

**Words, Substance, War: The Rhetorical Constitution of Iraq's Combined Security
Mechanism**

By

Melvin W. Hall

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

(English)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN – MADISON

2013

Date of final oral examination: 12 June 2013

The dissertation is approved by the following members of the Final Oral Committee:

Michael Bernard-Donals, Professor, English

Morris Young, Professor, English

Christa J. Olson, Assistant Professor, English

David Fleming, Professor, English, University of Massachusetts – Amherst

Robert Glenn Howard, Professor, Communication Arts

Colonel Michael W. Bowers, U.S. Army

© Copyright by Melvin W. Hall 2013
All Rights Reserved

Dedication

To Dad, Mom, Kurt, Lisa, Kathryn, Dennis and my Grandparents

The Word carries us from one generation to the next.

Contents

Acknowledgments.....	vi
Abbreviations	vii
Introduction: Dramatistic Participation.....	1
A Note on the Dissertation’s Textual Ecology	38
Map A: The Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq	45
The Historical and Constitutional Struggle of Northern Iraq (Scene) and the Combined Security Mechanism (Act).....	46
Words: The Fog of Symbols and The Fog of War.....	56
The Paradox of Substance and The Paradox of Constitutions.....	73
The CSM Constitutive Act in The Agonistic Conversation	93
Research Methodology: Measuring the Rhetorical Constitution of the CSM	100
Dramatism: A Research Methodology.....	101
Primary Research and Fieldwork – Source of Data.....	121
Sorting, Ordering, and Interpreting the Data	127
Dial’s Combined Security Mechanism: Five Combined Checkpoints' Featured Constitutional Terms	131
Map B: Diyala Mutually Claimed Region	135
Checkpoint 1: Featuring Scene-Purpose.....	136
Checkpoint 2: Featuring Agent-Purpose / Agent-Agency	148
Checkpoint 3: Featuring Agency-Agent	159
Checkpoint 4: Featuring Local Scene-Agent.....	169
Checkpoint 5 and Conclusion: Featuring Scene-Agent / Scene-Act	179
Kirkuk's Combined Security Mechanism: The Dramatistic Struggle to Forge a Constitutional Myth.....	187

Constitutional Myth and God-Term.....	195
Map C: The City of Kirkuk.....	212
Kirkuk the God-Term and Image of Ethnic-Nationalism.....	213
ESU Shurta and Constitutional Myth	226
Agent-Purpose (The Constitutional Myth)	228
Agent-Counteragent (Parties)	234
Agent-Scene (Geo-Political).....	240
Agent-Scene (Economics)	250
Conclusion	253
Ninewa's Combined Security Mechanism: The Dramatism of <i>Constitutional Dissociation</i>	259
Map D: Ninewa Mutually Claimed Region	266
Map E: Mosul Mutually Claimed Region.....	267
.....	267
Dramatism's Hierarchies of Merger and Division - The Methodology of Constitutional Dissociation.....	268
Ninewa CSM's Dramatized Hierarchy of Scene-Agent Ratios	287
Conclusion	315
Epilogue: Diplomacy and Dramatism	319
Coda: Force, Poet-Soldier, and the “Aesthetic Reconstruction of Struggle”	330
Historical Documents, Timelines, CSM Description, and Short Analysis	345
Appendix A: CSM Declaration of Principles (English/Arabic)	346
Appendix B: CSM - 12 Guiding Principles	348
Appendix C: 20th Century Monarchy, Military Rule and Military Coups D'état in Iraq...	350
Appendix D: 20th and 21st Century Iraqi Constitutions	352

Appendix E: History of Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq Related to Creation of Combined Security Mechanism.....	353
Appendix F: Transitional Administrative Law, Article 58 and Iraqi Constitution, Article 140	359
Appendix G: Matrix of Iraqi Cultural Complex	361
Appendix H: Blank Creative Movie “We Will Write the Constitution Again.”	362
Appendix I: ESU's Candle of Idealism Still Burns Strong - A Kirkuk ESU's Constitutional Act (Attempt) to Purify War and Conflict	363
Appendix J: Combined Security Mechanism Basic Description	365
Appendix K: ESU's Terms of Militia, Backbone, Shakāwa (شقاوة), Tinted Windows, and Punishment.....	377
Appendix L: The Only Thing We Get From This Oil Is Smoke	382
Appendix M: Survey of Burkean Literature and Interdisciplinary Influence.....	388
Appendix N: Question Set and Semi-Structured Interviews	395
Bibliography	406
Works by Kenneth Burke.....	406
Works Cited and Consulted	407
Literature Review of Burkean Studies in <i>Rhetoric Review</i> and <i>Rhetoric Society Quarterly</i> for Introduction and Appendix M.....	410
History of Iraq.....	412

What is your substance, whereof are you made?
That millions of strange shadows on you tend?

William Shakespeare, Sonnet 53

Revolution thus ran its course from city to city . . . Words had to change their ordinary meaning
and to take that which was now given them.

Thucydides, *History of The Peloponnesian War*

Acknowledgments

This dissertation is the culmination of effort made and support given by a great many people in a variety of disciplines and professions. It is a testament to academic and military partnership in pursuit of the understanding human conflict. First, I want to thank the Officers and Soldiers of the U.S. Army and the 4th Infantry Division for their support and encouragement while conducting primary research for the 4th Infantry Division in Iraq. During primary research, Battalions and Brigades as well as individual Soldiers and Officers in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa provided security, transportation, and hospitality while I conducted interviews throughout the communities of Iraq's Combined Security Mechanism. I met and worked with many exemplary, selfless, and brave American soldiers throughout the primary research. I am still amazed and always will be with the Herculean task they undertook to bridge the differences of two traditional rivals. American Soldiers and Officers were charged with fostering a sense of unity and community where a nation's leaders and politicians struggled to do so.

I want to thank the 4th Infantry Division's officers who commissioned the primary research and supported it until completion. Specifically, accolades go to the G5 and G9 officers and non-commissioned officers. They helped plan and support the mission until it was complete, asked tough questions, and integrated social-science research in their conversations. The officers and soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division taught a civilian academic about the best of the men and women of the U.S. Army.

I want to thank the translators I worked with in the field, both Kurdish and Arabic. I refrain from mentioning their names in keeping with standard policy regarding the protection of sources and translators. However, they know who they are and their dedication and support was tremendous.

I want to thank Scott Zillmer and Rob McCaleb with XNR Productions in Madison, Wisconsin for their hard work, skill, and artistry in creating the maps that appear in this dissertation. I learned a tremendous amount about the process of cartography, and they made it easy for me to communicate my ideas. They provided wonderful and detailed maps to bring out the geographic nuances of the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. They taught me the capabilities of maps to tell a complete story.

Finally, I want to thank my dissertation advisor, Michael Bernard-Donals for his indefatigable support, reading, and suggestions while conducting this dissertation's secondary analysis. And I must thank Professors David Fleming, Marty Nystrand and Deb Brandt for shaping my scholarly career as a rhetorician.

Abbreviations

Works by Kenneth Burke

- ATH** *Attitudes toward History*
GM *Grammar of Motives*
PC *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*
PLF *The Philosophy of Literary Form*
RM *Rhetoric of Motives*
RR *Rhetoric of Religion*

Combined Security Mechanism and Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq

- CSA** Combined Security Area
CSF Combined Security Force
CSM Combined Security Mechanism
ESU Emergency Security Unit
GOI Government of Iraq
IA Iraqi Army
KRG Kurdish Regional Government
MCR Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq
NCO Noncommissioned Officer
OIC Officer in Charge
RGB Regional Guard Brigade

Introduction: Dramatistic Participation

The following dissertation applies Kenneth Burke's dramatistic theory and methodology to examine the complex motives behind human conflict and war. Specifically, it applies dramatism to disclose the paradoxical and sometimes contradictory motives and identities of Iraqi Army and Kurdish *Peshmerga* soldiers working side by side at the combined checkpoints of Iraq's Combined Security Mechanism (CSM), a large-scale *rhetorical act* which attempts to overcome ethnic-nationalist rivalries in Northern Iraq by *constituting* a shared *identity* (a shared motivation) between Iraqi Army and Kurdish *Peshmerga* soldiers.

Already, we can see an incongruous method or perspective applied to analyze a *security mechanism* when we name it a “rhetorical act,” a term often confined among the general public, analysts, and scholars to “literary concerns,” or even “political analysis of speeches and policy.” This is so because in our highly scientific, efficient, statistical, and mechanized world we tend to operate with trained incapacities; we are used to framing our international and national conflicts in political, sociological, economic, conflict studies, anthropological, psychological, and logistical terms. Indeed, by an act of *naming* not only do we (narrow) imply an entire method of analysis (most often statistical), we (narrow) shape a conflict's identity and motivational essence – constitute its reality. Selecting a term (even a disciplinary one) is a rhetorical act that selects a reality by “reducing” human motivation and life to the particular terms of a discipline and thus that particular discipline's solutions. As Robert Wess puts it, “One must choose one's reduction, and in doing so, one constructs one's reality. There is no truth of motives” (*Kenneth Burke*, 150 and 116). In essence, we see our world through language. Language is our human terrain and provides us with the vantage points and grounds from which to observe our “situations” and

devise our “strategies.” By selecting a name for a problem, we supply our motives and methods for its study. And Burke persistently admonishes us to take care when choosing our terms (our reductions) because those terms will motivate our thinking, research methods, and *dictate* acts to follow.

In this introduction, I explain my motivations for studying the Combined Security Mechanism as a “rhetorical act.” In essence, I answer the question why name the CSM a rhetorical act and what advantage does Burke’s dramatism give us for studying such a complex political and military mechanism. To answer this two part question, I situate this study within the field of rhetorical studies, briefly explain the advantages of dramatism for studying human conflict and motivation (situate the study in the contingent events of Northern Iraq), and provide an outline for the dissertation which in itself provides a more complete answer by demonstration. As I progress through these three stages, I hope to show that Burke’s dramatism is the analytical tool of tools to be used to study complex human conflicts which in their essence are conflicts of identity and identification grounded in language. Before proceeding, it is important to define this dissertation’s originating and organizing term – rhetorical act.

Rhetoric is the study of the cognitive and expressive *forms* that hold a society and culture together or rend it apart (Weaver, *The Cultural Role of Rhetoric*, 62).¹ In Burke’s terms, rhetoric is the study of “identification,” and identification is the repetition of *form* (*GM* 227-32). A study of *forms* and identification (of whatever kind) is necessarily *aesthetic* in essence because repeated forms that hold communities together do so by *appeal* – persuasive power to enthrall and exert a compelling force of attraction (Burke, *RM*, 65-29, 81 and Gadamer, *Truth*, 481-491).

¹ Also see Burke’s “Psychology and Form” and “Lexicon Rhetoricæ” in *Counter Statement* 29-44 and 123-183.

And *acts*, as Burke tells us, – borrowing from the scholastic realists - are *ontological forms* (Brock, “Dramatism as Ontology or Epistemology,” 22-24). A rhetorical act is the repetition of a symbolic form that creates the identifications by which socio-political groups sustain their associations *or* sunder their associations (create new forms). Rhetorical acts appear in every facet of a community’s cultural and socio-political life. Symbolic forms are manifest in clothes, patterns of speaking, narratives, poetry, body language, architecture, tools, machines, seasonal patterns (planting and sowing), holidays, strategies, legal systems, institutions, bureaucracies, biological patterns, bodily physiology, from the most minute cultural forms to the largest *ad infinitum*. To stress the point, rhetorical acts (as today’s common idiom would have it) are not *confined* to art (in its limited definition), ornamentation, or blandishments. Even the most “objective” or “scientific” action has an inherent *appeal* – is an expressive form of identification, as Burke states in *Rhetoric of Motives* when he discusses “‘Administrative’ Rhetoric in Machiavelli:”

The nonverbal, or nonsymbolic conditions with which both lover and ruler must operate can themselves be viewed as a kind of symbolism having persuasive effects. For instance, military force can persuade by its sheer “meaning” as well as by its use in actual combat. In this sense, nonverbal acts and material instruments themselves have a symbolic ingredient. The point is particularly necessary when we turn to the rhetoric of bureaucracy, as when a political party bids for favor by passing measures popular with large blocs of voters. In such a case, administrative acts themselves are not merely “scientific” or “operational,” but are designed also with an eye for their *appeal*. (161)

My point (and Burke’s) is that rhetorical acts (*aesthetic forms*) run through and through a socio-political community, and these cognitive and expressive forms hold a community together by

expressing its essence or *quiddity* and providing *motives* for repeated acts – the sustainment of the political association.

To put it another way, *all* human behavior is rhetorical and symbolic (aesthetic). In this sense, rhetoric contains all aspects of human's symbolic life. Even so called "objective" points of view ($e^{i\pi} - 1 = 0$ or $E = mc^2$) have rhetorical appeal as mathematical, cultural, and socio-political form. In a sense, every act (form) is an identification. Non-verbal (or even non-symbolic) objects exert rhetorical force (aesthetic appeal) through their forms. And rhetoric is the study of how human's cognitive and expressive forms come to be and come to *mean*. In a very Aristotelian manner rhetoric's foundational question is what is the *cause* of human's expressive forms and motivations? How do these forms and motives come into existence? This question is most completely answered by rhetoric (because of its interdisciplinary nature and focus on language and symbols) and Burke's dramatism. Today's "New" Rhetoric, the study of the rhetorical *act*, is founded on Burke's definition of a human as a "symbol using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal" ("Definition" 16).

The Combined Security Mechanism as a rhetorical act, then, is an attempt to enact an aesthetic form that establishes an identification that would hold the Iraqi Army and Kurdish *Peshmerga* soldiers together as one security force. The CSM, even with all of its "operational," "mechanistic," "engineering," and "bureaucratic" elements, is in essence a rhetorical act of appeal (an argument) to the soldiers working at the combined checkpoints and (most importantly) an appeal to the Iraqi people of various rival ethnicities. It is a symbolic form and image (a temporizing of essence) that allows Iraqis to observe the image of their common ground, shared identity, and motivation in action (Burke, *RM*, 21). Paradoxically it is also an

image of the Iraqi people's divisions. The CSM, a military and political *mechanism*, is a rhetorical act with aesthetic appeal; it can "persuade by sheer 'meaning,'" or presence. The two soldiers (Arab and Kurdish) standing side by side embody the CSM's aesthetic form. The CSM is a work of poetry as much as it is an engineering structure or political mechanism. The question remains, however, how does one study the creation of such rhetorical acts (forms) and identifications, especially one as enormous and complex as Iraq's CSM? It is one thing to say what a thing is but it is quite another to describe how it comes into being and how it works. The answer to this question is Kenneth Burke's dramatism which I now turn to introduce with some help from colleagues in the field.

Burke developed a comprehensive system to analyze human motives and rhetorical form/identification culminating in *Grammar of Motives* and *Rhetoric of Motives*. The interdisciplinary theory Kenneth Burke developed to study and analyze the formation of identity (group and individual) and the motives for human acts is *dramatism*. Our field over the last ten years has had somewhat of a Burkean revival with over thirty articles devoted exclusively to Burke's theory appearing in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* and *Rhetoric Review*. And, by my count, at least nine monographs dealing with Burke have been published over the last twelve years.² Of the thirty or more articles, twenty-two are historical/biographical or conceptual exegesis of Burke's theories and key dramaturgic terms. Six of the articles apply a key Burkean term to

² There are no doubt more monographs and more articles. In reviewing the issues of *Rhetoric Review* and *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, I searched for articles with Burke in the title or key Burkean terms in the title. I also used these article's own bibliographies as a resource. I may have missed one or two (or more). The on-line *KB Journal* has an enhanced bibliography that sorts articles by journal title and date. I noticed that the last article appearing for *Rhetoric Review* is Jeff Pruchnic's "Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the Work of the Body in Burke's Body of the Work" in 2006. And the same bibliography had only three articles related to Burke published in *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. So my bibliographic work augments that found on the *KB Journal*, at least to my knowledge. I believe I have covered most if not all of the articles published in these two journals in the last ten years.

analyze an historical event, scholarly debate, or a person's or leader's speeches or poetry. Of the nine books, seven are historical or conceptual exegesis. Two monographs apply Burke's dramaturgical theory to problems of human identity. It is safe to say that within Rhetoric and Composition, the field has taken an historical and hermeneutical turn in order to more fully develop a comprehensive Burkean theory of human relations and establish a research paradigm for scholars who follow.³

Among the field's critical conversations, there is one relatively small discussion begun, I believe, by Robert Wess who has paved the way for a complete theoretical and methodological paradigm for applying Burkean dramaturgism to understand human socio-political conflicts. Wess and the few other scholars I discuss below draw our attention to four key Burkean terms that summarize dramaturgism's method for understanding *the cause* of human acts (forms), motives, and identification. The four terms are constitution, conversation, agon/conflict, and literal. In Wess' article "Burke's Dialectic of Constitutions," and again in his comprehensive study of dramaturgism, *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, and Postmodernism*, he reminds (perhaps gently chastises for not reading Burke close enough) rhetorical scholars that the foundational concept of dramaturgism is not "identification" or even the "the pentad" *per se*. As useful as the pentad is as an analytical tool and as useful as identification is as a charismatic term uniting rhetoric and communication scholars in agreement that identification is what human relations are all about, it is Burke's summational term and anecdote *constitution* that undergirds Burke's entire methodology for understanding the cause of human identification and acts (forms).

³ For a more complete survey of the literature and bibliography, please see "Appendix M: Survey of Burkean Literature and Interdisciplinary Influence."

Wess writes, “In [the field’s] secondary literature that has developed. . . ‘The Dialectic of Constitutions’ has been further marginalized. . . [which] is especially surprising when one considers how Burke goes out of his way in *GM* itself to call attention to its seminal role in the book’s genesis” (*Rhetoric, Subjectivity, and Postmodernism* 137 - 38). Wess’ book length explication of dramatism, read in dialogue with postmodern theorists, provides a substantial corrective to a methodological oversight – an oversight that Burke complained about to prominent Burke scholar William H. Rueckert because he felt it caused misinterpretations of dramatism (138). *Constitution* is important to the study of human relations, acts, and identification because it recognizes the fluidity of human identity and motivation and places *act* as the purpose of human language and symbols. As Wess notes, “the transformative power” of the term constitution is one of its most important features (142). In Chapter 2, I provide a full explanation of dramatist methodology, so it suffices here to quote from Burke to summarize the relationship between constitution, form, identification, and motive:

Men's conception of motive . . . is integrally related to their conception of substance. Hence, to deal with problems of motive is to deal with problems of substance. And a thing's substance is that whereof it is constituted. Hence a concern with a substance is a concern with the problems of constitutionality. (*GM* 337- 38)

Substance can be read as synonymous with “identity” or “identification,” the enactment of a form or *essence*. And according to the theory of dramatism, human identities and identifications are in a constant state of flux. A constitution is the *formal cause* of identity.⁴ Constitutions, as symbolic acts momentarily fix identity and motive in place (order terms, principles and priorities

⁴ For Burke’s own description of Aristotle’s four causes related to the pentad’s *act*, see *Grammar of Motives* page 228). The formal cause fits with act. A constitution, however, like language itself, in keeping with the paradox of substance can in fact share the identity of all four Aristotelian causes. And a constitution can have the essence of all five pentadic terms. It can be a scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose.

of reality – enacting dramatism’s pentadic ratios). Constitutions give a socio-political group’s and individual’s substance symbolic and verbal *form*. Which brings us to the importance of *conversation* to dramatism.

Out of what is this constitutive act and form (identity) produced? Simply put, human’s conversations are the material cause of their constitutions. Humans constitute themselves by verbal placement in conversation with other humans; the “ritual drama” of creating forms (identification) is located in conversation (Burke, *PLF*, 103 and 110). It is in dialogue and conversation that humans *select their constitutive terms* and in selecting their terms they give form to their individual and group identities; they select and create their reality. As is easily imagined, ordering and fixing terms in place is no easy matter. It is the act of *naming* a thing, describing its *quiddity* and making it stick. Take for example the dispute over land in Northern Iraq. Kurds name the land “Kurdish,” and Arabs name the land “Arab,” and the CSM would strive to name it *Iraqi*. Just as the *constitution* of national identities shifts in conversation (what we call diplomacy and politics) so do our individual identities and motives. Observing and keeping track of constitutional fluidity (and its tautological nature) is a significant theoretical and methodological problem. Burke, however, devised a calculus for observing and tracing the constitutional flux of identification and form – the pentad. Wess makes the link for scholars between dramatism’s constitution and the pentad writing that “the pentad and the constitution coalesce in ‘The Dialectic of Constitutions,’ where Burke uses the pentad to lay out a terminology of motivation featuring ‘act,’ as its key term” (181). Again, in Chapter 2, I provide a complete explication of dramatism that unites constitution with the pentad (scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose), so I want to dwell for a moment on the importance of conversation in

general to human relations as a way of conceptualizing the CSM as a *statement* (rhetorical and symbolic act) made in a national and international conversation.

It seems that humans are so immersed in conversation (our symbolic, linguistic, and verbal worlds) that we are often not conscious of our conversations – our symbolicity. Perhaps this is like not really being conscious of the air we breathe until it gets cut off. Or, perhaps, it is like a fish who is not so much aware of water as never before as when it is out of it. For humans, defined as symbol using animals, not to be *a part* of the conversation is to be *apart* from society. For added emphasis to the importance of conversation to human relations, I want to draw on the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s writing about the narrative unity of life in *After Virtue*. In his chapter “Virtues, Unity of Life, and Concept of Tradition,” MacIntyre places the ultimate motive for human actions and formation of individual character in narrative *form* or *genre* (211). And the answer he gives to what *material* the narrative form or genre is made is *conversation*. He writes:

The most familiar type of context in and by reference to which speech-acts and purposes are rendered intelligible is the conversation. Conversation is so all-pervasive a feature of the human world that it tends to escape philosophical attention. Yet remove conversation from human life and what would be left?
(210)

MacIntyre goes on to claim that our conversations take *narrative form*. However, he does not work out a method for analyzing conversations as *forms* or *acts*. Burke with his dramatic method (and as a literature scholar reading widely in sociology, psychology, anthropology, theology, philosophy, and law only to name a few branches of Burkean thought) did work out a calculus for observing and analyzing conversations’ rhetorical (narrative) nature. What MacIntyre names as *narrative* Burke names *constitution* – the actualization of a *form* and *genre*.

Burke in fact corrects and significantly adds to MacIntyre's use of narrative (which is beyond the scope of this introduction to explain). However, what is important to this dissertation is the wide scope that MacIntyre gives to conversation which is quite similar to Burke's own use of conversation. MacIntyre writes that conversation – in its narrative *forms* – encompasses all modes of human life and interaction, such as “battles, chess games, courtships, philosophy seminars, families at the dinner table, businessmen negotiating contracts – that is, of human transactions in general. For conversation, understood widely enough, is the form of human transactions in general” (211).

The similarities and differences between MacIntyre's and Burke's theories are important but have to wait to be fully analyzed for another time and separate article.⁵ They do agree on conversation as the ultimate ground of human's socio-political life. And the point I am making here is that not only is conversation overlooked (as both the material *and* formal cause of human symbolic life), but we often don't think of *security mechanisms* as statements made (rhetorical and symbolic acts) in a larger *international* diplomatic and political *conversation*. And, as Burke

⁵ A significant difference between MacIntyre and Burke is that for MacIntyre, narrative contains conversation. For Burke, however, the conversation contains narrative, supplying narrative with its “material” which is what allows for transformation. There is always a steady flow of new material for a narrative to change. MacIntyre alludes to conversation as being ultimate context but later seems to privilege narrative (*After Virtue* 210-15). I believe this is so because MacIntyre takes his cues from J.L. Austin's speech act theory. Wess helps to make the distinction between Austin and Burke. He writes, “Burke's act is constitutive; Austin's confirmative” (*Rhetoric, Subjectivity, Postmodernism* 139). Applying this theoretical paradigm to MacIntyre who is concerned with the *constitution* of tradition and “unity of life,” we see that for MacIntyre the point of conversation is to *conform* to a narrative or genre. For Burke, however, the conversation is constantly in transformation reconstituting itself and transforming the narratives themselves. The point of the conversation is to *create* and constitute the appropriate narrative genre to fit the current circumstance. Wess sums up Burke's conversational paradigm this way: “The unending middle of this unending conversation is postmodernist insofar as it swallows the “grand narratives” *PC* and *ATH* offer with their histories. . . . In other words, the grand narrative attempt to encompass history becomes an act in a historical process that cannot be encompassed narratively” (132). In short, we constitute and reconstitute ourselves in conversation. Conversation destroys narrative form preparing the way for the constitution and reconstitution of new narrative forms (acts and identifications). Previously established narratives are, in Burke's pentadic paradigm, the “scene” that implies the quality of future acts – one element of the larger dramatistic conversation. In fact, this is what is wrong with current popular uses of narrative to describe (usually an opponent's) ideological position or motive. Narratives are treated as the ultimate ground. They are not. The conversation is the ultimate ground of human motives.

notes, our conversations necessarily take *dramatistic form* synopsisized in the ephemeral order and fixity of pentadic terms (*GM* 56). The strategy MacIntyre is looking for in order to disclose the *cause of* narrative and conversation (human, identity, form and motives) is Burke's dramatism. As Wess succinctly puts it "The conversation is the fundamental object that dramatism theorizes" (133). And if this is the case, we should be able to apply dramatism to observe and apprehend the essence and identity of the CSM's combined checkpoint communities by participating in the soldiers' *conversations* who work and live there and by inserting ourselves in the larger historical and international conversation of which the CSM is but one voice making an argument and selection of reality.

I am anticipating, however, and need to circle back on the discussion of conversation before taking up the topic of *applying* dramatism. Another important aspect of dramatism that is often overlooked in the Rhetoric and Composition field – but that Wess and Debra Hawhee attempt to correct – is that dramatism is an agonistic theory that admits the militant and violent nature inherent in language. So although we may be discussing human acts as poetry, narrative, or constitution (the actualization of an identity and form), we decidedly do not mean for these terms to connote an idealized state of being devoid of material consequence, pain, or suffering. In fact, we mean quite the opposite as Burke himself summarizes the point, "Indeed, all life has been likened to the writing of a poem, though some people write their poems on paper, and others carve theirs out of jugular veins" (*PM* 76). The *expressive forms* that hold a society together (or tear it apart) can be agonistic and/or deadly, either acutely or in protracted form.⁶

⁶ See Richard Weaver's excellent treatment of the violent nature of poetic/ aesthetic form on a societal level in his essays "Forms and Social Cruelty," and "Dialectic on Total War." In addition, Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" begins to provide a psychological basis for repetitions of trauma, or the taking of pleasure in the reliving

Debra Hawhee, in “Burke and Nietzsche,” states that one of her aims in analyzing Nietzsche’s influence on Burke’s theories of “orientation,” and “perspective by incongruity,” is to “trouble his status as our favorite humanist” (131). Indeed, Hawhee makes a trenchant argument that Burke, *via* Nietzsche, recognizes the agon of human’s conversation as an arena in which human’s struggle, compete, and cooperate to fix (constitute) individual and group identities. She stresses that Burke’s perspectival theories, and I would add dramatism’s in general, assume that language has an inherent *entelechi*al force impelling humans to enact and actualize an identity’s “perspective” (132, 134, and 139). So each selection of reality (term) in our human conversation sets the stage for a confrontation with other selections of reality – *weltanschauung* vs. *weltanschauung* as I will discuss in Chapter 1 as pieties to symbol systems. A terministic selection of reality *impels* us on our way; when we name a situation, we become the character that fits that situation (scene-agent). One of Burke’s foundational and theoretical assumptions, then, is that language has *entelechi*al force that leads to tragic ways of acting and thus knowing. Hawhee writes that “Burke conveyed a sense that humans are sick with purpose, struggling towards action” (137). She goes on to add that Burke would name this linguist and symbolic force (the desire to actualize an identity in competition with other identities) “the tragic mechanism.” I will return to Burke’s concept of the tragic mechanism in the dissertation’s conclusion. However, we will see hints of it throughout the dissertation’s chapters.

For now, my focus is on the importance of language’s and the dramatisitic conversation’s latent agonism and militarism. Hawhee succinctly summarizes agonism as foundational to Burke’s theories:

of traumatic events – a stylization of violence (physical or emotional) in aesthetic form. And there is Burke’s own essay, “Form and Persecution in the *Oresteia*.”

Following Nietzsche, Burke asserted that all cultural activity is founded upon warlike patterns, that the teacher, the inventor, the scientist, and the explorer all engage in warfare to a certain degree. Further, he wrote, “These militaristic patterns may sometimes have bad results, sometimes good, but all cultural activity as we know it is erected upon them (*PC* 198).” (Burke 137)

For Burke, human’s selection of terms – the choice of a perspective – is poetic, ethical, and agonistic. And it pervades all aspects of human’s symbolic life. Constitutionally, humans are faced with the “freedom” and “necessity” of choosing the terms whereby they select their realities and then must live with the consequences both peaceful and violent. Knowing is accomplished after the act (*GM* 84). Our symbol systems and verbal choices use us as much if not more than we use them. We will see a reciprocal “using” between humans and their symbols throughout the dissertation.

We can conclude that dramatism’s material – the conversation – is agonistic and fluid in nature (the terms of the conversation are never in a state of equilibrium or stasis) (*GM* 83 and *RM* 22). Humans constitute their *entelechi*al identities and identifications (forms) in what Wess calls “The rhetorical struggle of the cultural conversation” (150). Burke undergirds his dramatic theory and methodology with the agonistic principle – the constant flow, give and take of dialectic. He admonishes us to remember that although our forensic, diplomatic, judicial, and bureaucratic choice of means are peaceful these means are not in essence “peacefulness itself” (*GM* 370). He adds:

There is a real sense in which brute force is less thoroughly militant than poetry or philosophy, since its expression is so crude and superficial, and can only be said to go to the depths of a man because there is a stupid modern habit of thinking that a few easily aroused forms of fury and vengeance constitute the “depths” of mankind. . . By such crass simplifications, people are *emptied* rather than *filled* – and their wars are more like the clashes of

automata than the combat of men profoundly locked in a wrestling match that has an infinity of holds. (370-1)

Burke's point is that we should not be fooled into self-righteousness because we fight our battles with words (pens, diplomacy, negotiations, laws, development projects, the championing of democracy) or that the intentions and consequences of verbal and symbolic combat (pens, diplomacy, negotiations, laws, development projects – even the term democracy used as a weapon) to divide and pierce human souls are any less forceful and violent (lack material, psychological, and emotional consequence). It is not the material act of violence (the temporizing of an ideal intention) that is the only *sin* (if we allow ourselves to use a theological word here) but the idea (the fixing of a term and naming of a situation) that is the essence of violence. The verbal selection of a reality impels an act of violence or peace because it necessarily impels the desire to self-actualize a world in one's own image. The humbling truth is that our wars are a manifestation of a greater human logomachy; they are contained by an agonistic *conversation*, the cause of which is language (*RM* 23).⁷ Burke discloses the corollary to Carl von Clausewitz's famous definition that "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means" (*On War* 119). In a Burkean metonymic reversal, constitutions are the continuation of our wars by symbolic means. Constitutions are "the purification of war," the desire to actualize a form using symbolic means (language), war simply being the most violent material manifestation of agonistic conversations.⁸ A researcher participating in a community's conversations is not

⁷ Burke gets to the very bottom of the agonistic and violent nature of language in his famous "Prologue in Heaven" in which the agonism of violence might be said to be located in a single word that contains the dialogue of Satan and Christ.

⁸ Another important point is that a form's actualization is *real*. By symbolic act, Burke (and I) do not mean "illusion" or mere words. Burke's dramatism is a theory of "rhetorical realism," as it studies humans' acts (forms)

seeking to find the “elimination” of conflict but rather its continuation and impulse in the conversation. The relevance of this point will become clearer below when I discuss reading the CSM soldiers’ conversations *constitutionally*.

Burke names humans’ symbolic and dialectical cause of form dramatism. Dramatism in its most complete articulation – as Wess does in (re)linking constitution with the pentad (173-85) – is an exemplary method for observing, charting, and following the agonistic creation of form (identification) and motive (*PLF* 5-6 and Burke, “Freud,” 282-83).⁹ The brief review of Wess’ and Hawee’s dramatisitic scholarship, allows us to state that dramatism both defines the *cause* of cognitive and expressive forms (identity and identification) that hold a community together and provides a method for mapping human’s constitutional transformations. We can literally watch human forms (identification) take shape, dissolve, and reshape in a community’s agonistic conversation. In doing so, we can chart motives for acts. Wess by stressing the importance of dramatism as a holistic methodology – constitution, pentad, and conversation – paves the way for its application in the field. And when Hawhee and Wess stress dramatism’s agonistic, militaristic, and transformative nature, they set researchers’ expectations for its use. The researcher is not necessarily looking for *fixed* forms and identities – *an essentialized structuralism* at peace. The pentad is not a set of positive terms but rather a set of contending dialectic questions and forms (answers) always in transformation. As Wess puts it, dramatism’s

that give meaning and appeal to life (Burke, *GM*, 227-35, *PLF* 8, and Wess 19, 167-75). Wess applies the term “rhetorical realism” to describe dramatism.

⁹ Bryan Crable in “Burke’s Perspective of Perspectives: Grounding Dramatism in the Representative Anecdote,” links the pentad more generally to Burke’s concept of the representative anecdote (without discussing constitution) and defends “dramatism’s claim to superiority in the study of human motives” by linking the pentad to a community’s representative anecdote, which I read as a constitutive anecdote or god-term, the ultimate frame of a community’s constitution (328).

pentad allows us to see the rules of the game being changed while playing the game (*Kenneth Burke* 38, 139, and 145). The researcher is looking for *competing*, shifting, and *changing* forms and identities. And the researcher is looking to participate *in* these constitutional conversations. The expectation is that there will be multiple and competing identities at stake. And by the choice of *naming* (verbal placement and selection of reality) humans *act* and create the scene that will imply the kind and quality of their future acts.

Burkean scholarship has not only stressed the importance of conversation and constitution to dramatism, it has also stressed that dramatism is *literal*. This means that dramatism is not a *metaphor*, such as “life is like a drama on a stage,” and that humans play out an illusion by assuming roles. It means that humans do *in fact* utilize language dramatically. The pentad is universal. As Wess puts it “If the pentadic terms are, as Burke remarks at one point, ‘the necessary forms of talk about experience,’ then all of us speak pentadese (“Burke’s Dialectic” 17). Clark Rountree in “Revisiting the Controversy over Dramatism as Literal,” stresses this point. He writes that “For Burke there is no escaping scene, agent, agency, purpose, or act; whatever is being done, the grammar is implicated both in interpreting motives and in ‘say[ing] what people are doing and why they are doing it’ (*Grammar xv*)” (web).

Rountree goes on to add that Burke told him that scholars did not utilize the pentad enough when interpreting motives (web). The importance of this should not be overlooked. Burke asserts that no matter what conversation humans are having (from small one-on-one conversations, to academic, to international conflicts, legal, economic, philosophy, bar room, and wars) the pentadic “forms of thought” are present; literally, language is dramatism (*GM xv*). And the pentad is the pliable substance from which all human conversations, acts, forms, and

identities are *constituted*. As such, it is also a *tool* that can be applied to conversations to understand human conflict, because the pentad provides a calculus for understanding the creation of the cognitive and expressive forms that hold a society together. As will be demonstrated in the dissertation's chapters, we can literally view the shift of CSM soldiers' identities and motives with verbal placement. The pentad is Burke's method for observing and making clear the ambiguities of constitutional acts (*GM* xix). Most importantly, dramatism is literal. It is the final and ultimate ground of human relations and motives.

Recently, two scholars have responded to Wess' admonishment to focus more closely on the importance of dramatism's summational anecdote to analyze transformation of individual identity and the creation of group (national) identity. Dana Anderson, for instance, in *Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversation*, develops a theory of constitutive rhetoric to disclose the transformation of individual identities. Through a close reading of Burke's "Dialectic of Constitutions," Anderson generates a rhetorical methodology to trace and observe the transformation of identity in *conversion* narratives, perhaps the most radical kind of identity transformation, when A becomes B, such as Saul's conversion to Paul. To develop his rhetorical methodology Anderson focuses on Burke's concepts of god-term and circumference as well as constitutions' volitional and necessitarian principles (47-54). Anderson explains that the tension between volitional and necessitarian principles of constitutional identity create the agon that individuals must contend with in *substantiating* their identities (50-51). Anderson then applies his methodology to examine three prominent figures' conversion narratives (autobiographies) disclosing the agonistic constitution of their identities (conversion) through verbal placement – the selection of terms, constitutional wishes and necessitarian principles. As Anderson puts it, he

wants to develop a method for revealing the “interplay” between identity as “a matter of choice [and] a matter of acceptance” (9).

Gregory Clark in *Rhetorical Landscapes in America: Variations on a Theme from Kenneth Burke* applies Burkean theory to analyze how features of the American landscape constitute a shared national identity “that has the power to shape beliefs and actions in ways that unify them with one community as they divide them from another” (4). Clark’s focus is on the ways landscape (a non-symbolic object) is imbued with symbolic meaning. He nicely sums up his project and Burke’s conceptualization of landscape writing that “[for Burke] American history was propelled by the rhetorical power of land made symbol, a power that some wielded as others learned to read in the land particular claims about who they collectively were” (10). Clarke then analyzes the use of tourist guides, magazine descriptions, national parks (Yellowstone), automobile travel, and international exhibitions as uses of landscape to constitute a common national identity. It is in his chapter on the Panama-Pacific International Exhibition that he employs Burke’s “Dialectic of Constitution” to frame international exhibits as constitutional acts. Clarke argues that landscapes (the non-verbal) are given shared meaning through human symbol systems. The landscape becoming what Burke calls “a constitution-beneath-the-constitution,” an ultimate ground of shared meaning and identity (128). He later goes on to argue that world’s fairs are essentially “constitutions” because they “enact visions of an ideal collective future, and the visitors who inhabit them each take upon themselves, for a time, the myths enacted there of an ideal society and idealized identity within it” (130). Clarke’s description of the world’s fair as constitutive rhetoric is a definition I apply to understand the

CSM. Soldiers’ “inhabit” the checkpoint communities and attempt to take on the shared identity of those communities.

Both Anderson and Clarke, however, make no mention of the Burkean conversation or the pentad when developing their interpretive theories and explicating Burke’s constitutive rhetoric. So although they have heeded Wess’ and Burke’s admonishment to bring the dramatic principle of the dialectic of constitution to the fore in our field’s theorizing and use of dramatism, they drop the pentad from their discussions and methodological paradigms. They do not mention the pentad, in fact, as providing a constitution with its generative terms of placement and *v.v.* They perhaps overcorrect our field’s original error and commit the injustice of now ignoring the pentad. For that matter, *dramatism*, the term that contains both constitution and the pentad is left unmentioned in the development of their methodological paradigms. Constitutions, yes, are about the formation of identity, act, and forms (identification) but they are about the formation of identity *dramatically so*. That is, humans use the dialectical and verbal resources of the pentad to constitute and fix their identities. And they transform their constitutional identities by exploiting language’s pentadic resources for *naming* situations: scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose. Burke makes clear that both constitution and pentad work together; they are in fact one in the same thing: self-grounding. And Wess makes this clear writing that “the pentadic linguistic laws are executed in the constitutional act” (177).

I situate this dissertation within the conversation begun by Wess, Hawhee, and Rountree to conceptualize and apply dramatism using its holistic paradigm of constitution-pentad. It follows Anderson’s and Clarke’s efforts to use Burke’s constitutive rhetoric, and augments their efforts in that it attempts to provide an example of dramatism holistically applied. In addition,

the dissertation brings to the fore the importance of the “agonistic conversation” as dramatism’s material for study. Over the course of reviewing Burkean literature, various scholars might allude to Burke’s famous analogy of the parlor conversation (Brummett, Williams, Weiser), however, the importance of conversation is not stressed enough. Simply put, without conversation there would be no dramatism. The dissertation argues not only for the importance of conversation but demonstrates that one studies conversations by *participating in* conversations. Similar to Clifford Geertz admonishment that “social scientists don’t study villages; they study *in* villages,” rhetoricians don’t study conversations, they study *in* conversations (*Interpretation* 22). Hawhee notes that Burke calls this “ceaseless indwelling” (*Moving* 57). Rhetoricians must make themselves a part of a group’s conversation as much as possible in order to chart the agonism of constitutional formation, which brings me to Northern Iraq and the advantages of using dramatism to study the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM).

The CSM is a rhetorical act that is part of a larger historical and international conversation regarding Iraqi national and constitutional identity. As such, it is a constitutive act that attempts to forge an Iraqi identity that transcends ethnic differences (Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman). For the purposes of this introduction (See Appendix J for a full description of the CSM), it suffices to say that the CSM is a complex rhetorical act located in Iraq’s Mutually Claimed Region (See Maps A, B, C, and D). The CSM is one mechanism that spans three provinces with a total of twenty-two combined checkpoints: Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa. Each province’s mechanism has its own distinct identity. And each combined checkpoint within each province has its own unique identity. At each checkpoint, Iraqi Army and Kurdish *Peshmerga* soldiers (traditional rivals), with the help of the U.S. Army, attempted to constitute a unified

identity. Traditional rivals would become one security force collectively named the Combined Security Force or Golden Lions. The CSM would be, it was hoped, the image of a cooperative national identity and mechanism for national reconciliation. In short, the CSM was an argument and constitutive act made in a larger international and national conversation about the *constitution* (identity) of Iraq itself. It was part of the agonistic conversation of national and international politics situated in the conflict zone of Iraq's Mutually Claimed Region.

This dissertation grew out of research conducted for the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division throughout the CSM's twenty-two combined checkpoint communities, and it tests dramatism's rhetorical theories and methodology regarding the constitutional anecdote, the pentad, and the agonistic conversation. The question is what can dramatism tell us about such a complex rhetorical act and what can such a rhetorical act tell us about dramatism. The first answer to this question comes from research in the field of Iraq: Burke's pentad (dramatism in general) allowed for a simple treatment of complexity and paradoxes of substance and identity. His summational anecdote of constitution (including the pentad and conversation) proved to be ideal for simplifying without essentializing the identities and dynamics of the checkpoint communities. I originally framed the primary study of the checkpoint communities as one of collective ethos and trust. Yet how does one study ethos in a practical manner (again without essentializing). Burke's dramatism provides the method, and dramatism's emphasis on conversation provides an organizing term for the research. A researcher must participate in the conversation of each checkpoint community to understand the dynamics of the group's constitutional identity, motives, and paradoxes of substance.

I framed the conversations as a set of widening concentric circles similar to Burke's terms of circumference (*GM* 77-85). Each checkpoint community was the inner circle and core conversation. It was contained by the local community conversation in which it was located. And third, the checkpoint and local community were then contained by a much larger *historical* regional/national and international conversation. All of these conversations intersected at the checkpoints. Specifically, and most importantly, they intersected in the person and identity of each soldier. Each soldier and group of soldiers was/is, I considered, not only a participant in these many conversations simultaneously but is also *constituted* by these conversations in which he and the group was/is a participant. A soldier's identity and motive could change depending the conversation *he placed himself*. By recognizing that the soldiers would necessarily be negotiating multiple conversations, the research avoids essentializing the soldiers' motives and identities and instead reveals the agonistic conversations they participate in simultaneously. The CSM was one statement in a larger complex of conversations competing for the constitutional identity of Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers.

By talking and interacting with the soldiers, I would become a part of the soldiers' constitutive conversations. My goal as a researcher was to simply join the conversation. The constitutional terms of each community's identity and identification, then, would be present in their conversations. In other words, the soldiers' conversations would disclose clusters of pentadic ratios that would not only reveal their motivational grounds but paradoxes of substance and identity. I found theoretical inspiration not only in Burke but Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of conversation as well. We are the conversation that we have (*Truth* 383-400). The one place (*topoi*) in which we are always located no matter where we are geographically is language – the

conversation is the ultimate human terrain and geography. And, each soldier or group of soldiers would reveal in their conversations how their substance was shaped by the various conversations they were simultaneously a part of and embodied. They would give expression to competing *corporate* identities (Burke, “Twelve Propositions,” 243). In short, true to dramatic methodology, the agonistic conversation became the object of study for the research conducted in the field and the secondary analysis performed in this dissertation (Wess, *Kenneth*, 133).

So dramatism’s pragmatic benefit is to reduce the object of study to the soldier’s conversation which also includes their scene, agents (ideals) agency (tools), acts (forms and identity), purpose (mystical unities). In other words, their conversation also includes the ways in which their scenes and environments (non-verbal objects and other agents) contribute to their conversation’s meaning. Conversations are grounded in place. A researcher must *participate* in the conversation (situate him- herself in the *locus of enunciation*) and interact within the community to gain as full of an understanding as possible of the flux and dynamics of shifting identities and motives. I participated as much as possible by interacting with the soldiers and conducting casual semi-structured interviews (detailed in Chapter 2). As we know, however, by reducing the object of research to a conversation the irony is that the soldiers’ words contain and produce an entire complex of worlds (Feehan, “Oscillation,” 323). So, in the end, the reduction to conversation is an increase of understanding from multiple perspectives as soldiers’ conversations reveal their various complex worlds and contending motives (*weltanschauungen*, paradoxes of substance, and their own competing perspectives). The same is true of constitutions as verbal or symbolic acts; they reveal a complex of paradoxical and rival motives and identities (See Chapter 1). The CSM, itself a verbal and rhetorical act, is given meaning, that is *constituted*,

by the symbolic acts present in the soldiers' conversations.¹⁰ It is the rhetorician's task (and burden) to follow the network of contending verbal worlds and identities in each conversation – to see how “the pentadic laws” are manifest in the soldiers' everyday constitutive rhetoric (conversation).

Another pragmatic outcome from using the pentad is the avoidance of essentializing and oversimplification of complex and paradoxical human identities. In other words, dramatism makes an asset of ambiguity rather than trying to explain it away. Dramatism locates ambiguities and conflicts of identity and motive (*GM* xix). Dramatistic analysis of the checkpoints (conversations) can acknowledge that soldiers are getting along and also disclose counter motives that sunder the community. In other words, a soldier can maintain several motives (identities), cooperation and rivalry, simultaneously. Dramatism can also locate motives of cooperation not just in agents but the scene (environment), agency, (tools), and (purpose). For example, a soldier as agent may express an idealistic motive (identity) of cooperation and simultaneously express historical and scenic (identities) motives that imply actions of rivalry. It is the pentad's pliability (ability to disclose ambiguity) that leads to another important aspect of dramatism. It is inefficiently efficient and focuses on identity (identification) as a complex human act.

¹⁰ In the field, while in Northern Iraq, dramatism had another pragmatic benefit. I could read and sort the conversations using the pentad – the way Burke reads the schools of philosophy (human motivation) in *Grammar of Motives*. Large amounts of data could be summarized succinctly in pentadic terms (discussion points organized pentadically) on a single PowerPoint slide or several slides depending on the given needs. Under time constraints for analysis, simple pentadic analysis served well. It was an economic method for organizing data regarding a complex topic of study. But it was not a complete dramatistic analysis combining a constitutional reading or a pentadic reading using the ratios to analyze soldiers' conversations.

Burke labored his entire career to develop a method for analyzing human motives that countered the mechanistic, statistical, and efficient assembly line logics of modern science and industry - one grounded in rhetoric. Burke states:

I contend that social relations can be adequately interpreted not by physicalist or naturalistic terms but only by terms that treat experience as an “art,” hence drawing upon vocabularies of rhetoric, dramatic criticism, etc., (“men as poets, or at least as poetasters” – which I take to be more relevant than the “scientific” perspectives upon human life got from the description of machines or billiard balls or salivating dogs). . . . My point is, in sum, this. I take social relations to be essentially dramatic in nature. I thus take a discussion of them to be very much like dramatic criticism. (“Intuitive” 140)

Following through with Burke’s dramatistic methodology, as Hawhee argues, places a great burden on a scholar and researcher. She writes, “Burke’s model of artistic efficiency involves protracted engagement with material in order to know it thoroughly, intimately. As such, the slow, painstakingly careful version of artistic practice becomes a resistant counterpractice in the realm of mechanistic, out-put-focused, high-speed efficiency” (*Moving Bodies* 58).¹¹

Dramatism, in making an asset of ambiguity and paradox, as just described above, is an inefficient method if one’s goal is to come up with *one solution* or *one answer*. Or if one already has the answer(s) in mind that one wants, such as categories on surveys and polls. Dramatism, however, is quite efficient if a researcher wants to disclose the complexities and paradoxes that *cause* the formation of human identity and motives in a well-rounded way and if a researcher assumes that motives, identity, and acts are a complex *choice* – not simply a compulsory given

¹¹ Also see Jordynn Jack’s “Kenneth Burke’s Constabulary Rhetoric: Sociohistorical Critique in Attitudes Toward History” and Marika A Seigel’s “‘One Little Fellow Named Ecology’: Ecological Rhetoric in Kenneth Burke’s Attitudes Toward History” for an in-depth discussion of the genesis of Burke’s inefficient efficiency influenced by ecology and his work at the Bureau of Social Hygiene.

(PC 218-19). Dramatism, in theorizing identity as an act (a choice) necessarily requires a researcher to forego making the interlocutor's choice for him or her (by placing them in a category, such as statistical polls and surveys do) but to instead unpack all the available choices and verbal placements present in the agent's many agonistic conversations in which the interlocutor participates and expresses. The rhetorical and poetic agent provides his own categories, terms of order, and reasons. Unpacking these choices discloses a full range of current and future choices and possibilities – the ritual drama within an agent's conversation. Ultimately, it *humanizes* interlocutors as facing the same human paradoxes and dilemmas of substance, identity, and survival as all of us face – dramatism's "tragic mechanism." Instead of foisting an identity on interlocutors (Arab, Kurd, soldier, enemy, brother) and thereby making our own policy choices based on a very small part of our enemies' or friends' reality, dramatism allows us to see a full range of identities and realities available to an interlocutor.

Instead of an essentializing method, constitutional and pentadic analysis requires a *proportional* reading which places a burden on a researcher to read "identity" and "motive" not only from the perspective of each pentadic term (scene, agent, act, agency, purpose) and their ratios but constitutionally as a set of competing choices and wishes present in a complex of conversations (GM 380 and Wess, *Kenneth*, 19-20). Unlike polls, surveys, and current statistical analysis, dramatism does not reduce human identity or motive to a single statistical term or category; dramatism seeks *all* of a person's available terms *as they speak them and organize them in the moment*. A person's identity is constituted via a range of terministic choices and orders both of an agent's own making and those given to him or her by contingent circumstances (their scene).

This dissertation is a secondary constitutional and pentadic reading of the CSM soldiers' conversations in order to understand the CSM as a constitutional act that attempts to fix soldiers' motives and shared identity – make them consubstantial with a single unified purpose. Burke himself never performed a constitutional reading in his dramatic analysis of the schools of philosophy in *Grammar of Motives*. Furthermore, he performed a pentadic analysis that applied the terms not as ratios but individually. Wess provides a reason for Burke's own reduction of his methodology and a framework for the constitutional reading performed in this dissertation. Wess writes that "Connecting the pentad to the constitution more visibly would have required Burke to add to his pentadic reading of texts constitutional readings *situating them as acts in the conversation of their day*" [emphasis added] (177). Wess goes on to note that if Burke had done so, his book of five hundred pages would perhaps have become more enormous than Richardson's *Clarissa* at 1500 pages. So Burke had practical considerations for presenting a limited application of the pentad, similar to the practical considerations I had to contend with in the field which made simple pentadic readings the proper method of analysis for that moment's rhetorical situation.

In the secondary research I read the CSM as a constitutional act and the soldiers' conversations both constitutionally and pentadically, I situate the CSM in Iraq's historical constitutional conversation that begins for the purposes of this dissertation in 1918. As such, I consider the CSM a rhetorical act in the political "conversation of its day." For the purposes of economy, to avoid an overwhelmingly large dissertation, I rely on historical timelines which I present in the appendix. The timelines in the appendix should be read as historical conversations regarding the constitutional identity of Iraq and Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman ethnic groups.

The dissertation represents an interdisciplinary synthesis of Burkean dramatism, history, and a secondary analysis of ethnographic fieldwork to accomplish as complete a rhetorical (constitutional) analysis of the Combined Security Mechanism communities as possible. The dissertation's thesis regarding the CSM is that it is a rhetorical act and argument that attempts to establish the aesthetic form of an identity embodied in the soldiers that live and work at the checkpoints. As a rhetorical act in a larger constitutional conversation, the quality of the *act* was and is inevitably implied and shaped by Iraq's greater socio-historical constitutional conversation (scene), the agents (soldiers) and their ideals, their agency (tools, logistics, and means), and their shared and rival purposes (mystical unities and divisions). Dramatism resists *essentializing* the CSM act as taking on the *properties* and *qualities* of any one element of substance, motive, or identity. In the end, however, the dissertation shows that the CSM act, although maintaining its form (its aesthetic and narrative *appeal*) with the power and assistance of the U.S. Army, is inevitably swallowed and melted down by Iraq's greater agonistic constitutional conversation. The same paradoxes of substance and competing principles inherent in the Iraqi national constitution are inherent in the CSM soldiers' conversations about the CSM. The CSM becomes what Burke might call a "conspiratorial unity faction" and is absorbed in various ethnic groups' attempt to achieve their nationalist ends or defend their claims to the MCR territory (*RM* 139). In short, the soldiers working at the checkpoints struggle to maintain the CSM's constitutional form (identity). So despite its idealism (one Iraq), the historical and political scene, the soldiers' agency (institutions, logistics, and chains of command), counter-agents (political leaders of rival ethnic parties and other security units) and divergent purposes (rival ethnic nationalisms) sunder the CSM's ideal of *Iraqi* unity and identity. In the end, the meaning of the CSM act was, and

perhaps still is, being constituted and formed in an on-going agonistic conversation regarding the *entelechia* realization of contending ethnic nationalisms and symbolic kinds.

The dissertation's outcomes (thesis) regarding dramatism as a methodology is four-fold. The dissertation provides empirical evidence as to the "literalness" of the pentad and dramatism theory in general, 2) demonstrates the *universality* of the pentad as a pliable tool to be used in nearly every human situation for understanding motives, identity, and rhetorical form (aesthetic appeal), 3) demonstrates the importance of "constitution" to dramatism theory as an *everyday* and *primary* mode of human conflict, and 4) uses dramatism as Burke might have hoped it would be used – **linking the pentad to the constitution** – to assist scholars, analysts, and policy makers in understanding the dynamics of human conflict and conflict's poetic and symbolic origin. Burke's rhetorical constitution, pentad, agonistic conversation, and concept of symbolic action bridges the divide between the technocratic and humanist ways of understanding conflict and viewing the world. It is a heuristic method for understanding the *cause* of the cognitive and expressive forms that hold a society together or rend it apart. It discloses the paradoxes of identity and motive as it is being shaped in life's everyday agonistic conversation.

The dissertation follows a simple outline. Chapter 1 situates the CSM rhetorical act within Iraq's historical and constitutional conversation. The chapter provides a constitutional reading of Iraq's history based on Burke's theories and discussions of symbol systems, piety, the paradox of substance, and dialectical constitution. In addition, it synthesizes Burke's dialectical constitutionalism with theories of counterinsurgency. The two paradigms read together complete one another and emphasize Burke's own principle that constitutions contain a "militaristic ingredient." More specifically what Burke names a constitutional *wish* can be read as a

constitutional *grievance* from the perspective of counterinsurgency theory. Chapter 1 shows that constitutions are self-grounding (metonymical) rhetorical acts that inherently contain principles of their own dissolution. And, finally, by situating the CSM within Iraq's historical constitutional conversation, I lay the groundwork to understand the Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa security mechanisms as a rhetorical and constitutional act. It is by situating the CSM act in the historical conversation and "conversation of its day" that a constitutional analysis of the CSM by region can be performed (using the pentad) in the subsequent chapters. I use historical timelines available in the appendices as a record of Iraq's historical and constitutional conversations to help ground the chapter's and dissertation's analysis as a rhetorical act in a much larger conversation.

After the historical, political, and constitutional context is given, Chapter 2 describes in detail the dramatistic methodology used to analyze the CSM act and soldiers' conversations in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. I link constitution to the pentad, detailing four key principles of Burke's theory of rhetorical constitutions: 1) symbolic act, 2) agonistic instrument, 3) paradox of substance, and 4) self-generating (pentadic terms). The chapter stresses that for Burke and myself rhetoric is equipment for living. The soldiers' conversations are their *constitutional talk* and the poetry of their everyday lives. Through conversation, humans *act* and their poetic *acts* pervade every aspect of their lives and provide them with their motives. The chapter augments Aristotle's basic definition of a constitution. Aristotle writes that a "constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives" (*Politics* 266). Dramatism augments this definition to read that a state's constitution (or any socio-political group's constitution) is in a sense the way it lives and *talks*; the *linguistic* nature of humans' socio-political life is stressed. Humans use language to act.

Without it, they would just move. The chapter closes by detailing the method of analysis used in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 analyzes the Diyala CSM soldiers' conversations as discrete checkpoint communities. This chapter shows that each community featured a unique pentadic ratio in their conversations scene-purpose, agent-purpose, agency-agent, and scene-agent. In other words, although each community was part of the same mechanism, they expressed a unique constitutional identity based on the selection and ordering of the terms in their conversations. Whereas Chapter 1 illustrates dramatism's application on a large-scale historical and international level. Chapter 3 applies dramatism at a local and intimate level of each checkpoint. Taken together the chapter shows dramatism's scalability; it is universal and can be applied in any situation or scale to understand the formation of human identity and motive. The chapter concludes that the Diyala CSM is both a substantial success and a substantial failure – like any constitution. The chapter pinpoints those *topoi* (pentadic terms of placement and force) that pull the checkpoint community apart: divergent purposes, agencies, and Iraq's historical agonistic scene (conversation).

Chapter 4 analyzes Kirkuk's unique CSM. Kirkuk is considered the "epicenter" of the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq and has its own historical context. To perform a constitutional as well as a pentadic analysis of the Kirkuk CSM requires the creation of a new dramaturgical term "constitutional myth." Essentially, the Emergency Security Units manning the Kirkuk checkpoints are civil servants striving to create and embody a constitutional myth based on "rule of law." They are in search of Kirkuk's and Iraq's *Magna Carta*. Because of Kirkuk's unique historical situation, constitutional analysis requires that the Kirkuk CSM be situated within its

own unique historical conversation (an augmentation of Chapter 1's historical conversation). In Chapter 4, then, I introduce the new term constitutional myth created by examining Burke's writings on the use of myth for political persuasion and community cohesion. I then situate Kirkuk as an historical, geographical, and symbolic god-term undergirding various ethnic groups' constitutional myths. Following this I apply the pentad to analyze the ESU's conversations to tell the story of the ESU's effort to forge a constitutional myth. The chapter provides a new term for Burkean studies and provides an example of a constitutional and pentadic analysis combined.

Chapter 5 analyzes the Ninewa CSM, a yet more complex CSM. A constitutional and pentadic analysis of the Ninewa CSM can be situated within Chapter 1's historical context (although I grant that Ninewa and the city Mosul too have unique historical features, such as unresolved borders with Turkey – the Brussels' line tentatively accepted by Turkey – and internal ethnic tensions of its own, Arab, Assyrian Christian, Kurd, Turkoman Shebek, and Yezidi). The complexity of the soldiers' conversations and the CSM does require, however, the innovation of a second new dramatistic term: "constitutional dissociation." To develop a new term suitable to simplify analysis of the Ninewa CSM, I synthesize Burke's discussions of "De Gourmont on "Dissociation," "A Metaphorical View of Hierarchy," and "Administrative Rhetoric in Machiavelli" to explain the concept of constitutional dissociation. Chapter 5 provides a synthesis between *Grammar of Motives* and *Rhetoric of Motives*. It essentially dramatizes the *Rhetoric of Motives*. In doing so, the analysis clearly shows how by acts of verbal placement soldiers can be both "brothers" and "enemies." Ultimately, it shows that an ultimate term of ethnic division sunders the CSM identity.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by reiterating what the dissertation reveals both about Iraq's CSM and use of dramatism for understanding complex human conflicts. It argues that dramatism (perhaps not the comprehensive version I employ in the dissertation) is an excellent pedagogical paradigm for instructing young students about the importance of language in their lives and as a tool to be used by scholars, diplomats, and soldiers to analyze complex political conflict as well as help them to be self-aware about their own analysis (find where it is they may be *essentializing* and overlooking important aspects of a conflict). Finally, the chapter ends with an epideictic analysis of what Burke names the "tragic mechanism." I end the dissertation with an epilogue showing that Burke has caught us back up to the ancient Greeks' understanding of the *force* of language. I do so by borrowing from Simon Weil's essay "The Iliad, or the Poem of Force" and Burke's tragic triumvirate: *poiemata*, *pathemata*, *mathemata* (*GM* 38 – 41).

I want to conclude the introduction by referencing M. Elizabeth Weiser's influence on the field's and my own understanding of the genesis and meaning of Burke's *Grammar of Motives* and dramatism. In her monograph *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*, she unfolds the story of Burke's struggles to conceptualize and write *Grammar of Motives* which would give complete articulation to his dramatic methodology. She also details the struggles of Burke's contemporaries to come to terms with his challenging book which required them to shed their perspectives on rhetoric and literature (their "trained incapacities" of segmenting human's world into literature-art / science, creating divided disciplines and subjects, fragmented human beings) and embrace a more capacious understanding of literature-rhetoric-science and what it means to be human.¹² She notes that Burke was "trying to be read by both scholars and policy makers"

¹² Weiser provides some responses from Burke's colleagues regarding the reception of *Grammar of Motives*. Burke apparently criticized Francis Fergusson's review of *GM* for missing important aspects. Weiser quotes Fergusson's

(104). He did so because he felt that rhetoric, literature, and poetry had something to contribute to the understanding of human conflict, had something to contribute to understanding the source of human conflict and violence as inherently an aesthetic matter. The study of art, literature, poetry, and rhetoric as pure aesthetics had *disarmed* humans of their most powerful weapon for confronting and combating the contingencies that threatened their world. For if one removes literature, art, rhetoric, and poetry from one's arsenal the only thing left to turn to is a shouting match, economic arm twisting, and a more lethal weapon. Burke undertook and wrote a major portion of his theoretical project in the wake of World War I and through World War II. So his dramatic project is informed by the worst of human relations and by the most human of ideals – to purify war.

Weiser reminds us that “‘The new world will be one of participation’ – this was Burke’s message to those scholars who saw the study of language as pure science and the study of literature as pure aesthetics. He *did* believe that participatory action was needed, and so as he worked to develop his grounding terms, he also tried hard to ground them not in science but in rhetoric, the inducement to action” (104). Indeed, Burke developed a methodology that is participatory to the extreme. It lacks any sense of self-righteousness; it even includes participation by “the enemy:”

The world as we know it, the world in history, cannot be described in its particularities by an idiom of peace. . . .we are actually in a world at war – a world at combat – and even a calculus must be developed with the dialectics of participation by “the enemy” - hence the representative anecdote [constitution] must contain militaristic ingredients (*GM* 337).

response back to Burke as “believe me the book is no joke to deal with” (141). She also notes that two scholars passed up an opportunity to review *GM* because, according to Fergusson, “not because they didn’t think it important, but because they figured it would take a month or two to study it out” (141).

Burke's ironic and dramatic perspective in which the world is viewed from the point of view of all the participants is humble enough to recognize that the perpetual exclusion of the other is the perpetual creation of a constitutional grievance and thus a violent enemy. Unless our "enemies" are part of our verbal conversations, they will likely turn to other more violent symbolic means to get our attention and we the same. Burke's aim is to overcome the enemy by including the enemy, not to eliminate the enemy by a fierce and false peace (such as Burke warns us of in "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle"). Burke would make a partner of his enemy and recognize himself in his enemy. Even more humbling is Burke's recognition that the source of division is located in language itself. So that when we exclude others in favor of our own self-actualization (the sickness of purpose Hawhee mentions above), we are being impelled by the same *entelechi*al force of language as our enemy. A dialectic of participation necessarily is an identification with an enemy, recognizing that the same *entelechi*al forces impel both sides of a dispute – language's force given mythic embodiment by the god Athena impelling Achilles to realize his status as the god-man and hero by killing and then desecrating his enemy Hector; his self-actualization his own demise. It is the force of language that impels our disputes. A force no one man or woman can contain and control; the conversation goes on impelling us from within and pulling us without to act. A point I will return to in the conclusion.

Following Weiser's and Burke's admonishment, my intent is for this dissertation to be participatory in two senses. In the first sense, I attempt to allow the CSM soldiers to speak for themselves, to show us the reality of their situation from their perspective. I attempt to include all the perspectives the soldier's offered which is perhaps a rather inefficient method but it is the only way to guarantee a well-rounded and complete picture of the CSM and the greater ethnic

conflict currently simmering in Iraq. After all, dramatistic methodology is intended to allow participation from all *entelechial* perspectives which is an efficient method for *inclusion* and studying the *substance* of human conflict.

Secondly, the dissertation is participatory in the sense that I had an opportunity to apply dramatism in conjunction with the officers and soldiers of the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division. In being tasked by the 4th Infantry Division to conduct primary ethnographic research in the CSM communities, rhetorical studies participated alongside the Army's efficient logistics and science. It was a concerted effort to provide as detailed a study of the CSM as possible. It shows that the U.S. Army is in agreement with Burke. Scholars should be participating in the "new world" in order to help shape and understand our human conflicts. Our aesthetic understandings and scientific understandings must work side by side to achieve as complete an understanding of our current conflicts as possible. Taking Burke's and Weiser's admonishment seriously, it is not for rhetoricians to withdraw their support in a world at war and conflict (a discipline founded on agonistic principles) and only study the problems of logic, aesthetics, academic writing, and grammar as if it was somehow apart from our decision and policy making – exiled from our conversations.

Much has been made for the need to revamp our educational system based on humanistic and rhetorical principles. Perhaps the best place to start is for rhetoricians to leave the classroom and show up to help in our current conflicts, be humble enough to show up and enter into conversation with our friends and enemies alike outside academia. Then we can take the lessons learned back into the classroom. We would be enacting Burke's interdisciplinary model. It is for rhetoricians to participate by teaching rhetorical and dramatistic analysis in the conversations

out in the field, within the various disciplines, and in the classroom. It is for rhetoricians to understand their times and *participate* in the understanding of current human conflicts in any way possible not only within the confines of academia, but *in* the world assisting our diplomats, soldiers, businessmen and women – always making art answerable to life and life answerable to art (Bakhtin, “Art and Answerability,” 1-2).

A Note on the Dissertation's Textual Ecology

In developing his dramatistic methodology, Burke was reacting against the scientific and efficient study of human relations. Burke attempted to account for the complexity of human relations as a complete ecosystem, as Marika A. Seigel explains very well in her article “‘One Little Fellow Named Ecology:’ Ecological Rhetoric in Kenneth Burke's Attitudes Toward History.” Burke adopted a “complex systems” approach to his analysis of human relations which required a complex and heuristic writing style. He developed a heuristic (both an analytic methodology and writing style) to accommodate his dramatistic analysis of human relations. A methodology and analysis in adopting the “whole systems” perspective of ecology or dramatism requires augmentation of our current clear, brief and simple forms of writing. Seigel writes that “Tests of ecological balance, however (by which Burke seems to mean in essence stepping back and seeing the whole picture), can correct imbalances caused by particular efficiencies, even efficiencies that could have beneficial effects” (397). She also states that Burke challenges his readers to “rethink what is ‘efficient’ and what is ‘inefficient’ by looking at efficiency through a different frame: in this case through that of ecological balance rather than, perhaps, that of technologism or scientism” (396). And she goes on to explain Burke’s own use of footnotes in his writing as important to the ecology of his text as a whole.

In attempting to read the CSM as a constitutional act and trace the pentadic laws at work in soldiers’ conversations, I have had to use an “ecological” style of writing. The dissertation synthesizes Iraqi history, dramatism, and primary ethnographic research (soldiers conversations). The complexity of the project and dramatism’s methodological requirement to at least attempt to

deal with “whole systems” requires the use of footnotes and appendices. For example, I use appendices, fourteen to be exact, to provide analysis and historical information that completes as much as possible the complexity of Iraq’s history and the context of the CSM act. The appendices provide historical documents, timelines, a description of the CSM, and important analysis of Kirkuk Emergency Service Unit conversations that could not fit within Chapter 4 but nonetheless provide important insight and documentation of ESU terminology and descriptions of their reality as they see it. As Siegel notes, Burke’s own use of footnotes is vital to the ecology of his own texts and complete analysis. For the most part, I use footnotes for citational references. On occasion, I use footnotes to fully substantiate a concept, explain a key point, or draw the readers’ attention to important consequences of a key point. The footnotes and appendices, of course, do not have to be read, but they are an important part of the dissertation’s theoretical and analytical ecology.

At times, I faced the same problem Wayne C. Booth faced in his monograph *Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent*. In a footnote referencing Kenneth Burke he writes that “I wish I could at this point incorporate about five hundred pages of his brilliant discussions of how art serves for maker and receiver as a way of both understanding and coping with the world. . . . Burke’s genius is peculiarly resistant to short citation, and it would be absurd to pick out a few essays or chapters for special mention” (167). Booth’s statement that Burke’s methodology resists “short citation” is absolutely the case. I found in explicating his dramatic thought that getting to the gist, “narrowing,” “being economical,” or “efficient” will simply not work at times. In any case, to do so would be to turn Burke’s writing and theory into the very scientific, efficient, assembly - line logic he attempts to counter. I do, then, use footnotes and appendices

to create as complete and well-rounded analysis as possible. They are an important part of the dissertations textual ecology that resists “efficiency” and “reduction” for the sake of being efficient in providing a well-rounded analysis.

To perform a constitutional and pentadic reading of the CSM and soldiers’ conversations requires it to be situated in the historical conversation. In addition, dramatism’s own key concepts must be put into context and explained. The synthesis of history, dramatism, and primary ethnographic research necessitates, therefore, more detailed and extensive chapters than perhaps normal. For example, Chapter 4 regarding Kirkuk requires an explication of a “constitutional myth,” Kirkuk’s unique history (a very brief dramatisitic reading of the history) and finally an analysis of soldiers’ conversations. In its textual organization, the dissertation demonstrates dramatism’s scalability. We begin with a constitutional and dramatisitic analysis of Iraq’s historical scene. Then in Chapter 3, we apply dramatism to Diyala checkpoint communities, followed by Chapter 4’s analysis of Kirkuk and finally Chapter 5’s analysis Ninewa’s CSM. No two checkpoint communities are alike and no CSM regions are alike. Dramatism in its full application unfolds the individual character of each region and discloses the complex constitutional character of the CSM as a whole. It proves dramatism’s universal presence and pliability in the study of human relations.

As I was writing the dissertation, I imagined two audiences: my dissertation advisor and committee (my colleagues in the rhetorical field) and the soldiers and diplomats I worked with in Iraq. The dissertation is written primarily for the first audience, but I believe it will provide insights for the second audience regarding the CSM and the study of human conflict in general. It begins to introduce dramatisitic analysis to understand complex conflicts, and I believe

prepares the way for dramatism to be taught in military and diplomatic schools. In fact, during the primary research I found Burke's methodology an excellent heuristic to simplify a complex conflict and environment, so although in its full-blown application it is thorough, it also provides a way of reducing complex human relations without being too narrow. In addition, what is perhaps most important about dramatism for both audiences is the critical mindset that recognizes the force that language plays in human conflict. Not only does dramatism ask us to think critically and be critically self-aware of the language and symbols that impel human conflict, it provides an exemplary method and heuristic for the study of human relations and conflict that can be illustrated using everyday examples or ones as complex as Iraq's Combined Security Mechanism. At times, thinking about the second audience led me to write pages of material regarding dramatism's relationship and analytic abilities for understanding insurgencies, diplomatic conflicts, and strategic communications. This material is waiting to be written into various articles after the dissertation is complete. The dissertation itself is an example of the way dramatism can be applied to analyze extremely complex conflicts. Dramatism as both a method of analyzing human conflict and educating self-critical analysts, soldiers, and diplomats should be taught in our military and diplomatic schools. The effort is already being made by scholars to reinvent American education based on Burke's dramatism. Our schools for soldiers and diplomats should also be included.¹³

I use footnotes to cite the primary research and soldiers' interviews. For soldiers' and translators' protection, the citations intentionally do not use personal identifiers for either the soldiers or translators. I have also removed the day of the interview (only giving the month) for

¹³ See the recent monograph *Humanistic Critique of Education: Teaching and Learning as Symbolic Action* discussing the application of dramatism in the development of pedagogy and curriculum.

an extra layer of anonymity. I only cite the interviews used in the dissertation and do not include the coded list of interviews in the bibliography for soldiers' and translators' protection.

Finally, a word needs to be said about the region in Iraq nominally known as the Disputed Internal Boundaries and the maps used in the dissertation to represent this territory. In this dissertation, I rename the Disputed Internal Boundaries the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. I did so for both historical and rhetorical reasons. "Disputed boundaries" puts too much emphasis on the conflict's agonism and violence. In addition, the emphasis on boundaries too easily reinforces the "divide" between Iraqi groups. The term leaves out the common identity and ground for both Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman – *Iraq*. A "claim," however, signifies a more forensic and symbolic argument and less of a pugilistic and divisive affair. Historically, the United States was involved in a similar dispute regarding a mutually claimed region. Researching in the U.S. Archives, I found a history of the "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute." Venezuela and Great Britain both claimed territory and the Orinoco River in 1841. And with the discovery of gold in the region, the claims became more strident. The disputed territories were referred to as "the mutually claimed region." It was not until 1899, with the intervention of U.S. President Cleveland that the claims of both parties were settled. So "Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq" has the rhetorical purpose of naming a shared identity, *Iraq*, emphasizes a diplomatic arbitration of a dispute, and has historical precedent.¹⁴

I would like to also point out that I am aware that when writing about the history of Kurdish nationalism that I focus on the Barzani family and remain tacit on the importance of Jalal Talabani in leading Kurdish nationalism. This is especially true in chapters one and five. I

¹⁴ For a record of the "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute" see A. Curtis Wilcus' *Latin America in Maps: Historic, Geographic, Economic* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1943, page 297

do this not because Jalal Talabani and the history of his political party Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is not important, but to be economical. There was a point at which I had to make decisions about what include in my examples and what to exclude. I do include Talabani and the PUK in the appendices’ timelines. Talabani’s importance to Kurdish nationalism (as well as the Kurdish internal divisions) is represented in these timelines.

The maps used in this dissertation are symbolic representations of the common ground (both material and ideal) Iraqis tread on when making their claims to territory. Interlocutors spoke in terms of geographic reference points, mineral wealth, arable land, and water. The maps represent metonymic scene-agent fusions. They represent the power of symbolic acts to breath spirit into the material world, “spiritualize” the land, water, and mountains as well as *ground* (temporize and make material) the ideal world of ethnic-nationalisms and identity. The land by its very presence exerts rhetorical and persuasive force on the people of Iraq - evidence of object oriented rhetoric in which “things” of the world exert their own powers to persuade. As when one climbs a mountain because it is there. In reviewing Curtis Wilcus’ maps regarding the history of Latin America, it occurred to me that maps would help ground this dissertation’s readers in a shared *topoi*. The maps represent, therefore, not simply a material geography but the human terrain (*koinos topoi*) of the mind, as will be elucidated in Chapter 1. The maps illustrate Kenneth Burke’s concept of symbolic act and the tautological and self-grounding nature of human constitutions. My goal with the maps is to make the geographic world and the *ideas* they represent as *tangible* as possible, in order to replicate (to some very little degree) the consubstantial relationship between agent (idea) and land (material).

Finally, the dissertation's rhetorical analysis in synthesizing history with primary ethnographic research and interviews creates an historical document of one synchronic moment in time regarding a larger international and historical conversation. Following Clifford Geertz' admonishment that social scientists study *in* villages, as a rhetorician I studied *in* a conversation and *in* checkpoint communities. Therefore, the conclusions drawn in the dissertation are strictly about these communities. The analysis is not done to draw conclusions about the larger international and historical agonistic conversation or substantiate claims to territory. The agonistic conversation regarding the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq will go on for quite some time, as conversations have lives and *entelechiial force* of their own for which no one can encompass.

Map A: The Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq



Chapter 1

The Historical and Constitutional Struggle of Northern Iraq (Scene) and the Combined Security Mechanism (Act)

In 2003 the United States' military deposed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman, Yezidi, Shebek, Assyrian Christians resumed their historical dispute over the ownership, administration and sovereignty of a region extending from the southeast of Diyala Province, through central Kirkuk Province (including the city of Kirkuk) to the northwest corner of Ninewa Province (including the city of Mosul and the areas around Sinjar mountain). The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Provincial Governments (Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewa), The Government of Iraq, (GoI) and various local tribes and families all made and continue to make claims and counterclaims to their jurisdiction over the region.

After 2003, the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR) quickly became and remains an administrative no-man's land in which various political groups struggle for ascendancy over the ground they believe constitutes their individual, familial, tribal and national identities. (See page 3 for a map of the MCR). This complex of claims is normally reduced to a paradigm rivalry between the KRG and GoI owing to their monopoly on the violence needed to enforce their claims - the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army. True, mistrust between the KRG and GoI frustrates settlement of the claims. But severe mistrust between ethnic groups, tribes, and families, from which both governments derive their legitimacy to rule, also agitates and superheats the political cauldron from which their leaders must draw a palatable solution. Thus, many view the struggle boiling over into a protracted civil war and / or the dissolution of the current Iraqi Constitution either into three separate nation states (modeled on the Ottoman empire's three *wilayats*: Mosul, Baghdad, Basra) or an extremely contentious system of federated states (or emirates) forever

bickering over the profits from the natural resources mined, cultivated, and drawn from the land (oil, arable land, water). In the decades to come, however the Mesopotamian map gets redrawn and claims to the territory (re)settled, the Mutually Claimed Region will likely be the *primum movens*.

By 2009, Iraq's second Parliamentary Elections, which would determine the next Prime Minister and President of Iraq, were on the horizon. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution unimplemented and unresolved left the MCR un-administered and unsecure. Terrorists exploited this seam (also called “the trigger line”) between the KRG and the GoI to foment fear and destabilize Iraq. They would likely do the same to disrupt the elections, it was believed. The (KRG) had its own independent security force, the *Peshmerga*. The (GoI) had the Iraqi Army. Any unilateral movement within the MCR was provocative. If *Peshmerga* entered to provide “security” the Iraqi Army (IA) viewed it as an encroachment upon the GoI's and Provinces' jurisdiction and claims, so the IA would follow in after (and *vice versa*). With bravado and brandishing of weapons, standoffs were allowed to escalate, both sides knowing that the U.S. Army would literally stand in the middle allowing them to save face as they retreated.

Peshmerga and IA soldiers tell about Qara Tapa: In July 2010 tensions escalated between *Peshmerga* and IA forces to the point that, according to one *Peshmerga*, “four Kurdish soldiers and two IA were shot.” At this point, according to one IA officer, the *Peshmerga* mustered and dispatched approximately fifty vehicles loaded with soldiers and weapons to fight at Qarah Tapah. An IA officer working a checkpoint went to a nearby American checkpoint requesting assistance and saying, “if those *Peshmerga* are allowed to cross the checkpoint there

will be a disaster. I need one U.S. soldier to stand at the checkpoint and block them.”¹⁵ The U.S. officer sent one Stryker vehicle to block the road at the checkpoint, and the *Peshmerga* stood down upon seeing the U.S. Stryker. The U.S. Officer's actions averted a firefight that could have escalated to include other regions of the MCR. *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers were fond of saying, “One U.S. Army Stryker can stop an entire battalion.”

A statement made by a *Peshmerga* in Diyala Province provides a penetrating view into the *Weltanschauung* that orient and impel the troop movements in this area:

I received a phone call from my commander telling me, 'there are three Iraqi Humvees crossing the border and entering the MCR. Go and stop them!' I went to their location to intercept them and block the road. And the Iraqi Humvees showed up with Americans. So I still stopped them. The Iraqis stopped and said, 'What are you doing?' I told them, 'I am waiting for you because these are the [disputed territories (MCR)] and we are combined forces. Whatever mission you are going on with the Americans, IA and the Peshmerga should take part in it together.' And we got in our vehicle and went with them. . . . Let's say I went out there to kill those IA soldiers. But they were with Americans. If Americans are not with IA soldiers, I will block the road. I will ask that we accompany them on their mission within the MCR. The IA soldiers will refuse. Then I will fight. They will go through over our dead bodies.¹⁶

The *Peshmergas'* and IA soldiers' accounts illustrate the *psychological* and *symbolic* trigger line that exists in minds and on the ground. A line that various terrorist groups exploited. With Iraq's 7 March 2010 elections approaching, Prime Minister Maliki requested from the Commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I), General Odierno, assistance providing security and de-escalating tensions in the MCR - a task that would necessarily include as a means to the end

¹⁵ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁶ *Peshmerga*. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

fostering a stronger relationship between *Peshmerga* and IA commanders, officers, and soldiers. The U.S. Army reached an agreement with *Peshmerga* and IA Commanders at a summit held at the KRG's Interior Ministry Headquarters on 5 September 2009. The signed *Declaration of Principles* pledged the two forces: “to support a Joint Security Architecture, maintain open dialogue and close working relationships, and uphold the [six] principles” listed in the *Declaration of Principles* (See Appendix A).

By January 2009, the 3rd Infantry Division, in whose Area of Operation (AO) the MCR was located, issued orders and guidance to the various Brigades and Battalions under its command in Diyala, Kirkuk and Ninewa to establish the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM). The U.S. Army designed, built, and supplied a turnkey system that contained 22 Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) and 3 Combined Coordination Centers (CCCs) throughout three northern provinces: 5 CCPs and 1 CCC in Diyala, 6 CCPs and 1 CCC in Kirkuk and 11 CCPs and 1 CCC in Ninewa. The U.S. Army's design included life support areas (LSAs), command centers (supplying communication, security, and monitoring equipment), fuel and lights, (in some cases internet service and occasionally food) and regular training for *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers. Each CCP was a garrison built to scale; its form following its operational function: monitor and stop traffic on the roads and conduct patrols in order to establish relationships with community leaders and roll up bad guys within each CCP's Combined Security Area (CSA).

Initial guidance to the Brigades and Battalions summarizes the goals of the CSM: “Look at this opportunity to do a heck of a lot more at these locations and with these forces than just check vehicles and go on patrols. . . . Build a force with an identity that you are one working for one purpose.” The guidance encouraged U.S. soldiers to remember that “There is no internal

boundary. . . We see provinces in the sovereign nation of Iraq. . . We exist in those CCPs to secure the people of that CSA. That CSA must be the safest place around and the population sees that Iraqi-Kurds, Iraqi-Arabs, and Americans with guns can get along, work together, and protect all citizens.”¹⁷

The goals were clear: protect and provide security for Iraqi people the ultimate purpose, (first principle listed in the *Declaration of Principles*) and create a common identity and union between two armies (the means to the end) who had for decades hated and fought each other. The CSM was considered not simply an administrative act but a rhetorical act of *appeal* regarding the unity and identity of Iraq. Iraqi Army, *Peshmerga*, and U.S. Soldiers, lived and worked together at each CCP, and the CSM served its purpose successfully during the 2010 elections. The U.S. Army’s original intent was that the CSM would be a limited-scope project that would not last beyond the 2010 national elections. And it was not envisioned, then, in its original conception, to act as an instrument to achieve Iraqi national harmony. However, the formation of a government and agreement on who would become Prime Minister remained a contested issue until November 2010. The new government was essentially deadlocked. Finally, on December 21, 2010 the Iraqi Parliament approved a new government. During the ten months in which the national elections were unresolved, the CSM took on a life of its own. It was increasingly talked about as an instrument of reconciliation and a reason for the U.S. Army to remain in Iraq as a neutral third party helping the KRG and GoI resolve their differences.

¹⁷ Initial guidance provided by 4th Infantry Division Contingency Operating Base Speicher.

So the CSM continued with “provide security” persisting as its *raison d'être*, but now, with elections concluded, ends and means began to dialectically transform. Providing security became the means for creating a common identity. Thus, the CSM was increasingly being discussed as a mechanism for fostering national reconciliation and a unified Iraq by amalgamating the *Peshmerga* into the IA as Regional Guard Brigades (RGB).¹⁸ If Kurdish *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army commanders, officers, and soldiers could reconcile, the CSM would become an institutional (instrumental) example to the people of Iraq for resolving their bitter disputes - a *fait accompli* of Iraqi unification and possibly article 140. The *Peshmerga* and Iraqi armies, tools or means to achieve political ends of their respective civilian leadership, whose own bickering represents their constituents' squabbling over the MCR, would become a political end and unifying force in itself known as “The Golden Lions.” This aggregated security force would endure after the U.S. Army withdrew from the CCPs and the country of Iraq on 31 December 2011. In rhetorical terms, the Golden Lions and CSM would act as a *metonymic* univocal sign /voice heard over the particularist Babel of its political leaders dividing Iraq (Bourdieu, *Language*, 206 and Burke, “Four” 505-09). Since the political leaders could not implement article 140 of the Constitution, the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* would unite Iraq by acting as “One Iraqi Army” within the MCR after the U.S. departed. And if not united as one consubstantial force, the two forces might, at least, cooperate to avoid a major escalation of tensions.

With ends and means now inverted, the CSM was at risk of becoming a substitute for or at least competing with the Iraqi Constitution, the grounds of Iraqi union and common identity

¹⁸ Please see Appendix J for a brief description of the creation of the Regional Guard Brigade and Golden Lions.

established by the Iraqi people on 15 October 2005. So after the 2010 election, its original purpose fulfilled, the “mechanism / tool” became subsumed into a much larger and century-long political and symbolic struggle – the agonistic conversation – of Iraq's various ethnicities to formally constitute the nation-state and government.¹⁹ So no matter how hard the U.S. Army tried to keep it a purely “instrumental” and “neutral mechanism,” creating a united Iraqi identity within the Army, ironically divided from Iraqi politics, it could not keep the tool from implying the purpose for which nearly every *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army soldier believed its substance was forged - resolve Article 140 and the administrative boundaries of Northern Iraq between the KRG and GoI. As one IA officer summed it up, “These CCPs are political . . . everything here is political.”²⁰

The U.S. Army and U.S. Mission in Iraq found themselves floating in the same political nebula as the British and King Faisal I in 1921: Iraq's political identity, void and without *form* – *aesthetic appeal*. Faisal I, too, turned to the army to forge a common Iraqi substance and deescalate conflict. He referred to the army as “the spinal column for nation-forming” (Batatu 25). The British and Faisal I's effort to create a common identity within the Army was at the expense of building and creating a common identity within civil institutions: Iraq's civil sector suffered while King Faisal I focused on “security.”²¹ Although he populated the army with those

¹⁹ See Appendix E for a timeline of the Century Long struggle and agonistic conversation regarding the MCR.

²⁰ Eight IA Soldiers. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and translator. Diyala. January 2011.

²¹ The end goal of creating an autonomous and unified Iraq within the military is in fact what motivated Iraq's long string of military coups d'état of the 20th century. The monarch could not unify Iraq as an independent sovereign state free from the meddling of international powers, so the military took it upon itself to do so. But the military leadership then became divided by the same ethnic and nationalist arguments that divided Iraq's civilian leadership. This is especially true of the 1958 Free Officer coup d'état, in which its nominal leader Karīm Qāsīm, having no political party affiliation, soon became crushed by all parties within and outside the Army. See appendix C “list of

loyal to him - the ex-Sharīfian officers, the U.S. Army and U.S. Mission in Iraq were attempting to comingle soldiers with rival allegiances and opposing identities lacking the centripetal image of a single figurehead (Muslim monarch or constitution) drawing the periphery toward a unifying center. In short, the CSM was a complimentary and competing constitution within the Iraqi Constitution. Like Britain's puppet monarch and army in 20th century Iraq, the CSM was successful as a “mechanism,” or artificial constitution, but not as an autochthonous and organic conception of Iraq's body politic. The mechanistic unity of the CSM strained under the KRG's and GoI's contrary pulls - two substantial and organic historical centers of political force in Iraq drawing their power and legitimacy from historical arguments of identity and international governments' interests.

A well-rounded and comprehensive understanding of this constitution within a constitution is made possible by conceptualizing it as a rhetorical and dramatistic human act situated in Iraq's historical and agonistic conversation. That is, the entire edifice and community was a statement and argument in a much larger conversation about the substance and identity of its members - a constitution intended to fix soldiers' motives for future acts of unity or division. As such, once “identity formation” became dialectically paired with “providing security,” the CSM entered an historical struggle to transform Mesopotamian substance into a common Iraqi constitution - it was a “spinal column for nation-forming.” The CSM, and the MCR which contains it, therefore, are rhetorical acts of constitution forming (an attempt to create an *aesthetic form of appeal* uniting rival forces in cooperation) and as such can most fully be understood by

Iraqi military coups d'état,” and especially the chapters “Sole Leader” and “Bitterest of Years” in Hannah Batatu's *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* listed in the bibliography.

applying Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory of dramatism to the historical event (Burke, *PC*, 263-264 and *PLF* 103-07).

I structure this Chapter's argument and analysis using the scene/agent and scene/act ratios placing the MCR and CSM within the historical and strategic (national) agonistic conversation, doing so allows for the constitutional and pentadic analysis of the various CSM communities in the subsequent chapters. Throughout the chapter aims to create the historical context (scene) that implies the quality of the CSM act. It also discloses the metonymic fusions of various agents with their material and historical scene.²² Again, my purpose is to focus on the scene-agent / scene-act ratios (within a wide historical scope) as they provide the most fundamental and qualitative understanding of the CSM as a symbolic act of constitution making within a large strategic and historical context. As Wess states, "Connecting the pentad to the constitution more visibly" requires "to add to pentadic reading[s] of texts constitutional readings *situating them as acts in the conversation of their day*" [emphasis added] (177).

The dramatic nature of the thesis generates an argument of contrapuntal quality in which the interplay of theory, history, current events, and fieldwork provides as complete an understanding of the CSM as a rhetorical and constitutional act. In this way, the Chapter and its interior argument's design remain in agreement with the figurative concept (drama) that forms the analysis' structure. This means at various moments in the chapter, for example, theory may recede into the background (the dramatic ratios only implied) while history, current events, or

²² For the importance of metonymy to Burke's dramatism see his essay "Four Master Tropes." More recently, David Tell has explicated the importance of tropes to dramatism and Burke's theories of language and symbolic acts in general in "Burke's Encounter with Ransom: Rhetoric and Epistemology in 'Four Master Tropes.'" Also see Hayden White's readings of Burke to explicate the four master tropes for his own historical project in "The Theory of Tropes" in his book *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*.

fieldwork emerge to carry the argument's dramatic theme on to its end. And, of course, the reverse is true.

The chapter's global structure also maintains a dramatic (contrapuntal) quality in which the first section on symbol systems; the second on substance, constitutions, and verbal acts; and the third on the constitutional act of the CSM transform into one another to form a holistic and qualitative proof of the thesis. The first two parts, in different but very important complementary ways, establish the symbolic and historical scene (terrain) in which the CSM act was accomplished. The first part shows how Iraqi agents literally shape their scene - their symbolic and geographic (material) terrains - with verbal acts of ethnic-nationalisms (agent-scene) - the positive role of symbol systems. It also shows how these same ethnic symbol systems play a *negative* role in shaping the Iraqi scene. The first part shows reveals that symbols systems are the ultimate historical context or scene. The second part establishes the historical and geographic scene with a focus on the history of the Iraqi constitution (scene-agent / agent-scene). In doing so, it demonstrates how constitutions contain each society's traditional arguments and paradoxes of substance that potentially unite or divide the body politic, preparing the way for situating the CSM within this larger historical conversation. Finally, with the scene (context or agonistic conversation) prepared, the third part presents the quality of the CSM act contained by its scene - a symbolic act and argument for an Iraqi constitution within a constitution, a rejoinder in a larger historical and international conversation. Locating the CSM in the historical conversation of its day, allows for a complete dramatic reading of soldiers' conversations in the subsequent chapters (Wess, *Kenneth*, 133 and 177).

Words: The Fog of Symbols and The Fog of War

Nothing is harder than to have an idea or easier than cutting off heads.
 -- Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *Demons*

Indeed, all life has been likened to the writing of a poem, though some people write their poems on paper, and others carve theirs out of jugular veins.

-- Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*

The layman knows that “you need the context” to fully understand an event's meaning. Politicians bellyache that their words are “taken out of context.” Professors preach “context” in their classrooms. The assumption being that context is a final arbiter and a pre-existing phenomena, like the air we breathe, that imparts absolute meaning on the world. But context is subject to the same interpretation and flux as the events it contains. Most importantly, context (or scene) is a carefully built symbolic edifice or *Weltanschauung* to which humans show reverence. To say to someone, “put it in context,” is to assert one worldview over another.²³ In the realm of politics, then, a stable symbol system (context/scene) is a stable political state. Because context is so important - creating meaning, interpreting events, and most importantly providing motives for human behavior - governments, states, and political groups expend massive amounts of money, human labor, and military might to fix the symbolic edifice of context in place. This is easily seen in the conflict over the MCR. The MCR is a battle to create an Iraqi context and scene that will give meaning to the people and nation of Iraq. Thus, at rock bottom, it is a clash of *weltanschauungen* - the ethnic-nationalist symbol systems through which Iraqi people interpret their world. The symbolic act of drawing the border on the MCR map is an ultimate

²³ See Mark T. Williams’ “Ordering Rhetorical Contexts with Burke's Terms of Order” for an historical reading of the contested, rhetorical, and symbolic nature of context. Williams performs a reading of ancient texts using Burke’s paradigm of terms of order and hierarchy and Burke’s use of Malinowski’s context of situation.

rhetorical act that will fix the constitutional scene that gives shape to Iraqi substance/identity and, thus, future acts (economic, political, artistic, and intellectual) of the Iraqi people. The inner symbolic world of a people reflected in the scene that contains them - creating a symbol system of inner (mind) and outer (body) reflexive identity. And here in section one of the paper I show how words (symbol systems/ terms) shape the scene and agents of the MCR conflict.

Ultimately context is a doing, an act of form. And humans constitute their individual and group identities (scenes) in reverence to the elaborate symbol systems they build for themselves. Every human act is a pious reinforcement of their symbolic (aesthetic) edifice. Burke establishes this in *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose* demonstrating that men and women interpret their motivations based on their symbol systems - calling these symbol systems “pieties.” Burke defines piety as “loyalty to the sources of our being” (*PC* 71). Humans shape their realities (from their smallest of acts (forms), greeting someone, to the greatest of acts (forms) massive cities and nations) out of their reverence for their symbol systems. In short, “Piety is a system-builder.” (*PC* 74). The Kurds, Arabs, Shebek, Turkoman, and Yezedi are pious to their sources of being. As such, they dress, cook, speak, move, strike deals, and act in ways that pay reverence to the symbol system that is the source of their ethnic or nationalist being. Every behavior and act is a piety to their symbolic substance (*PC* 74-9). The irony of course is that a diplomat's or military commander's beseeching a group to be *pious* to international symbol systems will most likely require an act of *impiety* to more local or parochial symbol systems. The conflicts of the MCR, then, are conflicts of rival pieties to symbol systems which are the source of Iraqi ethnic groups' being.²⁴

²⁴ Burke later calls piety to symbol systems “secular prayer.” In a section entitled “Secular Prayer – or, extended: Character-building by Secular Prayer” in *Attitudes Toward History*, he refers to secular prayer as the “building of a

Symbol systems also provide the substantive bridge from ideas to acts as the ultimate source of human (group or individual) motives. As Burke states the fundamental axiom, “A motive is not some fixed thing, like a table, which one can go and look at. It is a term of interpretation, and being such it will naturally take its place within the framework of our *Weltanschauung*” (P&C 25). Sigmund Freud's discussion of worldviews in his essay “The Question of a *Weltanschauung*,” is helpful in understanding its inherent agonistic nature.²⁵ He provides the following definition: “A *Weltanschauung* is an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place” (196). Freud goes on to discuss *weltanschauung* using bellicose language. He names four prominent *Weltanschauung*: science, religion, art, and philosophy and, then, declares the religious *Weltanschauung* science's arch enemy: “Of the three powers which may dispute the basic position of science, religion alone is to be taken seriously as an enemy” (198). Freud follows using the hostile and jingoistic language of a tyrant to describe the conflict between the two worldviews (symbol systems/ contexts), asserting that “Our best hope for the future is that intellect -- the scientific spirit, reason -- may in process of time establish a dictatorship in the mental life of man” (212). As Freud helps us see in stark terms, the primary and ultimate territory on which ground is claimed, land is occupied and boundaries are drawn, is

character,” and “The *coaching of an attitude* by the use of mimetic and verbal language (322-27). For an in-depth summary of piety as “secular prayer,” see Bernard L. Brock's entry “Secular Piety” in the *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*. The building of ethnic-nationalist symbol systems (symbolic edifices) is the building of a nation's and individual's character. The CSM is an attempt at “secular prayer” pious to an Iraqi identity that transcends ethnic nationalism.

²⁵ For an in-depth study of Burke's use of Freud, please see Diane Davis' “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are” in which she discusses Freud's influence on Burke's foundational term “identification,” what she names constitutive mimesis. She does not discuss, however, *weltanschauung*. She explicates Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* and *Interpretation of Dreams* to theorize affective identification.

first and foremost that of the human mind. Freud lays bare the human struggle to establish symbolic context in human's inner life that can be reflected in the quality of exterior scenes they build for themselves.

Freud is right to use such bellicose language. History is rife with human's *agon* of worldview vs. worldview (the “Cold War,” for instance). *Weltanschauungen*, however, are not limited to the four in Freud's rubric. Indeed, the very abstract concept of “nation” or “constitution” is yet another symbol system providing an “overriding hypothesis” of social, economic, and political organization and context²⁶. This is especially true in Iraq just before and after the Ottoman Empire when Arab, Assyrian Christian, Jewish, Kurdish, and Turkish nationalisms emerged as the ultimate *Weltanschauung* (god terms) by which the people of Mesopotamia began to organize their lives.²⁷

Ethnic-nationalist symbol systems play a positive political role of uniting and organizing people in Iraq. Important to this paper, these symbol systems literally shape the geographic terrain. Iraqis' statements during interviews in Iraq revealed how symbol systems of ethnic-nationalism (*weltanschauungen*) subsume the land within their symbolic structure. The examples that follow demonstrate that the land and people are shaped by a reflexive scene (material)-agent (idea) ratio in *metonymic fusions*. The geographic features on the ground - rivers, lakes, mountains, oil, and gas fields - are used as the very material and symbolic backing of Iraqis' claims to territory. For instance, the Kurdish Peshmerga in Diyala province express

²⁶ See Aristotle's *Politics*, Partha Chatterjee's *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories*, Geoff Eley's and Ronald Grigor Suny's *Becoming National: A Reader*, and Benedict Anderson's “Census, Map, Museum” for discussions of “nation” as symbolic acts.

²⁷ See Hanna Batatu's *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*; David Fromkin's *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*; and Wadie Jwaideh's *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*.

their claims to land in the aphorism “Hamrin or death!”²⁸ Hamrin, a mountain chain in north central Iraq, becomes an autochthonous validation of Kurdish political aspirations, Kurd's very essence and substance consubstantial with the mountains of this region. What is more, the agents' mystic idea (derived from their symbol system) shapes the geographic scene so that an “interior” purpose (idea), ethnic-nationalism, appears *metonymically* to be an exterior goal (making the Hamrin mountains part of the Kurdish region). As the idea of Hamrin impels them from within the material Hamrin pulls them toward its heights from without.

In addition, it is common for Kurdish *Peshmerga* to express a brotherhood with the U.S. Army, saying that “the Kurdish and American soldiers' blood is mixed together in the soil of Iraq,” a clear symbolic consubstantiation of Kurds and Americans whose blood and essence springs from north-central Iraq's soil, another *metonymic fusion* of scene and agent. Kurds express their elemental substance in the scenic axiom: “The Kurds have no friends but the mountains” (Gunter 197). Following on this, David McDowall catalogs several Kurdish myths locating their “mystic” origins in the mountain folds of the Zargos, Taurus, and Rawanduz chains. (McDowall 4). So the idea (agent) of Kurdishness becomes *metonymically* fused with the substance of the mountains (scene).

There are examples of symbolic consubstantiality with the land (scene-agent ratio) from other ethnic nationalisms. One line of thinking traces the Turkoman claim to the city of Kirkuk back to the Ottoman Sultan Murād IV's advance into the city in 1638. Hanna Batatu mentions that the Naphtajīs family “held exclusive control over” Kirkuk's naphtha springs. The family's

²⁸ Peshmerga Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and translator. Diyala. January 2011.

very name (meaning “oil producer” in Turkish) indicating a consubstantiality with the oil under the city. In fact, the Turkish diplomat Yücel Güçlü in his essay “Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case” points to the family name as evidence to the Turkoman's historical (and *metonymically* aboriginal) claims to the city (81). The Turkoman also use the Kurdish *weltanschauung* to rebut Kurdish claims to the city of Kirkuk. The Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation, in an article entitled “Who Owns Kerkuk [*sic*]: Examination of Basic Dimensions,” argues the following, “Kerkuk [*sic*] province is located in a non-mountainous plain region, while the traditional homeland of the Kurds has always been documented as mountainous regions. They have only in recent history started to migrate towards the plains” (3). Here the Kurds' mystic mountain substance seems to work against them. The implication of course being that the Turkoman derive their substance from the geographic plains south of the mountains.

And on Sinjar Mountain of Ninewa, the Yezidis have one of their most revered temples, the Chermera or “40 Men” Temple, so old the time of its establishment forgotten lending Yezidi identity a consubstantiality with eternity and the creation of the world. Sinjar Mountain itself is strongly associated with Yezidi identity. And, finally, as one Arab farmer described his relationship to the land, “The Farmers or the Bedouins believe that the land is their mother, because the human being was created from the earth. If you go to a farmer and go to take his land away, he will die fighting to protect his land because his spirit is in the earth; it is very dear to his heart.”²⁹ The scene in this case not constituted from an ethnic-nationalist *weltanschauung* but a more intimate familial substance. The earth in a reflexive scene-agent ratio becomes the

²⁹ Arab Farmer. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall. Salah al-Din. Fall 2010.

ultimate source of being for which Arabs (especially Arab Muslims) show the greatest of piety - their mother. The mother occupying the pride of place within the Arab-Muslim culture.

Consubstantiality of symbolic and material substance in the land is not exclusive to the parochial *weltanschauung* of nationalisms. Businessmen and women concerned with profit see in the land the very essence and substance of their capitalist spirit derived from the ground (oil, water, crops). The more sophisticated cosmopolitan capitalist's identity (whether he or she be Arab, Assyrian Christian, Kurdish, Turkoman, or Yezidi) is very much derived from the Iraqi earth. An example of this is an impromptu conversation with an Iraqi driving through Kirkuk checkpoint 1. He was driving a new Lexus sport utility vehicle with his family at approximately 12:30 a.m. When he stopped, I said hello in Arabic. He realized I was American and he said in English, "Hey, man! I am from New York; I lived there for about 20 years. I am Kurdish." When I asked what he was doing in Iraq he said, "It is safe, now. I came here to invest and make money!" All of the above are very literal examples of the scene-agent and agent-scene ratios of dialectical transformation (mind-body); the fusion of the material and ideational worlds to use Burke's terms.³⁰

Through various ethnic-nationalist symbol systems, then, the Iraqi ground (by a reflexive scene-agent ratio and *metonymic* fusion) is made to signify the very substance of those who tread on it. And due to the reflexive nature of the scene-agent ratio and *metonymy*, cause and effect enter a relationship of circular representation - scene the cause of the agents' *weltanschauung* and the agents' symbol system the cause of their scene. In this way, the ethnic-nationalist *weltanschauungen* play a positive role; they give people a way to organize their social, political,

³⁰ We will examine this metonymic fusion of material and ideational worlds as the temporizing and spiritualizing of essence to create a constitutional myth in Chapter 4.

and economic lives - it gives them meaning, purpose, and fulfillment. They see and validate themselves in the symbolic meaning of the land. And they are pious to the land as the source of their being - sacrificing their lives if needed.

What is troublesome is that the various ethnic *weltanschauungen* claim within their symbolic structure the same geographic region as their agents' source of being. And here, as I segue to the negative aspect of symbol systems, Burke's trenchant observation about symbols and *weltanschauung* begins to emerge. He soberly assesses *weltanschauung*, or any symbol system (ethnic, religious, scientific, political, sports *ad infinitum*), as bringing "fog" or blindness a "trained incapacity" to human judgment. As Burke states it:

"Man, *qua* man, is a symbol user. In this respect, every aspect of his "reality" is likely to be seen through a **fog of symbols**. And not even the hard reality of basic economic facts is sufficient to pierce this symbolic veil (which is intrinsic to the human mind). One man may seek to organize a set of images, another may strive for order among his ideas, a third may feel goaded to make himself head of some political or commercial empire, but however different the situations resulting from these various modes of action, there are purely symbolic motives behind them all"
(*Rhetoric* 136).

Burke refers to such symbolic fogs as "trained incapacities." He writes that "by trained incapacity is meant that state of affairs whereby one's very abilities can function as blindnesses" (*PC* 7). In short, our education and training to be pious to our (cultural, ethnic, political, social, familial) symbols makes us blind to other ways of interpreting the world and acting based on those interpretations. As Burke famously states the negative aspect of symbol systems, "One adopts measures in keeping with his past training - and the very soundness of this training may lead him to adopt the wrong measures. People may be unfitted by being fit in an unfit fitness" (*PC* 10).

It is helpful here to introduce the ancient Greek term *hybris* to discuss the negative aspects of symbol systems as an “unfit fitness” because it links symbol systems to the ultimate cause of governments' instability, wars, and the dissolution of constitutions. *Hybris* - an inability to view the world from any other perspective than one's own “trained” worldview - puts one in the grip of *atē* (blind folly) so that one's acts which appear to be intelligent choices from an agent's own perspective are actually acts that contribute to the agent's demise - *nemesis*. The Greeks were obsessed with *hybris* because they made the connection between *hybristic* overconfidence in one's *weltanschauung* and the “fog of symbols” that lead to the “fog of war.” In Book 5 of Aristotle's *Politics* in which he discusses the sources of constitutional change (*stasis* or revolution), *hybris* is a theme that implicitly contains the entire discussion, and its acts are explicitly mentioned throughout Book 5 as acts of factions (tyrant, oligarch, demos *etc.*) precipitating a constitution's downfall. As *weltanschauungen* are the source of human motives (things interpreted), a *hybristic* piety to a symbol system can lead to unfortunate misinterpretations and acts (scene-agent / scene- act ratios). An exemplary case of this is found in the historical struggle between various ethnic and political groups to dominate North Central Iraq - to impose their *weltanschauung* (context) on the territory, shaping the geographic scene in their symbolic image literally eliminating the other people and their *weltanschauungen* from the geographic terrain.

Two powerful examples cogently illustrate the *hybristic* clash of *weltanschauungen* in the region: leaders who consider themselves to have the attributes of a god and a history of genocides. The Barzani family which has ruled in Kurdistan for over 100 years and Saddam Hussein provide the examples of leaders looked upon as gods. The prominent historian of

Kurdish Nationalism, Wadie Jwaideh, reminds his readers often that the Barzani sheikhs (*aghas*) are leaders of the Naqshbandī Sufi order. And Hanna Batatu, who has written the definitive history of the modern revolutionary movements of Iraq notes that the Barzani family's ascendancy in the region is due to the strong religious ties they have with Naqshbandī order. The historical record shows that the followers of Barzani sheikhs revered them as gods. For example, Jwaideh quotes the Sufi scholar Damaluji to show how orthodox Islam and Sufism were corrupted and turned into the zealous worship of Barzani Sheikhs. Damaluji notes that isolation and religious fervor “resulted in [their followers] deifying and worshipping these men” (Jwaideh, 220). The men he is referring to are Sheikhs 'Abd al-Salam I and 'Abd al-Salam II (Barzanis).

In the 1930s, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani came to power (uncle of the now ruling Massoud Barzani) as a god. Again to quote Jwaideh:

Shaikh Ahmad dominated the Barzan region with the aid of his brothers and an armed band of several hundred adherents. He was so greatly venerated that he came to be regarded as a god. A fervent devotee of the shaikh, one Mulla Jug by name, is reported to have traveled throughout the Barzan region claiming that Shaikh Ahmad was God and that he, Mulla Jug, was his prophet. (221)

Jwaideh's allusion to an “armed band” in the quotation above adds a militant quality to the Barzani god-like *weltanschauung*. Kurdish society for many years has been structured as a military cast system - the soldier occupying the highest ruling cast. The synthesis of a militant-religious *weltanschauung* was manifest in life of soldiers devoted to their Shaikhs. As Jwaideh writes when discussing the triumph of the Barzani shaikh 'Abd al-Salam II, “The Barzan shaykhs had succeeded in overcoming their enemies with their desperate band of *murids*. The religious fervor of these *murids* and their blind obedience to the shaykhs had been such as to earn them the appellation *diwana*, or 'madmen'” (110).

Jwaideh goes on to note that the religious zealotry and deification of the Barzani sheikhs was the source of constant fighting and rebellion with neighbors and the Iraqi and Turkish governments. Massoud Barzani receives similar veneration today by his close followers. I noted this behavior among Kurdish *Peshmerga* (which means one who faces death) and Zerevani soldiers, a private security force of the KRG with devotion to Massoud Barzani and the KDP. The Zerevani, venerate both Mustapha and Massoud Barzani; they place Massoud Barzani's (and occasionally Mustapha Barzani's) photo in nearly every public room on their base. When I visited their base, soldiers often pointed to it with reverence wanting me to take a photo of the image of their iconic leader. Based on interviews and observations, many Peshmerga and Zerevani soldiers maintain a blind devotion to Massoud Barzani - equivalent to the *diwana*. One can also take as more recent examples the Kurdish civil war of the mid 1990s,³¹ or the difficulties Ambassador Bremer found in working with Kurdish leadership: "The Kurds are going to be a real problem," he told British Prime Minister Tony Blair (268). He went on to inform Blair that the Kurds were setting up a "shadow government" inside Kirkuk (268).

The Barzani Sheikhs, of course, were not the only gods to have strutted onto the Iraqi stage. It is well documented that Saddam Hussein perpetuated his own god-like status among Iraqis. He encouraged the belief that he shared the identity of Nebuchadnezzar and that he would lead Iraq and the rest of the Arab world to glorious unification. Jerrold M. Post, M.D. and Amatzia Baram, Ph.D. in their psychological study of Saddam entitled, "Saddam is Iraq and Iraq is Saddam," stress that Saddam promoted a messianic and god-like image of himself. He most likely did not compare himself to god out-right as that would have outraged the many Iraqi

³¹ See Appendix E timeline the years 1992 through 1997. Also see Michael M. Gunter's "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq" in *Middle East Journal* for a history of the causes of this civil war.

Muslims. Post and Baram write, “In pursuit of his messianic dreams, there is no evidence he is constrained by conscience. His only loyalty is to Saddam Hussein. When there is an obstacle in his revolutionary path, Saddam eliminates it, whether it is a previously loyal subordinate or a previously supportive country.” The two authors go on to add that he created a god-like image by posting giant portraits of himself at the entrance of every large city with lights to make the portraits seemingly glow at night.

However, the best evidence of Saddam's *hybris* is the genocide he committed against the Kurds in the late 1980s known as the *Anfal* campaign. Kurdish officials believe that over 180,000 Kurds lost their lives in the chemical gassing of villages and systematic execution of entire rural villages. An accurate number of the Kurds who died in the genocide will never be known.³² The campaign was carried out in eight phases throughout the rural Kurdish region of Iraq (Anfal I through VIII under the leadership of Ali Hasan al Majid - now known as chemical Ali)³³. Anfal lasted from February 1988 to September 1988. The most well-known of the attacks occurred in the town of Halabja in which 5000 Kurdish civilians were gassed was carried out during Anfal I on 16 March 1988. Not only were chemicals used for mass killings of civilians but al-Majid's army rounded up entire Kurdish villages, sent them to detention centers, tortured, and killed them *en masse*. These events have left an indelible mark on the Kurdish *weltanschauung*, equivalent to the effect the holocaust has had on the individual and communal psyche of the Jewish community. Most *Peshmerga* and Kurds interviewed in Iraq have a

³² Powers, Samantha. “Iraq: ‘Human Rights and Chemical Weapons Use Aside.’” *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. Harper Perennial: New York, 2007.

³³ McDowall, David. “The Road to Genocide, 1975-1988.” *A Modern History of the Kurds*. London: I.B. Taurus, 2009. 343-367.

pathological fear of the Ba'th party returning to Iraq and deep mistrust of Arabs (especially Sunni) in positions of power. Many *Peshmerga* would tell me during interviews that “a party never dies,” referring to the Arabs of the old Ba'th party. Of course, the irony is that it can also refer to their own Kurdish parties. This world view or *weltanschauung* is best summarized by one *Peshmerga* officer interviewed at a Ninewa checkpoint:

. . . . the Americans treat the Arabs and Kurds alike. We are mad about this because you say that we [Kurds] are like Arabs. But we are not like Arabs. . . Now, if we [Kurds] work with Americans, we mean it and we will never stop. Arab people say this, but they don't mean it. They will stab you in the back. It depends on if the Arabs are working with a clean heart. But if they stab us in the back, then that trust will not continue. We had a dictatorship, and since 2003 we started using a democratic system. But do Arabs use the democratic system the right way? A party [Ba'athists] never dies - How long will it take to clean their mind? It will take a couple of generations. Arabs don't have an idea what democracy means.³⁴

The officer's words express his fear of the Ba'th, his ethnic pride, and extreme prejudice toward Arabs, conflating Arab ethnicity with the Ba'th party because the Ba'th party was originally founded on principles of pan-Arab nationalism (although the original principles were no longer in play under the cult of the Saddam regime) and committed (under Saddam) the genocide against Kurds. His words also express the Kurdish desire to pit Americans against Arabs in favor of the Kurdish nationalist cause, believing that American's own fear and mistrust of the Arab world will work to the Kurdish advantage.

The Iraqi Ba'th party was turned into a cult following for Saddam. And this cult following, of course, rivaled the cult followings that Kurdish leaders (sheikhs and secularist political leaders) had established in the Kurdish region as described above. Saddam's example of

³⁴ Peshmerga OIC. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and translator. Ninewa. March 2011.

hybris - considering himself like a god and committing acts of genocide - is not unique to this region. Kurdish leaders, too, have made their own attempts at ethnic cleansing throughout history. In the late 1820s and early 30s, Muhammad Pasha, known as the one-eyed pasha of Rawanduz, wiped out Yezidi and Christian villages, nearly exterminating the Yezidis but for the Ottoman Sultan stopping the massacres at the last minute. The one-eyed pasha also defeated his Kurdish rivals the Baradost, Shirwan, Surchi, Khoshnaw, and Mamish tribes. And he expelled the Kurdish Baban rulers. A decade later the Kurdish leader Bedir Khan Beg converted Yezidis “by argument or by sword.” But Bedir Khan's most egregious crime would be to exterminate the Nestorian Christians (man, woman, and child) a campaign that was so cruel and brutal that it opened the door to foreign powers (British and European) to begin “meddling in Ottoman affairs.” By the late 19th century and early 20th century, the Kurdish area of northern Iraq was becoming more and more the domain of solitary powerful Kurdish sheikhs.

One such Kurdish leader was Sheikh 'Ubayd Allah who attempted to unite all Kurds under one umbrella known as the Kurdish League in the late 1880s in response to article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin which proposed an autonomous Armenian state (an event that stoked Kurdish fears of Armenians). He sent his son, Sheikh 'Abd al-Qadir, to invade Persia in 1880. His son, massacred 3,000 men, women and children in the town of Miyanduab. The massacre would help persuade the U.S. Congress to institute the first formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Persia on 5 August 1882 (Jwaideh 92-95). It is well known that Kurds participated in the genocide against Armenians alongside the Turks in 1915. In fact, the Ottoman Sultan recognized Kurdish tribes, armed Kurdish warriors, and subsumed them in the Turkish army throughout the late 1880s and early 1900s to deal with Armenian and Nestorian Christians

seeking an independent homeland of their own. Edwin Munsell Bliss, in an article published in 1894 in Harper's Weekly, describes one set of events related to the Hamidian Massacres of 1894-96 in which the Sultan's army, combined of Kurds and Turks, attempted to repress Armenian protests and rebellions by creating such carnage of women and children that it "rivals the stories of Barbarians in Rome and the experiences of Bulgaria." He notes that 4,000 (perhaps as many as 10,000) men, women and children were brutally killed (Bliss 1242).

Of more recent interest is the 2006 demonstrations by the people of Halabja (the same community Saddam attacked with chemical weapons) against their own Kurdish government for its neglect and corruption. The KRG's response was to suppress the demonstrations "with considerable violence" (Tripp, *History of Iraq*, 309). The people who became the symbol of Saddam's ethnic cleansing against the Kurds, became the victims of their own Kurdish brothers. And, finally, as Ambassador Bremer mentions regarding his difficulties with Kurdish leaders, "For Barzani, reversing Arabization of Kirkuk had become a sacred duty. He'd been giving speeches proclaiming that 'Kirkuk is the Jerusalem of Kurdistan'" (Bremer 271). The City of Kirkuk became a *metonymic fusion* of Barzani's own divine vision of himself and the Kurds.

Iraq's instability is partially (or perhaps mostly) caused by leaders *possessed* by the *demons* of their *weltanschauung* - a *hybris*.³⁵ No doubt both Saddam and the Kurdish sheikhs felt that their particular worldview allowed them to see their world clearly, or like Freud might

³⁵ Richard Pevear and Larissa Volkhonsky explain well the phenomena of political leaders and their people (whether nations or small revolutionary groups) *possessed* by *ideas*. In Fyodor Dostoyevsky's novel *Demons*, he explores the psychology of political leaders and revolutionaries possessed by *ideas* - ideas are in fact the demons that lead to horrific acts of political violence. As Pevear and Volkhonsky write in their forward, "implicit at least in [Dostoyevsky's] analysis is the possibility of an evil or alien idea coming to inhabit a person, misleading him, perverting him ontologically, driving him to crime or insanity." They go on to quote the lines from a character in the novel, "It was not you who ate the idea, but the idea that ate you" (Pevear and Volkhonsky xvii-xviii).

put it, their *weltanschauung* “solve[d] all the problems of [their] existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis.” In this case, the overriding hypothesis was ethnic-pride and perhaps malignant narcissism.³⁶ They saw clearly by eliminating other hypothesis and reducing their argument to a thesis narrowed to a very painful point (G.K. Chesterton, “The Maniac,” 16-17).³⁷ Iraqi's symbol systems have played both a positive and negative role in the country's life. The first examples showed how the scene-agent ratio working within ethnic-nationalist *weltanschauungen* united people with people and people with the land - gave substance and fulfillment to their lives. The second examples showed a scene-act and agent-act ratio at work and the negative consequences of an overweening unification of worldview - war, ethnic cleansing, and instability. These ethnic *weltanschauungen* simultaneously unite and divide Mesopotamian Iraq.

³⁶ Post, Jerrold and Amatzia Baram. “Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam.” *The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 17*. USAF Counterproliferation Center: Air University, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama, 2003. 9

³⁷I borrow G.K. Chesterton’s description of the maniac as a man or woman of exceptional reason but with a very narrow thesis. Chesterton writes in his Chapter “The Maniac,” that a maniac “is in the clean and well-lit prison of one idea: he is sharpened to one painful point” (*Orthodoxy* 16-17). Composition instructors, charged with teaching successive generations of bureaucrats, technocrats, citizens, business, political and military leaders, must be mindful that when they ask students to “narrow a thesis” in order to present clear arguments and prose, they are asking students to also narrow their minds. In addition, it teaches the cognitive and rational habit of “eliminating” other hypothesis for the sake of “clarity” rather than learning how to engage with the dialogic world - develop a sense of dramatic irony. Granted it perhaps requires an inefficient writing style, but the ethical ramifications of “well-lit” cognitive methodology to the lives of students and our political and social life is staggering. The cognitive patterns and symbol systems taught in the educational system will be acted out in physical ways throughout society. Both Kurdish leaders' and Saddam's “narrowed thesis,” or “overriding hypothesis,” for instance, were proven all too harshly. See Richard Ohmann's *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession* and Richard Weaver's “Form and Social Cruelty.” As much as Burke created a theory and methodology for rhetorical analysis, he also created a pedagogy to be used for developing thinkers with the cognitive skills for entertaining multiple perspectives in dialogue. For the most recent discussion of the use of Burke in the classroom see Scott Wible’s “Professor Burke's ‘Bennington Project’” and Jessica Enoch’s “Becoming Symbol-Wise: Kenneth Burke's Pedagogy of Critical Reflection.” For an in-depth discussion of the dangers of what Bruce Krajewski calls the “clear, brief, and simple” pedagogy of writing currently being taught in schools and universities see his Chapter “Against Clarity: Hermeneutics and Writing” in his book *Traveling with Hermes: Hermeneutics and Rhetoric*. Related to applying Burke’s dramatic theories to education there is the recent Burkean reform movement given expression in *Humanistic Critique of Education: Teaching and Learning as Symbolic Action* edited by Peter M. Smudde.

Borrowing a military truism, Burke, in *Grammar of Motives*, epitomizes the above discussion: "Terrain determines tactics" (12). Or, as this section began, context determines meaning and motive. It is symbol systems of piety, *weltanschauungen* that constitute the human terrain (*koinos topos*) in both its ideational and material forms. In their positive agency, symbol systems carve out the topography of the human landscape giving shape and meaning to mental and physical worlds in *metonymic fusions*. In their negative agency, symbol systems obscure the same scene and terrain they help to create - the symbolic and material scene that supplies human motives for good or ill - as seen above. The symbolic act of drawing a border on the MCR map, then, literally shapes the geographic terrain, carving out the landscape of Iraq to reflect the image of a dominant *weltanschauung*. It is an effort to fix the context of the Iraqi (Mesopotamian) state in place. Therefore, the enterprise to write an Iraqi constitution from 2003 through 2005 was an endeavor to create a supreme *weltanschauung* of the land - the firm ground from which to build a stable Iraqi state and the motives for future social, economic and political acts that would transcend the historical scene of ethnic and nationalist strife detailed above into one consubstantial identity.

The Paradox of Substance and The Paradox of Constitutions

Each of us has become a nation in himself.

-- Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, *Umm Al-Qura*, 1902

“In Iraq there is still - and I say this with a heart full of sorrow - no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings.”

-- King Faisal I of Iraq, *Confidential Memo* 1933 (Quoted in Batatu)

“That is why diplomats smile: it is not hypocrisy - it is a sort of metaphysical awareness of the human impossibility of their task.”

-- Charles Habib Malik

Following the discussion above about how *weltanschauungen* (pious symbol systems) shape the symbolic and material ground (for good and ill) on which Iraqis constitute their ethnic-nationalities, I now turn to the metaphysical hyphen between words and war - substance. In Iraq, the paradox of substance manifests itself in an exemplary phenomena for study. The paradox: The Mutually Claimed Region qualitatively unites the people of Iraq, because each ethnic-nationality derives the substance of its identity from the land, and the same land quantitatively divides the ethnic-nationalities. Iraq is united in symbolic substance and divided in material substance. It is this paradox that ultimately gets translated into the 2005 Iraqi Constitution - the paradox is referred to by diplomats, military commanders and the Iraqi people as “Article 140.” This section, then, completes the historical and constitutional scene, preparing for the discussion of the symbolic act of the CSM as a constitution within a constitution, by discussing the creation of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution and article 140.

I organize this section's discussion in three parts. I synthesize, in part one, Burke's theory of constitutional wishes with counterinsurgency's theory of grievances. The two theories complete one another fully revealing the paradox of substance found in all human constitutions and most especially article 140. In the second part, I focus on substance analyzing the Iraqi

constitution in terms of circular representation (agent-scene) followed by a demonstration of substance's paradox in the preamble of the Iraqi constitution (it is an elemental demonstration of identity and group formation that all diplomats and military commanders must work with). Finally, in part three, I focus on the history of the dispute related to article 140. I am not presenting a complete history of the dispute; I select key historical attempts to write Iraq's constitution in order to explain in principle the historical essence of article 140 and today's Iraqi constitution that would contain the CSM. (I state upfront that in this section I do not deal with the mechanism or details of Article 140 - the three step process to settle the MCR: normalization, census, and referendum. This would be to deal with matters of agency. In this paper, I deal strictly with scene-agent and scene-act ratios - the constitution as scenic substance within the historical agonistic conversation).

Essentially the disagreement fought between Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman, Assyrian Christians, Yezidis, and Shebek using material power (guns, bombs, gerrymandering, and population movements) is also fought symbolically on the grounds of the Iraqi Constitution. Although constitutions are generally thought of as documents (written or oral) that unite, they also inherently contain the disagreements, divisions, and grievances of their transformation or dissolution. In essence, constitutions transform human disagreements from the material world to the ideational or symbolic realm. Or to put it another way, they transform war into argument or language. And this is the reason Burke chose the idiom or anecdote of *constitution* as the ultimate dramatic term to describe human relations, motivations, and acts; constitutions represent a “purification of war” (*Motives*, 337).

Symbolic warfare (verbal arguments), therefore, is a primary feature of societies. As the rhetorician Richard Weaver exhorts us to remember “at the center of the public life of every people there is a fierce struggle over who shall control the means of rhetorical propagation” (Weaver, 24). In other words, the control over a society's symbolic life is just as, if not more, important than controlling the material life. When a particular group or faction within a society controls a nation's symbolic constitution it controls the nation and nation's ultimate legal grounds for resolving internal disputes and most importantly it controls that nation's material constitution. Not only did the Ba'th party under Saddam have a monopoly of force, the Ba'th party also maintained a relative monopoly on symbols and verbal action. (Similarly Barzani and Talibani maintain a monopoly on the Kurdish symbols, verbal action and material force). No ratified constitution existed in Iraq after the 1958 Free Officer Coup which was an attempt to snatch Iraq out of the British Empire's and Iraqi Monarch's *mortmain* constitution, 1925-58.

The constitutions of each nation-state and culture contain the traditional arguments and disagreements over principle that both unite and divide those particular societies.³⁸ Or, to put it differently, the traditional internal disputes of principle and substance of each cultural group are the elements that comprise a society's constitution. It is the equivalent of saying that communities are united by their differences. That the Iraqi Constitution both substantively unites and divides, then, is not a feature unique to it. In fact, an *agreement* at an international level by all sides on a fundamental principle is paradoxically what drives the current conflict

³⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre, in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* highlights disagreement as the fundamental element that in fact unites communities when he lays down the axiom that “a tradition is an **argument** extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and **by whose progress a tradition is constituted**” (MacIntyre, 12).

beyond resolution. All parties involved agree on the *right to self-determination* articulated by President Woodrow Wilson in his 14 points speech. Wilson stipulated that the people of the Ottoman Empire “should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”

When British Foreign Officer Sir Arnold Wilson met with Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji of Sulaimania (1878-1956), a champion of Kurdish unity and nationalism, around 1919, he noted that the Shaikh “recited to me President Wilson's twelve points [*sic*], and the Anglo-French Declaration of 8th November 1918, a translation of which in Kurdish, written on the fly leaves of a Qur'an, was strapped like a talisman to his arm” (quoted in Wadie Jwaideh, 176). President Wilson's principle of the right of self-determination (as well as that of the Anglo-French Declaration) is taught, today, in some Iraqi schools. In an interview March 2010 in a small town located within Ninewa's MCR which I conducted with an Arab Ph.D. history teacher, he told me that he had just finished teaching his high school students about President Wilson's 14 points, “and now the U.S. military can leave Iraq - GO!”³⁹ The idea of course being that Iraqis should have the right to self-determination without the influence of what he considered American imperialism. The great paradox is that a consensus on principle (self-determination) creates bitter disunities and divisions among various Iraqi groups seeking the same land through which to actualize their self-determination and symbolize the essence of their identities. To put it another way, all parties agree in substance and all parties disagree in substance.⁴⁰

³⁹ Two History Teachers, and One Psychology Teacher. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and translator. Ninewa. March 2011.

⁴⁰ Another example of the international community's agreement on the right of self-determination encouraging the conflict in Iraq is shared by Samantha Power. In the chapter on Iraq from her book *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, she recounts the following story about U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Staff Member Peter Galbraith. On 30 March 1991 while in the Kurdish region of Iraq during the Gulf War he proclaimed: “We liberated Kurdistan. . . . President Woodrow Wilson promised the peoples of the world self-determination, and the Treaty of

So Woodrow Wilson's 14 points speech -a kind of draft international constitution that aimed at creating a League of Nations - simultaneously unites and divides in its attempt to transform international conflict into the symbolic realm of argument - mitigating the amount of violence and killing that international players mete out on each other's people. Although the international community may agree in principle and substance that groups have the right to self-determine, the international community also disagrees in principle and substance as to what groups are worthy to constitute themselves as free and autonomous nation-states within the international power structure or scene. What occurs at the level of “international” constitutions certainly occurs within nations' constitutions.

Take for example the United States' own constitution. Burke demonstrates in *Grammar of Motives* that fundamental tensions and disagreements are written into the U.S. Constitution. The name of *The United States of America* and the motto *E Pluribus Unum* contain the fundamental tensions between collective and individual identities and interests. Or to put it another way, our name and motto express the fundamental principle and substance that both unites and divides our nation (*Motives* 375). He goes on to explain that courts can deliver a ruling that favors the principle of state's rights or issue a ruling favoring federal powers. In either case, although the rulings are different, favoring one group's or individual's interests over another, the two rulings are still unifying in the sense that they are both in principle and

Sèvres gave that right to the Kurds. I am pleased to be the first American government official to stand on territory governed by the Kurds themselves!” (Powers, 238). Of course, by 2003, Galbraith was an unpaid advisor to the Kurdish Government regarding the writing of the new Iraqi constitution. His efforts were behind the KRG getting exclusive rights to all future oil finds in Northern Iraq (dividing the KRG from the GoI). At the same time, in 2005, while advising the Kurds about how the Iraqi Constitution should be written, Mr. Galbraith was also advising the Norwegian oil company, DNO, on how to negotiate an oil contract with the Kurdish government. In October 2010 a court awarded Mr. Galbraith between 55 and 75 million dollars related to the negotiations to be paid by DNO (Glanz, “Ex-diplomat”). Mr. Galbraith, too, was motivated by a constitutional wish – President Wilson’s right to self-determination.

substance constitutional (*Motives* 375). Yet, at the same time, the ruling divides by placing one group's interests and identity above the losers' in the argument. The rivals may be united in qualitative substance but divided in quantitative substance - as Burke sums it up:

Insofar as a good job of wishing is done in a Constitution (that is, if the document contains an assortment of both public and private rights and obligations) there is one sense in which it becomes almost impossible for a legislature to propose a law in defiance of Constitutional guaranties. The law that frustrates one wish in the Constitution will, by the same token, gratify another. (*Motives* 378).

In short, nearly every nation's constitution is in substance and principle a representation of contending rights, wishes, and ideals of its people. It attempts to *metonymically fuse* together the symbolic and material scenes of humans' worlds. Not only is it a set of constitutional wishes it is also a set of potential *constitutional grievances*. For a constitutional wish denied one group on principle can easily become that group's *constitutional grievance*. Therefore, each and every constitution contains the germ and legal justification for insurgencies that would seek to overturn the power structure, reshape society, and reconstitute the body politic in terms more favorable to its *weltanschauung* or symbol system. Aristotle, in his examination of the reasons for faction (what today is called insurgency) and revolution cogently sums up the process that leads to a constitution's dissolution:

So it seems that every distinction leads to division. . . . The important thing to remember is that those who are responsible for the acquisition of power, whether they be private individuals or officials or tribes, or whatever aggregate or part you will, it is they who provoke faction. They may do so indirectly, as when the rest, jealous of the honor bestowed on them, start up the faction, but also directly, when they themselves are so preponderant that they are no longer content to remain on terms of equality with the rest. (*Politics*, 305 and 308)

As illustrated in part one above certain factions of Iraq “responsible for the acquisition of power” viewed their world through the *hybris* of their *weltanschauung* or symbol systems, leading to continuous revolutions and fighting on the material level of war. Iraq's various ethnic-nationalities “were no longer content to remain on terms of equality with the rest.” Their constitutional *wishes* transformed into constitutional *grievances*.

It is commonly said that the essence of insurgencies (factions) is a grievance. Stated in positive terms, it can also be said that the essence of an insurgency is a constitutional wish guaranteed or granted by a country's supreme law. As the Army's Field Manual on Counterinsurgency notes, “Revolutionary situations may result from regime changes, external interventions, or grievances carefully nurtured and manipulated by unscrupulous leaders” (*Counterinsurgency FM 3-24*, 3). The circle of leaders, however, who foster and stage-manage grievances can be expanded to include all leaders - not just the “unscrupulous.” In addition, it is not only grievances (a statement of a group's or faction's desire in negative terms) but a constitutional wish (a statement of a group's or faction's desire in positive terms) that forms the essence of an insurgency.

Bard E. O'Neill's definition of insurgency consummates Burke's theory regarding the paradoxical quality of human substance and constitutions. He defines insurgency “as a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics” (15). The terms “political resources” and “basis of legitimacy” can be recast as *verbal (symbolic) action* and *the substance of a political constitution*. Insurgents, then, seek to rewrite

and re-argue their country's constitution through symbolic/verbal acts and material power - what O'Neill describes as insurgency is - at rock bottom- human's natural symbolic way of life.

Insurgency/faction, then, is inherent in the very symbol systems humans use to mitigate conflict.

So what both O'Neill and Burke describe - the urge to rewrite constitutions or the political system - is fundamental to human life. Burke cogently summarizes the meaning of constitution and its basis of human action and conflict in the following terms:

The world as we know it, the world in history, cannot be described in its particularities by an idiom of peace. . . .we are actually in a world at war - a world at combat - and even a calculus must be developed with the dialectics of participation by "the enemy" - hence the representative anecdote must contain militaristic ingredients. It may not be an anecdote of peace - but it may be an anecdote giving us the purification of war. . . . Men's conception of motive, we have said, is integrally related to their conception of substance. Hence, to deal with problems of motive is to deal with problems of substance. And a thing's substance is that whereof it is constituted. Hence a concern with a substance is a concern with the problems of constitutionality. (*Motives*, 337)

Indeed, the entire modern history of Iraq has been a "concern with a substance" and "a concern with the problems of constitutionality." Iraq has been a perennial question of colonial powers and various historical groups that inhabit "the Land between Two Rivers" (Mesopotamia) as to how to speak the modern state into existence - that is, how to constitute it and shape its paradox of substance to include all of its competing aggregates into a constitutional agreement that would "purify" their historical conflicts, divisions, and disagreements. Iraq has been looking for the ruling group or leader to provide the needed reciprocal representation to perform the verbal act giving the country *constitutional* integrity in which it could dialectically transform its traditional conflicts from the realm of material warfare to the more "pure" realm of symbolic warfare.

I now turn to discuss the writing of the Iraqi constitution in terms of circular representation and paradox of substance - an effort to shape the substance in which the Iraqi people would conceive their motives for future political, economic, and social acts. This will clearly illustrate how the material and geographic scene of conflict becomes transformed into the symbolic scene of the Iraqi constitution.

1908 was perhaps the last time Mesopotamia had a leader who legitimately spoke for all of the region's various ethnic and religious groups - Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II, the supreme leader of the Ottoman Empire. For the Young Turk Revolution of that year ushered in a century of contending nationalisms (Arab, Jewish, Kurdish, and Turkish), international power (American, British, Russian) and local power interests (sheikhs, *aghas*, tribes, landed bureaucrats, Sharīfian military officers, and Hashemite monarchs, etc.) that continue to shape the conflict of the MCR and formation of the current Iraqi constitution. Indeed, once the Young Turks, officially organized as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), began Turkification and centralization of Ottoman/Turkish government in response to the ethnic fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire's Balkan and Caucuses regions,⁴¹ the *idea* of nationalist self-determination metastasized producing Arab, Jewish (Zionist), Kurdish, and Turkoman nationalism throughout the body politic of the Ottoman Empire.

Of course, each nationalist group needed a representative voice to constitute the group. And each of the large ethnic groups of the Middle East found its representative voice that would

⁴¹ Bulgaria announced its independence on 5 October 1908, and on 6 October 1908 Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed into the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

Ahmad, Feroz. "The Young Turk Revolution." *Journal of Contemporary History*. 3.3. July 1968. 24

Jwaideh, Wadie. "The Impact of the Young Turk Revolution on Kurdish Nationalism." *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*. Syracuse UP: New York. 2006.

call the nationalist movements into being: Turkish Nationalism, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk; Zionism, Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizmann; Kurdish Nationalism, Sheikh Mahmoud, Sheikh Mustapha Barzani, Sheikh Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani; and Arab Nationalism Michel 'Aflaq (founder of Ba'th party in Syria), and Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. In short, the leaders formally constituted their ethnic-nations. Iraq had no autochthonous leader to constitute it. The British in an attempt to provide reciprocal representation placed King Faisal I on the throne.

Pierre Bourdieu's discussion of representation in "Delegation and Political Fetishism" fully illustrates how the symbolic action of a leader creates the group (an agent-scene ratio). The term we take up here is Bourdieu's "circularity of representation." He notes that a group comes into existence through a *representative* or *delegate* who speaks as a unifying voice for the group. Without this voice - a representative invested with the power of the group - there is no group, simply a loose collection of individuals in routine motion but not yet aware of itself and without direction. The group transfers its power (substance, essence) to the representative and the selected "delegate" speaks and calls the group into being by giving it voice. Bourdieu labels this reciprocal representation (symbolic action) because the individual selected as spokesperson becomes a sign signifying the group. The irony of course is that the group can exist only by giving its authority (essence) to the individual to speak *as* the group, and the individual as spokesperson can only exist as a sign signifying the group by abandoning his or her individual self to assume the substance, essence, and form of the group. Bourdieu calls the spokesperson (delegate) "the cause of that which produced his power [the group] (Bourdieu, 203-05). Bourdieu states his theories using terms of *constitution* similar to Burke:

Individuals. . . . cannot constitute themselves (or be constituted) as a group, that is, as a force capable of making itself heard, of speaking and being heard, unless they dispossess themselves in favour of a spokesperson (204).

And, finally, he sums up the concept of “circular representation,” how a group's existence comes into being, in the following *rhetorical* and *constitutional* terms of *substance*:

He can function as a passive, objective sign, who signifies or manifests the existence of his mandators, as a representative, as a group *in effigy*. . . . But in addition, **it is a sign which speaks, which, as a spokesperson, can say what he is, what he does, what he represents, what he imagines himself to be representing. . . . In the limiting case of dominated groups, the act of symbolization by which the spokesperson is constituted, the constitution of the 'movement', happens at the same time as the constituting of the group;** the sign creates the thing signified, the signifier is identified with the thing signified, which would not exist without it, and which can be reduced to it. The signifier is not only that which expresses and represents the signified group; it is that which *signifies* to it that it exists, that which has the power to call into visible existence, by mobilizing it, the group that it signifies. (206). [Bold emphasis added]

In part one, I discussed how through *metonymic fusions* of agents with their scene - the people of Iraq consubstantial with their land - the various ethnic nationalisms constituted themselves as a group. A nation or state also performs the same *metonymic fusion* with the leaders and delegates that represent them - through an agent-scene ratio a nation comes into existence - it constitutes itself.

Iraq, however, never had a legitimate leader to call the nation into being as an organic whole. King Faisal I was a foreigner from the Hejaz Mountains of the Arabian Peninsula and neither the Kurdish or Turkoman leadership were present at his coronation. As such, the Iraqi nation suffered from military coup to military coup in search of the representative leader that

could signify a complete and organic nation. It never happened. For nearly one hundred years Iraq was without a legitimate constitution. The ethnic-nationalist groups, who did have the needed representation to constitute them could not agree on who would represent them as a unified nation.⁴²

The British used the concept of circular representation to rule their empire by delegation. It was eponymously named the Sandeman or Bruce system - after the British Foreign Officers that devised it (Jwaideh 165). Essentially, the British would locate a powerful leader in a region (whether a tribe existed or not) and anoint that leader as *representing* the larger group. The British did this with Kurdish Shaikh Mahmud in 1919 in an effort to maintain control over the northern region of Iraq. The Kurds were *constituted* as a larger group through this reciprocal representation.⁴³ Willy-nilly, the British went from region to region in Iraq reconstituting the tribal system by ordaining various “sheikhs” - powerful and wealthy strongmen - as the *representative delegates* of their tribal and ethnic groups. In this way, the British maintained relative influence in local regions of Mesopotamia and literally called various aggregates of the Iraqi nation into being.

At the same time the British divided Iraq by calling competing groups into being, they attempted to unite Iraq by using the same concept of circular representation. King Faisal I and the British established the Iraqi Monarchy in 1921. By the time King Faisal I neared the end of

⁴² See appendices C and D for a timeline of the attempts by various leaders and groups to *constitute* Iraq under their leadership.

⁴³ The Kurdish Nationalist cause was constituted by other representatives after Shaikh Mahmoud. The most famous of these of course, the Barzani family. See appendix E for a timeline of the Barzani efforts to constitute a Kurdish nation-state. See Wadie Jwaideh and David McDowall for a more complete telling of the history.

his reign (his son Ghazi assuming the thrown in 1933) he candidly stated the failure to constitute an Iraqi nation:

In Iraq there is still - and I say this with a heart full of sorrow - no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate, and refine. . . . The circumstances, being what they are, the immenseness of the efforts needed for this [can be imagined] (Quoted in Batatu 25).

King Faisal I brought with him to the thrown an ideology of Arab nationalism and a coterie of ex-Sharīfian Officers. The ex-Sharīfian Officers and their descendents would adopt the Arab nationalist ideology and in 1936 begin a series of coups d'état that would last until 1979 when Saddam Hussein came to power.

By 2003, then, these same “unimaginable masses of human beings” were still divided by tribal and ethnic nationalisms egged on by international powers and interests who had their own representation (as noted above with Mr. Galbraith’s example) that signified the various contending groups. The U.S. Army and U.S. Mission in Iraq needed to call the Iraqi nation into existence through circular representation (agent-scene ratio) - the sign signifying the signified, too. The U.S., with a tradition of *constitutional* rule unlike the British tradition of monarchy, chose for reciprocal representation a written document.⁴⁴ A monarch is tangible, easy to see and represent. King Faisal I could become a scenic feature of the Iraqi nation as well as the agent

⁴⁴ The U.S. Army and U.S. Mission also turned to tribal sheikhs for help. Instituting figureheads throughout the regions of Iraq to help bring stability to the country. The best example of this is the Sahwa (Awakening), or Sons of Iraq movement based on real and fictive tribal structures. These tribes were paid and armed to assist in the fight against Al-Qaeda. It began in al-Anbar province.

that spoke on its behalf. A constitution, however, is an abstract concept that is difficult to embody. In an effort to render the constitution that would call the Iraqi nation into existence *tangible* (make the idealism of an agent into scenic material) Blank Creative produced a short animated film that gave concrete meaning to the abstract concept. The U.S. Military and U.S. Mission in Iraq used this movie to help explain the circular representation needed to constitute Iraq - literally call it into being. This time, instead of the Iraqi people seeing their image in the thrown of a king, they would see their image in the symbolic grounds and substance of a *constitution*.⁴⁵

The movie opens with an ancient scene from the age of Hammurabi - the law giver who first used writing to constitute the law of the land. The movie makes the material (scenic) substance of the constitution palpable by depicting the weight of the stone being hoisted up using the sound of the rope straining and quarry workers grunting. Next a group of men (agents) - like wise councilors or law givers - are shown in discussion. One of the councilors gestures toward the stone tablets. At the councilor's gesture, the movie transitions to depict an ancient scribe with his stylus and hammer inscribing the “laws of the land” on a stone tablet. The abstract concept of the agent's (law giver's) idealism (symbolic act) made tangible by the visual of the words in stone, the sound of the stylus hitting the stone, and the labored breathing of the scribe (scenic material). The movie is framed by the words - in Arabic- “We were the first to write a constitution. . . . And, today, we will write it again” (Blank Creative).

The movie illustrates the creation of an “ideal” (agent) that calls itself into being by simultaneously calling the thing it signifies into being - the Iraqi nation (scene). This is

⁴⁵ See Appendix H for snapshots of the story told in the 30 second animated film.

accomplished through *metalepsis* - a series of reflexive *metonymic fusions* of scene and agent. The abstract concept of a constitution “reduced” to the more tangible historic figure (historical scene) of Hammurabi who represents and embodies “the law of the land.” This figure, “the law giver,” in turn, reduced in substance to the words on the stone tablet. Here, the *person / monarch* as law giver disappears replaced by the law in stone. Finally, the Iraqi people replace the law giver as writers of their new constitution, a final reflexive metonymic transformation of scene-agent. The mystery of circular representation is achieved (at least in the movie). The constitution (agent) which is the cause of the Iraqi people/nation (scene) is at one and the same time the effect (ultimate scene) of the people and nation (agent) which create it. The constitution substitutes for the law giver (agent) and confers on the Iraqi people its existence but the Iraqi people also substitute for the law giver (agent) - *metaleptic* transformation from law to law giver (Hammurabi), to words on stone, to Iraqi people, and finally back to words in the new Iraqi constitution. A constitution (of any people) then is both its cause and effect. In sum, a constitution of a people “is the way it lives” (Aristotle, *Politics*, 266) - the real document is the way people live their material lives on a daily basis. And the wishes and grievances of the Iraqi people's lives made their way into the “document” that constituted their nation.

The Iraqi people, under the auspices of the U.S. Military and the Coalition Provisional Authority, in writing the constitution that would simultaneously call them into being as well as the symbolic scene which would provide their “common ground” had to come to *terms* with their own historical paradoxes of substance. The paradoxes of wishes and grievances that comprised the Iraqi nation of the 20th century would be fixed in place in the constitution of the 21st century. This can best be illustrated in a brief analysis of the preamble of the constitution

followed by highlighting historical moments in Iraq's history that foreshadowed the writing of TAL 58 and Article 140.⁴⁶

Burke in his chapter “Survey of Terms for Substance,” denotes three general terms by which substance can variously and *simultaneously* be defined and shaped: geometric (contextual) substance, familial substance, and directional substance (29-33). Burke calls it the *paradox* of substance because a thing's (sign's) or human's essence (the whatness - *quidity*- of a thing) is derived from that which it is not and which are always in transformation.⁴⁷ For example, geometric substance involves defining something in relation to where it is placed - its environment - “an object placed in its setting, existing both in itself and as part of its background. Participation in a context. . .”(Grammar, 29). Familial substance refers to a more “genetic” shaping of substance that is to say a thing's essence is attributed to its origin from where it came. In Burke's words:

In its purity, this concept stresses common ancestry in the strictly biological sense, as literal descent from maternal or paternal sources. But the concept of family is usually “spiritualized,” so that it includes merely social groups, comprising persons of the same nationality or beliefs. Most often, in such cases, there is the notion of some founder shared in common, or some covenant or constitution or historical act from which the consubstantiality of the group is derived. (29)

In other words, a thing is both its parent and not its parent, so to speak. Or the species is its genus but not the genus *qua* genus. The stress Burke places on the “spiritualization” of familial substance is seen in part one's discussion of various Iraqi nationalisms - the Kurdish nationalism having familial ancestry in the Barzanis and Talabani tribes and the Ba'th and the nation of Iraq

⁴⁶ See Appendix F for the complete text of TAL 58 and Article 140.

⁴⁷ Just as the *backing*, proof, and arguments of a nation's constitution come from without the constitution.

having ancestry in Saddam, lending a biological quality to circular representation discussed above.

In the third case, directional substance is quite clear in the term itself. A human's or a thing's substance and essence can be defined by the direction in which it is going. Its aims, goals, the road it takes, defines a thing's substance. Burke notes that it “stresses the motivation from within,” and is “strongly futuristic” and “purposive.” He sums its meaning up by suggesting that its “slogan might be: Not “who are you?” or “Where are you from,” but “Where are you going?” (31). The three types of substance are easily seen in the Preamble to the Iraqi Constitution. The examples chosen from the Preamble of the Iraqi Constitution illustrate substance that both unifies and divides the nation - the Iraqi people's lived wishes and implied grievances.

Substance that Unifies:

The preamble begins by placing all of the various people groups within the Mesopotamian circumference in an attempt to create a common identity through a shared geometric or contextual circumference. The Preamble begins: “people of Mesopotamia, the homeland of the apostles and prophets, resting place of the virtuous imams, cradle of civilization, crafters of writing, and home of numeration.” The scene described by the preamble is both geographic and historical (bounds the people of Iraq by time as well as space/land). The next example of unifying substance is familial. The epigraph of the preamble states “We have honored the sons of Adam,” a unification by a shared common ancestry. Another example of familial unification is the phrase, “Upon our land the first law made by man was passed.” Here all Iraqis and the new government share a common ancestry with Hammurabi and the first

written “constitution.” The example of unification through directional substance is also quite obvious. The Preamble states, “The Iraqi People marched for the first time in our history towards the ballot boxes by the millions, men and women, young and old, on the thirtieth of January 2005.” This is followed by the directional statement, “Accusations of being infidels, and terrorism did not stop us from marching forward to build a nation of law.” The Preamble of the Iraqi Constitution, then, demonstrates how the several paradoxes of substance may be used to unify a group under a shared identity - located in time and place, ancestrally of the same family, and going in the same direction.

Substance that Divides:

The Preamble of the Iraqi Constitution also implies geometric substance that is incongruous and familial substance of separate lineage. I stress that it is implied because the Preamble delineates various ethnic and religious groups within the shared context of victimhood. It tells how the Iraqi people of the past suffered under “sectarian oppression inflicted by the autocratic clique and inspired by the tragedies of Iraq’s martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and Kurds and Turkmen and from all other components of the people.” The naming of Iraq's three largest ethnic groups implies divergent familial ancestries. And this is followed by a rehearsal of victimization by region dividing the geometric substance of Iraq. The constitutional wish to be united is in fact derived by the many constitutional grievances seeking justice.

To summarize: The Iraqi People's constitution is the substance of their way of life. As such their constitution calls the nation into being and necessarily includes contending wishes and grievances that comprise Iraqi history and ethnic-nationalist *weltanschauungen* (described in part one). The Iraqi Constitution was and is a verbal act that creates the symbolic ground that would

literally shape and give meaning to the geographic ground. As demonstrated in part one, the ethnic-nationalisms by *weltanschauungen* of their own were pious to the Iraqi earth as the source of their being. The Iraqi constitution reflects the same pious attitude for the symbolic ground that is the source of a nation's being. As Burke sums up the verbal / symbolic act of a constitution using all five terms of the dramatisitic pentad:

A legal constitution is an *act* or body of acts (or enactments), done by *agents* (such as rulers, magistrates, or other representative persons), and designed (*purpose*) to serve as a motivational ground (*scene*) of subsequent actions, it being thus an instrument (*agency*) for the shaping of human relations (Grammar, 341).

The Iraqi Constitution, as the ultimate ground (metonymic agent and scene) of human motivation, the *weltanschauung* (vantage point) from which people would read and interpret the signs of their geographic and human terrains, mirrored the pious conflict over the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. Article 140 would in fact be the motivational ground for shaping the Iraqi political geography and landscape - both uniting and dividing Iraqis.

The three phase instrument (agency) for resolving the dispute - normalization, census, referendum - had its historical roots dating back to 1921. What follows is perhaps the most important key events related to writing the Iraqi constitution. There were Mulla Mustafa Barzani's demands in 1963 for complete Kurdish Autonomy, Kirkuk and all of its oil fields, and a separate Kurdish armed force (augmenting his previous demands of 1944). Then in 1970, when Mulla Mustafa and Saddam Hussein wrote out a "Peace Accord" (in effect changing the Iraqi constitution which had still not been ratified by the people), it included key principles seen in today's constitution - a return of Arabs and Kurds to their original place of habitation, a census to determine the Kurdish region, rewording of the Iraqi constitution to include the Kurds and

Arabs (Turkoman not mentioned in the 1970 peace accord). The census never happened. And not until 2005 were a majority of the Kurdish demands included in the Iraqi constitution.

The writers of Article 140's three phase instrument provided for a census to take place that would “constitutionally” resolve the ownership of Kirkuk and its oil, of Ninewa and its oil and arable land, and of Diyala and its gas and oil and border with Iran. Article 140 stipulated that the government complete the three phases by 2007. 2007 came and went. And 2008 and 2009 came and went. The MCR was unresolved. Iraq, in effect, was living out the constitutional wishes and grievances written into the document that called it into being.

In part one and part two of the chapter, I illustrated and analyzed the “constitutional” scene (the historic and symbolic battles of the MCR and writing of the Iraqi Constitution) which contains the CSM act. Essentially, the scene is one of a paradox of substance by which Iraqis must negotiate their existence and way of life. As Charles Malik sums up the human political situation, “That is why diplomats smile: it is not hypocrisy - it is a sort of metaphysical awareness of the human impossibility of their task.” Indeed, the very Mesopotamian ground and substance (the earth) that unites Iraqis by giving them a shared identity also divides Iraqis. The very constitutional ground that unites Iraqis in symbolic substance (wishes) also divides Iraqis with constitutional grievances. In metonymic fusions of agents (ideas) with their scenes (material), the Mesopotamian world became and remained divided as the 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary election neared. The constitution meant to transform their conflict into a “purification of war” was not working. The symbolic conflict of words was in danger of transforming into a conflict of violence between the Kurdish *Peshmerga* and the Iraqi Army egged on by terrorist groups and outside interests. This is the geographic, historical and

symbolic scene that implies the quality, *quiddity*, of the CSM act as a constitution within a constitution.

The CSM Constitutive Act in The Agonistic Conversation

Within this chapter, little is left to be written about the CSM from the strategic perspective of the scene-act ratio. In fact, the chapter returns to where it began in the introduction, which was a description of the CSM act. The strategic scene described in parts one and two above implies the quality of the strategic CSM act -its *quiddity*. The CSM with the U.S. Army living with *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers within the MCR took the place of the Iraqi Constitution that was intended to unite Iraqis in a common and shared substance. In the Declaration of Principles and the Commander's guidance to his Officers and Soldiers in the field identity formation (the creation of a common Iraqi identity within the Iraqi Army) between Kurds and the Arab / Turkoman Iraqi Army was to be constituted on the very ground the various ethnic-nationalities were fighting over.

The U.S. Army (*agent*) created the CSM (*act/form*) in order to bring security (*purpose*) to the MCR (*scene*) providing material support and guidance (*agency*) to the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi Army (*co-agents*). In doing so, the U.S. army sought to not only bring security to the MCR of Northern Iraq but also sought to create a group identity and form the substance of a “political” association. It was an attempt to constitute a unified group that was previously divided and to *fix* (through the Declaration of Principles and 12 Guiding Principles)⁴⁸ the new

⁴⁸ See appendices A and B for the 12 Guiding Principles - the CSM's *constitution*, way of life.

constitutional terms (context) by which all future acts would be undertaken, interpreted, evaluated, and judged.⁴⁹ A Herculean task not in myth but *in reality*.

The CSM was both a symbolic and material act. However, as a constitution within a constitution its quality inevitably was derived from the geographic and historical scene (the geographic and human terrain) that contained it. Effective security operations at each checkpoint depended on overcoming hatred, mistrust, and suspicion inculcated into Kurdish and Arab populations throughout 35 years of Saddam Hussein's reign (and before Saddam according to the narrative of Iraqi history). And for some Kurds and Arabs, mistrust reaches back to the early 20th century. For instance, a *Peshmerga* officer in Diyala begins his list of Arab betrayal of Kurds with the year 1919 when the British, preferring not to alienate the Arab center of power in Baghdad, squashed Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji's Kurdish uprising. The *Peshmerga* Lieutenant went on to opine the British failure to implement the Agreement of Sèvres (which demarcated a Kurdish State) in 1921, the failure to implement then Vice-President Saddam's 1970 March Peace Accord and the 1974 Autonomy Law as well as the fatal 1975 Algiers Agreement between Saddam and the Shah of Iran.⁵⁰ The *Peshmerga* officer's litany reveals the tremendous historical (scenic) force of distrust that current *Peshmerga* and IA officers and soldiers were being asked to push back against and overcome at each CCP. The *Peshmerga* soldier painted very well the historical scene that contains and influences day-to-day life, conflicts and dramas at the CCPs and the entire CSM.

⁴⁹ As stated in this chapter's introduction, the CSM was meant to be temporary and last only until the end of the Iraqi elections. The CSM, however, took on a life of its own lasting longer than intended and being subsumed into conversations about reconciliation and mediation.

⁵⁰ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

What is more, IA and *Peshmerga* officers are themselves very aware of the need to overcome the political and psychological aftermath of the Saddam regime (the symbolic scene). As one *Peshmerga* Lieutenant in Diyala commented, “After 35 years of Saddam, building trust will take a long time. I am Kurdish and I discriminate. However, I know that not all Arabs are bad. After communicating with Arabs, I have learned better. I think that Arabs and Kurds need to interact and live with each other - communicate with each other [to overcome years of built up hatred and racism].”⁵¹ At the same checkpoint the IA Commander said, “We are dealing with 35 years of persecution from Saddam. His manipulation of ethnicities taught us to hate one another and it will take a long time for us to overcome the effects of Saddam.”⁵² *Peshmerga* and IA officers knew that they had a very difficult challenge at the CCPs and with U.S. Army support they worked hard to establish a relationship that could stand alone without a U.S. Army presence.

However, the task seemed riddled with paradoxes and impossibilities. For instance, the same IA Commander who admitted the historical challenges told his soldiers during early morning formation, “Don't take the Kurds as your example of military discipline and of how to conduct yourselves on duty at the checkpoint.”⁵³ The commander may be correct that the *Peshmerga* lack military discipline, but his use of the *Peshmerga* as an antagonist to motivate his troops to be better disciplined perpetuates the feeling of mistrust among the two groups of soldiers at the CCPs, dividing the two forces instead of fostering camaraderie and unity.

⁵¹ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011

⁵² IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁵³ Early Morning Iraqi Army Formation. IA OIC. Observed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

Therefore, the success of each CCP depended on *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers creating a unique community of trust strong enough to overcome the historical momentum of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkoman hatred, opposed political interests, institutional pride, and the current misbehavior and neglect of their own leaders (for instance ministry officials driving around the line of cars at CCP-4 in Diyala believing they are exempt from searches or political parties and elites in Kirkuk disciplining common police for stopping and checking their cars).

The CSM constitution meets at the MCR territory a confluence of at least four historically competing constitutions. Kurdish ethnic-nationalism unifies the Kurds while dividing Iraq. Its leaders (representative delegates) are Barzani and Talibani. The Arab (Sunni and Shi'a) and Turkoman ethnic-nationalities attempt to unify the geography of Iraq but alienate the Kurds. Its nominal leader is PM Maliki. A related constitution is Article 140 itself, the democratic process of the Iraqi Constitution which appears to be without a leader, although, again PM Maliki is the nominal leader backed by the U.S. Government. And the fourth constitution is the U.S. Army CSM and Golden Lions which only have a unifying role as long as its leader is in place – the U.S. Army.

The U.S. Army and the U.S. Mission, because of the failure of Arab, Kurdish and Turkoman political leaders to overcome their past differences and meet on the common ground of the Iraqi Constitution, and most importantly because the Iraqi Constitution itself contained the same historical dispute in symbolic form, were faced with the problem of keeping Iraq unified. Even the solution of autonomous federal regions divided by ethnic and religious identity was not and may not be able to solve the problem because each of the people of the three federal regions claim the same arable land and water resources in Ninewa, the oil riches of Kirkuk, and the

oil/gas riches of Diyala and its long border with Iran (income from trade). In short, The U.S. Army and Mission faced the same problem that King Faisal I and the British faced in 1921 - “unimaginable masses of people.” And like King Faisal I the U.S. Army discussed the CSM as a method for using the Army to create a common Iraqi identity and to form the nation.

The geographic and historical scene implied the quality of the U.S. Army's act - a constitution within a constitution. As one IA Colonel (Kurdish) when asked if the CSM had become a substitution for the constitution said, while shaking his head emphatically and smiling, “Yes, definitely, it has taken the place of the constitution.”⁵⁴ Or as one *Peshmerga* commander described in Ninewa after learning that the CCP's equipment would be signed over to his rival in the IA:

The U.S. CPT came and signed the equipment over to [my rival]. I will not accept that! [He] is on the other side of the river and has only been here for a short amount of time. I blame the U.S. Lieutenant and his group for signing the equipment over to [him]. This material will stay with this base (CCP). Since 2005, we were the only ones pulling security on this CCP and now the U.S. is here. After the withdrawal I will stay. This was my checkpoint and it is my region. It is my right to have this equipment. How can that be fair that someone from the outside gets this material? If you continue down this road, it means that there will be a fight! If you did this to [my rival], he would not accept this. It is bad for my reputation to lose this equipment at the CCP. It is my responsibility to fight for this.⁵⁵

The property of the CSM scene had become the property of the MCR scene - the greater historical and constitutional struggle and battle to own the land of north central Iraq. What the U.S. Army intended to be a symbol of “neutral” Iraqi identity within the Army, known as the

⁵⁴ IA Colonel. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall. COB Speicher. May 2011.

⁵⁵ *Peshmerga* Commander. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. February 2011.

Golden Lions, became a means for both *Peshmerga* and IA to occupy the geographic and human terrain of their respective leaders' political desire. After the 2010 elections, the CSM as a mechanism for creating a greater Iraqi consubstantial identity, entered that realm in which Charles Malik tells us diplomats are smiling, for they realize the “metaphysical impossibility of their task.” The task for the CSM was to reconcile the various *weltanschauungen* of Iraq - to help the Kurdish, Arab, and Turkoman leaders see through their pious and at times *hybristic* “fog of symbols.”

The CSM succeeded substantially as a mechanism (agency) but substantially met with the same challenges and short comings of past Iraqi constitutions - a lack of an organic (scene/context) and unifying idea (agent) of substance and trust. As one *Peshmerga* officer noted when asked how military convoys were allowed to pass through the Kirkuk checkpoints without calling ahead of time - a violation of the Declaration of Principles and the 12 Guiding Principles, “We will do whatever our political leaders tell us to do.”⁵⁶ Or as one senior officer in the *Peshmerga* noted, “If the politicians work together well the CCPs will work together.” He followed saying that the army (*Peshmerga*) was “neutral” or a-political. I responded, “Yes, but the army follows the orders of its political leaders.” He just smiled - the smile that recognizes “the metaphysical impossibility of their task.”⁵⁷

The historical and theoretical context now established and the CSM constitutional act situated within its historical conversation, it remains to arm ourselves with our methodological tool for understanding “metaphysical impossibilities,” or dramatically put, “paradoxes of

⁵⁶ *Peshmerga* OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

⁵⁷ *Peshmerga* Commander. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. February 2011.

constitutional substance.” In the following chapter, I turn to develop dramatism as a comprehensive theory for understanding the shaping and formation of human identity, motives, and aesthetic forms in everyday conversation. The soldiers standing at the checkpoints transform into poets writing the poetry of their lives in their conversations. I briefly discuss how dramatism is applied in the dissertation to provide both a constitutional and pentadic reading of soldiers’ conversations. Now that we have participated in the larger historical and agonistic conversation, we can participate in the soldiers’ conversations in each region and at each combined checkpoint to chart and describe the pentadic laws at work as they attempt to rhetorically constitute themselves. Chapter 2, then, establishes the dramaturgical methodology that will allow us to disclose the poetic acts of soldiers in their everyday conversations and disclose the differences of identification and identity present in each CSM region.

Chapter 2

Research Methodology: Measuring the Rhetorical Constitution of the CSM

The field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory.

-- Bronislaw Malinowski, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*

Sociologists don't study villages; they study *in* villages.

-- Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*

Whereas the first chapter applied dramatism to the larger geo-political scene or context to establish the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) as a symbolic and constitutional act contained by a historical geo-political scene and agonistic conversation, the following chapter discusses the dramatisitic methodology used to analyze the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) communities, a brief description of the primary research (the data collection) in order to describe from where the data originated in this dissertation's secondary analysis, and the process used in this dissertation to sort the data. The discussion of methodology will explain the key concepts and terms of dramatism important for understanding the analysis in the chapters to come. In so doing, the chapter will situate the dissertation's outcomes within current discussions and applications of Kenneth Burke's dramatisitic theory of human relations. By beginning the first chapter with the application of the pentad's ratios (mainly scene agent and scene act) on a "global" context and now turning to the narrower focus of the CSM and each of Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) within the CSM, the dissertation demonstrates the scalability of the pentad to analyze and shed light on constitutional and symbolic acts of *identification* that shape human reality within a vast circumference as well as a very narrow circumference. The important terms that create dramatisitic methodology are act, constitution, substance, and pentadic ratios. It is

these four basic concepts that contain the entire dramatistic methodology which will be discussed below.⁵⁸

Dramatism: A Research Methodology

Things move; humans act. This is the axiom which undergirds dramatistic theory and methodology. Humans transform the realm of motion into the realm of action through the application of learned symbol systems. These learned symbol systems (most notably language, but also included are images, dance, music, painting etc.) give meaning and purpose to the mere motion of things and persons. Using symbols, mankind creates a world both apart of and a part from the given natural and material world of purposeless motion.⁵⁹ And as Burke trenchantly observes, it is symbolic “orders” and “hierarchies” of terms (“terministic screens” or “pities”) that divide or unite one person from or with another through rhetorical identifications and divisions.⁶⁰ He writes, “Two men may be standing side by side performing the same 'operations,' so far as the carrying out of instructions is concerned. Yet they are performing radically different acts if one is working for charitable purposes and the other to the ends of vengeance.

They are performing the same *motions* but different *acts*” [bold emphasis added] (*GM* 108).

It is human's symbol systems, then, that provide the ultimate *motives* for human *acts* -

⁵⁸ For a description of the Combined Security Mechanism itself, its geographic location, security elements, and agents please see Appendix J.

⁵⁹ See Burke's “(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action,” pages 813-15 and particularly the maxim that “symbolic action is not reducible to terms of sheer motion,” which is what differentiates dramatism from behaviorism. And also see “Dramatism.” in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, particularly the section entitled “The Nature of Symbolic Action” on page 448.

⁶⁰ As Burke writes in *Rhetoric of Motives*, “Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity” (22). A rhetorician creates corporate unities by using language and symbols to identify a substance that individuals have in common - they become consubstantiated or “identified” as a unit.

simultaneously constituting the character, meaning, and purpose of their motion by transforming it into “the image of their imagery,” thus making it a meaningful *act* which embodies their identity in tangible and aesthetic form. (Burke, *Philosophy*, 116).

Constitution, after *act*, is the next of dramatism's primary terms. *Constitution* is a *multum in parvo* anecdote which generates dramatism's entire qualitative terminology and establishes a simple, complete, and pliant methodology for the study of human relations (*GM* 324). It is able to generate all of dramatism's methodological terminology because it is an archetype or ideal model possessing four representative qualities of human relations and reality: 1) it is a symbolic act, 2) it is an “agonistic instrument”, 3) it shares *substance's* protean and paradoxical nature, and 4) it generates dramatism's five terms and ratios of terms. A brief discussion of constitution's four qualities will unfold dramatism's terminology and methodology for use in the field.

First, constitutions are ideal symbolic acts that shape communities' and groups' intrinsic identity/substance and extrinsic environment by ordering the terms and images that motivate future corporate and individual acts. Burke summarizes the concept in his article “Questions and Answers about the Pentad,” “The Constitution is in itself a verbal enactment. But in defining a realm of motives for the citizens' acts with regard to the nation's material resources, it constitutes a socio-political scene for those acts” (334).⁶¹ He goes further in *Grammar of Motives* to assert that constitutions are an act of *human will* writing that “A Constitution would be an 'idealistic anecdote' in that its structure is an enactment of human wills” (*GM* 323). Exactly what this enactment of human wills does “is to *substantiate an ought* (to base a statement as to *what should be* upon a statement as to *what is*)” (*GM* 358). As such, a constitution is an agent's

⁶¹ Note one of Aristotle's definitions for constitution in *The Politics*: “For the constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives” (266) in which Aristotle hints at constitutions' self-grounding nature.

command about the substance/identity of associations and groups; therefore, a constitution lays down “a set of *motives*” not only for future acts but “terministic screens” or “god-terms” which *interpret*, name, and order future contingent situations. And these interpretations and application of terms, filtered through the symbol system and *weltanschauung* of an enacted constitution, become the concrete motives and ground for future acts. (*GM* 342 and *PC* 19-36). In short, a constitution is the ideal rhetorical act that transforms individual and group motions into the purposeful acts of unified social and political bodies (*RM* 20-23). Finally, Burke himself sums up the way in which symbolic acts (the application of terms) bound and therefore create grounds for new and future acts. He writes that symbolic “acts become scenic in that *enactments* survive as *constitutions*,” the very ground for interpreting future events and acts (*GM* 420).

Second, “Constitutions are agonistic instruments. They involve an enemy, implicitly or explicitly.” (*GM* 357). A constitution assumes conflict between competing groups, identities, and interests. And, thus, it “establishes a motivational fixity of some sort, in opposition to something that is thought liable to endanger this fixity” (*GM* 357). Transformation of combat into the symbolic realm of constitutions, then, does not preclude enmity or competing claims but allows for competing claims to stand side by side to be adjudicated through verbal argument. As Burke makes special note:

We are actually in a world at war - a world at combat - and even a calculus must be developed with the dialectics of participation by “the enemy” - hence the representative anecdote [constitution] must contain militaristic ingredients. It may not be an anecdote of peace - but it may be an anecdote giving us the purification of war. (*GM* 337)

A constitution's fundamental agonistic principle is important to the dramatistic methodology because it admonishes researchers and analysts to treat conflicting identities and symbol systems

as a given and natural element of human relations.⁶² What is more, the agonistic nature of constitutions implies that identity's strife is inherent in language and symbol systems. The symbols that unite one group in cooperation also divide it from a second or third group. Constitutions do not create peace, then, by the elimination of conflict. They provide for peace by transforming physical conflict into verbal acts and argument (which means they also provide the impulse for future physical conflicts). In short, a constitution provides the linguistic and symbolic equipment necessary to engage in conflict at the verbal realm. Constitutions, as the archetype of human relations, are substantially and inherently phenomena of conflict.

Third, constitutions possess the protean and paradoxical qualities of the poetic and philosophical term *substance*. To continue the description of constitution, then, it is necessary to discuss the nature of substance. Substance is, like act, a foundational term of dramatistic methodology. It provides dramatism with its pliable measuring tool for analyzing human motivations in a well-rounded manner that avoids easy and over-simplified monologic explanations of human acts. As Robert Wess notes, substance is what gives the dramatistic methodology its “convertibility” between various terms that place and account for human motivations and acts (“Burke's Dialectic 16). Burke places substance at the center of dramatism

⁶² For the purposes of a chapter on dramatistic methodology as applied in the field, it is not necessary or convenient to go into great detail about how competing wishes are adjudicated in forensic combat or legal argument. It suffices to say that competing *volitional* principles, that is constitutional wishes (e.g. states rights, individual rights, right to self determination etc.), require *necessary* principles (a methodology) that “define a procedure for” adjudicating conflicting and *guaranteed* constitutional wishes between rivals - a legal tradition, so to speak (*GM* 375). For an in-depth discussion of the importance of *volitional* and *necessary* principles see Robert Wess' “Burke's Dialectic of Constitutions.” *Pre/Text* 12.1-2 (1991): 10-30. Also see M. Elizabeth Weiser's excellent discussion in *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*. U of South Carolina P: Columbia, 2008. p.127-130. Also see Dana Anderson's discussion of volitional and necessary principles in *Identities Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversation* pages 48-54. And see Burke's own discussion on pages 373 to 401 in *Grammar of Motives*.

because it reveals the paradoxical nature of human essence (identity) and motives, for substance refers to both the intrinsic (psychological) and extrinsic (material) natures of human identity (GM 21-58). He sums up the dramatistic aspects of substance in the following way:

Dialectically considered (that is, “dramatistically” considered) men are not only *in nature*. The cultural accretions made possible by the language motive become a “second nature” with them. Here again we confront the ambiguities of substance, since symbolic communication is not a merely external instrument, but also intrinsic to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterize both “the human situation” and what men are “in themselves” (GM 33).

In sum, substance names what a person (or group) both is, its intrinsic identity, and what it is not, its environment or scene. For example, one can speak of a person's substance as who or what his or her friends are, according to the old bromide, “we are who our friends are.” Or one can speak of a person's substance as their inner ideals and individual character, “He or she is his or her own man or woman.” The importance and protean character of substance will fully manifest itself by continuing the discussion of constitutions. In fact, from this point forward, substance will always be lurking in the discussion of constitution as a kind of “shadow constitution.”

How do constitutions share the paradoxical nature of substance? As noted in the discussion of a constitution's first quality above, a constitution is a symbolic act that shapes individual and group substance or identity. Yet it is an agent's idealized substance or essence that also lays down, shapes, and orders the terms of the very constitution used to shape and *fix* motivational substance. In short, a constitution is that which expresses the intrinsic nature of a group by creating its extrinsic context or grounds for motivation, and these same grounds of

motivation are what shape the intrinsic nature of the group.⁶³ As Robert Wess succinctly puts it a constitution's substantive act is “self-grounding or self-constituting” (20). Burke sums up the intrinsic paradox of constitutions in terms that link it to *motivation* for future acts:

Men's conception of motive, we have said, is integrally related to their conception of substance. Hence, to deal with problems of motive is to deal with problems of substance. And a thing's substance is that whereof it is constituted. Hence a concern with a substance is a concern with the problems of constitutionality (*GM* 337- 338).

The “self-constituting” paradoxes can be illustrated with regard to a constitution's second quality as an “agonistic instrument.” Burke's *ad bellum purificandum* is achieved, as noted above, not by eliminating conflict but by transforming it into symbols and language. The same intrinsic extrinsic paradox is present in this dialectical transformation from material to ideational realm, too. Conflict is inherent in language and symbols, and as constitutions are grounds for motives, they also act as catalysts for transforming conflict into the physical realm. As language and symbols constitute grounds for interpreting motives and creating conflict, it is perhaps more accurate, therefore, to assert that physical conflict is transformed back to where it originated in the first place - the symbolic realm. As we noted in the dissertations introduction, this is the reversal of Clausewitz's definition war. In this sense, a community's or socio-political group's *traditional* conflicts will appear in its constitution. This means the conflicts of substance become contending constitutional wishes (or guaranteed rights and principles) (*GM* 373-80). At first glance, these ambiguities and paradoxes of constitutional substance may appear troubling, but

⁶³⁶³ Burke provides another way of illustrating constitutions as both an extrinsic “ground” and intrinsic “substance” in “What are the Signs of What?” In this essay he reverses the traditional order of words and things exploring the ways in which “things are the signs of words” (361). To put it another way, a constitution (symbolic act) names the exterior scene and in reverse this scene (thing that now means) will name the constitutional act by what Burke calls the logic of the scene-act ratio (353).

dramatistic methodology instead of brushing it aside is built on the pliancy of constitutional substance to transform between the five general dramatistic terms: *scene*, *agent*, *act*, *agency*, *purpose*, to which the discussion of dramatistic methodology now turns.

Fourth, a constitution generates terms and ratios for terms. Remaining consistent with the paradoxical principle of symbolic “self-grounding,” it is terms and ratios of terms that also generate constitutions (Burke, “Questions and Answers,” 334 and Wess, *Kenneth*, 136-39). A cursory review of the definitions of *term* in the *Oxford English Dictionary (OED)*, introduces a fully rounded vocabulary to aid in understanding the conceptual importance of *term* as the fourth quality of constitutions. *Term* is derived from the Latin root word *terminum* meaning limit or border. The *OED* defines the original and first sense of *term* as “that which limits the extent of anything; a limit, extremity, boundary, bound” (*term OED*). The word retains the meaning of limit or boundary through senses two and three. It is not until the 14th Century that the contemporary sense of “expression or conception” appears. The *OED* notes that the transition from the sense of “limit or boundary” to “expression” began with “the application *terminus* to the definition or limitation of a word appear[ing] in Petrus Hispanus, [which] led finally to the application of *terminus* to any word used in a definite or limited sense.”

Dramatistic theory and methodology retains the earlier sense of *term* to describe symbolic acts. To apply a term -*e.g.*, to name a situation, thing, human, or association of humans - is to lay down a boundary, or, in other words, *to place* a thing, situation, or human. A symbolic or constitutive act, then, is an attempt to place or fix the identity of an individual or group within a *terministic* context or circumference. In addition, to select a term to classify, name, or describe a situation or event is to perform a self-constituting symbolic act. In short, it determines the

context by which the situation is interpreted and the interpretation provides the motives for actions. (Wess, “Burke's Dialectic,” 20). In other words, human's linguistic terms not only *describe* situations and events they *circumscribe*, or more importantly, create - by carving out a delimited territory - situations and events (Consider the importance of carving out a *Kurdish* or *Arab* circumference on Iraq's map. It provides the context for an entire nation's collective acts; it gives them their nationalist motive). One's identity/substance - that which determines motives - is determined by the words used to constitute the scenic substance of that identity. Finally, as Burke concisely sums up the case, “To select a set of terms is, by the same token, to select a circumference” (*GM* 90).

Dramatistic methodology makes a link between motive, constitutions, and terms. From this point forward *term* can be read as synonymous with circumference or boundary. As Burke asserts the selection and ordering of terms is a creative act. He writes that an agent's selection of “terms . . . will thereby establish a circumference, marking the outer boundaries of the ground that is to be covered. [An agent] . . . will have acted creatively – and the motives and motifs featured by his terminology will fix the nature of the constitution which he has enacted” (*GM* 86). As noted above, a constitutional act creates “a socio-political scene.” (“Questions” 334).

To which Burke adds the following comment:

[A constitution is] an enactment in the fullest sense of the term. At the same time, its scope (circumference) as an act [is] so comprehensive that it set[s] up and define[s] the over-all motivational scene, in terms of which countless personal acts of its citizens [will] be both performed and judged. (*GM* 334)

In very practical terms, Burke, in “Twelve Propositions on the Relation between Economics and Psychology,” implies the importance of circumference (context) to changing human identity. In

proposition #5 he states that “In this complex world, one is never a member of merely one 'corporation.' The individual is composed of many 'corporate identities.' Sometimes they are concentric, sometimes in conflict” (243). A symbolic or rhetorical act (the fixing of a term or word), then, is an attempt to place or fix the identity of an individual or group within a *terministic* context or scene (scene-agent ratio as we saw on a historical national scale in Chapter 1). This is easily understood in the common sense expression that a man or woman is known by “what *circles* he or she runs in.” And of course, a human can run in conflicting circles of substance and identity and often has to negotiate such conflicting “corporate identities.”

There are, however, as many constitutive and conflicting acts as there are conflicting terms in human language. Burke brings this to the fore when noting the almost infinite nature of terms and constitutions. He writes that “one has *a great variety of circumferences* to select as characterizations of a given agent's scene” (*GM* 84). He notes the same infinite quality of constitutions:

There are constitutions of a purely natural sort, such as geographical and physiological properties, that act motivationally upon us. We are affected by one another's mental constitutions, or temperaments. A given complex of customs and values, from which similar customs and values are deduced, is a constitution. And we may within limits, arbitrarily set up new constitutions, legal substances designed to serve as motives for the shaping or transforming of behavior. (*GM* 342)

It is easily observed, then, that there are as many constitutions (circumferences) as there are terms. And it is the human condition of “freedom” and “necessity” to choose and order competing terms in order to constitute human realities and motives for acts (*GM* 77-85). Take for example the conflicting corporate identities of Iraq discussed in Chapter 1. A single person may be constituted by terms of ethnicity (Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman), material wealth (rich, poor,

and land owner), occupation (farmer business man), social standing, historical conflict, war, peace, tribe . . . *ad infinitum*.⁶⁴ And, when faced with a contingent situation, this individual is faced with the “freedom” and “necessity” of choosing the terms that will ground his or her act. His or her choice of terms will determine and constitute his or her substance and identity. And in keeping with the paradox of substance, an individual could choose terms that overlap or even seem to be contradictory. To use an example related to the CSM, a *Kurdish* soldier can consider himself a part of the *Kurdish* struggle for an autonomous national state even while serving as an officer in the *Iraqi Army* commanding *Arab* soldiers. In this case, the terms of substance and identity overlap in seemingly conflicting circumstances and identities. It is up to the individual, political, and military leaders to *order* these conflicting terms of identity. And they attempt to do so by laying down constitutions – symbolic acts. Using the pentad, we can disclose CSM soldiers’ conflicting and paradoxical choices in the chapters to come as I will explain below.

Finally, it is important to remember that the fourth quality of constitution is its relation to *terms* and that constitutional terms have the ability to generate entire vocabularies for *talking about* and grounding human motives and acts. However, the near infinite possibilities of terms *enacting* and *placing* human context, motives, and identities themselves need terms that ground a discussion of human's symbolic acts. To solve the methodological problem of infinite constitutional terms, Burke grounds a discussion that answers the question “what is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” in the terms of the pentad which serve as ultimate classifications in which humans talk about their substance, identity, motives, and acts: materialism (scene), idealism (agent), realism/form (act), pragmatism (agency),

⁶⁴ See Appendix G for a matrix depicting a small number of constitutional terms by which an agent’s substance (identity) can be fixed.

mysticism (purpose). Burke summarizes the importance and function of the dramatistic terms writing that “Men have talked about things in many ways, but the pentad offers a synoptic way to talk about their talk-about. For the resources of the five terms figure in the utterances about motives, through all human history” (*GM* 56).

In addition, the five terms form ubiquitous *ratios* that account for and describe the necessary *ambiguities* and conflicts of human substance and identity (*GM* 11). In keeping with the paradox of substance, an agent can be limited by the terms that describe his or her scene or the scene can be widened and narrowed in terms of an agents' ideas, wishes, beliefs *etc.* Chapter 1 illustrated the ubiquity of the scene-agent and scene-act ratios within the geo-political context of colonial Iraq and the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. There, agents were transforming their scene as well as being transformed by their scene. The point here, however, is not to illustrate the ratios at work - that will be done in the chapters to follow. The point is that the pentad provides a methodology of pentadic ratios for understanding groups' constitutional ambiguities and transformations. As Robert Wess sums up the methodology, “If the pentadic terms are, as Burke remarks at one point, 'the necessary forms of talk about experience,' then all of us speak pentadese (“Burke's Dialectic” 17).

“Speaking pentadese” is the crux of dramatistic methodology; it provides a method for discussing the four qualities of constitutions as *substantive* (identity) *grounds* for human motives and acts. The introduction of the five fundamental terms for discussing human motives recalls the axiom which began the discussion of the dramatistic methodology: things move; humans act. Humans essentially *act* by speaking pentadese. The terms humans use to transform their motion into meaningful and purposeful acts will *necessarily* be derivative of the five terms and their

ratios. In other words, humans, as symbol using animals, will use terms that *necessarily* circumscribe and constitute their worlds in material, ideal, real/formal, pragmatic/means, and mystical/teleological terms. And humans will create constitutions that attempt to *fix* and *order* these conflicting terms of human substance and identity.

Dramatistic methodology is fully realized by augmenting Aristotle's definition of constitutions. He writes that a “constitution of a state is in a sense the way it lives” (*Politics* 266). Following the principles and terms of dramatism, the definition is now rendered to read that a group's or community's constitution is in a sense *the way it talks* and lives. For the way it talks is how it will act and live. To understand both individual and group identities and the ambiguous paradoxes that shape those identities and constitutional grounds for motives, it is necessary to listen to the “talk” and “conversation” of a group. Only by listening to a group's or community's conversations and translating it into the language of the pentad can an analyst or researcher begin to arrive at an understanding of the constitutional complexity of a group's identity in a “well-rounded” manner.

Prior to applying the dramatistic methodology to the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) a rehearsal of key points is required to bring the discussion to a close. Constitution's four qualities are also shared by the pentad. Each heading of the pentad represents a realm of terms that can locate and describe human motives. As such, choosing a set of terms that privileges one aspect of the pentad over another is to perform a symbolic act that constitutes the substance and identity of a particular group. The pentad is also necessarily agonistic in that each term of the pentad is “bounded” by the other terms. In other words, each term and its derivative terminologies must be seen in terms of the other five rival terms and their ratios - known as the

antinomy of definition (*GM* 21-58). The dialectical or agonistic relationship (ratios) of the terms, reveals the “paradox of substance” inherent in human relations: agents can be constituted *in terms of* their scenes, scenes can be constituted *in terms of* agents; means (agency) can be constituted in terms of ends (purpose) *etc.* And, finally, the main headings of the pentad - materialism (scene), idealism (agent), realism/form (act), pragmatism (agency), mysticism (purpose) - generate vast terminologies of new terms and acts for constituting human identity and motives and thus transforming the given universe of motion into the human reality of symbolic acts and aesthetic form.

The discussion now turns to apply dramatism's methodology to the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) in Iraq. In so doing, the theoretical discussion above gives way to dramatism's practical application to understanding the CSM. This study defines the CSM as a *constitutional act*, enacted within the historical scene of the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR). As such, all five terms of the pentad apply to its description: The U.S. Army (agent), Iraqi Army, and *Peshmerga* (co-agents) created the CSM (act) to be the motivational ground (scene) for IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' future acts and behaviors. As such, it was “an instrument (*agency*) for the shaping of human relations” (*GM* 341). As a constitutional or symbolic act, the CSM was an instrument for shaping the human substance and identity of the soldiers that worked at its Combined Checkpoints (CCP) and Combined Coordination Centers (CCC). It brought together two traditionally antagonistic entities in an effort to find the “common ground” that would create a new unified Iraqi identity within the military structure. And, more importantly, as a *constitutional act* and instrument one can view and discuss it from all five perspectives of the pentad: it is *scene, agent, act, agency, and purpose*, of which a very brief discussion follows.

As with any constitutional act, the CSM shares in the paradox of substance. These constitutional paradoxes are implicit in the title: Combined Security Mechanism. “Combined” is a term of agency suggesting a method, process or way. It only remotely suggests the *idealism* (and transcendental mysticism of unification) involved in the CSM constitutional act - that Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman identities (agents) can be transformed into a shared identity - a common substance that agents might all share in common - becoming one Iraqi substance (agent). “Security” suggests the *mystical* purpose of transcending and transforming the current *scene* of insecurity or tenuous security to stability. “Mechanism,” of course, suggests the *instrumentality* (another agency term) of the CSM as a means to achieve ends. In addition, as already illustrated in Chapter 1, the *purpose* of providing security can be viewed in terms of the scene-agent ratio. In an effort to transform the scene, the U.S. Army enacted a constitutional instrument that would both transform the scene and the agents. It would forge a cooperative identity between two rival military forces by providing security and stability (scenic or extrinsic substance) in an effort to transform the soldiers' identities (agents' intrinsic substance). What this shows is that the CSM, in its title, was treated as a means to an end or in terms of *agency* and *purpose*. Its title only *implies* agents - that is, its idealism. And since the goal was to create a common substance, it would have been perhaps better to *explicitly* name the agent that would embody the idealistic goals. This line of thinking suggests “*Iraqi Security Mechanism.*”

Despite the dramatic quibbles over the CSM name, it remains that the CSM was a constitutional and symbolic act. The entire edifice and community was an argument/claim about the substance and identity of its members - a constitution intended to fix soldiers' motives for future acts of unity or division. This is equivalent to Gregory Clark's application of dramatism to

understand the rhetorical act of World's fairs. In *Rhetorical Landscapes in America* he writes that “World's fairs are, in Burke's rhetorical sense of that term, constitutions. They work rhetorically very much like constitutions rendered in words, but theirs is the language of material design and physical experience, taking the form of temporary places made from concrete, plaster, and steel, and from fountains and gardens. World's fairs enact visions of an ideal collective future, and the visitors who inhabit them each take upon themselves, for a time, the myths enacted there of an ideal society and idealized identity within” (130). Indeed, the CSM was very much a “material design” and “physical experience” intended to circumscribe soldiers in an idealized environment to create a *myth* of a consubstantial identity. Apart from the materiality and the physical nature of the CSM, however, it was a *constitution within a constitution*, an act in a larger agonistic conversation. Furthermore, each soldier brought with him membership in other corporate identities established by already historically enacted constitutions like Kurdish nationalism, Arab nationalism and Turkoman nationalism. In brief, despite its material nature (scenic), the meaning of the CSM *act* could only be understood by listening to the conversations of the soldiers living and working at the CCPs and CCCs. The CSM, ultimately, was a constitution (human act), so it not only implied “a way of life,” it implied “a way of talking.”

Indeed, the CSM set the order for many motions implied in a way of life: soldiers pulling duty at the checkpoints, training, cooking, eating, and recreation. The operations and motions of everyday life were highly organized. To understand the CSM constitution, the conflicting identities and paradoxes of substance, however, one cannot study the motions and operations of a community alone. As Burke admonishes researchers to remember, “Two men may be standing side by side performing the same 'operations,' so far as the carrying out of instructions is

concerned. Yet they are performing radically different acts if one is working for charitable purposes and the other to the ends of vengeance. **They are performing the same *motions* but *different acts***” [bold emphasis added] (*GM* 108). To understand what the CSM constitution *means*, to understand it as a *human act* requires listening to the talk of the soldiers to understand their terms of order. For a Kurdish soldier and an Arab soldier on duty at a checkpoint may be performing the same motions, carrying out the same instructions, but be performing not only different acts but rival acts.

It is through language and conversation, then, that one arrives at what the soldiers think they are doing and what they believe their act is and means - the rhetorical act of the CSM. The pentad provides a rhetorical tool in which the various fields of motivation can be used to study how the dialectical paradox of substance is turned into the rhetorical certainty of an identity. And how these symbolic and verbal acts divide the soldiers' common motions into competing acts nominally contained under the CSM constitutional scene. The CSM constitution is an ultimate symbolic act and can, for that reason, best be studied by applying a dramaturgical methodology. Simply put, to answer the question “what are the soldiers doing and why are they doing it” requires a researcher to inter into conversation with the soldiers and translate their terms into pentadese.

A conclusion of the methodological discussion requires a statement of the research question and assessment of what is at stake by applying dramaturgical theory in the field. First, the CSM is a rhetorical and constitutional argument about the identity of the group of soldiers contained within its constitutional scene. The dissertation, then, strives to answer the following research question: what is the rhetorical constitution of the Combined Security Mechanism

(CSM) and what are the substantive and rhetorical forces (both material and symbolic) that unite and/or divide the community? Through the application of dramatisitic theory, the dissertation demonstrates that dramatisitic methodology as described above is ideal for use in the field - especially conflict zones - for providing a well-rounded description of the dynamics of human substance and identity as it is being shaped by and through contending symbol systems.

Second, applying dramatisitic theory in the field to analyze the CSM constitution yields important outcomes for the discipline of Rhetoric. Field application necessarily 1) verifies the “literalness” of dramatisitic theory, 2) demonstrates the *universality* of the pentad as a pliable tool to be used in nearly every human situation for understanding motives, 3) demonstrates the importance of “constitution” to dramatisitic theory as an *everyday* and *primary* mode of human conflict, and 4) uses the tool as Burke might have hoped it would be used - to assist policy makers in understanding the dynamics of human conflict and conflict's poetic and symbolic origin. A very brief description of each outcome is warranted. In a sense, dramatism's claim to literalness generates the other three outcomes. The first two outcomes, literalness and universality of dramatism will be treated together.

Recently, Clarke Rountree in his article “Revisiting the Controversy over Dramatism as Literal,” made a theoretical and conceptual case (supporting Burke's own position) that dramatism is not a “metaphorical” method for describing and analyzing human relations but a literal “universal heuristic of human motives” (“Revisiting” web). Burke himself states that the pentad is universal when one is measuring human substance, identity, and, most importantly, human *acts* (GM 56). And in Burke's own entry written for the *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* he states “man is defined literally as an animal characterized by his special

aptitude for 'symbolic action,' which is itself a literal term. And from there on, drama is employed, not as a metaphor but as a fixed form that helps us discover what the implications of the terms 'act' and 'person' *really are*" (449). The analysis in Chapter 1 as well as the chapters to follow clearly shows that people really do create their realities or constitute their worlds and acts using language in its five pentadic senses. As Rountree states, "there is no backstage" in human relations ("Revisiting" web).

In the CSM's checkpoint communities, the participants really do speak pentadese. As Rountree and Burke both state - there is no escaping the pentad and the world of human symbols it generates ("Revisiting" web). In this regard, the dissertation lends support to Burke's assertion that the pentad figures in a discussion of motives "throughout all human history." The universality is not only seen in the texts and artifacts that different communities and societies produce, but in their everyday speech and talk. Most importantly, then, the dissertation reveals the dramatism involved in everyday speech in which agents must *act* to both create and maintain the meaning of who they are, what they are doing, why they are doing it, what they are doing it with, and where they are doing it. In other words, humans are always engaged in *constituting* their realities through their written (texts) and oral language (talk). Dramatism is both literal and universal because it is what humans *do*; they act and talk in symbols. The pentad gains its universality from being a principle of human relations and acts. It also gains its universality, however, from it being acted out and performed in everyday conversations.

And the power of language to *constitute* realities and identities, leads to the third outcome of the dissertation: the importance of "constitution" to the *everyday* conduct of human conflict and dramatisitic methodology. The concept of constitutions and "The Dialectic of Constitutions"

has been relatively neglected by the fields of Communications and Rhetoric and Composition. This neglect is made apparent in Burke's own lament that it did not receive the attention it should have by thinkers, scholars, diplomats, and policy makers. Dana Anderson, in *Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversation*, chronicles Burke's laments and the fields' neglect of constitution as the conceptual lodestone or prime mover of dramatistic theory (35-38). As he points out, Robert Wess in *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, Postmodernism* and Gregory Clark in *Rhetorical Landscapes in America* are among the "handful" who recently attempted to rectify this neglect by applying the concept of "constitution" in their own research. M. Elizabeth Weiser's monograph, *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*, which chronicles the composition and intellectual history of *Grammar of Motives*, can be added to the list of recent scholarship lamenting a neglect of Burke's work on constitutions. In brief, the dissertation adds to an incipient turn within the field to reconsider the importance of "constitution" to dramatistic theory. It also corrects an overemphasis of constitution at the expense of the pentad. It attempts both a constitutional and pentadic reading of the CSM as discussed in the Introduction.

The present dissertation contributes to the current conversation about the place of constitution in the theory of dramatism by being equally attentive to both constitution and the pentad. In essence, one cannot talk about constitutions (identity formation, grounds for motives, or *weltanschauungen*) without speaking pentadese. Now that the field is drawing greater attention to "constitution," it must maintain equal attention to the pentad as well. One must not be dropped in light of the other. As demonstrated in the methodological discussion above, a constitution as a summational anecdote of human relations is "self-grounding." This means that a constitution both generates and is generated by the terms of the pentad. The language people

speak will not be the jargon of pentadese, but their language that constitutes their reality can be easily *translated* into the jargon for analysis and thoughtful reflection about human relations and conflict.

Finally, Burke ultimately hoped that dramatism would have the greatest impact among “officialdom” and “policy makers” in the understanding of everyday human relations and conflict as symbolic acts (Weiser 90-104). The present dissertation accomplishes this by providing a secondary analysis of primary research commissioned by the 4th Infantry Division in the conflict zone of Northern Iraq. Originally, I was tasked with understanding the relationship between the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army. What was their level of trust, *ethos*, or *identification*? As Chapter 1 illustrated, the *scene* of the study was extremely complex. As one U.S. Army Officer noted, “the MCR and CSM are chaoplexic,” to use one of the U.S. Military's popular theoretical terms to describe human relations and war. One could easily say that Burke's concept of *constitution* and *identification* is chaoplexic. That is, it is always being formed, reformed, and transformed through symbolic acts and identifications, mergers and divisions. Our agonistic conversation are chaoplexic. The following dissertation is a secondary analysis of the primary research conducted in the field. Nonetheless, when faced with such a complex task, Burke's methodology of dramatism naturally fit the complex environment, and this dissertation will show that natural fit for understanding complexity.

Whether the scene is chaoplexic, out of control, overwhelming, or multifaceted, it still must be talked about in terms that are easy to understand without oversimplifying or providing a blind monographic point of view. The pentad allows for the reduction of complexity without oversimplifying. Or to put it in Burke's terms, it allows analysts, researchers, scholars, officials,

and diplomats to avoid the “spotlight” analysis of situations in which only a part of the human stage is illuminated while the rest remains in the dark (*GM 87*). I believe the application of dramatism in this dissertation will show that it is a viable tool to help officials, diplomats and soldiers understand complex environments in simple terms, analyze their own analysis to see what has possibly been left out, understand how their own terminology and others' terminology creates conflict, and generate new terminology to transform conflicts into new ways of talk. For to “keep them talking” is an acceptable form of conflict and diplomacy; it saves our soldiers' lives and the lives of those with whom we might be in conflict. However, I grant that the model employed in this dissertation will have to be rewritten and/or modified to provide small digestible lessons with real-world examples for audiences outside academia.

Primary Research and Fieldwork – Source of Data

Before proceeding to the discussion of the CCP communities, it remains to answer the question from where did the data used in this dissertation's secondary analysis originate. What is the data being analyzed? To answer this question, I discuss the collection of data within the parameters of the original primary research conducted in Iraq. The CSM research was conducted in five phases over a period of six months - 15 December 2010 to 15 June 2011. December 2010 to the beginning of January 2011, the first phase, was devoted to writing the research design. The second phase was data collection in Diyala followed by phase three, data collection in Kirkuk, phase four data collection in Ninewa, and phase five, data collection at the Ninewa and Kirkuk CCCs.

The U.S. Army soldiers and units in the field provided security, movement to and from the CCPs, and life support. Once at the Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Diyala, Kirkuk, and

Ninewa, military convoys (MRAPS, Strikers) transported the research team to each CCP.

Research team movements were dependent on units' movement times for logistical and security reasons, so work was performed nearly non-stop once the mission began. Time at CCPs had to be balanced, therefore, among research needs, security, and logistical demands. At least 48 hours was spent at each CCP (with the exception of Kirkuk CCPs which had to fit within a fixed schedule). The team consisted of myself an Arabic linguist and a Kurdish linguist/analyst as well as a 4th Infantry Division NCO to help navigate the Army bureaucracy in the Areas of Operation and provide security.

Summary of Research by Province

Diyala

Diyala research lasted 12 days. IA and *Peshmerga* officers and soldiers at all five Diyala Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) were interviewed in January 2011. In total 50 group and individual interviews were conducted.

After arriving at each CCP, I introduced myself and the linguists to both the IA and *Peshmerga* commanders (mostly Lieutenants) and conducted a semi-structured interview with each. I requested permission to interview each officers' soldiers, and conducted group and individual interviews with soldiers. When time and opportunity allowed, I interviewed local citizens affected by the CCPs and ancillary security units at or near the CCPs, such as the local Gharman police units.

Kirkuk

Kirkuk research lasted six days. Emergency Security Units (ESU) Shurta and Officers were also interviewed in January 2011. Following the interviews with ESU, two days were spent

interviewing 1st and 3rd Platoon, Combined Security Forces (CSF - Golden Lions). In total, approximately 54 ESU Shurta were interviewed in focus groups and ten in-depth interviews were conducted with ESU commanding officers at K1 through K5.

Ninewa

Ninewa research lasted 37 days. IA and *Peshmerga* officers and soldiers were interviewed at all eleven Ninewa Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) from February to March 2011. Over 130 group and individual interviews with soldiers and citizens were conducted (similar to the process described for Diyala research).

Kirkuk and Ninewa CCCs

Three days were spent at Ninewa CCC followed by three days at Kirkuk in June 2011. All participants, IA and *Peshmerga* officers were interviewed at both locations. A total of 33 individual in-depth interviews were conducted. A similar process described for the Diyala research was used.

Creating Rapport and Language

Once out in the field, the team lived at the CCPs and participated in the life of the community as much as possible. Often we were invited for tea, lunch and dinner with both the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army officers and soldiers. At times, we were asked to play a friendly game of dominoes. In Ninewa, we also had the opportunity to go out on patrol with the soldiers to local villages to conduct interviews. When possible, we also walked the checkpoints with soldiers, especially late at night when work was slow.

When speaking with the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi officers and soldiers, I spoke Arabic at all times, mostly modern standard Arabic which they understood. I began our stay at each CCP by

gathering our research team with the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army Officers in Charge (OICs) and introducing who we were and why we were there. Most soldiers, although they understand modern standard Arabic, only spoke Iraqi dialect with which I had little experience. I relied on Arabic translators to interpret Iraqi dialect, so that I would understand all of the nuances of the conversation. When an Arabic translator was not available, I was able to facilitate interviews in Arabic and occasionally act as a translator. I also relied on a Kurdish speaker and linguists to facilitate interviews with *Peshmerga* soldiers in Kurdish.

In brief, building rapport with Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* officers and soldiers was made easier by their hospitality and warmth, the ability to speak Arabic, and willingness to “live with them” and adopt their life style as much as possible – participate in their conversation

Oral Consent Script

The same oral consent script and introduction was used throughout the primary research. See Appendix N for the script and translation.

Participant Inclusion Criteria

The original research objective was to understand the level of trust and community among the Kurdish Regional Guard Brigade (RGB, *Peshmerga*) and Iraqi Army (IA) officers and soldiers within each Combined Checkpoint (CCP). To help understand the level of trust and community of a CCP and organize research interviews, CCP participants in the study were divided into three tiers for in-depth interviews. The participants were selected because they were the members that made up the CCP community or they had a relationship with a CCP community as citizens, tribal leaders, and public officials (see tier 3 below):

Tier 1: *Peshmerga* and IA officers in charge OICs and soldiers at each CCP

To respect the military command structure and make the research very open and transparent, introductions and interviews were first conducted with the *Peshmerga* and IA Officer in Charge (OIC). The initial interview with the OIC had three goals. The first goal was to introduce myself and the linguists to the OIC using the oral consent script. The second goal was to interview the OIC using the same questions that would be used with his soldiers making him aware of the questions and topics to be covered during in-depth interviews with his soldiers. Finally, I asked for the OIC's permission to interview his soldiers. The oral consent script contained information stating that no one was obligated to participate in the interviews. After permission was granted by the respective OICs, interviews were conducted with *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers using the questions outlined in the research plan and submitted to the University of Wisconsin - Madison IRB for review in order to conduct this dissertation's secondary analysis. A combination of individual and group interviews was used to interview *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers. *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers dictated how they wanted to be interviewed. If soldiers preferred a group interview then group interviews were conducted. If soldiers preferred individual interviews, then individual interviews were conducted.

Tier 2: Members of Secondary Security Elements (Daughters of Iraq, Asayish, Christian Guards, and Gharmian)

Occasionally, CCPs contained security units other than the *Peshmerga* and IA. These security units also influenced the trust and community of the CCP. Interviews were conducted with Daughters of Iraq (hired to search women passing through the CCPs) Asayish leaders,

Christian Guards, and Gharman. In every case, the same introduction and oral consent script was used. Participants chose how (group or individual) where and when they wanted to be interviewed.

Tier 3: Local community leaders and citizens affected by the CCPs

After interviews inside the CCP community were complete. If time and opportunity allowed, interviews were done with local community leaders (sheikhs and/or mayors of villages and towns) and local citizens. CCPs exist in and are contained by local communities, so the views of local leaders helped validate the information gathered during in-depth interviews with *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers. The same set of questions regarding the CCPs was used when interviewing tier 3 participants.

Number of Participants

In the original study, in-depth interviews were conducted with approximately 375 Kurdish *Peshmerga*, Iraqi Army officers and soldiers, tribal sheikhs, local political leaders, and Iraqi citizens.

Tier 1: 303 participants (individual and group interviews)

Tier 2: 40 participants (individual and group interviews)

Tier: 3: 30 participants (individual and group interviews)

The number above represents the approximate total number of Tier 1, 2, and 3 participants interviewed to achieve saturation and complete the interview of *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers at 21 CCPs in Northern Iraq. Tier 2 and 3 interviews were opportunity interviews and were limited by time and movement feasibility.

Role of Participants

Participants were asked to participate in in-depth interviews and focus groups about the CCPs. Once the general introductions were made, including the oral consent script, the participants controlled the interviews. The participants chose where they wanted to be interviewed and when they wanted to be interviewed. Participants chose if they wanted to be interviewed individually or in groups, and the participants had a choice of what questions they wanted to answer and when to end the interview. In short, the participants controlled the interview.

Sorting, Ordering, and Interpreting the Data

The soldiers' constitutional talk is the poetry of their everyday life. Poetry is used here in its most capacious sense as a strategy for creating a symbolic structure/order that shapes and gives meaning to human situations and acts. Burke states that poetry “is undertaken as *equipment for living*, as a ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks” (*Philosophy* 61). The soldiers' everyday “talk” and conversations provide them with symbolic clusters, images, and orders of terms which constitute their identities and allow them to “confront the perplexities and risks” of their everyday world within the MCR and CSM. Their conversation (collected data during interviews) is a poem to be read, a symbolic act and grounds for motivation to be understood in pentadic terms. The soldiers' everyday constitutional talk (although it does not necessarily take the form of a canonical *literary* work) is equivalent to the literary works a writer, rhetorician, and politician produces to constitute his or her world – it is imbued with rhetorical and *aesthetic form*. As Burke notes, such poetic works and conversations

“bequeathed us by history must be treated as a *strategy for encompassing a situation*,” and treated as “the *answer and rejoinder* to assertions current in the situation in which it arose” (*Philosophy* 109). The soldiers' conversations, then, which are *poetic rejoinders* to their situation, supply the material (data) for this dissertation's dramatic analysis. Indeed, Burke himself notes that *drama's* material for analysis comes from human's “unending conversation” (*Philosophy* 110-11)⁶⁵.

The sorting of the collected conversations (data), then, follows Burke's own methodology for sorting. He outlines the dramatic methodology of sorting data in “statistical” and “citational” terms writing in *Philosophy of Literary Form*:

Now, the work of every writer contains a set of implicit equations. He uses associational clusters. And you may, by examining his work, find “what goes with what” in these clusters - what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situation go with his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc. And though he be perfectly conscious of imagery to reinforce a certain kind of mood, etc., he cannot possibly be conscious of the interrelationships among all these equations. Afterwards, by inspecting his work “statistically,” we or he may disclose by objective citation the structure of motivation operating here. There is no need to “supply” motives. The interrelationships themselves *are* his motives. For they are his *situation*; and *situation*, is but another word for *motives*.” (20)

Burke later sums up this *dramatic* methodology as laying the groundwork for all *social* sciences. He asserts that “The general perspective that is interwoven with our methodology of analysis might be summarily characterized as a *theory of drama*. . . We are proposing it as a

⁶⁵ Burke famously illustrates the material of drama as an unending parlor conversation. One enters the parlor with the conversation already fully in progress. One participates in the conversation and then leaves with the conversation still in progress. This analogy fits with the research conducted at the CCPs. The CCP conversations were in progress before I arrived. I participated in the conversations (gathering material), and then left the CCP conversations to continue. See *Philosophy of Literary Form* page 110. Burke's stress of conversation is quite similar to the importance Hans Gadamer gives to conversation in his own hermeneutic account of meaning in *Truth and Method*: “We are the conversation that we have.” It was my task to be an authentic *listener* in these conversations. The soldiers provided the material, images, order, and clusters to be sorted later.

calculus - a vocabulary, or set of coordinates, that serves best for the integration of all phenomena studied by the *social sciences*” (*Philosophy* 105).

I treat the soldiers' *constitutional* conversations as the **material** for their *dramatistic interaction* with their situation. The conversations represent their attempt to apprehend and shape their situations and create grounds for acting. I apply the calculus of the dramatistic pentad to describe imagery, associations, and clusters already present in the soldiers' constitutional conversation. In other words, the soldiers' constitutional talk is already (implicitly) organized and sorted. Soldiers are not talking in some disorganized unstructured way that the researcher then has to organize. What I attempt to do is make explicit the symbolic acts that encompass the soldiers' situation, which provides them their motives and paradoxes of substance.

To do so, I use the ratios of the dramatistic pentad (as described above) to organize and sort the soldiers' imagery, associations, and clusters. The pentadic terms themselves are not the material to be analyzed. As Burke makes clear, the terms and ratios are not “positive” terms with readymade answers. Each situation, each conversation, and each symbolic act supplies new answers (material) to the dramatistic methodology and calculus. He admonishes researchers to remember that “[the pentadic terms and ratios] are really *questions*. They are but a set of *blanks* to be *filled out*. They are an algebra, not an arithmetic. The *functions* of these terms could be analyzed in relation to one another, without concern for any specific answers with which some particular terminology of motives might fill in the blanks” (*Rhetoric of Religion* 26). So the soldiers' conversations (the data) provide the material and values that fill in the blanks and variables of the dramatistic ratios.

I use the *calculus* and *algebra* of the pentad's ratios to disclose the already present clusters of terms and images the soldiers at the Combined Checkpoints use to constitute their identity and grounds for motives. I do so by featuring certain ratios in each chapter that best present the ways in which the soldiers describe their situations. I interpret the clusters of terms using the ratios of the dramatisic pentad. The pentad provides a simple tool for dealing with a complexity of terms in a synoptic way. It is a synopsis that does not provide a “skeleton” or truncated outline of the soldiers' conversations but a synopsis that “conveys a comprehensive” or fundamental essence of their constitutional conversations (Burke, *Philosophy* 106). It is the ability of dramatism to deal so simply with such complexity that makes it an ideal tool for understanding human identity/essence and acts disclosed in the poetry of everyday conversation.

Chapter 3

Dial's Combined Security Mechanism: Five Combined Checkpoints' Featured Constitutional Terms

Every human constitutional act is an attempt to create a new constitution and historical *scene* that grounds and determines the kind and quality of future *acts*. The Diyala CSM is such a constitutional act and symbolic argument intended to create a new *scene* which would imply the quality of national unity by encouraging traditional rival soldiers to “act as one common Iraqi army” in their future acts. The scene the U.S. Army wanted to transform and the scene that contained this act was the colonial and historical scene illustrated in Chapter 1. The entire historical scene reduced to and represented in the Iraqi legal constitution as “Article 140- “the dispute over the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR). What follows will show how the CSM was primarily a symbolic and poetic act attempting to shape the identity and substance of the soldiers working at the CSM. It measures the quality of the CSM substance using the calculus and tools of dramatic ratios to answer the fundamental question of act - *what* is the Diyala CSM? That is to say, what is its essence and *quiddity*? In what ways does it achieve substantive successes? In what ways does it meet with substantive failure? For we know that inherent in any constitution are forces that substantively unite and divide.

The Diyala CSM achieved success in securing the Iraqi 2010 elections - as a *mechanism* or *instrument* of security – largely due to the effort and presence of the U.S. Army at the CCPs. The CSM, however, was not an adequate constitutional instrument for shaping a common identity or substance that could overcome well established ethnic constitutions and nationalisms that would endure after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq as the ground for new *Iraqi* ideals of unity. It is a Herculean struggle to make the CSM's terms of order stand up against the terms of

order propagated by ethnic nationalisms. As of December 2011, the Diyala CSM lacked the persuasive force needed to inculcate new habits of symbolic action and to act as a reaffirmation of Iraq's legal and political constitution. It acted more as a surrogate constitution mirroring the problematic qualities of the Iraqi legal constitution and scene which contained it. And, therefore, the Diyala CSM became another instrument to be used by the various contending nationalisms to achieve disparate sectarian goals. This chapter argues, then, that although the Diyala CSM achieved success as a security apparatus, it fell short as a constitutional act and argument shaping a common *Iraqi* identity and unity among Arab and Kurdish soldiers. Instead, the historical ethnic divisions that endured (as the scene containing the CSM act) shaped the meaning of the CSM. The CSM was only a partial act that did not shape the substance of the historical scene intrinsic to the agents working at the CSM's combined checkpoints (CCPs). The historical scene – the greater agonistic conversation – and constitution shaped the CSM substance. And the CSM, therefore, became a symbolic act signifying historical Iraqi divisions and a substitute for the *Iraqi* political constitution. This chapter essentially narrows the circumference of analysis from that in Chapter 1. Whereas Chapter 1 treated the CSM within a large historical and geo-political scale and conversation, Chapter 3 deals directly with the CSM at a local level; we join in the agonistic conversation at each checkpoint community.

Diyala's CSM consists of five Combined Checkpoints (CCPs). Map E represents the Diyala CSM and the geographic scene containing the CCPs. Each CCP community is an individuation of the larger Diyala CSM substance and constitution - a representation (part) of the entire Diyala CSM (whole). The soldiers' conversations reveal the ways in which various and

dynamic pentadic ratios shape their CSM substance, identity, and, most importantly, *motives* for acting as a larger CSM community.

Each community of soldiers emphasizes a different pentadic ratio to describe their life at the CCP and the meaning of their CSM act. Of course, the soldiers do not speak pentadic jargon, but the soldiers do *feature* in their conversations clusters of terms that disclose a pentadic ratio unique to that community's conversation about the meaning and act of the CSM as a whole. In essence, each group of soldiers *encompasses their situation* by employing a set of terms and images. In turn, these clusters of terms reveal the various and contending pentadic ratios shaping the CSM community. For example, CCP-1 soldiers' conversations featured terms of the *scene-purpose* ratio. CCP-2 soldier's conversations featured terms of the *agent-purpose* and *agent-agency* ratios. Soldiers' conversations at CCP-3 featured terms of the *agency-agent* ratio. At CCP-4, soldiers spoke in terms of a local *scene-agent* ratio. And, finally, at CCP-5 soldiers spoke in terms of the *scene-agent* ratio which transforms into a concluding discussion of the *CSM symbolic act*.


That soldiers stressed or featured certain ratios over others at each CCP community does not mean that soldiers did not speak in terms of other ratios or individual terms of the pentad. It is simply that soldiers at different locations stressed different pentadic elements that constituted their associations at that particular CCP. In other words, all five terms of the pentad and their ratios are present in any human act and, therefore, present in the soldiers' conversations. But in these instances of interaction with the soldiers, the soldiers at the CCPs spoke in terms more “statistically” and “citationally” weighted towards one pentadic ratio or term over the others. Finally, although none of the ratios listed above do not include the term *act*, each ratio, in fact, is

a disclosure of the quality and *quidity* of the CSM *symbolic act*, a point I will return to in this chapter's conclusion.

What slowly unfolds, then, through the presentation of each of the five CCPs and their featured ratios is a well-rounded representation of the Diyala CSM *act* as a holistic description of its constitutional essence and proof of the thesis stated above. The description of each CCP alone is *informative*, but taken in the aggregate the analysis of all five CCPs transforms into a *representative and summational* anecdote and description of the Diyala CSM's core substance and, most importantly, colliding constitutional terms and identities (Crale, "Burke's Perspective," 319). In other words, the CSM can be read as a summational anecdote of the current agonistic and historical conversation. In brief, the analysis of each CCP and their ratios provides a qualitative view or snapshot of the collision of the historical terms of order (ethnic nationalism, for instance) with the CSM's new constitutional terms of order (Iraqi unity, for instance). And in this sense what is revealed is a snapshot (synchronic) of the attempted creation of a consubstantial identity by bringing together two historically opposed forces - Arab Iraqi Army (IA) and Kurdish *Peshmerga*. The descriptions of colliding symbolic forces that follow, then, are as objective as a physicist's snapshot of the collision of two atoms as they create a new material and atomic order. It *literally* depicts the dramatism of contending symbolic orders. The collisions of terms slowly builds through the analysis of the conversations at each CCP. And it reveals that, although the CCPs were part of a greater CSM constitution or substance, each CCP had a unique constitutional make up - the soldiers emphasizing different dramatic ratios in their conversations.

Finally, for the purposes of economy and efficient presentation, my analysis uses representative quotations to illustrate each CCP's featured ratio. The quotations chosen, therefore, represent the most prominent clusters and trends present in the aggregate data.

Map B: Diyala Mutually Claimed Region



Map E: Diyala's Combined Security Mechanism. The Hamrin Mountains, Al Mansuriyah Gas Field, arable land, the cities of Jalula and As Sa'diyah are of geographic importance to this region and the CSM. Also of note is the long border with Iran and the Al Manthuria Port of Entry through which thousands of religious pilgrims cross daily on their way to religious sites throughout Iraq. Faii Kurds, who are Shi'a, live in this region of Diyala and across the border in Iran.

Checkpoint 1: Featuring Scene-Purpose

Both the Iraqi Army (IA) and *Peshmerga* Officers in Charge (OICs) spoke in scenic terms about their CCP, placing the CSM within Iraq's historical scene of factional mistrust. A *Peshmerga* OIC stated that “after 35 years of Saddam, building trust will take a long time. I am Kurdish and I discriminate. However, I know that not all Arabs are bad. After communicating with Arabs, I have learned better. I think that Arabs and Kurds need to interact and live with each other - communicate with each other.”⁶⁶ The IA OIC said, “We are dealing with 35 years of persecution from Saddam. His manipulation of ethnicities taught us to hate one another and it will take a long time for us to overcome the effects of Saddam.”⁶⁷ A Daughter of Iraq (DoI) working at the checkpoint offered the following scenic description of the CSM stating that “These checkpoints are here to lower the tension between Arabs and Kurds. However, there are 35 years of disputes and arguments. They [Arabs] are not going to like us [Kurds] and we are not going to like them [Arabs].”⁶⁸ Both Kurdish *Peshmerga* and Arab IA spoke in common terms of historical *scene*. In essence, therefore, the CCP's constitution (or intrinsic identity and grounds for motives) derives its quality from the implied quality of its extrinsic scene - a hostile environment whose properties include thirty-five years of Saddam, historical disputes, hate, and discrimination.

Analysis of the transformation of “Saddam” from an *agent* to *scenic* term, as used by the interviewees, illuminates in detail the *situation* the soldiers describe. Saddam, the dictator and

⁶⁶ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011

⁶⁷ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011

⁶⁸ *Peshmerga* OIC and Daughters of Iraq. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

agent, performed a series of acts, such as the *Anfal* campaign, Arabization (removing both Arab and Kurdish families from their homes and relocating them to alter Iraq's regional demographics), and desiccating the Marsh Arabs' rivers in southern Iraq, to name a few of the most prominent acts. As Burke tells us “acts become scenic in that *enactments* survive as *constitutions*” (*GM* 420). Saddam's acts (and those of Kurds as related in Chapter 1) indeed were an attempt to reconstitute Iraq's geographic, demographic, and symbolic scene - the *very grounds* for motives. And these acts survived as a scenic constitution for the soldiers working at the CCPs. Saddam's acts, however, also possessed the qualities of the historical scene and co-agents - the *stage props* commensurate with and containing his acts. As described in Chapter 1 and outlined in the timelines in Appendices C and E, there were a chain of (ethnic, tribal, and nationalist) enactments - both Arab and Kurdish - throughout the 20th Century (and before) that constituted the historical scene that implied the quality of Saddam's acts.

“Saddam,” as used by the interviewees, therefore, is a *summational scenic term* containing and implying the bitter qualities with which they themselves describe their scene: “discriminate,” “persecution,” “manipulation,” “hate,” “disputes,” “tension between Arabs and Kurds,” and “not like them.” Ironically, it appears that “Saddam” survived as a *god-term* organizing the scenic substance of the CSM soldiers who worked and lived at the CCPs. “Saddam” (the term) stands as a symbolic representation for the historical scene shaping the soldiers' substance and, more importantly, motives for acts. For “motives are **shorthand words for situations**,” and, therefore, are “linguistic products” [emphasis added] (Burke, *PC*, 29-36). The soldiers' linguistic products, their terms defining or naming the situation, are the motives impelling their acts. In this case, “Saddam” in association with clusters of terms listed above

creates the soldiers' *scenic* motivation. An IA lieutenant's words further illustrate the use of

“Saddam” as a scenic god-term which shapes the CSM constitution. He said that

For a very long time, *Peshmerga* have hated Arabs; they think that we are all Saddam. Some of the *Peshmerga* don't have an education and have never been around Arabs, never lived with Arabs. And especially after what Saddam did to them in Halabja, they don't think [are unable to see] that we, the Shi'a from the south, also suffered under Saddam. We don't hate the Kurds, but why do they hate us? The Kurds are very stubborn. Some of them are nice, very nice. However, their friends question them for working with the IA, and they tell them that they should not work with the IA.⁶⁹

The officer's words demonstrate the use of “Saddam” as a terministic screen or god-term by which the CSM scene is ordered by the generation of other scenic terms (Burke, “Terministic Screens,” 47-45).⁷⁰ The officer's words above, for instance, contain scenic terms similar to those spoken by the OICs and a Daughter of Iraq above, such as “hate,” “we are all Saddam,” “Halabja,” “suffered,” “don't think [unable to see *us*],” and “should not work with the IA.” It is as though the vestiges of Saddam's enactments endure *constitutionally*, especially through Arab and Kurdish soldiers' symbolic acts - the use of “Saddam” as the ultimate scenic term in

⁶⁹ IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁷⁰ Here “Saddam” acts as a god-term in keeping with the following definition Burke gives in *Grammar of Motives*: “a God term designates the ultimate motivation, or substance, of a Constitutional frame” (355). One term contains the entire narrative and aesthetic form of the MCR, links to individuated images and acts. However, there is also a scapegoat mechanism involved here which is beyond the scope of this Chapter or dissertation to analyze. By identifying with “Saddam” (he is one of us) and piling all of the sins of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkoman on Saddam and then sacrificing him (verbally) as the cause of the entire conflict, (through an act of dissociation) the current players involved in the conflict (Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman) absolve themselves of their guilt. See Burke’s tripartite scheme of the Scapegoat Mechanism in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s Battle:” identification, division-alienation, scapegoat. And also see Burke’s “Dialectic of the Scapegoat” in *Grammar of Motives*. Rene Girard perhaps provides the most compressive expression of Burke’s scapegoat mechanism worked out in a theory describing the origin of violence in mimetic desires and rivalries.

conjunction with the associated clusters of terms - to substantiate an *ought* from *what is*.⁷¹ The *what is* being the historical scene of factional and ethnic discord and perceived injustices. Indeed, the CSM's *purpose* (what *ought* to be) took on the qualities of Iraq's historical scene of factional fighting as will be discussed next.

One IA soldier makes an explicit link between scene and purpose stating that “If it wasn't for the disputed territory [Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR)], there would not be a CCP. The CCP is just for show to make it look like both sides are working together. There should be one Army, one uniform. I trust my own [Iraqi] Army more than them [*Peshmerga*].”⁷² The soldier's criticism of the CSM is couched in terms of scene and purpose. The scenic terms are “disputed territory” and “one uniform.” The terms of purpose are “CCP,” “working together,” and “one Army,” as one of the CSM main goals was to create a unified identity. Essentially, the soldier points out that the CSM's intended *purpose* does not match its intended *new scene*. Instead, the historical scene shapes the CSM act. A uniform is a scenic property that indicates an agent's identity and substance, similar to a judge wearing a robe, a priest wearing vestments, baseball players all wearing a matching uniform, or the U.S. Army and Marines wearing their respective uniforms. The uniform signifies that the agents are one substance with their environment and will act in harmony with their scene and shared purpose. The scenic prop shapes the substance of the agents and their acts. In this case, wearing two uniforms - one *Peshmerga* and one Iraqi Army - fits the historical scene of the disputed territories and its

⁷¹ I want to stress that “Saddam” the term is used summationally to account for the total historic scene which includes the acts of other agents, such as Kurdish leaders, that contributed to the factional environment of the MCR and CSM.

⁷² IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

purposes of factionalism and ethnic pride rather than the intended *purpose* of creating a unified security force working together.

The soldier's cynicism - that the CSM is just for show - stems from his trenchant observation that the CSM scenic properties are in concord with the historical scene and not exemplary of the “new scene” of political and social unity of the two forces. It is the equivalent of a New York Yankee baseball player wearing a Boston Red Sox jersey during the most heated of rivalries and declaring that he is still a Yankee, or a U.S. Army Soldier wearing a Russian Army uniform and declaring he is still consubstantial with the U.S. Army⁷³. The scenic terms and symbols are incongruous (jarring at best) with the intended purpose, and, no matter the agents' honorable efforts, their scenic properties reveal a conflict of *purpose*.

IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers had *to come to terms* with their conflict of purpose. On the one hand, they understood that they had to work together under U.S. Army auspices; on the other hand, they knew that they had a more enduring allegiance (or *piety*) to the purpose of their historical scene. The external scenic conflicts were internalized by the soldiers who understood that serving two purposes was like trying to serve two masters. This is best illustrated in the words of a *Peshmerga* officer in the following statement:

I do make a difference here [on the CCP]. I do my duty for Kurds and not for income. If they ask me to do this without income, I will do it. However, there are bad people, both Kurdish and Arab, and I am here to defend against these bad people. There is no difference between Kurds and Arabs. We are both here to protect

⁷³ Another more sobering example of the discord between scene-agent and scene-purpose are the recent killings of U.S. Soldiers in Afghanistan by Taliban wearing Afghanistan security uniforms. Although they wear the scenic properties that identify them with a new Afghanistan scene of unity, they retain their historical allegiance as Taliban agents (intrinsic idealism) with a Taliban purpose.

people and secure the area. But the main reason I joined the *Peshmerga* is to protect Kurds.⁷⁴

The *Peshmerga* officer's words reveal a professional soldier *coming to terms* with his conflict of purposes. He is literally ordering his terms of purpose in keeping with his concentric scenes - the historical scene encompassing the CSM scene. The conflict of purpose can be organized in terms of the CSM purpose and the greater historical purpose. "Duty for Kurds" and "joined the *Peshmerga* to protect Kurds" resonate with the purpose of the historical scene of conflicting nationalisms. "No difference between Kurds and Arabs" and "protect people and secure the area" reflects the more immediate purpose and act of the CSM. Essentially, the *Peshmerga* officer reveals an astute awareness of the paradox of substance that soldiers manning the CCPs must negotiate. These paradoxes of substance (or identity), however, seemingly disappear when situations force one to place the conflicting terms of scenic and purposeful substance into a hierarchy.

For example, the same *Peshmerga* officer expressed frustration with conflicting purposes and his terms of order - that the historical scene more than the CSM scene (as grounds for motives) would shape his acts. He told the story of an incident at the town of Qarah Tapah (See Map B).

Once there was a problem in Qarah Tapah that led us from both sides to load our weapons, IA and *Peshmerga*. And I was waiting for an order from my chain of command to open fire on them [IA]. Everything is political and it's not in our hands. Iraq needs someone, a dictator, who is just and that won't discriminate. If you want to speak about democracy, it's all bullshit⁷⁵. Everyone does

⁷⁴ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁷⁵ A desire for a dictator can be viewed as a desire for a synthesis of agent (ideal) with scene (material reality) or fact and value. In other words, a dictator would make complete or congruous the disparate and divergent ideals and material realities by pointing all parties toward one *mystical* purpose that transcends their differences - a dictator

the act of ethnic discrimination in Iraq. There is actually no one who doesn't discriminate. If I tell you, now, I am Kurdish and don't discriminate that is false, I do discriminate. So we need a dictator who is just since every person thinks only of himself.⁷⁶

The key terms are “waiting for an order,” “everything is political,” “discriminate,” and “it's not in our hands.” The officer implies that the larger historical and political scene in fact sets the terms by which the soldiers act. The soldiers are the effect of the larger disagreement between their respective political leaders (scene) - they follow their leaders' factional orders; they discriminate when called upon to do so. He also acknowledges that the political issues and historical scene are larger than (encompass) the CSM scene - “it is not in our hands,” an observation about the larger historical and agonistic conversation discussed in Chapter 1. It is as though the soldiers are simply moved along by the material force of the scene and their symbols which they inhabit and embody. The ultimate motive for action, then, is the *situation* named in the terms of the historical scene - not the terms of the CSM constitutional act.

The IA soldiers also use terms that describe scenic dissonances and rival purposes when they describe two separate chains of command (note that the Kurdish officer stated he was waiting for an order from *his* chain of command - not the CSM chain of command). A chain of command can be viewed as an agency (means, method, operational system). Here, in the case of

would represent their common (and just) substance. This is similar to Great Britain using a monarch, King Feisal, to attempt and unite Iraq (although they encouraged powerful sheikhs to sunder Iraq as well). Wayne Booth in his monograph *Modern Dogma and The Rhetoric of Assent* quotes John Dewey regarding the split between fact and value or the emotional life (an agent's ideals) from the intellectual life (a scene's material world). In essence, the *Peshmerga* soldier is making a profound statement about the split between the CSM and Iraqi constitutional ideals and his scenic (intellectual world) - the emotional desire for justice is incongruous with the intellectual and material reality on the ground. Booth writes, “Dewey suggest[s] that modern dictatorships gain much of their support because ‘the strain produced by separation of the intellectual and the emotional is so intolerable that human beings are willing to pay almost any price for the semblance of even its temporary annihilation’” (19).

⁷⁶ *Peshmerga* OIC and Daughters of Iraq. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

the current checkpoint community, however, agency is so prominent it is a *fixed* scenic property implying the divergent purposes of the two security forces. One IA soldier describes the scene's two chains of command stating that

The Peshmerga have their system and government. I don't like this idea. If we are a *Combined* Checkpoint then we should be under one umbrella, one Ministry of Defense. For example, once we had to block the road, the Peshmerga Lieutenant said, 'I don't have this order.'⁷⁷

A Gharman police officer⁷⁸ at CCP-1 similarly describes the scene containing rival purposes as follows, "The *Peshmerga* tell us, 'I don't follow the Kurdish Ministry of Interior; we are Ministry of Peshmerga.' The IA tells us, 'we have our own Ministry of Defense.' Therefore, I prefer that only the Gharman remain here [at this checkpoint area]."⁷⁹ The Gharman officer (an outside security force not technically a part of the CSM community) corroborates the scenic terms by which the *Peshmerga* and the IA officers and soldiers describe their situation and, therefore, the grounds for their motives. The scene-purpose interrelationship could not be made any clearer than in the *Peshmerga* OIC's own words:

There is no one, united Iraq that's just what they call it. If there was [a united Iraq] then there wouldn't be two Ministries of Defense (MoD). The Kurds have one and the IA has one. . . . if I get an order from their MoD, I will not follow it. I roll under the Peshmerga MoD. Everything is political in Iraq."⁸⁰

⁷⁷ IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁷⁸ Nearby three of Diyala's checkpoints a local police force known as the Gharman operated their own checkpoints. Although not an official part of the CCPs, the Gharman cooperated with the *Peshmerga* and American soldiers at the CCPs.

⁷⁹ Gharman Police Officers. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011. It should also be noted that local Faili Kurds are a Shi'a branch of Islam struggling to obtain their own status as national group.

⁸⁰ *Peshmerga* OIC and Daughters of Iraq. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

The material scene (two uniforms, two chains of command, historical hate, discrimination, nationalist pride) shapes the soldiers' purpose as well as implies the quality of the CSM act. The words an IA officer uses to name this quality is *mujaamila* / مجاملة [literally “flattery” or a cosmetic show].⁸¹ The *Peshmerga* and DoI name this quality “false hope.”

It is worth quoting the words of the IA officer in full as it serves to summarize the scene-purpose ratio shaping the substance and identity of the soldiers at the CCPs. He states that

The Kurds will never withdraw from these lands; they will sacrifice themselves in order to keep the land for themselves. Now, the new idea is to include some of the *Peshmerga* Divisions under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and remove the IA from the disputed territory [MCR] and CCPs⁸². However, this will create more issues; it won't be justice. I want the CCPs to stay; however, it should be joint with one Army that consist of Arabs and Kurds, that way the *Peshmerga* can get assignments to Basra [Southern Iraq and not just remain in “Kurdish” parts of Iraq] and other provinces. Wherever I go, they should go. One Ministry, which I don't believe will happen, the *Peshmerga* will never agree to have one [Iraqi] Ministry of Defense. Therefore, The CCP is *mujaamila* / مجاملة.⁸³

The *Peshmerga* soldiers themselves express the purpose of sacrifice in order to obtain the lands on which the CSM is occupied. They repeat the following slogan, “Yan Hamrin, Yan Amreen” which means Hamreen or death.⁸⁴ The Hamreen Mountains act as a geographic property of the

⁸¹ IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁸² See the discussion of *Regional Guard Brigades* (RGB) in Appendix J.

⁸³ IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Personal Interview and Focus Group. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁸⁴ *Peshmerga* OIC and Soldiers. Personal and Group Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish speaker and Recorded in Primary Research. January 2011.

CSM scene.⁸⁵ Add to this the geographic properties of gas and oil fields, arable land, and a border with Iran (a source of trade revenue) and the geographic scene begins to overlap with the historical scene, becoming the material embodiment of *mystical* purposes - to realize a single Kurdish identity reified in the symbols of the geographic landscape and apart from the rest of Iraq, or, conversely to realize a unified Iraq more inclusive of Arabs and Kurds under the centralized government in Baghdad.

The soldiers' scene (the terms of the situation) lends its qualitative substance to the CSM purpose. The IA officer's criticism that there is not "one Ministry of Defense" and that the Kurds will sacrifice themselves for the land reveals a scene promoting divergent purposes and representing the character of two antagonists. Both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' terms disclose a historical scene impelling sectarian purposes. Indeed, the soldiers are standing side by side "performing the same motions but different acts." The purpose of the *Peshmerga* is to protect Kurdish interests and land. The purpose of the Arab IA is to protect the unity of Iraq and Arab interests in maintaining administrative control over the geographic riches of Diyala. In both cases, their purposes derived from their historical scene.

For the discussion of this checkpoint community's scene-purpose ratio, it is illuminating to show how the larger historical scene is mimicked in the properties of the local scene. At night, for instance, the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers take positions at opposite ends of the checkpoint rather than work together as they do during the day. The IA, refusing to live with the *Peshmerga* inside the CCP, prefer the leaky roof and mice infested quarters of an old dilapidated building - living across the street and apart from the *Peshmerga* and U.S. Soldiers. It is also

⁸⁵ See the discussion of the Scene-Agent and Scene-Act symbolic acts in Chapter 1.

worth noting that the IA at CCP-2 live apart from the *Peshmerga* across the street. This is not surprising as the *Peshmerga* at CCP-2 laid claim to the CCP by painting the top of the central living area's table with a Kurdish flag as shown in photo 1. In all of the above mentioned acts, the soldiers altered their CCP scene to fit the quality of their historical scene and purpose.



Photo 1: The top of a table inside the living area of CCP-2. The CCPs were to be, if not “neutral” grounds, at least provide an environment depicting a shared and unified *Iraqi* identity. The Kurdish flag, however, is a scenic feature of the CSM's divergent purposes and conflicting substance and identity. And, perhaps, it signifies one reason (factional pride) the IA soldiers chose to live apart from the *Peshmerga* and U.S. Soldiers. Photo taken by author.

As dramatic theory stipulates, the interrelationship of terms denotes the *situation* and, therefore, *motives* for acts (Burke, *Philosophy*, 20). The soldiers' conversations are organized by the interrelationship of scenic and purposeful terms. These scene-purpose ratio discloses that the historical scene of factionalism exerts a tremendous shaping force on the quality of the soldiers' acts and more importantly the CSM purpose. Despite the U.S. Army's attempt to create a new scene (the CSM act), the historical scene subsumed the CSM giving it the qualities of historical nationalisms. The CSM allowed the *Peshmerga* to seemingly occupy positions within the MCR under the name of “Golden Lions” or even *Regional Guard Brigade*, while maintaining their clearly stated purpose to protect Kurds and realize a greater Kurdish nation. From the alternate perspective, it allowed the IA to push back the *Peshmerga*. *Peshmerga* soldiers stated that the IA forced them from Hamreen; they wanted to fight back, but the U.S. Army got in the middle.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker and Recorded in Primary Research. Diyala. January 2011.

The soldiers' historical, geographic, and institutional scene - Saddam, hate, discrimination, Hamreen or death, two chains of command, two ministries of defense - constitute the CSM substance and gives the soldiers their grounds for motives. The *Peshmerga* soldier striving to realize a separate Kurdish state; The IA Arab soldier seeking to maintain the unity of Iraq to realize their own sectarian ends.

A good way to conclude and show the degree to which the historical scene-purpose ratio is an ever *present* substance and constitutional principle of the CSM is to quote the words of a *Peshmerga* OIC from CCP-4. He said,

Again, a fight is all up to Baghdad and our leaders [Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)]. However, there are 19 articles in the constitution that deal with Kurdish issues and one of them is article 140. But I don't think the Arabs will resolve it. Arabs promised Kurds resolution in the past. For example, 1919, 1921, 1974 and 1975. None of those agreements have been resolved.⁸⁷ And the CSM and article 140 is the same thing as before. I do not believe that Iraqi Arabs will allow Kurds to have success. Turkey, Iran and Syria are enemies of Kurds; all Muslim countries don't like Kurds; Americans and British will do whatever benefits them. They will not lose the support of the Muslim countries for Kurds.⁸⁸

The implicit scenic god-term in the OIC's list of broken agreements and treaties is “betrayal,” accompanied by the more explicit terms “Arab” and “Saddam.” He provides a litany of constitutional wishes transformed into constitutional grievances linked to Arabs, Saddam, Americans, and British. And these constitutional grievances create the constitutional scene (the

⁸⁷ In 1919 the British, preferring not to alienate the Arab center of power in Baghdad, squashed Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji's Kurdish uprising. Then the British failed to implement the Agreement of Sèvres (which demarcated a Kurdish State) in 1921. The remaining dates refer to the failure to implement Saddam's 1970 March Agreement, the 1974 Autonomy Law. The 1975 Algiers Agreement between Saddam and the Shah of Iran ended Iranian support of the Kurds. See the Timeline in Appendix E for further contextual details.

⁸⁸ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker and Recorded in Primary Research. Diyala. January 2011.

human terrain) that generates the soldiers' terms of purpose. Taken as a whole these constitutional terms of scene-purpose (such as Saddam, hate, discriminate, betrayal, protect Kurds, Arabs, two Ministries of Defense, two chains of command, sacrifice for land, mujaamila, just for show) indicate that the soldiers constitute their CSM substance and identity using the historical scenic terms of ethnic strife and sectarian purpose. The scene and purpose acting as a *vis-a-tergo*.

Checkpoint 2: Featuring Agent-Purpose / Agent-Agency

The historical scene and purpose discussed above reveal the *vis-a-tergo* of ethnic nationalism and the historical scene which constitute the CSM soldiers' identity and substance; it suggests a glum scene, extrinsic substance and constitution, indeed. Ideas and idealism, however, are capable of reconstituting substance, identity, and motives. The CSM in its idealism was intended to be an *agent* of change; it was intended to help the two forces (IA and *Peshmerga*) learn to be their own agents of change articulating ideas and ideals that would transcend the historical scene of ethnic strife. Soldiers were to take on the *ethos* and habits of the new constitution's idealistic terms of unity, ameliorating the scenic and purpose driven factionalism discussed above with CCP-1. The motives for their act, from this perspective, would reside in the soldiers' new CSM *ethos*. In short, they would learn to speak in new terms and act in new ways reflecting the CSM's constitutional spirit and idealism of one Iraqi substance and identity.⁸⁹ And there idealistic act of unity would survive as a new constitutional scene for future acts.

⁸⁹ See Appendices A and B, “The Declaration of Principles” and “Twelve Guiding Principles” which articulate the CSM's constitutional terms. “The Declaration of Principles” particularly articulates terms of unity, most especially

The confrontation of scene and agent can be put another way. The CSM act was an attempt to remake the historical scene and purpose. As such, it was a poetic act in that it sought to reorder the soldiers' terms of motive and identification (Burke, *PC*, 255-61). The above analysis of CCP-1 established the *present* historical scene and purpose that encompassed the soldiers' CSM act - it could be called the traditional order of constitutional terms. In essence, therefore, the soldiers' acts of CSM idealism was a push (or counter force) against the recalcitrance of their historical scene in an attempt to remake it in the image of the U.S. Army provided imagery of unity - one military force with “unity of command” and “unity of force” called the Golden Lions.⁹⁰

The following discussion of CCP-2 reveals the phenomena of the new constitutional terms of order confronting the traditional terms of order - the moment when agents' idealism meets the recalcitrance of already established social and political orders that are no longer “ideals” but seemingly material “facts on the ground” as revealed above in CCP-1. I provide a qualitative view or snapshot of the collision of these two *poetic* forces that is as objective as a physicist's snapshot of the collision of two atoms as they create a new material and atomic order. In this case, differing terms of constitutional substance collide in an effort to create a new social and political order. The featured ratios and terms of CCP-2 that illustrate the constitutional confrontation are agent-purpose and agent-agency. The first ratio reveals the agents speaking in terms of the CSM's idealistic purpose. The second ratio shows how the idealistic talk confronts a

terms such as “unity of command,” “unity of effort,” and “work for Federal and provincial Governments and not political parties.” Certain political parties, however, dominant the Federal and provincial Governments.

⁹⁰ See footnote 24 above for the source of “unity of command” and “unity of force.” See Appendix J for a description of the Golden Lions.

seemingly intransigent agency - two chains of command and two *languages* - tools and instruments seemingly incommensurate with the ideal the soldiers strive to achieve - unity.

In the following discussion of the agents' idealism the contrast between the preponderance of idealistic and mystical⁹¹ terms used by the soldiers at CCP-2 with the dearth of such terms used by the soldiers at CCP-1 will be easily apprehended. A good place to start is with a statement made by an IA OIC at CCP-2. He describes the work of the CSM in the following terms:

Of course we don't want the Americans to withdraw; however, we and the Peshmerga dominate these areas. It's ok if the U.S withdraws [from the CCP]. . . . The reason for the CCP is to combine both sides, IA/Arab and Peshmerga/Kurdish ethnicities, so that people get to see that we work together since the civilians don't like the Iraqi Army. Also, when we have problems here, we

⁹¹ In keeping with the dramatic calculus, terms of idealism are associated with agent and terms of mysticism are associated with purpose. The following analysis of agent-purpose will show the convertibility (or paradox) of the ratios. It is important to stress that despite the pragmatic terms of the CSM (such as mechanism) it had a mystical quality - to unite contraries or opposing forces. Agency implies its purposive quality of unity - Agency can retain vestiges of mysticism in this regard. It is worth quoting Burke's discussion of the mystical properties of purpose as he makes an explicit connection between terms of "unity" and mysticism: "Often the element of unity *per se* is treated as the essence of mysticism. . . . We may establish the connection between Mysticism and Purpose sociologically by noting that although individual mystics may arise at any period of history, mystical philosophies appear as a general social manifestation in time of great skepticism or confusion about the nature of human purpose. They are a mark of transition, flourishing when one set of public presuppositions about the *ends* of life has become weakened or disorganized, and no new public structure, of sufficient depth and scope to be satisfying, has yet taken its place" (*Grammar* 287-88). Burke's description of mystical purpose and unification accurately describes the situation and purpose of the CSM. The CSM attempts to transcend the historical scene with the *mystical* unification of the opposing soldiers within a higher social and political identity. The CSM was, indeed, "a public structure" intended to point the way to its mystical end of Iraqi unification. In the series of soldiers' quotations presented in this section the stress on "combined" "together" and "one" will show the presence of the *mystical* substance at work from the perspective of the agents' idealism. Here the easy convertibility from one term to another is clear. The agents' purpose revealed in their "will" to lay down the terms of idealism becomes their *mystical* or "spiritual" purpose to be one. Burke makes the connection between idealism (agent) and mysticism (purpose) in his discussion of agent. Because of its relevance to the current discussion, it is worth quoting: ". . . the separations of private property are matched by the unifying idealism of country. [quoting Emerson] 'There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet.' It is a type of thinking capable of organizing mighty powers, as men materially in different worlds can be spiritually one" (*Grammar* 176). The CSM is an attempt to make two groups of soldiers that are "materially in different worlds spiritually one." The CSM ideas and idealisms, however, are "creatively" at odds with the conditions," the historical ethnic nationalisms and the divisive geographic scene which contain the CSM quantitatively divide the horizon and land into ethnic property. It is an attempt to make a military force that is "spiritually one" despite its historical and material and pragmatic divisions (*Grammar* 176).

do our best to solve it inside the compound so civilians won't think that we can't get along together.⁹²

The featured terms of agent and purpose are obvious “we [IA] and the Peshmerga,” “combine both sides,” “work together,” and “inside the compound.” The IA OIC clearly places the source of identity and influence in the agents as it is “we” and the “Peshmerga” who dominate. He does not speak in the terms of the historical scene dominating as the primary force acting at the CCP. The agents contain within themselves the power to affect their scene. In addition, he speaks in terms of the *mystical* purpose of unity to the point of making sure differences are resolved away from the public eye in order to maintain the image and mystification of unity nurtured in the embrace of the compound's walls. The compound a material reduction (metonymy) of the soldiers' unification.

The IA soldiers reinforce their OIC's terms of order stating that “The reason for the CCP is to unite both of the forces. I just graduated from training and I have been here for a month now. Everything looks good here. There are bad and good people here; its Army life.”⁹³ A second IA soldier used the same terms stating

I have been here for about two years. If people don't know anything about this checkpoint, I will explain it to them by saying this checkpoint is a combined checkpoint between *Peshmerga* and IA to provide safety for the country. We are good here; we do play soccer. We had some incidents at the checkpoint, like 'Why are you searching this vehicle?' type of issues.⁹⁴

⁹² IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁹³ IA Soldier. Personal Interview #1. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁹⁴ IA Soldier. Personal Interview #4. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

A third soldier adds the importance of *language* to the idealistic terms of order saying that “This Peshmerga unit is very nice; they teach us Kurdish and we are friends and most of them speak Arabic and we are learning Kurdish from them.”⁹⁵ The act of learning to speak a common language is perhaps the ultimate form of mystical union and purpose.

Peshmerga soldiers as well speak in agent-purpose terms. The *Peshmerga* OIC stated that “The reason for the CCP is for IA and *Peshmerga* to get to know each other and work together.”⁹⁶ In a later interview, he expanded on the terms of agent and purpose stating that

Some Arabs dislike Kurds and some Kurds dislike Arabs because of what happened in the past, under the old regime. Now, we are here and learning to share and like each other. We will be working together for a long time and we won't let you guys [U.S. Forces] down. Both sides will improve as time goes on. But we agree that both sides will make mistakes. We have our problems but we know [how to overcome them].⁹⁷

A *Peshmerga* soldier adds that “We do operations together, play soccer together; we also sell cell phones to each other sometimes. We do not have problems and do not make differences between IA and *Peshmerga*. Our soccer teams are mixed with IA and *Peshmerga*. [The CCP is] “for Arabs and Kurds to be able to work together and protect people.”⁹⁸ *Peshmerga* soldiers echo, then, the idealistic and mystical terms used by the IA soldiers. The IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' terms are “get to know each other,” “work together,” “both sides improve,” “operations and

⁹⁵ IA Soldier. Personal Interview #1A. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

⁹⁶ *Peshmerga* OIC Interview. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker and Recorded in Primary Research. Diyala. January 2011

⁹⁷ *Peshmerga* OIC. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

⁹⁸ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview #12. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker and Recorded in Primary Research. Diyala. January 2011.

soccer together,” “mixed teams,” “protect people,” “safety for the country.” All of these terms disclose a common constitutional ground of motives and unity of purpose.

The IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers’ terms reveal a strong sense of idealism (agent) and unifying *mysticism* (purpose). The soldiers work very hard to fix their grounds for motives and acts at the CCP in terms of the CSM principles, pushing back against the historical and geographic scene that surrounds them and could easily shape their substance and constitute their motives. These agents and their ideals, however, confront very obdurate historical agencies that would shape their substance (identity) and grounds for motives in keeping with historical factionalism. In other words, the CCP-2 soldiers' constitutional talk also “involves the enemy.” That is, the soldiers constitutional talk reveals that they face a tremendous foe (or counter-force) in the historical agencies that are unfit (the wrong means and tools) to achieve the CSM's and their idealistic and *mystical* ends. The antagonistic terms of agency that both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers speak of are “language” and “two chains of command.”

The *Peshmerga* OIC stresses the importance of a shared language for creating positive relationships, “[Language] communication is the biggest problem. In the three hours on duty the soldiers could tell each other stories and get to know each other, but, now, they just sit there and smile at each other. Language - things would go a lot better if the language issue was better.”⁹⁹ The IA OIC also stressed the importance of the soldiers speaking a common language saying that the reason for the positive relationship (unity) with some of the *Peshmerga* units rotating through the CCP was that they spoke Arabic. He said:

Some of the *Peshmerga* officers speak Arabic and some don't, so we have a lack of communication sometimes, and sometimes we

⁹⁹ *Peshmerga* OIC. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

get help from the linguist, but [the interpreters]¹⁰⁰ translate things differently. It's important to understand each other; previously, I had a good social relationship with the *Peshmerga* officer because he spoke Arabic.¹⁰¹

The IA OIC goes on to give an example of how the agency of language can in fact divide the CCP community and work against the CSM's idealistic unity:

The *Peshmerga* OIC we have now, he does not speak Arabic, so we really don't have good communication with him. So if anything happens, he goes to the Americans instead of coming to me, first. Once the U.S. NCO came to me and told me that my soldiers were not at their posts on the checkpoints. I asked him, 'who told you they are not at their post? Maybe they went to use the restroom when you went to check on them.' So I asked him at what time were the soldiers not at their post. He said that it was in the afternoon. My reply was that I was in charge of the checkpoints from morning to the evening. The U.S. NCO said, 'I think it was at night that they were not at their post.' So I got out of the situation [because I was not responsible for the CP at night]. It was the *Peshmerga* OIC who was in charge, and he went and told the U.S. NCO about it. It wasn't nice. However, I just let it go because I didn't want to create tension.¹⁰²

The seemingly small incident of the IA and *Peshmerga* OICs' social relations illustrates the importance of language as a means (agency) for assisting in creating the sought after CSM unity. Both IA and *Peshmerga* officers and soldiers acknowledge language as a fundamental tool of unity. In fact, soldiers at CCP-1 (not just CCP-2) reinforce language's influence on CCP unity and division. As one IA soldier stated, "Language is the biggest concern here. If they bring us more *Peshmerga* who won't speak Arabic, then we will have more tension after the U.S.

¹⁰⁰ Not only do individual translators translate things differently, but all of the translators working at the Diyala CCPs were Kurdish, having different levels of Arabic speaking skills.

¹⁰¹ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁰² IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

withdrawal.”¹⁰³ And, finally, one *Peshmerga* soldier at CCP-1 noted that his inability to speak Arabic kept him from associating with IA soldiers saying, “I’m from Sulaimanīyyah and most are Kurds [there], so I interact with Kurds. I don’t have many Arab friends because I do not speak Arabic.”¹⁰⁴

The division caused by speaking two languages forces the need for a co-agent (agency) to facilitate CSM unity - like putting a penny in a burnt-out fuse. In this case, the U.S. Army and hired translators are the compensatory tool (penny) that strengthens unity by completing the circuit. However, the need of the *Peshmerga* soldiers to go directly to the U.S. rather than their IA counterparts (although it may seem small) reinforces the behavioral patterns of division and mistrust inherent in the language the soldiers speak. The U.S. Army, then, is an instrument (agency) reinforcing historical divisions even while attempting to act as a tool of CSM unity. More fundamentally, language as the *vehicle of ideals* carries the soldiers towards that language's already established ends as well as social patterns.¹⁰⁵ But language is not the only agency that reinforces patterns and behaviors of division. The IA's and *Peshmerga*'s two chains of command are a pragmatic agency with their own implied purpose that nearly dissolves the CCP's idealistic unity.

One IA Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) explained how the fixed chains of command create friction with the CSM's ideals of unity:

¹⁰³ IA Soldiers and IA OIC. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁰⁴ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview #3. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011

¹⁰⁵ This point about language as the *vehicle of ideals* (ideals of division) will unfold in greater detail in the discussions of CCP-3 and CCP-5. At those CCPs, *Peshmerga* and *Gharmian* police talked about listening the Kurdish poet Farhad Sangawi from which they received the order of their symbolic terms and ideals in the form of ethnic nationalism.

We had problems at the checkpoint. For example, some *Peshmerga* did not like taking orders from the IA. And if the U.S. was not here, I am pretty sure that there would be problems related to receiving two sets of orders. I don't take their orders either. We have different ministries. They have their own Ministry of Defense and we have ours. They don't share any information either.¹⁰⁶

One local police officer working with the Gharman police (a Kurdish police force of approximately 25) who reside near CCP-2 but for all practical purposes are a part of it said the following about chains of command, “We don't recognize this chain of command [IA and *Peshmerga* chains of command]. If there is a problem [after U.S. withdrawal], we will take care of it then,” [followed by mimicking shooting with rifles].¹⁰⁷

And the IA OIC expressed concern over receiving two sets of orders and having two chains of command saying that

When the U.S. Army withdraws, the tension might go up; however, it's all going to depend on the orders that we receive from our chain of command. If the *Peshmerga* have the same orders then we are good. If they receive different orders then it won't be good. Also, it goes back to the officers at the CCP, if both of them cannot get a long together, then conflicts will occur.¹⁰⁸

Here the IA OIC provides a nutshell summary of the contending forces Agent-Purpose and Agent-Agency. He first explains that the agency of two chains of command works at cross purposes. Next, however, he acknowledges that there is an element of idealism or agent's will involved in overcoming the obstacles of divergent agencies when he says that “it all goes back to

¹⁰⁶ IA Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁰⁷ Gharman Police. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁰⁸ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

the officers.” The agents if strong willed enough, if they embody the idealism of CSM unity can effectively push back against the historical forces of both scene¹⁰⁹ and agency that divide them. However, the task seems to take a Herculean act of idealism on the part of the soldiers at the CCPs. Essentially, these officers and soldiers are being asked to unify what their political leaders divide.

The principle and logic of agencies with divided purposes necessarily plays itself out, and it appears to have a greater amount of energy and force than the idealism and mystic purpose of the CSM. This means that when these two forces collide (the two sets of constitutional terms), the already established forms (acts) of agency dictate the substantial outcome. The words of the *Peshmerga* OIC and one of his soldiers best reveals how the divided agencies give way to divided purposes and disunity - despite the idealistic talk expressed above. The *Peshmerga* OIC said that “Yes, we are all Iraqi. At the same time, we, as *Peshmerga*, are defending Kurdish people. We will not allow anyone to conquer Kurdistan.”¹¹⁰ One of his soldiers elaborated in-depth on this issue saying

Up to now, the CCP has been working very well between Arabs, Kurds and U.S. forces. And the U.S. forces are trying to find out if Kurds and Arabs will be able to work together. It's not easy now [to tell how things will work out in the future], because, until now, the IA has been under the U.S. force's orders, and the IA are not able to harm people. However, in the past, Kurds suffered at the hands of the past regime and Saddam. Not only that, they took Kurds land from them; it's been a country of Arab terrorists. After 2003, it's true that Iraq had a lot of issues and a lot of terrorists, but those terrorists are the ones who are former Ba'athists (former regime), and these borders, such as Karah Tapah CCP, is Kurdish land. Hamreen Mountains and Kirkuk are Kurdish land. We have

¹⁰⁹ The two chains of command treated as scenic material in the discussion of CCP-1.

¹¹⁰ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011

been trying to get this land back peacefully not with guns and war, because anyone who gets killed is still Iraqi (not only Kurds but also Arabs). We are still trying to get this land peacefully. This is our right, and we are not asking for more than what belongs to us. We will try to resolve this peacefully as long as we can. We are trying to free our land, and make other countries proud of us, and we will be able to work and help other countries as well.¹¹¹

As the *Peshmerga* officer's and soldier's terms indicate, they, too, struggle with the collision of idealistic and pragmatic/scenic forces. They acknowledge that all the people are Iraqi; however, their primary responsibility is to defend Kurdish people and land they believe to be Kurdish. The soldier hints at the two chains of command placing the burden of division of command on the Iraqi Army - who if not under the thumb of the U.S. Army would not be effectively participating in the CSM, at least in the soldier's estimation. Finally, the *Peshmerga* officer and soldier alike reveal that the CSM's idealism (the agents themselves) must succumb to the historical forces of agency, scene, and purpose which shape their identity and substance into agents of factional ideals and mystical purposes of sectarian nationalisms. This is why the IA NCO states that "With the U.S. withdrawal, each force will have its checkpoint. The *Peshmerga* work much better on the north side of the checkpoint, but when they are on the south side of the checkpoint, they really don't do anything since it's exactly on the border of the MCA."¹¹² The main point here is that both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers use terms of agency - fixed agency - that disclose already set motives of action rivaling the CSM's idealistic terms of motive.

The CCP-2 soldiers' conversations provide a snapshot of the constitutional collision of terms of order. In this case, agency-purpose, the unifying idealism and mysticism of the CSM,

¹¹¹ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview #10. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011

¹¹² IA Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

collides with the immovable terms of agency-agent, the dividing pragmatism and materialism of two languages, chains of command, and implied sectarian idealism - the realization of ethnic nationalism. The *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers remain in materially different worlds in need of very strong officers (agents) to embody the idealism and communicate a vision that would unite them spiritually as one (Burke, *Grammar*, 176). The analysis of the CCP-2 soldiers' conversation began with a focus on the agents and their purpose - the CSM constitution's idealism and mysticism and transformed into a focus on the agents and their agency - a competing idealism and implied mysticism of ethnic nationalism contained in the soldiers' instruments and institutional means: language and two chains of command. CCP-2 analysis coupled with that of CCP-1 shows the tremendous forces of scenic agencies that collide with and fracture the idealistic unity and purpose of the CSM. Nonetheless, the idealism does remain as a part of the soldiers' substance. The choice of terms, situation, identification, and motive, however, are weighted in favor partisan agencies, scenes, and purposes.

Checkpoint 3: Featuring Agency-Agent

The soldiers' conversations at CCP-1 and CCP-2 disclosed the dramatic action on a national scale - historical scene, agency, purposes and agents - that shape their CSM constitution and conflicting allegiances and identities. Now, with the transition to CCP-3 and CCP-4 the soldiers' dramatic terms shift to a *local scale*. Although the larger historical and political scene is present in conversations, the stress of the soldiers' terms reveals the more immediate and local influences that shape the CSM constitution. To put it another way, the soldiers emphasize the inner workings and local surroundings of CCP-3 and CCP-4 and how these local scenes, agents, and agencies shape the CSM constitution. In the case of CCP-3, soldiers, especially

Peshmerga, spoke in Agency-Agent terms. This section begins with a discussion of the Agency-Agent ratios found in soldiers' conversations. It ends by making a transition to the (local) scene-agent ratio which will then be the main focus of CCP-4.

Terms of Agency-Agent dominated the *Peshmerga* conversation at CCP-3. For example, the *Peshmerga* OIC immediately stated that “the biggest issue is logistics and supplies. All forces must be fully equipped. If we don't have a generator for electricity, we will be running around like squirrels with flashlights.”¹¹³ The *Peshmerga* commanding officer, also spoke in terms of agency saying that prior to U.S. withdrawal from the CSM there needed to be a signed logistics and property agreement between the *Peshmerga* and IA forces. He said that the U.S. needs to

sign equipment over in an orderly manner. There needs to be a clear and signed agreement about who owns what equipment and who is responsible for maintenance. There should be only one list detailing what belongs to us [*Peshmerga*] and what belongs to them [IA]. After the agreement is signed, it can't be broken by either side.¹¹⁴

The dividing up of agency (means, instrument, tools, logistical support) is a tangible (quantitative) measure signifying a qualitative division. The material division implies that the two military forces are in fact not *one*. As Burke asserts in *Rhetoric of Motives*, “It is enough for our purposes to note the value of the admonition that private property makes for a rhetoric of mystification, as the “ideological” approach to social relations sets up a fog of merger-terms where the clarity of division-terms is needed” (109). The commanders and soldiers concern with

¹¹³ *Peshmerga*. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

¹¹⁴ *Peshmerga* Commanding Officer. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

“private property” in fact lifts the veil of mystery from the checkpoint unity. CCP property like the MCR land itself will be *divided*.

The issues of agency places pressure on the agents' idealism of CSM *unity*. The *Peshmerga* officer highlights this tension when he says, “We build the CCP together and use it together. We should not split it. It should all belong to the CCP [and not one army or the other].”¹¹⁵ The *Peshmerga* officer speaks in idealistic and mystic terms about the CCP. The property “should all belong to the CCP” as though the CCP is a “higher” order of substance that transcends material divisions of property. This idealism, in fact, is the CSM's chief aim. The *Peshmerga* commanding officer, however, suggests that a list of who owns what be made and agreed to, splitting the CCP's agency and property among the two forces. Taken together, the *Peshmerga* officer and the commanding officer articulate the terms of the CSM's paradox of substance: idealistically unified (agent) and materially and pragmatically divided (agency).

Peshmerga soldiers predominantly spoke in terms of agency, and their terms revealed an anxiety about the substance of the CSM's constitutional idealism. It revealed two important qualities - a material power imbalance (agency) at the CCPs and the U.S. Army as *the* agency (instrument, means) to achieve idealistic unification. With the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, the CCP soldiers' would lose the instrument or agency for idealistic change and *mystical* unification. Statements made by a *Peshmerga* officer regarding the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from the CSM provide a good example of the *Peshmerga's* anxiety:

Americans are supporting us. Not one thing comes from our conversations [with our commanders]. All the water comes from the IA. Our commanders will tell you that we are not going to have

¹¹⁵ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

any [logistical] problems. They will say that, but there will be problems once U.S. forces leave.¹¹⁶

The IA OIC corroborated the *Peshmerga* OIC's concerns over logistics saying that the “Peshmerga depend on the IA and U.S. Army for water.”¹¹⁷ The *Peshmerga* OIC's statements above point to not only water as a term of agency but to “forces,” “equipment,” “generators,” “electricity [light towers].” The need for more forces and equipment refers to the manpower and firepower the U.S. Army brought to the CCPs. The *Peshmerga* fear they would be left the weaker of the two military forces at the CCPs because the IA is more logistically capable, receiving direct (and legal) military support from the United States.¹¹⁸ The IA did not express concerns related to firepower, generators, water, or food. The IA soldiers at CCP-3 (all of the Diyala CCPs) appeared to be secure in their logistical support.

Two final examples of agency - communication and intelligence gathering- highlight the agency-agent terms in which the soldiers at CCP-3 ordered their CSM constitution. A

Peshmerga officer tells the importance of unified communication:

A while ago I received a phone call from my commander telling me, 'there are three Iraqi Humvees crossing the border and entering the disputed territories [MCR] go and stop them.' I went to their location to intercept them and block the road. And the Humvees showed up with Americans. So I still stopped them. The Iraqis stopped and said, 'What are you doing?' I told them, 'I am waiting for you because these are the disputed territories [MCR] and we are combined forces. Whatever mission you are going on with the Americans, IA and the Peshmerga should take part in it together.' And we got in our vehicle and went with them.

¹¹⁶ *Peshmerga* Officers. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

¹¹⁷ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹¹⁸ See the discussion of Regional Guard Brigade (RGB) in Appendix J.

Before the U.S. Army leaves, it needs to get all the commanders from the Peshmerga and IA together and come up with SOPs [standard operating procedures] to handle these movements. Let's say I went out there to kill those guys [IA]. But they were with Americans. If Americans are not with them, I will block the road. I will ask that we accompany them on their mission within the disputed territory. They [IA] will refuse. Then I will fight. They will go through over our dead bodies. *Therefore, it is important to have a plan to handle this problem. If you tell me we are combined then we need to do everything together. The IA and the Peshmerga have to have radio communication.* [Bold and underline added for emphasis]

The *Peshmerga* OIC speaks in terms of a unified agency - shared radio communication and “a plan” or “standard operating procedure.” The Combined Coordination Center (CCC) located near Baqubah, in fact, was supposed to provide the unified command and communication for the Diyala CCPs. And according to the signed “Twelve Guiding Principles,” the CCC joint command was to be the ultimate authority and communications hub for the Diyala CSM (principles 2 through 12).¹¹⁹ Soldiers, not just at CCP-3 but the rest of Diyala's CCPs, do not mention the CCC in any of their conversations. This conspicuous absence in addition to the above statements about the need for unity of *agency* points to an incongruity between the agents (idealism) of the Diyala CSM and the material agency (means and instruments) for accomplishing their idealistic purpose. In fact, the CCC was to be *the* agency to unify command and communication throughout the Diyala CSM. That the *Peshmerga* OIC had to request “a plan” for such unified communication indicates the dysfunction of the Diyala CCC agency and unified command. What is more, the fact that not a single soldier (IA or *Peshmerga*) mentioned the CCC throughout interviews (but emphasized two chains of command) reveals the lack of

¹¹⁹ See Appendix J, “Twelve Guiding Principles” for a description of the CCC's authority and standard operating procedures. Also see Appendix B for the “Twelve Guiding Principles.”

agency the soldiers faced at the CCPs - at least an agency of unified command. It betrays not a unified identity or constitutional substance, but a divided constitutional substance and rival identities.

A final example of terms of agency is expressed by an IA officer with regard to intelligence information shared by the forces at the CCPs. During an interview, he pointed to a document that had a list of over 200 names (approximately 40 names per page) and explained that he could not use the information. He said, “What are my men supposed to do? Memorize 200 names?”¹²⁰ The lists had no photos and he considered the document a farce. He went on to add that the CCP lacked other essential equipment to look for weapons and explosives at the checkpoints.

In sum, the soldiers at CCP-3 feature in their conversations terms of *local* agency and agent - the instruments, tools, and logistics immediately associated with the everyday operation of the CCP. And the imbalance of logistical support (agency) between the IA and *Peshmerga* signifies that the divided command of the two forces (presumably a unified force would receive the same supplies through the same supply chain) reaches all the way down to the most basic forms of agency (water and communication). The property and equipment of the CCP, after U.S. withdrawal, was thought to be divided among two *separate* forces. Generators, light towers, water, food, communications equipment, and weaponry signifies a material division even while the CCP strives to maintain a qualitative unity. Furthermore, the “Twelve Guiding Principles” and authority of the CCC (the essence of the two forces unification and single identity at the CCPs) are not terms of agency used by the soldiers to describe their work at the CCPs,

¹²⁰ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

suggesting that the enactment of the CSM ideals do not survive as a constitutional scene or even instrument shaping future acts. In short, the soldiers' terms of constitutional order reveal a divided substance down to the smallest scale of agency - supplies of water, communications equipment, and generators. The divided agency of the local CCPs, then, is derivative of the divided material agency of the Mutual Claimed Region of Iraq on the geo-political scale spoken of by soldiers at CCP-1 and CCP-2.

There is one final and important point that needs to be made regarding agency. The anxious terms of agency that the *Peshmerga* use to describe their CCP substance and identity in fact reveals the presence of the supreme agency that allowed the CCPs to function and reach their idealistic goals - the U.S. Army. Indeed, up to now, both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers spoke in terms of rival agencies and ultimate purposes that suggest a dysfunctional CSM. The agency (or ultimate instrument) overcoming the historical scene and agency, providing a “eulogistic cover” for the ethnic-nationalist divisions, keeping the Diyala CSM functioning, and at least operationally and materially unified, was the U.S. Army which followed a single chain of command, unity of force, had adequate firepower, and maintained constant communication from CCP to CCC. *Peshmerga* soldiers summed up the importance of U.S. Army agency saying that “Now, we live and work together like brothers because Americans are here. But when Americans leave there will be problems.”¹²¹ Americans, the U.S. Army, had become the transcendental term of unity.

And these “problems” that the *Peshmerga* soldiers spoke of were not only the problems of the historical scene and rival agencies, it was also the more local scenic problems that

¹²¹ *Peshmerga* Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011.

influenced activities near CCP-3 and CCP-4: the tense situation in the city of Jalula. At this point, the discussion of CCP-3 segues to local scene-agent terms that overlap with CCP-4. Jalula is proximate in the minds of the soldiers working at CCP-3 and CCP-4. For example, the *Peshmerga* OIC stated that when he went into Jalula to purchase groceries and supplies that “Jalula was so dangerous that he had his finger on the trigger of his rifle the entire visit.” He was also upset that the Iraqi Army is threatening Kurdish families telling them, “leave your home or we will kill you and your family will be in danger.”¹²² The truth of his claims could not be verified in Jalula nor did IA soldiers at CCP-3 speak about Jalula. *Peshmerga* and Gharman police, however, did speak in terms of Jalula, so Jalula at least affects their scenic terms of order shaping their constitutional motives for acts - for the Kurdish *Peshmerga* and Gharman Jalula like the Hamreen Mountains acts as a scenic god-term ordering motives.

The Gharman OIC's conversation about Jalula best illustrates the potential Jalula has to shape soldiers' substance. The Gharman local police are themselves a property or feature of the CCP-3 scene. Their presence thus shapes the CCP substance of soldiers at CCP-3. In a long conversation, a Gharman police officer made the following statements about Jalula:

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) made us Gharman police in the disputed territories (MCR). We got approved by the Kurdish Ministry of Interior and went to classes in Sulaimaniyyah. We received weapons permits, and we went back to live in Jalula. The IA, however, went to Jalula and kicked us out. They threatened to kill us. I should have sacrificed myself and not gotten kicked out. I am feeling weak now. The IA will not let me go with my weapon to Jalula. 500 families got kicked out.¹²³

¹²² *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011.

¹²³ Gharman Police Officers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

The Gharmian leader then became animated and said that he listens to the poetry and songs of Farhad Sangawi.¹²⁴ He stood up and mimicked holding a gun and said, “When I listen to him, I want to grab my gun and go and fight [for our land and Jalula].”¹²⁵ Finally, the Gharmian leader stated that “there is no trust between Arabs and Kurds - The CCP makes no sense [in its current location].”¹²⁶ He then became passionate and drew a map of the Emergency Response Forces (ERF)¹²⁷ checkpoints around Jalula and said, “If you want to unite Arabs and Kurds, put a CCP somewhere around Jalula.”¹²⁸ For the Gharmian near CCP-3, the scenic events in Jalula provide the intrinsic motivation for their acts. The same scene-agent terminology is repeated by the *Peshmerga* soldiers at CCP-3:

We know that the MCR belongs to Kurds, and we have been fighting over this land for a long time, and it is our land, and it is our right to fight for it. We will die before someone else can have this land. Kurdish history tells how many Kurds lost their life over this land. And we will continue until we free this land.¹²⁹

They went on to add:

The reason the CCP is here is because of the MCR border. Before, it was controlled by the *Peshmerga* from 2003 to 2008. In 2008,

¹²⁴ Farhad Sangawi, in fact, was listened to by *Peshmerga* at CCP-5 on their phones.

¹²⁵ Gharmian Police Officers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011. We notice here a relation between gestural-speech (body language) and verbal language as discussed in Debra Hawee’s chapter “Body Language: Paget and Gesture-speech Theory” in her monograph *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*. I will return to this point in the conclusion when I discuss the entelechial force of language.

¹²⁶ IBID

¹²⁷ Emergency Response Forces (ERF) are a Federal Police Unit under the authority of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. The ERF are accused of prejudicial acts of violence and discrimination against Kurds. I was unable to independently verify the accusations against the ERF.

¹²⁸ Gharmian Police Officers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹²⁹ *Peshmerga* Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker. Diyala. January 2011.

the IA came and forced the *Peshmerga* out of the area and created a lot of tension between *Peshmerga* and the IA. It was turning into a firefight, then the problem escalated to Baghdad. Both leaders came up with the CCP idea. This is why we are here at the CCP until now.¹³⁰

In sum, scenic terms such as “forced” out of Jalula, *Peshmerga* “forced” from the land, “right to land,” “die for land,” and “sacrifice myself” establish the constitutional motives for *Peshmerga* and Gharmian acts at and near CCP-3. And “Jalula” like Hamreen is a summational god-term containing and implying the entire scene. This is similar to the way the soldiers at CCP-1 used “Saddam” as a summational god-term. Thus, the single term “Jalula” in fact implies an entire conceptual argument, a whole range of practical actions, and a moral allegiance for *Peshmerga* and the IA. Although the IA did not speak of Jalula outright, *Peshmerga* soldiers' constitutional terms in fact *imply* the enemy - “The IA forced us out.” Finally, to the point of the scene-agent ratio, the scenic term of Jalula also implies the intrinsic essence of the soldiers working at CCP-3. Their inner idealism of desiring to die and fight for their land is shaped extrinsically by their scene and *vice versa*. These reflexive metonymic fusions between scene and agent were discussed in detail in Chapter 1 in the section “Fog of Symbols and the Fog of War” in which the agents and scene called were both the cause and effect of each other. Throughout the conversations at the Diyala CCPs, *Peshmerga*, especially, spoke in metonymic terms. Their willingness to die reveals, too, that groups are made “consubstantial by the sacrifice” (*RM* 266). They lift up their now dead brothers as the sign that signifies the ultimate ground of their transcendental ethnic unity.

¹³⁰ IBID

Finally, the soldiers' conversations at CCP-3 provide a unique set of constitutional terms featuring the agency-agent and scene-agent ratios. Their terms narrowed the circumference of their scene and substance to the CCP's immediate and local surroundings (Jalula), instruments, and means. They spoke of the CCP's basic logistical supplies which implied a division between agents and their ideals. In addition, *Peshmerga* and Gharman spoke in local scenic terms regarding the conflict with the IA over the city of Jalula and surrounding land.

Checkpoint 4: Featuring Local Scene-Agent

The soldiers' conversations at CCP-4 feature the ratio scene-agent on a local scale. Their featured terms complete the discussion of scene-agent terms discussed at the end of CCP-3, illustrating how the local environment near Jalula fixes the soldiers' terms of motive. CCP-4 is located at a dynamic crossroads within the MCR; its local scene and traffic through the checkpoint place stress on the CCP-4 soldiers as agents of change and highlight a lack of agency. A brief description of the CCP-4 scene as observed on the day I toured the checkpoint is warranted in order to provide the context for the soldiers' statements to follow.

CCP-4 is located near Jalula - a city the soldiers at CCP-3 described as a source of heated Arab-Kurd tensions and rivalries. It is also located on the main highways that run from the Al Manthuria port of entry on the Iranian border, through the major Kurdish city of Khanaqin, along to Muqdadiyah (crossing over the major Al Mansuriyah gas field), Baqubah and finally to Baghdad and the rest of Iraq. Its location makes it a major crossing for military convoys, tourists (religious pilgrims), government officials, trucking/shipping, and general public travel to northern Iraqi (the Kurdish KRG) and southern Iraq. It is the congestion and numbers of different groups travelling through the checkpoint that create tension. On the day I walked the

checkpoint, I saw many different groups pass through the checkpoint, including private security firms as well as various Kurdish and Iraqi forces.

Approximately 25 tour buses an hour (during the day) carrying foreign passengers to various destinations throughout Iraq passed through the checkpoint. I observed a convoy of *Asayish*¹³¹ (approximately ten trucks with a total of 75 personnel), very heavily armed, most wearing skeleton ski masks and sunglasses, pass through the CCP without being stopped and searched (the front and rear trucks of the convoy mounted 50 caliber machine guns). A second convoy of approximately six vehicles, again with heavily armed and covered men (some wearing *Gharmian* police patches) also drove through the CCP without being stopped. A third convoy, this one Iraqi Police traveling to Khanaqin paraded through the checkpoint blaring music from their lead vehicle, brandishing weapons, dancing, waving their arms, and carrying a sign that read, “Khanaqin!” This group was stopped and had to present their paper work.

And while *Asayish* and *Gharmian* convoys were passing through the CCP on the north end, the Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) were stopped on the south end in two Humvees. The ISF was the private security detail (PSD) for a delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense who just passed through CPP-4 on its way to the KRG. The ISF PSD, because it was *Iraqi Army*, was not allowed beyond the south checkpoint and was stopped by *Peshmerga* from continuing through to the KRG side of the checkpoint, even as the *Asayish* and *Gharmian* freely travelled south crossing into IA jurisdiction just minutes earlier. The official from the Ministry of Defense continued his trip to the KRG escorted by *Peshmerga* security forces who also drove through the checkpoint. The ISF, after just watching two convoys of heavily armed Kurdish security units

¹³¹ See Appendix J for a description of the *Asayish*.

(*Asayish* and *Gharmian*) pass through “into Iraq” (as though the KRG is not part of Iraq) from the KRG, expressed frustration about the CCPs and remaining behind while their Iraqi official proceeded under *Peshmerga* protection.

An Iraqi Special Forces (ISF) officer spoke out saying, “[When the U.S. Army leaves the CCP], there will be big problems because discipline will breakdown. There is no point for having a CCP. The CCP is a symbol of two countries. We have our borders and they have their borders. It represents the borders of two regions.”¹³² Another ISF soldier added, “I hate them because they hate me. I want to kill myself [martyr myself] for this country; I want to fight the Kurds!”¹³³ The ISF officer then added, “I am the private security for the [the official that just passed through the checkpoint] Look! I am here; my [minister] is there in Kurdistan.”¹³⁴ The ISF technically not a part of the IA and *Peshmerga* units manning the CCP are nonetheless a significant part of the CCP's environment. They candidly expressed the scenic terms that shape the extrinsic substance of the soldiers working at the CCP. Here the terms are “symbol of two countries,” “our borders,” “their borders,” “martyr,” “fight the Kurds,” and “my minister is there in Kurdistan.” This cluster of terms depicts a scene of ethnic-nationalisms colliding at the CCPs rather than two ethnicities sharing a substantive national identity that transcends the ethnic divisions. In short, the CCP's constitutional terms of order are not the desired CSM principles of unity, but the constitutional terms of ethnic division. And, most importantly, it is this scene that

¹³² Iraqi Special Forces. Group Interview on the Checkpoint. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹³³ IBID

¹³⁴ IBID

soldiers working at the CCP must confront every day. The ethnic rivalry is the locus of their motive.

The above scenic terms of division are in fact acted out on the checkpoint, and they shape the intrinsic *ethos* of CCP-4. It is *Asayish* and *Gharmian* freely passing through the CCP while the IA may not pass beyond the CCP into the KRG that provides the tangible scenic terms of division. And according to IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers, *Asayish* and *Gharmian* often pass through CCP-4.¹³⁵ The effect of the scene on the soldiers at the CCP is best described by a Kurdish IA soldier. His conversation is structured around terms of a scene-agent ratio:

Even if we have officers and soldiers who speak both languages, this CCP will fail if the U.S. Army leaves. One major reason is that we grow up thinking “I am Kurdish and only Kurdish, or I am Arab and only Arab.” This discrimination has been building up [and plays itself out on the CCP]. For example, when my [IA] General comes here and he gets stopped by the *Peshmerga* and told not to pass beyond this CCP, I get furious and I don't accept it. And sometimes the *Peshmerga* Brigade Commander passes through the CCP and drives over the speed limit. Basically, he flies through here at such a high speed that we have to hide ourselves from the flying gravel. The *Peshmerga* OIC went and talked to him telling him, “when you drive through the CCP you don't stop, but we have to stop the IA officers and get them out of their vehicles. It is not fair.” And as you witnessed today, there was a delegation from the [Ministry]. We had to stop them here, and they had to continue with Kurdish forces to go to Kurdistan. Therefore, I believe this CCP is a false hope for Iraq and will fail. We do have good officers who do not discriminate, but when the soldiers witness this type of behavior and these kinds of issues at the checkpoint, it creates tension and discrimination between them. Wait and you will see. After the U.S withdrawal *Peshmerga* will have their checkpoint and the IA will be on the other side.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ IA and *Peshmerga* Soldiers. Discussion on CCP as Convoys Passed. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translators. Diyala. January 2011.

¹³⁶ IA soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

Here the IA soldier provides his own dramatic analysis of CCP-4, linking the scenic environment (who can and can't pass through the checkpoint, disregard for CSM decorum and principles, and historical discrimination) with the agents' intrinsic symbol systems and substance. The scene the soldiers witness on the checkpoint reinforces the historical and intrinsic forms of Arab-Kurdish discrimination nurtured over the years. The IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers have learned to read these scenic signs as indicators of “two countries” and a material and ideational border between two people. The CSM constitution - “The Twelve Guiding Principles” and “Declaration of Principles” - asks the soldiers to rise above their scene - to act out of character so to speak with their surrounding environment. The IA soldier emphatically points out, however, that the day to day scene exerts much (if not too much) force on the soldiers. In addition, although the CCP is intended to be an act signifying unity, it is in fact a sign signifying the greater political divisions that literally drive through the checkpoint every day in the form of armed military groups. As the ISF officer declared, “it represents a border.” In dramatic terms, the CSM act takes on the quality of its historical scene, becomes absorbed in the pious symbol systems that declare “I am an Arab and only an Arab” or “I am a Kurd and only Kurd.” And as the IA soldier reveals every act of discrimination and double standard between IA and *Peshmerga* forces on the checkpoint *writes* the border that divides the CCP soldiers in their minds' symbol systems. Their interior *weltanschauungen* given material expression in their embodied acts and the checkpoint itself. Their named situation their motives for acts. So although they go through the CSM motions, their *act* (their repetitions of form) are those of their historical scenic rivalries.

A *Peshmerga* OIC similarly points out how the checkpoint environment affects the soldiers at the CCP. He said, “Our problems will start from the highest ranking leaders from both sides, the KRG and Baghdad. For example, if one person of higher rank does not stop at the CCP, the *Peshmerga* and IA [at the checkpoints] will get into arguments. The leaders need to stop at the CCP.”¹³⁷ So the *Peshmerga* OIC also uses scenic terms revealing how the checkpoint environment exerts tremendous force the soldiers to interpret their acts through sectarian symbol systems. It is not simply the on-duty officials and officers driving through that bring the historical scene with them to the checkpoints, it is also the off-duty officers and local citizens. Soldiers on the checkpoint noted that off-duty IA generals driving through the checkpoint would scold the checkpoint soldiers for stopping them. In addition, throughout the interviews from CCP-1 to CCP-4 both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers said that *Peshmerga* do not stop Kurdish drivers and that IA soldiers do not stop Arab drivers. For example, the an IA officer at CCP-1 stated that

The *Peshmerga* don't really search vehicles that have KRG plates or Kurds in general. When my soldiers want to search the car the *Peshmerga* says, 'let him pass; he is my cousin' if he knows him or not. It doesn't really matter for them as long as they are Kurds. And when I tell my soldiers that they have to search the vehicles and the *Peshmerga* won't do it, it creates embarrassment between me and my soldiers. This is what is going on in general at the CCPs.¹³⁸

And an IA soldier at CCP-2 noted that

We have problems on the checkpoint from the people who drive through the checkpoints. We (IA) were here before the *Peshmerga*

¹³⁷ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Kurdish Speaker and recorded in Primary Research. Diyala. January 2011.

¹³⁸ IA Soldiers and IA Officer. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

and the Americans. And I was here for two years conducting security in this area, so I know all the people that come through this area. The problem I have is the people, the citizens, don't understand the meaning of these CCPs. Most of the Arabs know me from the village, so I just let them pass. Now I have to stop and ask for their IDs, and they don't like *Peshmerga* asking for their IDs.¹³⁹

The citizens using the checkpoints are the most important scenic feature of the CCPs (especially as highlighted at CCP-4). The citizens do not live by the same CSM constitution “Twelve Guiding Principles” and “The Declaration of Principles.” The citizens (and military units) driving through the checkpoints bring with them the historical scene of ethnic division.¹⁴⁰ And the soldiers within the CCP work and live surrounded by a constitutional scene created by previous sectarian enactments. The ISF officer summed up the affect this scene has at the CCP, “Kurds don't search Kurds and Arabs don't search Arabs. We are waiting for the fight to begin.”¹⁴¹

The final scenic feature that influences the agents at CCP-4 answers the question where were the *Asayish* and *Gharmian* going as they passed through the checkpoint. The answer is that the armed units were travelling to Jalula and As-Sa'diyah. To IA soldiers noted Jalula's influence

¹³⁹ IA Soldier. Personal Interview #1A. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁴⁰ There is a bureaucratic element of discrimination between Kurds and Arabs, too, that was mostly complained about by Arab soldiers at the CCPs. Iraqi Arabs must receive a “voucher” or sponsor from the KRG - someone to vouch that they know the person - before they can enter the KRG. A Kurd, however, can leave the KRG and enter southern Iraq without obtaining any such voucher. A Kurdish woman at CCP-1 explained this system: “We don't want problems we want safety. Therefore, when Arabs enter our land, they need a voucher at the Peshmerga checkpoint. My brother in-law, he is an Arab. When he wants to visit us, he calls me so I can go and provide the needed voucher for him to enter Kurdistan. Arabs hate Kurds. Think about it. Why do we have safety in our land and Arabs don't!” The Arab soldiers working the checkpoints must allow Kurdish citizens through checkpoints without “vouchers” knowing that they must obtain a “voucher” before traveling to the KRG. They live out historic patterns of discrimination everyday on the checkpoint.

¹⁴¹ Iraqi Special Forces. Group Interview on the Checkpoint. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

on CCP-4 saying that “If you want to see hate, go to Jalula. The IA (ERF) is kicking Kurds out of their homes just for revenge.”¹⁴² And a Kurdish IA soldier added that “The *Asayish* conduct missions in Jalula and As-Sa'diyah since those cities are not safe for Kurds. Then they go back to Khanaqin. The main problem is Jalula. The IA controls it and whatever happens in Jalula will affect life here at the CCP.”¹⁴³ Jalula and As Sa'diyah act as geographic centers of gravity pulling at CCP-3 and CCP-4. Jalula, a scenic god-term, sets the constitutional order of terms at both CCP-3 and CCP-4. Like the Hamreen Mountains, Jalula serves as a metonymic fusion of material scene with idealistic agents. And this god-term shapes the meaning of the CSM act because it describes (or labels) the situation and a label for a situation is another term for motive. In this case, the motive is control over Jalula, so the CSM becomes an instrument in the struggle over control of Jalula and the rest of the Diyala MCR. The checkpoint signifies a front between two armies and a border between ethnic-nationalisms. The soldiers live out the *entelechi*al force of their language at the checkpoints.

One ISF soldier summed up the CCP's geographic and symbolic place within the MCR in the following terms: “The *Peshmerga* should go back to Khanaqin. That will be the best solution. We are not expecting them to move completely, but they should go live in Khanaqin and let us control this land.”¹⁴⁴ The ISF soldier's terms clearly place the CCP (and CSM in general) between two colliding forces and national identities: “go back,” “move,” “Khanaqin,” “go live,” and “[we] control this land.” His terms bring into sharp relief the border that is the

¹⁴²IA soldier. Personal Interview. Iraqi Special Forces. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁴³ Kurdish IA Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Iraqi Special Forces. Group Interview on the Checkpoint. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

CSM and the continuous back and forth movements and counter-movements of the two forces driving through the CCP. The *Asayish* and *Gharmian* heading to Jalula then back to Khanaqin; the IA in 2008 pushing back the *Peshmerga* from Jalula and Qarah Tapah. And, now, at the CSM the two forces meet in the middle of the MCR battlefield.

The Diyala CSM and its concomitant CCPs can be characterized as attempt to turn the local scenic battlefields into soccer fields. One of the major activities of the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers at the CCPs was to play soccer in their downtime - an attempt to foster a strong unified identity. I brought this to the attention of the ISF soldier who said the *Peshmerga* should go back to Khanaqin, noting that the soldiers within the CCP play soccer together and share in daily activities. His response was trenchant: “Sure they play soccer, but they hate each other like Barcelona [Catalan Nationalism] and Real Madrid [Spanish Nationalism].”

Within the CCP, both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers said that it took very strong officers (agents with strong faith in the CSM idealism, as discussed in the section on CCP-2) to overcome the scenic force of division surrounding the CCP. They indicated that, for the moment, they had strong, idealistic officers who encouraged and supported the soldiers in pushing back against such environmental forces. However, just like the soldiers at CCP-3, they also indicated that they would lack the agency to sustain the CSM act of constitutional idealism (the counter act to their scene) after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. They provided the same list of logistical needs as the soldiers at CCP-3: generators, lights, a central command post, communications equipment (There were no handheld communications devices between the soldiers on duty and the checkpoint life support area. So soldiers on the checkpoints could not communicate with their officers inside the CCP), weapons, intelligence system, and basic

logistical support such as water and food and perhaps most importantly unity of command - as opposed to the two chains of command.

Finally, CCP-4 is exemplary of the scene-agent ratio in terms of its geographic location, movement of groups through the checkpoint and the language CCP soldiers (agents) and ISF soldiers use to label their CCP situation. In essence, CCP-4 is the culmination of the soldiers' conversations from CCP-1 through CCP-4. It is a tangible representation of the historic scenic forces confronting CSM agents' constitutional idealism. In other words, it not only signifies the idealistic agents striving to create a common identity and unified force, it signifies the divisions of the larger historical scene that contains it. The city of Jalula, the militarized traffic through the checkpoint, and terms of ethnic division are the extrinsic substance that imply the quality of the CCP-4 agents' intrinsic substance and idealistic struggle between allegiance to a CSM constitution of fostered unity and allegiance to a historical constitution of *familiar* ethnic struggles. CCP-4 analysis shows how the soldiers' terms narrow and enlarge the circumference of their scene and how the narrower scene of CCP-4 takes on the quality of the historical scene of a larger circumference. As Burke avers

We may reduce the circumference still further, as when we define motivations in terms of the temporally or geographically local scenes that become a "second nature" to us, scenes that may themselves vary in circumference from broad historical situations to the minutely particularized situations of back-stairs gossip. (*GM* 77).

Indeed, Jalula became like a geographic "second nature" radiating out from the armed groups and citizens travelling through the checkpoint to CCP soldiers. The CCP soldiers' larger historical struggle for the region of the MCR, Hamreen Mountains, Jalula, and As Sa'diyah became their constitutional talk at the "minutely particularized situation" of the CCP-4

checkpoint - their checkpoint gossip forming the agents' constitutional identity and locating their motives in the situation of ethnic rivalry even as they attempted to speak in terms of the CSM idealism.

Checkpoint 5 and Conclusion: Featuring Scene-Agent / Scene-Act

CCP-5 is the last of the Diyala CCPs and as such provides an opportunity to summarize and conclude the discussion of the Diyala CSM as a whole. CCP-5 is unique in that its geographic location is bucolic compared to the other four CCPs. It rests just below the Darawishkah mountains and is not near to any large population centers. Perhaps 10 to 15 vehicles a day pass through the checkpoint - on a heavy traffic day. Life is relatively still and methodic at the CCP. Soldiers expressed the normal feelings of missing home and wanting to be anywhere else but at the checkpoint. The weather for January was very cold and windy adding greater discomfort to the soldiers' loneliness at the checkpoints. A four to six hour shift on the checkpoint without electricity or heat is very miserable. For the most part, the soldiers completed their shifts and hunkered down when not on duty. And, for the most part, the IA and *Peshmerga* mainly kept to themselves when not on duty, at least for the three days I was at the checkpoint.

The quiet nature of CCP-5 (even so, it still remained a target for terrorists) allows for a more summational approach to this section's analysis. In fact, the wide-open geography of CCP-5 and the soldiers' conversations featured an all-encompassing scene-agent ratio. I organize this section to first illustrate that the soldiers at CCP-5 spoke in terms of the historical scene first discussed by soldiers at CCP-1. After very briefly illustrating this, I will turn to summarize the Diyala CSM as a symbolic act and argument shaping the *ethos* and identity of its soldiers, concluding this chapter's analysis.

Under the watch of the U.S. Army the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers worked well together at CCP-5, at least they did not express any significant problems. They simply set about executing their orders and mission in their seemingly remote post. However, both groups of soldiers used terms of nationalistic pride to describe their CCP environment. As a *Peshmerga* officer candidly stated:

I am not saying we need them [CCPs] or not - Arabs don't like the Kurds and the Kurds don't like the Arabs. The CCP is not a solution for this problem [article 140, the MCR, historical grievances, miss trust]. . . . We waited for Jaafari, Allawi, and Maliki to solve this problem. Let me cut the story short and just say that you cannot trust Arabs. They don't even trust themselves.¹⁴⁵

Here are the *familiar* historical terms of ethnic clashes over the MCR and extreme distrust:

“Arabs don't like Kurds,” “not a solution,” “cannot trust Arabs.” The officer notes that Kurds in general had hopes that the new Iraqi leaders after Saddam (Jaafari, Allawi, and Maliki) would be able to make headway with article 140 and resolution of the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. The new Arab Iraqi prime ministers became new scenic god-terms replacing “Saddam” first spoken of at CCP-1. The new leaders now serve as summational signs signifying the historical scene of Arab-Kurd divisions over land.

The CCP is a place of contending historical symbol systems of ethnic strife as demonstrated in the *Peshmerga* OIC's terms and CSM ideals of unity. Soldiers struggle to be true to their historical substance as much as to be true to the newer CSM substance of unity. This played out in the *Peshmerga* soldiers' conversations. One young *Peshmerga* said that, “If America leaves there will be a fight between Arabs and Kurds over the MCR. Arabs are not

¹⁴⁵ *Peshmerga* Officer and soldiers. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

human beings and fight. It's difficult to deal with Arabs - they communicate by fighting.”¹⁴⁶

The soldier was immediately pulled aside by his fellow *Peshmerga* soldier and lectured. The *Peshmerga* soldier giving the lecture said, “The land is not worth lives, and we will not fight over the land and we will not have any problem working together. There is not going to be any fight because of the relationship we have developed over time. As soldiers and young officers, we need someone to motivate us. We need motivation to have a good attitude.”¹⁴⁷

The two *Peshmerga* soldiers' statements demonstrate in a nutshell the greater constitutional clash of identities and ideas taking place at the CSM. They provide a summational anecdote of the historical agonistic conversation in which identities are forged and motives cast in an act of naming. The first soldier represents the historical scene that is a repetition of the historical forms of identity and rivalry. The second soldier represents the CSM act interested into the conversation in an attempt to create a new *aesthetic* form of identification and motives for acts. The back and forth exchange of soldiers is the *representative anecdote* for the entire MCR conflict and CSM. It itself is an agonistic conversation between two soldiers, a confrontation of symbol systems and an attempt to order and reorder terms of identity and motive in momentary fixity, and a representation of the MCR conflict and CSM constitutional act. We saw in Chapter 1 the agonistic conversation carried on over a large historical time period and at an international and national level among nations, ethnic groups, and powerful leaders. Here the same conversation is repeated among two soldiers at a lonely and remote

¹⁴⁶ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview on the CCP. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

¹⁴⁷ *Peshmerga* Soldier. Personal Interview #2 on the CCP. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. 11 January 2011.

location of Diyala. It shows language's and symbols' ubiquity and repetition of form that runs through and through *all* levels of history, social standing, and individual speech. Throughout this chapter, we have witnessed the *repetition of form*. The agonistic conversation replicating itself from the highest level political leaders (the national scene and agencies – Saddam, broken treaties, two chains of command) to the lowliest soldier. The one thing they all have in common, what holds them together and pushes them apart is their symbol system, their terms of verbal placement. In short, the two soldiers' attempt to constitute themselves by verbal placement (one in the historical scene, the second in the ideal CSM act) represents the larger CSM as a rhetorical act of *aesthetic form* in the larger historical and national agonistic conversation.

To illustrate the way the larger conversation (the repetition of *aesthetic form*) inserts itself into Peshmerga soldiers' agonistic conversations, we offer the example of soldiers who listened to the jingoistic songs of Farhad Sangawi (first mentioned at CCP-3) on their phones even while they were attempting to uphold a greater *Iraqi* identity of “Golden Lions” working in harmony at the CSM.¹⁴⁸ The Golden Lions - no soldier mentioned the Golden Lions in their conversations about the CSM until CCP-5. The Golden Lions were to represent a united Iraqi constitutional identity of *Peshmerga* (Kurdish) and IA (Arab) soldiers.¹⁴⁹ It was hoped that the CSM soldiers would speak in terms of the Golden Lions. One IA soldier who was asked about the Golden Lions flag flying above the CCP, however, stated that the flag was something the Americans made and was for them. The IA OIC said the following about the Golden Lions flag:

¹⁴⁸ *Peshmerga* listened to the Kurdish national anthem recited by Farhad Sangawi on their phones. The Kurdish National Anthem's first verse reads: “Hey enemy, the Kurdish nation is alive with its language / cannot be defeated by the weapons of any time / Let no one say Kurds are dead / Kurds are living / Kurds are living, their flag will never fall.

¹⁴⁹ For a more detailed description of the Golden Lions see Appendix J.

From the beginning of the CCP, we raised only one flag [the Golden Lions Flag], so that there would not be any tension. Our chain of command ordered us to raise only one flag, so that we could start from there to build strong social relationships. However, in my own opinion I would love to raise our flag, since we are two countries.¹⁵⁰

The IA officers and soldiers, too, express the CSM act as a collision of terms - historic divisions meet idealistic unities. The IA OIC's synoptic statement above illustrates this collision. The Golden Lions flag representing the idealistic unity of the two forces and the Iraqi flag representing the division of two ethnic groups with two separate countries still trying to determine where to draw the border. Two *entelechi* forces of symbolic form clash at the combined checkpoints.

The IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' statements at CCP-5 provide an abstract of the symbolic and dramatic struggle for the meaning of the Diyala CSM - a nutshell representation of the forces of scene (material), agent (ideal), agency (means/logistics), and purpose (mysticism) that shape its constitutional substance that would act as the grounds of soldiers' motives. The above analysis from CCP-1 through CCP-5 presented a range of dramatic ratios revealing various aspects of contending symbolic acts (terms) for fixing the Diyala CSM substance. Implicit in all of the above discussions is *act* - the central term of dramatic methodology – the enactment, creation, repetition of *aesthetic form* and “identification.” The terms of each ratio discussed above, in fact, can be converted into *act*. For example, the scene-purpose ratio of CCP-1 is easily transformed into a scene-act or act-purpose ratio - the CSM act imbued with the meaning and qualities of its terms of historical scene and purpose - or in the case of CCP-2 imbued with the meaning and qualities of its terms of agents and purpose, CCP-3 terms of agent and agency,

¹⁵⁰ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Diyala. January 2011.

CCP-4 terms of local scene and agent, and finally CCP-5 a return to historical scene and agent. Whatever ratio the soldiers at each CCP featured in their conversations, they were always disclosing the *meaning* and *quality* of the CSM as a human symbolic *act*. They were answering the implied question *what* is the CSM and they used the full set of dramatic terms to come to terms with and fix the terms of their CSM act and essence. In short, within their agonistic conversations to determine their situation and their identities “the pentadic linguistic laws are executed in [their] constitutional act” (*Kenneth* 177).

This chapter presents a snapshot of colliding substances that contribute to the CSM's form and *quidity*. The Diyala CSM is an amalgamation of U.S. Army agency; historical scene of ethnic nationalisms; mystical purposes of unity and division; and idealistic forces of human will contending to make the Diyala CSM over into the image of its terms. In coming together of substance in one agonistic conversation represents what Burke called the “alchemic center” and “molten liquidness” from which humans form and reform their identities and motives by the fixing of their terms in rhetorical and constitutive acts (*GM* xix). The pentadic analysis discloses the “ambiguities” and paradoxes of substance, identity, and motives, too. It allows us to see from many perspectives at once. Soldiers can be idealistic in their CSM terms and simultaneously be moved along by their scenic terms of ethnic-nationalism (which can also be read as another intrinsic idealism). The soldiers use the resources of the pentad universally present in their language to “confront the perplexities and risks” of their situation. They are poets using the resources of language as “their equipment for living.”

At rock bottom, as a human symbolic act, The CSM is a *poetic* act attempting to make an argument that will fix the constitutional terms of the Arab and Kurdish soldiers' associations of

unity or division. The analysis above shows that despite the U.S. Army's powerful agency that made the CSM an *instrumental* security success, the CSM did not achieve the idealistic and mystical success of unity it also set out to achieve. In the end, as the soldiers' conversations revealed, the CSM - as a constitution within a constitution - took on the quality of the historical scene that contained it - the historical scene-agent ratios discussed in Chapter 1. It became a sign signifying historical divisions and an instrument used to foster qualitative unities that would lead to quantitative divisions - "false hope" or "mujaamila" as the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers labeled their CSM situation. The primary terms of order - the ratio of ratios for the Diyala CSM is the scene-agent ratio. Soldiers discussed their CSM act predominately in terms of ethnic-divisions, article 140, Saddam, Jalula, Hamreen Mountains, land, hate, betrayal, discrimination, political leaders, borders, two countries, two chains of command, two languages, and two uniforms. And these terms implied the quality of their agency (or lack of agency without the U.S. Army) the quality of their purpose, the *ethos* of the agents, and most importantly the quality of their *act*. The CSM communities despite their instrumental success were divided historically and idealistically. The CSM could not act as a substitute for the shortcomings and grievances written into the Iraqi legal constitution. The CSM would not serve as a military "spinal column for nation-forming." The soldiers were successfully performing the same CSM *motions* but performing different *acts* of factionalism.

A final word about the dramatistic theory is warranted to closeout this chapter. By applying dramatistic methodology to understand the Diyala CSM, the chapter also achieves the four outcomes listed in chapter 2. It verifies that dramatistic theory is, in fact, literal and universal. Humans cannot escape ordering their world in dramatistic terms. The soldiers at the

Diyala CCPs do speak in terms of scene, agent, agency, purpose, and act. It reveals that the terms soldiers use to describe their situation is an attempt to *constitute* (reconstitute) their substance, reinforcing the importance of the concept of “constitution” to dramatic theory as an *everyday* and *primary* mode of human conflict and linking it to the pentadic terms made present in soldiers’ agonistic conversations. The CSM soldiers’ various terms of historical scene collide with various terms of historical and idealistic agents. And, finally, the dramatic theory assists in understanding in a well-rounded way the complexity of human conflict as well as its poetic and symbolic origin in the *factional word* as the ultimate scene containing and implying the quality of human acts. There is no narrative form or symbolic form that transcends the conversation; it is perpetually and poetically created by humans’ naming of their scenes and the fixing of their terms in the *everyday conversation* that they are and become.

Chapter 4

Kirkuk's Combined Security Mechanism: The Dramatistic Struggle to Forge a Constitutional Myth



Photo 1: Flames and smoke rising from Kirkuk's oil wells and refineries near *Baba Gurgur* - father of fire - the location where the British owned Turkish Petroleum Company drilled the first Kirkuk oil well in 1927 and the city's Eternal Flame burns. Seen from the top of the Kani Domlan Ridge. Photo taken by Author 22 January 2011.

Prometheus es in Verbis

- Lucian of Samosata

At every checkpoint they wrote, "The law above everyone." But it's not really true. The parties are above the law.

- ESU Shurta and Member of Kirkuk's Golden Lions

A dramatistic analysis of Kirkuk's Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) is necessarily about the formation of a *constitutional myth*. As the term suggests, we are not concerned with positive legal constitutions; we are concerned with *constitution* as a symbolic (narrative and dramatistic) act which creates and forms the *ultimate* ground, the "**common substance [and] motivational basis**" with which and upon which humans unify themselves and build their civil, economic, and (positivist) legal institutions - "the constitution-beneath-the constitution" (*GM* 343, 367, and 377). As already argued in the previous chapters and will be argued in Chapter 5, the CSM is a rhetorical and symbolic act (form) that attempts to create a new constitutional

ground and motivational basis for rival agents - Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers. However, Kirkuk's CSM act is substantially different based on the city's unique geo-political location (scene) and the civil police units (agent) that man Kirkuk's checkpoints. Briefly examining this unique scene-agent ratio will introduce Kirkuk's CSM, the chapter's thesis, and the chapter's outline. In short, Kirkuk's CSM takes our dramatic analysis from an "ideological" to a "mythical" scene with Promethean agents striving to forge an ultimate unifying symbolic term and image.

Kirkuk, the scene that contains and implies the quality of this chapter's Combined Security Mechanism, is a large metropolitan city with an ethnically mixed (Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, Assyrian Christian) population approaching 700,000. The city is located on one of the world's largest oil fields. And it is nominally considered the "epicenter" of Iraq's MCR conflict. Map A depicts the scale of Kirkuk's oil reserves and its geo-political centrality to the MCR and Northern Iraq in general. Kirkuk, as a city, reservoir of mineral wealth, and geo-political totem is most often thought of in material (scenic) and pragmatic (agency) terms. But this city is also an *agent*. The *essence* of this city contains a mythical (or divine) substance elevating it to the status of a god (or god-term). For Kirkuk is an ultimate and universal motive that impels various political groups, international corporations, governments, and local populations to *act* in various ways. Like Athena propelling Achilles on his way, Kirkuk takes on a "personality" of its own in discussions published by various analysts, governments, and think tanks. As such this material scene is *idealized*, assuming characteristics of an acting agent, quite

the way analysts note that “Washington was paralyzed” and “Wall Street reacted,” to cite examples from the American pantheon of god-terms (*GM* 171-72).¹⁵¹

In Chapter 1, we discussed how humans erect symbol systems using *metonymic fusions* of scene-agent. Agents' extrinsic substance (material landscape) shapes their intrinsic substance (ideational symbols) and *v.v.* This is also true for the city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk's material wealth (scene) is given the Promethean name *Baba Gurgur* -father of fire. By a symbolic act of naming (perhaps the Fates themselves gave the name), the material city is *idealized* treated as a personality and character with a will and embodying an idea. In this case, the character idealization takes on attributes of ultimate and mythical proportions. The city's constitutional scene and *essence* is “brought to life,” or “spiritualized” as a Promethean god of fire and power. So the city is both idea (agent) and scene (material). Understanding Kirkuk as a scene-agent god-term is critical to understanding the CSM act as well as our new dramatic term *constitutional myth*, so we will discuss it in greater detail below. In this introduction, it suffices to say that the metropolis, Kirkuk, with its national and international geo-political importance is the unique (mythical) scene that contains and implies the quality of this chapter's CSM act as well as the narrative beginning and ending of the MCR conflict.

¹⁵¹ As we will see in the discussion of Kirkuk as a god-term, it exhibits properties associated with both a material scene and an ideal agent. God-terms in this sense share conceptual properties recently discussed in object oriented rhetoric and object oriented ontology. A discussion of Burke's dramatist philosophy and rhetoric that shares object oriented rhetoric's theoretical paradigms is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the connection should be made that when material scenes become idealized in dramatic terms the material object takes on an independent ontology apart from human symbolic intelligibility. More will be said about this in a footnote below.

Kirkuk's CSM consists of six checkpoints manned by Emergency Security Unit (ESU) police/Shurta (شرطة الطواري).¹⁵² The ESU are the unique agents of Kirkuk's CSM.¹⁵³ Unlike Diyala and Ninewa checkpoints, manned by Iraqi Army (IA) and *Peshmerga* soldiers, the ESU is a local *civil police* unit under the command of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI). The ESU is comprised of an “equal” mix of Arab, Kurdish, Turkmen and Assyrian Christian police officers and shurta all from and living in Kirkuk.¹⁵⁴ The agents all claim the common substance and identity known as *Kirkuki*. The main point here is that Kirkuk's CSM agents are *civil servants* representing the *rule of law*, They are united - one force, one uniform, one chain of command, and one ministry. They are local residents, mixed ethnically and united as *Kirkukis*.

The Kirkuk CSM's unique scene-agent ratio (city-civil servant) leads to this chapter's thesis and coining of a dramatistic term. **The Kirkuk CSM is a symbolic act that attempts to create a constitutional myth - the rule of law.** The U.S. Army created the scenic (material) embodiment of this constitutional myth - the concrete checkpoints (the castles), the life support areas, generators, training, and procedures. All of these material (scene) and pragmatic (agency)

¹⁵² In this chapter I refer to the Emergency Security Unit collectively as the ESU, including their officers and regular police ranks. To distinguish between the officers and regular police ranks, I use the Arabic word for police, “*shurta*” to indicate regular police ranks and “officer” to indicate an ESU officer or Officer in Charge (OIC). The ESU are a branch of Kirkuk's Iraqi Police (IP), so occasionally I refer to IP who were also interviewed.

¹⁵³ The CSM checkpoints around Kirkuk are not “Combined Checkpoints,” in the intended meaning of that term (Kurdish *Peshmerga* combined with Iraqi Army). The ESU themselves considered the label of their checkpoints as “combined” a misnomer. There is only one security force working at the Kirkuk checkpoints, Kirkuk's ESU. The U.S. Army lived and worked side by side with the ESU at the checkpoints. For this reason, the checkpoints in this chapter are not referred to as combined checkpoints (CCPs). The ESU stressed this point noting that the ESU are comprised of all different ethnicities having a shared (or higher) identity - *Kirkuki* - that transcends their ethnic differences. In this *ethnic* sense, they are “combined,” but not in the CSM sense of “combined forces” which representing exclusive *nationalist identities*.

¹⁵⁴ In theory and according to one Senior Iraqi Police Officer interviewed, the ESU is supposed to mimic the ethnic percentage of the Kirkuk Provincial council 32-32-32-4 (Arab, Kurd, Turcoman, and Assyrian Christian respectively). However, as the IP officer also noted, the ESU's ethnic ratio changed in practice out on the checkpoints. For example, at checkpoint 2 all 20 of the ESU were Kurdish at the time of the interviews.

elements help to create the image that would give form to and signify the abstract idea *rule of law*. The most important CSM *image* that empiricizes the rule of law, that embodies the constitutional myth, however, is the agent - the ESU policeman as he embodies himself its *idealization*. It is the forging of a constitutional myth in the souls and minds of the ESU manning the checkpoints that is most fundamental to *fixing* in place the scenic context of rule of law for the city of Kirkuk.

This chapter, then, strictly focuses on the ESU agents' constitutional and motivational substance. We argue that the ESU (and the U.S. Army) agents are engaged in a dramatic (aesthetic) struggle with political parties to create a constitutional myth (*rule of law*) which will begin to unite their city, transcend ethnic difference, and serve as their motivational basis. As they attempt to forge their constitutional myth, they are simultaneously temporizing their essence and spiritualizing their material institutions (the CSM and their bodies) as the corporate and corporal *image* of the *rule of law* (an attempt to *give form* to an ideal concept). And the material from which they forge their constitutional myth is their everyday conversation and interaction with citizens which necessarily takes the aesthetic form of dramatism's pentad (storial and narrative). The ESU's struggle to create a constitutional myth (rule of law) is countered by ethnic-nationalist groups who would turn Kirkuk (the material city) into a god-term and constitutional myth that exclusively undergirds the constitutions of respective ethnic groups to the exclusion of a mythic identity that transcends their differences. We are in essence able to witness a mythic struggle to fix a god-term, a term for which there is no

higher term and subordinates all other terms of identification and motive within its circumference.

We can restate the thesis in terms of Chapter 1's discussion of symbol systems. Essentially, the ESU are building the symbolic edifice (the aesthetic form of rule of law) for which they and their fellow citizens will be pious to as the source of their being. The dramatic methodology allows for a “snap-shot” view of this constitutional formation as their terms are not yet *fixed* (constituted) in and by a “communal work of art (form),” also called a symbolic edifice. We will literally be able to observe their constitutional substance (and grounds for motivation) transform with acts of pentadic verbal placement made present in their conversations. When the time comes, this is what we must keep our attention focused on throughout the chapter: the way verbal placement *transforms* the ESU agents' intrinsic and extrinsic motivational substance - this is the ritual drama of the pentad - as they attempt to forge a constitutional myth. Our primary concern in this chapter, then, is with a constitution as a symbolic act of human will that simultaneously creates its citizens' mythical (ultimate) scene and the agent that embodies its ideals. The ESU agents then by metonymic fusion are both scene (material/body) and agent (ideal/mind), representing the circumference and force of an idea (*QAP* 334 and *GM* 323).¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ As we have been discussing the metonymic shifts between thing (material) and idea (spirit), such as Kirkuk treated as agent or the ESU the agent of the *rule of law*, it may occur to some that we are also discussing the operation of the “pathetic fallacy” – which is no “fallacy” – throughout all human life in which human’s breath spirit into their material world through symbols. Burke nicely sums this up in *Permanence and Change* when he discusses the “pathetic fallacy.” He writes, [The pathetic fallacy] is forever at work molding the qualities of our experience, as it sometimes induces us to single out those aspects of events which immediately reflect our interests, and at other times it trains our attention upon the selection of such means as will make events reflect our interests. *In this sense, all action is poetic.* Rockefeller’s economic empire is as truly a symbolic replica of his personal character as Milton’s epic was a symbolic replica of Milton” [emphasis added] (215). The ESU and Kirkuk CSM attempt to become a “symbolic replica” of the rule of law and confront the ethnic-nationalist forces that would seek to make it an exclusive replica of ethnic character.

This chapter makes two methodological arguments. The first argument is that, as Kenneth Burke claims, *ritual drama* (tism) is the “*ur-form*” of human's symbolic action and constitutional formation made present in *conversations*. That is, *conversations* necessarily take the aesthetic form of drama (storial and narrative). The ESU shurta speak pentadese in an effort to come to terms with their motivational paradoxes and the complexities of their situation. So this chapter provides an empirical example of everyday conversations infused with the *ritual drama* of the pentad as the archetypal form of human's constitutional formation and motivational ground (PLF 103-116). Second, we introduce a new term to the Burkean lexicon: constitutional myth. Burke never (to my knowledge) uses these two terms together. However, as we will see, Burke appears to always be groping toward or hinting at such a term in his writing and scholarship. His concern (and our concern) is with constitutional motivation - the grounds for establishing and interpreting motives for acts. Every constitutional act is bounded by a previous constitutional scene (an act that “survives as an enactment”) - the constitution-beneath-the-constitution. In Aristotelian terms of dialectical logic this would be the “prime mover.” For us, it is the constitutional (symbolic) myth and god-term (which summarizes the myth) that unites and motivates socio-political groups in common purpose. **For the ESU, the constitutional myth they embody and attempt to establish (their *mystical* pentadic purpose) is the *Iraqi* rule of law as their city's prime mover and ultimate ground from which other constitutional acts will emerge (institutional, economic, social, and legal) within an ordered conversation that expresses the substance of a single *Iraqi* identity through and through.**

We conclude our introduction by outlining the chapter's analysis and argument. First, we define our new term, constitutional myth, in relation to god-terms. After defining this term, it

will become clear what we mean in our thesis by asserting that the ESU are struggling to create a constitutional myth. Defining our new term will prepare the way for the rest of the chapter's analysis which is divided into two sections. The first section of analysis deals with Kirkuk as a scene-agent god-term. We can understand the ESU's struggle to create a constitutional myth only by understanding Kirkuk's unique historical, political and material scene - a city rising to the status of mythical agent becoming the *image* and *form* of exclusive ethnic-nationalist identity embodying the *entelechiial force* of the word. After all, the ESU are both a part of and apart from their scene, and mostly, it is their act of will pushing back against this scene/agent that is their attempt to create a constitutional myth. The second section analyzes the ESU shurtas' use of ritual drama (the pentad) in their conversations to forge their constitutional motivation and *fix* their constitutional myth as the ground for their city's way of life.

Constitutional Myth and God-Term¹⁵⁶

One of Burke's speeches and two of his articles, "Revolutionary Symbolism in America: A Speech to the American Writers Congress," "Permanence and Change: A Review of Thomas Mann's *Joseph and His Brothers*," and "Ideology and Myth" provide the principal material for the creation and conceptual understanding of our new dramatistic term. Throughout Burke's career, one of his main concerns was with (symbolic) grounds and ultimate (symbolic) grounds for human motives. While working through a conceptual understanding of his summational anecdote for dramatism - *constitution* - he admonishes his reader to remember that socio-political constitutional acts (such as the enactment of the U.S. Constitution, Iraq's 2005 Constitution, or the CSM) are always but partial acts because humans' symbolic acts are undergirded by a constitution-beneath-a-constitution - or an ultimate scene, ground, proto-act, the scene before the

¹⁵⁶Recently Laurence Coupe published a book length exegesis of Burke's use of Myth throughout his career, *Kenneth Burke on Myth: An Introduction*. Coupe's focus is largely on explicating the concept of Myth chronologically as it appears in Burke's work and relationally to key Burkean concepts such as "ritual drama," "victimage," and "Ecology." No where in Coupe's discussion does he link Myth to constitution or the pentad. His discussion of ritual drama focuses mainly on the similarities and differences between J.G. Frazer and Burke. Coupe's chapter on "Myth and Society" is helpful for tracking down some of Burke's writing related to myth. Coupe's reading is a text by text analysis and explication. I specifically link myth to Burke's "ritual drama" and constitution/pentad a relationship Coupe elides even in his discussion of ritual drama. An important point Coupe does make and which influence my own reading of Burke for this chapter is the "social use of myth, in his chapter "Myth and Society."

C. Allen Carter also discusses Burke's meaning and use of Myth in his article "Kenneth Burke and the Bicameral Power of Myth." By "bicameral" Carter means viewing situation, event, or object as both a thing in itself and as a contributing part of a larger whole, ascending toward greater completeness (359 and 361). His chief concern is with Burke's contribution to narratology and overcoming the "scapegoat mechanism" inherent in narrative by translating narrative back into logical firsts. He emphasized the *entelechiial* nature of narrative to enact a beginning's end. Both scholars emphasize Burke's insight regarding the narrative "temporizing" of essence, but leave unexplored the "spiritualizing" of material – the metonymic shifts, at least in my reading of their work. In addition, neither scholar connects myth to constitution, the pentad, or the historic and agonistic conversation. I believe this is why Burke's article "Joseph and His Brothers" is vitally important. It situates myth when a larger conversation, as created by "community" in reaction to a historical situation. Myth, like constitutions, emerge from a community's historical conversation over time – this is the ritual drama in its pragmatic use as a psychological tool, a vitally important Burkean element of Myth. I advance the two studies of myth in linking it to constitution, the pentad, and conversation. In addition, I tether Burke's concept of myth to a real-world example, the Kirkuk CSM and the representation of the idea of rule of law. So my reading of myth is less textual exegesis and more application.

scene.¹⁵⁷ So throughout his discussion of “The Dialectic of Constitutions” in *Grammar of Motives*, Burke approaches the threshold of a substance that lies beyond temporal constitutional acts. He does so in his short section on “Constitution-Behind-the-Constitution” only mentioning in passing that a constitutional act needs reference to a “social, natural, or supernatural environment” for backing (*GM* 362-63).

On page 367 of *Grammar of Motives*, he refers once again to the “Constitution-beneath-the-Constitution” as a ground beyond (outside) a constitution which legitimizes and holds up a socio-political constitution. The example he gives is the Declaration of Independence whose (mythic) principles provide the ultimate scene and foundation for the enactment of the U.S. Constitution. What Burke is hinting at - and only in passing - is that positivist legal constitutions, social constitutions, or whatever kind of human (symbolic) constitution we can think of must transcend, seek ultimate grounds, outside itself for its legitimization. He goes on in his section on “Dialectic in General” to refer to this process as “Socratic Transcendence” and “The Temporizing of Essence,” but again in these two discussions he only flits about the threshold of the *term myth* - even when discussing Socratic transcendence of ideas (dialectical ideology) to a higher plane in Plato's *Phaedrus*, a work regarding the force of language and symbols that contains one of the most famous of Plato's myths.

His discussion of the temporizing of essence in *Grammar of Motives* approaches very close to an explicit discussion of myth without ever naming it myth. He trenchantly illustrates that humans' logical firsts, principles, and essences must necessarily be expressed in historical, *imagistic*, temporal terms. So logical firsts expressed and embodied in their temporal images

¹⁵⁷ Theologically, God as “pure act” is only able to simultaneously act and create the scene that contains the act (*GM* 69-72).

take on a historical character *as though* one thing preceded another (narrative form) - giving us the feeling we are moving or looking back to the “first,” “original” foundation of things and ultimate *essence* – the beginning that implies the end. In short, ontology, the state of (always) being, is seen in terms of the historical rectilinear state of one thing after another. So the human pursuit for an ultimate (logical, substantive) ground to undergird constitutions appears as a looking backward as when Freud develops the concept of the primal horde (Burke's example), Americans talk about the Founding Fathers, the Tea Party points to the Boston Tea Party and the Spirit of 1776, Muslims (Salafis) speak of the time of Mohammed, Christians speak of the time of Christ, and Darwinians speak of the time of the first protoplasm. The temporizing effect does not necessarily need to be a “look back,” it can appear to be a “look forward” as when political movements *imagine* what an ideal (utopian) state might look like - pure communism, socialism, democracy and the like. It is the poet's and rhetorician's role to create these temporal images (forward or back on the historical timeline and narrative plot) of our very essences and ultimate motives.¹⁵⁸

We can add astrophysicists to this list as when they look at the stars noting that the light they are looking at was produced many billions (if not trillions of years ago), and so by an act of “looking back,” and historicizing they can tell us something of our *universal origins* (narrative beginnings) and *existence now in scientific principle* and tells about our narrative end. What appears to be a looking back (teleology in reverse) is *essentially* the search for and expression of an *essence* and *enduring principle* that helps answer questions about the *quidity* of human

¹⁵⁸ C. Allen Carter also discusses the backward and forward nature of the temporizing of essence (but not the spiritualizing of material. See “Kenneth Burke and the Bicameral Power of Myth” pages 347 to 351.

substance and upon which human symbol systems and motivational grounds are built. And this expression of essence in temporal terms is necessarily dramatic, poetic, narrative, and mythical - the creation and fixing of a unifying image. Our point here is that in *Grammar of Motives*, Burke hints at and makes room for a discussion of myth without ever explicitly mentioning myth or formally introducing it to his treatment of dramatism's summational anecdote. We are left with the concept of the constitution-beneath-the-constitution and to search among Burke's other writings to work out and consummate the dramatic principle of the constitution-beneath-the-constitution as *constitutional myth*.

Before developing our new term and concept implicitly discussed by Burke, we need to tether our theoretical discussion to the Kirkuk CSM. This example will keep our theoretical discussion grounded. The Kirkuk CSM is an attempt to temporize essence. That is, the concrete structures of checkpoints, the motions and acts of the ESU police, and their interactions with citizens are the historicizing/temporizing of the principle of *the rule of law*. It creates a poetic and *aesthetic* image representing the *rule of law* - a logical first that undergirds Iraq's unity and legal constitution. The choice of a "golden lion" as the *image* that temporizes (or empiricizes) the CSM communities' ideal unity and essence is a case of "looking back and forward" to locate an ontological principle of essence that can stand as a constitution-beneath-the-constitution. A golden lion is variously associated with the Babylonian goddess Ishtar and the reign of Nebuchadnezzar II. The lion is reproduced in tiles along the walls of Procession Street issuing from the Ishtar Gate running to the king's palace, suggesting the divine ground and basis of his rule.¹⁵⁹ The lion represents a logical first of unity (the Mesopotamian people's totem, so to speak)

¹⁵⁹ The lion also has associations for Muslims as Mohammed's cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib (the historical originator of Shi'a Islam) is known as "the Lion of Allah." And Kurds, too, use the symbol of the lion as

derived from a divine goddess, Ishtar, and her historical counterpart Nebuchadnezzar II. For the CSM “Golden Lions,” it suggests the ultimate ground of their unity - an attempt to transcend ethnic-nationalist identities by seemingly “looking back” to create a *new constitutional myth* grounded in a power that transcends ideological faction of Article 140. The consubstantial essence and principle of the various Iraqi security forces cast in the form of an eternal “gold lion.”

Which brings us to Burke's discussion of myth related to human political motivation. In his article “Ideology and Myth,” his aim is to distinguish between the two terms, giving pride of place to myth as the ultimate resource of groups' socio-political motivation. He notes that in strict terms ideology deals with ideas and myth “gravitates to the side of image.” He defines ideology as a set of ideas (doctrine) that “constitute” and motivate parties' and governments' acts (196). Burke then briefly rehearses Karl Mannheim's effort to “buil[d] up a science that transcends [rival ideologies'] factionalism” (198). He comments on Mannheim's effort noting that his “science,” although successful, was derived from the same factionalism Mannheim is studying so that “as soon as he thinks of faction as transcended, he can find no further source of motives,” and the human will slowly atrophies, as though technically doing away with the ideology removes any motivational ground to stand on - the negation of self and society (198).

At this point, Burke turns to myth stating that there are two ways to transcend “political faction,” using Mannheim's “sociology of knowledge. . . Or there could be another way: by using terms that were not strictly social or political at all, but moved to another plane. This would be the step from 'ideology' to 'myth’” (198). At this point Burke turns to discussions of Plato's use of

symbol of power and strength. One Kurdish groups includes a golden lion on their flag in front of symbol of the sun on the flag.

myth to transcend the ideological agonism of Socratic Dialogue. Drawing on J.A. Stewart's *Myths of Plato* Burke makes the point that Plato's use of myth “does not arrest the movement of the dialogue, but sustains it 'at a crisis, on another plane.' It has the effect of 'Revelation.' And it takes us from the order of Reason to the order of Imagination” (199).¹⁶⁰ The CSM as an act to establish the image of rule of law takes us from reason “to the order of imagination.” The ESU would become the temporized image of rule of law – the mythical narrative embodied in its agent.

Drawing on Stewart's work again, Burke works out his definition and concept of myth in the same kind of temporizing terms discussed above:

[He] sees the highest purpose of poetry in the communication of “transcendental feeling,” and we might define this technically, as **the sense of oneness with the universe in which the individual's being is grounded.** The mere “vegetative” desire to live is itself an implicit judgment that life is worth living; and since the “Good” is, in the rational vocabulary, the common word for all objects of desire, **the unitary vision of the “The Good” is thus the replica, in ideal terms, of this underlying “vegetative” certainty. Here, then, is the “mythic” ground of Reason, itself beyond Reason.** . . . We are merely trying to indicate the point at which the “ideological” gives way before the “mythic.” And here is where *ideological* purpose should move on to, or back to, a grounding in *mythic* purpose. **Another way of saying it is that political and social motives cannot be ultimate, since they must in turn be grounded in motives outside or beyond the political or social, as these words are used in the restricted sense**[bold emphasis added] (199).

In Mythic terms Burke is describing the constitution-beneath-the-constitution that provides a “unitary vision” and consubstantiality. In keeping with Burke's own definition of a constitution

¹⁶⁰ Here is a possible origin of Burke's idea of constitutions as a purification of war. Plato's use of myth as “sustaining a crisis on another plane,” hints at Burke's own qualification of symbolic constitutions as a “purification of war.” Burke notes that constitutions include the enemy, so they translate material war (ideological) to a new plane of symbolic grappling.

as “agonistic instruments that involve the enemy,” - ideological factionalism present in human political constitutions as discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 - the mythical step is a necessary poetic step to transcend the factionalism written into constitutions. With regard to Iraq and the MCR, the obvious example of factionalism written into a constitution is Article 140. To keep this factionalism from breaking out into open war - to achieve a unity of vision that transcends these ideological differences, there must be a “prior” mythical image of unification - a common ground of motivation derived beyond the *mere* realm of reason, ideas, agonism, and power struggle that will motivate *allegiance* to the *ideological* (legal) constitution and produce a kind of faith and trust in the *legal processes of Article 140* for deciding the city of Kirkuk's political identity. The Kirkuk CSM as a *constitutional mythic* act is such an effort to forge a mythical substance and national identity.

Burke concludes his discussion of myth (the constitution-beneath-the-constitution) by illustrating for readers one of his favorite examples - the use of narrative and poetic imagery as the “temporizing of essence,” the constituting of substance in poetic and symbolic form. We already explored the temporizing of essence above, so it suffices to say here that unlike the example of Freud's “primal horde” which he uses in *Grammar of Motives*, in “Ideology and Myth” he uses as the example of the mythical temporizing of essence a poetic work with political purpose - Virgil's *Aeneid*, an epic that mythically unites the Roman empire with images of a common hero and god. Burke provides a detailed explication of the *Aeneid* and its use in creating a constitutional myth. And at the end of his article, he provides “a recipe,” list of lessons learned, from the *Aeneid* about how to create and use new myths to unite people in new socio-political situations. What is important for our purposes is that Burke establishes in his

article that myth is relevant today, as a way of transcending the ideological factionalism found in socio-political constitutions. Myth's form and function are still in use and most importantly *should* be used, as when he notes that the United Nations although constituted ideologically lacks any kind of “grounding myth” to unify its members (202).

Because myth is freighted with conceptual baggage (illusion, lie, what primitive people create and believe in) it needs to be made clear that myth in Burke's scheme is *real, pragmatic* and as contemporary and up-to-date as the latest computer chip. Myth is meant to be *applied* to achieve socio-political results. His speech “Revolutionary Symbolism in America” given before the American Writers Congress in 1935 provides the needed discussion of myth in pragmatic terms. He writes that

“Myths” may be wrong, or they may be used to bad ends - but they cannot be dispensed with. In the last analysis, they are our basic psychological tools for working together. A hammer is a carpenter's tool, a wrench is a mechanic's tool; and a “myth” is the social tool for welding the sense of interrelationship by which the carpenter and the mechanic, though differently occupied, can work together for common social ends. In this sense a myth that works well is as real as food, tools, and shelter are. . . . Totem, race, godhead, nationality, class, lodge, guild - all such are the “myths” that have made various ranges and kinds of social cooperation possible. They are not “illusions,” since they perform a very real and necessary social function in the organizing of the mind. But they may look illusory when they survive as fossils from the situations for which they were adapted into changed situations for which they are not adapted. (RSA 267-68)

Perhaps the most important quality of a constitutional myth is its pragmatism. The concept initially seems ethereal and abstruse - the beyond of reason, the constitution-beneath-the-constitution, the unconscious - an illusion. A constitutional myth, however, is like dramatism “rhetorical equipment for living.” It is a socio-political tool forged from human's everyday

language and conversations and used by humans to create the unifying grounds that warrant and legitimize their socio-political constitutions/motives. It uses dramatic and poetic imagery to embody unifying “firsts,” “principles” and “essences” that imbue all elemental parts of a community with a shared substance (identity).

An example of the use of myth relevant to Iraq and the MCR is Saddam Hussein's own use of the past (historicizing essence) to unite his country. We remember that King Faisal I in 1921 described a country consisting of “no *Iraqi* people but unimaginable masses of human beings, *devoid of any patriotic idea*” [emphasis added] after the British established Iraq. The missing *patriotic idea* is a constitutional myth (some might call it a master narrative or image, today). The timelines in the appendices variously record the struggle to forge a unifying (constitutional) myth. The lack of a constitutional myth is particularly revealed by the timeline that shows that Iraq had no ratified *legal* constitution until 2005 - no mythical unification to undergird (and prior to) the legal constitution. Saddam Hussein, however, as noted earlier likened himself to Nebuchadnezzar and used images of himself as a god to unite the Iraqi people. Soldiers and police manning the checkpoints said that the *rule of law* was better under Saddam because when you broke the law it was a crime not against *the law* but against *Saddam*. Saddam became his own constitutional myth and image representing the rule of law. And this makes sense in terms of constitutional tyrannies where a nation's substance necessarily culminates in a single individual as its god-head. In the United States when one breaks the law one is still committing a crime against the *constitution* or the way of the life of the people (which, however, can also have tyrannizing properties which are beyond the scope of this chapter and dissertation to discuss).

What the example of Saddam Hussein as the material representation of an *idea* also discloses is that mythic symbols are created in a process of metonymic fusions. Where there is a mythic scene there is a mythic god (idealized agent). Above we spoke of the “temporizing of essence” the use of material and historical symbols to locate and embody a *principle of substance* - an idea. Essentially, it means reducing an ideal to material or empirical terms. As temporizing is the effect of metonym, the process also works in reverse. A material and historical situation can be “idealized” and “spiritualized.” In this case, human's material worlds and concepts become agents - what Burke refers to as a “god-term.” A god-term is the ultimate *idea* (concept or term) representing the unified substance of a social group - the semantic core of its constitutional myth. As Burke writes in *Grammar of Motives*, “the word that summed up 'everything' would certainly be the god-term, the universal title or all-inclusive epithet to which any less generalized terms would be related as parts to a whole” (*GM* 73). A god-term is the unifying substance ordering and running through an entire socio-political complex. We can liken it to a *centripetal image* and expressive form drawing and holding a community together.

A god-term, then, is the ultimate principle and commanding concept by which humans organize their socio-political associations - the ground upon which they base and write their constitutions. As Burke further describes it in *Grammar of Motives*, “[a] God-term designates the ultimate motivation, or substance, of a Constitutional frame” (*GM* 355). Here he describes in *mythical terms* of agent, the constitution-beneath-the-constitution. This time, however, instead of using scenic terms (temporizing, material reductions, for instance), he uses ideational terms of agent, a divine agent. A constitution's motivational basis is *substantiated* by a single divine agent (idea) in which all motivational power is localized and which motivates an entire society's

“way of life.” Saddam, again, serves as an illustration. Wall Street in the United States or Burke’s example of Rockefeller in *Permanence and Change* can serve as other examples.

In this case, Saddam, through metonymic fusion, becomes an idealized agent. As the soldiers said above, “Saddam *is* the *rule of law*.” (much like Christ *is* the Word of God, or Aisha proclaiming that “Mohammad's character *is* the Qur'an”). The material man is “idealized” as “the rule of law,” he takes on a *transcendental* meaning; he acquires divine motivational attributes. It is as though Saddam *is* the rule of law (in divine form) walking the earth, or George Washington considered the embodiment of the democratic ideals of the new U.S. Constitution's Executive branch. Or consider the example used in Chapter 1 in which Blank Creative created an animated movie equating the Iraqi constitution with the person of Hammurabi. In this case, an historical figure is “idealized” and “spiritualized” as the constitution while the constitution is temporized as the *mythical image* Hammurabi. The *Iraqi* constitution born from a divine Hammurabi. Or, finally, concepts and ideas (god-terms) can take on the characteristics of a divine *personality and image*. An example is the Homeric god Athena which is a transformation of an idea or concept into a personified (divine) agent; in this case, material warfare becomes “idealized,” an agent that impels the acts of men and demands sacrifices - war is a self-grounding act, both idea and material. This is similar to *Saddam-as-rule of law* demanding sacrifices and allegiance. Related to our chapter's analysis of the Kirkuk CSM, the city Kirkuk serves well as an example of a material city being idealized as a god-like agent of motivation (which will be discussed in more detail below). It literally demands sacrifices and ritual acts from its citizens similar to the way Athena the god of war may demand hecatombs of cattle from Greek warriors as Homer describes in the *Iliad*. Any ultimate terms that serve as a god-term, then, take on

metonymic attributes of being both scene (material) and agent (idea). And, most, importantly are a constitutional myth's summational statement and semantic core supplying its *entelechial* energy and force.¹⁶¹

The concept of a god-term also introduces another important attribute of constitutional myths - they demand sacrifice. The rhetorician Richard Weaver helpfully expands on Burke's concept of god-term in a way that drives home its impelling nature of piety and sacrifice. He writes that “the surest indicator of a 'god term' is its capacity to demand sacrifice. . . for when a term is so sacrosanct that the material good of this life must be mysteriously rendered up for it, then we are justified in saying that it is in some sense ultimate” (“Ultimate Terms” 214). Weaver's helpful description of a god-term illustrates the way in which concepts, symbols, and ideas once reaching the status of divine personification (idealized and spiritualized) can act as *agents* making demands of the communities they unify. The important point to notice here is that (again through metonymic fusion) humans who create their symbolic god-terms become beholden to their own creations. A simple way to put it is that the constitutional myths humans use - use them in return. Or, more fundamentally, language uses us even as we use it. For example, once Arab, Turkoman, and Kurdish communities establish *Kirkuk* as both an idealized god-term and temporized material *place* (scene) replicating and representing their ethnic-communities' intrinsic identities, they must organize and sacrifice their lives according to this ethnic-nationalist principle as though it was an agent making demands.

¹⁶¹ A god-term being both scene and agent is congruous with Burke's discussion of creation in *Grammar of Motives* in which God's creative act is simultaneously the scene, agent, act – God simultaneously creates the scene in which he acts as agent. Here we see this creative mechanism present in language in the form of myths and god-terms (*GM* 69-72).

So far, we have discussed the form, function, and purpose of constitutional myths or god-terms. Before summarizing our discussion in one definition, we must introduce one more aspect of constitutional myths: they are rhetorical: they are created and established by communities in the endless give and take of their socio-political *conversations*. In fact, in *Rhetoric of Motives* Burke lists several pages of possible god-terms (*RM* 298-301). Burke notes that “god-terms” pervade human's symbol systems, “dot[ting] men's thinking constantly.” He goes on to note that the conflation of the natural and divine worlds in symbols (as discussed above), leads to the “extension of “God” into the area of god-terms, generally” (*RM* 299). This comment is followed by a three page list of “synonyms” for God that seems to cover every possible area of human life, and this is only a partial list. Each nation and culture has a near infinity of god-terms that can be established as the constitutional myth that supports their legal and social constitutions. So how are constitutional myths established? Rhetorically through endless conversation (and conflict) humans establish their constitutional myths and *fix* their god-terms and images.

It is in his review of Thomas Mann's *Joseph and His Brothers* that Burke provides this answer. What is particularly illuminating are Burke's comments on *precedent*, in which he makes a distinction between legal and mythical precedent. Here he describes a community's dramatic ritual (poetic ritual) of establishing the constitutional myth that undergirds its entire socio-political association. In making his distinction between legal and mythical precedent, he writes that reading Mann's novel provides us with a new perspective about the importance of precedent “in the matter of human motives” (427). Unlike a legal precedent which is an obstacle, “a way of preventing new decisions by reference to past decisions,” a mythical precedent is “revealing.” It reveals a community's *common essence* and identity - its logical first,

their story's beginning and ending. He concludes the point writing that Mann's insight is that there is a mythical constitution (our word) that unites communities. He writes that legal precedents recorded in court records are [were] not the ultimate unifying substance of community. Instead, the ultimate unifying substance [was and is]

mythical precedents: they were group products - they were "right" because **they took their form as a collective enterprise**. They were **selective and interpretative, the results of long revision at the hands of many people through many years**. . . . They were not "facts," as legalistic precedents are, **but communal works of art**. And when the individual understood his own role by reference to them (saying, "I am Jacob," or "This situation is like Leah's") **he was being himself and a member of his group simultaneously** (427-28) [emphasis added].

And these mythical "works of art," the god-terms and constitutional myths that bind a community together by giving form and expression to its substance, are produced in the ritual dramatism of a group's conversations.

As Burke suggests, through the slow process of symbolic accretion and agglutination, over many years of selection and interpretation (argument and conflict), a constitution-beneath-the-constitution is formed and transformed. In *Philosophy of Literary Form*, after proposing "ritual drama" as the "ur-form" from which all other human symbolic acts derive their meaning and substance, Burke, in a footnote, introduces his reader to the pentad as containing the synoptic elements of ritual drama used to establish the constitutional myths (god-terms) that motivate an entire society in shared purpose. He then goes on to provide his famous example of the "unending conversation" as the material of this ritual drama as a "social enterprise" founding constitutional myths. Burke's point, in simple terms, is that our conversations (that serve as the ultimate linguistic grounds -material- of human motives) take *aesthetic* form, that is narrative

and dramatic form. As he writes in *Grammar of Motives*, “Since drama necessarily takes the form of “story,” the approach to essence is conveyed in temporal, or “storial” terms [form] (433).


So it is through the everyday ritual activity and the social enterprise of conversation, that necessarily takes the form of ritual dramatism, that humans establish the constitutional myths and god-terms that form the basis for erecting their ideological and legal constitutions. The importance of “conversation” to socio-political activity (and its taking narrative or dramatic aesthetic form) is profound and easy to overlook. So to help establish the fundamental legitimacy of the point, we quote from the American Philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, who in his seminal work *After Virtue*, arrives at the following conclusion about the importance of conversation (and its narrative form) to the unity of an individual life as well as the unity of an entire community. Even when reading MacIntyre's statement we can note the pentadic terms present. MacIntyre asserts that “The most familiar type of context [scene] in and by reference to which speech-acts [act] and purpose [purpose] are rendered intelligible is the conversation [agency]. Conversation [scene/agency] is so all-pervasive a feature of the human [agent] world that it tends to escape philosophical attention” (*After Virtue* 210). It did not escape Burke's attention that conversation in dramatic form is a constitutional act. He establishes that the locus of human motivation and the creation of our constitutional myths and god-terms is in the dramatic nature of human's everyday conversations as an *aesthetic act* of building and transforming the mythical images, constitutional myths, and god-terms that found community. As he writes in his review of Mann's *Joseph and His Brothers*, the conversation is social, selective, interpretive, and revised over the course of a communal conversation lasting many years.

We have concluded our explication of constitutional myth and god-term and summarize it in the following definition. **A constitutional myth and god-term is a social enterprise and symbolic act created and emerging from humans' everyday conversations, taking the aesthetic form of ritual dramatism in which terms are selected, interpreted and revised over time; it culminates in a communal work of art (narrative form or image) expressing a metonymic image and idea that momentarily temporizes social groups' ideational essence while spiritualizing their material substance (agents made consubstantial with their scene). It thus continues a group's ideological and socio-political conflicts on a unified "plane," and provides the *ultimate* ground (real not illusion), the "*common substance [and] motivational basis*" with which and upon which humans unify themselves and build their civil, economic, and (positivist) legal institutions and constitutions. Put simply, and in Burke's own terms, it is the constitution-beneath-the-constitution.**

So far our discussion of constitutional myth has been theoretical with occasional real-world examples illustrating key points. We now provide an empirical example of the dramatic formation of a constitutional myth and god-term made present in Kirkuk's CSM. First, we begin by demonstrating how the scene that contains the Kirkuk CSM act - the city of Kirkuk - is itself a god-term (the poetic core of a constitutional myth) grounding the people of Iraq's ideological and socio-political conflict - giving their idealism of ethnic-nationalism material form and *v.v.* This god-term emerges out of a historical international and national conversation/argument as detailed in Chapter 1 and Appendices C, D, and E's historical timelines. In fact, these appendices can be viewed as key moments of an *historical conversation* out of which an Iraqi myth or ethnic-nationalist myth would emerge.

Second, we will show that the ESU are engaged in an ongoing conversation (a “social enterprise”) speaking a pentadese that discloses the formation of and struggle to form a constitutional myth - *the rule of law* competing with the constitutional myth and god-term of ethnic-nationalism. In creating their constitutional myth, they attempt to establish themselves as the temporized embodiment of their god-term and spiritualize their material institution, bodies, and movements as the replica of the rule of law. In other words, our focus is on the constitutional substance of the ESU agent and their conversations. A focus on their conversations and the pentadic terms they use discloses the *inchoate* stage of creating a constitutional myth. As such, there are other scenic and counter-agent forces at work also attempting to shape a constitutional myth (ethnic-nationalism) in and out of the ESU units. Using the resources of the pentad, we can observe this struggle and watch the transformations of constitutional grounds and motivation. We can watch the reflexive fusion of mind (idea/agent) and body (material/scene) with our linguistic instruments to disclose a mythical struggle.

Map C: The City of Kirkuk



Kirkuk the God-Term and Image of Ethnic-Nationalism

One of the purposes of this short section is to set the political and historical scene for the analysis of the ESU conversations to follow. The context is needed to more fully understand the tremendous rhetorical force the city exerts, as an “object of rhetoric,”¹⁶² (scene and context), on its inhabitants and various political agents. This section will reveal the reverse to be true, too, the amount of material and rhetorical force agents (political leaders, political and nationalist groups, international, national, and corporate) exert to shape Kirkuk into the *image* that represents their ethnic-nationalist aspirations. Without this understanding, the ESU shurta's conversations analyzed below would not have the depth of meaning needed for a well-rounded understanding of the Kirkuk CSM act as the creation of a constitutional myth that would transcend ethnic identities and myths. After all, it is Kirkuk's historical scene that contains the CSM act.

A second and equally important purpose is to provide an example of the creation of a mythic god-term within a historical national and international conversation. In essence, it reveals the *aesthetic form* and appeal (attractiveness) Kirkuk takes as a god-term motivating the MCR conflict and unifying various ethnic factions. The forging of Kirkuk as a vast communal

¹⁶² We borrow the term from recent discussions in the study of “object oriented rhetoric” in which a thing or non-human object (in its ontological state) is said to exert rhetorical force and interact with other objects (things) and humans - have a perspective and reality of its own apart from human reality. Burke's conception of act as a form (borrowing the concept from medieval scholasticism) and concept of logical firsts (ontological principles of *reality*) in fact can be likened to an object oriented philosophy and rhetoric. In this case, the city of Kirkuk (as an act) is conceptualized as a *verb* and not a *noun* - Kirkuk(ing) or the “way of being Kirkuk” - a phenomenological ontology. Kirkuk the scene, in essence, exerts its own rhetorical force and shapes the CSM act. A god-term, as the metonymic fusion of scene-agent (material object with ideal principle/agent) is a possible description of object oriented rhetoric in which the thing (Kirkuk) takes on a beingness and rhetorical force of its own. And an idea or concept gains its rhetorical force by becoming a thing and having a presence as a part of the material scene. This is especially apposite with regard to symbolic acts, in the sense that Burke admonishes us to remember that our symbols *use us* as much as we use them.

work of political art is directly related to the concept of piety discussed in chapter one where we noted the tremendous amount of material wealth and effort nations spend to fix context in place. Burke's discussion of piety in *Permanence and Change*, in the section entitled "Piety as a System-Builder," drives home the point we are making here. He notes that piety runs through-and-through every aspect of our lives. Although we, by force of intellectual habit, relegate piety to "churchness," piety in fact is present in our symbols and language in *all* human endeavors. Paraphrasing Bentham, Burke, states that "poetry is implicit in our very speech. For our words affect us and our hearers by drawing upon the wells of emotion behind them" (75).

Our pieties, then, build vast symbol systems informing us of "what [image] goes with what [image]" (enabling us to name situations and thus motives for acts) linking *all* aspects of our life to an overarching principle that informs us as to "what is appropriate," and makes *links* to the images that are pious to our sources of being - even the postures our bodies must take to be pious to our sources of being. These poetic and symbolic pieties can affect the physiologies of our bodies, such as when addictions form.¹⁶³ Burke summarizes the pervasiveness of piety and poetry in the following terms: "So if we are all poets, and if all poets are pious, we may expect to find great areas of piety, even at a ball game. *Indeed, all life has been likened to the writing of a poem, though some people write their poems on paper, and others carve theirs out of jugular veins*" [emphasis added] (76).

In essence, the life and history of Kirkuk has been one of various socio-political groups' efforts to shape it into their god-term. In other words, Kirkuk is the historical scene of ethnic-

¹⁶³ For a full-length treatment of the body in relation to Burke's rhetorical theory please see Debra Hawhee's monograph *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*. Related specifically to the physiology of the body see Chapter 7 "Welcome to the Beauty Clinic."

nationalists seeking to carve into its material and psychological landscape a living geo-glyph or image that represents each group's originating principle of ethnic-nationalism that demands piety. Put in aesthetic terms, various ethnic groups make the city over into their own image and form. What Burke calls the “incantatory process” in *Philosophy of Literary Form* (116).¹⁶⁴

Kirkuk as a communal work of art (god-term) is important to develop a well-rounded understanding of the ESU conversations (as poetry). As the various ethnic groups strive to create one god-term based on ethnic-nationalism, the ESU shurta strive to carve out of the landscape (via the CSM) the constitutional myth and god-term *rule of law* that transcends the exclusive ethnic nationalisms. In what follows, we briefly show the poetic process (on a historically large scale) of creating a god-term out of the city Kirkuk - the conversations that contains the ESU shurta's conversation.

Geographically, Kirkuk is the center of the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR). Like a loadstone, it draws the nation of Iraq, the region, and the international community toward its center. As the ultimate MCR god-term, it is a fusion of agents (ideals) with their scene (material world). As such, it contains within its semantic and geographic core the material and symbolic energy motivating the entire MCR conflict. A cursory study of the Map of Kirkuk brings into sharp relief the merger of scene with agent. The potential energy of Kirkuk's oil field (dwarfing the city, see Map C, page 205) is translated into the kinetic and aesthetic energy of *Kirkuk* - a political ideal of ethnic-nationalism and Iraqi nationalism - motivating (literally) individual and communal acts in which each individual's and group's advance toward Kirkuk in material reality signifies an equal advancement toward the *ideal* city which signifies the

¹⁶⁴ Burke's statement: “But we must consider also the 'incantatory' factor in imagery: its function as a device for inviting us to “make ourselves over in the image of the imagery” (*PLF* 116).

*entelechi*al consummation of nationalist identity. The map discloses that which stands underneath or holds up the intrinsic essence (*hypostasis / sub-stance*) of Kirkuk and the MCR conflict - the hydrocarbons underneath, a material and geographic constitution-beneath-the-constitution. In other words, the logically prior principle of ethnic-nationalism translates into the ultimate material (temporal) first - oil. We will see this metonymic fusion of Kirkuk in Kurdish and Arab groups' attempt to both *name* (spiritualize) Kirkuk and to shape its material environment (temporize), so that its scene is made over in the ideal image of ethnic-nationalism “spiritualized,” and the ideals of ethnic-nationalism are temporized - given aesthetic form in the city.

Kirkuk's power as material and symbolic motive is found in its quality and capacity to assume the substance of all five pentadic terms simultaneously. As explained in the previous section, a god-term contains the entire constitutional frame. In this case, a single word “Kirkuk” is a verbal act that creates the entire MCR world and current constitutional crisis in Iraq. For example, Kirkuk is a scenic term representing the material reality of the city, oil, power, land, buildings, trading crossroads, and material wealth of the region (object oriented rhetoric). It is an ideal term of agent representing the idealism and identity of nationalist movements - Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, and Assyrian Christian. It functions, too, as an agency in that the city is a means to realize material and political purposes - local, regional and international. To control Kirkuk is to control the instrument that consummates nationalist realities and regional influence. Kirkuk is mystical in that it represents a transcendental purpose of unifications.

Not only does it unify ethnic groups who seek their own mythic realization, it merges these different groups into a common substance of difference and division - metropolitan Kirkuk

- a plurality of identities individuating the common substance as they struggle to make the city over into their image. It draws to its center regional and international corporate identities as well, Turkey, U.S., Great Britain, Iran, and Arab Gulf States seeking their own mythic realizations. In short, Kirkuk is a god-term whose motivational substance permeates through each individual and corporate agent. As such, it demands piety and sacrifice. As explained above, god-terms in their ability to *move* groups of people, are “so sacrosanct that the material good of this life must be mysteriously rendered up for it” (Weaver, “Ultimate,” 214). The more various groups make the city over into their image and symbol of material and ideal power, the more it demands in return.

Indeed, Kirkuk demands the sacrifice of politicians, soldiers, and citizens in their daily lives and behaviors. They must render up their bodies, minds, and acts in the form of the struggle for Kirkuk. Take for example the building of Kurdish homes in northern Kirkuk. Free land is offered by one Kurdish land owner to Kurds to build a family home in the city - increasing Kurdish demographic presence in the city (See Photo 2). These Kurdish citizens “render up the material goods of their life” to carve out an image of their ethnic-nationalist quest and to make over Kirkuk in their image - a way of *temporizing* their ethnic essence in the landscape.



Photo 2: New Kurdish homes being built south of Kirkuk Checkpoint 1. ESU policemen said the land, owned by a Kurdish business man, is given to Kurds for free with the stipulation that the Kurdish families must pay to have a home built for their family on the free lot of land. The writing of Kurdish poetry on the landscape of Kirkuk. Photo taken by author 22 January 2011.

The Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani “spiritualizes” and “idealizes” Kirkuk when he states that, “Kirkuk is the Jerusalem of Kurdistan.” Not only is his act of naming an “idealization” of the city, it is a form of piety fusing Kurdish essence with the material reality of the city. Ambassador Paul L. Bremer states that, “For Barzani, reversing Arabization of Kirkuk had become a *sacred duty*” (*My Year 271*). Kurdish groups attempt to make the city over into the image that represents their nationalist identity (make the city *appeal to* Kurdish identity). At the same time, the city has an incantatory power over the Kurdish community which believe the city to be their “Jerusalem” and “sacred duty.” Kirkuk, the material city, is “spiritualized” as the essence of Kurdish quidity; and the ideal of Kurdishness is temporized - given material (aesthetic) form and *appeal* - in the city and its structures. For the Kurdish people Kirkuk is a god-term that undergirds their nationalist aspirations. It is given further material reality when Kurds celebrate their “martyrs” on television programs broadcast throughout Iraq. One program viewed while visiting checkpoints honors Kurdish martyrs in a pageantry of coffins draped with Kurdish flags while young girls stand by their sides holding flowers and nationalist songs declare


the unity of the Kurds and glorify nationalist goals. Arabs, too, have attempted to carve out of Kirkuk their own poetic image.

Historically, the Ba'th party strove to make Kirkuk into the image that would represent an Arab ethnic-nationalism. In 1976 the Ba'th party nationalized the region around Kirkuk and named it Ta'amim (تأميم), meaning

literally “nationalization” in Arabic (See Map F: Iraqi Provinces). The creation of the Province of Ta'amim followed (and celebrated) the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 which gave the Iraqi government control of the

country's oil production (free from outside interference) for the first time

since 1925. The 1976 creation of Ta'amim coincided with the Arabization of north-central Iraq, including the city of Kirkuk, in which Arab families were relocated from other parts of Iraq to Kirkuk and Kurds removed from their homes. Kurdish leadership claims over one million Kurds were removed from their homes, but, as David McDowall attests in his *Modern History of the Kurds*, the exact number of relocated is impossible to verify (340). The rhetorical point important to us is that the Ba'th party under Saddam attempted to make Kirkuk the *image* (aesthetic form) of Iraqi and Arab nationalism by carving out the landscape for and with Arab families. Again another example of the effect of metonymy at work in temporizing an ideal (Arab nationalism) and idealizing the material (Kirkuk the city and its oil). Although it is common practice to think



Map F: Iraq's Provinces after 1976 to Present

of the carving of graven images out of wood or stone, in this case the demographic manipulation of Kirkuk amounts to the carving out of the city a graven image that represents Kurdish or Arab nationalism. But the situation is slightly more complicated when we add that Kirkuk also represents *Iraqi* nationalism.

Yes, Kirkuk represents a convergence of nationalisms: Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman. And in context of the international and historical setting of colonial and international control over Iraq's oil from 1925 to 1972, Kirkuk also represents *Iraqi* sovereignty and autonomy - the *idea* of the nation as its own agent. The 1972 nationalization of the Iraqi Oil Company was the culmination of *Iraq's* struggle for independence since the foundation of the Iraqi monarchy and the signing of an oil concessions treaty with the British (the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty) in 1925. So, in 1973, Mullah Mustafa's gambit on behalf of Kurdish nationalism (or simply self-interest) perhaps seemed a galling act of betrayal to Iraqis (of all ethnicities) who shared a common *Iraqi* identity and complete sense of autonomy for the first time. He is reported to have approached the CIA with the following offer: "We are ready to act according to U.S. policy if the U.S. will protect us from the wolves. In the event of sufficient support we should be able to control the Kirkuk oilfields and confer exploitation rights on an American company" (McDowall 333). Essentially, Mullah Mustafa's offer to surrender Kirkuk's oil for favors conferred was a betrayal of the century-long struggle for *Iraqi* independence (and Arab nationalism). McDowall notes that as early as 1963 Arab nationalists feared that the Kurds were being used by Iran and Western powers, especially oil companies, as a "Trojan horse" to control Iraq's oil including that of Kirkuk (313). So adding a third national identity (that is to ostensibly transcend ethnic identity on a higher plane) complicates the struggle for Kirkuk even more. In short, there are efforts to

carve out of Kirkuk's landscape the *image* of a universal *Iraqi* identity. And the *Iraqi* identity and image is often conflated with Arabness or Kurdishness or Turkomaness.

We are not arguing that any of the parties mentioned above acted favorably or unfavorably. The point we are making with these examples is that *Kirkuk* (an ontological phenomena) is a god-term and symbolic act (logically and temporally) *that attracts agents to it holding them enthralled*, demonstrating its aesthetic “incantatory” appeal:¹⁶⁵ Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, ethnic-nationalism, Iraqi state-nationalism, international governments seeking their own nationalist power (France, Great Britain, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the U.S.) and international companies representing the identities of corporations, cartels and future Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) at the London and New York Stock Exchanges. Whatever the individuation, they all share and are united by the universal motivational substance *Kirkuk*. It is both idea (an agent that seems animate and attractive) and material (scene). And for a leader, ethnic group, or nation to be blessed with the control of Kirkuk's material wealth (oil) is in effect to rule by divine right - to legitimize their nationalist spiritual ideals in a universal material (aesthetic) form and substance known today as the *oil god* (or *energy god*) whose only counterpart is the *money god* as universal motive transcending all difference.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ It is common to refer to Kirkuk as the “epicenter” of the MCR (disputed territories) conflict. But this geological term implies a radiation outward - moving away from the city. In fact, the paradigm is simultaneously a moving toward and away from Kirkuk. National and international groups are moving toward Kirkuk as the oil, of course, legitimate and smuggled moves away from Kirkuk.

¹⁶⁶ It is necessary to quote at length Burke's comments on polytheism found in his section “Universal Motives as Substance” in *Grammar of Motives* for a full understanding of how we arrive at the oil god, a concept of deification of material reality that the “modern” world attributes to the inventions of so called “primitive” societies, such as tribes deifying the material sources of their being and worshiping the “sun god.” Burke writes: “**All gods are 'substances,' and as such are names for motives or combinations of motives.** . . . We may even think of local divinities as theological prototypes of contemporary environmentalist, or geographic motives. **For to say that a river is a different “god” than a mountain is to say, within the rules of a polytheistic nomenclature, that a river calls for a different set of human actions than a mountain.** . . . Universal religions, proclaiming some one principle of divinity as the ground of being, have assisted in development of world-wide commerce by enabling the

After the fall of Saddam in 2003, Kirkuk's pull would draw the PUK *Peshmerga* into the city on 9 April, despite U.S. assurances to Turkey and other nations that Kurdish parties would not be allowed to enter and take over Kirkuk once the war on the ground began. The Kurdish PUK's *Peshmerga* with Jalal Talabani's blessing entered the city on 9 April 2003. The seizure of Kirkuk angered the PUK's traditional Kurdish rival Massoud Barzani and the KDP. The KDP and PUK had fought a bloody civil war from 1995 to 1999 and both groups now sought exclusive control over Kirkuk. The Kurdish PUK presence also enraged the Iraqi Turkoman Front, who told of the *Peshmerga* evicting Turkoman from their homes and killing Turkoman - in one case, crushing the skull of a young Turkoman boy. Arabs, too, would be evicted from their homes as a form of Kurdish justice for being moved to Kirkuk during the 1970 Arabization program. These refugees within Iraq became known as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) - an embodied (material) symbol of Iraq's (and Kirkuk's) fractured mythical image.¹⁶⁷ And, finally,

believers, who share in this over-all substance, to retain a sense of one master motive prevailing throughout the world. For the believer in such a universal scheme of motives may go to many different scenes, each with its own peculiar motivational texture, without losing his 'hypostasis,' the sense of his personal identity and of one "real" motivational substratum underlying it. . . . The British official's habit, in the Empire's remotest spots, of dressing for dinner is in effect the transporting of an idol, the vessel of a motive that has its sanctuary in the homeland. . . . Of course, by the time the monotheistic motive has become embodied in a structure of world empire, it has usually been transformed into its secular analogue, the monetary motive. For the incentive of monetary profit, like the One God, can be felt to prevail as a global source of action, over and above any motivations peculiar to the locale. And it serves the needs of empire precisely because it "transcends" religious motives, hence making for a 'tolerant' commerce among men whose religious vocabularies of motivation differ widely" (43-44). In the case of Kirkuk as god-term sharing the substance of the global *oil god*, it organizes and constitutes a particular pattern of life and motivational basis. It gives ethnic-nationalism and identity *divine* validation and legitimacy. To call it one's own *is*, in today's polytheistic terms, to rule by divine right. The one group which speaks for the god Kirkuk (oil god), speaks with a divinely powerful voice. The group's *hypostasis* taking on the universal substance, as real as the ground they walk on and the oil they drill for, that will "hold them up" before the international community. Treating such material entities like mineral wealth (oil) and cities as having their own unique (scenic) ontology is perhaps an instance of object oriented rhetoric. The "god" status a human way of expressing a "things" qualitative essence and rhetorical force apart from the human symbolic world. And humans organize their lives according to this "things" power. Our symbols and environment (objects) use and motivate us as much as we use them.

¹⁶⁷ The Kurdish ESU and *Peshmerga* interviewed told the story of the Arabs given 10,000 Iraqi Dinars by Saddam's government to move to Kirkuk. This group of Arabs is referred to as the "10,000 Dinar people."

the PUK and KDP branches of the *Asayish* converged on Kirkuk and remained as a Stasi bringing “security” to the city and fighting a shadow war for control.¹⁶⁸ Whatever these acts of evicting “other” ethnicities from their homes and occupying Kirkuk may be in material terms, their motives are essentially poetic acts of piety - piety to an ethnic-nationalist god-term that finds its ultimate grounding in the oil god. The forcing of populations from Kirkuk and the moving of new populations into Kirkuk are a socio-political groups' attempt to carve their poetry and image of their god-term out of Kirkuk's geographic and demographic landscape, and, at times, out of the jugular veins of their rivals. (A, perhaps, less violent instance of this in the United States is political parties' efforts to gerrymander voting districts. Parties write their poetry in the form of a voting district that will reflect the party's ideal image).

Kirkuk is a God-term; it is the ultimate motivation, or substance of Iraq's and the MCR's constitutional frame (*GM 355*). All of the historical acts delineated above from the naming of Kirkuk, to the eviction of populations, the building of homes and settling of new populations, are motivated by the *idea* and *aesthetic form* of ethnic-nationalism temporized in the city of Kirkuk. The *idea* of Kirkuk demands material sacrifice as well as daily acts of piety that give material form to *Iraqis'* historical constitutional struggle. And these daily acts (simple “ways of life” to complex security force movements) performed by group and individual agents and counter-agents give material expression to and build Kirkuk's symbolic edifice in the struggle to validate nationalist identities. Kirkuk's checkpoints (which ring the city and have the image of a castle

¹⁶⁸ For greater detail about events after April 2003 see the chapter “Deeds to the Promised Land” in Quil Lawrence's book *Invisible Nation: How The Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East*. Metin Turcan's “Confrontation or Conciliation? Kirkuk Question as the Tightest Knot in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish Politics to Resolve it Through Compromise” pages 39-42. Liam Anderson's and Gareth Stansfield's monograph *Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethno Politics of Conflict and Compromise*. And Lydia Khalil's “Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?”

resembling Kirkuk's ancient citadel), its CSM, are one of these acts constituting the *idea* of *Kirkuk* in material and symbolic form. The city is the *koinos topos*, the ontological common place of common places acting as the very ground (logically and temporally) that is both the proof (*pisteis*) supporting nationalist claims and the nationalist belief/claim (*pisteis*) itself - the claim its own evidence - the act its own scene, the constitution self-grounding, a god-term emerging from the national and international conversation of ethnic-groups and foreign nations.¹⁶⁹

Kirkuk as a constitutional god-term is a self-grounding poetic act. So the more it is made in the image of ethnic-nationalism, international legitimacy, national and corporate identity, the more sacrifice and piety it demands (in those terms) from the agents that make the image. To find one's narrative purpose, one's *final cause* in Kirkuk is to reach the full potential of one's *ethnic* and *Iraqi* essence in the presence of the mythical god (*constitutional myth*) of one's own symbolic kind (form) and making. What we have briefly described above is the attempt to make and *fix* in place a national god-term (constitutional myth) that would undergird and legitimize the various ethnic-nationalist claims to Kirkuk as well as constitute the Iraqi nation's claims to

¹⁶⁹ The *claim* its own *evidence* or *proof* is played out in very material and ideal ways - logical principles translated into temporal firsts and *v.v.* Take for example Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution which provides a three phase process for resolving the MCR - normalization, census, referendum. "Normalization" requires the creation of *facts* on the ground - a return to Kirkuk's "normal" ethnic population. In this case, *fact* takes on its literal meaning to *do* or *make*. The government of Iraq and regional parties (Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman) must - by constitutional decree - *make* their material scene reflect (temporize) an *ideal* - whatever that ethnic demographic ideal may be. And once these demographic *facts* are established as a manufactured material reality called "normalization," they become the *proof* or *evidence* substantiating the very ethnic claims and *ideas* that motivated "normalization" in *the first place* (*koinos topos*). And this demographic *fact* is transformed into constitutional proof or *evidence* supporting the claim through the bureaucratic legerdemain of the census and finally the referendum. The census and referendum "spiritualizing" and "idealizing" the "normalized hard facts on the ground." A difficulty, then, with Article 140 is that it is *in fact* self-grounding (in the geography and demographics of Kirkuk) - like all constitutional wishes and constitutions. The *claim* its own *evidence* is a literal creation of a common place (*koinos topos*) in the human terrain. Do ethnic groups occupy land because it is theirs, or is it theirs because they occupy it? A paradox of substance written into the Iraqi constitution which all political parties attempt to fix in their rhetorical and substantial terms (and images) of argument.

Kirkuk. It is a communal work of political art emerging from a vast national and international conversation (dispute). It demonstrates the metonymic process of *temporizing* and *idealizing* inherent in socio-political groups' efforts to make Kirkuk over into their own image as the god-term of a constitutional myth. It shows that political struggles (on a grand scale such as an entire city or nation) are *aesthetic* (dramatistic) struggles in that a city can be made over into the form and *image* of ethnic identity by metonymic fusions of agent-scene. The social problem of *appeal* and *identification* is, at rock bottom, simply the repetition of aesthetic form. And we understand that our god-terms and the material images that embody our god-terms make us even as we make them.

Most important for understanding the Kirkuk CSM, it is the historical and political scene, briefly described above, that contains the ESU shurta's CSM act. The ESU, in effect, attempt to transcend the constitutional myth and image of Kirkuk representing exclusive ethnic-nationalist interests by attempting to carve into the landscape of Kirkuk and make of themselves the image of *rule of law* shared equally by all *Iraqis*. Even more to the point, they view their corporate and corporal identity as embodying the rule of law. They see themselves as the agents of a constitutional myth that transcends ethnic difference - or at least continues it on a new plane. What follows is the story and struggle of the ESU shurta to write "The law above everyone" in the city of Kirkuk and repeat this *poetic form* of their god-term and constitutional myth throughout the city.

ESU Shurta and Constitutional Myth

The CSM as a symbolic act is necessarily an attempt to carve into the geographic and psychological landscape of Kirkuk the image and form of the rule of law. As such, it is a large-scale rhetorical rejoinder emerging from a national and international conversation about the status of Kirkuk (the history presented above). It is a symbolic response to terrorist groups and ethnic-nationalist groups who would assert their own constitutional myth as the unifying principle within Kirkuk. The motive of the CSM act emerges from the divisive situation of threatening civil war and ethnic fighting (political instability). The CSM attempts to transcend these sectarian identities and stabilize Kirkuk by creating the image of *Iraqi* rule of law - a law whose substance permeates through all ethnic communities and serves as the ultimate common ground - constitutional myth - undergirding and unifying Kirkuk and the rest of Iraq.

The checkpoints' system of concrete structures, roads, and living areas temporize the ideal of rule of law as much as they represent an engineering problem or security response to terrorism or the threat of civil war. The Kirkuk CSM is a poetic and rhetorical act that establishes the material presence of an ideal constitutional concept. The building of the structures, then, are poetry writ large on Kirkuk's landscape and the creation of an image of rule of law that necessarily demands the piety of the city's and country's citizens. As one ESU shurta interviewed said, "At every checkpoint they wrote, 'The law above everyone.' But it's not really true. The parties are above the law." The U.S. Army Engineers who built the structures were in effect poets writing into Kirkuk's landscape the symbols of the rule of law - a rhetorical message and argument. At the time of the interviews, three of the six checkpoints were built in the shape of castles, a temporizing of Kirkuk's ancient past. It was a "looking back" (intentionally or

unintentionally) for an ontological principle of unity, as the checkpoint “castles” reflect the essence of Kirkuk's ancient citadel located in the city's center (a symbol of security and a unified city identity).

The security mechanism's scenic features help imply the quality of the act as a material reality and serious security operation giving tangible meaning to the rule of law. The most important element in the Kirkuk CSM, however, is the ESU agent who is the embodiment of the rule of law at each checkpoint. The ESU agent represents the ideal of rule of law even while being a part of the security mechanism's scene: he is both scene (material) and agent (ideal). The ESU are the agents that both make and are made by the CSM. As the ESU substance transforms so transforms the Combined Security Mechanism's substance and meaning. It is from their conversations and interactions with their communities that creation of a constitutional myth (rule of law) takes the form of ritual dramatism. Their conversations disclose that they are aware of the metonymic fusion they represent regarding the rule of law. And it reveals the contested nature of their constitutional and mythic substance. The analysis from here to the end reveals a symbolic battle to write the image of an idea that would transcend ethnic strife - an attempt to write a constitutional myth.

Our goal is to tell the ESU's story about how they struggle with their constitutional history and current political scene (the story told above) to create and believe in a constitutional myth that will transcend their historical and ethno-political conflicts. Their conversations necessarily feature the following pentadic ratios: agent-purpose, agent-counteragent (political parties), agent-scene (political), and agent-scene (economic). So our analysis is structured with the ESU shurta standing at the center, representing the god-term and constitutional myth *rule of*

law. We first unfold the intrinsic substance of ideal purpose beginning with the shurta at the center, move outward to the influence of the parties, to geo-political influence, and finally economic influence. As we move through these stages of concentric circles of substance, we witness the struggle to fix ESU shurta substance and the Kirkuk CSM as the image of rule of law. The organizational structure of concentric circles of motivational substance, as we fill out each stage, will provide a full picture of the competing placement of god-terms and constitutional myths. The ESU conversations provide a window into the Kirkuk dispute on the ground - the police officer at the checkpoints. It also provides a snap shot of the formation of ESU substance and the paradoxes of motive they must negotiate as they attempt to create their constitutional myth, *rule of law*.

Agent-Purpose (The Constitutional Myth)

The communal work of art the Kirkuk CSM is forging is the ESU shurta himself. Once the man puts on the uniform (a scenic property), he becomes the image of *rule of law*. He influences the quality of the scene in which Kirkuk's and Iraq's citizens act. And his actions and interactions as agent represent the ideal of *rule of law*. In short, his acts both temporize the rule of law (in his own person) and idealize his own body (person) and the institutional body of the ESU as the rule of law. The ESU officers and shurta understand that their *mystical* purpose is to *empiricize* the rule of law and themselves be *idealized*. They use terms of idealistic agent and mystical purpose to describe their work. One ESU officer made the following observation regarding the ESU's metonymic and promethean function:

As Iraqi Police, as you know, we represent the law. We have the law, and we are the law. And any of us that is out there at the checkpoints - we run the law and are part of the law, and if anyone

comes through those checkpoints that is higher than us, that has power, he can do whatever he wants.¹⁷⁰

The ESU Officer's words express a common theme among the Kirkuk police. They are aware of their idealistic purpose and mission to make tangible the abstract concept *law* - "We have the law, and we are the law." The ESU derive their intrinsic motivational substance, then, from the *law* as an *ideal* concept, and they recognize that they embody this ideal at each checkpoint - shaping the Kirkuk scene to represent this *Iraqi* constitutional ideal. Even by acts of standing on street corners, the ESU carve into the Kirkuk landscape an image (a pageantry) of the rule of law. As one ESU OIC states, "The ESU means everything to the city. We have a shurta that stand in the streets every 100 to 200 meters in the city to provide security for the citizens."¹⁷¹ So the purpose to embody an ideal (law) and themselves be idealized (law-man) - a metonymic fusion- is an intrinsic motivational substance of purpose undergirding ESU acts. In essence, the ESU give the *rule of law* a *posture* (attitude) in the city and at each checkpoint.¹⁷² This dramatic purpose implies the CSM quidity as an act giving aesthetic form to the rule of law, making present an ultimate constitutional myth standing at nearly every street corner and every checkpoint protecting Kirkuk and shared by all of its citizens - a universal substance running through-and-through the city in the form of an ESU shurta.

The ESU see themselves as educators or advocates for the ideal of rule of law and what it means or should mean. ESU said that, in their daily interactions with the public, citizens thought

¹⁷⁰ ESU (Iraqi Police), 1. Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

¹⁷¹ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

¹⁷² See Debra Hawhee's discussion of attitude, the body, and gestural-speech theory in *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke and the Edges of Language*, Chapter 6, "Body Language: Paget and Gesture-Speech Theory."

of the ESU as representing the “old system” under Saddam (related to the history of Kirkuk told above in which various ethnicities were removed from their homes and the *secret* police worked for one party). Several ESU OIC's explain that they attempt to educate citizens about their purpose to protect all citizens and establish the rule of law as a legal ideal (and system) that applies to all equally. They note that the slogan they use with citizens that may be belligerent or not accept their authority is “respect yourself and others will respect you,” in an effort to reinforce their own professionalism and inculcate the public to a “new way” of interacting with their civic police. So the ESU represent the rule of law in terms of metonymic fusions and function as scenic advocates as well as agents, ideal rhetoricians or poets, attempting to write *the rule of law* as the constitutional myth uniting Iraqis and the citizens of Kirkuk. Their daily conversations and interactions with citizens are an epideictic rhetoric that establishes the constitutional myth by presenting citizens an ideal and material image giving aesthetic form and advocacy to the rule of law. (We also discussed this advocacy as the self-grounding of a group's reciprocal representation).

An example of how the shared purpose to embody the *rule of law* transcends ethnic difference and provides a unifying substance is found in the terms the Kirkuk shurta use to express the ideal character of their ESU institution. The shurta declare that their institutional identity represents the “diversity” of Kirkuk constituted by Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman, and Assyrian Christians. Shurta describe, then, an institution that represents a unified *Kirkuki* identity embodying an *E Pluribus Unum* principle. So, in ideal terms of purpose, ESU describe their corporate body whose *hypostasis* is both rule of law and a unique *plural Kirkuki* identity. As one shurta asserts, “[we] have no problems with the locals, especially in Kirkuk, it has its

own unique people, we call it little Iraq.”¹⁷³ One officer working at the Combined Coordination Center reflects on the unique relationship between Kirkuk residence saying that “Where I live I have one Turkoman, one Arab, and one Christian family that live near me. So when I leave for a few days, I am not worried about my family because we are like brothers. Our main fear is of the parties.”¹⁷⁴

When stripping away all of the ESU's scenic and pragmatic substance, their material agency (equipment, vehicles, gas, weapons, electricity, and uniforms) and political and economic environment they must contend with, leaving only the agent and his ideal, they use an image of a candle to embody their intrinsic purpose. They recognize that the U.S. Army provided much if not all of the material, technological, and logistical support for their CSM work - even providing boots as well as the structures, living areas, training, back scatter technology, and communications rooms. For example, when asked what they will do when the U.S. Army withdraws from Iraq, a group of ESU responded with their history, a narrative that expresses the ideal they and their institution signify. They said that prior to the U.S. Army's arrival at the checkpoint, they worked alone and they only had candles for light. They said that they had worked at the checkpoint for four years. And after the U.S. Army withdraws from Iraq, they continued, “We will return to the candle, and we will provide security to the city the best that we can. Just like we did before.”¹⁷⁵ An ESU OIC echoes this sentiment saying that “I am pretty sure the checkpoint will be ok [with regard to equipment], but, in any case, we will stay and do our

¹⁷³ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

¹⁷⁴ N - Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

¹⁷⁵ Eight ESU. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 3. January 2011.

job just like we did before. When I first got here, we had candles and we all slept in one CONEX.”¹⁷⁶ Various ESU use a candle flame to metonymically express in material terms the *substance* of the ESU's ideal purpose. Their personal psychological and intrinsic substance (motive) and ideal - the rule of law - burns like Promethean candlelight.

The image of candlelight, however, also expresses the fragility of the ideal they strive to embody. Candle flames are subject to suffering the environmental (scenic) forces around them. And so are the ESU and their ideal purpose of rule of law (motivation) subject to suffering the political, historical, and economic forces around them. For example, one ESU OIC uses a candle's flame to refer to the scenic forces and counteragents working to shape the ESU and Kirkuk substance. This ESU officer, expresses the dramatistic paradox of substance intrinsic to Kirkuk and the ESU. His use of the candle is no *mere metaphor* but a profound metaphysical statement exemplifying Burke's dramatistic theories regarding the paradoxes of human substance and motivation. He states that “A candle flame gives off light and is dark at the center. Iraq is like this.”¹⁷⁷ The officer's use of a candle flame as both a source of light and darkness is a figurative way to express and sum up the dramatistic paradox of substance the ESU shurta themselves embody - that is, conflicting basis of motivation. The ESU understand that they have an *ideal and mystical purpose* - the rule of law - which is their unifying and motivational basis. Their terms of purposive substance reveal that they see themselves as “works of communal art” shaped into the image and *ethos* of rule of law at every checkpoint and on street corners. The forging of the ESU as an institution and individual shurta imbued with the ultimate substance of

¹⁷⁶ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 4. January 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

purpose - rule of law - attempts to carve out of the Kirkuk landscape an *Iraqi* constitutional myth and *enact* a god-term that will uphold (hypostasis) Iraq's social, economic, and legal constitutions in Kirkuk.

The darkness in the officer's candlelight represents conflicting terms of substance (scenic forces, counteragents and counter acts) that compete to shape the ESU's intrinsic substance and motivational basis and to transform the CSM act into a sectarian image and message. As much as the ESU are aware of the ideal they embody and believe in, they are also aware that there are historical, political and economic forces with which they must contend in order to survive, which they necessarily must overcome to consummate the formation of their constitutional myth. The ESU officer above poetically and dramatically empiricizes the paradox of substance found in any constitution and the ESU themselves. Light and darkness come from the same candle. Here we do not mean a good / bad binary (although the ESU officer may have meant this). We simply mean that the image of the candle flame represents the conflicting motives present in any constitution - that every constitutional act and substance is contained by another scene. And so it is that the ESU shurta is the centripetal image at the center of the CSM's constitutional myth. The person of the ESU *is* the expressive form that would hold the CSM together under the term *Iraqi rule of law*. The intrinsic substance and motivation is clear - rule of law. We now move out from the ESU ideal center (god-term) and take up the terms of agent-counteragent which work against the ESU ideal of rule of law - the darkness given off by the candle.

Agent-Counteragent (Parties)¹⁷⁸

The ESU, in their conversations about the security mechanism and Kirkuk, refer to the scenic forces that controvert their attempt to establish rule of law as “the parties.” In discussing the ESU's ideal purpose in the preceding section, we glossed over terms that clearly imply counter forces (counteragents) and scenic counter motives: “If anyone comes through those checkpoints that is [at a] higher [position] than us, that has power, he can do whatever he wants.”¹⁷⁹ “At every checkpoint they wrote, 'The law above everyone.' *But it's not really true. The parties are above the law.*” And “Our main fear is of the parties.”¹⁸⁰ The previous section is idyllic in that it discloses the agent alone at the center of his mystical and ideal purpose unencumbered by life's ritual drama - the unending conversation and scenic recalcitrance with which constitutional myths are forged and motivational god-terms established. In short, as we move through outer concentric circles of pentadic ratios we witness the ESU's confrontation with their scene. So this section begins to round out the analysis of the ESU's statements by situating the Kirkuk CSM's ideal and mythical argument within the context of the historical and political struggle of various political parties to carve an ethnic-nationalist image out of the Kirkuk landscape. In essence, we continue the historical story told above regarding the attempt by various ethnic-nationalist forces to shape Kirkuk into the image and god-term signifying their

¹⁷⁸ For the sake of economy and easier reading, we use only enough representative quotations to make our key points within this section. For a fuller treatment of ESU terms regarding party influence of the ESU and counteragent as a locus of motive see “Appendix K: ESU's Terms of Militia, Backbone, Shakāwa (شقاوة), Tinted Windows, and Punishment.” Appendix K shows in greater depth the pervasive influence of parties as key motivational terms in shurta conversations.

¹⁷⁹ Iraqi Police Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

¹⁸⁰ N - Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

nationalist essence. In this case, these same forces carve their ethnic-nationalist poetry out of the ESU and the security mechanism.

We will see how political parties and elite citizens, shape the ESU's motives and meaning of the CSM by a counter act to the U.S. Army's rhetorical act to transcend the historical ethnic conflict on a higher plane of *rule of law* that applies equally to all. This section discloses how the parties begin to transform the ESU and CSM into a motivational substance of ethnic nationalism that permeates every aspect of ESU activity, institutional identity, and motivational basis competing with *Iraqi rule of law* to unify the ESU and Kirkuk. In terms of our definition of constitutional myth, various parties use the CSM and the shurta to temporize the ideal of their ethnic nationalism and “spiritualize” the police force in their own ethnic image. So security in Kirkuk has an *ethnic* image. Ultimately, The ESU are faced with the “freedom” and “necessity” to choose which god-term and myth they will enact (or both simultaneously) at the checkpoints - *Iraqi rule of law* and/or ethnic nationalism: Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman. Here the ritual drama of national and international conversations (the substance of these conversations) is made present at the “street level” with the ESU shurta.

A *Peshmerga* Officer working at the Kirkuk Combined Coordination Center introduces Kirkuk's political parties:

The political parties affect the work of the checkpoints because most police get their job by being recommended by their political party. The political parties have their own people that they want to work in a specific office or section. So when they need something, they call their staff working in any section of a security force and ask them to do something for them, so he has to do it for them.¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ *Peshmerga* Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

The *Peshmerga* presents a predominant term used in ESU and Golden Lions conversations to signify the dramatistic struggle to create a constitutional myth - “party.” As seen in the ESU quotations above, “political party” is the rival term to “rule of law.” In essence, these two terms provide the constitutional frame for the entire dramatistic CSM act and mythic struggle. We can add “political party” to our list of god-terms: Kirkuk (oil), Iraqi rule of law, and political party (ethnic-nationalism). What particularly makes political party a god-term is the piety and fear the common ESU show for the parties, not speaking the name of the parties during *any* interviews, even when asked what parties they were talking about. This is, perhaps, similar to the Hebrews' ritual silence in the Old Testament, not speak the name of their God out of reverence and respect for the source of their being, a testament to their God's power and ubiquitous presence. One ESU officer at a checkpoint used figurative language and sarcasm to describe parties, “Oh, you know, there are so many colors. . .and all the letters of the alphabet,”¹⁸² only alluding to the blue, yellow, and green of the Turkmen Front (ITF), Kurdish KDP and Kurdish PUK and their acronyms.¹⁸³ It should be emphasized that ESU did not mention fear of terrorists or terrorism in their conversations; they readily mentioned their fear of political parties.

“Political party” serves as an ideal term of agent (god-term) in ESU conversations. This ideal term also shapes the ESU's motivational substance in material (scenic) and pragmatic (agency) ways. What we present next is how the parties write their image into the ESU institution and the CSM checkpoints. The parties shape the ESU in their image in two ways: 1)

¹⁸² ESU Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 4. January 2011.

¹⁸³ Lydia Khalil in her article “Security in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage?” notes that the Kurdish PUK party repainted a newly built bridge in Kirkuk yellow because it was green, the color of their rival Kurdish party the KDP. See page 20.

controlling the police by placing loyalists within its ranks, and 2) overriding ESU authority and fracturing their *image* as *Iraqi of rule of law* at the checkpoints.

An Intelligence Officer characterizes the parties' influence in general terms:

[Security] offices [in Kirkuk] are much divided. Arabs and Kurds don't have good feelings. God knows we are not good. We have a lot of local problems and it all starts at local offices. For example, Arabs (IP) catch a Kurd, they will beat him; and if Kurds (IP) catch an Arab they will beat him. The senior politicians have to get better, and they have to change their thinking about each other. What do you expect from Iraqi Police officers if their leaders fight over one chair?¹⁸⁴

The “fight” over one chair at the top leads to an ethnic stratification of the Kirkuk IP down to its bottom ranks - an infusion of ethnic substance that divides the IP and ESU departments. We begin to see the ethnic-nationalist poetry written into the ESU when an *Asayish* officer in Kirkuk illustrates how the IP's *ethnic order of command* molds the institution into an image of ethnic-nationalism saying, “The IP commander is Kurdish, the staff is Turkmen, and the low ranking IP are Arabs. And each wants to benefit himself; each commander comes from a certain political party.”¹⁸⁵ The obvious implication is that officer rank within the IP is based on ethnicity, creating an ethnically stratified police force - the power at the top held exclusively by Kurds. One ESU officer sums up the party substance within the ESU comparing it to the material substance of poppies in Afghanistan:

The parties are controlling security; it would be like saying there are no poppy fields in Afghanistan [to not acknowledge party control]. We cannot say that an officer in the Army is neutral. And

¹⁸⁴ Iraqi Intelligence Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

¹⁸⁵ Asayish. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

it is a fact that the Kurdish parties control Kirkuk and the Americans know this.¹⁸⁶

From the top down, then, the ESU ranks take ethnic form made over in the image of an ethnic party: Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman. This is a writing and fixing of the ESU institutions' intrinsic substance and identity *in terms of* the ethnic-nationalist myth, a continuation of the attempt to shape Kirkuk over into a mythical image (god-term) of ethnic-nationalism. In this case, the police ranks replicate and serve the ethnic image and the *rule of law* becomes linked to this ethnic image. As party substance, temporized in the form of loyalists, filters through the ESU ranks, unification along ethnic party lines necessarily means a fracture in the image of an *Iraqi rule of law*, the mythic identity that would subsume and surpass Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, and Assyrian Christian identity. The pieties to an ethnic myth and god-term run through and through the ESU until the ESU *posture* of rule of law throughout the city begins to transform into an ethnic-nationalist posture, or simply no form or posture at all.

We see the parties shaping of ESU motivational substance in the way the ESU image as mythic *rule of law* is fractured and undermined at checkpoints. ESU shurta provide a surfeit of stories and claims in their conversations regarding the effect of the parties' influence at checkpoints. One group of ESU, however, provide a summary statement of how their ideal image is fractured and undermined. The quotation used here includes the four most used terms

¹⁸⁶ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

The ESU officer went on to delineate the commanding officers in Kirkuk's security forces: General Jamaal, IP commander - Kurdish; General Khatab, ESU commander - Kurdish, PUK; General Salar, Traffic Police Commander -Kurdish, PUK; General Sarhad, District Police commander - Kurdish, KDP; General Burhan, Rural Police - Turkoman. Of the five IP security forces in Kirkuk, four are commanded by Kurdish Generals with ties to Kurdish political parties.

by the ESU to describe parties' influence at checkpoints. The four summary terms are militias backbone, tinted windows, and punishment.

The Government is a failure. **The parties** will come back to have power, and we [ESU] don't have a **backbone**. Parties have their own **militias**. They roll as a group. Then there are those who use vehicles with **tinted windows**. They create the problems in the city.

We get punished for stopping people. Anyone having a gun [or having tinted windows] - you get some kind of **punishment**.

I pulled a vehicle over that happened to be an ESU officer. He said, "You don't know who I am?" He was a colonel. So now I come to work, and I don't have anything on me but my uniform and the money I need to **shave my head** [punishment meted out for various offenses within ESU ranks]. Officers don't value the IPs.¹⁸⁷

Appendix K provides a fuller treatment of these four terms and their material manifestation at the Kirkuk checkpoints. The point that we make with them here is that parties and their militias as well as powerful citizens driving vehicles with tinted windows undermine the CSM's intended purpose to unify the police and Kirkuk under a common rule of law. So not only are the ESU's institutional ranks divided by ethnicity, the ESU lack the agency (backbone), or legitimization from the political parties and powerful citizens to consummate the image and meaning of the ESU at the checkpoints. Powerful citizens demand special treatment and punish the ESU for attempting to stop them at checkpoints (for not knowing who they are). "You don't know who I am?" is a common question asked of the ESU at the checkpoints. The ESU proclaim that many times citizens connected to parties or the military can make one phone call to high ranking party members and police and the shurta will be punished for trying to "do his job."

¹⁸⁷ Five ESU shurta. Group Discussion. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 4. January 2011.

So we witness the CSM's rhetorical and idealistic act (Iraqi rule of law) confront the historical ethnic struggle for Kirkuk. The parties' and militias' daily acts of disrespect for the ESU temporize the ethnic, social, and political power structures over *Iraqi* rule of law. As one ESU summarizes their situation, "At every checkpoint they wrote, 'The law above everyone.' But it's not really true. The parties are above the law. In terms of "the parties," the ESU Promethean light of rule of law becomes increasingly fainter. And the image of the security mechanism begins to not only fracture but to be drawn into an historical struggle to form Kirkuk into the image of an ethnic nationalist god-term, which leads us to the third of our concentric circles.

Agent-Scene (Geo-Political)

We take another step out from our idealistic ESU shurta at the center of rule of law and advance to the terms used by ESU to describe their geo-political or national scene. This third band of our four concentric circles deals directly with the security mechanism as a scenic property or tool (concrete, geographic image). It shows that the ESU's ethnic-nationalist terms literally reshape the political geometry of Kirkuk's CSM. As can be seen on Map C, Kirkuk's six checkpoints form a circle around the city. The geometric shape of the circle a scenic property implying a unified center, identity, and constitutional frame. In carving this ring around the city, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and U.S. Army shaped the image of unity and rule of law in the Kirkuk landscape (In this case, too, terrain determined tactics. The geographic shape of the city and its roads implying the geometric quality of the CSM act - circle). They wrote the poetry of their constitutional myth and god-term in a unified image in opposition to the divided historical and political forces of nationalist self-interest and political instability. As one ESU shurta

declares, “The checkpoint is a barrier between Kirkuk and the outside world.”¹⁸⁸ The god-term of ethnic nationalism, however, just as it transforms the ESU intrinsic substance (via party influence as discussed in the previous section) also transmogrifies the CSM's circular geometry into a linear geo-political front of two ethnicities and armies. We can almost see the CSM change its material geometric structure with a shift in god-term. When rule of law is the ESU's central god-term, the CSM is a unified ring encircling the city. When ethnic-nationalism is the ESU's central god-term, the CSM is cut in half becoming a linear front and border between two military forces: the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish *Peshmerga*.

The CSM like the city of Kirkuk is divided North/South. The ESU refer to checkpoints 1, 2, and 3 as being in Kurdish territory in the north and checkpoints 4 and 5 as being in Arab territory in the south. One *Peshmerga* officer's response to a question about how long the CSM will be needed clearly outlines Kirkuk's and its security mechanism's geo-political divide:

[Kirkuk's CSM will be needed] as long as there are terrorists. From checkpoint 1 to 3 there are no terrorists. [But in the south] all this area [south of checkpoints 3, 4, and 5] is Sunni and Ba'athi loyalists. Checkpoints 1, 2, and 3, are the border of the *Peshmerga*. But if they let us enter the city, we will stop the activity of the terrorists. Most members of the IA are from this area [the southwest] because the majority of their officers are members of the Ba'th party and terrorists and they don't like us.¹⁸⁹

The *Peshmerga* officer perhaps best summarizes the geo-political forces dividing the Kirkuk CSM. He also introduces terms conflating terrorists with Sunni Arabs, with Ba'athi loyalists. An examination of the prevalence of these terms in ESU and Golden Lion's conversation would lead

¹⁸⁸ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

¹⁸⁹ *Peshmerga* Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

the chapter far off course. A brief analysis of these divisive terms can be found, however, in “Appendix M: Kirkuk's Terms of Geo-Political Division.” For the purpose of this chapter, however, the term we focus us on is “border.” In the minds of the Kurdish officers interviewed (*Peshmerga* and Iraqi Police) Kirkuk's CSM is divided north/south. As a Kurdish Iraqi Police officer states, “Checkpoint 4 and checkpoint 5 are bad. They are located in a bad area and terrorists come from the south.”¹⁹⁰ Kurdish interviewees went on to disparage the work of the ESU at checkpoints 4 and 5 claiming that they did not do their jobs correctly but the checkpoints (1, 2, and 3) located in the “Kurdish” north of the city ran according to protocol.

Now our point is not the accusations of poor work at the checkpoints for which there is no way to substantiate without long periods of observation at all checkpoints. Our focus is on the way the Kirkuk CSM's ideal and geometric substance is changed by a shift in *terms* present in their conversations. In the minds of Kurdish soldiers and police, the checkpoints are not necessarily the image and representation of a unified *Iraqi rule of law* but an image and representation of an ethnically divided city: north/south; Kurd/Arab; checkpoints 1,2,3/ checkpoints 4, 5; good/bad. Some ESU also divided the regions educated/uneducated. And the CSM is a border between two armies IA/*Peshmerga*. Checkpoints 4 and 5 signify Arabs, terrorists, Iraqi Army, and Ba'th party and the north a safe haven of Kurdish territory, at least in the minds of Kurdish officers interviewed. And to some extent this north/south ethnic divide is written into the purpose of the Kirkuk CSM and the area of responsibility Kirkuk's Golden Lions are sanctioned to patrol.

¹⁹⁰ Peshmerga Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

One ESU senior officer (Turkoman) notes that the primary purpose of the Kirkuk CSM is to keep the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army out of Kirkuk and coordinate Iraqi Army movements through the city. He went on to make a point that “The Iraqi Army entering Kirkuk is a problem for the *Peshmerga* - the Kurds.”¹⁹¹ Indeed, it is written in the security mechanism's Twelve Guiding Principles that the checkpoints main responsibility is to coordinate these troop movements. However, in the case of Kirkuk, it turns its CSM into a border crossing between two ethnic nations, not necessarily the *civil Iraqi rule of law* its ESU represent. And the *Peshmerga* (Kurdish) and Iraqi Army (Arab) divide is most pronounced in the geographic image representing the Golden Lions sanctioned area of patrol.

The Kirkuk Golden Lions, a combined force of ESU, *Peshmerga*, and Iraqi Army, patrols Kirkuk's periphery. When the Iraqi Government and U.S. Army first established the CSM, an agreement was made that only joint forces could patrol around the perimeter of the city. If IA patrolled alone, they received the ire of Kurdish communities. If the *Peshmerga* patrolled alone, they received the ire of Arab communities. However, Arab leaders in the southern region of Kirkuk balked at the combined force patrolling in the south, so the area the Golden Lions patrol represents a horseshoe. The combined force patrols North, East and West, but the Iraqi Army patrols to the south of Kirkuk. The unclosed circle of Golden Lions' patrols represents another example of how ethnic-nationalism is carved into Kirkuk's geographic scene. The divisive scenic features discussed above taken together with the CSM purpose to divide the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army from one another shows a near complete conceptual and physical rending of the Kirkuk CSM.

¹⁹¹ ESU Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

One purpose of the CSM and Golden Lions is to unite Kurds, Arabs, and Turkoman (as well as *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army) under the rule of law, in the case of the ESU, and as one combined security force, in the case of *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army. The CSM, however, has a purpose to keep the two armies apart (out of Kirkuk without permission). These are two very contrary movements originating from the same mechanism that seem to cancel each other out. On the one hand, the message of the checkpoints is that Kirkuk (and Iraq), the IA (Arabs/Turkoman) and the *Peshmerga* (Kurds) are politically divided. On the other hand, the message of the Golden Lions (and ESU checkpoints) is that the two forces are in fact *consubstantial* - united in common cause of *Iraqi rule of law*. The CSM is a candlelight giving of light that is dark in the center. The Kirkuk CSM, then, inherently contains a paradox of substance and motive, and, more importantly, for the Kirkuk and Iraqi citizens to whom the CSM is addressed, a mixed message is written into the Kirkuk landscape. It can be read as unity and/or division. And this is in keeping with our understanding of constitutions containing their own competing wishes and paradoxes of substance - so we need not be alarmed.

As we reach the outer limit of our third concentric circle containing the geo-political terms of ethnic-divisions (north/south, border, Kurd/Arab, *Peshmerga/IA*), the ESU agent as image of a constitutional myth - rule of law - recedes further away as the central god-term holding the ESU and the CSM together. The separatist terms demarcate exclusive territory on the Kirkuk map, dividing the Kirkuk checkpoints geographically and conceptually, and reasserting the god-terms and constitutional myths of ethnic-nationalism. The checkpoints and ESU become the temporized ideal of an ethnic struggle and the idealization of nationalist aspirations.

The ESU, too, essentially lose all “backbone” or begin to fade away as the image of *Iraqi rule of law*. The lack of backbone is explicitly expressed (temporized) in Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* ignoring CSM protocol. For example, although military movements must give 48 hour notice before moving through the city and checkpoints, ESU and officers working at the KCCC said that this coordination virtually never happened. A Kurdish IP officer noted that “we have issues with checkpoints 1, 2, and 6. The IA and *Peshmerga* pass through them and they need to coordinate with us first.”¹⁹² In fact, during the interviews on 8 February 2011 a convoy of armed 4th IA Division soldiers escorting their commander to northern Iraq passed through the checkpoints unannounced, causing a temporary stir. I was also told that zero coordination occurred in the months leading up to the *Peshmerga's* 24 February 2011 advance on Kirkuk before the Iraqi day of rage, with a slight uptick after the advance (which also caused a small and temporary crisis), which then returned to zero coordination a month later in late March 2011. When asked why the KCCC was not informed so it could authorize and coordinate an officer responded, “Don't ask me this question. Ask the main headquarters - this is a political issue,”¹⁹³ indicating that substance of *rule of law* resides with the individual ethnic parties and government heads but not necessarily on the checkpoints with the ESU. In other words, the image of *rule of law* is fractured along party lines and government lines Erbil/Baghdad representing two centers highly politicized rule of law.

Like a holograph that changes image as the observer changes his or her angle of perception, the Kirkuk CSM material image transforms from an image of rule of law to an image

¹⁹² Iraqi Police(IP) Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

¹⁹³ *Peshmerga* Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

of ethnic division with the change of terms. The terms ESU use to describe their geo-political scene transform the CSM act into a replica of Iraq's historical ethnic divisions described in the section on Kirkuk as a god-term. The image of a unified circuit of checkpoints representing a unifying idea of the ESU and rule of law physically changes shape, in substance, and becomes a front of two armies facing each other along ethnically divided checkpoints - Arab checkpoints in the south and Kurdish checkpoints in the north. What is more, the ESU and the CSM system lack the agency of *Iraqi rule of law*. Their temporizing image and spiritualization as rule of law begins to fade as political and military leaders ignore the CSM protocol outlined in the Twelve Guiding Principles. At this third stage of our concentric circles of terms, we see the Kirkuk CSM scene change to imply not the ESU ideal (the candle light of rule of law) but the idealistic god-terms of ethnic nationalism. It is this historical geo-political scene that contains the ESU's and CSM's ideal act and attempt to create a constitutional myth that unites Iraq. It is this scene that fractures the image of rule of law from the outside while the parties fracture the image from the inside (as discussed in the previous section). Both the ESU's intrinsic and extrinsic substance is imbued with ethnic nationalism and ethnic division that competes with the identity of *Iraqi rule of law*. The parties and their leaders carve their poetry out of the CSM landscape. And the physical geometry of the CSM transforms from a unitary circle into a dividing line.

On the threshold of advancing to our fourth and final concentric circle of terms, it is appropriate to introduce a god-term with liminal properties: the *Asayish*. For this group of Kurdish intelligence and security forces is ubiquitously present in ESU conversations, but seems to fit nowhere within ESU's scheme of terms in any convenient place. In interviews with *Peshmerga*, ESU, and Iraqi Army, the *Asayish* is a god-term equivalent to Kirkuk, *rule of law*,

and ethnic nationalism. Security and rule of law become conflated in the image of the *Asayish*, and the organization becomes an ultimate motivational force. One ESU shurta sums up the perceived power of this secret security unit saying that the “*Asayish* controls Kirkuk and are very strong. They are undercover civilians just like in Saddam's time, but they don't harm people. And they are the reason why there is security in Kirkuk.”¹⁹⁴

We introduce *Asayish* to the analysis because of the organization's prevalence in ESU conversations and because the Iraqi Government does not legally recognize the *Asayish*. Yet the ESU, a legal Iraqi Government police unit, gives the *Asayish* credit for establishing security in the city. One officer noted that there are good aspects and bad aspects to the *Asayish*. He stated that “The *Asayish* works for two parties, the KDP and PUK. The *Asayish* does a very good job in Kirkuk. But even if I am Kurdish and raise a concern about the *Asayish*, they will come to my home and arrest me. They have positive points and negative points - this is a negative point.”¹⁹⁵ The two quotations above give us the essence of shurtas' and officers' comments about the *Asayish*, and disclose why we give the *Asayish* a god-term status within ESU conversations. Simply put, the *Asayish* achieves its god status by being an ultimate term in the ESU's conversations of security and *rule of law*.

The best way to illustrate this is by comparing the presence of the ESU with that of the *Asayish*. Above when we analyzed the ESU's ideal terms of purpose, we quoted one shurta who said the following, “The ESU means everything to the city. We have a shurta that stands in the

¹⁹⁴ Four ESU Soldiers. Kani Domlan Observation Post above K1. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. January 2011.

¹⁹⁵ N-Officer #2. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall. Kirkuk. June 2011.

streets every 100 to 200 meters in the city to provide security for the citizens.”¹⁹⁶ The ESU presence is a visible and tangible representation of the rule of law as part of the city's socio-political fabric. And we argue the primary purpose of the ESU is to establish the *image* and *form* of the rule of law throughout Kirkuk; *civil rule of law* is the poetic form they wish to write in their city. The *Asayish* presence is essentially invisible and therefore ubiquitous. This is so because *Asayish* success is partially based on *fear* - the agent in “civilian clothes,” blending in, collecting information (intelligence) and watching people - “just like in Saddam's time.” The *Asayish* substance and form permeates everywhere through the intrinsic fear located within citizens and establishes an omnipresence in Kirkuk's scene. The organization literally seems to be everywhere - or feared to be *everywhere*. And in “filling up” the entire scene (by occupying people's minds), the *Asayish* displaces the Iraqi Constitution (rule of law) by displacing the ESU who do not operate in the shadows but are intended to be an open presence embodying Iraq's constitutional rule of law throughout the city - a part of the community socio-political fabric they serve.

One ESU officer describes the extra-constitutionality of the *Asayish* in these terms:

The *Asayish* is not an official Iraqi security organization; it has no official connection with the [Iraqi] government. *Asayish* belongs to a party [KDP and PUK]. According to the [Iraqi] constitution, they have to work with the Government of Iraq [central government in Baghdad], and the same with the *Peshmerga*, they have to work with the central government. The *Asayish* works against the constitution of the country.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ ESU Officer #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. January 2011.

¹⁹⁷ ESU (Iraqi Police), Lieutenant Colonel, OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

So the *Asayish*, especially by ESU Arabs and Turkoman, are perceived to be an *unofficial* secret security force. The organization is certainly official within the boundaries of the Kurdish Regional Government, however. And as one *Asayish* officer simply said, “if the *Asayish* is not a legal organization why is it invited to all of the security meetings?”

Our goal is not to sort out the constitutional legality of the *Asayish*, nor its success, nor reasons for success, nor its short comings. Our concern here is how the *Asayish* operates not as a security unit but as a symbolic act (term) within ESU conversations. Within these conversations the *Asayish* are treated as an ultimate god-term of security. The secret organization is given credit for bringing security to the city even while bringing fear and not being legally recognized as an *Iraqi civil* police force. It has a liminal status legally and on the street. Whereas the newspapers may report that the IP or ESU detained suspects, the word on the street and even among the ESU and IP is that the *Asayish*, an agency not recognized by the Government of Iraq (at least in an open and official capacity), really controls the city and its security. Indeed, as noted above, the *Asayish* are likened to Saddam's secret Ba'th party police. And if the *Asayish* achieve security success while “working against the constitution of the country,” reinforcing images of the past regime's security apparatus, and working for Kurdish sectarian parties, it displaces, or more appositely put, *overshadows* the ESU *image* of *Iraqi* civil rule of law as an ESU motivational basis. The *Asayish* write their own poetry into the geographical and psychological landscape of Kirkuk creating a liminal form of security and rule of law that works against the constitutional myth of an *Iraqi rule of law*. And, perhaps most importantly the *Asayish* occupy an important part of the ESU motivational scene. This is so because the primary motivation, here, is fear (like the fear of a god or something that is the source of being or power).

Above, we learned that fear of the parties is a primary ESU motivation. ESU would not speak the name of parties in group or individual interviews. The *Asayish* perform the same god-like function as an *agency* of the parties that has a god-like omnipresence in the minds of the ESU and Kirkuk's citizens.

Agent-Scene (Economics)

We now advance to the fourth and final ring of our concentric circles of terms. ESU terms clustered around economic hardship. They described their economic scene in vivid terms of corruption and lack of government support. In this short and final section, we simply note the motivational capacity of the ESU's economic scene to potentially transform their ideal substance from one representing rule of law to one representing a citizen against the government whose rule of law they embody (as though they would be against themselves). For a more complete analysis of the ESU's use of economic terms to describe their substance (motivational identity) see “Appendix L: The Only Thing We Get from This Oil Is Smoke.”

A discussion of the ESU's economic terms of scene necessarily begins by returning our focus to oil and its material meaning. Oil is a symbol of Kirkuk's wealth and power, a reason all nations, corporations and political groups converge on the city. When viewed in terms of the Arab Spring or the change of government from Saddam's regime to the new Iraqi Constitution, for the ESU, oil serves as a material reminder of Iraq's lost potential, economic depravity, and corruption. A common ESU argument (cluster of terms) is that they have no economic support, health insurance for family members, enough financial support to supply their ESU institution, no electricity, and complaints about food supply. All of these complaints can be summarized in one ESU's comment that “The only thing we get from this oil is smoke.”

As members of a civil police unit representing the government and rule of law, the economic scene presents a paradox of motivational substance for the ESU. For example, two days prior to interviews with the ESU, Kirkuk youth and men took to the streets to protest a lack of electricity, jobs, and government corruption. One ESU showed me a video of the protest. The video shows ESU firing in the air towards the protesters to disperse them. And here we arrive at the paradox of substance that perhaps all police around the world face. The ESU as much as they are agents of the government (identified with and motivated by the government), they are also identified (consubstantial) with the citizens of Kirkuk. In fact, they are the citizens of Kirkuk, and they are the ESU. So the poor economic conditions and the perceived poor government response as well as corruption puts the ESU in a motivational paradox as to when their representation and image of *rule of law* transforms into the *tyranny of government* against its own citizens (themselves). One ESU officer for the Golden Lions summarizes their paradox of substance and motives in terms of the struggle for democracy and freedom of speech. A case of economic necessity confronting the political necessity for a powerful government (and security) which the ESU represent:

[Regarding] the demonstration that occurred in Kirkuk, people started protesting about the electricity and the Iraqi Police [ESU] opened fire on them. This is not right especially if we are a new democracy in transition. We should have our freedom of speech. I do not agree with their action toward those civilians that day. So what difference have we made from the previous regime? Saddam left; now, we have another Saddam.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁸ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) #1. ESU, *Peshmerga* (RGB), and IA Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

In terms of the ESU's economic scene and actions against Kirkuk's citizens (which is really an action against themselves as their ranks come from Kirkuk's citizen population. The local police living the paradox of a self-grounding constitution), the ideal constitutional myth of rule of law seems to recede far into the background. Indeed, the ESU image and form of rule of law, in the words of the ESU above, appears to have transformed into an image of the *tyranny of government* - Saddam, the security state. And as discussed in our first section, ESU noted Kirkuk's and Iraq's citizens view them as the image of the old regime's police, not necessarily the image of a constitutional myth - *Iraqi rule of law*, a dialectical transformation similar to the one discussed above regarding the *Asayish*.

The *Asayish* displaced terms of rule of law with terms of security. The ESU in expressing a shift from freedom of speech to Saddam (the ESU representing the crackdown) a shift is also made from representation of *rule of law* to *simple security* (tyranny of the government). Here we enter a dialectical relationship between “rule of law” and “security,” yet another metonymic fusion of cause and effect that is difficult to disentangle. And it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the implications of these dialectical reversals of rule of law and security and how this dialectical relationship explicitly manifests itself in policies and actions. It suffices here to conclude that the economic fellowship of the ESU with their fellow citizens has them walking a dialectical tightrope in the placement of their terms: ESU representative of rule of law and the citizens or ESU representative of absolute security and the

tyranny of government. Their image and form temporizing the rule of law transforming yet again to temporize absolute security.¹⁹⁹

We have moved quite far from the center of the ESU's ideal constitutional myth and watched the ESU image temporizing the constitutional myth transform as we advanced to each set of terms, gaining a new terministic perspective of the ESU motivational substance (identity) each time. We have seen it in terms of counteragents (parties), geopolitical scene (north/south; Kurd/Arab; checkpoints 1,2,3 / 4,5; Erbil/Baghdad; *Peshmerga* / Iraqi Army), liminal security agents (*Asayish*), and economic scene. After completing the steps in our analytic journey, it remains to conclude and summarize what we have taken from our dramatistic analysis of ESU's conversations and struggle to forge the material image and spiritual ideal of a constitutional myth and god-term.

Conclusion

As we begin our conclusion, we notice that our analysis of terms embodies the movement away from an ideal constitutional myth and agent (center) to scenic features (periphery). The ESU conversation became increasingly populated with scenic terms and terms of counteragents. What began as an analysis of an agent and his ideal seems to be about scenes and other agents' ideals. So even in our analysis we notice a complete transformation of narrative form with the agonistic conversation as though the story is suddenly about another agent or transformed agent. We have enacted the paradox of substance. We began by discussing the intrinsic substance that forms the motivational basis of the ESU and ended by discussing an extrinsic substance that also

¹⁹⁹ It should be noted that this points to the need for more police training in how to respond to citizen protests. It also means the training of citizens on how to protest and exercise their freedom of speech in a manner that embodies the rule of law.

forms the motivational basis of the ESU. A transformation motivated by ESU shurtas' verbal placement. What has happened to our Promethean agent and his constitutional myth?

Let us begin again at the ideal center and god-term, *rule of law*. As we move from term to term and advance toward the periphery, the center recedes into the background. From where we now stand (with counteragents, political parties, historical divisions, and finally economic hardship) looking back, the center appears a distant periphery; it has become the scene of a different center, a different god-term. The new constitutional myth and center is ethnic-nationalism discussed above in the section on Kirkuk as a god-term. This is not an either/or proposition, however. The ESU hold the narrative (and dramatic) center as long as their terms of agent-purpose (rule of law) hold the center. They become the scenic material of another narrative (dramatic) center when elements and terms of their scenic environment become the powerful agents and constitutional myth and god-term. Constitutional myths and the placement of god-terms (the most powerful kind of verbal placement) is the *quidity* of the CSM's rhetorical act. It is a poetic and rhetorical act of *appeal* attempting to place at Kirkuk's (and Iraq's) constitutional center a constitutional myth and god-term that will serve to transcend ethnic difference and undergird their political association and differences on a higher plane. In Chapter 1, we noted the massive amount of resources nations and governments expend to fix these mythical centers of piety in place, the organization of a centripetal image that organizes all other ideas and images.

The ESU (as well as the Kirkuk citizens, parties, and other groups) are faced with the “freedom” and “necessity” of placing the terms that would serve as their ultimate and universal substance for corporate motivation. When the ESU speak in terms of an ideal purpose, they are

agents acting on their scene and environment. When the ESU speak in terms of counteragents, political scene, and economic scene, they become the scenic property acted on by other agents. To put it another way, the ESU become another scenic property simply moved (not acting) by the agents enacting and embodying the principles and narrative of rival god-terms.

It is not so much the conflicts dealing with a legal constitution that make Kirkuk unique as it is the struggles and conflicts regarding the creation of a constitutional myth that would undergird the legal constitution that make Kirkuk's situation unique and difficult. At rock bottom, Kirkuk is a poetic and rhetorical conflict in which first principles (metaphysical and logical firsts) become metonymically fused with material reality. It is about the embodiment of an idea and constitutional myth in the form and image of Kirkuk and the ESU. The ESU, the agents of our analysis and story, are essentially engaged in an *aesthetic* (dramatistic) struggle to temporize the rule of law. That is, they seek to temporize the essence of an idea and themselves be “idealized” as the presence of *Iraqi rule of law* treading on Kirkuk's contested ground and territory. The CSM rhetorical act, however, is part of a larger conversation that confronts ethnic-nationalist poetic acts that attempt to carve their image in Kirkuk's geographic and psychological landscape.

The CSM and ESU rhetorical act is about the placement, then, of a god-term or constitution-beneath-the-constitution. We can use a mathematical analogy to make clearer why this makes resolving Kirkuk so difficult. Kirkuk as a struggle to place a constitutional myth and god-term is about placing “zero.” Number lines receive their origin and orientation by the placement of “zero,” and zero can be placed in an infinite number of places providing an infinite number of beginnings and originating sources (The placement of all other numbers depend on

zero. They derive their unitary substance and direction from zero, a mathematical god-term). And there is no number beyond or beneath the orienting “zero,” other than other potential locations of placing “zero.” And there are no instructions as where to place zero, its placement emerges from our social conversations – our desire. And the same is true of our concentric circles. Like zero, their center can be placed anywhere. And this is how we found ourselves at the end of our analysis. Our center the ideal of rule of law became the periphery. It lost its zero status, and was placed and relegated to participating in the orbit of a different zero term or god term - ethnic-nationalism. There are essentially an infinite number of constitutional myths and god-terms, for which there are no other terms beyond or beneath and no instructions or principles as to how to place them other than an infinite social and agonistic conversation – the ritual drama.

The Kirkuk CSM attempted to place *Iraqi rule of law* as the “zero” term, the constitutional myth and god-term. Various political parties attempt to place “ethnic-nationalism” as their “zero” and god-term. The placing of an ultimate rhetorical ground and constitutional myth for which there is no prior context or greater circumference, so to speak, is what makes it difficult for the ESU to fix their god-term and motivational substance. It is also what makes Kirkuk such an intractable political obstacle. There are no rules about where to place zero other than *desire*, the attraction to an *aesthetic form that reflects individual and national identity*.

The CSM is a poetic and rhetorical act in that it gives aesthetic form in the concrete buildings, but most especially in the ideal image embodied by the ESU shurta and officers who stand at the checkpoints and throughout the city. By their symbolic acts the aesthetic form of *rule of law* permeates the city. They attempt to write their poetry throughout the city in the

aesthetic form of rule of law as they embody it. Much like Hammurabi placing the codification of his laws on tablets outside the cities of his empire (marking zero term or the birth of an empire). We learned, too, however, that there are other god-terms motivating other agents and the ESU agents, most especially ethnic nationalism which sunders the ultimate image and form that ESU would seek to forge: “The law above everyone.” What we have witnessed is the inchoate stage of a “social enterprise” to create a constitutional myth, to both temporize an idea and spiritualize the ESU as its material embodiment. As Burke admonishes us to remember, constitutional myths are “the results of long revision at the hands of many people through many years” (*Permanence and Change: A Review* 427). And as the Promethean agents tell us, the flame of their ideal is that of a candle.²⁰⁰ It is the incipient stage of the myth. After the fall of Saddam, and the rise of ethnic-nationalist god-terms to the top, the *Iraqi* identity and rule of law was left to be rekindled and reborn over many years. Indeed, Burke notes that the “mystic moments” of a god-term’s consummation is an act of rebirth necessarily in the form of drama. And our placement of a god-term “is the *Grammar* of rebirth, which involves a moment wherein some motivating principle is experienced that had not been experienced before. Usually, this dialectic resource takes the form of a generalization carried to the point of some metaphor or image, after which all particulars are seen in terms of it” (*GM* 306).

The CSM act then is a poetic and rhetorical act carving the image of rule of law out of the Kirkuk landscape, temporizing and giving form to a unifying idea while it idealizes the security mechanism as the “spiritual” manifestation of rule of law. It is an attempt at a rebirth of a

²⁰⁰ For an example of one ESU Officer’s attempt at the purification of war, encourage dialogue, and to keep the candle flame burning among Kirkuk’s parties see Appendix I: A Kirkuk ESU’s Symbolic Act to Purify War and Conflict. It is an example of one ESU’s constitutive and act. He took the time to write it out by hand on paper in Arabic. Appendix I is the English translation.

“motivating principle” and “generalize image” of the rule of law and the ESU. Our agents are *Promethean* agents attempting to create a scene that represents the rule of law to the people of Iraq while at the same time attempting to make themselves over in the imagery of rule of law - a manifestation of the metonymic fusion of agent (idea) and scene (material). Finally, the locus of constitutional motivation for the Kirkuk CSM is the internal ideal substance of the ESU shurta (agent). And like verbal *Prometheans* (or Joyceans) they are “forging in the smithy of their souls” the *inchoate* constitutional myth (rule of law) of their city, people, and country. And their tool for forging this constitutional myth is the ritual dramatism of the pentad found in their conversations, bodily postures and material acts small and grand. Their task, however, is not only Promethean it is Herculean. They must go through the dramatic struggle and contend with ethnic-nationalist god-terms and constitutional myths that currently hold dominion in Kirkuk and sunder their nascent image and form of *Iraqi* rule of law and nearly smothering the light of their motivational principle (Burke, “Semantic,” 157-58).

Chapter 5

Ninewa's Combined Security Mechanism: The Dramatism of *Constitutional Dissociation*

Divide the parted; part the divided.

-- Iraqi Police Lieutenant Colonel summarizing the situation in Ninewa and the strategy used by both foreign and Iraqi groups to gain advantage in the Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq. He said that he was quoting Winston Churchill.

If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.

-- Kenneth Burke *Rhetoric of Motives*

Because the Iraqi Army (IA) and *Peshmerga* are divided, the U.S. Army proclaims their unity with the Combined Security Mechanism (CSM).²⁰¹ This statement is so obvious - so fundamental to the CSM's purpose - that its reality and implications are easy to overlook. The CSM - with its material and logistical realities, its pragmatism, (HESCO walls, Jersey barriers, Life Support Areas, MRAPs, latrines, checkpoints, generators, weapons, communications, soldiers, shifts and patrols) - is fundamentally an *idealistic* (rhetorical and constitutional) act that proclaims the unity of two rivals. It is a security apparatus spanning the entire MCR intended to present an *image* of unity.²⁰² The CSM's pragmatic and material means (agency) implies its mystical and idealistic purpose - to transcend division by linking the two armies to the *image* that

²⁰¹ This is of course true of any constitution. The authors of the U.S. Constitution had to proclaim the unity of the Thirteen Colonies precisely because they were divided. And the U.S. Constitution must proclaim, still, the unity of the people of America - WE THE PEOPLE- precisely because we are divided. The U.S. Constitution being grounded in the way its people lived (and live) embodies the lived divisions as much as it embodies a substance of lived unity (the separation of powers is an enactment of a division). The Rhetorician (political leaders and their people) must choose when to emphasize the principles of division and the principles of unity. And in doing so must balance the need for partisan advantage with the need for maintaining the unity of the constitutional apparatus that allows differences to be adjudicated peacefully - the purification of war.

²⁰² The CSM's unifying function is metaphorically referred to as "closing the seam." This metaphor highlights the pragmatic function over its idealistic and mystical purpose.

represents the *idea of Iraqi* unity. In other words, the CSM attempts to empiricize an *Iraqi* constitution and motive, allowing the *Iraqi* ideal to be seen, felt, and heard in the daily acts and behaviors of the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* at each Combined Checkpoint (CCP). The two groups of soldiers would move and act as *one body politic* and become the *image* of an *idea* that is *Iraq* acting in cooperative *purpose*. And these CSM acts both large (CCPs as a whole and as concrete material objects) and small (soldiers standing shift together) would have *rhetorical appeal* (act as mystical coverings) proclaiming *Iraqi* constitutional unity to the Mesopotamian people now divided over the territory of the MCR. The CSM agency would speak as the voice of the Iraqi constitution incarnate.

In short, the CSM is a *form* (act) of the *Iraqi constitution*. A constitution is the way a people lives and converses - a self-grounding rhetorical act. As such, it contains a socio-political association's substantive divisions in both their ideational and material forms. Although constitutions proclaim substantive unity, they inherently contain the substantive divisions the constitutional act seeks to transcend.²⁰³ The Iraqi constitution's example relevant to the CSM is Article 140. Although the article is a legal and bureaucratic mechanism (agency) for bridging a constitutional divide - an attempt at unification - **it nonetheless articulates a lived division of the Iraqi people (divided ideal/agents as well as divided material scenes)**. The CSM, as a surrogate of the Iraqi constitution, is the embodiment of the substantive divisions and unities expressed in Article 140 and *lived* by the *Iraqi* people making mutual claims on the territory of the MCR.

²⁰³ The inherent divisive and unifying nature of constitutions is discussed in Chapter 1, Part 2 and in Chapter 2's explanation of the dramatisitic methodology. For a more in-depth discussion of the dramatism of constitutions please see Chapter 2.

So, similar to the *Iraqi Constitution*, it is inevitable that the CSM as a rhetorical and constitutional act would disclose the divisions of the Iraqi people even as it attempts to enact their unity. It is in expressing a society's fundamental divisions and unities that constitutions reveal their essential agonistic nature. As Burke writes, "Constitutions are agonistic instruments. They involve an enemy, implicitly or explicitly." (*GM 357*). The CSM provides an empirical or explicit example of a constitution involving the enemy. Two rival agents, IA and *Peshmerga* that represent the opposing military forces of two rival political claims (the two sides of Article 140) literally stand side by side, united by the CSM constitution. The CSM would seek to do what Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution could not - "establish a motivational fixity of some sort, in opposition to something that is thought liable to endanger this fixity" (*GM 357*). In this case, strident partisan claims to the MCR threaten to unravel Iraq's unity. The CSM would "establish a motivational fixity" for the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers in opposition to their partisan (and *constitutional*) divisions inculcated in them by their political leaders and historical political relationships. The CSM would establish a constitutional unity *in opposition to* a constitutional division, an attempt to substantively transform agents from enemies into brothers. (I want to remind the reader of a historical point made in Chapter 1. Originally, the CSM was to be temporary and only exist until the end of the 2010 national elections. After the elections, the CSM took on a life of its own becoming part of discussions related to national reconciliation. In any case, before or after the elections, the CSM attempted to unify two armies under one identity – the CSF or Golden Lions).

What Iraq's highest ranking politicians and civil leaders could not do, the two armies' lowest ranks (Privates, Corporals, Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains) were asked to do - unite

Iraq and cooperate. In essence, the soldiers were asked to *dissociate* themselves (agent) from their constitutional terms of division (scene) and *associate themselves* (new agent) with the CSM's constitutional terms of unity (new scene). Or to put it another way, they were asked to deemphasize their ideal and material divisions and emphasize their ideal and material terms of unity as *Iraqi*. It is expected, then, that the soldiers' conversations (constitutional terms) would reveal the process of *constitutional* (dramatistic) *dissociation* in an effort to establish a CSM (*Iraqi*) motivational fixity. Indeed, the soldiers' conversations do reveal various symbolic acts of *constitutional dissociation* and re-association. Their conversations also reveal that their dissociations follow a *dramatistic hierarchy* of constitutional terms.

This chapter's focus, then, is on the Ninewa CSM soldiers (Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga*), the agents who had foisted on them the task of uniting what their political leaders divided. More to the point, the chapter focuses on the soldiers' conversations as symbolic acts of *constitutional dissociation* and association - a process of verbal mergers and divisions. Their conversations are literary "equipment for living" in which their pentadic terms assist them in confronting the chaotic situation of the MCR, enabling them to organize and classify the political unities and divisions (and, thus, motives) they inherit from their historical situation and leaders. First, this chapter demonstrates that the soldiers' pentadic terms reveal a *hierarchy of constitutional mergers and divisions* within the Ninewa CSM communities. It illustrates that the soldiers can be paradoxically *united* on an individual and local level (at the rank of the constitutional hierarchy - corporal and CCP) and *divided* on a national level (at the highest rank of the hierarchy - national political leaders and *Iraqi* nation). These paradoxical unities and divisions reveal the everyday constitutional flux of dramatistic dissociation (transformation) by which soldiers confront the

“necessity” and “freedom” of choosing their motivational terms - a choice that will enact the self-grounded unities and divisions already present in Iraq's legal and lived constitution. In brief, the soldiers enact a rhetorical process of *constitutional* (dramatistic) *dissociation* ascending up a hierarchy of socio-political terms until brothers become enemies - or *brotherly enemies* better expresses the constitutional paradox of substance.

Second, the analysis of the soldiers' conversations shows that constitutions, as verbal and symbolic acts, are fluid and ever changing. An individual in his or her selection of pentadic terms, in *constituting* himself or herself, can *paradoxically* and *potentially* be in multiple scenes and be multiple agents at any one time.²⁰⁴ The meaning and substance of a soldier's acts at a particular time depends on the *ephemeral rhetorical fixity* of his dramatistic terms at that moment - a fundamental poetic act. The soldiers of the Ninewa CSM speak in a hierarchy of dramatistic terms which they are continuously using to dissociate and associate themselves with new scene-agent ratios - transforming their motivational substance and identity (their constitution) to fit the self-grounded situation at any given moment.

This chapter's thesis unfolds from a synthesis of Burke's concepts of dissociation and hierarchy, described in *Rhetoric of Motives*, with the dramatism of *Grammar of Motives*. This methodological synthesis when applied to the historical constitutional struggle of Iraq's MCR

²⁰⁴ This is the power and ability located in dramatism's “storial” or “narrative” qualities. Today, “narrative” is an *idée fixe* of analytic talking heads who tend to reduce narrative to a monological, single form (act), or genre. Dramatism in fact shows that narrative's power is that it can simultaneously take an infinite number of forms (acts) and genres in everyday conversation, so that our novels and other literary genres are but a single slice of an infinite intersection of narratives (dramatistic constitutions) intersecting at any given moment. Alasdair MacIntyre's use and ethical treatment of narrative in *After Virtue* is a useful discussion and sophisticated treatment of narrative sharing similarities, I think, with Burke's notion of a dramatistic paradox of substance. Although, as briefly mentioned the dissertation's introduction, there are significant differences. See particularly the chapter entitled “The Virtues, The Unity of Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition.”


shows Burke's dramatistic theory at work on a grand scale of political and national relations. It demonstrates the literalness and effectiveness of Burke's dramatism for analyzing and understanding human conflict at a national and local level. In essence, this chapter *rhetorizes dramatism*²⁰⁵ showing that the grammar of the pentad is essentially the essence of human's symbolic conflict. It shows that constitutions are formed and transformed using dramatistic hierarchies of agent-scene ratios. When synthesized with dissociation and hierarchy, the chapter demonstrates dramatism's material consequences, revealing the ways in which agents must necessarily be (painfully) alienated from their material scenes in order to transcend divisions and become a unified body politic. **In short, Burke's pentad must be read and applied in terms of the rhetorical struggle for partisan advantage. The analysis of the CSM soldiers' conversations shows that the dramatism of the *Grammar* is the *lived* rhetoric of a symbol using animal to constitute its *human* world. And it shows that it is an ideal and simple tool for understanding human conflict.**

The organization of the chapter is quite simple. In the first section, we develop the method of constitutional dissociation and dramatistic hierarchies. The synthesis of Burke's concepts of dramatism, dissociation, and hierarchy is done using the historical struggle of the MCR as an example and to establish the scene in which the Ninewa CSM was enacted. In the second section, we analyze the soldiers' conversations in which they reveal their own constitutional and dramatistic dissociations and hierarchies in terms of the scene-agent ratio.


²⁰⁵ This is different than Weiser's claim to rhetorize dramatism in her monograph *Burke, War, Words: Rhetorizing Dramatism*. She rhetorizes Burke by historicizing the creation of Burke's dramatistic theory and focusing exclusively on a biographical account of Burke's struggles to persuade his audience about the usefulness of his theory to understanding human conflict. I focus on applying Burke's *theory* to human conflict. And I further rhetorize dramatism by synthesizing it with Burke's *Rhetoric of Motives* which is in actuality dramatism applied to the creation of group unity and division, identification (consubstantiality) and dissolution, the partisan conflict for "advantage."

Finally, with regard to the CSM, two summative statements follow from the above thesis. First, only the presence of the U.S. Army was able to “unify” the IA and *Peshmerga*. The U.S. Army acted as a “mediating principle” and “common ground” substituting for the Iraqi constitution's own principles of unity (or ultimate terms of the constitutional hierarchy). Second, the Ninewa CSM became an instrument for rival parties (especially the KRG as will be shown) to advance their ethnic-nationalist cause. In other words, the CSM was not able to complete its *idealistic* unification of the two armies - its intended rhetorical act. The CSM act simply could not replace the principle of division (article 140) with an ultimate term of unity - *Iraq*. **What is more, because the Iraqi Army is already a “combined” force representing Iraqi national interests, the addition of the *Peshmerga* at the CCPs makes Kurdish national interests (doubly represented) equivalent in the socio-political hierarchy to not necessarily *Arab* interests but *Iraqi* national interests as a whole. As such, the Ninewa CSM became a “conspiratorial unity of faction” rather than a meaningful and consubstantial unity of two armies under *one* nation's constitution.**

Map D: Ninewa Mutually Claimed Region



Map E: Mosul Mutually Claimed Region



	Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq (MCR)	Elevation 1600 m 1200 m 800 m 400 m 0 m
	Approximation of greenline—TAL 53(A)	
	Oil field	
	Oil pipeline	
	Gas pipeline	
	Roads	
	Combined Checkpoint	
	Combined Coordination Center	
	Dam	

Copyright © 2013 Melvin Hall. All Rights Reserved.

Dramatism's Hierarchies of Merger and Division - The Methodology of Constitutional Dissociation

Dramatism's application to the CSM soldiers' conversations has important consequences for Burke's dramatic theory and methodology in and of itself. This chapter's methodological innovation is to synthesize Burke's concept of *dissociation and hierarchy* with the dramatism of the pentad. This synthesis especially illustrates the literalness of the pentad as a *lived rhetorical resource* (literature as equipment for living) used by humans to symbolically constitute their substance and motives. The synthesis generates a new term - *constitutional dissociation* in which the agonism of a rhetorical hierarchy breathes life into dramatism animating the pentadic transformations present in human conflict. The pentad is a *rhetorica utens* in the logomachy of everyday life in which humans determine where to draw the line of unity and division, in and out, winner and loser, us and them - the struggle for advantage is the process of constitutional dissociation and association.

As Burke admonishes us to remember in *Rhetoric of Motives*, “The *Grammar* was at peace insofar as it contemplated the paradoxes common to all men, the universal resources of verbal placement. . . . But insofar as the individual is involved in conflict with other individuals or groups, the study of this same individual would fall under the head of *Rhetoric*” (23). Indeed, the study of the CSM communities is the study of individuals and groups in conflict with other individuals and groups. It is the study of how the rival soldiers use the grammatical resources (the pentad) to gain advantage in their struggles to unite and divide; it is their struggle to *fix* the “universal resources of verbal placement” at an individual and a national level. The *Grammar* is no longer at peace. And in human conflict the pentad is a dramatic rhetoric of constant formations and transformations of substance and motives - that is *identifications*. And it is

conflicts that reveal the power of dramatism as an analytical tool useful to scholars, analysts, diplomats and statesmen and stateswomen alike. This section then explains the dramatistic methodology in Burke's rhetorical terms of *identification* - specifically *hierarchies of identification (consubstantiality)* in order to prepare the way for this chapter's analysis of the Ninewa CSM soldiers' constitutional hierarchies of motive.

Identification is a synonym for consubstantiation. When individuals and groups are united and act in concert they are consubstantial - being of one substance. And as Burke writes, "A doctrine of *consubstantiality*, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance [is] an *act*; and a way of life is an *acting-together*; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them *consubstantial*" (RM 21). In other words, identity is a doing - it should be thought of as a verb rather than a noun. The CSM substance (identity) is its way of being. The same is true of constitutions; they are not abstract nouns (nominalism) they are verbs and ways of being (realism). Constitutions are symbolic acts that *form* a group's and individual's substance and motives.

When people act together they are said to be *identified* with one another; they are consubstantial. But *identification* or *identity* is an inadequate term to adopt in the study of human motive and action. To be clear, the term *identification* is useful in a technical sense and for a shorthand and colloquial means of discussing substance and communicating the meaning of consubstantial. (Burke himself uses it *Rhetoric of Motives*). However, it lacks the analytical and generative power of dramatism's *substance*. Dramatistic substance is a more useful term because it deals with human relations in a *realistic* manner - in terms of *acts*. And most importantly the dramatistic terms (substance, constitution, and the pentad) generate a series of terms

(summarized in the pentad) that are useful in *showing* where *identifications* - that is mergers and divisions - between individuals and groups occur. It vividly brings verbal transformations and acts to life, so we can see the symbolic transformations take place and perhaps predict the future acts that give human identity and substance form. Whereas identification says that a group of people may share the same identity, dramatism and the pentadic terms of substance *reveal* how it works - in a hierarchy of *constitutional dissociations*. Rhetorical dramatism is a methodology fit for the entire world as laboratory.

Burke makes a passing comment in his discussion “De Gourmont on 'Dissociation'” that begins dramatism's synthesis with the agonism of *hierarchy*, specifically hierarchies of scene-agent consubstantiality (identification) that will be used in this chapter's analysis. In examining De Gourmont's method of dissociation, the dividing of an abstraction (idea) from its conventional *tangible* image, Burke makes a distinction between a nominalist and a realist approach to human symbol use. De Gourmont is concerned with dissociating abstract ideas from the tired images society uses to embody them. For example, dissociating the idea of justice from its concrete image as a “balanced scale” to show that the image is not necessarily representative of the idea of justice but that society falls into a rut of letting conventional images perform the tough analytical work of determining the meaning of abstract ideas in particular situations. And these linked images (scales or blindness) obscure other meanings of justice such as hatred, revenge, social privilege, envy lurking in the term and idea *justice*.

Consider the example of the MCR's Article 140, an abstract idea associated with civil and political images (demographic normalization, census, referendum, parliament, discussion,) these civil procedures embody the abstract idea of MCR resolution in tangible *civil* images - conflict in

its symbolic form. One can imagine (an abstraction made empirical) a political discussion, politicians shaking hands, a census taker, and a voting box for the referendum. In short, one can imagine Article 140 (the dispute over the MCR) embodied in procedural justice and fairness of a civil and bureaucratic (hierarchical)²⁰⁶ mechanism. However, the images may also serve as “eulogistic coverings” for partisan advantage, nationalist dreams (Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman), revenge for past wrongs, and hate.

With the creation of the CSM, Article 140 was dissociated from the civil images and associated with military images that more overtly and militaristically represent Article 140's partisan interests. Article 140 is now associated (constituted) with images of armies who by their inherent nature are partisan. The two armies (IA and *Peshmerga*) become the dominate image of rival political powers' efforts to resolve the MCR dispute - the CSM the military embodiment of Article 140. With the U.S. Army's “Let there be a CSM” act, the political MCR *scene* became *militarized*. The constitutional scene that once implied political and civil acts (and political agents) now implied military acts carried out by armed agents. The armed conflict that was hidden under the eulogistic images of Article 140 were fully disclosed with the creation of the CSM. In trying to “combine” the two armies, the CSM performed a constitutional act of dissociation from *Iraq's* constitution and an association with partisan militaries.

The CSM unites the rival armies and in doing so ironically *escalates* the *imagery* of division. Images of *militaristic* cooperation (peaceful and violent) compete with images of political cooperation (diplomatic and forceful) - political *ideals* of compromise confounded with

²⁰⁶ As Burke points out bureaucracy is but another term for *hierarchy*.

military means of conquest.²⁰⁷ For armies represent political leader's means (agency/power) to exert their will over an opponent.

Before showing the process of hierarchical (constitutional) dissociation, however, the point here is simply to illustrate De Gourmont's method of dissociation related to images and ideas. Burke notes that De Gourmont's method of dissociation is in practice about *identification*.²⁰⁸ Dissociation implies new associations or consubstantialities (new identifications). However, Burke makes a more important point about De Gourmont's dissociative method - a point easy to overlook because he makes it only in passing. He contrasts the *nominalist* and *realist* use of De Gourmont's dissociative method. To use the method simply to sever ideas from images and tether new images to the ideas is to remain in the abstract realm of nominalism - simply playing with ideas and images as thought exercises²⁰⁹. A *realist*

²⁰⁷ This is not to say that the MCR was not at the time of the CSM's creation linked to militaristic images. After all, the MCR with over 200 Unified Fixed Positions (UFPs) embodied a classic military front from Diyala to Ninewa: The *Peshmerga* manned checkpoints facing off against the Iraqi Army manned checkpoints. The CSM if it did not make the militaristic images more prominent certainly reinforced the militaristic nature of the conflict. It in fact drew the two armies deeper into the conflict making them an integral tool in resolving the dispute. Thus, the CSM escalated the conflict by involving the armies to such a great degree. A de-escalation of the conflict would necessarily reduce the *image* of military involvement in dispute resolution in favor of *civil* images. Now the MCR is linked to military images by the third party (U.S. Army and Mission in Iraq) that seeks to de-escalate the conflict.

²⁰⁸ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca criticize Burke in explaining their theory of dissociation in *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, claiming that both De Gourmont and Burke are both simply referring to “connections [links] and rejections of connections” in pairs of terms. They go on to state, “The dissociation of concepts, as we understand it, involves a more profound change that is always prompted by the desire to remove an incompatibility arising out of the confrontation of one proposition with others, whether one is dealing with norms, facts, or truths” (413). I believe, however, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca overlooked the distinction between a *nominalist* and *realist* application of dissociation. In short, once dissociation is *dramatized* (considered in terms of acts and substance) Burke's notion of *identification* (consubstantiality) achieves “the more profound” change Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca claim for the process of dissociation. Comparing Perelman's and Olbrechts-Tyteca's and Burke's *dramatized* dissociation is well beyond not only this chapter but this dissertation in general and must be saved for a future endeavor.

²⁰⁹ I believe this is what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca mean by simply “breaking connections or links.”

application treats ideas not as abstract nouns (the CSM) but as *verbs* (*the way of being* the CSM).

That is, a way of being and living, an act and form of life - a constitution. As Burke states:

Methodologically, linguistic realism would correct DeGourmont's overimagistic emphasis. It would call for kinds of analysis more nearly Marxist. For whereas the De Gourmont kind of archetypation might lead one to be content with shuttling between idea and image, **a realistic approach to abstraction would lead one to consider it in terms of acts, by agents, in scenes.** [Bold emphasis added](152-53).

Instead of *simply* de-linking images and ideas, the realist approach to dissociation (identification or consubstantiality) is one of agents dissociated from scenes, dissociated from implied acts (forms and ways of being - embodying the ideas implied by the scene-agent ratio). If an agent is dissociated from one scene, his or her acts will no longer be in harmony with that scene as the scenic motives have now changed. The reverse is also true. A scene can be changed by dissociating certain kinds of agents from it. These dramatic (or *realistic*) dissociations and associations profoundly change the reality (substance) of one's or a group's *being* that is to say their motives and acts. The naming of *situation* (scene) and the naming of agent is to constitute a motive.²¹⁰

The CSM is a *realistic* (dramatic) act. It sought to change the scene of the MCR by *dissociating* the MCR from uncooperative rival agents (armies), and sought to re-constitute the scene with new kinds of agents whose way of being was a unified Iraq - cooperative and unified armies. The important point here is that the pentad's ratios work as methods of dissociation and association, merger and division, consubstantial and divided. An agent can be dissociated from a scene and associated with a new scene which provides motives for new kinds of acts. The CSM

²¹⁰ As Burke stipulates situation is but another name for motive. Such and such a scene requires such and such an agent that can carry out such and such an act (*PLF* 20).

laid down a new constitutional ground (the Twelve Guiding Principles and the Combined Checkpoints) creating a new scene for a new kind of agent and new kinds of acts. It attempted to call into being a new agent - “Golden Lion” that called for a new scene. It was an attempt to dissociate the *Peshmerga* from their historical ethnic-nationalist scene (and the Iraqi Army from this same historical scene) and associate these agents with a new *Iraqi* scene of cooperation that called for new agents and new acts - a new constitutional substance, “a way of life acting together.”

We are ready, now, to introduce the concept of hierarchy to the dramatic process of dissociation and association. Specifically it is Burke's discussions “A Metaphorical View of Hierarchy” and “Administrative Rhetoric in Machiavelli,” in *Rhetoric of Motives* that will complete the method of dramatic (constitutional) dissociation for analyzing mergers and divisions in this chapter. Although the concept of terministic (dramatic) hierarchies can be applied to any of the pentad's ratios, this chapter focuses on the unfolding of mergers and divisions within the scene (material)-agent (ideal) ratio.

In “A Metaphorical View of Hierarchy” Burke makes a dramatic (realist) observation about human political and social life. It is a distinction between the nominalist principle of hierarchies and the realist application of hierarchies to human's political and social existence. First, the principle of hierarchy is inherent in human relations, and, therefore, division is inherent in human relations. The best way to illustrate this is with the CSM agents. The agents, of course, are divided by military rank. The corporal divided from the sergeant, the sergeant divided from the officer (lieutenant through Colonel) and all of those ranks divided from the General, the General divided from the President (KRG or Government of Iraq civilian ruler). Every hierarchy

is organized from last (least) to first (greatest)). The nominalist approach to hierarchy acknowledges that each rank in the hierarchy shares in the ultimate principle of hierarchy (the ARMY), so that a reversal of the hierarchy is easy to accomplish. Without much consequence, in the realm of nominalist principle (what Burke also calls *spiritual*), last can become first, corporal can ascend to the top and General to the bottom, because the *principle* of hierarchy (the division of ranks) is still upheld in name - it is still the ARMY.²¹¹

Burke states the nominalist view of hierarchy in the following terms:

The hierarchic principle is not complete in the social realm, for instance, in the mere arrangement whereby each rank is overlord to

²¹¹ Burke in *A Grammar of Motives* and especially in *Rhetoric of Motives* works out another kind of transcendence of division other than nominalism's illusions - *mysticism, pure persuasion, or ultimate identification* (constatubiality). It is appropriate to reiterate what was quoted in an earlier footnote found in chapter 3. In Burke's discussion of the mystical properties of purpose, he makes an explicit connection between terms of "unity" and mysticism: "Often the element of unity *per se* is treated as the essence of mysticism. . . . We may establish the connection between Mysticism and Purpose sociologically by noting that although individual mystics may arise at any period of history, mystical philosophies appear as a general social manifestation in time of great skepticism or confusion about the nature of human purpose. They are a mark of transition, flourishing when one set of public presuppositions about the *ends* of life has become weakened or disorganized, and no new public structure, of sufficient depth and scope to be satisfying, has yet taken its place" (*GM* 287-88). Burke's description of mystical purpose and unification accurately describes the situation and purpose of the CSM. The CSM attempts to transcend the historical scene with the *mystical* unification of the opposing soldiers within a higher social and political identity. Burke makes the connection between idealism (agent), mysticism (purpose) and property (material scene) in his discussion of agent: ". . . the separations of private property are matched by the unifying idealism of country. [quoting Emerson] 'There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet.' It is a type of thinking capable of organizing mighty powers, as men materially in different worlds can be spiritually one" (*GM* 176). In *Rhetoric of Motives*, Burke applies mysticism to the divisional and material (property) problems of hierarchy as a way to transcend the pure dichotomy between material division and *nominalist* (in name only, illusion, abstract idea) unity. In *Rhetoric of Motives*, from Burke's discussion "Marx on *Mystification*" to the final discussion "Ultimate Identification," Burke is working out a form of transcendental rhetoric or mysticism. It is a method for placing ultimate terms of a hierarchy that may transcend material divisions without "invidiously" covering up material injustices inherent in the hierarchies' systems. Taking a cue from Burke's quotation above, we can conclude that the *mystical* CSM appears at a time when Iraq is in a state of "skepticism and confusion about the nature of "its purpose. That is to say in a state of confusion about the ultimate unifying term of its political and social hierarchy - the purpose for which it acts and lives. Previous to 2003, the ultimate purpose and term of hierarchy was Saddam Hussein. A discussion of mysticism and its relation to Burke's dramatic method is beyond the scope of this chapter. For an excellent treatment of it please see Debra Hawhee's *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*, especially her chapter "Burke's Mystical Method" and Bryan Crable's article "Distance as Ultimate Motive: A Dialectical Interpretation of A Rhetoric of Motives."

its underlings and underling to its overlords. It is complete only when each rank accepts the *principle of gradation itself*, and in thus “universalizing” the principle, makes a spiritual *reversal* of the ranks just as meaningful as their actual material arrangement. . . . The state of first and last things, the heavenly state, is the realm of *principle*. In this state (a mythical term for the *logically prior*) the reversal of social status makes as much sense as its actual mundane order (*RM* 138).

In the realm of principle each rank of the hierarchy transcends its differences by sharing in the substance of the rank above until all ranks in the hierarchy share in the ultimate substance of the principle terms of the hierarchy. The divided ranks of soldiers are unified in the ultimate idea of the *Peshmerga* (Kurdish) Army - we are all Kurds - the principle of the Kurdish ethnic nation the ultimate *spiritual* and *mystical* substance of the hierarchy. And it is the same with the Iraqi Army. This time, the primary *spiritual* unification is accomplished by the term Iraq (or Arab Nationalism). The soldiers may be divided by rank (especially the materiality *associated with* that rank), but they are all one in substance as the *Iraqi* army - one body. And within an exclusive nominalist paradigm, the reversal of ranks makes sense because each rank partakes in the same spiritual and unifying principle. No matter who the (material) person is at each rank (first through last), the hierarchy still represents the ultimate substance of that order of divisions/ranks - the ultimate *idea* of the group's constitution. However, in the material (dramatist and realist) realm of social and political life such reversals are much more complicated because it is unlikely that an agent (person at the top) will be willing to leave the material scene (substance/privilege) that allows for his or her *individual* power and success. A General is not very likely to leave the material comfort of his or her power and a soldier may feel alienated at first upon ascending to a higher rung in the ranks. His or her former buddies may think he or she is no longer “one of them,” least in that rank of the hierarchy.

The realist approach to hierarchy shows what kinds of upheavals can occur in the social and political realms by attempts to reverse or change the orders of a hierarchy - **constitutional dissociations**. In fact, the *dissociation* of ranks of the hierarchy from their ultimate terms in the social and political realm is called *revolution*.²¹² A revolution can be the most violent kind of human *dissociation* as it relates to *agents* (ideals) dissolving links with their *scenes and material substance* - constitutional grounds - in profound ways that change the entire reality of the order and the agents' identity. Burke makes special note of this when he shifts his discussion of hierarchy from agents (idealism) to scene (material property):

The reduction of such reversibility to the world of property can add up to political or social revolution, as the “Edenic” world of universal principle is ironically broken down into the divisions of property, **confronting one with a choice between the frozen order of the *status quo* and the reversal of that order through its “liquidation.”** [Bold emphasis added] (*RM* 139).

Hierarchical transformations translated into realist (dramatistic) terms vividly reveal the kinds of political and social transformations that occur in human relations. Or, at least, the dramatistic terms starkly reveal the painful scenic (material) impieties and alienations being asked of agents when their ideal terms are re-ordered or transformed. To encourage an agent to *identify* with the rank of hierarchy above (or below) requires at least a partial severing of the agent from the scene (material property and substance) of the lower (or higher) rank which both implied and embodied the agent's identity and acts- agents act in harmony with scenic motives and the agent creates the scene that enacts his or her ideal motives. The process of scenic (material and ideal) alienation occurs at every new rank in the hierarchy until the ultimate term of the hierarchy is reached and

²¹² Constitutional dissociation is another term for what the U.S. Army calls insurgency. Insurgents seek to dissociate *the people* from their ultimate terms of constitution.

all divided ranks share in one principle of identity and scene (material property, ultimate image, or god term). Based on the *principle of hierarchy* all factions (ranks and divisions) of the hierarchy are on *terms* of equality. But the material transcendence from each rank of a hierarchy can be very painful. So the constitutional *act* of naming a scene has material consequences beyond its *mere* symbolic value. It requires agents to change their *way of living/being*.

For example, the CSM's purpose is to create a new constitutional scene that dissociates Kurdish *Peshmerga* and IA agents from historically established material scenes. The CSM attempts to persuade them to act as agents of an Iraqi scene. In doing so, it must change the *terms* of the hierarchy under which the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers act. The new terms of the hierarchy are “one Iraq” and/or “Golden Lions.” Each CCP is a scene requiring certain kinds of agents that carry out acts that embody and give form to the hierarchy's ultimate term - one Iraq. As we will see when introducing Burke's discussion of Machiavelli, however, this *ideal* change of agent requires an agent to relinquish (at least partially) ties to previous material scenes (property) that express the agent's identity - the “sources of their being.”

For now it suffices to state that the *intended* ultimate term of the CSM's hierarchy, the principle substance by which all ranks (divided) of the hierarchy are unified and the purpose for which they strive, is one Iraq (Golden Lion). The hierarchy looks something like this in its ideal form (act and substance): PUK *Peshmerga* and KDP *Peshmerga* unite at the next level of Kurdish (KRG) *Peshmerga*. In parallel, the Sunni Arab, Shi'a Arab, Shi'a Persian, Kurd and Turkoman soldiers unite at the next level of Iraqi Army. These two divisions of the hierarchy *Peshmerga* and IA unite as Golden Lions (one Iraqi force) at the ultimate level.²¹³ In this way,

²¹³ As we can already foreshadow because the ultimate term of the hierarchy “one Iraq” or “Iraqi Army is repeated at two levels, it creates a false sense of transcendence to the ultimate level. Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman are already

the material divisions of the two armies is spiritually or mystically transcended. They are united in the spiritual substance of their ultimate term.

Once the *ideal* (agent) of hierarchy is established we can see how scenic hierarchies of material property complicate the ascension to higher levels of unity and cooperation. As Burke points out hierarchical mystifications, such as the *Peshmerga* uniting with the IA, must be viewed in terms of their material scenes:

Though *hierarchy* is exclusive, the *principle* of hierarchy is not; all ranks can “share in it alike.” **But:** It includes also the entelechial tendency, the treatment of the “top” or “culminating” stage as the “image” that best represents the entire “idea.” **This leads to “mystifications” that cloak the state of division, since, the “universal” principle of the hierarchy also happens to be the principle by which the most distinguished rank in the hierarchy enjoys, in the realm of worldly property, its special privileges** [bold emphasis added] (*RM* 141).

In short, the ranks of the hierarchy may be united in name (ideally) but divided materially (scene and property). This is because each new rank of agent (idea) implies a new relation to scene/property privileging the agents that represent the principle or ultimate idea of the hierarchy. Although Burke is specifically referring to “class” divisions in his explication of hierarchy (this is what he means by “the most distinguished rank,” the leadership classes, enjoy

united at the level of “Iraqi Army.” To unite the IA and *Peshmerga* (Kurds) a second time at the CSM simply reinforces the factional division - this is why the CSM acts as a rival to the Iraqi constitution. In having the agent and idea “Kurd” at one level of the hierarchy and then appear again at the ultimate level of the hierarchy reveals the property (scenic and agency) divisions of the hierarchy. And more importantly the CSM makes the ranks of “Kurd” and “Arab” co-equal with the ultimate term “Iraq.” According to the Iraqi constitution, these ranks are placed below “Iraq.” Here we begin to see the principle of division that governs the CSM constitution. “Golden Lion” as a hierarchical term introduces new relations of the agents to property. In uniting the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* on an *ideal* level as Golden Lions (agents) the CSM also introduces a hierarchy of property relations that represent partisan interests. It gives legitimacy to the Kurdish-Nationalists' exclusive claim to the region of the MCR. In short, the hierarchy has “two heads” or ultimate terms when it should have one guiding and unifying principle.

special privileges of property because their interests represent the *group's* interest), the dramatist reading of hierarchy can especially be applied to a nation's political divisions.

At this point Burke's discussion of Machiavelli will complete the dramatic reading of hierarchy helpful to the analysis of the Ninewa CSM constitution. We begin to see that when the CSM introduces a new hierarchical order of agents and ideals, the old relations of agent to scene (property) do not change.²¹⁴ Burke's reading of Machiavelli especially helps make this dramatic methodology constitutional dissociation applied to the CSM clear because Machiavelli's analysis of human political relationships begins with a principle of national division. And as Burke highlights, Machiavelli is “concerned with motives which will protect *special* interests. *The Prince* is leading towards the period when the interests of a feudal ruler will be *nationalistically* identified, thought to represent one state *as opposed to* other states” [italicized emphasis is Burke's own] (*RM* 165). Burke goes on to explain how the interests of a ruler (prince, politician, president) can be “nationalistically” identified in terms of hierarchy:

Now, national motives can be placed in a hierarchy of motives, graded from personal and familial, to regional, to national, to international and universal. As so arranged, they might conceivably, in their different orders, complement or perfect one another rather than being in conflict. But where the princes, or the national states identified with them, are conceived antithetically to the interests of other princes and states, or antithetically to factions within the realm, the “virtues” of the ruler could not be the

²¹⁴ Note the relevance of Burke's comment on Marx's historical criticism. The CSM sought to change the *agents* but the *scene* (historical property desires and structures) remained the same. Here is the relevant text taken from *Rhetoric of Motives*: “Marxism shows that often the shifts between ins and outs is but the most trivial of palace revolutions, where an apparently cleansing change of agents has left the morbidities of the scene itself substantially unchanged” (103). Indeed, as this chapter shows the CSM did not change the “morbidities” of Iraq's historical scene despite changing the agents - “Golden Lions” in place of *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army. The “morbidities” of the Iraqi scene maintained the “frozen status quo” and made the “Golden Lions” an agent in the wrong scene or at least an agent that had to reimagine and remake his scene.

“virtues” which are thought most beneficial to mankind as a whole (in an ideal state of universal cooperation) (*RM* 165).

Dramatistically read, when the prince or leader (the ultimate agent of a hierarchy) is linked to sectarian (special) interests he or she embodies in his or her acts a substance of division - separatist acts that require separatist scenic property and purposive motives. He or she cannot transcend to the higher rank of “universal cooperation” without abandoning the character (ideal substance - what Burke calls “virtue”) and identity associated with the material scene that embodies the *ideal substance* of a group's sectarian interests - at least to some extent (unless the leader or prince can make the sectarian interests serve as *national* interests - all the factions' interests falling under the ruling group's guiding principle). The universal scene (circumference) of cooperation calls for agents motivated by an ultimate constitutional scene that calls for acts that at least strive to perfect the ultimate substance of the hierarchy. In brief, the CSM is an attempt to create a hierarchy of motives (concentric circles of agents and scenes) that “complement or perfect one another” until all agents partake equally in the ultimate substance of “Golden Lion” or “One Iraq” and share a common “way of life . . . an *acting-together*; and in acting together . . . have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them *consubstantial*” (*RM* 21).

The historical ascendancy of Kurdish nationalism illustrates the dramatic hierarchy (in Burke's reading of Machiavelli) at play in the MCR and CSM. The historical emergence of Kurdish nationalism coincides with the coalescing of the Barzani family at the top of the Kurdish hierarchy - *the prince* and ultimate term of Kurdish Nationalism.²¹⁵ Within the context of

²¹⁵ As I wrote in the dissertations beginning section “A Note on the Dissertation’s Textual Ecology,” for reasons of space I chose the Barzani family to illustrate this point. In doing so, I do not mean to downplay the importance of

military coups and un-ratified interim constitutions, Appendix E which outlines the centuries long conflict between Arabs, Kurds, and Turkoman over the (MCR) can be read as a the historical establishment of hierarchies (agents linked to their scenes). As Kurdish tribes became more united, first under Shaikh Mahmud in 1918 and eventually under the Barzani family beginning in 1943, they became more divided against Arab and Turkoman groups and tribes (and v.v.). Kurdish unity under the Barzani family and the KDP also divided them from other Kurdish groups. For example, the Barzani's eliminated in 1959 the rival leadership of the Kurdish Zibaris, Harkis, Surchis, and Baradustis tribes to further ascend the Kurdish hierarchy. And by the mid-1990s Barzani's KDP was fighting a brutal civil war with the rival PUK under the leadership of Talabani to determine who would ascend to the ultimate rank of the Kurdish hierarchy.²¹⁶ Mahmud Barzani was the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) president by the time the U.S. Army established the CSM in 2010. He had ascended to the ultimate rank of the Kurdish social, political, and economic hierarchy.

Jalal Talabani and the PUK to the history of Kurdish nationalism or unity. For the sake of space, I focus on Barzani to illustrate the points. Talabani and the PUK are represented in the timelines found in the appendices.

²¹⁶ Please see Appendix C and E for a more detailed timeline of the various unities and divisions related to the formation of the Iraqi Nation-State. Here I use a Kurdish example, but timelines in Appendix C and E give examples of association and dissociation related to Arab nationalism and the Ba'th party. Appendix C especially illustrates the Arab formation of a hierarchy with the Ba'th party interests finally aligning with Saddam's personal and tribal interests and those interests aligning with Iraq's national interests. The timeline in Appendix E leaves out reference to the Iraqi Communist Party (for the sake of space and a clearer focus on the Arab-Kurd conflict over the MCR) which was a prominent rival to Arab, Kurdish, and Turkoman parties as well as the Ba'th party until it was brutally suppressed by the Ba'th party. Also see Chapter 1 where I discuss the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire into various ethnic nationalisms including Arab, Jewish, Kurd, Turkish, Turkoman, and Assyrian. One can also add to this complexity various other divisions within Iraqi society. For these divisions please see Appendix G "Matrix of Iraqi Cultural Complex" for a partial rubric of the divisions of Iraqi society other than ethnic nationalism including, tribal, religious, social status, political ideology etc. Burke's observation in *Rhetoric of Motives* is empirically true. Humans live in a state of almost infinite division for which *identification* is at best compensatory. For example, the timelines and "Matrix of Iraqi Cultural Complex" show more ways to divide Iraq than to unify the nation. The rhetorician must ideally unify what "enlightenment," "economics," and "science" seek to reveal - our material divisions. In this sense, the CSM is an *idealistic* and *mystical* act of unity implied in its pragmatic terminology of "combined" and "mechanism."

In short, the culmination of Kurdish nationalism is also the alignment of the Barzani family's and tribe's (the prince's) personal interests with *Kurdish National* interests. Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his son Mahmud Barzani become the material image at the top of the Kurdish hierarchy embodying the *Kurdish Nation*. In effect, the Barzani family aligned its interests with Kurdish national interests. These interests include the extension of the Barzani/Kurdish circumference (the ultimate term of the Kurdish hierarchy) to include what is now the MCR, especially the city of Kirkuk with its large oil wealth. As Mullah Mustafa's oldest son, Ubayd Allah, declared in 1974 regarding the alignment of personal (the prince's) interests with Kurdish national interests “My father, Mullah Mustafa, does not want self-rule to be implemented even if he was given Kirkuk and all of its oil. His acceptance of the [autonomy] law will take everything from him, and he wants to remain the absolute ruler” (quoted in McDowall, 337).

At this point the dramatization of hierarchy is complete because we can see that hierarchy is but another term for *circumference* (material scene). In the social and political worlds of human relations, the higher one ascends a hierarchy the wider one's *circumference* (called the *sphere of influence* in politics). That is, the top of a social and political hierarchy has the largest possible scene (sphere of influence) both materially and ideally from which an agent can act. As Burke points out in *Grammar of Motives*, among the theologians and philosophers, God would have the widest (infinite) sphere of influence as the ultimate or prime mover of a hierarchy. But our concerns are more earthly and require us to return to down-to-earth political *terms*.

As demonstrated in Chapter 2, *term's* etymological definition is limit, border or circumference. Every *ideal* term, then, implies a corresponding material scene or circumference.

That is, every ideal term of a hierarchy has its corresponding scene. This is true of any hierarchical taxonomy. In social and political taxonomies, for instance, the naming of a certain agent (the idea) is *necessarily* linked to that agent's environment. There is a material scene and sphere of influence corresponding with that agent and his or her *way of being* - acts of substance. Now consider the hierarchy related to the MCR and CSM. It begins with the individual, and ascends to the family, tribe, tribal confederation (region) and nation. Each of these agents (ideal terms) has a corresponding (is *necessarily associated with*) a material scene of influence (circumference) whether it be social, political or economic. The Kurdish ethnic-nation as agent (and ideal term) is necessarily associated with the widest circumference of material scene within the hierarchy delineated above. As Maps A, D, and E indicate, the *image* of this scene is believed by the Kurdish people to be a circumference that includes the greater material wealth of North-Central Iraq: rivers and water; arable land; ports of entry (economic trade); and many oil and gas fields - especially those around Jalula, Kirkuk and Mosul. The MCR scene, of course, is also associated with Arab and Turkoman agents (nationalisms and identities), hence the conflict. To earn the place as representation at the top of the hierarchy is to widen one's scenic sphere of socio-cultural influence. And the *Iraqi* nation has the widest circumference and scene of all including Kurds, Arabs and Turkoman alike. In any case, the struggle is grounded in a “symbolic struggle,” making an idea stick at the top.

The summational point is that the CSM requires Kurdish, Arab and Turkoman agents to disassociate themselves from the ideal terms and material scenes that most embody their ultimate terms of hierarchy (Kurdish nationalism, Arab nationalism, and Turkoman nationalism) and to be subsumed by a higher term and agent - *Iraq* - that requires alternate material associations. In

strictly nominalist (or ideal) terms such dissociations are relatively easy. However, as the dramatism of hierarchy shows, such dissociations cause extreme disturbances (revolutions, some violent) in social and political hierarchies' material order. A ruling class's (a prince's) interests necessarily coincide with the *nation's* interests, so the ruling class of *Iraq* will be associated with the material scene (the widest sphere of influence) that includes the material wealth of the MCR region. At the top of Mesopotamia's nationalist hierarchies, then, is a political fight to be associated with the widest sphere (scene) of influence both because it actualizes the ideal of the nation and it confers certain material, social and political privileges upon the prince and his nation.

We have achieved this section's end, the dramatization of *rhetorical hierarchy* related to Kurdish and Arab nationalism in Iraq. In doing so, we created the methodology (constitutional dissociation) for analyzing the Ninewa CSM soldiers' conversations. We took seriously Burke's admonishment to *dramatize* (place in the realist terms of the pentad) the operations of dissociation and association. We followed that by introducing the concept of *hierarchy* (of terms) to the dissociative process. This showed that hierarchic orders of terms reveal *material* (scenic) dissociations (divisions) and associations (mergers) as much as they reveal merely *ideal* or *spiritual* associations. **In sum, realistically and dramatically speaking, each term of a hierarchy implies a *scene-agent* ratio in which an agent (idea) corresponds with a scene (material) and *v.v.* And each scene-agent ratio implies an *act* which gives form to the scene-agent ratio's substance. A step above or below each term or ratio in a hierarchy involves a *constitutional dissociation*.**²¹⁷

²¹⁷ Burke provides a wonderful example of the ironies of qualitative (spiritual) association and quantitative (material) dissociation. We can call a leaders' or a ruling group's ascent up the symbolic hierarchy a *Falstaff motive*.

Finally, we applied the dramatist reading of rhetorical hierarchies to Kurdish and Arab (Iraqi) nationalism using Burke's reading of Machiavelli. This reading illustrates that the CSM requires soldiers to dissociate themselves not only from the idealistic terms of their political hierarchies but to dissociate themselves from the corresponding material hierarchies which embody their historical nationalist identities (“sources of being”) and substance to create a consubstantial body *acting as a single agent* under an ultimate title *Iraq* (an ostensible higher “source of socio-political being”). Another way to put the CSM's constitutional dissociations is to say that the CSM requires each individual participating in the CSM to align or associate his or her individual interests with the CSM's ultimate terms of unity.

The next section demonstrates that the Ninewa CSM soldiers engaged in a process of *constitutional* (dramatistic) *dissociation* in order to name their scenes and thus motives for acts. They speak in terms of a hierarchy of scene-agent ratios. Thus, they can proclaim unity and *act* united at the level of the CCP scene and proclaim division and *act* divided at the level of the nation. As the CSM soldiers' terms of scene-agent ratios ascend the hierarchy, they become more divided until an ultimate principle of division governs their constitutional hierarchy. And as the last (CCP scene-agent ratio) and the first rank (national scene-agent ratio) are part of the same hierarchy, a constitutional (substantive) paradox of purpose emerges within the CSM constitution: unite and provide security; divide and realize ethnic-nationalist glory.

Like Falstaff, leaders identify with their group on a spiritual level. Also like Falstaff leaders dissociate from their group on a material (quantitative) level. Burke writes: “Falstaff would not simply rob a man, from without. He *identifies himself* with the victim of a theft; he *represents* the victim. He would not crudely steal a purse; rather, he *joins forces* with the owner of the purse – and it is only when the harsh realities of this imperfect world have imposed a brutally divisive clarity upon the situation, that Falstaff is left holding the purse” (*GM* 515). We can see the Falstaff motive at work in the CSM. There is an attempt to identify on a spiritual level to *represent* a common identity. However, on the material level the “harsh realities” of the scene will leave one group “holding” the MCR purse.

Ninewa CSM's Dramatized Hierarchy of Scene-Agent Ratios

When rhetorical hierarchies are dramatized the paradoxes and difficulties of human's social, economic, and political substance and motives are more easily seen and understood. The CSM soldiers' use hierarchical orders of terms *to constitute* their identities and motives for acts. This section shows that the CSM soldiers organize their constitutional motives hierarchically with an ethnic- nationalist ideal as the ultimate term of the ascending order. The hierarchic terms the soldiers use culminate in a principle of division - Article 140 - rather than a principle of unity - *Iraq*. Another way to express this is that the nationalistic agents (the Kurdish nation and the Arab nation as a single political body and agent) are struggling to become the culminating term and image of the *Iraqi* hierarchy. That is, the rival nationalist agents desire to be the image that represents the entire idea of Iraq and win the material interests for sectarian purposes that are *cloaked* by and happen to coincide with the *national* interests.

The soldiers' terms of hierarchy begin with the individual soldier and end with the Kurdish nation and the (Arab)-Iraqi nation. An IA Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) describes the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' constitutional relationship by using the first and last terms of their constitutional hierarchy:

There are small problems between the *Peshmerga* and IA. There is trust, but not the trust you can depend on. Things will go bad after the U.S. withdrawal. There is article 140, and we are not sure if it will be resolved peacefully or if there will be a fight. I recommend that you spend time at all CCPs. This is the DIBs [disputed internal boundaries - MCR], and it is political. We don't have a problem with the *Peshmerga*, but we both know that this is the DIBs area. *Peshmerga* and IA [soldiers] do not really care on a personal level. They try their best to get along, but we both

understand why we are here. And we both understand that it's a political issue.²¹⁸

In Burkean terms, the IA NCO summarizes this chapter's thesis and method of analysis. Although he does not use such terms as hierarchy, scene-agent ratio, and dissociation, his words reveal a *poetic* and *authorial* placing of terms so that scenes correspond with agents that correspond with acts. In addition, his summational statement reveals the conflicting dissociations and associations of agents (soldiers) from their various scene-agent ratios. He places the last and first terms of the soldiers' hierarchy of constitutional substance and motives. He begins at the individual level (soldier and CCP scene) at which there is *trust* (a sense of the consubstantial) and soldiers “try their best” to act as one in keeping with the constitution of their CCP scene. At this rank of the hierarchy the agents' scene is the CSM constitution as lived at each CCP - the place that proclaims one cooperative military force tethered to the *common property* and *material* support of the CCP. The NCO then introduces the ultimate term of the soldiers' hierarchy of scene-agent ratios: Article 140 (agents of ethnic nationalism) and the MCR scene. His reference to “political issue” and Article 140 is a direct reference to the political leaders (agents) that embody the two national agents - Barzani and Kurdish nationalism and Maliki - the highest term and guiding principle of the hierarchy. In addition, his reference to “the DIBs” (MCR in this dissertation) links the nationalist agents (both the individual leaders and the ethnic-national political bodies) to the MCR scene - the land and material wealth depicted in Maps D and E.

So the soldiers' hierarchy of scene-agent ratios begins with unity at the level of soldier and the CCPs, and, as the soldiers' terms ascend up the hierarchy, the soldiers become divided

²¹⁸ IA NCO, #1. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa, 9. February 2011.

reaching the greatest division at the top of the hierarchy in which the ultimate term - Article 140 - signifies rival “princes” and their ethnic-nationalist interests. It is an inverted hierarchy because it divides rather than unites. Each term of the hierarchy implies a corresponding circumference or scene. Each term in effect “draws a line” of division or unity in greater detail.

And a line of division is literally what the *Peshmerga* soldiers have in mind. As one *Peshmerga* soldier states, “After the American withdrawal, the conflict between Arabs and Kurds will start with civilians then political parties. The Kurdish and IA forces will be increased on both sides in the name of protecting citizens. We don't have a border [designating *Peshmerga* and IA responsibility] and this is a problem.”²¹⁹ Other soldiers throughout the Ninewa CSM expressed a need to clearly have a border - dividing line - between the two armies, such as one *Peshmerga* saying “I don't want the CCP to exist after the U.S. leaves. I want a clear border that demarcates *Peshmerga* and IA jurisdiction. I don't want them [IA] entering my land.”²²⁰ Not only do the *Peshmerga* soldiers express their identity (substance) as KRG agents linked to a national scene of division - they disclose that CSM's constitutional hierarchy of terms culminates in a principle of division.

This section rapidly ascends from the bottom of the CSM's constitutional hierarchy to the top in four stages of scene-agent ratios: CCP-individual soldiers; Local CCP community-Family/Tribe; Regional Scene - Ethnic-Institutional (Army) agent; National scene- Iraqi Army-*Peshmerga*. After collecting nearly 150 pages of conversations, I limit the number of quotations

²¹⁹ *Peshmerga* Soldier #2. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 25 February 2011.

²²⁰ *Peshmerga* Group Meeting and *Peshmerga* OIC Interview. Discussion Lead by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 23 February 2011.

used to demonstrate each rank of the hierarchy to a very minimal amount. I use quotations that best represent the essence of the CSM's constitutional hierarchy as it ascends to the ultimate principle of division and unity.

At the rank of CCP scene and CCP agent, both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers express the greatest amount of consubstantiality. At the rank of individual agent and CCP scene, they speak in positive terms about their relationship and cooperation. As one *Peshmerga* Officer in Charge (OIC) suggests, “We sit together, eat, drink and exchange stories and information. We have a very close relationship. Every time we are together; we are very good. One night, I am in charge of our training [officers take turns leading training] and we have a very good relationship.”²²¹ The *Peshmerga* officer's statement regarding a “good relationship” at the CCP is supported by statements made by both IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers throughout the Ninewa CSM. As an IA NCO stated at CCP-8, “On a **personal level we will not have any problems** but politics will get involved in the CCPs. After the U.S. leaves there will be *فتنة* (fitna)” [bold emphasis added].²²²

IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers, officers, and NCOs speak of a consubstantial CCP relationship in which the CCP scene suggests a united and cooperative CCP agent. Throughout the Ninewa CSM, soldiers note that occasionally there are small problems but that individually they act as a single unit on a daily bases. The *limited circumference* of the CCP scene implies a unified agent as well as a shared enemy. A scenic element playing a significant role in unification at the CCPs is *the terrorist enemy*. Soldiers state that they face a common enemy,

²²¹ *Peshmerga* Lieutenant and Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 25 February 2011.

²²² IA NCO, #1. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. February 2011.

that the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers standing at the checkpoint are united by being the target of terrorist attacks and bombings. At the level of the CCP scene, then, the soldiers see themselves in terms of a common CSM agent. So when soldiers name the scene, limiting the circumference of their acts to the CCP area of operation, the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers are able to express *a way of being* consubstantial agents acting as one. They are able - with some degree of success and veracity - to dissociate themselves from their larger historical and political scene and to act in keeping with the terms of their CCP scene. *In principle*, they are correct to say that they are united in a way that embodies the CSM ideal of one Iraqi and CSM military force - that the CCPs achieve a degree of constitutional unity.

However, while acknowledging trust within the CCP scene; they often hinted at other scene-agent ratios and terms influencing their unity. For example, one *Peshmerga* soldier sums up the consubstantiality at the CCP scene-agent rank of the hierarchy while foreshadowing the constitutional hierarchy of division several ranks above. He states, that “99% there is trust between IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers [here at the CCP]. But I am not speaking about the trust between governments.”²²³ Here it is quite clear the way in which the soldier limits the scene first to the CCP and then expands the scene to the level of government or nation to express a hierarchy of divisions. The awareness of a hierarchy of motives (terms) is strong among the soldiers. They know that they have to act in accordance with the common ground laid down by the CSM constitution while remaining mindful of greater divisions up above. As an IA OIC candidly states, “The officers here at the CCP have to have a political and a military mindset, and

²²³ *Peshmerga*. Group Interview with *Peshmerga* Captain. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 2 March 2011.

they have to be open minded and not be racist in order to keep a good relationship.”²²⁴ In the pentad's dramatist terms, the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers and officers are saying that as long as we can limit our scene to the CCPs (the political mindset that the IA OIC speaks of above) we can be consubstantial agents.

“The political mindset” that the IA OIC speaks of, then, is really the dramatist and rhetorical awareness of a need to know where and when to name terms that demarcate certain scenes that call for certain agents to perform certain acts. The soldiers recognize the need to dissociate themselves from the historical and political scenes of partisan self-interest and division. However, they also acknowledge that the logic of their divisional hierarchy will (sooner or later) impose upon them choices that will dissociate them from their CCP scenes (terms) and associate them with more divisive regional and ethnic scenes (terms) in which they must act as different agents.

At the next level of the scene-agent hierarchy, local CCP community - citizen/family/tribe, the paradox of substance begins to reveal itself in the form of tribal and ethnic unities that begin to divide the soldiers working at the CCPs. Here the CCP circumference widens to include the local citizens, families and tribes living within the operational area of the CCP. There are two kinds of relationship formed between CCP soldiers and their local communities. One in which the CCP soldiers are united because they are all from the local communities which they serve and one in which the relationship with the local community divides the CCP soldiers along an Arab-Kurd ethnic line. We deal with the two kinds of CCPs in the order just described.

²²⁴ IA OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 28 February 2011.

In general, CCPs 1, 3, 11, 14, and 15 exhibit the greatest amount of CSM constitutional cohesion because the CCP soldiers are from the local communities they serve and are all Kurdish. In this case, whether or not the soldiers are serving in the Iraqi Army or the *Peshmerga* army, the soldiers manning the CCPs listed above are all self-proclaimed Kurd or Yezidi-Kurd from the CCPs' local communities. It is enough to establish the constitutional success of these CCPs by hearing from one of the *Peshmerga* soldiers who states, "We, the IP, IA and Peshmerga, have one goal - to bring security here [the local area] and to protect people. We have very good cooperation among each other because all forces are from this area and speak the same language/dialect."²²⁵ With regard to CCPs 11, 13, 14 and 15, then, their success is due to their community scene "complimenting or perfecting" the CCP and CSM scene. The agents are not asked to dissociate themselves from their substantial links to their local communities in order to form a relationship between IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers because they have *not so much changed scenes as widened their sphere of influence so it is congruous with that of the local community*. They are able to remain the same agents operating within the scenes of two concentric spheres of influence - the CCP and the local community. Their constitutional terms in fact complement one another as they ascend up the constitutional hierarchy. They are not asked to alienate or dissociate themselves from local *identities* in order to assume an *Iraqi* national identity or constitutional substance.

With regard to CCP-1 and CCP-3 the case is slightly different. The soldiers from the two armies are not necessarily from the local community, but they are mostly if not all Kurdish. As one *Peshmerga* soldier from CCP-1 states, "So far our relationship is very good here because

²²⁵ IA OIC and *Peshmerga* OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 19 March 2011.

Peshmerga, IA, and IP are mostly Kurdish. We don't know how the relationship will be if there is an Arab unit that replaces the IA.”²²⁶ And an Iraqi Police Officer at CCP-3 notes the homogeneity of Kurdish agents as a reason for the CCP's success saying that “The reason why the CCP is successful. . . [is because] everyone here is Kurdish and Kurds are not like Arabs who will betray someone for a hundred dollars and will let some bad guy pass the CCP.”²²⁷ In the case of CCP-1 and CCP-3, although the agents are not from the local community, they retain complimentary spheres of influence because the agents operate largely within the same scenes at the next highest rank - the regional scene. So the IA and *Peshmerga* substance match at the rank of agent (Kurd) and the local community scenes - at least for CCPs 1, 3, 11, 13, 15. There are no real choices of constitutional dissociation to be made by the agents working at these CCPs at the second rank of the constitutional hierarchy.

The remaining CCPs - 4, 5,6,8,9, and 10 - reflect a more genuine combination of rival agents and the constitutional divisions begin to reveal themselves. The divisions are scenic divisions manifested in soldiers' relationships with local community members. The paradox is that the IA (Arab) and the *Peshmerga* (Kurd) success is in the respective armies ability to *identify* with (be consubstantial with) the divided local citizens. Arab citizens from the CCP's area of operation feel comfort and security having an IA Arab soldier at the checkpoint and the local Kurdish citizens feel secure and comfortable having a Kurdish *Peshmerga* manning the

²²⁶ *Peshmerga* OIC and Six *Peshmerga* Soldiers. In-depth Interviews. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 12 March 2011.

²²⁷ IP Officer and one Shurta. In-Depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 06 March 2011.

checkpoint. So in widening the scene to the local community, the constitutional unity (one Iraq) of the CCP begins to dissipate. CCP-5 serves as a good example.

Local citizens near CCP-5 state the following about the CCP's success:

It is good for the CCP to remain [after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq] because citizens will get equal treatment. As citizens, we want the IA and Peshmerga to work together. If there is only one force, that force will be racist toward some citizens. But now there is the CCP and the same treatment for citizens. Not only that, there is both languages at the CCP. Some of the citizens don't speak both languages (Arabic and Kurdish).²²⁸

At first this seems a statement of success and to some degree it is because the citizens testify that the CCP brings a level of cooperation and security to the local area. However, the comment that “one force will be racist toward some citizens” indicates the beginning of a division between the IA and *Peshmerga*. Citizens in the local area are now categorized as Arab and Kurd with the IA and *Peshmerga* serving the interests of those local citizens respectively. So the political hierarchy's ultimate term of division begins to show how far its substance reaches through the CSM's hierarchy of constitutional principles and ranks: IA is for Arabs and *Peshmerga* is for Kurds.

The alignment of IA and *Peshmerga* forces with Arab and Kurdish citizen's provides for low level bickering between the two forces at the CCP - one army accusing the other army's soldiers of “harassing” the citizen of opposite ethnicity as they drive through the checkpoint. An IA soldier at CCP-9 accuses the *Peshmerga* in the following manner, “We are on the border between the KRG and Baghdad. The CCP is a good thing and makes it easier for citizens. Before there was *Peshmerga* only and citizens were harassed by *Peshmerga*. They did not search

²²⁸ Local citizens near Ninewa CCP. In-Depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 2 March 2011

Kurds, but now we have one system and now everyone gets equal treatment.”²²⁹ Or even with both an IA and *Peshmerga* soldier manning a checkpoint problems occur as the IA OIC at CCP-5 attests, “There is a problem between the IA and Peshmerga. One lets a car pass and the other doesn't [IA let Arabs pass and Peshmerga let Kurds pass].”²³⁰

This relationship between armies and local citizens becomes a problem when Kurdish and Arab citizens expect “partisan support” from *their* army - or what they believe to be their partisan army. For example, the IA OIC at CCP-4 notes that one IA officer at his battalion refuses to work at the CCPs because the Kurdish local citizens and the Kurdish parties will interfere in his CCP work. The officer continues saying that “The current *Peshmerga* officer has this problem, too. He is Kurdish and the Kurds in the area will complain that he is supposed to help them.”²³¹ Likewise IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers note that Arab citizens expect to be treated with special privileges from the Arab IA soldiers at the checkpoints and on patrol. A persistent complaint from IA soldiers is that *Peshmerga* allow local Kurdish leaders special privileges at the checkpoints. So the relationship between the CCP soldiers and the local citizens while at first appearing to be a positive reinforcement of cooperation and unity actual begins to show a principle of division in the CSM. Indeed, the CSM asks both Arab IA and Kurdish *Peshmerga* to *dissociate* themselves from their relationships at the level of local communities. However, the actual material separation from their local scenes is difficult. A PUK Asayish commander summed up the division at the local scene saying that “It is not important what forces support

²²⁹ IA Soldier #4. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 23 February 2011.

²³⁰ IA OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 2 March 2011.

²³¹ IA LT and Three IA Soldiers. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 4 March 2011.

this area. It is important what forces people support.”²³² At the rank of local community then, the local citizens begin to divide the CCP communities by ethnicity.

The low-level bickering and accusations about IA and *Peshmerga* favoring local citizens is based on a principle of ethnic division. However, on a deeper level, it is ironically based on a positive principle of “equality” and IA *identification* with their *Peshmerga* counterparts. So before continuing to the next level of the Ninewa CSM's constitutional hierarchy, it is important to explain how this principle of equality which unites soldiers (the principle they share) also divides them. Essentially, the complaints of favoritism towards local citizens is couched in a mimetic competition or rivalry over “who is most fair,” “most equal,” and “most professional.” It is a competition over who best -Arab or Kurd - embodies the democratic principles of not only the CSM constitution but the Iraqi constitution in general. So as the soldiers' constitutional scene widens (ascends the hierarchy) a partisan competition begins over what *agent* best represents the people of the MCR areas in the *most fair and democratic way*. Kurdish *Peshmerga* note that they are fairer and that Arabs cannot be trusted. Arab IA note that the Army is more professional than the *Peshmerga* and the IA executes its CSM duties without letting politics interfere. In brief, the partisan bickering is to some degree based on “out-imitating” the other group over who can be “more fair” and “more democratic.”²³³ In essence, both armies' soldiers declare themselves the *ideal democratic agent* that best embodies the identity and substance of the local community and

²³² PUK Asayish. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 15 March 2011.

²³³ In general, Kurdish citizens and *Peshmerga* claimed democratic superiority over their fellow Iraqi Arab citizens and soldiers. Often Kurdish citizens and *Peshmerga* would use terms like “dirty Arabs,” “Chauvinist Arabs,” and “Ba’athist,” and “tyrant” to describe in very pejorative and racist terms Arabs. One *Peshmerga* OIC's words are representative of a dominate motif heard in *Peshmerga* and Kurdish soldiers' conversations: “We had a dictatorship, and since 2003 we started using a democratic system. But do Arabs use the democratic system the right way? A party (Ba’athists) never dies - How long will it take to clean their mind? It will take a couple of generations. Arabs don't have an idea what democracy means.”

scene. This mimetic rivalry over who is more professional, fair, equal, and *democratic* continues through the rest of the CSM's constitutional hierarchy ironically reinforcing the ethnic-nationalist principle dividing the two armies.²³⁴

At the rank of local community (scene) and CSM soldier (agent), then, the two armies' constitutional divisions begin to present themselves as choices of constitutional dissociation (and association). Citizens' divisions and mistrust influence the way the two armies' soldiers name scenes that imply partisan agents and accompanying partisan acts, such as a show of favoritism at the CCP. Divided citizens along ethnic Arab-Kurd lines link the armies to partisan groups - the *Peshmerga* represent Kurdish speaking citizens and protect their interests. The IA represent Arab speaking citizens and their interests. These local community divisions become wider at the next level of the IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' constitutional hierarchy: the regional Ninewa scene and the IA and *Peshmerga* Army (institutional agent).

When IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers use regional scenic terms to discuss their CCP relationship their substantive divisions become more prominent and increase in number. First, they recognize that they are *counter-agents*, one belonging to the IA and one belonging to the *Peshmerga*, who operate under two separate chains of command and whose scene is (at this level of the hierarchy) the historical struggle to realize ethnic-nationalist goals associated with their respective military associations. Second, the Iraqi Army begins to show substantive divisions

²³⁴ Burke makes a trenchant discovery in *Rhetoric of Motives* regarding imitation, competition, and *identification* (consubstantiality). He writes, "From the standpoint of "identification" what we call "competition" is better described as men's attempt to *out-imitate* one another" (131). See his entire discussion "The 'Invidious' as Imitation in Veblen" for his explication of imitation as a case of competition. The notion of consubstantial imitation plays an important role in Burke's discussions of the *scapegoat*. We can read the entire MCR conflict as a case of "imitation as competition" and the use of the scapegoat but this subject is outside the scope of this dissertation and chapter.

among Arab and Kurd agents. Third, the *Peshmerga* and local Kurdish governments begin to show their own internal divisions.

The regional scene-agent ratio manifests itself when IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers discuss the influence of their respective armies on their mission at the CCP. Essentially, they divide themselves in terms of *institutional* agents (armies) linked to regional scenes of operation and control. The CSM soldiers' constitutional hierarchy, at the level of army agent, widens their circumference of motives to include their respective Brigades' and Divisions' adversarial purposes. The division of the two forces at this level of the hierarchy is quite wide and pronounced. The rival armies' agencies and purposes signify the “morbidity” of the unchanged historical scene of ethnic struggle which dominates the MCR. The CCP agent at the first rank of the CSM hierarchy declaring “we have a very close [personal] relationship” gives way to “We have two forces: they believe in their way [agency-purpose]; and we believe in our way [agency-purpose].”²³⁵

These two agents' (armies') constitutional divisions manifest themselves in two chains of command and a struggle for who controls the CCP property (scene) after the U.S. Army's withdrawal from Iraq on 31 December 2011. Regarding the opposing chains of command, soldiers and officers (IA and *Peshmerga*) at every Ninewa CCP made clear that their divergent *institutional* interests (Brigades and Divisions) and orders divide the CSM communities. In fact, the two armies are living the constitutional paradox of substance. As one IA OIC stated, “We have orders from our commanders for us not to interact with the *Peshmerga*. But we live here

²³⁵ IA Soldier #2. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 23 February 2011.

together like a family and it would be difficult for us not to interact and talk to each other. We really don't follow that order, however.”²³⁶ The paradox here is that the IA soldiers must be both agents of their Battalion (rivals) while being agents of the CCP (“family”). Another IA OIC states that “I have no connection with the CCC [Combined Coordination Center]. I take orders from my Battalion and report to my Battalion. Even if I get orders from the CCC, I can't follow those orders unless my battalion OKs it.”²³⁷ One IA soldier bluntly stated the reality of the two chains of command in front of both his IA and *Peshmerga* OIC, “We have our rules to run the CCP and the *Peshmerga* have their rules. With respect to our OICs, the Americans are currently running the CCPs.”²³⁸

Peshmerga, too, note the same division of command often stating the obvious “If we are combined forces we should be under one command. If we work here, we should all have the same authority.”²³⁹ In essence, the CSM soldiers recognize that their *ideal* agent of unity (the CSM Golden Lion) is not in accord with their regional and institutional material scenes. No degree of “eulogistic terms” and “mystifications” could cover up the operational divide between the two rival armies. And this material (scenic) divide manifested itself in squabbles over ownership of CCP *property* at the rank of regional scene and army agent.

During interviews soldiers and officers from both the IA and *Peshmerga* claimed the right to CCP command (agent) and property (scene). Two examples suffice to make the point of

²³⁶ IA OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 2 March 2011.

²³⁷ IA OIC and Eight Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 26 February 2011.

²³⁸ IA LT and Three IA Soldiers. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. 4 March 2011.

²³⁹ Eight *Peshmerga* and *Peshmerga* LT. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 19 March 2011.

IA and *Peshmerga* Battalion and Division commanders competing for the CCPs. At CCP-5 for instance, the soldiers from both armies went without fuel for their CCP generator. Essentially going without lights and heaters. The IA Battalion would not provide fuel for a generator it did not own. The *Peshmerga* Battalion would not provide fuel for a generator it did not own. An IA OIC stated the problem in the following terms:

We get logistical support from our Battalion, but the Battalion takes money from our salary to buy our supplies, including food. U.S. forces cut off fuel from us and we have problems now. We [*Peshmerga* and IA] tell each other that the other needs to provide the fuel. The *Peshmerga* says we need to provide fuel. We came up with an agreement as officers [at the CCP] to get fuel together, each provides a certain amount [our Battalions did not honor this agreement]. So the *Peshmerga* and the IA Battalions did not provide us with any fuel this month.²⁴⁰

Note that the two OICs (IA and *Peshmerga*) cooperated to find a solution to their local CCP problem. However, as institutional agents operating within their Battalions' and Divisions' scenes - they could not cooperate to fuel the generator that would give both forces heat and lights.

The seemingly simple conflict over who provides logistical support to the CCPs is actually a sign of a deeper conflict over what army actually commands and owns the CCP and its property. IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers both said that when the U.S. Army leaves their commanders would fight over the CCPs. Indeed, one senior *Peshmerga* officer stated in very clear terms his claim to a CCP:

Also, I will get all the equipment and everything associated with the CCP. The U.S. Officer came and signed the equipment over to [my counterpart with the IA]. I will not accept that! [He] is on the

²⁴⁰ IA OIC In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 28 February 2011.

other side of the river and has only been here for a short amount of time. I blame the U.S. officer and his group for signing the equipment over to [him]. This material will stay with this base (CCP). Since 2005, [*Peshmerga*] were the only ones pulling security in this area and now the U.S. is here. After the withdrawal I will stay. This was my checkpoint and it is my region. It is my right to have this equipment. How can that be fair that someone from the outside gets this material? If you continue down this road, it means that there will be a fight. If you did this to [my counterpart], he would not accept this. It is bad for my reputation to lose this equipment at the CCP. It is my responsibility to fight for this. We suffered a lot! We lost a lot of lives! And now security is good. [The *Peshmerga*] brought security to this area.²⁴¹

IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers' statements portending an *institutional* conflict over the ownership of the CCPs were rife. And the *Peshmerga* commander's statement above provides good evidence of the institutional pride found in both the IA and *Peshmerga* agents. It shows that divided agents *associate* themselves with *material scenes* that embody their constitutional identity and substance. At the level of institutional agent and regional area of operation (scene) the soldiers at the CCPs are divided.

The two chains of commands' squabble over institutional control of the CCPs indicates the influence of a principle of division as the ultimate term of the CSM constitution. The CSM's goal is to dissociate the rival soldiers from their divisive constitutional principles *and material scenes*. Ironically and instead, the CCP property (scene) became aligned with agents of the constitutional divisions and a symbol of IA and *Peshmerga* competing pride and identity - a material *image* of their essence. It shows that what the CSM asks IA and *Peshmerga* to do *ideally* -dissociate themselves from their institutional scenes and the role of agent those scenes imply - is extremely difficult *materially (scenically)*. To act as a united CSM agent means

²⁴¹ *Peshmerga* Commander. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 21 February 2011.

relinquishing (dissociating) one from material power, in this case, military power perceived and real symbolized in the CCP. For the Battalions and Divisions (both IA and *Peshmerga*) to dissociate themselves from principles of scene-agent on an institutional level is to request to some degree that these institutions (agents) alter their very essence and purpose; it nearly requests a self-dissolution or at least *shrinking* of one's scene (sphere of influence). The very thing that the *Peshmerga* commander “would not accept” is a *constitutional dissociation* (or partial alienation) from his material sphere of influence which would reduce the *Peshmerga* agent's *ideal* and *material* reach over the MCR territory. The CSM soldiers are asked, too, to dissociate themselves from their institutional scenes and property while still maintaining an institutional identity.

There are perhaps more ominous divisions at the rank of institutional agent and regional scene that the CSM soldiers reveal in their conversations. These terms of constitutional division deal directly with the Iraqi Army manning the CCPs and begin to transition to the next and ultimate rank of the CSM constitutional hierarchy. The discussion of the IA at the current rank of the hierarchy returns the discussion to the CCPs whose IA agents as well as *Peshmerga* agents are overwhelmingly majority Kurdish: CCPs 1, 3, 11, 13, 15. What we notice is that the **Iraqi Army is, in fact, already a “combined” force.**²⁴² It includes Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman

²⁴² Here we notice the redundancy of having a “combined” force within the MCR which is a corollary to the redundancy of having a Kurdish principle of identity (substance) appearing at two of the upper ranks of Iraq's constitutional hierarchy. As noted in the previous section, Kurdish substance and identity is repeated at the two highest ranks of the political hierarchy - it never really transcends to *Iraq*. The material corollary of this doubling of idealistic representation is to have Kurdish ethnicity represented twice in the militaries manning the CCPs - IA and *Peshmerga*. The CSM gives Kurds extra representation within the MCR at the expense of *Iraqi* identity and substance and at the expense of other ethnicities. There is the possibility that the IA could have simply assigned all Kurdish Battalions or Divisions to the MCR instead of creating a “new” combined force welcoming the *Peshmerga* to the region who clearly represent only Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Or the IA perhaps could have created a combined MCR unit of Arab and Kurdish soldiers created from its own ranks and representing a unified body acting as one *Iraqi* agent (Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman).

soldiers and officers. In principle, it represents Iraq's ethnic plurality. There are Battalions and Divisions within the IA that are predominately Kurdish and these Kurdish IA units man the CCPs listed above. The participation of the Kurdish Battalions and Divisions in the CSM reveals an ethnic and political division within the Iraqi Army in and of itself as well as begins to disclose a strong ethnic-nationalist and political tendency (purpose) among Kurdish participants (both IA and *Peshmerga*) in the CSM.

The predominately Kurdish IA 3rd Division operates at CCPs 11, 13, and 15. The IA OIC at one CCP notes that “Our Division told us in the beginning that all the soldiers on the CCPs in the DIBs [MCR] have to be Kurdish - [an] officer at 3rd DIV [gave this order]. After a while, [however], the soldiers did change.”²⁴³ Of course, assigning all Kurdish agents to the CCPs pragmatically serves the purpose of “reducing tension” among the CCP agents. However, it controverts earlier statements made by IA, *Peshmerga*, and citizens that it is important for local citizens see agents at the CCPs who ethnically represent Arabs and Kurds living within the CCPs' area of operation. More importantly, it highlights tensions within the IA.

What follows are representative examples of Kurdish dominance within the CSM causing tension in the IA. Arab soldiers at one of the predominantly Kurdish CCPs said the following:

We should search all cars, both Kurdish and Arab. Our problem here is that we want equality. The problem here is that the Asayish let Kurdish civilians go without being checked²⁴⁴. We want equality. If the U.S. withdraws, they will send a unit here that is all Kurdish. All of our commanders are Kurdish. 3rd DIV commander is Kurdish, Brigade commander is Kurdish, Battalion

²⁴³ IA OIC and 4 Soldiers. In-depth Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 23 March 2011.

²⁴⁴ *Peshmerga* and local Kurdish leaders corroborated that Kurdish (KDP) Asayish manned the CCP checkpoint dressed as *Peshmerga*, a violation of the CSM principles. So Kurdish interests are represented in three forces working at the CCP: IA, *Peshmerga*, and Asayish.

commander is Kurdish, and our company is Kurdish, so they will send a Kurdish unit here. Kurdish officers have *wasta* [personal influence] and can get promoted.²⁴⁵

What we see at the institutional level of the soldiers' constitutional hierarchy is an ethnic division that *latently* sunders the Iraqi Army in and of itself. For example, a Kurdish IA OIC at one CCP implies how IA units can be used as a tool to achieve ethnic ends (both Arab and Kurdish). He says that, "Arab People - meaning ex-Ba'athists, dirty Arabs - are terrorists and are always making problems in this area. *After the U.S. Army leaves, they will move our Brigade because it is mostly a Kurdish Brigade.*" [emphasis added].²⁴⁶ A predominant concern of Kurdish IA and *Peshmerga* is the rotation of IA units which disrupts the Kurdish homogeneity at some CCPs. As one *Peshmerga* OIC notes, "So far our relationship is very good here because *Peshmerga*, IA, and IP are mostly Kurdish. *We don't know how the relationship will be if there is an Arab unit that replaces the IA.*"²⁴⁷ And a common grievance of *Peshmerga* units working at the CCPs is that the IA rotates its troops through the CCPs altering the composition of CCP forces, making it difficult to forge CCP working relationships.

Before transitioning to the final rank of the CSM hierarchy, the scenic divisions at the rank of institutional agent and regional scene need to be completed. For example, soldiers at the CCPs encounter, enforce, and negotiate local citizens' scenic (bureaucratic) divisions. First Arabs must submit to a voucher system to enter towns within the KRG - even if they are residents of the CCPs local community or town. Second, local Arab farmers note that they must

²⁴⁵ IA Soldiers. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. 15 March 2011.

²⁴⁶ IA Lieutenant. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 05 March 2011.

²⁴⁷ *Peshmerga* OIC and Six *Peshmerga* Soldiers. In-depth Interviews. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 12 March 2011.

submit to a time consuming process to retain the appropriate paperwork to transport their livestock and goods through the CCPs, essentially shuttling between three different Kurdish agencies to finally be given a stamp of approval by the local *Asayish*.²⁴⁸ Third, the KRG and Baghdad governments keep separate data bases on vehicle registrations, so soldiers and Iraqi Police at the CCPs may or may not recognize a vehicle owner's registration as he or she passes through the CCP. In brief, Arab citizens claim harassment from KRG bureaucratic procedure and *Asayish* and *Peshmerga* manning the CCPs. And IA, *Peshmerga*, and *Asayish* can use a decentralized system of registration to harass those (Kurd or Arab) passing through the checkpoint. And this kind of petty harassment (such as a soldier or IP allowing certain people to pass without the proper paperwork and scrutinizing the paperwork of second driver of a different ethnicity) exacerbates tension between the Arab IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers manning the CCPs.

Finally, the *Peshmerga*, too, show signs of division within their ranks. For example, the Ninewa CSM *Peshmerga* are comprised of *Zerevani* (with ties to the KDP) and PUK *Peshmerga*. One *Peshmerga* soldier comment is sufficient summarize the divisions among the *Peshmerga* in terms of the KDP and PUK. He states that “We don't work for any ministry [PMoD], not for a ministry, and not for the KRG. We work for General Aziz.”²⁴⁹ For example, other *Peshmerga* are working for a minister, but something needs to happen with the *Zerevani*. It is all bullshit. It has been going on for a year. 20 *Zerevani* (KDP) and 10 *Peshmerga* (PUK) here at the CCP.”²⁵⁰ The grievances that the various units comprising the *Peshmerga* have are over differences in pay and missing danger pay. In other interviews, *Peshmerga* and *Zerevani* note

²⁴⁸ Interview with farmers near Zomar.

²⁴⁹ For a brief explanation of the *Zerevani* and *Asayish* please see Chapter 2.

²⁵⁰ *Zerevani* Soldier. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 20 February 2011.

that they can give their *Peshmerga*, *Zerevani*, and CSM patches to Kurdish soldiers that don't have CSM training so that they can work at the CCPs. For example, the KDP *Asayish* work at (at least) one Ninewa CCP as *Peshmerga*. Not only did this anger Arab IA soldiers the local Kurdish PUK leaders at one CCP community expressed their displeasure of the local Kurdish KDP who sent their *Asayish* officers to work as *Peshmerga* on the checkpoints to collect intelligence information - a violation of the CSM 12 Principles. *Peshmerga* noted that there is an agreement between the KDP and PUK that both the PUK and KDP *Peshmerga* must be represented at the CCPs.

In summary, the conflicts and squabbles over logistical support, CCP command, ownership of CCP property, ethnic divisions within the Iraqi Army and ethno-political divisions within the *Peshmerga*, show a wide constitutional division at the rank of the regional scene-agent ratio. At this rank, soldiers show an inability to dissociate themselves from their institutional identity (agent) and material scene - logistical support, chain of command, orders, area of operation, and institutional pride and goals. Dissociating themselves from their regional (material) scene (area of operation) the substantive identity of their respective armies' commands amounts to a painful alienation of identity and the material loss of substance that sustains their institutional identity. Most importantly, the ultimate *political principle of division* (Article 140 and the MCR) begins to clearly show its influence on the entire CSM constitutional hierarchy at this rank. We see the *principle's* influence in the ethnic divisions of the IA Army itself and the dominant Kurdish representation at certain CCPs in both the IA and, of course, *Peshmerga*. The CSM's institutional and regional rank of the hierarchy can be summarized in the phrase “we have *our own way*.”

And this “own way” leads to the hierarchy's ultimate principle of division - article 140 and the MCR conflict which nationalizes and politicizes the CSM soldiers' constitutional relationship. This is most strikingly revealed by noting that at this point of the CSM's constitutional hierarchy there is a total reversal of purpose. What began as unity to bring security to the local community is now division to win exclusive ethnic-nationalist control of the MCR. The CSM and its CCP communities become “conspiratorial factions of unity” at the ultimate rank of the constitutional hierarchy. Indeed, when the CSM's scene (circumference) widens to the national level the CSM agents become most divided and aligned with nationalist aspirations.

The ultimate level of the CSM constitutional hierarchy is simple to articulate, for the CSM soldiers were united in their political principle of division. A few examples express what nearly every soldier at the Ninewa CSM expressed - the purpose of the CCPs is to resolve the MCR constitutional issue. In essence, this final stage of CSM hierarchy widens the scene to the national circumference so that agents now embody *ethnic-nationalist ideals* - not necessarily *Iraqi* ideals. As one IA NCO said, “There will be a *فتنة* (fitna) between the Peshmerga and the IA because of the [MCR], *and the [MCR] is the reason that the CCP is here*. There is no terrorist here. But the problems are between the political parties about the MCR.”²⁵¹ A *Peshmerga* soldier also expresses the CSM's purpose in terms of the MCR saying that “Political events affect the CCP because *the CCP represents the disputed territories*. It represents the border between the KRG and Baghdad. We say this is our border, but our border is much farther

²⁵¹ IA NCO and Soldier. Short Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 28 February 2011.

south.”²⁵² Finally, one IA OIC sums up the majority view of IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers at the CCPs:

All these problems at the CCP and its area of operation [MCR], will depend on *the constitution that Iraq follows*. If we follow the constitution, we will not need the CCPs. If we get rid of the CCPs, it is at that point when *Article 140 is resolved*. Until now, the CCP has been successful, but eventually it will not be a success *because article 140 needs to be resolved*. [emphasis added]²⁵³

The CSM's constitutional hierarchy, like that of the *Iraqi* constitution, is guided by an ultimate principle of division. IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers overwhelmingly state in their conversations that the ultimate principle -the purpose toward which all lower ranks of their hierarchy move - is one of division - Article 140 -the MCR. The *logical* principle of Article 140 is associated in substance with the MCR political and historical scene which calls into existence rival agents that embody an *ideal* and symbolic division between Kurds and Arabs over the material scene that signifies and embodies their national identities. The logical ascendance toward the ultimate principle calls for a material movement toward the expanding circumference (border) of the Kurdish and/or Arab MCR. At this ultimate stage of the CSM hierarchy, the soldiers' *constitutionally dissociate* themselves from the CSM's idealistic principles of unity and associate themselves with the idealistic principles of their constitutional and historical division. **The CSM's purposive substance has completed the agents' constitutional transformation from CCP comrade and buddy (merger) to national rival and enemy (division). And with that transformation, motives for acts, too, change.**

²⁵² *Peshmerga* Soldier #1 In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 25 February 2011.

²⁵³ IA OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 05 March 2011.

One Kurdish IA Officer said that he would turn against his own IA soldiers if Article 140 was not resolved in Kurdish (KRG) favor stating that “The reason for this CCP is because this area is disputed territory and because article 140 is not yet resolved. If anything happens, I will side with the Kurds [and not with my IA soldiers]. I will fight for the Kurds. 40% of the Kurds in the Iraqi Army are leaving the IA, including me, and joining the *Peshmerga*.”²⁵⁴ A second Kurdish Officer stated a similar allegiance to Kurdish nationalism saying that “I am not allowed to say this as Iraqi Army. The politicians at the top will say, ‘this land belongs to us.’ The point I am trying to make is that there will be a civil war. If there is a conflict between Arabs and Kurds, I will resign [from the IA]. However, I hope that we don't get there.”²⁵⁵

At the ultimate rank of the CSM constitutional hierarchy, Arab IA soldiers express misgivings and animosity about Kurdish soldiers and units within the IA. As one IA soldier characterized the relationship between Arabs and Kurds:

All the people in the 5th Brigade are all Kurdish. They don't count as IA. Arabs get transferred out - they work for the *Peshmerga* and the Kurdish Government. The 5th Brigade was asked to move to Mosul and they refused because they service the gate to Irbil. These *Peshmerga* Observation Posts [also called Unilateral Fixed Positions exclusively *Peshmerga* and located near the CCPs] secure the road. They just watch the area. They believe that from our checkpoint to Irbil is theirs, and they believe that the Shebek [local ethnic and religious community and Iraqi minority] belong to them too.²⁵⁶

The lived constitutional division of the CSM soldiers is as far apart as it can possibly reach. They are only consubstantial in the sense that two enemies share the common ground they are fighting

²⁵⁴ IA OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 19 February 2011.

²⁵⁵ IA OIC. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. 06 March 2011.

²⁵⁶ Three IA soldiers and two NCOs. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. 4 March 2011.

over - which is the common ground of the *Iraqi* constitution, Article 140 and its material embodiment in the MCR scene. And as the soldiers' terms widen the CSM scene to a national circumference the civilian agents are not necessarily the community members living around the CCPs but the most senior political leaders of the country - the princes aligning their *special* interests with national interests.

And the CSM soldiers, too, speak in terms of Machiavelli's alignment of a community's or nation's interests with their political leader's (prince's) interests. Now the CSM soldiers' motives for acts are their political leaders' motives for acts. For it is the prince who is the *agent of the nationalist scene* and the head of the national body politic moving as one. For example, soldiers speak of *politicians* dictating their future acts and relationship. The soldiers point out that the Ninewa Governor ran and got elected on a platform that would remove the *Peshmerga* from the MCR areas and eliminate the CCPs calling them “checkpoints of annihilation.” One senior *Peshmerga* Officer noted the direct relationship between the two armies' motives and acts and their political leaders saying that “*One thing we have to know is that the politicians run the Army. Our leaders, if they get along and work together, if they agree, then who is the military [the military has no role or is not needed if the politicians resolve the issues]. The MCR should be resolved before the Americans leave*” [emphasis added].²⁵⁷

The soldiers, both IA (Arab and Kurd) and *Peshmerga*, identify themselves with their political leaders' interests - individual and national. In so doing, they alter the CSMs substantive act until it becomes another means to achieve *special* ethnic-national ends, for they *constitutionally dissociate* themselves from the unifying principles of the CSM and

²⁵⁷ *Peshmerga* Senior Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall. Ninewa. 28 February 2011.

constitutionally associate themselves with the nationalist interests of their political leaders. As Burke states, “[B]y such identification of ruler and ruled, Machiavelli offers the ruler precisely the rhetorical opportunity to present privately acquisitive motives publicly in sacrificial terms.” And *Peshmerga* and IA soldiers state bluntly a willingness to make the ultimate sacrifice for their prince's and nation's *acquisitive motives, interests, and claims to the MCR*: “As long as we can bleed and have blood in our body, we will defend our country. Our grandparents fought with nothing, and we can fight with nothing, too,” says one *Peshmerga* soldier. At this point the analysis of the CSM soldiers' constitutional dissociations (their constitutional hierarchies of scene-agent ratios) spin-off into the realm of national narrative and myth in which the soldiers speak of *mystical consubstantialities*: “brotherhoods,” “blood mingling with the earth,” “national suffering,” “justice for genocide,” “killers of tyrants,” “agents of democracy,” and “gods of national destiny,” the transcendental unities of mystical warriors (*RM* 332). But these narratives and national myths that mystically unite Iraqis into opposing factions fly quite beyond this chapter's and dissertation's scope and horizon and must wait to be told another time.

So to close this section's analysis of the CSM soldiers' hierarchy of constitutional dissociations. We introduce one final term to help us summarize our hierarchical analysis of the CSM's constitutional dissociations: *conspire*, a term of unity to summarize the CSM hierarchy's ultimate term and principle of division - Article 140 / MCR. In every rank of the CSM hierarchy of scene-agent ratios, we find conspiracy and the ultimate term of division at work. The U.S. Army seeks to achieve a *conspiracy* between IA and *Peshmerga* at the CCP scene-agent rank in order to better unite Iraq under a term of ultimate unity that transcends ethnic divisions. Thus, the CSM attempts to dissociate (divide) the respective soldiers from their ethnic *constitutions* in

order to transcend to a higher level of unity. At the rank of community within the CSM scene-agent hierarchy, local citizens *conspire* with IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers to achieve protection for their local ethnic special interests: IA aligned with Arab citizens and *Peshmerga* aligned with Kurdish citizens. And Kurdish IA units *conspire* to populate certain CCPs with majority Kurdish soldiers from local CCP communities.

Army Brigade and Division commanders *conspire* with their soldiers to further the interests, aims, and pride of the respective commanders and their armies at the rank of institutional agent and regional scene. And within these institutions we witness internal ethnic *conspiracies* in which all Kurdish units work at the CCPs, *Asayish* man the CCPs, and IA are told not to cooperate with their *Peshmerga* counterparts. At the rank of national scene-agent, armies *conspire* with their respective leaders to achieve nationalist goals and secure ownership of the MCR. And all of these acts of conspiracy move toward an ultimate principle of nationalism and sovereignty (Article 140) a unity and conspiracy that divides Arab from Kurd.

The CSM works toward and conspires to achieve a higher level of *Iraqi national sovereignty* while the IA and especially the *Peshmerga* work toward and conspire to achieve partisan ethnic national sovereignty. As we work our way from the bottom of the constitutional hierarchy to the top, we witness the constitutional transformation of agents from “family,” and “friends” until they became “strangers” and “enemies.”²⁵⁸ Symbolic acts of verbal placement actuate these transformations of substance - a rhetorical process of *constitutional dissociations* and *associations* in which agents name their scenes and thus the grounds for their motives and acts. When the soldiers *name* the CCP scene, they are united agents; when the soldiers *name* the

²⁵⁸ Soldiers working at the CCPs often said, “We know who the strangers are.”

national scene, they are divided agents - but always united by the *constitutional principle of hierarchy*. In some regard, this means that the CSM and MCR are not a question of unity and division but a question of by what terms will the IA and *Peshmerga* be united. Will they be united by the clasping of hands in friendship or united by the strangling of necks in enmity?

For now, based on the analysis above, the IA and *Peshmerga* ascend up the constitutional hierarchy of dramatic terms until they arrive at a “conspiratorial unity of faction” and the hierarchy's ultimate principle of division imbues every agent at every position with the “necessity” and “freedom” to choose constitutional and conspiratorial merger or division. Burke, in his discussion of the principle of hierarchy, cogently states the principle of constitutional hierarchy that follows the CSM soldiers' own transformation from friendship to enmity:

And out of this [human state of division] came the variety of attitudes: first, ideally, love, charity, the attempt of the divided being to overcome division; then, when the tension increased, the various departures from love, beginning with the slight ironic embarrassments, the modified tribute of courtship (as regards the relations between either social or sexual classes); then the tragic attempt to transform hate into love “on a higher level”; and finally, the organization of hate and war, the farthest stage of division, though out of it in turn arises a new compensatory union, the *conspiratorial* unity of faction, where “spies” go by the name of “intelligence.” (There is a satanic caricature of the Trinity here. God being the source of power, the Son the bringer of light, the Holy Ghost the Gift of Love, in the conspiratorial unity of faction the war machine is power, espionage is the bringer of light, and the breathing-together of the warrior-conspirators is love) (*RM* 139).

Indeed, what we reveal by analyzing the CSM soldiers' hierarchical terms of substance -their scene-agent ratios - is a “breathing-together of warrior-conspirators” at the “combined” checkpoints. Out of Iraq's state of ethnic division comes an attempt at *patriotic love* and *familial* union - the CSM act. IA and *Peshmerga* soldiers are asked to court one another and join in

political union in order to transcend their divisions at a higher level of their political hierarchy. The CSM, however, is unable to replace the ultimate principle of division with an ultimate principle of unity - a belief in a constitution and constitutional process that adequately transforms the soldiers' divisions into symbolic and consubstantial unities and “purifies” their war. So the professing of brotherhood at the CCPs becomes a “eulogistic covering” for *special* interest, hate, and the conspiratorial unity of faction.

Conclusion

In tracing the CSM soldiers' constitutional dissociations of hierarchical mergers and divisions, we participate in the dramatistic and rhetorical mysteries in which brothers become strangers and strangers become brothers. In *dramatizing* the hierarchical transformations, that is analyzing them using the *realist* terms of the pentad, the transformations become a vividly tangible series of intimacies and alienations of *ideal* agents with and from their *material* scenes. The dramatistic analysis, in fact, illustrates in concrete terms the paradox of substance. A CSM soldier can say “he is my brother,” and “he is my enemy” without lying or hypocrisy. The soldier's statement is substantially correct. A single soldier can, in fact, be performing a single motion that translates into many *acts*. When symbolically constituted, a soldier's *motions* at a CCP can be an act of CCP unity, ethnic affirmation and/or favoritism toward local citizens, institutional (separatist army) aggrandizement, and ethnic-nationalist military might. The soldier's motion can be these acts simultaneously or at different times.

The soldiers' motives require a verbal placement of agents with scenes along the CSM's constitutional hierarchy as described by the soldiers' own scene-agent ratios. Soldiers face the rhetorical choices of constitutional dissociation and association - symbolically and verbally

placing themselves in material scenes (naming or constituting their substance) that embody their identities as agents performing acts that consummate and reinforce the constitutions they choose to *fix* at any given time. And the reverse is also true. Soldiers in naming what *agent* they are imply the material scene in which they are acting. The CSM soldiers essentially perform *poetic* acts of verbal placement authoring their characters and scenes with an *ephemeral rhetorical fixity* repeated from moment to moment, contingency to contingency, and rhetorical situation to rhetorical situation in which they must apply the rhetorical resources of the pentad to constitute and re-constitute their substance and motives into a constitutional act that momentarily abides the corrosive force of counter constitutional acts.

The U.S. Army, with the CSM constitutional act sought to *fix* the soldiers' terms of scene and agent so that the soldiers' motives and acts “complimented or perfected” the *Iraqi* national hierarchy of substance in a principle of constitutional unity. It asks the CSM soldiers to perform a self-alienating constitutional dissociation from their historical and material scenes and become agents associated with an *Iraqi* universal scene. Such constitutional dissociation requires a painful and courageous relinquishing (at least partially) of the material promises promised by the agents' ethnic-nationalist scenes and idealistic agents. From the context of the soldiers' symbols systems a constitutional dissociation is an act of *impiety* towards the sources of their being. It asks them to - in terms of idealistic agent and materialistic scene - dissociate themselves from their local communities, institutional armies, and ethnic-nationalities to create the Iraqi Golden Lion. It amounts to a complete re-ordering of their constitutional terms and hierarchy. A constitutional dissociation that is incomplete at best.

For it is the U.S. Army presence that provides the principle of unity - the *mystical* and *spiritual* cover for division. CSM soldiers referred to the U.S. Army as “their father,” their fair judge,” “their neutral referee” - “the reason the CCPs work.” In sum, the U.S. Army and CSM substitute for the *Iraqi constitution* which was to be the *legitimate* “father,” “fair judge” and “neutral referee” for the *Iraqi people*. At the CCPs, the U.S. Army became the guiding principle of Iraq's constitutional hierarchy allowing Iraq's sectarian leaders (the princes) to retain their ethnic-nationalist and partisan aims without the need to estrange themselves (compromise) from their ethnic-nationalist scenes and risk a higher level unity that brings sustained cooperation to the *Mesopotamian* people.

What has become of Burke's dramatistic pentad? The synthesis of dramatism with dissociation and hierarchy shows that dramatism's pentadic terms are not only *the* fundamental tools of human's symbolic constitutions, but that human conflicts inherit dramatism's dialectical process of symbolic mergers and divisions. That is to say, the pentad is never at restful peace. By taking Burke at his word and dramatizing dissociation and hierarchy (a rhetoricizing of dramatism) the pentadic ratios' transformations fully reveal their *material* consequentiality. It shows that pentadic transformations are *constitutional dissociations* which in their ultimate human expression are socio-political revolutions (insurgencies) - a reordering of socio-political terms. Constitutional wishes can be read as constitutional grievances. The important point is that these wishes and grievance are inherent in language itself; human symbol systems both unite and divide.

The first section of this chapter showed that socio-political hierarchies, specifically Kurd and Arab nationalisms in Iraq, are a series of constitutional dissociations and associations

simultaneously creating and ascending the hierarchical order of terms until they culminate in an ultimate principle of division -Article 140. It appears that we prepared the dramatistic hierarchy first (a reflection of our culture's deductive writing convention). In reality, as the soldiers conversations were collected in the field, their terms of hierarchy appeared first. This shows that Burke's theory of dramatism has universal applicability. Burke's dramatism literally grew out of the Ninewa soldiers' own conversations. Burke simply had keen insight in developing his theory in both *Grammar of Motives* and *Rhetoric of Motives* to develop a rhetorical methodology and theory that literally is human's ultimate means of conflict and its resolution. Thus, the pentad, especially when rhetoricized - when considered as a processes of hierarchical *constitutional dissociations* is an ideal instrument and methodology for analyzing the substantial and motivational paradoxes of humans in symbolic conflict. It ultimately shows that human conflicts are first and foremost symbolic conflicts with symbolic acts. As we stated in the beginning, Burke's pentad must be read and applied in terms of the rhetorical struggle for partisan advantage. The analysis of the CSM soldiers' conversations shows that the dramatism of the *Grammar* is the *lived* rhetoric of a symbol using animal to constitute its *human* world. And it shows that it is an ideal and simple tool for understanding *human* conflict.

Epilogue: Diplomacy and Dramatism

I began the dissertation with the definition of rhetoric as the study of the cognitive and expressive forms that hold a socio-political group together or rend it apart. I defined the Combined Security Mechanism as a rhetorical act (form) and argument. Throughout the dissertation, because dramatism provides a rhetorical calculus and methodology for understanding *the cause* of identification and forms' *force of aesthetic appeal*, I argued by demonstration that it is an exemplary methodology for the study of complex human conflicts and constitutive acts (forms), such as Iraq's Combined Security Mechanism. The reading of the CSM as a rhetorical and poetic act is no longer incongruous (if it ever was). The CSM is a rhetorical and poetic act because it seeks to create and transform human substance, identity, and motives for acts. And human substance is transformed by symbolic acts (forms). The tool that exerts shaping force on a human soul is language in its most capacious definition; the CSM is constitutive rhetoric shaping souls. I argued throughout this dissertation that Iraq's security mechanism is such a symbolic force, an attempt to embody the image of a unified identity and inculcate shared motives in soldiers, an attempt to make them *consubstantial*. In short, it is an enactment of a symbolic form that has the force of aesthetic appeal. The image and form it attempts to constitute is an *Iraqi* identity that would transcend ethnic-nationalist rivalries.

The CSM is a constitutive argument made to *fix* the Iraqi Army soldiers', *Peshmerga* soldiers', and Emergency Security Units' (ESU's) pentadic terms of order and motivation. The constitutional and pentadic reading of their conversations discloses the contending terms of identity and paradoxes of substance with which the soldiers and ESU must contend. It is no longer incongruous (if it ever was) to describe the IA, *Peshmerga*, and ESU's constitutional

conversations as the poetry of their everyday lives. Burke states that rhetoric/poetry “is undertaken as *equipment for living*, as a ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks” (*Philosophy* 61). The dissertation shows that soldiers and police units manning the checkpoints, use language (pentadic verbal placement) to both *fix* and transform their identities and to “arm [themselves] to confront their own perplexities and risks,” to provide them not only with identity and motives but tools to transform their identities and motives in keeping with their contingent situations. Their words are their fundamental weapons for confronting the recalcitrance of a harsh world as they attempt to constitute their individual and collective identities (Prelli, “Kenneth Burke on Recalcitrance”).

The dissertation also demonstrates dramatism’s power and utility to disclose the paradoxes and complexities of human conflict without *essentializing*. It is a merciful methodology that enacts an inefficient efficiency allowing for the study of multiple perspectives simultaneously, to avoid what Burke calls spotlight analysis in which only one area of a stage is well illuminated and the rest left dark (*GM* 87). It enables the study of complexity and paradox by foregrounding *agonistic conversation* as the ultimate symbolic context of human relations, whether those relations are between governments, two individuals, or a single individual in conversation with his or her community or self. In fact, by highlighting conversation and the ritual drama of symbolic struggle, dramatism proves not only to be a valuable tool for diplomats and political analysts, but it also reveals the *diplomacy* that runs through and through our lives. As I quoted in Chapter 1, the philosopher and diplomat Charles Malik defines diplomacy as a kind of metaphysical impossibility. Dramatism renames this metaphysical impossibility the paradox of substance and motive. And it provides a method for observing the symbolic struggles

individuals and groups negotiate to constitute their identities and realities. Diplomacy is an everyday agonistic conversation and attempt to purify war using symbolic and linguistic tools and weapons. Burke, in a rather amusing perspective by incongruity, makes this clear. He writes the following about diplomacy in *Permanence and Change*:

Suppose I . . . noted a connection between English *diplomacy* and the philosophy of *muddling through*. To *muddle through* is to be not over-exact, to let events shape themselves in part, to make up one's specific policies as one goes along, in accordance with the unforeseen newnesses that occur in the course of events, instead of approaching one's problem with an entire program laid out rigidly in advance. Is not this the ideal equipment of the diplomat? (PC 108)

He later concludes that the perspective by incongruity allows us to see that “successful diplomacy is a kind of bungling, while the British public is ‘diplomatic’ in its present confusions” (PC 108).

We can draw the same conclusion about the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers as well as the Emergency Security Units in Kirkuk. As they negotiate their paradoxes of substance, attempt to order and reorder their pentadic terms, now assuming one corporate identity and motive and now another through acts of verbal placement, they are essentially “diplomatic in their confusions,” adjusting to the vicissitudes of events using their linguistic equipment for living while their leaders and diplomats bungle through the issues that divide them. Soldiers and political leaders alike take part in the same agonistic conversation (the MCR and national identity). The one context (scene) that contains them all is the conversation, by their symbol systems they are consubstantial. Dramatism is an ideal methodology for studying conflict and diplomacy because its inefficiency mimics that found in the agonistic conversation of everyday

life found at *all* levels and parts of a socio-political community. Dramatism prevents scholars, analysts, diplomats, and soldiers from being “over-exact” in their analysis. It reveals that all humans are symbolic bunglers and then helps us muddle our way through by revealing the ways in which our symbol systems both elucidate and confuse our *weltanschauungen*, identities, and motives.

Diplomacy is in essence a conversation using symbols and language as tools and weapons. The foundational and vital term here is *conversation*. Conversations are not static; they imply movement and change in perpetuity. And what agents aim to do is *fix*, momentarily, the conversation in place. Agents attempt to constitute themselves with terms of order. The Latin etymology of conversation reveals the ritual drama and agonism of conversation. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, conversation is derived from the Latin root word *convertire* “to turn about, turn in character or nature, transform, and translate.” When humans enter into conversation, they turn themselves about, transform their characters, and translate their ideas into material reality. Dramatism – linking constitution, the pentad, and conversation – allows one to trace and perhaps even anticipate the ways that language (and the conversation) forms and transforms identities and motives for action. Privileging the agonistic conversation (language and symbols) reconstitutes human life as an endeavor of *aesthetic form*. Men and woman, diplomats and soldiers are not machines; they are poets and artists of language. And dramatism is the ideal methodology for understanding humans’ conflicts as essentially *aesthetic struggles of form and language*. Burke himself asserts this:

I contend that social relations can be adequately interpreted not by physicalist or naturalistic terms but only by terms that treat experience as an “art,” hence drawing upon vocabularies of rhetoric, dramatic criticism, etc., (“men as poets, or at least as

poetasters” – which I take to be more relevant than the “scientific” perspectives upon human life got from the description of machines or billiard balls or salivating dogs). . . . My point is, in sum, this. I take social relations to be essentially dramatic in nature. I thus take a discussion of them to be very much like dramatic criticism. (“Intuitive or Scientific” 140)

Teaching Burke’s dramatism to soldiers and diplomats alike is one for rhetoricians to participate in our nation’s national and international struggles as well as help our soldiers and diplomats learn a method for becoming self-aware about the role and power of symbols and language in conflict.

Analyzing soldiers’ conversations constitutionally and pentadically, discloses the various rhetorical (symbolic) forces that unite or divide the combined checkpoint communities and unite or fragment individual soldiers’ identities. We learn, for example, that by acts of verbal placement (naming a scene, agent, agency, purpose, or act and emphasizing one ratio over another) two soldiers could be standing side by side “performing the same motions but different acts” (*GM* 108). In Diyala, we learn that the Iraqi Army soldiers could represent and advance the Government of Iraq’s right to the MCR, the *Peshmerga* soldiers could represent and advance the Kurdish government’s claim to the MCR (contrary acts), while both groups of soldiers perform the same *motions* of checkpoint security. We learn that ESU shurta could maintain a mythic ideal of *rule of law*, considering themselves its embodiment, even while the locus of their motives in counter-agents and the political and economic scenes provide a yet more powerful motive of ethnic division (political) and individual/family survival (economic). In Ninewa we witness how an individual soldier can maintain a series of identities and motives depending on a hierarchical placement of scenes and agents. In one scene he can be a bother in another he can be an enemy depending on the soldiers’ *choice* of scenic terms and terms of agent.

The soldiers and ESU shurta, alike, confront their contingencies by naming their situation and thus creating their interpretive motives for acts. As Burke forcefully argues, the naming of a situation is a strategy for coping with contingencies and determining one's motives for acts (*PLF* 1-3). That being said, as we illustrated in Chapter 1, governments and political leaders expend large amounts of resources and wealth to fix their peoples' terministic (rhetorical) choices in place. So the soldiers demonstrate through their conversations that they are confronted with choices of constituting their individual identities via numerous corporate identities – the Golden Lions being one among many. It is the soldiers' choices of different identities that leads to a summational point regarding the paradox of substance and motive.

Burke notes that there is a paradox of motive when “a *collective* motivation, such as a concept of class, nation, the ‘general will,’ and the like. . . . [is] matched against some individual motive” (*GM* 37). So the CSM soldiers in choosing terms of corporate motivation may choose motives that rival their *individual* motives. A *Peshmerga* may choose motives commensurate with the goals and aims of the Kurdish political collective that in fact run counter to his individual motives to live at peace next to his neighbor – which paradoxically may be a choice to participate in a *collective Iraqi* motive (*GM* 37). I heard ESU and some *Peshmerga*, in fact, express the paradox in the same sentence. They would say that they are *Peshmerga* and want to fight for the Kurds and then say that they wanted to go to America because there is a correct system of government there (we should remember that the ESU in Kirkuk are particularly fearful of the parties as demonstrated in Chapter 4). The individual motive to live a better life, in this case, trumps a collective motive to sacrifice for one's nation (which may yet be another collective motive to find a better future for one's *family* or be *American*).

Of course, the soldiers provided opposite examples, too. The collective motive to sacrifice for one's nation trumped individual motives. Or the collective and individual motive aligned. The theoretical and paradoxical point is that often the soldiers' describe their *individual* motives by what they are not *a collective motive*. However, the more important principle is that the soldiers' faced the "freedom" and "necessity" of constituting their own identity and motives, creating the apposition or opposition of individual and collective identities and motives. It is the *choice* of terms that is the poetic act of living. At the moment in which soldiers choose between two or more competing terms of identity (name their situation) they constitute their identity and motives for acts. Importantly, these paradoxes of substance are not only found in scene-agent ratios (collective-individual) but all of the pentadic ratios. An agent is both his or her tool (agency) and him or herself, his or her purpose and him or herself. A researcher could disclose all of the ratios' paradoxes present in a conversation but would have to write a rather large book covering all possible twenty pentadic ratios (*GM 262*). Nonetheless, dramatistic methodology is able to unpack paradoxes of identity and competing constitutional wishes. In the dissertation's various chapters, I used *featured* ratios to provide an analysis of the most prevalent paradoxes of substance and identity in soldiers' conversations, which brings us to dramatism's benefits and outcomes.

Dramatism is a rhetorical methodology which assumes a paradox of substance and ambiguity of motive. Its advantage, then, is in providing a synoptic pentad for analyzing a near infinite number of contending and paradoxical constitutional acts and wishes. Dramatism theorizes the human agonistic conversations of choice (rhetorical acts). As such, it is a method for observing "the pentadic linguistic laws . . . executed in the constitutional act" within human's

agonistic conversation (Wess, *Kenneth Burke*, 133 and 177). Every constitutional act gives rhetorical *form* (aesthetic appeal and embodies the image of an identity) to humans' conversational material by ordering terms in proportion to pentadic ratios. What the dissertation has accomplished, I believe, is to reunite dramatism's fundamental principles – conversation, pentad, and constitution – into a holistic method for analyzing human's use of symbols and language in order to understand complex human conflicts. I believe the dissertation provides a model for future scholars, analysts, diplomats, and soldiers to utilize and modify in their future research regarding complex conflicts grounded in language.

The dissertation provides evidence and lends strong support to Burke's, Rountree's and Wess' theoretical claim that the pentad is both *universal* and *literal*. In Chapter 1, the scene-agent and scene-act ratios proved to be both present and useful in analyzing a large-scale strategic, historical, and international conversation about Mesopotamia's constitutional identity. We noticed that a constitution is the continuation of a socio-political group's much larger historical and agonistic conversation. Then in Chapter 3, the pentad proved to be present at the much smaller scale of individual checkpoint communities and even a single soldiers' agonistic conversation. The pentad proved present in Chapter 4's analysis of the ESU's attempt to form a constitutional myth – fix a god-term – in Kirkuk. And again in Chapter 5, the pentad was made present in soldiers' conversations regarding hierarchies of motives and identity. There is strong evidence that the pentadic “forms of thought [are] in accordance with the nature of the world as all men experience it” (*GM xv*). And that as Burke also states, “the resources of the five terms figure in the utterances about motives, through all human history” (*GM 56*). The dissertation shows that the pentad figures in soldiers' motives and agonistic conversations at checkpoints

across the Mutually Claimed Region of Northern Iraq. As Wess puts it, “we speak pentadese” (“Burke’s Dialectic” 17).

We can reorder the pentad’s manifestations in the chapters of this dissertation into a climactic hierarchy to illustrate the point. The pentad is present in individual soldiers’ conversations, their larger checkpoint communities’ conversations, the regional conversations of Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa, the international and historical conversation of Mesopotamian identity, and finally present at even a mythic (eternal) scale when the ESU seek to ground their constitutional efforts in a divine god-term called *rule of law* that would contain their entire *weltanschauung*. No matter how enormous or how infinitesimal the constitutive conversation the pentadic terms are present, as the atoms of language and human’s symbolic identity.²⁵⁹ Humans are always constituting themselves and their nations by defining their scenes, agents, acts, agency and purpose in proportion to one another. And by participating in conversations a rhetorician can trace the convergence and divergence of different conversations and identifications at a particular point and time.

The dissertation also represents a *constitutional* reading of the CSM and the soldiers’ conversations by situating their conversations and the CSM act within the historical conversation and conversation of their day. In Chapter 1, I situated the CSM act within Iraq’s historical conversation (scene). In Chapter 4, I situated the ESU’s conversations within the historical

²⁵⁹ Clarke Rountree makes an important point about the universality of the pentad. The pentad is essentially humans’ basic questions about their world and themselves. It is these questions that are universally present. Rountree writes, “[Burke] notes that the pentadic questions have been the subject of scholars concerned with motives for thousands of years, from Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* to Talcott Parsons’ *Structure of Social Action*, and they were “fixed in the medieval questions: *quis* (agent), *quid* (act), *ubi* (scene defined as place), *quibus auxiliis* (agency), *cur* (purpose), *quo modo* (manner, ‘attitude’), *quando* (scene defined temporarily)” (“Revisiting” web).

conversation regarding Kirkuk as a god-term. In doing so, I rhetoricize the CSM and the soldiers' conversations. Most importantly, it is situating the CSM within the larger historical and current conversation that enables the dissertation's constitutional reading of the CSM. The dissertation, then, provides of holistic use of dramatism situating the CSM as a rhetorical act and rejoinder within a larger conversation and analyzing the soldiers' conversations pentadically.

The dissertation, then, continues and adds to our field's own conversation about the nature of dramatism and its uses. I follow Anderson, Clark, Hawhee, Weiser, and Wess. Following their lead, my goal has been to unify Burke's dramatisitic method – conversation, pentad, and constitution – to perform a dramatisitic analysis of the CSM and illustrate that dramatism is in fact human's "rhetorical equipment for living" by participating in the CSM soldiers' conversations. The dissertation strives to correct two errors in our field: ignoring the importance of the dialectic of constitution to dramatism and then the overemphasis of constitution at the expense of the pentad. In the course of doing so and by the necessity of the situations being analyzed (Kirkuk and Ninewa CSM), I have also added two new dramatisitic terms to be considered by scholars in future conversations, "constitutional myth," and "constitutional dissociation."

Ultimately, dramatism provides rhetoricians with a method for participating in our nation's and world's current conflicts in a holistic and interdisciplinary manner. The dissertation shows that our conflicts at rock bottom are conflicts of aesthetic form (appeal) and identification shaped in agonistic conversation. Weiser argues that Burke strove to develop a theory that would transcend scholars' and scientists' *divided, bureaucratized, and overly efficient* methods for understanding human conflict. He did so by showing us that rhetorical, poetic and literary

(aesthetic) concerns of language are made present in and contain humans' agonistic conversation in *all disciplines and throughout all human life*. She writes:

Dramatism became the manner in which **internal and external motivators could be reconciled via aesthetics**, as humans were viewed as agents within scenes, acting in response to particular situations that were, in turn, shaped by the attitude of their language about the situations.

The linguistic focus of dramatism, then, would transcend both the literary/ political questions of the humanities scholars and the internal/external motivational questions of the social scientists. [emphasis added] (*Burke 5*).

Indeed, the dissertation provides an example of dramatism's use to understand in a seemingly incongruous way a "mechanism." I am not arguing that "mechanism" is the correct name for the CSM or not, but what I am arguing is that it figures the checkpoint communities in such a way that it takes our attention away from the encompassing aesthetic concerns of identity and the agonistic conversation. Mechanism forces us to consider the CSM as a machine that would compel a certain outcome or proleptic end state. More importantly it forces us to consider the soldiers as simply moving and not acting, like alfalfa being scooped into a baler and made into the same bundle of hay as a manufactured "aesthetic" form. The mechanistic title covers up the more important fact that the CSM is an aesthetic act (poetry – *poiema*) of *appeal* in a much larger agonistic conversation that has no one outcome but many different outcomes, a process of perspectival formation that is continuous. Burke by synthesizing science and art in his dramaturgical theory allows for the CSM to be seen from multiple perspectives – both as a material mechanism (which it is) and as aesthetic (rhetorical) equipment intended to constitute a human identity – an attempt to shape a soldier's aesthetic soul and substance in a never ending agonistic conversation (*PLF 110-11*). The next step is to assist and learn alongside our soldiers and

diplomats as we discover applications and modifications of dramatism to help understand human conflict and its symbolic and linguistic nature. In testing Burke's and our field's hypotheses regarding the dramaturgical and linguistic nature of social relations in Northern Iraq, this dissertation provides one example (that can be modified) illustrating dramatism's usefulness to understanding the complexities of human conflict and the force that all humans must succumb to; their own symbol systems. The conversation has us; we do not have a conversation.

Coda: Force, Poet-Soldier, and the "Aesthetic Reconstruction of Struggle"

This coda is the statement of some final thoughts regarding the nature of language, force, aesthetics, conversation and the CSM as a constitutional act as they occurred to me throughout writing the dissertation. It attempts to explore in more detail the universal, comic, and tragic implications of the concept of the symbolic act related to dramatism and the CSM. It is a synthesis of (or dialogue between) Debra Hawhee's work on "Burke and Nietzsche," and "Body Language: Paget and Gesture-Speech Theory," Simon Weil's "*The Iliad* or the Poem of Force," and Burke's writings on *poiemata*, *pathemata*, *mathemata* in *Grammar of Motives* and Aeschylus in *Philosophy of Literary Form*. The epilogue essentially ends where the dissertation began with the power, pieties, and force of symbol systems to impel us on our way. It illustrates the comic and tragic nature of constitutions as "aesthetic reconstructions of struggle" in an ongoing agonistic conversation ending with a final word about the CSM in the context of Iraq's historical conversation. It shows how we all must succumb to the force of language and symbols – even in our peaceful constitutions, and that it is rhetoricians' obligation to participate in the

world and its agonistic conversations to assist in the understanding of language, conflict, and the aesthetic forms that hold our communities together.

Debra Hawhee, in explaining to our field Nietzsche's influence on Burke has alerted us to be on the lookout for Burke's "tragic mechanism" throughout his theoretical work on language and as acted out in our daily lives ("Burke" 137). She has helped us recognize Burke's insight that language contains universal force and the *word* impels us on toward our *entelechi*al glory. It is the "tragic mechanism" in language that is the constitutional ground (scene) that contains us all – the word – and implies our acts and attempts to transform our identities. She writes:

Language's action, replete with attitude and purpose, is far from predictable, calm, or passive. Indeed, just as Nietzsche's "mobile army of metaphors" suggests a sense of violence, the space where incongruous perspectives clash, the space Burke characterized as the state of transition between orientation and a new orientation is often violent, rife with trauma. Such trauma springs from what Burke called "the tragic mechanism." (137).

Hawhee's words transport us back to the beginning of Chapter 1, in which we discussed the "trained incapacity" and pieties of symbol systems (ethnic-nationalisms). When Hawhee emphasizes "orientation," she uses a Burkean term that stands for "symbol system" and "motive for act," and "piety." What is more, as Hawhee points out, the "transition" to a new perspective is often "violent" and "traumatic." We learn and achieve full poetic understanding by "going through drama" (Burke, "Semantic," 157). So I want to follow and add to Hawhee's tragic line of thought and explore in brief the force and tragic nature of language (symbols) and end where we began in Chapter 1. I do so to provide a full illustration of "symbolic act" as grounded in the material world – chiefly our bodies and our minds simultaneously. In doing so, we transcend our

focus on Iraq's CSM and apply the lessons learned to ourselves, and we understand why all of our conflicts are aesthetic conflicts of symbolic form.

In his chapter "Dialectic of Tragedy" in *Grammar of Motives*, Burke examines the ancient Greek proverb "*ta pathemata mathemata*," which he translates to read "the suffered is the learned" (*GM* 39). We also find this proverb in Ecclesiastes, "knowledge is sorrow" (1:18). And we might also translate it in the vernacular as learning is painful. Burke goes on to note that the Greek "*pathema* (of the same root as our word, 'passive') is the opposite of *poiema* (a deed, doing, action, act; anything done; a poem)" (39). Burke then expands on the ancient proverb rewriting it as "*poiemata, pathemata, mathemata*" (39). In doing so, the dramatic stress on *act* is returned to the *human* equation. As Aristotle declares "life consists in action." (*On Poetry* 9). Burke's concept of "symbolic act" is clearly revealed. The purpose of language is to act – but we suffer for it. We are, in a sense, at the mercy of our symbol systems.

We can illustrate the "tragic mechanism" related to the three part *poiemata, pathemata, mathemata* by examining more closely how consubstantial our *acts* are with our symbol systems. An act and a symbol system are virtually one and the same thing, keeping in mind that an act is a form. And an act is also consubstantial with our bodies which will help us more clearly see how an act and a symbol system are virtually the same thing. Hawhee, in *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke and the Edges of Language*, helps us apprehend this difficult fusion of mind-body in a symbolic act, and I will provide an example from my research in the CSM. In her chapter, "Body Language: Paget and Gesture-Speech Theory," she details Paget's influence on Burke's conception of symbolic act. She writes that for Paget words are closely related to our bodies' gestures. She provides the following explanation:

Paget holds that the word is frequently not arbitrary at all but gestural, and it in turn evokes a gestural signified – that is, an image or sense of the gesture (rather than a concept or an idea). . . . In the Burkean scheme, the building up of abstractions happens in reciprocal relation with biological processes and development, thereby producing a theory of symbolic action inseparable from – and indeed dependent on – the body’s capacity for mimetic variation and migration, which results in what Burke formulates as bodies’ “emergence into articulation” (109).

Hawhee establishes a connection between the human body and our words (or symbols). As our bodies react to the situation around us (gesture, signifying danger if the situation is danger) our ideas (words) also articulate a stance, danger linked to actions of what to do in the danger situation. Dramatically this is equivalent to the metonymic fusions of the scene-agent ratio discussed in Chapter 1. There, we noted that idea and land become one (idea-material symbolically synthesized). In essence, the territory of the MCR took on a symbolic gesture that matched the agent’s abstracted idea of Arabness, Kurdishness, or Turkomanness.

Hawhee focuses in great detail on Paget’s influence on Burke, especially in regard to theories regarding the origin of speech. For our purposes, the key point that she makes is that Paget’s gesture-theory is a physiological counterpart to dramatism (122). I interpret this to mean that the link between the idea (word) and the body (material) is *act* – the aesthetic form and enactment of an idea. Dramatism’s foundational pentadic term is *act* because there would be no *being* without it.²⁶⁰ The larger point is that the ideal and material simultaneously take form (*act*)

²⁶⁰ Hawhee puts the stress on *attitude*, the sixth term of the pentad – making it a hexad. I believe, however, building on Hawhee’s scholarship, that attitude needs to be explored more to properly understand its place within the dramatic scheme of things. Burke, too, seems unsure how to place it. Although Hawhee argues convincingly for more “attitude” in dramatism, she does not explain what that would mean in terms of application. For example, Hawhee emphasizes attitude as a body’s posture or stance in her thesis because her project is to link dramatism with somatic theories, tracing Burke’s own theorizing about the body. She does note attitude’s confusing meanings defined both as a cognitive “disposition” and a “bodily posture” (122). So does our field stress the cognitive or bodily disposition? She does not answer. She also does not investigate attitudes overlap with *act*. So I believe that she puts too much stress on Burke’s later addition of attitude to the pentad. In Burke’s chapter on “‘Incipient’ and

in the body. The point I want to stress for our conclusion is the *symbolic force* exerted to shape a cognitive and material form (*act*). Language is origin of action. And the example I want to use to illustrate this is an interview I had with a Kurdish Gharman about Kurdish poetry (*poiema – act*).

Near a checkpoint in Diyala, I interviewed local Gharman police near a combined checkpoint. As part of the conversation, I would normally ask my interlocutors if they had a favorite Kurdish poet. This particular time I asked a group of Gharman about the Kurdish poet Hajji Qadir of Qoi, considered Kurds' greatest (historical) poet (Jwaideh 24). The group of men I asked this of were sitting on the ground in a semi-circle. One man became very animated stood up mimicked the posture of holding a rifle and said that he prefers the poet Farhad Sangawi. He said, as he gestured with his body as though holding a rifle, "When I listen to him, I want to grab my gun and go and fight."²⁶¹ Here we see the dramatistic act in a very literal manifestation. The force of the word shaping the ideational substance and the material substance (body) of the Gharman. His body enacts the form of his symbol system as his mind enacts the poetic forms and images of Farhad Sangawi's nationalist words. We see the *entelechiial force* of an idea come to fruition as the Gharman rises to his feet and aims his gun in order to write his poetry on a perceived enemy. He enacts a "perspective" showing "piety" to his symbol system.

We can extrapolate this example to the body politic, as when an entire army (Iraqi Army or *Peshmerga*) assumes a bodily posture or disposition in a given situation based on their symbol

'Delayed Action,' he notes that attitude is "a substitute for an act" (236). I, therefore, retain act (as a form) as central to dramatism. Language's (and humans') fundamental purpose is to act not to have an attitude. Although we can consider attitude to be a shadow act, we can have an attitude when we act. In any case, attitude's place within the dramatistic scheme still must be worked out. Hawhee has begun to turn our field's attention to the task.

²⁶¹ Gharman Police Officers. Group Interview. January 2011.

systems. Their symbol systems name the situation as the group (body) enacts the idea materially in a metonymic fusion of group idea (agent) with group body (material). The unilateral checkpoints both the IA and *Peshmerga* man facing each other along the MCR is a “bodily” (material) manifestation of an idea. In essence the *force* of a symbol manifests itself ideally and materially – the agents (persons, groups, communities, and nations) are shaped mind and body by the force of a symbol – an interpretive meaning given *form*. A nation (a body politic), then, assumes a “gestural signified,” as when a nation is put on a “war footing,” interpreting or reacting to a real or perceived threat. Another example is when the symbols of the stock market are reciprocally imitated in the a nation’s posture – a “slump” in the market embodied by the “slump” of the unemployed on the street or the “slump” of abandoned neighborhoods of a “housing bubble.” The *entelechi*al force of an idea (symbol) runs through-and-through a society giving “form” to individuals and the group alike. An act is the embodiment of a symbolic perspective. The point we should focus on is that *force* is inherent in language. The motive for our poems (acts) is located in language – the word. And humans, being impelled along by their symbol systems (just as the Gharman was impelled to rise to his feet and point a gun), suffer (*pathemata*) their acts. The CSM, in its material reality, is the “gestural sign” of a symbol system – the posture of a combined security force.

In recognizing language’s force and control over humans, the suffering of the word, we arrive at what Burke calls “the aesthetic reconstruction of struggle” (“Semantic” 154). The “reorientation” of a perspective, the reconfiguring of a symbol system to perceive a new reality – arrive at *mathemata* – is gained in confrontation with other perspectives and with an ability to “see” from other perspectives, a necessarily agonistic process. Burke, borrowing from Veblen,

names the *entelechial* force of language a “trained incapacity,” by which is meant “that state of affairs whereby one's very abilities can function as blindnesses” (*PC* 7). In other words, our perspectives (symbol systems) that give our life *entelechial* force (push us on our way to actualize an identity) also push us into harm's way (and harming others) when our selection of reality blinds us from other possible selections. Our trained incapacities (pieties to our symbol systems as discussed in Chapter 1 and as synthesized in mind-body in a “gestural signified”) actuates the “tragic mechanism.” Burke in uncovering the trained incapacity and tragic mechanism made present in language implicitly acknowledges that modern science – sociology and cognitive studies – has finally caught up with the ancient Greek poets and the “aesthetic reconstruction of struggle.”

Simone Weil's essay “*The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,*” perhaps the greatest modern essay written about force, language, and war, fully illuminates the tragic mechanism in language. In her explication of *The Iliad*, she is concerned with understanding that force which transforms a human into a thing (3). She writes that “the human spirit is shown as modified by its relations with force, as swept away, blinded, by the very force it imagined it could handle, as deformed by the weight of the force it submits to”(3). She continues to examine how “force” urges Achilles on to not only kill Hector, the hero of Troy, but to brutally desecrate his body and leave it for the dogs to eat (realizing his identity as a man-god). In the end, Achilles accepts Priam's humiliation and pleas at Achilles' knees and gives the mutilated carcass back to Hector's father for burial. Weil notes that this is one very small instance of grace in the *Iliad*, grace that came at a very high price. She works her way through many chapters of the *Iliad* to illuminate for us the meaning of

the *Iliad*, today. In doing so, she provides a nice summary of force in which we can read language or word as a metonymic substitute for force. She writes:

Force [the word] is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really possesses it. The human race is not divided up, in the *Iliad*, into conquered persons, slaves, suppliants, on the one hand, and conquerors and chiefs on the other. In this poem there is not a single man who does not at one time or another have to bow his neck to force [the word]. (11)

Indeed, Burke's "tragic mechanism" of perspective or *entelechial* force catches us back up to what the ancient Greek's already knew. Humans must inevitably succumb to the force of their symbol systems and trained incapacities. Our perspectives, realities, and motives are located in the agonistic word and symbol. In focusing on the word and the symbol (the conversation) as the context that contains all humans, Burke maintained the tragic and militant element in his dramatist theory, which he calls the "aesthetic reconstruction of struggle" (*PLF* 154).

Dramatism is the dialectic of *renaming* and *forming* new perspectives regarding the same reality. Aesthetics (art, poetry, music, literature) is not outside the human *entelechial* struggle. It is the *entelechial* struggle and we learn by "going through drama" (*PLF* 157). Achilles and the Gharman enact a form that represents their perspective. They write their poetry in the world. *Poimata, pathemata, mathemata*, an agent acts and enacts his or her symbols system, suffers his or symbol system, and arrives at knowledge.

Indeed, Burke's "tragic mechanism" and "trained incapacity," humans succumbing to the force of their symbol systems, can be interpreted as a rewriting of the ancient Greek dictum "*hybris-atê-nemesis*." What appears to be an advancement in our current thinking is really a catching up to our ancient ancestors. We discussed the *hybristic* mechanism related to symbol

systems in Chapter 1, so we will not rehearse it here. It suffices to say that *hybris* is an overreliance on one's symbol system; it represents the *entelechial force* of an idea controlling a human, blinding him or her to *act* (atê) in such a way that it brought about his or her demise (*nemesis*).

Ancient Greek poets and thinkers understood human's overreliance on their symbol systems as simultaneously comic and tragic, embodying it in the characters of Greek theater. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides pitied it in their tragedies and Aristophanes lampooned it in his comedies, especially in his play *The Birds*.²⁶² Homer gave epic expression to *hybris* and *atê* in the characters of Agamemnon and Achilles in the *Iliad*. Plato gave *hybris* mythic form as the second "bad" horse pulling the chariot of the human soul in the *Phaedrus*, a dialogue which investigates how orators and sophists persuade and lead the souls of men toward action through language and symbol systems and even how the new invention of writing and the alphabet had potential to lead the people of the Greek *polis* astray. And Thucydides documented *hybris'* geopolitical consequences in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*.²⁶³ The term, however, was not

²⁶² Aristophanes depicts the man Peisetairus (Mr. Trusting) who sets out to become a bird and found a utopian avian empire only to become its tyrannical leader who then usurps Zeus and the gods. In *The Birds* we witness the best of intentions affected by *hybris* – symbols' *entelechial force*.

²⁶³ Although Thuc. does not use the word *hybris* in his own analysis of the civil war in Corcyra, he at least describes *hybristic* states of mind and acts on a geo-political scale. The key words related to *hybris* in the famous passage are *philotimia* and *pleonexia* (insatiable love of honor/thinking oneself superior and greed without limit, respectively) [I am thankful to Douglas Cairns, classics professor at University of Edinburgh, for an email in which he helped me more fully understand this connection - although Thuc. does not himself use the term *hybris* in his description]. I cite it as an example of *hybris* related to symbol systems because Thuc. Specifically relates the brutal actions of the Corcyrans to the changes in the meanings of words (reflecting a change in character) and the actions themselves are described in *hybristic* terms if not explicitly labeled *hybristic* by Thuc.: "Words had to change their ordinary meaning and to take that which was now given them. Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal supporter; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question incapacity to act on any. Frantic violence became the attribute of manliness; cautious plotting a justifiable means of self-defense. . . . The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of parties once engaged in contention." (Thucydides, 3.82.4-8). We see here at work the *entelechial force* of symbol systems. The same force that Weil explicates in the *Iliad*.

only treated in poetry, philosophy, and history. Solon, the famous law giver of Athens, included it in his laws drawing an explicit connection between *koros-hybris-atē-nemesis*.²⁶⁴ Indeed, by its very ubiquity in Greek thought one can conclude that the Greeks were obsessed with the concept, especially because they did not consider it as some esoteric metaphor explaining the actions of men; they saw it as the very real and primary cause for the instability of governments, revolutions, and internecine factions. In Book 5 of Aristotle's *Politics* in which he discusses the sources of *constitutional* change (*stasis* or revolution), *hybris* is a theme that implicitly contains the entire discussion, and its acts are explicitly mentioned throughout Book 5.

Hybris, then, is an excessive pride in one's world view and interpretation of reality making one feel superior or at least overly confident in a single perspective. What the ancient Greeks considered to be the source of nations' and states' demise is an overweening world view. However, the dictum *hybris-atē-nemesis* was not a case of evil versus good, but simply the human condition that seems fated or unavoidable - the very strengths of our ways of knowing, the very same symbol systems that give humans confidence in locating motives and then acting also lead to *hamartia*, our errors in judgment. Weil points out that the force of our symbol systems (what I refer to as language) is not "divided up" between rich and poor, weak and strong, or smart and dumb. The force of symbol systems – the aesthetic struggle – is the human condition. How else are humans supposed to judge the world and act if not by using their most advanced tool for doing so -language and symbols? What else can the Garmian mentioned above do but adopt the stance (body and soul) of his symbol system? What else can the

²⁶⁴ John David Lewis in his article, "Solon of Athens and the Ethics of Good Business," provides a thorough analysis of Solon's thought as it applies to business, today.

American do but judge the world from his or her own perspective? We must act by using symbol systems that leave us blind while illuminating an aspect of reality.

In order to act, we must accept this deficiency in our ways of knowing. We always act without knowing or seeing the whole. And we may act, therefore, in blind ways that bring about unforeseen devastating consequences. The ancient Greeks developed a concept represented in the gods named the *Litae*, or prayers, which followed behind blind folly *atē* cleaning up and mitigating the outcome of such acts. The *Litae* move slowly (the *atē* moving too swiftly for the *Litae* to keep up), are old and wrinkled, and look sideways - perhaps suggesting that we only know what to pray for after we act and see the culmination of our act's consequences through the “recalcitrance” of our physical and social universe and world. I believe that when Hawhee focuses our attention on the somatic-mind relationship, she uncovers what Weil calls force and Burke the *entelechiial force of language* that runs through-and-through our material, biological, and ideal lives. Language is for acting and sometimes blindly so.

Burke’s solution to the dilemma of the “tragic mechanism,” that runs through our lives (the *hybristic* problem of trained incapacities and symbol systems) is to go through it: *poiemata*, *pathemata*, *mathemata*. Humans would live a true illusion if we thought the agonistic struggle of perspectives could be avoided. In fact, Burke praises the aesthetic struggle with and against “force” because the poet abandons him or herself to the “force of language,” and “goes through the drama” of competing perspectives to arrive at a new understanding. Burke’s exemplar of the aesthetic struggle is Aeschylus both an artist and a soldier. Burke writes the following of Aeschylus’ *Orestes* trilogy:

In the *Eumenides* . . . we see the poetic method in its completeness.
Where the semanticist does not fight, and Lucretius fights while

stacking the odds against himself, Aeschylus completely gives himself to aesthetic exposure, and surmounts the risk. Here, to be sure, is the ideal of analgesia - but it appears at the *end* of a most painful trilogy, devoted to an *aesthetic reconstruction of struggle, horror, and the tortures of remorse*. And to comfort us, the dramatist undertakes nothing less than the *conversion of the gods themselves*. (“Semantic” 154)

The “conversion of the gods” is the reorientation of an entire culture’s symbol system and perspective of reality undertaken in the drama of agonistic conversation. To abandon one’s piety to one’s source of being (god-terms and gods) is to enact an impiety and be ripped apart. It is to have one’s identity on both a cognitive and material level fragmented in order to be reunited under a new identity, a new name. Some, such as Hegel, would argue that war is the mechanism to purify and fragment societies so that they can be rebuilt.

Throughout Burke’s work, the “aesthetic struggle” retains its violent and militant aspects.

In praising Aeschylus Burke later writes:

There is a crucial difference between the peace of a warrior who lays down his arms (Aeschylus wanted to be remembered, not as a poet, but as a soldier), and the peace of those who are innocent of war (innocence untried being like snow fallen in the night; let us not praise it for not melting until the sun has been full upon it). And the semantic ideal [neutral ideal that avoids perspective and the agonistic conversation] would attempt to give us the final rewards of *Versöhnung*, of atonement, before we had ever gone through the conflicts by which alone we could properly “earn” it. (“Semantic” 158)

Burke then concludes that “Men, out of conflict, evolve projects for atonement, *Versöhnung*, assuagement” (“Semantic” 158). For Burke, the most important project that evolves out of conflict is a *constitution*. A constitution is the “aesthetic reconstruction of struggle.” A constitution retains the “tragic mechanism” and the “militant” attitude alike because it represents the conflict of perspective (*entelechi*al force) on a symbolic level. A constitution

assists humans in “going through the drama.” It is participatory and self-grounded in the way of life of a people (as we saw in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2). Constitutions, inherent, therefore, a socio-political group’s historical and agonistic conversation. One might say that a constitution is a record of a people’s story both comic and tragic. It should be expected, then, that the Iraqi constitution would inherit the Iraqi people’s historical agonistic conversation regarding the Mutually Claimed Region and the identity of Iraq (See the timelines of this conversation in the Appendix). The Iraqi constitution was an act of atonement that grew out of conflict. And like all human acts (lacking the power of the gods) it was an imperfect and partial act, a continuation of an agonistic conversation on a symbolic plane retaining both the tragic and militaristic mechanism already present in the conversation of the people who created it.

The CSM, too, grew out of the same conflict. It is a constitutional act; it is a “project for atonement” and reconciliation. As such it would be grounded in the same agonistic conversation (national and international) it attempted to transform. In the end, the CSM is shaped more by the historical agonistic conversation of the Arab, Kurd, and Turkoman conflict than it shapes the conversation. To complete the transformation, to create the *Iraqi* unity – the complete conversion of the gods no less – requires going through the drama and completing the traumatic process of the aesthetic struggle. It must be earned. The dissertation presents one point in time of the current constitutional and rhetorical transformation of Iraq as told in CSM soldiers’ conversations. It traces the tragic mechanism in soldiers’ conversations as they confront the paradoxes of their substance and identity. To borrow Burke’s metaphor of the parlor conversation, the CSM was the U.S. Army’s statement in a larger conversation. The

conversation started long before the U.S. Army arrived. The U.S Army participated by making its statement with the CSM. After the U.S. Army leaves, the agonistic conversation continues.

Trained in Burkean dramatism, however, we may be able to participate in the ongoing conversation a little wiser. We can look for the paradoxes of substance and be aware that identity and motives for acts take pentadic form, and that they are both a choice and a necessity. We can also be on the lookout for the *entelechiial force* of language that impels us to blind acts of realization and folly. For the word that we use to unite our world is the same word that divides our world. The human question is one of continuous mergers and divisions brought about by our symbol systems. Perhaps the greatest *hybris and blind folly* is to think that we can control language or the conversation. As Weil eloquently states, “Force [the word] is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really possesses [the word]” (11). Nonetheless, like Aeschylus the poet-soldier, we open ourselves to the struggle and go through the drama and earn our transformations, reconciliations, unifications, and divisions in our aesthetic struggles and agonistic conversations armed with the word as we write our poetry on the world and constitute the world in our image. The soldiers at the CSM checkpoints are poet-soldiers “going through their drama” and earning their reconciliations, unifications, mergers, and divisions. They also suffer the acts of their symbol systems.

As rhetoricians it is our obligation to participate in the world’s conversation no matter what genre they may take (text, painting, speech, historical, daily talk, and political talk) and reunite art with life by teaching in the classrooms and being out in the field understanding our current conflicts as aesthetic struggles of symbols, language, and identifications. Burke affirms

in his definition of rhetoric just how through and through human's language and symbols penetrate into our lives – even to our bodies and physiological forms:

Rhetoric was exiled. And, emigrating, it received a home among various so-called “new sciences.” (Anthropology, social psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis, semantics, and the like all took over portions of it. I would also include here psychosomatic medicine, concerned as it is with ways in which our very physiques are led to take on attitudes in keeping with the rhetorical or persuasive aspects of ideas – attitudes of such conviction that they are worked into the very set of nerves, muscles, and organs). (“Rhetoric 203)

In defining the many disciplines rhetoric subsumes, Burke defines the many areas of our lives it influences, even our very physiologies. Its force is felt everywhere. Rhetoricians can adopt the interdisciplinary *attitude* and *act* in the many conversations about our rhetorical lives and unite art with life and our communities with the aesthetic substance of our being. We can also participate with our military as our poet-soldiers confront the tragic mechanism and entelechial force of our lives in our world's conflicts and in the field of battle.

Historical Documents, Timelines, CSM Description, and Short Analysis

Appendix A: Combined Security Mechanism “Declaration of Principles” Arabic and English

Appendix B: Combined Security Mechanism “12 Guiding Principles” Arabic and English

Appendix C: Timeline 20th Century Monarchy, Military Rule and Military Coups D'états in Iraq

Appendix D: Timeline 20th and 21st Century Iraqi Constitutions

Appendix E: Timeline of Mutually Claimed Region Related to Creation of Combined Security Mechanism

Appendix F: Transitional Administrative Law, Article 58 and Iraqi Constitution, Article 140

Appendix G: Matrix of Mesopotamian (Iraqi) Social and Cultural Complex

Appendix H: Six Snapshots (Scenes) of Blank Creative's “We will write the Constitution Again”

Appendix I: A Kirkuk ESU's Symbolic Act to Purify War and Conflict

Appendix J: Combined Security Mechanism Description

Appendix K: ESU's Terms of Militia, Backbone, Tinted Windows and Punishment

Appendix L: The Only Thing We Get From This Oil Is Smoke

Appendix M: Survey of Burkean Literature and Interdisciplinary Influence

Appendix N: Question Set and Semi-Structured Interviews

Appendix A: CSM Declaration of Principles (English/Arabic)

Ministerial Summit – 2
KRG Headquarters Ministry of Interior
Irbil, Iraq

September 5, 2009

Recognizing that we face a common enemy in al Qaeda, we pledge to support a Joint Security Architecture, maintain open dialogue and close working relationships, and uphold the following principles:

Six Principles

- 1. The security of the people is paramount.**
- 2. Unity of command is critical to achieving stability. Joint Security Structures in the disputed areas must support close coordination and unity of effort. U.S. forces should be part of these Joint Security Structures in accordance with the Joint Security Agreement.**
- 3. Force levels must be sufficient to secure each province.**
- 4. The composition of Joint Security Forces must reflect the demographics of the area in which they operate.**
- 5. Intelligence structures must have sufficient capability and transparency to defeat the enemy. They must work for the Federal and provincial governments and not political parties.**
- 6. All security forces must operate within the Rule of Law.**

Iraq is one country and the Kurdistan Region is part of Federal Iraq.
We are brothers.

Sheik Jafar Mustafa Ali
Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs

Abdal Qadir Muhammad Jassim al Mufriji
Ministry of Defense

Abdul Karim Sultan Sinjari
Minister of Interior

Jawad al Bulani
Minister of Interior

General Raymond T. Odierno
MNF-I

General Babakir Badr Khan Shawkat al Zibari Commander,
Chief of Staff, Joint Forces Headquarters



إعلان الدعم



5 أيلول 2009

القمة الوزارية -2
مقر قيادة وزارة الداخلية- إقليم كردستان
إربيل- العراق

مع الإعراف بأننا نواجه عدواً مشتركاً في تنظيم القاعدة، نتعهد بدعم هيكلية أمنية مشتركة، والحفاظ على حوار مفتوح وعلاقة عمل قريبة والتمسك بالمبادئ التالية:

المبادئ الستة:

1. الأمن الأسبقية الأولى للشعب العراقي.
2. وحدة القيادة أمر حاسم لتحقيق الإستقرار. الهيكلية الأمنية المشتركة في المناطق المتنازع عليها يجب أن تدعم التنسيق الوثيق ووحدة الجهود. يجب أن تكون القوات الأمريكية جزء من هذه الهياكل الأمنية المشتركة.
3. مستوى القوات يجب أن يكون كافي لتأمين الأمن في كل محافظة.
4. تشكيل القوات الأمنية المشتركة يجب أن يعكس التركيبة السكانية للمنطقة التي تعمل بها.
5. الهيكلية الإستخبارية يجب أن يكون لديها القدرات الكافية والشفافية لدحر العدو. ويجب أن تعمل من خلال الحكومة الفدرالية(المركزية) والحكومات المحلية وليس الأحزاب السياسية.
6. يجب على كل القوات الأمنية أن تعمل في إطار سيادة القانون.

العراق بلد واحد وحكومة إقليم كردستان هي جزء من العراق الفدرالي ونحن كلنا أخوة .

Appendix B: CSM - 12 Guiding Principles

In the Name of God the Merciful,

In May 2010, the High Level Committee approved twelve guiding principles to direct operations within the agreed upon areas of mutual concern in Iraq. These principles represent our common desire to bring security to all areas and regions of Iraq. Adherence to these documented principles will improve partnership, trust, and security in Northern Iraq.

The twelve guiding principles recognize the three main components of the Combined Security Mechanism: the Combined Security Areas (CSA), the Combined Checkpoints (CCP) and combined security forces. As directed by the HLC all forces within the areas of mutual concern must observe these principles in daily operations and leaders and soldiers are held accountable for their enforcement.

The twelve guiding principles the HLC directed are:

1. All activities will comply with Iraqi Law, and the Security Agreement.
2. All Parties will man the Combined Coordination Centers at all times with Operations and Intelligence personnel that are authorized to conduct coordination & planning operations.
3. All Parties will coordinate with Combined Coordination Center for movement, entry, transit, and combat operations in a Combined Security Area. Pre-coordination will be NLT 48 hours prior to the movement, entry or transit of any armed force in the conduct of combat operations in the CSA except in the case of time sensitive targets.
4. No Checkpoints will be established or operations conducted in a CSA without coordinating with Combined Coordination Center and agreed upon by the ISF (Iraqi Army, KRG Regional Guard Forces, and Iraqi Police Forces) and USF.
5. All forces located in a CSA are required to keep the Combined Coordination Center informed of operations and activities, and are subject to the approval of the ISF (Iraqi Army, KRG Regional Guard Forces, and Iraqi Police Forces) and USF. Each provincial CCC will maintain an accurate and up-to-date inventory of armed entities that exist within their CSAs.
6. Higher HQs will not by-pass or countermand the coordination & control authorities of Combined Coordination Centers.
7. All Intelligence efforts will be integrated at the Combined Coordination Center.
8. All parties will comply with Transparent Targeting, and Warrant-based detentions.
9. Local Police will continue to do their normal duties without going back to the CCC

10. Movement of additional forces into a CSA or the withdrawal of forces from a CSA must be coordinated through the local combined coordination center and then reported through the Senior WG to the HLC.

11. U.S. convoys will move in accordance with the security agreement and in coordination with CCCs.

12. VIP convoys will be coordinated through ISF (Iraqi Army, KRG Regional Guard Forces, and Iraqi Police Forces) and USF at the CCCs. VIPs are defined as 1) any elected or appointed official who, in order to execute his authorities and responsibilities, must move in or through the Combined Security Area, 2) any civilian official whose senior status requires some degree of security (for example, a senior representative of the United Nations). VIP movements will be governed in accordance with the following rules:

a. Coordination for VIP movement will be made NLT 24hrs in advance of movement, entry, or transit of the CSA.

b. VIP Convoys will be no larger than a total of 15 vehicles per VIP movement. The final number of vehicles will be coordinated with the CCC. Every VIP convoy will also receive a Combined Security Force escort of appropriate size while moving through the Combined Security Area.

As agreed to by the senior leaders below at the High Level Committee on 19 May 2010.

Sheik Jafar Mustafa Ali
Minister of Peshmerga Affairs

Abdul Qadir Obeidi
Minster of Defense

Kareem Sinjari
Minister of Interior

Jawad al Bulani
Minister of Interior

General Raymond T. Odierno
Commander, USF-I

Appendix C: 20th Century Monarchy, Military Rule and Military Coups D'état in Iraq

1921 Monarchy Founded on sham referendum conducted by British Empire in which King Faisal I receives 96 % of the votes. The British foist upon the people of Mesopotamia and their King the Herculean labor of shaping a common and unified Iraqi substance and nation.

King Faisal I sums up the task of 1921 and hints at the difficulties of Iraqi politicians' task today:

“In Iraq there is still - and I say this with a heart full of sorrow - no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate, and refine. . . . The circumstances, being what they are, the immenseness of the efforts needed for this [can be imagined]” (Quoted in Batatu 25).

King Faisal I considers Army the “spinal column for nation-forming” (Batatu 26).

Although King Faisal I appoints 3 civilians to be Prime Minister of Iraq, a majority of the appointments throughout his reign go to ex-military officers. Nūrī Saʿīd, the Commander and Chief of the Iraqi Army held the position of Prime Minister more times and the longest, throughout the monarchy. Essentially he and the monarch ruled Iraq with the help of the British until the 1958 Free Officer Coups D'état (Batatu 180).

King Faisal on his ascension to the Iraqi throne: “Apart from my personal ideals in the direction of Arab nationality, I am an instrument of British policy. His Majesty's Government and I are in the same boat and must sink or swim together. . . . Having, so to speak, chosen me, you must treat me as one of yourselves and I must be trusted as His Majesty's Government trusts you and if you wish me and your policy to succeed, it is folly to damn me permanently in the public eye by making me an obvious puppet as might be. . . . Much more is it to your interests to show at once that I am really King, that I am trusted, and that you are ready to support me. I undertake to be guided by your advice in all important matters” (Batatu 324).

1936 (29 October) Bakr Sidqī (General and ex-Sharīfian Officer) military Coup D'état (1936-41) Army Rule Until 1941 - Motivated by Kurd and Iraqi trend within Army. (Batatu 29)

11 August 1937 - Bakr Sidqī assassinated

1937 (Fall) - Jamīl al-Midfaī (ex-Sharīfian Officer)- Premier of Iraqi Government - Motivated by Pan-Arab trend within Army (Batatu 29)

- 1938 (24 December)** Army counter coup d'état brings Nūrī Sa'īd back to power as Premier of Iraq and he has bitter disputes with King Ghazi - Pan-Arab Trend within Army (Batatu 29)
- 1938 to 1941** - Four Colonels control Baghdad politics: Salāh-ud-Din as-Sabbāgh (Commander of 3rd Division), Kāmil Shabīb (Commander 1st Division), Mahmūd Salmān (Commander of Air Force), Fahmi Sa'īd (Commander Mechanized Troops)
- 1941** Rashid 'Ali' coup d'état with the support of pan-Arab officers in military
- 1941** Second British Occupation of Iraq
- 1941 to 1958** Baghdad under martial law for a total of 2,843 days or eight years out of the seventeen (Batatu 345)
- 1958** (14 July) Free Officer coup d'état - Staff General 'Abd-ul-Karīm Qāsim President of the Republic of Iraq - End of Monarchy - Qāsim not affiliated with any political party - soon crushed by those who are affiliated with organic Iraqī political parties.
- 1963** Ba'th Coup D'état by Ba'thi military officers
- (18 November) Staff Marshal 'Abd-us-Salām 'Āref assumes Presidency of New Regime Brigadier General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr Premier -Ba'th lose control
- 1966** (16 April) General 'Abd-ur-Rahmān 'Āref assumes Presidency after brother's death. 'Abd-ur-Rahmān al-Bazzāz civilian Premier from 18 April to 16 August. Military rule not comfortable with his leadership (Batatu 1063)
- 1968** (30 July) Final Ba'th Party coup d'état led by Ba'th Military Officers; General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr President of Republic; Saddām Husain Secretary General of Ba'th party (civilian)
- 1979** Saddam Husain assumes presidency after al-Baker resigns. Throughout al-Baker's rule Saddam controlled the Internal Security and Military Intelligence through the party's National Security Bureau (Batatu 1085)
- 2010** Nūrī Kāmil al-Mālikī, civilian, Prime Minister of Iraq. As of April 2013 has not appointed Minister of Defense or Minister of Interior; Mālikī maintains control of Iraq's interior security apparatus and military

Appendix D: 20th and 21st Century Iraqi Constitutions

- 1925** (29 July) Constitution of the Kingdom of Iraq - Monarch given complete authority over Government and the British have complete authority over the monarch
- 1958** Interim Constitution - never formally and legally ratified by the sovereign people of Iraq
- 1964** Interim Constitution -
- 1968** Interim Constitution -
- 1970** Interim Constitution -
- 2004** Transitional Administrative Law written under the auspices of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer and Coalition Provisional Authority
- 2005** Iraqi Constitution ratified by popular referendum on 15 October; however, some allege fraud in Iraqi Provinces especially Mosul

To read or download a copy of listed constitutions go to the following website

Niqash: Briefings from Inside and Across Iraq

<http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=477&lang=en>

Appendix E: History of Mutually Claimed Region of Iraq Related to Creation of Combined Security Mechanism

- 1918** (1 December) Shaikh Mahmud given nominal control of Kurdish tribes in Sulaimanīyyah region
- 1919** Shaikh Mahmud consolidates his hold over Kurdish Tribes using British money to create patronage system with Kurdish tribal Sheikhs
- 1920** (28 January) Kemalist Nationalist Pact (Turkey) demands return of Mosul *wilayat*
- 1920** (April) British accept Mandate for Iraq
- 1920** (10 August) Ottoman Sultan's weak regime signs Treaty of Sèvres with British - Articles 62, 63, and 64 sanction creation of Kurdish State
- 1922** (30 September) Shaikh Mahmud returns from exile and assumes presidency of elective council in Sulaimanīyyah
- (10 October) Shaikh Mahmud forms eight member cabinet, issued postage stamps and published a newspaper, "Sun of Kurdistan." (Jwaideh 192)
- (November) Shaikh Mahmud assumes title of shah/king of Kurdistan and secretly corresponds with the Turks - perhaps using Turks to play against the British for his own autonomous region (Jwaideh 193)
- 1923** (January) Turkish Officers, especially 'Ali Shafiq al-Misri Özdemir, and Shaikh Mahmud plan a revolt against the British (Jwaideh 197)
- (May) Shaikh Mahmud cornered in Sulaimanīyyah; British reoccupy Sulaimanīyyah on 24 July and exile Shaikh Mahmud to Persia. Shaikh returns in 1927.
- 1923** Treaty of Lausanne signed with Kemalist Turkey, abrogates Treaty of Sèvres leaving Kurds' statehood unanswered

1931 to 1932 Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan fights Sheikh Rashid Baradost and the British

Principle Causes:

1. Very Heterodox Religious Views (Thought he was god and a Christian)
2. Assyrian Settlement on periphery of Barzan region - "a search for a suitable district large enough to provide a home for all survivors of this broken nation proved futile"
3. British extension of influence (Jwaideh 224)

1943 to 1945 Mulla Mustafa Barzani Rebellion

- 1944** Mulla Mustafa main demands of Iraqi Government paraphrased and quoted from Jwaideh and McDowall:
1. Establish an all-Kurdish region that includes the provinces of Kirkuk, Arbil, and Sulaymaniya; the Kurdish districts of Mosul (Dahuk, 'Amadiya, 'Aqra, Zakho, Sinjar, and Shaykhan) and the Kurdish district of Kahnaqin in Diyala Province (Jwaideh 232)
 2. Kurdish cabinet member with veto power over policies affecting the Kurdish region (Jwaideh 232; McDowall 292)
 3. Kurdish undersecretary appointed to each Iraqi ministry (Jwaideh 232)
 4. Kurdistan's complete cultural, economic, and agricultural autonomy “except in matters pertaining to the army and the gendarmerie” (Jwaideh 232)
 5. Remove corrupt officials from Kurdish region who abuse their office (Jwaideh 232)
 6. “The adoption of Kurdish as an official language” (Jwaideh 232)
 7. “gifts of 144,000 British Pounds for personal use and agricultural loans” (McDowall 292)
- 1944** (22 February) Mulla Mustafa Visits Baghdad to “submit” to the government, meets with Regent 'Abdullah and Fattah Agha Herki, paramount chieftain of the Herki tribe (Jwaideh 235)
- 1945** (August) Mulla Mustafa's last rebellion flees to Iran.
- 1946** (January) **Kurdish Republic of Mahabad Established** (Jwaideh 252)
- 1946** Mulla Mustafa and 2,000 Kurdish *Peshmerga* flee to Azerbaijan after fall of Mahabad Republic
- 1946** (16 August) **First KDP Congress in Baghdad Mulla Mustafa Barzani President in Exile** (McDowall 196)
- 1957** Mullah Mustafa secretly returns from Russia to the populated areas of Northern Iraq (Mamikonian 390)

- 1958** Article III of Interim or Provisional Constitution: “The Arabs and the Kurds are regarded as copartners in this homeland, and their national rights are recognized within the framework of Iraqi unity” (Jwaideh 281).
- 1958** Mulla Mustafa returns to Baghdad after eleven years of exile and Qasim publicly validates him as leader of the KDP and Kurds although there are many different Kurdish leaders - gives him car, house in Baghdad, and stipend (McDowall 303) Mulla Mustafa refused to pardon the Kurdish tribal leaders that helped to drive him from Iraq (the Harkis, Surchis, Baradustis, Zibaris) (McDowell 306)
- 1959** Mullah Mustafa allows Jalal Talabani into the KDP as Politburo member (McDowall 306)
- 1959** (November) “Mulla Mustafa had begun to deal with his other enemies: in November he managed to kill Ahmad Muhammad Agha (Mahmud's brother), chief of the Zibaris, his men burning Zibari villages and crops and seizing livestock; then he attacked the Harkis, Surchis, Baradustis and others in the northern area” (McDowall 307)
- 1961** Kurdish War (Revolt) against Qāsim Regime
- 1962** Mullah Mustafa attacks Kurdish tribes in Zakhu and Dohuk; *Peshmerga* (those who face death) constituted in Southern Kurdistan around this time (McDowall 311)
- 1962** (December/January 1963) KDP begins negotiating with Ba'th and preparing for Coup against Qāsim but Ba'th has strong pan-Arab and Arab nationalist currents (McDowall 313)
- 1963** (March) **Mulla Mustafa's demands of Iraqi Government as described by McDowall:**
- 1. Kurdish Autonomy**
 - 2. The entire Mosul Province and Kirkuk and its oilfields annexed into Kurdish region**
 - 3. Separate Kurdish Armed force**
 - 4. Iraqi Government gives two thirds of national oil revenue to Kurdish region (McDowall 314)**
- 1963** (10 June) Kurdish War Resumes and on 5 June Ba'ath troops surround Sluimaniyah
- 1963** (10 February) Mullah Mustafa signs peace agreement with 'Aref but not as representative of the Kurds only as representative of himself

- 1969** (March) Mulla Mustafa ignores Ba'th statements of compromise and bombs Kirkuk's oil installations (McDowall 326)
- 1969** Iran, Israel, and USA supply Mulla Mustafa with weapons and training (McDowall 320, 326) "Between 1965 and 1975, Israel continued supplying Iraqi Kurds wi[th] different kinds of weapons. Mossad also helped the Kurdish Democratic Party set up its intelligence-gathering apparatus known as Parastin, in the late 1960s" (Mamikonian 393).
- 1970** - (11 March) Saddam Hussein visits Mulla Mustafa sets out several blank sheets of paper and they write the 11 March 1970 Peace Accord. Major points as quoted by McDowall:
1. The Kurdish language shall be, alongside the Arabic language, the official language in areas with a Kurdish majority; and will be the language of instruction in those areas and taught throughout Iraq as a second language
 2. Kurds will participate fully in government, including senior and sensitive posts in the cabinet and the army.
 3. Kurdish education and culture will be reinforced
 4. All officials in Kurdish majority areas shall be Kurds or at least Kurdish-speaking
 5. Kurds shall be free to establish student, youth, womens' and teachers' organizations of their own.
 6. Funds will be set aside for the development of Kurdistan
 7. Pensions and assistance will be provided for the families of martyrs and others stricken by poverty, unemployment or homelessness.
 8. Kurds and Arabs will be restored to their former place of habitation
 9. The Agrarian Reform will be implemented
 10. The Constitution will be amended to read 'the Iraqi people is made up of two nationalities, the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality.'
 11. The broadcasting station and heavy weapons will be returned to the Government.
 12. A Kurd shall be one of the vice-presidents.

13. The Governorate (Provincial) Law shall be amended in a manner conforming with the substance of this declaration.
14. Unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit. (Required Census - never complete)
15. The Kurdish people shall share in the legislative power in a manner proportionate to its population in Iraq.

1974 (11 March) Autonomy Law proposed by Ba'th

1974-75 Ba'th - Kurdish War with Mulla Mustafa

1975 (6 March) **Algiers Agreement** between Iraq and Iran. Shah shuts border with Kurdish region and halts all support - KDP defeated and Mullah Mustafa leaves Iraq.

1979 (1 June) **Jalal Talabani announces (from Damascus, Syria) formation of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Unites under one umbrella Komala party (a secret Marxist-Leninist party) and Socialist Movement of Kurdistan (KSM) - (McDowall 343).**

1980-88 Iran-Iraq War

1980 Kurds split into two regions divided by language (and political camps / organizations) Surani speaking Sulaymania (PUK - Talabani) and the Kurmanji speaking area around Bahdinan (KDP-Barzani) (McDowall 346).

1981 PUK, while undermining KDP in Iraq, give support to KDPI in Iran. (McDowall 346).

1987 Formation of Kurdish Front announced includes KDP, PUK, KSP, KPDP, Pasok, The Toilers' Party, ICP, and Assyrian Democratic Movement

1988 (February - August) Anfal campaigns I-VIII. Saddam's ethnic cleansing and collective punishment of Kurds

1992 (May) Elections held in Kurdish region to form government - evenly split between KDP and PUK - one government two administrations (McDowall 380-81)

(July) Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) formed

(July) Talabani visits Turkish Prime Minister and suggests that Turkey take back the Mosul *wilayat* "annex Kurdish region" (McDowall 384).

1994 (May) Open Civil War between KDP and PUK to last until 1999 both sides brutal to one another - KDP and PUK ran detention centers secretly holding prisoners from

both parties and Iraqis from the south (Lawrence 92). KDP and PUK commit own terrible crimes and massacres against Kurds (Lawrence 100)

- 1996** (August) Barzani partners with Saddam Hussein and asks him to send the Iraqi Army to Irbil to retake the city. Iraqi Army remains in Irbil for a couple days at the invitation of Barzani (Lawrence 101 and McDowall 389)
- 1997** (March) Barzani withdraws from peace agreement with PUK
- (May) PUK and IMK begin fighting in Halabja, IMK's headquarters and home
- (May) Turkish forces invade Iraq with cooperation of KDP
- 2003** (March) Operation Iraqi Freedom
- 2004** (1 March) Iraqi Governing Council signs TAL into law. Article 58 relevant to MCR and CSM
- 2005** (15 October) New Iraqi Constitution Ratified. Article 140 provides three step process for resolution of MCR, including a census as first set in writing in the 11 March 1970 peace accord. See point 14 above at the year 1970.
- 2009 -10** U.S. Army establishes Combined Security Mechanism in MCR
- 2011** (31 December) U.S. Army withdraws from Iraq; Military Advisors Remain in Iraq

Appendix F: Transitional Administrative Law, Article 58 and Iraqi Constitution, Article 140

TAL, Article 58:

(A) The Iraqi Transitional Government, and especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps:

- (1) With regard to residents who were deported, expelled, or who emigrated; it shall, in accordance with the statute of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other measures within the law, within a reasonable period of time, restore the residents to their homes and property, or, where this is unfeasible, shall provide just compensation.
- (2) With regard to the individuals newly introduced to specific regions and territories, it shall act in accordance with Article 10 of the Iraqi Property Claims Commission statute to ensure that such individuals may be resettled, may receive compensation from the state, may receive new land from the state near their residence in the governorate from which they came, or may receive compensation for the cost of moving to such areas.
- (3) With regard to persons deprived of employment or other means of support in order to force migration out of their regions and territories, it shall promote new employment opportunities in the regions and territories.
- (4) With regard to nationality correction, it shall repeal all relevant decrees and shall permit affected persons the right to determine their own national identity and ethnic affiliation free from coercion and duress.

(B) The previous regime also manipulated and changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.

(C) The permanent resolution of disputed territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified. This resolution shall be consistent with the principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.

Iraqi Constitution, Article 140:

First: The executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law.

Second: The responsibility placed upon the executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that it accomplishes completely (normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens), by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.

Appendix G: Matrix of Iraqi Cultural Complex

<p>Tribal Structure</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Tribes</u></p> <p>Qabila (largest unit – Tribal Confederation)</p> <p>‘Ashira (sub-tribe sometimes referred to as a clan)</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Economic and Housing Units</u></p> <p>Fakhd (subclan): patrilineal line</p> <p>Hamoula (Sometimes considered the same as a Fakhd): common life and kinship groups</p> <p>Bait – small households / family units</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Religious Groups</p> <p>Christian</p> <p>Jewish</p> <p>Mandian</p> <p>Muslim</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Sunni</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Shi’a</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">Sufi (Naqshbandī and Qadīrī)</p> <p>Yezidi</p> <p>Shabak</p> <p>Other heterodox</p>	<p>Political / Ideological Groups and Organizations</p> <p>Communist</p> <p>Socialist</p> <p>Religio-Political</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Ethnic Groups</p> <p>Arab</p> <p>Kurd</p> <p>Persian</p> <p>Shabak</p> <p>Turcoman</p> <p>Yezidi</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Status Groups</p> <p>Sheikh / agha</p> <p>Ayatollah</p> <p>Political / Civil Leader</p> <p>Military Leader</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Class (wealth) Groups</p> <p>Landowner</p> <p>Shop Owner Businessman</p> <p>Government Employee</p> <p>Peasant / Farmer</p> <p>Laborer</p> <p>Scholar</p> <p>Bureaucrat</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Legal Systems</p> <p>Secular (Constitution)</p> <p>Religious (Sha’ria)</p> <p>Tribal (Customs and Traditions)</p>
--	---

Appendix H: Blank Creative Movie “We Will Write the Constitution Again.”



Snapshot 2




Snapshot 5



Snapshot 1



Snapshot 6



Snapshot 3



Snapshot 4

Appendix I: ESU's Candle of Idealism Still Burns Strong - A Kirkuk ESU's Constitutional Act (Attempt) to Purify War and Conflict

Proposal to Create a Political Coordination Center

A: Because most of the city of Kirkuk's problems stem from political origins, there exists a political influence and impact on any economic or security effort. Because of this, the political dimension should be tackled first as a key to solve other problems.

B: Open the Political Coordination Center (PCC) at the Freedom Airport (FOB Warrior) since it is a neutral area for all political parties in Kirkuk.

C: This center should be comprised of Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman, and Christians who have a Parliamentary representative (MP), which means that they have real votes in Kirkuk. They are not just trivial parties whose goals are to trouble the process or hide the reality about Kirkuk's residents. They should have Members of Parliament represent them from:

1. Kurdish Alliance
2. Iraqi Turkoman Front
3. Political Arab Council
4. Assyrian Movement

D: At the end of this 2011 year, The American side will withdraw, and they will no longer have a legal cover to patrol security and political areas inside the city. However, the American consulate will have employees, who may be able to coordinate politically with representative from these parties above. This can happen through the creation of a PCC, which would allow communication with politicians, just as there is communication between security forces now at the KCCC.

The PCC is to ensure the following goals are met:

1. Pacify the street in the city through powers that move it, which is the political parties, until the central government has stabilized and the democratic transformation has been established, and solutions to all these problems have been reached in a legal manner.
2. Control the activities, movements, and hostile actions between these parties, for example protests and media clashes).
3. Open a window of political dialogue that doesn't exist currently, and bring ideas for the goal of reaching peaceful solutions because media clashes and accusation will not produce any result.
4. Reach satisfactory solutions with the partnership of the mediating (coordination) officer or the American political coordinator by putting problems on the table for discussion.

5. Break the ice between these political parties in the coordination center through the help of U.S. Military and a U.N. representative to reach legal solutions which satisfy all.
6. Involve a U.N. representative if there are differences to help reach a solution.
7. Request to open all the problems' folders (issues) for each side, folder after folder, and discuss them with the presence of all parties, in order to reach satisfactory and agreeable solutions.
8. Each side will need to pacify (calm) its followers in the street.
9. The American side should stay neutral - completely - on the subject.
10. There should be no relationship between the KCCC and the suggested new center, because the former is a security center, whereas the latter is political.
11. Representatives from each political party should have direct contact with their leaders.
12. The suggested center should be located near the consulate or between the consulate and the KCCC.

Appendix J: Combined Security Mechanism Basic Description

With the description of the CSM, my goal is to provide as complete an answer as possible (in basic scenic terms) to the question “What was the CSM?” The description also introduces all of the key players (agents) discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 5. I don't claim to describe all the parts and aspects of the CSM. I hope that the following description provides readers of this dissertation with a complete context in which the research was conducted and contributes to future research done by those who will provide greater depth of study regarding the CSM and Arab, Turkoman and Kurdish relations. In this regard, the description below may provide a starting point from which to analyze how the CSM evolved once the Iraqi Army took responsibility after the U.S. Military withdrew from Iraq. Finally, my attempt to be thorough is also a tribute to the American soldiers who built, manned, and sustained the CSM as well as worked with the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers on a daily basis. Their task was Herculean and what follows in no way captures their tremendous effort to forge not only a “mechanism” but a “relationship.” I hope it does some justice to the effort made by U.S. soldiers in the field who undertook such a massive material, mental, and spiritual effort.

At the time of research - 15 December 2010 to 15 June 2011 - The Combined Security Mechanism consisted of four levels of command: three levels of military command combining the U.S. Army, Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* as well as one level of nominal civilian command combining United States Forces - Iraq (USF-I), Iraqi Government and Kurdish Regional Government Ministries. Table 1 diagrams the CSM articulation and hierarchy.






Table 1: Structure of CSM showing the four levels of command. The green highlights (■) represent the CSM communities (“constitution”) this dissertation seeks to understand. Flags represent CSM participating members. The U.S. Army played an advisory and training role at all levels.


HLC - High Level Committee




SWG - Senior Working Group



CCC - Combined Coordination Center



CCP - Combined Checkpoint



From a purely mechanical point of view (agency in pentadic terms), The U.S. Army designed the CSM to articulate combined Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* movements (combined patrols) and communication (chains of command) throughout the MCR. In order to facilitate both the movements and communication, the U.S. Army had an advisory and training presence at all levels of the CSM - the U.S. Army was nominally in control (as *the* agency) at all levels. The following description of the CSM focuses on the CCPs and CCCs as they were the essential working parts of the CSM and sole focus of research and study in the field.

Combined Checkpoints (CCPs)

Location (Scene)

The CCPs were located throughout the MCR in the provinces of Diyala, Kirkuk (city), and Ninewa along main roads and routes (See maps B, C, D, and E). In Kirkuk, the CCPs were located at the major entrances and exits to the city. In Ninewa, the CCPs were located around Sinjar mountain, along the Tigris River (Zumar and Wana), and along the roads leading into the City of Mosul from Syria and Turkey in the North and from Baghdad and Kirkuk in the South. In Diyala, the CCPs were located along the roads leading into Jalula and Muqdadiah from the North and the Port of Entry, Al Manthuria, on the Iran and Iraq border. There are five CCPs in Diyala, six CCPs in Kirkuk, and eleven CCPs in Ninewa - A total of 22 CCPs within the MCR.

Each CCP in Ninewa and Diyala was responsible for a Combined Security Area (CSA). The personnel (combined security force) at each CCP conducted patrols within their CSA. In Kirkuk, the CSA was exclusively patrolled by the combined security force (CSF) - the Golden Lions while local Kirkuk Police (Emergency Security Units) manned the Kirkuk checkpoints.

CCP Architecture and Supplies (Agency)

Each CCP consisted of a Checkpoint (CP) and a Life Support Area (LSA). At least two soldiers (one U.S. soldier, one Iraqi Army, and one Peshmerga soldier) are stationed at opposite ends of the CP. Soldiers at the CP were responsible for making an initial assessment of vehicles, drivers, and passengers and either directing the drivers through the CP or to the search lane for a more comprehensive check of the vehicle and passengers for explosives, weapons, smuggling, and proper documentation. Large Trucks transporting goods - especially oil - are stopped entering and exiting Kirkuk and Mosul as the smuggling of oil out of Iraq was and likely still is a lucrative business. The CP was constructed using Jersey Barriers, HESCO walls, and concrete T-Walls.

The LSAs provide a secure command center, sleeping quarters, burn-out latrines and urine tubes, showers (not always with warm water) very basic medical facilities, a containerized kitchen or mobile kitchen trailer (providing Unitized Group Rations and MREs), common meeting area, recreation and training area. In most cases, but not all, Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers live inside the LSA with their U.S. Army counter parts. In Diyala, at CCP-1 and CCP-2,

the Iraqi Army preferred their own living quarters outside the provided LSA's. These were extremely austere - dirt floors, leaky tin roofs, and infestations of mice.

CCPs in Ninewa, Diyala, and Kirkuk were modified so that the LSA and CP fit the terrain and unit needs. Some LSA's provided tents for sleeping while others provided shipping containers or Containerized Housing Units (CHUs), with heating and air conditioning units. Ninewa CCP-8 used an abandoned building for the LSA. U.S. Soldiers in Ninewa had access to internet.

In addition to the architectural structure, the U.S. Army supplied (before the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq) the CCPs with communications equipment, at least two generators for electric power, light towers, and water. The Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* provided for their own meals. The U.S. Army also provided Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles for patrols within each CCP's Combined Security Area (CSA). By January 2010, in preparation to transfer the CSM to Iraqi responsibility, the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* were to begin to take responsibility for supplying the CCPs. Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers openly worried about logistically maintaining the CCPs - more so the *Peshmerga* than the Iraqi Army.

Participants (Agents)

Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* - Diyala and Ninewa CCPs:

The CCPs in Diyala and Ninewa were tripartite combining a platoon of U.S. Army (15 to 20), Iraqi Army (10) and *Peshmerga* soldiers (10). Each Diyala CCP also included two female searchers known as the Daughters of Iraq (DoI). They were civilians from nearby communities. Their responsibility was to search female passengers passing through the checkpoints as needed. Nearby Diyala's CCPs 1, 2, and 3 a local police force known as the Gharmian operated their own checkpoints. Initially, the Gharmian were a part of the CCP communities. Later they were separated from CCPs and maintained their own checkpoints near the CCPs. Although not an official part of the CCPs, the Gharmian cooperated with the *Peshmerga* and American soldiers at the CCPs.

Ninewa CCPs were comprised of U.S. Army, Iraqi Army, *Peshmerga* soldiers and local Iraqi Police. There were no Daughters of Iraq. The combined security forces (CSF) in Diyala and Ninewa were nominally called Golden Lions.

Emergency Service Units and Golden Lions - Kirkuk CCPs and CSA:

Prior to the U.S. withdrawal, in Kirkuk, the CCPs were bipartite combining a U.S. Army platoon (15) with Emergency Service Units (12 to 20 ESU). The ESU are a local city of Kirkuk police force intended to have an ethnic balance within its ranks of Arab, Turkoman, and Kurdish police officers. Only two checkpoints had a working Daughter of Iraq, but the DoI were very inconsistent (if not rare) participants in the CCP communities. U.S. Army soldiers and ESU police did not conduct any patrols. ESU police lived at the checkpoints for 48 hour shifts.

The CSA around the city of Kirkuk (except for the southern periphery of the city) was patrolled by a combined security force (CSF) comprised of U.S. Army, Iraqi Army, *Peshmerga* soldiers, and ESU police officers. This CSF was known as the Golden Lions. The U.S. Army provided all of the logistical support for the Kirkuk Golden Lions, including weapons.

Golden Lions

In an effort to create a unique identity (constitution) for the CSM's combined security forces (Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga*), the U.S. Army named the CSF the “Golden Lions”



Photo 3: A photo of “Kirkuki” the CSF Mascot in Kirkuk. Photo taken by Spc. Jessica Luhrs-Stabile and downloaded from DVIDS on-line.

complete with emblem and mascot. The Kirkuk CSF identified the most with the “Golden Lions” image. Prior to the 2010 elections the U.S. Army in Kirkuk promoted the Golden Lions identity within the CSF (substance of agent) using posters which read, “Iraq's security force working together for free, fair, and safe elections.” The Kirkuk Golden Lions used a mascot, “Kirkuki” when conducting humanitarian patrols in the Kirkuk CSA. The CSF used humanitarian patrols throughout the CSA to build communities' confidence in the

security force. When a patrol passed out humanitarian aid in a CSA community the Mascot would greet the children while the Golden Lions (CSF) handed out school supplies, soccer balls, other toys, and food. The Kirkuk Golden Lions were the only CSF to use the Mascot. All CSF (Iraqi Army, *Peshmerga*, Iraqi Police, and ESU) wore - or were supposed to wear - a Golden Lion brassard while on duty as shown on the arm of the ESU police officer in photo 1. The Golden Lions Flag was flown at most CCPs in Diyala, Ninewa and Kirkuk. Iraqi Army, *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Police working at Diyala and Ninewa CCPs did not mention “the Golden Lions” when describing their CCP communities²⁶⁵. It suffices here to state that in order to help forge a unique identity or CSF substance for those troops manning the CCPs and patrolling the CSAs, the U.S. Army attempted to cast the CSF substance in the mold of a Golden Lion.




Photo 2: Golden Lion Emblem and Flag at Ninewa CCP-11. Photo taken by author.

Regional Guard Brigade (RGB) and/or the Kurdish *Peshmerga*

The U.S. Army went one step beyond the creation of the CSF - an attempt to amalgamate the Kurdish *Peshmerga* with the Iraqi Army. USF-I strove to create two *Peshmerga* Army Divisions under the command of the Iraqi Army. The new Iraqi Army Divisions would consist of *Peshmerga* Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs). What were formerly *Peshmerga* Brigades under the command of the KRG and Ministry of *Peshmerga* would become (it was hoped) two new Iraqi Army Divisions under the command of the Iraqi Government's Ministry of Defense.

The U.S. Army's mission under Operation New Dawn was to advise, train and assist Iraqi Security Forces, preparing them to take responsibility for their sovereign nation's security after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq on 31 December 2011. Legally, under the rules of the

²⁶⁵ One Iraqi Army soldier in Diyala when asked about the Golden Lions flag flying above the CCP responded that “It is something the Americans made; it is for them.”

Iraq Security and Stabilization Fund,²⁶⁶ the U.S. Army could not equip or train the *Peshmerga* as they were an army (militia) affiliated with a non-state government. In other words, the U.S. Army could not legally equip or train the *Peshmerga* manning the CCPs - it could only work with the Iraqi Army or Iraqi Security Forces under command of the Iraqi Government. For this legal reason, USF-I needed Prime Minister al-Maliki to officially recognize the *Peshmerga* forces as Regional Guard Brigades (RGB) and part of the Iraqi Army. In a letter dated 16 April 2010 and addressed to Lieutenant General Michael Barbero²⁶⁷ Prime Minister al-Maliki recognized the *Peshmerga* brigades as RGB and part of the Iraqi security forces. The equipping of the RGB according to Prime Minister al-Maliki was to be done through the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. Prime Minister al-Maliki's recognition of the *Peshmerga* as RGB and part of the security architecture of Iraq legally warranted the *Peshmerga* presence at the CCPs and CCCs - not as "*Peshmerga*" but as an element of the Iraqi Security Forces. So mechanically and administratively the *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army were "combined" by considering them *nominally* of the same substance (the same army), so to speak. The Combined Security Force (CSF) at the CCPs and CCCs would now be composed of RGB, Iraqi Army, and U.S. Forces.

The notion of an RGB also assumed a unified KDP and PUK *Peshmerga*. From 1994 to 1998 these two Kurdish groups were engaged in a civil war (See Appendix E for timeline). The animosity and fighting over trade routes and control of the Kurdish region's economics continued through 2003 and continues today. With the creation of a single Ministry of *Peshmerga* the two Kurdish forces had a mechanism for becoming nominally united. And Article 121 of the Iraqi Constitution grants the Kurdish Regional Government responsibility for its "internal" security force - the *Peshmerga*. This internal regional force then was still considered under the "constitutional authority" of the Iraqi Government. In Ninewa, soldiers and political leaders indicated that there were on-going tensions between the two groups of Kurdish *Peshmerga* and *Asayish*.

The RGB strategy was also part of USF-I's effort to unify the Nation of Iraq and deescalate tensions throughout the MCR by unifying the Iraqi Security Forces (*Peshmerga* and Iraqi Army). Like King Faisal I the U.S. Army, in some quarters, considered the ISF the "spinal column for nation forming." The key word was "integration." If the "militia" known as the *Peshmerga* could be integrated into the Iraqi Army under the command of the Ministry of Defense it would go a long way to solve the outstanding *political* issues of ethnic identity and land ownership. However, the *Peshmerga* forces (RGB) participating in the CSM continued to answer to the command of the KRG's Ministry of Peshmerga even while looking for funding and supplies from the Iraqi Government's Ministry of Defense.²⁶⁸

"RGB" was a legal moniker and badge the *Peshmerga* assumed and wore when serving within the CSM. Despite the legal nicety, the *Peshmerga* remained "Kurdish *Peshmerga*" under

²⁶⁶ Other funding sources that dictated the building and transfer of the CSM were the Operations and Maintenance Army Funds (OMA) which could only be used for United States Forces (USF) and Foreign Excess Personal Property Program (FEPP) which allowed for the transfer of USF equipment to the Government of Iraq.

²⁶⁷ LTG Michael Barbero was responsible for training and equipping all Iraqi Security Forces from 2009 to January 2011.

²⁶⁸ Integration of the two armies seems *historically* difficult considering that one of Mulla Mustafa's demands of the Iraqi Government in 1963 was a "Separate Kurdish Armed Force." See Appendix E for the extent of his demands and how they fit within the historical timeline of the CSM.

the command of the KRG Ministry of *Peshmerga*. The term RGB was the term USF-I and Government of Iraq used to discuss the Kurdish participants in the CSM. So it is important to mention this legal security entity among the participants of the CSM for two reasons: it was a legal mechanism for USF-I to train and equip the *Peshmerga* and it was a mechanism for helping to create a common *Iraqi* national identity among security forces - part of the “spinal column” of nation building. However, because “RGB” is a *nominalist* legality and the participants on the CCPs and CCCs referred to themselves as *Peshmerga*, I also use the name *Peshmerga* rather than RGB throughout this dissertation.

Iraqi Police (IP)

The Iraqi Police participated in the Kirkuk and Ninewa CCPs and CCCs. The IP are local civil police units under the command of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. In Kirkuk, the IP manning the checkpoints are Emergency Service Units (ESU) and only the ESU manned the checkpoints in Kirkuk. Neither the *Peshmerga* nor the Iraqi Army was/is allowed inside the city of Kirkuk to perform security duties. And must communicate their intentions to travel through the city 48 hours prior.

Zerevani

The *Zerevani*²⁶⁹ are a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) security force under the command of the KRG Ministry of Interior. Their commander, General Aziz Weysi, notes that the *Zerevani* were founded in 1997 when the KDP was fighting the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). *Peshmerga* forces were stretched thin and it was recommended that a security force be created to protect government buildings, infrastructure, and highways throughout Dahuk. Approximately 30,000 *Peshmerga* were converted to *Zerevani*.²⁷⁰ After 2003, according to General Weysi, the *Erivan*'s area of operation expanded to Mosul and Irbil when U.S. Army General Curtis Ham requested support from KDP leader Massoud Barzani to secure the city of Mosul after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The *Zerevani* are a paramilitary (special) security force. General Weysi uses the term “gendarmerie,” a military body charged with civilian duties, to describe the *Zerevani*. The *Zerevani* were considered the counterpart to the Iraqi Police and an attempt was being made to integrate the *Zerevani* into Iraqi Federal Police as the Iraqi 6th Division Federal Police. In relation to the CSM, the *Zerevani* comprised some of the *Peshmerga* forces manning the CCPs and CCCs in Ninewa. What makes the *Zerevani* unique is their tie to the KDP. With regard to the CSM study, I consider the *Zerevani* to be *Peshmerga* as they served in this capacity while manning the CCPs and CCC. For example, a *Peshmerga* Officer in Charge at the Ninewa CCC was *Zerevani*, so he reported to both the KRG Ministry of *Peshmerga* and his commander General Weysi at the *Zerevani* Headquarters in Zaytun.

Bargiri-Fryakawtin and PUK Peshmerga

The *Bargiri-Fryakawtin* is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) counterpart to the *Zerevani*. They were associated with the CSM as a part of the planned creation of an all Kurdish

²⁶⁹ *Zerevani* means “Guards” in the Bahdinan dialect.

²⁷⁰ See Dennis P. Chapman's *Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government* for a very detailed and exhaustive study of Kurdish forces.

6th Federal Police Division as described above. No interviewees identified themselves as *Bargiri-Fryakawtin*.

The PUK *Peshmerga* participated in the CSM as an entity comprising the *Peshmerga* units that manned the CCPs and CCC in Ninewa and Diyala. The *Peshmerga* at the CCPs in Ninewa, then, were comprised of Zerevani and PUK *Peshmerga*. *Peshmerga* soldiers in Ninewa noted that a balance of PUK/KDP *Peshmerga* at the CCPs was part of an agreement between the KDP and PUK.²⁷¹

Asayish

The Asayish is an interior state intelligence and security agency of the Kurdistan Regional Government. It can be described as a cross between the FBI and CIA focusing on internal KRG security. Dennis Chapman reports that in his interview with the Governor and former head of the PUK Asayish, Dana Majed, that the Asayish officers first received their training from former Kurdish officers in Saddam Hussein's Ba'th security units (182). The Asayish is a tacit participant in the CSM. Although not officially a part of the CCP communities, the Asayish established working relationships with CCP communities to monitor people and terrorists. The Asayish also monitored the CCP communities. In one case, in violation of the CSM principles, the Asayish sent officers through “Golden Lions” training to earn their CCP credentials and patches. Acting as *Peshmerga* the Asayish manned the CCP checkpoint in Zumar collecting information, according to those interviewed. Ironically, this was a complaint of Iraqi Army soldiers *and* a local Kurdish political official who accused the KDP branch of the Asayish of violating the integrity and principles of the CSM. The important point here is that the Asayish, played a significant role in the CSM in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa, so significant in fact that some *Peshmerga* soldiers interviewed while working at the CCPs in Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa claim that the Asayish are responsible for security in the area and not the CSM Combined Checkpoints.

Daughters of Iraq

The Daughters of Iraq (DoI) were a local cadre of women contracted to act as female searchers at checkpoints. The Diyala CCPs were the only ones that seemed to have active and regularly working DoI, with two women at each of the five checkpoints that worked day shifts. In Kirkuk, there was only one DoI present to interview. In Ninewa there were no DoI.

Summary of CCP Participants

The above list of CCP participants, although complicated, can be succinctly classified into primary, secondary, and tertiary groups. The primary participants were the Iraqi Army and the *Peshmerga* (composed of Zerevani, KDP and PUK *Peshmerga*, and nominally known as RGB). The primary participants formed the “Golden Lions.” The secondary participants were the Iraqi Police and Daughters of Iraq. In Kirkuk, however, the Iraqi Police (ESU) were the primary participants at the CCPs and a third group comprising Kirkuk's “Golden Lions.” The tertiary participants were the Asayish and, in Diyala, the Gharmian. The U.S. Army was the governing or supreme participant.

²⁷¹ Regional *Peshmerga* (PUK). Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. February 2011.

Activities (Acts)

Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* joint activities can be divided into three kinds: training, mission, and recreation/down-time. The programmed activities were designed to accomplish two goals: provide security to the people of the MCR and create a unified identity (constitution) of the two armies.

Training

One way to describe training is to divide it into individual, collective, and leadership tasks. Before Iraqi Army or *Peshmerga* soldiers deployed to a CCP they received training at various U.S. and Iraqi Army bases in Northern Iraq certifying them as “Golden Lions,” the Iraqi Security Force dedicated to bringing security to MCR communities. Once deployed to the CCPs, joint training continued. At times, however, Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* trained separately as was the case at Diyala CCP-1 and CCP-2. The U.S. Army Officer in Charge at each CCP set the joint training schedule, so each CCP had a similar but unique method for accomplishing joint training.

Individual tasks prepared soldiers to man the checkpoints, training soldiers in weapons familiarization, basic marksmanship, weapons cleaning, combat casualty care, equipment familiarization, communication, clearing and searching a vehicle as well as clearing and searching persons. The Soldiers' main task was to interact with the public traveling through the checkpoint, searching their vehicles and persons if necessary. A primary goal of the training, then, was to teach soldiers to carry out their duties with the public in a professional and effective manner.

Collective training prepared the CSF for group movements and patrols throughout their Combined Security Area (CSA). It taught soldiers to work as a unit regarding all CCP and CSA operations including targeting the enemy (terrorists), performing cordon and search operations, and executing mounted and dismounted patrols. In essence, collective training taught soldiers and their officers to run and administer the CCPs as a single unified group.

Leadership training taught the Officers in Charge (OIC) how to communicate with other military units, keep units consolidated, and issue orders.

Mission

Once preparatory training was complete, units deployed to CCPs to carry out their missions. The two primary duties were to run the checkpoints and patrol the CSAs. Soldiers running the checkpoints searched cars, gathered intelligence, and monitored traffic. On patrols within their CSA, soldiers visited key leaders of the CSA communities and assisted in hunting “bad guys” as needed. By the time the CSM research was conducted patrols had begun to diminish. Ninewa CCPs (called “patrol bases” by their soldiers) were the only CCPs conducting regular patrols. In Diyala the Iraqi Army were on duty 25 days and off 10 days. The *Peshmerga* were on duty 10 days and off 20 days. In Kirkuk, the ESU pulled 48 hour shifts at the CCPs and had 48 hours off. In Ninewa, according to soldiers' accounts, both the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* duty schedules varied. In many ways, however, the standard duty schedules for both the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* mimicked the Diyala duty schedule.

A final component of the soldiers' CCP mission was to sustain training exercises while manning and living at the CCP. The training followed and expanded on soldiers' preparatory training described above.

Recreation (Down-Time)

Life at the CCPs was austere if not boring at times, so most of the down-time at the CCPs was spent playing soccer (when the space was available), playing volley ball (if available), playing dominoes, preparing meals, eating meals, watching TV (when available), and sleeping.

Goals (Purpose)

The goal of the CSM checkpoints was twofold - establish security in the MCR for the 2010 elections and create a common and unified identity between the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga*. Once the elections ended, the CSM goals in essence were political or constitutional goals as described in chapter 1. November/December 2010, the U.S. Army conceived the CSM as a sustainable arbitration mechanism that would create a unified Iraqi Security Force (ISF) and assist in resolving the larger political issues associated with the MCR - Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. The proposed end state the Combined Security Mechanism would be instrumental in achieving is the end state of political resolution of issues.

Summary of CCPs

Based on the above description of the CCPs and mindful of the CSM goals of integration/Iraqi unification, the CCP communities were viewed as a critical component for unifying the various security units and armies, resolving the MCR (Article 140), and stabilizing Iraq. They were treated as a military and political forcing house for Iraqi integration and unification cultivated by the U.S. Army. It is these 22 communities that were the research focus for fieldwork done for the 4th Infantry Division between 15 December 2010 and 15 June 2011.

Description of CCCs

There were three CSM Combined Coordination Centers (CCCs), one each in the provinces of Diyala, Kirkuk, and Ninewa. Each CCC, as shown in Table 1, was a command level above the CCPs and below the Senior Working Group (SWG). Checkpoint, patrol, and security issues that CCP officers in charge could not resolve were sent to the CCC for adjudication. If the CCC officers could not resolve disagreements regarding mission execution they raised it to the national level of the Senior Working Group (SWG)²⁷².

Like the CCPs, the U.S. Army built and supplied the CCCs. The CCCs were essentially command and control rooms, or Joint Operations Centers (JOC) in military parlance, with the necessary communications equipment needed to monitor and coordinate CCP activities. Despite the U.S. Army providing communications equipment, cell phones were the Iraqi Army's, Iraqi

²⁷² The chain of command outlined in Table 1 illustrates how the CSM flow of information was supposed to work. In reality, the CCP officers in charge would directly contact the Ministry of Peshmerga or Iraqi Army Ground Forces Command (bypassing the CCC or contacting the CCC and national level command simultaneously). This meant local or tactical problems and disagreements escalated to the highest levels unnecessarily or without giving U.S. command an opportunity to train and advise on how to resolve the issue.

Police's, and *Peshmerga's* primary and in most cases only means of communication with the CCCs.

Officers from the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and *Peshmerga* were the Officers in Charge of the CCC. So the CCC composition reflected that of the CCPs, integrating the three primary security forces at a higher level of command. The Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and *Peshmerga* officers and NCOs manning the CCCs (along with the U.S. Army Officers) manned the Joint Operations Center (JOC) 24/7, living on site.

The CCC's purpose was to act as the highest authority in each province authorizing and controlling patrols and troop movements throughout the CSAs. Ten of the CSM Twelve Guiding Principles establish the command authority of the CCC over all CCPs; military convoys and patrols through the Combined Security Areas (CSAs) and MCR; and VIP (political figures) convoys passing through CSAs and disputed territory.

Twelve Guiding Principles

The Twelve Guiding Principles are the CSM's constitution, shaping the way of life for the Iraqi Security Forces at the CCPs as well as all Iraqi Government and KRG security forces wishing to enter a combined checkpoint's CSA or conduct operations within the MCR. The principles outline the procedures for manning the CCPs and CCCs; coordinating movements of all parties (simple transit through or combat operations in the CSAs) and CCP patrols within a CSA; invested the CCC with ultimate authority over CSA operations (principles 4, 5, and 6); required the CCC to log all armed and security entities within the CSA; and required all VIP (political officials) to coordinate convoys with the CCC.

The Twelve Guiding Principles, then, establish the operational framework and command structure for the CSM. It places authority for CSA and CCP operations with the CCC. Despite the agreement to operate by these principles, CCP officers in charge report directly to their chains of command within the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* or directly contact the Ministry of Peshmerga or Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). In addition, security forces ignore the CCC. For example, on 25 February 2010, *Peshmerga* forces surrounded the city of Kirkuk under the pretext of preparing for the “day of rage” protests in Iraq. Politicians heard that Arabs would target Kurds, so the KRG sent in the *Peshmerga* to surround Kirkuk ignoring CSM protocol.

During primary research at Kirkuk's CCC, a convoy of Iraqi Army security forces blew through several checkpoints escorting an Iraqi general, clearly ignoring the stipulation in the Twelve Guiding Principles that such movements be communicated to the CCC 48 hours in advance. In Ninewa, the Provincial Governor campaigned and was elected on a promise to eliminate all of the CCPs in Ninewa. According to CCP soldiers, the Provincial Governor calls the CCPs “intelligence checkpoints.” At least once, the Provincial Governor tested his freedom of movement by taking his security convoy through a CCP without consulting the CCC. And, finally, as one *Peshmerga* Colonel commanding forces at the Ninewa CCPs stated, “After the U.S. withdrawal, bad guys will do bad things. And we will not allow the governor here. If he comes here, we will attack him and his security forces.”²⁷³

Another important point to be made about the CCC is that although it had nominal authority over the CCPs and CSAs, it did not have resources or funding to supply the troops working at the CCPs or provide the infrastructure needed to maintain the CCPs. The Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* units received all logistical and material support from their respective Battalions

²⁷³ *Peshmerga* OIC. Personal Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Ninewa. February 2011.

and Divisions. Supplying the CCPs and CCCs after the U.S. withdrawal, according to soldiers interviewed, would become a source of tension between the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga*.

However, Iraqi Army officials at the Ninewa Operation Center explained during an interview that once the U.S. left Iraq, the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* would likely alternate command over the CCPs. So the Iraqi Army would be responsible for every other CCP and the *Peshmerga* responsible for the others. The important point here is not to discuss supplying the CCPs, but to clearly demarcate the CCCs' authority. The CCCs were nominally the communications hub and authority over the CCPs and CSAs, but it did not have resources or authority to supply the CCPs or command troop movements (other than CCP patrols) or the rotation of troops to and out of the CCPs; that authority remained with Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* Battalions and Divisions. So the CCC competed with each CCP unit's Iraqi Army or *Peshmerga* Brigade or Division command. During interviews both Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* soldiers - mostly in Ninewa and Diyala- expressed concern that the CCC had no real authority and once the U.S. Army left Iraq their respective Battalions and Divisions would interfere in CCP and CSA operations. It seemed difficult for the participating forces to establish the Twelve Guiding Principles as the CSM's constitutional "way of life."

Conclusion of CSM Structure and Components

The next level of command above the CCC was the Senior Working Group (SWG) combining the leaders of the Deputy Ministry of *Peshmerga* and Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) on a national level. And, finally, above the SWG was the High Level Committee (HLC) comprised of the Iraqi Government and Kurdish Regional Government Ministers of Defense and Ministers of Interior. Both of these senior level committees fell outside the scope of the CSM research designed and executed for the 4th Infantry Division and discussed in this dissertation. As these committees fell outside the purview of both the primary research and secondary analysis, I have no greater detail on the workings of these committees or their members' concerns. It suffices to say that the members of these committees signed and agreed to the Twelve Guiding Principles and the Declaration of Principles which launched the creation of the CSM.

The Legal Committee was an independent committee established by Prime Minister al-Maliki on 16 August 2010. It was comprised of the General Councils of the Iraqi Government's Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and the Kurdish Regional Government's Ministry of *Peshmerga* and Ministry of Interior and reported to the SWG and HLC. It created three provincial legal committees to investigate violations within the MCR by all security forces. The Legal Committee also falls outside the scope of primary research and secondary analysis.

Finally, the CCPs and CCCs as described above constitute the research focus and environment of field research. They are the main components of the CSM intended to integrate the Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* into one security unit to patrol the MCR. Successful integration and creation of a common identity/substance was the means to reduce the number of Unilateral Fixed Positions (UFP), defeat the enemy (terrorists), bring security to the people of the MCR and help stabilize Iraq.

Appendix K: ESU's Terms of Militia, Backbone, Shakāwa (شقاوة), Tinted Windows, and Punishment

Militias and Backbone

An ESU OIC describes the checkpoint policy regarding militias or “party guards:

There are militias. However, we don't call them militias anymore. They are security guards for the party or party leaders. They are all armed and they do have licenses for their weapons, and there is a lot of them. In every party, there is about a company of soldiers and guards with them. They work for the benefit of that party. All security companies and the militias must show their weapons badges, and the serial number of that weapon must be included on their badge.²⁷⁴

There are many militias (party guards) and personal guards. While at the checkpoints, I noted several religious leaders, political leaders and other unknown VIPs driving through checkpoints with their armed entourage of two vehicles or more. However, despite the requirement to show their weapons badges, I never saw the ESU stop and request the information from a group of armed men. And, as one Kurdish woman noted, standing at the checkpoints, the badges are easily forged. An observation repeated by ESU and their officers alike. At one checkpoint, the ESU claimed that some of them still did not have police ID issued from the MoI. Therefore, when they ask drivers for their ID or a badge for their weapon, drivers retort, “Can I see your ID? Show me your ID?” If the ESU officer does not have an ID, the question became an embarrassment for the shurta.²⁷⁵ An ESU related one of many stories about attempting to stop officers (Iraqi Army or ESU) at the checkpoint. He asked the officer for his ID. The officer told his sergeant to show the ESU his ID. The ESU followed with “Not the sergeant. I need to see your ID.” The shurta finished the story saying that “Basically, we got into an argument, and he said, 'you don't know me. I will call your commander and let him discipline you.’”²⁷⁶

One ESU officer working at the KCCC noted the fear that ESU shurta have of the militias.

Before the U.S. forces [began working at the checkpoints], police feared the parties and would not stop them. If an ESU stops one of the party members, the party member will not say anything. Then he calls the ESU's commanding officer and tells him different things [about the encounter]. And without consulting with the ESU, his commander sends him to jail.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ ESU Lieutenant. In-depth Interview #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

²⁷⁵ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Recorded in Personal Field Notes. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 3. January 2011.

²⁷⁶ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

²⁷⁷ ESU (Iraqi Police), 1LT. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

The ESU officer went on to recount his personal experience in the streets of Kirkuk. He said that he would stop various people and that the person he stopped would phone his superior who in turn would phone the ESU's commander. And the ESU's commander would say "leave him alone. So many time that has happened."²⁷⁸

A *Peshmerga* officer at the KCCC echoed the ESU's assessment of party power at the checkpoints saying that "With regard to the officials and politicians - if the U.S. soldiers are at the CCP they will stop. If they are not at the CCP, the officials just go through and don't respect the ESU policeman; they will just pass through."²⁷⁹ He then added that the Iraqi Army from Hawijah can also pass through checkpoints unchecked. An officer at the KCCC repeated the charge saying that "At the KCCC, political parties do not have any influence, but at the checkpoints just like this incident that just happened [the 4th IA commander's convoy passing checkpoints check points 1 and 2 without notification] - they pass without being stopped and checked. Parties do affect the checkpoints."²⁸⁰

The ESU at K5 summed up the situation of no "backbone" for the rule of law in the following terms:

The problem with people is that when the U.S soldiers point at a vehicle to direct it into the search area, the citizens will take the order without complaining. The American does not speak Arabic; he just points at them. Whereas I do speak Arabic and treat them nicely. They complain and they show me official government badges, and we let them pass whoever it is.²⁸¹

Despite speaking Arabic, the ESU's social, political, and class status make him an unworthy representative of Iraq's rule of law in the eyes of the parties, their militias and elite citizens. In effect, the political parties - in belittling, bullying, and manipulating the ESU at the checkpoints - belittle and betray the ESU as an institution for the rule of law. An ESU on Kani Domlan ridge summarized the corrosive effect the political parties and their militias have on the checkpoint as a meaningful symbol of the rule of law by saying that "the checkpoint is just a picture in a frame. We can't do anything when people don't respect you."²⁸²

²⁷⁸ ESU (Iraqi Police), 1LT. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

²⁷⁹ Peshmerga, CPT. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

²⁸⁰ N - Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

²⁸¹ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk,5. January 2011.

²⁸² Four ESU Soldiers. Kani Domlan Observation Post. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

Shakāwa (شقاوة)

ESU described some of their officers as shakāwa (شقاوة) a word that means “nasty,” and/or “mischief.”

Most of Kirkuk IP officers are (shakāwa) - [nasty mischief-makers, perhaps “gangsters”]. You can't talk to them. When there is a bad security situation, the officers will kiss our hands, so we will provide them personal security. Back in 2005, 2006, and 2007 the officers used to kiss our feet to provide them security. So now that there is safety, everyone says, “So what if you are an IP?”

Once, an officer driving his personal vehicle passed through the military express line. We stopped him and asked him why he used the express road with a civilian vehicle. He said, “Well, I am an officer.” Whoever has rank can violate the law.²⁸³

The statement above highlights the corrosive effect party influence and officer malfeasance has not only on the morale of the ESU rank and file, but, most especially, on faith in the very *rule of law* the CSM is trying to constitute at the Kirkuk checkpoints.²⁸⁴ “So what if you are an IP?” a statement disclosing not what a civilian might think about the rank and file but what the ESU believe their own officers and political leaders think about them - pawns in their game.

Tinted Windows

A fourth term often repeated by ESU and related to militia, citizen, and officer abuse of the ESU at checkpoints is “tinted windows.” A vehicle with tinted windows signifies an IP Officer, IA officer, or some other elite Iraqi citizen, according to the ESU and Golden Lions. ESU often said that they simply stopped approaching these vehicles to ask the drivers for papers or to search the vehicle. The ESU OIC, who noted above that militias and armed groups must display their weapons badges to the ESU at checkpoints also said the following about vehicles with tinted windows:

Who would search a vehicle with tinted windows, because they are mostly officers? So either corrupted officers or someone else [citizen] gets tinted windows. [And] The problem with us is that we can't really search the vehicles with tinted windows because most of those vehicles are government vehicles. They do slow down sometimes and they flash a badge and they leave.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

²⁸⁴ An example of the same officer, government official, and political leader malfeasance was heavily stressed by IA soldiers at Diyala's CCP-4. In fact, I witnessed government officials speeding through the checkpoint.

²⁸⁵ ESU Lieutenant. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

Another ESU shurta said that they have orders to search vehicles with tinted windows but they ignore it: “Yes, we have an order but no one cares. Who are you going to search? They are all officers.”²⁸⁶

Finally, an officer at the KCCC corroborated the statements by the ESU shurta on the checkpoints saying that “Cars with tinted windows can't be stopped. They never stop. The ESU shurta think there is some official in there. It is either IA or IP officer, and he says, 'how can you stop me?' Four or five cars (and they are all armed men) can go through checkpoints. ESU shurta can't stop and check them. They will in fact lose their jobs.”²⁸⁷ Tinted windows in Kirkuk are a sign of power and rank. At the checkpoint, a vehicle with tinted windows is, in fact, a free pass (the badge) through the checkpoint. ESU, as the officer states, are afraid of losing their jobs by challenging a driver with a tinted-window imprimatur.

Punishment

Stories and examples of punishment visited on the ESU shurta for stopping the wrong vehicle or asking the wrong citizen for documentation are also plentiful. ESU shurta spoke of punishment in terms of having to shave their head (at a southern checkpoint shurta provided the shaved head of one of their colleagues as evidence), spend time in jail, and lose salary. The ESU at an observation post on Kani Domlan Ridge recounted an incident they witnessed between the shurta at the checkpoint and an officer (Colonel from the Kirkuk traffic police). They said the officer was in civilian clothes and driving a civilian car. The shurta stopped him for using the dirt road at the checkpoint (trying to go around the checkpoint using a military lane). They noted that an argument started and then a fight. Eventually, both shurta went to jail. The comment the ESU that told the story made regarding the incident was that it showed the ESU and IP have no authority at the checkpoints.²⁸⁸

An officer at the KCCC recounted his brother's experience as an ESU shurta saying that “If he [my brother] stops any car that belongs to a party member, the driver of the car calls my brother's chief. Either they shave his head and put him in jail and/or they deduct pay from his salary. All of the parties do this - Kurd, Turkoman, Arab.”²⁸⁹ The parties and officers linked to the parties not only control the ESU and IP by populating its ranks with loyalists, they also punish and intimidate those ranks weakening their authority in executing the rule of law on the checkpoints.

To conclude: What this appendix presents is representation of the many stories and comments told and made by ESU and Golden Lions. The terms disclosed above communicate the amount of force and impact the political parties, militias (private and party), and officers (IA, IP/ESU, and *Peshmerga*) exert on the ESU shurta who would embody the rule of law at the checkpoints. They exert so much force that the ESU substance and ideal as the image and replica

²⁸⁶ Five ESU soldiers. Group Discussion. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 4. January 2011.

²⁸⁷ N - Officer. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

²⁸⁸ Four ESU Soldiers. Kani Domlan Observation Post. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. January 2011.

²⁸⁹ N - Officer. In-depth Interview. Recorded in Personal Field Notes. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. June 2011.

of *rule of law* shows signs of being deeply fractured. The parties' acts are an attempt to reform (or deform) the constitutional substance (constitutional myth) of the CSM into a tool for sectarian division rather than an instrument for bringing together Iraqis under a shared identity or constitutional myth - *rule of law*. The agent of Iraq's rule of law is in a troubled spot, indeed. And his relentless cluster of terms discloses the quality and substance that is his troubled place that points to motives for his acts located in the counteragent: ethnic parties, planted loyalists, militias, private guards, no backbone, no authority, no respect, shaved heads, jail time, tinted windows, kicked out, lost job - fear.

Appendix L: The Only Thing We Get From This Oil Is Smoke

An ESU officer working with the Golden Lions begins telling the ESU's and Golden Lion's economic story. "We Iraqis are very angry people now because we want electricity. I have kids; we have kids. What sins have they committed that makes it so you [*Iraqi* society in general] let those kids live in the cold with no power at home for many hours."²⁹⁰ He went on to add later, "Previously; it was said that Saddam used to sell the power to other countries, now tell me who is selling it to whom?"²⁹¹ Others in the Golden Lion's group added accounts about the Governor of Kirkuk diverting electricity from Baghdad to Kirkuk in response to protesters' demands for more electricity in Kirkuk. The ESU officer spoke up and said, however, that the increase of electricity to Kirkuk was only a "kind of Ibuprofen," a palliative for the pain caused by the government's lack of service. "The pain" sure to return as the government's service returns to normal.

In interviews with officers at the KCCC just over four months after interviews with the ESU and Golden Lions one *Peshmerga* officer explained the economic scene in the following terms:

Everyone is tired of politics. People were tired of Saddam because he did not serve people; he killed his own people and stole from them. And people wanted a change and to make a better life. It is worse than back then - there are terrorists and bombs. And there is no way to make a living. There is no clean water; the government cannot provide power; the young men do not have a job. The poor people are increasing day by day. In the winter, if you go out to get one barrel of kerosene, mud comes up to your neck. Once a month they give us 100 liters of Kerosene. There is nothing to enjoy. We are just surviving.²⁹²

The *Peshmerga's* reference to "mud coming to your neck" refers to the poor conditions of dirt roads that winter rains make impassable. In a second interview with Golden Lions, they include food rations to the list of poor roads, and rationing of electricity and Kerosene as a property of the poor economic scene. One Golden Lion said, "If the Government can't help the people then what is the major role of that Government? For example, our government! For how many months haven't we received our ration of rice and wheat?! Before we used to receive it month by month now we have to wait longer. Why?"²⁹³

²⁹⁰ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, IA, and *Peshmerga* (RGB) Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

²⁹¹ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, IA, and *Peshmerga* (RGB) Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

²⁹² *Peshmerga*, 2LT. In-depth Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk. 8 June 2011.

²⁹³ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 3rd Platoon. ESU, *Peshmerga* (RGB), and IA Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

The simple equation inherent in the conversations above is that the Government equals a failed economic state and a wasted opportunity to build something new after Saddam. Or more importantly, the poor economic conditions and slow Government response (Kirkuk, Baghdad and KRG Governments all three) creates a community of *cynical citizens* from which the ESU and Golden Lions draw their ranks. In other words, the ESU and Golden Lions may necessarily be employed by a government they have difficulty respecting and *believing* in. It is true and largely very well known that Iraqis' lives at the time of the interviews (and perhaps still) were contained by a scene of economic deprivation. Yet the larger point is that that same economic scene of “just surviving,” because of its persistence and perceived lack of justice, implies an inner quality of the agents' substance and identity. In this case, *cynicism* toward the very Government ESU and Golden Lions represent at the checkpoints and Kirkuk CSM.

The ESU and Golden Lions piled on examples of economic corruption two of which included government institutions that provide retirement benefits and health care. For example, one department provides the elderly and widows with monthly benefits. And the ESU and Golden Lions said that one has to pay \$200.00 to someone that knows someone inside the department in order to complete the process for the benefits check. They followed by saying that even this palm greasing is no guarantee. An example related to health care was given by an ESU from Kirkuk. He noted that on a trip to the local hospital with his children, he had to purchase medication. He was told by the hospital technician that the hospital pharmacy could not provide him with the medication that he would have to go across the street to a private pharmacy. He said that the medication's cost at the private pharmacy is ten times more. And when he arrived at the private pharmacy he discovered that that the technician who works at the hospital sells the medication to you at the private pharmacy. In the first interview with the Kirkuk Golden Lions a series of examples detailing economic deprivation and corruption ended with an ESU saying, “There is a large amount of corruption going on, still, even today. Not all the leaders and government departments are corrupt. *However*, let's just say that most are.”²⁹⁴ And the group of ESU, Iraqi Army, and *Peshmerga* erupted in harmonious laughter. Their own governments' corruption and shared economic deprivation a common scene (or shared enemy) uniting them.

Out on the checkpoints, the ESU spoke of their economic condition in terms of (a lack of) financial and health care support from the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The men at one checkpoint stated:

No one cares about the Iraqi Police here. There is no health care for us. If you die, they will support the spouse with two to three months of salary and then they will stop it. We don't have marriage benefits. What is the difference between us and the public? They get paid more than us.”²⁹⁵

ESU complaints and charges against the MoI for a lack of support, low salaries, and no benefits were rife. ESU at one checkpoint said that the MoI has very low pay and no benefits. They

²⁹⁴ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, *Peshmerga* (RGB), and IA Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

²⁹⁵ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Recorded in Personal Field Notes. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

noted that the Ministry of Defense (Iraqi Army) pays much better. But most of the men join the ESU and Iraqi Police (IP) because they want to live close to their families. ESU noted that the MoI and ESU Headquarters supply the shurta with uniforms, but they often don't fit, so the ESU purchase uniforms from the local souk. In fact, the ESU at another checkpoint said that the U.S. Army - when the Golden Lions and checkpoints were first established - gave them boots (at least one year prior to the interview) which most were still wearing. As the ESU at K3 summarized the situation:

We bought our own uniforms and got shoes from U.S. Army. All the ministries get a budget except the police. We don't get increased pay. IP's don't get a raise; we want a raise. The Government spent money to build the castles [Kirkuk checkpoints K1, K2, and K3] and doesn't supply them with equipment. The government tells us that it doesn't have enough money.²⁹⁶

The *Peshmerga*, too, who comprised the Kirkuk Golden Lions also complained about poor salary. The Golden Lions interviewed noted that the differences in salary between the ESU, Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga* was a bone of contention. Eventually, the *Peshmerga* who fall under the command of the KRG's Ministry of *Peshmerga* (MoP), received higher pay after their complaints were eventually heard by their MoP. During the group interview, brief bickering broke out about equal salary between the three groups (who gets paid more, who gets more time off). Despite the hard won better pay for *Peshmerga*, the *Peshmerga* Officer in Charge (OIC) noted that "We had four guys quit here [Golden Lions]. My guys prefer to go back to the *Peshmerga* battalion, since they work five days or a week there, and then they take forty days off, and they have a civilian job to support their family."²⁹⁷ The differences in pay are a latent source of division among the Golden Lions, as it ultimately represents the two divided governments at a bureaucratic level (Baghdad - Greater Iraq and the KRG - Erbil). However, the larger and most important meaning regarding the stories and scenic terms of economic deprivation is that it creates a *cynical citizen* whether one is Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, or Assyrian Christian. It is a scenic condition that transcends ethnicity; they are all consubstantial with regard to their economic scene. And it means the ESU and members of the Golden Lions must wrestle with their role as *citizens* with grievances against the very government (Baghdad and KRG) they represent in the role as ESU and Golden Lions at the checkpoint and in the CSA.

Kirkuk's oil wealth is viewed with *cynicism* by the ESU and Golden Lions. A very common observation and question was stated thus: "We have all of this oil; Why are we living like this?"²⁹⁸ The ESU OIC working with the Golden Lions linked Kirkuk's economic conditions, the abundance of material wealth (oil), and the Arab Spring:

²⁹⁶ Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

²⁹⁷ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, IA, and *Peshmerga* (RGB) Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Recorded in Personal Field Notes. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

²⁹⁸ ESU Lieutenant. In-depth Interview #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 3. January 2011.

You heard what happened in Tunisia! We don't want Iraq to have the same issues [poverty, large gap between rich and poor, corruption] anymore. Iraq has struggled for years. We don't want the government's bad treatment and the lack of services and basic supplies and help for people. So enough of all this! And enough of the leaders who only know how to fight for chairs and fill their stomachs with money while others suffer. And enough of leaders who discriminate between ethnic groups. We want someone to govern Iraq with justice. We are a rich country; we have enough oil to build this country so that people can live without want and need. There are some countries who have a quarter of what we have, and they live in better conditions than we do. Why? We don't even have health insurance.²⁹⁹

Kirkuk's oil - a symbol of wealth and power, the reason all nations, corporations and political groups converge on the city - when viewed in terms of the Arab Spring or the change of government from Saddam's regime to the new Iraqi Constitution serves as a material reminder of Iraq's lost potential, economic depravity, and corruption. As long as the economic disparity remains it fuels and empowers *cynical citizens* and places the ESU and Golden Lions in a *substantial* quandary of motive. Will they act as *citizens* protesting their government or will they act as the *police* and *security forces* defending the very government they appear to despise? And it is the government that currently has purchase on their support by providing them with an income even if they complain about its inadequacy.

The ESU OIC for the Golden Lions summarizes their paradox of substance and motive in terms of the struggle for democracy and freedom of speech. A case of economic necessity confronting political ideals:

[Regarding] the demonstration that occurred in Kirkuk, people started protesting about the electricity and the Iraqi Police [ESU] opened fire on them. This is not right especially if we are a new democracy in transition. We should have our freedom of speech. I do not agree with their action toward those civilians that day. So what difference have we made from the previous regime? Saddam left; now, we have another Saddam [the new Iraqi Government in general].³⁰⁰

The ESU OIC's words suggest the transition from the old regime to the new government is simply the democratization of Saddam in the sense that all leaders in government can now act like thugs - an extreme manifestation of the *cynical citizen* that suggests the *essence* of Saddam

²⁹⁹ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, IA, *Peshmerga* (RGB) Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

³⁰⁰ Kirkuk Combined Security Forces (Golden Lions) 1st Platoon. ESU, *Peshmerga* (RGB), and IA Officers and Soldiers. Group Interview Golden Lion's Compound, FOB Warrior. Recorded in Personal Field Notes. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. January 2011.

lives in Iraq's new institutions (whether the institutions be Arab, Kurd, Turkoman, Shi'a or Sunni). What is more, the ESU OIC's words are a tangible statement of the ESU's and Golden Lion's *substantial* paradox of motive. The senior ESU OIC states that he does not agree with the actions of his own police force. Actions whose motives appear to reside in the scenic conditions that constitute the ESU's and Golden Lions' motives. As one Kurdish woman, whose words complained, the ESU are corrupt - they take bribes from truckers passing through the checkpoints and let their families through the checkpoints. At K1, the ESU referred to their colleague who manned the window at which truckers presented their papers for inspection and approval to enter the city of Kirkuk as "Ali Baba." The K1 OIC stated that the oil trucks enter Kirkuk and do not come out - referring to the oil smuggling that takes place in Kirkuk to benefit sectarian groups. The ESU's own corruption derived from the substance and motives of their economic scene. The ESU's choice of corruption is a corollary to the choice between acting as a *cynical citizen* or as an Iraqi Police shurta. Do the ESU act in keeping with the corrupt and impoverished economic scene they describe, or do they act as the representatives and agents of positive governmental change and rule of law?

Whatever the individual answers to such questions, it is clear that the ESU's and Golden Lion's conversations and stories clustered around terms and images of economic hardship and corruption. Their scenic terms disclose the economic conditions which they must struggle against simultaneously as *Iraqi citizens* and as ESU, Iraqi Army and *Peshmerga*. Their conversations and stories make clear that as agents of the ESU (Iraqi Police) and Golden Lions they maintain their ideals and purpose to strive for the *Iraqi* rule of law and democracy - for this is the standard by which they judge the very system of which they are a part. It is these ideals that generate their criticism of the current economic conditions recounted above. They criticize their economic system and exercise their freedom of speech (at least to me as an American outsider) and in doing so reveal the ideals of agents that believe in something better and want something better. After all, the *cynical citizen* is a jilted *idealist* - or more to the *Iraqi* point a jilted *constitutionalist*. And the ESU and Golden Lions as agents (idealists) are performing constitutional acts when they *expect* and try to establish an *ought* (or what will be) from what *is*.

They navigate that space in which constitutional wishes become constitutional grievances. Without an agent's ideals, the ESUs' and Golden Lions' powerful and humorous criticism (grievances) would perhaps be more muted. They are frustrated precisely to the degree that they have economic ideals, political ideals, personal dreams (encouraged by the overthrow of Saddam), and a hope of democracy (promulgated by the United States, U.S. Army, and themselves).³⁰¹ The *is* from which they establish their *ought* is the potential found in their new constitution and opportunity (beginning) to transition to a new economic system and political government. At the street level of Iraq's new economic formation and system, ESU and Golden

³⁰¹ U.S. Army and the U.S. Mission in Iraq tethered political (or democratic success) with material and economic success. They did this with massive amounts of infrastructure projects, such as building schools, roads, farm aid, rebuilding industrial infrastructure and utility plants. Economic success (scene and agency) became the measure of the political system's success (agent and purpose). A failed economy, then, would mean a failed constitution and political system. In this case, the success of the government was deflected away from the sphere of political agents negotiating their conflicting ideals (the realm of the diplomat and statesmen and stateswomen) and presented in terms of scene (material) and agency (means, economics, logistics - security forces, utilities, and infrastructure). It is easier to work in the material world than in the world of contrary human realities and ideas. And of course one way for a government to stay in power is to eliminate the possibility of constitutional grievances by eradicating constitutional wishes - a pure form of tyranny.

Lions negotiate the paradox of substance everyday - they are both a part of (citizens) and apart from (ESU and Golden Lions) their economic scene. As the ESU shurta posed the dialectical question of substance, "What is the difference between us and the public?"³⁰² The ESU's choice (*krisis*), like that of the citizen's, is one of survival - "We just survive" - and belief in the ideal of the civil institution they represent. As the ESU Lieutenant at K4 posed the paradoxical question between scenic and idealistic substance and motive, "Youth - the young are jobless. A poor man in a troubled spot, what will he do?"³⁰³ And, finally, as one ESU shurta trenchantly summed up the *Iraqi* lower classes plight while standing on Kani Domlan ridge and overlooking Kirkuk's vast oil fields and wealth, "The only thing we get from this oil is smoke."

³⁰² Eight ESU Soldiers. Group Interview. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 5. January 2011.

³⁰³ ESU Lieutenant. In-depth Interview #2. Interviewed by Melvin Hall and Translator. Kirkuk, 4. January 2011.

Appendix M: Survey of Burkean Literature and Interdisciplinary Influence

Kenneth Burke has had a profound influence on American intellectuals, scholars, researchers and analysts in virtually every field of human studies. His presence is felt in the beginnings of Sociology at the University of Chicago. Erving Goffman, in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* adopted Burke's dramaturgical methodologies to create his own dramaturgical sociology and a main branch of sociology called symbolic interactionism. (Kenny, "The Glamour of Motives," 5). Another seminal figure in sociology, Clifford Geertz, was influenced by Burke's theories and cultural analysis in developing his theory of "thick description" as a method for interpreting cultures. And Dell Hymes relied heavily on Burke's teaching and theories to create the field of Sociolinguistics, a relationship recently documented in Jay Jordan's article "Dell Hymes, Kenneth Burke's 'identification' and the Birth of Sociolinguistics." Burke's influence on Sociology, however, goes well beyond the three foundational figures mentioned above. Robert Kenny, in his Article "The Glamour of Motives: Applications of Kenneth Burke within the Sociological Field," provides an in-depth survey of Burke's influence on Sociology, noting that Burke even though borrowed from is not often acknowledged within sociological circles.

Within Anthropology Burke has had a formative influence on René Girard's theories of the origins of violence, scapegoating, and mimetic rivalry (mimetic desire). He borrows Burke's work on scapegoating and advances it in *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World and I See Satan Fall Like Lightning* as a general theory for the origin of violence in human culture. More recently, Professors Ivo Strecker, Christian Meyer, and Stephen Tyler in their article "Rhetoric Culture: Outline of a Project for the Study of the Interaction of Rhetoric and Culture," claim that Burke "may justly be called one of the fathers of current Rhetoric Culture" (n. pag.). The authors note that the Rhetoric Culture project grew out the 5th Biennial Conference of the European Association of Social Anthropologists in 1988. As they put it, Rhetoric Culture "[is] to provide a new – or rather very old – direction and sense of relevance to the study of culture by retrieving, exploring, and making full use of the ancient insight that just as rhetoric is founded in culture, culture is founded in rhetoric" (n. pag.). The authors go on note that the book *The Social Use of Metaphor: Essays in the Anthropology of Rhetoric* – the first to include metaphor and rhetoric in an Anthropology monograph is dedicated to Kenneth Burke by its editors David Sapis and Christopher Crocker.

The Burkean study of rhetorical figures and tropes reaches beyond Anthropology. The historian Hayden White employed Burkean theory to develop his own complex theories of metahistory to examine how historians *figure* their narratives using the four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. He develops an historical hermeneutic based on the formation of archetypal patterns of tropological thought in his seminal works *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* and *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* (*Tropics of Discourse* 9 and *Metahistory* 31-38).

Communication Studies, too, has a robust and long Burkean history. Barry Brummett, and Anna M. Young provide an historical survey of Burke's influence on Communications Studies beginning with Marie Hochmuth's article "Kenneth Burke and 'The New Rhetoric'" published in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* in 1952 (n. pag.). They then review the Burkean literature published in Communications Studies journals over the last half century. The body of work is immense but the authors organize the use of Burke within their field into three major

categories: extratextual (historical/biographical scholarship), textulcentric (interpretations and explanations of Burke's key concepts and work), and seminaltextual (critical and genealogical scholarship that exalts Burke as being a founder or major influence of a conceptual movement) (n. pag.).

The brief survey of Sociology, Anthropology, History, and Communications studies above provides a very small perspective of a much larger American and international intellectual horizon influenced by Burke. Burke led and leads by example. As the reach of his influence into so many fields testifies, in an intellectual world that praises the importance of interdisciplinary studies to solve human problems and conflict, Burke led and leads by example. Outside the field of Rhetoric and Composition, my own use of Burke is influenced by Clifford Geertz (Sociology) and Hayden White (History); their work provides theoretical inspiration for my own application of Burke's dramatism to tough human problems and conflicts. In addition, from Communication Studies, Clark Rountree's work in "Revisiting the Controversy over Dramatism as Literal," and "Coming to Terms with Kenneth Burke's Pentad," as well as Maurice Charland's work in "Constitutive Rhetoric: The case of the *Peuple Quebecois*" influences the way I theorize dramatism and apply the dramatisitic methodology used in this dissertation.

Within the field of Rhetoric and Composition my use of Burke is influenced by Debra Hawhee, "Burke and Nietzsche," and *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*; Robert Wess, "Burke's Dialectic of Constitutions," and *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, and Postmodernism*;" Gregory Clark, *Rhetorical Landscapes in America: Variations on a Theme from Kenneth Burke*; Elizabeth M. Weiser, *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*; and Dana Anderson, *Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversation*. The influence of these scholars' work, including Rountree's and Charland's, on this dissertation's dramatisitic methodology is summarized in four concepts: constitution, conversation, agon/conflict, and literal. Before detailing the importance of these four concepts to the dissertation, however, I need to more broadly examine Burke's current influence on the field of Rhetoric and Composition.

Since 2001, *Rhetoric Review* and *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* published approximately thirty articles (by my count) that treat Burke or an aspect of his theory. In *Philosophy and Rhetoric* I count four articles. I am not going to review all of these articles here, but I am going to provide a bird's eye view of the Burkean terrain to better situate my dissertation and the scholars that influence the dissertation's conceptual method. The point is not to provide an exhaustive history of Burke scholarship (a dissertation in itself) but to situate my dissertation within the broader Burkean map. Unlike Brummett's and Young's categorization of Communication texts on Burke, I categorize articles published in *Rhetoric Review* and *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* into two categories: Burkean exegesis and Burkean application. There are two branches of Burkean exegesis: historical/biographical and conceptual/textual. Fourteen of the thirty articles deal with historical and biographical exegesis. Eight of the articles present an exegesis of a key Burkean term, and seven articles apply Burke's concepts to explain a rhetorical/historical event or historical figure's rhetorical actions.³⁰⁴ From this we can conclude that the vast majority of scholarship is focused on explaining and interpreting Burke's theories in order to develop new conceptual paradigms for understanding the New Rhetoric. Current Burke scholarship is predominately hermeneutical in nature. Whether it is historical or textual scholarship, it is confined to interpreting Burke contextually (historically) or inter-textually

³⁰⁴ I only use two representative examples from each category to illustrate the work of that particular scholarly movement. For a complete bibliography by category see "Appendix N: Recent Burke Scholarship."

(Burke's writing). I discuss the Burkean branches of scholarship in Rhetoric and Composition in the following order: historical/biographical, conceptual/textual, and application.

The articles in the first category provide an historical or biographical exegesis of Burke's theories and concepts. The authors focus on a Burkean concept (or book) and reconstruct Burke's historical interaction and conversations within his intellectual circles to explain the origin and development of Burke's concepts, ideas, books, and articles. Or they simply explicate one of Burke's early works situating it within historical events and intellectual conversations between his friends and colleagues.³⁰⁵ A representative example is James Beasley's article "Demetrius, *Deinotes*, and Burkean Identification at the University of Chicago." In this article Beasley details the influence of a pedagogical debate at the University of Chicago between professors about the use of Demetrius' rhetorical principles in the teaching of writing on Burke's concept of identification. Specifically, it was a debate between neo-Aristotelians and neo-Demetrians. Neo-Aristotelians argued that the composition classroom should strictly teach imitation of style. The neo-Demetrians argued that composition courses should be a more heuristic endeavor encouraging conversation among students and teachers to discover the principles of academic writing. Beasley argues that the arguments about Demetrius ambiguous meaning and use of the term *deinotes* (force, fearful, wondrous, clever) influenced Burke's own concepts: dramatism, identification, and the negative.

A second example of the historical genre of Burke studies is Marika A. Seigel's article "One Little Fellow Named Ecology: Ecological Rhetoric in Kenneth Burke's *Attitudes Toward History*," in which she situates the development of Burke's critique of "efficiency" within the larger national debate about the cause of the 1930's Dust Bowl. In particular, she describes the influence Paul Sears' book *Deserts on the March* in which he argues that human efficiency disrupted the natural ecosystem (balance) of the Midwest's environment causing the Dust Bowl of the 1930s had on Burke's own writing and theorizing about human's use of symbols. She also illustrates how ecologist Frederic Clements' "climax model" influenced Burke's ideas regarding "proportion" and "balance." Concepts Burke applies to human's symbolic communities, particularly his theory of proportion or ratios in dramatism. The point to take away is that of the thirty scholarly articles and eight books published on Burke in approximately the last twelve years, fourteen of the articles and four of the monographs are historical exegesis of Burkean theory, what M. Elizabeth Weiser calls in the preface to her book *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*, in which she historicizes Burke's writing of *Grammar of Motives*, "rhetoricizing theory. . . by using history to do theory" (xiii).

What I categorize, then, as historical exegesis (similar to Brummet's and Young's category, "extratextual Burke") is currently the largest and most robust scholarly movement in Burkean studies within Rhetoric and Composition. Within this movement, there is a special focus on Burke's writings of the 1930s and prior: *Permanence and Change*, *Attitudes Toward History*, *Philosophy of Literary Form* and *Counter-Statement*. Ann George's and Jack Selzer's article "What Happened at the First American Writers' Congress? Kenneth Burke's

³⁰⁵ I also think of this category as "The Sociology of Burke." Reconstructing Burke's relationships and correspondence with colleagues and friends to trace Burke's networks of thought and the genealogy of ideas is quite similar to Randall Collins' work in *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* in which he applies a version of Erving Goffman's interaction rituals to reconstruct intellectual movements throughout history and within different cultural groups.

‘Revolutionary Symbolism in America,’” and their book *Kenneth Burke in the 1930s* are exemplary works of this early period of historical Burkean scholarship.³⁰⁶

The eight articles that explicate a key Burkean concept can be described as genealogies of an idea. In these articles, the scholars reconstruct how Burke arrives at his conception of a key term or idea and explicate this term by examining Burke’s use of the concept, trope, or idea in Burke’s own texts and/or the influence of a particular theorist’s writings on Burke’s use of the concept. The point is that this category of scholarship is more text centered, and the scholars find their “way into Burke” through a concept and a key text rather than necessarily beginning with an historical period or place.³⁰⁷ So the conceptual exegesis is diachronic and inter-textual in nature, spanning a range of Burke’s writing to follow the evolution of a concept from its first use to Burke’s final use of the term.

Bryan Crable in his article “Symbolizing Motion: Burke’s Dialectic and Rhetoric of the Body,” for instance, seeks to get to the exact meaning of dramatism’s foundational concepts action/motion. In doing so, he traces Burke’s discussion of action/motion beginning with Burke’s use of “embodiment” and “metabiology” in *Permanence and Change* as a third term transcending the traditional Hegelian-Marxist dualism ideal/material. Crable then explains Burke’s own dissatisfaction with “embodiment” as a transcendental term and Burke’s conceptualizing of the action/motion pair as a better conceptual foundation of human reality. Crable’s ultimate point after explicating Burke’s use of the action/motion pair using many of Burke’s texts is that action/motion produces human’s other binary paradigms, such as mind/body, symbolicity/ biology, and spirit/matter. Through a close reading of Burke, Crable reverses Burke’s own axiom that “There can be motion without action.” In other words, the symbolic world calls motion into being. Without humans symbolicity we would not be able to make the distinction between mind/body. Crable’s interpretation is controversial.

Debra Hawhee, for instance, in *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Languae* takes issues with Crable’s privileging of symbolic realm over matter (body). She writes, “Crable’s amendment lends an epistemological emphasis that Burke’s pair fundamentally resists in favor of an emphasis on movement” (157). Hawhee argues for a more action oriented theory grounded in motion (bodies), preserving Burke’s original axioms. Hawhee’s book is an example of historical exegesis combined with conceptual explication. Her book’s chapters variously interpret Burke through the lens of historical context and textual analysis to trace how Burke’s theorizing of the “body” both evolved and influenced his paradigms for studying human language and action. The concluding point is that Crable’s and Hawhee’s conversation provides a good example of the second most dominant scholarly movement within Burkean scholarship – conceptual exegesis with a focus on the meaning of Burke’s concepts in his use of them within his texts.

A second example of conceptual exegesis is Diane Davis’ article “Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are.” In her article, Davis focuses on the development and meaning of

³⁰⁶ Barry Brummett reviews George’s and Selzer’s *Kenneth Burke in the 1930s* for *Rhetoric Review*. In his review, he categorizes their work as “grounded in extratextual scholarship so as to facilitate textualcentric knowledge” (440). This persistent overlap in *Rhetoric and Composition* scholarship is one reason why I categorize this group “historical *exegesis*.” The emphasis is on *exegesis* as the goal of the scholars is to produce an interpretation of Burke that provides a paradigm for further theoretical study or possible application.

³⁰⁷ Conceptual exegesis is similar to Brummett’s and Young’s classification of scholarship in *Communication Studies* as “textualcentric.” It is Burkean exegesis, however, whether historical time and place is the motivating *topoi* or text/concept is the motivating *topoi*.

Burke's foundational term, "identification," for New Rhetoric. Like Crable, she aims to reverse a key Burkean concept. Burke argues that human "identification" follows biological alienation. In other words, identification presupposes a symbolic world. According to Burke, humans are biologically divided, separate individuals seeking a re-identification and social belonging which can only be achieved through humans' rhetorical world of symbolic reality. Our common substance is rhetorically created through language. For Burke then, the equation begins with (biological) alienation and ends with a symbolic struggle for identification. Davis points out that Burke borrowed his key terms, "identification" and "motive," from Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* and located *desire* and identification not in the sexual motive (like Freud) but in the social motive. Her central claim, however, is that Burke elided some of Freud's basic principles of identification which call into question Burke's assumption that humans are in a natural (biological) state of alienation. She makes her argument by examining key Freudian texts that analyze an "affective identification" that suggests a biological or pre-identification prior to the symbolic identification. She chiefly relies on Freud's writings on hypnosis and suggestion to further substantiate her case against Burke. She concludes that Freud's more thorough examination of identification as an already *affected* human state prior to symbols or meaning calls into question Burke's assumptions about identification being "compensatory" to biological division. According to Davis, *via* her reading of Freud, Burke overlooks important Freudian insights suggesting that even in our biological states we are always already affected with identification. So the rhetorical problem becomes one of disassociating and dividing not "identification."³⁰⁸ Both Crable's and Davis' articles illustrate very well the second exegetical trend within Burkean studies: conceptual exegesis. Of the thirty articles reviewed in *Rhetoric Review* and *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* I count eight that focus on conceptual interpretation of key Burkean terms.

Seven of the articles reviewed test Burkean theory by application. The scholars in this group apply a key Burkean concept to analyze contemporary or historical events and persons. They briefly explicated a key Burkean term and apply it to analyze speeches and texts. For example, Shane Borrowman and Marcia Kmetz in "Divided We Stand: Beyond Burkean Identification," apply Burke's concept of "division" to analyze the complex ways that the United States' first congresswoman's, Jeannette Rankin's, political career both unites (identification) and divides Montana citizens and themselves. The authors argue that scholars have placed too much emphasis on Burke's concept of identification ignoring his concepts of division. They correct this by applying Burke's identification/division pair to study how Rankin's career (first congresswoman, speeches, and controversial votes in congress) in fact divides as much as it unites. They use Burke's concept of the scapegoat, as theorized in his article "The Rhetoric of Hitler's Battle," to analyze the way Rankin's speeches supporting women's suffrage simultaneously divide and unite her audience. First she unites them all against national waste. She then divides the audience along gender lines (men from women) and finally divides the audience along racial lines (whites from blacks). Ultimately, she uses blacks as a scapegoat to re-

³⁰⁸ A possible counter to Davis' thesis is Bryan Crable's argument in his article "Distance as Ultimate Motive: A Dialectical Interpretation of Motives." Crable argues that scholars have incorrectly focused on "identification" as Burke's ultimate term in *Rhetoric of Motives* but rather should be focusing on "pure persuasion." Burke arrives at "pure persuasion" through a Platonic "Upward" ascension that begins with "identification/division." Pure persuasion is akin to Freud's concept of *desire*. We all are united, in fact, by sharing in the substance of pure persuasion (desire). The desire of pure persuasion is ironically maintained by always being divided – apart from one another. There would be no need for persuasion if we were united. In this sense, division is once again prior to identification although we remain united in "pure persuasion" – the desire to be persuaded.

unite white women and men. The authors' ultimate aim is to "add a rhetoric of division to the cannon of rhetorical study" (280). They do this for the sake of emphasizing that "identification" in its hyperbolic state is a disease that leads to war and severe tyranny – such as Hitler's. Division, they argue is important to a healthy democracy, hence Rankin's dissenting votes to enter both World War I and World War II. She wanted to uphold the principles of democracy which are founded on the ability to dissent – that is divide. Rankin did not want to imitate Hitler's "overly identified" form of government. But, then again, we can over identify with democracy using it as an ultimate motive for invading countries whose government is despotic.

A second example of conceptual application in Burkean studies is Mary E. Tiece's article "Appealing to the 'Intelligent Worker:' Rhetorical Reconstitution and the Influence of Firsthand Experience in the Rhetoric of Leonora O'Reilly." Tiece analyzes the suffragist leader O'Reilly's speeches to illustrate the rhetorical ways she identified with her audience which was largely made up of poor, uneducated women working in sweatshops. The author analyzes several strategies O'Reilly used to identify with her audience: "intelligent worker" (she spoke to the women as already knowing their importance to the larger industrial economy – with respect), "affirmed the weight of labor," (stressed the importance of labor to the industrial might of the nation), "industrial democracy," and "brotherhood of man" (created a common vision for the future in order to overcome resistance to joining unions). Tiece argues that not only did O'Reilly's rhetorical strategies enable her to identify with her audience it also assisted (along with the women's first-hand experience) to "reconstitute" her audience. That is, the women "redefined their identity" from one of an oppressed undereducated working class to "intelligent workers" with a strong will and purpose to transform not only their own working conditions and lives but the moral squalor of their nation. And this, according to Tiece, is O'Reilly's most important rhetorical strategy, employing the notion of "true womanhood" to expand the "traditional" role of women as homemakers. O'Reilly makes the nation the "home" and as such it is women's rightful place to clean up government and that only women can do so. Tiece, then, is an example of applying the Burkean concept of "identification" to analyze an historical event (women's labor unions) and the speeches of a prominent leader.

In summary, only seven of thirty articles apply Burkean concepts to help understand human conflict in a real-world setting. After this brief survey of current literature, our field's dominant Burkean focus is readily apparent. Rhetoric and Composition is mostly focused on historical and conceptual hermeneutics in order to reconstruct and explain Burke's key theories, concepts, and ideas. In doing so, scholars have been doing important work to prepare theoretical paradigms for scholars and researchers who follow to build on and use. Of especial importance is the theoretical and historical exegesis done with Burke's early work such as *Permanence and Change*, *Attitudes Toward History*, and *Philosophy of Literary Form*. To my mind, and for the purposes of my dissertation, this is vitally important because I draw on all of these works including *Grammar of Motives* and *Rhetoric of Motives* to understand the rhetorical constitution of Iraq's Combined Security Mechanism. I especially rely on *Permanence and Change* to discuss the over-identifications of ethnic nationalism in Chapter 1 and *Philosophy of Literary Form* in Chapter 2 to develop a dramatistic research methodology that can be used *in the field of human conflict*. The survey of literature above, however, also reveals a severe lacuna in Burkean studies (and perhaps rhetoric in general). Burke's dramatism is intended to be used not to necessarily better understand Burke's dramatism itself but to better understand and analyze real-world conflicts. I argue that the best way to understand Burke's theory and develop Burke's

theory is to use it in the arena of human conflict – apply it to both teach an analytical mindset and to understand the complexities of our conflicts.

Appendix N: Question Set and Semi-Structured Interviews

Question Set (semi-structured interview)

Questions are intended to be conversational guides for encouraging interviewees to speak as much as possible about their environment, community, and life at the CCPs and to help the interviewer keep the interview focused. It is expected that interviewees' answers will generate more focused follow up question and that the conversations between the researcher and interviewee will naturally emerge and take shape. It is likely that most of the questions below will be answered as the interviewee answers the more general questions. However, with that said, interviewers should use these question sets to ensure that conversations touch on most of the topic areas suggested by the questions. In addition, the researcher should discuss and practice the interview before conducting research, including the text to obtain informed oral consent.

Questions will be translated into both Arabic and Kurdish.

General Initial Questions - Attitude and Purpose Questions

1. In your opinion, what is the purpose / mission of the CCP and the CSM?
2. How would you describe the CSM to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that know nothing about Iraq, its problems and culture)?
3. How would you describe your life/ work at a CCP to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that knows nothing about Iraq, its problems and culture)?
4. If someone asked you to tell a story about yourself and your family (the last two years), what story would you tell them?
5. What are the DIBs?
6. In your opinion, what are the most significant security problems / threats within the DIBs / CSM
7. What are your expectations and what do you think will happen with the CSM after USF-I withdrawal from Iraq?
8. Who do you look up to and who do you consider to be a hero?
9. Who is someone you want to be like

Activities and Interactions

1. What are your primary activities and duties during the day?
2. What people do you interact with the most?

3. What people do you like interacting with the most?
4. Who do you look for at a CCP?
5. Who do you protect? Or what people are protected by a CCP?
6. What do you spend most of your time doing during the day / night?
7. What non CCP /security activities do CCP forces do together?
8. Are your officers from different areas from Iraq?
9. What equipment enables you to do your job?
10. How is equipment distributed among the CCP forces?
11. How would you describe the level and kind of communication between CCP forces?

How can communication be improved?

Future CCP / CSM

12. Who among the forces is trusted the most at the CCP?
13. Currently, how do forces resolve disputes?
14. What is the population's level of trust for the forces?
15. What works well within the CSM / CCP?
16. What can be improved or make the CSM / CCP work better?
17. What is an ideal mechanism for resolving future disputes?
18. Can the CSM remain in place without a third party?
19. What is the ideal situation for the CSM after the USF-I withdrawal?
20. What is something that all Iraqis along the DIBs have in common?

Oral Consent Script: Arabic and Kurdish Translation

Arabic Translation

My name is Melvin Hall and I am a civilian who works for the 4th Infantry Division. I am a social scientist who studies cultures and communities like the Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun.

The 4th ID is responsible for all of the Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) in Northern Iraq. And as you know, the United States Army will be withdrawing from Iraq by the end of the year. Because of the U.S. Army withdrawal from Iraq, the leaders of the 4th ID are responsible for giving advice to the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) regarding the future of the Combined Security Mechanism and Combined Checkpoints.

So I am here to try and understand the life and community of the CCP. In order for the 4th ID to give the best advice and make the best decisions regarding the future of the CCPs, we need to know the reality on the ground from those who live and work at the CCP every day.

The 4th ID wants to give advice after fully understanding what life is like for the soldiers on the CCPs. I would like to interview you about your experience with the CCP. I do not want anyone's name; we are only interested in personal opinions and points of view about the work of the CCPs. The information in interviews will be presented to the commanders of the 4th ID and the U.S. Army. You can decide if you want to participate in the interview or not. The interview is not mandatory. And you can choose the questions which you answer. You do not have to answer any questions or participate in the interviews. In addition, you can choose when and where you would like to be interviewed and if you want to be interviewed as a group or as individuals.

With your permission I would like to make an audio recording of the interview. Also with your permission, I would like to take notes during the interview. Again, the only ones that will see this information are the Commanders of the 4th ID in the form of a report and the information will be used to help the 4th ID give the best advice possible about the future of the CCPs. I (Melvin Hall) will keep and protect the information and will not identify you by name. I want the interviews to be completely anonymous. The information will be presented in a very general way in a report. We want the interview to be conversational, so please ask us any questions you might have during the interview about any topic. Do you have any questions about who I am or why I am here?

اسمي ملفن هال, انا مدني و اعمل مع فرقة المشاة الرابعة للجيش الامريكي. انا عالم اجتماعي و ادرس ثقافات المجتمعات مثل العالم الاسلامي ابن خلدون.

وكما تعرفون ان القوات الامريكية سوف تنسحب من العراق في نهاية السنة الحالية و بسبب هذا الانسحاب واستنادا الى مسؤولية الفرقة الرابعة عن كل السيطرات المشتركة في شمال العراق . سوف يتوجب على هذه الفرقة مسؤولية اضافية من خلال اعطاء النصح للحكومة العراقية، الجيش العراقي، الحرس الاقليمي، و الحكومة الاقليمية الكردية بشأن مستقبل السيطرات المشتركة.

ولكي تتمكن الفرقة الرابعة من اعطاء النصائح الصحيحة للحكومة العراقية واتخاذ القرارات الاحسن بشأن مستقبل السيطرات المشتركة، يتوجب علينا ان نفهم الواقع على الأرض من الذين يعملون ويعيشون في السيطرة المشتركة كل اليوم ولهذا السبب أنا هنا لكي افهم واتعلم عن طبيعة الحياة اليومية والاجتماعية الموجودة في السيطرة المشتركة.

تريد الفرقة الرابعة أن تعطي نصائح بعد أن تحصل على فهم شامل نظرا لحياة الجنود في السيطرة المشتركة. وأريد أن اقابلك عن تجربتك مع السيطرة المشتركة. لا نريد أسماء او اي معلومات شخصية. نحن نهتم بآراء شخصية ووجهات نظر عن عمل السيطرة المشتركة. سوف نقدم المعلومات لقيادة الفرقة الرابعة والجيش الأمريكي. وانت تستطيع ان تقرر إذا اردت ان تشارك في المقابلة. المقابلة ليست اجبارية. وتستطيع ان تختار الاسئلة التي تجيب عليها.

أنت غير مجبر على إجابة الأسئلة أو إجراء هذه المقابلات . بالإضافة إلى ذلك يمكنك اختيار المكان والزمان لإجراء المقابلة أو ما إذا كنت ترغب بمقابلة فردية أو جماعية.

نود أن نعمل تسجيلا صوتيا ونقوم بتدوين بعض الملاحظات خلال هذه المقابلة إذا لم يكن لديك مانع . أود الإشارة مرة أخرى بان هذه المعلومات لن يطلع عليها احد سوى قائد فرقة المشاة الرابعة على صيغة معلومات وتقارير من شأنها دعم فرقة المشاة الرابعة لتقديم أفضل النصائح الممكنة لدعم مستقبل عمل السيطرات المشتركة.

أنا ميلفن هول, سوف أحفظ وأصون هذه المعلومات ولن افشي باسمك الشخصي. وسوف اجعل هذه المقابلات مجهولة بحيث يتم تقديم هذه المعلومات بطريقة عامة وعلى شكل تقارير.

نحن نرغب بان تكون هذه المقابلة على شكل محادثة اعتيادية لهذا نرجو منك أن تسأل أي أسئلة قد تدور في بالك أثناء المقابل و حول أي موضوع.

هل لديك أسئلة من أكون أنا ولماذا أنا هنا؟

General Initial Questions - Attitude and Purpose Questions

1. In your opinion, what is the purpose / mission of the CCP and the CSM?

1. في رأيك ما هو هدف / غرض مهمة السيطرة المشتركة والمناطق الامنية المشتركة؟

2. How would you describe the CSM to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that knows nothing about Iraq, it's problems and culture)?

2. كيف تشرح المناطق الامنية المشتركة لشخص غريب عن العراق.

3. How would you describe your life/ work at a CCP to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that knows nothing about Iraq, its problems and culture)?

3. كيف تشرح معيشتك اليومية ومهمتك في السيطرات المشتركة لشخص غريب عن العراق؟ (شرح ماذا يعني عملهم لهم شخصيا، مع من يعملون، تفصيل لبيئة عملهم وكيف ينظر الآخرون لما يعملون)

4. If someone asked you to tell a story about yourself and your family (the last two years), what story would you tell them?

4. اذا سألك احدهم عن حياتك او حياة عائلتك خلال السنتين الماضيتين, عن اي موضوع سوف تتحدث

5. what are the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs)?

5. ما هي مناطق الحدود الداخلية المتنازع عليها ؟

6. In your opinion, what are the most significant security problems / threats within the DIBs / CSM

من وجهة نظرك ما هي المشاكل او التهديدات الامنية في المناطق الحدودية او السيطرات المشتركة؟

7. What are your expectations and what do you think will happen with the CSM after USF-I withdrawal from Iraq?

ماهي توقعاتك للفترة بعد انسحاب القوات الامريكية؟

8. Who do you look up to and who do you consider to be a hero?

من بوجهة نظرك يعتبر مثالا حسنا او بطلا بنظر المجتمع؟

9. Who is someone you want to be like

من هو المثال الحسن الذي تحب ان تتبعة او تقدي به؟

Activities and Interactions

الانشطة والتفاعل مع المجتمع

1. What are your primary activities and duties during the day?

ماهي الانشطة والمهام اليومية التي تمارسها؟

2. What people do you interact with the most?

من هم الاشخاص الذين تختلط معهم اكثر؟

3. What people do you like interacting with the most?

من هم الاشخاص الذين تحب الاختلاط بهم اكثر؟

4. Who do you look for at a CCP?

من هم الذين تبحثون عنهم في السيطرات المشتركة؟

5. Who do you protect? Or what people are protected by a CCP?

من هم الاشخاص الذين تقومون بحمايتهم بالسيطرات المشتركة؟

6. What do you spend most of your time doing during the day / night?

كيف تقضون اوقاتكم خلال الليل والنهار؟

7. What non security activities do check points forces do together?

ما هي الانشطة الغير امنية التي تقوم بها قوات السيطرة المشتركة معا ؟

8. Are your officers from different areas from Iraq?

هل ضباطكم من مناطق مختلفة من العراق ؟

9. What equipment enables you to do your job?

ما هي المعدات التي تمكنكم من القيام بعملكم ؟

10. How is equipment distributed among the CCP forces?

كيف يتم توزيع المعدات في صفوف قوات السيطرة المشتركة ؟

11. How would you describe the level and kind of communication between CCP forces?

كيف تصف مستوى ونوع الاتصالات بين قوات السيطرة المشتركة ؟

12. How can communication be improved?

كيف يمكن تحسين التواصل؟

Future CCP / CSM

13. Who among the forces is trusted the most at the CCP?

من هو الشخص الاكثر ثقة بين قوات السيطرة المشتركة ؟

14. Currently, how do forces resolve disputes?

حاليا, كيف تقوم القوات بحل الخلافات ؟

15. What is the population's level of trust for the forces?

ماهو مستوى ثقة الناس بهذه القوات ؟

16. What works well within the CSM / CCP?

ما الذي كان اكثر فائدة في المناطق الامنية المشتركة

17. What can be improved or make the CSM / CCP work better?

مالذي من شأنه تطوير او جعل المناطق الامنية المشتركة والسيطرة المشتركة تعمل بشكل افضل ؟

18. What is an ideal mechanism for resolving future disputes?

ما هي الالية المستقبلية لتسوية النزاعات المستقبلية ؟

19. Can the CSM remain in place without a third party?

هل تستطيع المناطق الامنية المشتركة البقاء بدون طرف ثالث؟

20. What is the ideal situation for the CSM after the USF-I withdrawal?

ما هو الوضع المثالي للمناطق الامنية المشتركة بعد انسحاب القوات الامريكية ؟

21. What is something that all Iraqis along the DIBs have in common?

ما هو العامل المشترك لكل العراقيين في مناطق الحدود الداخلية المتنازع عليها؟

Kurdish Translation

My name is Melvin Hall and I am a civilian who works for the 4th Infantry Division. I am a social scientist who studies cultures and communities like the Islamic scholar Ibn Khaldun. The 4th ID is responsible for all of the Combined Checkpoints (CCPs) in Northern Iraq. And as you know, the United States Army will be withdrawing from Iraq by the end of the year. Because of the U.S. Army withdrawal from Iraq, the leaders of the 4th ID are responsible for giving advice to the Iraqi Government, Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) regarding the future of the Combined Security Mechanism and Combined Checkpoints.

Navê min Melvin Hall e, ez kesekî sivîl im û ligel Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn kar dikim. Ez zanyareke komelayetî me ku çand û civakan dixwînim, her wekî zanyarê Islamî Ibn Xeldûn. Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn berpisryarê hemû Xalên Pişkinînê yên hevbeş e li Bakurê Iraqê. Wekî hûn dizanin, Leşkerê Amerîkî dê dawîya vê salê ji Iraqê vekêşe! Ji ber vekêşana Leşkerê Amerîkê ji Iraqê, serkêşên Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn berpirsiyar in ku şîretan bidin Hukûmeta Iraqî, Leşkerê Iraqî, Pêşmerge û Hukûmeta Herêma Kurdistanê (HHK) derbarê ayindeya Mîkanîzma Asayîşa Hevbeş û Xalên Pişkinînê.

So I am here to try and understand the life and community of the CCP. In order for the 4th ID to give the best advice and make the best decisions regarding the future of the CCPs, we need to know the reality on the ground from those who live and work at the CCP every day. The 4th ID wants to give advice after fully understanding what life is like for the soldiers on the CCPs. I would like to interview you about your experience with the CCP. I do not want anyone's name; we are only interested in personal opinions and points of view about the work of the CCPs. The information in interviews will be presented to the commanders of the 4th ID and the U.S. Army in the form of a report. You can decide if you want to participate in the interview or not. The interview is not mandatory. And you can choose the questions which you answer. You do not have to answer any questions or participate in the interviews. In addition, you can choose when and where you would like to be interviewed and if you want to be interviewed as a group or as individuals.

Lewra ez li vir im da ku hewl bidim ku jiyan û civaka Xalên Pişkinînê têbigihim. Heta ku Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn bişê baştirîn şîret bide û baştirîn biryar bistîne derbarê ayindeya Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn, me pêwîstî bi nasîna rastiya rojane heye ji wan kesên ku li Xalên Pişkinînê dijîn û dixebitin. Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn dixwaze şîretan bide piştî baş-têgihîştina rewşa jiyanê bo leşkeran li Xalên Pişkinînê. Ez hez dikim hevpeyvînan ligel we bikim derbarê tecrubeya we li Xalên Pişkinînê. Ez navê kesekî navê, em tenê hez dikim ku nêrînên kesayetî derbarê kar li Xalên Pişkinînê binasin. Agahiyên van hevpeyvînan dê bigihêje destên efserên Leşkerê Amerîkî bi formê raporekê. Tu dişê biryarê bide aya hez dikî beşdarî hevpeyvînê bibe an ne. Ev hevpeyvîn ne mecbûr e. Herwisa tu dişê pirsyaran hilbijêre bo bersivdanê. Ne pêwîst e tu bersiva ti pirsyaran bide yan beşdarî hevpeyvînê bibe. Her weha, tu dişê hilbijêre li kîve û kengî hevpeyvîn durist bibe û aya hez dike wekû grûp yan tekane were hevpeyvîn kirin.

With your permission we would like to make an audio recording of the interview. Also with your permission, we would like to take notes during the interview. Again, the only ones that will see this information are the Commanders of the 4th ID in the form of a report and the information will be used to help the 4th ID give the best advice possible about the future of the CCPs. I (Melvin Hall) will keep and protect the information and will not identify you by name. I want the interviews to be completely anonymous. The information will be presented in a very general way in a report. We want the interview to be conversational, so please ask us any questions you might have during the interview about any topic. Do you have any questions about who I am or why I am here?

Bi ruxseta we em hez dikin hevpeyvînê bi deng tomar bikin. Herwesa, em hez dikin ku têbîniyan binivîsin di dema hevpeyvînê de. Careke dî, kesên ku dê derbarê van agahiyan binasin tenê efserên Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn di formê raporekê de û ev agahî dê werin bi kar înan da ku Beşê Peyan yê Çaremîn baştirîn şîretan bide bo ayindeya Xalên Pişkinînê. Ez (Melvin Hall) dê agahiyan biparêzim û ez dê we bi navê we nenasim. I dixwazim ku ev hevpeyvîn nenas bin. Agahî dê bi riya raporekê bi şêweyekî giştî werin pêşkêş kirin. Em hez dikin ku ev hevpeyvîn ku wekî giftugo be, vêca hemî pirsyaran bikin di dema hevpeyvînê de derbarê hemî mijaran. Aya we hîç pirsyar hene derbarê min û bo çi li vir im?

General Initial Questions - Attitude and Purpose Questions

Pirsyarên giştî

1. (U) In your opinion, what is the purpose / mission of the CCP and the CSM?
1. Di nêrîna te de, armanc ji Xalên Hevbeş yê Pişkinînê û Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş çi ye?
2. (U) How would you describe the CSM to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that knows nothing about Iraq, its problems and culture)?
2. Tu dê çawa Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş şîrove bikî bo kesekê ku hîç agahî derbarê Iraqê nîne?
3. (U) How would you describe your life/ work at a CCP to someone not familiar with Iraq (a complete stranger that knows nothing about Iraq, its problems and culture)?

3. Tu dê çawa jiyan û karê xwe li Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê şîrove bikî bo kesekê ku hîç agahî derbarî Iraqê nîne?

4. (U) If someone asked you to tell a story about yourself and your family (the last two years), what story would you tell them?

4. Eger kesekî ji te xwest tu çîrokekê bibêje derbarî te û mala te (di du salên dawî de), tu dê çi çîrokê bo wan bibêje?

5. (U) What are the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs)?

5. Deverên Kêşe li Ser çi ne?

6. (U) In your opinion, what are the most significant security problems / threats within the DIBs / CSM

6. Di nêrîna te de, çi ne ew girîngtirîn arîşeyên asayîşê li nav Deverên Kêşe li Ser û Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş?

7. (U) What are your expectations and what do you think will happen with the CSM after USF-I withdrawal from Iraq?

7. Têxmînên te çi ne û tu çi hizir dike li Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş rûdaw bibe piştî vekêşana Hêzên Amerîkî ji Iraqê?

8. (U) Who do you look up to and who do you consider to be a hero?

8. Tu li kê seh dikî û tu kê dibîne weku qehreman?

9. (U) Who is someone you want to be like?

9. Tu hez dikî bibe wek kê?

(U) Activities and Interactions

Çalakî û Danûstandin

1. (U) What are your primary activities and duties during the day?

1. Ferztirîn çalakî û erkên te çi bi şeweyekî rojane?

2. (U) What people do you interact with the most?

2. Tu zêde ligel kê danûstandinê dikî?

3. (U) What people do you like interacting with the most?

3. Tu hez dikî zêde ligel kê danûstandinê bike?

4. (U) Who do you look for at a CCP?
4. Tu li kê digerî li Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê?
5. (U) Who do you protect? Or what people are protected by a CCP?
5. Tu kê diparêzî? Xelkên bi Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê têne parastin kî ne?
6. (U) What do you spend most of your time doing during the day / night?
6. Tu dema xwe çawa derbas dike bi roj û şev?
7. (U) What non CCP /security activities do CCP forces do together?
7. Hêzên Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê ligel yêkûdû çi dikin ji bilî çalakiyên asayîşî?
8. (U) Are your officers from different areas from Iraq?
8. Aya efserên we ji deverên cuda ne ji Iraqê?
9. (U) What equipment enables you to do your job?
9. Çi alav alîkariya te dikî bo duristkirina karê te?
10. (U) How is equipment distributed among the CCP forces?
10. Alav çawa di nav Hêzên Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê de têne belav kirin?
11. (U) How would you describe the level and kind of communication between CCP forces?
- How can communication be improved?
11. Tu dê çawa ast û şêweyê danûstandinê di navbera Hêzên Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê de destnîşan bikî? Dê çawa danûstandin bi pêş bikeve?

(U) Future CCP / CSM

Ayindeya Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş/ Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê?

12. (U) Who among the forces is trusted the most at the CCP?
12. Çi kes di nav hêzan de bêtir têtê pêbawer kirin li Xalên Hevbeş yên Pişkinînê?
13. (U) Currently, how do forces resolve disputes?
13. Nuka, hêz çawa kêşeyan çareser dikin?
14. (U) What is the population's level of trust for the forces?

14. Gelo asta pêbaweriyê di nav xelkê de çi ye bo hêzan?
15. (U) What works well within the CSM / CCP?
15. Çi baş kar dike li nav Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş/ Xalên Hevbeş yê Pişkinînê?
16. (U) What can be improved or make the CSM / CCP work better?
16. Çi kar pêwîst e were kirin bo duristkirina karê Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş/ Xalên Hevbeş yê Pişkinînê?
17. (U) What is an ideal mechanism for resolving future disputes?
17. Baştirîn mîkanîsm çi ye bo çareserkirina kêşeyên ayindeyê?
18. (U) Can the CSM remain in place without a third party?
18. Gelo Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş dikarin li cih bimîne bêyî layeke sêyemîn?
19. (U) What is the ideal situation for the CSM after the USF-I withdrawal?
19. Baştirîn çare çi ye bo Deverên Asayîşa Hevbeş piştî vekêşana Hêzên Amerîkî ji Iraqê?
20. (U) What is something that all Iraqis along the DIBs have in common?
20. Çi ye ew tiştê hevbeş ku li dif hemû Iraqiyên Deverên Kêşe li Ser peyda dibe?

Bibliography

Works by Kenneth Burke

- Burke, Kenneth. *Attitudes Toward History*. 3rd Ed. Berkeley: U of California P 1984.
- . "Definition of Man." *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1966.
- . "Dramatism." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Ed. David Sills, 7: 445-52. New York: Macmillan, 1968.
- . "Dramatism and Logology." *Communication Quarterly*. 33.2 (1985): 89-93.
- . *Essays Toward a Symbolic of Motives: 1950-1955*. Ed. William H. Rueckert. West Lafayette: Parlor Press, 2007.
- . "Freud and The Analysis of Poetry." *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973. 258-92.
- . "Four Master Tropes." *A Grammar of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969. 503-17.
- . *A Grammar of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969.
- . "Ideology and Myth." *Accent: A Quarterly of New Literature*. 7.4 (1947): 195-205.
- . "Intuitive or Scientific?" *Nation*, January 29 (1938): 139-40.
- . "In Haste." *Pre/Text*. 6 (1985): 329-77.
- . "Form and Persecution in the *Oresteia*." *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1966.
- . *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature and Method*. Berkeley: U of California P: 1966.
- . "(Nonsymbolic) Motion/(Symbolic) Action." *Critical Inquiry* 4. 4 (Summer, 1978): 809-838
- . *Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose*. 3rd Ed. Berkeley: U of California P, 1984.
- . "Permanence and Change: A Review of Thomas Man's *Joseph and His Brothers*." *Philosophy of Literary Form*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973. 427-29.
- . *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973.

- . "Questions and Answers about the Pentad." *College Composition and Communication*. 29.4 (1978): 330-35.
- . "Revolutionary Symbols in America: Speech by Kenneth Burke to American Writers' Congress, 26 April 1935" *The Legacy of Kenneth Burke*. Ed. Herbert W. Simons and Trevor Melia. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1989.
- . "Rhetoric - Old and New." *The Journal of General Education*. 5.3 (1951): 202-09.
- . *A Rhetoric of Motives*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1969.
- . "Semantic and Poetic Meaning." *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1973. 138-167.
- . "Twelve Propositions on the Relation Between Economics and Psychology." *Science and Society*. 2 (1938) 242-49. Rpt. in *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, 305-13.
- . "Symbolic War." *The Southern Review*. 2 (1936): 134-47.
- . "What are the Signs of What." *Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method*. Berkeley: U of California P, 1966.
- . "War and Cultural Life." *American Journal of Sociology*. 48.3 (1942): 404-10.

Works Cited and Consulted

- Aristophanes. "The Birds." *The Complete Plays*. Trans. Paul Roche. New York: New American Library, 2005.
- Anderson, Dana. *Identity's Strategy: Rhetorical Selves in Conversation*. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2007.
- Bakhtin, M.M. *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essay by M.M. Bakhtin*. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Eds. Micahel Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. Austin: U of Texas P, 1990.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. "Delegation and Political Fetishism." *Language and Symbolic Power*. Trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Ed. John B. Thompson. Harvard UP: Cambridge. 2003.
- Brock, Bernard L. "Secular piety" *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*. Ed. Thomas O. Sloane. 2006 *Oxford University Press*. *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric: (e-reference edition)*. Oxford University Press. University of Wisconsin - Madison. 25 June 2012 <http://www.oxford-rhetoric.com/entry?entry=t223.e224>

- Brock, Bernard L, Kenneth Burke, Parke G. Burgess, and Herbert W. Simons. "Dramatism as Ontology or Epistemology: A Symposium." *Communication Quarterly*. 33.1 (1985): 17-33.
- Carter, C. Allen. "Kenneth Burke and the Bicameral Power of Myth." *Poetics Today*. 18.3 (1997): 343-73.
- Chesterton, G.K. "The Maniac." *Orthodoxy*. New York: Image Books, Doubleday, 2001. 1-24.
- Clark, Gregory. *Rhetorical Landscapes in America: Variations on a Theme from Kenneth Burke*. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 2004.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. *On War*. Ed. Anatol Rapoport. New York: Penguin Books, 1982.
- Coupe, Laurence. *Kenneth Burke on Myth: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Crable, Bryan. "Burke's Perspective of Perspectives: Grounding Dramatism in the Representative Anecdote," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 86.3 (2000): 318-333.
- Davis, Diane. "Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 38.2 (2008): 123-147.
- Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. *Demons*. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. New York: Vintage Classics, 1994.
- Enoch, Jessica. "Becoming Symbol-Wise: Kenneth Burke's Pedagogy of Critical Reflection." *College Composition and Communication* 56.2 (2004): 272-296.
- Feehan, Michael. "Oscillation as Assimilation: Kenneth Burke's Latest Revisions." *PRE/TEXT: A Journal of Rhetorical Theory*. 6.3-4 (1985): 319-27.
- Fernheimer, Janice W. "Black Jewish Identity Conflict: A Divided Universal Audience and the Impact of Dissociative Disruption." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 39.1 (2009): 46-72.
- Freud, Sigmund. "The Question of a *Weltanschauung*: New Introductory Lectures on *Psychoanalysis*. Trans. and Ed. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. 2nd Ed. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Continuum, 2003.
- Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Hammes, Colonel Thomas X. *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. Minneapolis: Zenith P, 2006.
- Hawhee, Debra. "Burke and Nietzsche." *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 85:2 (1999): 129-145

- . *Moving Bodies: Kenneth Burke at the Edges of Language*. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 2009.
- Homer. *The Iliad*. Trans. Richmond Lattimore. Chicago: U of Chicago P: 1961.
- MacIntyre, Alasdair. *After Virtue*. 2nd Ed. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1984.
- Malinowski, Bronislaw. *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland P, Inc, 1984.
- Ohmann, Richard. *English in America: A Radical View of the Profession*. Hanover: Wesleyan UP, 1996.
- O'Neill, Bard E. *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc, 2005.
- Petreus, David H. and James F. Amos. *Counterinsurgency: FM 3-24*. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006.
- Race, Jeffrey. *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province*. Berkeley: U of California P, 2010.
- Rountree, Clarke. "Revisiting the Controversy over Dramatism as Literal." *KB Journal* 6.2 (2010): n. pag. web. 14 November 2011
- . "Coming to Terms with Kenneth Burke's Pentad." *The American Communication Journal* 1.3 (1998): n. pag. web. 10 May 2012.
- Thucydides. *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Trans. Rex Warner. Penguin Books: New York, 1986.
- . *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to The Peloponnesian War*. Ed. Robert S. Strassler, 2008.
- Weaver, Richard. "The Cultural Role of Rhetoric." *Visions of Order*. Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995.
- . "A Dialectic on Total War." *Visions of Order*. Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995.
- . *The Ethics of Rhetoric*. Hermagoras P: Davis, CA, 1985.
- . "Forms and Social Cruelty." *Visions of Order*. Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995.
- Weil, Simone. "The Iliad, Or the Poem of Force." *War and the Iliad: Simone Weil, Rachel Bespaloff*. New York: New York Review Book, 2005.

- Wible, Scott. "Professor Burke's 'Bennington Project.'" *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 38:3 (2008): 259-282
- Weiser, M. Elizabeth. *Burke, War, Words: Rhetoricizing Dramatism*. Columbia, SC: U of South Carolina P, 2008.
- White, Hayden. *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1975.
- Wilcus, A. Curtis. *Latin America in Maps: Historic, Geographic, Economic*. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1943.
- Williams, Mark T. "Ordering Rhetorical Contexts with Burke's Terms of Order." *Rhetoric Review*. 24.2 (2005). 170-87. JSTOR. 08 August 2011.
- Wess, Robert. "Burke's Dialectic of Constitutions." *PRE/TEXT: A Journal of Rhetorical Theory*. 22.1-2 (1991): 10-30.
- . *Kenneth Burke: Rhetoric, Subjectivity, Postmodernism*. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996.

Literature Review of Burkean Studies in *Rhetoric Review* and *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* for Introduction and Appendix M

Historical Exegesis

Rhetoric Review

- Beasley, James P. "Demetrius, *Deinotes*, and Burkean Identification at the University of Chicago." *Rhetoric Review*. 29.3 (2010): 275-92. JSTOR. Web. 02 July 2011
- Jordon, Jay. "Dell Hymes, Kenneth Burke's "Identification" and the Birth of Sociolinguistics." *Rhetoric Review*. 24.3 (2005): 264-79.
- King, Andrew. "Burkean Theory Reborn: How Burkean Theory Assimilated Its Post-Modern Critics." *Rhetoric Review*. 20.1 (2001): 32-27.
- Seigel, Marika A. "'One Little Fellow Named Ecology:' Ecological Rhetoric in Kenneth Burke's Attitudes Toward History." *Rhetoric Review*. 23.4 (2004): 388-404. JSTOR 08 August 2011.
- Weiser, M. Elizabeth. "Burke and War." *Rhetoric Review* 26.3 (2007): 286-302

Rhetoric Society Quarterly

- Betts Van Dyk, Krista K. "From the Plaintiff to the Comic: Kenneth Burke's Towards a Better Life." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 36:1(2006): 31-53 (mixed)

George, Ann and Jack Selzer. "What Happened at the First American Writers' Congress? Kenneth Burke's 'Revolutionary Symbolism in America.'" *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 33.2 (2003): 47-66

Hawhee, Debra. "Burke on Drugs." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 34.1 (2004): 5-28.

Jack, Jordynn. "Kenneth Burke's Constabulary Rhetoric: Sociorhetorical Critique in Attitudes Toward History." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 38:1 (2008): 66-81

Nicotra, Jodie. "Dancing Attitudes in Wartime: Kenneth Burke and General Semantics." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 39:4 (2009): 331-352

Crable, Bryan. "Race and 'A Rhetoric of Motives:' Kenneth Burke's Dialogue with Ralph Ellison." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 33.3 (2003): 5-25. JSTOR. Web. 19 June 2012.

Overall, Joel. "Piano and Pen: Music as Kenneth Burke's Secular Conversion." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 41:5 (2011): 439-454

Wible, Scott. "Professor Burke's 'Bennington Project.'" *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, 38.3 (2008): 259-282

Tell, David. "Burke's Encounter with Ransom: Rhetoric and Epistemology in 'Four Master Tropes.'" *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 34.4 (2004): 33-54.

Conceptual Explication (Textual Exegeses)

Rhetoric Review

Brummett, Barry. "Speculations on the Discovery of a Burkean Blunder." *Rhetoric Review*. 14:1 (1995): 221-225 JSTOR 2 July 2011.

Crable, Bryan. "Symbolizing Motion: Burke's Dialectic and Rhetoric of the Body." *Rhetoric Review*. 22.2 (2003): 121-37. JSTOR. 2 July 2011.

Williams, Mark T. "Ordering Rhetorical Contexts with Burke's Terms of Order." *Rhetoric Review*. 24.2 (2005). 170-87. JSTOR. 08 August 2011.

Rhetoric Society Quarterly

---. "Distance as Ultimate Motive: A Dialectical Interpretation of A Rhetoric of Motives." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 39:3 (2009): 213-239

Desilet, Gregory and Edward C. Appel. "Choosing a Rhetoric of the Enemy: Kenneth Burke's Comic Frame, Warrantable Outrage, and the Problem of Scapegoating." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 41:4 (2011): 340-362

Davis, Diane. "Identification: Burke and Freud on Who You Are." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 38.2 (2008): 123-147.

McClure, Kevin. Resurrecting the Narrative Paradigm: Identification and the Case of Young Earth Creationism.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 39.2 (2009): 189-2011. Routledge. Web. 19 June 2012.

Prelli Lawrence J., Floyd D. Anderson and Matthew T. Althouse. “Kenneth Burke on Recalcitrance.” *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*. 41:2 (2011): 97-124. Routledge. Web. 19 June 2012.

Conceptual Application (Texts, Speeches, or Interdisciplinary Studies)

Borrowman, Shane and Marcia Kmetz Divided We Stand: Beyond Burkean Identification. *Rhetoric Review*. 30:3 (2011): 275-292

DeGenaro, William. “The New Deal: Burkean Identification and Working-Class Poetics.” *Rhetoric Review*. 26.4 (2007): 385-404. JSTOR. 15 October 2011.

Jensen, Kyle. “A Matter of Concern: Kenneth Burke, Phishing, and the Rhetoric of National Insecurity.” *Rhetoric Review*. 30.2 (2011): 170-90.

Mays, Chris and Julie Jung. “Priming Terministic Inquiry: Toward a Methodology of Neurorhetoric” *Rhetoric Review* 31:1 (2012): 41-59 JSTOR 2 March 2013.

Pruchnic, Jeff. “Rhetoric, Cybernetics, and the Work of the Body in Burke’s Body of Work.” *Rhetoric Review*. 25. 3 (2006): 275–96. JSTOR 2 July 2011.

Thompson, Jason. “Magic for a People Trained in Pragmatism: Kenneth Burke, Mein Kampf, and the Early 9/11 Oratory of George W. Bush.” *Rhetoric Review*. 30.4 (2011): 350-371. JSTOR. 19 June 2012.

Rhetoric Society Quarterly

Triece, Mary E. “Appealing to the 'Intelligent Worker:' Rhetorical Reconstitution and the Influence of Firsthand Experience in the Rhetoric of Leonora O'Reilly.” 33.2 (2003): 5-24. JSTOR. 19 June 2012.

History of Iraq

Abdul-Jabar, Faleh and Hosham Dawod. Eds. *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi, 2003.

Ahmad, Feroz. “The Young Turk Revolution.” *Journal of Contemporary History*. 3.3. July 1968.

Anderson, Liam and Gareth Stansfield. *Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise*. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2009.

- Bartu, Peter. "Wrestling with the Integrity of a Nation: the Disputed Internal Boundaries in Iraq." *International Affairs*. 86.6 (2010), 1329-1343.
- Batatu, Hanna. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*. London: Saqi Books, 2004. (first published by Princeton UP, 1978).
- Bliss, Edwin Munsell. "1894: Kurds, Armenians, and Turks." *Harper's Weekly*. Number 38 (December 29, 1894): 1242. Web. *International Journal of Kurdish Studies*. 19 May 2011.
- Bremer, L. Paul. *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York: Threshold Edition, 2006.
- Chapman, Dennis P. *Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government*. U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2008.
- Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt and Company: 1989.
- Glanz, James. "Ex-Diplomat Who Advised Kurds Gets Millions in Oil Deal." *New York Times*. 6 October 2010 web.
- Güçlü, Yücel. "Who Owns Kirkuk? The Turkoman Case." *Middle East Quarterly*. (Winter 2007), 79-86. Web. 02 February 2012.
- Gunter, Michael M. "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq." *Middle East Journal*. 50.2 (Spring, 1996), 224-241.
- Hodgson, Marshall G.S. *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*. 3 Vols. U of Chicago P: Chicago, 1977.
- Jwaideh, Wadie. *The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development*. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 2006. (Originally an unpublished dissertation completed in early 1960).
- Kaplan. Robert D. *The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite*. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
- Khalil, Lydia. "Stability in Iraqi Kurdistan: Reality or Mirage." *The Seban Institute for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute*. Working Paper 2 (2009).
- "Kurds Move to Upend Status Quo in Kirkuk." *NPR: Morning Edition*. 30 March 2011. Accessed 20 September 2012. <http://www.npr.org/2011/03/30/134975038/iraq-update>
- Lawrence, Quil. *Invisible Nation: How the Kurds' Quest for Statehood is Shaping Iraq and the Middle East*. New York: Walker & Company, 2008.

Mamikonian, Sargis. "Israel and the Kurds: 1949-1990." *Iran and the Caucasus* 9.2 (2005): 381-99.

McDowall, David. *A Modern History of the Kurds*. 3rd ed. London: I.B. Taurus, 2009.

Post, Jerrold and Amatzia Baram. "Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam." *The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 17*. Air University, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2003.

Taylor, Scott. *Among the 'Others:' Encounters with the Forgotten Turkmen of Iraq*. Ottawa: Esprit de Corp Books, 2004.

Tripp, Charles. *A History of Iraq*. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.

Weaver, Teri. "Northern Checkpoints a Laboratory for Arab-Kurd Relations." *Stars and Stripes*. 29 September 2010. On-line Newspaper. <http://www.stripes.com/news/northern-checkpoints-a-laboratory-for-arab-kurd-relations-1.120026>

Writing the Iraq Constitution. Blank Creative. Youtube. TVC Animated Film. Web. 1 April 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkHF3GF6BoA>

"Who Owns Kerkuk: Examination of Basic Dimensions." Iraqi Turkmen Human Rights Research Foundation. 13 Sept. 2011: Art. 5-J1311. pp.1-13. Web. 3 April 2012