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United States Department of State

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Foreign
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1949


Volume VII

THE FAR EAST
AND
AUSTRALASIA

(in two parts)
Part I

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
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


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ELIOT CHILD





Foreign Relations
of the
United States
1949

Volume VII

The Far East
and Australasia

(in two parts)

Part 1



United States
Government Printing Office
Washington : 1975

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PREFACE

Part 1 of this volume was prepared under the direct supervision of the late S. Everett Gleason, former editor of *Foreign Relations*, and Fredrick Aandahl, the present editor.

John G. Reid compiled and edited all of the documentation in part 1.

The editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided them by the historians of the Department of Defense, including those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The technical editing of this volume was done by the Publishing and Reproduction Division, headed by Willard M. McLaughlin. The index for part 1 was prepared by Francis C. Prescott.

Part 2 will contain documentation on Japan, Korea, and on the policies of the United States with regard to the East Asian-Pacific area generally, with particular reference to proposals for the formation of regional associations or pacts.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN
*Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs*

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United

States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- ACJ**, Allied Council for Japan
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AMIK, American Mission in Korea
AmRep, American Representative (Korea)
AP, Associated Press
APOs, Allied political officers (Japan)
AusDel, Australian Delegate (or Delegation)
BelDel, Belgian Delegate (or Delegation)
Benelux, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg
BFO, *Bijeenkomst voor federaal Overleg* (Assembly for Federal Consultation, or Federal Consultative Council, Indonesia)
BIO, bill on government for Indonesia during transition period (Netherlands)
C 1, Committee 1, Far Eastern Commission
C 2, Committee 2, Far Eastern Commission
C 4, Committee 4, Far Eastern Commission
CA, circular airgram; or Division (after October 3, 1949, Office) of Chinese Affairs, Department of State
Cantel, series indicator for telegrams from branch of the United States Embassy in China at Canton
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CG, Commanding General; or Coast Guard
CGO, Committee of Good Offices (see GOC)
CHO, cease-hostilities order (Indonesia)
CIC, Counter Intelligence Corps
CINCFE, Commander in Chief, Far East
cirtel, circular telegram
CJB, Central Joint Board (Indonesia cease-hostilities military group)
CNAC, China National Aviation Corporation
CNR, Canadian National Railways
COMNAVFE, U.S. Commander of Naval Forces, Far East
COMRYKOM, Commanding, Ryukyus Command
ConGen, Consul General
CP, Communist Party
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (London)
CSUSA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
DA, Department of the Army (U.S.)
daerah, autonomous area (Indonesia)
DEC, French unit (headed by Colonel Fourcaud) in Indochina
Depins, Department instruction
Dept, Department of State
Deptel, Department telegram
DRR, Deconcentration Review Board (Japan)
E, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
EE, Division (after October 3, 1949, Office) of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ESS, Economic and Scientific Section, Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan

VIII LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

- ETA**, estimated time of arrival
FACC, Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (Korea)
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service
FCN, friendship, commerce, and navigation (treaty)
FE, Office (after October 3, 1949, Bureau) of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FEC, Far Eastern Commission; or Far East Command
FIC, French Indochina
FIG, Federal Interim Government (Indonesia)
FLC, Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
FonAff, Foreign Affairs
FonOff, Foreign Office
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FTC, Fair Trade Commission (Japan)
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information
G, Deputy Under Secretary of State
G-2, Intelligence section (U.S. Army)
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GARIOA, Government and Relief in Occupied Areas
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GHQ, General Headquarters
GI, Government Issue (U.S. Army personnel)
GIC, Government of Indochina
Gimo, Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek, China)
GOC, United Nations Good Offices Committee in Indonesia; or General Officer Commanding
Gocus, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the U.S. member of the United Nations Good Offices Committee in Indonesia
GOL, Government of India
HOLC, Holding Company Liquidation Commission (Japan)
Hicus, series indicator for telegrams to the Department of State from the U.S. member of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia at The Hague conference
HMG, His (Britannic) Majesty's Government
HRC, High Representative of the Crown (Netherlands) in Indonesia
IC, Indochina
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICJ, International Court of Justice (The Hague)
ID, Intelligence Division (Korea)
IMF, International Monetary Fund
IMTFE, International Military Tribunal for Far East
Indo, Indonesian
IndoDel, Indonesian Republic Delegate (or Delegation)
IPS, International Prosecution Section, International Military Tribunal, Tokyo
ITO, International Trade Organization
ITU, International Telecommunication Union
JCOS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMAC, Joint Munitions Allocation Committee (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff)
JUSMAG, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines
KMAG, U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea
KNIL, Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army
KNIP, *Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat* (*Komisi Nasional Indonesia Pusat*), central Indonesian national committee (central Indonesian national assembly, or provisional parliament of Indonesian Republic)
KODM's, anti-Netherlands group in Indonesia
KSF, Korean Security Forces
ky, administrative district in French Indochina (e.g., Cochin-China)
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LJC's, local joint committees (of cease-hostilities period) in Indonesia
MAP, Military Assistance Program
Masjoemi (*Masjumi*), Moslem League (Indonesia)
ME, Middle East

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES IX

- Merdeka**, Indonesian for Freedom
mfn, most favored nation
MilEx, Military Executive Board (Indonesia)
MilObs, Military Observers for Batavia consular corps
MVD, Ministry of Internal Affairs (U.S.S.R.)
mydes, my despatch
NA, Division (after October 3, 1949, Office) of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State; or Naval Attaché
NAC, National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems
NAP, North Atlantic Pact
NEA, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (after October 3, 1949, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs), Department of State
negara, state (Indonesia)
NEI, Netherlands East Indies
NethDel, Netherlands Delegate (or Delegation)
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NME, National Military Establishment
NPC, National Preparatory Committee (Indonesian pre-independence unit)
NSC, National Security Council
NWA, Northwest Airlines
NYA, National Youth Administration
O, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas
OCI, Overseas Consultants, Inc. (New York)
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OFLC, Office of Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
OIR, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
OSR, Office of the Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration
P&O, Plans and Operations, Army Department
PC, patrol vessel, submarine chaser
PCJ, Netherlands broadcasting system
PKI, *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesian Communist Party)
PMAG, Provisional Military Advisory Group
POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
PolAd, Political Adviser
PPS, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
PSA, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State
PX, Post Exchange (U.S. Army)
RCT, Regimental Combat Team
reftel, reference telegram
Rep, Indonesian Republic; or representative
reps, representatives
RepubDel, Indonesian Republic(an) Delegate (or Delegation)
Repubs, Indonesian Republicans
res, resolution
reurtels, regarding your telegrams
RFC, Reconstruction Finance Corporation
RIS, *Republik Indonesia Serikat* (United Republic of Indonesia, or United States of Indonesia)
ROK, Republic of Korea
ROTC, Reserve Officers' Training Corps
RPF, French People's Rally
RTC, Round Table Conference (The Hague)
RUSI, Republic of United States of Indonesia
S, Secretary of State (or Office of the)
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SANACC, State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (successor of SWNCC)
SC, Security Council of the United Nations; or Far Eastern Commission steering committee
SCAP, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan
Scapin, SCAP instruction
SEA, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State; or Southeast Asia

X LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

- SKLP**, South Korean Labor Party
SOA, Division (after October 3, 1949, Office) of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
SQL, *status quo* line (Indonesian truce)
SWNCC, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
SYG, Secretary-General of the United Nations
TBA, *Territorial Bestuurs Adviseurs* (Netherlands East Indies term for territories of Djambi, Tapanuli, Benkulen, Lampongs, Minankabbau Siak, Indragiri, and Pagaralam in Sumatra)
TDY, temporary duty
Telcan, series indicator for telegrams to branch of the United States Embassy in China at Canton
TNI, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National army)
UNA, Office (after October 3, 1949, Bureau) of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNCFIN, United Nations Commission for Indonesia
UNCI, United Nations Commission for Indonesia
UNCOK, United Nations Commission on Korea
UNCOM, United Nations Commission
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNO, United Nations Organization
UNOGA, United Nations Organization General Assembly
UNP, Division of United Nations Political Affairs (after October 3, 1949, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs), Department of State
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSEC, United Nations Secretary-General
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General
UPU, Universal Postal Union
urdes, your despatch
URI, United Republic of Indonesia
urinfo, your information
urtel, your telegram
USAFIK, U.S. Army Forces in Korea
USDel, U.S. Delegate (or Delegation)
Usgoc, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the U.S. member of the United Nations Good Offices Committee in Indonesia
Ushic, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the U.S. member of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia at The Hague conference
USI, United States of Indonesia
USIE, U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Program
USIS, U.S. Information Service
USPolAd, U.S. Political Adviser
USUN, U.S. Mission at the United Nations
VOA, Voice of America (broadcasts)
VOUSA, Voice of America
wali negara, head of State (Indonesia)
WE, Division (after October 3, 1949, Office) of Western European Affairs, Department of State
Weeka, weekly, inter-agency, summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions
WU, Western Union
YMS, motor mine sweeper

AUSTRALASIA

AUSTRALIA

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA RESPECTING A UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION IN AUSTRALIA

[For text of Agreement, signed at Canberra, November 26, 1949, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1994, or 64 Stat. (pt. 3) B 39.]

NEW ZEALAND

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEW ZEALAND RESPECTING A UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION IN NEW ZEALAND

[For text of Agreement, amending Agreement of September 14, 1948, effected by exchange of notes dated at Wellington, March 3 and 9, 1949, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1912.]

EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

CHINA

(See volumes VIII and IX.)

FRENCH INDOCHINA

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN NATIONALIST OPPOSITION TO THE RESTORATION OF FRENCH RULE IN INDOCHINA¹

851G.00/1-1449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, January 14, 1949—2 p. m.

164. Pignon² told me Wednesday night that he is well aware that government should take adequate measures to assure inhabitants of Indochina that government stands firmly on Bay D'Along agreements.³ He hopes Assembly can be persuaded to ratify them formally. He remarked that he believes Communist successes in China will frighten a great many Vietnamese who have been apathetic or indifferent and cause them to rally to Bao Dai.⁴

Sent Department 164, repeated Saigon 5.

CAFFERY

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1948, volume vi. Additional documentation on French Indochina is included in the material on general U.S. policies with respect to East Asian-Pacific area, scheduled for publication in part 2 of the present volume. Documentation on U.S. policy toward Indochina during 1949 also appears in United States Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, 12 vols. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971), Books 1 and 8.

² Léon Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indochina.

³ See telegram 5398, December 16, 1947, 6 p. m., from Paris, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. vi, p. 150, and despatch 30, June 6, 1948, from Hanoi, *ibid.*, 1948, vol. vi, p. 24.

⁴ Former Emperor of Annam negotiating with the French regarding a new régime for Indochina.

851G.00/1-1049 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1949—6 p. m.

145. Daridan¹ has expressed to Dept same view contained penultimate para urtel 107 Jan 10² qualifying his remarks however with statement that he uninformed developments past ten days which might explain optimism Overseas France officials in urtel 106 Jan 10² re negotiations with Bao Dai.

¹ Jean Daridan, Counselor of the French Embassy.

² Not printed.

While Dept desirous French coming to terms with Bao Dai or any truly nationalist group which has reasonable chance winning over preponderance of Vietnamese, we cannot at this time irretrievably commit US to support of native govt which by failing develop appeal among Vietnamese might become virtually puppet govt, separated from people and existing only by presence French military forces. Accordingly, Emb should make no additional representations to French until and unless further instructed by Dept which does not believe it desirable go beyond position outlined Deptel 2637 Jul 14³ its reftel 3621 Jul 9 from Paris⁴ and Embtel 5129 Sep 30.⁵

Dept will inform Emb re possibility any common anti-Communist action Indochina (third para Embtel 107) after it has recd Brit views as Emb London reports Brit FonOff has instructed Brit Emb Wash discuss matter with Dept.

LOVETT

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵ Not printed.

851G.00/1-1949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, January 19, 1949—9 p. m.

250. Pignon-Bao Dai conversations ended yesterday. Pignon returned Paris, saw Coste-Floret¹ who this morning informed Cabinet results Cannes meetings. According communiqué, cabinet "took note atmosphere cordiality and reciprocal sympathy in which conversations, which will continue in Paris at end of week, took place".

Upon termination final meeting Bao Dai spokesman stated: "We agreed on all questions examined. Only lack of time prevented us from concluding agreement here. Work will be pursued Friday in Paris of drafting definite agreements which will be incorporated in solemn act which will make Vietnam an associated state. We are optimistic as to final outcome." Spokesman added Bao Dai might make announcement on January 29—Annamite New Year's day—of his plans re return Indochina.

Pignon simply stated any announcement would have to come from Bao Dai. "I think he will make one soon". Bao Dai will not come to Paris for meetings beginning Friday which apparently will be devoted to drafting by technicians.

Press treatment of Cannes meetings on whole optimistic except for current Communist and fellow-traveler anti-Bao Dai pro-Ho² cam-

¹ Paul Coste-Floret, French Minister for Overseas France.

² Ho Chi Minh, President of the Provisional Government of Vietnam Democratic Republic".

paign. Minor disturbing element is motion adopted political affairs committee, Assembly French Union, calling for negotiations with all Viet elements including "groups associated with Ho Chi Minh".

Sent Department, repeated Saigon 9.

CAFFERY

S51G.01/1-2049: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, January 20, 1949—2 p. m.

260. Pignon informed us today in utmost confidence govt has made important decision to request Assembly approval outcome present negotiations.

He stated Cannes conversations had resulted in agreement on fundamentals and the parties were well along in drafting stage. Bao Dai had insisted and Pignon had agreed that because of present status of Cochin China previous parliamentary approval was essential if agreements were effectively to confer on Vietnam the attributes of unity and independence which are heart of Baie d'Along accord and represent minimum to insure acceptance of Bao Dai solution by people. While measures might be taken in Saigon to transfer administrative functions to Vietnamese, the administration of justice can only be transferred by a positive legislative act. Sovereignty, he said, has two aspects—external and internal, for internal sovereignty it is justice. Under Cochin China treaty justice is in hands of French. It cannot be transferred to Vietnamese without formal change in status of Cochin China which necessitates parliamentary approval.

Govt is now studying timing of Bao Dai's return and form of submission to Parliament. Pignon (who professes no competence in politics) stated any debate would have to take place before cantonal elections, i.e. before March 15, and implied Bao Dai would not return before then. He recognized political difficulties which faced govt, but did not consider either Gaullist or Socialist leadership would actively oppose agreements. He thought however that there would undoubtedly be large number of abstentions. He was reservedly optimistic of favorable vote but said if govt should reverse decision to present matter squarely to Parliament or if vote was negative he would resign.

Embassy will watch carefully and report political evolution this decision to grasp nettle which, however sound in conception, will present govt with series very tricky political problems. Pignon leaves for Saigon January 24.

Repeated Saigon 10.

CAFFERY

851G.01/2-1849: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, February 18, 1949—7 p. m.

718. Buuloc, Bao Dai's cousin and *Chef de Cabinet*, who has just returned from Cannes, told us last night that conversations were progressing in generally satisfactory manner and it was hoped complete negotiations next week when Bao Dai comes to Paris at invitation President Auriol. In this event Bao Dai would return in early April on French warship. His cousin said he had ordered complete set tropical clothing.

Formula for changed status Cochin-China and ratification by French Parliament which Buuloc indicated Bao Dai had accepted now appears to be following: Article 75 French Constitution provides status parts French Republic and French Union can evolve and that change from one category to another takes place by law voted by French Parliament after appropriate territorial assembly and Assembly French Union have been consulted. Cochin-China, now French overseas territory, would become part of Vietnam, an associated state of French Union. Thus abandonment of sovereignty or cession of territory, as contemplated under Article 27 of Constitution, would take place and no referendum required. Therefore after return Bao Dai and favorable vote of to-be-organized territorial assembly of Cochin-China and Assembly French Union, French Parliament would be requested vote law confirming desire Cochin-China change its status under Article 75 rather than cession of territory under Article 27. (Not clear why this was not thought up before.) Presumably Parliament receive at same time above described law for approval and treaty for ratification.

Re diplomatic classes agreement, Buuloc told us that Bao Dai could have diplomatic secretaries attached to any French mission but that number of separate missions would be limited to three. He and French are agreed on Siam and Vatican but for third French propose China and Bao Dai wants (but does not expect to get) Washington. There is no limitation, however, on number foreign missions Bao Dai can receive and Buuloc hinted strongly that former Emperor was looking forward to welcoming in the near future first American minister there.

Sent Department, repeated Saigon 18.

CAFFERY

851G.01/2-1849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1949—8 p. m.

598. Urtel 718, Feb 18. Dept despite reported progress Fr-Bao Dai negots queries whether Fr are really making such concessions as to (1) induce Bao Dai return Indochina (2) give him best opportunity succeed even if he returns there. For months, even though Commie successes China should have induced Fr make outstanding effort, negots have dragged, with Fr unable or unwilling put question status Cochinchina before Fr Assembly. Foregoing connection Dept fully realizes polit difficulties present Fr Govt putting this question before Assembly but Dept equally aware that over past three years Fr have shown no impressively sincere intention or desire make concessions which seem necessary solve Indochina question. Present formula solving status Cochinchina may have virtue but in Dept's thinking it may be but another device to obtain delay and unless proof is adduced to offset record of past three years Dept is now far from inclined give public approval any arrangements with Bao Dai. This disinclination springs from Dept's considered belief it would be unwise give public support to any arrangements for Indochina concluded by Fr unless that arrangement embodies means clearly sufficient insure its success or until it achieves substantial measure of success. Thus even though Bao Dai induced return Indochina Dept views failure Fr Govt take decisive action, at very least re status Cochinchina, as seriously weakening possibility ex-Emperor will obtain support any appreciable portion population. Without such support Bao Dai cannot hope, even though supported by Fr arms as he must necessarily be, wean away militant and organized followers of Ho Chi Minh.

Dept believes therefore it should not now be committed in any way to approval Fr action vis-à-vis Bao Dai and must reserve aforementioned public expression until Fr have provided Bao Dai with means to succeed and he has demonstrated ability use successfully such means to obtain support appreciable portion Vietnamese population. This connection, Emb may recall doubts expressed in several Fr quarters re Bao Dai's capacities and abilities when negots were first undertaken with him two years ago. Accordingly Emb should make clear to FonOff that for these reasons US not prepared give public indication its approval until, in Dept's opinion, conditions noted above fulfilled.

At same time Emb may state while US remains willing reconsider its ECA Indochinese policy such reconsideration must await developments.

Sent Paris as 598. Rptd Saigon as 15.

Emb should note particularly with respect to first part para 1 that above tel was drafted before receipt Embtel 771 Feb. 24, 4 p. m.¹

ACHESON

¹ Not printed.

851G.00/2-2549 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, February 25, 1949—9 p. m.

807. Foreign Office source describes as "quite accurate as far as they go" report carried today's press giving following highlights of forthcoming Franco-Vietnam agreement :

1. Independence and unity Vietnam within French Union. Vietnam to have complete administrative autonomy.

2. Vietnam to receive and accredit diplomatic representatives subject to agreement President of French Union.

3. Vietnam to have national army with French instructors and specialists. In peace time will have combined Franco-Vietnam General Staff and in war time single Commander-in-Chief. Strategic bases to be conceded to France.

4. Piastre to be part of franc zone. French citizens to pay same taxes as Vietnamese.

5. Vietnam to recruit necessary technicians in France.

6. Vietnam to grant full liberty for teaching French in all grades public and private schools. France to be permitted to establish scientific institutes. System of equivalents to be worked out between French and Vietnam diplomats.

Sent Department 807; passed Saigon 24.

CAFFERY

851G.01/3-649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, March 6, 1949—2 p. m.

928. Embassy has for some time made broad hints to Foreign Office and Ministry Overseas France that sooner we received text Bao Dai agreement sooner US Government could make decision as to what, if any, degree support it would give proposed solution. Upon receipt Deptel 598,¹ Devinat² was directly requested furnish advance copy and a favorable response is expected shortly. Accord is still being worked on and will be signed (and probably published) Tuesday.

¹ February 25, p. 8.

² Paul Devinat, vice president of the Committee of Overseas Territories, French National Assembly.

Embassy is frankly reluctant, until agreement has been studied in Department and outcome Assembly debate is known, abandon wait-and-see attitude it has so far maintained. It has always been made quite clear to all concerned here that US judgment is reserved until all facts have been considered. Furthermore, French decision to postpone session Cochinchina until after Bao Dai's return makes it illogical for French to expect us to be more forward than themselves. However, French could logically consider *démarche* proposed reference telegrams as negative prejudgment whole Bao Dai experiment which at present time is only non-Communist solution in sight. *Démarche* would certainly become known and arouse fears (or in certain quarters) that US was veering towards compromise with Ho Chi Minh thus threatening to upset teetering political applecart on eve of Assembly debate where every word spoken by a deputy will be weighted for its effect on his party's electoral position in Cantonals.

Under circumstances I respectfully request Department's authorization defer proposed *démarche* preferably until such time as Foreign Office may seek our support.³

Sent Department, repeated Saigon 27.

CAFFERY

³The Department gave its approval to this in telegram 743, March 9, 4 p. m. (19 to Saigon).

851G.01/3-849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, March 8, 1949—8 p. m.

951. Auriol and Bao Dai at noon today exchanged letters to which agreement was annexed.¹ According to official communiqué, "this agreement completes and defines joint declaration signed Bay of Along, June 5, 1948. Instrument will be exchanged at Saigon between Bao Dai and French High Commissioner. Agreement will enter into effect date this exchange".

In statement to press Bao Dai recalling principles Bay of Along agreement remained to be defined said: "the agreement just signed accomplishes this aim. It replaces the former treaties signed by my

¹The French text was published in pamphlet form about June 18 by the French Service de la Presse et d'Information at Saigon (transmitted in despatch 29, July 6, by Saigon; received by the Department July 20). English texts were transmitted in airgram A-301, July 2, by the Department to Manila and repeated to Bangkok, Batavia, Hanoi, New Delhi, Rangoon, Saigon, Singapore. See also Paris telegrams 1065, March 16, 2 p. m.; 1077-1078, March 16, 8 p. m.; and 1168, March 22, 8 p. m., none printed. Telegram 2608, June 23, 1 p. m., from Paris, reported the agreements of March 8 had been made public there June 20 and published late June 22. (851G.00/6-2349)

ancestors". Embassy understands government has decided not make agreement public at least until after Assembly debate and probably not until Bao Dai reaches Indochina. Exchange of letters may however be published sooner.

Repeated Saigon 29.

CAFFERY

851G.01/3-1249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, March 12, 1949—3 p. m.

1027. Following government's plea for "national vote" clearly indicating approval principle of unity three *kyes*, Assembly last night by overwhelming vote of 387 to 193 (Communists and handful rightist factions) approved Cochinchina Territorial Assembly Bill. Bill goes to Council of Republic today and if second reading required Assembly will meet tonight.¹

Thursday sessions were devoted to interpellations with Communists and RPF hammering on division within government majority on Bao Dai solution.

Friday morning government requested Assembly interrupt interpellations and give urgent consideration Cochinchina Assembly Bill. Government's request approved by 294 to 287 vote, high opposition vote reflecting deputies irritation over repeated changes in agenda (Embtel 986, March 10²). In ensuing debate government plead for clear endorsement unity principle and vigorously defended its Indochina policy. Outside of Communists' attack, unexpectedly little opposition developed to Bao Dai solution, Socialists indicating they could consider him as "mediator" between French and spiritual cultural families of Vietnam. Final vote took place at midnight. Motion then introduced from floor (not by government) calling for suspension further interpellations as government's policy had been thoroughly aired in preceding debates. Queuille³ declined give government endorsement to motion, stating Assembly itself had called for interpellations and, therefore, must itself decide whether they should be continued. If motion carried, however, government would interpret Assembly decision as approval its Indochina policy. Communists and Gaullists objected violently. As interpellations must be

¹ The Council of the Republic adopted an amended version of the bill on March 12, 185 to 97, and the Assembly on second reading then approved by 348 to 202 (telegram 1031, March 13, 2 p. m., from Paris). The bill as enacted was published March 24 in the *Journal Officiel* (telegram 1221, March 24, 10 p. m., from Paris).

² Not printed.

³ Henri Queuille, President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier).

followed by order of day they were hoping that Socialists would find it politically impossible for them to go along on order of day approving Bao Dai solution. Motion to suspend interpellations finally adopted by 332 to 272 vote.

Furious at being thus out-maneuvered, Gaullists introduced motion of censure of government. Assembly voted to interrupt pre-election vacation and meet in special session on March 15 to consider motion (which has little chance of being adopted).

Past week's debates on Indochina demonstrated government's ability bring Socialists to heel on Bao Dai issue, to maintain its majority, to obtain an overwhelming vote when merits of Indochina case itself involved, and to forestall Communist and Gaullist attempts to make pre-election political capital out of Indochina problem.

Sent Department 1027, repeated Saigon 34, London 203.

CAFFERY

851G.01/3-1649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, March 16, 1949—2 p. m.

1066. We are told by influential member Bao Dai entourage who participated recent negotiations that Bao Dai and entourage are well pleased with outcome debates on Indochina. Overwhelming vote in favor of Cochinchina assembly bill will he says be well received in Indochina and Capitant's motion of censure will be attributed to pre-election political maneuvering in France and will soon be forgotten.

Bao Dai-Auriol agreement "while not including everything we would like to have" is considered "a very favorable point of departure launched under better circumstances than we had hoped for in view domestic French political situation" and "affords workable basis for fulfillment Vietnam aspirations."

Our source states that while elements of agreement so far made public naturally emphasize advantages to France, other side of coin is quite favorable to Vietnam and it is now up to Bao Dai's supporters to see that this aspect gets wide publicity in Vietnam. ("Very fact government hasn't dared publish agreement shows how favorable it is to us.") On economic matters there is agreement on relationship between France and Vietnam which does not infringe on latter's internal sovereignty (one example given was that Vietnam can negotiate commercial agreements with foreign countries).

Certain matters involving common services such as customs, transportation and communications will have to be regulated in conference in which Cambodians and Laotians as well as French and Vietnamese

will participate. Source does not believe agreement on technical details in this regard will prove either difficult or onerous to Vietnam.

Cochinchina Territorial Assembly will be convoked about April 7 and after union with other two *ky's* approved, French National Assembly will be asked give urgent approval. Bao Dai and French both in agreement this must transpire prior to former's arrival Indochina which is scheduled for April 25. Time permitting, Bao Dai will return on French warship ceded to Vietnam flying Vietnamese flag and carrying Vietnamese crew.

Source expressed opinion work in Paris on Bao Dai solution has now been satisfactorily completed and major future developments will take place in Indochina. He stated Bao Dai and entourage place great confidence in Pignon and are satisfied he will proceed honestly in implementation of agreement.

Bao Dai's two principal tasks were described as forming government capable of really governing (which we were told is well under way) and bringing about pacification of country.

Source informed us Bao Dai hoped US would make some public statement supporting principles of agreement (which would have most important effect on Vietnamese population) that we would seriously consider some form of recognition of Vietnam and would assist in making arms available.

Source was told we could not comment on any of these points until we had received and studied text of agreement. Under no circumstances, however, could we envisage Department's approval furnishing arms directly to Vietnam. (Bao Dai is of course aware substance my talk with Chauvel ¹—Embtels 5129, September 30 and 5405, October 16, 1948.)² From information so far available it appears to us that with signature agreement and Assembly vote on Cochinchina Bao Dai solution has been favorably launched from French end. Period which will elapse prior his arrival Saigon and formal ratification agreement will afford Department opportunity make serious evaluation his chances success. Upon his return Indochina, Bao Dai will be faced with primary tasks forming government including influential Vietnamese nationalist leaders who have so far remained on sidelines, of attracting maximum popular support and of reducing and eventually eliminating Viet-Minh. At present his tools are largely limited to his personal prestige, the Paris agreements and such military economic and financial assistance as he will receive in Indochina from French.

As Bao Dai represents only foreseeable opportunity for anti-Communist nationalist solution Indochina, I recommend that Department in light our declared policy preventing spread of communism in

¹ Jean Chauvel, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry.

² Neither printed.

SEA and of supporting truly nationalist movements in that area, study agreement when received with view to possibility extending to Bao Dai solution as calculated risk moral and perhaps some economic support in difficult initial period following his return, support which if given will increase its possibilities success and if withheld will constitute negative rather than neutral factor.

I appreciate of course that if Bao Dai fails after receiving such support from US it will be interpreted as further blow to our own position in Asia. On other hand in view of fact that only alternative to Bao Dai solution would involve dealing with Ho Chi Minh (to whom I assume we remain unalterably opposed), I believe we should take this risk.³

Sent Department as 1066; repeated Saigon as 38.

CAFFERY

³ In telegram 955, March 25, 9 p. m., to Paris, the Department stated its position in telegram 598, February 25, p. 8, "remains unchanged for the present." (851G.01/3-1849)

851G.01/3-1749: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, March 17, 1949—3 p. m.

66. In conversation with Lacy,¹ myself, General Blaizot² stated second exchange of letters Bao Dai-Auriol has occurred covering many points left open original agreement. Third exchange Bao Dai-Pignon being drafted will cover practical application agreements including question federal services. Blaizot also stated confidential parliamentary processes will be completed before arrival Bao Dai April 25. Emperor will return to united independent country with all preparations made for prompt transfer of authority and application of agreement. Pouched Hanoi.³

ABBOTT

¹ William S. B. Lacy, Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, on a visit to Saigon.

² Gen. Roger Blaizot, Commander in Chief of French Forces in the Far East.

³ Repeated by the Department in airgram A-267, March 18, to Paris.

851G.01/3-1849: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, March 18, 1949—6 p. m.

1120. Devinat invited us yesterday to talk Indo-China with Huu,¹ President of South Vietnam and politico whom French consider best

¹ Tran Van Huu.

qualified govt man presently with Bao Dai. Carefully explaining that until Vietnam nation came into formal existence (i.e., after Cochinchina had pronounced itself on union 3 *lys* and Franco-Vietnam accords had been appropriately ratified UN) neither France on behalf French Union nor Vietnam could officially talk on international basis about Vietnam affairs, they both made preliminary unofficial requests that US give serious consideration to supplying directly or indirectly arms for new national Vietnam army provided for in Auriol-Bao Dai agreement. Huu spoke at length of conception and role of new national army not as army of aggression engaged in civil war but as national protection and liberating force to insure Vietnam people now suffering oppression under Communist dictatorship necessary physical and moral protection to enable them rally to Bao Dai (see also Embtel 1119, March 18²). Devinat added that French forces Indochina would progressively be withdrawn to support positions as they were replaced by new Vietnam units. He did not imply lessening of French military effort Indochina but rather shift of emphasis operationally to new national army. Both men emphasised necessity of rapid action in Indochina if "liberation" was to have substantially progressed before Mao Tse[-tung]'s army reached Indochina frontier.

Devinat repeated his now familiar theme that ridding SEA of communism was international job and that France was doing its bit in making liberal agreement with non-communist nationalists which it would loyally implement but that both France and Vietnam would need material and moral support from outside in next few months. Neither man could give estimate size national army nor amount arms needed.

Devinat said that we could expect formal request for arms by Queuille directly after ratification agreement, i.e., in about one [month from ?] present *démarche*. We limited ourselves to reiterating US position on (a) arms to Indochina and (b) substance Caffery-Chauvel conversation (Embtel 5729, September 30, 1948³) and to stating that whole problem of US position was now being studied in Dept which would be requested to take under consideration present advance request for arms.⁴

Sent Department, repeated Saigon 44.

CAFFERY

² *Infra*.

³ Not printed.

⁴ In telegram 33, March 23, noon, to Saigon (901 to Paris), the Department said it would send instructions upon receipt of fuller information and would give its views "on problems raised by diplomatic provisions Auriol-Bao Dai accord and question implied recognition which may arise in connection latter's arrival Saigon Apr 25".

851G.01/3-1849: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, March 18, 1949—6 p. m.

1119. ReEmbtels 1077 and 1078.¹ Following meeting with Huu (Embtel 1120, March 18²), Devinat yesterday allowed Wallner³ to read Vietnam agreement for one hour in Devinat's office. He said that since Queuille had himself been criticized for not making document available to Parliament he could not risk communicating text to foreign power until Parliament had received it for ratification. Wallner pretended take notes. I need not reemphasize importance of concealing fact we have text until we receive it from French. Wallner told Devinat he anticipated Department's reaction would be to suspend formulation US Government position until text was received and Devinat replied that if US Government should request full provisions on any point after reading Embassy's summary he would see that it received them.

We had not seen Auriol's letter to Bao Dai containing text of agreement but only Bao Dai's acknowledgment thereof repeating text of agreement. Auriol letter opens with important paragraph of which following is summary:

Your Majesty requested the French Government to confirm and clarify (*confirmer et préciser*) principles of unity and independence embodied in Baie d'Along declaration. French Government accedes to this request and is prepared to enter into an agreement with a view to implementation of principles of Baie d' Along declaration. The special conventions called for in declaration are to be concluded between Your Majesty's Government and French Commissioner. Under these conditions I confirm following agreement. *End summary.*

Auriol letter also contains final paragraph, apparently inadvertently omitted in Bao Dai acknowledgment, roughly as follows:

Principles Baie d'Along declaration and present agreement will take effect after ratification by French Parliament and by appropriate approval by Vietnam conformity Article 61 of Constitution.

Embassy requesting text from Vietnam sources.

This clear tie-in with Baie d'Along declaration supplies element of independence within French Union which is lacking in texts previously cabled.⁴

CAFFERY

¹ March 16, 8 p. m.; see footnote 1, p. 10.

² *Supra.*

³ Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary of the Embassy in France.

⁴ Telegram 2096, May 21, 3 p. m., from Paris, reported in response to the Department's telegram 1636, May 17, 6 p. m. (neither printed), that the French Foreign Office had provided texts of the March 8 agreements for the Department's confidential use. Texts were transmitted in despatch 517, June 1, from Paris (received June 6); it was noted "that with the exception of two additions which appear on pages 14 and 15, the texts are identical" to those transmitted by telegram on March 16 and 22 (see footnote 1, p. 10). (851G.00/6-149)

851G.01/3-2449 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, March 24, 1949—7 p. m.

1210. Deptel 901, March 23.¹ While Bao Dai's "capacity" has been subject some discussion here, government has never publicly indicated what they consider his official position to be. Text of Auriol-Bao Dai agreements, however, clearly indicates that in French eyes he is Emperor of Vietnam. Until Vietnam nation comes into formal existence (Embtel 1120, March 18) his "capacity" remains debatable. (Department will recall that during 1948 Bollaert²-Bao Dai conversations at Geneva, Bao Dai communiqués repeatedly stated he was acting in his private capacity and that it was up to Vietnam population to choose by popular referendum when it became possible form of government they prefer, implication being that he would be equally happy as Emperor, Prime Minister, President, etc.)

Department now has complete text Auriol-Bao Dai agreements and will receive shortly text Pignon letter to Bao Dai on economic matters.³ Department will recall (Embtel 1119, March 18) that Devinat has undertaken to give full precisions of any point of the agreement on which Department remains in doubt.

Embassy has not yet seen Saigon's 70 of March 18.⁴ In this connection request that during coming weeks Saigon's telegrams be repeated to Paris by cable rather than by airgram.

CAFFERY

¹ See footnote 4, p. 15.

² Émile Bollaert, former French High Commissioner in Indochina.

³ March 15, transmitted in telegram 1234, March 25, 7 p. m., from Paris, not printed.

⁴ Not printed.

851G.01/4-249 : Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HANOI, April 2, 1949—2 p. m.

22. Vietminh radio made following announcement: "The High Command of the Vietnamese resistance forces (NB Vietminh) announces that the first elements of the Chinese forces of liberation¹ have registered great activity recently at the Sino-Vietnamese frontier." Radio then referred to "important support which the Vietnam forces have received as a result."

¹ Chinese Communist forces under Mao Tse-tung.

This is first official acknowledgment by Vietminh of military cooperation with Chinese.

Sent Department, repeated Paris 5, pouched Saigon.

GIBSON

851G.01/4-1149

The Consul at Saigon (Colebrook) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 85

SAIGON, April 11, 1949.

[Received May 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit the complete text, in English translation of a letter addressed by Ex-Emperor Bao Dai to Governor Huu¹ of Cochinchina under date of March 16, 1949, at which time Huu was in France consulting with the Ex-Emperor. Publication of the letter has just been authorized by the Ex-Emperor, and the text has been widely circulated in Saigon.

The statement is regarded as an important declaration of policy and has been well received in all "Unionist" circles in Saigon, both Vietnamese and French. The prominent French newspaper in Saigon, *Le Journal de l'Extrême Orient*, has taken particular pleasure in noting the contents of the penultimate paragraph dealing with French interests in Cochinchina and says so in a leading article in today's issue. Die-hard French colonial circles and the newspapers which are their mouthpiece give full coverage to the statement but refrain from comment.

The text of the declaration has, in fact, been published on the first page of all Saigon's leading newspapers today in conjunction with the news concerning the results of the Territorial Assembly elections. It is notable that although returns are as yet incomplete, the Vietnamese candidates in the Saigon-Cholon area who listed themselves as "Unionists" in favor of junction of the three *kys* and in keeping with Bao Dai's declared policy on that question, have made a clean sweep. It is possible that any connection between the two events is circumstantial, but it is much more likely that President Huu was strongly influenced by his knowledge of the Ex-Emperor's policy regarding union of the three *kys* in his designation (with Governor General de la Tour²) of Vietnamese electors for the Saigon-Cholon district. The electors, so designated, were those subsequently elected a full list of "Unionist" candidates. As reported telegraphically the list included Ministers Ty and Hue of the Central Provisional Government, both avowed "Unionists".

Respectfully yours,

MULFORD A. COLEBROOK

¹ Tran Van Huu; letter not printed.

² Gen. Pierre Boyer de Latour du Moulin, commanding French Forces in southern Indochina.

851G.01/4-1349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 13, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Counselor of French Embassy
Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director, FE
Mr. Charles S. Reed II, Chief, SEA

Mr. Daridan called at his request to discuss problems raised by the projected return of Bao Dai to Indochina. He opened the conversation by saying that people in Paris, by that meaning French officials, appeared to have a different idea as to what the US might be willing to do to assist Bao Dai than that of the French Embassy in Washington. In this connection he said that a high American official, whom he preferred not to name, had so expressed himself as to lead the French officials to believe that the US might be disposed to give some backing to Bao Dai, possibly by furnishing military equipment. Mr. Daridan said that the foregoing conversation had been brought to the attention of the French Embassy in Washington with roughly the query why the Embassy had reported the improbability of the US giving any backing to Bao Dai, at least at this time. Following a general discussion of the situation not only in Indochina but also in the Far East as a whole, including an explanation of the capacity in which Bao Dai is returning to Indochina, Mr. Daridan posed the question whether the US would be prepared to assist Bao Dai if in the course of the coming months his cause showed some signs of success. I replied that I could not give an answer to such a hypothetical question and that we would have to be guided by circumstances existing at the time. I continued that the whole matter of assistance to Bao Dai or to anyone must be viewed in the light of what the Indochinese or any of the Far Eastern peoples did on their own behalf—that the US could not be expected to supply arms, for instance, if the peoples wanting the arms did not show a desire and willingness to use them against communist or unfriendly pressure. Mr. Daridan agreed that that was a reasonable position to take.

During the course of the conversation Mr. Daridan intimated that Bao Dai might be hesitating to return to Indochina and evidently hoped that the US would bring what pressure was possible on him to induce him to proceed with announced plans. I remarked that Bao Dai was thinking of his neck and Mr. Daridan was in agreement, and he also gave the impression that Bao Dai's chances of success were not brilliant.

Mr. Daridan then brought up the matter of Mr. Schuman's¹ recent

¹ Robert Schuman, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

conversation with the Secretary and he said that he believed Mr. Schuman had discussed transferring two pursuit plane (King Cobra) squadrons from France to Indochina. He made available the text of a telegram addressed to Mr. Schuman in which the latter was urged to get the Department's consent, at least tacit consent, to this transfer on the ground that the planes would be used to combat Mao Tse Tung's communist forces when they reached the Tonkinese border and entered Indochina. As the planes had come from the US the French Government hoped to regularize such a transfer by securing the Department's prior consent. I pointed out that the arrival of Mao at the Tonkinese border did not appear to be as imminent as the French Air Chief of Staff appeared to think, that experience in China had greatly discounted the use of this type of plane against ground operations in and over the terrain which had been encountered in China and which would be encountered in Tonkin, and that definitely I could not give any degree of consent to the proposed transfer. The whole matter, I concluded, must rest in abeyance and be considered only in the future in the light of actual developments.

[It was evident that Mr. Daridan was under instructions to sound out the Department as to the help Bao Dai might expect, that the opinion in Paris as to what help might be forthcoming was far different from that of the French Embassy at Washington, and that the question of the planes was a probable feeler in the direction of transferring American-provided military equipment in France to Indochina. Mr. Daridan was given no encouragement on either point.]²

² Brackets appear in the source text.

851G.00/4-2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon ¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1949—7 p. m.

69. Urtel 129, Apr 28.² You shld indicate to DuGardier ³ U.S. Govt has no intention recognizing Chi Commie regime precipitously, and that in any case Chi Commies have not organized themselves into govt to be recognized; that we see no objection for time being trade Commie-controlled areas China through private channels so long as commodities of strategic importance Sov area not involved; that U.S. considering application export controls China for purpose prohibiting or restricting strategic items primarily with view prevent their re-

¹ Repeated by the Department as 1384 to Paris.

² Not printed.

³ Diplomatic counselor to the French High Commissioner in Indochina.

export via China to USSR, eastern Europe and northern Korea. For urinfo, matter recognition has been discussed Brit and Fr Embs here. Our position vis-à-vis trade has been discussed Brit and intend take up with Fr Emb shortly.

ACHESON

851G.00/4-3049 : Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

HANOI, April 30, 1949—11 a. m.

34. Atmosphere Viet Nameese circles Hanoi following action Territorial Assembly and arrival Bao Dai¹ reflects first display even slight optimism. Demonstration fêting Bao Dai's arrival took place all day 28th with apparent sincere display enthusiasm. Expected Viet Minh terroristic counter display failed materialize and during whole day only one grenade exploded in town, killing Viet Nameese child.

Central Govt actively recruiting personnel for anticipated enlargement services. Have already hired one Consulate secretary at double present salary.

French circles severely depressed, convinced if their days are not numbered as result military crisis, changeover to Viet Nameese Govt will accomplish same result. Colonialists appear be grasping for first time true impact March 8 accords and believe any future for French business lies in Cochin-China if at all. Hanoi director Denis Frères, leading French house, informed me that majority French interests Hanoi were quietly selling out, making plans return France and he would do same if he were able. This trend corroborated elsewhere.

Sent Department 34, pouched Saigon, repeated Paris.

GIBSON

¹ He reached Dalat on April 28 from Singapore.

851G.01/5-249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1949—noon.

70. In forthcoming difficult period Dept desires you guard carefully against any action which might be seized upon as premature endorsement or *de facto* recognition by US of Bao Dai or any regime he may establish. Fr giving evidence pessimism re viability Bao Dai solution and Dept desires retain as much freedom of action re IC as possible without in any manner giving impression we oppose or wish to hinder

ex-Emperor. Dept has already discussed informally with Fr Emb (as well as Brit Emb here) desirability appropriate Fr officials issuing to consular corps invitations to attend all ceremonies involving Bao Dai (fifth para urtel 92 Mar 29¹).

Dept wishes you and Gibson continue reporting situation as closely and well as you have in past.

ACHESON

¹ Not printed.

851G.01/5-649: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, May 6, 1949—3 p. m.

141. Due note taken Deptel 70, May 2. Agree any action re endorsement or recognition must await:

- a. Publication March 8 agreements.
- b. Action by French Parliament to join Cochinchina to Vietnam.
- c. Formation by Bao Dai of Cabinet of sufficient calibre to give chance success.

However, when *b* and *c* accomplished and if text agreements reveal no jokers feel prompt change from passive to active attitude important.

Assumed Department desires success Bao Dai experiment since no other feasible non-Communist solution in view. Only suggested alternatives are: (*a*) Agreement with Ho Chi Minh which means setting up Communist controlled government in SEA; (*b*) New attempt at purely military solution for which resources are not available unless US furnishes them.

While fully aware many difficulties in path Bao Dai, feel chance success still exists and that policy US in critical initial period can have important influence. Our support will not insure Bao Dai success but the lack of it will probably make certain his failure.

The following measures are suggested for the Department consideration:

a. Immediate and continued pressure on French at highest level pointing out danger of delays such as that caused by present recess French Assembly and necessity for bold liberal and rapid implementation and interpretation March 8 agreements.

b. Statement from Department indicating our interest in and sympathy with new developments Indochina to be issued when conditions paragraph *b* fulfilled.

c. Consultation with British and Indians looking towards parallel recognition at early stage.

d. Exploration of possibility of at least token economic aid either direct or through ear-marking French ECA funds.

Would appreciate clarification of "reliability Bao Dai solution" used Deptel 70. Does this refer to rumors re Emperor's present or proposed contacts with Ho Chi Minh and fears expressed certain French circles Communists will infiltrate and take over new regime? Obvious such danger exists. Nevertheless adherence substantial portion non-Communist elements resistance is essential feature Bao Dai solution and this requires contacts with them and probably inclusion resistance elements in government. Selection such elements will be crucial test Bao Dai's political ability and he may be tempted to include some Communists perhaps even Ho in order to achieve immediate end fighting. It might be desirable to bring to his attention many examples proving futility and danger of collaboration with Stalinists but presume Department does not desire me to establish contact with Bao Dai or his entourage at this time.

Pouched Hanoi, repeated Paris.

ABBOTT

851G.01/5-749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, May 7, 1949—5 p. m.

1862. While Embassy has not received copy Department's 70, May 2, to Saigon,¹ I wish to state my concurrence in general line contained latter's 1412 [141], May 6, to Department.²

In connection with Abbott's recommendation for "immediate and continued pressure" (Paragraph 4-a), in which I expressly concur, I suggest that in immediate stage it would be helpful, in event Embassy is to undertake such representations, if they could be accompanied by indications our intentions according *b*, *c*, and possible *d*, same paragraph, provided representations are successful.

Sent Department 1862 (for action); repeated Saigon 73 (for information).

CAFFERY

¹The Department repeated telegram 70 in telegram 1522, May 10, 8 p. m., to Paris.

²*Supra.*

851G.01/5-649 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1949—6 p. m.

77. Assumption urtel 141² Dept desires success Baodai experiment

¹Repeated as 1514 to Paris.

²May 6, p. 22.

entirely correct. Since appears be no other alternative to estab Commie pattern Vietnam, Dept considers no effort shld be spared by Fr, other Western powers, and non-Commie Asian nations to assure experiment best chance succeeding.

At proper time and under proper circumstances Dept will be prepared do its part by extending recognition Baodai Govt and by exploring possibility of complying with any request by such Govt for US arms and econ assistance. Must be understood however aid program this nature wld require Congressional approval. Since US cld however scarcely afford backing govt which wld have color and be likely suffer fate of puppet regime, it must first be clear Fr will offer all necessary concessions to make Baodai solution attractive to nationalists. This is step of which Fr themselves must see urgent necessity view possibly short time remaining before Commie successes Chi are felt Indochina. Moreover, Baodai Govt must through own efforts demonstrate capacity organize and conduct affairs wisely so as to ensure maximum opportunity obtaining requisite popular support inasmuch as govt created Indochina analogous Kuomintang wld be foredoomed failure.

Assuming essential Fr concessions are forthcoming, best chance success Baodai wld appear lie in persuading Vietnamese nationalists (1) their patriotic aims may be realized promptly through Fr-Baodai agreement (2) Baodai govt will be truly representative even to extent including outstanding non-Commie leaders now supporting Ho and (3) Baodai solution probably only means safeguarding Vietnam from aggressive designs Commie Chi. While attainment these objectives depends initially upon attitude Fr and Baodai circle, Dept believes more will ultimately be required. Best hope might lie in active demonstration of interest in and support of Baodai solution by other non-Commie Asian govts. Appeal such solution to Vietnam nationalists wld presumably be far greater if it appeared sponsored by free Asian nations animated by interest self-determination Asian peoples and their own self-preservation in face immed Commie menace rather than if it had appearance gambit engineered by Fr, US and UK as part strategy of West-East conflict.

Dept giving closest consideration to means whereby US might assist attainment these ends.

From above, you will see Dept thinking closely parallels your own. Dept agrees when time comes Baodai must certainly be fully warned of danger yielding to any temptation include Commies his govt and this connection again believes other Asian govts cld serve most useful purpose since India, Siam, Philippines, and Indonesians (both Repubs and Federalists) are fully alive growing Commie threat Asia.

Re last para urtel 141 "reliability Baodai solution" was error. Deptel 70³ shld have read "viability" meaning able live.

While Dept continues believe it wld be premature and unwise for you make special point (such as trip Dalat) see Baodai, there no objection your talking informally with polit personalities close to him with whom you have doubtless already made contact in normal course carrying out your functions. In such talks you might well as suggested urtel 141 take occasion cite examples futility collaboration Commies and grave danger such course.

ACHESON

³ May 2, p. 21.

851G.01/5-1149 : Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HANOI, May 11, 1949—3 p. m.

36. Interview Xuan¹ his request following return Dalat and consultations Bao Dai, he asked US use its influence impress French Government necessity for prompt and decisive action by French Assembly after May 17 query Cochinchina territorial assembly resolution and ratification March 8 accords.

Xuan asked what would be US policy in supporting or even nominating Vietnam for membership UN event France does not live up obligation do so under terms accords or stalls. Emperor attaches great importance prompt UN membership even in recognition of what he regards as "possibility" USSR veto.

President extremely concerned developments China and reaction it will have Chinese minorities Vietnam. In this query, as virtually all others, he regards time element highly important in influencing margin Bao Dai's chances success.

He stated further Emperor would definitely visit Hanoi before leaving Vietnam. Departure planned about one month after French National Assembly takes decisive action two matters enumerated above. Emperor will return France, but Xuan states he plans go Washington thereafter both establish contact and, I ventured, probably ask arms for new Vietnamese army among other things. Xuan readily admitted this.

Xuan reports Emperor does not regard failure publish March 8 accords to date as important—states done purely for internal French

¹ Gen. Nguyen Van Xuan, former President of Cochinchina, 1947, and of the Central Provisional Government of Vietnam, 1948.

political considerations as they are so favorable to Vietnam, not reverse.

Xuan reports Emperor landed Dalat extremely pessimistic frame mind as result of (a) military developments China and Tonkinese border which he felt might cause crisis before he could establish his presence and form government; (b) what he considered French loophole contained territorial assembly's resolution. Emperor has since re-adjusted his thinking and discarded concerns with (b) entirely and thinks possibility of (a) temporarily postponed, but danger ever present.

Xuan considers military query primary importance and agrees heartily but privately with urgency of need French reinforcements men and materiel to forestall further Viet Minh successes north and maintain sufficient order make it possible for National elements who wish rally Emperor's side to do so. Note: I am informed by reliable journalistic source here that long time National Hanoi estimates true "National" defections [*defections*] Viet Minh will be limited less than 10 percent.

I questioned President what further consideration was being given to making conciliatory gesture Ho Chi Minh, even perhaps as far as offering him portfolio new cabinet as had been suggested by Xuan during our last discussion Saigon. He made entirely evasive and ambiguous answers to such an extent I am now convinced such eventuality is under active consideration at least by Xuan himself if not with Emperor's approbation.

On latter point Department may wish issue guiding instruction to us as what tack follow with Xuan and perhaps others this specific query. I think any simple statement to Xuan now or near future to Emperor by Consul General Abbott regarding Ho the Stalinist vs Ho the National would strongly influence direction any such move. Xuan and probably Emperor are lead think more and more, notably most recently by April 25 *Newsweek* article, US looks almost favorably on Ho and considers him as much National as Communist. Study Viet Minh broadcasts, recent survey which now en route Department, are sufficient in themselves dispel any such naive theory, and it might be useful point out at this time *Newsweek* and other recent similar articles not only do not necessarily coincide with views US Government but exactly how they differ.

This interview with President more significant and profitable than usual for his sentiments obviously grew out consultations with Emperor in Dalat (he referred constantly to notes). It probably took

place as it did at all only because direct contact between Bao Dai and Abbott is not yet feasible.

Sent Department 36, repeated Paris.

GIBSON

851G.01/5-1749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., of the
Division of Southeast Asian Affairs*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1949.

Participants: Mr. John Davies, SP
Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, WE
Mr. Elim O'Shaughnessy, WE
Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley, WE
Mr. Charles S. Reed, SEA
Mr. W.S.B. Lacy, SEA
Mr. Charlton Ogburn, Jr., SEA

The meeting was called to consider what steps, if any, we might profitably take in Indochina.

The SEA representatives noted that the agreement of March 8 between Baodai and Auriol left France in nearly full control of Vietnam's foreign relations and in substantial control of Vietnam's armed forces and hence that there seemed little chance that the agreement would appeal to Vietnamese nationalists or that the Baodai experiment would succeed.

The WE representatives explained that there was no chance whatsoever of the French making any concessions at the present time beyond those contained in the agreement, and that for us to press them to do so would only stiffen and antagonize them.

It was the consensus of the meeting that the US should not put itself in a forward position in the Indochina problem since there appeared to be nothing we could do to alter the very discouraging prospects, and that we should endeavor to "collectivize" our approach to the situation.

Accordingly, it was determined that WE would instruct Embassy Paris to endeavor to obtain openly the text of the agreement between Baodai and Auriol in order that we might discuss it with the French and other governments. Embassy Paris would also be instructed to obtain copies of the documents associated with the agreement, some of which the Department has not received from any source and which are believed to include provisions for the transfer of the federal services to the Bao-dai Government.

In particular it was decided that we should aim at establishing a common position with the British, the Indians, and the Filipinos.

851G.01/5-1349: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1949—5 p. m.

83. Urtel 147:² Dept believes extent to which Fr concessions embodied Mar 8 agreements will satisfy nationalists can be determined only by reaction nationalists themselves. Meanwhile wld appreciate your view.

While not fully informed provisions Mar 8 agreements plus associated documents, Dept fears nationalist opinion will follow line Duoc Viet editorial Apr 9 which states "although Vietnamese reassured on score their country's unification, they remain uneasy about question foreign relations and army. Vietnam sovereignty will not permit Vietnamese army be commanded by Fr general nor will requirement of sovereignty be satisfied by diplomatic representation only in China, Siam and Vatican."

As practical matter, Dept believes that when independence movement in colony too strong to be defeated, metropolitan power if it wishes preserve influence in area has no real choice but attempt establish special relationship with former colony based free acceptance terms by latter, and that assoc between metropolitan power and former colony is more likely prove fruitful and durable if based free consent of latter than if transfer of autonomous powers to latter is made conditional upon its acceptance of such important qualifications upon its independence as continued metropolitan control its fon relations and command armed forces.

However, Dept persuaded Fr unlikely make further concessions this time and that any US efforts press them do so wld probably miscarry. (Paris to indicate if this not correct.) Hope is, therefore, that Fr will carry out their obligations under Mar 8 agreements with such generosity and expedition that impressively constructive atmosphere will be created and that at same time Viet nationalists will rapidly appreciate true character menace approaching from Chi and will prefer cooperate Baodai solution rather than accept alternative continued resistance and risk loss all real autonomy to Chi Commies. Presumably such outcome not impossible particularly if Fr cld let it be understood Baodai agreement does not permanently define status Vietnam but provides basis for further early evolution.

¹ Repeated as 1712 to Paris and 13 to Hanoi and in 379, May 24, 5 p. m., to New Delhi, 286 to Bangkok, and 636 to Manila.

² May 13, not printed.

At same time, shld it appear as Dept fears that Fr are offering too little too late, Dept will not be inclined make up for Fr deficiencies by rushing into breach to support Baodai agreements at cost its own remaining prestige Asia. Dept considers US this stage shld avoid conspicuous position any kind and try reach common attitude with other interested govts, particularly UK, India and Philippines.

ACHESON

851G.01/5-1149: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Hanoi*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1949—5 p. m.

14. Reur informative tel 36:² In talks Xuan and reps his govt you may take fol line as representing consensus informed Americans:

In light Ho's known background, no other assumption possible but that he outright Commie so long as (1) he fails unequivocally repudiate Moscow connections and Commie doctrine and (2) remains personally singled out for praise by internatl Commie press and receives its support. Moreover, US not impressed by nationalist character red flag with yellow stars. Question whether Ho as much nationalist as Commie is irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists. With achievement natl aims (i.e., independence) their objective necessarily becomes subordination state to Commie purposes and ruthless extermination not only opposition groups but all elements suspected even slightest deviation. On basis examples eastern Eur it must be assumed such wld be goal Ho and men his stamp if included Baodai Govt. To include them in order achieve reconciliation opposing polit elements and "national unity" wld merely postpone settlement issue whether Vietnam to be independent nation or Commie satellite until circumstances probably even less favorable nationalists than now. It must of course be conceded theoretical possibility exists estab National Communist state on pattern Yugoslavia in any area beyond reach Soviet army. However, US attitude cld take acct such possibility only if every other possible avenue closed to preservation area from Kremlin control. Moreover, while Vietnam out of reach Soviet army it will doubtless be by no means out of reach Chi Commie hatchet men and armed forces.

Fol is for urinfo and such reference as you deem judicious:

Dept naturally considers only Fr can through concessions to nationalist movement lay basis for solution Indochina problem. As suggested Deptel 83 to Saigon, if nationalists find concessions Mar 8 agreements inadequate, much may depend upon willingness Fr put agreements in

¹ Repeated as 84 to Saigon and 1713 to Paris and in 379, May 24, 5 p. m., to New Delhi, 286 to Bangkok, and 636 to Manila.

² May 11, p. 25.

most favorable possible context by emphasizing expectations rapid evolution Vietnam beyond status envisaged those agreements. Provided Fr display realistic and generous attitude, most important part remainder immed program—viz, winning support nationalists away from Commie leadership—must devolve upon Baodai and Xuan group seconded by other South Asian govts who stand in most immed danger from Commie conquest Indochina and who by full polit and propaganda support Baodai solution might more than anyone else be able deprive Ho of talking-points in event he continues demand armed resistance Baodai regardless circumstances (which appears certain in light vitriolic tone current Vietminh broadcasts on Baodai which give no recognition any Fr concessions to nationalist demands). Even with conditions for US support Baodai realized, it futile expect US be able assist effectively this initial task beyond stressing requirements situation in talks South Asian govts and providing materials evidencing realities of Communism through USIS for distribution as you and Congen Saigon consider desirable in conjunction with Baodai efforts arouse compatriots to Commie menace. Experience Chi has shown no amt US mil and econ aid can save govt, even if recognized by all other powers and possessed full opportunity achieve natl aims, unless it can rally support people against Commies by affording representation all important natl groups, manifesting devotion to natl as opposed personal or party interests, and demonstrating real leadership.

Re Viet opinion reported Saigon's 145³ that US abandonment Nationalist China presents unfavorable augury for non-Commie regime Vietnam, there no objection emphasizing to persons with this view that Nationalist China came to present pass through deficiency above qualities and lack will to fight, not because US "wrote it off".

Re Xuan query whether US wld propose Vietnam for membership UN shld Fr renege, you shld avoid discussion this matter, at most if pressed state circumstances at moment will of course determine US action. For urinfo only it unlikely US eld even vote for Vietnam membership UN if as it appears now Fr wld remain in control Vietnam fon relations.

ACHESON

³ May 11, 10 a. m., not printed.

851G.01/5-2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (MacArthur)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1949.

Participants: The French Ambassador
Mr. MacArthur, Chief, WE

Ambassador Bonnet asked me to lunch alone with him today "to renew contact" following my return to the Department for duty. After

a general dissertation on internal political and economic conditions in France the Ambassador changed the subject to Indochina, stating that he would be glad to hear my views on the situation there.

I replied that having been in Belgium for the last nine months and only having returned to the Department last week I was not conversant with the latest developments in Indochina, but that nonetheless I would be very glad to give him my personal views on this very critical subject and that I would speak with complete frankness. I said that my impression, after having been in Washington ten days, was that there is a strong current of informed American opinion which believes that the French have in general followed a policy of "too little and too late" in their dealings with the Indochinese Nationalists and that specifically such concessions as France finally made in the agreements of March 8, 1949 would probably not be enough to rally sufficient support for Bao-Dai to enable him to successfully oppose the efforts of the Ho Chi Minh faction from taking over the country. While this might well be true, I realized that given the circumstances the French Government would not reopen negotiations with Bao-Dai even if we pressed them to do so, and therefore I would not argue the merits or demerits of the March 8 Agreements. The point I did wish to make very strongly was that in my opinion if the French did not rapidly ratify the Agreements and then interpret and implement them in the most liberal manner possible the Bao-Dai solution was doomed to failure since at best his chances of success hardly appeared to be 50-50. The essential is, therefore, that the French move with all possible speed to ratify the March 8 agreements and then act in such a way that the Vietnam Nationalists may be persuaded that at last France is embarking on a more liberal policy which holds the possibility of further evolution.

I concluded by stating that I was concerned by the views held in certain French circles that the United States would pour all sorts of aid into Indochina at the last minute to prevent the country from being taken over by the Communists. This view, together with another idea held by certain French to the effect that possible future military aid under the Military Assistance Program if voted would enable France to try to seek a military solution against the Vietnam, was both dangerous and fallacious.

Ambassador Bonnet said that he was glad I had spoken to him so frankly. He thought I might be unduly concerned about the French dragging their feet on ratifying the March 8 agreements, since during his recent visit to Paris he had been told that the Government intended to move rapidly. He said that the successful conclusion of the debate on Cochinchina indicated that the French realized speed was essential.

I asked him if he had any information on when the Assembly would vote on the March 8 Agreements. He replied in the negative but added that he would send a telegram to Paris reiterating the urgency of the matter and inquiring when Parliamentary action would be taken.

He concluded by saying that the United States and France had the same interest in seeing that Indochina was not taken over by the Communists; that the Bao-Dai solution was the only non-communist solution in sight; and that therefore when the Agreements were ratified he hoped not only that we would not criticize them "as this would cut the ground from under Bao-Dai's feet" but that eventually we might "be able to do something" showing approval.

I replied that what we would or would not be able to do appeared to depend almost entirely on the speed with which the French acted and on their own efforts to strengthen Bao-Dai by a sincere, far-reaching and liberal interpretation of the March 8 Agreements.

851G.01/5-2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, May 23 [24], 1949—8 p. m.

2121. Cochin China bill will be considered by Council Republic May 25.¹ Second reading by Assembly, if required, cannot take place before middle next week at earliest as Assembly recesses 26th for long Ascension week-end.² De Peyrera, who replaced Pignon in Political Affairs Division Ministry Overseas France, states March 8 agreements will be made public immediately final action taken Cochin China law and understands Bao Dai now considering leaving Dalat directly for Saigon.

He stated implementation March 8 agreements has in fact already begun and will proceed as rapidly as possible with step by step transfer administration Vietnam to Bao Dai Government. Entire process to be completed well before December 31 deadline.

Regarding ratification agreements, he expressed opinion, which he says is widely shared in his Ministry, that agreements, which enter into effect upon exchange instruments, will not be submitted Assembly as such. Recalled that agreements were concluded with Bao Dai as "most representative element Vietnam" but not as chief of state. France therefore does not wish to "impose" them on Vietnam before freely elected government established there. Following formation such gov-

¹ The bill was approved early on May 26.

² The second reading took place on June 3; the bill would become law after publication.

ernment, treaty incorporating June 5 accords, March 8 agreements and supplementary agreements envisaged thereunder would be signed between Vietnam and France which, following Parliamentary ratifications, would constitute "act" required Article 61 constitution establishing relations between France and Vietnam. In this connection he added that while French commitments under March 8 agreements firm, agreement itself not static but subject enlargement in light future developments. He believes final treaty will be concluded within next six or seven months.

De Peyrera volunteered information that within next two or three weeks France would approach friendly powers including US informing them that while Vietnam temporarily accrediting missions only to Siam, India, and Vatican, France would "welcome" decision other nations to accredit missions to Vietnam. Juridical aspects recognition problem now under urgent study in Foreign Office. Latter tells us Bao Dai's people are pressing for quick action and have indicated to French their intention to send two special roving missions (one to US and Western Europe and one to neighboring countries) to announce Vietnam's new international status and invite recognition.

De Peyrera stated that Pignon's telegrams reporting internal situation Vietnam as developing more favorably than anticipated. Expected Viet Minh attacks Tonkin had not developed and even terrorist activities had fallen off. Pignon favorably impressed with Bao Dai who is proceeding slowly and carefully with composition government. De Peyrera stated that Bao Dai is in contact with non-Communist elements Vietnam and hopes for their inclusion in government. Despite recent "rumors" it was inconceivable that Bao Dai would consider inclusion Communists, particularly such conspicuous figures as Ho Chi Minh or Giap.³ In reply question, De Peyrera expressed doubts that Bao Dai has any intention leave Indochina within next few months but considered possible that in perhaps six or eight months after his government established as going concern he might visit France "for a month or so."

De Peyrera warned against expecting startling results in immediate future but believes that within next two or three months it will be evident whether or not Bao Dai solution will succeed or fail. He stated Pignon and Ministry Overseas France at present more optimistic than at any time previously.

Repeated Saigon 83.

BRUCE

³ Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces.

851G.01/5-3049: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, May 30, 1949—1 p. m.

2189. Embassy has carefully studied Deptels 77, May 10 and 83, May 20 to Saigon and 14, May 20 to Hanoi. French Government is of course acutely aware that Bao Dai's success will depend on ability his government obtain wide popular support and to govern effectively. Embassy receives impression, however, that Department convinced Bao Dai doomed to failure unless further concessions obtained from French at this time.

At risk being repetitious, Embassy wishes point out that March 8 agreements define limits of Vietnam's "independence within French Union." Obviously these limits could not be broadened without renegotiation March 8 agreements which embody maximum concessions which Cabinet has been able to agree upon and which Queuille risked his government to obtain. It was only with great difficulty that he was able to persuade political parties forming coalition—notably the Socialists—to approve action their members in Cabinet in accepting March 8 agreements. Such approval was of course essential if government was to obtain parliamentary support its Indochina policy in form early approval. Change status Cochin China and ultimately approval agreements themselves in one form or another (Embtel 2121, May 23 [24]).

Embassy believes, however, that March 8 agreements afford as much room for satisfying Vietnamese aspirations self-rule and international status as Vietnamese themselves are now able to cope with. Department is aware of prominent role of French High Commissioner in implementation agreements. Embassy has been repeatedly informed by Bao Dai's advisers that they are satisfied Pignon will move forward rapidly in an honest and sincere implementation of agreements. It is Embassy's belief that French Government will be guided by and support Pignon and is well ahead of parliamentary thinking on evolution Vietnam. On the specific points of foreign relations and army, command of latter reverts to French only in time of war. As to former, French prepared gradually to extend scope Vietnam representation abroad but basic conception French Union calls for coordination foreign policies of its component elements. Department will recall Ho is on record as prepared accept status for Vietnam within French Union.

Within above limits, Embassy believes French can be constantly and successfully pressed for liberal interpretation and implementation.

Sent Department 2189; repeated Saigon 85.

BRUCE

851G.01/6-249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, June 2, 1949—noon.

2230. Following tentative Indochina timetable obtained French-Viet sources: Second [reading] Cochin China bill in Assembly scheduled for today. Bao Dai arrives Saigon June 10 to exchange instruments March 8 agreements with Pignon. Agreements to be published following day.

Following ceremonies Saigon: Bao Dai will go to Hue and Hanoi making important policy statements all three cities. Composition government may not be announced until June 15 or June 20. In the meanwhile provisional government will have resigned and new government will take over at Hanoi. Not clear whether new government will be announced before trip or when he reaches Hanoi.

Regarding recognition, Foreign Office holds exchange instruments will constitute France's acknowledgement existence new state, but Auriol will send message Bao Dai on date exchange. Foreign Office is opposed French *de jure* recognition new government as long as it remains provisional but is recommending that *de facto* recognition, implied by its being instituted under French auspices, be underlined by second Auriol telegram this time to new Prime Minister.

After publication accords, current Foreign Office's plan is to inform foreign powers by note of coming into being new state together with statement Vietnam's ability to receive foreign diplomatic missions. Foreign Office idea is that each foreign power in its reply (or absence thereof) to note will indicate degree acceptance new status Vietnam and its views regarding entering into formal relations therewith.

Bao Dai will be chief of state not emperor or monarch pending popular consultation. Bao Dai advises state government is to be clearly provisional pending physical possibility popular consultation on national basis. It will be composed of representatives of all major non-Viet Minh Nationalist groups but some important portfolios will be in hands secretaries of state, thus leaving these ministerships open to Nationalist elements now in Viet Minh.

Two close advisers of Bao Dai, who accompanied Buu Lee [*Zoe*] on his tour of Vietnam and have just returned Paris, state that Bao Dai's people have been in contact with all major Nationalist groups and with certain non-Communist elements Viet Minh. They report general acceptance of March 8 agreements (whose terms are better than offered Ho) on satisfactory basis from which independent Vietnam can evolve. In Viet Minh circles contacted, however, the expected skepticism exists as to honest implementation agreement and positions

reserved until French declarations of intention are confirmed by performance. Source said there would be no "psychological shock" in Viet Minh territory. Only gradual growth of pro-Bao Dai sentiment could be expected. What was important was emphasis on factors which did not exist on other side of lines. Transfer of administration from French to Viet hands, although it would be closely scrutinized for French renegeing, would impress Viet Minh elements less than international status (not possessed by Ho) granted Bao Dai government by agreements and degree recognition accorded it by foreign government, particularly US.

Sources emphasized that this was one of principal psychological factors on which Bao Dai counted in building his prestige throughout Vietnam and an important element in stimulating defections from Viet Minh particularly among educated elements whom he needs to swell ranks of people capable to help him govern. Limitations on conduct diplomatic relations provided in agreements were described by our informants as creating little adverse comment among people they consulted.

Our Viet informants in conclusion gave us the optimum program of what Bao Dai hoped the US could do for him and his new regime. Points in chronological order are:

1. Shortly after exchange instruments, public statement welcoming creation Vietnam state. Hope statement can be phrased so as to constitute indirect endorsement Bao Dai himself.
2. About two months later, *de facto* recognition Vietnam government.
3. Favorable reception "goodwill mission" (Embtel 2121, May 24).
4. Creation of US Legation in Vietnam.
5. Economic assistance taking form direct ECA aid Indochina without necessarily increasing amount of aid now given.
6. Military assistance via France in form of light arms (rifles, machine guns, mortars and ammunition) to help equip national Vietnam army of 50,000-60,000.
7. *De jure* recognition after approval regime by popular consultation.

Embassy comments follow separately.
Repeated Saigon 86.

BRUCE

851G.01/6-249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, June 2, 1949—7 p. m.

2258. Following discussion of considerations arising from Embtel 2230, June 2 (repeated Saigon 86) may, together with Saigon's comment, be helpful formulation Department's policy and US public atti-

tude toward developments which are rapidly coming to head in Indochina.

1. Quite apart from probabilities success or failure Bao Dai experiment in Indochina, creation of Vietnam as associated state of French Union with wide attributes of internal and external sovereignty is important event in development and evolution France's relations with its far-flung and widely variegated dependent peoples. It is first major step taken by France in recognition of native nationalism to give autonomous status and international standing other than purely nominal to overseas territory. As such it is milepost and measure of France's willingness to implement principles of French Union. While conception underlying these principles contemplates closer control by Metropole in such matters as foreign relations and army than would perhaps be theoretically desirable, they are those which will govern France's future relationships with other dependent territories, particularly Tunisia and Morocco. While implementation for latter will be slower developing and different in degree, Vietnam accords may be expected have considerable influence both on Nationalist movements these areas and French thinking regarding them. The new Vietnam, even though created under extreme pressure events, represents maximum to which present government or foreseeable successor can be expected to go until French public opinion on colonial questions evolves. Therefore it would appear to be clearly consonant with Department's policy of encouraging development French imperial policy along more progressive lines to take due public note this important event with such degree of approval its essential elements as seems appropriate.

2. Insofar as Indochina itself is concerned and on continued assumption based on Department's telegrams that US desires success Bao Dai experiment without being expressly committed at outset to support it, birth of new state would appear to be appropriate moment for public statement on our part phrased in general terms and applying to state of Vietnam rather than Bao Dai or new government. Neither French nor Vietnamese with whom we have talked expect major powers to rush into any overall endorsement of Bao Dai regime until it has started functioning and given some signs of viability and public support. Bao Dai's advisors and Bao Dai himself have on numerous occasions over past months emphasized to us, however, the great weight which some degree of international acknowledgment of new state's existence will carry in local popular opinion and stabilizing function it will perform in early weeks when considerable fumbling may be expected as grim task of governing a people rent by civil war gets underway. From our point of view such statement would avoid for moment juridical aspects of recognition *de facto* or *de jure* of a government or regime though Bao Dai's people would find it helpful if

its terms were so conceived as to permit favorable construing by them. Furthermore such general statement could be unilateral although Department would no doubt wish previously to inform other interested Governments of its intentions in this respect.

3. Formal recognition and assumption diplomatic relations would presumably call for study and consultation particularly with UK, India, Burma, Siam, Philippines. Our first thoughts lend themselves towards Bao Dai schedule of *de facto* recognition of new regime and representation of US in Vietnam by minister or chargé d'affaires taking place in late summer if conditions then appear warrant such action.

Sent Department 2258, repeated Amconsul Saigon 87.

BRUCE

851G.01/6-649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, June 6, 1949.

2308. Today's press carries text Auriol message to Bao Dai informing him of promulgation of law for union Cochin-China with Vietnam. "France has thus carried out its commitments; independence and unity Vietnam within French union have become a reality".

Message states March 8 agreements will enter into effect following "imminent" exchange of instruments at Saigon and will be published in their entirety immediately thereafter. As Viet national aspirations satisfied and way now clear for reestablishment peace, Auriol requests Bao Dai, as soon as he shall have constituted the government of "new state", to choose immediately Viet diplomats foreseen in agreements in order that they may be jointly accredited to interested states. Message concludes that as soon as Bao Dai shall have appealed to all spiritual and political groups to collaborate in rebirth Vietnam and that appeal shall have restored peace, he, Auriol, in agreement with Bao Dai and Vietnam law, is prepared either to grant broad pardons for offenses and crimes committed during last unhappy years or in the same spirit to grant wide amnesty to bring about a fraternal reconciliation and to contribute to a sound peace and a growing prosperity in Vietnam.

Sent Department 2308, repeated Saigon 92.

BRUCE

851G.01/6-649

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET
No. 289

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1949.

SIR: There is transmitted herewith a memorandum setting forth the Department's views on the agreement signed on March 8 by the Presi-

dent of France and the former Emperor of Annam defining the future status of the State of Vietnam. You are requested to present this memorandum to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the French Government.

It is suggested that the Embassy's note transmitting the memorandum be composed along the following lines:

"The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instruction from its government, has the honor to transmit herewith certain comments of the Department of State on the agreement concluded on March 8, 1949, between the President of the French Republic and the former Emperor of Annam, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was kind enough to make available to the Government of the United States."

As an alternative, the presentation of the note by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen¹ may appear preferable. The problems dealt with in the memorandum were discussed in a conversation with the Secretary of State shortly before his departure from Washington at which Mr. Bohlen was present.²

Very truly yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:
W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH
Director for Far Eastern Affairs

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Department of State to the French Foreign Office

The Government of the United States is most appreciative of the action of the French Government in making available to it the text of the agreement concluded on March 8 between the President of France and the former Emperor of Annam defining the future status of the State of Vietnam. The agreement has been studied with the greatest interest by the Department of State.

As the French Government is aware, the United States Government has followed with some concern the course of events in French Indochina since the end of the war in the Pacific. This concern, it is needless to say, has been prompted by a realization that the forces which have contributed predominantly to the character of the Vietnamese nationalist movement are manifestations of the same forces which have worked profound changes in southern Asia generally and that the outcome of these forces can be of considerable consequence for the world in general.

When at the end of the war it became evident that in most of the dependent countries of southern Asia the indigenous peoples were

¹ Counselor of the Department, with the rank of Career Minister.

² Secretary of State Acheson and Mr. Bohlen were in Paris to attend the 6th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 23-June 20.

determined to control their own destinies in the future, the United States Government ventured to hope that the western nations would appreciate the strength of this resolution and willingly grant the essential demands of the nationalist movements. It was believed that in so doing, the metropolitan powers would be yielding what in any case they could expect to hold only by military force at great cost. In such event it seemed probable that the costs to the Metropolitan Government would be unrecoverable and the value of the colony and its possible contribution to world stability would be reduced by the ensuing hostilities. On the other hand it was believed that by promptly offering the necessary political concessions to the nationalist demands the metropolitan power would be adopting the course most likely to result in a continued close and mutually fruitful relationship with the former colony, in the preservation of patterns of trade and economy long intermeshed, and in a readiness on the part of the colonial people to welcome the continued technical and administrative assistance of the metropolitan power. It appeared that only on such a basis would there be any real hope that the Western powers could retain their legitimate interests in the countries so closely associated with them over such long periods, and that among the new nations of southern Asia conditions of political stability and of freedom of political and economic development could be achieved enabling them to realize their potentialities and make their full contribution to the world.

Conversely, it seemed that an intention on the part of the metropolitan power to retain an authority which the dependent people was determined to exercise itself could result only in turning the nationalist movement into destructive channels. In these circumstances it could be expected that widespread hostilities would result and that the consequent destruction of the facilities of production in the dependent area would cause economic setbacks seriously injurious to both peoples. Furthermore, it could be anticipated that the nationalist forces would turn increasingly to an uncompromising leadership which would react against cooperation with the West and against those free institutions which European civilization has evolved through long experience in self-government.

Events in southern Asia in the past four years have caused no revision of these views; and it is in the light of this estimate that the United States Government has examined the agreement of March 8 and offers its views.

Because of its conviction that concessions by France to the Nationalist movement commensurate with the strength of that movement can alone provide the basis for a resolution of the Indochinese situation and the creation of a stable, representative Vietnamese Government, the United States Government welcomes the step taken

by the President of France in arriving at an agreement with ex-Emperor Bao Dai whereby the territorial unity of Vietnam, comprising Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina, may be realized and the Vietnamese State enjoy far-reaching powers of internal autonomy. It may be stated at once that in the opinion of the United States Government the Vietnamese people would be guilty of a mistake disastrous to their future should they reject this solution and give their support not to the Vietnamese Government formed under the March 8 agreement but to the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For those in command of this Republic are men trained in the methods and doctrine of international communism, and regardless of their present espousal of the nationalist cause, it cannot be ignored that they have never disavowed their Kremlin connections or repudiated the techniques and objectives of communism, which are the cause of so much suffering in the world today. It must be assumed, therefore, that should their government succeed in its aims with the support or through the acquiescence of the Vietnamese people, the pattern of a foreign totalitarianism will be clamped upon Vietnam under which all liberties, national and personal, will be lost. Such an outcome would not only be fatal to the welfare and hopes of the Vietnamese but would be most detrimental to the interests of all free peoples, particularly those of southern Asia who stand in most immediate danger of further Communist aggression.

However, the United States Government does not feel confident that the Vietnamese people in general will see the choice confronting them in these terms, especially in view of the isolating factors in their situation during most of the past decade. The Vietnamese nationalists who for the most part have been supporting the so-called Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the one agency which appeared to promise independence may not, it is feared, find the provisions of the March 8 agreement entirely appealing. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the United States Government is considering only this agreement since it is not familiar with the contents of any associated documents which may bear upon the matter and does not know whether the March 8 agreement is intended to define the status of Vietnam permanently or to provide a basis for the further early evolution of the Vietnamese State.

The United States Government is inclined to believe that one of the strongest motivating forces behind nationalist movements among dependent peoples is resentment of the imputation of inferiority implicit in a subordinate status. When a people has fought for the goal of independence with such tenacity as that displayed by the Vietnamese resistance forces, it appears unlikely that it will be content with a position of anything less than equality with other peoples. It is feared that the

concessions granted by the French Government may be obscured in the eyes of the Vietnamese by those terms of the agreement which are incompatible with Vietnamese national pride.

Should such feelings determine the reaction of the majority of Vietnamese to a Government formed under the March 8 agreement, then it must be supposed that the Communist-dominated "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" will continue to receive the support of these Vietnamese. Certainly as long as the Vietnamese are persuaded that the two-and-a-half-year-old war with France must be prosecuted to a conclusion if the goals for which they have fought are to be won, they will continue to regard the dominant Communist element of the Vietminh League in the light of its effective leadership of the nationalist movement and not of its inevitable intention to subvert the nationalist cause in the end to the requirements of international Communism, with which they have had little acquaintance as yet.

The United States Government would be lacking in frankness if it did not state that in its considered estimation the paramount question in Indochina now is whether the country is to be saved from Communist control. Under the circumstances, all other issues must be regarded as irrelevant. Much time has already been lost. The years since the end of the Pacific War have seen the Communist threat to Indochina intensified rather than otherwise. The southward progress of Chinese Communist armies toward the northern frontier of Indochina introduces a new element that transforms an already serious situation into an emergency.

As it has made clear in the past, the United States Government is of the opinion that it must prove difficult to save this situation and to preserve Indochina from a foreign tyranny unless the French Government offers the Vietnamese the attainment of those nationalist goals which they would continue to fight for rather than forego and unless the Vietnamese can be convinced that they can, in fact, fully realize their patriotic aims through cooperation with the Government envisaged in the March 8 agreement. In its view, developments have reduced the choice in Indochina to simple alternatives: will Vietnam achieve independence through an agreement with France and with the assistance of France and maintain this independence fortified by collaboration with France, or will it achieve independence from France while at the same time falling victim to Communist totalitarianism?

The United States Government believes that the Vietnamese will willingly accept a partnership with France only if the equality of Vietnam is recognized and if, as a prior condition to the determination of the character of this relationship, the sovereignty of Vietnam is acknowledged. Observation of developments in southern Asia since the end of the war would seem to leave little doubt that a Union be-

tween France and Vietnam would be far more likely of attainment and would prove more fruitful and enduring if attained were the Union conceived not as an instrument for the control of one member by the other but as an agency of cooperation in fields of common interest, diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural, voluntarily espoused on both sides.

An approach to the future on these lines would appear to offer the greatest hope that French influence in Indochina may be preserved, which must be regarded as unquestionably to the best interests of the Indochinese, and that military and naval bases in Vietnam may be retained by France and French economic rights be assured. By adopting this course the metropolitan country would appear to have little to lose and much to gain. Moreover, from a strictly practical point of view, the United States Government has been impressed by the difficulties likely to arise if in transferring autonomous powers to the government of a dependent territory the metropolitan power seeks, as a condition to such transfer, to subdivide sovereignty in the area by retaining certain transcendent rights to itself. For in this case the question of the precise division of authority is prone to present itself in connection with every field of government as the process of transfer is planned. In consequence, the prestige and good will which should accrue to the metropolitan power from its acceptance of a new order is likely to be dissipated in an atmosphere of discord and mistrust, as suspicion grows among the nationalists that the metropolitan power is in fact seeking to perpetuate its existing controls. In consequence the process of giving definition to the new order and establishing it in practice may be indefinitely protracted, with results which may defeat the enterprise.

A dispassionate appraisal leads the United States Government to believe, in short, that the preservation of Indochina's integrity depends, in the first place, upon the willingness of the metropolitan country to give assurances that Vietnam is to exercise control of its destinies; that its participation in the French Union will be upon terms freely accepted by representatives enjoying the confidence of the Vietnamese people when these shall have been assembled; that the powers of administration exercised by France in Vietnam will be transferred to the Vietnamese as soon as conditions permit the institution and functioning of the new regime; and that the deployment of French forces in Vietnam outside their bases is to be accounted for in terms of the defense of Vietnam against the protagonists of a supranational totalitarianism who would surrender Vietnam to alien controls.

In the second place, much would appear to depend upon the readiness of the heads of the Vietnamese Government formed under the

March 8 agreement to invite the participation in this Government of bonafide and truly nationalist leaders of Vietnam, including those who have heretofore supported the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam", to the end that this Government may provide dynamic leadership and obtain the confidence of the nationalist elements comprising the major part of the resistance forces.

Such an approach to the problem would best appear to lay the basis for the clear separation of nationalists from Communist elements in Vietnam; for those who persisted in resisting a Vietnamese Government through which all nationalist aims could be realized in favor of continued adherence to the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" would in effect be acknowledging that their goals were not nationalist but Communist. The achievement of this distinction would appear to be the *sine qua non* of a solution of the Indochina problem.

Having demonstrated its capacity to rally the nationalist majority of Vietnamese to its support, the Government formed under the March 8 agreement would—it would seem to the United States Government—have grounds for appealing for the support of all free nations. The United States Government would hope that this appeal would be generally heeded, especially by the other Governments of southern Asia which, themselves having every reason to regard the further extension of Communist controls in the region with alarm, could fill a vitally important role by clarifying for the Vietnamese people the issues confronting them on the basis of their own experience and undoubted fidelity to the cause of self-determination by the Asian peoples.

The United States Government is, however, convinced that if the requisite concessions by the French Government to the nationalist demands are not forthcoming, the task of the Government envisaged in the March 8 agreement must prove most difficult of accomplishment and the countries adjacent to Indochina will most likely be confronted by the prospect of the appearance of sizable Communist-controlled forces on their frontiers.

It goes without saying that the earnest hope of the United States Government is that the Government formed under the March 8 agreement will succeed in its crucial task. At the same time it would appear axiomatic that insofar as the probabilities of its success are related to the extent of international support it obtains, the decision of a third party in respect of the feasibility of its extending support or assistance must be governed by the extent to which the French Government has itself provided that Government with the political advantages upon which its appeal to the Vietnamese must be based. Clearly the success of this Government must rest in the first instance upon those means of accomplishing its purpose which only the French Government can provide.

In taking advantage of the relations of cordiality and mutual understanding it enjoys with the French Government by offering this frank appraisal, the United States Government has been prompted only by the thought that it should not leave the direction of its thinking a matter of doubt and that an exchange of views might be advantageous considering all that is involved in the outcome of the situation in Indochina.

851G.01/6-1049 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, June 10, 1949—noon.

189. Consider Bao Dai's views on hoped for aid from US (Paris telegram 2230 and 2258, June 2 and 3[2] repeated Saigon 86 and 87) relatively modest with exception point 6 and hope Dept may feel it is possible to give them prompt consideration. In addition points brought out in Paris 2258 (with which entirely agree) feel that too long delayed indication our support new Vietnam state will deprive us of opportunity to exert influence on developments during crucial initial period when many important policy decisions will have to be taken by both French and Bao Dai.

Prolonged delay will also be interpreted by many as sign that US sees no hope for success Bao Dai and is resigned to future inclusion area in Communist sphere. Effect of this on non-Communist nationalists weighing pros and cons of throwing their lot in with Bao Dai can be imagined.

If as it is hoped the Dept is prepared to issue a favorable statement regarding the new regime, it is suggested it include friendly mention of Bao Dai in his capacity as mediator between all truly nationalist and non-Communist elements. Recent developments emphasize importance of building up prestige and authority ex-Emperor as essential cohesive element in otherwise confused political situation.

It is believed that Bao Dai's message to people planned for June 13 will contain statement of policy on democratic consultation of people re future for government agrarian and social reforms cooperation with other nations, et cetera, which might be noted in Dept's statement.

Pouched Hanoi, repeated Paris.

ABBOTT

851G.01/6-1349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, June 13, 1949—7 p. m.

2430. Department's Instruction 289, June 6. The following are my considered views. We are unanimous in thinking it would be a serious

mistake to deliver Department's memorandum. The Secretary has read both the memorandum and my reply which follows and concurs with us that the delivery of such views as expressed by the Department would at this time be inappropriate.

Embassy has attentively and exhaustively considered memorandum enclosed Department's instruction 289 and has reached conclusion that while it is an excellent summary of Department's thinking on latter-day aspects of colonial problem and its relationship both to strong current of nationalism in SEA and to latter's tragic corollary of Communism, its presentation to French officials at this time would impede rather than encourage achievement by French of Department's desiderata.

Members of Cabinet and other French officials concerned with formulation of Indochina policy are battered and bruised by the long struggle against prejudice, self-interest and political opportunism from which they have emerged with a partial triumph embodied in March 8 agreements and passage of Cochin-China bill. While many of them have their doubts, as has the Department, as to whether the March 8 agreements are entirely adequate or whether Bao Dai has astuteness and ability necessary for success, they are equally aware that there is no present alternative to them and that they must live with the document and with the man throughout the early phases of the experiment. In their eyes Department's memorandum would constitute not only a discouraging document in that it unfavorably prejudices outcome of an experiment which has not yet got off to fair start and implies that US will support it only in unlikely event that it succeeds, but also an unrealistic document in that its references to further concessions suggests that March 8 agreements be renegotiated. (In this connection please see Embtel 2189, May 30 explaining why March 8 agreements cannot be renegotiated.) Under the circumstances effect produced on these officials would be opposite of constructive at time when their best efforts are required to help Bao Dai experiment succeed.

For the above reasons I strongly urge that I be authorized to give the French orally a resume of the Department's general views on problem as a whole as contained in first four and half pages of Department's memorandum and simultaneously continue to urge the adoption of a liberal interpretation and loyal implementation of the agreements already reached and a similarly generous attitude in the negotiations still to be conducted.

At same time I am hopeful that Department is giving sympathetic consideration to suggestions advanced in mytels 2258, June 2 and 2309, June 7.¹

BRUCE

¹ Latter not printed.

851G.01/6-1449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET NIACT

SAIGON, June 14, 1949—8 a. m.

192. At Huu dinner last night Minister Information Dan informally suggested that if I wished to see Bao Dai he thought interview could be arranged Wednesday morning. In view of Department's instructions regarding any premature action indicating recognition, I replied that it would seem more appropriate if I had informal conversation with Prince Buuloc.

Later Diplomatic Counsellor Dugardier said he had heard of above approach and Pignon had no objection my seeing Bao Dai. Still later Dugardier again approached me and said he felt I should see Bao Dai.

Understand Chinese Consul General and British Consul in charge also approached. Former accepted, latter undecided. Please instruct urgently.

ABBOTT

¹ Repeated in telegram 2096, June 14, 7 p. m., to Paris.

851G.01/6-1449 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon*¹

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—11 a. m.

94. Urtel 192, Jun 14. You are authorized hold conversation Bao Dai. Since coordination with British desirable you may express hope to your Brit colleague that he will be able to make similar acceptance.

Dept believes that other South Asian Govts, notably India and Thai, may be of great assistance in enhancing chance of success Bao Dai experiment. Suggests that you point out to Pignon and Bao Dai desirability extending to Indian and Thai Consuls Saigon invitations to hold conversation with Bao Dai, if this has not already been done.

WEBB

¹ Repeated in 2095, June 14, 7 p. m., to Paris.

851G.01/6-1449 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, June 14, 1949—11 a. m.

193. Exchange letters marking entrance into effect March 8 agreements took place this morning City Hall after speeches by Pignon and Bao Dai. Then following hoisting Vietnam flag, 21-gun salute, formal address broadcast to nation by Bao Dai in Vietnamese, presentation colors to Vietnam regiment and review of troops. Guard of honor ex-

clusively Vietnamese including elements Caoadaists, Hoa Hao, Ben Nguyen and New Catholic local defense corps. Spectators limited, in rancid [*sic*] enthusiasm but such as there was apparently spontaneous contrast certain ceremonies in past. Extraordinary security precautions have prevented populace getting close enough emperor even recognize him. Bao Dai's speech, prior exchange letters, hailed new era France-Vietnam relations based on friendly understanding. France has recognized aspirations for independence and granted territorial unity. "We count on France to realize our sovereignty within country and to proclaim it throughout world. Our country, which hopes rapidly to achieve its international status, understands its mission is to cooperate with all countries who wish to defend conception of life based on peace, democratic principles and respect for individual liberties."

Emperor then stated that adherence to French Union was recognition that present world situation prevents purely national policy. Vietnam can count on diplomatic support French Union and vice versa. Within Union, close and friendly relations desired with Cambodia and Laos and confident outstanding problems can be settled. Also spoke of mission in SEA as member "concert free nations anxious to preserve peace and guaranty [*guarantee*] happiness of people."

Bao Dai closed with thanks to Auriol, Queuille, Coste Floret, [apparent omission] on French Parliament Bao Dai's broadcast message to people opens with acknowledgment of heroic part played by Cochin China history Vietnam, then refers to destructive Nouryr war due to failure to satisfy national aspirations. In order to stop this sad conflict between two fundamentally peace loving peoples, he accepted mission "to find peaceful solution and to satisfy deep aspirations people."

Provisionally keeping old title in order have legal international status but promises future constitution to be drafted by people. In meantime due grave international situation and impossibility hold elections "I accept from today to take over direction of state."

Then takes up March 8 agreements "which will be eventually submitted for ratification to Vietnam Parliament". Unity of country restored and colonial status definitely abolished. "The independence of the country is restored and from today Vietnam directs its own affairs both external and internal." Internationally, country has all powers independent state; right foreign relations, right send Ambassadors, receive Diplomatic missions, appoint Consuls abroad, right to sign international treaties and join UNO.

First task new government implementation these rights by sending Consuls abroad and accrediting Ambassadors to countries named March 8 agreement. We also await "with fervor" representatives

friendly governments and future membership UNO. Repeats statement previous speech reference individual liberties, etc.

Then discusses internal policy based on discipline and justice. Involves social program: elimination illiteracy, labor legislation, higher standard living, land for peasants assistance, foreign specialists.

Speech closed with appeal to entire population for peace and order so that all can unite efforts for rebuilding country of which all can be proud—to begin a new page in history of new Vietnam.

Believe important features speech are emphasis on foreign relations, no mention autonomy or special status Cochin China, absence reference French Union, no direct appeal resistance elements, no mention of armistice.

If Department plans issue statement, helpful if text transmitted Hanoi and Consulate General for advance issue certain French and Vietnamese officials.

Sent Department; repeated Paris, pouched Hanoi.

ABBOTT

851G.01/6-1449: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*¹

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—7 p. m.

2044. For Holmes² from Butterworth and Hickerson.³ We have asked Graves⁴ of Brit Emb (now en route London) for current Brit views on Indochina particularly policy Brit intend to pursue vis-à-vis Bao Dai Govt. We pointed out that at present Bao Dai solution only existing alternative to Communist domination and therefore in interest US, UK and other democracies that Bao Dai succeed.

We told Graves we intend issue statement welcoming formation of new Vietnam state and are now also considering how best exert influence on both French and Viets during crucial initial period of first several months and what position we should take (1) when faced with question of *de facto* recognition (2) should French and Viets request economic or military assistance.

We also informed Graves that we believe support of neighboring SEA countries—India, Siam, Burma, and Philippines—of great importance in contributing to possibility success Bao Dai experiment; that these countries, particularly India, should be induced to take lead

¹ Repeated as 2094 to Paris and 95 to Saigon; sent in 419, June 15, 8 p. m., to New Delhi.

² Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes, Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, with rank of Minister.

³ John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

⁴ Hubert Ashton Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy; memorandum of conversation on June 10 not printed. (851G.00/6-1049)

if possible in supporting ex-Emperor, that if US and UK played too prominent a role it might prove "kiss of death". However, before consulting SEA countries, we wish obtain British views.

Please approach FonOff at appropriate level and cable us Brit thinking and whether they plan to issue independently a statement such as outlined in para 2 above which is of course designed to gain support for Bao Dai in Indochina.

You may point out to FonOff that Dept recognizes (1) Mar 8 agreement leaving French in substantial control Vietnam foreign policy and army may not satisfy all demands Viet nationalists, (2) this agreement represents concessions beyond which French not prepared go at this time.

WEBB

890.00/6-1449

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

BANGKOK, June 14, 1949.

No. 201

[Received June 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the Department's Instruction No. 27 of April 22, 1949, which has recently been received, transmitting a copy of a memorandum on Southeast Asia dated April 2, 1949, left with the Secretary by the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Ernest Bevin, during his recent visit to the United States.¹

I have read the British memorandum with great interest. I believe that the analysis of the situation contained therein is sound and that the British approach to this problem as outlined in the memorandum displays a clear appreciation of the dangers of the spread of Communism throughout Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the suggestions advanced to contain Communism in this part of the world appear to me to be thoroughly realistic. I might mention that the views expressed by the British Government closely parallel our own estimate of the situation of which the Department has been made cognizant through our despatches, policy suggestions, and telegrams.

There are two points made in the British memorandum which I feel are vital to this whole problem and which I am therefore commenting upon at the risk of being repetitious. I have reference firstly to the statement appearing in the opening paragraph of the British memorandum that if the general impression prevails in Southeast Asia that the Western powers are both unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Soviet pressure, the psychological effect may be that local resistance

¹ Instruction No. 27 is not printed; the enclosure, dated April 2, is scheduled for publication in part 2 of the present volume.

is weakened with the result that the undermining of the Governments of that region will succeed and that eventually the whole of Southeast Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance, thus coming under Russian domination without any military effort on the part of Russia. The significance of this statement regarding the psychological attitude and feeling on the part of the peoples of Southeast Asia generally, and of Thailand in particular, is constantly being impressed upon me and my staff. With the sweep of Communist forces through China and their rapid approach to the southern borders of that country, government officials and educated Thai have become increasingly uneasy over the future of their country. Many of them unfortunately do not have any very clear conception of the ruthless policies and objectives of Communism or what this would mean to Thailand and the Thai people if a Communist regime were to be established here. There is great need to bring home to the people the dangers of Communism. As reported to the Department from time to time there is among some Thai a feeling of fatalism and a resignation to the fact that Thailand in the not too distant future will be confronted by a powerful force which she alone is unable to cope with. In these circumstances there is a natural disposition and tendency for the Thai people to look to the Western powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, whom they know are opposed to the spread of militant Communism, for help and assistance. It is for this reason that any statements or developments concerning the Far East and this part of the world are examined and weighed rather seriously by influential Thai. What they have thus far observed has not reassured them but, on the contrary, has caused them to believe that the United States in particular is not seriously interested in the future of Thailand. I have reference to the following series of events, namely, the statements attributed to former Secretary of War, Mr. Royall,² at Tokyo; the lack of serious United States interest in Southeast Asia as reported by Prince Wan, the Thai Ambassador at Washington, to the Government and the Thai Army General Staff, upon his return to this country early this year, and the Secretary's recent statement regarding a Pacific Pact.³ While we have done what we could to counter this general impression of lack of United States interest in the fate of Thailand because of our preoccupation with the European situation, we have not been in a position to point either privately or publicly to any specific statement of policy with regard to this part of the world, to any authorized official approach to the Thai Government concerning

² Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall was on a visit to Japan in February.

³ For Secretary Acheson's statement of May 18, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 29, 1949, p. 696.

the problem of Communism and ways and means of meeting that problem, or to any concrete measures of technical or other assistance actually extended to the Thai people. The psychological effect of the ominous developments in China coupled with our seeming unwillingness and/or inability to assist the Thai people at this critical juncture in their history, is, I fear, likely to have precisely the reaction foreseen and to result in the commencement of a process of weakening the will of the Government and people to resist.

It can be argued that the Thai, in full realization of the dangers of Communism to the liberties of their people and the freedom and sovereign integrity of their country, should depend upon themselves and their own resources to resist the menace which threatens them. I believe that to a certain extent the Thai people can and will resist the seizure of their country by the Communists but historically and by temperament they have tended to bow to force which they regard as overwhelming and against which they feel they cannot count on outside aid and assistance. I think I can safely say, therefore, in the absence of either a policy statement regarding Southeast Asia or some concrete evidence of our intention to assist the Siamese that psychologically they are allowing themselves to think in terms of acquiescence to Communism when serious pressure is applied.

The second point in the British memorandum which I feel deserves special comment, has reference to the desirability of taking steps to "stiffen the will to resist" on the part of Southeast Asian countries, simultaneously with our efforts to strengthen the defensive position of Europe and the Middle East. This is precisely in line with our thinking as set forth in various telegrams and our Despatch No. 35 of February 10, 1949,⁴ forwarding certain policy suggestions regarding Thailand which were prepared for the Foreign Service Regional Conference held in April of this year at New Delhi.

I feel that the phrase "to stiffen the will to resist" very aptly and accurately describes precisely what I believe we should seek to achieve without too deeply committing ourselves politically or financially. It is obvious that we do not, at this juncture, wish to bind ourselves by an agreement which would commit us to defend Thailand from a Communist attack and guarantee the sovereignty and independence of the country. I do not believe that such extensive commitments are necessary. I believe that the issuance of a carefully worded policy statement clearly emphasizing our desire to assist in the problems of rehabilitation which face the country in order that Thailand might achieve both economic and political strength sufficient to ward off the dangers of Communism or other threats to her sovereignty and independence, would have a very beneficial effect upon the general morale of the Gov-

⁴ Not printed.

ernment and people and would in effect "stiffen the will to resist". Such a statement, perhaps made in conjunction with the British, should enumerate the aid we propose to extend in the technical fields, the supply of a modest amount of military aid and equipment and the implementation of the other recommendations set forth in our despatch No. 35 of February 10, 1949. I believe such a statement would create in the minds of the Thai people the reassuring feeling that they are not without outside friends to give them some measure of support against the powerful menace of Communism.

Finally, may I say that while our commitments designed to stem Communism in Europe and the Middle East are tremendous, we cannot afford to close our eyes to the equally tremendous gains made by Communism in China and the Far East or to the fact that a wholly Communist dominated Asia constitutes an extremely serious threat to the economy of Europe, our peace and the peace of the world. The grouping together of the nations of Southern and Southeastern Asia in a common and solid front against Communism, as hoped for by the British, would be a most desirable development. However, such a development is problematical and not likely in the immediate future. The only desirable alternative is the adoption by these countries, on an individual basis, of measures to resist Communist pressure. We can, and I believe we should, encourage the adoption of such measures by judicious extension of modest aid particularly to a small country such as Thailand which looks for reassurance from the friendly powers that in standing against Communism it is not standing alone. I believe further that in extending aid to Thailand there is reasonable prospect of such aid achieving what we hope it will achieve and that the withholding of aid is likely to have only one result—namely, a fatalistic acquiescence to Communist domination.

Respectfully yours,

EDWIN F. STANTON

851G.01/6-1449: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers Abroad*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14 [15?], 1949—2 a. m.

Fol is tentative text press statement to be issued re developments Indochina:

"The formation of the new state of Vietnam and the recent announcement by ex-Emperor Bao Dai that the future constitution will

¹Originally dated June 14, 7 p. m., and sent to 8 posts (Bangkok, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Rangoon, Saigon, and Hanoi). Comments suggesting changes were received from Saigon, Hanoi, Paris, and London; further telegrams were sent by the Department accepting some of the suggestions. For the text of the press release issued on June 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1949, p. 75.

be decided by the Vietnamese people are gratifying developments which should serve to hasten the reestablishment of peace in that country and the attainment of Vietnam's rightful place in the family of nations.

"The US Govt hopes that the agreements of Mar 8 between Pres Auriol and former Emperor Bao Dai who is making sincere efforts to unite all truly nationalist elements within Vietnam, will form the basis for the progressive realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people. Continuing statesmanship such as that already displayed by both parties to the present accord will accelerate this development."

Wld appreciate ur comments soonest as we inclined believe statement shld be issued, perhaps June 17, before announcement formation of Bao Dai's govt. We desire also avoid giving Bao Dai experiment "kiss of death" by too generous treatment of ex-Emperor.

Sent Paris, rptd Saigon, Hanoi, all for action; rptd New Delhi, London, Bangkok, Manila, Rangoon, for info.

WEBB

851G.01/6-1549: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, June 15, 1949—4 p. m.

195. Department's 94, June 14 arrived shortly before my appointment Prince Buuloc and enabled me explain situation to him. British Consul¹ saw Bao Dai privately yesterday connection special reception for Chinese, Indian, Pakistan colonies which Hopson attended as representative Pakistan interests.

Prince Buuloc stated Emperor attaches great importance his two speeches yesterday (mytel 193 June 14). They should be considered as complementary, first speech as announcement foreign policy, second outlining internal policy. Prince drew attention to sentence quoted third paragraph mytel 193 which Emperor considers form slanderence [*sic*] to anti-Communist bloc which should correct any misunderstanding this point aroused by irresponsible journalists. Second speech pledges Emperor to democratic, socially liberal internal regime. Subsequent speeches Hue [and] Hanoi will supplement and expand above themes.

Prince expressed hope Britain and US would issue friendly welcoming statement as soon as government formed. Said Emperor returning Dalat next day or so to form government before proceeding Hue, Hanoi. Indicated no decision yet made whether Emperor should head government himself or name Prime Minister. Said Emperor reluctant proceed Hanoi during current heat wave (110 degrees with high

¹ Donald C. Hopson.

humidity) and hinted possibility permanent residence Dalat (reference mytel 186, June 1)² or at least regular week-end trips in his new plane.

Discussed with Buuloc importance attitude India and Thai. Emperor has sent representatives neither country. Indian Consulate in charge minor clerk who is hospitalized lumbago. However, French suspect diplomatic illness in view current strained relations over French territories in India and French refusal accept [apparent garble] newly appointed Consul General Saigon following reports from former post Batavia that Maerelmani is bitter disgruntled unsuccessful journalist and violent anti-imperialist. Thai Vice Consul absent all ceremonies and social functions. Excuse illness mother. French Chargé Bangkok now in Saigon reticent and evasive re attitude Thai Government towards Bao Dai.

Buuloc confirmed plans for good will mission Thai, India, perhaps Australia. I suggested possibility Philippines. Also said similar mission to US under consideration. French had indicated no objection and had offered to approach US. Would appreciate Department's views on this.³

Sent Department; reypeated Paris; pouched Hanoi.

ABBOTT

² Not printed.

³ Telegram 102, June 18, 6 p. m., to Saigon, replied that the Department considered such a mission "premature at this time."

851G.01/6-1549: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

LONDON, June 15, 1949—5 p. m.

2301. From Holmes for Butterworth and Hickerson: Complying with Department's 2044,¹ saw Makins,² temporarily chargé of Foreign Office today. Lloyd of Far Eastern Department in Dening's³ absence was present. Foreign Office had not contemplated making statement welcoming formation Vietnam and doubt advisability of so doing. It is felt that prospect of Bao Dai so unlikely that supporting statement now might result in embarrassment following Bao Dai's failure. Opinion was expressed that it is doubtful French would consider statement by US or UK would be helpful and that in any event French should be consulted in advance of any statement.

¹ June 14, p. 49.

² Sir Roger M. Makins, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.

³ Maberly E. Dening, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, in charge of Far Eastern Department.

Foreign Office believes that approach to India might in present circumstances do more harm than good, fearing Nehru⁴ blast on colonialism. Foreign Office opinion principally based on statements made by Nehru at time Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting: that he does not consider Ho Chi-minh a Kremlin tool but rather a Nationalist and does not approve of March 8 agreement.⁵ Foreign Office doubtful usefulness any statement from Burma but feel that possibly something from Siam and/or Philippines might be helpful later.⁶

But I feel that no steps should be taken for *de facto* recognition until Bao Dai has formed government, is in effective control, and produces tangible evidence of success. They are desirous close consultation with US and common front. Foreign Office attitude with regard to economic and military assistance consistent with position concerning *de facto* recognition.

Foreign Office will give immediate consideration to all aspects this question; will consult with Graves on arrival and keep in close touch with Embassy. British feel that March 8 agreement gives Bao Dai little to work with and are pessimistic concerning outcome. The general position is to concert with US and so support French greatest practicable degree.

Sent Department 2301; repeated Paris 425, Saigon unnumbered. [Holmes.]

DOUGLAS

⁴Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.

⁵The Department repeated telegram 2301 in 421, June 16, 3 p. m., to New Delhi, and asked for an estimate of Prime Minister Nehru's "actual position". (851G.01/6-1549)

⁶In telegram 2063, June 16, 2 p. m., to London, the Department asked for further information on the British position. (851G.01/6-1549)

851G.01/6-1349 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1949—7 p. m.

2139. Urtel 2430, June 13. Dept's intention in forwarding its instruction 289 June 6 was twofold (1) to put French Govt on notice US, while recognizing internal polit realities of France may prevent Govt from proceeding beyond limits of Mar 8 agreement at this time, regards this accord as only first of important steps in evolution Vietnam (2) to make entire position Dept clear beyond peradventure. It was not intention Dept force French to renegotiate now Mar 8 accord as Emb has undoubtedly noted memo nowhere expressed hope French could at present take such action.

Dept of course accepts Emb's judgment regarding delivery at this time of memo under ref and is agreeable to oral presentation of Dept's

general views on problem as contained in first four and half pages of memo. Dept suggests Emb in making such presentation emphasize (a) that we regard IC problem as continuing one in respect solution of which French Govt wld be ill advised to take intransigent stand (b) that future US considerations assistance IC will depend in overwhelming measure upon interpretation and implementation Mar 8 accord by both parties involved.

Pls show Sec foregoing,¹ and note opinion Siamese Amb described in tel fol shortly.²

WEBB

¹ Telegram, 2533, June 20, 5 p. m., from Paris, stated that Secretary Acheson had not seen telegram 2139 before returning to Washington, but that the Embassy was in agreement with the Department and would continue stressing "overwhelming importance of a most liberal interpretation and implementation of March 8 agreements." (851G.01/6-2049)

² *Infra.*

851G.01/6-1649: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1949—7 p. m.

2140. In course call at Dept on other matters Thai Ambassador commented on French-Bao Dai Agreement that (1) present terms Agreement inadequate to win support Vietnam people; (2) principal lack is promise specific time for complete independence; (3) if Bao Dai experiment to have any chance to succeed concerted support other nations now required; (4) Thailand's relations with France are good and accordingly will be good with Bao Dai.

WEBB

851G.01/6-1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW DELHI, June 17, 1949—3 p. m.

684. Re final sentence Deptel 420.¹ 1. We have not yet received London's 2301, June 15 but comment as follows on Deptel 419² which expresses view that neighboring SEA countries particularly India should take length [*lead?*] supporting Bao Dai.

2. As was manifest last session UN General Assembly, GOI is still more interested in combating colonialism and racial discrimination than in actively opposing Communism outside of India. To ask India to take lead in supporting Bao Dai would be in effect to ask it to re-

¹ Telegram of June 16, 2 p. m., repeated 2063 to London; see footnote 6, p. 56. The final sentence indicated "thinking Indian Govt differs from Makins' statement of Nehru's position".

² June 15; see footnote 1, p. 49.

verse a basic policy for sake combating Communism and to play active role in supporting efforts colonial power keep Asian people under its control.

3. Until such time as Bao Dai appears to GOI to have gained large measure national support and it is convinced that this experiment offers best prospect real independence for Indochinese people (see Embtel 575, May 21,³ paragraph 2), we feel that our efforts here can best be directed to explaining importance to Asia of success his regime and to expressing hope GOI will refrain from public statements which would prejudice chances success. It would be futile to expect at this time anything in nature of positive help. Such help would also cut across GOI policy of avoiding alignment with either of "power blocs" since it is certain to regard Bao Dai as mere creature of member of Western "bloc".

4. It would be helpful if we could inform the GOI in advance of proposed public US statement and explain our views in some detail. Indian reaction would be more favorable if we could indicate that we regarded agreement between Bao Dai and French as not of permanent character and that we expected further progress in due course towards full independence.

Sent Department 684; repeated Saigon, Paris, London.

HENDERSON

³ Not printed.

851G.01/6-1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BANGKOK, June 17, 1949—4 p. m.

566. Our information based Hunter's¹ recent talk with High Commissioner, General Revers, head *Sûreté* and of DEC, other French officials, businessmen and conservative Vietnamese, plus my own conversations here with members French Embassy, causes us view with serious misgiving Department's proposal issue statement to press before Bao Dai Government set up and functioning. While we also hopeful Bao Dai successful setting up liberal government which will rally support Vietnamese people, our misgivings based following brief estimate situation:

1. Statements made to Hunter by Pignon and others and to me by French Embassy officials here indicate Bao Dai having very serious difficulty forming cabinet due reluctance important, capable Vietnamese join his cabinet.

2. Extent support Bao Dai from public and men of influence unknown, but judging from meager interest thus far displayed by public

¹ Lt. William H. Hunter, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air in Thailand.

in Saigon, elsewhere Indochina and Bao Dai's difficulties getting good men for cabinet, present Vietnamese support Bao Dai exceedingly limited.

3. We believe full import March 8 agreements and subsequent protocols between French and Bao Dai not entirely clear.

4. Ability and desire French particularly in Indochina to implement agreements and actually turn over effective control to Bao Dai not clear. As Department aware, agreements, generally speaking, strongly opposed by French colonial functionaries, Indochina, and by vested business interests. Therefore, while High Command French Government no doubt seriously desirous fully implementing agreements entirely possible their efforts sabotaged by above mentioned groups.

In these circumstances, we feel very strongly inadvisable US Government give such fulsome endorsement Bao Dai before his government actually set up and functioning and particularly before some indication degree popular support. We believe such course unwise, if not dangerous, firstly, because Bao Dai Government may speedily be shown ineffectual without popular support and merely puppet government of French; secondly, because French colonial officialdom Indochina may succeed sabotaging French Government's good plans and intentions; thirdly, issuance statement this time might conceivably react very unfavorably and give impression we committing ourselves full support French and Bao Dai without waiting see success Bao Dai's efforts and implementation French promises. I earnestly urge therefore no statement be issued at this time but if at a later date it is clear Bao Dai Government has reasonable chance success Department give consideration issuance carefully worded statement at that time. If text proposed statement Deptel June 14 [15?], 2 a. m. is used that time, might I suggest revision second paragraph somewhat along following lines, "US Government hopes agreements March 8 between President Auriol and former Emperor Bao Dai will be fully and expeditiously implemented in order legitimate aspirations Vietnamese people may be realized and peace, prosperity restored people Vietnam.["]"²

STANTON

² Repeated by the Department in telegram 104, June 20, 3 p. m., to Saigon and in 2186 to Paris. In despatch 32, June 30, from Hanoi, Consul Gibson pointed out some factors favorable to the Bao Dai solution. (851G.01/6-3049)

851G.01/6-1749: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1949—4 p. m.

430. Dept recently despatched Paris for delivery FonOff memo commenting on Mar 8 agreement. Memo expressed view success Bao Dai solution depends first instance upon readiness French provide him

with means satisfying aims nationalist majority Vietnam, that if requisite French concessions forthcoming and Viet govt formed under Mar 8 agreement evidences capacity rally support substantial percentage Viets such govt would have grounds for appealing for support free nations, which US hopes would be generally heeded. Should French govt and Viet govt envisaged Mar 8 agreement make success this venture, US with expectation coordination British would seek obtain backing other south Asian govts and itself lend support including recognition new regime and extension such assistance as possible in circumstances. Other hand, should French and Viet govts fall short what incumbent upon them, US would refrain from supporting Bao Dai solution and it would be clear as to why US unable prevent Commie control Vietnam.

Memo will be delivered only orally and in part as Emb Paris reports its delivery at this time would impede rather than encourage French to move along lines Dept desires.

Before receipt urtel 684 Jun 17 Dept had been hopeful it might be possible induce Indian Govt take action somewhat along line British as expressed in London's tel 2342 Jun 17,¹ repeated to you as 59. As this now seems impossible, Dept would appreciate your personal views without consultation GOI soonest on possibility that an arrangement might be made, possibly with you as "honest broker", whereby in return for public expression of encouragement for Bao Dai experiment from India, French might be induced make some conciliatory move re their colonies India.

You are of course authorized to proceed along lines suggested final para urtel 684 as soon as possible in order that Indian Govt may have text statement (final corrections on which will follow shortly) and explanation our position before statement made to press. Time and manner issuance not yet final but probably will be issued in press conference by Dept spokesman next week. You may also use as you deem advisable info contained in tels which have been repeated to you.

In explaining our position to GOI, you may point out that failure Bao Dai experiment may well result shortly in Commie control IC; that US recognizes Mar 8 agreement far from model arrangement between metropolitan power and colonial area, but that in view internal political practicalities, France, this accord represents for moment maximum concessions which Fr govt could make; that Bao Dai, with all his frailties, represents only personage visible at present about whom Vietnamese nationalists may group. You may also point out that Ho Chi Minh has long record as agent of third international including service Soviet Consulate Canton 1925 under Borodine, was

¹ Not printed.

organizer IC Communist Party and that his recent actions have not changed Dept's belief that he remains Commie.

You may state that US regards Mar 8 agreement as only first step in evolution Vietnam problem and that we believe in time French will have to move far beyond concessions contained therein to accommodate nationalist aspirations Vietnamese people.

For urinfo, Dept planning approach Thai and Philgov with view to obtain some public expression encouragement for Bao Dai solution.²

WEBB

² Repeated as 2105 to London, 2180 to Paris, and 101 to Saigon.

851G.01/6-2149: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NEW DELHI, June 21, 1949—9 a. m.

697. (1) I had long talk with Bajpai¹ afternoon June 20 regarding Vietnam. I told him frankly your hopes and concern and stressed that failure new regime obtain wide support people of country would almost inevitably result in eventual Communist conquest. Communist control would open way for Communists to Siam and other southern Asian areas. I handed him latest available draft our proposed announcement and said my government sincerely hoped, in view all circumstances, responsible Indian leaders would not for time being make any statements or take any action which would make more difficult success new regime. I said we realized unless French could by acts convince nationalist majority Vietnam that requisite concessions would be forthcoming, present experiment would fail. We were hoping enlightened policy on part of French and Bao Dai would gain support of real nationalists and separate them from present Communist leadership.

(2) Bajpai replied:

(a) So far as he knew, there was no intention on part Nehru or other Indian leader to make public statement or take other action regarding present situation Vietnam. An announcement might of course result raise inquiries which must be answered. He would discuss question at once with Prime Minister to ascertain if it would not be possible for GOI at least to reserve for present its position regarding Bao Dai. He would inform me Nehru's reaction.²

¹ Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.

² In telegram 704, June 22, 8 a. m., from New Delhi, Ambassador Henderson reported a note from Sir Girja confirming the oral remarks and advising the French to inform India urgently of their intentions respecting Indochina (851G.01/6-2249).

(b) Difficult for GOI to make decisions since French Government has not enlightened GOI regarding its plans in Vietnam, and GOI has no information other than that appearing in press.

(c) He was afraid such expressions "progressive realization" contained in our proposed announcement would not appeal to Indian public since British in their documents 30 years ago continually used expressions like "progressive steps direction self-government." There was feeling in India use word "progressive" by colonial powers, unaccompanied by listing of measures and dates, was a rather worn device for doing nothing.

(d) It might be helpful if in talks with press following issuance of announcement, Department spokesman could stress informally somewhat more explicitly Department's understanding that there were to be in Vietnam orderly developments which would satisfy legitimate aspirations people.

(e) Regardless attitude GOI, he had grave doubts French would be sufficiently intelligent to follow policy in Vietnam which would gain support of population.

(3) I referred to elections yesterday in Chandernagore and asked if relations with French had improved. He replied affirmatively, but said French colonial office was nevertheless backward and stubborn. India sincerely wished to maintain good relations with French. However, no Indian Government could afford, for internal or external reasons, take any action which might be interpreted as supporting continued control by colonial powers of Asian peoples.

(4) Our conversation confirmed my views expressed Embtel 693, June 20.³ Unless French really intend take measures progressively place power in hands Vietnam people and convince GOI in Paris or Saigon of their intentions, GOI will probably, at some time not distant future, condemn Bao Dai regime as fraud.

Sent Department 697; repeated London, Paris, Saigon.

HENDERSON

³ Not printed.

851G.01/6-2149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Landon)

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] June 21, 1949.

Participants: H. R. H. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Ambassador
Mr. Kenneth P. Landon, Assistant Chief, SEA

The Thai Ambassador called by invitation and I informed him of our thinking in regard to the March 8 agreements between Emperor Bao Dai and the French Government and our hope that the experiment would be given every opportunity to succeed. I gave the Ambassador a copy of a press release to be issued on June 21¹ in regard to the

¹ For text of press release issued at noon, June 21, on "new unified state of Vietnam", see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 18, 1949, p. 75.

new developments, and expressed the hope that his government would also feel as we did that the agreements marked a step in the right direction toward a solution of the troubles in Indochina, and that it would make a public statement of its own which would offer some encouragement and express sympathetic interest in the success of the agreements.

The Ambassador said that he and his government did not have the full text of the agreements but that they were in general sympathy with them and were especially encouraged by one provision that France would propose the newly formed state of Viet Nam for membership in the United Nations. He assured me that he would convey the information to his government but made it clear that he was uncertain whether his government would be willing to take a public stand at this time.²

² The foregoing was reported in telegram 355, June 22, 6 p. m., to Bangkok; in telegram 105, June 22, 5 p. m., to Saigon, the Department stated as follows: "Shld you be queried by press, you may point out US statement does not constitute recognition of any sort and indeed no Govt was in existence when statement was issued June 21 which cld be recognized. Pls inform Hanoi." (851G.01/6-2249, 6-2149)

851G.01/6-2349 : Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

HANOI, June 23, 1949.

61. Official announcement by Buu Loc confirms following developments: Xuan¹ to be president of privy or high council (Haut Conseil Privé) being set up by Bao Dai. Body will be comprised of about ten members representing various groups including Catholics, Cao daists, Protestants, ethnic minorities, etc. Will have consultative powers, a sort of Senate paralleling the future government composed principally of technicians.

Future government will be headed by Bao Dai himself and include six ministries: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finance, National Defense, Justice, Public Works and Planning. In addition there will be several under secretariats of state which may be transformed into ministries following the rallying of leaders still in the resistance. Seats will also be reserved among the nineteen allotted to Vietnam in the Assembly of French Union for members rallying from the resistance.

¹ General Xuan's government had resigned as of June 20 but had been requested by Bao Dai to carry on until formation of a new cabinet. On July 1 Bao Dai issued a proclamation naming General Xuan as his deputy and Minister of National Defense and added: "As soon as the people are in a position to express their will freely, the accords of March 8, signed in Paris with President Auriol, will be submitted to them for their approval, and the people will decide the political nature of the state." (851G.01/7-749)

Finally Prince announced impending resignation south Vietnam government, retention of Huu as governor and formation of committee to study March 8 accords and formulate modalities of implementation. Sent Department 61, repeated Paris, pouched Saigon.

GIBSON

851G.01/6-2349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1949—noon.

112. As soon as practicable you shld in your discretion see Pignon re his replies to press questions reported urtel 205 Jun 23² making abundantly clear Dept's press statement June 21 expresses hope (1) of US Govt that Mar 8 agreement will be starting point for progressive realization legit aspirations Vietnamese and (2) that continuing statesmanship on part French will induce acceleration this development.

Foregoing clarification believed desirable as Pignon's reply under (a) and last sentence (b) in reftel wld appear indicate he (and French in general) accepts Mar 8 agreement as end in itself whereas in US views that agreement, tho creating partial basis for future Vietnam independence, is but step toward solution Vietnam problem. In Dept's thinking French in course of time will find it not only politically advantageous but also necessary and possible to move far beyond concessions contained in Mar 8 agreement to accommodate fundamental nationalist aspirations Vietnamese. Dept believes suspicions of French intentions, voiced in many quarters, may be removed by rapid and liberal implementation of that agreement and by generous attitude and speedy evolution in future negotiations envisaged under that agreement.

In ur discretion you may add that in above connection certain other interested govts (urinfo only India and Thailand) save Brit seem to regard Mar 8 agreement as cloak for continued French domination Indochina and consider Bao Dai as puppet without a present substantial following. Under such circumstances burden of proof rests mainly upon French to convince not only Vietnamese but also other govts of their good intentions.

For urinfo Dept is stressing same points in talking with French here and in Paris but has some doubt whether its views have been made available to Pignon.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 2326 to Paris.² Not printed.

851G.01/6-2949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, June 29, 1949—6 p. m.

2709. I had long conversation with Schuman yesterday re Indochina. After giving him in detail views contained in first four and half pages of Department's memo (Depins 289, June 6), I went on to say that in case of Vietnam, US Government, without at this time offering comment on March 8 agreements, believes Vietnamese would commit serious mistake should they reject possibility of solution offered by those agreements and give their support not to government formed under them but to so-called Democratic Republic Vietnam.

In furtherance this view US has given public welcome to formation new unified Vietnamese state and has expressed hope March 8 agreements would form basis for early realization legitimate aspirations Vietnamese people. I told Schuman US is, however, of firm opinion realization these goals would be most difficult of accomplishment in association with French Union should government-envisaged March 8 agreements fail to obtain support of truly national elements Vietnam. Our recent experience in China had given us abundant proof of fact no amount of moral and material aid can save government isolated from contact with its people and enjoying little popular support. US Government, therefore, of opinion that in absence definite schedule outlining successive steps of Vietnam's evolution towards independence, ability of new Vietnamese Government to attract popular support will, in overwhelming measure, depend on most liberal interpretation and implementation of agreements already reached and on similarly generous attitude in negotiation of various agreements remaining to be completed.

Insofar as success of government formed under March 8 agreements related to extent international support which it receives, US considers determining factor will be attitude towards new Vietnamese Government adopted by other nations SEA, many of which have, themselves, only recently emerged as independent states and who, if persuaded Vietnamese people will be given full measure self-government in near future, will be inclined not only grant new government moral status which in Asian eyes cannot be achieved by Western recognition alone, but also to enter into fruitful association with it, looking forward to solution grim common problem now facing all South Asian Governments.

I informed Schuman that in light foregoing, US feels that its future attitude must depend largely on those developments Vietnam which will determine popular support and authority of new Vietnamese Government and on standing it achieves with neighboring

governments. US of opinion attitude adopted by French Government will be major controlling factor this development and therefore urges bold and rapid implementation and interpretation March 8 agreements with view affording new Vietnamese Government maximum possibilities for realization of legitimate aspirations Vietnamese populations.

In conversation which followed I emphasized that there appeared to be two major elements essential to success Bao Dai experiment. First was internal and involved assuring new Vietnamese Government maximum opportunities obtain popular support. This was directly dependent on liberal and enlightened French policy in rapid implementation of March 8 agreements. Second was external and depended largely on attitude which neighboring governments in SEA adopted towards new Vietnamese Government. Schuman replied that Assembly debates on Indochina and March 8 agreements marked successful realization of great step forward in evolution French policy in Indochina and assured me that French Government would implement this policy by most liberal interpretation and implementation of agreements. In this connection he remarked that for execution of its policy, France had in Pignon very able man of liberal school and moreover, General Revers had informed him—Schuman—that he had given categorical instructions to French military authorities in Indochina to give Pignon their full cooperation and support. Re neighboring countries SEA, he said he had instituted and was personally supervising program of information and interpretation. Foreign Office had already furnished text March 8 agreements to their representatives and would call them in to give them a full explanation French intentions and significance March 8 agreements.

I observed that of those countries, India seemed by far most important and our information indicated that GOI, while so far not publicly indicating hostile attitude, was in fact most skeptical of French intentions Indochina. Schuman expressed surprise, saying that in his conversations with Indian representatives here, he had received impression GOI was favorably disposed towards Bao Dai solution. In view our information, he would personally see to it that French intentions were made clear to GOI.

Sent Department 2709, repeated London 458, Saigon 99, New Delhi 12.¹

BRUCE

¹ Repeated by the Department in telegram 375, June 30, 5 p. m., to Bangkok.

851G.01/6-3049: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India*¹

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1949—3 p. m.

458. For info and for such use as you may deem appropriate in conversations with officials govt to which you accredited, official organs of USSR have on at least three different occasions since end war referred to Ho Chi Minh as a Communist—once in official Sov publication and twice in Sov radio broadcasts beamed to Far East.

15 Dec 1947 issue Soviet periodical *Bolshevik* contained art "The Crisis of the Colonial System" in which fol para appeared:

"The Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on 26 Aug 1945 at the moment of the fall of Japanese imperialism. Progressive, democratic forces arose to lead the young republic. These forces were rallied and strengthened in stubborn guerrilla warfare with the Japanese occupation forces and the French colonizers. The Communist Ho Chi Minh, a leader in the fight against the Japanese, was elected President and headed the Govt of Vietnam."

23 June 1948, Radio Moscow in Jap language broadcast on IC situation declared "Ho Chi Minh, who is respected by the Vietnamese masses, is the only Communist (representative) in the Govt".

1 Apr 1949 Sov Radio Khabarovsk (Siberia), in broadcast to Korea re Vietnam, gave gen review accomplishments and present status Vietnam Gov and declared: "The Communist Party is headed by Mr. Ho Chi Minh."

Dept sending additional info next few days.²

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 2349 to Paris, 374 to Bangkok, 2247 to London, 786 to Manila, 151 to Rangoon, and 115 to Saigon.

² This was done in telegram 471, July 5, 7 p. m., to New Delhi (repeated to 6 other posts), not printed. It noted that "to Dept's knowledge no Commie propaganda organ has ever attacked Ho Chi Minh or has ever referred to him in terms other than praise." (851G.01/6-2249)

851G.01/7-549: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, July 5, 1949—6 p. m.

221. In private conversation with Dugardier some days ago said I had just finished reading text of March 8 agreements and was somewhat astonished and worried by certain provisions particularly in Section Two on diplomatic questions.

There did not seem to be a single right accorded Vietnam which was not limited some way to requirement for approval or consultation with French. What worried me I explained was that when the time came

for presenting the Vietnam for membership in UNO our experts might feel that under the terms of the March 8 agreements the Vietnam had little if any diplomatic independence and would have difficulty in finding grounds for our support for its application. I emphasized these were my own personal views and were expressed without consultation with or instructions from Department. Dugardier replied that also speaking personally he could say that both he and Pignon realized that many of the diplomatic clauses were politically unwise and unenforceable and believed that Pignon did not intend to try to apply them. Dugardier said that it was his understanding (he was not present during the negotiations) that the present text did not represent Foreign Office views and that most restrictive clauses inserted at express demand Ministry Overseas France. He hinted strongly that he felt Quai d'Orsay would not resent expression American views along above lines particularly UNO angle.

Dugardier then mentioned again importance of removing GIC from control Ministry Overseas France. Said General Revers strongly agrees and has recommended that if for internal political reasons IC cannot be given to Quai d'Orsay it must at least be placed directly under Prime Minister's orders (announcement that Coste-Floret would visit IC July and later announcement visit postponed may be connected this).

Sent Department, repeated Paris, pouched Hanoi.

ABBOTT

851G.01/7-2049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, July 20, 1949—10 a. m.

2964. France-Laotian treaty signed today follows broad outline Auriol-Bao Dai agreement, March 8. Principal provisions are:¹

1. France recognizes independence Laos which in turn adheres to French Union.
2. France to place its diplomatic missions at disposition Laos except in certain countries to be mutually agreed upon where Laos will have own diplomatic representation. Agreement already reached for Siam.
3. Laos endeavored negotiate and conclude agreements relating exclusively to its own interests provided are within framework general policy French Union.
4. France to support Laos candidacy for membership UN.
5. France undertakes defend Laos frontiers. Laos to organize internal security of country.
6. France granted such bases as deems necessary in Laos and freedom circulation between them.

¹The French text was transmitted in despatch 710, August 2, from Paris (received August 6), not printed. (851G.01/8-249)

7. France to turn over to Laotian Government all administration services which latter desires to manage.

8. France undertakes afford financial and technical assistance development Laotian economy, transportation system, public hygiene and education, and for development natural resources. Laos to request necessary technicians and experts for France. Laos to grant French citizens and nationals French Union equal national treatment for establishment business and commercial activities.

9. Piastre to be sole currency and linked with French zone.

11 [10]. Laos to negotiate with other associated states Indochina agreements covering common services, etc.

Sent Department; repeated Saigon as 108.

BRUCE

851G.01/7-2449: Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, July 24, 1949—2 p. m.

3037. I had Pignon to lunch yesterday and he discussed developments Indo-China most frankly. He remains optimistic and believes given necessary time Bao Dai "solution" has good chance of success. He was particularly pleased with Bao Dai's reception at Hue and Hanoi which will strengthen latter's personal prestige and authority.

He outlined 3 essentials for success, first being continuity in French Govt's Indo-China policy and exercise of wisdom and liberality in its implementation. Second is Bao Dai's ability to discipline members his govt and persuade them to subordinate their personal and regional interests to national welfare. He considers, as individuals, they are "on par with those in Viet-Minh" but lack discipline and will have to learn to work as a team. Third and unknown factor depends on developments China, particularly Mao Tse-tung's actions once his army reaches Tonkin border.

In this latter respect he echoed Revers' opinion French able cope with anything short of all-out invasion of Indo-China. Stated 41,500 Vietnamese troops actively participating in military operations with French army constitute satisfactory nucleus for formation Vietnam army which will be responsible for policing of Annam and Cochin China, freeing bulk of expeditionary force for operations in Tonkin.

Felt Viets capable filling this role, pointing out Viet-Minh forces not effective except in hit and run guerrilla attacks which well-trained and equipped Viet army could deal with more effectively than French.

He does not believe Vietnam Govt interested in participating any Pacific Union that may result from Baguio conversations and has warned Bao Dai against association his govt with Nationalist China.²

¹ Repeated in airgram A-251, July 27, to New Delhi.

² Documentation respecting a Pacific Union is scheduled for publication in part 2 of the present volume.

Both he and Bao Dai, on other hand, acutely aware of importance attitude neighboring countries SEA and latter searching for top flight men for Bangkok and New Delhi diplomatic assignments. In meanwhile goodwill missions being formed and will be sent out in near future.

Stated Bao Dai had decided on Hanoi as provisional seat of govt which eventually certain to move to Hue.

Pignon returns Saigon July 26 and Coste-Floret leaving about August 4 for two-week visit Indo-China.

Repeated Saigon 102.

BRUCE

890.20/7-2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1949—6 p. m.

130. Dept cirtel July 20, 1 a. m.,¹ will serve as guidance in interview with Quirino² (urtel 232 Jul 13³) shld he raise question US attitude re Pacific Pact and recent Chiang⁴-Quirino conversations.

However, before you call on Quirino, you shld, after consultation with Emb Manila, visit Romulo⁵ who was thoroughly briefed on Dept's position these matters, before his recent return Manila.

In discussing with Quirino Viet-Phil relations, suggest you be guided by Deptel to Bangkok 350, Jun 20, rptd Manila as 740.³ You shld emphasize that US is constantly urging Fr govt to be most liberal in accommodating legitimate nationalist aspirations of Vietnamese. You may imply that Phil govt may wish consider making similar approaches this connection to Fr pointing out that to give Bao Dai experiment greatest chance success possible, Fr must move rapidly and liberally in interpretation and implementation of Mar 8 Agreement which Dept considers only as first of series of steps which must be taken in evolution situation Indochina.⁶

ACHESON

¹ Scheduled for publication in part 2 of the present volume.

² President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines.

³ Not printed.

⁴ President Chiang Kai-shek of China on a visit from Taipei to Baguio.

⁵ Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Philippine Representative at the United Nations.

⁶ Repeated as 876 to Manila.

851G.01/8-1049 : Telegram

The Chargé in France (Bonbright) to the Secretary of State

PARIS, August 10, 1949.

3322. Following is translation of Auriol's letter of July 27 which Coste-Floret delivered to Bao Dai. Letter was counter-signed by Queuille, Schuman, Coste-Floret and Ramadier.¹

(*Begin translation*) The Government of the Republic has received the official notification of the constitution by Your Majesty of the Vietnam Government charged with ensuring the implementation of the agreements of March 8, with establishing the state, with carrying out urgent reforms, with preparing and ensuring peace and, the peace won, with organizing the free consultation of the people on the final choice of their political regime and their government.

We are convinced that Your Majesty will bring these tasks to a successful conclusion.

As far as it is concerned, the Government of the Republic has just made the greatest efforts to attain this objective and will assist you therein until the complete and sincere execution of the agreements concluded between us.

In loyal negotiation it has entirely satisfied the national claims of the Vietnam people, such as have been expressed by Your Majesty since 1945 and such as were specified at that time by the *de facto* government of Ho Chi Minh: The unity of the Vietnam was approved by the vote of the French Parliament and by a French law changing the status of Cochin China.

The independence of the Vietnam State was recognized in the agreements of March 8, 1949 by the Government of the Republic.

The relations between Vietnam and France within the framework of the French Union were clearly and extensively defined in the very terms of the constitution in order to assure common prosperity and the common defense, more indispensable than ever in the instability, the uncertainty and the anxieties of the world.

Thus, the armed conflict, allegedly launched for the fulfillment of these national claims, has no further object. The peace, ardently desired by the Vietnamese people as well as by France, is in the hands of the Vietnamese people and their hands alone.

Undoubtedly, Sire, an atmosphere of confidence, of friendship and of loyal and sincere collaboration must be established between our associated states in the French Union.

The fact that the Government of the Republic and I, myself, in my capacity as President of the Republic and of the French Union, vouch for the loyal and entire execution of the agreements signed, will contribute to its establishment.

The High Commissioner has received all instructions to transfer to Your Majesty's government the services, for which the responsibility will henceforth be incumbent on the Vietnam State, and to place at its

¹ Paul Ramadier, French Minister of National Defense.

disposal the cadres and advisers whom you may desire and for such time as you may deem necessary.

Our military chiefs will give you their collaboration for the organization and instruction of the Vietnam army placed under the responsibility of your government and acting in concert, for common security, with our army.

I confirm to you for my part in the name of the government of the Republic the terms of my telegram of May 22, 1949 according to which I declared myself ready to accredit the Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls appointed with your approval and on your recommendations to the states provided for in our agreements: As also to accept, in agreement with you, the Ambassadors, Ministers and Consuls appointed to your state by foreign powers.

Under the conditions provided in the act of March 8, 1949 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic will support, before the General Assembly of the U.N., the candidacy of the Vietnam State to this great international organization, in order that, through the French Union and world solidarity, the independence, security and frontiers of the state be guaranteed.

Lastly, it is with great satisfaction that the Government of the Republic and I have heard the noble appeal, highly appreciated, of Your Majesty in making a formal promise to submit to the sovereign will of the Vietnam people—after all necessary preparations for a pacified and organized territory—the choice of their constitutional regime, political institutions and government.

If, for the organization of the territory and for this consultation, the Vietnam people decided to unite for the cessation of hostilities, which, we repeat, depends only on themselves, the Government of the Republic and I will be glad to see thus established the peaceful conditions for the renaissance of Vietnam and for the renewal of the bonds of friendship which must unite our two nations for a sound prosperity and security.

If this were not so, if—despite the real and effective satisfaction of aspirations which they themselves defined at the outset of this conflict—certain men or certain political movements, for reasons or changes in orientation concealed by vain pretenses, should maintain their attitude, it would mean that they would wish to isolate Vietnam in order to lead her later towards destinies which at that time would appear clearly and would open, too late, the eyes of sincere and temporarily misled Vietnamese.

We wish to believe that it will not be so.

In any case, Sire, certain of being in agreement with your government and with the populations torn and ruined by war, the Government of the Republic will not abandon the peoples of Vietnam nor the other associated states to this terrible solitude and to these dreadful adventures in which those peoples, thus abandoned, risk losing their independence and the liberties to which all men are entitled. France will not abandon them and, if need be, would assure with their government and, should the need arise, with the assistance of the U.N., the defense of their independence and their security against all external attacks if they came to be threatened.

It is in this spirit that the Government of the Republic and I associate ourselves with the appeal which Your Majesty has already

addressed and will renew to all political, intellectual and spiritual organizations of the Vietnam, to all the so hardly tried urban and rural populations, in order to fulfill our common wish: Peace, reconstruction and prosperity.

Having confidence in your efforts and those of your government to realize the objectives recalled in this letter and to establish your communal organizations in the depths of the scattered villages and rice fields, I pray you, Sire, to accept for the Vietnamese people, the expression of the friendship of the French people, and for Your Majesty, the expression of my highest regards. (*End translation.*)

BONBRIGHT

851G.01/8-1149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, August 11, 1949—4 p. m.

257. In conversation with Diplomatic Counselor Du Gardier he said internal political developments during my absence had been generally encouraging tho slow. Regarding purpose President Auriol's letter to Bao Dai (mytel 254, August 9¹) he believes letter had 3 objectives:

- (a) Spur Bao Dai to greater activity in setting up his administration and accepting responsibilities.
- (b) By repeating that France had no objections to negotiations with Viet Minh, or at least certain elements thereof, to encourage Bao Dai to undertake such negotiations.
- (c) To make clear that if such fail French will defend the Vietnam against Communist threat both internally and externally, in latter case in cooperation with UNO.

Du Gardier feels that point (c) was mainly for internal French consumption. Wintrebert, assistant to Political Counselor Bonfils, who was present during this part conversation, agreed with Du Gardier's analysis but felt point (a) far most important.

Du Gardier subsequently said recent information indicates that local military reverses together with approach Chinese Communists is causing increased internal dissension between hardened Stalinists and nationalist elements within Viet Minh with some evidence that Ho Chi Minh then is to favor latter group in opposition to Giap. French feel that proper approach from Bao Dai might accentuate and consolidate this split. French also informed recent anti-Communist stand of Vatican has had influence on those Vietnam Catholics til now supporting Ho Chi Minh. Feelers have been received from Catholic elements in North Annam (which represents one-third population many districts) regarding possibilities military protection if they join Bao Dai.

Believe above largely answers Deptel 136, August 8.²

¹ Not printed; for text, see telegram 3322, *supra*.

² Not printed.

Du Gardier said he had established cordial relations with Foreign Minister Nguyen Phan Long and is impressed by his intelligence but worried by complete lack experience and knowledge diplomatic practice. New Vietnam Foreign Office currently submerged in administrative problems such as stenos, stationery and protocol. Reluctance to request French advisor, while understandable for political and prestige reasons, will greatly impede efficient organization of Ministry.

Sent Department 257, repeated Hanoi 25, Paris 257.

ABBOTT

851G.01/9-2449

*The Chief of State of Vietnam (His Majesty Bao Dai) to President Truman*¹

[Translation²]

SAIGON, August 31, 1949.

GREAT AND GOOD FRIEND: Under the terms of the agreements which I signed in Paris on March 8, 1949 with Mr. Vincent Auriol, President of the Republic and President of the French Union, Viet-Nam was recognized as an independent State forming part of the French Union, with the status of an associated State.

The Government which I have just constituted as a result of these agreements and of which I assumed the presidency, henceforth possesses all powers necessary for the exercise of its authority. It comprises personages representative of the varied shades of Vietnamese public opinion.

It is my earnest desire that relations with Your Excellency's Government may be established according to international custom, in the common interest of our respective nationals and in order to permit us more usefully to contribute on our part to the strengthening of world peace and security.

I express the hope that you will be among the nations friendly to the Vietnamese State, and I convey to you, Great and Good Friend, my best wishes and those of the members of my country's Government for the prosperity and happiness of the people to whose destinies you devote your enlightened efforts.

I avail myself [etc.]

BAO DAI

¹ Original letter in French transmitted in the French Ambassador's note 300, September 24, not printed. The latter referred to the French Ambassador's note 280, August 31, not printed, in which the Department was officially informed of the newly constituted Government of Vietnam presided over by His Majesty Bao Dai. (851G.01/9-2449, 8-3149)

As sent in Department airgram A-81, October 8, to Saigon (751G.00/10-549).

851G.01/9-849: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, September 8, 1949—5 p. m.

284. Du Gardier informs me that attitude of SEA countries toward Bao Dai Government and reaction to recently delivered letters (mytel 271, August 27¹) extremely cautious with general tendency to wait action by US and GB before taking steps towards inviting good will mission or formal recognition. US and GB in turn apparently wish neighboring countries to act first thus resulting in vicious circle. He feels it will be dangerous for Bao Dai's prestige if nothing is done on diplomatic front till November when Indians are willing to receive mission.

I agree entirely with Du Gardier and suggest that time has come for some further action on our part, particularly since helpful effect of our June 21 statement has begun to wear off. Several steps would seem worthy Department's consideration:

(a) A cordial friendly but perhaps noncommittal reply to Bao Dai's letter.

(b) Concerted action with British to persuade countries SEA promptly to establish relations with Bao Dai Government. There is some evidence (my 281, September 7²) that cautious attitude of British is changing and that they now realize importance of aiding establish non-Communist Government in IC and feel Bao Dai has chance of success.

(c) Since it can be argued that action suggested in (b) equivalent to abandonment of Department's preference that support for Bao Dai come spontaneously from neighboring countries it might be preferable to take initiative ourselves in belief that SEA countries will follow our lead. First step could be intimation that we would be glad to receive good will mission from Bao Dai at some convenient time in near future.

Suggest useful preliminary would be informal approach by Embassy Paris to Quai d'Orsay since Du Gardier intimates that his government is not entirely convinced of importance of outside diplomatic support to success of Bao Dai and inclined to disregard Pignon's recommendations in this connection.

Pouched Hanoi, repeated Paris.

ABBOTT

¹ Not printed, but see letter of August 31 to President Truman, *supra*.

² Not printed.

890.00/9-949

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1949.

Participants:

Participants:

*For the United Kingdom:**For the United States:*

M. E. Dening, Director, Office, Far
Eastern Affairs, British Foreign
Office

W. Walton Butterworth, Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs

C. A. Gerald Meade, Counselor,
British Embassy

Livingston Merchant, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State for
Far Eastern Affairs

J. F. Ford, First Secretary, Brit-
ish Embassy

Charles S. Reed, II, Chief, South-
east Asian Affairs

William S. B. Lacy, Asst. Chief,
Southeast Asian Affairs

I opened the conversation by suggesting the desirability of begin-
ning a *tour d'horizon* of Southeast Asia and inviting Mr. Dening's
views on French Indochina. Mr. Dening stated that his Government
had considered it highly desirable that the interested Asiatic powers
indicate their approval of the March 8 agreement with Bao Dai and of
his Government before the Governments of the United Kingdom or
the United States volunteered their approval. He said that his Gov-
ernment had concluded that the reaction of the Asiatic powers to the
Bao Dai effort was not as favorable as might have been hoped—their
attitude appears dubious but not hostile. He continued to say that
his Government believed that the course of events in Asia made it
even more desirable that the Asiatic powers give Bao Dai their bless-
ing before the Western powers announced their approval. Mr. Dening
interpolated his opinion that French concessions to Bao Dai were not
as extensive as those concessions which the Dutch seemed prepared to
make to the Indonesians and that as a consequence, French unpopu-
larity in the Far and Middle East had not diminished since March 8
in any appreciable degree. I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had
in mind any approach to the Asiatic powers designed to encourage
their early approval of Bao Dai. Mr. Dening replied that he did not
know but that he would ask Mr. Bevin. I asked Mr. Dening how his
Government proposed to respond to the French notification of the
establishment of the Government of Vietnam under Bao Dai, adding
that we felt that the French were not disposed to be satisfied with
anything less than the accrediting of senior diplomatic representation
to the Bao Dai Government. Mr. Dening replied that he did not know
what course his Government would take.

I observed that my Government had made no decision in the matter of the recognition of the Bao Dai Government nor of the extent and character of support if any which we were prepared to give it, but that the Department was much impressed by the fact that there appeared as a practical matter no alternative to the recognition and support of Bao Dai; that inaction might well result in the control of French Indochina by the Communist Ho Chi Minh; that in view of this simple choice of alternatives, the Department had issued its statement on the March 8 agreement. Mr. Dening said he thought his Government would wish to press the French to make further concessions to Bao Dai and simultaneously to impress upon the Asiatic powers the simple choice of alternatives in the given premises (he did not dissent from my view that the choice of the alternatives was as simple as I had stated it). He added that he felt his Government was prepared to tell the Asiatic powers that they considered the concessions embodied in the March 8 agreement evidence of genuine effort on the part of the French to accommodate Indochinese nationalism.

I asked Mr. Dening his Government's opinion of Bao Dai's performance since his return to Indochina. He replied that his Government had been agreeably surprised, particularly by the favorable reception which Bao Dai had received in Tonkin. He added that officials of his Government held high opinion of Mr. Pignon whom he considered eminently realistic. In this connection, he referred to a conversation he had with Pignon in which Pignon said he realized he had been selected for his present position because, not being a politician, he could be disowned if his efforts met with failure. I took this occasion to refer to Mr. Pignon's remarks at New Delhi that he was not particularly concerned with the manner in which Bao Dai disposed of internal affairs in Indochina nor with the manner in which he dealt with Ho Chi Minh, adding that it gave us pause to think since it seemed to foreshadow the unpleasant possibility that Bao Dai might choose to make a deal with Ho. Mr. Dening did not comment on this contingency but countered by referring to a radio Vietnam broadcast in which Ho Chi Minh expressed his gratitude to Stalin for the assistance the latter had provided him in the way of arms in his struggle against the French. He remarked that he considered this revelation of the close relationship which existed between Ho and the Kremlin had inclined the Indians toward a better understanding of the Communist character of Ho and his Government.

I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had carefully considered the consequences of Bao Dai's failure. As Mr. Dening's reply was of a negative character, I pointed out that a Communist-dominated Indochina would expose Siam and Malaya to immediate Communist pressure; I remarked that whatever its intentions, I did not consider Siam

a tower of strength in such a situation, adding that I thought the Siamese were inclined to continue the habits they had formed in the 19th century of playing off one great power against another, and that they had not fully understood that Russian imperialism in the 20th century was of a different constituency than British and French imperialism in the 19th century. Mr. Dening agreed adding that a recent conversation with the Siamese ambassador at London had led him to conclude that at least that official was inclined to assume that Siam could have the best of both worlds in the event of USSR-Western conflict as it had after the Japanese war.

I then asked Mr. Dening if he felt we could afford to face the consequences of failing to give more than reasonable support to Bao Dai. Mr. Dening replied that it would be necessary for him to consult Mr. Bevin before he could reply, but that it was his hope that the Asiatic powers could be brought to realize the unhappy consequences of Bao Dai's failure.

I asked Mr. Dening if his Government had made any estimate of the French military situation in Indochina. Mr. Dening replied that the French had advised his Government that they believed they could hold the frontier. I asked if it was his belief that the French could restrain the Chinese Communists from pouring across the Tonkinese border. Mr. Dening replied that he thought Ho would be particularly careful in encouraging large movements of Chinese troops into his territory since the Chinese were unpopular in Indochina. He added, however, that the French would certainly find the frontier difficult to hold. Mr. Reed observed that his knowledge of the terrain had led him to conclude that the French would find the border very difficult to hold indeed, and that the Chinese would, as a matter of good sense, choose to infiltrate in small groups rather than *en masse*.

I asked Mr. Dening if he thought recognition of Bao Dai by the interested Asiatic powers would strengthen him in the eyes of his Indochinese constituents. Mr. Dening said he was doubtful since he believed the Indochinese were relatively impervious to the attitude of foreign states. Mr. Reed said that he believed the Indochinese would be impressed by one thing only; further French concessions to Bao Dai of a real character, including the transfer of Indochinese affairs from the Minister of the Overseas France to the Foreign Office; that such concessions, if coupled with the recognition of the Asiatic states, would in his opinion have a profound effect upon the Indochinese people who ardently desire peace after years of war. I suggested that these various considerations seemed to me to indicate the desirability of Mr. Bevin's and Mr. Acheson's impressing upon Mr. Schuman the importance of the French Government's continuing on the course of making real and genuine concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Mr. Dening said

that he would present this view to Mr. Bevin but that Mr. Bevin was especially aware of French sensitivity in this particular. Mr. Lacy asked what Mr. Dening considered the effect might be of US-UK recognition of Bao Dai—whether indeed it would strengthen Bao Dai, or would, as some believed, prove a “kiss of death”. Mr. Dening replied that he thought US-UK recognition of Bao Dai, unless preceded by a favorable expression from the interested Asiatic powers, would have an unfavorable effect on Bao Dai and would cause certain members of the British Commonwealth considerable annoyance.

Mr. Dening and Mr. Meade continued a brief discussion which resulted in Mr. Dening's expressing the opinion that Mr. Bevin must (1) impress upon the Asiatic powers and members of the British Commonwealth the fact that no acceptable alternative existed to the support of Bao Dai, and (2) encourage the French to make further genuine concessions to Bao Dai. He added that the nature of these concessions and the manner in which the approach to the French should be made, should be left to Mr. Bevin and Mr. Acheson.

Mr. Meade asked if I could describe the Philippine attitude toward Bao Dai. I replied that I considered the Philippine situation had not yet crystalized; that we had consulted with the Philippine representatives in Washington before we issued our press statement on Bao Dai but that we had not attempted to influence them. I added that we were prepared to influence their position when we considered the time appropriate.

Mr. Dening asked that the conversations be brought to a close at 5:25 p. m. I suggested and he agreed that conversations would be resumed at 10:30 Monday morning, at which time Indonesia would be the topic of consideration.¹

¹ For further report, see memorandum of September 28, p. 83.

851G.01/9-949

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1442

LONDON, September 9, 1949.
[Received September 15.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that during the course of a recent conversation with Mr. R. H. Scott, Head of the South-East Asia Department of the Foreign Office, he discussed with me the problem presented by the negotiations initiated by the Bao Dai government for representation in Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and India. It seems that Australia has approached the United Kingdom on this question and has asked for its views as to the appropriateness of accepting a Bao Dai representative.

Mr. Scott said that his Government was most anxious to do everything possible within the limits of law and common sense to support Bao Dai, and was attempting within these limits to find some basis to encourage other members of the Commonwealth to do likewise. The legal people in the Foreign Office, he said, raised three serious objections to the recognition of Bao Dai: (1) The agreement between Bao Dai and the French Government, even though fully implemented, would grant Bao Dai only the most limited sovereignty; (2) The agreement requires ratification by both parties to become effective and this ratification has not yet taken place; and (3) by no stretch of the imagination could the regime as now constituted be construed as being in *de facto* control. If the agreement were ratified, and if happily Bao Dai did obtain control of a substantial portion of the country, the Foreign Office lawyers might then, notwithstanding the limiting features of the agreement, be able to find some formula for *de facto* or even *de jure* recognition of Bao Dai, or at least encourage Australia and India to do so.

With respect to India, Mr. Scott recalled, Nehru temporized by stating that his departure abroad would interfere with the reception of a Bao Dai representative. Bangkok likewise was finding the question embarrassing because of the large number of Free-Laoian and other political refugees from Indochina resident in Northern Thailand. Never bold with respect to foreign affairs, it could not be expected that Thailand take a leading position in support of Bao Dai.

Mr. Scott inquired whether the Philippine Government had approached the American authorities in regard to this matter. He said it would be very helpful if he could be acquainted of the Department's views. Because of the Australian inquiry, he said, the question was of some urgency.

I should be grateful for any information on the above subject which I could appropriately pass on to the Foreign Office.

Respectfully yours,

For the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.:

ARTHUR R. RINGWALT

First Secretary of Embassy

851G.01/9-2449: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, September 24, 1949—1 p. m.

303. Detailed reply Deptel 156, September 22,¹ will be furnished after conversation Pignon tentatively scheduled September 26 since he apparently only person fully informed all phases present compli-

¹ Not printed.

cated details arising from efforts to unscramble and divide present highly centralized administration between three associated states. Certain important questions policy and principle have also arisen from fundamental contradiction of March 8 agreement which first promises full internal sovereignty and then proceeds to limit it. Most serious concerns *Sûreté* which Vietnam insists is integral and essential element justice administration and must be turned over with it. Disagreement also exists over organized courts to have jurisdiction over French.

Current negotiations also hampered by reservation for future conference between French and three associated states all questions concerning communications, immigration, foreign trade, customs, treasury and reconstruction and development plan. Understand consideration being given calling this conference without waiting conclusion current negotiations with Vietnam but signature Cambodian agreement (now scheduled late October) would seem essential preliminary.

If present procedure followed there seems little prospect implementation March 8 agreement by end of year as scheduled. Growing dissatisfaction over lack concrete results being exploited by both French and Vietnam opponents Bao Dai solution.

Pouched Hanoi; Department pass Paris.²

ABBOTT

² This was done the same day at 10 p. m.

851G.01/9-2749: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL SAIGON, September 27, 1949—4 p. m

306. Further reference Deptel 156, September 22,¹ Pignon informs me that of twelve supplementary accords mentioned March 8 agreement, one, providing three Vietnamese representatives on Council French Union, has been concluded. Four others process negotiation. Balance either secondary importance or dependent on interstate conference.

Negotiation accord transfer administration progressing satisfactorily but hampered by interconnection interests Cambodia, Laos (mytel 303, September 24). Accords on Vietnamese Army and French military bases will be negotiated together. Preliminary conversations concluded, first formal meeting September 28. Accord on judiciary expected shortly. High commissioner admitted serious difference during negotiations was with Vietnamese delegation attempting modify March 8 agreement by placing time limit existence mixed courts. This

¹ Not printed.

demand now abandoned and no further difficulties foreseen. This commission will next take up question *Sûreté*. Pignon believes Vietnam will accept French proposal which accepts principle *Sûreté* to be completely turned over but with proviso certain services be retained French hands limited period. For reasons military security impossible withdraw French *Sûreté* immediately.

Calling of important interstate conference originally planned September held up by:

(a) Delay in opening negotiations Vietnam accords which Pignon insists Bao Dai's and not his fault as he was ready to start June 14.

(b) Delay in signing Cambodian agreement. Dissolution Cambodian Assembly (mytel 294, September 20²) has eliminated opposition. Pignon and King³ leaving for Paris October 3 to sign agreement. Interstate conference now planned for first week November even if Vietnam negotiations incomplete. Pignon said French have decided present bad feeling between Vietnam, Cambodia makes impossible any agreement for [so-called federal] services and will accept separate customs communications, et cetera, only limitation being no customs barriers between Indochina states and identic tariff schedules. Pignon feels this new approach should eliminate bulk anticipated disputes and assure success of interstate conference.

With regard information received by my British colleague that Schuman in Washington talks spoke of early ratification March 8 agreements, Pignon said he was puzzled by this since agreement provides for ratification only after negotiation supplementary accords which become part of instrument to be ratified. Thus ratification would not seem possible before February. He also spoke of the possibility of absorbing all agreements into one inclusive document which he personally favors for sake of clarity and because March 8 agreement is "very badly drafted document."

Pignon said all reports indicate Bao Dai's visit Tonkin great success (re Hanoi 104, September 22²). Emperor greatly encouraged and Pignon hopes period delay and indecision is over.

Pouched Hanoi; Department pass Paris.⁴

ABBOTT

² Not printed.

³ Prince Norodom Sihanouk at 18 was chosen King of Cambodia in 1941 by its royal council.

⁴ This was done the same day at 3:25 p. m.

851G.01/9-2749: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1949—5 p. m.

162. Re penultimate para urtel 306 Sep 27, Dept pouching near future full text conversations re Indochina which took place prior

to and during recent visit Schuman and Bevin to Washington.¹ Schuman told Secy and Bevin Fr Assembly, convening Oct 18, would take up Mar 8 Agreement in several weeks, probably Nov. However, he made no ref supplementary accords (Dept had been given understand prior Schuman's visit that Fr intended package Mar 8 accord, supplementary agreements thereunder, and June 5, 1948, declaration for Assembly approval, and has no firm indication that Fr plans this particular have changed).

During tripartite conversations, Secy and Bevin pressed Schuman to (1) push ratification as much as possible, (2) transfer Indochina from Overseas France to FonOff (3) make further concessions particularly field international relations. Schuman indicated (1) Fr considering transfer Indochina to FonOff but felt no move possible until after Assembly approval Mar 8 Agreement, (2) he considered Mar 8 agreement as only one step in evolution Indochina problem.

(Bevin pointed out that Brit would, after Fr Assembly approval Mar 8 Agreement, talk with South Asian nations on support Bao Dai, and Secy thought US might be helpful also at that time. Both felt recognition Vietnam should first come from South Asian nations.

WEBB

¹ *Infra.*

851G.00/9-2849

*Memorandum by Mr. James L. O'Sullivan, of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, on Preliminary Talks as to Indochina*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 28, 1949.]

PRELIMINARY TALKS [ON] INDOCHINA

Mr. Dening and Mr. Butterworth
(September 8 through September 12)

[Here follows summary of conversation on September 9; see memorandum of that date, page 76.]

In connection with the conversations on recognition of a Chinese Communist government,² Mr. Butterworth stated that the Department had recently circulated its missions in SEA on the question of probable reaction in that area to recognition of a Chinese Communist government by the Western powers, and that the replies so far received indicated without exception that early recognition by the West-

¹ Copy transmitted by the Department to 14 posts (Tokyo, Manila, Rangoon, Karachi, Bangkok, Colombo, Seoul, New Delhi, Saigon, Batavia, Singapore, Taipei, Hanoi, and Kuala Lumpur) by October 10.

² For documentation on this subject, dated September 9, see vol. IX, pp. 76 ff.

ern powers would cause adverse reactions in Southeast Asia. Mr. Dening commented that, whether early or late, recognition would have adverse consequences. Mr. Butterworth said that in the Department's view early recognition would carry special disadvantages for Southeast Asia.

In connection with the discussions on Hong Kong, Mr. Dening stated that the Ministers of the Cabinet had authorized Mr. Bevin to tell the Secretary that the UK considered Hong Kong the right wing bastion of the Southeast Asian front; that if Hong Kong were lost, the whole front might go; that the UK regards Hong Kong in the same way that it regards Berlin; and that the UK will disregard the extent of military commitment necessary to hold Hong Kong but that it *must not go*.

In connection with the Japanese peace treaty, Mr. Meade (First Secretary of the British Embassy) recognizing the possibility of the emergence of Indonesia and/or Indochina as sovereign states, considered that all countries which had actually waged, not just declared, war on Japan should be asked to the conference. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that this formula would admit Mexico and possibly other countries having remote interests in the Far East, a situation which would be resented by the Asiatics.

In connection with a regional arrangement in Southeast Asia, Mr. Dening stated that the British government considered that the first and necessary step toward meeting the Communist threat to Southeast Asia was to develop the economies of the countries of the area to a degree of strength equal if not superior to Communist pressure. Mr. Butterworth pointed out that the essential political instabilities in Indonesia and Indochina were an almost insurmountable obstacle to the successful extension of financial and economic assistance. In answer to a question, Mr. Dening stated his belief that the influence of anti-Communist states would have an appreciable influence on India adding that India was learning more about Communism in Asia as time went on; that, for example, Ho Chi Minh's radio association with Stalin had had a salutary effect upon the Indian estimates of the Communist character of Ho Chi Minh's government.

*Secretary-Mr. Bevin conversation*³

The Secretary pointed out to Mr. Bevin that we feel nationalism is an offset to Communism and a rallying point for dissatisfied elements who otherwise might become Communists. In promoting nationalism, we, of course, must be careful not to encourage the native peoples to feel resentment towards colonial powers. We feel that the French and Dutch should follow the excellent British lead. We plan to talk to Mr.

³ On September 13.

Schuman and urge that the French move faster in Indochina in setting up a Vietnam national state. We would like to see some of the Asiatic nations take the lead in recognizing a nationalist government there. We feel it would be the "kiss of death" if we or the British took the lead.

In reply, Mr. Bevin said he wished the French had gone further in Vietnam. He said it was possible the French wanted the United States and Great Britain to recognize the Bao Dai government in Indochina so that they could present a *fait accompli* to the Assembly and the Assembly would have to ratify the new agreements. But he didn't like this possibility. He said that before we did anything, the French government should ratify the agreements and shift its dealings with the Bao Dai government from the Colonial office to the Foreign office. We can't recognize the Bao Dai government until the French take these steps but we don't want the favorable possibility to go by default either. Mr. Denning said the people of Indochina wanted peace more than anything else. The Secretary said that we can feel Mr. Schuman out but we must get the French to take the requisite steps. Can we get countries in the area, say Burma and India, to take the lead in recognition after the French do the necessary? Mr. Bevin said they hadn't sounded them out and that the Burmese and Siamese were cautious. He thought that if the French ratify, we could get the Asiatics to recognize the *de facto* government. Ho Chi Minh had thanked Stalin in a radio broadcast for assistance and had exposed his hand as being a Moscow Communist and this had been passed on to Nehru who previously had thought Ho was a *bona fide* Nationalist leader. Mr. Bevin repeated that the French must give us the groundwork.

Mr. Butterworth emphasized that while we are not fully satisfied with the Bao Dai regime, we saw no acceptable alternative in this area, and that accordingly we and the British should push behind this experiment. He called attention to a recent report from our Consul General in Saigon to the effect that the fillip which had been given by our original statement and that of the British government on Bao Dai was now wearing off and there was need for a new effort. Before turning to other subjects, an understanding was reached between Mr. Bevin and the Secretary that we would meet with Mr. Schuman and urge him strongly to take the two steps referred to; namely, ratification and the transfer of business to the Foreign Office. Subsequently, Mr. Bevin would take the matter up with the Asiatic Commonwealth countries.

In a meeting (September 14) with Mr. Denning, the day following the Secretary's conversation with Mr. Bevin, called for the purpose of tying up any loose ends that might have appeared, Mr. Butterworth suggested that it would be helpful if Mr. Bevin would impress

upon Mr. Schuman the importance of France's imposing as few restrictions as possible on the ability of the Vietnam government to conduct its foreign relations, arguing that this would be an important factor in obtaining the recognition of the Vietnam government by South Asian countries. Mr. Dening observed that Mr. Schuman would undoubtedly reply that the March 8 Agreement goes as far as it can in this direction without causing trouble with French North Africa; but that he was inclined to agree with Mr. Butterworth that the issue is of sufficient importance to bring to Mr. Schuman's attention again in the context of the difficulties which would arise were the Bao Dai government not recognized by India, Burma and other nearby countries. In this connection, Mr. Dening stated that the UK had been at pains to convince Nehru that Bao Dai, rather than Ho Chi Minh, is the power in Indochina with whom India should deal.

Secretary-Mr. Schuman Conversation (September 15)

Mr. Schuman outlined France's views on the Indochinese situation as follows:

France is faced with a very serious situation in Indochina because of the heavy financial strain it places on French budgetary equilibrium. French expenditures in Indochina would amount this year to almost 200 billion francs, approximately one-eighth of the total French budget.

He said that the French efforts to prevent Indochina from falling into Communist hands transcended and went far beyond French national interests since French action represented the hard core of resistance to Communist attempts to take over Indochina with a view ultimately to take over all of Southeast Asia. France was therefore fighting the battle of all the democratic powers and would need assistance to hold Indochina. He realized that it was politically impossible for the United States to give military aid to Indochina but there were forms of economic assistance which the United States could give. This assistance need not be given directly to France but be given to the three governments (the Vietnam state of Bao Dai which unites the three *kys*; Laos; and Cambodia) which France had established in Indochina. In this connection France had turned over a large measure of independence to these governments and was sponsoring a truly nationalist movement in Indochina so that these governments could win the support of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants who were certainly not pro-Communist. He said that the Bao Dai agreements of March 8 did not represent a limit to the concessions which the French would eventually make and that France intended to follow an enlightened course looking to greater self-government. Mr. Schuman hoped that the United States also would support these independent governments.

In conclusion Schuman said he wished to point out that a number of people were perhaps laboring under the mistaken belief that if France got out of Indochina the native inhabitants would have a better chance of attaining real independence. This was an erroneous viewpoint since at the present time the three infant governments were incapable of succeeding alone and would need French military assistance to survive the Communist efforts to take over the country and would also need French technical assistance to arrive at a point where they could cope with their own internal problems of organization. In other words the presence of the French Army and French technical advisers was indispensable to the emergence of truly nationalist and independent states in Indochina. He reiterated that France intended to be most liberal in dealing with these governments so that gradually they could attain an increasing degree of independence. He said that in a sense France had been penalized for trying to hold the line against Communist efforts in Indochina since as a result thereof Indochina had been excluded from the benefits of the Marshall Plan.

The Secretary replied that he was very glad to have had Mr. Schuman outline the French position to him and he was particularly glad to note that in many respects the French thinking was so close to our own. The Secretary said that he could not give Mr. Schuman any reply as to the question of what aid might be given to Indochina as he would have to study the matter very carefully. He said, however, that we realized that the presence of French troops and technical advisers in Indochina was indispensable at this stage of the game and for a considerable time to come and that we had never suggested that the French withdraw and abandon Indochina. The Secretary said that we fully recognized the importance of Indochina in connection with the whole Southeast Asia picture but that he did believe the French could play a great role in preventing Communist domination by moving quickly wherever possible to satisfy the truly nationalist aspirations of the inhabitants.

In connection with the question of what might be done for the governments in Indochina, the Secretary said he hoped the French Parliament would ratify the March 8 Agreements rapidly but he wished to mention that at present the French position seemed somewhat anomalous in that Indochinese affairs are now being administered by the French Ministry of Overseas Areas which did not seem consistent with the French statement that the governments are to a large degree independent. The Secretary said that he also thought it was most important that the other governments of Southeast Asia, particularly India, Burma and Siam, recognize the independent status of the Bao Dai government and in this connection the French could be helpful by giving greater independence to the Indochinese governments in

their foreign relations. The Secretary said that at the present time and given conditions in Indochina he realized it might be difficult to give the Indochinese governments as much internal authority as was desirable but that in the field of foreign affairs there certainly appeared something that could be done. He said that if the United States and Great Britain rushed in to recognize the Bao Dai Government it might, in a sense, be the "kiss of death" to Bao Dai since certain Asian political leaders such as Nehru, might think that the United States and Great Britain were acting with imperialistic motives to insure continuing full French control and domination of Indochina. On the other hand the Secretary thought that the British might be helpful in getting the governments of India and Burma to recognize the Bao Dai Government and we would be disposed to do what we could to encourage the Governments of Southeast Asia to recognize the Indochinese nationalist government which had recently been established as a result of the March 8 Agreements.

Mr. Schuman said that he agreed with the Secretary and that he had already taken up with the French Cabinet the question of transferring responsibility for Indochina from the French Ministry of Overseas France to the French Foreign Office. While he hoped to be able to arrange for this it was difficult at the moment because of French internal considerations but that once the March 8 Agreements were ratified he thought it would be much easier and he hoped that this ratification would occur soon after the Parliament reconvened in October. Mr. Schuman said that he also agreed with the advisability of the other Southeast Asian governments recognizing Bao Dai.

Secretary-Mr. Bevin-Mr. Schuman Conversation (September 17)

Mr. Schuman then talked about Indochina. He said the Bao Dai government was not quite complete but it was satisfactory. The government was not yet fully established but it would be and it was the only way for a permanent solution. There is no love lost between the Chinese and the Indochinese. The Indochinese are afraid of China. Some of Ho's men, if there was a threat of invasion from China, might go over to Bai Dai. If the Southeast Asian countries recognize the Bao Dai government, its prestige would be increased. Perhaps the United Kingdom and the United States could help the French with Southeast Asia. The agreement with the Bao Dai government would be ratified by the French Parliament soon. Siam perhaps could be encouraged to recognize, by a word from the United States or the United Kingdom, the Bao Dai government. Bevin asked when the French Parliament would ratify the agreement. Schuman replied that Parliament meets on October 18 and should ratify it a few weeks after that—perhaps in November. Bevin remarked that France has to ratify the agreement before anyone else can help.

The Secretary said that if the French ratify the March 8 Agreement and transfer dealings with Bao Dai to the Foreign Office, we could help with the Philippines and Siam. The Southeast Asian countries should take the first steps, otherwise recognition by the United Kingdom and the United States in advance of other countries would make the Bao Dai government look like a Western "front". Congress may take up the question of Point Four Program⁴ after the Military Assistance Pact. Perhaps we can arrange technical assistance and Export-Import Bank funds.

⁴ For statement by Under Secretary of State Webb on August 9 before the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, see "Relation of Private Investment to Point 4 Program", Department of State *Bulletin*, August 22, 1949, p. 274. Documentation on Point 4 Program is scheduled for publication in volume 1.

751G.00/10-549: Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, October 5, 1949—3 p. m.

320. Recent communications from New Delhi and London indicate considerable confusion re purpose Bao Dai letters and good will mission to neighboring states. My understanding has been that:

(a) Bao Dai letters merely announcement his assumption power and not formal request for recognition or establishment diplomatic relations.

(b) Good will mission would then visit neighboring countries, establish personal contacts with government officials, explain new status Vietnam and discuss question recognition and diplomatic relations.

(c) Hoped formal relations would then be established with at least Vatican, Thailand, India and perhaps Burma, Ceylon, Philippines, Australia since French have indicated no objection broadening diplomatic provisions March 8 agreements.

(d) Question recognition by US, UK, other Western Powers then taken up.

Felt that present confusion partially fault French missions abroad particularly New Delhi, Bangkok which have apparently done little pave way for Bao Dai. Proposed acceptance by GOI of informal Vietnam representative (Delhi A-957, September 14, telegram 1178, October 3¹) would merely raise Bao Dai to equal status Ho Chi Minh who has representative Thailand, Burma, India (and US in person Vangly, head Vietnam-American Friendship Association (mytel 296, September 22²)).

¹ Neither printed.

² Not printed.

Some indication Quai D'Orsay deliberately holding back perhaps in anticipation transfer to its jurisdiction over Indochina. Necessity ratification March 8 agreements possibly another factor.

In absence Pignon, Bao Dai, Du Gardier, hesitate to discuss above with Nguyen Phan Long who is ignorant diplomatic practice and often indiscreet.

Pouched Hanoi, Department pass Paris.³

ABBOTT

³ This was done the same day.

851G.00/10-1349: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 13, 1949—noon.

4292. With thought that present time might be more propitious for removing Indochina from Overseas France Ministry (which amounts to decapitation of same) than after constitution new government, I arranged to have Schuman reminded of Washington conversations on this point. We were told that Schuman had returned with firm intention of arranging this matter even had there been no crisis and that under circumstances he intends take it up with Moch.¹

Elsewhere we hear that there is some thought of creating secretaryship of state for Indochina and that Devinat is after this job. We have let it be known that if this formula is accepted, new agency should in our view be directly tied to Foreign Office in order that psychological effect of change in SEA and elsewhere be maintained. Department will appreciate that in view necessity close liaison with political parties (parliamentary ratification March 8 and supplementary agreements) and with military in next crucial months, sudden responsibility for Indochinese matters would place great strain on Foreign Office machinery and on Foreign Minister personally, and that consequently transition agency headed by political man but under authority of Foreign Minister might be sensible compromise.

Sent Department 4292, repeated London 709. Department pass Saigon 134.²

BRUCE

¹ French Minister of Interior.

² This was done the same day.

851G.01/10-1849 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, October 18, 1949—11 a. m.

335. Text given press two letters from Bao Dai to President Auriol and Boisdon, President, Assembly French Union.¹ First is reply to Auriol's letter July 27 (mytel 257, August 11). While text given press undated, Bonfils believes in recent answer original taken Paris by Pignon. Delay of two months in replying Auriol perhaps significant.

In letter Bao Dai ties together Auriol's statement that return of peace depends entirely on Vietnam with President's promise that March 8 agreements would be loyally implemented and says "return peace depends on manner agreements we signed are applied. On March 8 we reached meeting of minds. This must now be translated into action".

Emperor then refers to Auriol's promise that if all efforts fail France will defend independence and security Vietnam with help UNO if necessary and concludes "in the eventuality foreseen by you my government gives its full approval to an appeal to UNO.["]

Bao Dai thus joins swelling chorus of those who blame everything on delaying implementing March 8 agreements and contend nothing can be accomplished till implementation completed. While there is some truth in this argument, it opens dangerous possibility of new psychological letdown when it is discovered that implementation accords has by no means solved all problems and has in fact created many new ones.

Reference to UNO may forecast effort have Vietnam problem referred UNO after Chinese Communists reach frontier with Greek analogy in mind.

Letter to Boisdon merely states Vietnam representatives to Assembly will be named "as soon as possible".

Pouched Hanoi. Department pass Paris.²

ABBOTT

¹Texts in French were published October 17 at Saigon and transmitted to the Department in despatch 205, October 25, from Saigon, not printed.

²This was done the same day.

851G.00/10-2049

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1949.

PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S MEMORANDUM ON INDOCHINA

There is attached a summary of the memorandum on Indochina, written by the Indian Consul General at Saigon,¹ whose previous post was Washington, which Prime Minister Nehru sent to you on October 13. It is suggested that to obtain the full impact of this document (Tab A) you read it in its entirety although, for your convenience, there is attached a summary (Tab B). The memorandum is extremely well written and appears to have been accepted by Prime Minister Nehru as the basis for his remarks to you on Indochina. The memorandum falls naturally into two parts, an exposition of the facts and conclusions drawn from these facts. In general, its exposition of the situation in Indochina is well done. Certain statements, however, are exaggerated:

1. I doubt that Ho Chi Minh has gained strength since the return of Bao Dai to Indochina as the evidence indicates that there has been some diminution, perhaps slight, in the number of supporters of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam".
2. Bao Dai is not the complete puppet which the memorandum would have us believe. If he were, the French would not be having difficulties in negotiating the supplementary accords called for by the March 8 Agreement.
3. Bao Dai's supporters, listed by the memorandum as being only members of his rather large family and his former court, include also a portion of the two million Roman Catholics in Indochina as well as other quasi-religious groups; namely, the Caodaists and Hoa Hao.
4. The memorandum omits to state that Ho Chi Minh's "Democratic Republic of Vietnam", under the March 6, 1946 accord which it signed with the French, agreed to form part of the Indochinese federation within the French Union which puts entirely different light upon concessions the French made at that time.

However, it is in the conclusions drawn from these facts with which I disagree. I do not believe that by having the French treat with Ho Chi Minh, who is presumably the real leader of the Vietnamese people to whom Mr. Nehru's memorandum has reference, we will be able to save Indochina for democracy. While such a plan might have been feasible at the time the Communists participated in the governments of Italy and France, from which they were later expelled, this is no longer so. However, the insistent French pressure since the end of the war, characterized by failure to accommodate the legitimate na-

¹ F. M. de Mello Kamath; memorandum and summary not printed.

nationalist aspirations of the Vietnamese, has enabled Ho Chi Minh and the Communist leadership to consolidate its hold upon the very deep-seated nationalist movement. The Communist grip of the armed forces fighting the French appears particularly strong. It, therefore, seems beyond the realm of possibility that the nationalist movement could throw off its Communist control without external assistance. As you know, we have long felt that the strongest weapon the French could place in Bao Dai's hands was a promise of ultimate independence or independence at a fixed date some time in the future. We have felt that by thus accommodating the nationalist movement the French would lure support from Ho Chi Minh and with their help Bao Dai might be able to establish a nationalist government. For reasons of French internal politics no French government has made a promise of ultimate independence for Indochina and it is further evident that no amount of pressure on our part would have brought forth such a statement.

It seems to me that the memorandum, while in a single sentence acknowledging Ho Chi Minh to be a Communist, generally takes the attitude that he is primarily a Nationalist. Accepting that Ho is a Communist, it can only be concluded that he is working toward extending Soviet domination in Asia. The refusal of the memorandum to recognize this imperialism because it is being carried out by Indochinese instead of foreigners is its basic fault. No amount of legerdemain can conceal the fact that the Indians will not, at least at the present, recognize this new imperialism. Their emotional reaction to the imperialism of the 19th century is so great that it has blinded them to the fact that Russian imperialism in the 20th century is of a different consistency than 19th century imperialism.

I do not believe that we can make these views available either directly or indirectly to the French for the Department cannot be put in the position of urging at the present time a French government to negotiate with the Communists. Neither do I think that we can afford to allow the United Nations in any guise to intervene as a mediator in this struggle for such mediation would inevitably be a vehicle for forcing the French to yield the country to Communist domination.

We should continue the line of approach that we have followed with Nehru, expanding that approach to include the thesis that Communist activity, particularly Chinese and Vietnamese expansion into Southeast Asia, is an expression of Soviet imperialism. You will recall that Ambassador Henderson, during the past six months, has evidently succeeded in persuading the government of India that Ho Chi Minh is a Communist, a proposition which Mr. Nehru accepted in his recent conversation with you. We should now stress particularly the nature and overall menace of Soviet imperialism, an operation which will be

delicate but no more so than was the effort to convince Mr. Nehru of Ho Chi Minh's real political affiliations and ideology.

851G.01/10-2049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Saigon

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1949—7 p. m.

177. Dept, on receipt from Fr Emb Sep 24 of ltr from Bao Dai addressed Pres¹ (text sent Saigon as agam), consulted with Brit here (urtel 340 Oct 20²). Dept explained desired if possible coordinate action with Brit in premises and suggested fol for their consideration:

Reply be made to Fr note transmitting Bao Dai's ltr simply acknowledging receipt. Dept added that it considered no action on ltr was possible, at least until ratification by Fr Assembly of Mar 8 accords and that in interim, Brit and US ConGens in Saigon informally might be instructed indicate member Bao Dai's entourage via High Commissioner that no reply possible until requisite Fr Assembly action Mar 8 agreement.

Brit subsequently informed us that Bao Dai's ltr has been brought King's attention but have not yet responded to our suggested course of action. Further instrs will follow.

ACHESON

¹ August 31, p. 74, and footnote 1.

² Not printed.

851G.00/11-949 : Airgram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, November 9, 1949.

[Received November 15—2:12 p. m.]

A-2063. Following in substance are the recommendations made at the Singapore Conference in regard to Indo-China:

1. A failure of the Bao Dai experiment would inevitably result in a complete French withdrawal from Indo-China; therefore U.S. and Commonwealth Governments should join the UK in assisting the French in support of Bao Dai.

2. In view of the urgency of the situation Western nations cannot afford to await prior sponsorship of Bao Dai by the Asiatic nations. It is therefore recommended that after the transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam on January 1 the UK support the new regime.

3. Following action is recommended:

a. The French should be asked to clarify the legal status of the Vietnam.

b. *De jure* recognition is not possible until March 8th Agreement is ratified. It is therefore recommended that *de facto* recognition of Vietnam be granted on the transfer of sovereignty. It would be desirable to inform Bao Dai of the British Government's intention before the British Government recognizes the new Chinese government.

c. The French should be encouraged to expedite the ratification of the March 8th Agreement and the transfer of the control of Indo-Chinese affairs from the Ministry of Overseas France to the Foreign Office.

4. It is hoped that Secretary of State Acheson will issue a public statement with regard to Indo-China similar to that made with regard to Hong Kong on May 18th when he stated that in the event of an attack on Hong Kong the United States will fulfil its duties under the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The UK should consult closely with the French in Indo-China with regard to anti-Communist propaganda.

6. Neutrality from India is the most that can be expected.

BLISS

851G.00/11-1049

*Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in France for the Secretary of State, Temporarily at Paris*¹

SECRET

[PARIS, November 10, 1949.]

The Foreign Office has informed us that Mr. Schuman will wish to discuss with Messrs. Acheson and Bevin the question of the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government, and in this connection he will undoubtedly raise the question of Indo-China. With regard to the latter, we are told that what he specifically has in mind is the possibility of Nationalist troops retreating into Indo-China and the situation resulting therefrom, and also the possibility of the US and UK extending some form of moral support to the Bao Dai Government. We are told that he probably will not raise the question of economic or military support to Vietnam or recognition of the Bao Dai Government.

The Bidault² Government has not since its formation met on the subject of Indo-China. The High Commissioner, M. Pignon, is leaving for Saigon tonight after a stay in Paris which was prolonged by the Government crisis. The Embassy took advantage of his enforced idleness to conduct a series of informal conversations with him. It was thought that the subjects covered in these talks might receive Govern-

¹ Submitted to the Secretary by the Ambassador in France (Bruce), together with a covering memorandum of November 10 and two annexes, none printed. (851G.00/11-1049)

² Georges Bidault succeeded Henri Queuille on October 27 as President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier).

ment consideration before the Secretary's arrival and that a tentative French Government position might emerge to serve as a basis for conversations between the three Ministers. This has not transpired, and our latest word indicates that Schuman will not be in a position to initiate substantive talks on Indo-China. However, the substance of our verbal exchanges with Pignon is given below.

The informal and purely exploratory discussions with High Commissioner Pignon covered current Indo-China situation and steps which might be taken by both the French and American Governments to improve the situation in Indo-China.

The Embassy outlined the measures to be taken by the French which it considered would not only ensure the best chance of rapid success of the Bao Dai experiment but also encourage further international support thereof by foreign powers, including the US. These were: Parliamentary ratification of the March 8 agreements, the early conclusions of the negotiations of the supplementary agreements and the effective transfer of administrative functions to the Vietnamese Government, the transfer to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the administration of the Vietnamese Affairs, and lastly, a public declaration by the French Government in the near future to the effect that the March 8 agreements represent only one step in an evolutionary process, that they are not intended permanently to define the status of Vietnam within the French Union, and that the final treaty defining that status will be concluded with a duly elected Vietnamese government.

M. Pignon informed us that he believed French government to be favorably disposed towards the early ratification of March 8 agreements, and that he was confident that upon his return to Indo-China, the negotiation of the supplementary accords could be accelerated and completed prior to the end of the year. He personally was favorably disposed towards the transfer of Vietnamese affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but considered that the domestic political situation might make such a complete break impossible at the moment, and that as an interim measure, a special agency comparable to Britain's Commonwealth Relations Office and responsible to the President of the Council might be created for this purpose.

As regards a governmental declaration on the evolutionary character of the March 8 agreements, he, himself, was personally well disposed towards this idea which he believed would be of great psychological value in the Viet Nam as well as in neighboring countries of southeast Asia. He considered, however, that such a declaration should only be made at such time as the negotiation of the supplementary

agreements should have been concluded: coming earlier, it would jeopardize the successful conclusion of these negotiations and Bao Dai solution itself.

With regard to assistance which the US might extend, he mentioned action on our part to dissipate beliefs widely held in Viet Nam that the US favored the total withdrawal of French influence from that area and, once this was accomplished, would be prepared to extend practically unlimited financial and material assistance. He also hoped that the US and Britain could take a common position with France announcing that in the event a Chinese Communist invasion of Tonking, the three countries would take common action. He believed that the presence of American warships, notably aircraft carriers, in Indo-Chinese waters, would have a decided effect in making our position clear in this respect. He also hoped for assistance from the US in replacing and repairing military transport and combat equipment, and favored supplying military assistance directly to the Viet Nam government provided that this be done in consultation with the French.

Lastly, he spoke of direct ECA aid to Viet Nam which would have more of a psychological than a material benefit, and of a continuation of our past efforts to persuade the government of India to adopt a favorable attitude towards the Bao Dai government.

851G.01/11-2149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, November 21, 1949—8 p. m.

4883. Baeyens¹ tells us MacDonald² informed Pignon that he was strongly recommending to London British recognition of Bao Dai government. While MacDonald believes it preferable that British recognition follow similar action by some SEA nations (he mentioned Ceylon and Siam), he does not feel that British need wait if there are signs SEA recognitions will be delayed.

Sent Department 4883; repeated London 839; Department pass Saigon 155.³

BRUCE

¹ Ferdinand Jacques M. G. Baeyens was in charge of Asian affairs at the French Foreign Office.

² Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South-east Asia, with rank of Ambassador and headquarters at Singapore, was on a visit to Indochina.

³ This was done November 22.

851G.00/11-2249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, November 22, 1949—4 p. m.

401. From Gibson : Deptel 199, November 17.¹ I do not believe there has been any change in French military policy re defense Sino-Vietnam frontier. Policy is still to defend frontier by every means at their command.

In reporting my interpretation of Alessandri's² personal reaction to present situation, I meant to indicate that General is realistically considering all possibilities, the worst of which is that Chinese, either in form of present Communist forces in southern provinces, or of armies further reinforced by additional Nationalist defections, may pursue their way in an organized mass into Indochina. In such an eventuality, though French will unquestionably resist from beginning, it is unrealistic to expect that they will be able to block any such invasion at frontier itself. This conclusion was not only strongly implied by General himself in our reference conversation, but is certainly studied opinion of majority of French military in positions of authority in Tonkin.

In stating problem would then consist simply of getting out "with as few losses as possible", I am reporting what I consider to be on the basis of cordial and, I believe, frank relations, the General's own personal views. He would not of course state them in so many words to a foreign official yet his implication was clear and undercurrent of other military opinion in Tonkin equally so.

Actually, while conservatively realistic to the point of bearing the worst of possibilities constantly in mind and planning accordingly, General is not pessimistic and considers chances this development as being remote.

Question of "rear guard action" evolves about point that best French defense can only be achieved in relatively open country where superiority equipment, if any, can be brought to bear. This is particularly true of fighter aircraft including recently arrived King Cobras on which they count so heavily and are ineffective in the rough mountainous jungle country of most of frontier.

Thus if circumstances require a "rear guard" action in relatively flat country of delta region would in sense be strategic military manoeuvre for French have learned from bitter experience in Tonkin most recently from inability to protect the Caobang-Langson road convoys that attempts to fight Oriental guerrilla in jungle terrain of

¹ Not printed.

² Gen. Marcel Alessandri was acting Governor and French Commanding General in north Vietnam (Tonkin).

frontier are virtually suicidal. Bombing or strafing in these areas is futile, while movement of mechanized equipment is impossible.

Accordingly in worst, French might be faced with withholding their major defenses until they reach area bordering Red River delta, an area of combat uncomfortably near the European centers, Hanoi and Haiphong. If further retreat were found necessary, it would inevitably pose problems of evacuation of the European colonies of two cities. This is only feasible by sea from Haiphong and given the state of road transportation facilities between the two cities, inadequate port facilities, lack of shipping would present a considerable problem.

Elimination of Vietminh as an organized fighting force in most of Tonkin by end February in event Chinese Communists establish themselves along frontier with well-disciplined troops and do not violate it on any organized scale is most favorable of all eventualities in Alessandri's view. In this regard General is undoubtedly thinking primarily of delta and Namdinh-Phatdiem areas in French realization that frontier regions will thenceforth be subject to free exchange of arms and equipment. As long as French and Vietnamese Government forces control heavily populated fertile areas and cut Vietminh lines of communication into them, usefulness of any Chinese Red arms will be considerably restricted. Recent successes in extension of area of control in Red River delta and Phatdiem operation have lent support to General's hope that this can be accomplished if required. He is also counting heavily on known antipathy of Vietnamese for Chinese and resulting increased degree of cooperation which may be expected from the great mass of the Tonkinese people if they become convinced they are in actual danger of Chinese domination.

In weighing the General's opinions Department is reminded that Alessandri is unquestionably best, if not only, high ranking officer in Indochina qualified to pass judgment on these and related questions with any degree of authority. He is keen student of Oriental mind and thoroughly familiar with terrain in question from actual experience.

Pouched Hanoi. Department pass Paris.³ [Gibson.]

³ This was done the same day.

ABBOTT

851G.01/11-2649 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, November 26, 1949—noon.

410. Following brief comments on Franco-Cambodian Treaty November 8 furnished on assumption text also released Paris and sent Department by Embassy.

In contrast to March 8 accords with Vietnam, agreement designated as treaty and previous treaties specifically abrogated insofar as conflict with present one. France guarantees "actual frontiers" Cambodia which would appear deny French support for Cambodian demands revision Vietnam frontier. No limitations on number Cambodian diplomatic missions abroad. Treaty specifically designated as "act" specifying status Cambodian-French union called for by article 61 French Constitution. Effective on signature but mutual ratification called for.

Aside from above points, treaty substantially same as March 8 accords but briefer and clearer. Pignon remarked to me that drafting much improved. "We learn by experience". Same auxiliary accords for implementation required. Bonfils leaves today for Phnompenh to set up joint commission.

Little comment so far Saigon press with great majority not even publishing text.

Pouched Hanoi. Department pass Paris.¹

ABBOTT

¹ This was done the same day.

851G.01/11-2949 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

SAIGON, November 29, 1949—4 p. m.

416. Despatch from Vientiane announces that the Laos National Assembly ratified Franco-Laotian treaty¹ by 24 votes to 6 with two members absent. Communiqué adds six negative votes represented opposition to government and not to treaty. Prime Minister Boun Oum arrived Saigon yesterday to discuss organization joint committee for implementation treaty.

Department pass Paris,² pouched Hanoi.

ABBOTT

¹ See telegram 2964, July 20, 10 a. m., p. 68.

² This was done the same day.

851G.00/11-3049 : Airgram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, November 30, 1949.

[Received December 2—9:03 a. m.]

A-2252. Reference is made to the Embassy's A-2063, November 9, 1949, giving the substance of recommendations made by the Singapore

Conference in regard to Indochina. This airgram was drafted on the basis of a conversation with Mr. R. H. Scott, Head of the South-East Asia Department of the Foreign Office.

In a subsequent conversation, Mr. Scott referred to the hope expressed by the members of the Conference at Singapore that Secretary of State Acheson might make a public statement to the effect that in the event of a Communist attack on Indochina the United States would fulfil its duties under the Charter of the United Nations. (Apparently Mr. Bevin would concurrently make a similar public statement). Mr. Scott expressed the informal view that this aspect of the Singapore Conference recommendations at any rate would probably not be acted upon for, as he pointed out, such a stand with regard to Indochina would doubtless elicit from other Governments in an even weaker military position than the French in Indochina (Portugal with respect to Macao, or Thailand, for example) a request for a similar stand with regard to an attack across their frontier. The China-Burma frontier, he recalled, had never even been formally delimited in its entirety. It was his opinion that a guarantee of the frontiers of all the southern neighbors of China might prove to be an overwhelmingly impossible undertaking.

DOUGLAS

851G.00/12-149: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1949—6 p. m.

4633. Dept's views on Mar 8 Agreement remain substantially same as expressed in *Aide-mémoire* transmitted to Emb under cover instr 289, Jun 6. However, while Dept recognizes that Bao Dai has made relatively more progress than had been anticipated, and is encouraged by evident efforts of Fr Statesmen and particularly Pignon to give life and viability to present Vietnam Govt, Dept queries whether, in view of developments in Far East and notably in China and Indonesia, mere ratification of Mar 8 Agreement and transfer of limited powers stipulated thereunder to Bao Dai regime will be sufficient to insure success of or even afford fair chance of success to Bao Dai solution. Unhappily events beyond our control are marching on the mainland of Asia and it may well be that the Mar 8 Agreement is but another instance of too little and too late. This view is predicated upon belief that a mil solution or a polit containment of Communism is indeed beyond the capacity of France and of Western Democracies unless, at very minimum, the Bao Dai regime obtains the support of a substantial proportion of the Vietnamese. Such being the case, Dept considers problem as how best to obtain this support, and suggests that, as one

of barriers to winning this support is the inherent Vietnamese distrust of Fr good faith, the two essential steps are :

(1) Solemn declaration by France of timetable leading to independence of Vietnam within a relatively short period, and

(2) Setting up of mechanism which wld in effect create the widest conviction of Fr intentions to abide by foregoing declaration.

Dept realizes any plan incorporating above considerations, particularly any forthright promise of ultimate and absolute independence, wld probably be unpalatable to Fr. Nevertheless, Dept wishes leave no avenue unexplored in prevention of Commie domination Indochina and is considering advisability and utility, after prior consultation with Brit, of approaching Fr with somewhat the fol proposal :

(a) Immediately fol the ratification of the Mar 8 Agreement Fr to issue declaration providing timetable leading to independence Vietnam at fixed time in near future, stressing its hope that the century of close relations between Fr and Vietnamese will lead new state to associate itself freely with the Fr Union and emphasizing mutual benefits to be derived from such assoc.

(b) Simultaneous with issuance timetable, Fr to propose internatl Comm to supervise steps leading independence and to assist Bao Dai regime in establishing viable govt (Dept's current thinking is for Comm of three or five non-Soviet Bloc powers with Fr selecting one or two reps and Viets selecting similar number, and those selected agreeing upon additional member—it would be essential that certain number of these members be Asiatic and this action shld have beneficial psychological effect especially upon those Asiatic neighbors who have remained cool to Bao Dai under belief he is Fr puppet.[]) Or if UN approach appears preferable Comm under UN auspices might be set up from amongst those countries represented by career consular officers now in IC which wld afford means eliminating Soviet bloc representation and wld include India, Thailand and possibly PI.

(c) At same time, Fr or possibly above Comm cld invite recognition of Bao Dai Govt by family of nations.

If some such plan cld be put into operation, Dept believes it wld be of great value in dissipating Vietnamese distrust of real Fr intentions, in providing Bao Dai with all attributes of sovereignty for which Ho Chi Minh says he is fighting, in creating proper atmosphere for return to peaceable conditions and restoration of country's economy, and in affording other non-Commie countries chance to join in helping Bao Dai with both economic and military support without stigma of backing a puppet. Propaganda possibilities would be unlimited.

Dept wld appreciate Emb's views in near future as to substance and timing this proposal.

ACHESON

851G.01/12-749 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1949—4 p. m.

4702. Dept officers immed concerned IC met informally Dec 2 and 3 at small social gatherings with Buu Loc and Nguyen Dac Khe² in presence officials Fr Emb.

In course these mtgs Buu Loc made fol points:

1. Bao Dai in touch many non-Commie elements now supporting Ho Chi Minh. These elements give strong indications switching allegiance when "internal sovereignty" transferred Vietnam. Presumably such transfer will take place Dec 31.

2. Most important assistance Bao Dai cld receive wld be US support, even without Southern Asian nations, if necessary. He envisaged such support wld be based on consideration that China-Indochina border marked limit between Commie and anti-Commie blocs, although he did not expand upon measures he thought US shld take in this connection.

3. Purpose his visit Paris was to consult with Fr and to arrange for permanent Viet mission to France. In this connection, he mentioned several times his view that Mar 8 Agreement was only start in evolution Vietnam and concurrently rejected energetically view that Mar 8 Agreement set rigid limits upon Vietnam.

4. Stated that both he and Dac Khe planned return IC for interstate conference late Jan or early Feb. He emphasized that Bao Dai wld not allow central admin common services to evolve into new "Govt general".

5. He was evasive regarding replies Southern Asian nations to Bao Dai's letter but pointed with obvious satisfaction to response from Vatican and "moral recognition" given by MacDonald in Bevin's oral message to Bao Dai.

Buu Loc added that views he expressed were not necessarily firm position Bao Dai's Govt, but did reflect thinking inner circles that regime.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 212 to Saigon.

² Members of Vietnamese mission en route to Paris to arrange for a permanent mission.

851G.00/12-849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, December 8, 1949—6 p. m.

5166. Foreign Office note December 6 initialed by Schuman contains answers Department's October 15 questions to Bonnet. Original by despatch.¹ Rough translation follows:²

¹ Despatch 1101, December 9, from Paris, not printed. (851G.01/12-949)

² A text in French was received December 22 from the French Ambassador. (851G.00/12-2249)

I. The Franco-Vietnamese, Franco-Laotian, and Franco-Cambodian agreements will be submitted for approval to the Assemblies in the near future.

Since the details of the ratification procedure have not yet been decided, they will be communicated to the Embassy later.

The ratification of these agreements by Parliament will not imply, however, the "legal creation" of the states with which France has signed them. These states already exist. Ratification will merely confirm (*consacrer*) the essential points of the new regime of independence granted to these states.

(Embassy comment: While complete information not available Foreign Office when note drafted, Letourneau³ tells me decision now reached submit Parliament three agreements under cover single bill and in interest speed not wait to include supplementary accords to March 8 document.)

II. The supplementary agreements presently being negotiated are to be signed at Saigon by the chief of the Vietnamese Government and the High Commissioner of France for Indochina. These agreements must, in principle, be signed at the same time and before the end of the year. It is possible, however, that if a delay occurs in the conclusion of one of them, the accords already agreed upon will be signed first.

III. The agreement of March 8, 1949, refers to qualified Vietnamese authorities without specifying what authorities will be called upon to act. The decision as to who these authorities shall be constitutes in effect a domestic Vietnamese problem whose solution will derive from the constitution of that country which at the present has only provisional institutions.

Under the circumstances, it appears that the French Government cannot inform the US Government of the rules which will result from the free determination of Vietnam. However, the general tendencies of political and constitutional order allow one to suppose that a representative assembly of Vietnam will be called to pronounce itself on these agreements.

IV. The territory of Cochin-China has been part of the associated Vietnam state since the law of June 4, 1949, and by virtue of its text.

The law of June 4, 1949, was passed pursuant to Article 75 of the constitution of the French Republic which provides for changes of status within the French Union as the result of a law passed after consulting the territorial assemblies and the Assembly of the French Union. The territorial assembly of Cochin-China was organized by the law of March 14, 1949.

V. The character of the consultation which took place can only be appreciated in the light of the disturbed situation which then prevailed in Cochin-China.

The French Government did not wish to use the state of disorder in Cochin-China as a pretext for delaying the reuniting of this territory to Vietnam. On the one hand, in fact, the demand for Vietnamese unity constituted such a grounds for agitation that one risked never achieving pacification if the unity question was made a condition previous. On the other hand, the sentiment for Vietnamese unity seemed strong and unanimous enough for the French Parliament to draw the proper

³ Jean Letourneau, French Minister of Overseas France.

conclusion, regardless of the imperfections of the representation charged with its expression in the territorial assembly.

VI. In the interest of reestablishing normal conditions in Vietnam, the French Government is dealing with H. M. Bao Dai, as the most qualified Vietnam representative in the present situation, to reestablish peace in that country under the authority of a government of its own and whose interests are truly national.

The political regime of Vietnam organized under the authority of H. M. Bao Dai is still only provisional and holds itself out as such. The working out of definite institutions for Vietnam will keep pace with the progress in the task of pacification and unification to which this provisional government has set for itself. It will be the concern of the future constitution of Vietnam, after the population has been able freely to express itself, to decide on a monarchical or republican form of government. At that moment Bao Dai will be invested with such titles (*qualités*) as the Vietnamese nation may confer upon him after it emerges from its difficulties.

VII. Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations provides that all peaceful states which accept the obligations of the Charter and, in the judgment of the organization are capable and disposed to fulfill them, may become members of the United Nations.

Without doubt the disturbances in Indochina and the delays necessary to draft treaties have not, so far, permitted the French Government to consider that the Associated States of Indochina can fulfill all the conditions set forth in the above-mentioned Article 4.

Nevertheless, the solutions already reached in Laos and Cambodia, as well as the Franco-Vietnamese settlement concluded by the agreement of March 8 and its expected consequences, give the French Government great hopes of being able to present the candidacy of the three Associated States of Indochina to the UN Organization in the near future.

Sent Department 5166; repeated London 907.

BRUCE

851G.00/12-1149: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, December 11, 1948—2 p. m.

5197. For the Secretary from Bruce: ReDeptel 4633, December 1.

1. In my view the Indochina problem should be considered by the US in a completely cold-blooded fashion. If as some observers contend, it is a matter of indifference to American security and political interests whether or not that country falls completely under Communist domination, then we are wasting our time in reflecting upon possible courses of action calculated to compress and suppress Communism there. If, however, as I personally believe very strongly, we as a nation have a vital interest in the establishment and maintenance in Indochina of a non-Communist government, we must reconcile ourselves to the

necessity of adopting such practical measures as might at least give us an expectancy of bringing about this condition.

2. I assume that no responsible American official believes that we can afford to take a chance that Asiatic Communism will in a reasonable future become a national Communism more friendly to US than to the USSR or that a round-table conference at which Bao Dai and Ho Chi Minh would sit as equals could result at best in more than a dangerous stalemate or, more probably, in the victory of the latter.

3. Let us first examine from the standpoint of realistic French politics what cannot and what can be done by the French Government in this matter.

(a) On the negative side, no French Cabinet would survive the running of the Parliamentary gauntlet if it suggested the withdrawal at present or in the near future of French troops from Indochina. Such a move besides the powerful opposition to it generated by considerations of national pride and prestige, of financial commitments and of sentimental ties would probably result in the massacre of tens of thousands of French civilians and anti-Communist Vietnamese as well as severe military losses to the troops covering evacuation. Shipping is not available in sufficient tonnage even to begin an operation of such magnitude whose only possible success would depend upon its being carried out with great speed. Other logistical considerations would be equally adverse.

(b) At present no French Government could remain in power that advocated complete independence either now or in the future for Indochina, if by complete independence we mean that the country would not form a portion of the French Union. Public opinion in France is unalterable on this point and only the Communists and some left-wing Socialists would give support to such a notion. The French profess their willingness to abandon colonialism in all its forms as rapidly as is consistent with security, and feel that March 8 agreements are already a pledge of their good faith in that connection, but they sincerely believe and I agree that the maintenance of Vietnam in the union is the only present method by which Communism can be contained and a stable state created. Also, it should be observed that the parable of the mote applies to the French as well as to other nations. They do not feel any consciousness of having on balance grievously oppressed the native population or exploited it for their own exclusive benefit; on the contrary they take pride in having by their own account led with a vast expenditure of effort, blood and treasure a congeries of backward and ignorant peoples toward a state of enlightenment where they are sensible of nationhood and are demanding the rights of self government. Bigoted as many foreigners may think this attitude to be, nevertheless it exists and is an element in the situation which must not be disregarded.

4. The fact remains that there will be at the end of this year in Indochina almost one hundred and fifty thousand regular French and African troops, well equipped judged by Asiatic standards, and it is these and not any native forces which have prevented the country from

having long ago fallen a prey to Ho Chi Minh and his Communist associates and followers. Naturally, there are in France and in the overseas territories from which these soldiers derive a multitude of families who would rather have these men at home than dying under the stinking circumstances of jungle warfare many thousand miles away. But the necessity for such service is almost universally understood by those upon whom it imposes the heaviest sacrifices. In addition great as is the financial burden heaped upon the French nation by this thankless war, which swallowed up this year about half a billion dollars in expenses none of which will ever be recuperated, an amount which represents approximately the deficit in the national budget and is deadly to sound fiscality, there is no intention in the French Parliament, contentious though the subject be, of laying down this task and abandoning the conflict there. All this is a sentiment deep rooted in the national consciousness, despite the fact that while the best troops are engaged in these border skirmishes a far mightier enemy threatens her Rhine borders stripped of men than otherwise would help in their defense.

The above are not mere conjectures; they represent the practicalities of politics.

5. I agree of course with the Department's basic thesis of necessity wider popular support Bao Dai regime and important part played by widespread distrust of French as barrier to attainment of this popular support. I am convinced that there is no chance of French Government accepting the time table idea or the offer of international supervision, and that submission by US of these proposals which French Government could not possibly accept in view domestic political realities this subject would seriously prejudice the adoption of the program recommended below. In French view March 8 agreements supplemented by conventions now being negotiated at Saigon confer independence on Vietnam within French Union. Such limitations on sovereignty as will exist upon conclusion signing these agreements can gradually be removed when peaceful conditions restored and functioning non-Communist Viet government in control until something approaching or even exceeding dominion status is attained. As long as presence French Army, a certain number of trained French civil servants, and French financial support absolutely indispensable to maintenance non-Communist regime Indochina, a declaration of "complete independence for Vietnam at fixed future date" is out of question. I likewise believe that there is no chance of French accepting international supervision plan any more than the British would if it were suggested for Malaya. In addition factors national pride involved, almost universal revolt in French official and political life against what are considered unrealistic UN solutions of such problems as Italian colonies and UN

attempt confer upon Trusteeship Council broader investigatory powers in French dependent areas would render acceptance such a scheme impossible and might prejudice ratification agreements now pending. Also, even broadminded and liberal Frenchmen question necessity international supervision negotiations between partners, for it is as partners in struggle against Communist domination Indochina that French officials view Bao Dai and themselves. There is no parallel to Indonesian case. Some of the vitriolic native critics of the French, their freedom of speech and safety of person guaranteed by French bayonets, would cry lustily and despairingly if they were deprived of the military protection, the administrative assistance, and the subsidized economy which now defends them against terror, chaos and inflation. If there were deadlock between French and Bao Dai and latter requested international supervision, matter would be placed on different basis but in absence such request by Bao Dai average Frenchman would consider suggestion by US as gratuitous and offering opportunity much mischief making (for instance by present Indian Consul General) in already complex enough situation in Saigon.

6. Since the French will neither leave Indochina lock, stock and barrel nor grant fuller independence to Vietnam than is consistent with membership in French Union, what can be done to further our objective of halting Communist expansion at the Tonkinese border. If that is not done, Burma and Siam will fall like overripe apples and the British, as MacDonald has warned, will be forced to reconsider the tenability of their position in Malaya.

7. I shall outline below maximum program which we in Embassy, after mature reflection and discreet consultation with leading French official and political figures, believe feasible. This program falls considerably short of what we should like to see accomplished but is necessarily adapted to actual public opinion in France, the capabilities of a government operating with a slim Parliamentary majority and to other factors too well known to the Department to require comment here.

8. Program for French action should be:

(a) Immediate ratification of Auriol-Bao Dai, Franco-Cambodian and Franco-Laotian agreements. As previously reported, decision to submit them to Parliamentary approval has already been taken.

(b) Immediately thereafter transfer of Indochina affairs from Ministry Overseas France to another government department. This principle accepted by Cabinet but majority government thinking now appears against transfer to Foreign Office and in favor creation Ministry French Union on pattern British Commonwealth Office.

(c) Completion and signing supplementary accords Saigon and turning over powers to Viet authorities in picturesque ceremony attended by Pignon and Bao Dai in which former either makes or reiter-

ates (according to timing see point (d) below) declaration of evolutionary principle characterizing Franco-Viet relations.

(d) A statement by the French Government as clear, dramatic and sweeping as possible made before, during or after the ratification debates to the effect that the March agreements represent only one step in an evolutionary program, that they are not intended permanently to define the status of Vietnam within the French Union and that the final treaty defining that status will be concluded with a duly elected Vietnamese Government as soon as conditions in Indochina permit the normal operation of democratic processes and the establishment of definitive constitutional institutions.

9. As heretofore outlined, I consider that this program is the best that the French can be expected to consider at this time.

10. To increase chances success this policy and our objective, I believe foregoing French action should be supplemented by the following:

(a) Recognition of Bao Dai Government by US and UK and as many other states, particularly, in neighboring areas, as can be induced follow us.

(b) Recognition of Bao Dai to precede or to be simultaneous with recognition of Mao Tse-tung.

(c) The latter recognition to be accompanied by statement to Chinese Communist regime that the UK, US and such other powers, including India and SEA countries, as care to join would take grave view of any attempt by China or [of] any pretext to extend her authority south of Tonkinese frontier.

(d) Direct ECA financing in Indochina (Department will recall that we are practically committed to this if French request it.)

(e) Consideration of extending aid to Vietnam from special 75 million dollar fund provided by MDAP law to be distributed at discretion President to stop Communists in China and neighboring areas.

If the Department favors this program, it might consider the desirability of discussing it with the British and, if agreed, its presentation should be accompanied by a conditional offer of action by the United States and United Kingdom of the points in paragraph 10. This presentation should be made quickly and should be designed to elicit support if possible from Asian states. It may fail to achieve results for various reasons such as internal Indochinese complications or a decision by Mao Tse-tung for direct military invasion of the peninsula. At present we are almost in a stalemate. We are waiting for the French to act, the French are hoping that help from us may make their internal political problem easier. Bao Dai has improved his chances and has gathered increased strength but is waiting for both of us. Any course of action we may decide upon involves some risks but the greatest risk and one certain to precipitate failure is that consequent upon continued inaction. A view that Ho Chi Minh will inevitably take over Indochina is dangerous and defeatist. We should

act courageously and speedily within the limits of the possible. If the above program is carried out, I believe it will promote American security interests.

BRUCE

851G.01/12-1749

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Bonnet)*¹

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of France, and has the honor to inform him that the exchange of letters which took place on March 8, 1949 between M. Vincent Auriol, President of the French Union, and Bao Dai has been brought to the attention of the President.²

President Truman wishes to congratulate M. Vincent Auriol, President of the French Union, on the conclusion of these agreements and to extend his best wishes for their successful implementation.

WASHINGTON, December 17, 1949.

¹ President Truman on December 3 approved sending this note in response to President Auriol's note transmitted by the French Ambassador in his note 280, August 31; see footnote 1, p. 74.

² Memorandum of November 29, not printed.

851G.00/12-1949: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Gibson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HANOI, December 19, 1949—3 p. m.

167. After return Saigon Saturday Alessandri furnished British colleague and me detail latest developments frontier.

Noon 17th Nationalists surrendered to French at Dong Dang, Chi Ma totalled 24,000. Groups continue be composed remnants 97th army some units 46th. Units pursued by Communist regulars who for first time crossed into French territory where following transpired.

Small force Communists pursued surrendering Nationalists at Chi Ma past Chinese frontier guard post to frontier across "to point directly in front French frontier guard post (French and Chinese posts both placed short distances behind actual frontier)".

There Communist captain in command met by French commander who informed him "You are, Sir, on French territory." Captain apologized abjectly and signified intention retire. Before doing so, he requested French officer as personal favor sign attestation stating he pursued Nationalist troops very limit Chinese territory. Captain explained he wished present attestation his CO, that it would win him citation. Frenchman complied. Captain and force then withdraw orderly fashion. Not a shot fired. If there had been, Chinese would prob-

ably have been wiped out by force Legionnaires present. This may be factor explaining conduct Chinese.

Alessandri attaches importance incident for he believes Communist officers have strict orders not violate French territory and this first proof accuracy his convictions that effect expressed to me and reported several recent occasions.

French now look further developments frontier regions west Chi Ma remnants 14 Nationalist army known to be. How many this group will attempt cross unknown. Army believed caught by Communists, but nature engagements, retreat, casualties, defections uncertain. In any case, maximum number available following retreat Indochina estimated 20,000. Surrendered arms Chi Ma-Dong Dang transferred Langson thence Hanoi by air. Said be good quality.

French looking in question costs housing feeding refugees now being moved Damdha. Mentioned cost several million piastres heavy financial burden. Commented arms at least provided guaranty and French might have been justified taking custody twenty silver dols each with which majority if not all Nationalist soldiers appeared be provided. General not certain provisions this question under existing international convention and proceeding carefully.

Last groups refugees included Vietnamese members Vietnam Quoc Dandang, anti Communist Nationalists, who fled Vietnam 1945. They being disarmed, interned separately, have already signified desire join Vietnamese forces under Bao Dai.

General had discussion with Bao Dai. Described Emperor pleased with turn events and agreement Alessandri's prognostications re expected future conduct Communists. These include passage Siam, Burma borders and possible invasion there, where General states "Their fifth columns can really achieve results and they need not face European forces or territory and enormous psychological barrier apart from military considerations."

General qualified his discussions 16th in Saigon with Generals Willoughby and Stratemeyer¹ as highly successful and reassuring. States he urged former return soon Vietnam spend at least ten days including visit Tonkin and received favorable response.

General still classifies full facts frontier developments secret, although press partially informed and official communiqué issued Saigon.

General continuing display utmost frankness relations British colleague, me. Convinced neither withholding nor distorting facts, states he wishes us be fully and accurately informed. I have impression in

¹ Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, U.S.A., and Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commanding U.S. Far East Air Forces.

view absence Carpentier² Paris, Alessandri has full authority act in emergency without referring higher authority.

Department pass Paris.³

GIBSON

² Commanding French armed forces in Indochina.

³ This was done on December 20.

851G.00/12-2249

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

No. 1146

PARIS, December 22, 1949.

[Received January 2, 1950.]

With reference to the Embassy's Cable No. 5197 of December 11, 1949, and to Toeca Cable No. 1435 of December 2, 1949,¹ I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum prepared in the Embassy's Combined Financial Group² dealing with the burden imposed on the French public finances by military expenditures in Indochina; a summary of the major lines of the attached document was contained in Toeca 1435.

The enclosed memorandum highlights the fact that Indochinese expenditures impose such a burden on the French public finances as to constitute an important obstacle to the success of the whole French recovery and stabilization effort. The 167 billion francs spent in Indochina in 1949 is not only equivalent to over two-thirds of the total direct American aid to France for 1949-50, but some ten billion francs greater than the estimated French budgetary deficit for the year; the sixty-billion franc excess over budgetary estimates of actual Indochinese expenditures in 1949 more than accounts for the operating deficit of the French Treasury as of the end of 1949; and the year 1950 will probably see the Treasury saddled with at least forty billion francs more in unforeseen expenditures. It is clear that the struggle to create conditions necessary for the continued growth of a non-Communist Viet Government in Indochina, to which the French are apparently irrevocably committed, constitutes for the moment a major obstacle in the path of French financial stabilization and economic progress, with all that that implies for the European Recovery Program as a whole.

Unlike so many of the seemingly insoluble problems of the French Treasury, the Indochinese problem is one the United States can do something about. For in addition to taking the general political measures recommended in the Embassy's telegram 5197, measures designed by strengthening Bao-Dai to shorten the period of necessary military

¹ Latter not printed.

² Not printed.

activity, the United States is in a position to take direct action to relieve the French of at least a part of the financial burden of their Indochinese commitment by making use of the special fund established by the Mutual Defence Act of 1949. This double opportunity to resist Communist expansion in Asia at one of its most dangerous points while contributing directly to the maintenance of French economic stability, is one which in my opinion the Department should seriously consider.

Respectfully yours,

DAVID K. E. BRUCE

851G.01/12-2349 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Thailand

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1949—noon.

704. Fr Govt has informed Emb, Paris, it intends submit Mar 8 Agreements for ratification Fr Assembly together with similar agreements concerning Laos and Cambodia before end Dec.

On assumption such ratification will take place near future, pls report what action re recognition Bao Dai regime Govt to which you accredited is likely to take.

In formulating your estimate you may, in your discretion, approach informally appropriate governmental officials. Shld you make any such approach, you shld emphasize fol :

1. There is no apparent present alternative to Bao Dai regime other than Commie domination Indochina.
2. Bao Dai regime, while far from being success at present moment, nevertheless is stronger today than was anticipated six months ago.
3. Some form recognition by South Asian nations wld be most helpful in attracting to Bao Dai true nationalists now neutral or following Commie Ho Chi Minh.
4. Widespread recognition of Bao Dai, particularly by South Asian nations, might provide effective means to continue channelization of French policy toward fulfillment of legitimate nationalist aspirations Vietnamese people.
5. Mar 8 Agreements by no means estab rigid framework for Vietnam problem, solution of which must be evolutionary with ratification by Fr Assembly as only first of many steps which shld also include clarification of Fr policies in Indochina transfer of powers to Bao Dai, announcement of timetable for further transfers, and continuing liberal attitude by Fr, particularly in interstate conferences involving Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.¹

Bangkok repeat as airgram to : AmEmbassy, Rangoon, AmEmbassy, New Delhi, AmEmbassy, Manila, AmConsul, Batavia, AmEmbassy, Karachi, all for action ; AmConsul, Saigon, for info.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as airgram to London and Paris.

851G.01/12-2749 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

SAIGON, December 27, 1949—11 a. m.

465. Pass Paris.¹ Pouched to Hanoi. Assume Department is planning extend recognition Bao Dai Government simultaneously with or immediately after British (Paris telegrams 5366 and 5367, December 22, to Department²). Failure to do so would be interpreted by all circles in Indochina including key fence-sitting element as further evidence that US Government indifferent and irresolute in opposing spread of Communism in SEA. Furthermore, recognition by UK alone would give Communists golden opportunity to feature Bao Dai as puppet of French-British colonialists. If we join, our record in Philippines and Indonesia sufficiently well known to people this area to take edge off such propaganda particularly in neighboring countries.

Success of Bidault in budget vote makes Schuman timetable (Paris telegram 5366) realistic and January 15 would seem probable target date for recognition Bao Dai. Strongly agree with Schuman's argument that British should recognize Bao Dai before Mao Tse-tung and hope Department will urge British to delay latter. Opening of Colombo conference would seem logical excuse. British Consul General Gibbs who returned Saigon last week has telegraphed London emphasizing importance prior recognition Bao Dai.

It seems likely that there will be an interval of relative calm on Chinese frontier. First threat from retreating Nationalist armies has been successfully avoided. Second threat from Communist armies does not seem immediate. The interval should be used to consolidate position Bao Dai and give his regime international standing as Keystone anti-Communist defense in SEA. Since period calm may well be brief urge:

(1) That decision re recognition Bao Dai should not be delayed until after Bangkok conference.

(2) That at earliest possible moment Bao Dai be informed our plans to avoid possibility his absence on recognition date.

(3) That Embassy Paris continue press Bidault [and] Schuman expedite ratification and emphasize very real danger any further delay.

ABBOTT

¹ This was done the same day.

² Neither printed.

851G.01/12-2849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BANGKOK, December 28, 1949—8 p. m.

1100. Department please repeat London, Paris;¹ pouched as airmail to New Delhi, Manila, Batavia, Karachi, Saigon, Singapore. In recent conversation Prime Minister² concerning situation Indochina which included mention likelihood early ratification French Assembly of March 8 agreements, he indicated no change attitude on question recognition Bao Dai. (Deptel 70 [704], December 23). Prime Minister continues reiterate that while Thailand Government opposed formation Communist Government in Indochina under Ho Chi Minh they reluctant recognize Bao Dai until full control vested in him by French and he receives substantial popular support. Same views expressed by Prime Minister to Malcolm MacDonald when latter discussed recognition Bao Dai during his recent visit Bangkok. I feel certain therefore and my British colleague concurs we cannot expect Thailand Government take initiative recognition Bao Dai. Thailand position based firstly on belief Bao Dai essentially French puppet, and secondly, apprehension Vietnamese in Thailand numbering approximately 40,000 majority of whom support Ho Chi Minh might cause trouble.

STANTON

¹ This was done on December 29.

² Field Marshal Luang Pibul Songgram.

851G.01/12-3049 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

SAIGON, December 30, 1949—2 p. m.

474. Pass Paris.¹ Pouched Hanoi. In hectic rush ending 2:30 a. m. December 29 agreement reached on about 30 conventions signed today covering transfer powers in following fields: justice, military, economics, finance, public works, cultural affairs, public health, information, personnel.

Justice convention provides for mixed tribunals for criminal and civil cases involving citizens of French Union and privileged foreigners (Chinese). Presidents mixed courts and state attorneys to be appointed mutual agreement French Vietnam.

Sûreté entirely transferred Vietnam in principle but French *Sûreté* will continue control immigration and interstate travel until comple-

¹ This was done the same day.

tion of forthcoming interstate conference, and validate Viet Government passports and travel authorizations until Vietnam achieves international recognition. Counter-espionage and anti-terrorist activities of French *Sûreté* on behalf French Union troops to continue until restoration of order. Only permanent *Sûreté* organization will be liaison mission with Vietnam *Sûreté* to coordinate security French Union. Viets may have similar mission in Paris.

Permanent military convention covers bases for and activities of French Union troops. Described by Nguyen Phan Long as more liberal than US-Philippine agreement. Separate agreement covers situation until peace and order restored.

Above based on summary and analysis furnished Consulate General by French and press interview Nguyen Phan Long. No information re date publication actual texts.

ABBOTT

851G.01/12-3149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Saigon (Abbott) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

SAIGON, December 31, 1949—8 a. m.

475. Pass Paris.¹ Pouched Hanoi. In spite hasty preparation transfer ceremony impressive and attended by crowd about 40,000 marked contrast to June 14 ceremony. Parade lasting over hour followed Emperor's speech. Participants appeared largely peasants including some 15,000 Cao daists from Tay Ninh and surrounding area. Among banners were several carrying openly anti-Viet Minh and anti-Communist slogans.

Addresses of Pignon and Bao Dai before signature conventions were of considerable interest. High Commissioner emphasized transfer ceremony was answer to skeptics and cynics who doubted French good faith. Length of negotiations caused not by obstruction but by mutual wish for clarity and careful preparation of difficult task involved in transfer complicated government machinery.

Pignon then traced in some detail steps leading to Vietnam independence mentioning declaration of June 5, 1948 (Baie d'Along Agreement), March 8 accords and transfer sovereignty Cochin China to Vietnam. In analyzing conventions to be signed emphasized they represented conclusion process in effect since 1946 of transfer all phases government administration to local and national authorities. Referring to interstate conference "which would open in few weeks" Pignon remarked that what remained of Indo-Chinese political unity would be broken up and distributed among the individual states. He closed

¹ This was done on January 1, 1950.

this part of speech with remark that present state of insecurity which required presence French Union troops in many areas might hide to casual observer fact that henceforth sovereignty was in Vietnam hands. This fact would appear clearly when peace returned.

"Equipped with all the attributes of state power, Vietnam will now appear on international scene". Admission to family of nations requires fulfillment of certain conditions. Vietnam Government by its policy, both internal and external, Vietnam people, through their national unity must earn right to join family of nations. High Commissioner then referred to admission to ECAFE and to messages received from "highest spiritual and temporal authorities" as forecasting future recognition. French diplomacy using all its influence with its friends and allies. "I have reason to believe that numerous friendly governments are waiting only for French Parliament to ratify March 8 accords to take this step. I am certain this condition will be soon fulfilled, French Government having announced that it will undertake ratification procedure without delay."

Pignon then spoke of recent grave threat of Chinese Nationalist troops entering Tonkin followed by Communist forces. This catastrophe avoided by French diplomatic action backed by French troops. This striking example of value membership in French Union and proof in this dangerous atomic age no state can live in isolation.

Tone of Bao Dai's reply in some contrast to that of High Commissioner and indicated continued lack confidence in continuity French policy. Emphasized six months had passed before symbolic gesture of June 14 achieved practical realization. Addressed particular cordial thanks to Pignon for part in developments.

Warned developments in Vietnam must no longer be referred to as an experiment but must be considered in France and Vietnam as definitive and only policy can safeguard mutual interests. Assurance given by High Commissioner of ratification March 8 accords gives hope this view shared by French people. "It is encouraging to hear from you formal assurances that French Government will continue in this new policy". In its support of democratic principles and respect for individual liberty Vietnam feels it has earned sympathy of concert of nations. For this reason "Vietnam state attaches great importance to international recognition which our government will endeavor to obtain with the support of the French Republic". We will justify recognition by our unity, our labor and by clear expression of our international policy. Between two streams of ideas tending to divide world our people have the duty to choose that fitting their temperament. Because of ideals they defend great western powers are bound to guarantee our integrity and our independence. Vietnam will grant its confi-

dence to the countries which offer it sincere friendship and which assure their support in defense of its rights. Basing our policy on the above principles I am confident of support from my people. "Supported externally by friendship of great democratic nations, associated with France by agreements which derive their force from loyal cooperation and progressive adaptation to modern ways of living, we will construct our independence upon a basis of fraternity and justice." Bao Dai's speech in Vietnamese broadcast on nationwide hookup was primarily call for unity and appeal to resistance and fence-sitters. Also made clear Vietnam sides with democratic powers in world ideological struggle and called for diplomatic recognition and moral and material assistance from them.

After praising work of Accord Committee which had negotiated agreements in accord both with interests aspirations of people and with practical reality, and warning against impotence in spirit narrow nationalism, Emperor said real as opposed theoretical independence depended on efforts and unity entire nation. International recognition which Vietnam sought must be earned. Ideal of individual freedom defended by democratic great powers coincided with Vietnamese tradition and way of life. We will maintain close relations with them and neutral attitude towards other nations. Bao Dai then issued call to all who had struggled for independence and appeal "to those misled by false propaganda to return to right way. Government will defend welfare of all regardless of party or belief if they return to united national family."

Speech closed with hope that message going out over new purely Vietnam radio would reach not only 20,000,000 fellow citizens but cross frontiers as voice of powerful nation determined to preserve independence, respect principles of individual freedom and work for world peace.

ABBOTT

INDONESIA

THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN NATIONALIST OPPOSITION TO THE RESTORATION OF NETHERLANDS RULE IN THE EAST INDIES AND CONSIDERATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE INDONESIAN CASE; ¹ RECOGNITION OF INDONESIA

501.BC Indonesia/1-349 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ²

SECRET NIACT

BATAVIA, January 3, 1949—4 p. m.

8. Gocus 520. 1. Am wholeheartedly in accord with negative attitude in Deptel 711, December 31.³ My views relative this type approach expressed in paragraph 9 of Gocus 517, January 1.⁴ I see no reason for any effort help Netherlands in selling their plans in situation which they, heedless to all advice and admonitions by US and other powers, have themselves created.

2. Nehru ⁵ announcement yesterday re meeting of Asiatic conference to discuss Indonesian situation confirms and underlines fears expressed your cirtel 31 December ⁶ reference division world on lines Asia vs. West.

3. As member GOC I am convinced no appropriate role remains for me. On other hand I believe I have succeeded in course of months in winning confidence of Sukarno,⁷ Hatta ⁸ and other Republic leaders. I have been mentally exploring every possible channel by which I could possibly utilize this confidence, not to support an unworthy Netherlands plan but in manner which will benefit Indos and at same time serve to maintain US prestige in this area.

¹Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 57-624. The revised Netherlands constitution renamed the Netherlands East Indies as Indonesia on September 20, 1948. For UN documentation on Indonesia, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year*, Nos. 1-2, 4-9, 13, 19-24, 44-45, 51-52; *Supplement for January, February, March, September, October, November and December*; and *Special Supplement Nos. 5 and 6*.

²Repeated in telegram 6, January 4, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

³*Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. vi, p. 623.

⁴Telegram 1, not printed.

⁵Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.

⁶*Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. vi, p. 617.

⁷President of the Indonesian Republic, under Netherlands house arrest since December 18, 1948; transferred from Java to Sumatra by the Netherlands authorities.

⁸Mohammed Hatta, Vice President of the Indonesian Republic and Prime Minister, also under house arrest since December 18, 1948, and transferred to Sumatra.

4. Under certain conditions, with dissolution of GOC and acting in personal or other capacity which would not limit my freedom of activity, there is bare possibility I could contribute constructively toward salvaging something from situation.

5. I anticipate that I may be faced in immediate future not only with Netherlands solicitation of type revealed in your 711 but also with appeals from Republicans for advice as Netherlands' approaches to them are made. I request such instructions as will prepare me for meeting this issue in that way which will be most consistent with Department policy.

6. In my view I shall be confusing issues and weakening American position if I am called upon to act further and personally in reconciling parties unless under following conditions :

a. US clearly and publicly disassociate itself from present Netherlands policy. This requires definite unequivocal statement by us made either individually or in SC that in our view Netherlands is aggressor. This to be followed or accompanied by public notice that further ECA aid both to Netherlands and Indonesia is suspended until fair and reasonable settlement of Indonesian question has actually been achieved. Fact and public nature of such suspension is important thing whatever verbal formula may be used to express it. See Gocus 517, paragraph 8.

b. Netherlands cease hostilities forthwith and free all Republic leaders. This would be of token value although I recognize that such steps at this stage will be only nominal compliance with SC resolution. Better still would be withdrawal of all Netherlands forces to SQL but that is probably not now politically, tactically or even economically feasible.

c. Dismissal of Beel⁹ who, although only one of numerous militaristic leaders here, may be taken as symbolizing whole group. Better still dismissal of Spoor¹⁰ as well. Dismissal of Beel is particularly important as it is hard to envisage reasonable functioning of any federal interim government Netherlands is likely to provide in which Beel would exercise tremendous powers of High Representative of Crown. Believe if Stikker¹¹ offered job he would accept. Although standing here has necessarily suffered in light action taken by government in which he participates, he would still have better chance organize fair government and bring peace than any Netherlander I have met.

7. Only if Department is both prepared and able to obtain above as conditions precedent do I recommend that I be instructed to act as intermediary. Department may of course view this as an entirely unrealistic approach. I am not so sure that it is. Netherlands defiance

⁹ Dr. L. J. M. Beel, Netherlands High Representative of the Crown in Indonesia, at Batavia.

¹⁰ Lt. Gen. Simon H. Spoor, Commander-in-chief, Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army.

¹¹ D. U. Stikker, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.

of UN has caused real world criticism that threatens future confidence in international organization as instrument of right and justice. Reaction SEA promises to break into that storm which may divide east from west irreparably. US may be forced by Asiatic movement and/or popular sentiment in US and Congress to cut off financial aid. If this likely be done eventually, why not use now as lever for getting most possible out of Netherlands for Indonesia while maintaining our own reputation for defense of national aspirations for freedom, whatever SC decision?

8. While ECA does not desire be used as political weapon, should we not be equally conscientious and solicitous to see that funds given under guise economic recovery are not used to conduct what is generally viewed as war of aggression against a people seeking promised freedom?

9. If Department would come out separately at once, or promptly when SC reconvenes, along lines above indicated, its stand would be unequivocal and chances of Netherlands taking more reasonable attitude toward Indonesia might be enhanced. If Netherlands then still desirous use me as intermediary, US position would be so clear that our government should not suffer, whatever results obtained. While I am not sanguine I could help effectively, I believe Republicans will not yield far toward Netherlands position in absence third party. Any aid we give now should be on our terms and not at behest of Netherlands while they acting in disregard of all their international obligations.

10. Please note your 711 of 6 p. m. December 31, received here only 0930 January 3 Batavia time and your cirtel of 1 a. m. December 31 received at same time, illustrating delay in communications which may be serious at time rapidly moving events. In light of this urge all significant messages be sent urgent. Signed Cochran.¹²

LIVENGOOD

¹² H. Merle Cochran, U. S. Representative on the United Nations SC Good Offices Committee in Indonesia.

501.BC Indonesia/1-349: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
 US URGENT BATAVIA, January 3, 1949.

9. Gocus 521. GOC chairman¹ received today, 4 p. m., following letter addressed him by Schuurman.²

¹ Thomas K. Critchley, Australian Representative on UN GOC, Batavia.
² T. Elink Schuurman, Acting Chairman of the Netherlands delegation, UN GOC, Batavia.

"Under instructions from my Government I have honor transmit to you herewith for your information text of two statements delivered by Netherlands representative Van Royen³ in Security Council on December 27 and 29 respectively.

You will perceive that in first paragraph his statement of December 29 Van Royen on behalf Netherlands Government declared hostilities in Java will as far as Netherlands forces are concerned cease at latest on December 31 at 2400 hours whilst with view to special emergency situation existing in Sumatra, cessation of hostilities here cannot be effectuated until two or three days later. In accordance with these statements commander-in-chief Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army has issued order, translation of which is likewise attached hereto. Similar order concerning Sumatra will follow shortly.

With reference my letter January 1,⁴ I am now in position to state that Netherlands Government has sent to Government of Indonesia necessary instructions to enable Committee Good Offices, Consular Commission and military observers to carry out task as formulated in sixth paragraph of Van Royen's statement of December 27 and fourth paragraph of his statement of December 29. In this connection, it is observed that Netherlands authorities as result of shortage of material will especially in beginning only be able to place at disposal of Committee Good Offices, Consular Commission and their military observers limited transport facilities. It is, therefore, suggested that Committee Good Offices use as much as possible its own aircraft and other means of transportation.

It will be clear that under present circumstances visit to some areas might be temporarily restricted as result of measures taken by Netherlands authorities for reasons of safety and military necessity. Moreover, it is pointed out that visits to certain areas may entail considerable personal risk for which Netherlands Government must disclaim responsibility.

Finally, it would be greatly appreciated if Committee Good Offices would outline its plans for performing task referred to above.

Similar letter is being addressed to Consular Commission."

Enclosure one is statement delivered by Van Royen at Security Council December 27⁵; enclosure two is statement by Van Royen at Security Council December 29⁵; enclosure three follows.

"Order of Lieutenant General Spoor.

1. Military activities and therefore also hostilities in Java were terminated on December 31, 1948.

2. After that date task of troops is consequently confined and limited to action against roving groups, bands or individuals, who attempt cause unrest or, as was stated by our representative to Security Council, 'to act against disturbing elements who either individually or collectively endanger public security or interfere with or prevent supply of food and other essential commodities to needy population.'

³ Dr. J. H. van Royen, Netherlands Representative at the United Nations.

⁴ Quoted in telegram 3, Gocus 519, January 2, 11 a. m., from Batavia, not printed.

⁵ Not printed.

3. I charge you and troops under your command to carry out this task within its limits, strictly and with great diligence." Signed Cochran.⁶

LIVENGOOD

⁶ In telegram 11, Gocus 522, January 3, from Batavia, Mr. Cochran reported Mr. Critchley's reply of the same date and his letter notifying the Indonesian delegation.

501.BC Indonesia/1-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of South Asian Affairs (Sparks)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 3, 1949.

Participants: Sir Benegal Rama Rau—Ambassador of India
 Mr. Walton W. Butterworth—FE
 Mr. J. C. Satterthwaite—NEA
 Mr. Dean Rusk—UNA
 Mr. T. S. P. Ram—Personal Secretary to the Ambassador
 Mr. J. S. Sparks—SOA

The Indian Ambassador opened the conversation by referring once again to India's deep concern over the situation in Indonesia, indicating that India would appreciate being informed of the nature of the action contemplated by the United States, and urging that the U.S. stop ECA aid to Holland.

Mr. Butterworth stressed that the U.S. approach to the Indonesian problem was multilateral through the United Nations and that a resort to unilateral punishment of Holland by cancellation of ECA would establish a dangerous precedent of attempting to achieve solutions to world problems by direct individual nation approach and of employing economic aid to achieve political goals. He mentioned that Ambassador Henderson had already explained this to Sir Girja Bajpai, Secretary General of India's Ministry of External Affairs, and that Bajpai had indicated his belief that Prime Minister Nehru now understood that the U.S. could not afford to set such a precedent. Sir Benegal said that he appreciated the fact that India and the U.S. had the same over-all objectives in this problem but that he could not help but feel that if the U.S. took a determined stand with the Western European countries, making our further participation in the Western Union and the continuation of ECA assistance contingent upon their support in the SC, effective action could be achieved. Mr. Rusk

¹ Initialed by the Directors of the Offices of Far Eastern Affairs and of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Butterworth and Satterthwaite).

pointed out that in addition to the very great undesirability of our resorting to the use of economic instruments to achieve political aims, there was considerable question as to how effective the cancellation of ECA aid to Holland would actually be in view of the position of the Government of Holland vis-à-vis its own people. In so far as the U.S. assuming a full "chips are down" attitude toward the Indonesian problem, Mr. Rusk said that the whole future of the UN was involved in such a question as it would be difficult to choose which of numerous equally clear and equally important problems, such as the Berlin, Greek, or Palestine situations, the U.S. should attempt to solve by forcing other members of the UN to vote the way we wanted them to. He pointed out that it was obvious that such an approach, if adopted at all, could only result in the ultimate destruction of the UN, the support of which is the corner stone of both Indian and American foreign policy. Mr. Satterthwaite pointed out that he was confident that the Government of India would really be the last to wish to see the U.S. undertake a policy so close to "economic imperialism" as utilization of an ECA program in the manner suggested would be.

Reverting to the question of the Western Union, the Ambassador discussed at length the position in which the Far East would be placed, in his opinion, should the U.S. be successful in halting the spread of communism in Europe through this channel. He felt that such a halting would only mean that Russia would then turn the full force of its attentions to the Far East and specifically to India, which stands today as the only remaining effective stabilizing influence in the area. Mr. Butterworth said that in his opinion such would not be the result in as much as no matter how successful the Western Union might be as a military alliance, Russia would certainly not cease its efforts in Europe and that in any event the communists would follow every channel available to them for ideological propagation in the Far East regardless of developments in Europe. He said that rather than the Western Union it was unfortunate developments such as the current one in Indonesia which provided the stimuli to communism in its focusing on the Far East.

Mr. Satterthwaite said that speaking of such incidents, he wished to take this opportunity to tell the Ambassador how very pleased we were over the measures adopted by India and Pakistan in the Kashmir problem and how hopeful we now were of an effective solution. The Ambassador replied that India's action in agreeing to the proposals of the UN Commission on Kashmir was indicative of India's urgent need for, and devotion to, the maintenance of peace. He pointed out that India had agreed to the further conditions despite the fact that the original report of the Commission had shown that it was

Pakistan which had been at fault throughout. In particular he emphasized that India is interested in peace "frankly for selfish reasons" and that it must have peace if it is to achieve its economic and sociological growth which he said was the only hope of maintaining a democratic state in Asia today.

Mr. Rusk asked the Ambassador on the Indonesian question as to whether or not the GOI had any suggestions as to a practicable approach in the SC. The Ambassador replied that he did not have any such suggestions in his instructions and that he understood that the 13-nation conference being called by the Indian Prime Minister was for the purpose of determining in what ways the nations of the Near and Far East could be effective within the machinery of the UN on this one question. He said that in particular his instructions were to inquire as to the future plans of the U.S. Mr. Butterworth explained that the U.S. was in a difficult position in that its moderately worded resolution had failed to achieve a majority support in the SC. Mr. Rusk added that he thought it was possible that the European countries, including the Dutch, were more aware now than they had been at the time the resolution failed to pass, of the strength of the negative reaction of the American people to the Dutch action. He suggested that we would be interested in keeping in close touch with the Ambassador particularly following Dr. Jessup's² return from Europe at the end of the week. The Ambassador said that he was very anxious indeed to have another meeting before leaving for New York to represent India before the Security Council. The conversation was terminated with an agreement that such a meeting would be set up after Dr. Jessup's return.

² Philip C. Jessup, member of the U.S. delegation at the United Nations General Assembly meeting in Paris.

501.BC Indonesia/1-449 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, January 4, 1949—6 p. m.

20. Consular representatives countries which were represented in original Consular Commission (Australia, Belgium, China, France, UK, US) met yesterday for further discussion means carry out December 28 SC resolution which requested consular representatives report on situation Indonesian observance cease-fire, et cetera (preliminary informal meeting had been held 30 December). Various representatives stressed confusion over method proceeding view fact GOC and Consular Commission now have concurrent and largely over-

lapping request from SC and services military observers a prerequisite to either in performing requested function. Was felt, however, that clarification on action expected of GOC would come soon which would serve clarify at same time Consular Commission functions. Personally I am keeping close contact with Cochran on matter.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1449 [1-449]: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, January 4, 1949—10 a. m. [p. m.]

21. Gocus 525. Events of last three days have so confirmed my view that dissolution GOC should be effected soon as possible that I am sending this further message without awaiting Department's reaction to Gocus 517.¹ GOC will send SC telegraphic report incorporating recent correspondence with Netherlands Delegation and detailing other recent developments late Thursday 6 January Batavia time. If Department intends moving for early dissolution GOC, I recommend I be authorized make effort to have GOC itself recommend its dissolution in this report. Believe effect on public opinion will be greatest and position of GOC and its members will be clearest if initiative if possible taken by GOC itself. We cannot guarantee GOC colleagues will agree to making such recommendation in report but, on basis informal expressions of personal opinion, believe there is more than even chance of winning unanimity.

Please see paragraph two Schuurman letter quoted Gocus 524.² Now apparent Colombian resolution and undefined relationship GOC and Consular Commission will be used skillfully by Netherlands to stalemate performance even limited reporting function remaining to GOC.

At 1700 hours chairman and other members GOC MilEx Board called on Colonel Thomson, Netherlands General Staff, as per paragraph one, Schuurman letter. Thomson stated no answer to Schuurman letter 3 January (Gocus 521)³ yet received from Consular Commission and that General Spoor will have to consider status of military observes and decide whether they worked for GOC on [or] Consular Commission before plans can be worked out for their return to field. Spoor now out of town. Activities of military observers when, as and if they go to posts will be determined by orders issued to local

¹ Telegram 1, January 1, not printed.

² Telegram 19, January 4, not printed.

³ Telegram 9, January 3, p. 121.

Netherlands Brigade Commanders. Thomson avoided discussion of details of facilities needed from Netherlands for operations military observers. Chairman MilEx Board left meeting with definite conclusion that whole object Thomson was to delay and that there was no indication of any present intention on part of Thomson that military observers return to field at any foreseeable time. Thomson will let MilEx Board know when he is in position to discuss plans further.

Any observation compliance cease hostilities part SC resolution 24 December entirely meaningless in light fact that there has been no Netherlands compliance even by verbal formula and reasonable compliance with resolution no longer possible. Note paragraph four of Schuurman letter dealing therewith and that dissemination order presumably terminating hostilities December 31 not begun until 1845, January 2 and must have reached unit commanders much later. When asked at press conference January 3 about order, spokesman Netherlands staff said Republican Artillery Commander had not been informed of order by Netherlands and stated "there no need inform opponents since whole Java occupied. There is no regular Republican Army any more." When asked what happened Republican Army 200,000 men, spokesman replied "only Commander in Chief Netherlands Army can answer you." When asked how scattered Republican units in Java would know of cease-fire acceptance, spokesman answered "when they wish to follow SC resolution, they must do it for themselves." Note paragraph two of Spoor's order quoted Gocus 521 leaves ample room for all Netherlands military operations present military situation will involve.

Believe clear that GOC now in position where it can function even as reporter only at Netherlands sufferance and even then only within such limited zones as Netherlands may consider expedient. Believe further activities of GOC run risk of recognizing Netherlands action as *fait accompli* and inconsistent with [apparent garble] independent status as SC organ. Apart entirely from very real question of propriety involved, if only limited reporting functions can be performed, this can be done by Consular Commission rather than GOC which is not geared to and as fulltime group, too expensive machine for pure reporting. GOC was set up primarily for negotiations. With access to only one party, in fact with only one party now effectively existing, with Netherlands Delegation here referring all queries to Hague from which apparently no truly responsive answer is ever received; without any clear-cut basis of action, GOC by further action runs risk of seeming to condone Netherlands action without possibility of any compensating advantage either to Indonesian or to other interests.

My recommendation does not preclude continuing efforts by Depart-

ment to achieve as reasonable settlement as possible. This, however, must now be made in Washington, Hague and other capitals (see Gocus 523⁴ on British Consulate General proposals). Anything attempted here will not only lack effectiveness of direct dealing with highest responsible authorities but runs grave risk of crossing Department wires, particularly in light of slow communications between Department and US Delegation.

Gocus 520⁵ refers to purely personal efforts that might be attempted only if various conditions precedent these enumerated were fully performed and after dissolution GOC. It has no relationship therefore to recommendations made here.

If Department desires that I seek to get dissolution recommendation in GOC report of January 6, essential I receive NIACT instructions no later than early morning January 6 Batavia time. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁴ Telegram 17, January 4, not printed.

⁵ Telegram 8, January 3, p. 119.

501.BC Indonesia/1-549 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Batavia
(Livengood)*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, January 5, 1949—11 a. m.

6. Usgoc 269. Ref Gocus 525¹ Dept. believes you should return Washington for consultation at early as possible moment. Believe Lisle² should remain Batavia time being. SC meeting on Indonesia has just been called for Fri. Probable question of dissolution GOC may be raised that time.

If GOC report Jan 6 unanimous and your Belgian and Austrian colleagues believe issue of dissolution GOC should be raised therein, suggest you might insert at appropriate place sentence along following lines "These considerations inevitably raise question whether continuation of GOC would serve any useful purpose or could now contribute to a peaceful settlement Indonesian situation".

To #9-0348-B authorizes return.³

LOVETT

¹ *Supra.*

² Raymond E. Lisle, member of U.S. Delegation, UN Security Council GOC, at Batavia.

³ For Department press release on Mr. Cochran's recall, issued January 5, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 16, 1949, p. 84. Mr. Cochran departed for home on January 7.

501.BC Indonesia/1-649: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary
of State*

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 6, 1949.

44. Gocus 530. Following letter dated today addressed Schuurman by GOC chairman:

"I have honor refer your letter 3 January¹ in which you advised that you were in receipt of instructions under which committees military observers could return to field for implementation of duties conferred on Committee Good Offices by resolution of Security Council of 24 December. In your reply dated 4 January to our letter of 3 January which emphasized committee's desire to complete all necessary arrangements immediately, so that redeployment could be begun afternoon of 4 January, you confirmed that representative of Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army Chief of Staff would receive representatives of committee's military assistants at 17 hours 4 January to discuss plans.

Our military representatives have advised us that no concrete progress was made in this meeting towards return of military observers to field. Representative of Chief of Staff had no authority to decide on arrangements and insisted that matter would have to be referred to Commander in Chief and Chief of General Staff neither of whom was in Batavia at time. Representative of Chief of Staff undertook to advise chairman of committee's MilEx Board when a decision was made by Commander in Chief so that further meeting could be held. Up to 16 hours today, 46 hours later, nothing has been received from him.

Committee had studied Van Royen's statements in Security Council on 27 and 29 December appended to your letter 3 January, texts of your letters and transcript of meeting with representative of Chief of your General Staff. It wishes to make sure that no misunderstanding exists as to its position.

In your letter 4 January you state that as no reply had yet been received from Consular Commission to letter similar to that of 3 January addressed to committee 'discussions can only bear provisional character and cannot prejudice performance of task entrusted to Consular Commission'. You further state that coordination of plan of committee and of Consular Commission will be necessary 'as far as Netherlands and Indonesian authorities are concerned'. Similarly, Colonel Thomson, representative of your Chief of Staff, after querying at some length status of military observers in relationship to Committee Good Offices and to Consular Commission, stated: 'But still there is this confusion about existence of two committees; if Security Council will notify us or either of committees about exact position that will then help us greatly in going ahead with our part of task'. Again he stated, 'We consider clarification of confusion regarding functions of GOC and Consular Commission as very important'. This is one of matters to be referred to decision of Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff before arrangements can be begun.

¹ See telegram 9, January 3, p. 121.

In view of committee, there is no confusion of type which should delay it in performance of its urgent duty to report. Any position on part of your government preventing early return of military observers to field until 'confusion' has been clarified would in effect paralyze both organs of Security Council at crucial time.

What is important is timely resumption by military observers of their functions already in suspension over entire period in which their reporting would have been of greatest value and not irrelevant debate as to manner in which their reports will be channeled to Security Council whether through committee or through Consular Commission.

We wish further to correct tendency seen in meeting held with representative of Chief of Staff to limit unduly scope of work to be done by military observers. There were many references to military observers as having only function of observing 'cessation of hostilities' now that, as Colonel Thomson put it, 'there is no longer any truce, there is no longer any TNI, and there is no longer long list of truce infringements'. Broad scope of observations to be carried on by military observers is very clearly expressed in paragraph six of statement made on 27 December in Security Council by Van Royen, Netherlands representative:

'In order enable Committee to carry out its instructions to report on situation after December 12, Netherlands Government has issued instructions that military experts at disposal of committee and their staff be given opportunity to study course of events. I am authorized to add that this last provision means in practice that to use words of Committee Good Offices itself, military observers can again be dispatched to field'. It is feared that position of your government is not fully understood at all levels by those who are charged with making of arrangements.

It is obvious, of course, that military observers can in practice return to field only if your government permits them to do so. Further, as they are dependent to very great extent on facilities and opportunities provided by your field commanders, they must operate if at all in accordance with limitations you see fit to impose. However, you will appreciate that committee must comply with instructions given to it by Security Council. It cannot in any way consent to or tacitly condone by acceptance any limitation on activities of military observers which would prevent them from performing fully obligations imposed on them.

Ten days have passed since statement of Van Royen quoted above; almost two weeks since adoption by Security Council of resolution of 24 December. Not one military observer is yet in process of returning to field from which, as set forth in our letter of 23 December, military observers were excluded by Netherlands Army officials soon after hostilities were begun. Committee must emphasize that passing of time and progress of military action may well destroy value to committee and to Security Council of direct observations of military observers by whom alone in many cases can committee procure first-hand information needed for reports called for by resolution of Security Council of 24 December.

Committee awaits further word from you or other appropriate Netherlands officials as to whether and under what conditions military observers will be permitted to return to field". Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1949—7 p. m.

6. For Jessup: In event resolution offered Fri¹ involving withdrawal Neth forces from Republican territory in Indonesia and flash vote called thereon, fol is Dept idea of how such resolution should be safeguarded:

"Security Council calls upon the parties to withdraw their troops to positions occupied under Truce Agreement 17 Jan 1948, accordance with schedule to be determined by GOC, advised by reps of Neth Govt and reps of Republic of Indonesia, and by Mil Assistants of Consular Commission, which takes into account necessity for avoiding further loss of life and for assuring ability of Republican Govt effectively to resume control over evacuated areas."

We would prefer to avoid taking a position on any such resolution on Fri, pending outcome discussions here.

LOVETI

¹ January 7.

501.BC Indonesia/1-649 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 6, 1949—7 p. m.

7. For Jessup: In the event that we are called upon to speak during the Council meeting on Friday you may want to cover some or all of the following points. These have not been finally cleared in Dept. The Dept considers that your speech on Friday should be framed within your previous instructions and follow line of your initial statement in Paris. Dept does not desire you introduce any new resolution on Friday for reasons explained by Rusk.

1. The US Government can find no adequate justification for the military action taken by the Netherlands. The reasons put forth by the Netherlands representative at the meeting of the Security Council on the 22nd are not supported by Reports from the GOC. In

our view the Netherlands action is in conflict with the *Renville* agreement¹ and the Security Council resolutions of August 1, 1947 and November 1, 1947.

2. The continuance of the military action after the Security Council resolution of December 24 is an act of defiance of that resolution on the part of the Netherlands. Continuance of military action until all military objectives have been taken cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease fire order; furthermore no satisfactory report has been received in respect of the release of political prisoners called for under the Security Council resolution of December 24, 1948.

3. From a purely pragmatic point of view it should be pointed out that the quick military successes of the Netherlands forces will not constitute a solution of the problem. The Indonesian situation cannot be solved by force. A solution of this problem remains matter of international concern with which the Council must continue to deal. The United States Government cannot associate itself with any aspect of the recent Netherlands military action.

4. In considering the laborious efforts made to get a peaceful settlement and the culmination of these efforts in the Dutch military action, the U.S. Govt must state clearly that the Netherlands did not exhaust the methods of peaceful settlement available to them.

5. The Netherlands followed a course of action after the signing of the *Renville* agreement which did little to reduce the atmosphere of tension and this in fact sorely strained the truce, making the completion of political negotiation for a final settlement with the Republic most difficult.

6. My Government is convinced that the Indonesian problem can only be solved when a political settlement between the Netherlands and the peoples of Indonesia has been reached on a basis of bona fide negotiation.

7. My Government can only consider such a settlement valid if all elements of coercion and duress are removed and if it is conducted on the basis of the free and democratic procedures as reflected in the principles set forth in the Linggadjati and *Renville* agreements.²

LOVETT

¹ Signed January 17, 1948; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1948, p. 334.

² For statement by Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, Deputy U.S. Representative in the UN Security Council, made on January 11 and released to the press the same day at New York, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1949, pp. 91-95. For letter of January 3 by the Acting Secretary of State to President Philip Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, released to the press on January 6, *ibid.*, January 16, 1949, pp. 81-82. Mr. Murray's letter of December 23, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, p. 82. For UN SC minutes, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, No. 1*, pp. 3-34. (Hereafter cited as SC, 4th yr., No. 1.)

501.BC Indonesia/1-749: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

US URGENT NIACT

BATAVIA, January 7, 1949.

48. Gocus 531. GOC telegraphing unanimous report to SC by 1400 Jan. 7 Batavia time with urgent recommendation to Secretary it be made available to members SC before meeting today. Part one covering sections one to ten inclusive deals with course events since last report dated 29 December primarily as respected [*reported?*] in letters quoted Gocus 519, 521,² 522,³ 524, 528⁴ and 530.⁵ In part two Committee draws attention of Security Council to certain points related to performance of its functions under resolution 24 December. Part two follows:⁶

12. Committee is not in position to report there has been satisfactory compliance with subparagraph A of resolution of 24 December which called on parties cease hostilities: (a) telegram dispatched territorial commanders Java by Chief Staff of Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army at 17 hours, 29 December is according its terms for information and cannot be construed as order to "cease hostilities forthwith". Dissemination of order of commander chief to territorial commanders in Java which confirmed fact that hostilities in Java ended 24 hours 31 December was begun 1845 Batavia time 2 January. In Sumatra where "special emergency situation" existed, parallel order disseminated late 4 Jan. had effective time of 12 hours 5 January.

(b) It noted these orders were issued at time when "operational phase" of military activities presumably had been completed. Orders noted respectively that hostilities had terminated 31 December in Java and 5 January in Sumatra but charged troops to "carry out action against roving groups, bands or individuals, who attempt to cause unrest or, as was stated by our representative to Security Council 'to act against disturbing elements who either individually or collectively endanger public security or interfere with or prevent supply of food and other essentials commodities to needy population'" orders permit continuation very type of military action that would be required against guerrilla resistance likely be offered by regular or irregular Republican forces.

¹ Repeated in telegram 17, January 7, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² See telegram 9, January 3, p. 121, and footnote 4, p. 122.

³ Telegram 11, January 3; see footnote 6, p. 123.

⁴ Neither printed.

⁵ Telegram 44, January 6, p. 129.

⁶ For text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Supplement for January*, doc. S/1189, pp. 6-17. This contains correspondence cited above.

(c) As result of immobilization its military observers Committee has no first-hand information as to effect orders discussed above.

(d) Committee is of opinion that these orders issued more than week after adoption resolution 24 December and expressed as they were, cannot be looked upon as satisfactory compliance with subparagraph A of resolution.

(There no channel available to committee for dissemination resolution 24 December to government or commanders Republican Army).

13. Subparagraph B, SC resolution 24 December calling for immediate release President Republic and other political prisoners has not been implemented. Far as Committee aware, Sukarno, Hatta and other members Republican Government captured by Netherlands forces 19 December still under detention.

Direct questions relating present status, welfare and whereabouts political prisoners addressed to Netherlands Delegation our letter 25 December (December 26 report) have not been answered.

14. As pointed out December 26 report, task imposed upon Committee by SC resolution 24 December to observe and report upon implementation by parties of earlier portions resolution, was fraught with inherent difficulties from outset. These difficulties include absence demarcation lines between armed forces of parties, impossibility establishing contact with Republican forces and extreme difficulty distinguishing hostilities between parties from security measures.

15. Despite statements to SC by Netherlands representatives 27 and 29 December, Committee has not been in position make independent investigations of any kind in field for purpose carrying out its functions under December 24 resolution. As a result failure Netherlands to authorize or facilitate return Committee's military observers to field, they temporarily immobilized Batavia and Bandung without opportunities observation. Heard unofficially and informally that certain military and naval liaison officers attached some consular officials Batavia took advantage Netherlands offer to conduct them on tour some military areas 5 and 6 January. These officers not military observers of Committee and their observations not available to Committee even if their tour was type field investigations and observation required by functions of committee.

16. If Committee is to continue to function, it requested SC define respective functions of Committee and Consular Commission under resolutions 24 and 28 December. Inability to determine whether functions of one are at this point exclusive of other or concurrent, and problem of to whom military observers are primarily responsible has already created some difficulty and has been made occasion for delay.

It understood this point raised independently in telegram from Consular Commission to SC 6 January.⁷

17. This time Committee invites attention SC to problem its present and future status.

Functions exercised under truce by Committee and its military assistants have disappeared with truce itself. Committee was set up under SC resolution 25 August to aid parties in reaching pacific settlement their dispute. First of 12 *Renville* principles provided Committee would assist in working out and signing political agreement to be achieved by negotiation. But negotiations and methods pacific settlement now been rejected in favor military action.

Committee feels deep and abiding concern for welfare Indonesia. It does not, however, wish be put in position of seeming approve by its participation or even its authentication any settlement based on force rather than true negotiation.

Divested of broad functions it formerly exercised by change in circumstances resulting from military action instituted 19 December, there remains to Committee function of reporting to Council under terms resolution December 24. Subparagraphs A and B of resolution have already been subject of report. Committee also called upon in December 24 resolution to exercise what may be looked upon as continuing reporting function, that of reporting to Council on "events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December." Inability of Committee to carry out effectively this direction as result its failure obtain permission or facilities for return its military assistants to field already emphasized as have inherent difficulties in useful reporting. (See paragraphs 14 and 15 above). But even if its military assistants were permitted move freely everywhere in Indonesia without undue restrictions and were given adequate facilities, it must be emphasized that committee itself designed primarily as instrument of negotiations.

These considerations inevitably raise question whether continuation GOC in present circumstances would serve any useful purpose or could contribute to peaceful settlement Indonesian problem. Signed
Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

⁷ See SC, 4th yr., *Suppl.* (Jan.), pp. 17-18.

856d.00/1-749

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
(Butterworth) to the Counselor of the Department (Bohlen)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 7, 1949.

Subject: United States objectives in Indonesian situation.

At the present stage of developments in the Indonesian situation, I believe the United States Government should seek the attainment of two objectives: (a) to contribute in every practical way to a solution of the Indonesian problem; (b) to place itself in the best possible light with the Asiatic and Islamic countries whose sympathy with the Indonesian Republic is great. To accomplish these objectives I believe the Department should take the following action:

1. In respect of (a): Direct Dr. Jessup to speak in the Security Council to the end that the United States fully and finally dissociate itself from Netherlands police action, place the blame for the rupture of negotiations squarely on the Netherlands, and compel the Netherlands to state in practical and definite terms its plans for a solution of the Indonesian problem. Dr. Jessup should therefore introduce at the earliest possible moment in the meeting of the Security Council a resolution of the sort attached hereto as Appendix A.¹ If this resolution is offered early enough in the proceedings of the Security Council, it should obviate the possibility of other members offering resolutions of an undesirable or impractical character.

2. In respect of (b): The Acting Secretary should tell the Netherlands Ambassador² (a) that the Netherlands Government's resort to force has provided the Soviet Union with excellent propaganda material, has widened the split between East and West, and offers a serious point of difference between the peoples of Europe and America; (b) that the Netherlands resort to force has so aroused public opinion in the United States, that, unless adequate measures are taken by the Netherlands Government in the immediate future, the Congress may feel called upon to take such action in respect of ECA aid to the Netherlands as seriously to jeopardize progress in North Atlantic Security arrangements; (c) that the United States Government accordingly hopes that the Netherlands will immediately (1) release all political prisoners taken since December 18, 1948, (2) announce to the Security Council at the earliest possible moment the plans of the Netherlands Government for Indonesia with special reference to the holding of free and democratic elections on a date to be agreed upon by the Netherlands and Indonesian leaders, including recognizable

¹ Draft not attached to file copy.

² Dr. Eelco N. van Kleffens.

leaders of the Indonesian Republic, and in respect of the immediate announcement of the date on which sovereignty will be transferred by the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia, and (3) move immediately in the Security Council to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices or at least to our withdrawal from that body. This action is to be taken because we warned the Dutch that we would do so, because Mr. Cochran believes it should be done, and because the Committee of Good Offices can no longer serve any purpose in Indonesia save to act as a smokescreen for the pursuit by the Netherlands of its plans in that area.

501.BC Indonesia/1-849 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 8, 1949.

52. Gocus 533. GOC sent telegram to SC today as follows: "Subsequent its telegraphic report 7 January GOC was notified by acting chairman Netherlands delegation that his government now prepared discuss detailed plans for immediate dispatch military observers to field. Number of conferences held evening 7 January and morning 8th. As result arrangements approved for dispatch military observers to various areas Java, Sumatra beginning morning 9th January.

Military observers received from committee following instructions:

- (a) To observe and report on extent compliance with cease hostilities resolution of SC.
- (b) To observe and report on continuance military operations, if any, including their scope and mission.
- (c) To observe and report on effect of hostilities on normal pursuits and welfare of civilian population and nature and effect of relief and rehabilitation activities". Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1049 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 10, 1949—11 p. m.

61. Gocus 535. Following letter delivered today to chairman Nethdel by Herremans,¹ GOC chairman of week:

"I have honor refer our letter 28 December especially part beginning question four which requests certain information re status political

¹Raymond Herremans, Belgian Representative on UN Security Council GOC, Batavia.

prisoners referred to by SC 24 December resolution. Urlet 28 December and 4 January informed us in effect you not able as yet to supply information and that subjects covered still under consultation.

It now known from Van Royen statement before SC on 7 January that Sukarno, Hatta and Salim² are on island Bangka. Therefore, accordance 24 December resolution, GOC desires observe in person status these Repub leaders. GOC willing visit Bangka this purpose and request you provide necessary facilities and clearance. If you prefer, GOC will use US plane assigned it.

GOC wishes see and speak to President and his colleagues. If these Repub officials desire GOC to transmit their behalf message to SC, I am sure your government would interpose no objection.

I appreciate it if arrangements could be made if possible for early morning departure tomorrow and return same day”.

USDel initiated action in light following considerations:

- (1) Desirability of GOC vigorously obeying mandate given it in resolution 24 December;
- (2) Newsworthy character of step will help to maintain popular interest and exert continuing public pressure on Netherlands in direction moderation;
- (3) Possible advantage of opening channel between Sukarno, Hatta and SC;
- (4) Opportunity might be offered for brief private conversation and obtaining confidential information of value to Department;
- (5) Participation by all GOC representatives and nature of report that can be written preclude possibility of appearing to sell Netherlands plans to Repub.

Schuurman expressed surprise and characterized request as unforeseen and left hurriedly saying he must consult. Three telephone calls to Palace this evening brought replies that answer hoped for tonight but that consultations still going on. No decision reached 2200, probably indicating question raised looked upon as involving matter of policy. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

² Hadji Agoes Salim, Indonesian Republic Foreign Minister; under house arrest since December 18, 1948, and transferred from Java to Sumatra by the Netherlands.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT BATAVIA, January 11, 1949—3 p. m.
NIACT

65. Gocus 537. Following is Schuurman's answer dated and delivered late this morning to GOC letter forwarded Department Gocus 535.

"Re GOC telegram yesterday's date, I have honor inform you NethDel, in deference to wish expressed to visit Bangka, is at committee's disposal to provide necessary facilities and clearances for journey.

Delegation has honor to add that it was indeed intention to transfer Sukarno, Salim and Sjahrir¹ to Bangka. However, persons in question on being informed to this effect, manifested their preference for remaining in present residence although they had no objection to moving to Bangka if matters could not be otherwise arranged.

Competent authorities are now investigating possibility acceding this request having to take into account difficulties re accommodation for longer stay in present residence, especially in connection with desirability of speedy reunion of persons concerned with families, arrangements for which had already been completed with regard to Bangka.

NethDel would, therefore, appreciate forbearance of GOC for few days when it will be in better position to arrange and discuss details of journey GOC has in view.

I will be happy remain at your and your colleagues disposal for above purpose".

The two letters are being sent this afternoon to SC as telegraphic GOC report of this date with statement that final arrangements have not yet been made.

Herremans reports Schuurman much disturbed by matter. Latter stated Hatta is in Bangka and three other men still at Brastagi, East Sumatra. Schuurman indicates Netherlands unwilling to permit individual members of committee talk privately with Sukarno or others on occasion of visit and wishes to know what committee as whole will ask. GOC will discuss this informally with NethDel tomorrow and hopes to go to Bangka or Brastagi Thursday. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Sutan Sjahrir, Indonesian Republic Prime Minister, November 1945-June 1947; under house arrest since December 18, 1948, and transferred from Java to Sumatra by the Netherlands.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1949.

Participants: Mr. E. N. van Kleffens, Ambassador of the Netherlands

Mr. Helb, Counselor, Netherlands Embassy

Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary of State

Mr. Butterworth, Director, FE

Mr. Nolting, NOE

Mr. van Kleffens and Mr. Helb called at their request to discuss Security Council action in the Indonesian case. Mr. van Kleffens ex-

pressed the fear that another proposal for the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Republican territory would be offered in the Security Council. He stated that his Government could not acquiesce in such a proposal, in as much as chaos would result in the evacuated territory and the Netherlands Government was determined to carry through its obligation to launch a free and independent United States of Indonesia under conditions which would give it the best chances of success. He stressed the point that Queen Juliana's recent speech and other official pronouncements of his Government were sufficient evidence to the world of the Dutch intentions to grant sovereignty to a United States of Indonesia.

I replied that the Indonesian problem had been blown up, as a result of Dutch military action, to a point where it was extremely difficult to handle. I said that public and Congressional opinion might force us in a direction which would be extremely adverse to the interests both of the Netherlands and of the United States, including jeopardizing ECA aid to Holland and the North Atlantic Security Pact. To the Ambassador's arguments that public reaction was unjust to the Dutch, and to his contention that American public opinion was split on this question, I replied that we had to face the political reality of an extremely adverse reaction to the Dutch attack and that what the Dutch have stated as their intentions in Indonesia was not sufficient to take the heat out of the situation. I said that I could not recommend what they should do but felt strongly that they should do something positive as an earnest of their *bona fides*. I particularly mentioned the release of the Republican leaders and stated that while I did not know whether the Netherlands could name a date for the transfer of sovereignty, I felt that something along that line might be the answer. I mentioned particularly the serious possibilities inherent in the Asian conference called by Nehru.

Mr. van Kleffens went on to explain where the Dutch would move from here. He stated on the one hand that the Republican leaders had seemed to welcome liberation by the Dutch from their extremist following, and, on the other hand, that Hatta's influence and popularity seemed to be declining in Java because of the fact that he is a Sumatran. He stated it was the intention of the Netherlands Prime Minister, Mr. Drees, now in Batavia, to sample public opinion with a view to finding out who might represent the Republican state in the interim government which the Dutch expect to form shortly. Ambassador van Kleffens requested that this Government do what it could to resist a "desperate move" in the Security Council, affirming that his Government would not wish to be placed in a position of non-conformity with Security Council action.

I made it very clear that the situation was one in which "almost anything could happen", and that I was greatly disturbed, although not completely surprised, by developments since the Dutch undertook military action.

Ambassador van Kleffens said that he would convey the gist of our conversation immediately to his Government.

ROBERT LOVETT

501.BC Indonesia/1-1149 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 11, 1949—6 p. m.

41. For ur info, Dept at this stage developments Indonesia wishes pursue two objectives (a) contribution to solution Indo problem (b) making best possible record with Asiatic and Islamic countries. Objective (a) will be pursued thru actions SC and thru unilateral approach Neth Govt perhaps in concert with UK and other likeminded states to end that Neth announce to SC soonest plans for Indo with special reference holding of free elections and transfer sovereignty to independent United States Indonesia on definite dates. Objective (b) will be pursued in SC and by Dept in conversations with Asiatic and Islamic Chiefs of Missions Wash, but more importantly, Dept believes, by US Chiefs of Missions in countries Asia and ME. This connection, Nehru's Asian Conf occasioning Dept some concern (see Depcirtel Jan 8¹). To minimize untoward effects that Conf Dept suggests (1) you make US position Indonesia entirely clear Quirino² drawing freely upon Depcirtel Indonesia Dec 31³ and Jessup's speeches SC; (2) suggest Quirino unofficially and personally, unhappy effects on Philippines of split between Occident and Orient, expressing hope Asian Conf will not serve such tragic contingency. This connection point out certain other countries have been concerned this possibility. Thus, as announced publicly, Turkey and Siam have decided not attend, and (following to Quirino in confidence) we understand New Zealand and Ceylon have accepted reluctantly.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

² Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines.

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. vi, p. 617.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT BATAVIA, January 12, 1949—4 p. m.

68. Gocus 540. GOC had informal meeting this morning with Schuurman relative subject Gocus 535 and 537.¹ Schuurman modified statement made yesterday that Sukarno, Sjahrir and Salim still at Brastagi but said they had been moved Prapat, Lake Toba, Sumatra. Schuurman said Netherlands preferred GOC visit be postponed day or two because of "talks arrangements et cetera" otherwise unexplained, relative Drees visit. GOC agreed go to Bangka Saturday and arrange Sumatran trip later. Hatta, Roem² and Sastroamidjojo³ will be seen in Bangka. Round trip requires only one day.

NethDel agrees GOC as group may speak to individuals named without presence Netherlands officials. Schuurman stated Sukarno, Salim and Sjahrir have already given undertaking "to engage in no political activities for the time being", thus in view NethDel, they could not address direct message to SC through GOC. However, Schuurman thought Netherlands would not consider any statement made to GOC by officials named which was made subject of report by GOC to SC as violation of undertaking. He will confirm this. Said he not yet informed as to whether Hatta, Roem and Sastroamidjojo have yet signed this pledge. If they have, they will be in position of three at Prapat as discussed above. If not, Schuurman not prepared to say what effect failure to give undertaking might have on GOC visit. This question he felt was purely speculative. Said Netherlands not prepared permit private individual talks between GOC members and individual Repub officials on occasion of visit. When it explained to him such talks if authorized would not be part of GOC report to SC but merely for information individual representatives and possibly their govts, he stated this different matter and he would take it up with his govt. GOC showed Schuurman letter from RepDel (sent Gocus 539⁴) but made no recommendation. RepDel request will be considered by Netherlands. If RepDel request not granted, Schuurman will advise later as to whether Netherlands has objection to GOC turning over its reports to detained Repub leaders. Schuurman will pro-

¹ Telegrams 61, January 10, p. 137, and 65, January 11, p. 138.

² Mohammed Roem, chairman of the Indonesian Republic delegation to GOC until his house arrest and transfer to Sumatra from Java.

³ Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, formerly Indonesian Republic representative at the United Nations.

⁴ Telegram 67, January 12, not printed; the Indonesian letter asked that contact with their government leaders be arranged.

vide Netherlands plane Saturday. He will work on open questions and advise later today.

Schuurman's attention was drawn to item Aneta this morning stating that in letter published Batavia *Merdeka* Leimena, Repub Health Minister, corroborated earlier Netherlands statement that he and ministerial colleagues Laoh, Kusnan and Djuanda have regained freedom of movement in Djocja. Leimena quoted as saying that Netherlands officials refused him and others permission rejoin their families in Batavia on ground they were not permitted to contact GOC. Schuurman did not deny truth this statement but said he had not heard of it and that it sounded like a "foolish" order of military authorities.

Leimena quoted in above denied Van Royen statement that he had been appointed head of Djocja medical service. He is working in hospital but has refused Netherlands official appointment. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 12, 1949—5 p. m.

69. Gocus 541. Soedjono and Soepomo called today and reported following: Darmasetiawan approached informally by Koets of NethDel yesterday with suggestion he have talk with Beel (see Gocus 518²). He declined stating he had nothing contribute. Last night Soepomo received official invitation visit Drees this morning at Palace. At meeting Drees said Netherlands now desirous negotiating with real Republican officials. Not willing to deal with Sukarno and Hatta because they were "Japanese collaborationists," but willing recognize Sjahrir as outstanding Republican. Drees wanted discuss with Soepomo settlement under which Republican officials would support participation in work of Federalist Interim Government. According to Soepomo, he refused except on following conditions:

- (1) that Netherlands Army either be withdrawn to *status quo* line, or as alternative, that army be concentrated in garrisons and withdrawn from Republican centers;
- (2) that all Republican officials be given personal and political freedom and that their authority over Republican areas be recognized and maintained;
- (3) all talks be in presence GOC or other UN agency.

¹ Repeated in telegram 31, January 14, 3 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 2, January 1, not printed.

Soepomo told Drees he was sure Sjahrir would not deal with Netherlands unless these preliminary conditions met. Drees said in conciliatory manner that (1) was obviously impossible and that (2) could not be carried out because in many areas local populations did not want to be under Republican rule. He cited populations of South Ashuan and Labuhan, Batu who have petitioned to join East Sumatra *negara* and that at most Netherlands could consider Central Java as provisional *negara* replacing Republic.

With reference to (3) above, Drees said Netherlands could not consent any participation by GOC, that "GOC was not impartial organization. It always acts for Republic, especially with Critchley overactive and Herremans not active enough."

Soepomo inquired whether he could go with GOC to see Sukarno and other Republican leaders (Gocus 539,³ and 540⁴). Drees said if local members RepubDel went at all they would have to go alone because he "did not like to see them associated with GOC". Soepomo told USDel he and two other RepubDel colleagues are afraid to go on such trip without GOC for fear that once in Sumatra or on Bangka they will not be permitted return Batavia.

Soedjono reported also this morning that Ozinga, head Netherlands Information Service, had conversation with member former Republican Good Will Mission to East Indonesia. Ozinga spoke quite differently from Drees and said Netherlands will go ahead with their "national mission" in accordance with their "national conscience" regardless of attitude of Republic or its survivals.

Many federalists noted around hotel here. Reported to be consulting with Drees and among themselves. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

³ See footnote 4, p. 142.

⁴ *Supra.*

501.BC Indonesia/1-1249 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, January 12, 1949—8:20 p. m.

30. The following is suggested draft resolution in Indonesian case for your consideration. Our comments follow in another telegram:

The SC,

Recalling its resolutions of 1 August 1947, 25 August 1947, and 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question;

Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the SC by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;

Considering that its resolutions of 24 December 1948 and 28 December 1948 have not been fully complied with;

Considering that the maintenance of Netherlands forces in continued occupation throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia is incompatible with the achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute;

Noting that the parties continue to adhere to the principles and democratic procedures of the *Renville* agreement and agree that elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date, and further agree that the SC should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the UN; and that the representative of the Netherlands has disclosed that his government desires to have such elections held not later than the third quarter of 1949;

Noting that the Government of the Netherlands has disclosed its intention to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia during the course of the year 1950;

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and position of the Government of the Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia may not be prejudiced;

(1) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of military operations, and calls upon the Government of the Republic simultaneously to instruct its forces to cooperate in the restoration of peace throughout the area affected.

(2) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17 December 1948 in Indonesia, and to permit the officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to return at once to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under paragraph (1) above and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that government for its effective function in Jogjakarta and for communication with officials of the Republic elsewhere in Indonesia.

(3) Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal independent and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the Government of the Netherlands and representatives of the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance and under the auspices of the commission referred to in paragraph (4) below on the basis of the procedures and principles set forth in the Linggadjatti and *Renville* agreements and on the basis of the proposals submitted to the parties by the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices on September 10, 1948; in particular that the elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to an Indonesian constituent assembly should be completed by _____, and that the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands

to the United States of Indonesia should take place not later than _____.

(4) Terminates the Consular Commission and transfers all its functions to the Good Offices Committee which shall henceforth be known as the Security Council Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act as the representative of the SC in Indonesia and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Good Offices Committee by the SC since December 18, the functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution, and such other functions as the Council hereafter may assign to it. The Commission shall act by majority vote.

The Commission shall assist the parties in the negotiations to be undertaken under paragraph (3) above and is authorized to make recommendations to them or to the SC with respect to any of its functions.

The Commission is authorized to observe on behalf of the UN the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary to insure that such elections are free and democratic, and to guarantee freedom of Assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

The Commission shall immediately determine the extent to which consistent with reasonable requirements of public security, areas in Java, Sumatra and Madura (outside of the city of Jogjakarta) should be progressively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and shall supervise such transfer. The Commission shall determine which if any Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order and in the supervision of the elections.

The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council, and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary.

The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary and may utilize the services of the military assistants placed at the disposal of the Committee of Good Offices under the SC's resolution of 1 November 1947.

(5) Requests the SYG to make available to the Commission such staff, funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its functions.

(6) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cooperate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution.¹

JESSUP

¹ A revised draft resolution was sent the Department in telegram 38, January 14, 10:15 a. m., from New York (not printed), after consultation with the Department. The latter reported in its telegram 23, Usgoc 274, January 14, 6 p. m., to Batavia (repeated as 33 to The Hague and as 163 to London), that this draft was being circulated in the Security Council "as working paper, not at this stage as formal resolution." Text of the draft was sent in telegram 24, Usgoc 275, January 14, 7 p. m., to Batavia (repeated as 35 to The Hague and as 175 to London).

501.BC Indonesia/1-1249 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, January 12, 1949—8:55 p. m.

32. Our telegram No. 30, January 12, contains suggested draft of resolution on Indonesia. In my opinion, general ideas contained in this draft represent substantial concession to necessary face saving of Dutch and practical minimum of what US position in this case requires, taking into account all elements. Department is aware that all delegations are looking to us for leadership in resolution. A resolution along foregoing lines would, in my opinion, attract very general support. Timetable and general situation in Council indicates strong desirability of clearance of a draft resolution by Department so that we may receive instructions by Friday morning with a view to consultation with other delegations before SC meeting Friday afternoon.

Consultations with other delegates today indicate that such a draft resolution would attract substantial support. In meeting late this afternoon with McNaughton and Cadogan,¹ general ideas contained therein were discussed and full agreement reached in principle thereon. Specifically, McNaughton and Cadogan agree that resolution should express condemnation or displeasure concerning Dutch non-compliance with previous resolutions; that dates should be indicated for elections and final transfer of sovereignty; that release of political leaders in terms contemplated by draft resolution is essential and that Council could not possibly contemplate elimination of the Republic; that some formula on withdrawal in stages under UN supervision must be included; that some such provision as our draft suggestions on revision of GOC would be acceptable; that the *Renville* principles must be invoked; that there should be some provision regarding discontinuance of Dutch military operations. Only point in our draft in regard to which British expressed some reservation is direct reference to Cochran plan.

Earlier conversations today with Hood, Australia, and Rau, India, indicate that they also would support resolution along these lines. Hood has abandoned his former insistence on withdrawal to truce lines and welcomes suggestion of general nature included in our draft. Rau lays particular emphasis on importance of continuing existing personnel of GOC but considers question of change in its title and powers a matter of tactics in regard to which he would defer to our judgment.

Foregoing points have been discussed in conversations referred to

¹ Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton and Sir Alexander George Montagu Cadogan, Canadian and British Permanent Representatives, respectively, at the United Nations.

above as general ideas following the line of our statement in SC yesterday and as not representing any official position. We have indicated the hope that we might have a draft ready for at least private circulation so that delegates could secure instructions over the weekend. Cadogan stated that if he could see our draft before he speaks in SC Friday afternoon, he would try to frame his statement in terms of support.

JESSUP

501.BC Indonesia/1-1449 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 14, 1949.

78. Gocus 544. Official communiqué released at 0400 today states "during meeting of Assembly for federal consultation on Thursday at Batavia following resolution was carried unanimously: Assembly for federal consultation at their meeting January 13 at Batavia, wishing attain soon as possible by peaceable means formation of free and sovereign United States Indonesia is of opinion that:

1. In principle formation of national federal government for whole of Indonesia is necessary for transition to free and sovereign United States of Indonesia;

2. Decree administration Indonesia during period of transition (BIO) be taken as starting point for formation of above-mentioned government;

3. Before formation of above-mentioned national government it necessary to consult prominent persons from these territories not yet organized according article 5 of decree administration Indonesia during period of transition.

After this meeting, meeting was held with High Representative Crown at which Drees and Michiels¹ present. HRC as well as Drees, on behalf Netherlands Government, expressed their agreement with this resolution. HRC further promised all possible cooperation in order bring about desired contact with those persons referred to in point three of resolution".

Implementation of point three will be discussed by Assembly today.²
Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

¹ E. Michiels van Verduynen, Netherlands Ambassador in the United Kingdom, accompanied Prime Minister Drees to Indonesia.

² Telegram 85, Gocus 549, January 16, reported naming of a committee by the Assembly to carry on preliminary discussions with Indonesian personalities on the formation of a national federal interim government for the whole of Indonesia (501.BC Indonesia/1-1649).

501.BC Indonesia/1-1449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 14, 1949.

82. Gocus 545. GOC sending 2 telegrams to reach SC before meeting today.

"1. GOC refers to its report 11 January to SC in which was transmitted correspondence relating to proposal of GOC to Netherlands authorities that it be permitted visit President and certain other leaders of Republic.

2. Arrangements have been made with Netherland Officials whereby GOC will visit Vice President, Chairman RepDel and Minister Education of [on] Bangka on 15 January. Governor will report fully following day to SC on these arrangements and results of trip.

3. GOC has forwarded to NethDel letter from Secretary General of RepubDel requesting that one or more of three members of delegation in Batavia, with whom GOC has contact, be permitted accompany GOC on any visits it may make to Republican leaders. GOC has been informed by NethDel that request has been forwarded authorities competent to deal with matter and that GOC will be informed of their decision later." (Republican request forwarded Department Gocus 539.²)

Second report reads: "1. Following return to field of Military observers on 9 January (telegraphic report dated 8 January) GOC has now received first report from team in area of Soerabaya. As this first report from field, GOC believes SC will be interested in following points from report even before analysis entire military situation is possible.

a. Destruction of road, bridges and property has been and still is taking place on much greater scale than anticipated by Netherlands military authorities. Hundreds of bridges destroyed including many important ones. All railroads completely blocked owing destruction of bridges and railroad property. Many main roads central Java still not open and on those which open travel only possible in convoy.

b. Towns of Lamongan and Bodjonegoro reported badly damaged by fire and demolition and practically uninhabited by local population or troops.

c. In former Netherlands demilitarized zone, it observed nearly all bridges destroyed and number kampongs destroyed mainly by fire and most deserted.

¹ Repeated in telegram 36, January 15, 3 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 67, January 12, not printed.

d. Number Netherland troops in newly-occupied areas insufficient to prevent roving guerilla bands from moving freely and performing acts sabotage such as destruction newly repaired bridges. Netherlands troops are insufficient to maintain law and order in towns and many Chinese merchants suffered severely from looting." Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, January 14, 1949—11 p. m.

83. Gocus 546. Leaving for Bangka morning 15 January on GOC plane with other GOC representatives. Return late afternoon. Have prepared large number questions designed evoke from Hatta, Roem, Sastroamidjojo picture of situation as basis GOC report to SC.

Visited tonight by Supomo, Darmasetiawan, Sudjono. They have reliably heard that at Republican Cabinet meeting held 0900 to 1100 December 19 during assault on Jogja decision taken to entrust Shafrudin Prawira *negara*,² Min. economic affairs, with authority form emergency government. (They state this emergency government now located Central Sumatra). Heard also Cabinet meeting drew up instructions to Palar³ and message to Nehru giving them official notification of status emergency government. RepDel requests Hatta be asked confirm this. If confirmed RepDel will recognize authority Shafrudin government and will enter into negotiations only as this emergency government instructs. RepDel asked also for Hatta statement as to official status Darmasetiawan heretofore advisor. RepDel has received at least one communication from Shafrudin via underground. I will ask necessary questions accordingly.

Three Republicans have private source information as to proceedings in closed Federalist meeting in Batavia now in progress. Heard that yesterday morning Federalists made list thirty-one names including 22 Republicans who were to be consulted re participation Republic in Federal Interim Government. (See paragraph 3 Gocus 544, January 14). Among non-Republicans listed was [Anak] Agung, Prime Minister East Indonesia. Among Republican names were: Leimena, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Darmasetiawan, Supomo, Sultan of Jogja,⁴ Susahunan of Solo and Supomo. From this list a final list

¹ Repeated in telegram 40, January 17, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Also known as Dr. Sjafruddin.

³ Lambertus Nicodemus Palar, Indonesian Republic observer at the UN.

⁴ Hamengku Buwono IX.

drawn up of "prominent persons from territories not yet organized" containing five names: Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Sultan of Jogja and Supomo. This list prepared previous to meeting with Drees who has expressed himself privately against first two. (See Gocus 541.⁵) First four of five named under detention. Three Republican representatives ridicule idea this can come to anything so far as participation of Republic concerned.

Questioned about rumor that Netherlands considering division former Republican territory into three *negaras* with Hatta at head of one, Darmasetiawan said he had heard this under consideration and that three *negaras* contemplated were Atjeh, Central Sumatra and Central Java.

Supomo confirmed Atjeh still Republican and stated President had published decree emphasizing Atjeh fully loyal to Republic. Apparently little Netherlands military action against it. In fact recent reports Atjenese taking offensive. We discussed possible political and legal significance of fact that thus substantial territory with definite boundaries still at least nominally under Republican flag. Atjenese heretofore, of course, have been strongly particularistic.

Sudjono had been considering drafting letter to GOC but gave basic ideas instead. Stated that Federalists now meeting Batavia not representative of their areas not merely because from puppet states unilaterally [set up?] by Netherlands Government but because good number of them do not have support even of the *negara* Parliaments or other partially representative organizations which Netherlands themselves established. For example, Prime Minister East Indonesia was named by President East Indonesia recently without consent or consultation with Parliament. Sudjono submitted draft which stated further that present Cabinets in East Indonesia and Pasundan are "nothing but facades without democratic roots established as *ad hoc* organizations for sole purpose of expediting formation of Netherlands-controlled Federal Interim Government. Re above, I wish point out that on 21 December 1948 Pasundan Cabinet resigned in protest against Netherlands attack upon Republic. 14 January 1949 *wali negara* of Pasundan announced in Parliament the resignation of Cabinet and Parliament was sent home for recess before it received any opportunity state its position re this resignation. Since then it not yet been called into session. It understood Netherlands authorities put strong pressure on vulnerable *wali negara* of Pasundan who at present extremely ill to undertake above-mentioned action. Further wish to add that all political groups which form majority Pasundan Parliament are only willing participate in new Cabinet on basis following

⁵ Telegram 69, January 12, p. 143.

program: (1) Rehabilitation of status of Republic prior 19 December and restoration authority of Sukarno, Hatta; (2) formation Federal Interim Government with participation of rehabilitated Republic; (3) amendment BIO (decree administration in Indonesia in transitional period) to make it acceptable to people of Indonesia."

Darmasetiawan explained his view that any order for withdrawal to SQL would be entirely unrealistic even if Netherlands agreed. Only technique Republic can effectively employ is guerrilla warfare. Would be suicidal if effect of withdrawal order would be to require withdrawal TNI at present carrying on guerrilla warfare throughout Java and Sumatra. Would be real difficulty in obtaining compliance by units of TNI in light of manner in which they feel similar withdrawal in past has led to betrayal by truce. Darmasetiawan believes guerrilla warfare can be carried on for decades. Supomo agreed and explained that this is reason why Republic believes it preferable to have Netherlands troops withdraw to central garrisons where they would not be in position to coerce population rather than to issue order both sides to withdraw to SQL at this point.

Supomo is sending Hatta via GOC tomorrow account his meeting with Drees (Gocus 541). Will supply us with copy soon as translation made.

Arrange further meeting for tomorrow night. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1549 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 15, 1949—9 p. m.

84. Gocus 547. For Cochran: While with GOC today at Muntok, Island of Bangka, where Hatta *et al.* are confined to hotel under guard, had opportunity to see Hatta privately and procured hurriedly letter which he declares accurately expresses his sentiments. Some sentences may be useful re Asiatic conference. Told him it would be published or not as you and Department might find it advisable. Hatta entirely agreeable to this. Do not believe publication letter could in any way prejudice Hatta here. If you decide it now advantageous and consistent with Department policy to release in whole or part, you might consider possibility release Batavia five or six hours before Washington. Press men here state stories bearing Batavia dateline likely get greatest attention present time. Letter follows:

"Bangka, January 15, Dear Mr. Cochran: Mr. Lisle tells me that you have returned to the United States for consultations with your government. I am sorry that you could not come to see me today as

one of the Committee of Good Offices. On the other hand, it is a great satisfaction to me that you are now in a position to explain the Republic as you have seen and known it to your associates in America.

A little more than a month ago I handed to you my letter of December 13.¹ I tried in that letter to make it very clear that, so far as the Republic was concerned, the path of peaceful negotiation was still open. Despite the failure of all the approaches I had made, I was still confident, as I stated in the letter, that 'reasonable men can and must agree when the consequences of disagreement are so serious to both parties.' The consequences of disagreement have been more than serious. My own fate, political or personal, is unimportant. But, in the space of four weeks, I have seen my country torn by warfare; thousands of my fellow countrymen dead or cruelly wounded, many women and children among them; villages and towns burned or deserted and tens of thousands homeless; starvation widespread. This is the price we are willing to pay for our freedom. I wonder if the consequences of this unworthy war have not been even more serious to the Netherlands. Indonesia, which as a partner could richly reward from its potential wealth a Netherlands which would make freely available its experience and services, will now at best be a continuing drain on the Netherlands economy. The Netherlands will find its youth subject to the continuing and ever-increasing resistance of our guerrillas, a resistance which can and will continue until complete victory is achieved, whether it takes one month or ten years. I wonder if the Netherlands will not have to pay a price even greater than that represented by its young men and wealth. What can be the effect on the spirit of a people, themselves free, when they devote themselves to the enslavement of another people? May not their own freedom perish when they give themselves over to the path of military conquest?

I am heartened by the wave of sympathy which has flowed from the hearts of the people of the United States and those of the other peace-loving nations of the world, a sympathy which as I see it knows no race or creed, no division between east and west. I could expect no less from your people who themselves resisted the colonialism of a former age and laid down those principles of freedom and liberty which I have read in your Declaration of Independence.

I have not given up my trust in the United Nations and in its ability to find a fair solution. I know that it will not abandon us in our hour of need.

I affirm again my faith that only by the processes of democracy can a lasting settlement be obtained, that colonialism is dead, that the aspirations of a freedom-loving people for a government of their own cannot be long denied.

A great American spoke of 'one world'. I know that the modern world is one, that there cannot be a division into east and west, that all nations must cooperate for their mutual good. We need the west as the west needs the east. I do not hate the people of the Netherlands. I do hate the policy of military conquests which they are following. I regret that they and so many officials of their government have been deceived.

¹ See telegram 1090, Gocus 484, December 13, 1948, 11 p. m., from Batavia, *Foreign Relations*, 1948 vol. VI, p. 552. For text of letter, see UN SC, *3d yr., Supplement* (Dec.), p. 215.

I know and admire their struggles for freedom in the past. May they now seize the opportunity to give an example to the modern world, that of a people who will voluntarily surrender that which they hoped to win by force and heed the conscience of the world which tells them they have erred.

I know that you, Mr. Cochran, have seen the people of the Republic at their work, in their patriotic exercises, in their moments of recreation. I know that you must have come to realize that the Republic is not a mere governmental structure. I think you will be able to explain to your associates that the real strength of the Republic is in the hearts of the people of Indonesia, a fortress which cannot be taken by the assaults of tanks and bombers.

I have not attempted to suggest in this letter any definite plan of settlement. I must leave that to a time when my status is again that of one free to negotiate and not merely free to surrender.

I trust that I shall see you again very soon and at a happier time for my country, perhaps when a free and sovereign United States of Indonesia has been achieved. That it will be achieved cannot be doubted by those who know the Republic and the affection in which it is held by all the people of Indonesia.

I shall ask Mr. Lisle to make sure that this letter reaches you. Sincerely yours, M. Hatta."

GOC preparing full report visit tomorrow. Will transmit Department soonest. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1649: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 16, 1949.

85. Gocus 548. GOC will send late tonight following report to SC:

"1. 15 January accordance arrangements reported SC 11 and 13 January, GOC visited six Republican officials detained on Bangka. Officials are Hatta, Roem, Sastroamidjojo, Suriadarma, Assaat (KNIP) and State Secretary Pringgo Digdo. They detained. Isolated hill near Muntok.

2. GOC had been informed by Acting Chairman NethDel on 14 January that 'Government of Indonesia at this juncture cannot see way to permit a member of RepubDel to accompany GOC on forthcoming [visit] Bangka on 16 January. It intended shortly revert to possibility for members RepubDel now in Batavia to pay visit to Bangka.'

3. Officials brought to island by 31 December are detained in large building. They have one doorless bedroom 6 meters by 6 meters in

¹ Repeated in telegram 39, January 17, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

which located six beds. In addition they originally allowed area 4 by 10 meters wired off from large reception room. Since 12 January wire has been removed and entire reception room 19 by 16 meters open to their use. Permitted access to roof under guard. All windows enclosed by wire netting as is area around door. Guards on duty in sentry boxes immediately outside. They not permitted leave wired area. Up to two days before GOC visit when additional furniture installed, there only chairs and two tables.

4. On 10 January officials were visited by Brouwer described as Crown Commissioner in Medan and as personal representative HRC (High Representative of Crown). Brouwer asked them sign pledge to refrain from political activities and assured them if they gave such pledge, they would be given freedom move about Bangka and families be permitted join them. None gave pledge.²

6. Officials have been kept generally informed progress events and activities SC. May listen radio reports, given copies Bangka Indonesian press, Dutch magazines and Batavia newspapers, latter somewhat delayed. They not received reports or other documents from RepDel or GOC, GOC left with them recent reports and publications including Republican reviews of Indonesian press.

7. Vice President and other officials presented at length Republican position re military action and controversies between parties. It agreed that Republican position could be more effectively presented in writing and GOC would not attempt forward informal oral expressions of opinion. Group requested they be supplied with additional documents needed in preparation their statement and they be visited by three RepubDel present Batavia so that statement can be properly prepared. GOC indicated willingness forward such statement to SC and will use good offices with Netherlands to procure granting of above requests so that early preparation and transmission report will be possible. Chairman RepubDel submitted written report on experiences of internees since 19 December which GOC will forward airmail.

8. Since 5 January officials been permitted write their families. Letters handed local guard unsealed. One reply received. Are permitted communicate only with families.

9. No political proposals have been made to officials other than request to sign pledge (paragraph 3 above).

10. Group heard radio report of pending visit GOC on 11 January.

² Paragraph numbered 5 apparently not included; it read as follows: "The Vice President and others expressed concern at the fact to [that?] Mr. Brouwer indicated that the High Representative of the Crown no longer recognized either the legal existence of the Republic nor the official status of its servants. The Committee assured the group that so far as the Security Council and the Committee are concerned, the Republic was still a party to the dispute."

On 14 January they told by Netherlands official, GOC would come next day.

11. Vice President stated that at Cabinet meeting held 9 o'clock to 11 o'clock, 19 December during assault on Jogja, President and Cabinet had authorized Shafrudin Prawiranegara to establish in Sumatra emergency government of Republic. This government deputized by Cabinet and has authority act for President and Cabinet on all matters in which President, Prime Minister and members regular Cabinet not free to act. Vice President also stated Republican representative to SC has full authority to act on his own initiative in absence further instruction from his government.

12. On 16 January GOC received following letter from Acting Chairman NethDel:

'I hear with surprise that orders given concerning personal freedom of circulation in Bangka for Hatta and other prominent personalities have not been put into force.

I have at once ascertained cause of this regrettable state affairs. It is, as you know, entirely in contradiction with instructions given on this point and which being repeated today by telegram.

In order avoid further misunderstanding, I have honour inform you that two high Netherlands officials will leave for Bangka early tomorrow by special plane with specific mission see that no obstacles are placed to free movement and circulation in Bangka for above-mentioned personalities'.³ Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

³ Telegram 43, January 17, from The Hague, quoted a communiqué issued along similar lines, adding that "Severe measures will be taken against those responsible." Foreign Minister Stikker gave a copy of his statement to the American Ambassador (Baruch).

501.BC Indonesia/1-1749: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, January 17, 1949.

43. Department pass to UNDel Lake Success. Netherlands Government has issued following communiqué regarding treatment Repub leaders Bangka:¹

"The Netherlands Government has taken note with deep regret of the information regarding the accommodations and the treatment of the Republican leaders now at Bangka. From further information,

¹ The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stikker) gave a copy of his statement to the American Ambassador on January 17. (Repeated on January 19 to Batavia.)

meanwhile received, it appears that this treatment was not in conformity with the relevant instructions issued by the Netherlands Government.

Severe measures will be taken against those responsible. Two prominent officials are en route from Batavia to Bangka in order to draw up a complete report regarding the situation and to take measures for the prompt and full execution of the instructions".

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/1-1749

*The Netherlands Embassy to the Department of State*¹

Adoption of the United States working paper² would mean increased intervention by the Security Council in the Indonesian question to such an extent that the Netherlands Government does not see at this juncture how this paper could be made acceptable to it by way of amendment.

For that reason the hope is expressed that it will not be presented to the Security Council as a draft-resolution, and that the Netherlands Government will not be denied the time necessary for carrying out its constructive program, details of which are well-known, a program which completely fulfills the wishes of the Security Council, its purpose being the early establishment of a sovereign and democratic United States of Indonesia.

The Netherlands Government has the following primary reasons of a general political nature for declaring that it cannot accept the United States working paper:

(a) In the course of the last three years the Netherlands has striven sincerely and with what the Netherlands Government does not hesitate to call exemplary patience in the face of great and constant provocation, to form out of the Archipelago's heterogeneous parts at the end of a short transitional period the sovereign and federal United States of Indonesia, having a status equal to that of the Netherlands, and linked with the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union;

(b) the sole unsurmountable obstacle in the way of the realisation of this goal was the unwillingness and impotence of successive governments of the Indonesian Republic to carry out agreements they entered into;

(c) the Netherlands Government believes that conditions now permit the inception of the short transitional or interim period by the establishment within one month of an Indonesian national federal Interim Government. As soon as established this government can at once start the organisation of free elections which should be held not

¹ Handed by the 2nd Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy (Schiff) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Thompson) on January 17.

² See footnote 1, p. 146.

later than the third quarter of 1949, and should pave the way for the institution of a Constituent Assembly. It will be the task of this Assembly to adopt the Constitution of the sovereign United States of Indonesia, following which sovereignty will be transferred in the course of 1950 simultaneously with the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and of economic, financial and military agreements.

(d) In order to carry this firm program into effect, discussions are to take place, a beginning with which has already been made in the course of the last few days. Continuously increasing intervention on the part of foreign countries as well as increasing interference by the Commission of Good Offices in the situation in the shape of reports to the Security Council which are not free from bias, result in delaying the realisation of the aims which are those of the Netherlands as much as they are those of the countless people outside the Netherlands, rather than in advancing it.

In addition to these reasons of a general political nature, the attitude of the Netherlands Government in respect of the United States working-paper is motivated by the following special considerations:

Adoption of the paper would in effect be a premium on the Republicans' attitude of non-cooperation, for the reason that it holds out to the former Republican leaders the prospect of a position in Java, Sumatra and Madura which is so greatly at variance with possibilities as they are in reality that these leaders are encouraged to adopt a negative attitude in respect of the discussions which have begun between the Netherlands Prime Minister, the Government of Indonesia and the federal nationalists for the purpose of establishing a federal interim government.

Should the United States working-paper be presented to the Security Council as a draft-resolution and should that draft-resolution be adopted despite Netherlands warnings and objections, the only result will be increased unrest, a delayed peaceful and satisfactory solution, and a multiplication of existing difficulties.

The Netherlands Government has pledged itself in the most solemn manner, both as regards Indonesia and the Netherlands Nation represented by the States-General, to do its utmost to abide by its promises and to carry out its declared program. In its details the scheme set forth in the United States working-paper is inconsistent with that program, which is now anchored in the Netherlands Constitution as a result of a recent constitutional amendment. In addition, a Decree has been worked out on a basis of consultation with a comprehensive group of Indonesian leaders, in which provisions are laid down for the administration of Indonesia in the interim period, and containing a clause (article 69) by virtue of which this Decree can be altered after consulting Republican leaders.

Should adoption of the United States working-paper by the Security Council force the Netherlands to pronounce a *non-possumus*, the inevitable consequence will be:

(a) that the Netherlands will be fatally weakened as a vital element in the community of western nations; and

(b) that chaos arises in Indonesia, for the reason that apart from the constructive program designed by the Netherlands together with the federalists, there is no other possibility in Indonesia than the dictatorship of a small extremist minority, with the result that yet another element is added to the growing number of Asian states which as a consequence of internal weakness fall an easy and welcome prey to communism.

In the opinion of the Netherlands Government there can be no doubt that, in assuming jurisdiction in the Indonesian question (which is what the Security Council would do if it were to adopt the United States working-paper), that Council would far exceed the measure of its intervention in other disputes now before it, thereby creating a dangerous precedent for the future. Unquestionably this degree of intervention is in derogation of article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, and creates the danger that faith in the Charter is undermined.

In its appeal to the Netherlands Government alone to cease military operations, the United States working-paper ignores the fact that the Netherlands Government some considerable time ago caused hostilities to be stopped whilst on the other hand on the part of the Republic no order has ever been issued to its armed forces to observe army resolutions. This, incidentally, is wholly consistent with conditions as they existed prior to the beginning of the recent operation, the Republican Government having little or no authority over its armed forces, the remnants of which have now completely disintegrated.

Re-establishment of the Republican Government, at first, it is true, in the city of Djokjakarta, but later on, in the discretion of a United Nations Commission, in the whole of Java, Sumatra and Madura, is wholly unacceptable. The Netherlands, until next year sovereignty is transferred, is not only the sovereign power, but at present also exercises *de facto* authority. The possibility cannot be countenanced that, as result of the adoption of the United States working-paper, there would come into being a second, parallel Government. In addition, it should not be forgotten that this paper proposes to grant a priori to the republic a dominant position in the federation, thus derogating from the *Renville* principle which prescribes that it will be the people itself which will determine to what state it wants to belong.

Resumption of negotiations with the Republic on the basis of the plan presented by the United States member of the Commission of

Good Offices on September 10, 1948, is tantamount to the obligatory imposition of a specific solution from which both parties have deviated in an earlier phase on important points, and which the Netherlands Government could not accept.

Nor could the Netherlands Government see its way to accepting the extension of the powers of the Commission of Good Offices to be transformed according to the United States working-paper into a Commission for Indonesia, inasmuch as:

(a) it would appear that the sphere of action of the Commission is to be extended to the whole of Indonesia, in other words: to areas which were no party to the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. The Security Council, it seems, would extend its jurisdiction to regions where there is no dispute at all;

(b) the Commission is to take decisions by a majority vote, which means in effect that the United States member is to act as an administrator during the interim period, a construction which is incompatible with the responsibilities and duties devolving for the Netherlands from its sovereignty during that period;

(c) the contemplated powers of the Commission far exceed those which any organ of the United Nations possesses in the territory of any other state. This would seem to constitute a dangerous precedent for similar interference on the part of the Security Council in Malaya, Indo-China, and even in countries where conflicts exist between national groups.

It seems inadmissible that the Commission should have discretionary power to determine which parts of Java, Sumatra and Madura will revert to the Republic and where Netherlands troops will be allowed to remain to maintain order. Existing provisional political organs would thus be destroyed against the freely expressed will of the people; the areas concerned would become ungovernable, existing constructive nationalism being denied further possibilities to express its desires. During the interim period the Commission would in reality become an organ having wide powers of administration; in the exercise of these powers it could make use of such means as it considers proper in its own judgment, whilst at the same time responsibility for public order would continue to rest with the Netherlands.

Re-instatement of the Republican Government, coupled with giving it facilities throughout Indonesia, would not only open up possibilities for fruitful activity on the part of Tan Malakka, trained in Moscow, and his communist associates whose influence was previously confined to Republican territory, but would also extend Republican power far beyond its previous scope. To the Netherlands this would be utterly unacceptable, in addition to being inconsistent with elementary requirements of impartiality.

According to the United States working-paper, a date would be set

for holding elections without any evidence being shown in that paper that the need is acknowledged of conditions having to be brought about beforehand guaranteeing free and democratic elections. There is, furthermore, no indication as to how such elections are to be held in a country where the population has not been registered, where the rate of illiteracy is a special difficulty, and where so far the formation of political parties has hardly developed beyond the rudimentary stage, difficulties such as have been and to some extent are still being experienced also in India, various Arab countries, and elsewhere.

It is not possible to make use of Republican armed forces in restoring peaceful conditions, for the simple reason that it was these very armed forces who before the recent operation were the main cause of unrest and disorder in and beyond Republican territory, forces moreover who since have split up in roving gangs which for the time being are the chief element threatening security and public peace.

According to the United States working-paper, the Netherlands Government is in practice to be obliged to place its public organs at the disposal of the Security Council to ensure that the wishes of the proposed commission be carried into effect, a commission which is to carry out experiments in territory of a sovereign state without there being any assurance that the agreed Netherlands-Indonesian Union will come into being. As a matter of honor, of conscience, and of policy, no Netherlands Government could accept such a state of things.

The Netherlands Government, far from wishing to limit itself to a negative reaction with regard to the United States working-paper, is now working on positive suggestions for a final resolution for the consideration of the Security Council, to be presented at the earliest possible moment.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1749: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL
US URGENT

NEW YORK, January 17, 1949—7:50 p. m.

54. Van Roijen called to see me at my invitation this morning. We talked very frankly on a friendly personal basis for nearly an hour. He laid stress on his feeling that both Dubois² and Cochran were prejudiced in their point of view. He said that our draft resolution had made any solution impossible and expressly declared that this

¹ Repeated in telegram 42, January 18, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Coert du Bois, Mr. Cochran's predecessor as U.S. Representative on the UN Security Council GOC, Batavia, February-July 2, 1948.

statement was based on a telephone conversation with Stikker this morning. His main objection seemed to be that it was based on a complete denial of the possibility of Dutch good faith, and said no self-respecting government could accept such a position. He said if the US intended to put on enough pressure to drive the Netherlands out of Indonesia he supposed they could do it, but they preferred "to go down fighting." He had little new to say in regard to the past developments except that our *aide-mémoire* to his government³ had consolidated the determination of the Dutch Cabinet to go ahead with police action and that it had destroyed the possibility of moderation. We discussed at some length the question of the survival of the Republic as an entity and he conceded my point that the SC could scarcely accept their theory that they had wiped out the Republic with which they had made agreements including the *Renville* agreement under the auspices of the SC. In answer to a specific question, he said that his government did not take the position that the Linggadjadi and *Renville* agreements no longer existed but insisted that certain of their provisions had been modified by events although the principles of those agreements were still accepted. He half admitted my suggestion that in the case of the alleged violation of the orders regarding the nature of the confinement of Hatta and the others on Bangka, some of the Dutch officials on the spot had been very extreme in their attitude and actions and had caused additional difficulties. Van Roijen said he would be very grateful if we had any further information concerning incidents of this kind if we would let him know. I asked him whether he saw any possible bridge between the position of his government and the position of the SC which he recognized particularly with reference to the continued existence of the Republic and the restoration of its leaders. He said flatly that he saw none. He did say that he wished we had had this talk before our "working paper" had been distributed but I reminded him that the views of the US had been perfectly clear to his government for a long time. I also told him that on the basis of conversations with most of the people at the council table it seemed to me there was a general unanimity of view on most of the basic points.

So far as this conversation went, there was no indication that the Dutch were prepared to accommodate themselves to any SC resolution whatever. In view of talks with other members of the council, reported separately, it seems to me clear that we must proceed with a strong resolution although certain minor amendments may be acceptable to the co-sponsors of the resolution which would make it slightly more palatable. One lead which Van Roijen gave was the suggestion

³ See text of December 7, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 531.

that the resolution should include reference to the federalists as well as the Republicans.

De Rose⁴ in conversation with USUN today took a very strong line referring several times to the possibility that they would find it necessary to veto a resolution and insisting that the basic point was non-extension of the good offices principle. The French cannot contemplate any extension of powers for any UN body in the Indonesian question. While I personally doubt whether the French will veto, such action on their part would throw the whole onus of responsibility on their shoulders. Since it would clearly be based on an argument concerning the competence of the SC, I believe we should be prepared at that point to introduce at once a resolution submitting the question of competence to the ICJ for an advisory opinion. If resolution in some such form as now drafted is adopted by SC and if Dutch should immediately walk out or give notice of refusal to comply, believe we should be prepared to indicate our position.

Since next meeting of SC is scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, introduction of our resolution cannot be delayed beyond that time. Strongly recommend that if anything is to be done along lines of bilateral approach, it should precede possible further Dutch statement at that time.

JESSUP

⁴ François de Rose, member of the French delegation at the United Nations.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1749 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, January 17, 1949—10:22 p. m.

56. The following is our revised draft of a resolution on Indonesia which takes into account, insofar as possible, the views of other delegations consulted by us, and in particular Norway, Cuba, and China. We believe the latter three delegations would join the US in sponsoring such a resolution.

“The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions of 1 August 1947, 25 August 1947, and 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question;

Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the Security Council by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;

Considering that its resolutions of 24 December 1948, and 28 December 1948, have not been fully carried out;

¹ Repeated in telegram 43, January 18, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

Considering that the maintenance of Netherlands forces in continued occupation throughout the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, without the consent of the latter, is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute;

Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the principles of the *Renville* agreement and agree that free and democratic elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a constituent assembly at the earliest practicable date, and further agree that the Security Council should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the United Nations; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his government's desire to have such elections held not later than October 1, 1949;

Noting also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950, if possible, and, in any case, during the year 1950;

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and position of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force;

(1) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of military operations, and calls upon the Government of the Republic simultaneously to instruct its forces to cooperate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected.

(2) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17 December 1948, in the Republic of Indonesia, and to permit the officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to return at once to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under Paragraph 1 above and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom, including administration of the city of Jogjakarta. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that government for its effective function in Jogjakarta and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia.

(3) Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal, independent, and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the government of the Netherlands and representative[s] of their Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the commission referred to in Paragraph 4 below on the basis of the principles set forth in the Linggadjatti and *Renville* agreements, and taking advantage of the extent of agreement reached between the parties regarding the proposals submitted to them by the United States representative on the Committee of Good Offices on September 10, 1948; and, in particular, on the basis that:

(a) The establishment of the Interim Federal Government which is to be granted the powers of internal government in Indo-

nesia during the interim period before the transfer of sovereignty shall be the result of the negotiations and shall take place not later than March 15, 1949; provided that if no agreement is reached by March 1, 1949, the commission shall immediately report to the Security Council with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties;

(b) The elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to an Indonesian Constituent Assembly should be completed by October 1, 1949; and

(c) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia should take place on a date in the year 1950 to be fixed by the Netherlands Government before January 1, 1950; provided that if no agreement on the terms for the Netherlands-Indonesian union is reached by February 1, 1950, the commission or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendations under Paragraph 4 below shall immediately report to the SC with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

(4) The Good Offices Committee shall henceforth be known as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The commission shall act as the representative of the Security Council in Indonesia and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Good Offices Committee by the Security Council since December 18, and the functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution. The commission shall act by majority vote. Its reports and recommendations to the Security Council shall present both majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion among the members of the commission.

The consular commission is requested to facilitate the work of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other staff and facilities to enable the commission to carry out its duties under the council's resolutions of 24 and 28 December 1948 as well as under the present resolution, and shall temporarily suspend other activities.

The commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution, and shall assist the parties in the negotiations to be undertaken under Paragraph 3 above and is authorized to make recommendations to them or to the Security Council on matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations the commission shall make recommendations to the Security Council as to the nature, powers, and functions of the United Nations agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is transferred by the government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.

The commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and representatives of such areas shall be permitted to participate in the negotiations referred to in Paragraph 3 above.

The commission or such other United Nations agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under the second preceding paragraph is authorized to observe on behalf of the United

Nations the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary to ensure that such elections are free and democratic, and to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

The commission shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements of public security and the protection of life and property, areas in Java, Sumatra and Madura (outside of the city of Jogjakarta) should be progressively returned to the civil administration of the government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise such transfer. The commission shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend which if any Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommendations of the commission mentioned in this paragraph, the commission shall report immediately to the Security Council with its further recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

The commission shall render periodic reports to the council, and special reports whenever the commission deems necessary.

The commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary.

(5) Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the commission such staff, funds and other facilities [as] are required by the commission for the discharge of its functions.

(6) Calls upon the government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cooperate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution."

JESSUP

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, January 18, 1949—10 a. m. [p. m.]

93. Gocus 553.

1. Supomo and Sudjono called late today. Sjahrir has arrived in Batavia and has been permitted to live in own house and told he can see people freely during his stay Batavia. He has explained to Supomo circumstances under which he accepted invitation to come here. Yesterday he was visited by assistant resident in Prapat and asked to come Batavia. He thereupon consulted with Sukarno and Salim. Three of them do not have radio, receive only Aneta news and are very anxious for news of internal situation. They decided that Sjahrir should accept invitation only in order obtain latest information. Sukarno and

¹ Repeated in telegram 50, January 19, 9 p. m., to The Hague.

Salim received no invitation. As Hatta and other exiles on Bangka had visit from GOC and received latest information, Supomo thinks Hatta will not accept similar invitation. GOC will probably call on Sjahrir tomorrow as group. Sjahrir assured Supomo that he will not enter into any negotiations with Drees or Federalists unless and until all Repub leaders are free and restored to positions of governmental authority. Sjahrir will have informal talk with Drees tonight. USDel will be kept informed regarding developments.

2. Riphagen² called in response certain inquiries made [*made*] by GOC relating to implementation paragraph seven GOC report 16 January (Gocus 548). He stated high representative Crown agreeable in principle to visit of local RepDel to Bangka but that it was believed Hatta and possibly other exiles will be down to Batavia next day or two. Stated anyway Darmasetiawan going to Bangka tomorrow or next day in connection with Federalist negotiations. USDel had heard through private sources earlier today that Anak Agung Gde Agung had called on Darmasetiawan with reference to invitation to Hatta to come down for consultation. Riphagen stated Sjahrir entirely free here and need not go back Prapat unless he desires.

All these facts so far consistent with pattern revealed by Supomo yesterday (Gocus 551³). Believe either (a) Riphagen may be doing wishful thinking re Darmasetiawan activity as Supomo had not mentioned Darmasetiawan trip or (b) Darmasetiawan carrying on independent activity apart from RepDel. Will check further tomorrow but incline to (a).

3. British ConGen⁴ called re two points: (a) stated senior British-military observer believed a GOC report of 14 January (Gocus 545) reflected too hasty report by British military observer at Soerabaya. ConGen admitted, however, that facts probably true. Assured him GOC will submit general military report with full evaluation as soon as we can obtain it from MilEx Board. (b) Said he had been asked by his government to comment on US Working Paper but had seen only inadequate summary in USIS bulletin. Promised to give him written outline basic features tomorrow morning. He said did not believe his government could support commission instead of GOC because it would imply Repub had not been true party. Sought to explain to him inability of committee good offices to function as such under present conditions and will take opportunity tomorrow in delivering summary to explain further special features of American plan. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

² Adviser of the Netherlands delegation to the GOC, Batavia.

³ Telegram 90, January 17, not printed.

⁴ Francis Michie Shepherd.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1949.

Following the meeting of the three of us this morning, I had two telephone conversations with Dr. Jessup.

I told Dr. Jessup that we were interested in the situation in Indonesia and were not looking for a Security Council resolution merely to meet a situation in the Council itself. I told him we thought it would be unfortunate to force a resolidification of Dutch public opinion on Indonesia just when divergencies were beginning to appear. I reminded him that we did not wish to carry the banner and make ourselves solely responsible for whatever action was taken. I said we realized that we could not draw back from our present position but that we believe he should act on the basis of general agreement among at least seven members of the Security Council both as to (a) the content of any resolution which might be introduced and (b) the timing of such a resolution with particular reference to the situation in Indonesia and Dutch public opinion. I emphasized the importance of the attitude of the United Kingdom, stressed that their participation was essential in any further action, and pointed out that the United Kingdom might be able to move the Dutch closer to the general point of view of the Security Council. Finally, I told him that we were not pressing here for a Security Council resolution at this point and believed that there was considerable merit in deferring an actual resolution.

Dr. Jessup said that he was talking during the day with China, Norway, Cuba, Canada, the United Kingdom and Egypt. In view of my remarks he said that he would discuss with each of them not only the content of the resolution but the question of timing, and would specifically raise with General McNaughton the possibility of postponing the meeting now set for Wednesday. He asked, if there should be common agreement among seven members of the Council both as to the content of the resolution and as to its being introduced on Wednesday, whether he was authorized to proceed on a jointly sponsored resolution. I told him I would wish to confirm that point with Messrs. Hickerson and Butterworth.

After checking again with Messrs. Hickerson and Butterworth I informed Dr. Jessup that, with some reluctance, we were prepared to go ahead with a resolution commonly agreed among seven both as to content and timing but that he should not seek such action as our main

¹ Addressed to the Directors of the Offices of European Affairs (Hickerson) and of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).

objective. I passed on to him the information received from Mr. Hicker-son that the French Embassy has informed us that France would veto the resolution and urged Dr. Jessup to discuss the resolution with the French Delegation to determine what points were objectionable and whether these points could be resolved by negotiation. I asked him to consider with his colleagues on the Security Council the question of pressing the resolution to the point of a French veto since there was considerable reservation on that matter in the Department. I again emphasized the importance we attach to the attitude of the United Kingdom.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of United Nations Political Affairs (Bancroft)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] January 18, 1949.

Scott¹ called to bring me up to date on the latest developments after Mr. Rusk's conversation with Dr. Jessup. He said they had a meeting with Norway and China and had gone over the resolution in detail agreeing on certain drafting changes. The principal change was to provide that the Commission in making its recommendations should take into account the economic well-being of the population of Indonesia. In general, Mr. Scott said that drafting changes were such as to be more palatable to the French point of view and to the Dutch.

Scott reported that they plan to talk to the Cubans this afternoon to go over the resolution and have a meeting set up with the United Kingdom and Canada jointly. Thereafter if there was time today, or if not, early tomorrow morning they were going to go over the resolution with the Egyptian.

Scott also reported that after deBeus² had brought in the 9-page Dutch memorandum,³ Scott had a chance to talk to him further about the working paper. He told deBeus that we were interested in knowing exactly what parts of the resolution the Dutch objected to and pointed out that we were proceeding on a basis whereby we had not introduced a resolution in the Council, but were using the device of a working paper in order to get the suggestions of the Council members and of the Dutch. Scott said that apparently deBeus reported this conversation to Helb in Washington because a little later Helb called him from Washington and said that he would like to come to New

¹ Joseph W. Scott, of the same Division, was at New York with the U.S. mission at the United Nations.

² Member of the Netherlands delegation at the United Nations.

³ January 17, p. 157.

York to discuss the working paper with him. Scott suggested that this might mean that the Dutch point of view was changing slightly and becoming less intransigent.

Scott reported that pursuant to Rusk's conversation with Jessup they were going to talk to McNaughton about the possibility of postponing Wednesday's meeting. He said that there was a good chance of this although China had indicated that they did not believe that the meeting should be postponed beyond Thursday because of the conference in New Delhi.

Noyes⁴ called me later in the afternoon to say that they were sending down by telegram tonight the modifications in the resolution agreed upon with Norway and China this morning and would report on the British and Canadian reactions. He specifically raised the question whether the treatment of the Cochran plan in paragraph (3) of the resolution (NY Tel. #56⁵) was satisfactory to Mr. Cochran.

HARDING F. BANCROFT

⁴ Charles P. Noyes, of the U.S. mission at the United Nations.

⁵ January 17, p. 163.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

BRUSSELS, January 18, 1949—4 p. m.

86. At conclusion brief interview with Spaak¹ this noon on another topic he interjected inquiry about tenor and text proposed US resolution before Security Council re Indonesia. Upon my reply that I had no recent and positive information on what our final position in SC would be, Spaak said his sources indicated we were about to insist (a) Dutch withdraw troops to pre-December 17 lines and (b) GOC being rejuvenated with vigorous directive from SC. (Both these points at variance with position set forth infotels December 29, 1 a. m., and January 5, 9 a. m.²). Also said Dutch Ambassador had just been to see him saying Dutch were much concerned over (a) and that such withdrawal militarily and politically impossible.

Spaak said he himself could not reconcile withdrawal of Dutch troops with maintenance internal order and security in area thus vacated view natural disruption normal civil government due military operations. Even should Dutch agree withdraw (which Spaak does not believe they will) he feared condition anarchy and grave disorder would follow such withdrawal.

¹ Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

² Neither printed.

As for GOC, Spaak stated flatly once more that he thought it a body which had lost credit and was not susceptible of rejuvenation with any hope real accomplishment.

He gave me these views and asked to be informed if I were furnished any details our impending line approach this thorny problem. He readily agreed Dutch military authorities had committed very stupid blunder in their treatment Republic leaders. While Spaak knows our general attitude vis-à-vis Dutch procedures, this particular brief meeting was not occasion for me to elaborate to him personally and in detail our position as set forth Department's airgram January 5, 11:50 a. m.,³ and Depcirtel December 31, 1 a. m.⁴ However, if you decide to send me further details as to our contemplated action in SC which can be relayed to Spaak, such further interview would appear appropriate occasion further to develop detail our basic point of view.

Repeated The Hague 5.

KIRK

³ Not printed.

⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 617.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State¹*

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, January 18, 1949—5:55 p. m.

59. Following is latest draft of revised working paper on Indonesian draft resolution which the Cuban, Norwegian and Chinese are prepared to join US in sponsoring:

"The SC,

"Recalling its resolutions of 1 August 1947, 25 August 1947, and 1 November 1947, with respect to the Indonesian question;

"Taking note with approval of the reports submitted to the SC by its Committee of Good Offices for Indonesia;

"Considering that its resolutions of 24 December 1948, and 28 December 1948, have not been fully carried out;

"Considering that continued occupation of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of the Netherlands is incompatible with the restoration of good relations between the parties and with the final achievement of a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute; and that the establishment and maintenance of law and order throughout Indonesia is a necessary condition of the achievement of the expressed objectives and desires of both parties;

"Noting with satisfaction that the parties continue to adhere to the

¹ Repeated in telegram 59, January 19, 7 p. m., to Brussels and in 48 to The Hague.

principles of the *Renville* agreement and agree that free and democratic elections should be held throughout Indonesia for the purpose of establishing a Constituent Assembly at the earliest practicable date, and further agree that the SC should arrange for the observation of such elections by an appropriate agency of the UN; and that the representative of the Netherlands has expressed his government's desire to have such elections held not later than October 1, 1949;

"Noting also with satisfaction that the Government of the Netherlands plans to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia by January 1, 1950, if possible, and, in any case, during the year 1950;

"Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in order that the rights, claims and position of the parties may not be prejudiced by the use of force;

"(1) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to insure the immediate discontinuance of all military operations, calls upon the Government of the Republic simultaneously to order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, and calls upon both parties to cooperate in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order throughout the area affected;

"(2) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17 December 1948, in the Republic of Indonesia, and to permit the officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to return at once to Jogjakarta in order that they may discharge their responsibilities under paragraph (1) above and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom, including administration of the city of Jogjakarta. The Netherlands authorities shall afford to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia such facilities as may reasonably be required by that government for its effective function in Jogjakarta and for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia.

"(3) Recommends that, in the interest of carrying out the expressed objectives and desires of both parties to establish a federal, independent, and sovereign United States of Indonesia at the earliest possible date, negotiations be undertaken as soon as possible by representatives of the Government of the Netherlands and representatives of the Republic of Indonesia with the assistance of the Commission referred to in paragraph (4) below on the basis of the principles set forth in the *Linggadjatti* and *Renville* agreements, and taking advantage of the extent of agreement reached between the parties regarding the proposals submitted to them by the US representative on the Committee of Good Offices on September 10, 1948; and in particular, on the basis that:

"(A) The establishment of the Interim Federal Government which is to be granted the powers of internal government in Indonesia during the interim period before the transfer of sovereignty, shall be the result of the negotiations and shall take place not later than March 15, 1949; provided that if no agreement is reached by March 1, 1949, the Commission referred to in paragraph (4) below shall immediately report to the SC with its recommendations for a solution of the difficulties;

“(B) The elections which are to be held for the purpose of choosing representatives to an Indonesian Constituent Assembly should be completed by October 1, 1949; and

“(C) The transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia should take place at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 1 July 1950.

“(4) The Commission shall henceforth be known as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. The Commission shall act as the representative of the SC in Indonesia and shall have all of the functions assigned to the Committee of Good Offices by the SC since December 16, and the functions conferred on it by the terms of this resolution. The Commission shall act by majority vote, but its reports and recommendations to the SC shall present both majority and minority views if there is a difference of opinion among the members of the Commission.

“The Consular Commission is requested to facilitate the work of the UN Commission for Indonesia by providing military observers and other staff and facilities to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under the Council’s resolutions of 24 and 28 December 1948, as well as under the present resolution and shall temporarily suspend other activities.

“The Commission shall assist the parties in the implementation of this resolution, and shall assist the parties in the negotiations to be undertaken under paragraph (3) above, and is authorized to make recommendations to them or to the SC on matters within its competence. Upon agreement being reached in such negotiations, the Commission shall make recommendations to the SC as to the nature, powers, and functions of the UN agency which should remain in Indonesia to assist in the implementation of the provisions of such agreement until sovereignty is transferred by the Government of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.

“The Commission shall have authority to consult with representatives of areas in Indonesia other than the Republic, and representatives of such areas may be permitted to participate in the negotiations referred to in paragraph (3) above.

“The Commission, or such other UN agency as may be established in accordance with its recommendation under the second preceding paragraph, is authorized to observe on behalf of the UN the elections to be held throughout Indonesia and to make recommendations regarding the conditions necessary to ensure that such elections are free and democratic and to guarantee freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that such guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or reprisals.

“The Commission should assist in achieving the earliest possible restoration of the civil administration of the Republic. To this end it shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend the extent to which, consistent with reasonable requirements of public security and the protection of life and property, areas controlled by the Republic under the *Renville* agreement (outside of the city of Jogjakarta) should be progressively returned to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, and shall supervise

such transfers. The recommendations of the Commission may include provision for the economic well-being of the population of the areas involved in such transfers. The Commission shall, after consultation with the parties, recommend which, if any, Netherlands forces shall be retained temporarily in any area in order to assist in the maintenance of law and order. If either of the parties fails to accept the recommendations of the Commission mentioned in this paragraph, the Commission shall report immediately to the SC with its further recommendations for a solution of the difficulties.

"The Commission shall render periodic reports to the Council and special reports whenever the Commission deems necessary.

"The Commission shall employ such observers, officers and other persons as it deems necessary.

"(5) Requests the SYG to make available to the Commission such staff, funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for the discharge of its functions.

"(6) Calls upon the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cooperate fully in giving effect to the provisions of this resolution."

JESSUP

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY NEW YORK, January 18, 1949—11:27 p. m.

62. Canadian and British Delegations agree to text of draft working paper contained mytel 59, January 18, and will recommend to their governments that they should support and vote for this resolution. We are hopeful that governments will support. McNaughton urged that sponsorship by seven members would appear to be ganging up.

Fawzi, Egypt, has agreed to support this resolution subject to contrary instructions from his government and is prepared to make final commitment to this effect by Wednesday evening. He is doubtful re sponsorship since he wishes to be free to "speak in favor of stronger resolution and possibly to support stronger amendments." If these amendments not passed, he would support our resolution.

In agreement with Canadian and British Delegations, we gave text to French Delegation on confidential basis not to be passed on to parties. We advised we thought resolution in this form commanded support of seven members of Council. We expressed hope that changes we had made since previous draft would make this resolution more acceptable to them and enable them to abstain.

Am meeting Parodi¹ Wednesday morning.

JESSUP

¹ Permanent French Representative at the United Nations.

501.BC Indonesia/1-1949 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, January 19, 1949—3:03 p. m.

US URGENT

64. Jessup called on Parodi at his office this morning and had an hour's conversation with him alone regarding latest draft Indonesian working paper. Jessup reviewed essential elements in background of situation stressing following points.

1. SC cannot possibly acquiesce in theory that republic which is represented at SC table no longer exists.

2. Netherlands has not complied with SC resolution particularly on release of prisoners and in its arguments on this point has not relied on jurisdictional grounds but has attempted to explain its degree of noncompliance.

3. SC cannot approve fruits of resort to force particularly when resort to force was involved in breach of truce agreement.

General aspects of over-all situation in Asia and Europe were also mentioned and stress laid on fact that a difficult situation now exists from which, in common interests of all, way out must be found.

Parodi was told that China, Cuba and Norway had agreed to be co-sponsors of the resolution and that the possibility was not excluded that Canada, UK and Egypt might also join in sponsoring, although this was by no means assured even though those three had definitely indicated they would vote for resolution. It was noted that there were three alternative possible developments.

1. That the French would veto, which would be bad for SC and also for Dutch position in that opinion would say that they had no reasonable basis for their position but were protected merely by another colonial power and that this in turn would have bad repercussions for French position in Indochina;

2. That the resolution might be passed by seven votes with France abstaining but that Dutch would be defiant with inevitable repercussions in New Delhi Conference and demands for sanctions against Dutch;

3. That through cooperation of France, US and other states, resolution could be passed in friendly business-like atmosphere and acquiesced in by Dutch.

Changes made in working paper were then explained in detail. Parodi said the new text was a great improvement and represented a major effort to meet divergent views to which Jessup referred. With reference to possibility of French veto, Parodi said that on basis of this draft he would telegraph Paris recommending that they merely abstain. He said he could not promise that they would not veto but he

thought he would be authorized to abstain. The abstention would be based on their jurisdictional argument which Parodi still considers entirely sound. Responding to Jessup's suggestion that further proceedings in SC should be in calm negotiating atmosphere without recriminations and with further reference to ultimate solution of problem, Parodi agreed to endeavor to persuade Netherlands representatives to take an accommodating attitude. He remarked that their military action in Indonesia was brutal and unwise, and felt that some of their Army and colonial personnel had acted badly. He indicated general agreement with Jessup's over-all estimate of situation and necessity of finding way out in the light of common interests. Jessup said that he would in turn try to persuade Palar and Rau to take a moderate attitude in SC. Parodi inquired whether any amendments might be accepted in course of SC discussions and was told USUN had no idea what might be proposed or what might be acceptable but that we would maintain our position of endeavoring to negotiate any reasonable changes and would hope that no sudden votes would be forced before opportunity was afforded for discussions among interested members.

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/1-1949: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 19, 1949—5 p. m.

95. Gocus 554.

1. Made copy material parts US working paper for British Consul General at his request and went over all provisions with him. He felt personally Netherlands should accept this program but was aware their hostile position. Thought part providing immediate restoration govt authority of Republican leaders in Jogja probably most objectionable to Netherlands. Objected to form of paragraph 4 on technical ground SC has no authority transfer services MilObs to UNCom but can merely request as MilObs orders for some countries at least put them entirely at disposition their respective Consulates General. Withdrew objection made yesterday that idea UNCom inconsistent with idea of recognition Republic as party. Wondered at practicability of some provisions but stated that in light of present difficulties he had nothing better to offer. Characterized Netherlands military action this time as "worse than crime, a blunder." Had personal[ly] hoped Assembly will induce agreement "prominent persons" from Republican areas but seemed to have no specific information.

2. Supomo and Darma called regarding telephonic invitation transmitted through Republic delegate to Sjahrir to call on GOC. Republic delegates reported:

(a) Sjahrir asks for written invitation. This GOC has decided not to give. Sjahrir suggested off record that living conditions in Prapat good except for lack news and feared formal record would undo effect of conditions revealed by Bangka report.

(b) Sjahrir as well as Sukarno and Salim had been asked pledge when transfer to Bangka was contemplated not to "take any action" construed to mean engage in political activity. All three refused, no further suggestion made them. This contradictory Schuurman story (Gocus 540¹).

(c) Sjahrir talked with Drees last night. Atmosphere extremely cordial but no modification of Netherlands position suggested. No further talks with Drees or other Netherlands officials scheduled at this time. Sjahrir speaking informally with Federal Assembly leaders and seeing Anak Agung Gde Agung frequently.

(d) Sjahrir promised Republic delegation he will make no commitment as to substance of any plan unless with approval Republic Govt by which he means Hatta Cabinet.

(e) Hatta not coming Batavia but definitely refused invitation given by Netherlands officials who went Bangka yesterday. (Gocus 553² paragraph 2).

(f) Darma has rejected proposal made him by Federal Assembly that he go alone see Hatta as he fears this would make it appear he was acting as emissary Federal Assembly. This morning Anak Agung proposed Darma accompany Federal Assembly Committee established to contact "prominent persons" in order to introduce group to Hatta. It feared without such friendly introduction Hatta will refuse even to see or talk with Federalists. Darma after consultation with Republic delegation refused and stands on position he will go to Hatta only with other 2 as official Republic delegate.

(g) USDel expressed willingness see Sjahrir privately any time. Republic delegate stated Sjahrir for moment fully occupied. Gathered impression Sjahrir prefers not to have such talk at this time. This may be in light of consistent practice in past to keep much to himself or may indicate preference not to be questioned at this time regarding current activities.

(h) USDel asked whether Republic delegation now felt they might through Federal Assembly achieve amicable settlement from Netherlands independent of UN action. They replied negatively. Darma expressed view that only hope was combination of international pressure exerted through UN and active guerrilla warfare and in between skillful diplomacy on part Republic leaders. Only through continuance international pressure and UN organ they feel can agreement be reached or enforced.

(i) Lest there be any misunderstanding. USDel reiterated GOC attitude that Republicans perfectly free to reach any arrangements

¹ Telegram 68, January 12, p. 142.

² Telegram 93, January 18, p. 166.

they desire but that GOC itself could not participate in facilitating or authenticating any agreement resulting from force exerted upon a party not able thereafter to act as free agent. They reaffirmed previous position no acceptance by Republic of BIO decree even as basis further negotiations unless restoration both complete freedom and governmental authority to regular Republican leaders.

3. GOC forwarded Nethdel today for transmission Sukarno and Hatta "by most expeditious channel" message from Palar cabled here by UNSec accordance procedure worked out SC meeting 17 January. Message calls on Republican Government to send officials Lake Success to give Palar directives and SC first-hand account of recent happenings. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-1849 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1949—6 p. m.

58. Immed fol tel² contains latest text draft res on Indonesia which is presently being discussed with members SC and with parties concerned at Lake Success (reurtel 86, Jan. 18). This draft already has support China, Norway and Cuba; British and Canadian delegates have approved subject concurrence their govts.

Purpose further discussions draft res is to meet if possible three major requirements: (1) Consonance with UN Charter and with views majority members SC; (2) Nearest approach to acceptability to parties, i.e. Neth Govt and Repub of Indonesia; (3) Establishment by means of SC resolution of conditions in Indonesia favorable to decrease in hostilities and long-range solution based on *Renville* Agreement.

It is position of US that, if above requirements are to be met, one party to dispute, namely Repub of Indonesia, cannot be considered as having been obliterated by Neth mil action. This does not mean that US considers it feasible in present circumstances to reconstitute Repub in sense *status quo ante*, but rather that, for brief period pending establishment by negotiation of Interim Govt which will attract not only Repub leaders but their followers as well, Repub leaders must be freed and placed in position freely to negotiate after establishing contact with their colleagues, their adherents, and non-Repub Indonesian leaders. You will note that draft res does not require evacuation Dutch troops to position Dec 18, but only empowers Commission to recommend withdrawal from areas other than Jocoja when and if Comm

¹ Repeated as 47 to The Hague.

² See footnote 1, p. 171.

deems such withdrawal consistent with requirements for establishment effective Interim Govt.

Dept believes Spaak can effectively influence Dutch in direction draft res, and requests you follow up your previous conversation along lines above indicated at earliest possible opportunity.

LOVETT

856d.00/1-1849 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1949—6 p. m.

49. Dept appreciates reporting and suggestions contained your recent tels re Indonesia, and agrees (urtel 53, Jan 18¹) that time may now be ripe for negotiation SC res which will meet complex requirements case. We do not feel, however, that Western Union is suitable group within which to find solution or to influence Dutch on this issue, although we agree with you on desirability having US play less conspicuous public role.

Draft SC res is now being discussed by Jessup with other members SC and with representatives of parties concerned with objective of meeting fol requirements: (1) Consonance with UN Charter and with views majority members SC; (2) Nearest approach to acceptability to parties, i.e. Neth Govt and Repub of Indonesia; (3) establishment by means SC resolution of conditions in Indonesia favorable to decrease in hostilities and long-range solution based on *Renville* Agreement.

In light of your recent reports, and as result influence upon Neth of other allied nations, it may be that adequate and effective res can be agreed.

Please keep Dept closely informed re further evidence break in solidarity Neth public and Govt on this issue. You will realize, of course, that we do not seek fall present coalition Govt, but rather that it modify its position on Indonesia.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/1-2049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

THE HAGUE, January 20, 1949—6 p. m.

57. At social occasion last night, Lovink,¹ in course conversation with Embassy officer, said that SC resolution in form Netherlands had

¹ A. H. J. Lovink, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Office.

learned from press was entirely unacceptable and added that their objections were to what he called "body" of resolution. Continuing Lovink asked if officer wanted know what Dutch would accept. Officer said "yes, if you want us to know."

Subsequently at Stikker's home with Lovink present, Stikker handed us following typed text (in form SC resolution) dated January 18, which he described as text he had prepared in effort to find solution for Indonesian dilemma. Paper had been discussed and approved by certain cabinet colleagues, but not cabinet as whole nor with Batavia, and must therefore be understood as completely unbinding on Netherlands Government. However, he believed cabinet would be prepared to comply fully with resolution couched in terms to effect indicated. Text follows:

"The SC,

"Considering its resolution of August 1, 1947, August 25, 1947 and November 1, 1947 with respect to the Indonesian question;

"Taking note of the reports submitted by the Commission of Good Offices;

"Of the opinion that the resolution of December 24, 1948 and December 28, 1948 have not been fully complied with;

"Considering that all parties involved in the dispute desire that Indonesia will become a sovereign and independent federal state linked with the Netherlands in a union on a basis of equality in accordance with the principles of Linggadjati and the *Renville*;

"That for these ends the parties deem it necessary that free and democratic elections be held in the whole of Indonesia in order to create a constituent assembly which is to draw up a constitution for the USI and to determine with the Netherlands the conditions on which the Netherlands-Indonesian union will be established;

"That the Netherlands Government has declared its willingness to do everything in its power to organize these elections in the third quarter of 1949;

"That the Netherlands Government wishes to transfer the sovereignty, as soon as the above-mentioned measures have been carried out and, inasmuch as it depends on this government, no later than 1950;

"That the Netherlands forces will have to be withdrawn gradually from Indonesia, as the USI will have organized its own federal troops which are necessary to ensure the maintenance of law and order, taking into account the provisions in the agreement concerning defense between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the USI linked together in the Netherlands-Indonesian union;

"That the establishment of a national federal government for the whole of Indonesia is essential for the transition to the free and sovereign USI and to the free and democratic constitutional organization of all Indonesian territories including those over which the Republic exercised *de facto* authority until December 18, 1948;

"That the Netherlands Government has declared its intention to establish such a government within one month;

"That in order to achieve this, consultations are already taking place between Indonesian federalists and prominent persons from Republican circles;

"That the realisation of the programme outlined above will do full justice to the national aspirations of the Indonesian peoples;

"That the cooperation of the SC in this respect contributes to safeguarding the rights and claims of all parties involved in the dispute and could promote a speedy solution of the existing difficulties;

"Appeals to the parties;

"1. To harmonise their efforts for the realisation of this programme,

"2. To cease all hostilities in the meantime and to release without delay all political prisoners who are willing to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution.

"Resolves:

"To appoint a representative of the SC who is to be accredited as special plenipotentiary to the HRC in Indonesia and who will have the following tasks:

"1. To observe the implementation of this programme by the Netherlands Government.

"2. To call for the cooperation of all national forces in Indonesia in the realisation of this programme;

"3. To render assistance to the parties in the settlement of their dispute.

"The special plenipotentiary will submit reports to the SC regularly and whenever he deems it [necessary?] to do so.

"The special plenipotentiary will appoint observers, officers and staff as he deems desirable.

"The activities of the CGO and the consular committee are suspended.

"The SYG of the UN is requested to make available to the special plenipotentiary staff, funds and whatever may be required besides.

"Resolves:

"To request the government of blank to recommend a person to the SC whom the Council could appoint as its special plenipotentiary".

Stikker said he had secured postponement chamber debate Indonesia past week because fear temper likely displayed would inflame public opinion and seriously harm foreign relations. Resentment was growing against increasing evidence of SC intervention, under US leadership, into internal affair of Netherlands without any pretense of consultation or negotiation with Netherlands Government. This he said could not be understood by Netherlands, of country which had always been and still seemed to consider itself as friendly. He repeated, with greatest emphasis, that Netherlands could not accept or comply with resolution, arrived at in such fashion, which aimed at restoring the former Republican regime, with all its potentialities for domination of all Indonesia.

Stikker, with Lovink joining in, went on to say that Netherlands Government resented handling and above all the leakage (or release) of US draft resolution, as it had made Drees mission Indonesia futile and highly embarrassing, since it put US on record, in the eyes of all Indonesians and Asians generally, as taking sides openly with the Republic and aiming at its full restoration. This resolution, if adopted, in Asiatic eyes, meant "finis" for Holland in Indonesia, and of western prestige, influence and, largely, of western interests in that part of the world. Its consequence, inevitably, would be the long term impoverishment of Holland, and the almost certain growth of Communism here, as in France and Italy, into a force that threatened its democratic existence. If Holland was forced to take that road, the Dutch people would do so rather than submit to what they would regard as gravest injustice.

Stikker was reminded that Netherlands Government had taken its course in Indonesia after fullest and frankest friendly warning of the danger involved. It was also pointed out to him that Netherlands Government had indicated when it took military action Indonesia that it sought only to remove those forces in the Republic which were responsible for chaos and terror and which had restrained its government from coming to agreement with the Netherlands authorities, but that now it appeared that Netherlands had much more far reaching objectives and really sought to root out the Republic once and for all. His reply was that, notwithstanding opposition of some prominent individuals and certain parties, it was still the firm intention of Netherlands Government to deal with "prominent leaders" of the Republican regime, as had been agreed with the federalists and publicly announced. Their intentions, however they claim, were being completely crossed up by SC; Lovink pleaded for postponement of SC on resolution for long enough to permit working out of text Netherlands could comply with or progress to be made on negotiations currently going on in Indonesia.

Much of above has already been reported to Department and is repeated now only as showing thinking of Foreign Office has undergone little if any change by important and conciliatory revisions in original Jessup resolution which we believe should have gone long way to meet Dutch point of view. English colleague, however, who also received copy Dutch proposed resolution does not see eye to eye with us entirely.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/1-2049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, January 20, 1949—9 p. m.

58. In conversations with Lovink this morning, following indication Foreign Office was in receipt revised draft SC resolution (as set out Deptel 43, January 18¹) considerable satisfaction was expressed to Embassy officer over numerous revisions. Lovink said text, on first reading, seemed to be "negotiable", with one all-important exception, namely, the provisions for restoration Republican Government. He said quite frankly that Netherlands Government could not accept any arrangement that meant or would be generally interpreted in Indonesia to signify the return of the "old Republican gang" to power. That regime was one frankly based upon control by military force, and meant fear, intimidation, corruption and abuse to millions of Indonesians, both outside and within Republic areas. It was a Javanese regime, whose aims, as every informed person knew, were to play the dominating role in all Indonesia.

If that regime were to be installed once again, said Lovink, it would mean not only slap in the face of the Dutch, but the trooping back of all those who had played role in it before, and result in a virtual paralysis of any effort to establish democratic system in Indonesia generally. In Dutch judgment, which was based upon centuries in Indonesia, such step would be almost guarantee of future strife in Indonesia among its various constituent parts, and outright jeopardy of the law and order, peaceful economic recovery, and democratic development which Indonesia sorely needs, and which it is Dutch intent to assist to best of its ability.

Lovink said it was completely false to think that Republican Government as such had any claim to merit or consideration as governing body. Dutch had found on occupation that civil administration was either completely lacking, or corrupt or woefully weak. As symbol, it was force for chaos and not for order, reconstruction and peace. A new government, based on best elements of Republic, plus other well known figures, in their judgment, would find ready acceptance by people of Republic area and the cooperation of federalist areas, which, in Dutch opinion, were being almost completely disregarded in SC thinking.

Lovink indicated Dutch are seeking to secure the agreement of a group consisting of Hatta, Sjahrir, Leimena, Darmasetiawan, and one or two others, to undertake the task of working out basis for bringing the former Republican areas into the interim federal government.

BARUCH

¹ See footnote 1, p. 163.

501.BC Indonesia/1-2049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Acting Secretary of State*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, January 20, 1949—10 p. m.

96. Gocus 555. Following letter to GOC dated 20 January received 1015 signed Sudjono, Secretary General RepDel:

"I have honor to refer to my letter dated 11 January requesting that members RepDel be permitted to accompany GOC on any visit they may make to Republican leaders and to reply of Netherlands authorities of 14 January in which possibility of our visit to Bangka was envisaged. I also wish to refer to your letter of 19 January forwarding copy of telegram from Sobolev, Assistant Secretary General of UN secretariat, regarding provision of facilities for exchange of official messages between Indonesian delegation Lake Success and Republican Government at Bangka and Prapat and regarding arrangements for safe conduct of Republican officials to Lake Success.

Ten days have passed since our original request to contact our leaders. You will appreciate that over this period our need to talk with these leaders has become more pressing and now in light of recent instructions from President of SC as conveyed from Sobolev's telegram is extremely urgent.

I should therefore be grateful if Committee could arrange with Netherlands authorities to permit members RepDel in Djakarta to visit Bangka and Prapat without delay. It would be further appreciated if I could receive a reply to this request today."

Sudjono orally explained RepDel has private information Federal group going Prapat tomorrow but willing postpone visit if RepDel given chance to go first. Sudjono emphasized importance RepDel see Sukarno before Federal visit.

As chairman of week US representative transmitted above letter urgently NethDel in letter referring also paragraph 7 of GOC report dated January 16 and requested prompt action. At time of delivery US representative, after GOC discussion, suggested orally to NethDel that GOC visit Sukarno tomorrow by GOC plane, not displaying any knowledge of course of Federal plan re visit tomorrow. Riphagen (Schuurman is ill) explained might not be time to make necessary arrangements. Pointed out to him only motor transport Medan to Prapat and return would be required. Riphagen confirmed Palar message to Sukarno and Hatta transmitted expeditiously by telegraph yesterday (Gocus 554). Stated Hatta and other Bangka exiles now have freedom of island and that auto is assigned them.

At 1730 Riphagen called to give answers. Promised confirmatory letters later tonight. He explained Federal Assembly committee going Prapat tomorrow by special plane. They hope induce Sukarno to ac-

company them immediately to Bangka and there help induce Hatta to join all of them in return trip Batavia. NethDel states three RepDel members perfectly free to go along in special plane. USRep asked whether RepDel could go Prapat or Bangka subsequent day if unwilling accompany Federals. Riphagen replied that this last opportunity, that thereafter RepDel would have to make all arrangements themselves. Asked me transmit this message to RepDel immediately as arrangements require speedy completion.

As to request of GOC, NethDel would appreciate it if GOC went Prapat at later time. USRep asked whether GOC could go tomorrow anyway if it insisted, stating this unlikely. He stated no, impossible get reply in time from Medan as to necessary arrangements. Moreover, said frankly GOC would interfere with consultations that are to go on. Emphasized only Indonesians will go tomorrow, that problem is one for Federal Assembly with which Netherlands does not interfere. Suggests government [*GOC*] go Sunday or later if anyone still in Prapat to visit. His hope Sukarno and Hatta will return with Federalists to Batavia probably Saturday. Stated all this given me subject request "not for publication," as it will be embarrassing if exiles do not agree to come Batavia. USRep stated he would give no information directly to press and would ask colleagues not to do so. Gave him to understand however that this will probably become part of GOC report which will be released in ordinary manner and that it would be reported to Department which was free to use information as to [*it*] wishes. Conditions Batavia such that USDel anticipates most of this will be general information tomorrow morning anyway.

Sudjono and Supomo arrived 1815. Gave them NethDel answer. They decided it essential that they and Darmasetiawan go along tomorrow in Federal plane as it is important that before Sukarno responds to Federal overtures he be fully informed as to current situation. They will insist at Prapat on seeing Sukarno before he talks with Federals. They fear that their going in company press [apparent omission]. They asked that GOC issue press statement tomorrow morning explaining reason for their trip. Explained this impossible for many reasons. It was decided they would write letter to GOC explaining their position. This can be made subject of later public release either by GOC report to SC or their own volition. They will call later tonight and prepare this letter after official Netherlands letter has been received.

Army information service informed all American correspondents (also French Press Agency representative) that army will hereafter refuse them special military facilities without which they cannot go into military areas. This explained as result of their "prejudiced reporting". Pope warned earlier this week his position here jeopardized

by Chicago *Tribune* editorial characterizing Juliana and Spoor as "war criminals". This follows recent vituperative Netherlands newspaper attacks on UP and AP correspondents. Reporters called in body on Rittman, government information service head, who asked them file no story until he could see them at sixteen hours at which time order rescinded. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-2149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED US URGENT BATAVIA, January 21, 1949—7 p. m.
 NIACT

101. Gocus 557. GOC sending following message to President SC today:

"Pursuant cable 18 January transmitting Palar message, GOC delivered message to Netherlands Delegation for relay to Sukarno at Prapat and Hatta at Bangka.

Netherlands Delegation advised UN today that Sukarno has communicated his intention to reply Palar after he received answer to telegram which he dispatched to Hatta re Palar message.

GOC has likewise been informed by Netherlands Delegation that telegraphic communication has been received from Hatta requesting following message be transmitted to GOC.

'Chairman GOC, Jakarta. Have honor to request you first to forward Palar Lake Success following message answering his request: "Cable received. Qualified officials will be despatched to Lake Success. Necessary steps will be taken immediately".

Second request GOC assistance to obtain necessary facilities for despatch of Sjahrir and Leimena to Lake Success. Please, your further assistance for arrangement personal meeting Sjahrir, Leimena with me at Bangka before their departure. Copy of this being sent Sukarno. Signed Hatta.'

Netherlands Delegation will convey to GOC for forwarding to you any message from Sukarno.

GOC taking steps carry out Hatta's second request and will advise further". Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

856d.00/1-2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, January 22, 1949—2 p. m.

280. Schuman¹ said to me last evening, "I beg of you to tell your government that I am most unhappy about Indonesian situation and apprehensive that your policy may in the long run help only the Communists. I know only too well", he said, "that the Dutch have been stupid, but facing facts and having in mind our situation in Indochina I hope your people will not be too severe with them."

I told Schuman that I would transmit his message but at the same time I took occasion again to emphasize our views on the question.

CAFFERY

¹ French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

501.BC Indonesia/1-2149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1949—2 p. m.

54. Dept appreciates your efforts reach common viewpoint with Dutch on SC resolution. Parallel efforts have been made by Neth Emb here to influence text. We have tried keep center of discussions in Lake Success where our reprs have worked to find draft which would express views of SC and also be acceptable to Dutch. Urtel 62, Jan 21,² repeated NY as focal point for discussion this problem to avoid crossing wires. We perceive risks in discussing resolution in more than one place.³

ACHESON

¹ Repeated in telegram 37 (Usgoc 281). January 24, 7 p.m., to Batavia.

² Not printed.

³ For remarks by Ambassador Jessup at the meeting of the Security Council on January 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 23, 1949, pp. 104-105. The text of the resolution introduced, jointly sponsored by China, Cuba, Norway, and the United States, was sent in telegram 53, January 22, 3 p. m., to New Delhi, for possible use at the Asian conference there. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Egypt were expected to support the resolution, France abstaining. "Unless Russians veto or some unforeseen development occurs, SC will probably adopt res with minor modifications next week." (501.BC Indonesia/1-2249) For text of resolution as introduced, see SC, *4th yr.*, *Suppl.* (Jan.), pp. 53-56.

856d.00/1-2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BRUSSELS, January 22, 1949—4 p. m.

115. In view urgency sense Department's telegram 58, January 19, its contents at once conveyed Loridan¹ who said he would pass it on to Spaak. He expressed personal opinion that latter would not be in agreement with American proposed resolution.

Today Spaak informed Embassy that at same time we requested him use his influence with Netherlands, Dutch Ambassador had made similar request for him use his influence with US. He said he would do his best carry out both requests. He could not, however, bring himself support our draft resolution and he thought proposed United Nations commission supervision in Indonesia would prove to have too complicated task and if constituted was in all probability doomed to be unsuccessful.

He had recommended to Dutch that they at once have some country possibly France propose resolution sense which would be to (a) give Dutch 15 days in which understanding may be reached, (b) require Dutch form federal government in month February, (c) call for elections during this year, (d) require transfer sovereignty to federal government in 1950. He thought it might even be possible set date, say July 1, 1950.

Spaak thought Dutch plan stand aside and let Sharir² on behalf Republicans negotiate with representatives other members proposed federation was big step forward. If these negotiations were successfully concluded in 15 days and if Dutch would then give United Nations above assurances, he inquired whether this would not actually accomplish what we were all endeavouring achieve? He said he had strongly counselled Dutch against taking any violent position vis-à-vis United Nations, though he did not so state, he presumably referred Stikker's statement regarding possibility Dutch withdrawal from United Nations.

Repeated The Hague 9.

KIRK

¹ Director-General of the Political Department, Belgian Foreign Office.

² Sutan Sjahrir.

501.BC Indonesia/1-2349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT BATAVIA, January 23, 1949—7 p. m.

104. Gocus 560.

1. Consideration recent reports conditions here and various discussions lead to following conclusions.

a. After 5 weeks military action immediate withdrawal Netherlands troops would cause general chaos and strengthen forces which thrive thereon. Believe this now recognized by moderate Republican leaders.

b. There is little possibility negotiation, restoration moderate Republican leadership, popular acceptance in Republican areas of any settlement reached unless some type relinquishment by Netherlands forces of fruits of military action.

c. Leaving situation as it is would result positively in months, possibly much longer period, guerrilla warfare and its normal consequences. Even if moderate Republican leaders would join in Federal program, believe it unlikely law and order can be restored for long period.

d. There must be no vacuum of power. Even with gradual withdrawal Netherlands authority Jogja, and then other areas, restoration Republic authority must go *pari passu*.

e. US resolution meets this in providing withdrawal Netherlands authority only as Republic in position take over.

f. Moderate Republican leaders with whom we are locally in contact, Leimena, Sjahrir, Darma, Supomo, have not yet had opportunity full study and unwilling commit themselves officially pending consultations with Republican heads but agree on US resolution as best solution that can now be offered. Critchley now won to this viewpoint also.

g. Any further delay in adoption US resolution will be dangerous. Although Netherlands may become more amenable international pressure as more and more aware of local military and economic difficulties, everyday sees growing strength extremist elements and problem moderate Republicans will become greater. Leimena puts great emphasis on this.

2. If US resolution is adopted and there is at least nominal Netherlands compliance therewith, new UN committee will face tremendous problems.

a. There will be great difficulty in getting people to accept again legitimate authority of moderate Republican leaders (Gocus 551²).

b. Even if general tendency is to accept such authority Jogja and other areas thereafter returned Republic administration, there will be problem maintaining security those areas high of extent which forces disorder have been unloosed.

c. Presumably penultimate sentence paragraph 4(F) of US resolution providing for temporary retention Netherlands forces in any

¹ Repeated in telegram 55, January 24, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 90, January 17, not printed.

area is intended apply not only to the areas outside of Jogja generally dealt with in that paragraph but also to city itself in situation described in paragraph 2. To avoid controversy it might be desirable insert phrase "including city of Jogjakarta" between the words "in an area" and "in order to" in 4(F).

d. However, if Netherlands forces are retained for more than briefest period after Republic administration is set up Jogja, there is grave danger administration would be looked upon as puppet agency. There will be immediate problem then organizing police force large enough maintain order to take place Netherlands troops. Leimena felt that international UN police force, at least 1,000, would be necessary or, failing that, a greatly augmented group military observers to perform this function. USDel explained impracticability these proposals. It might be possible, however, to organize a trustworthy police force on short notice out of disarmed members TNI and presently cooperating and noncooperating civil police but under precautions that would prevent recreation of TNI not fully subordinated to government itself. This technique could be used as other areas are progressively turned over to Republic civil administration as a means of gradually effecting withdrawal Netherlands troops.

e. Problem of getting scattered guerrilla forces cease hostilities will be far greater than year ago when forces were more closely organized in larger units, when there was operating Republican Government in continuing authority with coherent territory subject to its jurisdiction, and greater trust in international organization. Problem might even be greater in light underground statement that present military situation is one they had waited for with Netherlands military strength spread out too thinly over too wide area. Meeting this problem will require every possible technique of planes dropping leaflets, radio appeals (Sukarno can be particularly effective here if reputation can be restored), special contacts in field. In this connection, thought should be given to temporarily augmenting number military observers. Might be advisable to consider having them headed by one or two star general officer. Netherlands are stated to be very rank conscious in military affairs and it is believed neutral military direction can be most effectively exercised at highest possible level of rank. Immediate attention will have to be given to means of restoring to civil life "armed adherents" of Republic who cannot be utilized in federal armed forces and police forces or perhaps temporary "reconstruction battalion" to take up slack.

f. There will remain grave problem arising from personalities. As previously stated (Gocus 520³ paragraph 6C), difficult to have Republicans adhere to a federal interim government in which powerful forces will be Beel and Spoor. Moderates like Leimena emphasize this. Recognize practical difficulties involved but note some tendency on part Netherlands political groups to use Beel as scapegoat. This might be worthy of all possible encouragement.

g. Will tentatively explore these problems with local Republicans. As soon as Department can give any indication resolution is likely become operative, USDel either individually or with whole GOC, if pos-

³ Telegram 8, January 3, p. 119.

sible, could begin preliminary discussions with Sukarno, Hatta and possibly with Netherlands delegation with view to doing as much preparatory work as possible for UN committee. Only most complete technical preparation can minimize possibilities of failure in program which would have gravest consequences.

h. In light all that must be done before even initial steps are taken to implement resolution, it is suggested timetable is too finely drawn. Suggest paragraph 3C of resolution should provide that with respect date in paragraph 3A committee should report not one month before 15 March but on 1 March. Seems impossible there can be sufficient restoration stability for agreement on federal interim government on 15 February. Would be unfortunate for committee to begin career by being unable meet first deadline calling for premature statement inability parties agree.

Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-2449 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 24, 1949—noon.

106. Gocus 561. Sudjono, Supomo and Leimena called late 23 January. Plane which took first 2 named and Darma together with Federalists to Prapat and Bangka (Gocus 555¹) returned late yesterday but without Sukarno and Hatta as Netherlands had hoped.

Plane went first to Prapat where Sukarno gave Federalists following letter addressed to chairman Contact Committee of BFO dated 22 January: "In reply your letter dated 20 January handed me Friday by Messrs. Djumhana Wiriaatmadja and Ateng Kartanahardja, I have honor inform you I am willing attend meeting as mentioned in above-mentioned letter on condition:

1. That I and other members Republican Govt who now still detained by Netherlands be released;
2. That we would be acting as President and members of government of Republic of Indonesia".

According to Republicans, Sukarno stated he would leave details to Prime Minister Hatta.

Original group then went on to Bangka. Results of meeting were incorporated in following memo which unsigned but was prepared by Federal Contact Committee and stated by Republicans to be accurate.

"In meeting between BFO Contact Committee on one hand and Hatta and Assaat on other on January 23 at Menumbing Bangka no definite answer could be received from aforesaid Messrs. as they of

¹ Telegram 96, January 20, p. 184.

opinion that reply to invitation can be given only after they be in position to consult members of Cabinet who are easily to be collected viz: Leimena, Natsir, Laoh, Djuanda, Salim, Kusnan, Sastroamidjojo, Sultan of Jogja. As provisional reply, aforesaid Messrs. state they agree with reply given by Sukarno and Salim".

Republicans requested these documents be sent Dept soon as possible as they feel adjournment SC meeting Friday might have been caused by Netherlands representations that Sukarno and Hatta were about to enter into negotiations with Federalists.

Republicans gave us copy following telegram sent by Hatta to GOC on 21 January but up to present not yet received by GOC.

"Owing to PCJ broadcast, Netherlands Govt will not oppose despatching Republic leaders to New Delhi conference. In conformity our interrupted plan please [give] your assistance for obtaining facilities for departure president Sukarno, Hadji Salim, Mohamad Natsir and Surya Darma. Please your assistance for meeting President Sukarno's party with me at Bangka before departure". (Note: PCJ is Netherlands broadcasting system).

This telegram not covered by procedure set up in SC meeting of 17 January but failure to deliver shows Republic leaders not in free communication with GOC.

No indication yet whether Netherlands prepared to permit mission to go Lake Success but GOC will press matter today. (Gocus 558².)

There had been no detailed discussion of US working papers with Sukarno or Hatta. It was stated Hatta expressed his general approval but felt transfer sovereignty sometime in 1949 had great psychological importance.

Roem sent brief informal statement via Republicans stating Gieben of Justice Dept visited Bangka exiles 17 January and *inter alia* stated:

"Position of Netherlands Govt:

- a. Republic as political organization is no longer acknowledged.
- b. Republic authorities not acknowledged as such.
- c. Responsibility over former Republic territories is taken over by Netherlands.
- d. Netherlands are intending to continue their policy: establishment of interim government USI.

On island of Bangka we are free to move but we have to refrain ourselves from political activities with exception of those in line with policy Netherlands, as from very instant.

It is regarded not necessary for us to sign written statement that we are refraining ourselves from political activities".

Later reports specify only 2 of 4 party leaders referred to Gocus 559,³ paragraph 3, actually members Pasundan Parliament. Other 2,

² Telegram 102, January 21, not printed.

³ Not printed.

however, prominent party leaders. English Aneta has ignored whole affair. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-2549: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 25, 1949.

116. Gocus 566. Committee sending following report to SC today¹ with request for distribution members before meeting:

[“]a. *Republican mission to Lake Success.*

1. Committee refers to its telegram 21 January addressed to president SC reporting that committee had received request from Prime Minister Hatta to arrange facilities for Republican mission to Lake Success in accordance with procedure outlined at SC meeting 17 January. Committee presented request to Netherlands Delegation 21 January so that necessary clearances could be authorized. Committee was that time informed that question authorizing mission had been referred to Netherlands Government Hague. Committee has been informed that no decision has been reached by Netherlands Government regarding clearances and facilities for Republican representatives to proceed Lake Success. Therefore, Committee is not in position to make any arrangements for this mission.

b. *Status Republican leaders.*

2. On 24 January following letter same date was received by Committee from Secretary General Republican Delegation (text in Gocus 564²).

3. At 2100 hours, 24 January Committee delivered this letter to Netherlands Delegation. Committee's covering letter stated that copy of Republican delegation's letter 24 January would be forwarded to SC and requested that any comments that Netherlands delegation might care make be given to Committee before 1100 hours 25 January.

4. At 1930 January 24 Committee received from Netherlands delegation letter dated 24 January transmitting telegram from Prime Minister Hatta quoted in paragraph 4 of Republican delegation letter 24 January. In addition, Netherlands delegation letter continued 'in this connection I have been authorized to state that neither Netherlands Government nor Government Indonesia has either officially or unofficially stated its position regarding visit of Republican leaders to New Delhi Conference'. Netherlands letter did not state date

¹ For text of report in full, see SC, *4th yr., Suppl. (Jan.)*, pp. 62-65.

² Telegram 112, January 25, not printed; the quoted exchange of letters is printed in SC, *4th yr., Suppl. (Jan.)*, pp. 62-64.

on which telegram thus transmitted from Prime Minister Hatta had been filed, or explain delay in delivery.

5. Committee notes that 'PCJ' in Prime Minister's telegram is call-sign of Netherlands station at Hilversum. Presumably, broadcast to which Prime Minister Hatta refers related to news item which appeared in English edition Aneta 20 January as follows: 'Replying to a question, spokesman said Netherlands Government will not place any obstacle in their way should one of Republican leaders wish to travel to Lake Success or to New Delhi.' Committee has subsequently ascertained from the 'spokesman' referred to that he was not at time speaking officially under instructions from his government.

6. On 25 January, Committee received following letter same date from Netherlands delegation (text in Gocus 564).

7. At 1215 January 25 chairman of Committee informed representative of acting chairman Netherlands delegation that in light final paragraph of latter's letter 25 January Committee would be glad to receive any further comments that Netherlands delegation might have ready up to 1530 hours of same day. No further comments have been received.

c. Federalist approach to Republican leaders.

8. Secretary General of Republican delegation has forwarded to Committee copies of correspondence between chairman of contact committee of conference for federal consultation on one hand and President Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta on other. In reply to invitation from chairman of contact committee to attend a meeting of federalists in Batavia in connection with formation of federal interim government for Indonesia, the President and Vice President of Republic have indicated that such a meeting can only be considered after Republican leaders have been released and there has been opportunity for Republican Government to consider invitation."

Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-2649 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, January 26, 1949—8 p. m.

98. In long conversation this evening Van Royen, Netherlands, discussing draft resolution² freely and in cooperative spirit stated ex-

¹ Repeated in telegram 74, January 31, noon, to The Hague.

² For text of resolution, as amended, adopted by the Security Council on January 28 (UN document S/1234), see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 27, 1949, pp. 250-251. For summary of discussion on January 25, 27, and 28, see *ibid.*, January 30, 1949, p. 136.

pressly that he was sure some parts of draft resolution could definitely not be carried out. He has not yet received final instructions and hopes he will not be instructed to state to SC tomorrow that his government finds draft resolution "unacceptable". He seemed to anticipate instructions permitting a moderate statement. He definitely believes restoration of Republic Government to Jogja as required by paragraph 2 would be impossible of acceptance since it would likely undo results of Dutch action, and destroy their whole plan for establishing USI. He stressed feeling in Netherlands that SC is operating with complete distrust of Netherlands and imposing a guardianship over its operations in Indonesia and restricting its sovereignty there. These subjective considerations are in his opinion of major importance. On details he still considered very important the modification of paragraph 4(F) particularly concerning recommendations relative to elections in areas outside Republic but admitted it was unlikely they could get any member of SC to sponsor such an amendment. He does not accept the objection that change in this provision now would suggest Dutch unwillingness to allow fair conditions for elections in non-Republican territories. The general impression created by talk was that Netherlands is likely to make moderate statement and in practice to accept Republic as party to negotiations but not to carry out provisions regarding restoration of the government to Jogja. Possibilities and advantages of cooperative policy were strongly urged on him. Emphasis was laid on possible fruits of a cooperative attitude on Netherlands side which could be reciprocated by UN Commission in sincere effort to make plan envisaged by draft resolution work.

JESSUP

501.BC Indonesia/1-3149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, January 31, 1949.

126. Gocus 570. Following report sent SC today :

"1. United Nations Indonesian Commission held its first meeting at 1600, 29 January.

"2. On same day Commission met with Acting Chairman Netherlands Delegation who reported he had received no information from Netherlands Government with reference resolution of Security Council of January 28. Therefore he stated delegation not in position to take any action in compliance with resolution.

"3. Commission stressed to Acting Chairman importance of taking preliminary steps in compliance with resolution without delay. Acting Chairman promised inform Commission soon as he received instructions from his government.

"4. At 1600 January 31 no further information had been received by Commission except that matter was under discussion by Netherlands Cabinet". Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/1-2149 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, January 21 [31], 1949—2 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE NIACT

90. At request Foreign Office called on Stikker and received following information:

Yesterday immediately prior to Cabinet meeting to discuss and formulate answer to SC resolution, Beel called from Batavia and outlined plan for immediate solution of Indonesian questions, which they found necessary to keep secret for present, which Beel and the Cabinet agreed offered an excellent chance of complete success to achieve objectives of resolution without delay and sooner than contemplated in resolution. Beel stated he had discussed plan with Federalists and it was acceptable to them and they had in turn consulted available leaders of Repub who had found great merit in suggested approach and had consented to going with Federalist leaders to Bangka for joint meeting to be held today which Beel would probably be invited to attend.

Stikker expressed great optimism on this plan which had been presented to Cabinet and met with their approval. He did not feel at liberty to disclose any details of plan. I asked him if it was in any way reflection of our Canadian colleague's suggestion and he said it was in no way connected with this. He further stated that Critchley had already approached Dutch authorities and wished to know what they were going to do about resolution. He said Herremans had been consulted and was agreeable to allow reasonable length of time for Dutch response to SC resolution and that matter now rested in hands of Lisle who had expressed no opinion as far as Beel was aware.

Stikker said that object of his asking me to visit him was to have me request our government to do whatever was possible to grant Dutch Government at least two or three days delay in making reply to SC resolution because of his belief that satisfactory solution might be found in Beel's suggestion for meeting convened for today on Bangka and requested that I urgently communicate this to Department. He said instructions had been sent to Van Kleffens in similar vein and that Van Royen had been instructed in premises.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/1-3149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 31, 1949—7 p. m.
NIACT

81. Dept has learned informally from rep Neth Emb Wash that Neth Govt intends shortly to deliver to you note requesting that Cochran not be returned Indonesia as USRep on UN Comm.

As you are aware, principal reason why this Govt reposes hope in success of settlement of Indonesian affair along lines of SC's res of Jan 28 is influence which Cochran has with Soekarno, Hatta and other Repub leaders. Conversely, principal factor in our judgment militating against chance of success of settlement along lines SC res is influence of certain high officials of Indo Govt, chiefly Beel and Spoor. Dept would take extremely serious view of any formal request from Neth Govt that Cochran not be permitted to return to carry forward his excellent work, not only because of implication involved in any such request, but more importantly because of effect of Cochran's removal upon chances of long-term solution in Indonesia.

You are requested to go immed to FonMin and using foregoing state that you are instructed to say US does not desire to receive any such request.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/1-3149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium*¹

SECRET WASHINGTON, January 31, 1949—7 p. m.

95. Cochran plans leave New York 7:00 p. m. Feb 3 PanAm for Brussels where he expects remain through Sat proceeding Hague Sun. Suggest you inform Spaak in event he wishes see him. Also suggest you inquire whether in view broadened scope Commission's responsibility it is intended that Van Zeeland return Batavia. This inquiry not intended discredit Herremans who has been cooperative but to emphasize importance we attach success Commission's work.²

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 80 to The Hague.

² Similarly, telegram 18 to Canberra inquired whether the Australian Foreign Office intended to return the former Australian member of the UN SC GOC, Justice Richard C. Kirby, who had retired early in 1948, to the newly expanded UN Commission on Indonesia.

501.BC Indonesia/1-3149 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, January 31, 1949—8 p. m.

45. Usgoe 282. For Lisle from Cochran: Tentatively planning to leave second returning via Lake Success, Brussels, The Hague. When plans firm press announcement will be made here.

Dept believes it would be good tactics that UNCI not press matters but allow Dutch to adjust themselves to implications of SC action.¹ [Cochran.]

ACHESON

¹ This telegram was repeated to The Hague in telegram 84, February 1, 8 p. m., which also replied to telegram 90, January 31, p. 196. The Department regarded telegram 45 as a response to telegram 90. (501.BC Indonesia/2-149)

501.BC Indonesia/2-149

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*¹

[WASHINGTON, February 1, 1949.]

In the situation which now confronts the Security Council as a result of the resolution of 28th January, it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that the following considerations will have to be borne in mind.

1. So far as the Dutch are concerned, there is the danger that the Security Council may seek to impose a policy which the Dutch cannot implement and which may force them into flouting the authority of the Security Council. This may lead to the imposition of sanctions by the Security Council, whereupon the Netherlands might withdraw from the United Nations. Any such development would be bound to weaken the position of the Netherlands in the Western Union and to that extent would weaken Western Union itself. In Indonesia it will do no good to undermine the authority of the existing sovereign power at a time when an Indonesian Government is in no way ready to take over power.

2. So far as the Indonesians are concerned, there is the danger that they will focus their attention exclusively on getting rid of the Dutch and devote too little attention to preparations for the transfer of power by the Dutch. There is also a danger that the Security Council's Commission on Indonesia will intervene to such an extent in the negotiations that the Indonesians may leave matters too much in the hands of United Nations agents and not face up to their responsibilities in regard to a common policy agreed among themselves, and in regard to control of Indonesian forces. The result may be that, when

¹ Handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador (Franks) on February 10; see memorandum of February 11 by Mr. Hickerson, p. 224.

they achieve self-Government, there will be a state of disorder in the country, a general breakdown in the machinery of Government through weakness and inexperience, and that the Independent State of Indonesia will emerge as another centre of instability in the Far East rather than, as we hope, a peaceful, orderly and democratic member of the Asiatic anti-Communist group. If the transfer of power is not planned with care, and if the Indonesians do not now begin to look to the future as well as the present, such a situation is almost certain to arise.

3. The magnitude of the task in Indonesia is such that no agency of the United Nations can hope to bring about a satisfactory solution by its own efforts alone. As in other cases which have come before the Security Council, a successful outcome is only possible if both parties to the dispute can be induced themselves to make a real effort to achieve it. In Indonesia, it is the Indonesians who from now on have got to do the spadework, if they are to be in a position adequately to perform the full functions of Government by 1st July, 1950, when the transfer of power is due to take place in accordance with the Security Council resolution. For the Dutch, their duty lies in facilitating the progress towards self-Government and not interfering with the process.

4. The first step is to be the creation of a Federal Interim Government by 15th March, 1949. In order to do this, it will be necessary for the Federalists and the Republicans to come to an agreement on the composition of such a Government, and they should be urged to get on with this. When the Federal Interim Government has been set up, it is to be hoped that it will have sufficient influence to put a stop to guerilla warfare and sabotage, which can only increase the existing chaos in the country. The cessation of these activities should render it possible for the cease-fire to become a reality instead of a farce as it is at present.

5. Not until the cease-fire has become really operative and the authority of the Federal Interim Government is established will it be possible to proceed seriously to the next step, which is the holding of elections throughout Indonesia by 1st October. In view of the necessity of preparing electoral rolls, it will be by no means easy to complete the procedure by the due date. In addition to this task, the Federal Interim Government will have to create a police force and to build up the Federal armed forces of Indonesia against the transfer of power. The example of Burma makes it clear that private armies must be abolished and that the only forces in existence at the transfer of power apart from the Dutch forces (which should then finally withdraw) should be the Federal Indonesian forces under the direct control of the Central Government.

6. After the elections have been held, it will presumably be possible to set up the new Government of the United States of Indonesia, and in the few months which will then remain it will be necessary to ensure that the machinery of Government functions smoothly in order that the transfer of power can take place on 1st July 1950 with the minimum of dislocation.

7. In all the above, the agency of the Security Council can obviously help. But however large the agency may be, and however many observers it may have, it will be impossible for it to exercise more than

a general supervision over these developments in so vast an area. It can smooth over difficulties and iron out disputes but it cannot govern. It can urge upon the Dutch the relinquishment of authority in this or that sphere when it is clear that the Indonesians are capable of taking over. But it should be careful not to undermine Dutch authority before the Indonesians are ready to assume a given responsibility, since no authority at all will result in chaos. The principle must surely be that one administration must be in effective control, until another administration is in a position to assume that control. The fact that definite dates have been set for the various stages leading to the transfer of power should safeguard the Indonesians from any danger that the Dutch will deliberately delay the hand-over, always provided that the United Nations agency holds a watching brief. There is a greater danger that the Indonesians will not bestir themselves sufficiently to be ready to take over efficiently when the time comes.

In the light of the above considerations, it is the opinion of His Majesty's Government that it is now desirable—

(i) to urge the Dutch to give every facility to the United Nations agency and its observers and to the Indonesians to push on with the various steps necessary before the transfer of power takes place;

(ii) to bring home to the Indonesians, more especially in view of their temperament and comparative inexperience, the paramount necessity of reaching agreement amongst themselves and of proceeding with all speed to undertake the measures necessary to complete the various stages in the transfer of power.

501.BC Indonesia/2-249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 2, 1949.

136. Gocus 572. UNCFI today sent Netherlands delegation following letter:

"UNCFI notes with concern that as result failure Government of Netherlands to give appropriate instructions, it is not possible for Netherlands Delegation or other authorities in Indonesia to take any steps in compliance with resolution Security Council 28 January.

Resolution contemplates number of measures designed to make possible achievement of lasting settlement in Indonesia. As you know these include discontinuance military operations; restoration Republican Government to Jogjakarta; negotiations for settlement based on recreation Republic as party in position to negotiate freely and independently; participation in such negotiations of representatives of areas in Indonesia other than Republic; progressive transfer of areas outside Jogjakarta as defined by resolution to Republican administration and withdrawal Netherlands troops from such areas to extent

consistent with maintenance order. Parties and Commission will be unable take these measures until Government of Netherlands has indicated its willingness to comply with provisions of resolution and as beginning makes possible meeting of Republican Cabinet.

As representative of SC in Indonesia, Commission would be failing in its duty if it did not press for action on which depends welfare, perhaps even lives of great numbers people. In urging compliance with resolution at earliest possible moment, it draws attention to mandate given it by resolution which requires that unless parties have reached agreement on interim federal government by 15 February Commission itself must report to SC and make recommendations for solution of difficulties." Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 2, 1949—8 p. m.

138. Gocus 574.

1. Letter forwarded Gocus 572¹ prepared before receipt Usgoc 282² this a. m. In light last sentence your telegram, US representative will adopt cautious policy and wishes review problems which may arise before Cochran arrival so as not to operate cross purposes Department. Assume it desired UNCFI be sufficiently active during week not to compromise its position before all parties or set precedent of ineffectiveness. UNCFI activity may have further effect of tending to soften Netherlands' position and produce reasonable response. On other hand, appreciate that throwing whole matter back into SC, if any other solution remains, would be futile and, in light all national interests involved, dangerous. Subject your guidance, will follow pattern below in various contingencies pending Cochran arrival:

(a) If Netherlands fails answer re resolution (Gocus 571,³ paragraph 3), us representative will seek hold off further report to sc until beginning next week or, if UNCFI feels obligated make earlier report, will so phrase it that it will not provoke immediate action SC and will leave door open for subsequent Netherlands answer.

(b) If Netherlands rejects outright, which seems unlikely from UN official reports here, immediate report SC is probably mandatory.

(c) If Netherlands announces acceptance resolution but makes strong reservations as to material provisions, UNCFI will probably feel duty make clear to SC in light local conditions precise position assumed by Netherlands. However, if in effect answer is counter-

¹ *Supra.*

² Telegram 45, January 31, p. 198.

³ Telegram 129, February 1, not printed.

proposal which is fair and reasonable, US representative will induce UNCFI to report in such manner as will permit trial of Netherlands proposals and avoid having whole question again made subject general debate.

In this connection an informal social talk with Von Baarda, Netherlands Far Eastern office, last night brought opinion that Netherlands will accept resolution, that they wish remain on good terms with UN, that present stakes Western Union too large for them to risk international displeasure. Von Baarda thought UNCFI or successor UN agencies will be here almost two years. To test his reaction US representative asked him whether he anticipated great difficulties in restoration Republican administration Jogja. That part resolution clearly impossible to carry out, he said. Republican leaders would be given governmental status but their actual administration restored nowhere except to extent Republicans might ultimately be organized as one or more *negaras*.

(d) Meanwhile, UNCFI may find it necessary to continue exert pressure reference matters arising under SC action before 28 January resolution such as release political prisoners, Sjahrir-Leimena mission. Will seek avoid making these subject any SC report this week.

2. If US representative has not correctly construed Department policy in anticipation of above contingencies, request urgent reply.

3. Secret Beel letter to BFO (Gocus 571, paragraph 1 (c)), as translated impromptu by Supomo from Dutch, authorities BFO to "consider Republican leaders you have approached to be governmental personalities of a Republic whose status will depend on the people's will, considering the principle of equal status of member states within framework of Republic of the USI." Considering there is to be no expression of "people's will" until fall elections, and that USI is far in future, this seems nonsense and evasive to Republicans. Despite this, BFO today sent telegrams to Hatta and Sukarno stating their conditions accepted (Gocus 571, paragraph 1 (a)). Supomo, Darma and Sudjono believe it essential they see Hatta tomorrow at Bangka in order inform him they did not believe terms BFO telegram accurate in stating his conditions have been met. Have arranged necessary clearances from NethDel.

4. Republicans state considerable pressure being exerted by Netherlands today on members BFO to pass resolution condemning 28 January resolution. Anak Agung on Republican advice will try have BFO postpone action until Netherlands answer on resolution given. Republicans have been given to understand that Netherlands desire is to be able announce people of Indonesia themselves have rejected resolution. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-349

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1949.

Mr. Daridan¹ stated that he had been instructed by his government to urge the United States Government to instruct its representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in Batavia to take no hasty action during the next few days as regards Dutch implementation of the Security Council's resolution of January 28 so as not to hinder in any way the Dutch carrying out the plan that they claim to have for reaching a solution of the Indonesian problem. He said that his government is greatly concerned as regards this matter and feels strongly that the Dutch should be given every reasonable opportunity to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the Indonesian problem.

I replied that we would welcome any agreement which could be reached in Indonesia which would represent the free will of the parties to the dispute, particularly if such agreement is generally consonant with the Security Council's resolution and prior agreements between the parties. As regards the Dutch "plan" I said that we had heard of Dutch intentions along this line but had received no details and I could therefore make no comment save to point out that any agreement which did not include responsible and representative Republican leaders would not, in my opinion, be a desirable one nor an acceptable one in terms of the Security Council's resolution and *Renville*.

I added that so far as our representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia is concerned, I was sure he would take no steps which would prevent the functioning of any method of attaining a solution of the Indonesian problem, save where his responsibilities as such a representative required him to take action, such as reporting to the Security Council.

¹ Counselor of the French Embassy.

501.BC Indonesia/2-349: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1949—8 p. m.

94. *N. Y. Times* Feb 3 carries story by David Anderson from The Hague to effect that "It is stated here that US State Dept will exert its influence over SC's Comm for Indonesia to give Dutch 'reasonable

¹ Repeated as 54 to New York (for Jessup) and as 55 to Batavia (for Lisle).

time' to work out solution between themselves and Indonesians. Provisions of last week's SC res will not be applied at this time". Story implies that US has given wink to Dutch that, despite adoption SC res with specific provisions and time-table, US is not insistent upon definite steps this res entails. Report obviously damaging to this Govt and to chances UNCI success. Jessup has been authorized deny it in Lake Success. Denial already made by Dept in press interview.

Deptel 84 of Feb 1 not intended convey idea that US agreeable to delay for purpose of Dutch circumvention SC res, or any of its provisions. We only agreed not to press Dutch too fast or too hard in Batavia, in order give reasonable time for psychological and political adjustment necessary to carry out provisions SC res.

If Neth Govt under misapprehension this regard, you shd make clear foregoing position.

ACHESON

501,BC Indonesia/2-449: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 4, 1949—noon.

144. Gocus 577.

1. Following information received from Supomo today in basis trip to Bangka yesterday (Gocus 574,² paragraph 3).

a. Hatta had not received copy SC resolution 28 January. (This given Netherlands delegation eve 29 January with request it be sent Hatta).

b. Hatta and other Bangka exiles not receiving replies to letters they send their families.

c. Supomo drafted reply to BFO telegram for Hatta to send. Hatta accepted this completely and after translating into Dutch will send it BFO. Should be received within day or so. Letters of Beel referred to were quoted in BFO telegram to Hatta. There follows rough translation made orally by Supomo from Indonesian:

"Netherlands Government, according to Beel letter, is not prepared to consider Sukarno and other Republic leaders as President and members Government of Republic Indonesia. According to that letter they would be only considered as governmental personalities of a republic whose status and appearance will be dependent upon people's will so they would be only considered as government personalities of a state which does not yet exist. Resolution of SC 28 January calls for restoration authority of Government of Republic Indonesia. So it must be stated Netherlands Government will not comply with that point of resolution.

¹ Repeated in telegram 103, February 7, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 138, February 2, p. 201.

Furthermore, according to Beel letter, Government of Indonesia is not prepared to release Sukarno and other Republic leaders unconditionally because problem of general freedom of movement of those leaders will be considered if talks between BFO and Republic leaders could lead to formation in short time of Federal Interim Government. It must be noted that also this viewpoint of Government of Indonesia is not in accordance with resolution of SC that demands immediate and unconditional release all political prisoners arrested since 18 Dec., 1948. It needs no argument that Hatta and other Republic leaders, in light of 2 letters mentioned above, cannot comply with invitation of BFO to enter into discussions with them. Also they would like to do it the less now that SC and also Asiatic Conference in New Delhi—thus greatest part of mankind—have made release of political leaders essential condition for solution of Indonesian problem.

Solution of Indonesian problem would be handled in best and soonest way if Netherlands Government as well as Republic Government declare explicitly acceptance of resolution of SC. Republic Government would be able do it only when it is enabled assemble. After this declaration a conference would be held within shortest possible time between representatives of Netherlands Government and BFO and representatives of Republic of Indonesia. In that conference all problems could be discussed to which, *inter alia*, belong formation of Federal Interim Government on March 15, implementation of resolution of SC so far as it concerns stopping of military operations, restoration of Republic and return of Republic Government to Jogja.

Finally, it must be noted that also Republic Government strives for setting up Republic of USI in which Republic of Indonesia in principle will be no more and no less than member state with equal status as other member states."

2. Agenda today's meeting BFO lists as first item "HRC's request to BFO to consider SC resolution". Republicans state Netherlands putting every pressure on BFO members to condemn SC resolution by assuring them it impracticable and will never be carried out. Anak Agung continuing fight to have BFO either endorse resolution or postpone action.

3. Radio Batavia this morning announced Washington sources reveal Cochran will come Indonesia after consultations with Spaak, Brussels, and Drees, Hague. States original plans stop Australia cancelled. Schuurman revealed last night Cochran will arrive about Tuesday and promised keep USDel informed. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-449: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, February 4, 1949—4 p. m.

108. Deptel 94, February 3. We have left no possible shred of doubt in our statement to Foreign Office of deadly earnestness of our Government and the serious view we take re situation in Indonesia and the full intention our Government to do everything necessary to push home objectives and meaning of resolution we sponsored in SC. Stikker, Lovink and members of Cabinet can have no illusion that US is speaking with its tongue in its cheek. My conversation with Stikker did not fail to impress him with fact US is most insistent that the definite steps this resolution entails must be promptly and fully complied with. Undoubtedly Cochran's visit here and the meetings which are being scheduled for him will further underline my statement of Department's position anent resolution and UNCI's duties in Batavia, especially in view of fact that emphasis was laid by me on this point when informing Stikker of salient facts Deptel 84, February 1.

BARUCH

¹ Repeated in telegram 62, Usgoc 286, February 5, 6 p.m., to Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/2-449: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, February 4, 1949—6:48 p. m.

137. For Rusk from Jessup: Earlier telegrams today, Nos. 131, 132,¹ summarize delegation reactions here to *New York Times* story February 3, dateline Hague and our denial of it. As indicated our telegram No. 131 re telephone conversation with Cadogan, we are taking line that Dutch should have reasonable time but that time must be used to arrange compliance with SC resolution and not circumvention of it. At same time we have made clear to all that US supports SC resolution January 28 which it sponsored and has not changed its position.

Anticipate strong pressure for SC meeting sometime next week if UNCI does not report cooperative Dutch attitude in Indonesia. In dealing with other delegates here USUN will continue emphasize that US is committed to the principles contained SC resolution. In my

¹ Neither printed.

opinion, US has secured important advantage in terms of relations with Asiatic and Near Eastern states through its position on this case in SC. Despite the many unfavorable press reactions believe also this action by SC over a period of time will have influence in strengthening UN and general US policy of support for UN. On other hand, any weakening of our position in support of action taken by SC would be highly injurious to UN, to our position in SC and to our relations with other delegations. Wish to emphasize specially our relations with Canadian delegation which is continually most helpful to us in SC. They extricated themselves from hampering Ottawa instructions to maintain support pledged to our joint resolution. Continued frank discussion and cooperation with them is highly important. Re such delegations as Australia, India and Philippines, they are supporting us now but would be quick to attack if they get impression that we are weakening.

We have throughout been conscious of difficulties of situation in terms North Atlantic Pact and other Western European problems. These difficulties were of course fully appreciated by Department in authorizing USUN to initiate SC action. Recognize that question of possible pressure for SC sanctions resolution would present added difficulties. Consider it practically certain France would veto such a resolution but question of US stand in SC debates if such issue arises may need to be faced. Final Van Roijen statement in SC and Van Roijen's attitude in last few days of SC consideration strongly indicated readiness of Dutch to cooperate which attitude probably reflects Dutch Labor Party dissatisfaction with Dutch military action. Am convinced hope of solution and avoidance of further complications can be secured only through continued support of resolution and steady maintenance of pressure on Dutch through diplomatic channels including every effort to persuade UK, France, Belgium, Canada to make continuous parallel representations. Believe further all these governments fully recognize both sides of picture and fundamental US position of basic friendliness to Dutch and basic disagreement with their recent Indonesian policy. UK, Canada, US have by supporting SC resolution jointly taken stand that implementing program in that resolution is only way for Dutch to get out of dangerous situation they created for themselves. If any modification this view seems necessary as situation develops, believe USUN should have opportunity in advance frankly to discuss with Cadogan, McNaughton as well as Tsiang² and other sponsors. [Jessup.]

AUSTIN

² Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Chinese Permanent Representative at the United Nations and temporary president of the SC.

501.BC Indonesia/2-549 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1949—5 p. m.

102. While confident you fully understand its position re carrying out SC Jan 28 res, Dept wishes clarify last sentence second para Deptel 94 Feb 3 lest any doubt arise therefrom. Dept merely agreed with Cochran personal tel to Lisle contained Deptel 84 Feb 1 advisable under circumstances. Dept has received requests from Neth Emb that it acquiesce in Neth delay in fulfillment terms SC res but has made no comment thereon. No agreement whatsoever has been reached with Dutch on these lines.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 61 to New York (for Jessup) and as 61, Usgoc 285, to Batavia (for Lisle).

501.BC Indonesia/2-749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 7, 1949.

149. Gocus 580. Following letter sent NethDel by UNCFI today: "Have honour submit following in confirmation and amplification points made in conversation 4 February between you and Commission's chairman. Points reflected desire of Commission to make whatever progress possible in period pending decision by Netherlands Government re its attitude toward 28 January resolution.

Question of Republican mission Lake Success taken up originally with you on 21 January in accordance procedure outlined SC meeting 17 January. That time GOC informed matter referred The Hague. Although no formal reply received from you, Commission understands your government at this time has no objection in principle and necessary authorization and facilities will be granted soon as you informed composition of mission and proposed time departure.

Commission again urges release political prisoners called for by 24 and 28 December resolutions well as 28 January. As you know, more important Republican leaders at present exiled Prapat and Bangka, confined former Republican Secretariat quarters Batavia, or for time being, resident Batavia and Djogjakarta. If as immediate minimum your government should restore freedom of movement and political activity of president, members Republican Cabinet and chairman Republican delegation, it would be possible make considerable progress

¹ Repeated in telegram 105, February 7, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

in preparation implementation 28 January resolution. It recommended therefore as first step these Republican political leaders be given opportunity come together Batavia or some other place where there convenient opportunity for consultation with Commission. You will recognize restoration freedom to political prisoners as called for by resolutions should not be conditioned upon acceptance by those released of any commitments which require them adhere to any political program, attend any particular meeting or otherwise accept any settlement other than one in formulation of which they themselves have participated.

Commission understands you will reply shortly to following questions first presented to representative of Commander-in-Chief Army by our MilEx Board 25 January and subsequently referred to you in Commission's 29 January letter :

1. Will it be possible for MilEx Board see Netherlands Army situation map order decide further deployment military observers?
2. Can Netherlands authorities give MilEx Board information regarding present guerrilla [activ]ities all areas Java, Sumatra, Madura occupied?
3. What military action being taken against such guerrilla activities if any?
4. May MilEx Board send military observers to those areas order report on these activities and resulting conditions?
5. Will Netherlands authorities keep MilEx Board currently informed regarding disposition forces as is known and what military action taking place?

You will appreciate these questions designed elicit information needed for effective discharge by military observers of their duties under 24 December resolution as well as 28 January." Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 8, 1949—5 p. m.

150. Gocus 581. 1. NethDel has given UNCFI no information re Netherlands plans. Nothing happening nor heard here indicates any Netherlands intention accept basic provisions 28 January resolution. All press reports including statements like those of Stikker's in second chamber show contrary. Re recent rumors plan (Gocus 579,² para-

¹ Repeated in telegram 113, February 9, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 146, February 5, not printed.

graph 1c), following told AP reporter by Rittman (Government Information Service) yesterday. Originally prepared by Beel or some one in his immediate circle. Sent Hague which without formal Cabinet commitment instructed government here test out reactions. Most of those questioned unwilling comment unless given more details (Gocus 576³). Report to this effect sent Hague yesterday.

Rittman encouraged reporter file story telling of Netherlands plan transfer "sovereignty" April 1949 and said he expected Hague announcement soon. Said under plan Netherlands army would remain, also HRC. First constitution new sovereigns state would be based on BIO decree for FIG. Apparently plan general and nothing concrete in writing. Some Federalists enthusiastic but so far as can be learned here sovereignty transferred would be merely verbal. Reason to believe Netherlands hope is to win Republican acceptance invitation enter BFO discussions this basis without providing anything more concrete, thus lessening pressure for 28 January resolution. Today UNCFI feeling it could no longer ignore unofficial information coming to it formally requested information in letter to NethDel re "proposals of official origin".

2. RepDel expected return from Bangka tonight.

3. UNCFI considering imminence 15 February deadline when resolution requires it make recommendations to SC unless parties reach agreement on Interim Federal Government. As alternative UNCFI might note complete disregard of resolution and ask SC for further instructions on ground negotiations of type contemplated by resolution not even begun. If Department has any particular view this subject, please advise soonest as UNCFI must start work on recommendations several days before deadline and Cochran will not arrive until late fourteenth. Meanwhile, UNCFI will probably report lack of progress to SC within next day or so but not make any recommendation which would lead to immediate SC meeting. Signed Lisle.⁴

LIVENGOD

³ Telegram 142, February 3, not printed.

⁴ In telegram 69, Usgoc 288, February 8, 8 p. m., the Department suggested the desirability of postponing if possible any report to the SC until Mr. Cochran arrived "unless situation arises requiring immediate report." However, the Department agreed to preparing recommendation to the SC "so that required Feb 15 report incorporating necessary recommendation be ready for Cochran's approval upon his arrival." (501.BC Indonesia/2-849)

501.BC Indonesia/2-949 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

BATAVIA, February 9, 1949.

152. Gocus 582. RepDel delivered to UNCFI following three letters. First signed by Roem dated 7 February conveys invitation UNCFI visit Bangka earliest convenience order supply clarifications resolution and discuss "what steps can be taken in spirit thereof." Sukarno and Salim will stay Bangka time being order remain close contact Prime Minister and be available UNCFI visit.

Second letter dated 8 February signed Roem attaches various documents relating recent conversations between Republican Government and BFO delegation on 7 February and concludes "Further it made absolutely clear Republican Government only willing enter into conversations with federal consultation conference with cognizance your commission and if official formal talks should be reached these could only take place under auspices your commission. This question will be brought forward first opportunity when commission comes Bangka." Attached is letter signed Hatta addressed chairman BFO dated 3 Feb. as follows: "From Your Excellency's telegram received today I conclude Netherlands Government, according contents letter from high representative to Your Excellency, is not ready recognize Sukarno and other Republican leaders as president and members of Republican Government. Letter says that we 'are regarded as authorities of a republic the status and form of which would be determined by the will of the people', in short, 'authorities' from a state which not yet in existence.

"Meanwhile, I wish state 28 January resolution also demands restoration of authority of Republican Government so that Netherlands Government on this question too refuses comply with SC resolution.

"I further conclude from letter of high representative to Your Excellency on 31 January that Netherlands Indies Government not ready free Sukarno and other Republican leaders from present political confinement because letter says freedom movement for us will be taken into consideration when consultations between BFO yield results so that within short period federal interim government could be formed.

"Re above, I wish also reiterate this position Netherlands Indies Government is also at variance with SC resolution which demands Republican leaders arrested and detained since 19 December should be released immediately and unconditionally.

¹ Repeated in telegram 111, February 9, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

"It therefore understood re high representative letters that I and other Republican leaders cannot accept BFO invitation to hold joint consultations despite our earnest wish exchange views concerning fate of our country, especially after SC and as Your Excellency knows Asian Conference—in short, majority of world opinion—have accepted conditions we have put forward as their own.

"According my opinion, quickest and best way solve Indonesian question is that both Netherlands and Republican Governments state clearly that they willing accept decision SC. It obvious that to be able declare its readiness accept SC resolution, Republican Government must be given opportunity assemble and hold consultations.

"Declaration of acceptance of SC resolution by Netherlands and Republican Governments must be followed soon as possible by joint conference between Netherlands Government representatives, BFO and Republican Government under auspices UNCFI to discuss several problems, especially (1) formation of federal interim government on 15 March next, (2) implementation SC resolution re cessation military action, restoration of Republic and return of Republican Government to Jogjakarta.

"I think it not necessary for me state here exhaustively that Republican Government aims at formation of free and sovereign Republic of United States of Indonesia and in which Republic of Indonesia occupies equal position, not more and not less, with other member states. However, Republic of Indonesia takes stand that form and organization of Republic of United States of Indonesia must be determined by Indonesian people themselves through constituent assembly elected democratically by whole adult Indonesian people and by secret ballot and not made by Dutch themselves."

Third letter dated 9 February signed by Secretary General RepDel reports Sukarno forbidden go on 8 February from Muntok to Pangkalpinang, both on Bangka, because as officially stated resident of Bangka had received information large scale demonstrations would be held and he concerned about "possibilities of accident or molestations which might occur among the several groups." This prohibition followed welcoming demonstration when Sukarno arrived on Bangka 6 February. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

BRUSSELS, February 9, 1949—5 p. m.

213. From Cochran: Left Washington night February 2. Visited Palar, New York, February 3. He concerned over *New York Times*

story regarding US going easy with Netherlands on meeting SC Resolution. Disabused his mind in accord with Jessup and I telephoned Butterworth regarding need press statement and contact with SC colleagues on this point. Palar stressed futility Netherlands trying get agreement unless all Republican leaders freely participate negotiations. Gave names military leaders who would be useful calling off guerrillas. I argued need for Sjahrir and Leimena in Batavia and opposed continuing SC debate on Indonesia before Netherlands have chance reveal plans implement resolution. He agreed their remaining Indonesia help negotiate and set up provisional government unless and until developments warrant coming Lake Success.

After mechanical and weather difficulties, reached Brussels via London afternoon February 5. In London, brought Dickover¹ to date. He confirmed British embarrassment as result Netherlands handling Indonesia. He thought Netherlands would go ahead their own way giving sovereignty Indonesia but that our difficulty might come from Republican intransigence and desire let SC fight their battle.

Ambassador Kirk took me morning 6th see Spaak. I gave details situation prior police action and reason my return US. Also discussed SC Resolution and US seriousness regarding Netherlands compliance. Spaak doubted Netherlands willingness include Soekarno and Hatta in Interim Government preferring work with Sjahrir and questioned feasibility restoration Republic. I argued need for broad cross section Republican leaders for effective call to guerrillas lay down arms and for participation in Interim Government if it to have confidence support all Indonesians. Notwithstanding exceptions which might be taken to individual leaders records I insisted these men have earned their positions as champions of Nationalist movement and are heroes to its followers. I thought folly attempt eliminate any these in negotiations. On contrary said effort should be made bring in Republican leaders scattered in Sumatra and outlying districts Java.

Without taking initiative had opportunity suggest Spaak difficulty would be experienced in having any agreement accepted by Republicans and carried out with confidence so long as Beel and Spoor remain. When Spaak asked regarding Van Mook,² I said latter had been confused at end his stay Indonesia and could not contribute progress if returned. I thought Spoor's chief of staff would be acceptable commanding officer. Reviewing visits of Netherlands Ministers to Indonesia, I praised Stikker's efforts and said he was only one who had gained confidence Republicans. I said agreement entirely beneficial to Netherlands could have been achieved on Stikker's first visit had he

¹ Erle R. Dickover, Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom.

² Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook, former Lieutenant-Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies.

been permitted remain few weeks longer and enjoy full support his government. I thought best step would still be return Stikker to Batavia for negotiations preferably with full power. Spaak distressed over Netherlands situation and admitted lack quick success in achieving complete military control in Indonesia confirmed police action unwise. Spaak asked me call on return to Brussels after visit Hague.

Arrived Hague February 6, 3 p. m. Visited Stikker alone 4 to 7 p. m. He sought details of negotiations GOC and myself with Netherlands and Republican officials immediately prior police action. I told him I reported I could be of little assistance Batavia following such action and that Department ordered me home for consultation. Said I had not participated discussions Lake Success but had conferred in Department with Jessup and visited him and Palar in New York on departure and Spaak in Brussels. I said would follow entirely his ideas as to whom I should see in Hague. We agreed on no information to press during Hague stay other than I was paying respects while returning my post.

Stikker reminded me how he endeavored prevent police action. He genuinely aware serious international situation into which Netherlands has come as result thereof. He insisted Netherlands political situation makes impossible full acceptance SC Resolution by present government. He said government would fall if attempted take this entirely. I analyzed resolution endeavoring ease his mind on certain points which he exaggerated. I emphasized, however, there should be no misunderstanding US loyalty to support this resolution. Stikker thought we should all agree that achieving common objective is real purpose irrespective methods. Said Republicans and Federalists without Netherlands meeting that day in Bangka to see if they could get together on ideas constitution and authority Interim Government to be set up soonest. Anything negotiated successfully between groups at Bangka would then have to be considered by Netherlands and agreement sought. Setting up of Interim Government would be followed by negotiations between Interim and Netherlands Governments on three major points of finance and economic arrangements, military agreement and union statutes. Idea is, however, to plan Interim Government as simply as possible and have it last briefly perhaps not more than two or three months with sovereignty thereafter turned over to strictly Indonesian Government. Elections and constitutional assembly would come thereafter. Stikker asked my ideas which I gave frankly and are set forth later in this message.

Stikker admitted Netherlands in critical situation. Said might not be able carry on military operations beyond another five or six months because of cost thereof. Admitted guerrilla activity serious and that

military mistakes had been made particularly in occupation certain important cities such as Madiun. He spoke unhappily of many incidents attributed to Batavia authorities which have embarrassed Netherlands Government. At same time he insisted Beel could not be fired. He said Schuurman would be replaced on Netherlands Delegation possibly by Netherlands Ambassador Lamping from New Delhi. He thought this wise in view Lamping familiarity with Eastern question. (From other sources, including Spaak, I learn Lamping stiff negotiator).

Dined with Ambassador, Steere and Coe³ to bring them to date with respect visits Department, Palar, Spaak and Stikker.

Conferred two hours morning February 7 with Blom and Boon.⁴ Blom went over plan Stikker had described and also let me know there had been alternative considered of having Interim Government to be arrived at through Bangka conversations merely body to negotiate with Netherlands for turning over sovereignty at later date. That is, this group would not be given operational authority until it became the government of planned "Republic of Federal or US of Indonesia" which it was hoped could be created before July 1, 1949. I learned from Blom that there was also some idea of not passing complete sovereignty on that date but only conditional sovereignty leaving period of perhaps one year to see how things went in Indonesia as to law and order, etc. I posed certain questions on this plan as I had to Stikker. Blom expressed surprise I hesitated fall in with idea such early settlement of question. Boon urged I talk frankly with Cabinet members on SC Resolution, he pleading that Ministry Foreign Affairs understood my position clearly and needed no argument to convince it what should be done.

At instance Her Majesty Queen Juliana, drove to Soesdijk afternoon February 7, had tea and visited with Her Majesty 1¼ hours. Her Majesty expressed warm appreciation US assistance to Netherlands during and since war. Recalled long established close ties and friendship between our countries. Introducing discussion Indonesian situation, revealed intimate knowledge events and personalities.

Asked my opinion Hatta and Sjahrir. I answered with respect Republican leaders manner above described in talk with Spaak. Her Majesty asked why I stood up for Republican leaders rather than Federalist leaders who represented majority. I explained GOC terms of reference envisaged extending Good Offices only between Netherlands and Republican Governments and that we purposely had re-

³ Loyd V. Steere, Counselor for Economic Affairs of the Embassy in the Netherlands, and Robert D. Coe, Counselor of the Embassy.

⁴ Dr. Nico S. Blom and Dr. H. N. Boon were high officers in the Netherlands Foreign Office.

frained from having official contact with Federalist leaders. I made point, however, that I had suggested inclusion in present SC Resolution of authority for UNCI contact and work with Federalists as well as Republican and Netherlands leaders. I said I had been well impressed by Federalist leaders whom I had seen and realized entirely need for bringing two groups together and consolidating their desires and efforts for achieving Nationalist aims.

I assured Her Majesty that it should be possible under present resolution for UNCI work effectively toward bringing all elements into Interim Government. Her Majesty asked how we would handle "wild boys". I said I favored widest possible Federalist leadership in discussions and in setting up Interim Government in order this can make effective appeal to armed forces to lay down arms. Her Majesty was critical of position Australia has taken in premises and of casting lot with Asiatic countries.

Her Majesty asked specifically what should be done. We agreed Solomon was required. Her Majesty said would like turn question over to him. I hinted Her Majesty give me chance do something. I said fundamental requirement is for Netherlands Government convince world it intends accept and abide by SC Resolution to fullest extent reasonably possible. I said I could not outline complete plans before returning Batavia and consulting Republican leaders whom I have not seen since before police action. I said immediately necessary Netherlands Government follow SC Resolution in appeasing Republican leaders and in permitting UNCI function in contacting Republicans and Federalists and assisting in plans leading to Interim Government. I said I was to talk further with Stikker, Drees and Sassen.⁵ Would give them any ideas I had.

Recalled pleasure I had experienced years before in cooperating with Netherlands officials such as Colijn and Trip and of my genuine desire be helpful in Indonesia in achieving workable solution that will preserve beneficial interests of Netherlands in Indonesia. In respect to Her Majesty's inquiry, I said I might see Spaak on return Brussels. Her Majesty expressed highest regard for his statesmanship.

Dined Stikker's night February 7 where other guests: Drees and Sassen. Stikker asked me repeat for colleagues statement I made him previous evening. I explained that upon return US, I had volunteered step aside if Department found my work Indonesia unsatisfactory or if of opinion someone else could serve more helpfully in future. Department led me understand there might be another assignment in view for me but that it desired I continue on present job until finished. I recalled that it had envisaged my being last US representative on

⁵ E. J. M. A. Sassen, Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories.

GOC. I said I had volunteered idea returning Indonesia by Hague in order let my friends here see there had been no bitterness whatever on my part although great disappointment over our failure prevent police action. I stressed American desire assist old friend and ally get out of present difficult situation. I spared no details in picturing how bad their predicament was and how much worse it might become unless Netherlands Government implemented SC Resolution. I recalled I had sent personal wire Lisle few days ago suggesting Netherlands Government would require some time to adjust its operations to SC Resolution. I emphasized, however, no intent to delay compliance therewith or for USDel to take any position different from that envisaged by entire SC group.

I explained resolution was not US measure but represented consolidation ideas contributed by representatives several countries and final compromise thereof. Recalled that Delhi conference had passed resolution⁶ along somewhat similar lines and assured them tone of latter had been kept comparatively moderate only through exceptionally skillful diplomacy on part of American Ambassador Delhi. I said I found American public and Congressional opinion keenly critical of Netherlands position and Department making great efforts protect ally. I specifically mentioned hearings on ECA aid and expressed intentions of certain Congressmen to question extension ECA aid to Netherlands if not assured such funds not employed in supporting military action against Indonesia. I said noncompliance by Netherlands now with SC Resolution would give press and Congress added reason for attack and for suggesting cutting off all funds. I insisted I was speaking entirely personally and not bringing any threat from my Department that ECA aid would be stopped. I was simply saying frankly as a friend that whatever might be attitude of Department of State such danger would be risked if behavior of Netherlands is such as to warrant SC calling it before its tribunal again on handling of Indonesian question. I reminded them that I had sought influence Palar, and I thought successfully, not to endeavor revive Indonesian debate unless real need develops after reasonable period.

Regarding plan outlined to me by Stikker I expressed two fundamental ideas (1) I was convinced neither SC nor public would accept with full confidence any decisions reached by Republicans and Federalists towards setting up Interim Government if conversations take place while Republicans in custody Netherlands Military Forces. I

⁶ For text of resolution adopted January 23 at New Delhi conference, see *New York Times*, January 24 reprint, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950*, p. 567. For Prime Minister Nehru's telegram of January 23 to UN SC President, with text of the New Delhi conference resolution, see SC, *4th yr., Suppl. (Jan.)*, pp. 56-59.

expressed entire agreement with idea that two groups should be brought together but reminded Ministers they had not yet complied with original or repeated requests of SC that Republican leaders be liberated; (2) I pointed out that UNCI is not permitted participate in present Indonesian conversations and that as far as I had learned from my talks to date with them there appeared no intention on their part permit UNCI play any role in negotiations toward setting up Interim Government. They responded that they, themselves, were not represented in present conversations, preferring give two groups privacy in settling their own problem. I said Republicans have in past indicated preference having third party, namely agency SC, present when consummating agreement with Netherlands. I felt strongly Netherlands should abide SC Resolution and permit UNCI assist immediately in any conversations following Bangka meeting. I said this not only required to meet SC desires but should also facilitate results.

Stikker stated I had presented SC and Republican views. He and associates would present Hague and Batavia side. He emphasized political difficulty for coalition Netherlands Government accept detailed resolution adopted by SC. While Netherlands Government had indicated willingness set up Interim Government, have elections and transfer sovereignty within certain periods, SC apparently had not taken their word and insisted on specific dates. Government had been embarrassed by constant flow of GOC reports. Furthermore, Critchley had gone to NEI Government few hours after adoption SC Resolution to inquire what had been done to implement it and UNCI had continued harass government with questions thereon. I said SC had adopted general date schedule offered by Netherlands and had gone slightly further in making specific appreciating value of fixed date to Indonesian psychological situation. While SC Resolution calls for thorough reporting job, I was confident UNCI would be reasonable once Netherlands Government gives some sign inclination comply with resolution.

Drees expressed unhappiness over extent to which he felt SC Resolution interferes with Netherlands sovereignty in Indonesia in political, military and economic fields. He mentioned new provision in SC Resolution regarding UNCI contacting Federalists. He said various provisions give such extensive powers towards moving troops and requiring economic aid for Republicans that Netherlands Government must yield much authority while retaining heavy responsibility. I said I had personally recommended inclusion privilege UNCI contacting Federalists freely. Federalists endeavored come to me frequently seeking ideas on eventual association with Republicans. After police action, requests had increased. I felt UNCI could be genuinely useful in

bringing these leaders together with Republicans and Netherlands. In economic field, I said resolution calls for not much, if any, outlay beyond that which Netherlands is probably making at present. I said idea was primarily to make sure Republican leaders would be taken care of upon return Jogja. Even now Netherlands Government has responsibility their maintenance.

I told Drees that he exaggerated complications of resolution. Stikker said I should frankly know, as I would be sure learn on returning Batavia, that they are in serious difficulties and can only carry on with present schedule for few months. I said we had anticipated this in our *aide-mémoire* of 7 December⁷ and are anxious help Netherlands get out of difficulty but can only succeed if Netherlands Government accepts and implements SC Resolution. Sassen endeavored justify police action. Said his government had taken steps with view combat Communism in Indonesia and assist in preserving rights Western peoples in Far East. I replied Netherlands military action had exactly opposite effect. First it had upset truly conservative Republican Government which with own leaders and resources had successfully put down Communist uprising few weeks earlier and had demonstrated to world its faith in democracy. Degrading policy pursued in taking Republican leaders into custody and continuing to hold them inevitably weakens their influence on followers. It will make more difficult any attempts influence guerrillas lay down arms and threatens destruction conservative [nucleus] leaders which I thought Netherlands Government considered as did my own best available group about which an Interim Government and finally a USI could be constituted. Secondly, police action had set off resentment in all of Asia with resultant New Delhi conference where only efforts of American Ambassador had been able to restrain delegates from adopting almost violent resolution. Netherlands action had thus given incentive to first actual steps toward constituting Asiatic bloc which may conceivably develop further and establish line of demarkation if not opposition to Western group.

Stikker asked if I offered objection to changing head Netherlands Delegation Schuurman and perhaps his assistants. I thought these men were worn out from long stay on difficult task and perhaps better results might be achieved by replacements. I had taken no initiative on this point and assured group I had gotten on with Netherlands Delegation personally although problems involved many tense situations. I said I had no suggestions to make with respect other officials at Batavia but assumed Netherlands Government must have some worries thereover as result recent incidents.

⁷ *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 531.

I told group I hoped I had been able convince them need for compliance with SC Resolution and for immediate commencement implementation thereof through first steps of releasing Republican civil leaders and permitting UNCI function. I said that unless this was envisaged there was no use my spending government money returning to Batavia or UNCI endeavoring be of assistance. Drees assured me he had desired place leaders at liberty but some Cabinet colleagues objected on fear some Republicans might scatter to otherwise peaceful areas in Indonesia and start trouble. I said such chance would have to be taken sooner or later and that I personally thought there would be no danger whatever from this source. I said it was much to interest these leaders continue contacts now commenced with Federalists, be in touch with UNCI and consummate negotiations for Interim Government. I added UNCI would, of course, use its influence if such might be necessary to see that no untoward acts taken by Republican leaders when once given complete freedom. Drees said there might have to be some fixing of residence although there would be no stipulation that Republicans must refrain from political activities when liberated. He promised move in this direction soonest. Group thought there should be no difficulty UNCI having contact with Republican leaders pointing out visits already permitted. I said not satisfactory if UNCI obliged require permits to see Republicans and to travel various parts Indonesia this purpose. I said I was not at all sure I could see fit undertake exercising Good Offices with Republicans as long as I have to ascertain visiting days from Schuurman and fly various localities to find them and then talk with them under surveillance. Cabinet officers promised remedy this situation and let me understand UNCI would be permitted function.

In our conversations, group mentioned idea bringing Interim Government delegation to Hague after Provisional Government set up to negotiate for USI arrangements. They said negotiations in Hague with Federalists had been much easier than if held in Indonesia and thought results could be achieved more satisfactorily in present case. I hoped that treatment of Indonesians from now on be such that they would have faith in undertakings Netherlands Government and would not fear their leaders subject to duress if brought Hague for final arrangements. I argued again as I had with Stikker that date of final transfer sovereignty to USI should be fixed and not postponed or conditioned. When I left 11 p. m., group remained to consider policy to be followed on SC Resolution in Tuesday Cabinet meeting.

Spent entire forenoon 8th talking with Blom and Boon, Foreign Office. They assured me I did not need convince Stikker or them of my position or my genuine desire to help. They said great need was to

make Sassen and other Cabinet Ministers comprehend serious international political situation Indonesian problem has brought Netherlands. They asked what I had accomplished "trio" previous evening. I summarized conversations. We then went over SC Resolution, paragraph by paragraph, since they sought my explanation thereof. I gave them my ideas but waived any responsibility for interpretation emphasizing this could be done by SC alone. I stressed to them as I had to Cabinet Ministers absolute necessity compliance with resolution and endeavored disabuse their minds any intention of US helping them to evade consequences of resolution. On other hand, I showed wherein I thought they exaggerated implications of resolution and argued they should depend on reasonableness of UNCI in using discretion granted by resolution in helping implementation once Netherlands begins cooperating. They endeavored argue SC action had thwarted Netherlands efforts settle Indonesian problem and was endangering success military undertaking. I made point Netherlands Government had not yet done anything SC had requested and latter surely could not be blamed for any failure Netherlands Government suffered through measures violating international undertaking. They said they meant Republican intransigence strengthened by knowledge SC taking action. I reminded them Indonesian question has been on SC agenda long time and both parties must expect SC interest continuing therein. Doubted guerrillas much influenced by SC Resolution. May not even know of it since I just read report Republican leaders had not yet seen it. To Foreign Office, as to Ministers, I gave our arguments that SC does not recognize that police action has eliminated Republican as one party to dispute before it.

Told friends that when conferring with Ministers had inquired whether UNCI would be brought Hague for negotiations here. They said this could be decided later. I had reminded them that *Renville* Agreements gave either party privilege insist on continuation UN agency until actual transfer sovereignty. Blom and Boon seemed much relieved by my explanation certain points on resolution. They gave interesting details confidentially on various communications exchanged with GOC when I was at Batavia and placed blame for some of most unhelpful correspondence on officials at Batavia. They insisted Stikker should be sent Batavia with full powers to negotiate.

My friends sought my advice since they were preparing statements to be used by Cabinet at Chamber session 9th when Indonesian question would be debated and Ministers likely be questioned extent SC Resolution would be followed. I said I had not anticipated any reply to resolution beyond Van Royen's last speech. I suggested this speech be quoted by Ministers in Chamber debate as indicating Netherlands

official position. I said it would be most helpful and I thought extremely wise if Ministers could follow up by stating steps being taken to give Republican leaders same freedom enjoyed Indonesia by any other civilians and that cooperation of UNCI in negotiations towards setting up Interim Government would be welcomed by Netherlands. I thought that more positive statement could be made along lines showing compliance with SC Resolution more beneficial in effect.

I said there should be absolutely no reservations other than those contained in Van Royen's speech on willingness Netherlands Government accept and comply with resolution. Friends inquired regarding possibility US giving financial aid soonest if sovereignty transferred. I pictured our dilemma if we try envisage with Congress and financial agencies new funds for Indonesia while Netherlands behavior is such that direct help to Indonesia is now suspended and Congress faced with measure to stop any funds to Netherlands. All of this comes at time ECA hearings on new appropriations.

At noon brought Ambassador Baruch to date. Received Labor Party leaders: Van der Goes Van Naters and Logmann in hotel room for half hour their request. They recalled conversations with me at Hague last July and discussed subsequent developments. They endeavored justify military action although they said they had consistently opposed it. I answered questions thereon and defended GOC and SC positions. They said mistakes had undoubtedly been made and they now desired know what I thought should be done toward righting situation. They agreed entirely with my idea that Republican leaders should be immediately liberated, UNCI permitted to function, and no defiance made of SC Resolution. They asked I convey their greetings to Sjahrir and other Republican leaders.

Motored Brussels afternoon 8th with Steere. Spaak received Ambassador and me 6 p. m. I summarized conversations with Queen and Netherlands officials. Emphasized extent Netherlands floundering in military and financial difficulties but religious factions in coalition government hesitating take broad view Indonesian problem and still working as if local issue. I said Stikker understood situation and I thought was one individual who had some chance negotiating agreement with Indonesia. I said I had not presumed make suggestion to Queen although had praised Stikker's efforts at negotiation in Java to Her Majesty. Likewise had felt should not as American representative advance to Netherlands Prime Minister suggestion on such delicate subject as Stikker proceeding Indonesia when Sassen opposes Stikker so strongly. I said I knew confidentially from Stikker that he would be willing depart on day's notice for Batavia if given full powers negotiation. I said his ranking assistants had volunteered to me idea Stikker should be so sent. Spaak stated he had been convinced my

objectivity on previous talk and had thereafter given ideas to Netherlands Ambassador Brussels on handling Indonesian situation. He said he would now undertake advancing suggestion of sending Stikker Batavia with full powers and would decide whether to do this directly to Drees or through Netherlands Ambassador. He thought I had done correctly in not myself making this suggestion to any Netherlands officials. I spoke of press story just announcing introduction measure by Senator Brewster⁸ toward stopping ECA aid to Netherlands. I insisted Netherlands situation serious and that failure commence sincere compliance with SC Resolution would risk incurring further action on part SC as well as American legislative body. Hoped Prime Minister could act promptly since critical debate might develop Netherlands Chamber 9th and that any official statement made therein indicating lack of Netherlands willingness endeavor comply with SC Resolution might react most unfavorably.

My reception by Netherlands entirely cordial. Made no statements to press. Made no commitments to Netherlands beyond voluntary promise endeavor have UNCI decisions unanimous and recommendations reasonable. Refrained from approving Netherlands short-cut plan presently undertaken Bangka. Said up to SC itself eventually to decide whether Netherlands meets resolution satisfactorily. Said I could make no more comments before meeting interested parties again in Indonesia. While Netherlands Government genuinely worried, must await Chamber debates and results of Bangka meeting and of Spaak approach before can report what course will be followed by Netherlands and what representations may be required on our part.

Pan American air flight from Brussels delayed until 10th. Due Bangkok [*Bangka*] 13th and Batavia 14th.

Copy to Hague by courier. Department please summarize to Batavia. Sent Department; pouched Hague. [Cochran.]

KIRK

⁸ Senator Owen Brewster, of Maine, on February 7 introduced S. Res. 56. On February 25 the Department informed the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) that it "considers that unilateral action by the United States along the lines suggested in the Resolution would be untimely and inappropriate." (501.BC Indonesia/2-1149)

501.BC Indonesia/2-1049 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

BATAVIA, February 10, 1949.

159. Gocus 585. UNCFI today sent following letter to NethDel and RepDel: "UNCFI must in near future prepare recommendations

which pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 28 January must be made to Security Council on 15 February if by that time parties have not yet reached agreement on establishment of interim federal government.

Commission, of course, desires take into due account views of both parties. I have honor therefore invite you submit soon as possible any documents or statements which you believe commission should consider in preparation its recommendations." Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

856d.00/2-1149

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Hickerson) ¹*

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1949.

After the conversation with the Secretary yesterday on the Atlantic Pact, Sir Oliver Franks of the British Embassy handed Mr. Acheson the attached memorandum on Indonesia ² and the possible effects in the Netherlands of an unwise policy in Indonesia. He said he would appreciate very much if Mr. Acheson would have the State Department working people consider this memorandum and later discuss it with Mr. Graves ³ of the British Embassy.

After we left the Secretary's office, Sir Oliver spoke to me further about this matter in the Secretary's anteroom. He said he had not wished to take up the Secretary's time unnecessarily with this matter but that the British Government was deeply disturbed over the Indonesian situation, not only from the effects it might have in South-eastern Asia where the U.K. has important interests, but also because of the possibility that a deteriorating Indonesian situation might so adversely affect the economy of the Netherlands that the European Recovery Program might be endangered.

Sir Oliver said that the British Government has had a good deal of experience in the transfer of power to colonial peoples; Burma, India, Pakistan et cetera. The British Government has found that there is always a lot of trouble and danger inherent in any such situation. Sir Oliver went on to say that in these circumstances he earnestly hoped that the United States would use its influence with both the Dutch and the Indonesians to "get them around a table and make them talk turkey".

Sir Oliver said that when our working people were in a position

¹ Addressed to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) and the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Thompson).

² See undated memorandum, p. 198.

³ Hubert A. Graves, Counselor of the British Embassy.

to talk to Mr. Graves it would be helpful if he could in due course be informed that the views expressed by them on this subject are the ones of the Secretary.

I told Sir Oliver that Mr. Butterworth, and I, or Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Thompson would after considering this statement get in touch with Mr. Graves.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1149

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1949.

Participants: Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director, FE
Mr. Charles S. Reed II, Chief, SEA

Mr. Graves called at his request to discuss new developments in the Indonesian situation, particularly the "Beel Plan" which he believed to contain certain elements which might serve to break the present apparent impasse in Indonesia. I said we had no great amount of information regarding that plan and he then made available a summary thereof. At the same time he communicated the texts of a number of telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and The Hague in which Mr. Bevin¹ requested and received clarification of a number of the points in the plan. From this exchange it was noted that Mr. Bevin had expressed misgivings as to the successful implementation of the plan.

In the ensuing discussion I mentioned my own doubts as to certain points in the plan and it was evident that my doubts and Mr. Bevin's misgivings related to the same fundamental issues, namely it appeared that the Indonesians were to have little choice in the matter and that the transfer of sovereignty was to be made contingent upon certain agreements and upon Dutch terms. I also pointed out that the plan did not go to the crux of the situation, which is how to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and that this essential cessation could not be effected unless and until the responsible Republican leaders were liberated and in a position to order a cease fire by the guerrilla forces operating in Indonesia and in a position to outlaw those who did not respond to this order. Furthermore, unless and until the Dutch took steps to carry out at least the initial requirements of the Security Council resolution I did not see how negotiations of a serious and binding character could be entered into, and without these there appeared to be little chance of the plan ever becoming operative.

¹ Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Graves asked whether or not the short cut to the establishment of an interim government and eventual transfer of sovereignty, set forth in the plan, did not have much to commend itself. But with so much to be done, to conclude arrangements for the government, with so many agreements (Netherlands-Indonesian union, economic and financial matters, and defence) to be negotiated, I felt that the two-month period mentioned in the plan was much too short. And as regards those agreements I believed that the wording of the plan envisaged transfer of sovereignty only after those agreements had been finalized—and negotiations in regard thereto might drag on interminably.

Mr. Graves mentioned that one telegram from the Foreign Office contained Mr. Bevin's desire to have our reaction to the "Beel Plan", particularly whether or not we would go along with it, and I said that, despite any advantages the plan might offer, the United States being a member of UNCFI, an agency of the Security Council, could not take an active position vis-à-vis that or any plan in preference to the Security Council resolution so long as UNCFI did not recommend it, as it could do under the resolution. I said further that the greatest disadvantage of the plan so far as I could see was that it did not initiate any implementation of the resolution, such as release of political prisoners, freedom to negotiate, etc., and with [*without*] such implementation I doubted whether anything could be done with any measure of success as regards solving the Indonesian problem. I confessed that we were concerned that the lack of implementation might lead to an unfavorable report by UNCFI on March 1 with the attendant danger of some member of the Security Council bringing up the question of sanctions.

Mr. Graves then mentioned the *aide-mémoire*² which the British Ambassador had left with the Secretary and we agreed that, as regards the final recommendations (1) to press the Dutch to take position with regard to the Security Council resolution and (2) to press the Indonesians to put their house in order, the first would have to take place before the second could be acted upon. In any event I said that we were anxious to cooperate with the British in any forward looking steps towards a solution.

² See undated memorandum, p. 198.

856d.00/2-1249: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary
of State*

THE HAGUE, February 12, 1949.

142. Morning issue ANP Aneta carries following translation official communiqué issued late last night:

"Minister Sassen has submitted his resignation to Her Majesty The Queen as Minister for overseas Territories. No fundamental differences have arisen within the Cabinet on the constitutional aims concerning the reforms in Indonesia. The aims of the government as they have been repeatedly made known will therefore be followed unchanged and, as far as this depends on the government, will be realized at short notice. While also the whole Cabinet wishes to adhere to the statement of Dr. J.H. van Royen made in the SC on behalf of the government on January 28 last, a difference of opinion arose between the other members of the Cabinet and Minister Sassen on the actual policy to be conducted in this matter".

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/2-1349: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, February 13, 1949—1 p. m.

164. Gocus 587. UNCFI visited Bangka exiles yesterday. Sukarno permitted come Pangkalpinang from Muntok under precautions designed prevent demonstrations. According to Repubs, these involved concentration police of five towns barring access to route to towns-people, order no [*all?*] inhabitants remain inside houses. UNCFI and Repub leaders held general discussion resolution 28 January covering meaning and problems involved. Following points emphasized by Repub leaders:

1. Delay acceptance resolution by Netherlands daily increasing bloodshed and difficulties ultimate pacification. UNCFI explained its policy to treat this as matter highest urgency.

2. Leaders willing enter political discussions with BFO only if all conditions met and then in presence UNCFI.

3. Agreement receive BFO contact committee merely to gain information and preliminary orientation and in no sense involves entering negotiations. Moreover, Sukarno announced he was replying to Hamid's request that contact committee come Bangka 15 February by suggesting Committee come two days after next visit Bangka of UNCFI including Cochran. USRep pointed out such visit probably could not be made before 17. Repubs put postponement on ground

¹ Repeated in telegram 125, February 15, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

desirability receiving latest news from Washington and Hague before meeting. Actually USRep understands this part of Repub strategy to require Netherlands acceptance resolution before entering any significant talks and at same time avoid rejecting squarely BFO overtures.

4. All Repubs stressed need acceptance all parts resolution by Netherlands including return released leaders to administration Jogja as full government in command all security forces there. As practical procedure, suggested preparations be made their behalf by Sultan Jogja several days before their return. Emphasized need restoration to Repubs about same time of Bukkitinggi, looked upon as second Repub capital. Hatta privately recognized tremendous problem involved inducing guerrillas cease hostilities and felt only hope was to (a) make clear Repub was real, not puppet, government and (b) permit guerrilla concentration in areas fully under Repub administration. This complicated, he pointed out, by fact Repub forces have now invaded large areas west and east Java which essentially under their control.

5. Repubs have seen Beel-East Indo plan eliminating interim period. Roem privately commented that information thus far available plan seems to him nothing but play on words involving "transfer sovereignty" before May but reserving to Netherlands Government after such transfer all powers previously claimed by it for interim period.

6. Hatta gave us copy statement issued by him yesterday *Newsweek* correspondent. Denounces "new plan" as trick designed deceive Indos and UN. States among Federalists many leaders who share Repub determination win real freedom and will not be deceived by such tricks.

Glad to answer questions of BFO group but these talks cannot be used by Netherlands to evade SC resolution. Repubs accept SC resolution and will do nothing help Netherlands evade their responsibility under it. Signed Lisle.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-1449: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1949—6 p. m.

82. Usgoc 291. Neth *aide-mémoire*² recd today urges postponement UNCFI Report re establishment interim govt to reasonable later date due to Dutch cabinet crisis and delay Cochran's arrival Batavia. Dept considers request reasonable and trusts report can be delayed for brief period. Your comments desired.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 118 to The Hague and as 78 to New York (USUN).

² Not printed.

856d.01/2-949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1949—4 p. m.

195. Urtel 352, Feb 9.¹ You may informally and confidentially pass fol FonOff as gist info available subject recognition accorded Indonesian Republic:

Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Trans-Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan concluded agreements friendship and commerce with representatives Republic though not known make any definite statements re character recognition. Accordingly may be considered have extended at least *de facto* and possibly *de jure* recognition.

India in suspending KLM's landing permit Dec 23 mentioned it had extended *de facto* recognition. Relationships Pakistan, China, Australia with Republican Government may also be taken indicate *de facto* recognition. US, UK and Burma have accorded Republic same recognition as Dutch accorded it in Linggadjati agreement which states Republic recognized as exercising *de facto* authority over Java, Madura, Sumatra.

Letters exchanged Praha May 1948 between representatives Republic and USSR calling for consular convention between them never acted upon by Republic and what kind recognition if any may be deemed have been accorded Republic by USSR unknown.

ACHESON

¹ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1549 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 15, 1949—7 p. m.

171. Gocus 590. [From Cochran:] Arrived 5 p. m. yesterday. Saw Henderson briefly New Delhi airport and informed him my conversations. In Calcutta read of Sassen's resignation. Schuurman informed me on arrival Beel leaving for The Hague five hours later. I offered call prior thereto. Two hours later received following letter from Beel.

"I hear from Schuurman that at your arrival this afternoon you were good enough to say that in case I should like see you before my proposed departure for Holland tonight you would be glad make yourself available.

My journey being rather unexpected I find to my great regret that I am fully booked up tonight until moment my departure which prevents me accepting your kind offer.

¹ Repeated in telegram 126, February 15, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

My absence from Indonesia will only be of short duration and I very much hope see you after my return".

To Herremans and Critchley jointly this morning gave orally abridged summary my trip. Likewise told Leimena, Darma, Supomo and Sudjono of trip. Said I preferred await developments rather than force attention SC to Indonesian problem immediately. In response their statement Sukarno and Hatta desire see me soonest, I said I would propose UNCFI make trip Thursday.²

Usgoc 291³ and 292⁴ confirmed my feeling further criticism Netherlands Government by UNCFI should be delayed pending developments The Hague. When Critchley called separately to learn attitude I would adopt, showed him my draft of brief cable reporting postponement. He differed sharply. I said I sincerely hoped we would not have divided vote on first decision to be taken after my return. I insisted, however, that developments were in process which I thought might result much more helpfully to Indonesian cause than would any critical report which UNCFI might cable today.

At informal UNCFI meeting this afternoon I suggested following draft report to SC.

"Resolution of SC of 28 January requires UNCFI report to SC and make recommendations for solution of difficulties if parties have not reached agreement on Interim Federal Government by 15 February.

In light recent developments at The Hague, Commission recommends that reporting date be postponed to 1 March."

Herremans agreeable. Critchley asked time to consider. Confidentially informed prior meeting he had cabled his government for instructions since he felt strongly obliged insist upon full factual report. Hopes have reply by Wednesday noon. He said he told his government how sincerely I felt such report this time would make difficulties for Netherlands Government rather than expedite implementation resolution. UNCFI decided visit Bangka Thursday if convenient Republican leaders and if NethDel approves. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² February 17.

³ Telegram 82, February 14, p. 228.

⁴ Telegram 83, February 14, not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1649: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 16, 1949—4 p. m.

177. Gocus 591. British Consul General handed me 15th *aide-mémoire* on Indonesia, reference Usgoc 290.²

Critchley received necessary authority for approval report to SC as quoted Gocus 590.³ Cable sent SC night 15th.

Visited Schuurman today. Summarized trip to US and Europe. Emphasized US adherence complete SC resolution and my desire be reasonable and helpful as possible in achieving early implementation thereof. He referred differences between The Hague and Batavia. Said The Hague views problem from international standpoint while Beel naturally concerned with Indonesian side. Said Beel's return Hague caused by resignation Sassen. Though there were three possibilities namely: Beel convinced Hague correctness his position or be convinced Hague's position or compromise. He did not rule out possibility Beel resigning. I said I understood Beel desired Hague issue statement refusing accept SC resolution and Hatta desired Hague statement accepting resolution. Said I suggested in Hague compromise idea of issuing no statement but letting Van Royen's last speech in SC suffice and proceeding with implementation resolution.

Discussed with Schuurman possibility progress that might be made by UNCFI assisting in talks with Republican[s] and Federalists. He said he had received no new instructions and doubted any would be received from Hague pending consultation there with Beel. Said Beel due Hague today and probably returning Batavia end next week. Said approval given UNCFI visit Republicans tomorrow. Saw no objection my receiving personally any Federalists who might desire call. Feared resolution might stiffen Republicans unduly and referred particularly statement attributed to Hatta by Isaacs (re Hague's 153⁴).

Schuurman referred to short-cut plan for settlement but said it too nebulous to give definite details. Said Beel would seek decision thereon. Discussions in Hague may naturally cause important changes. Explaining I had only sketchy idea of plan, Schuurman volunteered some information. Drees had told me plan was Beel's. Schuurman said original idea came up some time ago in East Indonesia and was later discussed by some Federalists. Beel further developed it. General idea is to set up interim government soonest and transfer sovereignty in two or three

¹ Repeated in telegram 136, February 17, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 80, February 12, not printed.

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Not printed.

months. Within that period conference would probably be held Hague for working out solution some major problems required before sovereignty could be transferred. Schuurman thought UNCFI might participate therein. Certain important issues would have to be settled by treaty or otherwise after initial transfer sovereignty. Full and unconditional transfer might not take place until twelve months after initial step.⁵

I said I had told Ministers The Hague I did not have sufficient information re plan to offer any observations except that world and SC would not take seriously any negotiations toward agreement taking place with one party in custody. Furthermore, I had withheld comments until return Indonesia and chance talk with Indonesians. I told Schuurman I had no objection early transfer sovereignty provided this arrived at through amicable negotiations without coercion or duress and provided transfer takes place in circumstances which would offer new government genuine chance succeed. Indonesian Government should not be loaded down with inherited mess of financial, military and other problems which would probably result in its failure. (I have felt that such catastrophe may be expected and desired by die-hards.) I said any Indonesian Government setup in most propitious circumstances would surely face difficulties as have new governments Latin-America and Philippines. Said Indonesian Government would have to look to Netherlands for much cooperation and should be willing assure Netherlands of continuing beneficial interest this area. I thought outlook would be disappointing unless both parties now act entirely in good faith and work out sound and enduring arrangement. Thought time schedule fixed by SC resolution ample and short-cut should be taken only if comparable soundness could be achieved.

Emphasized Schuurman [my] trip to Europe had been at own suggestion and on my responsibility; my government expected early implementation SC resolution; and I had no commitment whatever to contrary. Said I desired work with him and with other parties in calmest atmosphere possible toward progressive solution. He said some new officials might come from The Hague in replacement present delegations and two groups be set up instead of present NethDel. One would deal with foreign aspects problem while other would contact RepDel and Federalists group. He greatly appreciated UNCFI's postponement SC report to March 1. Hoped resolution Hague political crisis and Beel's problems would permit decisive developments before fixed date. Schuurman asked I keep in close touch and particularly let him know results Bangka visit.

⁵ For further details on the "Beel plan" as received from the British Embassy, see *infra*.

Indian Consul General called. He congratulated me on what he thought were results my visit Washington and Europe. I said Delhi Conference showed we were all working for same end. He agreed wisdom UNCFI decision postpone report. Said must give Netherlands opportunity solve political crisis and then begin implementation. Thought Sassen's resignation and Beel's hurried departure Hague promising indications change in policy. Hoped Cabinet downfall could be avoided and that no statement would be issued by government denouncing SC resolution. He had desired statement accepting resolution but saw virtue my compromise idea of no statement supplementing Van Royen's but quick move toward implementation.

Consul General said BFO representatives meeting continuously in Batavia and Leimena and other Republicans having considerable influence on their thinking. Said only leaders still holding views very far from Republicans are Mansur and Sultan Hamid⁶ with latter veering considerably toward Republicans. Thought Hatta could have good influence on Federalists if contact brought about. Favored my encouraging Republicans open direct talks with Federalists. Said time now come for Indonesians as well as Dutch stop quibbling and show leadership capable effect solution.

Went reception by Governor Batavia last night. Have been well received and without incident by Netherlands officials. Usual press comment but nothing serious. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁶ Dr. Mansur was *wali negara* (head of state), East Sumatra, and Hamid II was Sultan of West Borneo (Pontianak), and chairman of the BFO.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1649: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1949—5 p. m.

88. Usgoc 296. Fol is summary "Beel Plan" left with Dept by Brit Emb this morning:

"Federalists and Republicans would be encouraged agree form interim govt at once, this based on BIO decree. As interim period not expected last more than two months Beel does not expect Rep objections to decree would be maintained. During interim period agreements would be worked out between Neth and Fed Rep of Indo re (a) Neth-Indo union (b) economic and financial matters (c) defence. These agreements would come into force on date handing over sovereignty. Above outline of plan has been agreed to by Neth Govt, pre-Fed Govt and Fed Contact Committee. Repub reps Batavia have also been given

¹ Repeated as 28 to The Hague.

general idea of proposals, which they received favorably, and Rep leaders have been asked whether they will join in discussions thereof. Now decided Rep leaders will be regarded as a Rep Govt and not merely as individuals. Next stage should be meeting between Feds and Reps on general aspects of plan. If this successful there should be further meetings to arrange immediate setting up of interim govt under BIO decree. When this done Del of interim govt would proceed Hague discuss agreements referred to above. Elections to be held after transfer sovereignty and these would be matter entirely for Rep Fed Govt."

In discussion above plan Brit Emb inquired whether or not Dept disposed support it to which reply made that as US member UNCFI an agency of SC Dept could not support any plan in preference to SC Res, to which US committed, unless UNCFI's recommendations were in favor such plan. At same time Dept pointed out there appeared be little hope making plan operative until initial conditions of SC res were put into force, namely releasing political prisoners and enabling them negot with both Dutch and Federalists without stigma of negot under duress as would naturally be inferred if they negotiated while in Dutch custody. Also Dept pointed out two months period to negot points (a) (b) and (c) was short and plan envisaged transfer of sovereignty only after final agreement was reached on above points. Accordingly under best of circumstances "Beel Plan" means conditional transfer sovereignty in indefinite future whereas SC Res fixes definite date for transfer sovereignty. Moreover in Dept's judgment plan does not go to crux sit which is how being about cessation of hostilities and Dept does not believe such cessation can be effected unless responsible Rep leaders are liberated and in position authoritatively order cease fire by guerrilla forces now operating in Indonesia and therefore outlaw those not responding.

During further discussion Brit Emb communicated texts various tels between Brit FonOff and Hague and in last analysis Bevin himself has misgivings re plan as he indicates critics thereof may well say Dutch intend (a) select Republicans their own choosing (b) determine proportions Republicans in govt (c) define functions interim govt (d) impose their own conditions about union, economic matters and defence and (3) [(e)] retain bases and forces in Indo whether Indonesians like this or not; Bevin concludes nothing to show Indonesians are to have any free choice in matter and Neth is offering early transfer power on own terms and without regard Indonesian point of view. He adds if above are not Dutch intentions it is imperative they should make both their motives and their intentions absolutely clear when they announce their policy. Furthermore Bevin is increasingly perturbed at delay and appearance Dutch are giving of ignoring SC Res and he proposes Dutch make interim communication to SC which will have effect of

holding the position until policy can be formulated, but such policy must be of nature commend itself to SC.

In Dept's thinking Brit increasingly concerned Neth Govt will fall, that without some such plan or announced policy as basis of negot nothing will be done to resolve Indo problem until new govt formed and that Indo problem will have serious repercussions on ERP and Atlantic Pact.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/2-1749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

THE HAGUE, February 17, 1949.

159. In amplification main points government statement re Indonesia (Embtel 156, February 16¹), Maarseveen² said:

Government had repeatedly declared it would continue to act toward resolution in accordance Van Royen SC statement. (He quoted resolution and Van Royen statement). Netherlands' policy including military action "had same aim as SC resolution, i.e., maintenance of law and order. If good relations between parties are to be gradually restored, care will have to be taken that their basis internal quiet is maintained and not threatened anew. Break between UN and Netherlands would only be possible—as to procedure—and then only differences about procedure which is to be carried out in a relatively short time." He said that UN and Netherlands pursuing same goal.

Referring first recommendation of resolution Netherlands confining itself to "active defense" against murdering, plundering guerrilla bands. If Republican leaders "want to show that they are prepared to comply with first recommendation and cooperate with Netherlands for restoration peace, law and order, an important act would have been performed which could be built upon." Federalists without abandoning national aspirations have understood that quickest, surest, safest way of attaining sovereign Indonesian regime is way of order and consultation.

Netherlands prepared to offer Republican leaders a proper place in federal interim government but they have so far shown no inclination to enter such government. They prefer compliance with second recommendation. "Anyone who considers this demand objectively will be forced to admit that it is demanding the impossible of Netherlands Government, the more so because Republican leaders have not made it

¹ Not printed.

² Dr. J. H. van Maarseveen, Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories.

perfectly clear that they are also prepared to comply with first recommendation of SC, namely, that they will cease guerrilla warfare and will cooperate with Netherlands for restoration peace and maintenance law and order. Netherlands authority in Indonesia is for time being the only support for law and order in those areas. This would be dealt irreparable blow if Republican leaders [apparent garble] by close friends at home and abroad—to release the political prisoners in compliance with resolution of SC. This release is not among four points to which Van Royen objected. As I said earlier, this is not criterion by which to judge whether release can take place or not. Criterion is whether release is compatible with responsibility of Netherlands for maintenance of freedom and order.

“Whether that is the case will be immediately discussed with HRC. It is clear that we shall do so if it accords with our responsibility.”

The Governments of Netherlands and Indonesia are faced with two difficult problems: On one hand, to prevent chaos in Indonesia and, on other, to avoid a complete break with UN. These two problems partly overlap. A complete break with UN is not a condition for salvation of Indonesia. On other hand, strict compliance with resolution of SC would in our firm conviction mean chaos in Indonesia. It is understandable that in such critical situation some have wondered whether we ought to go [on?] making tremendous sacrifices for Indonesia and whether we are not obliged to leave Indonesia to its fate. The government could not entertain such a thought. The government would not abandon Indonesia. It was government's duty to lead the people.

Maarseveen then referred to Beel's “constructive proposals” which government had approved in principle. Government was prepared to cooperate in transfer sovereignty as soon as representative federal government for whole of Indonesia had been established. Simultaneously with transfer, statute of Netherlands-Indonesia union would have to be created and treaties on various subjects concluded. After that USI could organize their regime independently and democratically in observance of union statute and agreements concluded. If this plan to be realized, a federal interim government would have to be established soonest which up to transfer of sovereignty would exercise powers laid down BIO decree with exception of changes to be made in consultation. After creation of federal interim government it can appoint delegation which together with Netherlands delegation can draft union statute and further agreements at round-table conference to be held in Netherlands [if Republican leaders?] were to be restored to their authority in Djocja. But if Republican leaders are willing to cooperate with Netherlands fully and completely, then they will be

given a share not only in administration of Djoeja and its surroundings but in the government of the United States of the whole of Indonesia.

"Resolution of SC for the realization of Dutch aims wishes to make use of United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Leaving aside for the moment whether parties concerned arrived at agreement without this Commission, there can be no objection that this Commission use its influence with both parties for realization of program drafted by Netherlands and recognized by SC as effective for the rapid development of Indonesia into sovereign federal state united with Netherlands in a union.

"According to SC resolution, however, this Commission and also SC has wider powers. The Commission and SC can according to resolution concern itself with those areas being administrated by participating governments who in harmony with Netherlands Government have succeeded in realizing order and a restoration of property and economic well-being. This and other presumptions of SC cannot be accepted by Netherlands Government and constitute an intolerable violation of the internal sovereignty of the States of the UN."

Van Maarseveen recalled that this point was stressed by Van Royen in SC. He quoted the four points in draft resolution to which Van Royen said Dutch Government had "fundamental objections."

Maarseveen recalled Van Royen's statement as to extent to which the resolution insofar as it is compatible with responsibility of the Netherlands for maintenance of genuine freedom and order in Indonesia, [" "] a responsibility which at this moment no one else can take over from us."

"There," said Maarseveen, "is the formula which is the foundation of the further policy of Netherlands Government, a policy which maintains unchanged the attitude that SC has exceeded its authority.

"Perhaps I may explain the significance of this formula with an example. [" "] The Netherlands Government has been urged—also all [apparent garble] with view to speediest possible transfer sovereignty. Netherlands regards this Beel plan suitable to bridge existing differences and reach common goal including Security Council's. He said it would be necessary for Republican Government to join in discussions.

He thought it better for success of talks that parties did not first try to reach agreement about their respective positions because latter should be result of the consultations. He believed necessary consultations could take place only if Netherlands did not ask Republican Government first to recognize a certain formulation of its position just as Netherlands could not accept a demand by Republican Government that Netherlands agree with view that any discussion should

be preceded by restoration of certain rights. Only real condition for consultations was that they take place in full freedom and frankness and Netherlands prepared to create that condition.

If parties' wish discussions including those on establishment interim government to be held in Netherlands, and if UNCI should find occasion to come to Netherlands for this purpose to exert its influence in helping parties reach agreement, Netherlands would agree to this.

Above summary was taken from semi-official Aneta news bulletin and is stated by Foreign Office press section to be accurate.

Chairman second chamber announced yesterday that government hoped be able to make further statement on Indonesian policy on Friday following consultations with HRC Beel.

Not repeated to Batavia.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/3-2249

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Joseph W. Scott, of the Office of European Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1949.

Mr. Helb telephoned to say that he considered it important that we promptly advise the Netherlands' authorities, through our Embassy at The Hague, that Merle Cochran's appointment as Ambassador to Pakistan would not interfere with his duties as U.S. Representative on UNCFI.¹ Helb said that those in the Government who had been opposed to Cochran as not being qualified for the job in Batavia would characterize his appointment as Ambassador as "a kick up stairs". Those who felt we were to blame for continued Security Council intervention would use the appointment to emphasize our lack of seriousness in allowing a situation to arise in which vital Netherlands' interests would be handled by the "number two man" on our Delegation. Helb added that the Dutch press could be expected to make much of this, and that he hoped we would do the necessary, via Embassy Hague, to prevent it, particularly at the very time when the Government appeared to be "coming around a bit" and viewing the situation "unemotionally".

Helb didn't say so in so many words, but I believe what he had in mind was that a great deal of the effect of Cochran's talks in The

¹The Department of State *Bulletin*, February 20, 1949, p. 228, stated: "H. Merle Cochran, U.S. Representative on the [U.N.S.C.] Commission [for Indonesia], has been nominated by the President to be Ambassador to Pakistan. Due to the critical state of the Indonesian situation, Mr. Cochran will continue his work with the Commission until conditions warrant his departure for Karachi to assume his duties there."

Hague would be dissipated unless we were quick to emphasize that he was still in a position to carry out his duties as U.S. Representative on the Commission. I think his reference to Cochran's appointment as "a kick up stairs" probably means he fears that the appointment, unless fully and promptly explained, may be interpreted as a weakening in our basic position.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT BATAVIA, February 18, 1949—1 p. m.

182. Gocus 592. UNCFI spent February 17 Bangka visiting Sukarno, Hatta and other Republic leaders including Batavia group. I gave high points my trip. Stressed US continuing interest seeing Indonesia question settled fairly. Made point SC did not require formal statement acceptance from Netherlands or Republic of January 28 resolution. Compliance of course expected. UNCFI charged with duty reporting extent resolution implemented. SC then to decide what if any further action necessary its part.

In Hague I had impression impossible in present political crisis government make statement conceding complete acceptance resolution or going much beyond Van Royen's statement. I urged necessity both parties stop quibbling and debating and show actual readiness to implement.

Set fourth two points I had emphasized Hague, namely, freedom for political prisoners and utilization UNCFI. Explained US behind entire SC resolution and my emphasizing these two points in no way indicated deviation from UN on other points. Republicans agreed two essential but do not consider they would have genuine freedom unless and until restored to authority in Jogja as provided by resolution. I said I had not tried envisage either in Washington or Hague step by step procedures that should be followed other than on two points above mentioned until I might have opportunity return Batavia and find how Republicans view situation. They replied they would abide by resolution although some parts perhaps not entirely to their liking and would insist upon carrying out resolution on point of reestablishment at Jogja.

Hatta and Sukarno explained any appeal by them to their followers to lay down arms would be futile and disregarded unless they speak freely and with authority from their own capital. They said military action scattered their leaders and continued delay will make more diffi-

¹ Repeated in telegram 144, February 21, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

cult task calling them in Jogja and convincing them of good faith Dutch and wisdom accepting arrangement under SC. I requested advice as to how they thought return to Jogja could be effected. I said we put certain provisions in resolution to assure freedom of communication and economic support but I was not sure what measures could be taken which would guarantee security for persons of Republic leaders which we urgently desire. Republicans referred to plan for utilization Sultan Jogja for purpose reestablishing Republic civil authority as set forth Bangka meeting with UNCFI February 12 (Usgoc [*Gocus*] 587²).

I stressed our interest seeing Republicans entirely at liberty consult UNCFI and Dutch and opposition any arrangement involved in move to Jogja likely restrict contact and opportunity for exchange of views and quick negotiations.

Above discussions at round table. Republicans took definite position they would not consider themselves free to reach official decisions or negotiations with anyone until returned Jogja. I stressed desirability Republicans establishing more contact with Federalists. Republicans willing only have informal talks until resolution point on reestablishment Jogja implemented. When I mentioned short-cut plan with early transfer sovereignty, Republicans asked how much sovereignty? While satisfied with SC resolution timetable, they perhaps not opposed to early grant sovereignty provided plan laid squarely before them and transfer sovereignty unconditional at fixed date. Furthermore they will participate in no negotiations with Netherlands either for interim government or transfer sovereignty unless UNCFI present. They withheld comment on idea I reported from Hague of possibly having negotiations there after set up of interim government. This connection noted Hague Chamber debate indicated UNCFI would be asked assist in negotiations envisaged at Hague. From paragraph 23 my 213 from Brussels³ will be recalled I was given no definite answer this point by Netherlands Ministers. Had opportunity long talk with Sukarno alone and then with Hatta. Both thanked me warmly for what they felt I had been doing. I said I was not sure how successful we might be but thought everything possible done by US in Washington, Lake Success and Hague to work out of present situation into fair solution for Indonesia. I said much depended on outcome present political debate and crisis Hague. Explained UNCFI withheld February 15 report to SC on my recommendation since I feared it might upset government and result in lengthy period in which nothing constructive could be expected. Insisted to both I was here to support

² Telegram 164, February 13, p. 227.

³ February 9, p. 212.

resolution in its entirety but had assured Dutch I would try be practical and reasonable. Republicans assured me in turn they would be reasonable. Said I felt reestablishment Jogja should be considered as means permitting Republic authorities draw in leaders from all areas in order that consultation and agreement may be achieved and effective call for laying down arms made. Thought this should be emphasized rather than any attempt rebuild Republic to former proportions. Made point however that SC did not recognize Netherlands military action as eliminating one party to dispute on its calendar. I let two leaders know secretly my thought Stikker if given full powers negotiate would have best chance achieving early agreement between parties. I said no certainty this will result but we should be patient few days until outcome Hague crisis seen. Republicans in good health and comparatively good spirits considering circumstances.

I feel more than ever Hatta, Sukarno, Leimena group must be looked upon as nucleus Republic movement and permitted draw in other leaders without any being eliminated by Dutch choice. This group fears some adherents in outlying areas may veer leftist unless early settlement achieved. They definitely desire early settlement and not continuation guerrilla warfare which they realize would destroy country. Their one request of UNCFI was that it assist them establish contact with emergency government Sumatra. Chairman Critchley expressed uncertainty as to how this could be done. Republicans will write letter setting forth request and suggesting means.

Before our departure Sukarno received letter from BFO indicating delay in proposed visit Bangka presumably result postponement plenary meeting BFO until February 21. Republicans will then welcome BFO's for informal talks but not negotiations. To Hatta and Sukarno I emphasized need for them go as far as possible with Federalists and demonstrate to world they have qualities of leadership essential to participating importantly in eventual Indonesian Government.

Upon return Batavia found Usgoc 296⁴ re British memorandum on Beel plan. Bevin and Department point out obvious weaknesses therein. British Consulate General Batavia had visited me evening February 16 setting forth advantages that plan and referring *aide-mémoire* given me February 15. Stating he found me "skeptical," Consulate General admitted plan not sufficiently precise or convincing as presented to date to warrant Republic accepting it over SC resolution. He thought essential however Republicans and Federalists get together. I said convinced Indonesia's share nationalist aspirations and consolidated plan could be worked out easily if Netherlands Government would only show honest intent and effort achieve transfer

⁴ Telegram 88, February 16, p. 233.

sovereignty and would act in manner and through representatives in Batavia capable commanding confidence.

Feel SC debate on UNCFI non-submission February 15 report was beneficial. Netherlands should see from this continuing interest SC in early and full compliance with resolution and should understand impossibility UNCFI postponing beyond March 1 report in premises irrespective circumstances that may then obtain.

In summary convinced Republicans will not move beyond informal talks with Federalists or negotiate with Netherlands on any basis until reestablished Jogja and assured negotiations will be in presence UNCFI. Furthermore am convinced their situation such they could not do their part in implementing SC resolution without this condition being met. Once Republicans given freedom and authority in Jogja, am confident UNCFI can have useful influence and assist materially toward solution provided only Netherlands show good faith. I emphasized to Republicans as I had to Dutch that responsibility for agreement is primarily theirs and that I feel UNCFI should assist and not dictate.

Visited Schuurman this morning. Told him high points talk with Republicans. Told him I considered it absolutely essential Republicans' request and resolution provision for restoration Jogja be met if we are to make any progress. I let him know Lisle leaving about March 3 to be succeeded by Tuthill⁵ as my assistant. I did not go beyond Department's statement re my new appointment to effect I would remain Indonesia while conditions warrant. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁵ John W. Tuthill.

856d.00/2-1849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

LONDON, February 18, 1949—4 p. m.

619. Re Indonesia.

1. Robert Scott, now head of SEA Department FonOff, states that FonOff cannot accept Beel plan for Indonesia because:

- a. Contemplates USI Government composed of Indonesians picked by Dutch;
- b. Would retain too much authority and power in Dutch hands;
- c. Would not satisfy Indonesian desire for independence; and
- d. Would be attempt circumvent SC Resolution.

¹ Repeated in telegram 141, February 19, 2 p. m., to The Hague and in telegram 96, Usgoc 300, to Batavia.

2. FonOff wishes help Dutch save face in present difficult situation but realizes also necessity save face SC. Therefore cannot aid Dutch to evade responsibilities to UN.

3. If US decides press Dutch in SC to proceed with steps necessary to implement SC Resolution, British will support but "very reluctantly." Hope that Dutch will first adopt conciliatory line.

4. With Sassen out of Dutch Government, FonOff hopes that Beel and Spoor will also be eliminated, thus opening door to more conciliatory policy re Indonesia.

DOUGLAS

501.BC Indonesia/2-1949 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, February 19, 1949—4 p. m.

185. Gocus 593. Morning 18th Critchley told me had received instructions from his Government to press for submission UNCFI report to SC since they considered statement Netherlands Overseas Minister² unsatisfactory. I obtained his promise not to demand vote thereon.

At UNCFI meeting afternoon 18th Critchley circulated draft letter to Netherlands Delegation, referring UNCFI's report to SC February 15 seeking delay and press reports Netherlands Minister's statement in Lower House. He thought latter indicated government would not immediately release Republican leaders and restore authority Jogja. Draft continued: "If this is indeed policy Netherlands Government there is no justification for Commission delaying its report. It would, therefore, be appreciated if you would inform Commission early as possible whether report of Minister's statement truly reflects views Netherlands Government in these respects." I argued for delay pending receipt full translation Minister's statement which Netherlands Delegation promised us and also for the Netherlands Government decisions expected shortly. I contended we should not revive February 15 report before March 1 if statements from Hague simply reiterate Van Royen's. With due caution as to optimism, urged we await further development of what appears to be move Hague toward progressive implementation.

Herremans followed my lead. No letter sent. Critchley will reopen issue unless Hague statements or decision in line with SC resolution.

¹ Repeated in telegram 145, February 21, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² See telegram 159, February 17, p. 235.

At dinner last night Schuurman told me his house and several others being vacated with view occupancy by members prospective interim government.

Schuurman telephoned this morning that lengthy government statement he anticipated would be made 11 a. m. Hague yesterday had apparently been only brief statement. He thought comprehensive statement government policy on Indonesia thus being postponed. Said he had telegraphed Hague promptly following my yesterday's visit in order his Government know insistence Republicans on re-establishment Jogja. Am sure Department will do whatever it helpfully can Washington or Hague towards convincing Netherlands Government necessity accepting this point SC resolution.

Visited this morning by all members Republican group Batavia. I told them Schuurman telegraphed Hague my report Republicans insisting on re-establishment Jogja. I urged and they promised refrain from any unhappy statements while debate continuing Hague. In answer my question they said approximately 3,000 Netherlands soldiers Jogja. Said surrounding area except two small towns entirely in Republican hands and any Netherlands communication outside Jogja as with Solo accomplished only by heavily armored convoys. Thought if Netherlands agree withdraw from Jogja, Republican authority could be re-established quickly and easily. Republicans understand Netherlands considering replacement Beel by either Van Mook or Prof. Van Asbeck.

Chinese Consul General called. Submitted detailed report on condition Chinese inhabitants mid-Java. This confirms lack Netherlands control outside principal cities and activities by guerrillas and terrorists taking place constantly including depredations against Netherlands-held positions. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 22, 1949—6 p. m.

191. Gocus 597. Lunched with Hamid and Tahija, Chairman and Deputy Chairman respectively, BFO. Hamid said important Indonesians get together. Expressed regret Hatta and Sukarno feared talk with Federalists. Asked I accompany him Bangka tomorrow to start four-man conversations with them. I told Hamid I had already on first visit Republicans since return impressed them importance talking soonest frankest with Federalists toward reaching mutual trust and understanding. While Republicans consistently refused enter

formal negotiations with anyone pending release and freedom movement, they assured me readiness talk informally with Federalists immediately. I had no impression fear part Republicans and had been cognizant many months their desire for unhampered contact with Federalists. Mentioned assurances given orally last week and in telegrams today of desire Republican leaders reach equitable settlement for all Indonesia soonest.

Hamid said personally, not as BFO chairman, working secretly on plan under which Republicans and Federalists should join. Thought this would be major step in solving problem and agreement with Netherlands thereafter would be easy. I asked what he thought of SC resolution which I stressed was to advantage all Indonesia. He said technically satisfactory but took exception fact it provides for UNCFI invited Federalists participate and does not give definite right. Told him I was instrumental getting idea into resolution of both UNCFI and Republicans having free contact with Federalists. Said wording mere technicality resulting from compromise and he would find me and I thought other UNCFI members anxious consult and cooperate with Federalists whatever terms resolution.

I referred such sketchy details Beel plan as available. Hamid agreed impracticability go Hague prior interim government and two or three months period envisaged thereafter inadequate for settling outstanding problems preliminary transfer sovereignty. He felt premature transfer dangerous for new government. Agreed SC resolution timetable more realistic. Believes, however, Netherlands proposal, which he expects revealed tonight or tomorrow, will be closely akin original Beel plan.

I told Hamid anxious foster exchange ideas between Federalists and Republicans and between Federalists and UNCFI. Insisted, however, I could do nothing further until Netherlands' plan known and UNCFI has opportunity study and report to SC March 1. I said no matter how much cooperation obtained between Indonesians, impossible for SC approve Netherlands stand unless it implements resolution or comes forward with equally good plan acceptable by Indonesians and SC. Said could not participate in effort himself or Federalists sell any plan to Republicans other than SC plan. If Netherlands or Federalists themselves succeed convincing Republicans desirability something else, situation quite different.

Hamid stated always favored release Republicans. Thought they should be permitted return Jogja as individuals but not as government. I said resolution still recognizes existence Republican Government and envisages restoration civil authority Jogja. This considered necessary for consultation with scattered leaders and effective appeal cease-fire.

Hamid doubted effectiveness such appeal at best. Cited evidence some political leaders in Republic territory now occupied by Netherlands forces not favorable to restoration Jogja. I said attempt should be made give Republican leaders most helpful setup enable them issue appeal. Envisaged progressive steps necessary and admitted there would eventually remain terrorist groups and free operators who would not respond and would have to be dealt with militarily. I constantly argued favor steps toward cessation hostilities rather than debate among Indonesians as to form government. Made major point, however, that progress depends entirely this juncture upon Netherlands Government decision. Indicated willingness receive Hamid or other Federalist leaders informally any time. Would prefer act in conjunction other UNCFI members unless special situation might warrant otherwise.

Hamid agreeable and might be useful later. At present convinced working closely with Netherlands. For instance, Schuurman told me last night understood I lunching with Hamid when I had received invitation by phone only twenty minutes before. Considering this connection, concentrated on acceptance SC resolution and Netherlands responsibility for next step. Counting on his repeating my statements to Schuurman. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2349

*The Department of State to the Netherlands Embassy*¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

As the Netherlands Government is aware, the United States Government is extremely regretful of the circumstances which have led to an increasingly complex and difficult situation in Indonesia. The United States Government is therefore in no sense desirous of exacerbating further a situation which has already given rise to a difference of view between our two governments.

In frankness, however, this Government thinks that it is appropriate to invite the attention of the Netherlands Government to the following considerations.

The United Nations Commission for Indonesia, created under the Security Council Resolution of January 28, 1949, will be faced by March 1, next, with the duty of reporting to the Security Council on the progress of events in Indonesia, with particular reference to steps which have been taken in fulfillment of the resolution of the Security

¹ Drafted February 23 in the Office of European Affairs.

Council of January 28. During the interval since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution, representatives of the United States Government have, in numerous conversations with officials of the Netherlands Government, attempted to make clear the steadfastness of this Government regarding the program outlined in the resolution concerning Indonesia. If the Commission on March 1 is obliged to report to the Security Council that steps have not been taken by The Netherlands in conformity with the resolution, this Government will again take its stand in unequivocal support of the fulfillment of the Security Council's Resolution of January 28, 1949.

It is our earnest hope that the Government of The Netherlands will see its way clear to acceptance of the Security Council's Resolution in question, and will demonstrate its acceptance by prompt measures designed to carry out the provisions of this resolution with the assistance of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. It is only by this means that the Government of the United States can discern an end to the increasing difficulties to which this unfortunate situation has given rise for all parties concerned.

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1949.

501.BC Indonesia/2-2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, February 23, 1949—noon.

187. FonMin Stikker called me to his office 10:30 a. m today where I was preceded by all Ambassadors WU countries and gave me following communication which Stikker cabled to Cochran together with personal message to reach him today.

Invitation to Soekarno for meeting here follows later. No release any this matter being made before Saturday next. Pending Dept's instructions I have made no comment new proposals but believe this represents Stikker's utmost effort conform SC resolution in face some recalcitrant elements of coalition Cabinet, Second Chamber, and Beel, and published public opinion.

Text follows:¹

"After consultations with the HRC and in order to revise [*realise*] the plans announced in Parliament, the Netherlands Govt has reached certain conclusions concerning the policy it wishes to pursue with re-

¹ Corrections based on text given the Department by the Netherlands Ambassador.

gard to Indonesia, with which the govt desires to acquaint the Govts of friendly powers:

1. The Netherlands Govt is convinced that no essential differences exist between the Netherlands aims and the aims of the resolution adopted by the SC on January 28, 1949, which embodies the Netherlands program.

2. The difference[s] of opinion relate to the best methods to arrive at the establishment of the US of Indonesia and to bridge the period which will necessarily elapse before the US of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesia[n] union are established.

3. The Netherland[s] Govt maintains the pledges made by its representative in the SC that the Netherlands would carry out the resolution to the extent to which it is compatible with the responsibility of the Netherlands, for the maintenance of freedom and order in Indonesia, meanwhile maintaining its fundamental objections to some parts of the resolution as formulated on its instructions by Dr. Van Royen.

4. The Netherlands Govt is willing to cooperate with UNCI in the same manner as it has cooperated with the Commission of Good Offices to promote discussions to attain as quickly as possible the goal which is common to all parties.

5. The Netherlands Govt is convinced that all parties concerned should first of all endeavour to resume discussions on the basis of mutual appreciation and confidence.

6. In order to facilitate a prompt beginning of the discussions for the creation of the sovereign US of Indonesia, the Netherlands Govt has decided to lift the existing restrictions of the liberty of movement of the Republic[an] leaders, to consult with them concerning their residence and to invite them to participate in the discussions.

7. The Netherlands Govt is convinced that the interests of all parties concerned require that they make sincere and strenuous efforts to reach a speedy and prompt solution of pending problems.

The Netherlands Govt is of the opinion that a firm basis for cooperation and mutual respect can only be completely established when sovereignty over Indonesia can be transferred by the Netherlands to a federal Indonesian Govt which is truly representative for the whole of Indonesia.

8. On the basis of this conviction the Netherlands Govt has decided to take the initiative for the convocation at The Hague of a round table conference of all parties concerned with the Indonesian question. This conference will have as objective to devise the necessary arrangements for a considerably accelerated transfer of sovereignty, taking advantage of the basic principles on which agreement between parties exists, and also prepare arrangements for the intermediary period, including the creation of a federal interim govt. On the Indonesian side parties may decide to form a common all-Indonesian delegation or attend separately.

9. The convocation of this conference, which should start on March 12 if possible, should be considered as an effort of the Netherlands Govt to contribute to the conclusion of a speedy and definite agreement. The Netherlands Govt is fully prepared to consider the merits of all proposals put forward by any of the parties during the

conference and to determine in how far these are compatible with its responsibility.

10. The Netherlands Govt feels that all efforts should be made to terminate the negotiations for an unconditional transfer of sovereignty on May 1st, 1949, and to further the ratification immediately afterwards. By that date agreement should be reached concerning the union-statute and the financial-economic and military agreements. The Netherlands Govt sincerely hopes to establish this future relationship on the basis of what both parties voluntarily will accept as joint interests and purposes. Inasmuch [*insofar*] as on certain points no agreement can be reached on the proposed date, special transitional arrangements will have to be made for such subjects as well as for the adaptation of the civil service, the withdrawal of military forces and other problems. These transitional arrangements will remain in force for a short time to be agreed upon by mutual consultation, after the transfer of sovereignty has taken place.

11. The provisions to be made for the interim period, particularly the establishment of a federal interim gov't, should be considered in their relation to the proposed accelerated transfer of sovereignty. The significance of these provisions will diminish inasmuch [*insofar*] as this transfer of sovereignty can be accelerated.

12. The Netherlands Govt is fully aware of the seriousness of the situation. It makes an urgent appeal to the gov'ts with which close cooperation exists in the international field to bring their influence to bear to promote the convening of the proposed conference, with a view to further a constructive solution of the conflict in Indonesia, which offers the best attainable guarantees for a development of the USI and for a durable voluntary cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia."

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/2-2349 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE THE HAGUE, February 23, 1949—2 p. m.

188. Foreign Minister Stikker has just sent me following draft to be addressed to President of Republic of Indonesia being translation of invitation which will be forwarded from Batavia to Soekarno probably on Sunday next:

"(Draft for the President of the Republic).

Prompted by the conviction that the highest interests of Indonesia demand that all concerned should contribute to the fullest measure of their ability to a speedy and complete solution of the pending problems the Netherlands Government has again considered the way in which this goal can be soonest attained.

It is of the opinion that a situation should be created as soon as possible in which the conflicts and mistrust of today give way to mutual cooperation and appreciation. Such a state of affairs would in the

opinion of the Netherlands Government not fully be reached until sovereignty has been transferred by the Netherlands to a federal government representative of the whole of Indonesia.

The Netherlands Government is convinced that this situation which the resolution of the Security Council of January 28, 1949 has set as a goal to be reached by 1 July 1950 at the latest can be created at a considerably earlier moment by the sincere and energetic co-operation of all interested parties.

In view of this the Netherlands Government has conceived the idea to take the initiative for a round-table conference of all parties concerned in the Indonesian question which could commence at The Hague as soon as possible—preferably on March 12, 1949. At the conference the conditions and moralities [*modalities*] will have to be discussed under which the afore-mentioned accelerated transfer of sovereignty can be effected as well as provisions for the intermediary period including the institution of a federal interim government.

The Netherlands Government is prepared to examine on its merits every proposed solution submitted by one of the parties in free consultation with these parties and to examine to what extent these proposed solutions are compatible with its responsibility.

Consequently I have the honour on behalf of the Government of the Netherlands to invite Your Excellency to appoint a delegation to participate in this conference.

I wish to add that a similar invitation has been sent to the chairman of the Assembly of Federal Consultation requesting his co-operation for the appointment of the delegations for the territories affiliated to the BFO.

Furthermore, the Netherlands Government will invite to the conference representatives of the provisional federal government and of the minorities.

Finally, I inform Your Excellency that the UNCFI has been invited to attend the conference in order to assist the parties."

BARUCH

856d.00/2-2349

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 23, 1949.

Participants: Mr. van Kleffens, Ambassador of The Netherlands
 Mr. Helb, Counselor, The Netherlands Embassy
 Mr. Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State
 Mr. Butterworth, Director, FE
 Mr. Nolting, NOE

Mr. van Kleffens and Mr. Helb called at their request. Mr. van Kleffens said he wished to leave with us a copy of a communication which was being delivered at The Hague to the Belgian, Canadian, French, British and United States Ambassadors, setting forth the position on Indonesia which the Netherlands Government had

adopted. He requested that the contents of this memorandum be made known to the Secretary. He also requested that we regard the communication as secret until it was released by the Netherlands' authorities in Batavia upon the return there of Dr. Beel. (Copy of the communication is attached ¹.)

Mr. van Kleffens read to us the communication. He said that his knowledge of it was limited to the text and that he was therefore not in a position to elaborate. He said that he felt, however, that this was a major step forward; that it represented a real attempt on the part of the Netherlands Government to meet the "essentials" of the position of the Security Council expressed in its resolution of January 28, 1949; and that he hoped that the U.S. Government would be able to support the proposal contained therein to the full.

In accepting the memorandum, I stated that I would not want to give an official reaction to it without thorough study; that I would wish to take it up with the Secretary; and that I would meanwhile seek some clarification of the Dutch proposal.

In the ensuing conversation the following points regarding the Dutch plan came out:

1. Numbered paragraph 6 was interpreted by Mr. van Kleffens to mean that Republican leaders would be given full liberty, but that they would not be restored to governmental authority in Jogja or elsewhere. In this connection I suggested that the phrase "to consult with them concerning their residence" might well be deleted, inasmuch as it seemed to imply some restriction on their liberty of movement.

2. Mr. van Kleffens interpreted the first sentence of paragraph 10 as meaning that sovereignty would be transferred on May 1, 1949, subject only to those conditions expressed in the latter part of this paragraph.

3. I inquired why the Netherlands Government felt that more progress could be made in negotiations at The Hague than in Java. Mr. van Kleffens replied that better progress had been made in negotiations with the Federalists at The Hague and that he felt the same would be true at the proposed round-table discussions.

4. Mr. van Kleffens emphasized that the Netherlands Government plan seemed to him significant and progressive as much for what it did not say—e.g., it set no conditions precedent, such as the cessation of guerilla activity—as for what it did say.

5. It was inferentially brought to the Ambassador's attention that the plan did not seem totally consistent with the Security Council Resolution. I agreed, however, to give it careful attention and to let him know the Department's views as promptly as possible.

¹ See telegram 187, February 23, noon, p. 247.

501.BC Indonesia/2-2449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, February 24, 1949—7 p. m.
NIACT

105. Usgoc 303. Neth Amb called on Asst Sec Rusk Wed and delivered, on secret basis until released by Neth Batavia probably Sat, communication giving Neth Govt decision. Tel from Hague states Stikker cabled same communication to you.

In handing communication, van Kleffens stated that his info largely confined to text, and therefore he was not in position to elaborate, but personally considered decision reached in Hague real step forward. Upon questioning, he expressed personal view that numbered para 6 of communication rejects idea restoration Repub Govt at Jogja, though remainder of plan attempts meet all essentials of SC position and it will be noted does not require conditions precedent such as stoppage of guerilla activities to acceptance of invitation.

In accepting communication, Asst. Sec stated that he would wish to study text thoroughly, to discuss it with Secy, and could therefore give no official reaction at this time.

Without attempting prejudice your reactions, which Dept would appreciate soonest, following is point which might require action by UNCFI prior to completion Departmental study your views and issuance any further instructions.

Although Dutch proposal does not specifically exclude restoration Republican Govt in Jogja, Netherlands Amb here, as already noted, indicated his view that such would in fact not be acceptable. This point appears to be critical as between Dutch and Republicans on one hand and as between Dutch plan and SC resolution on the other. Present likelihood is therefore that Republicans will immediately reject Dutch plan on Jogja point. If this should occur, particularly if this point appears to be sole obstacle, we suggest UNCFI should immediately attempt to bring about direct and urgent negotiations between Dutch and Republican representatives to resolve this point. If complete impasse develops between parties, UNCFI might attempt through informal negotiations or improvisation to discover whether any basis for resolving Jogja point can be found. Care should be taken not to commit this Govt, however, to support any settlement which differs from Security Council resolution unless agreed to by both parties.

Dept considers main US and UN interest in Indonesian case is early settlement peaceful means of issues between Netherlands and Republic

¹ Repeated as 151 to The Hague.

which would include establishment government and constitution in Indonesia based on free consent Indonesians and relations with Netherlands on basis Dutch-Indonesian agreement. Dept does not believe that procedural differences between plan now proposed by Netherlands and recommendations in para 3 of Security Council resolution are themselves decisive if Dutch and Indonesians can move under either plan to agreed solution.

We believe further that Jogja point should not be allowed by either party to become so important as to frustrate main political program for independent USI and earnestly hope that Dutch and Republicans themselves by preliminary negotiation in Java can remove that obstacle.

You will note that Dutch document apparently recognizes the continued existence of the Repub by its reference to that entity.

Should not the Neth reference to negots for unconditional transfer of sovereignty on May 1, 1949 be maximized with a view among other things to committing the Dutch to the hilt.

Pls comment urgently.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/2-2549

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 25, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Jean Daridan, Counselor, French Embassy
Mr. Charles S. Reed, Chief, SEA
Mr. W. S. B. Lacy, SEA

Mr. Daridan called at his request and showed me two telegrams which his Embassy had received from the French Foreign Minister. The first telegram described in very general terms the Beel plan, which will be announced tomorrow in Batavia and The Hague. The second telegram directed the French Embassy in Washington to ascertain the Department's attitude toward the plan as well as the possibility of its support of that plan. The French Foreign Minister expressed the hope that Mr. Cochran could impress upon the Republican leadership the desirability of an immediate settlement of the problem and the sincerity of the Netherlands as evidenced in their willingness to transfer sovereignty on the first of May. During a long and somewhat discursive conversation which followed I told Mr. Daridan (a) that Mr. Cochran would continue to devote his energies and his ingenuity to bringing the parties together on the basis of any plan which was mutually agreeable; (b) that the Security Council's Commission for Indonesia would be obliged to report to the Council on March 1 in

pursuance of the January 28 resolution; that the Council, and only the Council, could decide whether the Dutch proposals complied with the spirit or the letter of the January 28 resolution; (c) that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia could not go to The Hague, in my opinion, without the permission or perhaps the direction of the Security Council since it was clear that the Netherlands would invite the Commission under such conditions as the Netherlands considered desirable and that it would be improper for the Commission to operate within a frame of reference differing substantially from that provided it in the January 28 resolution; and (d) that whatever the merits of the plan, the Republic would undoubtedly cling to the January 28 resolution since the Netherlands proposals do not restore Republican leadership to Jogja.

Mr. Daridan made it clear that his Government hoped that Mr. Cochran, in his capacity as an official of the Department of State rather than as a member of UNCFI, might persuade the Republicans to accept the Dutch proposals. I pointed out that whether or not he was willing to do so, Mr. Cochran would undoubtedly find it extremely difficult to convince the Republicans of the desirability of their accepting the plan; that if Mr. Cochran made such an approach to the Republic, the Australian representative would undoubtedly register strong objections to the plan, both with the Indonesian Republicans and the Security Council; that India would probably do likewise and that Mr. Cochran might find himself, as a result, in an embarrassing position.

Mr. Daridan said that he fully recognized the great difficulties which would face the Department and Mr. Cochran in approaching the Republicans as his Government had suggested. He realized, moreover, that the Netherlands had given the Government of the United States and the Government of France virtually no time to make constructive suggestions as to the subject matter of the plan or the manner of its presentation; that in effect, the Netherlands Government was presenting interested parties with a *fait d'accompli* and expecting their support. I agreed.

501.BC Indonesia/2-2549 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

THE HAGUE, February 25, 1949—1 p. m.

193. In our recent conversations with Boon (Embtels 171, February 19 and 180, February 21²) we have found him for first time

¹ Repeated in telegram 113, Usgoc 307, February 25, 7 p. m., to Batavia.

² Neither printed.

during protracted Indonesian crisis thoroughly gloomy. February 21 he remarked that conditions re Djocja mentioned by Hatta to Cochran for resumption negotiations had created consternation in Dutch Cabinet. Subsequently, Boon remarked that, contrary to impression left by Cochran in The Hague, he now seemed, after his talks on Bangka, to be backing Hatta's third demand, viz., restoration Republic at Djocja. Parenthetically would like say that Boon is most reasonable, rational and straightforward Foreign Office official with whom Embassy deals on Indonesia and has complete confidence Stikker and Lovink.

Yesterday we had further talk with Boon with view seeing how firm Dutch are in rejecting idea Republic return Djocja, making clear our approach purely personal and without instructions. Boon said Netherlands Government fearful that with restoration Republic chaos would ensue and Republican leaders would pursue procrastinating methods characteristic in past and refuse to open negotiations until further conditions had been met.

We said rigid positions being taken by both parties re Republic's return Djocja seemed likely result complete impasse, with Dutch in position of conflict with SC resolution, at time when UNCFI about submit March 1 report SC. Such development could have most unfavorable consequences for Netherlands, particularly in respect its efforts stage Indonesian conference Hague mid-March. We went on to state Dutch attitude re return Djocja was in some fundamental respects inconsistent with government's proposal (Embtel 187, February 23) to transfer sovereignty as of May 1. Proposal must be viewed with some doubt if Netherlands not prepared work out means for Republicans to prepare soon to assume responsibility government, particularly law and order within federated state.

We said that SC resolution in our opinion aimed at restoration Republican Government at Djocja for two immediate purposes:

(1) Give Republican leaders suitable opportunity call off guerrilla warfare;

(2) Give them prestige and authority necessary embark on negotiations. No one could deny Republican leaders were impotent stop guerrillas unless they were released and restored to authority. Re second point, viz., prestige, we asked Boon if he thought compromise might be arranged whereby Netherlands agreed restoration but on condition Republicans agree to commence negotiations at round table conference Hague within early definite time limit.

Boon, after indicating early in discussion that Netherlands Government must absolutely refuse agree re Djocja, finally said, in his personal opinion, Netherlands Government could not take any initiative now resolve this problem but would certainly listen any "ingenious

proposal" which Cochran or UNCFI might put forward to break deadlock. He indicated Netherlands Government pinning all its hopes upon convening round table conference Hague and went on to indicate Netherlands might be prepared "pay a high price in Djocja for agreement to negotiations The Hague."

Foreign Office fully aware urgency this matter, particularly view approaching March 1 deadline and Embassy believes Dutch would not turn their backs if Cochran were to advance proposal for compromise along lines that would save Republicans' face and same time give Dutch assurance law and order will not be jeopardized and Republicans are not simply given opportunity avoid negotiations and coming to agreements in sense contemplated both by Dutch and under SC resolution. This would involve something of a marriage between Beel plan and SC resolution, which, upon close examination, does not seem be out of question, but in fact has much to commend it. It might go long way to strengthen Cabinet's shaky position.

Embassy suggests to Department these ideas may be worth exploration, particularly in view of urgency of solution which will be apparent from re-reading Embtel 190, February 23 and Brussels' 269, February 24³ to Department. Not repeated to Batavia.

BARUCH

³ Neither printed.

501.BC Indonesia/2-2549: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET NIACT

BATAVIA, February 25, 1949—3 p. m.

196. Gocus 601. Eleven a. m. today Schuurman handed me copy memorandum submitted by Netherlands Government to Ambassadors US, UK, France, Belgium and Canada February 23 concerning Netherlands Government policy to be pursued Indonesia.² Not cabling this since assume Department has it directly from Hague or Netherlands Embassy.

Schuurman also handed me following undated unsigned memorandum:³ "Re-establishment of Repub Government in Jogja would give fatal blow to confidence of certain persons and political organizations in possibility of cooperation with Netherlands. It would mean encouragement of unconciliatory elements of Repub to abide by their

¹ Repeated in telegram 161, February 26, 2 p. m., to The Hague.

² See telegram 187, February 23, noon, p. 247.

³ On February 28 the Netherlands Embassy provided the text of this memorandum to the Department, saying it had been handed the UNCFI at Batavia on February 26. (501.BC Indonesia/2-2849)

inflexible attitude. Every social rehabilitation would be retarded, lives of Chinese population would be endangered. Tan Malakka would be stimulated to greater activity, guerrilla warfare and terrorism would flare up to unknown extent, it would be impossible maintain any authority in Jogja and cooperation of Netherlands forces in maintenance of law and order would [then] be extremely difficult, if not impossible. A new demarcation line would recreate chaos in field of economics, finance and communications, internal security would disappear completely and terrorism would prevail. Repub Government, which already in past was unable to suppress this terrorism to any extent, would now be at mercy of extremists. Information contained in selections of documents submitted to you on infiltrations and subversive activities from Repub controlled territory has now been confirmed by documentary evidence from Repub archives; comprehensive note on this matter will be completed shortly. Absolute certitude [*certainty*] that every possibility of reaching agreement and of successfully conducting negotiations would be frustrated by terrorism, infiltrations and subversive activities from Jogja does not permit Netherlands Government in view its responsibility to allow return of Repub Government to Jogja, since this would be tantamount to barring in advance possibility of achieving speedy transfer of sovereignty as envisaged under regular conditions."

Schuurman handed me following communication dated February 23: "My Dear Cochran, I have asked Schuurman to hand you a note which we have addressed today to several friendly governments.

I had hoped come for short visit to Batavia to assist in trying find solution our very complicated problems which are facing all of us, but political situation in Holland since resignation of Sassen remains unstable which prevents me from leaving country at this moment.

In view of very critical circumstances and bearing in mind frank and pleasant discussions during your recent visit to Hague I feel that a personal message might contribute to clarify situation.

Postponement of first report of UNCFI from February 15 to March 1 has given Netherlands Government valuable time to complete discussions with High Representative of Crown and to reach definite conclusions concerning future policy. I want you to know how much I have appreciated attitude of members of UNCFI in this matter.

Unfortunately pressure of time elements remains to large extent because Netherlands Government will only be able announce decisions after arrival Beel in Batavia which is scheduled for Saturday February 26. We are fast approaching date of March 1 on which first report of UNCFI to SC should be made. I trust you will understand that in view of tense situation in Indonesia such far-reaching decisions

as were taken can only be announced after return of highest Netherlands representative to Indonesia.

I would like make most urgent appeal to give favorable consideration to proposals which Schuurman will explain to you. Personally I do not see any way out if Repub would refuse come Holland for discussions. For nearly three years now negotiations have taken place in Indonesia. Ministers of Netherlands Government have gone Indonesia several times. Cabinet delegations in which I participated have gone Jogja under most difficult circumstances.

Netherlands Government has taken momentous decision to transfer its sovereignty at earliest possible date and discuss this transfer with all parties. Hague seems to be most logical choice for proposed conference because it is Dutch Government which is transferring sovereignty. You will agree atmosphere in Holland is far better than in Batavia.

If during proposed round table conference unforeseen complications should arise I would personally be willing do all I can straighten them out.

With regard to opening date of conference I would like explain to you that March 12 is only few days before deadline of resolution of SC. First we had in mind March 7 but amongst other things because of transportation difficulties it was clearly impossible get every one assembled such short notice. On tenth we have here Hague a Benelux meeting. Therefore there was no possibility meet earlier.

Present Netherlands Government takes realistic view of situation and future relationship which will be embodied in union statute and other arrangements. They see quite clearly that transfer of sovereignty should mean real and full sovereignty for Indonesia and not sovereignty restricted to such extent that *de facto* authority would remain with Netherlands. Therefore I do not feel that unsolvable difficulties will arise.

You and I have always believed that difficulties could be solved round conference table. To call such conference should be first aim of all who wish arrive at speedy and lasting solution of present difficulties. Netherlands Government has made first move in lifting restrictions on movements of Repub leaders. A genuinely free and open conference should be next step.

If on other hand Repubs would demand return of their government to Jogja before they participate in any discussions I am convinced that discussions will become impossible on Netherlands side. Therefore I venture presume upon your personal influence with Repub leaders to convince Sukarno and others that they accept invitation. Recent events have shaken confidence on both sides but we cannot let

our sentiments prevail. Much higher interests are at stake than personal feelings or opinions of those who take part in discussions. It is fate of Indonesia and Holland and to certain extent future relationship between east and west that is at stake.

Experience has taught both of us to be careful with predictions but we hope to terminate the work by May 1, which would probably also suit your personal plans.

I know how hard and patiently you have labored to bring parties together. I have tried to facilitate your task and therefore I feel as an honest man that I should inform you that I have done everything possible to create conditions for fresh start. It is up to you now to make best use of possibilities which situation offers.

If it would help to talk over phone please tell Schuurman so I can ring you up.

With kindest regards,

Above text is in conformity with telegram received today from Netherlands Foreign Minister Stikker." Signed Schuurman, acting chairman Netherlands delegation.

Schuurman said also giving Herremans copy first memorandum. Said no one should know of Stikker's letter except ourselves. Requested I maintain absolute secrecy re fact of memorandum having been handed me but desired I have this material for advance information and study. Said Beel scheduled arrive Batavia Saturday morning and would make public statement 6 p. m. Batavia time on Indonesian program. Presumes statement will include material set forth in memorandum to Ambassadors. Said it also presumably would reveal Beel plan details whereof Schuurman insists he has not received. Answer my query Schuurman did not know whether Beel would have meeting with UNCFI or have documentation transmitted UNCFI through Netherlands delegate. Did not know in what form or when invitations would be issued Repubs, Federalists and UNCFI to participate round table conference Hague.

See Gocus 602⁴ for comment. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁴ *Infra.*

501.BC Indonesia/2-2549 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET NIACT

BATAVIA, February 25, 1949—4 p. m.

198. Gocus 602. Reference Gocus 601.² To Schuurman I stressed UNCFI responsibility submit report March 1 including all facts avail-

¹ Repeated in telegram 161, February 26, 2 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra.*

able to that date. I said desirable be able acquaint SC with reactions Indos to Netherlands proposal.

Material provided today does not of course permit UNCFI report Netherlands has complied with SC resolution. Paragraph IV of first memo would give recognition UNCFI as GOC. Paragraph VIII may be interpreted indicating invitation to attend Hague conference may include UNCFI. Paragraph VI does not promise unconditional liberty to Republican leaders. Furthermore reestablishment Republic at Jogja is refused in second memo. No steps taken to date to carry out other provisions resolution.

USDel in recent cables reported Repub insistence upon Netherlands implementing SC resolution and upon small likelihood Netherlands so doing unless under heavy international or SC pressure. USDel set forth weakness Beel plan as revealed to date and of ideas presented in Maarseveen speech February 16. Mentioned particularly in Gocus 595³ question as to whether Repub would be willing proceed directly from confinement Bangka to Conference Hague. Procedure now being proposed by Netherlands Government would give Netherlands forces more time achieve military objective and includes no steps likely soon terminate hostilities.

Question will presumably be faced by SC therefore as to whether it prefers proceed with more pressure or sanctions against Netherlands for patent noncompliance with SC resolution to date, or accept in good faith invitation sovereign Netherlands Government to Indo parties to question to meet around table at Hague in presence UNCFI in effort negotiate on interim government and towards transfer sovereignty, or withdraw entirely from Indo question. Would appreciate any instructions or suggestions Department may issue, realizing I shall probably be called into UNCFI meeting Sunday preparatory to submission report and will also be contacted by Repubs for advice. Copy of reply Department makes direct to first Netherlands memo should be helpful.

Entirely possible Repubs may refuse invitation to Hague. Doubt all Federals would favor participation without Repubs even if Netherlands might desire proceed with Federals alone. Assume decision would rest with SC as to whether UNCFI participates Hague if formally invited. Assume would definitely object to transfer seat discussions without UNCFI being included. Revelation Beel plan details Saturday evening may of course have important bearing on some points above mentioned. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

³ Telegram 187, February 21, not printed.

856d.00/2-2449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium*¹

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1949—5 p. m.

208. Dept believes that Spaak's anxiety re financial aspects Benelux as result of Neth failure to settle Indo question fully justified and entails special effort on part Belgian Govt if consequences Neth intransigency are not to fall heavily upon Belgians. For this and other obvious reasons including importance successful Benelux union Dept trusts that Spaak will give Dutch partners benefit his advice to end that Neth Govt will go further than Beel proposal in offering basis prompt settlement. Specifically, we feel recent Dutch proposal lacks essential ingredient, namely, restoration Repub as governmental entity with some seat of authority, which is necessary (a) to meet essential position SC on this matter and (b) to enable Repub leaders to bring their followers into any federal Govt which round-table negotiations may evolve.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated 156 to The Hague, 110, Usgoc 305, to Batavia, and 6 to Luxembourg; in the latter, the directive named the Foreign Minister (Bech), referring to telegram 8, February 24 (not printed), with appropriate substitutions.

856f.00/2-2549 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1949—6 p. m.

111. Dutch and Repub releases present wildly contradictory pictures of mil situation Java Sumatra. Dutch generally contend operations proceeding satisfactorily against resistance perhaps lighter than expected, that remaining problem is mopping up pocketed pillaging gangs from whom population welcomes Neth protection. Repub maintains situation developing advantageously their cause, that Dutch troops occupy pockets (including Jogja) tenuously connected in predominantly Repub controlled countryside, are spread over thin and beginning suffer demoralization. Repub Govt Sumatra either feels or feigns sufficient confidence to have upped its ante from restoration Repub *Renville* territories to restoration Linggadjati territories as basis settlement.

On basis doubtless meagre info available you, Cochran and MilObs, is it possible assay claims two parties for content truth as basis for overall appreciation? In particular is there evidence indicating that in event failure negots (1) desire population for security, food and textiles may be determining, resulting isolation guerillas and facili-

tating mopping-up operations, or conversely, (2) Dutch, unable police all Java Sumatra, may be forced draw back to afford sufficient protection important plantation areas, resulting re-creation Repub authority and administration extensive territories regardless attitude Dutch to SC Res? ¹

ACHESON

¹ Telegram 219, March 3, 9 a. m., from Batavia, in reply, concluded: "Reference questions posed by Department due to claims each side, which are diametrically opposite, and complete lack of facilities to sample opinions and beliefs of populace, hazarding opinion this time not warranted." (856f.00/3-349)

501.BC Indonesia/2-2649: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State ¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, February 26, 1949—2 p. m.

203. Gocus 603. After sending Gocus 601 and 602 yesterday,² received Herremans his request. We exchanged ideas on documentation handed us each earlier in day by Schuurman. Herremans volunteered that Netherlands Government really offering Republic little concrete in exchange for requested agreement latter forego fulfillment SC resolution re restoration Jogja. [Stated?] Republicans would be reluctant proceed from confinement Bangka to conference Hague on short notice and without provisions SC resolution having been met. He hoped Beel would receive us soonest after return and would either make convincing approach directly Republicans or provide on occasion Saturday evening statement or through other documentation to UNCFI evidence good faith and determination transfer sovereignty in satisfactory manner.

At dinner I talked with Minister Leimena, ranking Republican Government official Batavia. I told him not informed what all Beel would announce Saturday evening but surmised statement might follow lines Maarseveen speech February 16 and possibly refuse restoration Jogja and offer conference elsewhere. Said we should all study statement carefully. Suggested Republicans make no reply either affirmative or negative to any proposals Netherlands might extend until they consult UNCFI members. I told Leimena Republicans had good record with SC. If Netherlands might now assume position which would request Republicans surrender or deviate from provisions established in their favor in SC resolution, they might have difficulty deciding or

¹ Repeated in telegram 165, February 28, 6 p. m., to The Hague, and as 220 to Brussels.

² Telegrams 196 and 198, February 25, pp. 256 and 259.

even desire leave matter to SC as to whether they should accept or refuse Netherlands alternative. I said Republicans themselves would, however, have to make decision whether reply at once to Netherlands or inform UNCFI of position and indicate readiness abide by SC decision as to what should be done.

Later in evening talked with Critchley. He was, of course, unaware documentation provided Herremans and me. He doubted Beel's coming statement would relieve UNCFI necessity report noncompliance March 1. He said he regretted Netherlands not moving more helpfully. He appreciated unfavorable report involves risks. He said critical report and strong pressure by SC and Asiatics might move Netherlands to implement SC resolution and consummate really acceptable and final arrangement. On other hand, Netherlands might stubbornly refuse and then both Netherlands and Indonesia suffer from sanctions that might ensue. He thought therefore UNCFI should not discard summarily any proposal Beel offers. He thought we should study it carefully, see if we could encourage Republicans accept at least part of it, and then ourselves work toward supplementing that part with UNCFI material to form basis of plan for interim government, et cetera. I agreed we should study whatever proposed and ascertain Republicans' ideas thereon but was more disposed refer matter if necessary back to SC in light very specific resolution adopted January 28 than have UNCFI itself now endeavor create plans its own divergent from both SC resolution and Beel plan.

Received 11 last night Usgoc 303³ which crossed Gocus 601 and 602. Department apparently had not been provided with second memorandum referred to in Gocus 601 which definitely rejects Republican restoration Jogja. While Van Kleffens claims one of virtues Netherlands plan to be that it does not require as condition precedent that guerrilla activities be stopped, I consider this weakness since feel SC would desire primarily stop bloodshed earliest possible moment.

Agree with Department as to urgency achieving settlement. Know directly from Netherlands Government Hague how seriously Netherlands effort bogging down militarily and financially. Cognizant deterioration position legitimate Republican leaders confined Bangka and out of contact with everyone except occasionally permitted Netherlands or UNCFI visitors. Department should not, however, minimize difficulty now reaching agreement through direct negotiations between Netherlands officials Batavia and Republicans Bangka on contentious point restoration Jogja. Drees did not even see ranking Republicans while in Java. Netherlands visitors Bangka have been military or Justice Department officials. There have been no talks between Nether-

³ Telegram 105, February 24, p. 252.

lands Delegation and Republican Delegation toward any agreement since police action. Talks which Hague acclaims as desirable between Republicans and Federalists have never taken place beyond what might be called preliminary contacts.

Agree with Department every effort should be made prevent impasse on Jogja point. Netherlands will have to give convincing evidence, however, of bona fide intention early unconditional transfer sovereignty if this impasse to be avoided. Eagerly awaiting Beel statement on this point since explanations given me Hague and Batavia have to date been neither precise nor consistent nor convincing.

As Department knows, I had hoped Stikker might come Batavia shortly after my arrival and personally undertake resumption negotiations with Republicans and drawing in Federalists. His letter to me explains why this impossible and states clearly he can do nothing helpful unless Republicans accept Netherlands position on Jogja restoration and proceed Hague for round table conference. It may be that Republicans would be well advised accept this arrangement. If they do, they risk losing support military and other scattered leaders and suffering deep humiliation if Netherlands attitude does not improve over that demonstrated to Republicans and to world in past. Little can be done for Republicans in their present state of despair and isolation by UNCFI Batavia if Netherlands Government determined follow its own course irrespective SC resolution. If negotiations are moved Hague and leading Republicans such as Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Leimena, Supomo, Hadji Salim, Roem, *et al.*, participate therein, they will have opportunity make personal impression on Netherlands officials and foreign diplomats which I feel will be infinitely better than has been created for them from distance by unfavorable press, et cetera. Some important advantages would accrue through having negotiations removed from poisonous atmosphere Batavia where efforts Netherlands Ministers and political leaders from Hague to obtain genuine understanding situation and seek honorable arrangements have been frustrated by colonial die-hards and militarists. With UNCFI at Hague, difficulty of liaison with our respective Embassies which results from wide separation between capitals Hague and Batavia would be overcome. While UNCFI might be able contribute helpfully in Hague negotiations, still feel desired results will depend importantly upon diplomatic pressure from US and allied powers. Extent to which Netherlands now appealing to such powers as well as manner in which other powers pleading to us that all of group will be weakened unless settlement bearable to Netherlands reached would confirm this feeling.

As indicated in earlier telegrams on sketchily revealed Beel plan, I have feared it might be conceived to circumvent SC resolution in

manner quickly to relieve Netherlands Government of direct responsibility and create weak USI which would flounder and at once look to us for support.

In going along with present Netherlands proposal, we risk seeing consummated quick but ineffective agreement. Separated for possibly months tedious and trying Hague negotiations, Republican leaders may lose even more support of nationalist following Indonesia. Guerilla and potential leftists may strengthen and "emergency government" Sumatra attempts seize leadership Republican elements. Unless Netherlands spirit undergoes genuine change, there is further possibility that once Republican leaders are at Hague Netherlands will use customary methods of documentary disclosures to weaken and even destroy Republican leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta whom colonialists and militarists realize are ones most likely to achieve successful sovereignty. If therefore we encourage Republicans accept invitation, we should be conscious our own responsibility to see they get squarer deal Hague than they have received here.

Beel arrived Batavia 9 a. m. today. When he greeted me, he said he hoped see me Sunday. I said "Sooner better" and mentioned Herremans standing beside me was chairman. Beel then said he would have Schuurman let us know when he could receive us. Said, "Hope my mission has been successful." Afterwards we asked Schuurman endeavor have meeting today prior 6 p. m. statement. Schuurman told me aside he had received word Van Kleffens considered US reaction Netherlands memorandum favorable. Asked if I had this impression. I replied had received cable (Usgoc 303) late last night asking my comments. I said I had secretly asked Leimena not let his people turn down any proposals without consulting UNCFI. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2649 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1949—2 p. m.

115. Usgoc 309 [for Cochran:] Asst Secty Rusk saw van Kleffens and Helb Fri evening re Dutch proposal presented Wed. Stated he wished convey preliminary reaction US to Neth proposal before proposal made public. Stated our views subject modification in light further info, but at present situation seemed to us as fol:

a. US is ready now, as always, help obtain settlement on whatever basis voluntarily acceptable both parties.

¹ As 160 to The Hague.

b. US sees impasse looming re new Dutch proposal on point restoring Republican Govt some seat of authority. We have noted with particular interest wording of para 6 Dutch proposals and would be greatly pleased to hear that language this para subject interpretation in Dutch view some sort of reconstitution Republican Govt with definite seat of authority. Van Kleffens stated immediately that reconstitution Republic Jogja definitely rejected by Neth Govt, reading from note transmitted your 601 of Feb. 25. In ensuing conversation van Kleffens strongly expressed view that Neth police forces firmly in control, that law and order being rapidly restored, that restoration Republic would undo constructive work already near completion, etc. It was pointed out to Neth Amb that this was somewhat at variance with our info.

c. Fol discussion feasibility restoration Republic Jogja, point was emphasized to van Kleffens that minimum restoration as proposed SC resolution seemed a *sine qua non* SC position, and that in absence agreement parties on some other proposal re restoration, US would support majority opinion SC this point.

It was again pointed out to van Kleffens that our consideration this matter and our info on possible acceptability plan by Republican leaders not yet complete.

In view foregoing, which confirms reports and reactions contained Gocus 601 and 602, we believe most hopeful approach lies in indication given Hague's 198 [193] Feb 25 repeated to you.

Dept interested in reaction of Federalists to Hague invitation (Gocus 602) particularly as regards status of Republic during course proposed negotiations at Hague. In view of responsibility placed on you by Stikker's letter, you might wish to tell Dutch that you feel it desirable to talk to Federalists and try to get a consensus on this point.

As matters now stand Dept sees no alternative for UNCFI report than to make it a progress report stating facts of present situation, but it has no desire to bind your hands in any way.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/2-2649: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 26, 1949.

204. Gocus 604. Following text official communiqué released Batavia 6 p. m. February 26.¹

"In communiqué of Wednesday twenty-third February Netherlands Government announced important conclusion had been reached between this government and high representative Crown at Batavia concerning policy to be pursued with regard to Indonesia.

¹ Telegram 196-B, February 26, from The Hague, also reported the text as given out there.

Netherlands Government is convinced that in order reach satisfactory solution of pending problems, and [am] accelerated transfer of its sovereignty over Indonesia to a representative federal government is indicated.

Netherlands Government has therefore decided endeavour effectuate this transfer considerably earlier than at date of July 1, 1950 which in accordance with previous plans of Netherlands Government has been laid down in resolution of Security Council of January 28, 1949 as ultimate date for transfer sovereignty.

It is clear that achievement this endeavour along most desirable lines required sincere and energetic cooperation all parties concerned. Netherlands Government is of opinion that common purpose eagerly aimed at justifies the confidence that all parties will show their readiness to cooperate.

In desire to facilitate prompt beginning of discussion for speedy creation of sovereign USI and in order fulfill terms of resolution of Security Council on this point, Netherlands Government has decided to lift remaining restrictions on liberty of movement of Republican leaders and consult with them concerning their wishes as to their future residence and arrangements which will have to be made in this respect.

For furtherance of effective discussions on this point Netherlands Government has decided to take initiative for convocation of round-table conference at Hague at earliest date, i.e., on March 12. Purpose this conference will be to discuss conditions for and ways along which earliest possible transfer sovereignty as indicated above could be effectuated, simultaneous establishment of Netherlands-Indonesian union and arrangements for intermediary period, including creation of federal interim government, these provisions being considered in their relation to accelerated transfer of sovereignty.

Netherlands Government is prepared consider together with parties concerned merits of any proposed solution put forward at conference by any of parties and to examine in how far it is compatible with its responsibility. In accordance with this purpose, Netherlands Government has extended invitations for round-table conference to all parties concerned. UNCFI has been informed that Netherlands Government will welcome committee's presence at this conference in order enable it to render its assistance." Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2649 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

BATAVIA, February 26, 1949.

205. Gocus 605. Following letter dated February 26 addressed Chairman UNCFI signed Beel handed Herremans by Schuurman 5 p. m. today :

"Netherlands Government has decided take initiative to convene soon as possible round table conference which should start on March 12 at Hague.

To this conference all parties concerned with Indonesian question will be invited. It is intention government to consider at conference in particular conditions and modalities by which accelerated transfer sovereignty over Indonesia by Netherlands to representative Federal Indonesian Government will take place. As consequence this proposed transfer sovereignty, consultations will be necessary concerning provisions for interim period, including institution of Federal Interim Government.

Netherlands Government has been guided by conception that lasting solution of pending problems cannot be arrived at until sovereignty has actually been transferred. Experience has shown that arrangements for rather prolonged interim period lead to insoluble differences opinion.

Therefore, Netherlands Government have invited President of Republic and Chairman BFO to appoint delegations for this conference. Your commission will find enclosed copies these invitations to which I beg to refer.

Moreover, it is intended that also representatives of Provisional Federal Government and of minorities of population will take part in this conference.

Netherlands Government have requested me inform your commission that they will highly appreciate it if your commission would attend this conference so that it can render assistance to achieve positive results."

Following translation letter addressed Sukarno Feb. 26 as provided by Schuurman to Herremans 5 p. m. today :

"Prompted by conviction that highest interests of Indonesia demand that all concerned should contribute to fullest measure their ability to speedy and complete solution of pending problems, Netherlands Government has again considered way in which this goal can soonest be attained.

It is of opinion that situation should be created soon as possible in which conflict and mistrust of today give way to mutual cooperation and appreciation. Such a state of affairs would in opinion of Netherlands Government not fully be reached until sovereignty has been transferred by Netherlands to a Federal Government representative of whole of Indonesia.

Netherlands Government is convinced that this situation which resolution of Security Council of January 28 has set as goal to be

reached by July 1950 at latest, can be created at considerably earlier moment by sincere and energetic cooperation all interested parties.

In view this Netherlands Government has conceived idea take initiative for round table conference of all parties concerned in Indonesian question which could commence at Hague soon as possible—preferably March 12. At conference conditions and modalities will have to be discussed under which aforementioned accelerated transfer sovereignty can be effected as well as provisions for intermediary period including institution of Federal Interim Government.

Netherlands Government is prepared examine at conference on its merits every proposed solution submitted by one of parties in free consultation with these parties and examine to what extent these proposed solutions are compatible with its responsibility.

Consequently I have honour on behalf Government of Netherlands to invite Your Excellency to appoint delegation to participate in this conference.

I wish add that similar invitation has been sent to Chairman Assembly for federal consultation requesting his cooperation for appointment of delegations for territories affiliated to BFO.

Furthermore Netherlands Government will invite to conference representative of Provisional Federal Government and of minorities.

Finally I inform Your Excellency that UNCFI has been invited attend conference in order assist parties."

Translation text invitation addressed Chairman BFO likewise provided. Text identical with Sukarno letter except sixth and seventh paragraphs BFO letter read as follows: "In view above I have honor at request Netherlands Government to invite Your Highness make necessary arrangements so that through intermediary of BFO member states represented in this body send delegations to above-mentioned conference.

I may further point out that President of Republic has also been invited appoint delegation. Netherlands Government will also invite representatives of Provisional Federal Government and of minorities to attend conference." Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, February 26, 1949—9 p. m.

206. Gocus 606. Through Herremans UNCFI sought meeting with Beel soonest and copy statement in advance. Was told 12 noon,

¹ Repeated in telegram 165, February 28, 6 p. m., to The Hague, and as 220 to Brussels.

Schuurman would receive three of us 5 p. m. Said no statement available until 6 p. m. UNCFI members actually received press release 12:45 p. m. through friendly reporters.

Three UNCFI members received by Schuurman alone 5 p. m. Gave us press release (Gocus 604²). Also handed chairman invitation UNCFI attend March 12 conference Hague and translations invitations similarly addressed Sukarno and chairman BFO. For texts see Gocus 605.³

Schuurman offered answer any questions he could. Said Beel would receive us Sunday 5 p. m. After talking with Schuurman we suggested desirability earlier conference with Beel if latter might find it convenient. Hour advanced from 5 p. m. to 12 noon. Subsequently, Schuurman secretly asked me meet Beel, Koets and himself 10:15 Sunday morning.

Schuurman told us Beel delivered invitation Chairman Hamid BFO 2 p. m. today and Gieben flew Bangka 3 p. m. today deliver invitation Sukarno and return Sunday. Said Koets visiting Bangka Monday to give background since he had been with Beel at Hague and to discuss situation with Republicans. Was not sure whether Republicans would give answer to Koets or whether they might desire further consultations perhaps to include UNCFI. We said initiative presenting this proposal rests with Netherlands Government but it available for consultation. We hoped be informed fully as possible of steps taken and reactions of Federalists and Republicans thereto prior submission our March 1 report. Schuurman doubted plans would be resolved by that time. We stated report would definitely go forward on fixed date.

We expressed surprise statement to press did not reveal more details Beel plan. Schuurman admitted he had anticipated more precise statement but learned on Beel's return of decision taken make this general statement containing two fundamentals, namely, Hague Conference by March 12 and transfer sovereignty at earlier date than anticipated by SC Resolution. He admitted this procedure constitutes quite different plan from SC Resolution but argued end purpose same and offers accelerated program. Noting that no fixed date for transfer is indicated in documents handed us today, Schuurman said May 1, 1949 is target date for completion Hague negotiations to be followed by submission agreement for ratification, etc. He conceded that date for transfer sovereignty would depend on progress made and parties' attitude. When difficulty arriving at Hague Conference by March 12 suggested, Schuurman said this date purposely fixed prior March 15

² Telegram 204, February 26, p. 266.

³ *Supra.*

since thought no provisional government could be set up then as anticipated by SC Resolution. Urgent therefore have present plan under way before March 15.

Answering my question, Schuurman said unable state whether any restrictions placed on number or identity Republic delegation. Said Gieben and Koets would give some details orally to Sukarno. Answering my question whether scattered Republican leaders including military and emergency government Sumatra figures could be included Republican Delegation, Schuurman expressed affirmative opinion but again thought Beel should be asked confirm.

Schuurman insisted Republicans would have entire freedom movement without surveillance Hague. Said Netherlands will now discuss with Republican leaders question future residence. Will not be permitted return Jogja as government or visit any former Republican territory without military permits. Furthermore, will have to have advance understanding with government as to where they establish residence in Netherlands-controlled territory whether this be Batavia, Bandung or elsewhere. We explained seeking precise information this point to determine whether SC Resolution met. We were informed immediate decision concerns freedom Republican leaders and not political prisoners as whole.

In talk following meeting UNCFI members expressed common disappointment Netherlands had not presented more specific plan after consultations Hague and extension time granted for our reporting. We feared present statement would have poor press. Herremans thought it offered Republicans little beyond opportunity for further discussions but thinks they should agree go Hague. He stressed urgency settling Indonesian question. Critchley expressed opinion strongly that Republicans could not accept without losing support. Took position we no longer good officers but charged duty seeing SC Resolution met. Change from more generous attitude reported paragraph three Gocus 603⁴ resulted perhaps from manner Beel and Schuurman handling question.

Hamid phoned 6 p. m. Told of invitation from Beel. Said BFO meeting Monday 9 a. m. and he will urge acceptance invitation. Will also suggest some of his group visit Republicans Bangka Tuesday or Wednesday to encourage them accept since Hamid feels both groups must participate.

Should explain Schuurman is not delivering to UNCFI text memos handed Herremans and me privately yesterday (Gocus 601⁵) since

⁴ Telegram 203, February 26, p. 262.

⁵ Telegram 196, February 25, p. 256.

Beel considers documentation political and only for countries whose Ambassadors received memoranda Hague. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, February 27, 1949—7 p. m.

207. Gocus 607. Received alone by Beel, Koets and Schuurman this morning. Beel referred statement handed UNCFI last night. I said when in Washington had suggestion from Embassy Hague some short cut plan conceived. At Hague had sought details but told by Netherlands obtain them Batavia. Since arrival here had been informed Beel discussing his plan Hague with possibility revision there and must await revelation his return. I said long awaited statement issued last night disappointing in not giving more specific plan.

I referred documents handed Herremans and me (Gocus 601²). I said UNCFI should be provided therewith not only since Herremans and I embarrassed but principally because Netherlands case would be clarified and strengthened by official submission thereof UNCFI and thence SC. Beel agreed.

I advised group I had assumed responsibility obtaining fortnight postponement UNCFI report but this would have to be made March 1. I urged they give specific information as possible re plans and intentions. I said would be difficult convince Republicans they should give up SC resolution to accept new Netherlands plan. I said in Hague I argued it would not be worthwhile for me return Indonesia unless Netherlands willing release political leaders at once and permit UNCFI function. I had explained Stikker and others that upon arrival Batavia would see Republicans and ascertain their ideas on procedures necessary if further implementation SC resolution particularly re priority considerations, sequence and negotiations. Immediately after first and only contact with Republican leaders, I let Schuurman know they adamant restoration Jogja. I had not any place any time presumed oppose this or any provision SC resolution or excuse compliance with single word. I said Republican leaders not yet released; invitation UNCFI does not assure us opportunity enjoy full authority and responsibility provided under SC resolution; and Netherlands only now approaching Republicans for way out present situation.

¹ Repeated in telegram 165, February 28, 6 p. m., to The Hague, and as 220 to Brussels.

² Telegram 196, February 25, p. 256.

Republican leaders would be informed by Koets tomorrow at liberty leave Bangka and return Batavia for instance whenever they wish. Koets stated invitation envisaged UNCFI as party to roundtable discussion Hague. He said his job sell Republicans confidence plan and asked my suggestions and help.

I said his plan different from SC resolution and initiative and responsibility rest with Netherlands. I said had already asked Leimena not let his people refuse any Netherlands proposal without consulting UNCFI members. This was my only contact with Republicans since Shuurman gave me advance information re plan. Koets said he would see Leimena this afternoon and endeavor convince him virtue of plan.

I asked whether Netherlands Government had definite plan in mind for presentation Hague Conference. They said nothing other than idea of early transfer sovereignty. To my further inquiry as to whether they would insist on BIO being basis negotiations they replied negatively. Said would take advantage any agreement in principle arrived at earlier conversations between Ministers and Republicans as on financial and economic matters. Would not revert to positions which they had maintained with respect authority HRC and control of military which had been stumbling blocks last autumn. They replied they would not now after military action request Republicans accept unconditionally points which Republicans had not agreed to previously. Wanted roundtable conference to begin from fresh start with no preconceived positions taken.

I argued their plan less satisfactory than SC resolution on point which they claim its fundamental virtue, that is, date sovereignty transfer. I said their plan leaves final transfer date unfixed and subject various conditions. I was sure they would have to remedy this before either Republicans or SC would find acceptable. They insisted plan was to transfer sovereignty soon as Netherlands chambers ratified agreements. Hoped latter would be reached by May 1 and thought ratification should not take more than four to six weeks. I foresaw further weakness their plan in drawing conservative Republican leaders away from Indonesia without giving them opportunity SC envisaged of appealing from seat of restored authority to followers to cease-fire. I said support might be lost and extremist elements gain strength while conservative group met at Hague. Stressed no matter how beautiful paper agreement drawn up, execution thereof might be impossible if conservative leaders lose following.

Response my query, informed Sukarno, Hatta could name delegation any size desired including anyone. Netherlands Government intends hold March 12 conference irrespective Republican reply. That is, they

insist on setting up government to which sovereignty can be transferred soonest. I said SC resolution had virtue providing for carefully spaced stages which should give USI safer foundation which to build than will be given through hastily organized government taking over mass of military, financial and economic problems on short notice. They admitted idea interim government might be skipped entirely dependent upon will of roundtable conference. Said nine parliamentary leaders who have visited Indonesia in past and particularly interested this question would participate in roundtable. Thought this should facilitate ratification any plan reached. There would be three representatives of minorities in Indonesia, namely Arabs, Chinese, Eurasians. Group took pains endeavor assure me no hidden phases to plan and everything aboveboard in inviting us all Hague roundtable conference.

Beel referred Stikker's letter to me (Gocus 601). I asked if Stikker would participate conference, mentioning he indicated readiness join if assistance needed, and also in final paragraph letter took position he had gone as far as he could and job was now up to me. Said I presumed Stikker's English had not conveyed his exact ideas but I insisted job belonged Netherlands and not me. Beel said roundtable would have Netherlands delegation from Hague presumably under chairmanship Overseas Minister and include either Stikker or other high representative from Foreign Office Finance Ministry and others high rank. I urged group have as much material as possible ready for UNCFI meeting would be forthright in stating position.

UNCFI group met with above trio at noon. Schuurman delivered formal memo providing almost verbatim copy memo to Ambassadors Hague and exact copy memo re Netherlands opposition restoration Jogja (Gocus 601). Beel asked Koets explain Netherlands Government position. Koets covered practically same ground as in earlier meeting including rather satisfactory answers to questions which I had posed. We three stressed our loyalty SC resolution but our desire see satisfactory settlement reached soonest and our noninterference with any direct negotiations between parties. Netherlands realized their task sell Republicans and Federals. Koets was to undertake former. We stressed importance Republicans attach restoration Jogja and definitive date for unconditional transfer sovereignty.

When we sought specific answers on prerogatives HRC in interim period and in emergency, Beel insisted on readiness Netherlands eliminate interim period entirely or shorten it to limit agreed upon by parties. Netherlands thought there should be no difficulty on economic and financial measures. Said willing approve Federal army under Indonesian command once sovereignty transferred and to withdraw

Netherlands forces on agreed schedule. When we pointed out paragraph 10 memo of procedure would indicate more doubt than they now declare as to transfer sovereignty unconditionally, Beel again assured US government had taken definite decision transfer sovereignty soonest and will not place difficulties in way reaching clear cut agreement thereon.

Netherlands repeated invitation to UNCFI and assured us privilege participating general and committee discussions Hague with right advance suggestions and generally assist parties. Koets hedged slightly by stating Van Royen's speech had contained some opposition to UNCFI and that government adhered this statement. Exchange ideas did not reveal prohibitions which should hinder our endeavoring assist.

When we complained lack details in Beel plan, Netherlands replied purposely leaving open forum Hague for presentation whatever plans parties agree upon but with genuine intention Netherlands side reach settlement by May 1 target date. We said Netherlands case would be more favorably understood by Indonesians, SC, UNCFI and public if more specific information, especially on points we had discussed, released by Netherlands Government. Koets promised be specific in talks with Republicans. We said could well utilize anything further they give us in writing prior submission our report. We argued this should be more helpful in presenting Netherlands case fairly and accurately to SC than depending upon Van Royen's answering questions perhaps of embarrassing character that will be posed. They promised give us one or two additional documents but did not commit themselves to put in writing what they had said in meeting. It was understood we were available for consultation by Republicans and Federals but initiative was with Netherlands.

Talking later with Herremans and Critchley, they both agreed Netherlands has presented case poorly to public if their oral statements to us can be accepted face value. To me alone Herremans said thought SC resolution and tight financial situation influencing Netherlands Government take sincere decision transfer sovereignty soonest.

Federal Malik talked with me. Said he hoped Republicans well as Federals would agree go Hague.

Received Leimena, Supomo, Pringgodigdo and Sudjono. Summarized discreetly developments to date that could be revealed in order they have background when and if called upon for advice by Republicans Bangka. We discussed disadvantages and advantages Netherlands plan. They thought leaders would not take decision without consulting UNCFI. I said UNCFI would not take initiative going Bangka but would accept invitation from Republicans after March 1.

Explained we would proceed with March 1 report giving chronology events to date, including Beel plan submission and such later facts as available by closing hour report.

Response my query, Republicans doubted Bangka group would come Batavia or elsewhere to reside unless authority restored Jogja. Realize seriousness threatened impasse and promised think over possible way out. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/2-2849 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Belgium (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BRUSSELS, February 28, 1949—2 p. m.

285. Urtel 208, February 25. Explained carefully and in detail to Spaak late Saturday our position re Indonesian question with its repercussions on Benelux, and I at same time left him text SC resolution 28 January, having gone over its salient features. I emphasized essential points liberation political prisoners, restoration Republic as Government entity together with some seat of authority preferably Jogjakarta and inclusion UNCFI in round table meeting 12 March at Hague; I stressed our desire to have SC resolution complied with in letter and spirit.

At yesterday's conference which included Drees, Stikker, Bech, Dupont, Spaak and other Belgians, Spaak said he hammered our position into Dutch with following results:

(a) Dutch say political prisoners have been freed (which is confirmed by newspaper reports here, although Soekarno name not published here).

(b) Dutch say their official communication to Cochran paragraph 4 transmits an invitation to "President to [of] the Republic and the chairman of the BFO" to appoint delegations to Hague conference which therefore is official and public acknowledgment by Dutch Government of existence of Republican Government.

(c) Dutch say they agree Republican Government may establish its seat in Republican area of Sumatra and Dutch will afford full facilities communications et cetera.

(d) Dutch say they cannot agree Jogjakarta as seat of Government since to do so would produce confusion and disaster. Spaak could not elaborate on this but said Dutch were obdurate that Jogjakarta was inadmissible.

(e) UNCFI are invited and expected at Hague.

Spaak says this was best he could do and he was asked by Dutch

¹ Repeated in telegram 117, Usgoc 311, February 28, 7 p. m., to Batavia.

Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to transmit foregoing to you via me for your consideration and reaction.

Dutch felt Cochran's influence on Indonesians was predominant and that if US could recommend acceptance these proposals through Cochran then Indonesians might be induced negotiate March 12 with some hope settlement.

Sent Department; repeated The Hague as 20.

KIRK

501.BC Indonesia/3-149: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 1, 1949—11 a. m.

211. Gocus 609. Schuurman addressed UNCFI February 28 letter enclosing Hamid radio speech (Gocus 608²). Letter concluded, "from contents of speech it appears BFO has accepted invitation extended by Netherlands Government to participate in round table conferences Hague". I told Schuurman by phone I had read speech and thought it indicated Hamid favors Netherlands proposal but constituted no BFO acceptance. He said Beel found acceptance in following Paragraph 17: "Now however we have been offered new opportunity and initiative taken by Netherlands Government to hold round table conference for transfer sovereignty has our wholehearted approval".

8 p. m. received as UNCFI chairman telegram filed Muntok 9:40 a. m. signed Roem, chairman Republic delegation, reading: "Latest decision Netherlands Government as in Beel's letter handed Saturday night to Sukarno in Muntok by Gieben, inviting Republic leaders join round table conference Hague with other representatives Indonesia on March 12, cuts across SC resolution and moreover explicitly rejects said resolution. In verbal elucidation Gieben made perfectly clear that on no account Netherlands Government will comply with condition to restore actual government of Republic in its power over any part its territory. In particular Gieben explained that, contrary to wording his government's statement on abrogation remaining restrictions concerning liberty movement of Republic leaders, we shall in no case be allowed return Jogja. This new move of Netherlands as so often before gives expression to their denial of legality SC intervention and substitutes different proposal on their own authority. Our government will however never cooperate in any action evading implementation

¹ Repeated in telegram 175, March 2, 7 p. m., to The Hague, and 233 to Brussels.
² Telegram 210, February 28, 4 p. m., not printed.

SC resolution. We particularly deem it urgent counteract any confusion which this move is apt to create in international circles."

I called informal meeting give UNCFI this message. With group approval phoned Sudjono. He said received same telegram. Said Republic group still desired go Bangkok [*Bangka*] as planned. UNCFI also approved my reading message to Schuurman. He said this obviously despatched by Roem prior any discussions by Republic with Koets who flew *Bangka* Monday.

Schuurman phoned 11 p. m., said gave Beel message. Latter said Koets had been instructed telegraph promptly if Republic answer negative. No such message received. On contrary Koets had telegraphed was remaining *Bangka* overnight and asked special plane bring him Batavia Tuesday evening. From this Beel thought matter not settled. I offered let Koets return UNCFI plane and promised hold UNCFI report open until late evening awaiting any word from him.

I phoned Sudjono recommending his group endeavor influence Republic leaders at least leave matter to SC decision if they not willing accept invitation and had not closed door finally.

This morning Critchley said he saw Leimena late last night. Even Critchley thought Republic's answer might have left way open for seeking more concrete information from Netherlands on their proposal or exploring after consultation with UNCFI some way out before turning down summarily.

Schuurman reported 10 a. m. today no word yet received from Koets.

UNCFI group regrets Netherlands has so badly handled their proposal. By sending Gieben *Bangka* to deliver proposal even before UNCFI received it deprived latter any chance it might have found feasible and proper to be helpful without weakening on SC resolution. By not sending Koets until two days later permitted Republic opposition crystallize before Republicans could be presented by Koets with some of arguments in favor proposal which he had so attractively set forth orally to UNCFI group Sunday (Gocus 607³). Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

³ Telegram 207, February 27, p. 272.

501.BC Indonesia/3-149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 1, 1949—3 p. m.

212. Gocus 610. Schuurman wrote UNCFI March 1 enclosing following letter same date, addressed High Representative of Crown, signed Hamid, chairman Assembly for Federal Consultation:

"In reply letter February 26 I have honor inform Your Excellency that Assembly for Federal Consultation has with great satisfaction taken cognizance of plan announced therein to accelerate transfer of sovereignty as much as possible.

Initiative of Netherlands Government to convocate a 'round table' conference in order reach agreement soon as possible concerning problems connected with transfer of sovereignty has been hailed with approval by Assembly for Federal Consultation.

The various delegates therefore unanimously declared to be willing accept invitation from Netherlands Government to participate in conference on basis of government statement February 26". Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

US URGENT

THE HAGUE, March 1, 1949—6 p. m.

203. Initial Foreign Office reaction to statement by Mohammed Rum that Republicans will not attend proposed Hague conference is that the door is not firmly closed but that things "don't look so good." It is opinion of myself and other Embassy officers that Dutch proposals represent thorough-going and honest attempt to bring about solution Indonesian problem; see Stikker letter in Deptel 161, February 26.² It must not be forgotten that they have been arrived at only through long and hard fought negotiations in four-party Cabinet. From our conversations with Stikker and other government officials it is evident that Dutch believe they have now offered a genuine constructive method of cutting the Gordian knot (Queen Juliana would not have left the country on holiday to Austria last week if she did not believe so). Dutch proposals constitute a victory for moderate elements in Cabinet and if conference or some agreement does not result repercussions here would be very bad, in government circles, in press and among public. Political crisis of first magnitude accompanied by collapse Dutch morale with unpredictable consequences would be distinct possibility.

Dutch have never been sanguine that Republicans would accept invitation unless Cochran was himself convinced and able to persuade them that this was quickest and surest way to ultimate solution of entire Indonesian question. Although we do not hold that a solution is

¹ Repeated in telegram 122, Usgoc 313, March 2, 3 p.m., to Batavia.

² See telegram 196, Gocus 601, February 25, p. 256.

certain through conference, it does seem that Dutch suggestion presents real possibilities of ultimate and early settlement. Heretofore all negotiations have been held in poisoned atmosphere of Indonesia and transfer of negotiations to Hague would enable negotiations to proceed in more suitable atmosphere, with presence of UNCFI guaranteeing fair deal for both parties. Despite intransigence on Netherlands side in past, they at least have been willing to conduct negotiations in Indonesia, but, in present case, involving transfer of sovereignty, Netherlands desire to have negotiations here is understandable as it is Netherlands Government that is handing over sovereignty.

As indicated in our telegrams 193, February 25, and 198, February 28,³ we have been discussing with Foreign Office officials the idea of compromise re Djocja. We suggest that the time has come for some pressure to be applied on the Republicans to effect a compromise in order that The Hague conference not be cancelled or stultified by non-attendance of Republicans over a point which is fundamentally of lesser importance in overall effort to achieve Indonesian settlement. We have carefully reviewed all available reactions to date to invitations for Hague conference and believe situation has been created wherein Cochran's recognized statesmanship and great influence should make possible solution of the Indonesian problem through Hague conference. We feel confident that he will use his skill and best efforts toward compromise by mutual concessions (note Brussels 285, February 28, re Dutch agreement establishment Republican government) so that best interests of western Europe as well as Asiatic situation might be served through only visible means at present time for Indonesian solution, namely round table conference.

Sent Department 203, repeated Brussels 15.

BARUCH

³ Latter not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/2-2849: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1949—6 p. m.

121. Usgoc 312. Fol are Dept's comments on Brussels' Niact 285:² In view Baruch's view that compromise on Jogja issue possible (Hague 198 [193], Feb 25) and in view pressure applied to Dutch by

¹ Repeated as 169 to The Hague and as 222 to Brussels.

² February 28, p. 276.

Brit and by US in Wash and through Spaak, Dept considers foregoing appears to indicate Dutch prepared to make concessions. Dept sees advantages in concessions obtained through Spaak's intervention if such will actually be put forward by Dutch. Establishment Repub Govt in Sumatra could be regarded as bona fide response to although not compliance with SC Res. Estab Repub Govt Sumatra has further advantage of bringing guerilla leadership into line with Sukarno-Hatta *et al.* which shd in turn facilitate efforts Hatta-Sukarno to repress guerilla warfare. Disadvantages Dutch proposal obvious and need not be reminded you. It wld appear to Dept that UNCFI might encourage immed discussion between Neth and Repub Reps on this proposal or some modification thereof to the end that Repub Govt be restored in Repub territory and negotiations be commenced at once in Hague or other place agreed to by parties.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-149: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 1, 1949—9 p. m.

213. Gocus 611. Received Anak Agung, Prime Minister East Indonesia. Referring to BFO's acceptance invitation (Gocus 610²), he said acceptance was on basis Netherlands invitation February 26 which involves participation UNCFI and liberation Republic leaders. Speaking for East Indonesia, he said his government would definitely refuse participate conference if UNCFI not accepting and he believes whole BFO group would likewise refuse. BFO contact committee going Bangka tomorrow, returning Thursday and will try encourage Republicans find compromise enabling them accept. He feels Indonesians should present solid front Hague, forcing Netherlands keep promise early transfer sovereignty and pressing for most advantageous agreement. Is Anak's opinion [that] Roem telegram (Gocus 609³) not rejection but way still open for Republic acceptance.

Sudjono sent back personal letter from Bangka this afternoon stating his group remaining until Thursday to participate in Republic talks with BFO.

UNCFI today completed unanimous report to SC, being telegraphed

¹ Repeated in telegram 175, March 2, 7 p. m., to The Hague, and 233 to Brussels.

² Telegram 212, March 1, p. 278.

³ Telegram 211, March 1, p. 277.

Lake Success tonight and thence available Department.⁴ Following paragraphs constitute conclusion thereto :

"25. UNCFI is obliged report that as of 1 March there has been failure parties to Indonesian question reach agreement on establishment of interim federal government. This situation results from failure Netherlands Government accept procedure of resolution of 28 January and not from mere difference of viewpoint on details of government structure and functions. If latter were case, UNCFI would be prepared recommend structure for interim federal government. Resolution contemplates that establishment of interim federal government will be product of negotiations between parties. That government, if it is to be effective one, must reflect interchange ideas both parties, give and take of bona fide negotiations.

"26. There have been no negotiations under resolution between Netherlands Government and Republic. UNCFI has performed function of reporting assigned it by resolution of 28 January in spite of difficulties described in this report. In exercise this function it has had contact with Netherlands delegation. UNCFI has visited Republic leaders informally at Bangka. They have had informal contact with members Republic delegation who are resident Batavia. Individual members UNCFI occasionally have informal contact with members BFO. There has not however been opportunity for UNCFI to function helpfully in manner envisaged by resolution, except to limited extent therein described.

"27. UNCFI itself has not authority under terms resolution 28 January to accept invitation received by it to attend 'roundtable conference' at Hague. Procedures to be adopted preliminary to transfer sovereignty, irrespective of ultimate objective Netherlands proposals announced 26 February, are not those contemplated by resolution. There is no indication in announcements or in invitation to UNCFI that role which it is being asked assume is that which it is authorized perform under resolution 28 January. UNCFI views invitation and related documents therefore as comprising counter-proposal or substitute for provisions 28 January resolution. UNCFI consequently refers this counter-proposal to SC for latter's consideration with request that UNCFI be instructed as to what its position should be toward invitation under resolution.

"28. UNCFI will forward to SC promptly any further information that may become known to it with respect to suggested roundtable conference or any other proposals that may be advanced. UNCFI has interpreted its duty to be that of assisting with implementation of SC's resolution and of reporting facts pertinent to situation which this resolution was intended resolve. It will not interfere with any efforts of parties to arrive freely at agreements. It is available to all parties for consultation. At same time UNCFI regrets that it has not been possible proceed with implementation of resolution. UNCFI is conscious of progressive deterioration of situation in Indonesia and of augmented danger to world stability which must result".

⁴ UN document S/1270, March 1, 1949; see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 6, 1949, p. 296. For full text, see SC, *4th yr., Suppl.* (March), pp. 8 ff.

Schuurman phoned 7 p. m., said Koets returned from Bangka this evening. After discussion with Beel, decided no further documentation to submit UNCFI for inclusion today's report. Schuurman told me confidentially Koets received in friendly atmosphere by Republicans who asked many questions yesterday and requested him remain today. Some questions being submitted Hague for answer. After replies received and BFO have finished talks with Republicans, Koets hopes return Bangka for further consultations. Netherlands do not consider Roem telegram (Gocus 609) constitutes rejection invitation and believe door still open. Koets reports Republicans prefer remain Bangka present and plan no visit or move to Batavia. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-249: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, March 2, 1949—4:30 p. m.

251. The following ideas are put forward for the consideration of the Department in dealing with the next phase of the Indonesian case.

1. It seems likely that we shall face in New York a considerable effort to hold US firmly to the position taken in the SC resolution of January 28. The six SC delegates who joined us in support of that resolution have given us their full confidence by delegating to UNCFI implementation powers. We are anxious, therefore, to avoid any action which would appear to be a unilateral change from the SC position. (Conclusions of UNCFI report seem helpful.²) If such a change should seem wise, we would like to have full opportunity to consult with them and to make the action joint.

2. When the matter returns to the SC, we would hope to be able to avoid a situation in which we had simply to choose between two alternatives: acceptance of the Beel plan or imposition of sanctions. It does not appear to us necessary to let the matter rest with a negative reaction to the Beel plan. In our view, emphasis should remain on pacific settlement. We doubt that consideration of sanctions now would advance us toward solution.

3. Furthermore, it seems to us urgent to avoid the possibility that the Dutch hold The Hague roundtable conference even without the Republicans present. Such a course would appear to be impossible for the SC to accept and might well close the door to all possibilities of peaceful solution.

¹ Repeated in telegram 126, Usgoc 315, March 3, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

² See *supra*.

4. There appears to us to be some value in pursuing the possibilities indicated in The Hague's No. 193, February 25, particularly if this can be done in such a way as to avoid an appearance of change from the SC resolution. Has Department considered the possibility that the commission should give the SC notice that within a short time it will present recommendations for a solution of the existing difficulties as required by the proviso in paragraph 3 of January 28 resolution. Notice of this intention would greatly help us keep the situation fluid and avoid efforts to concentrate SC attention on the question of sanctions. The framing of these recommendations by the commission in consultation with the Dutch, the Republicans and the Federalists would give Cochran an opportunity to negotiate the marriage of the Beel plan to the SC resolution without the US retreating from the principles in the Council's resolution. Early notice of the foregoing course of action might make it extremely difficult for the Federalists to attend The Hague conference, despite the refusal of the Republic to do so. The recommendations themselves would presumably take basic principles from *Renville*, Cochran plan, SC resolution and the principles which were agreed between the parties last fall, together with concessions which the Dutch have recently told Cochran they are now prepared to make. If the parties could be brought within reach of agreement on (1) a set of recommended principles, (2) return of Republic to Jogja, the Republic might feel sufficient confidence to accept the Dutch invitation to a roundtable conference at The Hague to negotiate on the basis of such recommendations. The conclusion in the third sentence of paragraph 25 of UNCFI's report may present a technical objection to this course of action. We believe the proviso to paragraph 3 of the SC resolution means that SC wants UNCFI recommendations on how to break deadlock which actually exists regardless of its cause, and not solely if caused by lack of agreement on structure of interim government. In other words, if scope of deadlock is across the board, scope of recommendations should be equally broad.

5. With reference to The Hague's compromise proposal and the Department's favorable comment on this to Cochran, there is one point which we should like to bring to the Department's attention. Paragraph 3 of the SC resolution requires negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic on the basis of *Renville*, and that the interim government be a result. As the Department knows, the Netherlands made a special effort to eliminate these provisions from the resolution before its adoption. At a meeting of seven supporters in our offices on January 25, all seven supporters unanimously rejected Dutch amendments eliminating these provisions. Department will have noted that

the Beel plan avoids these basic elements of the SC resolution. If there is to be a marriage of the Beel plan and the SC resolution, we feel it is important that the principle that the Dutch must negotiate an agreement with the Republic be adhered to.

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/3-249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 2, 1949—6 p. m.

217. Gocus 612. Indian ConGen called. Finds UNCFI March 1 report fair and balanced. Said his govt disturbed over Netherlands proposal lest this draw Indos to conference where dilatory tactics and divide and weaken policy will be followed. He insists Repubs cannot participate unless preliminary restoration authority and arrangements toward cessation hostilities. As military man (ConGen is Major General with service in both world wars), he considers Netherlands military effort has not been success. Thinks Netherlands in tight place and must find way out soon.

ConGen said understood views his govt on Netherlands proposal and present Indo situation shared by Australian Govt and mentioned Evatt's² visit New Delhi. Asked if I thought his govt should do anything now. I suggested let SC take lead and thought SC might desire see what parties themselves may accomplish in their talks of next few days.

Schuurman dropped in at noon. Said UNCFI March 1 report not bad. He asked explanation one or two points.

Schuurman expanded confidentially story Koets' visit Repubs (Gocus 611³). Said although Roem participated in two day conversations, his cable to UNCFI (Gocus 609⁴) never mentioned and Koets did not see it until return Batavia. Said Repubs stress return Jogja. Said I had very properly informed and warned NethDel on this point. Said this and few other questions have been referred Hague. Repubs concentrated discussion on conditions preliminary rather than on Hague round table, although some reported to have considered latter "grand idea".

Schuurman stressed to me loss of face to Netherlands and other difficulties involved yielding Jogja. I reminded him Netherlands has used maximum pressure, namely, warfare against Repubs but latter

¹ Repeated in telegram 183, March 4, noon, to The Hague.

² Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.

³ Telegram 213, March 1, p. 281.

⁴ Telegram 211, March 1, p. 277.

still held strategic position with respect any plans leaking [*leading*] to USI. For example, UNCFI could not participate roundtable without Repubs. Probably BFO and surely certain delegations therein would not participate without UNCFI and Repub.

Re Jogja, Schuurman said their information indicated Repub favor in former capital has declined, certain elements being sharply critical of manner in which old régime was carried on and of surrender Repub leaders. He thought even if Repubs return Jogja they might have difficulty regaining influential position and might even move to left in order satisfy strong elements now existing. I said Repubs had gained strength through putting down Communist uprising in September and we had hoped Netherlands would consummate agreement with conservative Hatta régime thereafter. I admitted Hatta group has suffered in prestige through Netherlands military action and deterioration continuing. Netherlands should give conservative Repub leaders best possible opportunity now appeal effectively to their followers rather than take them directly Hague and consummate agreement which followers would not accept. I deemed entirely impractical Schuurman's suggestion every one go ahead with Hague conference and place Jogja problem as first item on agenda.

Told Schuurman I thought present exploratory talks between Netherlands, Repubs and BFO should continue. When he said Repubs did not desire come Batavia and hinted UNCFI might desire go Bangka, I said we entirely prepared make trip if and when Repubs may desire. I thought initiative should still be left interested parties to problem at this point. I would probably hear from Repubs and BFO after both return from Bangka tomorrow and would desire exchange further ideas with Schuurman then. Finally he said that in Koets' discussions Sukarno ventured suggest possibility establishing Repub Govt in Atjeh, unoccupied north Sumatra, if Jogja impossible. Schuurman said Netherlands would agree to this.⁵ I said ideas this sort might conceivably lead to workable compromise. I told Schuurman I realized from observations Hague and Batavia how serious their situation is and desire as UNCFI member and representative of friendly power do everything possible assist in settlement. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁵ Telegram 209, March 2, 7 p. m., from The Hague, reported that the Netherlands Cabinet had confirmed this plan which "was official Dutch position. Beel is being accordingly informed." (856d.00/3-249)

501.BC Indonesia/2-2449

*The Department of State to the Indian Embassy*¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The views of the Government of India² on the situation with which the Security Council is confronted through the lack, so far, of any implementation of the Council's Resolution of January 28, are greatly appreciated by the United States Government, which shares fully the concern of the Government of India over the probable ultimate consequences of a substitution of military methods for those of negotiation as a means of achieving a solution of the Indonesian problem.

Before attempting to define what its precise position in the Security Council will be, the United States Government will of course wish to consider fully the report of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia received by the Security Council on March 1 together with the response by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to the new proposals for a resumption of negotiations made by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Government of India is aware of the extended efforts of the United States to find a peaceful path through the besetting difficulties of the Indonesian dispute in a role which it did not seek but in which it has endeavored to contribute its utmost, realizing that the prestige of the United Nations is deeply involved in the case. The Government of India has doubtless, indeed, a special insight into these efforts through the agency of its Consular Representatives in Indonesia, between whom and the successive Representatives of the United States on the Committee of Good Offices a most cordial and fruitful relationship has always existed.

The Government of India may be assured that the United States Government remains convinced of the fairness of the Security Council's Resolution of January 28, and, in the absence of a free agreement between the parties upon a solution outside the terms of that Resolution, will fully discharge the obligations imposed upon it by its membership in the United Nations and its position on the Security Council in support of the Resolution. Having subscribed to the principle of collective security, the United States will be guided by the consensus of the Council and in addition it will in this as in other cases contribute what it can to a wise decision by the Council as to its course of action. Clearly, the Council as a whole has the task of achieving a satisfactory solution of the Indonesian dispute and must as a whole bear respon-

¹ Reported in telegram 184, March 4, 7 p. m., to New Delhi, and in 62 to Karachi. (501.BC Indonesia/3-449)

² Indian *aide-mémoire* of February 24, not printed.

sibility for the outcome. No warrant would therefore appear to exist for fixing a collective responsibility upon a single nation and certainly the United States Government cannot regard itself as in any such position. World opinion would surely not expect nor desire the United States to take it upon itself to exceed its responsibilities under the Charter and to court justifiable resentment by assuming a unilateral and arbitrary if well-intentioned role.

The United States Government will continue to be most receptive to the views of the Government of India on the Indonesian dispute, upon which by reason of geographical and historical factors it is able to throw light, and to welcome information on any particular efforts to bring about a solution which the Government of India for its part may be contemplating.

Geographical and historical factors in its own case cause the United States to feel a deep concern in matters which give grounds for possible misunderstanding between the peoples of Asia and those of Western Europe. It is therefore particularly grateful for the expression of the Government of India's appreciation of the difficulties which it has faced and of the friendly feelings which have prompted the Government of India to make its views available. The United States Government will look to the Government of India for continued friendly understanding, confident that both Governments are striving for the same goal.³

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1949.

³ In response to a Pakistani *aide-memoire* of March 3 (not printed), the Department orally informed the Pakistani Counselor of Embassy (Baig) to the same general effect, concluding: "We would naturally welcome any mutually satisfactory agreement either negotiated under the Resolution [of January 28] or reached independently by the parties of the dispute." (856d.00/3-349)

501.BC Indonesia/3-149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1949—7 p. m.

180. Your 203, Mar 1, Dept does not believe that Neth can or shd attempt to place burden of convincing Repubs of the soundness of their proposal on Cochran. He has been given wide latitude to attempt compromise on re-establishment Repub authority and to present to Repubs the alternatives with which they are faced. (Usgoc 303, Feb 24, Usgoc 312, Mar 1.) Responsibility for convincing Repubs that they have anything to gain by accepting Neth invitation rests ultimately with Neth itself. The means to do so are readily available.

¹ Repeated as 129, Usgoc 317, to Batavia.

Their handling situation to date has not tended to make convincing case (Gocus 609, Mar 1). Dept requests that you make our views in this respect known to FonOff immed and emphasize that Neth failure cannot be charged to Cochran who has at all times made and will continue to make utmost efforts in their behalf consistent with his position.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-349: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 3, 1949—8 p. m.

NIACT

224. Gocus 615. At airport met Republican group and some BFO when they returned together from Bangka 4 p. m. Chairman Hamid, BFO, told me Republicans willing participate round table if preliminary condition met of restoration Jogja. He favored BFO supporting this position.

Received Leimena, Supomo and Sudjono 5:30 p. m. They said provisional reply given Koets by Republican leaders that they looked with favor on Netherlands proposal with sole condition Jogja restoration. Said conversations between Republicans and BFO had been entirely cordial. Following is rough translation agreement reached between Republicans and contact committee BFO subject approval by full BFO meeting 8 p. m. tonight:

"Netherlands intention hold round-table conference for purpose transferring sovereignty soon as possible, as stipulated in statement Netherlands Government 26 February which was further clarified by Koets to President and Vice President at Muntok, might be accepted by Government Republic Indonesia if following conditions fulfilled:

(a) Government Republic Indonesia shall be restored Jogja and shall be in position to act freely as government in specific territory Jogja in accordance with SC resolution.

(b) Roundtable conference shall not prejudice position UNCFI as decided by SC resolution.

If above-mentioned conditions fulfilled, then Government Republic prepared after its return Jogja and after it has functioned freely to issue immediately order for cease-fire for whole Indonesia."

Following is rough translation text letter from Sukarno to Beel which will be handed Netherlands resident Bangka tomorrow for delivery by plane to Beel:²

"I have received invitation of Netherlands Government to attend

¹ Repeated in telegram 184, March 4, 3 p. m., to The Hague, and as 241 to Brussels.

² For text of letter as sent March 4, see SC, *4th yr., Suppl.* (March), pp. 30-31. For Republican report of agreement with BFO committee, see *ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

round-table conference to be commenced March 12 at The Hague which you sent me through Gieben on 26 February. We have studied it thoroughly together with other members Republican Government now on Bangka. I can declare here idea accelerating transfer sovereignty to Government USI unconditionally, as explained verbally by Koets on 28 February and first March in his explanation of letter of invitation, which transfer sovereignty may be carried out approximately in month July 1949, is attractive to me. I am of opinion that transfer sovereignty as mentioned above is only way again clarify atmosphere of relationship between Netherlands and Indonesia. The more so because first January 1949, which is agreed upon as date transfer sovereignty to Government USI which has important influence in souls of Indonesian people, has already passed. By accelerating transfer sovereignty to USI all obstacles connected with formation interim government, which we found very difficult to overcome, can be avoided.

Therefore, without prejudicing position UNCFI in its efforts over dispute between Indonesia and Netherlands as mentioned in SC resolution of 28 January, I can in principle agree with intention holding conference mentioned above, as I understood after clarification of Koets. But in connection with my position as President and that of other members Republican Government who are cut off from state and people and separated from place of authority as government, I am not able take decision attend or send delegation to said conference. In our present position it is not possible appoint delegation which can represent government or people of Republic Indonesia for holding conference and accepting decision. Decisions to be made involve heavy responsibility. This responsibility can only be assumed by government of Republic which in fact can exercise authority in freedom in its territory in its capital Jogja as stipulated in SC resolution 28 January. Such authority we lack at moment."

Republicans stated this text letter definite and would be delivered irrespective decision to be taken by BFO tonight. Republicans said they genuinely believe Jogja restoration feasible and entirely essential. Said Sukarno would issue cease-fire soonest after restoration and would expedite arrangements for attending round-table conference once this step taken. Republicans believe Sultan Jogja could make arrangements within one week for turnover to Republicans.

In answer my question as to whether idea advanced of Republicans going Atjeh, they explained they had indicated preference proceed there for establishment residence rather than remain Bangka in event Jogja restoration denied. They emphasized, however, that preliminary restoration Republican Government must take place Jogja. Leimena said Koets discussed Netherlands position in detail with him before Republicans went Bangka. They realize Netherlands finding difficult accept Jogja and also aware Cabinet crisis threatened thereover.

Both groups insist SC resolution stand as is and UNCFI participate any roundtable conference. They will object to Maarseveen acting as chairman. Might consider revolving chairmanship.

While Republicans with me, I received following telegram addressed chairman UNCFI dated Muntok March 3 from chairman RepDel:

"Will your commission please come Pangkalpinang earliest convenience for consultation?"

Republican group said President and Vice President desire discuss situation with UNCFI but thought visit should be delayed at least until Saturday to see outcome BFO meeting, etc.

Anak Agung came 6:30. Told of Bangka meeting in which he participated as member BFO contact committee. Account entirely in line with above Republican story. He added Sukarno promised once in Jogja order Sjafruddin (head emergency government Sumatra) to capital and withdraw authority delegated that body. Sukarno insisted would be no undue delay after restoration Jogja before issuing general cease-fire order. Message accepting round-table invitation would then be sent by Republicans. Republicans and BFO might next get together for three or four days to assemble general ideas to be discussed round-table conference. [Anak] Agung aware danger political crisis The Hague but feels Netherlands must face this dilemma squarely. He as well as Republicans stressed if Netherlands genuinely sincere in promising yield complete sovereignty within three or four months they can have no valid objection restoration Jogja now for purpose permitting Republic opportunity carry out its obligations under SC resolution. They think that if Netherlands Government unable approve this it would never be able get transfer sovereignty agreement ratified. Agung promised report outcome tonight's meeting. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

s56a.00/3-349

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, March 3, 1949.

No. 86

[Received March 8.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram 208 of March 2, 1949,¹ I have the honor to enclose copies of the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitting documentation on the consequences of a restoration of Republican authority in Djokjakarta and its vicinity, together with various exhibits concerning the alleged subversive activities of the Republican Government.² The enclosures to Mr. Stikker's letter

¹ Not printed.

² Exhibits not printed.

are sent in only one copy as the Embassy has not sufficient staff to copy these lengthy papers.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:
ROBERT COE
Counselor of Embassy

[Enclosure]

The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stikker) to the American Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
No. 22271-2416 G.S.

THE HAGUE, 2 March, 1949.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR, During our discussions concerning the new proposals of the Netherlands Government for an accelerated transfer of sovereignty, the question of the return of the Republican leaders to Djokjakarta appeared to be the main although not the only difficulty preventing an acceptance of the plan by the Republic and a whole-hearted support of our proposals by the governments of the Atlantic nations. I have tried to explain orally to you the fatal consequences of a return of the Republican Government to their capital for an effective and lasting solution of the present difficulties. In case the Republic would definitely and irrevocably refuse the invitation which has been transmitted to them, the question of the return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta will undoubtedly figure in the report which the UNCI has to make to the Security Council.

I feel very strongly that your Government should have at its disposal all relevant information concerning this question before making a final decision. On the other hand I am very reluctant to give publicity to incriminating evidence concerning persons with whom we have negotiated in the past and with whom we are anxious to resume negotiations.

After considering this matter I have decided in consultation with my colleagues to send you for your personal information a short memorandum on some of the documents found in the archives at Djokjakarta which illustrate the policy followed by the Republican Government, in the hope that these documents will help you to understand the difficulty for the Netherlands Government to agree to a return of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta at the present time.

Djokjakarta is not only the capital of the Republic: it is also the source of inspiration for those Republican elements, which refuse any form of cooperation with the Netherlands and which will continue guerrilla action no matter what happens.

Although we have not taken any repressive action, we know that the Republican leaders, who are now in Djokjakarta or vicinity continue to support subversive elements, who prevent the restoration of orderly conditions.

It has been said that the Republican Government can only order its adherents to cease guerrilla warfare, when it has been reestablished in Djokjakarta and has sufficient facilities for communication. The enclosed documents indicate unmistakably the use which responsible Republican leaders have made of their authority and the facilities of Djokjakarta during the period when the truce agreement was in force. There seems little ground for the assumption that after their reinstallation in Djokjakarta they would follow a different course of action. The public declarations of the Republican emergency government, the authority of which has been expressly recognized by Mr. Hatta, that they would continue guerrilla warfare until victory was achieved only confirm the conclusion of the Netherlands Government, that a restoration of republican authority in Djokjakarta would inevitably result in a further deterioration of the situation, which is already extremely difficult.

In sending you the enclosed memorandum I wish to reiterate that this is not done in a spirit of bitterness or revenge, but only to enable your government to make a decision on their future attitude on the basis of a knowledge of the information which is available on the subject to the Netherlands Government.

Sincerely yours,

D. U. STIKKER

[Subenclosure]

*The Consequences of a Restoration of Republican Authority in
Djocjakarta and Vicinity*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 21204-2299 G.S.

The paramount question asked in the recently occupied territories is whether or not orderly conditions will be reestablished. Indonesians and Chinese, intellectuals and the man in the street alike, all ask whether the Netherlands troops will remain, or whether the TNI will return to resume its reign of terror. The Dutch answer to these questions is that the Netherlands army will stay as long as it is needed and that the TNI will not be allowed to return. The restoration of orderly conditions takes time. The confidence of the people, that they may resume their normal activities without fear of oppression or compulsion, can only be gained gradually.

The confidence of all those who have faith in our promises is based on the assumption that a restoration of Republican authority would not be permitted. Any indication to the contrary would cause those whose confidence is wavering to think twice before expressing willingness to cooperate, and would create doubt in the minds of those who have resumed their work as to whether they have made the right choice. Political and social reconstruction, for which confidence in Netherlands' protection is an indispensable prerequisite, would be slowed down considerably.

Everywhere in Indonesia even far outside Republican territories, the restoration of Republican authority would be interpreted as proof that Republican supremacy will ultimately return and in many federal territories this will create confusion and dismay.

The considerations described above with regard to individuals apply equally to political organisations. Extremists on the Republican side would receive encouragement, for they would rightly come to the conclusion that tenacity is profitable and this would stiffen them in their attitude.

A still more serious fact is, however, that Tan Malakka's group would gain by the restoration to an even greater extent, as it is their avowed purpose to put an end to all Netherlands influence in Indonesia and to promote Communism. Consequently it is to be expected that guerilla warfare, in which this group plays such a prominent part, would receive a new impetus. During recent weeks the military and political situation has improved, in some regions even considerably, mainly because various bands see no further use in armed resistance.

It is obvious that this guerilla warfare would flare up anew if Sukarno c.s. were to be vested with governmental authority and allowed to return to Djokjakarta. Loss of human life would inevitably result.

It cannot be expected that the Republicans would agree to the presence of Netherlands forces in Djokjakarta, even assuming that under those circumstances Netherlands forces would be able or willing to perform their task.

A new demarcation line, however short, would revive economic, financial and traffic chaos. A Republican Government would wish to set up its own financial and communications systems, including postal, telegraph and telephone services. This would artificially complicate the situation and render the future unity of Indonesia forever impossible.

All security would disappear and the same terrorism with which the Republican Government has been totally unable to cope in the past, and which it has even encouraged, would prevail. The Republi-

can Government would be completely at the mercy of Extremist groups and thus unable to continue negotiations.

From the situation briefly outlined above it appears that the Dutch efforts to introduce in the whole of the Indonesian archipelago a policy aiming at an early transfer of sovereignty to a federated state would again have to make way for the divergencies which have so far stood in the way of this unity.

A restoration of Republican authority would inevitably lead to a dualistic policy. Restoration of the Republican Government at Djokja—however small its territory may be—would in fact bring the parties back to their previous position, which for two years has prevented the conclusion of a real agreement. Even supposing the Republican Government would be prepared to order the guerilla bands to cease all fighting, and that these troops would carry out their orders—both improbable suppositions as the record shows—the first point of discussion after this cease-fire would be the consideration of a truce agreement and the establishment of new demarcation lines etc. In these circumstances, instead of passing from truce negotiations to political negotiations, the parties to the dispute would return to a previous stage which could only delay the final solution. The Republican army would be reconstituted and the existence of two opposing armies, both having legal status, would again lead to armed clashes with fatal consequences for the future of Indonesia.

The Netherlands have reluctantly been obliged to assume in practice exclusive responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of peace and order in the whole of Indonesia, and they cannot renounce this responsibility until a settlement has been made which provides for political cooperation and integration of the federal and republican territories under one government to which the Netherlands can transfer responsibility.

The artificial controversies between republican and other territories should at last come to an end. These controversies have been fomented neither by the Netherlands nor by the federal territories, but only by the Republic. Cooperation of the population for the common cause cannot be expected until the people have an assurance that the Republic will not be restored in its former shape. A restoration of the Republic would force them again to make their choice.

The Netherlands are therefore obliged to continue their efforts towards the establishment of a central authority, which, in fact, they would rather entrust to the Indonesians today than tomorrow. This authority must not again be split in two, as would be the result of a restoration of Republican authority at Djokja.

The Republican leaders would be welcome in a central Indonesian

Government which would also have authority over the former Republican territories. They cannot be allowed any longer as a separate political entity aiming at domination of the whole archipelago, in the interest of finance and economy, political development, social welfare, communications and all other common problems. Integration and not disintegration should prevail. The recommendation of the Security Council to reestablish the conditions which created the previous difficulties is unacceptable to the Netherlands in the interest of Indonesia. The interests of Indonesia are and should be paramount in all our decisions.

No sinister Dutch interests are being pursued; the Netherlands are concerned only with the necessity to create a United Indonesia to which complete sovereignty can be transferred with confidence.

As long as there is no guarantee of a United Indonesia, the restoration of a separate Republican administration in Djokjakarta is out of the question. The Netherlands cannot run the risk of a Republican Government continuing its old tactics.

Experience has taught a lesson which is not easily forgotten. Even before the political discussions envisaged in the *Renville* Principles began, the Republican authorities organized subversive activities by means of radiopropaganda, secret army orders and infiltration tactics. Few people believed this at the time, but the documents included in this survey prove it only too clearly.

It should be reiterated here that an all-Indonesian Government has to be created as soon as possible, but a situation in which the Central Government has no authority over Djokja cannot be allowed to arise again.

The Republican leaders have now been released and the Netherlands Government is fully prepared to come to an understanding with all parties, without attaching undue importance to formalities and procedure.

It is, however, only prepared to transfer its authority over the whole archipelago, including the Republican territory—and Djokjakarta—to one federal Indonesian Government.

Apart from evidence already published, these conclusions are borne out completely by the examination of the Republican archives which have been found after the occupation in Djokja and elsewhere in Republican territory.

The nature of the Republican activities during the period between the *Renville* agreements and the second Police action will be dealt with below under the following headings:

1. Infiltration and subversive activities contrary to the *Renville* Truce Agreement;

2. Opiumtraffic;
3. Double-dealing of the Republic in the negotiations;
4. The fictitious demobilisation and rationalisation scheme for the Republican army;
5. Contact of the Republic with the Malayan Communist Party;
6. Difficulties to reach binding agreements with the Republic.

The originals of the documents quoted are in the possession of the Government of Indonesia. In a number of cases photographic copies are available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The reference numbers are those of the Central Military Information Service.

501.BC Indonesia/2-1049

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*¹

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The United States Government is in full agreement with the conclusions of the note handed to the Secretary of State by the British Ambassador on February 10, 1949;² that is, that the Dutch should be urged to give every facility to the United Nations Agency and to the Indonesians in the task of proceeding with the steps which must be taken before the transfer of power in Indonesia takes place and that the Indonesians should be brought to understand the paramount necessity of reaching agreement among themselves in order that this task may be carried out.

In the telegram received by the British Ambassador from Mr. Bevin, which the British Embassy was generous enough to make available to the Department of State,³ Mr. Bevin expresses the hope that the Secretary of State will be disposed to ask Mr. Cochran to use his influence with the Republican Indonesians to induce them to accept the Dutch invitation to the proposed Round Table Conference at The Hague in exchange for some specific assurances regarding Dutch intentions.

The United States Government, which is acutely aware of the implications of the crisis impending in the Security Council, agrees that acceptance by the Republican Government of the Netherlands invitation is greatly to be desired and that the utmost efforts to bring about this end are necessary.

¹ Handed on March 4 to the British Counselor of Embassy (Graves) by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth).

² *Ante*, p. 198.

³ Copy handed by Mr. Graves to the Department on March 3, not printed.

In this connection, the United States Government regards the following aspects of the situation as most relevant :

1. The new Dutch proposals are extremely broad and beyond offering a resumption of negotiations looking toward an early transfer of sovereignty barely suggest a basis upon which the issues which have heretofore divided the parties may be resolved.

2. Republican elements appear convinced that the consistent Netherlands intention in Indonesia has been to transfer a highly qualified and merely nominal sovereignty to a government of subservient Indonesians which will agree to the retention of a large Netherlands army in Indonesia as a defense against the nationalist movement represented by the Republic. The military action initiated by the Netherlands on December 18 has of course had the effect of reinforcing this concept, in addition, it might be added, to disrupting the degree of law and order previously prevailing in Java and Sumatra.

3. The Republican resistance forces, far from eagerly seeking a formula which would permit them to cease hostilities, have enlarged their demands in the past month and profess to find the present military situation markedly to their advantage. A pliant attitude on the part of Sukarno and Hatta will be of little avail if they cannot carry a major part of the resistance forces with them. Indeed, concessions by these officials which the so-called Emergency Government in Sumatra and the non-Communist guerilla leaders in Java could not be persuaded to accept would tend to discredit the former moderate Republican Government and bring die-hard fanatics to the leadership of the nationalist movement.

For these reasons, the present situation would appear to require in the first place that the Dutch (1) give full freedom to the Republican leaders, (2) afford these leaders a seat of authority to the end that they may have access to the resistance forces in order that the Republican movement may be re-integrated and made answerable to the authority of these leaders, and, (3) elucidate their new proposals to demonstrate to the reasonable satisfaction of the Republican Indonesians that the objective is identical with that of the Security Council's resolution of January 28—the transfer of full sovereignty within the period laid down in the Security Council's resolution to an Indonesian government in which the Republic will be guaranteed its due role—even if the means of achieving the objective are somewhat at variance.

In any case, the essential requirements of the situation confronting the Dutch would appear to be plain. If these requirements are met, Mr. Cochran could look forward with some hope to prevailing upon the Republican Indonesians to accept the Netherlands proposals. But the task of presenting proposals which offer the basis of a reasonable solution falls primarily upon the Dutch. Mr. Cochran will exert himself to the utmost, as he has in the past, to find a way out of the impasse

which threatens. But he must have something substantial with which to work.

A report received on March 4 from Mr. Cochran states that the Republican Government on Bangka Island is disposed to accept the new Netherlands proposals to negotiate at The Hague on the strength of the explanations given by Mr. Koets, acting as emissary of the Government of Indonesia, provided that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia assist at those negotiations under the terms of reference laid down by the Security Council and that the Republican Government be restored to its seat of authority in Jogjakarta in order that it may be in a position to issue a cease-fire order and bring about a peaceful situation. These conditions, which seem reasonable to the United States Government, appear also to have the support of the Federalist Indonesians.

Should the Dutch fail to give the required minimum assurances on the points which are obviously critical, it is difficult to see how, through Mr. Cochran's efforts or by any other means, the Security Council can avoid being faced with a clear case of Netherlands non-compliance with its resolutions, with consequences of the most unwelcome nature, whatever form they take.

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1949.

501.BC Indonesia/3-449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1949—6 p. m.

187. Recent reports from Cochran (Gocus 615 and 616²) give real grounds for hope that Neth Govt will make the one remaining move apparently necessary to place Indon situation again in negots. This move, namely, restoration Repub Govt to a seat of authority at Jogja, involves, we realize, the hard core of political difficulties with which Neth Govt is confronted; but at same time we are convinced that it also involves key to solution this exceedingly difficult problem.

In addition restoration point, on which Federaists (Gocus 617³) have formed solid front with Repubs, you will note that Repub leaders also are worried lest role of UNCFI be reduced in proposed negots at Hague from that which it was created to fill.

¹ Repeated as 694 to Paris (for info Baruch, Kirk, and Harriman), as 244 to Brussels, and in telegram 140, Usgoc 323, March 7, 6 p. m., to Batavia. W. Averell Harriman was U.S. Special Representative in Europe for ECA.

² Telegrams 224 and 225, March 3; latter not printed.

³ Telegram 227, March 4, not printed.

Dept extremely eager receive soonest responsive clarification from Neth Govt on points which apparently remain at issue at this time, not only in order formulate its position at forthcoming SC discussions this subject, but also to be in position, if possible, assist in moving problem into stage of negots.

Making use such portions Cochran's reports as you deem wise, particularly his reference Schuurman's attitude re restoration and Beel's reported open-mindedness on subject, pls immed convey to FonOff our appreciation what has already been done and our earnest desire that Neth Govt will find way to meet requirement re restoration, and to give helpful clarification re functions UNCFI, in order that grounds may be given for constructive stand by SC in forthcoming debates and, more importantly, that way be opened for speedy solution Indon problem as envisaged in proposals Neth Govt.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-549: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1949—2 p. m.

191. Fol *aide-mémoire* presented Brit Counselor 5 p. m. Mar 4: [Here follows quotation of text printed on page 297.]

In presenting *aide-mémoire*, Dir FE read recent Gocus tels to Brit Counselor. In reply latter's reiterated query if US prepared act on recommendations Bevin tel, Dir FE pointed out US rep as member UNCFI could not exert pressure either party accept agreement outside terms SC Res. He noted, however, parties of course at liberty reach such agreement on own and Cochran given wide latitude as honest broker. Brit Counselor reported his understanding Dutch adamant on Jogja restoration. Dir FE noted BFO support Repub conditions on acceptance Neth proposal, and observing Sukarno reported willing order cease fire after restoration Jogja, expressed opinion present opportunity analogous that given by Hatta's Dec 13 letter. Stressed necessity interested parties work together get Dutch take constructive action prevent threatened impasse.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 135, Usgoc 318, to Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/3-649 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary
of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

THE HAGUE, March 6, 1949—1 p. m.

NIACT

220. Have carefully explored question raised Deptel 187, March 4, with Lovink in absence Stikker in Paris.

Lovink said Cabinet had invitation to UNCFI as constituted and would welcome their participation at round table conference in same manner as though they were functioning in Batavia. Commission would have access to all meetings and be afforded every opportunity to participate appropriately in discussions.

Importance Department attaches to restoration Republican Government at Jogja was stressed, in conjunction with SC debates and in light of BFO support of Republic demand. Lovink replying said Netherlands Government was categorically and repeatedly on record as unalterably opposed to restoration Republic at Jogja, and he, speaking as Acting Foreign Minister, would have to say that any possibility Netherlands Government agreeing to return to Jogja before Hague conference must be viewed with greatest pessimism.

I pointed out new situation existed as result BFO support of Republic re Jogja which he admitted and then, saying he spoke as strictly private person and must not in any circumstance be named or quoted, expressed view that if Netherlands could be assured Republic delegation would leave Batavia for Hague conference of specified date mid-March, he thought bare possibility existed Cabinet might agree to restoration without delay (and might even provide transportation for few days' visit and consultation Jogja before delegation take off), although might have to disclaim, at same time, responsibility for resultant disorders. Such agreement would have to give absolute assurance Republic attendance Hague conference and would need be worked out between [apparent garble] Republic's with definite participation UNCFI whose assistance and assurances would be of utmost importance from standpoint Netherlands Cabinet acceptance. Lovink admitted March 12 no longer possible but thought March 15 feasible start conference. We believe March 15 takeoff Republic delegation Batavia was in his mind.

Lovink further stated Netherlands Government felt UNCFI could exercise helpful influence at this time in restraining Republican leaders from making exaggerated and impossible demands as well as by indi-

¹ Repeated in telegram 136, Usgoc 319, March 6, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

cating Dutch proposals offer opportunity realization Indonesian aspirations at early date if Republic's will do their part.

I am convinced as I have indicated before that possibility of successful compromise to enable resumption Indonesian negotiations can be found along above lines, namely, agreement by Republic's to attend Hague conference in return for Dutch agreement to restoration Jogja; but the two must be linked together. It will be difficult secure Cabinet approval but we note a number of signs that international considerations are slowly making headway over largely national approach hitherto prevailing.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/3-749

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Nolting)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 7, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Helb, Counselor, Netherlands Embassy
 Mr. Ogburn, SEA
 Mr. Barco, UNP
 Mr. Scott, EUR
 Mr. Nolting, NOE

Pursuant to Mr. Helb's request that he be advised of the position to be taken by this Government on the Indonesian question in the Security Council, he was requested to call and was read pertinent passages of the telegram of instruction to USUN,¹ which had been repeated to our Embassy at The Hague for transmission to the Netherlands Foreign Office. Mr. Helb expressed appreciation for the information and for the favorable light in which we viewed the Dutch proposals for a conference at The Hague. However, he was specific in stating that he felt the condition precedent to such negotiations as set by the Republican leaders, namely restoration of the Republican Government at Djocjakarta, was impossible of acceptance by the present Netherlands Government or by any Netherlands Government likely to be formed. He reiterated his view that further pressure on this point from the Security Council would cause the fall of the present Netherlands Government. The Department's officers answered Mr. Helb's questions with regard to the telegram of instruction, indicating that if the Netherlands took a position in the Security Council amounting to an inflexible rejection of the proposal for restoration, the U.S. representative could obviously not put forward the point of view contained in

¹ Telegram 140, March 7, p. 305.

the telegram, but would be forced to revert to support of the Security Council's resolution of January 28 in its entirety.

In discussing the question of restoration, Mr. Helb was informed that according to our information the Federalist organization (BFO) had passed a resolution unanimously supporting in principle the Republican demand for restoration to Jogja; that later, according to our information, certain BFO members were influenced by Mr. Beel to change their positions; that it had been our understanding that one of the principal objections of the Netherlands Government to the idea of restoration was based on the belief that it was opposed by the Indonesian Federalists. We pointed out that the acceptance by the Netherlands Government of the proposal re restoration might be greatly eased by their placing face value upon the resolution of the BFO, rather than trying to oppose it. Mr. Helb said that his information differed from ours with respect to the degree of unanimity prevailing among the Federalists; and further stated that, in view of the pressures prevailing from many quarters upon the Indonesians, he saw no reason why Mr. Beel should not have counseled the Federalists with regard to their stand re restoration of the Republic.

Mr. Helb then raised the question of the information recently given Foreign Minister Stikker in Paris by Mr. Harriman relative to the Military Assistance Program. He inquired whether the caveat we had entered was timed as a "big stick" to influence the Netherlands' decision re restoration of the Republic, expressing his personal anxiety lest it be so interpreted by the Netherlands Government. He was assured that the timing on this matter was the result of the natural sequence of events in planning the Pact and the Military Assistance Program and that it was not devised as a means of pressure; he was further advised that the information was given to Mr. Stikker in an effort to be entirely forthright, in order to avoid the possibility of misunderstanding at a future date.

856d.00/3-749

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of
Southeast Asian Affairs (Reed)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 7, 1949.

Mr. Graves called to make available a summary of a telegram from Mr. Bevin to the British Ambassador at Washington relative to a suggestion by the Netherlands Ambassador at London ¹ as to the terms on which the Netherlands Government might be willing to agree to the

¹ Jonkheer E. Michiels van Verduynen.

restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta. Mr. Graves related that the Netherlands Ambassador's views were communicated to Mr. Bevin shortly after Mr. Stikker had been told by Mr. Harriman that MAP would be implemented so far as the Netherlands was concerned only after there had been a settlement of the Indonesian dispute. Mr. Graves agreed that the communication by Mr. Harriman had evidently shaken the Netherlands Government considerably and he believed that that government now appeared to be somewhat more amenable as regards the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta than it had been hitherto. Mr. Graves stipulated, however, that the views which the Netherlands Ambassador had communicated to Mr. Bevin were entirely personal and that the Netherlands Ambassador had said that he could not guarantee that the Netherlands Government would agree with and act in accordance with those views.

In reading the summary of the above-mentioned telegram it was noted that there was no substantial departure from the suggestions given in last week's telegram from Mr. Bevin to the British Ambassador, which Mr. Graves had made available on March 3 and which was discussed in our *aide-mémoire* of March 4 to the British Ambassador.

It would appear the Netherlands Ambassador at London has suggested that the Dutch would be prepared to permit the Republican Government to return to Jogjakarta, but not to re-establish itself as a government of the *status quo ante*, if the US and the UK would give certain assurances to the Netherlands Government:

- (a) Inform other governments that we thought the Dutch plan should be given a trial;
- (b) The British Consul General at Batavia be instructed to urge the Republicans to accept the Dutch invitation to The Hague;
- (c) Express the view in the Security Council that, though the Dutch plan does not conform to the letter of the Council's resolution, it does offer a possible solution and should be tried;
- (d) If the Republicans should nevertheless stand out, we should be prepared to say to the Security Council and to the public generally that we think they are wrong.

I pointed out to Mr. Graves that it would appear from recent communications from Mr. Cochran that the Republicans had already accepted to negotiate at The Hague provided that (1) UNCFI would assist at The Hague negotiations under the same terms of reference as provided by the Security Council for negotiations at Batavia, and (2) that it be restored as a government to Jogjakarta. I told Mr. Graves the foregoing would appear to dispose of point (b). I then remarked to Mr. Graves that so far as points (a) and (c) were concerned I believed they were substantially the same and further I

could see no virtue in publicly preferring any plan to the Security Council resolution until the parties to the dispute agreed to negotiate on the basis of that plan; that if they so agreed there could be no great objection raised as to the lack of strict conformity of the Netherlands plan with the Security Council resolution. So far as point (d) was concerned decision regarding thereto did not appear to be necessary at this time since it was a development which might or might not materialize and then only in the future.

I reiterated to Mr. Graves that, on the whole, the above-mentioned telegram did not appear to depart greatly from the previous telegram and that the Department's position as regards the suggestions in the previous telegram and as regards similar suggestions in the present telegram was set forth in our *aide-mémoire* of March 4. In sum, the United States Government, as a member of the Security Council could not take any action nor could it advocate taking any action which recommended a departure from the Security Council resolution of January 28 unless the parties to the dispute agreed to negotiate under a plan differing from that resolution, and even in the latter case the United States Government would be bound by the majority opinion of the Security Council. I expressed my personal opinion that as the Republicans had apparently agreed to negotiate at the Hague it would appear that the Netherlands Government should make an effort to meet the Republican's conditions so as to put the parties in a negotiating position as soon as possible.

Mr. Graves explained that his Ambassador had been instructed to seek the views of the Secretary of State on this matter and I said that I would make the foregoing information available to my superiors and that I would inform him of their views at the earliest possible moment.

501.BC Indonesia/3-749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 7, 1949—6 p. m.
NIACT

140. Dept suggests in your conversations other Dels and in statement before SC, USDel take fol position Indonesian case in accordance Cochran's recommendations contained Gocus 620.²

¹ Repeated as 193 to The Hague, 259 to Brussels, 750 to London, with instruction for immediate delivery to the three Foreign Offices as the position to be taken by the United States at the Security Council; as 190 to New Delhi, and 139, Usgoc 322, to Batavia for Cochran.

² Telegram 233, March 5, 9 p. m., not printed.

1. US continues to support SC resolution of Jan 28 which contains basic objectives for peaceful settlement of Indonesian dispute and early transfer of sovereignty from Neth to USI.

2. US perceives no reason why the objectives of the Security Council's resolution cannot be achieved through negots at The Hague as proposed by the Netherlands.

3. It is our understanding based on reports from our rep to UNCFI (and on the letter from Sukarno to Beel³ which has been distributed to Council) that Republic has accepted invitation to Hague conference subject only to conditions (a) that Govt of Repub be restored to Jogjakarta in accordance with SC resolution and (b) that UNCFI participate at conference.

4. As to second of these conditions Dutch have invited participation of UNCFI at Hague conference and accordingly there would appear to be no difficulty on this point. Problem arises in respect of restoration of Govt of Repub to authority in Jogjakarta. Purpose of that clause in res of Jan 28 was to enable Republican Govt to assemble at seat of authority.

5. It would be unfortunate if agreement could not be reached by the parties on this preliminary step in order that substantive negotiations at Hague conference can go forward with all speed. We see no obstacle to agreement on this point and believe UNCFI can make substantial contribution in bringing parties together in agreement both as to restoration of a seat of authority for Repub and the date to be fixed for Hague conference.

6. In seeking to find common ground of agreement it would be appropriate for UNCFI to arrange immediate negotiations between reps of Neth on one hand, and of the Republic and of the leaders of the Federal Conference on the other.

7. In as much as program here outlined will, if agreement can be reached on prerequisites for conference at Hague, be consistent with res of Jan 28, we would suggest that if this program represents consensus of Council, President transmit a telegram in this sense to UNCFI pointing out that UNCFI should make every effort to bring parties in agreement on conditions for holding of conference at Hague and that it should participate in that conference when and if it is held.

Note: Portion para 3 above in parens to be used when and if letter, which Cochran has requested Repubs submit UNCFI, recd by SC.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 8, 1949—noon.

241. Gocus 623. Visited Schuurman afternoon March 7. He said Jogja trouble March 1 has made The Hague more determined not permit Republican restoration. Criticized Republican reply to round table invitation and suggested Republicans would demand more once they have Jogja.

To Critchley and me, Herremans yesterday quoted Beel as saying Indonesians will have to choose between Beel plan and SC resolution (which Netherlands will not implement) since he is not willing to have any part of latter tied to his plan. Herremans proposed to us idea letting Republican leaders return Jogja with Netherlands troops therein placed at their command or simply return in existing circumstances. We opposed these as I would oppose idea of "visit" mentioned by The Hague Usgoc 319.²

These suggestions miss two main points (1) restoration must be sufficient in scope and bona fide in character to insure Republican leaders most propitious circumstances for appealing to followers cease fire; (2) trying eliminate Jogja restoration or so weakening it that response to leaders appeal will be slight would mean warfare continuing throughout months that may be required in The Hague Conference and ratification.

Lovink shows no sense reality in suggesting round table feasible by March 15. If Netherlands might decide today in favor restoration Jogja, my guess is that at least one month required before Indonesians could meet Hague. Simple tasks are not involved in getting Netherlands troops out of Jogja, bringing in and organizing Republican military police, placing Jogja on economic basis sufficient to guarantee existence of population and position Republican leaders, transfer Republican leaders from Bangka to Jogja and calling in collaborators from Java jungle and Sumatra emergency group, arranging for and issuing cease fire order and preparing for Hague trip.

Scarcely need warn Department that once at Hague real troubles will begin unless Netherlands may be forced in glare publicity possible in European capital but impossible in this police state to change from present tactics. While conference in session Hague, Beel, Spoor and others will undoubtedly be doing everything possible sabotage negotiations and annihilate TNI. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Repeated in telegram 199, March 8, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² See telegram 220, March 6, and footnote 1, p. 301.

501.BC Indonesia/3-849: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1949—7 p. m.

145. Usgoc 325. Brit Counselor today informed Dept Brit Amb Hague believes Dutch willing allow Repub Govt return Jogja on condition *inter alia* (1) TNI does not return; (2) no demarkation line fixed; (3) no separate currency established; (4) no victimization practiced; (5) no further concessions to be asked from Dutch. Further provision would be that UK urge US ask Cochran persuade Repubs accept invitation Hague Conf. Brit Ministers have considered these proposals and are authorizing Brit Amb Hague inform Dutch that upon their agreement return Repubs Jogja UK will urge US act in sense desired and accept first four conditions in principle. UK not accepting fifth condition.

Foregoing sent you in advance Dept comments in order keep you abreast.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 197 to The Hague and as 266 to Brussels.

501.BC Indonesia/3-849: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 8, 1949—7 p. m.

285. Following is a draft telegram from the president of the Security Council to UNCFI which, if you agree, we would propose to use in discussions with other delegations here. We have in mind that a text of this nature should be the end result of forthcoming series of SC meetings.

"The SC has today authorized me to inform you of its willingness that the negotiations which it has recommended be undertaken by the parties for the purpose of arriving at an agreement on a just and lasting political settlement of the Indonesian dispute be held at The Hague provided this does not prejudice the continued implementation of the SC resolution of January 28. The Council believes that the conditions precedent which the President of the Republic has set forth in his letter of March 4 are envisaged in and consistent with the resolution of January 28, and urges the Commission to facilitate agreement between the parties on the acceptance of those conditions so that the conference may be held. If such agreement is reached, the Commission

is authorized to participate in that conference in accordance with its terms of reference."

AUSTIN

840.20/3-949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 9, 1949—7 p. m.

151. Usgoc 327. Eyes only Cochran: In connection preliminary bilateral discussion of proposed Mil Assistance Program, US informed Neth on Mar 5 (Harriman speaking to Stikker in Paris) that US, in view its obligations under UN Charter, may find it necessary to refuse to furnish mil equipment assistance to Neth prior to Indo settlement consistent with position of SC. We have also made clear we trust WU countries including Neth will continue joint planning re assistance required from US and reciprocal assistance to be provided by WU, on assumption Indo situation will be clarified prior actual transfers mil equipment by US to Neth. Other WU countries informed of fore-going. WU meeting including Neth scheduled for Mar 14.

Neth Govt has inquired re timing and purpose stipulation cited above. We have replied that timing resulted from logical sequence events in planning Atlantic Pact and MAP, and was not introduced this juncture as "big stick" Indo impasse; as to purpose, we have stated that we wished to keep record clear in order prevent charge bad faith at later stage in event Indo situation remains unresolved.

Dept considers it important avoid use above as direct leverage in Indo situation.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-1049 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT THE HAGUE, March 10, 1949—4 p. m.

236. We find frequent evidence in Gocus telegrams of belief Netherlands Government not acting good faith in calling Hague conference and in its intentions at roundtable if conference should take place.

Naturally there are certain officials and numerous individuals Holland who would like see Indonesia kept as colony; however, we do not believe there is any real evidence lack of good faith in government's

¹ Repeated in telegram 166, Usgoc 334, March 15, 11 a.m., to Batavia.

intentions, or of animus of great majority Dutch people against national aspirations Indonesians. Repeated public statements of policy by highest authorities of land, from Queen down, indicate Netherlands government does intend grant real independence Indonesia. Although many actions Netherlands Government and officials have been inept, at time perhaps unworthy of Netherlands, we feel calling of roundtable conference was genuine and forthright effort solve Indonesian problem by discarding approaches hitherto unsuccessful. Fact Netherlands Government objected to certain features SC resolution, which were abhorrent to Dutch, and attempted to by-pass resolution by calling Hague conference do not speak for its bad faith vis-à-vis Indonesians. Furthermore, when judging Dutch intentions, it is necessary to have regard for Netherlands Government attitudes in Hague as well as Batavia as well as limitations imposed by coalition character present cabinet. Finally, we believe presence of UNCFI at conference is UN guarantee that rights of all parties will be protected.

Police action was started with approval most Netherlanders, both public and private. Although solemnly warned of dire consequences, because of traditional policy neutrality since Napoleonic wars, Dutch people were startled at world wide reaction against police action. Jolt they received has been rude lesson in internationalism for Dutch, effect of which has been gradual awakening political parties and press to dangers of world estrangement and condemnation Netherlands.

Question return Djocja has been difficult and thorny. Netherlands Government has thought, and for good reasons, return would create chaos and disorder and unduly exaggerate Republican's ambition for complete dominance ultimate government. Moreover, for considerable period Foreign Office officials told us they had documentation on Republican leaders which if not actually incriminating was seriously damaging. Officials said they did not wish publish documents as would inflame Dutch people, aggravate general situation and make it even more difficult deal with Republican leaders in future. However, Stikker felt documents should be released to Ambassadors friendly governments to explain and justify reasons for Dutch reluctance on return Djocja. We do not consider this smear campaign (Gocus 620²), but as indicated Embtel 208, March 2³ we do not believe it was timely to release this documentation because if it should leak out would seriously handicap roundtable conference. We express hope Department will not allow this untimely communication unduly to influence its opinion as to bona fide Netherlands Government re roundtable conference.

BARUCH

² Telegram 233, March 5, not printed.

³ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/3-1049 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 10, 1949—8:35 p. m.

300. At end of SC meeting today Van Roijen expressed some disappointment in US statement² which he thought was somewhat rough in spots and which he had hoped might have been toned down. Van Roijen added he hoped Stikker proposal would not be rejected. Ross³ told him he thought US statement as well as Palar statement left door open if Netherlands can see way clear to meet essential conditions. Stikker was out in front if his proposal did not meet with sympathetic consideration. He and other conciliatory elements would have to give way to extremist elements.

Van Roijen said he wanted to make clear Stikker proposal did not indicate Netherlands was leading from weakness. Van Roijen minimized in this connection effectiveness of guerrillas.

Text of excerpts provided by Van Roijen from Stikker letter to Bevin in next following telegram.⁴

AUSTIN

¹ Repeated in telegram 160, Usgoc 331, March 11, 6 p. m., to Batavia.

² For statement by the U.S. Representative at the United Nations (Austin) made in the Security Council on March 10, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 27, 1949, pp. 379-381; for summary of SC discussions on March 10-11, see *ibid.*, March 13, 1949, p. 317.

³ John C. Ross, Deputy to the U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

⁴ Telegram not printed; Mr. Stikker's letter of March 8 to Mr. Bevin (not printed) was handed the Department on March 10 by the Netherlands Minister (Reuchlin).

501.BC Indonesia/3-1049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 10, 1949—9 p. m.

NIACT

246. Gocus 624. Schuurman came Wednesday night. Said he hoped delay opening SC Indonesia meeting, indicated outside negotiations in progress toward some compromise on Jogja restoration. In circumstances suggested I should not encourage Republicans when in Bangka to expect SC support them 100 percent on Jogja. I said interested getting parties into conference soonest.

UNCFI visited Republican leaders Bangka informally today. Republicans unhappy over Netherlands reluctance in official statements

¹ Repeated in telegram 209, March 11, 8 p. m., to The Hague, and as 287 to Brussels.

and invitation to round table well as through Gieben and Koets to give specific information on what conference is to do, conditions as to transfer sovereignty, likely agenda rules procedure, etc.

Sukarno said some confusion exists following his answer to invitation. Said his letter based solely on invitation as received and as clarified by Gieben and Koets. Said it could not possibly take into consideration published reports of questions answered by Beel at press conference, etc. Said invitation so vague Republicans feel they should not be bound by commitments before entering conference. Specifically they take exception to Beel attitude that constitution of two parties Netherlands and Republic must be in conformity with statute union. Republicans realize Netherlands Constitution already amended to envisage union statute. They are willing have general concepts of union statute included in political agreement. Insist, however, that under Netherlands plan Republican Constituent Assembly can meet and adopt constitution only after signing agreement for transfer sovereignty including union statute. They want no mention of union statute in Republic constitution but union agreed upon through treaty.

While Republicans insist upon as unconditional and early transfer sovereignty as possible, they realize agreement toward this end will involve certain conditions which cannot be fulfilled until after transfer date, such as disposition Netherlands troops, etc. Consequently they argue UNCFI should remain on scene until sovereignty transfer agreement actually implemented.

Republicans hold firm to SC resolution and their rights thereunder. Look upon conference as simply medium for discussing earlier transfer sovereignty than anticipated in SC resolution and for getting lined up for bilateral political agreement with Netherlands under UNCFI auspices. They hope round table conference will be successful in developing form of agreement along pattern suitable to other Indonesian states and desire exchange views and cooperate toward this end. They will hold out, however, for agreement under UNCFI auspices.

At our general discussion Roem and Hadji Salim spoke of various desires on their part which they would like to see made conditions to acceptance invitation, such as meeting place other than Hague, chairmanship to rotate, conference to be under UNCFI auspices, etc. They also asked that UNCFI endeavor soonest get Sultan Jogja and two Republic Cabinet members still in Jogja well as perhaps some emergency government people to come Bangka to discuss plans. Republicans continued adamant on restoration Jogja, Sukarno saying guerrillas have let him know they will heed his appeals only when his voice comes from Jogja. Speaking to Sukarno alone afterwards, I advised him await Netherlands decision on Jogja before asking UNCFI help draw

in his leaders. I said if and when favorable decision announced, UNCFI would be glad help assemble everyone. I said he would weaken his own position well as his own arguments in favor restoration Jogja if he made proposed request this time when decision surely imminent.

In answer my queries of Sukarno re restoration Jogja, he assured me if Sultan authorized pave way it can be accomplished smoothly. Said if he and Sultan both there and permitted reasonable number civil and military police there will not be any chaos Netherlands predict or even any minor incidents to cause concern. He would expect to issue cease-fire order and accept go round table within possibly one week after return Jogja if this arranged in accordance his idea. Said withdrawal authority delegated emergency government will be prompt and simple. Expects receive support of 90 to 95 percent his old Republican followers if returned Jogja and Republic given fair deal by Netherlands. Among nonconformants he included Tan Malakka.

Sukarno assured me he would consider some of his assistants' suggestions only "tertiary" in importance and would not delay conference. I said it would be UNCFI duty criticize Republic if latter showed any such tendency after Jogja matter adjusted. Sukarno discussed possible Republic representation at round table conference with me. He spoke of sending best men he has. I favored both Sukarno and Hatta going. He said he feared necessary one of them, perhaps himself, remain Jogja to work toward pacification, etc. I said absolutely essential either he or Hatta be at conference at all times, if not simultaneously. He thought he would send Hatta for first three weeks and then perhaps relieve him personally for awhile. I reminded him Netherlands contemplates using entire Cabinet as conference delegation so his representatives should be strong as possible. I mentioned advantage having conference Hague where all Netherlands Cabinet on hand and no necessity representatives refer matters back for consideration.

Republicans feel they have made progress with BFO and can work in harmony with them for a nationalist Indonesia if Netherlands do not interfere. To Sukarno I opposed idea advanced by Herremans [that] Sukarno seek see Beel Batavia. I said let matters proceed formally for present. I discouraged Hatta from idea moving residence Republic leaders from Bangka to Atjeh, again saying wait Jogja development since Atjeh arrangement would not be considered substitute for restoration.

BFO meeting scheduled Batavia tonight postponed until Friday. Consequently visit Bangka by BFO members originally scheduled Friday cancelled. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-1049 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1949—9 p. m.

155. Usgoc 329. Dept requests your comments Niact on Stikker-Bevin letter which assume you have already received from Brit Con-Gen. Question which Dept must now answer is whether US should tell Stikker that we consider these proposals reasonable as basis removal Jogja obstacle and as preliminary to round table discussions, subject to bona fide negotiations in Batavia of details requiring negotiation. Neths Ambassador has made clear that unless US and Brit can so inform Stikker, Stikker would not attempt gain Dutch Govt approval this program.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-1049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State¹

SECRET US URGENT

THE HAGUE, March 10, 1949—11 p. m.

NIACT

237. Lovink and Boon in early afternoon, Stikker late afternoon and evening, have stressed repeatedly imperative need of obtaining some assurance on US attitude toward points set out Stikker letter March 8 to Bevin, if Netherlands Cabinet were to be induced to agree on "return to Djogja". Stikker expressed confidence he could secure Cabinet agreement, if he could offer some tangible basis for reversal previous unbending stand, and above all if Dutch military sensibilities and national pride were not inflamed by return of TNI to Djogja.

Stikker seemed gratified by our statements re US attitude round-table conference (Deptel 193, March 7²) and that it "was not US intention to encourage Republicans to make unreasonable demands", yet said, at end final talk, that he still felt necessity ask for US statement attitude toward proposals contained his letter to Bevin March 8, which Dept has doubtless seen. He stated that if Dept could see its way clear to endorse these proposals (Bevin's general approval of which Dutch regarded adequate) as basis for compromise Djogja issue, he would at once secure cabinet agreement, and would immediately be able to instruct Van Royen to accept, for Holland, a proposal which he understood McNaughton is ready to offer, or SC to instruct UNCFI to call conference Batavia of Republicans, Federalists and

¹ Repeated in telegram 160, Usgoc 331, March 11, 6 p. m., to Batavia.

² See telegram 140, p. 305, and footnote 1.

Netherlands for purpose only of solving difficulties standing in way of realization RTC plan, including return to Djogja.

Stikker was not satisfied with our statement re TNI, namely, that "US had taken no attitude in question" and considered it matter for local agreement; said he could not therefore instruct Van Royen to agree now to McNaughton proposal, if made (as we advised by telephone he would), but rather to state that he must submit it for consideration his government. Van Royen, therefore, would make opening statement reiterating Dutch stand but leaving door open for proposals. Nichols,³ who was present this conference, agreed on Dutch suggestion to recommend his government that Cadogan, after McNaughton proposal, should reserve British attitude to make position easier for Netherlands.

Stikker ended conference with final appeal US to assist as suggested above. This, he said, as final push that would get things off dead center.

BARUCH

³ Sir Philip Bouverie Bowyer Nichols, British Ambassador in the Netherlands.

501.BC Indonesia/3-1149 : Telegram

*The Consul General of Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

BATAVIA, March 11, 1949—7 p. m.

250. Gocus 625. Colonel Carlock² returned last night with senior Australian and Belgian military observers from trip Jogja. Team interviewed Republic Ministers Djuanda and Laoh at liberty in respective homes Jogja who consider restoration Republic Government there entirely feasible with assistance Sultan. These ministers desire UNCFI arrange for them visit leaders Bangka. Netherlands military commander Jogja said could not give team permission interview Sultan re March 1 incident Jogja without prior authority from Batavia.

British Consul General inquired this morning re UNCFI visit Bangka. I said Republicans insistent on Jogja and showed him letter Mar 10 from Roem to UNCFI³ clarifying Sukarno's letter March 4 to Beel re round table invitation. UNCFI wiring correspondence this

¹ Repeated in telegram 213, March 12, 4 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels.

² Col. Willard B. Carlock, U.S.A., senior military observer on Java.

³ For text, see SC, 4th yr., Suppl. (March), pp. 34-35.

type Lake Success as received in order keep SC informed during session.

Talked Anak Agung this afternoon. BFO meeting postponed from last night not held today. Leaders BFO delegations however called to Palace this morning. Beel there read them Van Royen's SC speech of yesterday in explanation Netherlands position. Anak told Beel BFO position already indicated in resolution March 3. To me he said his government approved position he took therein and he can only adhere thereto or resign. Anak said Hamid now has another resolution which will probably be introduced BFO meeting at 9 a. m. Anak and his sympathizers will oppose this if it inconsistent with or seeking invalidate resolution March 3.

Anak asked me if any danger SC weakening on January 23 [28] resolution, especially restoration Jogja. I assured him no danger on American side and certainly earliest press reports received so far covering first three speeches showed no tendency toward SC weakness. He said BFO leaders would be greatly disappointed and "let down" if SC should retract from resolution and support of Republic. He said if Netherlands not willing abide by Jogja clause SC resolution in order achieve own end of round table conference plan, certainly could not be expected carry out SC resolution if no round table.

Received Usgoc 329⁴ 4 p. m. and immediately called on British Consul General. He had not received Stikker letter. Read me from cable file including one message which set forth five conditions as given in Usgoc 325.⁵ In absence Stikker letter, am assuming his proposals involve five points under reference. Consul General promised let me know soonest if Stikker communication received. Following observations submitted on five points in order listed Usgoc 325.

1. Latest information Jogja indicates civilian police not likely be available in adequate number to maintain order if Republicans restored. Sukarno agreed with me yesterday minimum number military should be brought in to supplement civil police. Carlock says ministers whom he interviewed Jogja consider nearby TNI troops best source for required military police. In earlier talks with Republicans, have made point strongly that if Jogja restored UNCFI would have responsibility seeing Jogja does not become haven or concentration point for armed forces. Have had every assurance from Republicans that this not contemplated and will not be permitted.

2. Do not understand how numbered paragraph 2 SC resolution January 28 can be implemented with regard to administering "city of Jogja and its immediate environs" without some limits being fixed. Would leave this to judgment military observers in liaison with Netherlands and Republican authorities.

⁴ Telegram 155, March 10, p. 314.

⁵ Telegram 145, March 8, p. 308.

3. Would definitely agree no separate currency should be established but would remark that Republican currency unit rupiah continues to be accepted many places not only along with but in preference Netherlands florin. Carlock tells me both currencies circulating Jogja.

4. Agree no victimization should be practiced and military observers should observe and report to UNCFI if any evidence thereof.

5. Oppose any condition which would prevent Republicans from having freedom present whatever requests they may see fit to make. Have already personally cautioned Sukarno and other Republican leaders they must be reasonable once restored Jogja and UNCFI will consider it its duty to insist thereon. As for final suggestion that I be asked persuade Republicans accept invitation Hague conference Gocus 624⁶ and other recent messages show my readiness to do everything proper toward this end, as well as prospective Republican agreement thereto provided Jogja restored.

It is difficult for me to go beyond foregoing comments in absence text Stikker letter and latest word re Netherlands position at Hague and Lake Success. Believe strongly however that onus is on Netherlands Government to show its good faith rather than upon British and US Governments to seek conditions for Netherlands acceptance one part SC resolution. I believe every consideration has been shown Netherlands Government by friendly powers and SC. Am convinced that present is time for definite showdown. If Netherlands desires round table "detour", it should certainly be called upon to meet at once provisions SC resolution necessary to such detour. At same time should not be excused from any provisions resolution until SC shown Indonesian question honorably settled with realistic transfer sovereignty. If Netherlands Government unwilling meet above conditions, feel Netherlands must bear consequences.

Visited Schuurman 5:30 p. m. his request. Asked me about Bangka visit. I said informal with no significant developments. Summarized by saying Republican leaders insistent on restoration Jogja and genuinely interested in round table idea. Added that I had volunteered to Republican leaders UNCFI's duty to see they act reasonably if and when restored Jogja.

Schuurman showed me copy press cable filed third by Pope to Chicago *Tribune* alleging "UN sources Batavia" critically delaying tactics, etc. I said this did not worry me and I did not desire to [*do*] anything to limit freedom of press correspondents. Remarked however I resented spirit shown by Netherlands in distribution at Lake Success snapshot of secretariat group (New York's 297 to Department⁷ relayed Batavia). Schuurman said he unaware such distribution and regretted it very much. Signed Cochran.

I I V E N G O O D

⁶ Telegram 246, March 10, p. 311.

⁷ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/3-1249

*The Department of State to the Netherlands Embassy*¹

MEMORANDUM

The Secretary of State is encouraged by the informal proposals contained in the letter of Foreign Minister Stikker to Foreign Minister Bevin on the point of restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta, and sees in these proposals a reasonable basis for discussion in an effort to overcome the obstacles now standing in the way of the proposed conference at The Hague and for a fulfillment of the basic purposes and objectives of the Resolution of the Security Council of January 28, 1949.

The Secretary of State earnestly hopes that preliminary negotiations between the parties with the assistance of UNCFI can promptly go forward with the objective of reaching a solution of the Jogjakarta question and promoting at an early date the initiation of the proposed round-table conference at The Hague.

It is the opinion of the Secretary of State that the remarks made by Senator Austin in the Security Council on March 10 point the way for the holding of such a preliminary conference, and that making arrangements therefor should be an immediate task of the UNCFI. It is also the hope of this Government that the discussions in the Security Council now going on will enable the Council, through a communication from the President, to advise the UNCFI in this sense.

With regard to the specific conditions (nos. 1 through 9) contained in Mr. Stikker's letter, this Government considers that it is difficult, if not impossible, at this time and at this distance from the scene, to comment specifically upon their merits. Bearing in mind the main objective of the preliminary conference—namely, the clearing away of obstacles to the conference at The Hague—this Government believes that the most useful role it could play at this juncture would be to instruct its representative on UNCFI during the preliminary negotiations to make every effort to insure that full consideration be given these points by the Republic with a view to bringing the parties to agreement. This Government also considers that, after UNCFI has had an opportunity to learn the Republic's views on these points, it would be appropriate and desirable for UNCFI to make specific recommendations thereon to both parties.

The purpose of restoring the Republican Government to Jogjakarta is to enable it to reassert its authority over Republican elements, to

¹ Handed to the Netherlands Minister (Reuchlin) by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Thompson) on March 12.

enable it to take decisions as a government and, in cooperation with the Netherlands, to bring about a peaceful situation in Indonesia. This Government is confident that the representatives of the Netherlands and of the Republic can agree upon conditions which are fair and feasible and will make the holding of The Hague round-table conference possible.

In view of the forthright approach to the problem taken by Mr. Stikker, which is most gratifying to this Government, the Secretary of State has confidence that the possible issues in such preliminary negotiations between the parties will be handled by the Netherlands authorities with requisite flexibility; and in this assurance, this Government is confident that the issues can be resolved and the main objective of a successful conference at The Hague be achieved.

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1949.

501.BC Indonesia/3-1249 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1949—4 p. m.

163. Usgoc 333. In reply Neth request to US for response to Stikker's letter to Bevin re conditions on which restoration Repub Govt to Jogjakarta might become acceptable to Neth Govt, following memo handed Neth Min Wash Mar 12.

[Here follows text of memorandum printed *supra*.]

In verbal explanation, Dept officers stated that Dept obviously could not now make firm commitment its position re details involved restoration Jogjakarta, which in our view properly matters for negotiation, mentioning specifically police function in Jogjakarta and status Repub guerrillas during preliminary conference and round table conference. On other hand. Dept officers expressed view that restoration Repub Govt to Jogjakarta should not involve concentration large forces TNI that city, and pointed out responsibilities devolving upon Repub leaders after restoration, as already emphasized to them by Cochran.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 212 to The Hague, 290 to Brussels, and 831 to London, "for info, at your discretion, of respective Foreign Offices".

501.BC Indonesia/3-1249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, March 12, 1949—6 p. m.

253. Gocus 628. Received from British Consulate General, March 12, 6 p. m., copies letters exchanged between Stikker and Bevin. At hour preparation this message, have received section one only of Usgoc 331.² From my recent cables and Gocus 624 to 627³ inclusive, Department will have seen my opposition to any bargaining with Netherlands on restoration Jogja. Since Stikker letter differs from five points covered Gocus 625,⁴ I submit following comments compliance Usgoc 329.⁵

First paragraph Stikker letter gives well-known arguments in justification military action which SC has condemned.

Paragraph 2 argues against sound concept SC resolution namely that restoration Jogja necessary to enable Republicans issue most effective call to guerrillas. There is calculated risk of disorder which believe must be taken in view other important considerations. Seriously doubt Republicans, if permitted return to small area Jogja, would launch campaign victimization while surrounded on all sides by Netherlands military forces with planes, bombs, etc.

Paragraph 3, if Netherlands Government genuinely contemplates turnover sovereignty in few months, cannot believe such last ditch opposition should arise against real restoration, to say nothing of "token return".

Paragraph 4, while naturally favor cooperation, think SC should resent Netherlands effort avoid any UNGA [debate?] or suspicion their compliance with SC resolution.

Point 1, Republican Government cannot exercise appropriate functions in full freedom including administration Jogja area, if Netherlands authorities remain responsible for law and order therein. Clashes would appear inevitable, even if Republicans agreed to such arrangement, which I consider unlikely.

Point 2, convinced cease-fire order issued by Republicans when not functioning freely and in position authority would have poor response.

Point 3, law and order not being well maintained in Jogja now with

¹ Repeated in telegram 224, March 15, 4 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

² See telegram 237, March 10, p. 314, and footnote 1.

³ Telegrams 246, March 10, p. 311, and 252, March 12, not printed.

⁴ Telegram 250, March 11, p. 315.

⁵ Telegram 155, March 10, p. 314.

Netherlands nominally in full authority. Insufficient civil police likely to be found available. Mixture Republican civil with Republican military and Netherlands military would lead to troubles. Republicans would never trust Netherlands military to decide when an emergency exists.

Point 4, Netherlands would interfere with progressive withdrawal of Netherlands forces anticipated under SC resolution and delay any action thereon until agreement at round table.

Point 5, no comment. This already anticipated by paragraph 4(D) SC resolution.

Point 6, by military action Netherlands has already disrupted economic, financial, and social structure Indonesia. Restoration Jogja, accordance SC resolution, would be first orderly step toward reconstruction and under eyes UNCFI anxious see best results achieved.

Point 7, Republican leaders have already assured UNCFI representatives informally that when restored Jogja will call emergency government members Jogja and revoke all delegated authorities.

Point 8, UNCFI has military observer Jogja and would plan augment number considerably even to using entire force if necessary to observe turnover to an administration under Republicans. Civilian members could also be stationed there or visit frequently as circumstances warrant.

Point 9, Netherlands token restoration cannot be taken seriously if accompanied by demand that immediately after return of Republican Government to Jogja, delegation for round table will leave for Hague, such delegation to include Sukarno and Hatta. This would give no time for bringing in and consulting scattered leaders by Republican Government. Furthermore, would necessitate absence Sukarno at time when his efforts might best be devoted to pacification. I favor one of two top men being at Hague constantly, and Sukarno agreed thereto (Gocus 624) but I share his idea re advantage of his being principally Jogja. Bevin has expanded some above arguments.

As for remainder letter, "sweeping proposals" of Netherlands Government which to date have been so vague as to arouse little enthusiasm will cause Netherlands Government to be suspected launching colossal swindle if they insist stubbornly on holding out against SC resolution on point Jogja restoration, while giving no undertakings. I have gone along with round table idea, since I feel we could at Hague have best chance either force Netherlands give honorable deal or be shown up in true light, and dealt with accordingly. If Drees Government not strong enough weather Jogja, could surely never get transfer sovereignty agreement ratified. Arguments in regard to Netherlands effort create stability in Indonesia with 100,000 soldiers for over three years, pat-

ently fallacious. Unfair Netherlands approach US and UK Governments separately, seeking concessions under SC resolution in which both governments have participated. Inclined doubt moral value Netherlands in group of Atlantic friends, if inclined use friendships to escape compliance with judgment of majority Western powers and entire east.

In summary, I consider Stikker's approach weak and unconvincing. While willing compromise on means when motives beyond question, in light foregoing, must recommend strictest insistence upon prompt Netherlands compliance with SC resolution provisions pertinent restoration Jogja and free functioning government there. I recommend against stronger SC, throwing problem back to UNCFI for negotiations in bitter atmosphere Batavia. Recommend SC show strength expected of it by Asiatic countries and by BFO delegates, remembering that latter have just broken from Netherlands dominance to stand beside Republicans in resolution March 3, but awaiting SC outcome before making announcement. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-1449 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, March 14, 1949—7 p. m.

246. Deptel 213, March 12 (Gocus 625²) contained information of such importance from Dutch point of view that substance thereof (mainly contained 5 numbered points), was communicated this afternoon Lovink, in absence Stikker, London.

Stressing major Dutch objection restoration Djocja, that chaos inevitable result, Cochran view need for minimum number supplementary military police was pressed in conjunction with Cochran statements UNCFI would have responsibility seeing Djocja not become haven or concentration point for armed forces. This statement, coupled with Cochran indication that Republican leaders must be reasonable once restored Djocja and UNCFI would consider its duty to insist thereon, made obvious deep impression. On other hand, became clear that Dutch, including Stikker in letter March 8 (paragraph 3), have been thinking in terms of Djocja civil police and armed forces, both under Dutch.

¹ Repeated in telegram 169. Usgoc 336, March 15, 6 p. m., to Batavia.

² Telegram 250, March 11, p. 315, and footnote 1.

Lovink advised Van Royen being instructed agree McNaughton proposal at SC.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/3-1649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, March 16, 1949—noon.

322. Bajpai, SYG External Affairs, told me today GOI becoming increasingly concerned re Indonesian situation. He feared unless Republican Government could be restored soon Jogjarkarta Republican leaders who in general moderate and statesmanlike will be discredited and irresponsible or Commie-dominated leaders will replace them in influencing masses Indonesian people. Longer Republican leaders remain separated from Republican military activities, less their influence will become and greater will be that of Commies and Commie collaborators. It therefore extremely important Dutch carry out immediate terms SC resolution and restoration Republican Government.

GOI also considers essential any discussions between Indonesians and Dutch re future Indonesia be under auspices UN. It convinced moderate Republican leaders would immediately be discredited by their own movement in Indonesia if they would agree negotiate with Dutch before restoration Republican Government except under UN auspices.

He asked me convey GOI considered views to US Government and again express hope US Government which was in position wield powerful influence on Dutch would take every possible appropriate measure prevail on Dutch without further delay carry out literally and in spirit terms SC resolution.¹

It was clear Dutch by their various maneuvers were trying befog situation in order conceal fact they were flouting UN. Dutch apparently still seem hope they would succeed circumventing UN decisions without being called to account.

He added that recently GOI had received appeal from Bevin and also from Dutch Government to endeavor influence Republicans accept invitation enter into discussions with Dutch.

GOI had unequivocally replied it would not encourage Republican leaders follow line which might well mean loss control moderates Indonesian Republic movement.

HENDERSON

¹ The Philippine Foreign Office in a note on March 11 expressed its confidence that the U.S. policy would lead to a just and satisfactory solution (telegram 706, March 16, from Manila).

501.BC Indonesia/3-1749: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

THE HAGUE, March 17, 1949—8 p. m.

256. Stikker, tired, discouraged and emotional after exhausting fortnight of conferences covering Indonesia, Benelux and Western Unions, sent for me today; expressed strongest disappointment and discouragement at language of what he described as American draft of McNaughton proposal which he understands has been circulated to certain members of SC.² He stated that on strength Bevin, Acheson comments his letter March 8 to Bevin he was able secure cabinet approval for agreement to McNaughton proposal which had great virtue from Dutch viewpoint of being couched general terms permitting discussion all conditions, including restoration to Djocja, which agreement essential for arriving Hague conference. American draft, with its specific reference to Djocja and detailed spelling out of proposals and obligations, would go down extremely badly in cabinet and generally in Holland and he frankly feared that cabinet would balk and there would be another impasse. This would be deplorable. In his view, McNaughton proposal, which Holland had accepted, would in practice enable conference to cover exactly same ground as American draft.

From this and subsequent discussion Boon and British Ambassador, idea emerged Department might be willing, in view considerations above stated, to encourage McNaughton to formulate his own proposal to council, following as closely as possible language agreed to by Van Royen.

Position here as we view it is that Netherlands Government and Parliament are in process of backing down from position hitherto stubbornly maintained toward Djocja. It would seem important make it possible for them change their position without too much loss of face and still carry public opinion with them; otherwise they will do so if at all with bad grace and might even refuse, with further prolongation this dangerous crisis which, unfortunately, many Dutch officials and public figures associate more and more with problems Western Europe, including Atlantic pact. Stikker particularly stressed this to me while at same time expressing his own wholehearted support and espousal of spirit, principles and mutual material advantages of pact.

BARUCH

¹ Repeated in telegram 179, Usgoc 237, March 18, 8 p. m., to Batavia.

² For discussion at SC of the Canadian proposal, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1949, p. 361.

501.BC Indonesia/3-1849

The Netherlands Ambassador (Van Kleffens) to the Secretary of State

[WASHINGTON,] March 18, 1949.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY, It was my hope that you would be able to see me to-day in view of the latest developments in Lake Success and, as a result, in Holland, with regard to the Indonesian question.

In reply to my inquiry I learned that your time will be taken up with Congressional hearings, and that you suggest a talk on Monday. This, I assume, means that on Saturday too there will be no chance of seeing you. I therefore shall be very glad to come on Monday, but I am anxious to write to you without delay since I do not feel justified in withholding until Monday from you my realization of the fact that a situation is developing in Holland which gives cause for alarm. The circumstances are these:

You know that in regard to Indonesia the question is not whether that archipelago is to be free and independent. That question is answered in the affirmative, most especially in Holland. Nor is the question when it is to be free and independent: the reply is, so far as we are concerned: if possible in a few months time, well before the end of the year, months before the date suggested by the Security Council of the United Nations. The only question is: *how* can this best be brought about?

The United Nations Security Council, in a resolution of January 28, called upon the Netherlands in order that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia (one of several Indonesian States to be federated in the United States of Indonesia, and the only one with which there are difficulties) be returned to its capital city of Djokjakarta with full powers of administration. I may mention in passing that the republic has made this return a *condition* for fresh negotiations, thereby going farther than the Security Council's resolution.

If the Republican Government is reinstated in its capital without qualification, it is certain that those elements, now in hiding, will return with the government of the republic to its capital who have previously prevented that government from coming to terms with my Government. They are: communist leaders who, though ardent communists, do not (or do not openly) admit allegiance to Moscow, and secondly heads of armed organizations whose power depends on the perpetuation of unsettled conditions.

It is for that reason that, as honest people, we felt, and feel, that we cannot take upon ourselves to carry out that part of the Security Council's resolution without some reasonable qualification. If we took another attitude, we would be untrue to ourselves and to the Council, for

against our better knowledge we would do something which we are convinced in our heart and conscience would be a sure way of preventing agreement from being reached. No republican government, if subjected again to the dual influence I have just mentioned, could afford for reasons of its own personal safety to come to an agreement with us on *any* terms.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has done his best to find a compromise. He suggested to your Government and to the United Kingdom's Government that, if they could support him he would sponsor the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta *as a government*, with full civil administrative authority, it being understood—in order to prevent the simultaneous return of the frustrating elements above referred to—that we would undertake to police that city and surrounding district. The United Nations Commission for Indonesia could be our witness that we would let the republican government administer Djokjakarta and environs, and deliberate, communicate and consult in full freedom, as called upon by the Security Council's resolution.

You know what reply you and the British Government returned to this suggestion. I am anxious to bring this matter further, and therefore refrain from comment on that reply. But I am anxious to make a few observations on what happened after that reply was made on March 12.

On March 11 the Canadian Representative in the Security Council, stressing the desirability for the Council of doing everything possible to aid the parties to enter upon direct negotiations, stated that it would seem useful that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia would assist in reaching an agreement between the parties as to the time and conditions under which the proposed conference at The Hague would be held. He added that "it would be understood, of course, that these exploratory discussions under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia would be without prejudice to the resolutions of the Security Council and to the rights, claims or positions of the parties" (page 37-40, United Nations Document S/PV417).

This, although not ideal, seemed to us a reasonable idea and the Netherlands Representative in the Security Council, on behalf of the Netherlands Government, officially accepted the Canadian proposal in the terms and with the objective as formulated by the Canadian Representative. We fully understand that the authority of the Security Council has to be duly taken into account, and that therefore it is difficult to deviate from its resolutions very much, although in the Kashmir and Palestine cases such deviations from the Council's resolutions were more than once accepted with a view of achieving agreement between

the parties. But we also think that if, owing to an insufficient appreciation of the facts as they are on the spot, the literal text of the Council's resolution of January 28 went a little too far, this should be corrected in carrying out the resolution. This the Canadian draft takes into account, and in a spirit of compromise (we have made express reservations with regard to the original Council resolution of January 28) we were, and are, prepared to accept it. It seemed to us better than the suggestions made by the Chinese Delegate in his speech in the Security Council on March 11, which in our view were more in the nature of admitting the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta without sufficient qualification.

The Canadian draft seemed to have very good chances of being accepted, and its acceptance seemed assured if the United States Delegation would accept it. To our great regret, and without understanding the necessity for it, we then heard in spite thereof that the United States Delegation had made a different tentative draft. This draft, as we have it, reads as follows:

"It is the sense of the Security Council that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, without prejudicing the Council's resolution of January 28 and the rights, claims and position of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agreement as to the time and conditions for holding the proposed Conference at The Hague, including the manner in which the restoration of Djokjakarta to the administration of the Government of the Republic may be accomplished, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of January 28 may be held as soon as possible. It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of such a Conference and the participation by the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in accordance with its terms of reference would be consistent with the basic purposes and objectives of the Council's resolution of January 28, 1949, which remains in full force and effect."

We fail to see why it was necessary to draft this text, even in a tentative form, a draft which we are convinced would, if adopted, make agreement between the parties impossible, because it neither adds nor implies a qualification to the return of the republican government to its capital (see above), and, without any necessity, stresses the "full force" of the Council's resolution of January 28. That is the essential difference with the Canadian proposal, which, whilst entirely compatible with the Security Council's resolution of January 28, makes it possible to implement that resolution in such a way that ultimate agreement between the parties is not endangered.

This raises a crucial domestic issue in Holland, where the nation is getting restive because it is felt the Government's attempts at reasonable compromise are not duly acknowledged abroad. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, who hopes to meet you here on April 4, has asked me

to invite your serious attention to this situation, which may—there is no point in hiding it—lead to his early resignation, and perhaps to that of the whole cabinet. Dr. Baruch, who is on the spot, will be able to explain to you what that would mean.

I must admit in all candor that I do not see what can be gained by an attempt to exact from the Netherlands a too literal application of the resolution of January 28. The loss is certain: no agreement in Indonesia. On the most difficult point of that resolution (the return of the republican government to Djokjakarta), Mr. Stikker has explained in his personal letter to Mr. Bevin with which you are familiar, that this problem could find a practical solution, it being understood that the republican government would thereupon take part in the proposed Round Table Conference. This general idea you too seemed to favor in your letter of March 12. Your Government and the United Kingdom Government know that, if and when the parties shortly meet in conference, the Netherlands will not be found unreasonable. If the United States Government considers the Netherlands as a nation which abides by its promises, then it is very difficult to understand why the United States Delegation in Lake Success should believe that it is incumbent on it to present a text stipulating expressly that the unqualified re-instatement of the republican government in Djokjakarta is the aim and purpose of the contemplated conference, and reiterates, again expressly, that the Security Council's resolution of January 28 remains in full force.

Quite apart from their importance and effect in Indonesia, such useless reiterations have an effect on the States-General and on public opinion in Holland which I feel I must call to your earnest attention. It is an effect of exasperation. At a moment when Argentina, France, and the United Kingdom would no doubt accept Canada's text if only the United States would accept it—and China and Norway then would accept likewise—they see that the United States refuse, and, being unable to find any reasonable explanation for this refusal, they believe that it is in order to side with the Indonesian republic and against the other, non-republican Indonesians and the Netherlands themselves. It is felt that on our side so many concessions have already been made without there becoming apparent any appreciation by others for our accommodating attitude. In order to gain a generally workable solution, we have agreed to continue recognizing the republican government as a party to the dispute as before; notwithstanding the serious doubts as to the competence of the Council to deal with the Indonesian question and the refusal of the Council to submit this important point to the Court of International Justice for its advice, we have announced our willingness to carry out the resolution of

January 28, to the extent to which it is compatible with the responsibility of the Netherlands Government; we have decided to transfer sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia a full year earlier than foreseen by the resolution; we have thereby reduced the interim period and the necessity for arrangements for an interim-government to a minimum; and so there are more concessions which I will not enumerate fully in this letter.

But this is not a process which can be continued indefinitely; the line obviously has to be drawn at the point where a further concession (such as the unqualified application of the Security Council's resolution of January 28) would endanger if not nullify the chances of ultimate agreement between the parties. That point, it is felt in Holland, has now been reached, and the exasperation of which I spoke springs from lack of support abroad of this reality after we have shown our goodwill by a series of concessions on major points, our suggestion for a Round Table Conference and our desire to set up the United States of Indonesia a year earlier than the Security Council itself had envisaged. The Dutch people is naturally patient, but its patience has its limit somewhere, and that limit is now visible. It is not, as I said, drawn by either whim or caprice, but by cogent consideration of being unwilling to make concessions which endanger or nullify the chances of ultimate agreement.

There is a strong feeling amongst the people in Holland that at the moment there does not exist that real confidence between our nations which must be present if the Atlantic Pact is to be a success. Irrespective of what this or any Government in Holland would wish or prefer, this feeling is reaching a degree of intensity which is such that it may discharge itself, so The Hague assures me, in some irrational way. If next Monday, March 21, American influence in the Security Council results in the adoption of a decision which as honest people we cannot accept, knowing that subversive influences will make it impossible for the republic to come to terms, Mr. Stikker wishes you to know that this may well result in an open rupture between ourselves and the Security Council, and this when the margin is so small, and when it is difficult to see what general or Western interest should prevent adoption of the Canadian compromise. Mr. Stikker furthermore fears that public opinion would then strongly oppose Netherlands participation a few days later, in the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, however much he and the other members of the Cabinet would desire this participation.

For these reasons, Mr. Stikker has directed me to submit these considerations to you long enough before Monday (when the Security Council's decision is expected) so that you can decide what instruc-

tions to give to the United States Delegation in the Security Council, and to express to you his very earnest hope that by accepting the Canadian compromise the United States Government will not go farther against our reasonable attitude than other Governments who are to join us in the Atlantic Pact, Governments who have that confidence in our sincere intentions with regard to Indonesia which the Canadian proposal presupposes and to which my nation feels entitled.

I venture to express the hope that on Monday you will find it possible to authorize me to tell my Government that your Delegation in the Security Council will support the Canadian proposal.

Believe me to remain with high regard

Sincerely yours,

E. N. VAN KLEFFENS

501.BC Indonesia/3-2149

*Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross, Deputy to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] March 21, 1949—[9:45 a. m.]

1. We have been informed by the Canadians that they have authority to follow the line suggested by us; namely, they are authorized to discuss the revised formula with Alvarez,² President of the Council, with a view to the Canadians introducing this revised formula if Alvarez will go along.

2. I have just talked on the telephone with Van Royen, returning his call. Van Royen referred to a suggestion I made to him on Thursday afternoon that the best way out of this difficulty would be for Van Royen, on behalf of his Government, to state Dutch acceptance of the revised formula. Van Royen said with reference to this statement that he had been in touch with his Government which was being "difficult" about his making such a statement.

3. Van Royen said that he felt the holding of the preliminary conference at Batavia was the essential thing; it would be a pity, therefore, if this conference could not be held merely because we found ourselves unable to agree on a formula. He hoped, therefore, to be able to get together with me before the meeting to see what we could do. I told him I would be available either after twelve o'clock or at 2:45 before the Council meeting at Lake Success. (It was clear to me in the context of my conversation with Van Royen that he is waiting to find out the line which the Secretary of State takes with Van Kleffens this morning.)

¹ Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs (Rusk).

² Alberto I. Alvarez, Cuban Representative at the United Nations.

4. Van Royen said on the basis of a telephone conversation with Stikker yesterday he is worried about the situation of the Dutch Government. He said their position is "hardening". He added this may be only a psychological factor but as such it may well lead to the Dutch Government resigning.

501.BC Indonesia/3-2149

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1949.

We have just been informed by Mr. Ross (USUN) that seven members of the Security Council are agreed on the attached statement which the President of the Security Council might send to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia as the sense of the Council on the way in which we should proceed on the Indonesian case.² This suggestion will be made by the Canadian and it is expected that the President of the Council would adopt this statement without the use of a formal resolution. Senator Austin expects to say very briefly that we believe this is a useful way to proceed and seems to represent the sense of the Council.

So far as we now know, the only Dutch objection to this text is that they would like to substitute "terms and conditions for" in place of "the manner in which" under (a) in the attached statement. That change might in fact be made in New York, but I understand that many members of the Council seem to object to it at this stage.

You will also be interested in the report that Mr. Chauvel, French Representative on the Security Council, recommended to the French Government that they urge the Dutch to accept the view of the Council on the Djogjakarta point and that Chauvel has been informed that the French Ambassador in The Hague has been so instructed.

DEAN RUSK

¹ Notation by the Secretary of State: "Good. DA."

² *Infra.*

501.BC Indonesia/3-2149

Draft Statement on Indonesia for the UNCFI, Batavia

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] March 21, 1949.

It is the sense of the Security Council that UNCFI, without prejudicing the Council's resolution of January 28 and the rights, claims and position of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agree-

ment as to (a) the manner in which the restoration of the Government of the Republic to the administration of Djogjakarta may be accomplished, and (b) the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of January 28 may be held as soon as possible. It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of a conference at The Hague and the participation by UNCFI in accordance with its terms of reference would be consistent with the basic purposes and objective of the Council's resolution of January 28, 1949.

501.BC Indonesia/3-2149 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY NEW YORK, March 21, 1949—10:25 p. m.

390. 1. SC meeting became unhooked this afternoon when Cuban President, Alvarez, following speech by Palar (Indonesia) passed word to McNaughton he could no longer support formula for cable from president SC to UNCFI which had been agreed upon by McNaughton in accordance Cuban suggestions before meeting began (text statement McNaughton had intended to make, with agreed upon formula at end of statement, in next following telegram.)

2. Principal points Cubans now want changed based on discussion I had with Alvarez following SC meeting as follows:

a. Based on Palar charges (which so far as we know unsubstantiated) that Dutch have systematically destroyed Djogjakarta, Cubans want insert in formula some reference this charge. We took view SC should not take account such charges from one of parties in absence report from UNCFI, and we sure UNCFI would have reported if charges valid. Cubans will probably yield on this point, but have asked us we inform them any information we have received from Cochran. Any information Department may have not reported to us would be appreciated.

b. Cubans also want change draft be insert making clear restoration Djogjakarta should take place physically before any discussion at Batavia possible Hague conference. We expressed view immediate objective SC regarding proposed discussions Batavia was to bring parties together to talk about two points: namely, restoration Djogjakarta and possible Hague conference. To insist upon full restoration Djogjakarta before any talk Hague conference would meet Indonesian viewpoint 100 percent, but in this was virtually certain Dutch would not participate Batavia discussions and whole objective current phase SC activity would thus be defeated.

¹ Repeated in telegrams 181, Usgoc 338, March 22, 4 p. m., to Batavia, and 249, March 23, 4 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

3. Alvarez apparently impressed by suggested meeting 11:00 tomorrow of sponsors January 28 resolution to agree final formulation. We agreed might be good idea. Any guidance Department can give us before this meeting would be appreciated.

4. Egyptians with somewhat same emotional reaction also apparently became unhooked but we do not yet have motivation.

5. Fact of shift Cuban and Egyptian attitudes in favor much tougher approach against Dutch should be conclusive proof to latter our approach has been conciliatory effort meet them at least half way. We have some doubt they will understand this. Van Roijen in conversation Ross and Hyde before SC meeting expressed view that had US expressed support original Canadian suggestion as accepted by Dutch, majority of Council would have gone along. He regretted that US delegation, despite original reactions Department and others to Stikker line, had taken tougher attitude, thus forcing others to follow. Ross observed he could not accept this view, reiterated US effort had been to find middle ground between parties and at same time acceptable to SC, and that certain members SC wanted to be much tougher. McNaughton told Ross strict confidence after SC meeting, Van Roijen had said to him in effect "Americans are holding pistol to our heads and forcing our government to resign".

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/3-2149: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT NEW YORK, March 21, 1949—10:27 p. m.

391. Remytel 390, March 21. Following is text statement prepared by McNaughton on Indonesian question:

Text of statement on the Indonesian question by General the Honorable A. G. L. McNaughton, Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations, in the Security Council on March 21, 1949.²

"A number of questions have been raised at the last two meetings of the Council by several representatives with regard to my statement in the Council on March 11, and I should like to take this opportunity to provide the further development of that statement which is apparently desired by members of the council and by the representatives of the states who are participating in this debate.

¹Last paragraph of this telegram repeated in telegram 181, Usgoc 338, March 22, 4 p. m., to Batavia, preceded by "Following is communication from Pres SC to UNCFI proposed by Canad rep:".

²This draft, slightly revised, was made at the SC meeting on March 23; for text, see SC, 4th yr., No. 24, pp. 2-5.

"In the first place, I wish to make it clear that the suggestion embodied in the Canadian statement on 11 March was put forward in the hope that it might represent a practicable course of action leading to the resumption of direct negotiations between the parties. In advancing the suggestion for exploratory discussions, I put forward an idea, not the final text of a proposal. I fully recognize that the text of any final proposal could not appropriately be drafted until we had the benefit of the discussions in the Council to indicate a consensus of the Council's opinion.

"In the two meetings which have been held since I made my statement, the debate has revealed that the suggestion, as it was originally advanced on Friday, 11 March, has secured the support of a number of delegations; on the other hand, there are some representatives who, while expressing general support for the idea of preliminary discussions, under the auspices of our Commission, have urged that the first and foremost subject for consideration at any such preliminary discussions must be the terms and conditions on which the restoration of Jogjakarta to the administration of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia might be accomplished. I as I understand these representatives, their position is, that once agreement has been obtained on this matter, such preliminary discussions would then turn to the further question of examining the time and conditions under which there could be acceptance of the very welcome initiative of the Government of The Netherlands in proposing a conference at The Hague, which would include representatives of all parties to the Indonesian dispute including, of course, qualified representatives of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

"I believe that no real difference exists on this point which might prevent the Council from reaching a consensus of opinion. Indeed, the principal object of my remarks on 11 March was to suggest a procedure by which our Commission in Indonesia would be able to take the initiative in an endeavor to remove the present obstacles which exist to the attendance of Republican Representatives at The Hague Conference. Clearly the chief obstacle to the attendance of these representatives is the question of the return of the Government of the Republic to Jogjakarta and the reestablishment of the Republican Government as an effective administration.

"To put it briefly, our position is this:

"(a) We welcome The Netherlands offer to seek early agreement for the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia to the United States of Indonesia and the suggestion that a conference be held at The Hague to negotiate this agreement, provided arrangements are made that this conference takes place with the agreement and cooperation of all parties directly concerned.

“(b) In order to enable this conference to take place, it must be regarded as a ‘practicable and acceptable’ procedure by all the parties concerned in the proposed negotiations. To this end, UNCI should, in the first instance, seek, within the powers conferred upon it by the Resolution of 28 January, a way of bringing about an acceptable and voluntary agreement between the representatives of The Netherlands and of the Republic, which would enable the latter to participate in The Hague Conference as one of the parties to the negotiations leading to the transfer of sovereignty in Indonesia.

“(c) The principal obstacle to the participation of the republic in The Hague Conference is the question of implementing Article 2 of the operative part of the Resolution of 28 January, calling upon The Netherlands Government ‘to facilitate the immediate return of the officials of the government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta.’ An endeavor should therefore be made, with the assistance of UNCI, without prejudice to the Council’s Resolution of 28 January (including Article 2) to seek agreement on the manner in which this restoration should take place and also on the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague.

“(d) As one of the members of the Council which supported the Resolution of 28 January and contributed to its drafting, we continue to regard it as providing the procedures best suited to achieve a just and lasting settlement of this Indonesian dispute. What we propose at this time is that the Council, acting through its Commission, should help The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic to work out an agreement regarding the implementation of those parts of the resolution which are essential to enable further direct negotiations between all parties concerned in the Indonesian dispute to take place, leading to a peaceful settlement whereby sovereignty may be transferred from The Netherlands Government to the United States of Indonesia.

“We welcome the acceptance by The Netherlands Government of our suggestion, in terms in which I put it forward, and we also welcome the statement made by the distinguished Representative of The Netherlands on Wednesday, 16 March, when, in referring to the Chinese and Canadian statements, he said ‘we realize that the implementation of their suggestions will require concessions from both parties.’

“On 14 March the distinguished Representative of the Republic of Indonesia raised some questions with regard to the proposal made in my statement of 11 March. I hope that what I have said today will have served to dispel any misconception which might have arisen at that time.

“In our view the preliminary discussions in Indonesia, which I and others in this Council have suggested, are not only desirable, but absolutely necessary. Before this Council could sanction the presence of the UNCI at The Hague Conference, we would need to know that our Commission was satisfied that the proposal of The Netherlands

Government had been developed into one from which the Commission itself believed some useful progress toward eventual settlement would result. It would clearly be necessary also that The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia were likewise satisfied on this point; also that they were mutually agreed as to the respective conditions or stipulations, on which they felt they could need assurance, before The Hague Conference could assemble.

"It is clear to the Canadian Delegation, and I hope other members of the Council will agree, that it would be impracticable for the Council itself to attempt to specify in detail the conditions and procedures which might enable the parties to undertake the direct negotiations at The Hague as proposed by The Netherlands Government. These are questions which, in our opinion, should be worked out in the preliminary discussions and with the assistance of our Commission, acting by virtue of the Council's Resolution of 28 January and with the powers conferred upon it by that resolution. These powers include the duty to make recommendations to the parties as well as to the Security Council on matters within the competence of the Commission.

"The distinguished Representative of the Republic of Indonesia raised another question with regard to the statement of the Canadian Representative on 11 March, when he suggested that our proposal was founded on the mistaken impression that the aims of The Netherlands Government, as set forth in its proposal of 26 February, are identical with the aims of the Security Council and of the Republic of Indonesia. The distinguished Representative of The Netherlands has already twice replied to this question regarding the ultimate objective of Netherlands' policy on the transfer of sovereignty. On 14 March he declared 'I would now like to state most emphatically that the transfer, according to the Agreement of *Renville*, will be real, complete and unconditional.' Moreover, if there is any difference between the Government of The Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as to how this objective is to be attained, the place to clarify the matter is in the conference between the two parties which, as a result of the preliminary discussions we have proposed, we hope may take place subsequently at The Hague.

"In speaking again today it has been my thought, Mr. President, that, having taken the responsibility for bringing before this Council a suggestion for a preliminary discussion under the auspices of the UNCI, you might feel it appropriate if I were to summarize the suggestions which I think should be made by this Council to our Commission. This suggestion is that you, sir, on behalf of the Council, might write to the Commission in the following terms:

"'It is the sense of the Security Council that UNCFI, in accordance with the Council's Resolution of 28 January and without prejudicing

the rights, claims and position of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agreement as to: (A) The implementation of the Council Resolution of 28 January and in particular the most effective means by which the restoration of the Government of the Republic to the administration of Jogjakarta may be accomplished, and (B) the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the Resolution of 28 January may be held as soon as possible. It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of such a conference and the participation by UNCFI in accordance with its terms of reference would be consistent with the purpose and objectives of the Council's Resolution of 28 January, 1949.' "

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/3-2249 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 22, 1949—5:15 p. m.

393. Following is account private meeting I attended this morning called by Alvarez, President of SC, to reach agreement on formulation of cable President of SC would send to UNCFI. Others present were Fawzi (Egypt), Sunde (Norway), Tsiang (China), McNaughton (Canada), Shone (UK):

1. Gutierrez, speaking for Alvarez, made points they had made to me following SC meeting yesterday. Namely, (a) something should be done about Palar's charges that Dutch [army?] has systematically destroyed Jogjakarta, and (b) cable should be drafted so as to require restoration to Jogjakarta before going on and even talking about possible Hague conference.

2. On first point it was agreed that at beginning of meeting tomorrow President would propose, if no objection stated, send cable commission requesting report on Palar charges re destruction Jogjakarta.

3. Cubans were not supported on second point except by Fawzi in somewhat halfhearted and confused way.

4. I reiterated US continued to support SC resolution 28 January and stated that there was general agreement next step should be to get both parties together in proposed discussions Batavia. I said I felt best formula presented thus far was that which McNaughton had intended to present at SC meeting yesterday. Therefore, it seemed to me we should stick to this formula and avoid raising the ante for either side. McNaughton, Shone, Tsiang and Sunde supported this view. Discussion made perfectly clear all present agreed restoration to Jogjakarta should take place before Hague conference.

5. With view tightening draft, Tsiang proposed specific reference implementation paragraphs one and two of operative part January 28

resolution in place of wording in previous draft relating to restoration to Jogjakarta which Tsiang felt might be subject misinterpretation. Revised draft (text in next following telegram USUN 394) based on Tsiang's suggestion as slightly amended by Fawzi was unanimously agreed upon with some hesitation only on part of Sunde. Thus new draft assured seven votes.

6. It is our view new draft stronger from Indonesian viewpoint since based more squarely on 28 January resolution. At same time we feel new draft should be more acceptable to Dutch since Jogjakarta not mentioned by name.

Repeated Batavia for Cochran.

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/3-2249 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, March 22, 1949—5:15 p. m.

394. Following is text revised draft referred to mytel 393, March 22:

"It is the sense of the SC that UNCFI, in accordance with the Council's resolution of 28 January and without prejudicing the rights, claims and position of the parties, should assist the parties in reaching agreement as to (a) the implementation of the Council's resolution of 28 January and in particular paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part thereof, and (b) the time and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague, to the end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of 28 January may be held as soon as possible. It is further the sense of the Council that, if such an agreement is reached, the holding of such a conference and the participation by UNCFI in accordance with its terms of reference would be consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Council's resolution of 28 January, 1949."

Please relay Batavia for Cochran.¹

AUSTIN

¹This was done the same day.

501.BC Indonesia/3-2249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

THE HAGUE, March 22, 1949—9 p. m.

271. Stikker informed me today that latest US text of proposed SC guidance in UNCI on assistance to parties in reaching agreement

¹ Repeated in telegram 183, Usgoc 340, March 23, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

re Djocja and Hague conference would, in his opinion, be unacceptable to Cabinet, and would, he believed, not result therefore in preliminary Batavia discussions; anticipated also that he and Prime Minister would possibly find themselves under necessity withdraw from Cabinet if latter was forced to take decision re definite SC action in language now proposed. That, he intimated, would be most unfortunate and embarrassing if it should happen while he was en route or in Washington in reference Atlantic Pact.

I expressed to him in all frankness, the great mistake I felt Netherlands Government would make if it should quibble and refuse to accept proposal which, in my opinion, fully comprehended and covered Netherlands objectives, and, in fact, did not go beyond what Netherlands had indicated readiness to accept. Stikker replied it was matter of form and not substance, but that form was of utmost importance at present time as indicated Embtel 256, March 17.

It is my opinion that Stikker is not well man, is much overwrought and exaggerates opposition. Department will note from Embassy reports recent strong trend Dutch press toward recognition that Holland must eventually bow to force of world opinion also accept return Djocja.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/3-2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Nolting)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1949.

Mr. Helb called at his request. He spoke of the Netherlands delegates' reaction to the telegram dispatched by the President of the Security Council to UNCFI on March 23 and to various statements made by SC delegates at that time.¹ Mr. Helb's reaction to the telegram was that it might constitute an acceptable basis for proceeding with the preliminary discussions in Batavia, but that this was still contingent upon the Netherlands Cabinet's reaction. He stated that Senator Austin's remarks were helpful, but wished that they might have gone further in support of the "Beel plan".

I replied that I trusted that the Netherlands Government would regard the telegram of instructions to UNCFI and the remarks of Senator Austin in the light in which they were designed—namely, to help overcome a difficult political situation in the Netherlands in a manner which would not prejudice the interests of either party and

¹ For summary of SC discussion, March 21-23, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 27, 1949, p. 382. For text of telegram, see SC, *4th yr.*, No. 24, p. 5; for vote on it, March 23, see *ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

would promote the prompt initiation of a preliminary conference leading to the round-table negotiations at The Hague.

Mr. Helb then told me the following :

(a) That his government had decided to send Mr. van Royen to Batavia to head the Netherlands' delegation there; (b) That his government would be powerless to commence negotiations on the subject of restoration prior to Mr. Stikker's return from Washington, after having seen the Secretary and having consulted with his Cabinet colleagues. Mr. Helb stated that Mr. van Royen expected to return to The Hague with Mr. Stikker in early April, there to help persuade the Cabinet to implement the Security Council proposal, before proceeding to Batavia.

I expressed grave concern at the delay involved in this procedure, stressing not only the predictable adverse reaction in the Security Council, but the equally predictable adverse reaction in U.S. public and Congressional opinion. I said that in my opinion what was needed was some immediate tangible evidence of movement, that is, of progress toward implementation of the Security Council's position which would be evidence of the desire of the parties to reach agreement. I said I felt that otherwise UNCFI would be compelled during the interim to issue a report of no progress. I suggested that perhaps Mr. van Royen might proceed immediately to Batavia, with the idea in view of arranging a preliminary caucus of Republican leaders, if they so desired, providing safe passage, transportation, etc., to a central meeting point, in order that the Republicans might be placed in a position to move forward in the preliminary negotiations at Batavia immediately upon their commencement. I also mentioned the fact that the longer the delay, the more difficult became the achievement of the real purpose of restoration—namely, the reestablishment of the authority of the Republican leaders over their adherents.

While admitting the awkwardness of the delay, Mr. Helb stuck doggedly to the contention that the Netherlands Government was powerless to move until after Stikker's return from Washington. He requested specifically that Mr. Cochran be advised of the reasons for delay, in order that he might keep things on an even keel in UNCFI. I made no commitment in this regard.²

² In telegram 256, March 24, 8 p. m., to The Hague, the Department asked urgently for a report of "any info re Neth intention postpone implementation telegram SC President to UNCFI Mar 23." (501.BC Indonesia/3-2349)

501.BC Indonesia/3-2449: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 24, 1949—2:43 p. m.

408. The telegram which the SC approved yesterday for transmission to UNCFI is a compromise formula and is interpreted differently by different delegates in the SC who supported it. The interpretation we have placed and are placing on it in discussion here is set forth below. UNCFI is clearly going to have considerable difficulty in getting the parties and the members of the Commission itself to agree on an appropriate interpretation. It would, in our view, be advisable for the Department to inform Cochran of the interpretation which USUN has been and is placing on this language. We feel this interpretation is a middle ground which, if accepted by the Commission, would be best adapted to avoid difficulties and recriminations and obtain the support of the SC in case the issue has to be referred back as a result of deadlocked negotiations. Our gloss on the telegram is as follows:

1. The purpose of a telegram rather than a resolution is to emphasize that the January 28 resolution remains in full force and effect and that the SC has in no way modified or suspended it.

2. The assistance given by the Commission is intended by the SC to be "in accordance with the Council's resolution of January 28, 1949". In other words, the Commission remains bound by the provisions of that resolution.

3. The purpose of the separation into paragraphs (a) and (b) of the points upon which agreement is to be sought was to indicate that consideration of point (a) is to have priority over consideration of point (b). It is not, however, the intention of the Council to insist that agreement must be reached or, even less, carried out on point (a) before any consideration can be given to point (b). The exact details of how to give priority to point (a) is left to the parties and the Commission.

4. The timing of the action to be taken by the parties in implementation of any agreement reached on points (a) and (b) is left to the parties and the Commission on the understanding, however, that the basic principle of the January 28 resolution still stands and binds the Commission; namely, the principle expressed in my speech of March 10 that the re-establishment of the Republican Government as a functioning government in a position to respond to the wishes of its people and to take responsible decisions on their behalf must precede negotiations at The Hague. We feel, on the one hand, that it is incon-

¹ Repeated in telegram 193, Usgoc 342, March 26, 3 p. m., to Batavia.

sistent with the proper interpretation of this telegram that the Dutch should be permitted to make restoration of the Republic to Jogja conditional upon a firm agreement that the Republic will attend the Hague Conference. A binding agreement can be made only by the Republican Government after its re-establishment. On the other hand, the conditions of the Hague Conference could be discussed and a preliminary meeting of minds reached between the Republican leaders and Dutch before complete re-establishment of the Republic subject to final ratification by the Republican Government after its re-establishment.

5. The language of point (a) is intended to convey the idea that the principle of implementation of the January 28 resolution is not open to question but that agreement is to be reached in the details and manner of implementation.

6. The purpose of paragraph (b) is, as the Canadians stated, to develop the Dutch approval for The Hague Conference into an arrangement for negotiations which would fall within the framework of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the SC resolution of January 28. This, of course, does not mean that the Council is insisting on following the sequence which was indicated in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the third paragraph of SC resolution.

AUSTIN

501.BC Indonesia/3-2449: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1949—7 p. m.

243. Dept suggests you utilize last four paras US *aide-mémoire* Mar 2 (Deptel 184 Mar 4²) for background your conversations Nehru, Bajpai re Indonesia (your 322 Mar 16 and 241 Mar 20³).

US and GOI agree Jan 28 Res still represents most promising formula. US support this Res has not faltered. SC Mar 23 accepted draft of instructions to UNCFI designed stimulate agreement parties on means implementation Jan 28 Res and time and conditions initiation negots Hague. This connection, US has greatly appreciated constructive efforts and reasoned moderation characterizing GOI representations SC, which reflect particular credit on Govt as close as India's to Indonesian problem.

Re specific points raised by Bajpai, US notes Dutch have accepted role UNCFI in Hague negots and is satisfied there no reason concern

¹ Repeated as 78 to Karachi.

² See footnote 1, p. 287.

³ Latter not printed.

this score. On strength Cochran reports, Dept fully alive to threat moderate Repub leadership through continued separation leaders from resistance forces and through prolongation present military situation. Dept naturally attaches great weight GOI observations this aspect matter. On other side there has been at least one encouraging development in apparent growth measure understanding between Repubs and Federalists, which Dept considers most important to cohesion future Indo state.

In your conversations you may also wish, speaking personally, (1) refer in passing to outspoken resentment much of Dutch press over what it considers already excessive interference US in Indo problem and (2) touch speculatively upon situation which would be created should pressures on Neth Govt result its downfall and succession by care-taker govt from which no decisions could be expected or by more reactionary govt which might reject SC participation altogether.

You may state US confident any advice which GOI may offer Repub reps will be directed constructive solution problem.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-2549 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, March 25, 1949—4 p. m.

286. Gocus 637. Lacy¹ arrived Batavia Tuesday morning; saw Schuurman in afternoon; met mixed Netherlands, Federal, Republican, US group Livengood reception; dined with US delegation and five local Republicans. We lunched with Cochran and senior American and Netherlands officials; afternoon called with Cochran on Beel with Schuurman present; attended reception by Indonesian friends; dinner by Schuurman with Spoor, Pincke,² Van Hoogstraten,³ Hamid, Malik and leading Netherlands businessmen. Went Bangka Thursday a. m. with Cochran in UNCFI plane and visited Republican leaders Sukarno, Hatta, Hadji Salim, Ali Sastramidjojo, Roem and Pringgo Digdo. Cochran and Lacy to Singapore Thursday evening for final consultation that night.³

In talks with Republicans Tuesday night Republicans stressed necessity restoration Jogja and growing danger leftist guerrillas and Tan Malakka. Lacy emphasized danger Communism, however labeled, and sharp cleavage throughout world between Communist and anti-Communist aggregations.

¹ William S. B. Lacy, Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.

² Vice Adm. A. S. Pinke, Commander in Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy Far East.

³ J. E. van Hoogstraten, Netherlands Indies Department of Economic Affairs.

At Netherlands-American luncheon Lacy told Schuurman how serious Netherlands situation is and how relatively inflexible US position had become since SC resolution. Gieben told Cochran working on much material for Hague Conference and would be ready with Supomo to fit on negotiations where they ceased at Kaliurang under Stikker. Gieben believed progress could be achieved quickly. Also hoped Djuanda would participate at Hague.

When Lacy and Cochran received by Beel, Lacy repeated statement made Schuurman re seriousness Netherlands situation and American adherence to SC resolution, whatever its exegesis; compromise character January 28 resolution touched upon and essential difficulty of further compromise emphasized. Lacy explained how concerned US is over Netherlands situation with so many important international developments, Atlantic Pact, et cetera, and his hope Netherlands would move forward constructively soonest. Lacy told of US support for idea accelerated transfer sovereignty offer. Lacy supported Cochran's contention that compliance with SC Resolution in [on?] Jogja immediately necessary. Both strongly favored Hague Conference but emphasized surmounting Jogja impasse requisite to Republican agreement thereto and to placing Republic in position essential to issuance effective cease-fire order. Cochran had told Netherlands seriousness Republican demands on Jogja after first visit Bangka. Federalists now backing Republicans on this point. Cochran and Lacy stressed need push forward while Beel emphasized difficulty for him carry out resolution. Both appreciated this but Lacy referred to SC and US condemnation police action and Congress and press tiring of US bleeding for Netherlands over Indonesia which US cannot indefinitely afford. Cochran stressed his efforts and confidence in getting Republicans properly lined up for Hague once Jogja agreed to. No promise came from Beel or Schuurman although reception US views serious and amiable.

At Schuurman dinner Van Hoogstraten said Jogja restoration impossible; hoped his government would never yield; Netherlands knew their problem and knew their solution right; worst had been passed in Indonesia and some improvement being recorded. Cochran said police action had been condemned and SC Resolution had required certain performances including restoration Jogja. Hoogstraten said military action correct and returning Republican Government Jogja would be like turning a state over to Hitler. Cochran said he was confusing parties in his comparison. Hoogstraten said Americans interfering. Cochran said US only one party to SC Resolution. Hoogstraten still blamed Americans; voiced defiance SC, saying even economic sanctions would not change Netherlands attitude.

Hoogstraten said Republican leaders should ask Netherlands Government spell out Beel plan and then go Hague without mentioning Jogja. Cochran said if Netherlands Government sincere they would adumbrate program without request. Cochran stressed need for stopping hostilities. Hoogstraten said old Republican leaders have lost out. Said Batavia Republicans would not return Jogja and presumed attribute such statement second-hand to Darmasetiawan. Cochran retorted he had talked Darmasetiawan and four other leading Republicans previous evening and had been impressed their fidelity Republican leaders and insistence on Jogja move. Cochran said UNCFI had sounded out Sultan and other leaders Jogja and had been informed restoration entirely feasible. Cochran admitted calculated risk in restoration but thought this must be taken. Hamid told Cochran in presence Netherlands officials thought restoration Republic to Jogja essential. Said Federalists and Republicans could get together easily with UNCFI helping and quick solution would be possible if Netherlands overcame inferiority complex and rectified past mistakes. Hamid said giving explanation to press on BFO Resolution March 3. This appeared Aneta March 24.

At Schuurman dinner Lacy spoke strongly to Spoor and Schuurman, recapitulating US view folly police action, serious position Netherlands in community of nations and importance to Netherlands of paying small price restoration Jogja to attain immediate objective Hague Conference.

Thursday forenoon at Bangka Cochran gave story UNCFI deputies' visit Jogja and also of progress Lake Success on revision Canadian statement. Wednesday's decision SC not known at Bangka during visit. When question of extent of territory to be restored arose, Cochran insisted on text SC resolution (i.e. Jogja and environs only) but with understanding progressive withdrawal might be achieved later. Lacy and Cochran argued against Republicans quibbling over chairmanship Hague Conference. Stressed importance changing venue to Hague with conference taking place in western capital with UNCFI present and embassies of world powers observing. Republicans endorsed heartily Lacy's ideas that agreement on statute union should be voluntary.

In conversations with Republicans as with Netherlands officials Lacy stressed seriousness of Communist danger and need for unanimity in opposition thereto; thought workable and beneficial relationship between Republicans and Netherlands still attainable and absolutely essential as bridge between east and west. Lacy dilated grim results east-west split, tragic position Indonesia should it choose course inimical to policies democratic states rest of world which policies US prepared to effect strongest positive defense. Sukarno and company

exhibited enthusiastic agreement these views and seemed acutely aware Communist danger in Indonesia and determined to cope therewith immediately and with strong measures as soon as in practical position. Sukarno angered by Communist attacks on him and Republican Government; impressed by decision Norway, which Lacy described, for whose socialist government has great respect.

Foregoing message prepared jointly by Lacy and Cochran Singapore night 24 March. Cochran returned Batavia March 25, noon. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-2649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, March 26, 1949—3 p. m.

291. Gocus 638. Presided UNCFI meeting 25th which considered SC's cable of 23 March, first requesting report on damage Jogja and second regarding assisting parties reach agreement.

I suggested UNCFI ask parties meet with it next week to begin discussions and opposed Critchley's idea that UNCFI travel to Jogja for further preliminary contact with Repubs there and to assess damage to city and needs to be filled to enable Repub Government function there. Final action on both cables deferred until meeting forenoon today.

Following Friday's meeting I phoned Schuurman. Told him authorized by UNCFI let him know we had met and contemplated issuing invitations to both parties to meet with us some time next week. Desired inform Netherlands delegation of this decision before issuing invitation to Repub Government send delegation Batavia. Schuurman said he would consult Beel. He called back to state Beel approved Batavia as meeting place but invitation to Netherlands delegation would have to be referred Hague. Schuurman said no decision likely thereon before Cabinet meeting 28th. Consequently it might not be possible Netherlands to meet date if fixed early.

Leimena, Natsir, Supomo and Sudjono visited me Friday 7 p. m. I told them of Lacy and my visit with Repub leaders Bangka. I let them know SC cables above mentioned not received prior our departure from Batavia for Bangka and we had only seen sketchy press reports thereon at Singapore. I expressed my gratification at character of SC directive. Repubs had hoped restoration Jogja would have been spelled

¹ Repeated in telegram 266, March 29, 5 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

out. I insisted directive as stands gives us necessary opportunity accomplish desired end.

When Natsir raised question Repub consultations prior meeting Batavia, I assured them UNCFI would help make whatever arrangements Repubs desire and Netherlands approves. I urged however that Repub leaders Bangka must take responsibility for attending Batavia meeting and must not allege unable take such decisions as would be required at that meeting without prior restoration Jogja. I said meeting Batavia is necessary before there can be any restoration Jogja and Repubs simply must start at this point with such authority as we recognized them to have and take decisions prerequisite to implementation SC resolution.

At UNCFI meeting Friday I volunteered chairmanship Military Experts Board rotate (Uscog 335²). Australian and Belgian colleagues accepted idea with appreciation.

At this morning's meeting agreed on following report to be cabled SC in reply latter's inquiry regarding damage Jogja:

"Commission acknowledges receipt of telegram dated 23 March from President of SC to Chairman Commission requesting report on alleged damage in city of Jogja.

"On basis of information available to it from its military observers and from its deputy representatives who visited Jogja on 21 March Commission has honor to report:

"1. There is no serious damage to city Jogja which would interfere in any way with reestablishment to Repub Government in Jogja.

"2. However, lack of materials and equipment, part of which has been removed or destroyed since 18 December 1948, will seriously hamper effective functioning of Repub administration. It will therefore be necessary for Netherlands authorities to furnish necessary facilities as anticipated in Paragraph 2 of operative part of SC's resolution of 28 January.[²"]

UNCFI addressed following invitation to Netherlands delegation.

"I have honour refer to Commission's letter forwarding text of a telegram dated 23 March addressed to Chairman of Commission by President of SC, giving the sense of recent SC debate on Indonesia.

"As a first step in compliance with this telegram, Commission suggests that discussions under its auspices might be held in Batavia between delegations of parties soon as practicable. It is suggested that first meeting be held Wednesday 30 March at 11 hours at Hotel des Indes and Commission would be glad learn whether Netherlands delegation will be prepared attend".

Similar invitation telegraphed to Repub delegation chairman Roem with following additional paragraph:

"Commission remains ready to lend whatever assistance it can to

² Not printed.

facilitate contacts between Repub leaders before and during discussions."

I phoned text invitation to Stuyt this noon. He referred to Schuurman's talk with me last night and indicated possible delay beyond Wednesday since he understands likely Van Roijen will head Netherlands delegation. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-2749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, March 27, 1949—2 p. m.

294. Gocus 641. Following are ideas along which I have worked in advancing plans for discussions under UNCFI since receiving SC directive March 23 as reported Gocus 638,² 649 [639³] and 640⁴:

1. I felt early bringing together of two parties for direct discussions under UNCFI preferable to Critchley's two plans:

(a) UNCFI visit Jogja immediately and draw up recommendations to impose upon parties and

(b) Address communication to Netherlands Delegation requesting reply as to whether Netherlands ready implement SC Resolution on restoration Jogja.

2. Although Netherlands handling of proposal for round-table conference has not been such as to inspire complete confidence, I believe incumbent upon all of us now to assume attitude expressed by Austin at SC March 23 when he said SC directive "would open door for entry both parties" in manner in which neither would lose dignity or honor and added he accepted without question Netherlands statement transfer sovereignty would be real, complete and unconditional. UNCFI meetings will be test whether Netherlands have genuine intention meet SC Resolution to extent necessary arrive at Hague Conference with both Indonesian groups and UNCFI participating.

3. I have stressed to Republican leaders and their friends desirability accepting unconditionally invitation soon as any necessary contacts or communications between their leaders and delegates are accomplished.

4. At two UNCFI meetings I mentioned necessity both parties co-

¹ Repeated in telegram 264, March 29, 1 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

² Telegram 291, March 26, p. 346.

³ Telegram 292, March 26, not printed.

⁴ Telegram 293, March 27, 11 a. m., not printed.

operating freely if success is to be achieved. I stressed need for UNCFI endeavor establish proper atmosphere of confidence and good feeling for parties to take lead themselves in reaching solutions. UNCFI would make such recommendations and reports as developments might require.

5. I have asked Secretariat assemble all information available with respect Republican situation and needs Jogja and institute studies re problems which would have to be met restoration and functioning Republican Government there. Military observers likewise asked study these problems. UNCFI colleagues asked formulate their ideas and be ready for informal meetings to permit us agree upon general manner of handling meetings.

6. Critchley revealed determination endeavor limit Batavia discussions to restoration Jogja. I have taken position SC directive must be taken literally and completely and discussions cannot be restricted solely to Jogja restoration. My idea is that we should press Netherlands at reasonably early date make definite commitment on Jogja. We could refer paragraph 2 UNCFI report March 1 wherein we said Netherlands must comply with certain provisions SC Resolution January 28 before Republic could be expected discharge its responsibilities. Furthermore, we could support position adhered to by Republicans that they cannot be in position to function as government until restored Jogja. By this line we might endeavor consummate arrangements for return to Jogja and actually accomplish restoration while meetings in session. Other points in operative paragraphs 1 and 2 SC Resolution could be dealt with thereafter in continuing sessions.

7. I anticipate Republicans will stand by expressed determination not to accept formally Hague invitation until returned Jogja and government functioning. I think effort of Netherlands Delegation to tie up restoration Jogja to condition of prior acceptance Hague invitation would lead to impasse. Believe this may be kernel as to whether we can make progress here. If proper atmosphere can be developed so Republicans can give Netherlands informal assurances of type Bangka leaders gave me, difficulty might be overcome.

8. In Gocus 639, I indicated consideration might be given bringing BFO into Batavia discussions at appropriate time provided advance approval such move might be received from both Netherlands and Republican Delegations. Have not mentioned such possibility to anyone other than Tahija.

9. I doubt whether parties will undertake meet in Batavia by suggested date March 30 but UNCFI will press for earliest possible assembly. Reply dated March 26 received from Acting Netherlands Delegation chairman Schuurman to UNCFI invitation which said

"I have not failed cable contents your letter to Government at Hague and will inform your commission of its reply soon as possible. However, in view of necessary consultation with my government, it appears doubtful whether first meeting can be held as soon as Wednesday 30 March."

I should appreciate Department's comments on foregoing ideas and welcome any suggestions it may see fit make re conduct of meetings. Department might also indicate significance Van Royen detail to Batavia meetings, if he is so assigned, and provide any background re probable tactics. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-2849 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1949—10 a. m.

195. Usgoc 343. [For Cochran:] Brit Emb March 24 communicated to Dept fol summary info recd from Brit Amb Hague: Neth Govt might be disposed accept proposal approved Mar 23 by SC if SC would agree call upon Repub leaders issue cease-fire order within 24 hours return Jogja—object of this apparently to placate Neth Army also Neth opinion re safety Neth forces Indo. Bevin has instructed Brit Amb Hague he prepared support Neth proposal as being within terms SC Res Jan 28 and tho time limit short issuance cease-fire order soonest in best interest all parties. Bevin instructed Brit Emb Wash express hope Dept will likewise support Neth proposal on understanding Neth will then accept SC proposal Mar 23.

Dept agrees cease-fire order soonest desirable and so informing Brit Emb Wash but same time stating apparently no need specific SC action in this respect as (1) SC resolutions Dec 24 ("cease hostilities forthwith") and Jan 28 call for cease fire and (2) purpose restoration Repub Govt Jogja enable Repub issue authoritative cease-fire order. Dept also stating fixing date issuance cease-fire order matter of practicability best decided on spot and stating further that US Rep UNCFI fully conscious responsibility re cease fire devolving upon Repub after they placed in position take action.

Officers Neth Emb informed Dept officer personal opinion Neth Govt would not move until Stikker had been to Wash where would discuss Indo with Secy, had returned Hague accompanied by Van Royen where Neth Govt would further consider matter, and Van Royen had proceeded Batavia where would consult with all concerned parties. If this timetable correct this would mean the discussions under

SC proposal Mar 23 would not be under way until mid April at earliest.

Ur comments requested.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/3-2849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, March 28, 1949—8 p. m.

302. Gocus 643. UNCFI visited Republic leaders Bangka today. Roem requested chairman Critchley give information re meaning SC directive, our ideas in calling parties together for discussions, Netherlands reaction to invitation, and UNCFI plans for meetings. Critchley spoke guardedly in open meeting. Explained UNCFI had not yet considered as group detailed interpretation of directive for plans for discussions. Did cite significantly paragraph one UNCFI report to SC March 1. Asked two other members give their personal ideas.

I followed line set forth in Gocus 641² with amplifications and slight amendments as result receipt March 27 of several messages mentioned penultimate paragraph Gocus 642.³

I stressed hope both parties accept invitation unconditionally soonest but understood Netherlands might delay if Van Royen participates, as may Republicans through necessity consult scattered leaders and delegation members. Insisted Republicans would be making no commitments by accepting invitation and that no binding agreements could be expected before government restored Jogja.

I thought SC directive gave broad field for implementing resolution which stands unchanged. Thought both parties should strive cooperate fully in agreeable atmosphere. Mentioned advantages of bringing BFO into discussions at appropriate stage. Herremans endorsed my views almost 100 percent.

Republicans asked our help in bringing Ministers Djuanda Communications, Laoh Public Works, Kusnan Labor and Halim Working Committee from Jogja to Bangka to consult before Republicans answer invitation. We promised seek Netherlands permission to send UNCFI plane Jogja Wednesday to bring these four Batavia to spend afternoon with Republican group here and then combined group proceed Bangka Thursday for conference with leaders without UNCFI.

Hatta talked alone with me half hour. I gave usual argument favor-

¹ Repeated in telegram 270, March 29, 8 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

² Telegram 294, March 27, p. 343.

³ Telegram 300, March 28, not printed.

ing early acceptance Batavia meeting and speedy progress toward Hague round table via restoration Jogja and cease-fire order.

Hatta had just received letters from wife and friends Jogja reporting economic situation there worsening and leftist influence strengthening. Also had messages from TNI forces Pasundan re concern of military over failure leaders get successful negotiations started, et cetera.

Hatta admitted complete personal readiness follow my ideas. Said he must move cautiously, however, not to lose confidence of supporters through what might be considered weakness in agreeing negotiation with Netherlands at Batavia on implementation SC resolution prior restoration Jogja. He fears Tan Malakka and others will attack him bitterly thereon. Roem and some other Republicans emphasizing this to Hatta, abetted, I believe, by AusDel.

I hoped Van Royen coming might mean possibility sufficient statesmanship being displayed to permit some informal and gentlemen's agreements Batavia which might be ratified later when Jogja restored.

I urged Hatta send strong delegation Batavia and attend personally if possible. He is opposed at present to participating personally. Hatta, well as several other Republicans, skeptical about drawing BFO's into discussion at early stage or at all. This comes from fear Mansoer group might block progress and cause much trouble since BFO rules require their decisions be unanimous. I asked he take no definite position yet but wait and see if BFO participation may not later become advisable.

I told Hatta Netherlands press and Catholic Party leaders weakening somewhat toward Republicans and latter should move forward in quick and reasonable manner. I asked they let Hague Conference be Netherlands responsibility. I said UNCFI does not desire Hague meeting be under its auspices. Hatta said BFO shared Republicans' objection to Netherlands Minister being permanent chairman. Both prefer rotation.

I offered help Hatta in his desire establish contact with emergency government Sumatra through arrangements I made in Singapore. He had received messages I had brought via Sjahrir. Several Republicans commented on today's Aneta report of 1600 Netherlands reinforcements sailing from Holland for Indonesia. Think this not indicative cease-fire and wonder Montgomery's⁴ reaction thereto.

Sukarno absent on tour Bangka Island approved by Netherlands resident. Pringgo Digdo said demonstration 1,000 people at one small town yesterday in favor Sukarno and Republicans with Netherlands

⁴ Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, London.

Government civil servants participating therein including speeches.

Republicans Bangka definitely nervous and require early contact with scattered leaders and BFO.

Unless next few weeks go better with Republicans, serious doubt will arise as to whether cease-fire order would be effective. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-2949: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, March 29, 1949—7 p. m.

306. Gocus 645. Visited Schuurman 5 p. m. and received copy following letter dated March 29 addressed UNCFI chairman by Schuurman, which is to be delivered UNCFI 8 this evening and released press that hour simultaneously Hague and Batavia:

"I have honor inform you that Netherlands Government has taken cognizance of contents of cable of President SC to Chairman of UNCFI dated 23 March and of your letter to me dated 26 March.

Netherlands Government having taken note that it is sense of SC that suggested discussions will be held without prejudicing rights, claims and positions of parties and consequently will not prejudice responsibility of Netherlands for freedom and order in Indonesia—which responsibility has also determined Netherlands attitude toward Resolution of SC January 28—is prepared to participate in proposed discussions. If these discussions should take place, Netherlands Government intend appoint Van Royen as leader of Netherlands Delegation. Netherlands Government would appreciate Van Royen's participation in discussions as from outset and it is, therefore, suggested that first meeting be postponed until Van Royen's arrival in Batavia. Van Royen will travel at early date. I shall not fail advise you soon as expected date of his arrival is known."

I expressed disappointment over Netherlands reference in reply to its position taken with respect responsibility of Netherlands for freedom and order in Indonesia. I feared this would be interpreted as continuing defiance by Netherlands of SC Resolution January 28 and might lead Republicans to impose conditions on their acceptance in spite strenuous efforts I am making to prevent this. Schuurman complained of difficult position Netherlands Government had been placed in by SC. Said sending Van Royen should indicate importance they attach to UNCFI meetings. I said it would be up to Van Royen

¹ Repeated in telegram 273, March 30, 7 p. m., to The Hague, except that quoted portion not repeated.

contribute to success these meetings or no prospect for Hague round table.

Netherlands Delegation gave permission this afternoon for UNCFI plane proceed Jogja 30 to pick up four Republican officials and take to Bangka via Batavia. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/3-3049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, March 30, 1949—5 p. m.

312. Gocus 647. Believe Department should take advantage Stikker's visit Washington to impress upon him Batavia meetings may be last opportunity make progress towards constructive solution Indonesian problem.

Continued unyielding position Netherlands together with defiance SC would give support to view of many observers that Beel plan and Hague Conference were improvised for purpose of drawing SC off Netherlands trail and delaying to allow attempt solidification Netherlands position here. I suggested (Gocus 635²) Netherlands policy may be either transfer sovereignty under such conditions and to such weakened USI that latter could not succeed or premeditatedly permit situation to deteriorate to such level that Netherlands might appear warranted in holding transfer sovereignty impracticable. Latter alternative would follow decline moderate Republicans and ascendancy Tan Malakka, leftists and violent militarists. If latter alternative develops, then Netherlands would insist SC policy wrong all along and Netherlands should then be aided with materials and perhaps even with force to put down what they would term Communist war against them in Indonesia.

I have believed that SC Resolution January 28 represented, and in fact still represents, well-advised program but recognize that continued delay and Netherlands attitude toward moderate Republican leaders result in steady deterioration their position together with probable increasing ineffectiveness their ability stop hostilities.

As Department is aware, I have taken lead in UNCFI for calling Batavia meetings and attempting obtain best possible atmosphere. Conditional acceptance, appointment Van Royen and resultant delay could indicate Netherlands may make vigorous prolonged effort through most experienced representative to defeat purpose directive.

¹ Repeated in telegram 279, March 31, 7 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels.

² Not printed.

Van Royen's nomination might possibly indicate recognition potential usefulness of Batavia meetings and necessity best possible Netherlands representation well aware broader implications and world opinion. I have as yet no evidence to indicate latter to be case.

As Department well knows, I have always given Stikker credit for highest motives. I realized difficulties with which he has to contend. Cables from Hague and Department reports on conversations with Netherlands Embassy Washington tend to cause doubt, however, as to whether there is genuine intention backed by adequate character and strength in Netherlands Government to carry through promised accelerated SC transfer sovereignty. Department should impress upon Stikker that UNCFI will make serious all-out effort assist parties implement SC Resolution and come to understanding on Hague Conference. It should emphasize seriousness of situation and likelihood UNCFI will give parties only limited period within which to demonstrate good intentions and reach agreement. It might refer Stikker to second paragraph UNCFI report first March in which Commission unanimously stated that "first steps" up to Netherlands and that only after restoration Jogja and release political prisoners could Republican Government discharge its responsibilities. This forecasts that UNCFI will insist on Netherlands responsibility first move and that only after clear indication Netherlands willingness to make that move will there be [be] any hope success on (1) cease-fire and (2) time and conditions Hague Conference. In absence Netherlands initiative and full cooperation, vigorous and condemnatory report to SC by UNCFI appears inevitable. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-249 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1949—3 p. m.

204. Usgoc 347. Following main points Stikker-Acheson conv re Indo Mar 31:

Stikker referred communication recd by him concerning US pos on Brussels Treaty Powers' request for equality of treatment in MAP. Stated any singling out of Neth re possible military assistance or placing Neth on different footing from other members Pact would be incomprehensible his Govt and people. Requested clarification our position.

¹ Repeated as 284 to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels.

In reply Sec described reaction Am-people and Congress to Dutch actions in Indonesia, relating this reaction to ERP and MAP. Frankly stated reaction to be "Dutch were wrong" and Neth guilty aggression. Said deep-rooted conviction our people this matter has led to situation gravely jeopardizing continuation ECA assistance to Neth. Referred to support in Congress for Brewster Amendment. Said adm[inistration] has consistently opposed this amendment for various reasons, but that basic cause its growing support—namely failure Neth reach equitable settlement with Indos—must be promptly removed. Stated removal this root problem just as imp to adm as to Congress. Explained that even if Brewster Amendment defeated, same problem would plague ensuing appropriations legislation in event no progress in Indo, and following this, problem would plague MAP legislation. Stated frankly in his opinion in absence settlement Indo no chance whatever Congress authorizing funds for mil supplies to Neth.

Neth FonMin explained difficulties confronting him. Referred his own efforts under difficulties Coalition Govt reach compromise solution. Stated would have to give explanation his Parliament re US pos on Mil assistance to Neth. Said he feared our pos would result in reconsideration by Neth Govt advisability of signing Pact. Stikker further stated would have to consult other members Brussels Treaty re this matter. Sec replied it quite possible involvement Neth in Indo affair would prove factor to defeat MAP in toto, in view uncertainty passage at best. Re Stikker point that Pact might not seem attractive to Neth without MAP, Sec stated that US regards Pact as of great value whether or not MAP is enacted; that we consider commitment US under Pact in itself very substantial commitment.

Neth Amb said Neth Govt and people could understand US attaching conditions to ERP and MAP, if such reasonable and applied generally to all participants. For example, he mentioned withholding financial aid from country against which SC had voted sanctions, and withholding mil supplies from countries which violated commitment to retain such supplies for defense in Western Europe. Sec replied US criteria would surely not be whimsical, but that we faced here not with question of prin but with question hard political facts. Said again root trouble failure Neth reach settlement in Indo very long duration already, and it necessary for prompt tangible evidence Neth's willingness negotiate settlement. Suggested Van Royen should proceed Batavia just as promptly as possible.

Stikker stated his Govt prepared restore Repub leaders to seat of governmental authority in Jogja, but not unconditionally. Stated conditions outlined Stikker-Bevin letter about as far as could go. De-

scribed pressures upon Repub leaders resulting from admission Jogja, TNI and radical elements. Pictured bloodshed which would result from complete restoration Repub regime.

Sec replied that what is necessary is prompt initiation discussions with Repubs with object clearing obstacles to proposed roundtable negotiations at The Hague; that US must maintain flexibility re conditions imposed by either side; that he had confidence in Cochran and knew his desire to promote Hague negotiations; that he also knew Cochran's efforts to gain Republican participation in preliminary conference without conditions or reservations. Emphasized once again not much time to be lost in getting on with matter.

At close, Stikker raised question whether his speech after signing of Pact should be made in Eng or Dutch.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/4-249: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1949—3 p. m.

205. Usgoc 348. Fol long frank conversation* between Sec and Stikker Mar 31, in which Sec gave forceful presentation reasons US regards substantial moves by Neth toward settlement Indo dispute immediately necessary (telegraphic synopsis conversation follows²), Sec held conversation with Spaak Apr 1 which took fol turn.

Spaak emphasized importance to Neth Govt of statement from US outlining essential points Neth must meet in forthcoming preliminary discussions. Specifically, Spaak believes only way secure favorable Neth action is for Sec to tell Stikker with some degree exactness concessions which Neth must make re restoration and other points preliminary negotiations, in order obtain US support if such concessions made and if Repubs then fail come to agreement. Spaak feels such statement from US would eliminate Neth argument that they will be called upon concede ad infinitum.

Dept realizes, of course, undesirability shifting locus negotiations from Batavia to Wash and does not wish undercut your position or tie your hands in negotiation. However, we could go back to Spaak, if you think desirable, with list of points we believe Dutch must meet in preliminary negotiations, telling Spaak that we are willing to present this list to Stikker provided Spaak takes lead in getting Brussels Pact Govts to support this position with Dutch.

¹ Repeated as 285 to The Hague and 391 to Brussels.

² *Supra.*

If you think such action here would aid you in promoting preliminary agreement leading to Round Table Conference Hague, pls advise soonest essential points you think Neth must meet in order move forward.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/4-249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, April 2, 1949—9 p. m.

322. Gocus 649. Leimena and Djuanda called this evening after returning 6 p. m. with others of Jogja and Batavia Republican groups from visiting republican leaders Bangka.

Leimena gave me copy reply April 1 Republican Delegation Chairman Roem to UNCFI chairman text whereof follows:

"I have honor refer to your message March 26 and subsequent conversation between your Commission and our party in Pangkalpinang on March 28 and beg inform you that it has been decided to accept your invitation to discussions in Djakarta under auspices of UNCFI. Since it has not been possible to begin these discussions on Wednesday March 30 as you originally suggested, I presume you will let me know at your earliest convenience the proposed date for opening of talks.

My acceptance of Commission's invitation to discussions with Netherlands, before latter has agreed to establishment of Republican Government at Djocja, is likely to create grave misunderstandings among Republican leaders in other parts of country and abroad and among Indonesian people generally. Such misunderstandings could not fail to make eventual settlement of Indonesian dispute more difficult. I would, therefore, stress that my participation must necessarily be limited at least in early stages of discussions.

On 19 December 1948 authority was properly transferred to an emergency government in Sumatra to act on behalf of Republican Government until such time as that government is free to reassemble. As your Commission made clear in paragraph two of its report to SC of 1 March and as was emphasized by a number of speakers in recent SC's debates, restoration of Republican Government at Djocja free to take decisions uncoerced is a prerequisite to any fruitful negotiations.

I shall, therefore, only be able to discuss initially practical details of restoration of Republican Government at Djocja. It is my hope that Netherlands will agree in principle to this restoration at outset so that Republican Government can take at Djocja upon basis of ascertained wishes of its people essential decisions regarding SC's Resolution 28 January and directive 23 March."

Supomo and Sudjono joined Leimena, Djuanda and me analyzing this reply. They all assure me Republican Delegation will in UNCFI

¹ Repeated in telegrams 287, April 4, 6 p. m., and 297, April 7, 1 p. m., to The Hague, the latter to be forwarded to Brussels for Kirk.

meetings go beyond discussion restoration Jogja but insist that be given priority.

Roem will head delegation at start. Republican leaders say no one else can be appointed to this position except by President Sukarno functioning in Jogja.

Djuanda felt visit Bangka helped relieve nervousness of leaders there and his group remaining Batavia until Tuesday morning to have more contact with Republicans here. UNCFI plane will then take them Jogja.

Djuanda considers restoration Jogja entirely feasible with maximum 2,000 police mostly civil but insists all Netherlands military must be removed. Republican Ministers making serious studies of problems incidental to restoration from administrative, security and economic viewpoints. Jogja depleted of Republican currency. Need for trucks to supply foodstuffs will be considerable since railway service into Jogja from surplus areas largely interrupted. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-349: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, April 3, 1949—6 p. m.

323, Gocus 650. My emphasis has been on endeavoring get parties face each other soonest in best possible atmosphere for final effort work out fair settlement through two stages of preliminary discussions Batavia and round table conference Hague.

Toward this end I urged both parties accept UNCFI invitation unconditionally. I protested to Schuurman when Netherlands led off with acceptance containing their usual reservation with respect to their interpreting their own responsibility for freedom and order. He only replied that Republicans could in turn make what reservations or conditions they desired. They did just this (Gocus 649²), influenced considerably I believe by AusDel. Conditions thus advanced naturally make conference more difficult than if parties had not so announced their positions. On other hand, each knew reservations other had and these were bound come out early in meetings, so harm is not too serious provided neither party or partisan press take such exception to conditions so imposed as to interfere with convening of meetings or place additional pre-conference conditions.

¹ Repeated in telegram 287, April 4, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra*.

With reference Usgoc 347 and 348³ I provide hereunder certain ideas as to what Netherlands must do and what I am willing endeavor help obtain from Republicans for whatever use Department may see fit make thereof.

My thought is however that use of these ideas should be kept on informal basis and both Stikker and Spaak reminded strictly of full provisions SC resolution January 28 and directive March 23. As one of three representatives on UNCFI, I cannot recommend escapes from SC demands. With US as party to both decisions, I have not freedom which I assumed prior to police action of working independently of UNCFI with one or both parties. Republicans well aware their rights from SC debates and Netherlands deeply entrenched behind public opinion and official statements.

To achieve successful UNCFI conference Batavia, which is prerequisite to any round table talks Hague, believe Netherlands must:

1. Have Van Royen manifest from beginning sincere and generous attitude toward cooperating in endeavor reach settlement.

2. Move soonest toward genuine implementation SC resolution on restoration Republican Government to Jogja not on token basis but in manner to permit government function freely. This would require withdrawal Netherlands military forces from city of Jogja and immediate environs prior return of Republican leaders from Bangka, etc.

3. Permit entry into Jogja of sufficient members Republican Armed Forces to supplement available civil police to point sufficient for maintaining public order and safeguarding Republican officials. Entire responsibility for security within area to be administered by Republic must be in hands Republicans. UNCFI might be authority to determine whether this succeeds and what to do in case it does not.

4. Afford Republican facilities reasonably required for functioning government. At present this is seen as requiring *inter alia* carburants for power plants and motor vehicles; trucks, light cars and jeeps for transporting foodstuffs, fuel and equipment and permitting mobile police force; arms and ammunition and other equipment for police; electric light fixtures, office paraphernalia; supply of currency to meet Republican requirements and to maintain existing balance between Republic's and Netherlands' issues so that neither currency will be forced out of circulation in Jogja area and commerce will be as little hampered as may be necessary as result limiting area under Republican administration.

5. Release remaining political prisoners before termination Batavia meetings and prior to expecting Republican Government function Jogja.

6. Refrain from asking any commitments from Republicans prior to UNCFI meetings and from stating one way or another any additional Netherlands conditions to prompt participation in Batavia meetings.

³ Telegrams 204 and 205, April 2, pp. 355, 357.

7. Refrain from demanding once meetings start that Republicans enter binding agreements prior to Jogja impasse being solved.

8. Be prepared with frank and full outline of proceedings proposed for Hague conference and Netherlands undertakings thereunder.

Although Netherlands should not exact advance undertakings on following points, I am convinced Van Royen might early in meetings obtain informal understandings thereon probably with Hatta himself and I am entirely prepared to work toward Republican acceptance thereof, already having had personal assurance from either Sukarno or Hatta or both with respect most of these points:

a. That Republicans assemble necessary political and military leaders soonest after return Jogja.

b. That authority delegated emergency government be revoked soonest after Republican Government reconstituted and functioning Jogja.

c. That cease-fire order of most effective character possible be issued soonest after reconstitution government Jogja and consultation with military leaders.

d. That Republican Government accept Hague invitation and send delegation headed by Sukarno or Hatta thereto promptly after restoration and cease-fire.

e. That Republicans strive prevent influx Republican military forces into Jogja.

f. That Republicans cooperate toward maintaining freest possible traffic through Jogja and immediate surroundings, by reasonable agreements with respect to joint roadblocks, train movements, etc., and permit utilization of military observers in working out and possibly administering these matters.

g. That Republicans go as far as they possibly can in Batavia meetings and bring Hatta in, if and when this becomes feasible.

Believe above observations indicate large measure of differences can be bridged given willingness Netherlands to take initiative in practical statesmanship. However, one point must be clear. Stikker's letter to Bevin provides Netherlands forces remain Jogja and have last word on law and order. Am convinced Republicans will not accept this condition; if they did, their government would appear a facade and they would lose support. Accordingly, key to possible agreement Batavia is whether Netherlands willing withdraw army from Jogja as anticipated SC resolution January 28. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-649: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, April 6, 1949—5 p. m.

321. Foreign Office tells us that Netherlands will not take exception to Republic acceptance attend preliminary conference, "despite unsatisfactory Republic reply, circumscribed as it is by condition". Official said that Netherlands had accepted conference unconditionally but that it did not wish to split hairs over Republic attitude. We remarked that Cochran had received assurances from Republic leaders that Republic would be willing go beyond discussions Jogja but latter must be given priority (Gocus 649, April 2).

Van Royen leaves Hague for Batavia April 9.

BARUCH

¹ Repeated in telegram 215, Usgoc 351, April 8, 11 a. m., to Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/4-749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1949—10 a. m.

213. Usgoc 350. For Cochran from Rusk: Secy and Stikker have had two additional conversations re Indonesia since Mar. 31 which was reported Usgoc 347.² On Apr. 2 Secy expressed forcibly to Stikker that we are very hopeful that Dutch would now really set about settling this situation. He emphasized importance of sending Van Roijen to Batavia with broad instructions to do whatever was necessary to settle Indonesian affair without being circumscribed with detailed or piecemeal conditions. In return, Stikker asked Secy that US lend its assistance to keep Indonesian question from being debated in GA and asked that Cochran put all effort he can into persuading Repub to cooperate in reaching settlement.

Following receipt your Gocus 650³ Secy had another discussion with Stikker in NY afternoon Apr. 5. Secy outlined to Stikker main points your Gocus 650 in effort demonstrate to Stikker basis on which we think matter can be settled and effort we are prepared to make to assist.

Stikker readily agreed that Van Roijen would manifest sincere and generous attitude toward cooperation in trying to reach settlement.

¹ Repeated in telegram 298, April 7, 2 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels.

² Telegram 204, April 2, p. 355.

³ Telegram 323, April 3, p. 359.

Secy stated restoration Repub Govt Jogja as main requirement and referred to fact that Stikker already accepted such restoration. Stikker assented and interposed no reservation at this point conversation.

Stikker indicated he anticipated no difficulty about affording Repubs facilities reasonably required for a functioning govt. in Jogja.

Stikker noted but made no specific comment on release of remaining polit prisoners before termination Batavia meeting and your point that Dutch shld not ask commitments from Repubs prior to UNCFI mtgs. My personal impression was that in not raising any difficulty on these points he was indicating no particular objection to them.

Stikker clearly understands our view that removal of Jogja impasse is preliminary to binding agreements on part Repubs.

Ref frank and full outline of proceedings proposed for Hague conference, Stikker understands that that means that procedure and agenda shld be well understood in order to give RepDel full opportunity for adequate preparation and guarantee RepDel against surprises at Hague.

Secy then came back to what he called "heart of the matter," namely, that Dutch troops must be withdrawn from Jogja and immed environs, that Repub mil police must be permitted to supplement available civil police to point sufficient for maintaining public order and safeguarding Repub officials under Repub responsibility for security. Secy pointed out role which UNCFI might play in this arrangement. In view of your suggestion that Repubs be asked to prevent influx Repub mil forces into Jogja, Secy presented problem to Stikker as problem of "military police" in order not to raise fears about swollen Repub armies available to initiate hostilities or coerce Repub Govt itself. Stikker had in earlier talks reflected great sensitivity on this point. Stikker appeared to find acceptable idea that full security responsibility Jogja area wld be in Repub hands, that civil and mil police be subject to Repub orders, that Dutch forces be withdrawn from Jogja and immed environs, that Dutch would have freedom of passage through Jogja under proper UNCFI safeguards, and that UNCFI would accept role of observing and supervising these arrangements. Dept. hopes that difference between "military police" and "Repub armies" can be handled by you since neither term can be applied in ordinary western meaning.

Secy indicated general nature of points which you believed might be basis of informal understanding with Repubs and made clear that we believe such points should be sought through informal understandings and not through exact advance undertakings. Stikker indicated particular interest in including Hatta in Batavia talks as soon as possible since he doubted attitude of Roem would contribute to possibility settlement.

At end conversation Stikker agreed with Secy that matter must be settled and that it was adversely affecting almost every important problem in Europe. Stikker stated he did not wish to inflict upon Secy any disagreement between Stikker and Nethgov, therefore he wld not make specific commitments to Secy on points covered in conversation. It was clear that Stikker was trying to find a way out. He recalled his earlier view that he and Hatta could settle this matter if the two could get together without hampering instrs. He also indicated that he had told Van Roijen that Stikker would be available to come to Batavia if necessary to prevent breakdown in negots.

Dept. does not wish issue firm instrs prior to further indication official Dutch view. Nevertheless, we very much hope that you will find Van Roijen in mood and with instrs which will open way for settlement. If so, we hope you will do your best to ensure that Repubs show equal willingness to settle. Secy emphasized to Stikker that your influence with Repubs depended very greatly upon Dutch attitude and willingness to cooperate in reasonable result. [Rusk.]

ACHESON

591.BC Indonesia/4-849: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, April 8, 1949—6 p. m.

329. Blom who with Jacob accompanying Van Royen Batavia tomorrow called today his request to discuss and if possible confirm and clarify Stikker understanding US attitude as stated by Secretary April 5. He was advised basis Deptels 287, part two, April 4 (Gocus 650²) and 298, April 7³ that Stikker had accurately understood Secretary except re matter listed as point 7 (prerequisites for Dutch acceptance) in Gocus 650. Blom said Stikker had understood US to be insisting upon no binding agreements by Republicans until full implementation re restoration Djocja. This had immediately encountered strenuous objection in Cabinet as had also the understanding that US proposed UNCFI should exercise something approaching full authority to make decisions in event difficulty over maintenance law order by Republicans in Djocja. These were only two points Blom indicated confidentially upon which Cabinet had any real reservations or objections.

¹ Repeated in telegram 219, Usgoc 352, April 11, 4 p. m., to Batavia.

² See telegram 323, April 3, p. 359 and footnote 1.

³ See telegram 213, April 7, p. 362 and footnote 1.

Blom was given text Cochran's point 7 (Gocus 650) and our opinion that solution Djocja impasse meant full binding agreement thereon but did not include full implementation as well, prior to discussion and possible agreement on other issues. Otherwise, Batavia meetings might be indefinitely prolonged. Blom, himself, felt this only possible interpretation of language point 7 and said that it would greatly ease for Dutch reaching of early agreement they so much desired. He added Netherlands preferred reach agreement all three points Batavia agenda before announcing agreement restoration Djocja and thought such procedure feasible and desirable if parties reach accord promptly. He did not exclude possibility, however, Dutch might agree public announcement when agreement reached re Djocja and steps initiated toward implementation provided it also agreed and announced at same time that conference proceeding immediately negotiate remaining points.

Re ultimate responsibility for necessary decisions, in event Republic not able maintain order Djocja, Blom said Cabinet felt strongly Netherlands could not accept arrangement under which Netherlands authorities obliged stand aside if Republicans not able prevent vengeance being wreaked on Indonesians Djocja who had cooperated with Netherlands authorities or interference vital Netherlands communications, etc. Cabinet felt any such authority for UNCFI went beyond that contemplated SC resolution January 28 and was therefore objectionable. However, Blom seemed feel this problem probably could be worked out if recognized that Netherlands forces only ones available and capable restoring order in event necessity.

Blom said and repeated Netherlands Government had every intention reaching prompt, full and fair agreement.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/4-1149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 11, 1949—10 a. m.

338. Gocus 656. Leimena told me night 9th Sjahrir and group had returned from visit Bangka but failed convince Hatta he should head Republican delegation for UNCFI Conference. Leimena thought best hope for successful outcome conference would depend on Hatta and Van Royen having informal conversations. I agreed but considered impossible Leimena's suggestion Van Royen visit Hatta Bangka.

Leimena came again evening 9th. Said he desired, proceed Bangka 11th with Natsir to try again induce Hatta head Republican delegation. I arranged their transportation on KLM through Stuyt.

UNCFI plane returned evening 10th from taking Halim [to] Jogja, bringing back letter to Leimena re selection Republican delegation members from Jogja which selection had been left to Djuanda and Sultan. Following six names proposed: Sultan, Djuanda, Sukiman, Latuharhary, Loah, Halim. I expressed to Leimena my pleasure over such strong delegation and particularly inclusion Sultan. I requested travel approval this group from Stuyt and received it promptly after Koets consulted. With Sultan coming participate in Republican Delegation, I told Leimena this strong argument for Hatta head group.

UNCFI plane went Jogja 11th to bring to Batavia six members Republican Delegation and makes similar trip Bangka 12th.

As UNCFI chairman, informed Netherlands Delegation and Republican delegation today opening session conference fixed Thursday April 14, 10:30 a. m. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-1249: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 12, 1949—2 p. m.

341. Gocus 657. Called on British Consul General 11th. Told me of Bevin's talks with Stikker Washington and of instructions to British Ambassador Hague re need for Netherlands be conciliatory and reach agreement with Republicans Batavia Conference. Consul General instructed work toward that end and hoped see Beel soon thereon.

Met UNCFI plane 4 p. m. 11th which brought from Jogja RepDel members Sultan, Djuanda, Loah and Latuharhary. Decision taken Jogja for other two members Sukiman and Halim delay trip few days.

Talked with Darmasetiawan. He said at Bangka with Sjahrir 9th. Sjahrir agreed serve as advisor to RepDel during Batavia Conference. Although Sjahrir preferred Hatta head RepDel, he willing participate irrespective. Darmasetiawan said he endeavored impress upon Hatta necessity for courageous leadership of moderate Republicans to prevent swing left or capitulation on part some to Netherlands. Sultan consulted with Sjahrir night 11th.

Over weekend UNCFI received reports Netherlands military ultimatum to one brigade Siliwangi division near Bandung was expiring 10th but extended to 12th. No official confirmation thereof or knowledge exact terms ultimatum. At request Herremans and Critchley, I as

¹ Repeated in telegram 320, April 12, 8 p. m., to The Hague, to be forwarded to Brussels.

UNCFI chairman mentioned matter informally Riphagen last night. Said responsibility on part Netherlands determine whether contemplated action consistent with cease-fire orders but UNCFI interested nothing should take place day Van Royen arrival which might make negotiations even more difficult. Riphagen and Schuurman told me this morning they were looking into matter.

Met Van Royen and staff their arrival Batavia 8:30 a. m. 12th. Van Royen quite cordial and expressed desire meet UNCFI members soonest.

Sultan called for one hour this forenoon. Came Batavia primarily on plans for restoration Jogja and is consulting Republican leaders including former police officials Jogja thereon. Confident restoration entirely feasible if Netherlands will cooperate, particularly in providing light auto equipment and arms for civil and auxiliary police. Sultan said Netherlands officials have made no headway in establishing own civil government and Republican civil government practically intact. Said number civil police insufficient and he would like select personally number from TNI units which would be designated auxiliary police.

Sultan ridiculed extravagant measures taken by Netherlands military to surround him by tanks and heavy armor when traveling from Palace to Jogja airport in military observers jeep. Said Netherlands exaggerating danger to himself and to Hatta, Sukarno and other Republican leaders from Communists or other opponents. Said influence Tan Malakka waning in Republican territory, especially with younger men. Said he had communication from new head Communist Politburo Jogja indicating Communists would not oppose negotiations. Sultan said with population Jogja reduced approximately 50 percent since police action food situation now fairly satisfactory and functioning of restored government would be simple if Netherlands will provide reasonable transportation, fuel, food and clothing. Has developed his plan in considerable detail. Believes he could have administration and city in shape for return Republican leaders one week after evacuation by Netherlands military. Stressed urgency getting agreement and restoration Jogja soonest. Thereafter, he said, simple to bring in Republican Military Commander Sudirman and staff and also emergency government leaders from Sumatra. Once this accomplished, authoritative decisions on cease-fire, round table invitation, et cetera, could be taken. Sultan anticipates conferring with Roem 13th and returning Jogja 14th. Would be available come Batavia any time required for conference or particularly consultation on restoration plans.

Indian Consul General called today following return from several days tour Sumatra. Stressed need for early settlement lest Republican

Military Forces break up or move leftward out of control. Said Indian Government desires work within SC and GA but felt essential get Indonesian question before latter, in view Netherlands failure to date implement January 28 Resolution. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-1349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 13, 1949—8 p. m.

345. Gocus 659. Met UNCFI plane last evening bringing Roem, Sastroamidjojo Leimena and Natsir from Bangka. Roem and Leimena called later. Roem explained Hatta considered all arguments in favor his heading delegation but decided send Roem at least for present. Hatta stressed importance to Republic cause of success or failure Batavia conference. Remains to be convinced Netherlands finally resigned to conciliation and fair settlement. Believes if he personally participated initially in Batavia conference, and it developed Netherlands unreasonable, any possibility his later leading Republic successfully would be ruined. Hatta getting in touch with Sjafruddin and seeking understanding regarding possibility later participation in conference, presumably after Jogja impasse may be overcome. I went over with Roem matter of subjects to be discussed and procedures for conference.

Received letter from Van Royen stating existing Netherlands delegation dissolved and new Netherlands delegation appointed composed of Van Royen, chairman, Blom, vice chairman, and members Schuurman, Gieben, Hoogstraten, Jacob, Koets, Thomson and Vandevelde.

Visited Van Royen 1 hour this afternoon. Volunteered to refrain from including in my opening remarks, as chairman of tomorrow's meeting, reference to paragraph 2 of UNCFI March 1 report if Van Royen would agree to be second speaker and indicate willingness to discuss restoration Jogja initially. Roem will speak third. In this manner neither Roem nor I would be dictating priority of discussion but initiative come from Van Royen, which arrangement I hope will prevent any initial clash. Van Royen especially pleased that Sjahrir and Sultan drawn into meetings. I explained Sultan returning Jogja tomorrow but he would be available and I would send plane for him whenever required for consultation on restoration and law and order Jogja.

Republic delegation provided following list its representatives: Roem, chairman, Sastroamidjojo, vice chairman, members Leimena,

¹ Repeated in telegram 328, April 14, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

Djuanda, Supomo, Latuharhary. Advisors: Sjahrir, Laoh, Natsir, Darmasetiawan, Sumarto, and A. K. Pringgodigdo, director general, Sudjono, secretary, Noeradi, interpreter. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-1449: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, April 14, 1949—6 p. m.

352. Gocus 660. Aneta this morning carried following UP item heading Batavia: "Roem, chairman RepDel, on eve resumption Republic-Netherlands negotiations under UNCFI told correspondent of UP: 'I have little optimism over preliminary conference which opens tomorrow, but we must continue all efforts to reach peaceful settlement. My recent experience, however, has not given me much hope. The problem is simple, we want restoration Republic.' He further said Republic cannot make binding decisions on cease-fire or attendance Hague Conference until Government of Republic restored."

Aneta also carried following from Batavia: "Evan [Van] Royen, chairman NethDel, indicated unless Republic enters into talks unconditionally, these fresh negotiations will only lead to failure. He said, 'idea that Republic Government must first be restored Jogja as preliminary condition to conference is out of question'. He further said, 'I do not see why one should be pessimistic about conference'. He pointed out that ruling of SC must be considered as whole and that when Republicans assume there is only one point on agenda this may cause difficulties".

Van Royen phoned me 9:00 a. m. stating Roem received UP correspondent 11:00 last night and gave out story which might seriously hurt chances success discussions. When Netherlands authorities saw outgoing UP cable, they called in UP correspondent to whom Van Royen explained his position. I reminded Van Royen that matter of publicity was to be discussed at conclusion opening meeting today. I told him I had cautioned RepDel through Sudjono yesterday as I had likewise cautioned Van Royen against giving any press statements prior opening meeting which might embitter atmosphere or any information re proceedings of meetings except in manner to be agreed upon at first meeting.

Opening conference assembled 10:30 this forenoon. I welcomed delegation and outlined rules procedure. I quoted SC directive March

¹ Repeated in telegram 334, April 18, 11 a. m., to The Hague.

23 and paragraphs 1 and 2 of operative par[t] SC resolution January 28. I then said:

"Commission as subsidiary organ to SC has been instructed to 'assist parties in reaching agreement' on points covered by SC's directive March 23. It is assumed by commission that in course of these discussions representatives will wish avail themselves of opportunity to discuss all such matters. Commission expects delegations to indicate ideas which they propose and steps they prepared take towards definite and early implementation of SC's directive.

"Commission would be pleased to see parties come to understanding at Batavia on as many points at issue between them as may be possible. It might be arranged for certain decisions to be taken at Batavia, for formal ratification at Jogja once Republican Government is there restored and functioning. It is commission's idea in any case that parties should go as far as their authority will permit them toward clearing up during Batavia meetings contentious points which have to date separated them and toward achieving progress in direction of agreement.

"It is desire of commission that those steps necessary to consummate cessation of hostilities be expedited. With this in mind, commission is confident that Government of Republic will issue cease-fire order in most effective manner possible soon as it is in position at Jogja to assemble necessary members its Government to agree upon manner in which such orders should be given. Commission with technical advice its military observers will be available for consultation by parties and for possibly working out with parties technical questions involved in cease-fire orders, in establishing police and security measures for Republic and in creating set of rules to govern relations between Netherlands and Republican military forces which must be considered in connection with establishing area to be administered by Republic.

"SC has in its directive of March 23 stated that if agreement is reached by parties on points (a) and (b) of its directive, holding of such a conference as that proposed for Hague is consistent with purposes and objectives of its resolution January 28. It has asked commission to assist parties in reaching agreement as to time and conditions for holding proposed conference, to end that negotiations contemplated by resolution January 28 may be held soon as possible. This question should be given full and sympathetic study by parties in these present meetings. It would appear that if conditions under point (a) of directive March 23 are met or are in course of solution there should be no great difficulty in arriving at amicable understanding on point (b).

"Commission did not see fit when issuing its invitations to fix time limit for duration of present discussions. It believes both parties are entirely cognizant of need for clearing up misunderstandings promptly and moving quickly forward fair and final solution of Indonesian question.

"Difficulties and tragedies have attended this Indonesian problem. It is not for us to find fault but to find solution. We are confident of good faith and high motives, ability and determination of representa-

tives here assembled. We count upon them to be reasonable, tolerant and wise in their deliberations and decisions. Commission as agent for United Nations of world is ready to lend every possible assistance toward expediting just settlement of Indonesian question".

Van Royen set forth Netherlands position along expected lines. He made good impression through suggesting discussions be initiated on subject restoration Jogja and through giving clear undertaking as to intention Netherlands Government to transfer sovereignty soonest and unconditionally and also to work toward a union statute which would be real and voluntary partnership with no super state.

Roem's speech stressed restoration Jogja and was in anticipated tone but not so rigid as to exclude progress in conversations on points other than restoration.

I informed meeting of receipt 9:30 a. m. of letter dated 14th from NethDel to effect that chairman BFO made known to high representative Crown that it is unanimous wish of states and territories in BFO to be recognized as party to solution of Indonesian problem and be afforded opportunity participate as such in present discussions, and Netherlands Government is of opinion that such action would greatly further solution of pending problems. UNCFI therefore was asked to take necessary steps in this connection. I stated I told chairman Hamid 8:00 a. m. today when he mentioned letter to me that our meeting was to be private but I would submit for participation questions soonest. To our meeting I said would consider letter with UNCFI associates and then address question to RepDel.

Meeting adjourned until 10:00 a. m. Saturday with next meeting thereafter 10:30 a. m. Tuesday.

Informal meeting re publicity followed formal session. Van Royen and Roem agreed with UNCFI to release all three morning speeches to press without establishing precedent. Decision on press release will be taken at close each meeting. Both chairmen agreed at liberty to state own case to press provided in nonprovocative fashion and not likely prejudice conference. Any information re session business to be given out, however, only through official release. Two chairmen and I authorized press officer deny allegation by one American reporter that UNCFI was endeavoring restrict unduly information to press.

Roem and Van Royen lunched alone with me. They were mutually cordial and in good spirits following first meeting. Van Royen and I asked Roem consider carefully BFO request above-mentioned, pointing out certain possible advantages BFO participation. At Roem's request. I am providing him with copy NethDel letter in order he may indicate soonest RepDel opinion this point. I have taken position UNCFI has authority invite BFO representatives to discussions but should do so only if both parties to dispute agree.

To insure Saturday meeting moves smoothly, I obtained agreement Van Royen I should submit list questions on restoration Jogja to both chairmen to aid them in initiating discussion thereon soon as question re rules procedure settled. Also learned from Roem that question which seriously causes RepDel concern is that of change made in Netherlands constitution envisaging USI and union statute. Obtained promise Van Royen make clarifying statement thereon at next meeting. Also agreed Roem should submit to me any other points on which Van Royen's explanations would be particularly helpful this stage. Offered Roem UNCFI plane go Bangka Saturday afternoon, return Monday. He expects accept in order report progress to date to leaders and receive necessary instructions.

UNCFI press officer cabling Lake Success summaries this morning's three speeches and air mailing texts. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-1649: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, April 16, 1949—3 p. m.

353. Gocus 661. On 15th prepared and obtained approval Austr[al]ian and Belgian colleagues to 17 questions suggesting points for discussion on restoration Jogja. Submitted these informally to Van Royen and Roem.

Visited British Consul General and brought him to date on discussions. He said Van Royen had called and told him surprised and pleased with good atmosphere first meeting. Said Van Royen expressed concern lest restoration Jogja would lower morale Netherlands military forces and have bad press reaction in Netherlands. Consul General said he replied his press summaries from Hague Embassy indicated Netherlands being prepared for this and added that military would just have to accommodate themselves to situation. Consul General thought he should impress upon Republicans reasonableness of Van Royen and get Republicans concede where possible. I replied that although good progress made initially success depends largely on Van Royen being able and willing accept something less than strict "binding agreements" from Republicans in present conversations. I said I was constantly endeavoring make Republicans reasonable but would appreciate Consul General's support in letting Van Royen realize how much depends on one point mentioned.

Presided second UNCFI meeting 10 a. m. today. Cleared up agenda

¹ Repeated in telegram 336, April 19, 11 a. m., to The Hague.

and rules procedure satisfactorily. Roem presented Republican confidential working paper text whereof follows:

"1. Restoration Republican Government to Jogja should be undertaken along general lines indicated hereinafter.

2. Is generally very difficult for Republican authorities Jogja to collect adequate material and information regarding conditions Jogja and environs in view of existing military regulations, e.g.:

- a. Prohibition to assemble in groups of more than five persons;
- b. Continual raids and arrests which make it extremely difficult for Republican authorities to maintain regular contact with each other even within city;
- c. Virtual impossibility communicating with environs;
- d. Impossibility entering or viewing conditions in offices, industrial establishments, schools and other premises formerly used by Republic of Indonesia on account their being occupied or guarded by Netherlands Army or their being used to house Netherlands offices;
- e. Prohibition to engage in any form of activity designed to revive Republican organization.

3. Plan to be carried out is based on paragraph 4 (F) of Resolution January 28 of SC stipulating that whole territory controlled by Republic under *Renville* should progressively be returned to administration of government of Republic of Indonesia in shortest possible time. This restoration involves withdrawal of Netherlands Army, police and civil administration.

4. In first instance, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Resolution January 28 of SC, city Jogja and its immediate environs should be returned. Accordingly first phase should concern return of:

- a. City of Jogja (municipality);
- b. Its immediate environs consisting of "panewons" (administrative districts) around Jogja including Maguwo airfield and Kaliurang which supplies Jogja with its water.

Actual transfer in first phase will take three days. Population of municipality numbers approximately 400,000 people. Population of environs numbers approximately 300,000 people, making total of 700,000.

5. After this first phase three consecutive phases—one immediately following the other—should complete return of whole special territory of Jogja to administration of Republic of Indonesia within 14 days. Otherwise it would be extremely difficult effectively to maintain law and order within city since there exists close interrelation between security in city proper and its environs.

6. It is of utmost importance that transfer be preceded by local cease-fire issued by both parties and to be effective throughout special territory of Jogja.

7. Actual transfer should be preceded by preliminary period of two weeks in which to assemble police force and auxiliary police and in which to collect required material.

8. During preliminary period referred to sub 7, vital officials now outside city, whose services will be required, should be given opportunity to enter city. To this end creation of preparatory commission composed of Netherlands and Republican authorities working under observation of UNCFI (military observers and other advisors) is envisaged.

9. Minister of State (Sultan Jogja) in capacity of coordinator of security will be given full power to act in behalf of Government Republic in all affairs connected with preparations and execution of transfer.

10. After transfer completed Sultan will continue to exercise command over security organs until otherwise decided by Republican Government.

11. For maintenance of law and order a police force of 1200 men will be employed in city Jogja and its environs, in addition 1300 more will be employed for rest of special territory of Jogja making total of 2500 police troops.

12. In view of chaotic conditions in Jogja as result of second military action and considerable amount of arms in illicit possession and in view also of fact that much equipment has fallen into Netherlands hands, it will be necessary that equipment of police be supplemented with items as specified in list to be submitted.

13. Following materials required for administrative functions of government.

- a. Motor vehicles.
- b. Wireless and telephone equipment.
- c. Electric power generating and distributing equipment.
- d. Water supply equipment.
- e. Printing equipment.

f. Office equipment and stationery, because according to information received much of materials listed above has been removed, damaged or has become lost. Provisional specified list will be submitted.

14. In addition arrangements have to be made for supply of food, textiles, medicine and fuel as specified in list to be submitted.

15. To ensure supply of food to Jogja there must be free traffic between city and surrounding country primarily in view of fact that part of Jogja's food supply enter city through village roads so that traffic must not be hampered by blockade; such restrictions as have to be made must be limited to control on firearms.

16. Supply routes (railroads and highways) connecting Jogja with Solo, Magelang and Karanganyar should be opened and maintained since Jogja is situated in a minus area. In order ensure supply of fuel and lubricants facilities will have to be made to obtain these products from Tjepu or other cities where supplies are available. For this purpose road building material and auxiliary bridges (Bailey type) will have to be made available.

17. Pending over-all agreement Republic currency (URI) will be legal tender of Government of Republic Indonesia. To meet need of currency the complete printing plant which was in Jogja prior to second military action as well as paper and inks will be required. There will be no determination of rate of exchange between Republic

currency and NEI guilder. Neither will there be prohibition on use NEI currency.

18. Although personnel of Departments and services have left Jogja in large numbers there remains sufficient group to staff administrative organs of government. Netherlands authorities should extend facilities to enable persons willing return Jogja to do so.

19. Certain establishments set up by Netherlands military forces may be required by Republican Government, e.g. work shops, et cetera. No adequate data in this respect are available requiring further investigation by commission referred to sub 8.

20. In general all public utilities (post offices, telephone service, railway station, et cetera) should be returned to Republic of Indonesia. Personnel who have already entered Netherlands service should be free return to Republic service if they choose to do so."

Djuanda gave oral explanation thereof. After reading document Van Royen said his delegation would study and comment thereon soonest but might not be possible Tuesday. He volunteered have material ready Tuesday for discussion various questions pertinent restoration which I had circulated. Reference penultimate paragraph Gocus 660,² Van Royen continued his remarks of opening meeting 14th with statement on amendment to Netherlands constitution and raised question as to Republic constitution. Roem promised answer in due course.

I announced arrangements for Roem and three colleagues proceed this afternoon by UNCFI plane to Bangka for consultation with leaders and return Monday afternoon. Next meeting 10:30 Tuesday. We agreed Republic working papers should be kept confidential but Van Royen statement released to press. Text thereof forwarded Lake Success by secretariat.

Roem and other Republicans have expressed to me much satisfaction with attitude Van Royen has taken and progress achieved. Van Royen expressed slight shock at parts Republic working paper. I said best have views expressed frankly at once in pleasant atmosphere. Easter recess useful in permitting study and preparation for discussing calmly contentious points now brought into open. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² *Supra.*

501.BC Indonesia/4-1949: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 19, 1949—6 p. m.

358. Gocus 664. Lunched alone with Van Royen. He sought my advice on next move with formal discussions now halted (Gocus

¹ Repeated in telegram 339, April 19, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

663²) until informal talks tried for reaching understanding on Jogja.

Van Royen concerned lest paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 Republic working paper (Gocus 661³) indicate Roem group desires wreck Batavia conference thru seeking Netherlands commitments now on points beyond particular reference SC directive March 23. I said several RepDel members consulted me on these points following today's meeting. I told them they should seek this stage restoration Jogja and immediate environs only. I said implementation paragraph 4 (F) could follow in due course but that complications and extensive arrangements should not be brought up now which would inevitably delay Batavia decisions and any restoration Jogja. I thought they would be well advised look to Netherlands for reasonable facilities enable Republic Government function Jogja and immediate environs rather than attempt early control over more extensive area and handling economic and security factors connected therewith. I told Van Royen that if these points come to discussion in subsequent UNCFI meeting I would take foregoing position.

Van Royen was to meet Roem 5:30 this afternoon alone. I suggested he make his position clear on above points and let Roem know that too ambitious initial program for restoration beyond Jogja would be impossible of acceptance by Netherlands and would only bog down conversations if Republic insists thereon. I suggested Van Royen go far as possible in informal conversations with Republicans today and tomorrow toward giving them undertaking on general lines which could be accepted as assurance Jogja would be restored and on setting up preparatory commission. I realized he would desire tie in other two points of cease fire and Hague invitation but warned him again not to exaggerate binding character of commitment which he would require. He said if Republicans would show good faith and intentions he was hopeful some formula could be reached and Batavia meeting will succeed. I told him several Republicans had expressed genuine appreciation his approach to whole question and had confidence in him.

Van Royen told me Beel giving dinner for RepDel and NethDel Friday night and Roem pleased with idea. I recommended we arrange Roem and assistants visit Bangka thereafter. I said if progress made on formula above mentioned, I would see word got to Hatta that he consider most sympathetically coming Batavia next week. Van Royen said he would be delighted if Hatta would come even if he might leave Roem in charge RepDel and be available himself only for behind scene consultation. I let Van Royen know some Republicans genuinely interested broadening their approach to question much as possible and

² Not printed.

³ *Supra*.

anxious have Hatta available Batavia. Van Royen said if Hatta would come for even few days he would endeavor obtain approval his group for him return visit to Hatta at Bangka and perhaps then arrange Hatta come Batavia for remainder discussions. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-2049 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1949—7 p. m.

230. Usgoc 355. As you aware, Indo question now on agenda UNGA and in normal course may be reached within two weeks. Possibility obviating prolonged and acrimonious debate will depend largely upon reaching extensive field agreements between Dutch and Repubs prior UNGA debates.

From recent tels Dept concerned at what appears to be incipient repetition pattern former negots—to wit, presentation fairly detailed working papers, consideration these papers, submission counter working papers, and stalemating of progress in face areas disagreement with Dutch proceeding forward their plans on side with Federalists and with Repubs counting on UN buck line for them.

Dept believes highly desirable prior GA discussions that UNCFI be able report SC extensive list conditions for restoration Jogja on which parties agreed. Van Royen shld recognize that unless he can agree Repub working paper or promptly offer alternative proposals to which RepDel can agree, UNCFI itself must make recommendations which it wld be incumbent upon both parties accept. Shld Neth fail accept UNCFI recommendations, Van Royen must realize USDel GA will have no choice but take position Neth not in compliance SC Res.

Other hand Repub may be inclined insist upon extensive guarantees from suspicion Neth intentions. However, Roem shld appreciate that realities situation require Repub manifest consistently cooperative spirit and broad outlook if its position in UN to remain favorable and that shld Repub hold back from agreement on immediate restoration Jogja until further agreement reached on succeeding phases, debates UNGA may be less helpful Repub cause than he may anticipate. SC Mar 23 directive envisages initially restoration Repub Jogja, cease fire, and settlement conditions Hague negots. Thereafter, with task preliminary conf completed attention can be given to successive steps called for in Jan 28 Res, with Repub in advantageous position with respect UN.

¹ Repeated in telegram 354, April 22, '8 p. m., to The Hague.

Re Gocus 664² Dept entirely concurs your statements to Repubs and to Van Royen that immediate objective is restoration Repub Govt to Jogja and environs, without necessity prior agreement on plan for extension geographic area Repub authority and on substance polit settlement to be negotiated Hague. This connection Dept assumes Repub working paper para 3 is simply reservation on part Repubs of rights under SC Res, Jan 28 and not a program for Neth agreement at this time. If you deem advisable you are authorized state to both dels that US position forthcoming GA debates will be determined by the concrete contribution of each party to immediate objectives Mar 23 tel.

Dept in full agreement your view (extreme desirability Hatta participate Batavia negots) in view rigid doctrinaire attitude Roem and Sastroamidjojo. Dept also agrees views your unnamed Repub informants (Gocus 662³) that time has arrived for demonstration breadth attitude on part Indo nationalists and that such attitude not to be looked for from present leaders RepDel whose parochial preoccupation with Repub could only lead renewed drastic compartmentalization Indonesia when polit and economic situation archipelago demands removal barriers between groups and areas.

Accordingly Dept, appreciating your efforts bring Hatta Batavia, requests your advice as to whether it might helpfully approach Palar and/or Indian FonOff through AmAmb New Delhi with view encouraging them advise Hatta proceed Batavia immediately either as head RepDel or for talks Van Royen. Dept wld emphasize its realization Hatta's necessary concern for his own polit position as factor making him reluctant adopt this course but wld state its own view that present is outstanding opportunity for peaceful attainment nationalist aims Repub, that recent events have given impetus to progress negots which cld easily be lost, and that view considerations set forth above Hatta might well conclude advantages to be gained by his proceeding Batavia wld override other factors.

ACHESON

² *Supra.*

³ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/4-2049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 20, 1949—9 p. m.

360. Gocus 665. Van Royen phoned last night he had called on Roem alone in afternoon and enjoyed cordial visit and exchange views.

¹ Repeated in telegram 347, April 21, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

Visited Van Royen this afternoon his request. He recounted informal meeting held this forenoon Van Hoogstraten's office between half dozen representatives each from Netherlands and Republic delegations. Agreed RepDel should meet alone this afternoon and let Van Royen know whether they desire further informal conversations tomorrow or formal meeting scheduled for 4 o'clock. Van Royen said considerable progress made in morning's meeting. He opposed idea any reference this stage to paragraph 4 (F) SC resolution January 28. Said only initial step of restoration Jogja and immediate environs should be discussed now. Republicans said they motivated by two principal reasons in including reference to 4 (F) working paper.

First they thought necessary get commitment from NethDel now that initial Jogja restoration would be only first step in giving back all pre-December 19 area to Republic. They were concerned in this connection lest followers would question existence constituency for government and would be uncertain as to Republic proportional representation in envisaged constitutional assembly. Van Royen assured them Netherlands still had in mind giving proportion of one-third to republic and this would not be affected by limited restoration Jogja. Secondly Republicans feared Netherlands might proceed with setting up new *negaras* from former Republic territory unless commitment now made on restoration and implementation thereof started shortly after city Jogja restored. Van Royen promised consult colleagues on this point and felt he could give necessary assurances.

For initial restoration Republicans presented map showing area extending approximately 5 kilometers outside perimeter city Jogja but including Maguwo airport and Kaliurang. Van Royen said impossible yield Maguwo since it would be essential continuing Netherlands air service to Maguwo and technical staffs would have to be retained there for despatch aircraft, etc. Pointed out Republicans had no commercial aircraft and would be dependent on Netherlands services for transportation, supplies, etc. As for Kaliurang, Van Royen still considering this with colleagues including military advisors. He admitted to Republicans desirability letting Kaliurang be available for residence Republican officials and possibly for UNCFI and other representatives connected with restoration Jogja and conferences thereon. Republicans had presented argument Jogja water supply is at Kaliurang. To me Van Royen said principal concern comes from Netherlands military who fear Kaliurang might be place of contact for Republic military with subversive elements in mountain area back of town. I suggested rules could be established to diminish this danger and we might make Kaliurang headquarters for number military observers who could be useful this direction. Van Royen and Republicans ex-

changed views over difficulties administration area outside Jogja that normally depends on that center.

Republicans spoke of difficulty giving binding commitments Batavia on cease fire and Hague invitation. Said did not want government meetings restored Jogja have appearance rubber stamp concerns. Van Royen said Republicans should consult many as possible leaders now. Thought formula could be worked out by Republicans which could put Netherlands minds at rest on two points in question without too strict commitment being required. Willing make Hague conference easier for Republicans by stressing UNCFI assistance therein but made no commitment to Republicans that phrase "under UNCFI auspices" would be used.

Van Royen especially gratified by attitude Djuanda who desires no roadblocks or lines of demarcation and minimum impediments to intercourse between restored Jogja and rest of Indonesia.

Leimena raised question roundtable agenda. Van Royen replied preferable not anticipate roundtable conference entirely by going over Batavia everything to be discussed there but willing go far as practicable in letting Republicans and BFO know what to expect. Leimena inquired whatever scheduled could be promised by Netherlands as to time required for Hague Conference and for Netherlands ratification agreement reached. Van Royen held it impossible give definite dates but willing promise in official meeting that effort would be made to end conference within 6 weeks and secure ratification within similar period.

Van Royen expressed concern since RepDel not yet answered UNCFI letter transmitting BFO request made through NethDel for participation Batavia discussions. He aware some BFO leaders going Bangka tomorrow and feared Republicans might exact certain promises of support from them as price for Republicans letting them join UNCFI discussions. I reminded Van Royen BFO had already taken position in March 3 secret resolution strongly favoring Republic attitude toward Jogja, etc., and I thought only good could come from further contact between two Indonesian groups. He in turn expressed desire they hasten toward constituting Indonesian front. I told him Anak Agung spoke to me at noon and asked whether he could take any message to Hatta and Sukarno from me. I had told him I hoped Hatta would come Batavia next week at least for visit. Van Royen pleased I had said this. Anak Agung seeing him tonight but Van Royen prefers no request to Hatta come from himself. I told him Roem seeing me later. He said his delegation approved his idea returning call on Hatta Bangka if Hatta would make initial visit Batavia. He granted my request for permission convey this message to Hatta through Roem.

Visited Anak Agung 5 p. m. He and 5 other BFO leaders friendly Republic proceeding unofficially Bangka 21st, returning 23rd. Said they desire impress upon Sukarno and Hatta importance Batavia negotiations succeeding for future all Indonesia and their confidence success can be achieved if Hatta will lend his direct support. They desire Hatta come Batavia not only to have contact with NethDel and UNCFI but also to dissipate concern among some BFO members that Republic unfriendly or likely endeavor dominate USI. Premier Pasundan will offer house near Buitenzorg to Hatta if he comes but prefers not reside Batavia. I said Anak Agung at liberty to tell Hatta personally I thought well advised come Batavia for consultations without changing head RepDel. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary
of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 21, 1949—10 a. m.

361. Gocus 666. Roem and Sastroamidjojo called last night for hour and half. Were disappointed and concerned over trend day's informal meeting with NethDel (Gocus 665²). Most worried over attitude NethDel toward request in RepDel working paper for assurances under 4 (F) SC resolution January 28. I endeavored convince them SC resolution January 28 stands in its entirety and UNCFI has responsibility see it observed. Explained, however, that SC directive March 23 provides starting point for implementation. I said restoration Jogja and immediate environs should constitute first step. UNCFI charged with assisting earliest possible restoration civil administration of Repub and with making recommendations toward progressive Netherlands withdrawal. Insisted RepDel should not hold up negotiations seeking definite guarantee from NethDel now on progressive restoration. Furthermore emphasized fair attitude Van Royen has taken to date and said obviously impossible ask him reverse categorically his statements made before SC Lake Success.

I gave technical arguments favoring Netherlands operation Maguwo and against Repubs loading themselves down with administrative and security problems through seeking take in more territory initially than Jogja and immediate environs. Recommended they look to NethDel for facilities necessary reasonable functioning Repub Govt in prescribed area. Repubs argued Sultan insisted program set forth work-

¹ Repeated in telegram 353, April 22, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra*.

ing paper essential to maintenance law and order. I said UNCFI could only insist on letter SC directive March 23. Suggested Sultan present his views in UNCFI discussions. This might influence NethDel toward acting sympathetically on Sultan's and UNCFI's recommendations after initial restoration.

Repubs pointed out their officials still carrying on in many parts of pre-December 18 Repub territory and Govt Jogja would have responsibility for coordinating and directing them. I said our idea seeking quick restoration Jogja is to enable Repub Govt issue cease-fire order and accept Hague invitation. I said these points could not wait upon solution many problems which would be incidental to expanding area effectively under Repub Govt direction. I said UNCFI headquarters would remain Batavia with group including military observers assigned Jogja for seeing SC resolution January 28 carried out and Repub Govt assured of means and facilities for functioning freely.

They brought up their fear of Repub not receiving proportionate representation of one-third and of *negaras* being carved out former Repub territory before round-table agreement reached. With information provided by Van Royen to me (Gocus 665), I gave them what assurances I could on these points and reminded them again continuing status and validity SC resolution.

Repubs told me Van Royen could give partial answer Thursday to working paper. I suggested they have formal meeting to receive such information. I anticipate Van Royen might be able continue response at formal meeting Friday. If this proves impossible, he recommended Roem and Van Royen with possibly their two deputies meet informally to avoid any impasse developing. I took this position since Repubs particularly unhappy over attitude demonstrated by Hoogstraten and Koets in Wednesday's session. They said these two of Palace group followed old-time tactics which have defeated Repubs in past. They have confidence in Van Royen but dubious whether policy will eventually depend on him or be dictated by Beel group.

I reminded Repubs I had originally recommended Hatta head RepDel. I said Roem had done splendidly and I hoped he would continue head RepDel. I thought it would be most helpful however if Hatta could come Batavia to have direct contact with Van Royen and decide to what extent and in what form assurances can be given latter on cease-fire and Hague invitation. I said arrangement on these two points must develop before Van Royen can finalize undertaking on rest Jogja. They agreed their delegations should petition Hatta come Batavia and one or both of them go Bangka Saturday and endeavor bring him back with them Sunday. I told them I authorized by Van

Royen let Hatta know through them that if he called Batavia Van Royen would be willing accept Hatta invitation Bangka. Repubs agreeably surprised and promised help work out this arrangement. I suggested Hatta call first on arrival Batavia but if any obstacle to this I would take responsibility get Hatta and Van Royen together. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 21, 1949—7 p. m.

365. Gocus 667. Saw Van Royen at noon. Mentioned Republican concern over status negotiations (Gocus 666²) and then have only limited informal talks until possibility getting Hatta Batavia explored. He was pleased with approach I made through Roem and Sastroamidjojo re possibility exchange visits between Hatta and himself. Van Royen said Anak Agung visited him last night and will endeavor help Hatta with ideas on formula for tieing in three points desired by NethDel.

At formal meeting 4 p. m. NethDel presented following working paper in reply to RepDel working paper:

"In view short time available, NethDel has limited itself to formulating some comments on various points of RepDel's working paper dated 16 April.

NethDel therefore intends bring forward at later date other points in connection with a possible return of Republican Government to Jogja.

Ad. 2. Obviously Netherlands military authorities as consequence of conditions prevailing Jogja had to impose certain restrictions and take certain measures to maintain law and order.

Insofar as material and information to be collected is needed in connection with possible return of Republican Government to Jogja and its immediate environs, it would seem advisable to entrust this task to Joint Commission referred to in comments on point 8.

Ad. 3. Netherlands Government is prepared agree to return of Republican Government to Jogja provided a binding commitment is obtained on the two other subjects, namely, firstly, 'that Republican Government shall order its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare and cooperate in restoration peace and maintenance law and order' and, secondly, 'to make agreements concerning time and conditions for holding of round-table conference at Hague'.

With regard this point NethDel takes view that if and when return of Republican Government to Jogja and its immediate environs takes

¹ Repeated in telegram 353, April 22, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra*.

place, this will be effectuated on basis paragraph two of operative part SC's Resolution 28 January to which the ruling of SC of 23 March specifically refers.

Ad. 4 and 5. A counterproposal as to area to be transferred under conditions referred to in comments on previous point to Republican Government will be submitted as soon as possible.

Ad. 6. NethDel is of opinion that local cease-fire order, effective only for area Jogja and immediate environs, would not be sufficient and might even create impression that Republican Government is condoning—if only temporarily—continuation guerrilla warfare outside said area.

Ad. 7. NethDel shares opinion that preliminary period of approximately two weeks will be required before actual transfer effected.

Ad. 8. NethDel agrees to establishment of Joint Commission as envisaged by Republican working paper. It would seem preferable, however, to call this commission a joint commission of investigation and advice.

One of tasks to be entrusted to this commission could be to advise on question of return of vital officials now outside city whose services will be required.

NethDel has no objection in principle to return of such officials.

Ad. 9. NethDel welcomes suggestion that all affairs connected with preparations and execution of transfer will be coordinated in such manner that one high official will be fully empowered to act on behalf of Government of Republic in this regard.

Ad. 10. NethDel has no remarks to offer on this point.

Ad. 11. As already stated by its chairman, NethDel feels that important factor which cannot be ignored when making estimate as to 'total number of civil and perhaps auxiliary police that would be required for Jogja and immediate environs' is undoubtedly figure of number of civil police employed in city Jogja immediately prior to December 19, 1948. Figure of 1200 for police force to be employed in city Jogja and its immediate environs would seem somewhat excessive.

Ad. 12 and 13. NethDel must reserve its position until it is informed in further detail with regard these points and point 11.

Ad. 14. NethDel readily agrees that arrangements will have to be made for normal supply of food, textiles, medicines and fuel.

Ad. 15. As stated by Dr. Van Royen on April 19, NethDel feels that if at all possible, there should be no road blocks nor should there be restoration of demarcation lines of which those road blocks would be symptomatic.

NethDel considers it eminently desirable that traffic between city Jogja and surrounding country should not be hampered by a blockade on either side. However, if Republican Government deems it necessary to establish control of firearms carried or transported by individuals entering area Jogja, Netherlands authorities with view to cooperate in maintenance law and order in this area are willing assist in such control.

Ad. 16. For reasons mentioned above (Ad. 15), NethDel has no objection to first sentence this point.

Re second and third sentences, NethDel suggests that a preliminary survey be made by Joint Commission referred to Ad. 8.

Ad. 17. In interest of free traffic and of unity of monetary system of Indonesia, NethDel feels that reissuing of URI by Republican Government would create almost unsurpassable difficulties. Further discussions on this point seem therefore indicated.

It may be noted that printing plant at Jogja previously used by Republican Government has been returned to owners (Kolff and Company, Batavia). Arrangements concerning further use of this plant to be made by Republican Government would have to take this fact into account.

Ad. 18. Reference may be made to NethDel's comments on point 8.

Ad. 19. NethDel feels obliged reserve its position until it is informed on this subject in further detail.

Ad. 20. As stated by its chairman on April 19, NethDel is of opinion that railways and other means communication through Jogja and immediate environs should continue to function as part of Indonesian system of communications as a whole. This system should not be split in two separately organized entities as consequence of return of Republican Government to Jogja."

After reading NethDel working paper, chairman Critchley remarked to me aside he thought this unsatisfactory and he should express UNCFI opinion thereon. I firmly restrained him from this, insisting debate if any should be left to parties. At chairman's invitation, Van Royen explained certain points in his working paper particularly No. 3. He said his paper was more complete than [than] he anticipated he could make it by today and hoped fill in gaps early next week after further consultation his staff and informal discussions with RepDel. He thanked RepDel for attitude and helpfulness in Wednesday's informal discussions.

Roem said not yet in position comment on substance NethDel paper but appreciated their diligence in presenting their views in writing so extensively and quickly. Reciprocated compliments of Van Royen on yesterday's informal conversations. Meeting adjourned and next meeting to be called when Roem indicates prepared proceed.

Press release agreed upon which quotes Van Royen on point three.

After meeting I spoke personally with Van Royen and Roem. Latter agreed tentatively to have informal discussion with Van Royen alone Friday if this seems desirable after RepDel studies NethDel working paper. Roem spoke enthusiastically to Van Royen over idea exchange of visits with Hatta. I offered plane take Roem Bangka which he anticipates using Saturday. Blom agrees with me we should be able get parties in accord on most contentious points within few days if Hatta will participate. Signed Cochran.

501.BC Indonesia/4-2449 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 24, 1949—11 p. m.

371. Gocus 671. Van Royen phoned this morning . . .² recounted story Anak Agung had given him of Bangka visit which corresponded entirely with account provided me (Gocus 670³). Later in day I learned Hatta among Republican passengers on UNCFI plane coming from Bangka. Told Van Royen who had his assistant Van Schelle meet Hatta with me. Through Darmasetiawan, I offered make any arrangements Hatta might desire.

At 8:30 this evening visited Hatta for one hour his request. Told him reasons why his other friends and I thought his presence Batavia essential, praised Roem's performance to date and suggested he remain in charge RepDel; said Van Royen's approach sincere and helpful and I convinced he desires reach fair settlement soonest; pictured embarrassment for everyone if by time UNGA arrives at discussion Indonesian question both sides have not made real progress toward settlement; understood difficulties on each side but argued virtue having amicable negotiated settlement rather than one dictated by UNCFI; opposed idea letting case be thrown back to SC without every effort being made Batavia to adjust differences; stressed disadvantages to everyone of economic sanctions.

I emphasized opportunity for Hatta and Van Royen get together informally and arrive at formula for tying in three points March 23 directive; talked in favor speedy restoration Jogja within limits March 23 directive with Republic reserving rights under SC resolution but not endeavoring achieve extended restoration Republic territory initially; urged Hatta talk with Van Royen on over-all lines and leave technical points to assistants; favored Sultan in particular explain his views on restoration to Netherlands delegates; expressed confidence that Hatta and Van Royen would get on well together and achieve success if mutual confidence shown.

Hatta favored informal approach. Accepted my invitation lunch alone with Van Royen and me Monday. Desired then confer with Van Royen on neutral ground and accepted USDel quarters this purpose. Said would remain Batavia few days. He would then return Bangka and if circumstances favorable would invite Van Royen visit him there. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Repeated in telegram 359, April 25, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

² As in original telegram.

³ Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/4-2549 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 25, 1949—6 p. m.

372. Gocus 672. Told Van Royen this morning of points on which he would find Hatta particularly concerned. Both lunched with me. Made USDel quarters available for their private conversation which lasted two and one-half hours. They jointly told me thereafter had made much progress in understanding each other's position. Were confident they could reach agreement if two or three major problems solved. Each promised help find formula. Hatta to let Van Royen know when further talks desired. Tendency will be to avoid formal UNCFI meetings for present. Personal relationship between Hatta and Van Royen promises to be entirely cordial.

Van Royen phoned half hour after meeting broke up to give certain details. Said he and Hatta entirely in accord agreement must be reached soonest since only Communist benefit from delay and further deterioration situation. Said difficulties center principally on Hatta giving "binding agreement" on cease-fire and round table and on withdrawals envisaged paragraph 4 (F) SC resolution. Hatta willing give personal assurances. Van Royen thought these might be acceptable if formalized through UNCFI. He will sound out his government on acceptability and Hatta think over possibility such procedure. On 4(F) Van Royen told Hatta could insist to Indonesians SC stands by resolution January 28 including 4(F) but should not ask Van Royen give statement thereon. Is willing however assure Hatta no more *negaras* will be carved out former Republican territory. Hatta sought promise on restoration Jogja residency. Van Royen would make no promise beyond Jogja and immediate environs for initial step but suggested arrangement for extending Republican control might be worked out as counterpart to Netherlands having transit rights through Jogja and restored Republican territory. Van Royen desires technical assistants of two parties get together soonest and also consider setting up joint investigating committee to proceed Jogja. Asked me see that well-balanced group military observers chosen to assist.

Hatta told Van Royen RepDel reply being made Netherland's working paper. Said not be worried over seemingly stiff position on two or three points but Hatta obliged assert this. Van Royen and I have not yet seen reply. He thought Hatta's attempt soften impact thereof indicates desire his part be reasonable but would regret if Rep Del

¹ Repeated in telegram 363, April 26, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

is making off record reply which will so entrench position as to slow up progress.

Usgoc 353² decoded only today after difficulties transmission (also reference Delhi's 444, to Department²). Point 14 Netherlands' working paper (Gocus 667³) should take care food, textile, medicine and fuel situation Jogja. Understand Netherlands military forces have distributed supplies in areas under their control. Prior having any knowledge efforts borrow abroad, I advised Republicans look to Netherlands sources for relief. I have opposed idea any foreign loan to Republic as such. Favor International Red Cross and similar agencies working with Netherlands and Republican officials to alleviate suffering. Recommend against any international borrowing prior formation USI. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Not printed.

³ Telegram 365, April 21, p. 383.

501.BC Indonesia/4-2749: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 27, 1949—6 p. m.

381. Gocus 676. Roem and Supomo called 26th. Asked I arrange Van Royen meet with Hatta in USDel quarters 27th and for Van Royen and Sultan Jogja lunch with me same day and talk later in USDel quarters. I phoned Van Royen, who accepted.

To Roem and Supomo, I mentioned letter 26th from Roem to Van Royen, which just received by UNCFI Chairman Herremans with request he transmit to NethDel and arrange formal UNCFI meeting 28th to discuss it. Communication was five-page comment on NethDel working paper (Gocus 667¹) with emphasis on restoration beyond Jogja and immediate environs. To Republicans I pointed out flaws in letter and doubted I could support certain points if they came to debate. I thought it much better parties refrain from continuing exchange contentious papers and iron out difficulties in personal conversations so pleasantly commenced between Hatta and Van Royen. After Hatta consulted twice, Roem phoned my advice accepted and document still in possession Herremans should not be distributed.

Van Royen and Hatta came 10 a. m. today. Before leaving them alone to confer, I expressed appreciation Hatta's suppression foregoing letter and Van Royen's request honored by Hague that no official Netherlands comment be made on RepDel press statement (Gocus

¹ Telegram 365, April 21, p. 383.

673²). I asked both proceed urgently along lines conciliation and agreement and restrain subordinates from acts or words likely complicate situation.

After two and one-quarter hours alone, Hatta and Van Royen jointly told me following: They agreed Van Royen and Roem should lunch together 28th and then jointly request me submit formula which Hatta and Van Royen have been unable to work out to give Hague during Batavia discussions necessary assurances on cease-fire and round table without "binding agreements" in strictest sense of term. (Roem and Leimena have asked see me 9 a. m. 28th.)

Hatta reported Sultan Jogja insists restoration entire residency essential for security and administrative purposes while Van Royen thinks impossible for him go beyond terms March 23 directive on Jogja and immediate environs. He agreed, however, consider with open mind all arguments Sultan advances. I reminded Hatta January 28 Resolution still stands including arrangements for progressive withdrawals but I could only support initial restoration Jogja and immediate environs. I favored early setting up Preparatory Commission which should study technical problems Jogja and make recommendations, thinking this might produce aspects of problem not yet appreciated by two delegations and might point way to compromise solution.

Hatta said no assurance Netherlands would respect paragraph 4 (F) SC resolution January 28. Van Royen could not revoke statements made Lake Success under instructions his government. Could, however, give assurances no more states to be formed during period of negotiations from former Republican territory and no Netherlands desire or intention eliminate Republic as entity.

Hatta prefers give no written reply to NetheDel letter submitting through UNCFI request of BFO for participation Batavia discussions. Said he told Anak Agung, and latter agreed, BFO not third party to dispute before SC. Hatta willing UNCFI invite BFO participate when "UNCFI considers participation necessary." I doubted UNCFI could ever deem participation necessary but might conceivably find it "useful". I hoped both parties would be receptive to BFO participation when points other than those immediately in dispute between two parties are being considered and when UNCFI may believe such participation would be useful. I urged increased contacts between Indonesians during Batavia discussions and not postponement until Republic restored Jogja and Hatta invites BFO there as he hinted. (Learned later in day that Hatta entertained BFO leaders at dinner last night and is obviously strengthening relations there-

² Telegram 373, April 26, 10 a. m., not printed.

with.) I suggested initial meeting at which BFO be invited might be that wherein agreement on Jogja announced. Thought advisable give BFO opportunity question Van Royen in such meeting on plans for round-table conference, et cetera. Van Royen and Sultan lunched with me. Sultan said probably proceed Bangka with Hatta Friday and return Monday. Sultan and Van Royen talked alone two hours USDel quarters. Van Royen phoned me half hour later to report conversation. Said Sultan spoke strongly in favor restoration entire residency. Van Royen expressed concern lest this might lead to influx large number TNI with resultant influence on restored government. Gave Sultan general idea problems discussed with Hatta. Said if necessary assurances on cease-fire and Hague Conference can be obtained he thought Netherlands Government would be generous in considering Sultan's idea on territory. I told Van Royen I thought part Republican insistence on extended territory and paragraph 4 (F) comes from fear that after Van Royen concludes agreement and leaves Indonesia, local Netherlands group will not be so helpfully disposed. Van Royen countered that if everything goes as expected, sovereignty should be transferred three months from assembling round-table and then complete release of territory achieved. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/4-2749 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1949—9 p. m.

368. Recent tels from Cochran rptd to you and discussions with Neth Reps here indicate atmosphere surrounding discussions in Batavia conducive to successful outcome. However, Dept acutely aware of fact that, despite cordiality and frank exchange views, there is at present no evidence actual area of agreement between parties, and thus only the initiated have cause for optimism. Majority members GA are not initiated.

Dept has been hopeful that some concrete steps toward restoration might be taken and agreement re cease-fire and participation Hague Conference might be reached in time for GA discussions Indo question. In your discussions with Neth officials re developments Batavia, you may find it desirable, as we have here, to seek to keep attention focused on agreement, particularly in regard to desirability reaching some tangible and publishable results prior GA discussions.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 247 to Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/4-2849 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary
of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, April 28, 1949—6 p. m.

386. Gocus 677. NethDel entertained UNCFI and few BFO members reception 27th. Jacob told me he and Hoogstraten progressing with Djuanda and Laoh on technical questions incidental restoration Jogja. Blom and Schuurman pleased with trend conversations, but realize time required to achieve sound and workable agreement. During evening brought Herremans and Critchley to date on informal conversations. Critchley to spend weekend Singapore with Chifley² and Burton³ en route London Australia.

Received Roem this morning. He said Leimena drawing up memorandum based on informal conversations which will constitute something of plan of procedure. Roem asked if UNCFI was going to recommend any program, pointing out it has such authority under SC Resolution. I told Roem we had taken initiative in calling Batavia discussions between parties and in giving our ideas in my opening remarks as to what discussions should cover. I had distributed questions to both parties giving lead in discussions on restoration. Our formal meetings had enabled both parties set forth their position. Thereafter, we had gotten leaders two parties together informally for ironing out major differences and deciding on over-all plan. I said we prefer continue in this fashion as long as progress being made. We shall have our own representatives on Preparatory Committee which we hope will be set up and sent Jogja shortly, and we can through them give definite suggestions. I said UNCFI will be continuing body at Batavia to carry on work here well as at Jogja during Hague Conference and will be responsible for achieving best implementation SC Resolution possible.

Called on Hatta 11 : 30 a. m. at his request. He said Jogja restoration still big problem. Said Sultan explained to Van Royen he could not assume responsibility for law and order Jogja unless entire residency restored as initial step. Pointed out Netherlands control only few towns and part of roads; that in remainder area Republican civil administration still functions; and that TNI troops have situation in hand except for bands Sjarifuddin Communists, some roving but principally centering around town Pakem between Jogja and Kaliurang. Hatta and Sultan both spoke with Van Royen re Maguwo, insisting if

¹ Repeated in telegram 376, April 29, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Joseph B. Chifley, Australian Prime Minister.

³ Dr. John W. Burton, Secretary, Australian Department of External Affairs.

Netherlands troops left to control airfield they would likely subject night attacks. Hatta said Van Royen expressed concern lest Republic might arrange for resumption foreign planes landing Maguwo in trade with Singapore, etc. Hatta said he definitely has no intention establishing air service from Jogja with foreign lands. Thought, however, it should not be required of him to put this in writing. He emphasized that if his government to be strong and effective in issuing cease-fire order and having support of Republicans in going Hague and there negotiating, he must not be called upon to sign away prerogatives or make embarrassing pledges.

I reminded Hatta I could insist on no more extensive restoration Republic initially than envisaged in SC directive March 23. I added, however, that if responsible Republicans including Sultan can give convincing arguments that only feasible plan is to restore entire residency as initial step, and if Netherlands willing accept this, I would not oppose. Hatta said if NethDel agrees to this, he explained to Van Royen he would not ask latter give further undertaking on implementation paragraph 4(F), but would request promise that Netherlands would issue no denial when Hatta explained publicly to Republic that restoration Jogja residency initial step in light SC Resolution January 28. Furthermore, Hatta would not initiate any move toward asking extension Republic administration beyond residency during period round-table conference. Hatta said cease-fire order would require troops stand where they are or be concentrated in barracks. Thought military and technical officials could work out details satisfactorily once basic decision taken. Said no demarcation line necessary.

Hatta said he learned through his associates and from BFO that Van Royen meeting opposition on part Beel in effort give pledge to RepDel that during Batavia and round-table conferences Netherlands will not proceed with setting up new *negaras* such as Tapanuli and Djambi or permit other existing *negaras* enlarge their territory at expense former Republican areas. Hatta considers such pledge essential.

We talked over question of formula. Of various ideas I advanced, I found following to be best received: that Roem as RepDel Chairman make statement in UNCFI meeting that RepDel authorized by Hatta and Sukarno state they give their personal assurances they favor issuance cease-fire order and acceptance round-table invitation soonest possible after restoration Republican Government Jogja and will insist thereon to Government. Hatta preferred Roem should make statement in behalf delegation rather than in name himself and Sukarno, but I argued in favor other method. It was agreed I should endeavor work out formula with Van Royen and Roem. Hatta said if agreement

could be reached on formula and on restoration Jogja residency as above outlined, he would be willing have this announced in UNCFI meeting and would then permit his delegation discuss arrangements for cease-fire and matters pertinent round-table conference. Said his delegation already preparing in agreement with Van Royen list questions on round-table which will be submitted formally through UNCFI or at UNCFI meeting formally by Van Royen. Hatta departs for Bangka 29th, 10 a. m., Sultan Jogja accompanying him. Latter plans return Batavia 2nd, and Van Royen 3rd, and perhaps go Jogja 4th. Hatta has no present plan for returning, but wants discussions move rapidly as possible as he thinks time against Republicans. He prefers I discuss matter of exploratory committee with Roem and Leimena.

Van Royen and Roem lunched together. Former phoned 2:15 unable for them discuss formula with me as planned since RepDel prefers first complete Leimena paper. Arranged Van Royen and Roem meet 29th 10:30 a. m. and join me noon. I told Van Royen Hatta and I had hoped get points of difference cleared prior Hatta's departure.

Van Royen came my quarters 2:30 to explain situation. Talk with Roem had centered on restoration entire Jogja residency, progressive withdrawals under 4(F), setting up no more *negaras* and arriving at formula for Hague conference and cease-fire. Details agreed with position set forth earlier in day by Roem and Hatta to me, except on two points. First, while Hatta said would seek no extension beyond residency during Batavia and Hague conference, Roem seeks statement by NethDel that UNCFI would work on this problem during conferences. Second point concerned *negaras*. Van Royen said that following long talk with Beel, latter had conceded to him not to give formal status of *negaras* to two areas Tapanuli and Djambi pending outcome Batavia and Hague conferences. These are provisionally organized and have representatives with observer status in BFO. Beel also promised to recognize no further *negaras* to be cut or enlarged from former Republican territory pending outcome conferences. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/5-149: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

URGENT

BATAVIA, May 1, 1949—11 a.m.

394. Gocus 680. Van Royen came noon 30th, remained 1 hour. NethDel has studied drafts I gave him 29th. He stated they were sug-

¹ Repeated in telegram 381, May 2, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

gesting some amendments thereto and preparing some drafts of their own all of which he hoped show me Sunday.

With reference my formula, he insisted he could not weaken on this as Roem requested. Said it was less than "ratification" formula which I had suggested at opening UNCFI meeting. He was not sure how it would be received by his government but was willing submit it as it stands and attempt influence his government accept it, supplemented by oral assurances of Hatta, Sukarno and Roem.

Reference sections Leimena's plan regarding connection between restored government Jogja and Republic territory outside Jogja area, Van Royen said his delegation agreed unanimously with him they could not consider this subject at present stage. They insisted this beyond scope March 23 directive and opens up whole matter paragraph 4 (F) SC resolution January 28 which he stated he could not possibly discuss. Consequently his people not drafting on this section. I told him I had studied documentation thereon but since his group did not see fit to draft thereon I would not. I preferred leave it to NethDel to state their position directly to RepDel on this contentious part Leimena's draft.

Confirmed we should meet 11 a.m. Sunday to go over draft material and have as much reconciliation on views as possible between Van Royen and Roem. Van Royen would favor Roem taking any draft material to Bangka. He thinks we should urge however that Hatta return from Bangka to Batavia on Monday with Roem. Van Royen pointed out important topics on which Roem has assumed position different from that which Hatta had taken in talking with either Van Royen or me. Subject on which this most seriously occurred was extent Republic administration should be restored. Hatta had told me that if residency Jogja restored initially he would not ask any further restoration thru UNCFI recommendations or otherwise during Batavia and Hague conference. Van Royen had been given by Hatta impression regarding status desired for Republic civil servants presently in areas occupied by Netherlands in conflict with Roem position set forth in Leimena plan. Van Royen insists essential get Hatta here and two of us have direct and decisive talks with him on 4 or 5 main points of difference. He said Hatta had agreed with him when here as to identity these points. He had not included much of material set forth in Leimena plan presented too late for any discussion thereof by Hatta on his visit. Van Royen feels that if we can get these few points adjusted with Hatta himself technical groups should be able work out any arrangements necessary. He is especially anxious we should set up investigating committee to send Jogja soonest.

Referring story Sultan approached from Netherlands sources view to taking over matters law and order Jogja residency, Van Royen said possible one or more approaches may have been made to Sultan some weeks ago when Netherlands officials Batavia hoped a *daerah* might be formed out of that area. Said Stock had resigned and doubted there had been any approach to Sultan with approbations Batavia officials in sense RepDel indicated.

To my inquiry regarding territory Republic Government may have on initial restoration, Van Royen thought he should not go beyond city and immediate environs. Said Roem had shown too great proclivity take everything which we have handed him as basis for bargaining including formula which I had drawn up in consultation with Hatta. Said he had been favorably impressed by Sultan's approach and if RepDel would respond in promising manner on my formula and refrain from insisting on 4 (F) arguments, he might be able go beyond limited area prescribed by SC directive. He thought maximum limit possible would be residency as whole and this could be only by steps and provided things go well in area initially restored.

Van Royen said Hatta figured 2 weeks required after government returns Jogja to have necessary meetings and take decisions on cease-fire, Hague conference, etc. He thought after third week should be possible for his group proceed Hague. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

856d.00/5-249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW DELHI, May 2, 1949—10 p. m.

494. Menon, at present in charge External Affairs, asked me to see him today. He showed me a telegram received from Nehru and Bajpai dated April 29 instructing him to discuss Indonesia with me. He was asked to tell me that in opinion GOI latest Republic offer to Dutch was eminently fair and it was not seen how Republicans could well make further concessions. GOI was informing Republicans to this effect and promising its support.

Telegram also requested Menon to convey through me to my government hope of Prime Minister that US would not bring further pressure to bear on Republicans to soften their attitude. Exertion of such further pressure could only encourage Dutch stubbornness. Now seemed appropriate time for US and other great powers to insist that Dutch accept Republic proposals and agree to unconditional re-establishment Republican government for whole residency of Jogjakarta.

Menon said that he was not in position to discuss this matter in

detail since he had not been following Indonesian problem. I agreed to convey message.

Sent Department; repeated Batavia and The Hague.

HENDERSON

501.BC Indonesia/5-349: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary
of State*¹

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, May 1, 1949—11 a. m.

400. Gocus 682. Roem and RepDel members returned evening 2nd from Bangka without Hatta. Roem came later and stayed two hours. His group had amended and supplemented draft material Roem, Van Royen and I had prepared. Roem stated this represented final Repub position and no need Hatta come explain it. Roem asked that I discuss RepDel draft with Van Royen alone.

Spent hour and half with Van Royen this morning. Showed and explained RepDel document. Van Royen in turn gave me document containing NethDel amendments and supplements to our joint draft.

I then received Roem alone for two hours. I gave him Van Royen's reaction to RepDel draft and handed him NethDel draft. I explained that there were only two important points of divergence: First, that NethDel desires word "insist" while RepDel will not go beyond "urge" in indicating position Sukarno and Hatta undertake to advance with Repub Government when once restored Jogja in matter issuing cease-fire, cooperating towards peace, law and order and participating roundtable. Second matter concerns Repub's request NethDel recognize connection between restored government Jogja and Repub territory outside Jogja area not occupied by Netherlands.

Roem said he could yield no further. Said Natsir had already quit delegation, feeling he could not support its policy. Roem regretted losing this fellow Masjumi leader and said he would have to quit chairmanship if pressed on these two points. I insisted neither Van Royen nor I desired this and I was sure amicable arrangement could be worked out. It was agreed Roem should consult his delegation and then inform me whether he desired see me again or would be ready talk with Van Royen directly on differences. Idea advanced that if Roem found he could not reach understanding with Van Royen latter or both should proceed Bangka to lay matter before Hatta. Roem dislikes having to consult Hatta again. Asked I accompany him and Van Royen if trip decided upon. I have explained to both parties that

¹ Repeated in telegram 389, May 4, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

while chairman I am willing continue be intermediary as they have requested but unless they can clear up differences shortly I must take matter into UNCFI.

I phoned Van Royen later regarding Roem's position. I suggested possible way out on one of the two points at issue.

Sultan Jogja had lunched with Van Royen. Latter had endeavored solicit assistance Sultan in straightening out contentious points, promising in turn deal generously in restoring Repub administration Jogja residency.

Van Royen tells me confidentially Schuurman will be replaced by de Beus when Van Royen leaves Batavia. Latter desires particularly have de Beus with SC experience here to work with UNCFI representatives during Hague Conference. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/5-349 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

RESTRICTED US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1949—5 p. m.

253. Usgoc 359. Despite US opposition Indo item transferred to UNGA Ad Hoc Comite May 2. This means full debate Indo question may begin any time.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 382 to The Hague.

501.BC Indonesia/5-349

Position Paper Prepared by the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 3, 1949.

US/A/AC. 24/57

THE INDONESIAN CASE

I. PROBLEM

To determine the United States position in the General Assembly on the Indonesian question.

The Security Council is actively exercising the functions assigned to it in the Charter with respect to this problem. Under Article 12 of the Charter, therefore, the General Assembly "shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests." The role of the Assembly thus is limited here to discussion.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The following recommendations are made on the assumption that the Batavian talks are continuing and that progress is being made at the time the question is reached on the agenda.

1) It is desirable, in the interests of a speedy settlement, at least to defer debate to as late in the session as possible in order to take due account of developments in Batavia. The Department is committed to this position so long as the parties show continuing evidence of good faith in the negotiations.

2) If, in the judgment of the Department, there appears to be a reasonable chance of success and the Dutch evidence a real desire to reach a settlement, the United States position will be that there should be no discussion in the General Assembly on the ground that it would be harmful to the work of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in that it might force the parties to take more extreme positions in the General Assembly discussions than they are taking in the Batavia talks.

3) If the question is debated, the United States representative should not take the lead in the debate. When he does speak, he should:

a) Emphasize how, from the time of the Linggadjadi agreement, the United States has accepted and endorsed proposals for the early creation of a free and independent United States of Indonesia.

b) Describe how the United States has in every way sought to contribute to the achievement of that end. It has sent top level representatives to participate in the work of the Committee of Good Offices and of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. These representatives have actively contributed to the work of the bodies as shown by the du Bois-Critchley plan, the Cochran plan and the activities of Ambassador Cochran in bringing the parties together in Batavia.

c) Recount the progress being made in the Batavia talks.

d) Reaffirm our support of the 28 January Resolution and the 23 March directive, including the necessity of the restoration of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta.

e) Urge a speedy settlement of the immediate preliminary issues and the convening of the Hague Conference to work out arrangements for an early transfer of sovereignty.

4) If the present situation continues, the United States will neither support nor oppose a condemnatory resolution, but will abstain from voting if such a resolution is introduced. The general opinion may be expressed that no resolution should be of such character as to cause unnecessary firmness in the positions of the parties and prevent the flexibility desired in free negotiations. However, under no conditions, should the United States be put in the position of condoning Dutch policy in Indonesia or of guaranteeing the success of the Batavian talks.

B. The above recommendations are made on the assumption that the talks will be continuing and that there are evidences of substantial

progress. If, on the other hand, the talks have definitely broken down, an impasse has been reached, or if in the opinion of the Department no progress is being made, the Department will re-examine its position, giving due weight to the respective responsibility of each party. It is believed unlikely that this situation will develop during the course of the present session of the General Assembly. If the talks should break down or an impasse develop, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia itself will probably make positive recommendations. These recommendations, together with the views of the United States Representative will be given careful consideration by the Department in the reformulation of its position.

C. Procedural Recommendation :

There is no question but that in the present case the Security Council is actively "exercising . . . ¹ the functions assigned to it" and that the General Assembly may not make any recommendation with regard to the dispute (Charter, Article 12). It is the opinion of the Department, however, that the Assembly has not only the power of discussing the problem under Article 10 and 11, but can give expression to the result of its discussions in an appropriate resolution, so long as no recommendation is made. Although certain resolutions expressive of opinion may be undesirable and in effect interfere with the effective handling of the case by the Security Council and UNCFI, any opposition thereto should be based not on lack of power of the Assembly, but rather on the inexpediency of the exercise of the power in such case.

D. Further recommendations will be made as required by the course of events in Batavia.

¹ Omission as in the original.

856d.00/5-249 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1949—7 p. m.

330. Urtel 494, May 2. Re disclosures made you by Menon on current GOI position Indo dispute, request you see Bajpai or Nehru soonest and inform him that from info available Dept (1) issues in dispute in prelim conf Batavia have been substantially narrowed in past week (2) terms offered by Dutch in discussions indicate that compliance

¹ Repeated as 254, Usgoc 360, to Batavia, and as 383 to The Hague. Telegram 255, Usgoc 361, May 4, 5 p. m., to Batavia, advised Mr. Cochran that the Department wished him to "give Henderson benefit of your comments" on the Indian approach (501.BC Indonesia/5-249).

with SC Mar 23 directive likely to be achieved (3) Repub working paper on restoration Jogja to which it assumed Menon referred looks to settlement issues beyond immed objectives Mar 23 directive and (4) in view of apparently favorable progress of prelim conf at Batavia it would be unfortunate at this time if there were to be any unduly rigid position on either side which would seriously delay holding substantive negots at Hague (which SC has considered may be held there in conformity Jan 28 res).

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/5-449: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, May 4, 1949—5 p. m.

403. Gocus 683. Roem, Leimena and Djuanda talked with me for one hour last night. Expressed disappointment in Netherlands' revision draft material. Said their talks with Hatta had established final RepDel position. Roem said they were considering going Bangka and returning RepDel mandate to Hatta since they feared they could not arrive at agreement with NethDel. I said entirely wrong think of such step. I pointed out that there had been no direct conversations between Van Royen and Roem since each had transmitted to other through me his revision of original draft material. I was sure Van Royen could make certain changes in his draft and said its normal course of negotiations for final draft to be reached through each side setting forth its ideas and then getting together for reconciliation. Roem said he would consult his delegation and let me hear soonest.

This morning I brought Herremans and Critchley to date with respect progress informal talks in which I have acted as intermediary at request chairmen two parties. I told him [them] I hoped get two chairmen together today in another effort reach agreement on draft. I said if this failed I would suggest to chairmen they consult their governments on their respective positions or come into UNCFI meeting and state them formally.

Van Royen for NethDel and Roem, Leimena, Djuanda, Supomo and Pringgo Digdo for RepDel met with me 11:30 to 1:30 today. Went over NethDel and RepDel drafts sentence by sentence. Reconciled some points in good atmosphere and each side took certain suggestions under consideration. Are to consult their delegations and meet again with me 5:30 this afternoon in effort achieve further and perhaps full reconciliation.

¹ Repeated in telegram 388, May 4, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

Van Royen and I entirely mindful possibility early discussion Indonesian question UNGA and doing utmost reach accord soonest. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/5-549: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

BATAVIA, May 5, 1949—5 p. m.

410. Gocus 685: Van Royen and Roem each with five members respective delegations met with me for one and half hours last evening. Set forth positions on points taken under advisement after forenoon meeting. Progress made in reaching accord.

Brought Critchley to date last night and informed Herremans this morning of yesterday's proceedings.

Despatched Navy plane today returning Sultan to Jogja and permitting Laoh spend day there.

This forenoon Netherlands and Republic groups six each met with me for two hours. Agreement reached subject to approval by Bangka and Hague of text statements to be made formally in UNCFI meeting by Republic delegation and Netherlands delegation chairmen, except on point of extent territory to be restored. Explanation thereof and of secret understanding on supplementing "urge" given hereinafter.

Following text statement to be made by Republic delegation chairman:

"As chairman of Republic delegation I am authorized by President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta to give their personal assurances that they favor, in conformity with SC's resolution 28 January and its directive 23 March: (1) issuance of an order to Republic armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare; (2) cooperating in restoration peace and maintenance law and order; and (3) participation in a round-table conference at Hague with view to accelerate unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to USI. President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta undertake that they will urge adoption such a policy by Government of Republic of Indonesia soon as possible after its restoration Jogja."

Foregoing statement supplemented by oral undertaking given by Hatta to Van Royen and Cochran that once returned Jogja Hatta would go far as risking vote confidence for his government on point of policy indicated. Furthermore Roem gave his oral pledge as chairman Republic delegation and as one of leaders Masjumi party to Van

¹ Repeated in telegram 395, May 6, 6 p. m., to The Hague, in 338 to New Delhi, and in 63 to Canberra.

Royen and Cochran that he would use his best efforts in both capacities in support said policy. It was agreed further that in addition to permitting publication formal statement above quoted Netherlands Government would be free communicate secretly and not for publication information re oral undertakings of Hatta and Roem to appropriate committee Netherlands Parliamentary body dealing with Indonesian question.

Following text statement to be made by Netherlands delegation chairman:

"1. Netherlands delegation authorized to state that, in view of undertaking just announced by Dr. Roem, it agrees to return of Republic Government to Jogja.

Netherlands delegation agrees further to setting up of one or more joint committees, under auspices UNCFI, for such purposes as: (a) to make necessary investigations and preparations preliminary to return of Republic Government to Jogja; and (b) to study and advise on measures to be taken in order effectuate cessation guerrilla warfare and cooperation in maintenance law and order.

2. Netherlands Government agrees that Republic Government shall be free and facilitated to exercise its appropriate functions in an area consisting of blank, and that this is a step taken in light of SC's directive March 23.

3. Netherlands Government reaffirms its willingness to insure immediate discontinuance of all military operations and to release immediately and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested by them since 17 December 1948 in Republic Indonesia.

4. Without prejudice to right of self-determination of Indonesian peoples as recognized by Linggadjati and *Renville* principles, Netherlands Government will refrain from establishment or recognition of *negaras* or *daerahs* on territory under Republic control prior 19 December 1948 and from expansion of *negaras* and *daerahs* affecting said territory.

5. Netherlands Government favors existence of Republic as a state to take its place in USI. When a provisional Republic [*representative*] body for whole of Indonesia is to be established and it consequently becomes necessary to determine number of representatives from Republic to said body, this number will be one-half of total membership exclusive of Republic's membership.

6. Consonant with intent of SC's ruling of 23 March on subject of 'proposed round-table conference at Hague to end that negotiations contemplated by resolution 28 January may be held soon as possible'.

Netherlands Government is fully prepared to do its utmost that this conference take place immediately after return of Republic Government to Jogja. At this conference discussions will take place as to way in which to accelerate the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to USI in accordance with *Renville* principles.

7. In light of necessary cooperation in restoration of peace and maintenance of law and order, Netherlands Government agrees that in all those areas outside residency Jogja where civil, police and other officials of Government Indonesia are not operating at present, Repub-

lic civil, police and other officials, where still operating, will remain in function.

It is understood that Netherlands authorities shall afford to Republic Government such facilities as may reasonably be required by that government for communication and consultation with all persons in Indonesia, including those serving in the civil and military services of Republic, and that technical details will have to be worked out by the parties under auspices of UNCFI."

Reference "blank" in paragraph 2. Republic delegation draft calls for "residency (Daerah Istimewa) of Jogja" while Netherlands delegation draft specifies "Jogja and its immediate environs". Roem took position language of paragraph 2 acceptable only if arrangement is initially for all residency. Van Royen took position that unless language stands as quoted he would be obliged reconsider certain concessions already made elsewhere in document. Agreement now depends on willingness Netherlands Government restore Jogja residency. Van Royen consulting Beel, Spoor and other local officials thereon and cabling their views with above quoted texts to Hague for final decision. He indicated readiness his delegation recommend generous policy as possible but reminded Roem there has been Netherlands objection from start discussions to including Maguwo Airport in restored area. Roem insists agreement impossible unless Maguwo included. Republic delegation visting leaders Bangka Friday for consultation and approval above draft. Netherlands delegation anticipates Hague instructions by Friday night or Saturday morning. Republic delegation and Netherlands delegation would then meet informally with me to prepare, if Hague and Bangka agree on texts, for formal UNCFI meeting urgently hoped possible Saturday or Sunday. At UNCFI meeting chairman would ask delegations report results their informal discussions. Prepared statements above quoted would be made. Chairman would then ask Van Royen and Roem confirm his understanding that statements they had just made were agreed upon in consultation and each finds himself in accord with position set forth by other. Plan would be to follow UNCFI meeting with press release giving texts statements and announcing early sending of preparatory committee Jogja while UNCFI discussions Batavia would continue and deal with other agenda matters. These would include methods for achieving cease fire, law and order, time and conditions Hague conference, etc. Signed Cochran.²

LIVENGOOD

² In telegram Gadel 30, May 6, 8 p. m., to New York, the Department added: "if agreement in Batavia is reached and announced over weekend and if nevertheless substantial number of powers still want to debate Indonesia problem, US shld not oppose debate but shld use its influence to direct it on lines of congratulation and encouragement to parties to proceed further with details." (501.BC Indonesia/5-649)

856d.00/5-549: Telegram

The Chargé in Australia (Foster) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NIACT

CANBERRA, May 5, 1949—8 p. m.

88. Burton, who returned with Prime Minister Chifley from London this week, sent for me today and expounded for an hour the present Australian position on Indonesia. He spoke with unusual earnestness and none of his customary sardonic flippancy. Said he was communicating to me formally for transmission to highest levels Washington the views of Prime Minister and Australian Government, but added Makin¹ would supplement by call at Department.

Burton said as background that in London Chifley expressed in strong language to other Commonwealth Prime Ministers and senior British Cabinet Ministers following thesis: the Indonesian problem has been handled very badly from every point of view; on basis of Critchley's reports from Batavia, repeatedly proved sound in past, Australia satisfied that Dutch are making no general effort reach settlement; there will be no such effort until UK and US compel Dutch make it; meanwhile situation Southeast Asia growing worse all the time.

Burton said he believed Chifley made deep impression on Commonwealth Prime Ministers and especially on Attlee,² Bevin and Cripps.³ Added Chifley told British in effect it was time for UK give cooperation to Australia if it expected continuing cooperation, for example loans in return. Remarked incidentally that Chifley refused attend London meeting on aid Burma, not for reason suggested by press, but only because he believed any country furnishing arms to Burma could expect same outcome as US had with Nationalists in China. Said graft and corruption in Burma far worse than ever in China.

Burton said Nehru and Chifley see eye to eye on Indonesia.

Burton showed me secret telegram being sent today to CRO London and Australian Mission New York, Batavia, Ottawa, Wellington and New Delhi substance as follows: Australia has full and incontrovertible "appreciation" from Critchley. Negotiations between Dutch and Republicans continue but are "informal and completely non-committal". Dutch insist that before restoration at Jogjakarta there must be cessation guerilla warfare and agreement on Hague Convention; SC resolution does not admit such conditions. Meanwhile Dutch make no undertakings re prisoners, cessation hostilities or return Republican area to Republican administration as required by SC resolution.

¹ Norman J. O. Makin, Australian Ambassador.

² Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

³ Sir Stafford Cripps, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Cochran bringing strong pressure on Republicans to make concessions which they obviously cannot afford, thus permitting further Dutch stalling. Change in US policy probably because of change in China; US now evidently wants force Republicans to settle. But this is fatal mistake. Meanwhile Chinese in Indonesia have all joined Republicans. Dutch are playing for time so can argue in GA next week that negotiations are in progress and just not be embarrassed by GA discussion. Australia is "disturbed" by Atlantic Pact group all voting recently against GA discussion Indonesia. US and UK must once and for all "bring Dutch to adopt realistic attitude regardless of their alleged domestic difficulties". Australia will now insist on GA discussion and hopes other Commonwealth governments will adopt similar attitude for sake minimizing damage Dutch are doing to interests of western countries in Southeast Asia (end Burton's telegram).

Burton said with apparently full conviction that UK has at last realized gravity Indonesian situation and will act restrain Dutch. He gave no intimation, however, what action he believes UK will take or what actions or sanctions Australia is prepared to adopt. He reiterated what he has told me in past that Australia does not want Dutch leave Indonesia (Embteles 277, 278, 280, December 20, 21 and 28 and 1 January 5⁴).

Please instruct my reply Burton concerning our present position re Indonesia.

Sent by Courier to Wellington, New Delhi and Rangoon.

Sent Department; repeated Batavia, USDel New York, London, Ottawa.

FOSTER

⁴None printed, but see memorandum of conversation on December 20, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 589.

501.BC Indonesia/5-549: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1949—7 p. m.

64. Urtel 88, May 5. Far from pessimism expounded by Burton, tels from Batavia indicate very substantial progress has been made in negots between Dutch and Repubs and it would appear agreement has been reached between them with respect to majority points raised Austral secret tel to CRO London and Austral mission NY, Batavia, etc. You may use foregoing in replying to Burton adding that in view

¹Repeated as 398 to The Hague, 1562 to London, 339 to New Delhi, 60 to Ottawa, 97 to Rangoon, 53 to Wellington, 263 to Batavia, and 256 to New York (USUN).

progress which has apparently been made at Batavia it is difficult to understand criticism of Cochran who Dept considers has been consistently impartial, and also implication US policy towards Indonesia has changed. In this connection you may state US has unwaveringly pursued objectives of SC Res Jan 28 and SC directive Mar 23 which in essence stress desirability parties to dispute returning to negot status and you may point out that prelim negots at Batavia have kept in forefront SC directive Mar 23 which states negot substantive matters at Hague fully consonant with SC Res Jan 28.

Urinfo only Batavia's 410 May 5 re progress of negots has been repeated to you.

* * * * *

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/5-649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT
 NIACT

BATAVIA, May 6, 1949—9 p. m.

413. Gocus 687. Brought Herremans and Critchley to date this morning on latest informal talks between NethDel and RepDel. With Herremans discussed Maguwo question.

Phoned Van Royen and let him know that if issue raised I thought he would find UNCFI unanimous in opinion Maguwo should be considered as part "Jogja and its immediate environs" on ground that municipal airport is integral part of city whether 5 or 20 km. from city limits.

Van Royen said question would rise as to whether in event whole residency restored Republic should be required meet Montreal Convention rules for civil airports and give undertaking in this sense possibly with agreement have Maguwo controlled or supervised by international board including a Netherlands representative and military observers.

I said technically incompetent give immediate opinion. I agreed with Van Royen airport if given Republic should not be used, as Netherlands fears, for bringing in arms or engaging in smuggling operations. I thought we should take precautions prevent any such development. Am studying what documentation available including ICAO convention on international civil aviation.

Roem phoned 5:30 this afternoon his group returned from Bangka

¹ Repeated in telegram 402, May 9, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

where he had obtained approval to texts (Gocus 685²) as "integrated whole". This means Hatta accepts text providing residency Jogja restored initially.

I phoned this information to Van Royen immediately. He said texts cabled The Hague where Cabinet meeting late today for consideration. Said still difficulties Netherlands side to clear up but hoped be able have UNCFI meeting Sunday. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Telegram 410, May 5, p. 401.

501.BC Indonesia/5-649 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

THE HAGUE, May 6, 1949—9 p. m.

383. Lovink advised tonight under reference to statements prepared by both delegations in Batavia (neither of which Embassy has seen) that Cabinet has authorized Van Royen to proceed on basic statement prepared by him. Lovink expressed great satisfaction in being able to communicate this decision, saying he was confident it would enable reaching of agreement.¹

BARUCH

¹ Telegram 399, May 6, 9 p. m., to The Hague, conveyed Mr. Acheson's message to Foreign Minister Stikker: "I know you will fully understand how pleased I am with the progress made at Batavia and how appreciative I am of the part which I know you have played in achieving it." (856d.00/5-649) In response, Mr. Stikker expressed deep appreciation for the sentiments conveyed (telegram 389, May 9, 3 p. m., from The Hague; 856d.00/5-949).

501.BC Indonesia/5-749 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

BATAVIA, May 7, 1949—4 p. m.

415. Gocus 689. Van Royen phoned 8:30 this morning approval received from Hague but one point to clear. I called on Critchley and phoned Herremans to bring them to date. Van Royen came 9:15. Said point was that of obtaining assurance from RepDel that Maguwo airport would not be used for bringing in arms or illicit flights. He agreed

¹ Repeated in telegram 406, May 10, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

with me this should not go in UNCFI record in view Hatta's declared position thereon (Gocus 677,² paragraph 3). I suggested each chairman write other identical letter not to be published. I dictated draft thereof and Van Royen took copy to be studied by NethDel.

Roem came 10:15. I told him of Netherlands approval texts subject assurance from RepDel on Maguwo. Gave him copy above-mentioned draft letter for study by RepDel.

At 11 had Critchley and Herremans meet with me. Had them read texts statements by two chairmen. I told them I anticipated posing following question after two statements: "Will the two chairmen kindly confirm my understanding that the statements which they have just made were agreed upon in consultation, that each finds himself in accord with the position set forth by the other, and that the statements are hereby formally confirmed and accepted." I showed draft letter re Maguwo and explained still subject approval by parties. Obtained colleagues' approval proposed press release.

Roem with three and Van Royen with one delegation member met with me informally at noon. Agreed on following text my draft letter: "It is agreed that with return of Republican Government to Jogja and with restoration of residency Jogja to Republican administration, airfield of Maguwo will be operated strictly and solely as a civilian port. It is agreed that there shall be no traffic in arms or ammunition in or through this airport, or any flights which are not in conformity with existing international conventions on civil aviation and rules established by the International Civil Aviation Organization. It is agreed that airport of Maguwo shall not be used by military aircraft of either party except in case such aircraft is in distress.

Finally, it is agreed that the operation of Maguwo airfield will be subject to observation by the military observers of UNCFI."

Also agreed on procedure for UNCFI meeting and press communiqué to be released thereafter. Meeting scheduled for 5 p. m. today.

Reference draft text NethDel statement (Gocus 685³), paragraph 1 (b) should be amended read "cooperation in the restoration of peace and in the maintenance of law and order." Blank space. Two should read "the residency of Jogjakarta". Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Telegram 386, April 28, p. 391.

³ Telegram 410, May 5, p. 401.

501.BC Indonesia/5-749: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, May 7, 1949—8 p. m.

URGENT NIACT

416. Gocus 690. UNCFI meeting 5 p. m. today carried out as anticipated Gocus 689.²

After my question as to confirming and accepting statements, both chairmen replied affirmatively. I then said: "May I express my genuine appreciation of the excellent spirit in which the chairmen and their delegates have worked in their informal discussions and congratulate them warmly upon the results achieved. I think we should hereinafter refer to these results as 'the Van Royen-Roem statements'."

Van Royen replied: "I am happy to state on my part that my government is gratified at the first positive and hopeful results which this preliminary conference has obtained. I feel they augur well for the future. I wish assure Dr. Roem, as chairman his delegation, that agreement we have just reached will be carried out on our part with fairness and loyalty and that we shall see to it that no reprisals are taken and that no victimization occurs against anyone belonging to the other party. Allow me, Sir, to express before I end these brief remarks, my appreciation and sincere thanks to your commission, and more especially to yourself, for UNCFI's constant and fortunately fruitful efforts to assist the parties in arriving at an agreement."

Roem said in turn: "I am grateful for the expressions of Dr. Van Royen. We too shall implement the agreement in the same spirit. We share Dr. Van Royen's feelings, and shall do our utmost working in the same direction".

I stated understood that two delegations desire to meet informally on Monday afternoon May 9 to name members to two committees envisaged in statements just made and to plan work thereof. Furthermore members to be named by and from commission itself to those committees will join the conversations. While its preparatory committee is working, commission will continue to meet in Batavia for discussion of other items of agenda.

After meeting exchange of letters on Maguwo Airport took place privately.

¹ Repeated in telegram 405, May 10, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra*. For letter dated May 7 from the Netherlands Representative (J. W. M. Snouck Hurgronje) to the President of the UN Security Council, quoting statements of the Netherlands and Republic of Indonesia as read at the meeting, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 22, 1949, pp. 653-654 (UN document S/1319, May 7). For press release issued on May 9 giving the U.S. Government's approval, see *ibid.*, p. 654. Mr. Acheson sent Mr. Cochran a telegram (266, May 9, 2 p. m.) of congratulation. (123 H. Merle Cochran)

Meeting was entirely successful and everyone in best spirits. With two committees to be set up Monday, progress should be made rapidly. I plan utilize Abbey³ as deputy on preparatory committees. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

³ Glenn A. Abbey, Consul at Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/5-1149: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

BATAVIA, May 11, 1949—6 p. m.

438. Gocus 698. Committee One¹ left for Jogja this morning.

Aneta Batavia today announced Beel's resignation (Gocus 697²) submitted Queen and Schuurman to go Netherlands on leave before new assignment to be succeeded by De Beus (Gocus 682³).

Gieben called to discuss policy for Committee Two⁴ with hope we may be able do something reduce hostilities even before formal cease-fire orders. He was to consult his military people later in a. m., on ideas we developed and then see Leimena before this afternoon's committee meeting.

Visited British Consul General. He pleased with May 7 agreement; asked what I knew of possibility Van Royen succeeding Beel at least for present. Replied negatively.

Van Royen busy over Beel's resignation but lunching with Roem Thursday for exchange ideas on how start discussion round-table matters.

Met with Committee Two this afternoon. Some progress made. Chairman Gieben and Leimena will try drafting together before calling for another meeting with UNCFI participation. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ "On return to Jogja."

² Telegram 430, May 10, not printed.

³ Telegram 400, May 3, p. 396.

⁴ "On peace and order."

501.BC Indonesia/5-949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1949—6 p. m.

70. Urtel 96, May 9.¹ Ur info only, Cochran's views US contribution physical restitution Repub have been solicited. However, you may say

¹ Not printed.

to Burton our general understanding Neth will assist initially in providing housekeeping equipment. Moreover in absence direct request by Repub this matter wld appear be in hands UNCFI Comm and US will of course discharge responsibilities assigned to it by Comm.

Ur discretion you may add it regrettable Austral attitude toward May 6 [7] agreement so pessimistic as such attitude not calculated increase likelihood its success. We believe all members UNCFI share responsibility make sustained effort maximize success that agreement by encouraging not one party alone as Burton suggests but both parties to comply with spirit and terms of agreement so as not to prejudice commencement and successful conclusion substantive polit negots at Hague.

Foregoing connection Austral cld usefully influence Repub bend every effort toward desired objective with emphasis on that objective rather than on peripheral matters. During Batavia negots US has consistently kept foregoing in mind and welcomes Austral cooperation in achieving UNCFI's real purpose.

ACHESON

S56d.00/5-1949 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, May 19, 1949—6 p. m.

440. Boon read us today extracts from latest Batavia report re situation Djocja. Main points were:

(1) Serious situation created by desire of 25,000 at minimum to leave Republican area. Boon remarked that this is first tangible indication to world that many Indonesians do not look forward to return of Republicans to power and that exodus from Republican territory, although not as great as Pakistan-Indian evacuations, are likely to reach into hundreds of thousands.

(2) Netherlands troops will not leave Djocja area until evacuations effected.

(3) Situation in Djocja "not satisfactory" and liable to become increasingly dangerous because of Communist activity in neighborhood. Communists already filtering into Sultanate, and their troops are well disciplined, well fed and well armed. Tan Malakka seems to have effective control.

Boon said he finds it very difficult to decide whether or not Soekarno and Hatta will be able to maintain themselves after restoration. He added that it is folly for any Dutchman to hope they will be thrown out, because, if they were, a Communist government would be set up.

¹ Repeated in telegram 292, Usgoc 370, May 20, 9 p. m., to Batavia.

The Van Royen-Roem agreement means concessions on both sides, and for the Republicans to restore and keep their authority the necessity of living up to agreement, principally because of Communist disaffection and activities.²

BARUCH

² Telegram 443, May 19, 6 p. m., from The Hague, reported appointment of A. H. J. Lovink, Secretary-General of the Netherlands Foreign Office, as High Representative of the Crown in Indonesia. He arrived at Batavia on June 2.

501.BC Indonesia/5-1949: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1949—6 p. m.

287. For Cochran: Sukanto, Chief Repub Police, called Dept May 17 to renew request made Oct 19 for carbines, sten and bren guns, and pistols (also ammo), tear gas bombs, jeeps, weapons carriers and motorcycles for equipping Repub Police. Original request was for armament for five thousand police but ltr of authorization from Hatta brought by Sukanto upped figure to ten thousand, which latter thought insufficient. Sukanto maintained mil test of Repub by insurgent elements might come very soon and urged it vital for future Repub be able make its auth unquestionable from start if drift militant elements toward Commies to be prevented.

Dept officers expressed sympathetic understanding situation Repub Govt this context but pointed out (1) Dept understanding was that Dutch obligated by Roem[-] van Royen agreement provide essential needs Repub period pending conclusion Hague negots and (2) two outstanding obstacles to fulfillment request existed in (a) US recognition Neth sovereignty interim period and (b) current US policy supply no arms for use Indo, which had applied Dutch requests for arms since end Pacific War. Talk concluded on understanding. Dept wld solicit your views re needs Repub in light agreement and wld consider matter further.¹

Urinfo, arms wld be exceedingly difficult procure. Mil Assistance Program which wld provide necessary authorization for arms transfers on grant basis and for procurement assistance on cash reimbursable basis not yet submitted Congress and Congressional action not certain. Even after passage Indo needs whether on grant or cash basis

¹ In telegram 471, Gocus 705, May 21, 9 a. m., from Batavia, Mr. Cochran again pointed out he was "working closely with Van Royen toward insuring for Sultan and Sukarno best equipment possible for Jogja residency police" and agreed "entirely with Department's explanation of situation and oppose US now shipping arms and ammunition to Indonesians." (501.BC Indonesia/5-2149)

wld have to be balanced against other requirements. US stocks insufficient supply all needs. Consequently, competition will be great. At same time, Dept aware Repub may be faced crisis well before then and naturally does not wish run unnecessary risk Indo nationalist elements becoming casualties of expanding Commie power SEA.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/5-2549 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, May 25, 1949—9 a. m.

478. Gocus 710. Van Royen, Gieben, Roem and Leimena met with me afternoon 24th. Gieben and Leimena told difficulties in Committee 2 drafting on peace and order. Van Royen and Roem explained their respective positions. Leimena stressed need for Simatupang. Van Royen telegraphed Jacob instructing cooperate fullest towards sending Simatupang or other Republican Military expert from Jogja to Batavia soonest. Van Royen and Roem asked me draft toward reconciling views far as possible in meantime. We meet 5 p. m., today to go over what I produce.

Reference paragraph 3, Gocus 707.² Van Royen told me heart attack, suffered by Lt. General Spoor morning 23rd while conferring with staff, complicated by bronchitis. Spoor hospitalized critical condition and unlikely fit for duty for several months. Major General Buurman Van Vreeden appointed Acting Army Commander Indonesia. Beel visited Spoor night 23rd to inform him of royal decree May 23 promoting him to General signed by Queen shortly before word his illness announced.

Reference final paragraph, Gocus 709.² I told Van Royen last night Roem under impression Netherlands Delegation agreeable to formal meetings round table being presided by UNCFI representatives. I desired confirmation this point since I had different understanding. Van Royen said this entirely incorrect and Blom would inform Supomo or Roem accordingly. He said Blom and Supomo getting on well with talks on round table plans but there could be no thought of Netherlands Government permitting UNCFI preside at meetings called by Netherlands Government at Hague where entire Netherlands cabinet will presumably constitute Netherlands Delegation. As Department aware, I have opposed Republican and Aus-

¹ Repeated in telegram 452, May 25, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Not printed.

tralian Delegation ideas of UNCFI representatives presiding or directing round table.

Colonel Carlock returned from Jogja last night. Reported progress made in discussions and Netherlands Military planning begin withdrawal troops from Wonosari 30th.

Hoogstraten told me last night agreement being reached with Republicans on currency question. First step will be Netherlands provide republic 6 million florins NEI currency. Netherlands Delegation endeavoring convince Republican Delegation printing Republican currency should not be revived. Machinery therefore had been brought from Republican territory to Batavia following occupation. Initial printing would require six weeks. Furthermore Hague authorities strongly oppose increasing circulation Republican currency. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/5-2649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, May 26, 1949—6 p. m.

482. Gocus 711. Gieben called forenoon 25th to leave Netherlands suggestions for revision draft material Committee Two on peace and order. Leimena and Roem followed with their suggestions. Raised question of cease hostilities order to Republican adherents operating outside *Benville* territories. They had discussed this with Anak Agung, Hamid and other BFO representatives. I asked Roem hasten letter leaving discretion to UNCFI for inviting BFO into discussions in order chairman Hamid could be informed of prospective invitation in time communicate with Mansur before second Sumatran conference opens 27th and thus try prevent further division between Sumatran leaders and remainder BFO and Republicans.

General Spoor died 12:15 noon 25th.

Abbey returned from Jogja with Netherlands and UNCFI members Committee One 25th. Republican members with Austr[al]ian and Belgian military experts returned 26th. Abbey said good progress made on reaching agreements main problems. UNCFI press release on accomplishments Committee One tonight. Sultan unable to date to reach Simatupang. Abbey stressed to Sultan Leimena's need for military advisor Batavia soonest. Evacuation civilians from Jogja now between thousand and 1500 daily. Hope reach

¹ Repeated in telegram 465, May 27, 11 p. m., to The Hague.

by June 2 desired daily rate 3,000 but doubt whether total figure will be high as originally expected. June 15 considered more likely date than 10th for completion military evacuation residency indicated Gocus 709.²

Sultan was to issue afternoon 25th proclamation considerably delayed through submission to Netherlands officials Jogja and Batavia ensuring security life and property to all irrespective nationality and religion, promising against personal retaliation and offering allow anyone who wishes to evacuate after return of Republican Government to Jogja.

Van Royen, Roem, Gieben and Leimena met again with me afternoon 25th. We progressed satisfactorily on draft cease hostilities order and proclamation. Drafts now to be checked with Netherlands and Republican military soon as latter available. UNCFI military experts will also help prepare regulations under order and proclamation.

Brought Critchley and Herremans to date this noon on drafting on peace and order accomplished this week. They approved drafts with one or two minor changes.

Received letter dated 26th from Roem re BFO request. Wrote chairman Hamid thereof and indicated BFO would be invited UNCFI meeting shortly.

In separate conversation with Van Royen and Critchley today, reviewed Republican situation. From Netherlands military and civilian sources Van Royen and I had rumors possibility Sultan endeavoring aggrandize personal position expense Sukarno and Hatta and also of certain TNI elements, possibly preferring emergency government to Sukarno-Hatta regime. Critchley insists no danger either development if present trend in negotiations and arrangements continues although no one can vouch for scattered Republican military groups. Critchley thinks some possibility Sultan may be named Acting Prime Minister under Sukarno after restoration to permit Hatta functioning solely as Vice President participate Hague conference. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/6-849: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 8, 1949—5 p. m.

519. Gocus 721. Van Royen, Roem, Gieben and Leimena met with me two hours last evening. We discussed unfinished business including

¹ Repeated in airgram A-203, June 14, to The Hague.

evacuation agreement between Sultan and Nethmil Jogja, supplying arms to Jogja police, relieving tension between Nethmil and Sultan, amnesty provisions for guerrillas and question of responsibility Netherlands to help supply scattered Repubs if latter unable take care of themselves after cease hostilities. Van Royen and Roem were to instruct Jacob and Djuanda, respectively, as to points under foregoing items which they should endeavor clear up Jogja today and tomorrow.

Van Royen presented memo of Netherlands comments on UNCFI Milex draft regulations for peace and order. Roem submitted amended Repub version thereof. After lengthy discussion, agreed I should endeavor compromise and consolidate views and submit my draft to both parties this evening. Same group to meet evening ninth for further discussion.

Anakagung, acting chairman in absence Hamid, came this morning to discuss with me getting BFO representatives into UNCFI meetings. We arrived at idea personal invitations to six principal leaders which we will discuss with UNCFI colleagues today.

UNCFI plane to leave tomorrow morning, overnight Medan and return Repub group from Atjeh to Bangka and Batavia tenth. Planned start today but weather unfavorable.

Lovink² had Van Royen and me lunch with him. Lovink concerned, as would be expected from his background, over Commie danger Indo and particularly to Repub upon restoration Jogja. Working on this, I obtained his interest in adequate arms for Jogja police. Sultan may return from Jogja with Jacob. If so, Van Royen will talk directly with Sultan re arms et cetera. Lovink extremely cordial and assured me determined see through successfully present Indo policy. Visited Van Royen briefly to consult on my redraft of Netherlands and Repub ideas on rules for peace and order. Completed this draft and sent copies Roem and Van Royen to study before tomorrow's meeting. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Mr. Lovink had succeeded Dr. Beel as Netherlands High Representative of the Crown on June 2.

501.BC Indonesia/6-849 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1949—6 p. m.

316. Usgoc 377. Sukanto called Dept June 6 to present fol memo to Secy:

¹ Repeated as 490 to The Hague.

"On behalf Vice Pres Repub Indonesia Hatta have honor call attn fol matter. Realizing importance consolidating our internal policy and determined maintain law order in interior by means civil organ of Govt, Repub police, we found we were handicapped in functioning efficiently due lack or shortage transportation and communication equipment as well as armament. Was necessary improve this condition to meet emergency of situation.

For this reason Hatta sent me, R. Said Soekanto, Chief Repub State Police, 'unofficially' to US 'to study police matters'. Underlying purpose however was to appeal to State Dept for equipment and police armament in order strengthen Indo Repub Police.

On arriving US beginning Oct 1948, I informed Lacy at State Dept of my mission but because of unfortunate political developments Indonesia and finally 'second Dutch police action' I found it impossible accomplish anything. Since then due to results Premier Nehru's Asian Conf and developments of UN SC discussions on Indo question, improvements appear to have been made.

As expressed in enclosed translated letter from Hatta recd May 3, I am ordered appeal officially for police armament and equipment for not less than 10,000 men.

Strong police force more than ever necessary moment Repub re-establishes authority and duty. Equipment for not less than 50,000 men will be required for entire Repub territory. On May 17 I again approached Lacy and Ogburn concerning this matter.

Advance of Commies in China and serious intention of Repub to combat this destructive movement (as has already been proven in Madiun affair last year) makes presence of strong police force 'conditio sine qua non' for restoring peace and maintaining law order in our country.

Hatta sincerely hopes obtain material and financial assistance for Indo Repub from US and it my duty transmit his appeal to highest authority. I await your answer."

Dept officers had explained on previous occasion when similar request discussed with Sukanto that in view status negots and May 7 agreement US unlikely supply arms to Repub; that US would consider arms assistance to USI; that Dept keenly aware problem facing Repub reducing Commies and other extremists after restoration Jogja; and that Dept considered Neth obligated under May 7 agreement to supply police equipment requisite preservation law and order Repub-controlled territories. Dept officers this occasion recapitulated foregoing, adding that Cochran had advised Dept that he considered Neth obligated to supply requisite police equipment and that Neth had already agreed transfer 500 jeeps, uniforms etc and that discussion transfer arms to Repub police force now proceeding satisfactorily.

Sukanto, particularly anti-Commie, appeared believe he had recd responsive reply but expressed great anxiety lest Repub police force prove unequal to task because of inadequate equipment.

Sukanto stated frankly he feared Hatta unaware difficulties his position here and his efforts secure arms from US. Dept officers suggested possibility that Cochran could make appropriate reply [to] memo quoted above to Hatta referring favorably Sukanto's efforts Wash. Sukanto grateful.

For ur secret info, Sukanto has been conferring past six months with Amer police officials chosen by appropriate agencies US Govt. He plans proceed Italy latter June to study anti-Commie operations of Carabinieri, returning meet Hatta at Hague in July.

Dept officers have high opinion Sukanto's ability, reliability and determination crush Commies Indonesia.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-849 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1949—6 p. m.

317. Usgoc 378. Sudjatmoko, Sumitro and Sudarpo² called on Dept officers June 7, Sudarpo having returned from New Delhi and Bangka. Three concerned to impress upon Dept tenuous position Sukarno, Hatta vis-à-vis Repub polit leaders Java with whom Sudarpo had conversed, attitude these leaders being that they could support May 7 agreement with fingers crossed, not placing great reliance on sincerity Dutch intentions; that Sukarno, Hatta shld not have negotiated May 7 agreement without reps Emergency Govt participating; that shld either restoration Repub to Jogja or conversations at Hague drag as previous negots had, they would be unable further to support Sukarno, Hatta. Dept officers replied that they cld see no occasion for discouragement on part Indo polit leaders since course events last three months uniformly favorable to Repub position; that Neth Govt had apparently effected complete change previous policy; that no evidence had developed in course negots Batavia to give rise suspicion Neth intentions. Dept officers undertook acquaint trio with delicate balance present Neth coalition govt and unhappy consequences its fall. For ur info, Dept aware for some time of possibility split between Indo Repubs US and Sukarno, Hatta and associates. It not impossible that this group had hoped that Sjafruddin wld hold out for struggle for complete independence Repub as against negotiated solution embodying USI.

¹ Repeated as 491 to The Hague.

² Indonesian representatives at the United Nations.

In course conversation fol points emerged : (1) Sudarpo said that it was Hatta's position that Repub cld attend Hague Conf only if it held under UNCFI auspices and that in no event cld he attend under Neth auspices. Dept officers indicated that they were not aware that Hatta felt so strongly this matter and asked if he had represented these views to Cochran. Sudarpo said he did not know but that he thought Roem had done so. Dept officers impressed upon trio importance of minimizing prestigious considerations, of getting ahead with orderly transfer of sovereignty to USI and of importance to Neth Govt and people of some face-saving device such as acting as hosts at Hague Conf. Trio unimpressed, asked if Dept favorably disposed toward rotating chairmanship at Hague Conf. Dept officers replied Dept had no opinion, thought proposal not unreasonable, insisted that matters shld be settled Batavia. (2) Trio much concerned that Hatta's Sukarno's return to Jogja be attended by appearance of needed police equipment, public utilities and consumer goods to the end that their influence with wavering constituents be restored. Dept officers explained Cochran's view that such things shld be provided by Neth who under obligation to do so May 7 agreement. Trio obviously partially satisfied when told that Neth already prepared to supply jeeps and other equipment as well as uniforms for police and that arming of police presently under discussion. Trio stated that if textiles, medicines, office equipment, etc supplied by Neth inadequate, they wld feel compelled to try to get such supplies to Hatta, Sukarno from US. (3) Sudarpo said that Sukarno had told him that solution of Indo problem now rested solely with US, that if US "backed down" he and Hatta were finished and that chaos and Communism wld be inevitable result in Indonesia. Dept officers replied to effect that Indonesians must learn to stand on own feet, that US position in Indo dispute result of UN participation. Dept officers declared their awareness Commie threat Indonesia and their great concern that it be liquidated. This connection, reported execution Tan Malaka discussed, trio claiming they had confirmation this report, for which they were congratulated. (4) Trio anticipates deceleration progress restoration and plans for Hague. Dept officers replied that June 15 and July 15 were dates for respective events and in their knowledge had been for some six weeks; that they were unaware any desire part of Neth to delay restoration or conf beyond those dates.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-949: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE, June 9, 1949—5 p. m.

491. Deptel 491, June 8.² Numerous conversations with Foreign Office officials re Hague Conference have made it plain to us that the Dutch contemplate conference under Netherlands auspices and chairmanship. We cannot see them entertaining idea of any other procedure. Their reasoning is clearly that Netherlands sovereignty over Indonesia is still intact, that it is they, the Dutch, who are to hand over part of this sovereignty, that it is the Dutch Government which automatically plays the host in the capital and that the principals of Netherlands Delegation will be the Netherlands Cabinet.

We believe, therefore, that any proposals of conference being held under other auspices or of rotating chairmanship would probably be flatly turned down by Netherlands Government with full approval Dutch public. We hope, therefore, that conference will not be jeopardized by any such suggestion.

BARUCH

¹ Repeated in telegram 322, Usgoc 380, June 10, 8 p. m., to Batavia.

² See *supra*, and footnote 1, p. 418.

501.BC Indonesia/6-1049: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1949—6 p. m.

320. Usgoc 379. From State and ECA: Dept has recently noted from various sources expressions of a defeatist attitude on part of certain Neth and Repub officials re eventual outcome in Indonesia. Concern of these officials centers upon danger that Hatta Govt, after restoration, may not be able successfully to resist extremist pressures. Both sides imply that large measure of responsibility devolves upon US for achievement polit settlement within framework SC Res Jan 28, which remains objective US Indonesian policy.

In view foregoing we think present propitious time effectively to put forward measures designed to strengthen ability of Hatta Govt to carry out its commitments under recent agreement. Fact that Slav Group has officially for first time at recent GA session attacked Hatta Govt, supports the view that suitable aid from this Govt at this time

¹ Repeated as 499 to The Hague "for info. Baruch and Valentine." The latter headed the ECA mission in the Netherlands.

may be essential to Repub Govt's final integration into stable non-Communist USI.

As one such measure Dept has explored with ECA possible resumption ECA aid to Indonesia along line set forth below. Prior to reaching final decision on such program Dept wishes your very frank and considered opinion as to its feasibility and timeliness.

Unexpended balance of final 1949 ECA allotment to Indonesia is about \$5 million which might be increased to \$9.1 million if Neth consents to re-transfer to Indonesia \$4.1 million, representing off-shore purchase of copra by Bizone in Indonesia. This sum might be quickly made available by ECA, and ECA might also provisionally allot part or all of \$10 million contained in fiscal 1950 estimates for Indonesia submitted to Congress.

Plan wld be to announce resumption ECA aid to Indonesia specifying (a) Resumption only for interim period until settlement between Dutch and Indonesians reached (for ECA unable operate in areas which are not dependent areas of participating countries and direct assistance thru Neth impractical and undesirable), (b) Aid being renewed for area as whole with expectation aid be distributed throughout Indonesia in accordance economic requirements of various parts of an integral economy, (c) Resumption aid made possible by cooperative attitude both Repubs and Dutch in reaching agreement to make settlement.

In broaching with Neth Govt resumption aid Indonesia here described ECA wld base its offer on expectation May 7 agreement will in near future create conditions suitable for effective economic program throughout entire area including Repub territory. ECA and State Dept would make clear that pacification of Indonesia had resulted from agreement reached by Dutch and Repubs and that this had made possible temporary renewal aid to Indonesia as whole. Repubs cld therefore claim credit as well as Dutch for ECA supplies thus assured Indonesia. Assume where distribution normally through private channels this wld be continued by Dutch. State and ECA cld however suggest to Dutch that Repub authorities shd handle distribution whenever distribution normally through local govt channels. May be possible to formulate distribution plan for entire area by both sides by asking authorities in Indonesia to submit full statement requirements and proposed distribution program of available supplies of particular commodities throughout Indonesia. Moreover, shd State report obvious discrimination by Dutch against Repub areas ECA prepared consider ad hoc remedies.

Resumption aid shd afford opportunity during interim period to explore and secure means later non-ECA financing. In view impor-

tance Indonesia as substantial potential dollar earner for ERP countries, ECA considering taking initiative enlisting interest International Bank and/or Eximbank in financing Indonesian recovery. Resumption aid plan might therefore be fol by sending economic mission Indonesia to appraise possibilities.

Your comments requested. Specifically Dept wld like your estimate as to whether suggested course wld strengthen Hatta Govt vis-à-vis extremists or have reverse effect. Dept mindful of possibility (a) it might appear in Indonesia as pro-Dutch move by US inasmuch as ECA agreement wld be between US and Neth Govt and subject in whole or in part to Dutch administration or control, and (b) it might subject Hatta to criticism on grounds that he wld be sacrificing best interests of Repub under pressure of promised ECA aid. On other hand, it wld promise promptest available means of alleviating acute econ shortages in Repub territory as well as in other parts Indo and thus might contribute substantially to achievement political settlement and to viability such settlement when reached.

If plan appears to you helpful, what are your views as to timing in relation to restoration.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-1149: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 11, 1949—5 p. m.

528. Gocus 723. Hatta and party arrived back Bangka 10th, 4 p. m. from Kotaradja. Some of party returned Batavia 7 p. m. Received Roem, Sultan Jogja, Leimena and Sastroamidjojo this morning. Sastro recounted trip with Hatta. Said party received excellent reception by military governor Atjeh, other officials and population. Col. Hidayat, Republic Military Commander Sumatra, had been obliged travel several days on foot from his headquarters Central Sumatra to participate in meetings with Hatta. Was not possible for Sjafruddin and members emergency government reach Kotaradja. Direct exchange of communications by radio was possible for first time and utilized advantageously. Sastro said by this means Sjafruddin group given full information to date. Sastro thought outlook for cooperation entirely favorable. Methods being considered by which UNCFI plane can land Central Sumatra to take Sjafruddin emergency government leaders Jogja once Repub group returned there.

¹ Repeated in telegram 508, June 13, 9 p. m., to The Hague.

Sastro said valuable consultation had with Hidayat to whom tentative drafts cease hostilities order, proclamation and rules for peace and order were shown. Hidayat was to return to his troops. No military advisor brought Batavia from Atjeh.

Sultan said not yet able get Simatupang or other TNI leader into Jogja and thence Batavia as advisor. I made point civilian evacuation Jogja now apparently ended and emphasized necessity following soonest with Netherlands' military evacuation. Raised question as to whether RepDel would ask Hatta, when Roem and group spend tomorrow Bangka to approve in present form and without waiting longer for Repub military advisor, three documents of committee two above-mentioned in order that Netherlands may feel warranted begin military evacuation. Roem willing recommend this if Van Royen would permit such subsequent changes as TNI military advisors, whenever available, might consider absolutely essential. This [*That?*] is present documents would be approved for recommendation to restored government Jogja with understanding only to be amended if military advisors consider them unsatisfactory or have additions to make which could not properly be included in manual which is now under contemplation for guidance field officers both parties.

Roem stated Hatta would like invite Van Royen visit him Bangka shortly. I was sure Van Royen would accept and thought it might be possible gentlemen's agreement on above point with respect to approving three documents at once might be worked out on this visit.

Repubs will also seek clearance from Hatta on remaining points to be agreed with Netherlands on conditions round-table conference. These include role of UNCFI. I opposed Repub idea that Hague conference be considered simply transfer of meetings from Batavia and still under UNCFI auspices. I argued that (1) UNCFI headquarters continues Batavia with deputies, most of secretariat and all military personnel remaining here; (2) Hague conference called by Netherlands Government at its capital with its Cabinet constituting NethDel; (3) UNCFI invited by Netherlands Government "to assist" and authorized by SC directive March 23 to "participate" in accordance with its terms of reference; (4) responsibility for conference should be left entirely on Netherlands Government; (5) UNCFI within terms reference should be able participate in all meetings, make recommendations to both parties, receive all documents, make such documents available to SC and UNCFI headquarters Batavia, report when necessary to SC re progress conference, record final results thereof, report to SC at any time if conference should not proceed in manner anticipated. I stated if these responsibilities and privileges approved by NethDel, it would be possible for UNCFI perform its full role,

without having burden managing conference. Sultan said problem remained re arming his police. In response my question, he said sufficient armed TNI in residency to take over authority initially from Netherlands military. Said he has now 200 mobile police with arms. Said he already has approximately 600 civilian police without arms but otherwise ready participate. I told him had discussed this question with Lovink and Van Royen and hoped formula could be proposed by Netherlands for meeting situation.

Discussed procedure to be followed by UNCFI in bringing representatives from areas other than Repub into current discussions. I explained that at formal meeting yesterday UNCFI had so handled question of rules of procedure to eliminate possibility BFO now being considered third party to Indo dispute before SC. I sought Repub ideas as to whether initial meeting should be formal or informal and to what extent draft documents should be revealed.

In view urgency get as many matters cleared as possible with Hatta tomorrow, I suggested having Repub group meet with Van Royen before their departure. Saw Blom in absence Van Royen and arranged meeting with me between Repubs and Van Royen on latter's return this evening. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/6-1349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 13, 1949—4 p. m.

531. Gocus 724. Ultimate paragraph Gocus 723.² Van Royen came my quarters evening 11th to meet with Roem, Sultan Jogja, Sastrōamidjojo and Leimena. Van Royen opposed strongly Republican idea of "leaving door slightly open" to amend three Committee Two documents after return to Jogja if Hatta might finds [*find on?*] visit absolutely necessary to meet TNI requirements. He insisted documents should be completed and formalized UNCFI before evacuation Netherlands military. He contended his government should then have privilege revealing these documents to Parliament. Republicans argued this would seriously prejudice acceptance thereof at Jogja since they would be publicized and criticized several days in advance of possible consideration by Republican parliamentary group and military leaders brought in from field. While convinced Hatta could get necessary sup-

¹ Repeated in telegram 515, June 14, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² *Supra.*

port if matter handled properly, Republicans said Batavia decisions should not be presented as accomplished fact.

I commented that three documents are largely on political level, should be acceptable because of general and fair character and advanced idea that almost anything TNI advisors might have to say would likely fit in field manual for military both sides. Van Royen willing consider such idea but firmly against any subsequent amendments to three documents after formalized in UNCFI. Said he would visit Hatta if Republicans desired but could not change his position on this point or on revealing agreements to Netherlands Parliament. I observed that if documents formalized in UNCFI, they would be subject to UNCFI rules procedure re disclosure. I was confident UNCFI would only approve of public revelation of terms of documents simultaneously by parties or by UNCFI at time fixed by both parties. Question of Netherlands military providing arms for 600 Sultan's police taken under advisement by Van Royen.

Met 8 p. m. 12th with Herremans, Critchley, Hamid and Anak Agung to consider invitation that would bring into UNCFI discussions representatives from Indonesian areas other than Republican. Three UNCFI representatives working today on text invitation which would not by-pass BFO but would still draw in representatives of areas other than Republic without constituting recognition of BFO as party to Indonesian dispute before SC.

Roem and Leimena came 9:30 p. m. after return from Bangka. Roem said no purpose Van Royen visiting Hatta unless willing reach gentlemen's agreement with latter whereunder TNI would have something to say on three documents after return Jogja. Hatta unwilling follow "take it or leave it" tactics with TNI. Similarly he opposes revelation documents until they may be announced simultaneously at Hague and Jogja when Republican Government returns. Roem said had understanding with Van Royen he was to see him 13th re conditions for Hague Conference. In answer my question, said had cleared everything with Hatta re conditions Hague Conference but point of UNCFI's role remained to be settled with Netherlands. I reminded Roem I had set forth clearly my views on this (Gocus 723). He was confident this matter could be adjusted amicably with Van Royen.

I suggested Roem make definite appointment at once with Van Royen and that he should let Van Royen know Hatta was agreeable to three documents in present form with only one or two minor alterations subject to "door being left slightly open" for TNI. I told Roem he should to [let?] Van Royen reveal his formula, unannounced to me, for determining UNCFI role and clearing document on plans for

Hague Conference. He should then report Hatta's feelings re leaving opportunity for TNI technical views to be considered and re simultaneous revelation formalized documents after government restored Jogja. I reminded Roem of Van Royen's difficult position and insisted they should both continue work in spirit mutual confidence that has marked their relations to date. Roem phoned Van Royen from my quarters and made appointment for 10:30 a. m. Monday.

UNCFI representatives met this morning on draft invitation for representatives outside Republic. Hamid came see me immediately afterwards to state having difficulty with Mansur in keeping [apparent garble] out and group considering asking Hatta receive seven BFO leaders Bangka 15th to discuss question. I asked Hamid to come with Anak Agung 4 p. m. today to see with UNCFI representative whether UNCFI draft invitation would meet BFO situation.

Received Van Royen his request 11:30 a. m. He said Roem had just visited him and Republicans had not weakened any as result visit Hatta from position assumed night 11th herein above-mentioned. Van Royen expressed conviction Republicans felt they could not count on TNI. I said failure get TNI advisors here not necessarily due such reason but might partially be attributed to difficulty and risk traveling through Netherlands lines, objection of Netherlands to TNI advisors proceed Batavia from Jogja in uniform and insignia, et cetera. Van Royen said RepDel should not be excused from keeping commitments because of inability control TNI. I reminded him Sassen and Stikker had used some same argument that Republic could not control TNI when mission broke off promising negotiations last fall and resorted to second police action. I said Republicans had suffered seriously through second police action and we had all realized from time SC Resolution January 28 that risk would be involved in attempting restore Jogja, et cetera. I complimented him on manner in which he had conducted negotiations and pictured great confidence which Republicans have in him. I recalled advice given him on our first meeting here to effect that we would have many disappointments in dealing with [apparent garble] since they do not always think along our lines and are in such comparatively weak position when it comes to making binding commitments that can be implemented.

Van Royen urged me talk alone again with Roem and associates and see if I could get them meet his position. I asked whether (1) he would agree to advice TNI advisors, when obtained, being placed in field manual; (2) he would agree restoration Jogja on formalizing three Committee Two documents in present form or as may be modified immediate future by RepDel and NethDel; and (3) he would see no publicity given documents so formalized until Republican Government

restored Jogja in position present documents to Parliament. I asked further whether necessary he submit any amendments to three documents before considering them final from Netherlands side. He said he would and amendments would cover some serious points. Re my questions, he said there had been no undertaking on his part keep terms confidential and promise had been made Netherlands Parliament they would see agreement. I suggested terms might be made known confidentially to Parliament committee as had been gentlemen's agreement on Hatta risking government in support policy decided Batavia discussions. Van Royen indicated willingness recommend documents be seen only in closed session Parliament as whole, provided I could get Republicans agree final approval three documents Batavia discussions. I stressed danger being overly formalistic and risk we would all incur if oblige Republicans act in any way other than that which they thought most likely obtain support TNI. He properly pointed out we could not leave too many loose ends to be tied up Jogja. I hope see Roem later today for frank discussion. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/6-1349 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 13, 1949—6 p. m.

532. Gocus 725. For State and ECA. Reference Usgoc 379.² Question resumption ECA aid Indonesia appears to resolve itself into purely political and psychological matter in view relative unimportance unexpended balance 1949 ECA allotment Indonesia in relation 72 million dollars originally earmarked, most of which has been or is being utilized under procurement authorizations issued prior December suspension. Remaining sum negligible in relation to long-term needs and even from point of view immediate assistance could hardly make deep impression in either Netherlands or Republican circles on strictly economic grounds. Indonesian exports have been showing large improvement over 1948 and total Indonesian export salaries [*sic*] first 4 months 1949 amounted to guilders 436 million equivalent \$167 million. This figure not cited in order minimize Indonesian payments balance difficulties but to stress proportionate unimportance residual ECA allotment 7 if these could be channeled immediately into Indonesian economy, which appears impossible due to necessity procurement, shipment and distribution delay.

¹ Repeated in telegram 514, June 14, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 320, June 10, p. 420.

Political effect release this small fund would, however, be very great here and presumably in Netherlands. Favorable political impression in Hague and Netherlands circles here would undoubtedly have its counterpart in very adverse Republican reaction which would almost certainly regard move as reversal US policy prior to implementation agreement re Jogja and convening Hague Conference. Whatever manner of announcement, world press would tend take same view, particularly since actual initial recipients would be Dutch.

Aid could not be extended direct to Republic and effect would be to place Dutch in position deciding when and to what extent sub-allocations should be made for use Republican territory or by Republican authorities. Republicans could not claim credit in their area for supplies channeled this manner.

These comments intended to apply any proposal resumption ECA aid to Indonesia prior satisfactory conclusion Hague Conference. This does not imply that in meantime studies should not go forward in Washington re possible means non-ECA financing Indonesian recovery. Sending of economic mission to Indonesia, however, or even discussion thereof at present would result in probable serious misinterpretation US motives here, particularly in view status US as one of participant governments in UNCI, and already strong suspicion that US economic interests Indonesia are largely responsible our present policy.

After Hague Conference and delay in securing alternative financing could be bridged by ECA allocations up to date transfer sovereignty to USI. Re 4.1 million off-shore purchase copra Indonesia by Bizone authorized third quarter 1948 Netherlands might be pressed transfer proceeds to Government of Indonesia. Such transfer should not incur objections referred to above any more than does present shipment goods procured under pre-December procurement authorizations.

In summary, therefore, not believed that adverse political reaction to early resumption ECA aid Indonesia would in any way be counter-balanced by limited economic benefits to be derived Indonesia as whole and still more limited benefits Republican territory, latter channeled through Netherlands authorities. Believe action would undermine Hatta influence and be viewed both here and abroad as weakening US support of SC position. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/6-1349: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1949—6 p. m.

324. Usgoc 381. Fol is synopsis conversation between Helb, Neth Emb, and Dept officers June 9.

Helb called on instr FonOff to seek info re Aneta press dispatch to effect that in recent letter from Dept to Matthew Fox re Amer-Indonesian Corp, Dept had stated that in view of deletion from contract of clauses which Dept considered monopolistic, Dept had withdrawn its objections to contract. In full discussion this matter, Helb was informed (a) that Dept's objections to contract had been two-fold; (b) that polit objection, based on fact that contract imputed to Repub of Indonesia powers inconsistent with its future status as member state federal USI, was overriding; (c) that in published reports Dept's econ objection, namely monopolistic character of contract, had also been emphasized; (d) that Fox had on several occasions requested Dept's views respecting monopolistic aspects of contract, with purpose of removing same in order relieve himself of charge of being monopolist; (e) that Dept considered Fox's request in this regard reasonable, and had given him its views thereon, but only after clearest possible understanding with Fox that such changes as he might choose to make re monopolistic aspects of contract wld in no wise affect Dept's political objections thereto, which still hold; (f) that Fox subsequently proposed to Soemitro changes in contract eliminating monopolistic features; (g) that Fox subsequently requested Dept's recognition his action in this regard; (h) that Dept sent Fox a ltr on Apr 28, 1949 to effect that changes he had proposed in contract had met objections of Dept from monopolistic point of view, but had in no wise removed Dept's objections from polit point of view; (i) that in this ltr Fox was authorized to make contents ltr public if he so desired, but he was advised Dept's feeling that publicity on this question wld only make more difficult progress of negots; (j) that Fox had apparently refrained from making ltr public.

Helb was shown copy ltr from Dept to Fox. He readily admitted that this subj in certain Dutch circles generated more heat than light and stated his concern to minimize the heat. He seemed entirely satisfied with contents ltr. He was told that in view fact Fox himself had not made ltr public, it did not seem to us proper to give him copy, but only to acquaint him with content thereof in view of erroneous Aneta report.

In discussion involving possible transmutation of existing contract

¹ Repeated as 506 to The Hague.

after formation USI to cover entire USI, and Dutch fears of such development as result good will toward Fox in certain Repub circles, Dept officers made certain observations. They stated that any new contract negotiated between USI and Fox wld in their opinion necessarily conform to all agreements reached at roundtable conference concerning commercial and econ matters. They further stated they personally felt it wld be improper for this Govt, or its nationals, to take unfair competitive advantage as result of changed polit status in Indonesia in which change this Govt had participated, and that they felt this attitude was shared by their colleagues working on problem. They concluded by expressing hope that this gen assurance, plus demonstrated fact that Aneta report referred to above was in error, wld suffice to prevent this matter becoming disruptive factor in present or future negots toward formation USI.

Helb expressed satisfaction with this exchange of views.

You are authorized to use above event this matter raised with you Batavia or Hague.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-949: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1949—6 p. m.

512. Dept disturbed by certain indications present Neth position Indonesia may embody certain concealed alternative course action which if taken wld doubtless bring painfully constructed May 7 accord to ground. These indications are (a) ref urtel 491 June 9 to preparedness transfer "part sovereignty" to Indonesia. Dept believes and has supposed that Neth Govt agrees that when sovereignty is passed to USI, sovereignty must be complete and unconditional; otherwise demands of Repub and non-Repub Indo nationalists will continue unsatisfied and whole theory of voluntary Neth-Indo Union will be vitiated. (b) In negots with Rep del, Neth del has been reluctant to characterize restoration Repub to Jogja as "initial" restoration. This reluctance occasions Dept to consider possibility that Neth may hope limit territory restored to Repub to residency Jogja hoping thus contain Repub in relatively small area. Dept believes that Repub nationalist movement, not being geographical concept, cannot be so contained and that attempts to do so will only result in continued disorder throughout parts Java and Sumatra in which Repub sympathies are indisputable. (c) Foregoing hypothesis (b) possibly substantiated

¹ Repeated as 325, Usgoc 382, to Batavia.

by willingness of Neth to restore Repub to entire residency Jogja instead Jogja and its environs as required by SC Jan 28 resolution. (d) Neth del seems prepared to transfer to Repub Govt Jogja when restored limited supplies police equipment (it has not yet agreed to transfer of arms). It occurs to Dept that unwillingness to transfer larger supplies police equipment may reflect desire to limit Repub Govt's ability to restore and maintain law and order in area larger than residency.

If above assumptions justified, following hypotheses must be seriously considered: that Neth in addition to hoping to contain Repub in Jogja and residency, may consider Repub will be unable secure reasonable compliance cease fire from Repub adherents outside residency as well as extremist, Commies and otherwise; that shld such contingency eventuate, Neth wld be in position to insist on Repub's inadequacy and irresponsibility, decry policy forced on Neth by SC and foreign powers, US in particular, and demand control of archipelago by provisional govt from which present Repub leaders wld be excluded or reduced minor role and which wld be essentially Neth dominated.

Dept does not believe that hypotheses such as foregoing are necessarily subscribed to by Neth Govt as such or in any case by Van Royen who appears determined to implement May 7 agreement with complete sincerity. It seems possible to Dept that since Neth is popular govt, also coalition, such hypotheses as foregoing may be held by some elements Neth Govt who expect to develop them into reality in near future.

Pls comment foregoing identifying wherever possible personalities involved.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-1549: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, June 15, 1949—4 p. m.

508. For Secretary of State and ECA from Baruch and Valentine: This is joint statement Embassy and ECA mission in full agreement in response to Department/ECA 499, June 10, sent Batavia as 320.

Cogent reasoning in Department's 499 appeals strongly to us. We believe plan entirely feasible and timing should be now.

Answers to questions your penultimate paragraph should properly

¹ Repeated in telegram 329, Usgoc 384, June 16, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

come from Cochran, not us, but we offer following comments and suggestions.

On basis our information, amount of aid proposed entirely inadequate but realize your present problems and limitations. Therefore suggest emphasis be not upon amount but upon renewal of aid to all Indonesia as vital to development democratic government there through provision of basic economic needs.

While distribution of proposed aid presumably must at present be made through Dutch channels, we believe you can find way to arrange that Hatta, with Dutch cooperation and agreement, can play effective public role in helping determine recipients of aid and in working out relative requirements on geographical basis of different areas of Indonesia. If plan succeeds, Hatta government would then claim and probably receive credit for having brought about conditions which achieved aid for all Indonesia on equal basis. This should strengthen Hatta government against extremists, and also strengthen US position with Indonesians as a whole by supporting their desire to govern their own affairs.

Consequently it is further highly desirable if possible to include in planning and approval other Indonesian native elements, not Dutch or Republican, if this can be done without undue delay in providing aid, but we repeat need is urgent and its early fulfillment should take precedence over ideal arrangement which might be sort of all-Indonesian economic organization along general lines of OEEC.

If Hatta government and BFO also judged capable of assisting in distribution of aid, so much the better, but if Dutch [apparent omission] has any validity it seems doubtful that existing personnel experience and conditions would make for reliable distribution in Indonesia except through Dutch at present.

If above plan followed, we believe it removes possibility of being construed as effort to aid Dutch in Indonesia.

We believe Netherlands Government now has sincere desire to achieve objectives stated in Department's 499 and would cooperate in above plan. Our opinion fortified by discreet inquiries of key Netherlands Government officials here and following is summary for your information of their informal person first opinions.

a. Political effects early resumption of aid need [would] be favorable to all Indonesian parties except extremist groups.

b. If initial aid greatly limited, economic gains would be secondary but even limited aid if assured soon would among other advantages permit Dutch to expedite replacement of stocks their consumption supplies which they plan to use to support re-establishment of Republican goods and services.

c. Formula should stress distribution on geographic basis and Dutch recognize this would require special Dutch attention to emergency areas, especially within Republic.

d. Ideal psychological moment to announce renewal of aid would be coincident with assumption of government responsibilities in residency by Sultan of Jogjakarta, effective restoration of whose authority Dutch regard as essential to peaceful return and continued leadership of Soekarno-Hatta government.

We urge that when announcement of renewed aid is made it be accompanied simultaneously by announcement of intention to dispatch to Indonesia soonest possible a special mission to study need and possibilities of further aid, such mission to be headed by American of recognized distinction. In this connection see Valentine to Hoffman, to ECA 398 of June 6.² Such mission should have capacity to handle technical and general economic questions, also standing with Indonesian politicians, and recognition its immediate economic concern must be with consumer not production goods.

We repeat we endorse Department's thinking in your 499 and believe suggested procedure above would help meet Department's desire to impart maximum strength to Hatta without jeopardizing success of distribution scheme or impairing delicate balance political position.

Sent Department 508, repeated Paris 43, OSR for Harriman.

BARUCH

² Not printed. Paul G. Hoffman was the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA).

501.BC Indonesia/6-1349: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1949—5 p. m.

327. Usgoc 383. Dept concerned report negots Van Royen+Repub's contained Gocus 724.² Dept considers May 7 agreement reached as result of Hatta's willingness risk vote of confidence for his return Jogja. Repub position that "door must be left slightly open" appears to Dept to be entirely valid in light obvious fact Hatta Govt cannot be expected make binding commitments prior its return Jogja. We have always assumed this was basic concept underlying open-ended nature May 7 agreement and that it understood and appreciated by Neth. Under present circumstances it thus appears inconsistent for Van Royen to require Hatta to guarantee that no alteration of any

¹ Repeated as 517 to The Hague "for info and discretionary use discussion with FonOff".

² Telegram 531, June 13, p. 424.

kind in agreement will be made when it is submitted Repubs in Jogja. Additionally, Dept unable to understand Van Royen's insistence that agreement be first given to Neth Parl if Neth Del is in fact desirous of strengthening Hatta position with Repub opinion. We think Van Royen's tactics outlined Gocus 724 might well have effect of ruining Hatta's chances winning necessary Repub mil and polit support for agreement.

Dept considers Neth obligated by Jan 28 Res and March 23 directive to restore Hatta Govt Jogja after which both parties obligated bring about cessation hostilities. Position to which Neth apparently returning, namely that restoration is dependent upon Hatta's agreeing finally at Batavia to specific conditions re cease-fire is not a valid interpretation of Jan 28 Res, March 23 directive or May 7 agreement. You may in your discretion inform Van Royen Dept's views this point. In view desirability make full use of UNCFI on point directly related to SC Res, suggest you elicit expression UNCFI opinion this point.

While we recognize it entirely matter for Van Royen determine time and manner keeping Neth Parl informed progress negots, we do not consider that his willingness to submit three documents to closed session Neth Parl as *quid pro quo* for Hatta's acceptance of unalterable agreement prior restoration.

Pls forward three documents Comite to Dept soonest.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/6-1649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY BATAVIA, June 16, 1949—4 p. m.

537. Gocus 727. Roem, Djuanda and Leimena came 7 p. m., 14th. I told them my idea of letter from Hatta to Van Royen transmitting copies three Committee 2 documents as set forth penultimate paragraph Gocus 726.² Repubs interested in exploring this idea and agreed meet with Van Royen, Gieben, Debeus and me afternoon 15th to consider this and bring many further amendments to three documents.

Attended dinner given 14th by Lovink for BFO delegates, Netherlands delegation and UNCI. Lovink made speech pledging support to early establishment sovereign USI. To me he insisted we must and will achieve goal no matter how many difficulties have to be met.

Roem and Leimena came noon 15th to report RepDel meeting had approved my idea above mentioned. We discussed timetable for sub-

¹ Repeated in telegram 527, June 16, 9 p. m., to The Hague.

² Not printed.

mitting any agreed documents to Hatta and for procuring his signature to letter under reference.

Van Royen, Gieben, Debeus, Roem, Leimena and Pringgo Digdo met with me 3 hours afternoon 15th. Added some amendments to texts cease hostilities order and proclamation. Van Royen submitted Netherlands rewrite of regulations incorporating material which I believe was received from Hague 11th and from Netherlands military including highly contentious provisions. These were to be studied over night together with drafts I had prepared of exchange of letters between Hatta and Van Royen including specification of immutable elements of policy to be urged by Hatta on restored government Jogja.

Van Royen, Jacob, Gieben, Roem, Djuanda, Leimena and Pringgo worked with me today from 9 a. m. until 1 p. m.

Approval given, as far as delegations concerned, to six draft documents: (1) Cease hostilities order, (2) proclamation, (3) regulations governing implementation of agreement to cease hostilities, (4) description of contemplated Netherlands-Indonesian manual for military cooperation, (5) letter from Hatta to Van Royen specifying immutable elements of policy which government restored Jogja will urge, and (6) letter from Van Royen acknowledging Hatta's communication. Texts these six documents following Gocus 728.³

Agreement on regulations and immutable points of policy reached only after considerable difficulty. Van Royen to submit six drafts to his government for consideration. RepDel left 3 p. m., today, for Bangka to seek Hatta's approval thereto. RepDel returning Batavia night 17th with groups BFO leaders visiting Bangka tomorrow.

Agreed orally between groups meeting with me today that

(a) Three principal documents when approved may be shown in closed UNCI meeting to invited BFO representatives for their information and comment, but texts are not subject to amendment by BFO;

(b) Three principal documents will be considered confidential and exchange of letters secret;

(c) If Netherlands Government finds necessary, it may reveal these five documents to Parliament in closed session;

(d) Publicity may be given to three principal documents only when Repub Government restored Jogja is prepared submit documents to its Parliament for approval, and (e) BFO may participate in compilation manual.

It was further agreed orally that effort would be made to reach agreement between RepDel and Netherlands delegation 18th on memo setting forth conditions for Hague conference. Van Royen and Roem to decide before then whether they agree to BFO representatives par-

³ Telegram 538, *infra*.

ticipating in meeting under UNCI or UNCI chairman auspices to consider this document.

Manner in which Netherlands Government reacts to foregoing results Batavia negotiation may help answer some questions posed in Us goc 382.⁴ At same time Department will see from documents that fair treatment for Repub achieved therein. In matter of Jogja police, provision arms for first 600 police practically assured. Even if Netherlands should give no more, there should be sufficient weapons available from Repub adherent sources to meet need in residency.

Van Royen has this week been extreme in his criticism of Repubs alleging they are not meeting commitments when they ask that documents be open to some amendments after return government to Jogja and when they insist that these be kept confidential until submitted to Repub Parliament. If documents approved by both sides and agreement reached this week on round-table conditions, Netherlands military evacuation should follow shortly. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁴ Telegram 512, June 14, p. 430.

501.BC Indonesia/6-1649: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 16, 1949—5 p. m.

538. Gocus 728. Reference Gocus 727.² Herewith text Document 1: "Pursuant to 'Van Royen-Roem statements' of 7 May, 1949, and in order implement SC's directive of 23 March, 1949 and paragraph one and two of operative part SC resolution of 28 January referred to particularly in above-mentioned directive, following orders are issued simultaneously:

a. By Netherlands Government:

'As from (blank) hostilities between parties shall cease.

All measures shall be taken to cease-fire and to terminate all acts intended to harm other party.

Orders issued by Commander-in-Chief on 1 and 5 January, 1949, are hereby supplemented and it is explicitly ordered, as from (blank), that Netherlands troops shall discontinue all military operations.

Ending of military operations throughout Indonesia will render possible maintenance of peace and order through cooperation between

¹ Repeated in airgram A-217, June 22, to The Hague.

² *Supra.*

Netherlands and Republican Armed Forces. Cooperation in patrolling, in avoiding clashes and in maintaining peace and order shall be effected between local commanders in accordance with directives to be issued by parties, with assistance of UNCFI.

All persons are hereby warned that any act in violation this order committed after above-mentioned time and date shall be punished in accordance with existing military regulations'.

b. By Government of Republic of Indonesia :

'As from (blank) hostilities between parties shall cease.

All measures shall be taken to cease-fire and to terminate all acts intended to harm other party.

All personnel of TNI and all other armed adherents of Republic are ordered, as from (blank), to cease guerrilla warfare.

Cessation of guerrilla warfare throughout Indonesia will render possible maintenance of peace and order through cooperation between Netherlands and Republican Armed Forces. Cooperation in patrolling, in avoiding clashes and in maintaining peace and order shall be effected between local commanders in accordance with directives to be issued by parties, with assistance of UNCFI.

All persons are hereby warned that any act in violation this order committed after above-mentioned time and date shall be punished in accordance with existing military regulations' ”.

Herewith text Document 2.

“Simultaneously the following proclamation shall be promulgated jointly by both governments:

Order[s] to cease hostilities have today been issued by Government of Kingdom of Netherlands and Government of Republic of Indonesia. This means that end has come to conflict between Republic of Indonesia and Netherlands.

Henceforth endeavors to [of] everyone must be dedicated to banishing any thought of enmity or revenge and to removing any vestige of fear or distrust.

Many problems remain be solved. This can be achieved through constructive cooperation in atmosphere of confidence and security. Efforts with this purpose must have genuine support of all authorities. Coordinated measures must be taken to deal with all persons who would continue to disturb peace and order, disregarding policies adopted by both governments. To this end both parties shall make use of radio broadcasts and other means in order inform all troops and civilians clearly as possible of content cease hostilities order and this proclamation, and at same time make them realize necessity strictly obeying such order and proclamation and any other directives that may be required.

In common interest of peoples of Netherlands and Indonesia, and with view to accomplishing steady progress toward early consummation of happy agreement and transfer of real and complete sovereignty, both governments have decreed in common agreement:

1. That there shall be neither prosecution by course of law nor measures of administrative character against anyone who by fact that he, by offering his services, by seeking protection, or by acting in any other way, has taken sides in dispute which has divided Republic and Netherlands.

2. That those who have been deprived of their freedom, because of political convictions or functions, or because they have carried arms in fighting organizations of one of parties, shall be released soon as possible.

3. That those who are being prosecuted or have been condemned because of crimes which are clearly a consequence of political conflict between Netherlands and Republic shall be released from prosecution or reprieved from penalty in accordance with legislative or other measures to be enacted soon as possible. Measures concerning their social rehabilitation shall be worked out in cooperation between parties.

4. That everyone concerned is ordered:

a. To refrain from radio broadcasts, press reports, or any other form propaganda aimed at challenging or alarming armed forces or civilians of other party;

b. To refrain from sabotage and terrorism, and from all direct or indirect threats, destruction and other similar acts directed against persons or groups or [of] persons, or against property wherever it may be or of whomsoever it is;

c. To refrain from all acts which might be harmful to mutual cooperation;

d. To refrain from all acts of reprisal or retaliation; and

e. To avoid and prevent provocations and incidents of any kind.

All persons are hereby warned that any act in violation this proclamation committed after (blank) shall be severely punished".

Herewith text Document 3:

"It is agreed by both parties that following shall constitute regulations for implementation of order to cease hostilities, and proclamation promulgated jointly by both governments.

(1) Armed forces of parties shall not extend zones of patrolling, to be delineated in accordance with paragraph 6, or otherwise endeavor improve their respective military positions at expense of other.

(2) Armed forces of each party may be moved to any location within zones of patrolling of that party referred to in paragraph 6.

(3) Free movement of civilian population and free traffic of goods shall be permitted without hindrance, except for right of both parties to take such measures as may be required to ensure there no illegal carriage of arms, munitions and other materials of exclusively warlike character, or propaganda material of subversive nature.

(4) Both parties shall cooperate fully in maintaining law and order, in protecting all elements of population, and facilitating each other's measures of self-defense.

(5) Patrols of each party shall only be permitted in areas allocated for that purpose to respective parties in accord paragraph 6. All patrols shall be limited to maintenance law and order, including protection all elements of population.

(6) After consultation among themselves, parties shall delineate and allocate, according administrative units, zones of patrolling for maintenance law and order. Central joint board referred to paragraph 7 shall indicate lines of procedure for that purpose. If in any instance parties fail reach agreement on such delineation and allocation, central joint board shall make recommendations thereon to parties and UNCI.

(7) Central joint board consisting representatives both parties and civil and military representatives of UNCI and under chairmanship UNCFI representative (rotated), shall be established. Will be duty of central joint board to observe implementation present regulations, well as cease hostilities order, proclamation, and any other related orders and directives and report and make recommendations thereon to parties and UNCFI. Central joint board shall, as required, establish local joint committees, consisting representatives both parties and UNCFI, which shall be responsible directly to Central joint board.

(8) In zones of patrolling allocated to Republic in accord paragraph 6, Republican Government accepts in addition to duty and task for maintaining law and order, responsibility for feeding, clothing, provision of all services needed by population. Should these facilities not be available to Republican Government, latter will report any deficiencies to Government of Indonesia, if desirable through UNCFI, with view to seeing what arrangements can be worked out, keeping in mind interest of population of Indonesia as whole, and to determining manner in which further government of USI may be responsible for expenditures involved.

(9) All times quoted by either side shall be stated in both Netherlands and Republic local times.

(10) Consultation, communication and supply between responsible civil and military authorities in all areas will be facilitated in both parties.

(11) Present regulations shall enter into force simultaneously with order to cease hostilities."

Herewith text Document 4:

"There shall be established a 'Netherlands-Indonesian manual for military cooperation'. Manual shall consist of military definitions and rules to provide for implementation agreements between parties as set forth in three draft documents designated as (1) cease hostilities order, (2) proclamation, and (3) regulations governing implementation of agreement to cease hostilities. Material contained in this manual shall provide technical details considered necessary to achieve satisfactory carrying out of policies agreed upon by parties in military field. There shall be no material included therein which contravenes any final provisions of three documents above-mentioned. Work thereon should begin immediately UNCFI's military advisors and each of parties should assemble material which they think appropriate for manual. It anticipated manual should be completed by date of issuance three documents above-mentioned. With approval of parties, manual may be supplemented and amended to such extent as found necessary in actual practice, so long as terms of above-mentioned agreements not contravened thereby."

Herewith text Document 5:

"I have pleasure in referring to following statement made by Dr. Roem at UNCFI meeting May 7, 1949: 'As chairman RepDel I am authorized by Sukarno and Hatta to give their personal assurances that they favor, in conformity with SC resolution 28 January and directive of 23 March:

- (1) Issuance of order to Republican armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare;
- (2) Cooperation in restoration peace and maintenance law and order; and
- (3) Participation in RTC at Hague with view to accelerate unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to USI.

Sukarno and Hatta undertake that they will urge adoption such policy by Republican Government soon as possible after its restoration to Jogja'.

Since May 7 our delegates have been engaged in making plans for return of Republican Government to Jogja and in endeavoring reach meeting of minds on three points set forth in Roem's statement above quoted.

There attached copies of three documents which constitute drafts agreed upon by our delegates, insofar as they are empowered to proceed. These documents are (1) cease hostilities order, (2) proclamation, and (3) regulations governing implementation of cease hostilities order.

I find these documents in their present form to be reasonable and satisfactory. I am prepared urge adoption policy formulated in these documents by Republican Government soon as possible after its restoration Jogja. I would consider only lesser details covered by these documents as subject to change after consultation on return Republic to Jogja, and by mutual agreement between our delegates. I consider as immutable following elements of policy formulated in documents under reference:

(1) All hostilities between parties, including guerrilla warfare, shall cease.

(2) All measures shall be taken to cease-fire and terminate all acts intended harm other party.

(3) Both parties shall cooperate fully in maintaining law and order, in protecting all elements of population, and facilitating each other's measures of self-defense.

(4) Ending of military operations throughout Indonesia will render possible maintenance peace and order through cooperation between Netherlands and Republican Armed Forces. Cooperation in patrolling, in avoiding clashes and maintaining peace and order shall be effected.

(5) Armed forces of parties shall not extend delineated zones of patrolling or otherwise endeavor improve respective military positions at expense of other. Patrols shall be limited to maintenance of law and order, including protecting all elements of population.

(6) There shall be neither prosecution by course of law nor measures of administrative character against any one who by sole fact that he, by offering his services, by seeking protection, or by acting in any other way, has taken sides in dispute which has divided Republic and Netherlands.

(7) Those who have been deprived their freedom, because of political convictions or functions, or because they have carried arms in fighting organizations of one of parties, shall be released soon as possible.

(8) There shall be free movement of civilian population and free traffic of goods.

(9) There shall be cooperation between parties in assuming responsibility for feeding, clothing and providing medical supplies and services for population.

It will be my further undertaking endeavor limit amendments to three above-mentioned draft documents to absolutely necessary minimum and to incorporate insofar as possible in Netherlands-Indonesian manual for military cooperation material pertinent to such cooperation. There attached as fourth document description of contemplated manual."

Herewith text Document 6:

"I have pleasure in acknowledging your letter dated (blank) and

confirming I am in accord that three draft documents attached thereto are in their present form reasonable and satisfactory. I would consider only lesser details covered by these documents as subject to change after consultation on return Republic to Jogja and by mutual agreement between our delegates. I agree further that elements of policy formulated in those documents, as listed your letter under points one to nine inclusive, are immutable.

I agree that we undertake endeavor to limit amendments to three draft documents to absolutely necessary minimum, and to incorporate insofar as possible in Netherlands-Indonesian manual for military cooperation material pertinent to such cooperation." Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/6-1749 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 17, 1949—noon.

542. Gocus 729. Received Usgoc 383¹ after despatch Gocus 727 and 728,² first thereof reporting agreement between delegations on six draft documents and second transmitting documents.

Before Roem left for Bangka to submit drafts for Hatta's approval he thanked me warmly for my support and said was confident could obtain Hatta's approval. Gave complete sets documents to Critchley and Herremans. They had been familiar with three major documents until stage of final negotiations. They both approved manner in which I had sought way out of difficulty through exchange letters, et cetera. UNCI would be unanimous therefore if Netherlands Government should react to these documents in any manner which would risk weakening Republic at this time.

While I have not endeavored in my messages to explain every move to Department, it should be understood that when I am serving as middleman at request two chairmen, I present each side's position to other when asked do so without myself taking commitment thereon. When thereafter I get parties together to work out compromise, it frequently occurs that my own formula is accepted. For instance, I yesterday dictated following: "Both parties shall cooperate fully in maintaining law and order, in protecting all elements of population and in facilitating each other's measures of self defense" which was accepted as substitute for several last minute contentious Netherlands Delegation amendments, including following: "Parties shall not extend their military action to areas assigned to other party, unless armed forces of

¹ Telegram 327, June 15, p. 433.

² Telegrams 537 and 538, June 16, pp. 434, 436.

one party, by serious encroachment of present regulations, constitute immediate danger to armed forces of other party or unless disturbances of law and order take place to such extent that population urgently requires to be protected. In these instances parties shall instantly report to their governments and to UNCI." The proposed letters to be exchanged and plan for manual entirely my drafting. I submit foregoing since recent Deptels have indicated concern lest Republican interests were suffering.

Sultan Hamid called last night to ask if one more representative from Borneo could be added to six representatives his group invited to participate in UNCI discussions. I offered refer matter to my colleagues but told him my recommendation would be negative. He agreed to accept this as final. There is quoted text of letter which I, as UNCI chairman, addressed Hamid, as BFO chairman, on June 14:

"Have honor refer to paragraph 4(D) of SC resolution 28 January. Availing itself of authority contained therein, UNCI has honor to invite you and five other representatives of areas in Indonesia other than Republic, members of BFO, to participate, without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of parties, in discussions at present being held in Batavia under auspices of Commission.

"Secretariat of Commission will make known time and place of meeting which you and other representatives will be invited to attend."

From this it will be noted that letter of SC resolution January 28 was followed. While recognizing BFO through addressing Hamid, individuals to be invited are identified as representatives of areas in Indonesia other than Republic. By specifying these as members BFO there are eliminated observers from such areas as Tapanuli and Djambi. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

856d.00/6-1749: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, June 17, 1949—6 p. m.

523. Deptel 512, June 14. Always possible some elements Netherlands Government might have alternate courses action in back of minds should Van Royen-Roem agreement prove abortive. However, Embassy believes leading cabinet figures such as Drees or Stikker intend fullest Netherlands effort to implement agreement, restoration law and order and Hague conference. This also holds true of Lovink in our opinion. Since departure of Sassen from Overseas Territories port-

¹ Repeated in telegram 337, Usgoc 387, June 18, 6 p. m., to Batavia.

folio, that Ministry under Van Maarseveen seems to have pursued straight forward course and not endeavored to torpedo the course of Drees and Stikker as was Sassen's habit. Lovink's successor, Boon, is most decidedly taking every possible step to have SC instructions implemented. We have not in any of our contacts with government or Foreign Office officials encountered any indication Machiavellian plans.

The Embassy's language in Embtel 491, June 9, was ambiguous. Reference clause was meant to mean Dutch were relinquishing part of their total worldwide sovereignty in giving sovereignty Indonesia. Frequent declarations have been made by Dutch officials that the Netherlands Government intends to hand over sovereignty to USI completely and unconditionally. (See Stikker's remarks Embtel 510, June 16.²)

This is the first time Embassy has seen reference to "initial" restoration. We think that Netherlands Government went beyond SC instructions re restoration by including whole residency Djocja in a gesture of goodwill and with hope that this gesture would be recognized and might forestall wider demands that would jeopardize negotiations. However, we do not believe that Netherlands Government has contemplated that restoration of further territory to Republic would be necessary at present stage in solution Indonesian problem.

Re police equipment, Dutch are apparently exercising extreme caution perhaps too much for fear arms they turn over to Republic will encourage ambitious regain more dominant position by Republic regime. We do not recall that Dutch have ever been obligated to transfer sufficient police equipment for maintenance law and order beyond present contemplated Republic area. On other hand re hypothesis mentioned in Deptel, we know that Dutch are anxious that cease fire be effected and effective. Foreign Office feels that Soekarno-Hatta government must be strengthened and maintained else Communist government would be set up. (Embtel 440, May 19).

Netherlands Government and people have progressed very considerably in their attitudes towards the international reaction to Indonesian question as well as to their own thoughts about Indonesia. It has been drummed into them from every side that their actions have been stupid and arrogant, flouting as they have world public opinion. We believe that they are now sincerely anxious to rehabilitate themselves internationally. With respect to Indonesia, the Dutch have seen a steady drain on their resources, guerrilla warfare and no real progress made since the war ended. They have now resigned them-

² Not printed; it reported remarks made to group of American journalists on visit to Indonesia under Netherlands Government sponsorship (856d.00/6-1649).

selves to the inevitable and want the Indonesian question cleared up quickly.

If despite their best efforts, it is not settled—and some officials including Stikker are not entirely convinced that it will be—then the Dutch believe they can have clear conscience and stronger case before world if they should be confronted with possible alternative of complete retirement from Indonesia.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/6-1749: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1949—7 p. m.

333. Usgoc 385. Ur recent tels refer to recurring Repub suggestion Hague round table be held under UNCFI auspices. Dept believes ur reply to Repubs set forth fifth para Gocus 723² correctly states that round table is separate conference under Neth responsibility with UNCFI a participant rather than convener, assisting as instructed SC directive Mar 23 under UNCFI's terms of reference SC Res Jan 28. Dept anxious that all parties and world opinion realize responsibility for round table rests on Neth shoulders. No suggestion or implication should be allowed to arise that UNCFI or US is guaranteeing success round table.

Nevertheless Dept agrees with you that UNCFI shld participate round table, carrying on as a matter of right all specific functions itemized point (5) fifth para urtel Gocus 723 June 11. UNCFI shld insist that UNCFI functions and privileges be expressly recognized by NethDel, as well as by Repubs.

Re Indo participation round table Dept believes that altho Neth as host is proper general chairman of conference, Repubs and other Indo reps shld be given equitable proportion responsible posts as chairmen some general and working comites upon permanent or rotating basis. Position herein consistent with substance Usgoc 383³ in that in each Dept urges substance of Batavia preliminary agreements and plans for round table be worked out according to terms of SC Res Jan 28 and SC directive Mar 23.

WEBB

¹ Repeated as 532 to The Hague.

² Telegram 528, June 11, p. 422.

³ Telegram 327, June 15, p. 433.

501.BC Indonesia/6-1849: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, June 18, 1949—4 p. m.

545. Gocus 730. Lovink entertained RepDel, NethDel and UNCI at dinner night 17. He pledged early USI that should be based on four freedoms and should be bulwark against Communism.

RepDel had just returned from visiting leaders Bangka via Palembang where Malik, Sumatran BFO leaders, had invited them for short stop. Van Royen speaking with Roem asked me join them and decide which was right. Van Royen argued that three principal draft documents Committee 2 should be formalized secretly in UNCI session after expected approval in present form by Hatta and Netherlands Government. I said formalizing with UNCI should only come after Republican Government has returned to Jogja and there approved final form and Netherlands Government concurred therein. Roem said this was certainly his understanding of situation, after we resorted to exchange of letter idea. Van Royen did not argue further apparently accepting our view.

Roem said he had experienced more difficult time Bangka than expected. Said leaders had thought three draft documents, as they had seen them previous Sunday, were in form desired by Netherlands and had not realized that Netherlands military and Hague had not had opportunity give their opinions thereon. Three of us agreed tentatively on changes two or three words in drafts.

Roem then said Hatta sought fixing definite date for return Republican Government, namely, by beginning of Muslim fast days on 27 June, before he would consent to exchange letters. I opposed this as did Van Royen. I pointed out that:

- (1) Van Royen had yielded to RepDel on practically every point in amendments suggested by Netherlands Military and Hague;
- (2) RepDel familiar with all aspects our negotiations had found six documents and plan involved in their handling as reasonable way out of impasse;
- (3) My two UNCI colleagues and I thought this fair arrangement;
- (4) Netherlands Minister Maarseveen due arrive Batavia 20 and Netherlands Cabinet meets same day Hague;
- (5) We have all been rushing negotiations vigorously as possible this week and in agreement in pursuing same policy until we can get to Hague;
- (6) Van Royen should not now be faced with ultimatum as to restoration date;
- (7) This would not only prejudice chances for acceptance documents by Maarseveen and Netherlands Cabinet, but would also set

¹ Repeated in airgram A-218, June 22, to The Hague.

precedent for fixing deadlines to which Van Royen might justifiably resort, for example, in demanding cease hostilities order after restoration Jogja;

(8) This would be contrary spirit good faith in which our discussions have been conducted and might destroy atmosphere so badly needed for possibly troubled times ahead;

(9) Even if we agree on all six documents and additionally on round table plans this weekend, Sultan requires two days notice before Netherlands military evacuation should begin;

(10) That would take five to seven days and Sultan would then have to have few days in which to get Jogja in satisfactory state of order and preparation for return of leaders;

(11) This would all take time that would pass June 27;

(12) Republicans should be satisfied undertaking of Netherlands to announce just early as possible fact that Netherlands military evacuation is to commence on certain date be expedited and Sultan takeover thereafter;

(13) If everything goes well, should be possible issue this communiqué before fast days and thus give psychological effect which Hatta stresses is so important.

I followed same lines talking later with Leimena and Supomo in Van Royen's presence. Latter was appreciative my support and promised do everything possible expedite whole procedure preparatory to Hague.

We agreed RepDel should meet morning 18 on results Bangka and then meet with few members NethDel and myself to clear up questions on six document procedure and begin conversations on round table plans. Was agreed BFO should not participate in this first talk on round table.

Van Royen phone[d] 9 a. m. today asking that BFO be brought into today's meeting and that it be postponed until 4 p. m. He finally accepted my idea we go ahead with meeting as planned; get six document matter cleared, make some progress on round table with only two delegations represented and then bring BFO's in second meeting on latter subject this afternoon.

Roem came 9:30. Reviewed Bangka meeting and our conversation preceding evening. I reaffirmed my opposition to requesting Netherlands guarantee restoration Republican Government Jogja by 27. I promised however do everything possible toward getting Netherlands announce prior that date beginning evacuation by Netherlands military and timetable for turning over to Sultan. Re time and conditions Hague conference, we agreed approximate date probably August 1 should be fixed for assembly RTC, and it further specified conference should be completed within maximum of eight weeks with both governments undertaking endeavor ratify agreements within six weeks after

conclusion conference, with view complete transfer sovereignty before end 1949.

11 a. m. met in Van Royen's office with him, Gieben, De Beus, Roem, Leimena, Sastroamidjojo and Supomo. We agreed on following changes in texts documents quoted Gocus 728.²

Document 1 paragraph A omit "explicitly." Change "cooperation in patrolling" to "mutual coordination in patrolling, cooperation in avoiding." Make some change paragraph B. Document 2, 3rd paragraph should read "endeavors of everyone." Document 3 paragraph 3 after word "goods" insert "between zones." Document 5 point 8 add after "goods" words "between zones."

Van Royen promised endeavor clear six documents and handling thereof with Maarseveen on latter's arrival Monday and thereafter communicate urgently with Hague if further approval from Cabinet necessary. He hopes therefore be able by Tuesday or Wednesday 22 latest to state date Netherlands Military evacuation Jogja can begin. Republicans agreed that simultaneously with issuance communiqué on this point they would consummate exchange of letters included six documents. (Hatta has actually signed.)

We moved from Van Royen's to room of Blom, ill, confined to bed. As deputy chairman he has been assisting Van Royen through handling round table matters. It was agreed that on same date communiqué re military evacuation issued and letters above mentioned secretly exchanged, there would be formalizing with UNCI of document to be agreed upon by prospective participants RTC, setting forth general principles under following heads: aim of RTC; participants; procedure of RTC result of conference; items of agenda—(a) Provisional constitution USI, (b) charter of transfer of sovereignty, (c) fundamental provisions of statute of Netherlands-Indonesian union, (d) other items.

We spent hour revising latest draft this document on which parties have been working independently of UNCI. Study to be resumed in Blom's quarters 6 p. m. today with four BFO members whose names Hamid selected, and provided me in advance, also present. Effort being made to have this completed before Maarseveen's arrival. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

² Telegram 538, June 16, p. 436.

501.BC Indonesia/6-1949 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

RESTRICTED PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 19, 1949—5 p. m.

546. Gocus 731. Met with dozen including RepDel, NethDel and three BFO's in Blom's quarters 18, p. m., for three hours, developing draft document on RTC plans.

Van Royen told me alone of unhappiness over story of AP correspondent from Batavia visiting Bangka who reported interviews wherein Sukarno criticized alleged delays by Netherlands in restoration, etc., and insisted through press on plan Roem put up to us night 17 re return of leaders to Jogja by June 27. Such Republican publicity together with revived Australian and Indian criticism only adds to burden consummate genuinely fair agreements with Indonesians soonest. I am convinced of Van Royen's good intentions and confident best results can be achieved by refraining from expressions of doubt to Hague on our part that may be passed on to him. If impasse should arise, I would prefer first exhaust my efforts with Van Royen and Lovink. Again I object to idea trying effect rapprochement with Dutch through weakening on ECA policy at time Netherlands Government still needs to be conscious our firmness (Usgoc 384²). Again I insist Republicans' interests being more than safeguarded. We are helping Republicans as well as chances for successful restoration and Hague conference if we force their thinking along practical lines into as definite plans and decisions as possible without risking their prestige.

Accepted invitation to meet again in Blom's quarters 9 a. m. until 1:30 p. m. today with four BFO's and usual Netherlands and Republicans. Following draft document was completed:

"1. *Aim of RTC.*

Aim of RTC is to bring about just and lasting settlement of Indonesian dispute soon as possible by reaching agreement among participants concerning ways and means to accelerate unconditional transfer real and complete sovereignty to USI in accordance with *Renville* principles.

Participants in RTC undertake strive for convening of conference by August 1, 1949 and for completion of conference within two months thereafter. Participants undertake ratify agreements resulting from conference within six weeks after its termination. Consequently sovereignty should be transferred to USI before end 1949.

¹ Repeated in airgram A-216, June 22, to The Hague.

² See telegram 508, June 15, p. 431 and footnote 1.

2. *Participants.*

Participants RTC will be:

- (1) Representatives Government of Netherlands;
- (2) Representatives of Government of Republic of Indonesia; one and two parties in Indonesian dispute before SC;
- (3) BFO (Federal Consultative Assembly) representing areas in Indonesia other than Republic, as far as they are members this organization.

3. *UNCI.*

UNCI will participate in RTC accordance with its terms of reference as they have been established by SC. UNCI will be responsible for providing SC with reports of conference.

4. *Procedure of RTC.*

- (1) Conference itself will decide upon its rules of procedure, in addition to points established in this present document;
- (2) Formal and informal meetings shall be held;
- (3) Formal meetings shall be held with UNCI;
- (4) Informal meetings shall be held with or without UNCI as circumstances may require;
- (5) Resolutions shall be passed at formal meetings;
- (6) RTC shall give representatives of minorities (European, Chinese and Arabic) opportunity express their views to conference in all matters which are deemed to concern their interests.
- (7) Applications of representatives other significant interests who wish express their views may be considered by conference.

5. *Results of conference.*

Results of conference shall be laid down in documents and agreements binding upon parties thereto. These documents and agreements shall be subject to ratification and shall include A.OP. [among others] charter of transfer of sovereignty and statute of Netherlands-Indonesian Union, establishing fundamental provisions of future cooperation.

6. *Ratification of agreements reached at RTC.*

Documents and agreements referred to sub-5 shall be submitted immediately afterwards to Netherlands States-General, to provisional representative body of Republican Indonesia and, in way to be decided upon in due time, to representative bodies of BFO areas.

7. *Items of agenda.*

a. *Provisional constitution of USI.*

Sovereignty will be transferred to Provisional National Federal Government of USI which shall function on basis of a provisional constitution.

- (1) Provisional constitution shall include provisions with regard to structure and powers of Provisional Federal Government;
- (2) It shall stipulate that existing legislation insofar as it is not inconsistent with provisions of provisional constitution or with agreements reached by RTC, shall remain in force until replaced by legis-

lation enacted by competent organizations according to rules to be worked out in provisional constitution.

(3) All powers of Netherlands supreme legislative body, of Crown and of Governor-General, including those which Government-General had in consultation with "Volksraad" or "Raad van Nederlands-Indie" shall be vested in Provisional Federal Government. Supreme authority with regard to foreign relations and federal armed forces shall exclusively be vested in Provisional Federal Government.

(4) Provisional constitution shall not contain any provision inconsistent with charter of transfer sovereignty, statute of Netherlands-Indonesian Union or other documents relating to future cooperation.

(5) Provisional constitution shall include provisions to guarantee effective realization of rights of self-determination of peoples of Indonesia and holding of free and secret elections for Constituent Assembly.

b. Charter of transfer of sovereignty.

Charter shall include following provisions:

(1) Transfer of sovereignty shall be real, complete and unconditional;

(2) A union shall be established by Kingdom of Netherlands and USI on basis of voluntary and equal partnership with equal rights;

(3) An agreement with regard to transfer of rights, powers and obligations of Indonesia (Netherlands-Indies) to USI.

c. Fundamental provisions of statute of Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

In union neither of two partners, namely Netherlands and USI, shall be expected transfer or concede any more rights to union than other. Nor will this transfer include any rights other than those which either partner may voluntarily decide to concede in conviction of serving thereby as best he can common interests as well as his own. Union shall not be a super-state.

d. Observation of implementation of agreements.

UNCI or another UN agency shall observe in Indonesia implementation of agreements reached at RTC.

e. Other items.

Other items to be discussed at RTC shall include: foreign relations, rights of self-determination of peoples, contracts with self-governing regions, nationality and citizenship, financial and economic relations and cultural relations, military agreements and withdrawal of Netherlands forces, exchange of high commissioners, status of civil servants functioning at time of transfer of sovereignty and New Guinea."

Republicans flying Bangka Monday for Hatta's approval this draft. Van Royen telegraphing text Hague and discussing with Maarseveen on arrival Batavia 20. Being cleared with UNCI colleagues. When approved from all sides document will be formalized with UNCI simultaneously with announcement to press of date Netherlands evacuation and with secret exchange letters re three Committee 2 documents. At that meeting both Republicans and BFO's plan register objections to discussing New Guinea as other than part of area over

which sovereignty to be transferred. Van Royen will reply that positions not prejudiced by inclusion item New Guinea on agenda but will insist on such inclusion.

Agreement to have UNCI continue springs from Indonesian desire have witness to see sovereignty transferred and Netherlands military withdrawal and Netherlands desire have witness to see Indonesians hold proper elections.

Group asked and I promised UNCI would compile "terms of reference" as set forth in various SC directives and distribute this informally to three delegations. I refused Roem's request that annex giving and interpreting such terms reference be attached to document above quoted. I also agreed have UNCI Secretariat draw up suggestions for conference organization and procedure. Republicans have dropped idea requiring RTC under UNCI auspices. Question of principal chairman of conference will probably be deferred until convening Hague and then either be Netherlands Minister or rotated between him and Indonesians. Signed Cochran.³

LIVENGOOD

³ Telegram 338, Usgoc 388, June 20, 7 p. m., to Batavia, gave the Department's approval of the draft document and the manner in which Mr. Cochran achieved it.

501.BC Indonesia/6-2149: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 21, 1949—10 p. m.

551. Gocus 734. Gocus 731.² RepDel returned from Bangka last evening. Roem told me Hatta approved RTC document subject two small amendments. Roem and I talked with Van Royen at reception given by Koets for US press group. Van Royen said his government sought one amendment in his letter to acknowledge Hatta's letter on fundamental principles. With approval Chairman Critchley who was present, I agreed meet in Blom's quarters this forenoon with group that worked past few days on RTC document to consider above mentioned amendments.

Roem, Van Royen and I met this morning and agreed following paragraph be added Van Royen's draft reply to Hatta listed as document 6 in Gocus 728:³

"Also confirms statement made at meeting held May 7 under auspices UNCI to effect that proposed RTC at Hague will deal with way

¹ Repeated in airgram A-229, June 27, to The Hague.

² *Supra.*

³ Telegram 538, June 16, p. 436.

in which to transfer real, complete and unconditional sovereignty to USI accordance with *Renville* principles."

In subsequent meeting participated in by Netherlands, Republicans and BFO representatives, following changes agreed to in draft RTC document quoted Gocus 731:

I. After "ways and means" should read "to transfer real, complete and unconditional sovereignty."

II. After point 3, add following sentence: "It is understood that participation in RTC shall not prejudice rights, claims and positions of participants."

III. Delete final sentence.

VII. Sub-B-1 rewrite to read "Real, complete and unconditional sovereignty shall be transferred in accordance with *Renville* principles." Foregoing changes cleared afterwards with UNCI colleagues.

NethDel and RepDel agreed have ideas or memos to contribute 6:30 p. m. re procedure to be followed in formal UNCI meeting and re press statement to be issued.

Accordance with understanding of NethDel, RepDel, BFO and UNCI, chairman UNCI this afternoon gave chairman BFO copies three major Committee 2 documents for confidential study.

Critchley, Herremans and I met with Netherlands Republicans and BFO representative Blom's quarters 6:30 to 8:30 tonight. Discussed procedure for UNCI meeting and issuance press statement. No conclusive drafting done or agreements reached. Three delegations are to provide UNCI chairman 9 a. m. Wednesday morning with their drafts on what should be said in UNCI meeting and in press statement. Informal UNCI meeting scheduled for 10 a. m. where attempt will be made reconcile and coordinate drafts. Thereafter BFO representatives will have opportunity comment on three major documents Committee 2 and two other delegations answer such comments.

No progress made today in settling point of arms for Jogja police. Van Royen not willing go beyond 600. Roem asked whether Netherlands would object to Republicans buying or borrowing weapons from friendly governments. Van Royen urged against bringing up this idea which would raise whole question of permit of importation of arms and could give no early results. Since Roem insisted could take no decision without further consulting Sultan, we are sending UNCI plane 6 a. m. Wednesday to Jogja to bring Sultan back by noon. If this point can be then settled, plan formal UNCI meeting late Wednesday. I suggested to Van Royen confidentially that Sultan be placed in touch with Lovink on this vital point. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/6-2249 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, June 22, 1949—8 p. m.

557. Gocus 737. Gocus 735.¹ Roem told me 5 p. m. had with Sultan and Leimena been received by Lovink. Latter had agreed consider 600 "first supply" Lovink said if and when TNI auxiliary police being replaced by civil police and everything going well so Netherlands public opinion would not bet shocked Sultan should make request as to needs and Lovink would do everything possible see required equipment obtained. Roem said Sultan satisfied to accept this understanding. Roem would like have Van Royen include some statement in current progress report of Committee 1 to indicate Netherlands readiness fulfill Lovink promise regarding arms for police. [Apparent garble] agreed go forward with plans return Republic government Jogja irrespective any promise to mention this matter in progress report. I gave foregoing account to Van Royen who had not been able participate in meeting at Palace because of our committee work. He was relieved at this outcome. I said I certainly would not insist on mention of this in progress report but would leave matter entirely to good faith Netherlands and Republic authorities.

Formal meeting under auspices UNCI held 5 p. m. and proceeded as planned. Everybody happy. Texts statements chairmen three groups quoted Gocus 736.² Secretariat cabling Lake Success text press communiqué.

Netherlands military issuing instructions as of today for evacuation commence twenty-fourth. Sultan returning Jogja UNCI plane twenty-third. Senior Military Observer likewise proceeding Jogja. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Not printed.² Telegram 558, June 22, 7 p. m., not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/6-2449 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY WASHINGTON, June 24, 1949—5 p. m.

346. Usgoc 390. Gocus 739.² ECA prepared discuss all aspects aid program for all Indo once satisfactory political settlement reached. However, on strength views Gocus 725,³ no resumption under present conditions now being contemplated.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 552 to The Hague.² Telegram 563, June 24, not printed.³ Telegram 532, June 13, p. 427.

501.BC Indonesia/6-2849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1949—6 p. m.

350. Personal for Cochran from Secretary: I want you to have my own congratulations on your outstanding job in achievement of mutually satisfactory arrangements between Repub and Neth for implementation May 7 agreement and for RTC. I wholeheartedly share with all Dept officers who have been following developments their admiration for your skillful handling of an extremely difficult situation. You have realized the primary condition for final peaceful settlement Neth-Repub dispute.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/7-749: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

BATAVIA, July 7, 1949—11 a. m.

586. Gocus 750. UNCI representatives and deputies proceeded Jogja noon fifth, returned evening sixth. I called on Sultan fifth. Congratulated him upon results achieved Jogja residency. I hoped patriotic rally attendant upon return leaders from Bangka would be followed by serious efforts expedite final decisions and despatch Delegation to Hague in spirit cooperation that has marked relationship between delegates in discussions Batavia.

UNCI group on airfield sixth 1 p. m. to greet Sukarno, Hatta and others arriving by UNCI plane from Bangka. Procession to Palace and reception there reported in UNCI press cable to Lake Success despatched last night. Return of government was to a clean and orderly city whose population manifested welcome. Ceremonies were dignified and impressive. Attitude toward me was most cordial and appreciative.

Roem remained Jogja to see Commander-in-Chief General Sudirman, expected Jogja seventh or eighth. He and I spoke with Colonel Simatupang whom Roem has asked help with field manual. I have asked Senior Military Observer who returned with us to hasten their part drafting on manual.

No word yet received from Leimena, Natsir and Halim who went Bukittinggi fourth by KLM to arrange transfer Sjafruddin and emergency government members to Jogja. Plans send UNCI plane when requested by Leimena. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Repeated in telegram 590, July 7, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

501.BC Indonesia/7-1149: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1949—7 p. m.

370. Us goc 402. Van Kleffens saw Rusk today in connection with anticipated difficulties Neth Govt in debate Indo policy in secret session Second Chamber States General Jul 13. Stressing fact (a) that opposition present Govt policy from Anti-Revolutionary party and certain sections Catholic Party had been increased by recent speeches Repub leaders in Djocja, which regarded as inflammatory, and (b) that Govt wld consider anything short of a two-thirds vote of confidence as insufficient, in view of fact that implementation of agreements reached wld ultimately require two-thirds majority, he sought our help in easing Neth Govt over political hurdle which, he said, both Stikker and he regarded as dangerous. Van Kleffens spoke of possibility Govt's resigning if opposition mustered thirty-four votes.

As you know, Dept predisposed to help either party over political obstacles so long as such action consistent with our major objective, namely, a settlement in accordance with agreements already reached. Wld it be possible and in your judgment desirable for UNCFI, prior to debates in Hague on Wed, to issue statement urging both parties refrain from making statements which are not conducive to furthering an agreement between them? If UNCFI unable take action this regard, Dept authorizes you at your discretion to make such a statement.

In course of conversation, it was pointed out to Van Kleffens that you had already advised Repub leaders in Djocja to buckle down to serious business. However, what Van Kleffens seeks at this juncture is statement susceptible of political use by Neth Govt against its parliamentary critics. Dept willing to have such a statement made, in view Neth Govt's political hazards, but does not wish you undertake do so if in your opinion there are over-riding reasons against it.

Above drafted prior receipt Gocus 755.² Your proposed letter to Roem should give Neth Govt considerable assistance forthcoming debate, assuming info your letter usable in closed parliamentary debates. In any event, you may wish consider suggestion of public statement, as means of influencing both parties against making disruptive statements.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated in telegram 602, July 12, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² Telegram 597, July 11, not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/7-1149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1949—7 p. m.

371. Usgoc 403. For your info, fol is sequel to Usgoc 394 (Deptel to Hague 580) July 1 concerning ECA Indo.

Philipse² and Schiff called again to discuss Indo aid program with Dept officers. Dept position reaffirmed as reported previous tels. Dutch seemed fully to understand our reasoning re necessity avoid premature decision and announcement thereof, but emphasized fol points: (a) Indo dollar reserve dangerously depleted, import schedules very low with consequent hardship native population, further reduction imports in offing as result failure obtain CCC credit, serious danger that within four months economic situation so deteriorated as to render ineffective limited assistance which might then be available through ECA; (b) something in nature of deadline confronting Neth Govt, in view of OEEC meeting probably Aug-Sept to recommend division ECA funds now up for appropriation by Congress; (c) fluid situation in Dutch domestic politics re present policy vis-à-vis Indo. In this connection point was made that tangible encouragement to Neth Govt from US is factor as important as avoidance under-cutting Hatta, if real and enduring solution to be reached at Hague conference.

Dept officials replied that above points have been, and certainly wld be, factors considered in any decision; that matter was one in which timing seemed to be of great importance in order achieve political objectives both in Indonesia and in Holland, and that we desired keep these discussions on very frank basis in order avoid in so far as possible any misunderstanding of motive. No commitment was made either in principle or as to timing.

It appears desirable to Dept that ECA aid Indo be resumed at earliest possible time, but only, of course, when such resumption wld be compatible with attainment objective of strengthening Hatta Govt vis-à-vis extremists and otherwise effective in furthering final solution. In view above and in view fact discussions re resumption with Neth officials have taken place, Dept wld appreciate your taking matter up with Hatta or other Repub leader at your discretion and your forwarding his reaction and your comments thereon.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 596 to The Hague.

² Dr. Adrian H. Philipse, Commercial Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy.

501.BC Indonesia/7-1249 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, July 12, 1949—11 p. m.

602. Gocus 756. Morning 12th definitely refused go along with Critchley's idea issuing UNCI press release critical of reports by American journalists on military observers, etc.

Roem returned from Jogja five p. m. accompanied by TNI Major Harjono. Am sending UNCI plane morning 13th with Harjono and US military observer overnight Medan, proceed 14th Kotaradja to pick up TNI Colonel Hidayat and perhaps other member Republican military staff Atjen, return Batavia 14th and take TNI officers Jogja 15th.

Roem asked for eight p. m. appointment. I phoned Van Royen that Roem coming since Van Royen continued perturbed over political situation Hague. I told Van Royen that unless conciliatory statement arranged to be issued Jogja after receipt by Roem my letter this morning (Gocus 755²) I would suggest Roem make appropriate statement tonight or morning 13th. Van Royen agreed. He expressed sympathy over loss 13 US press correspondents since crash their plane over India just announced.

Roem came eight p. m. Had discussed my letter with Hatta. Said Hatta and others all unhappy over speech of welcome made sixth by vice chairman working committee. Said both Hatta and he had subsequently issued statements seeking to offset these unfortunate remarks. They felt, however, that there had been nothing in other Republican speeches or statements Jogja to which Hague properly could take exception. Nevertheless they desired improve atmosphere soonest and most effectively. Roem said first Cabinet meeting scheduled for night 13th and possibility Hatta issuing statement thereafter.

I told Roem speech after Cabinet meeting would be too late for Van Royen's need. I suggested Roem himself make press statement Batavia morning 13th reporting first few days at Jogja following restoration Republic. He said atmosphere was good, all political leaders working together and Hatta assured he would have unanimous vote of approval in Cabinet. Furthermore Sjafruddin will turn in his authority at Cabinet meeting and support Hatta. Although date not yet fixed for working committee meeting, Hatta thinks possibly only one dissenting vote therein. Following return General Sudirman to Jogja, Hatta has conferred with him and other military leaders. No objection on their part to cease hostilities, only question being that of arriving at

¹ Repeated in telegram 607, July 13, 3 p. m., to The Hague.

² Not printed.

technical measures to prevent clashes in exceptional circumstances which will obtain after cease hostilities ordered and two forces remain so intertwined. Said Leimena working seriously with Simatupang on compilation manual and remaining Jogja to complete Republican version thereof with TNI advisors. Roem said progress on all lines moving as quickly and satisfactorily as could be expected and optimistic final and favorable decisions can be taken shortly after 20th which will permit Republicans go Hague for RTC early in August in same spirit cooperation that has characterized Batavia discussions.

I asked Roem use in his statement as much foregoing information as he could possibly reveal without hurting Hatta's cause and also to repeat some sentences from his earlier statement at Jogja well as Hatta's since these had not been translated and broadcast in entirety. I suggested further he visit Van Royen soon as statement prepared and prior its issuance in order Van Royen could see it and phone text by noon to Hague for use before Parliament. Roem agreed.

I referred to second part my letter to Roem raising question placing Republican representatives in NEI Ministries. Roem had discussed this with Hatta. They favored idea provided representatives would be and remain Republican officials having contact and liaison with NEI Government and not become officials or employees of latter. I said appropriate arrangements and announcements along this line should await finalization agreement Jogja.

I said foregoing plan might eventually pave way for joint approach by Netherlands and Indonesia for revival ECA aid. I had not mentioned ECA to single Republican since question recently raised by Department. Roem promptly remarked ECA should not be revived until agreement reached at RTC and sovereignty transferred. I said under present set up ECA aid could not be given USI as sovereign state. I said some special arrangement would have to be made as for Korea or some other source funds sought. Roem looks upon ECA as means obliging parties work together rather than source dollars which could play any important part in Indonesian economy this juncture.

Reference Usgoc 402,³ received four p. m. Hope arrangement for statement by Roem will meet requirements. Do not favor UNCI or USDel statement.

Reference Usgoc 403,⁴ simultaneously received. I do not intend mention ECA revival further to Republicans at this time. Am cooperating with Van Royen as thoroughly as possible in seeking best atmosphere for final settlement. Toward that end, am assuming Netherlands acting entirely in good faith. At same time am convinced present policy

³ Telegram 370, July 11, p. 456.

⁴ *Supra*.

inspired importantly by fact that by end January Netherlands Government discovered second police action doomed to failure and NEI to bankruptcy by mid-summer. Without regard to various cables from Department envisaging possible escape measures by Netherlands Government, I have been slightly concerned by indication hedging on part both Maarseveen and Van Royen to effect RTC could not take place unless cease hostilities order effective. I recommend no weakening whatever in ECA and other US and SC policies vis-à-vis Netherlands until RTC actually assembles and is progressing towards desired end. Again I reiterate that if present Netherlands Government which instituted second police action cannot weather current squall no chance it surviving real tempest when genuine transfer sovereignty impends at RTC.

Roem was to call on Chairman Hamid yet this evening to extend invitation from Hatta to BFO meet Jogja 20th for inter-Indonesian conference which Roem thinks should take about five days. Anticipates that final Republican decisions may be taken and announced within that period.

Phoned Van Royen ten-thirty tonight. Summarized Roem's report to me except that I said nothing about ECA or Republican representatives in NEI Ministries. Van Royen delighted with idea Roem making statement tomorrow morning⁵ after letting Van Royen see draft and confident this will prove helpful Hague. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

⁵ The text was transmitted in telegram 604, Gocus 758, July 13, from Batavia, not printed; it was issued to the press by Chairman Roem the same day (501.BC Indonesia/7-1349).

856d.00/7-1849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, July 18, 1949—6 p. m.

611. Embtel 601, July 15.² Commenting today on last week's Chamber debates Indonesia, Boon said Roem statement which he knew Cochran had brought about had been, he felt, of greatest usefulness in helping Cabinet surmount recent crisis, and was appreciated accordingly.

Bearing on Cochran concern Dutch might make breaches cease-fire order excuse for putting off round table conference (Gocus 756,³ Deptel 607, July 13), Boon reiterated today Netherlands policy is earliest possible RTC. Said no responsible government official or any-

¹ Repeated in telegram 383, Usgoc 407, July 19, 9 p. m., to Batavia.

² Not printed.

³ *Supra*.

one acquainted Indonesia expects cease-fire be fully effective and would not be surprised if only "50 percent effective" up to time transfer sovereignty. If Republicans issue cease-fire order as agreed and there is evidence of genuine effort by Republican leaders to carry out he considered Dutch expectations would be met, and that RTC would proceed as planned.

Questioned re Netherlands attitude on federation question at RTC and the significance of final paragraph of statement by president Second Chamber following recent debate Indonesian question (Embtel 601, July 15), Boon said Netherlands inevitably would attach greatest importance to principles enunciated in paragraph in question⁴ in arriving at agreement for transfer of sovereignty. He spoke of Republican desire that USI consist of only three *negaras* (Republic, Borneo and East Indonesia) and said he thought there might be a dozen *negaras* if Indonesians enjoyed unrestricted self-determination. He did not regard as justified, for example, Republican desire incorporate all of Sumatra in the Republic.

STEERE

⁴ Namely, "The Chamber once more declares itself in favor of the speedy establishment of a free and sovereign US of Indonesia formed by equal constituent states on the basis of the unrestricted right of self-determination of the Indonesian people".

501.BC Indonesia/7-2049 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

BATAVIA, July 20, 1949—9 p. m.

624. Gocus 764. UNCI representatives visited Jogja today. Conferred with Sultan Jogja, now Repub Minister Defense, and Roem, Leimena and Colonel Simatupang on cease hostilities. With General Sudirman in hospital and necessity assembling military leaders from distant parts and acquainting them with understandings reached Batavia and problems yet to be faced, little progress made by Repubs on drafting for manual. Simatupang insisted TNI will obey government instructions. Military leaders desire participate solely as technicians in drafting field directives which will insure best possible implementation cease hostilities and related orders. Repubs preferred Netherlands and UNCI representatives meet with them Jogja for solution military matters. Our groups agreed far as UNCI concerned, since we feel time can be saved this manner and our presence and advice Jogja more likely be conducive to results than if we insist on small group Repubs coming Batavia in face necessity, their having

¹ Repeated in telegram 638, July 22, 6 p. m., to The Hague.

continuous contact with other Repub authorities Jogja before taking final decisions. Van Royen promised me before UNCI went Jogja that he would go there with group to participate in talks on manual if found necessary.

We received at Palace by Sukarno and Hatta. They approved plan UNCI and Netherlands representatives arrive Jogja 24, begin talks 25 and remain there until concluded. Repub sending Van Royen invitation.

Sukarno and Hatta gratified at political situation. Hatta made excellent speech before Working Committee 19. Have not seen text speech made this morning by Sukarno at opening session Inter-Indo Conference but informed it peaceful one seeking good feeling and cooperation with BFO towards achievement USI. Sultan Hamid replied appropriately. We reviewed with Repub and BFO leaders parade in honor latter. We talked separately with various BFO leaders and found them delighted with their reception and general atmosphere. They return Batavia afternoon 23. Second half conference begins Batavia 30. Effort being made limit it to 3 days.

I talked separately with Sukarno and then with Hatta. Sukarno assured me positively that cease hostilities order would be issued soon as technicalities cleared up and was sure response would be good. Said Hatta would head delegation to Hague. I expressed satisfaction so much progress made on political side and Residency doing so well since restoration. I told him repercussions from tragic trip US correspondents made more urgent than ever speeding up final decisions and moving discussions to Hague. I said fulfillment by his government, its undertakings and straight-forward negotiating by both parties at Hague, should bring about settlement that would give USI opportunity prove to world genuine spirit Indo democracy and correctness SC policy.

Chairman Herremans visited Van Royen upon our return to give account our trip. I also gave account thereof to Van Royen by phone, 7 p. m. In addition above information I told him of undertaking given me orally by Laoh and Djuanda. They agree second airfield (GA reg.) in Residency be operated along lines agreed to for Maguwo. Van Royen pleased with our progress and seeking Lovink's approval to arrive Jogja with four or five assistants morning 25. Van Royen insists meetings Jogja be informal and hopes possible formalize all documents Batavia by 30. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/7-2149 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1949—6 p. m.

387. Usgoc 410. In forthcoming presentation Mil Assistance Program to Congress Dept proposes take line re relation Indo situation to Neth participation as follows:

1. Recent agreements and actions by Neth have placed Neth in process fulfillment SC Res.

2. Dept places full confidence in *bona fides* both parties to agreements.

3. Implementation thereof expected mark real progress elimination fighting in Indo and reduction Neth forces there to point where major mil strength Neth will be returned to Holland.

4. Dept considers in light recent agreements there shd be no implication in MAP legislation calling good faith Neth into question.

5. Safeguard against possible misuse mil assistance by Neth, in event no polit settlement and renewal hostilities Indo, is provided by proposed clause of general application to effect US will not furnish mil assistance when such action inconsistent with its UN obligations.

Pls comment urgently.²

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 636 to The Hague.

² In telegram 630, Gocus 766, July 23, 1 p. m., from Batavia, Mr. Cochran concurred in paragraphs 1-4 but questioned 5 as "not entirely clear." He added: "I feel legislation should not contain anything to imply lack good faith Netherlands on Indonesian question. Same time, I believe no military assistance should be provided Netherlands pending manifestation sufficient progress RTC to insure that fair settlement will be reached and sovereignty transferred." (501.BC Indonesia/7-2349)

501.BC Indonesia/7-1949 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 21, 1949—7 p. m.

389. Usgoc 411. Dept regards exchange consular representatives between Philippines and Indonesian Republic (Manila's 25 July 19 to Batavia²) as highly undesirable and likely provide Neth opportunity to charge Republican bad faith (as with USSR exchange spring 1948) May 7 Agreement and Republican intention proceed uni-laterally to dominate foreign affairs Indonesia before Round Table Conference. If you agree, please advise Hatta that such exchange at this time and prior to regularization USI foreign relations at RTC might well

¹ Repeated as 866 to Manila and as 637 to The Hague.

² Not printed.

jeopardize smooth progress toward holding Round Table Conference and eventual transfer of sovereignty and suggest desirability suspending further activities this nature Philippines and elsewhere until progress negotiations at Hague warrants inauguration Cons exchange. For urinfo, Dept strongly disapproves contemplated exchange.

This tel being rptd Embassy, Manila and Hague for info only.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/7-2949 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, July 29, 1949—7 p. m.

639. Gocus 770. Informal cease hostilities discussions held Jogja from 25th between Netherlands delegation, Republic delegation and UNCI representatives ended satisfactorily noon 29th. Netherlands delegation and UNCI representatives returned Batavia this evening.

Republic delegation accepted three principal documents committee 1 (Gocus 728¹) as amended (Gocus 730²) plus document IV on manual with following changes:

[Section on amendments not printed. For texts of three documents and of manual with annex, see SC, 4th yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 5, pages 58-71.]

Text of manual anticipated by document IV was agreed upon. Manual and above amendments to documents being submitted Republic Cabinet tonight. Van Royen cabling above amendments to Hague. Hatta came Batavia this afternoon and Roem coming tomorrow. Expect final approval from both governments to foregoing documents tomorrow and formalizing thereof with UNCI Sunday morning. Roem would return thereafter with formalized documents to Sukarno Jogja and prepare for issuance. Roem thinks issuance cease hostilities order, proclamation and regulations should be possible within two or three days after formalizing. Effective date of cease hostilities orders will be determined after consultation today and tomorrow by Republic delegation with military leaders and should be known Sunday.

Principal difficulty in reaching agreement on manual resulted from desire Republic military led by Simatupang achieve set up which they thought most propitious for maintenance law and order. This would have involved certain withdrawals and concentrations Netherlands forces which Netherlands delegation could not support this juncture. After day of little progress, Sultan Jogja, Roem, Simatupang and Leimena called on me midnight 27th seeking formula. I gave them my

¹ Telegram 538, June 16, p. 436.

² Telegram 545, June 18, p. 446.

ideas for paragraph to include in manual. I discouraged Roem's idea of seeking vote at Hague during first fortnight RTC toward beginning implementation Simatupang plan above mentioned for Netherlands concentrations and withdrawals. I preferred approach through Van Royen to appropriate Netherlands officials. Early 28th Royen and Roem met with me. I gave them my draft formula as follows:

"Local commanders shall impress upon their forces that the more sincere and effective the response to cease hostilities orders, the sooner diminution of patrols and other military burdens can be accomplished. Improvement in situation that permits diminution in patrols should lead to next step of diminution of outposts. Outlying forces should then be found of necessity in what may be the more troubled areas, and elsewhere may be assembled in most convenient centers. As this process develops, way is prepared for reduction in armed forces, return of members thereof to their homes and to productive pursuits, and achievement of desired goal of peace and prosperity."

Van Royen agreed accept this with elimination third sentence and changing "lead to" to "clear way for" in preceding sentence. He agreed our request to take care of purport eliminated sentence through approaching Lovink and C-in-C Buurman Van Vreeden immediately on return Batavia and subsequently speaking with Netherlands Government Hague if necessary. At Hatta's request, Van Royen gave oral undertaking to Hatta evening 28th in above sense. Van Royen arranged that Hatta and Sultan Jogja should meet with Lovink soonest and have latter discuss and confirm his understanding of Van Royen's undertaking to Hatta. Van Royen's position is that Netherlands cannot politically now make concessions which involve troop withdrawals or definite promises thereon. States that if cease hostilities orders issued in good faith and reasonable response results therefrom, Lovink and C-in-C will be willing move toward meeting Simatupang's ideas. Van Royen has requested Republic delegation agree on certain areas where they think most effective cease hostilities response can quickly be achieved and concentrate on accomplishing results there soonest. These could then be cited to Lovink and C-in-C and to Hague as examples of satisfactory developments which should encourage progress desired by Republicans.

Plan is to have Sultan well as Hatta meet with Lovink on foregoing since Hatta will head Republic delegation RTC and be absent from Indonesia from August 6. Sultan and Hatta came with us on UNCI plane and likely see Lovink tomorrow. Hatta heading Republic delegation to second half inter-Indonesian conference beginning Batavia 30th. Signed Cochran.

501.BC Indonesia/7-3149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, July 31, 1949—8 p. m.

640. Gocus 771. Lovink received Sultan Jogja, Hatta and TNI Colonel Djatikusumo forenoon 30th with Van Royen present. Van Royen told me conversation went well and understanding confirmed which he had orally given Hatta Jogja. This involved Simatupang plan for progressive withdrawal Netherlands outposts and concentration in larger centers. This especially desired by Republican military as means of best achieving law and order and of making some centers available to Republican troops which are now almost exclusively in villages and mountainous districts. Van Royen said Hatta sought slightly broader understanding than Van Royen had given Jogja and preferred have in writing but seemed satisfied at result oral understanding on same lines set forth Jogja.

Van Royen told me in afternoon Boon had phoned from Hague documents well received by Netherlands Government but necessary consult some Ministers not immediately available. Consequently clearance could not be received in time for formalizing documents with UNCI 31st.

Roem arrived from Jogja afternoon 30th; stated documents cleared at Republican Cabinet meeting night 29th. BFO gave reception night 30th for Republican delegation arrived for opening second half inter-Indonesian conference 31st. Attended by Lovink, Sultan Jogja, Hatta, Netherlands Commander-in-Chief Van Vreeden, Colonel Simatupang and several other TNI officers in uniform. Spirit excellent. Commander-in-Chief told me satisfied with Jogja results and assured me would use best efforts achieve successful implementation cease hostilities. Hatta, Roem and Supomo talked with me of Hatta's meeting with Lovink in forenoon. Satisfied with outcome and especially pleased with cordial relations and spirit mutual confidence being developed. Palar and Sumitro had just arrived. Former was only Republican to indicate to me any concern over course events.

Attended this morning opening session inter-Indonesian conference. BFO Chairman Hamid stressed "love of freedom" which inspires Indonesians. Republican delegation Chairman Hatta replied in temperate speech emphasizing "strong desire Republic and BFO to cooperate in order some common understanding re readiness accept sovereignty to be transferred unconditionally." Conference expected terminate Tuesday. Hatta requested UNCI plane take him Jogja August 3. He plans leave Batavia 6th on first KLM special taking RTC group Hague but drop off for two days visit with Nehru Delhi.

UNCI representatives and chairmen Netherlands delegation and Republican delegation met with me this afternoon to review documents and agree on procedure for formalizing with UNCI at meeting to be held 10 a. m. August 1. BFO will participate. Press release will be given out 5 p. m. first to effect cease hostilities orders will be issued 3 August, 8:30 p. m. Batavia time (8 p. m. Republican time), giving terms and time of effect. It is likely that effective date will be midnight 10-11. At least one week required to disseminate information to outlying TNI and even longer to certain areas in Sumatra. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/8-149: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

BATAVIA, August 1, 1949.

642. Gocus 772. Van Royen told me last night had received final clearance from Hague on cease hostilities documents. Admitted might be some embarrassment at Hague as result First Chamber planning conference on cease hostilities documents about time participants arriving to commence RTC. Is confident however that no serious difficulty will be experienced by Government in obtaining support for Indo policy. Said only thing that might interfere with RTC negotiations for transfer sovereignty would be chaos in Indo resulting from failure response to cease hostilities.

Van Royen said Drees would preside RTC with Maarseveen, chairman Netherlands delegation, and Stikker, Van Royen and one other as vice chairmen. Roem had told me Hatta would head Republican delegation and take chairmanship Republic groups on Steering, Political and Economic Comites but have serve as active chairmen Republic groups thereon, Roem for steering, Supomo for political and Djuanda for economic. Said Sastroamidjojo would probably head a comite on cultural affairs and Simatupang would go as Mil advisor later. Other members nine-man Republic delegates will be Leimena, Sukiman, Sudjono, Hadinoto and Pringgodigdo.

Formal meeting under UNCI auspices held 10 a. m., August 1 as anticipated final paragraph Gocus 771.¹ Cease hostilities documents formalized. Chairmen Van Royen, Roem and Hamid all gave hopeful speeches stressing improvement in spirit and cooperation achieved Batavia discussions. Central Joint Board constituted. US members Dow² and senior military advisor. Effective date cease fire order for

¹ *Supra.*

² Edward A. Dow, Jr., Consul at Paris and First Secretary of Embassy in France, became an adviser to Mr. Cochran at Batavia on May 18.

Java set for midnight August 10-11 but extend to August 14-15 for Sumatra. Decision taken to set up sub-comite under point 7 Netherlands Del statement 7 May. Full text press communiqué including statements chairman cabled Lake Success and being released locally 5 p. m. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/8-449: Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, August 4, 1949—noon.

650. Gocus 777. Cease-hostilities orders broadcast night 3d with appropriate appeals to troops by Lovink and C-in-C, Batavia, and Sukarno, Jogja. All documents including manual airmailed Lake Success.

Upon departing today, Van Royen said looked forward working together again Hague and particularly asked I keep ECA help in mind. Interested note opinion expressed by Helb to Nolting (memorandum of conversation June 15th²) that he expects no revival ECA aid Indonesia prior successful outcome RTC.

Republicans pressing UNCI representatives insist on having chairmanship Steering Committee RTC rotate exclusively among latter. UNCI has taken no position but Critchley will urge (reference Reed's conversation with Makin June 3²). While desire UNCI be represented Steering Committee, am not entirely convinced we should insist on Republican idea since Netherlands Government responsible for calling conference and seeing it to successful finish in two months and especially if chairmanship of every other committee may rotate between Netherlands BFO and Republic. Signed Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

¹ Repeated in telegram 675, August 4, 7 p. m., to The Hague.

² Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/8-649: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, August 6, 1949—8 p. m.

661. Gocus 783. Cochran departed today KLM due Amsterdam evening 8th. Others aboard included Hatta who will break journey at Delhi to see Nehru.

First meeting of Central Joint Board held yesterday (Gocus 770 and 772¹) consisting UNCI deputies, who will rotate chairman-

¹ Telegrams 639, July 29, and 642, August 1, pp. 464, 467.

ship, three senior military advisors and four representatives each Netherlands, Republic and BFO. Arrangements made send liaison groups from Jogja including one civilian and one Republic military official accompanied by military observer to contact Republic area commanders Java and Sumatra next few days and emphasize importance attached by Republic Government to earliest effective cease-fire. Signed Dow.

Repeated The Hague as No. 5.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/8-949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY THE HAGUE, August 9, 1949—5 p. m.

684. Hicus 1. Arrived Hague August 8, 4 p. m. At airport followed Van Royen and Roem in broadcast saying "As US member UNCI, enjoyed working with good friends Van Royen and Roem in Indonesia. We all looked forward with anticipation to further negotiations in Hague. Am confident that with little time and patience satisfactory outcome can be achieved."

Pringgo Digdo, Secretary General Republican Delegation, called this forenoon. Is working with Secretary General Conference on rules procedure and agenda. Said Hatta and Roem instructed him Batavia insist on UNCI holding chairmanship Steering Committee. Pringgo favors gesture opening RTC 17th, Republican Independence Day.

Lunched with Van Royen and Secretary General RTC. Latter said might be no debate in second chamber 16th, but simply study of message which government will send Chamber on Indonesian situation. Doubted if anyone would risk hurting chances RTC by criticism government policy just before opening. Said if good news received from cease hostilities situation Indonesia by that date, no trouble would result in Second Chamber. I told Van Royen I thought UNCI members should be ex officio members all RTC committees and be specifically named to Steering Committee. I said was not seeking UNCI chairmanship of Steering Committee, but would not oppose Indonesians if they insist thereon. When Van Royen replied UNCI chairmanship very difficult politically for Netherlands, I suggested he should be one to approach Hatta and Roem with frank explanation. He would suggest chairmanship that committee rotate between Netherlands, BFO and Republic as chairmanship other committees. Secretary General expects conference open 20th or 22nd.

Stikker in Strasbourg. I see Drees and probably Boon tomorrow.
Signed Cochran.¹

BARUCH

¹The Secretary of State replied in telegram 693, Ushic 2, August 10, 7 p. m., to The Hague, welcoming Mr. Cochran on his arrival, and adding approval of his position in general as stated in his telegrams (501.BC Indonesia/8-1049).

501.BC Indonesia/8-1249: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BATAVIA, August 12, 1949—3 p. m.

677. Gocus 786. All available information indicates cease-hostilities Java was effective as of midnight August 10-11. Up to that hour sharpest fighting in Java in months had been taking place city Solo which had been under attack since Sunday by large forces which some Dutch military sources believed Communists. At stroke midnight however all Indonesian and Dutch firing ceased. TNI commanding officer met Dutch commander and agreed evacuate portion of town which had been held by Republicans. Van Vreeden, Dutch Commander-in-Chief flew Solo yesterday and on return expressed himself very satisfied prompt cessation fire agreed hour. Also stated incident involving infiltration TNI elements into city Surabaya had been settled by withdrawal infiltrators under Dutch escort early morning 11 August.

Foregoing information furnished officially MilEx chairman by representative Dutch Commander-in-Chief this morning. Palace which had been greatly disturbed at Solo fighting reporting to The Hague and release to press possibly tonight.

UNCI deputies flying Jogja tomorrow with Netherlands and BFO representatives hold further joint board discussing chiefly on patrol zone allocation. Signed Dow.

Sent Department 677, repeated The Hague 8 for Cochran.

LIVENGOOD

501.BC Indonesia/8-1949: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, August 19, 1949—noon.

710. Hicus 7. Hatta and Hamid significantly received jointly at large reception seventeenth celebrating Fourth Anniversary Republican independence. Van Royen there told me De Beus had phoned p. m. from Batavia infiltration situation continued serious and unless

TNI issued orders for infiltrants withdraw and latter complied clashes inevitable. BFO Mansour from Sumatra who has heretofore been one of leading dissidents from Republican cause told me thought we were "finally on right road" and he expected successful conference.

Night 17th visited newly arrived first Indian Ambassador who said his people concerned lest UNCI might not take active part RTC and lest I leave soon for Pakistan. I assured him UNCI already participating actively in planning RTC, will have ample role therein and I intend see job through.

As UNCI chairman, met with Van Royen, Roem, Anak Agung morning and afternoon sessions seventeenth and eighteenth. We completed draft rules procedure RTC which will be submitted this afternoon to large conference committee for approval. We issued communiqué noon eighteenth that conference would open 11 a. m. twenty-third. Now find necessary change to 2 p. m. to have direct broadcast Indonesia. Believe I obtained satisfactory safeguarding of UNCI position in draft rules and that Hatta will this afternoon accept compromise which I worked out between Van Royen and Roem on chairmanships conference and steering committee.

Visited with Stikker alone his home last night. He concerned over infiltration reports from Indonesia and feared Republic could not control military to effect satisfactory cease-hostilities no matter how well intentioned Hatta and other leaders may be. He was pleased with outcome Second Chamber debate, particularly Roem's [*Romme's*¹] attitude, and hoped there would be no developments in Indonesia in course of conference to cause its suspension. I argued that there could be no justification for such a move. I said he was repeating to me doubts of same sort that caused failure his second mission to Indonesia last fall. I endeavored portray big change in spirit of Republicans that has resulted from Van Royen's admirable handling of negotiations with Stikker's support in government.

I was happy be able tell Stikker I had heard through Dow that MilEx thought Netherlands' reports from Batavia exaggerated situation. I stressed need to perpetuate mutual confidence and contact between Lovink and Sultan Jogja. Stikker realizes Lovink has only handful of newly sent assistants and that old guard may still try color reports and make difficulties for government policy. He said he would write Lovink personal letter as I left counseling courage and communicating again my confidence in Republican intent to see agreements observed and in Sultan's ability implement.

¹ Professor Carl P. M. Romme, Catholic People's Party leader, was a member of the Parliamentary Commission of Nine advising the Netherlands delegation to The Hague conference.

Stikker also worried lest Indonesian question be brought before UN in September, not that he could not justify Netherlands acts since March 23 SC directive, but that this would only make more trouble for his government and would mean sending Van Royen to Lake Success just when needed for heavy share NethDel task RTC. I argued Netherlands should make every effort have Hague same cooperative spirit characterized Batavia discussions and complete RTC soonest. I said if genuine progress being made this direction Republicans themselves would most likely oppose UN taking up Indonesian question in September, especially if this required Van Royen leaving.

I said UNCI endeavoring strengthen MilEx through more officers and jeeps realizing that cease-hostilities Indonesia must be well observed if conference to move smoothly. Stikker complained of Australian attitude.

I said had word new senior US military adviser proceeding Batavia September. He insisted such officer should be at least of equivalent rank Brigadier Prior (Ushic 6²). Recommend get officer of highest qualifications Indonesia soonest in view importance to entire RTC negotiations of successful observance cease-hostilities orders and considering fact Netherlands feels Prior dominates MilEx in fashion unfriendly to Netherlands and will so continue unless checked by outstanding US officer. Signed Cochran.³

Sent Department 710, repeated Batavia 33.

BARUCH

² Telegram 713, August 17, to The Hague, not printed. Brigadier Prior represented Australia.

³ The Department of the Army was informed of this situation by letter dated August 25 and was requested to expedite the sending by the Department of Defense of a senior military officer to head the Military Mission at Batavia, with rank of a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General.

501.BC Indonesia/8-1949: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1949—8 p. m.

721. Ushic 7. Under instrs his Govt, Neth Chargé informed Dept today his Govt's increasing concern over numerous violations cease-fire order by Indonesian armed bands. He stated he would make available next week photostatic copies of documents seized in Indonesia evidencing that complained of infiltrations part of general plan, and not isolated incidents. He expressed hope Cochran in Hague and Dow in Batavia would impress urgently upon Republican leaders

¹ Repeated as 431, Usgoc 423, to Batavia.

necessity carrying out sincerely cease-fire orders in order avert unfavorable reaction in Neth to extent affecting adversely chances success of RTC. He said reasonable compliance with cease-fire order and cooperation on part of Republican leaders is all that is needed but remarked increasing number incidents did not warrant optimism in this respect.²

ACHESON

² Telegram 432, Usgoc 424, August 22, 2 p. m., to Batavia (repeated as 725, Ushic 8, to The Hague), requested even greater effort in reporting from Indonesia on the cease-fire situation in order to combat many rumors in circulation (501.BC Indonesia/8-2249).

501.BC Indonesia/8-2049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, August 20, 1949—11 a. m.

712. Hicus 8. Hicus 7.¹ Visited Queen forenoon 19th. She expressed concern over infiltrations in Indonesia. Said report of 4-hour talk between Sultan and Lovink unsatisfactory. I gave assurances along line of talk with Stikker previous evening and urged patience during time required to untangle difficult military situation Indonesia. I praised work of Van Royen and hoped good atmosphere would continue pervade Hague negotiations.

Queen said gratified progress made on Indonesia question since I saw her in February; said Netherlands had nothing to hide from Indonesians; decision of government to transfer sovereignty could not be questioned; Netherlands bore Indonesians no enmity and was sure latter would bear Netherlands no enmity. I expressed optimism over relations of Netherlands with future USI if only RTC can move quickly to satisfactory conclusion in spirit of mutual trust. She said also confident of outcome, realizing that aims of both sides had really never been far apart. Queen said could not understand Australian policy. I ventured no explanation.

Large RTC committee met 2:30 p. m., 19th, and approved rules of procedure as drafted by our small committee (Hicus 7). Decided on provisional agenda for first plenary session RTC, 23 August, 2 p. m., to be presided by Prime Minister Drees. Will be addresses by Presidents of three delegations. I declined suggestion of Roem that all three UNCI members speak, preferring have Critchley who will be chairman speak alone for UNCI. My policy has purposely been

¹ Telegram 710, August 19, p. 470.

during my present week of chairmanship to insure UNCI's position in an RTC setup to afford square deal to all sides, but to refrain from pushing UNCI forward unnecessarily at time when Netherlands political circles and press would be quick condemn US for any aggressiveness or obvious attempt run RTC. Resultant reaction from Netherlands has been extremely cordial. Republics have been quite satisfied with what they have obtained and have expressed pleasure to me that Van Royen, Roem and I will apparently have same opportunity to work in close harmony here as we did in Java.

Attended reception given by Netherlands Prime Minister to RTC groups evening 19th. To Drees and numerous other members of government and Parliament with whom I renewed acquaintance I followed same line as with Queen and Stikker in trying calm their doubts over Indonesian observance cease hostilities orders. I did likewise when British Chargé telephoned to tell me how worried Netherlands were over Indonesian situation.

My reception here has been entirely friendly to date. I am quite satisfied with progress made this week in preparing for conference both in way of drafting rules of procedure and in getting leaders to working harmoniously together. I am confident settlement can be negotiated RTC if military situation Indonesia can be controlled. I feel it can be controlled if military strengthened and if concerted efforts made to keep cool heads. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 712, repeated Batavia 34.

BARUCH

501.BC Indonesia/8-2349: Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1949.

A-303. Ushic A-1. Para 3, Hicus 2.¹ Looking toward the opening of the Round Table Conference the Department desires to confirm the soundness of your approach to the tasks ahead and to set forth views upon issues of the Conference. First, it is believed advisable to summarize for general purposes within the Department and Government certain elementary propositions, long familiar to you and others who have been striving toward settlement of the Indonesian dispute, describing United States interests in a settlement of the problem. These factors lead to an enumeration of a second group of principles, namely,

¹Telegram 686, August 9, 5 p. m., from The Hague, not printed. Mr. Cochran summarized his policy of letting the parties concerned work out agreement as far as possible between themselves, with assistance only when required. (501.BC Indonesia/8-949)

those basic considerations guiding plans for and participation in UNCFI's efforts to aid the parties in accomplishing the Conference's objectives.

A. In the light of the preliminary agreement reached within the last three months and of the major steps taken by the parties toward final settlement of the dispute, most of the substantive issues of the conference are of primary concern to the parties alone, with UNCFI and individual members thereof asserting ideas actively only when assistance is necessary or desired. Yet the U.S. is vitally interested in the outcome of the controversy and in the settlement reached at The Hague. And this concern carries a corollary interest in certain phases of the conference's deliberations.

This country's immediate interest rests upon long participation in UN efforts to settle the dispute. Various Security Council resolutions delineating UN interests and responsibilities with respect to the controversy are still in effect. The dispute still exists, even though both parties have complied with a substantial portion of the obligatory elements of the January 28 resolution. Under that resolution and according to the express intentions of the Netherlands and the Republic the UN may continue to exercise an active role in the situation, particularly with respect to observation or supervision of elections even after the formal transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, the item is still before the General Assembly and it is unlikely that the item will be dropped from the Assembly's agenda prior to a substantial settlement of the dispute.

Of critical importance is our concern over the stability of Southeast Asia and the development of friendly, peace-loving and economically sound governments in that area. It is of equal importance, in the context of United States world policy, that the adjustment in Indonesia be accomplished in a fashion which will not vitiate the Netherlands' position as a leading democratic nation.

Unless an amicable settlement, allowing room for the peaceful adjustment of nationalist aspirations, is accomplished by the parties, Southeast Asia and Indonesia will be more susceptible to Communist expansion. This hazard would constitute a major source of trouble for the U.S. and the free world.

Various Members of the U.N. will be asked to participate in and contribute substantially to a program for the economic rehabilitation and development of Indonesia after the establishment of the new federal government. It may be anticipated that this country will be requested to supply public and private capital for economic purposes. Since all plans for economic rehabilitation and development necessarily presuppose a sound political structure in the new nation, all

other nations contemplating participation in future Indonesian economic development must be concerned with the political stability of the new nation.

B. For all of the foregoing reasons certain of the specific terms of transfer and of Indonesia's proposed governmental structure are of more than general interest. As parts of what is believed to be a sound basis for a just settlement through the U.N., the following are cardinal elements of U.S. policy :

1. Although UNCFI should not be concerned with procedural details of the RTC, it is essential from the standpoint of a just solution that the conference be conducted in a fashion which will give reasonable voice to the views of the Republic and the other elements of the Indonesian group, particularly with respect to the structure and powers of the new Indonesian state. Similarly, appropriate weight upon issues of transfer and the formation of the Union must be accorded the views of the Netherlands.

2. The primary result of the Conference should be the establishment of a genuinely independent Indonesian state. After the transfer of sovereignty, this state should be able, both constitutionally and practically, to exercise all the powers of a member of the international community, i.e., primarily: self-government, independent foreign relations, and membership in international organizations such as the U.N.

3. Since the adoption of the Linggadjati agreement both the Republic and the Netherlands have frequently committed themselves to the principle that a Netherlands-Indonesia Union be formed; and UNCFI's proposals for settlement have encompassed such a relationship. Hence, in fulfilling mutual commitments the new state and the Netherlands should, as a part of the forthcoming settlement, enter into a bona fide Union. As with other settlement problems, the precise form and scope of powers of the Union are matters for decision between the parties. Presumably, as under previous plans, the Union will reach its decisions upon consultation, requiring the affirmative vote of both Indonesia and the Netherlands. The parties to the Union should consider the obligations imposed by the U.N. Charter when they formulate the projected defense relationship under which both the new nation and the Union may carry on consultation and make cooperative arrangements for Indonesian defense with other powers.

4. The structure of the permanent federal government and the delineation, form of government and size of member states should be determined in some measure, at least, by the Indonesian people rather than by self-appointed representatives. Under commitments previously made by both the Netherlands and Republic representatives and according to the terms of the January 28 Security Council resolution, the elections to determine membership of the constituent assembly should be subject to some form of observation or supervision by UNCFI or a successor U.N. body.

5. The new nation should adopt as one of its underlying tenets the principle of fair treatment to the Netherlands and other interests in Indonesia. Such an undertaking will be a natural consequence of

assurances of Indonesian leaders during U.N. negotiations that the new state will be responsible and cooperative when independent. Although no effort should be made to impose a western legal or economic structure upon the new nation, a guarantee of fair treatment should be formulated if Indonesian hopes for substantial economic assistance from sources outside Indonesia are to be realized. Such a principle would, of course, be consistent with prevailing conceptions of international law and justice and might be evidenced, in particular, by the following applications, which would give more specific meaning to general declarations previously made by Republican and Federalist representatives:

(a) Steps should be taken toward establishing protection of individual freedom and civil rights of all individuals in Indonesia, whether nationals or aliens, in accordance with guiding principles of international law, the U.N. Charter, and the concepts of the Declaration of Human Rights and the proposed Covenant on Human Rights;

(b) Existing property and contract rights and franchises should be recognized; and an obligation to refrain from confiscation of private property without fair compensation should be accepted in advance;

(c) Aliens of all nations as well as of the Netherlands should be accorded equal rights in participating in trade with Indonesia and in business activity and industrial development in the new nation. Although the new nation will, of course, enjoy freedom to adopt provisions designed to prevent foreign monopoly and exploitation, it may be observed that if full assistance through public and private investment from other nations is sought, some guarantee that there will be no serious discrimination against foreign interests will be necessary.

Beyond these essential principles, the concern of the U.S. with respect to the work of the RTC is to aid in seeing that nothing holds up the rapid completion of the negotiations, drafting, and disposition of all major issues preliminary to the transfer of sovereignty.

If efforts are made by the conference's representatives to include the principles enumerated above, the U.S. should not urge any details for the settlement. Should the parties encounter difficulty, however, in solving any particular problems, UNCFI should stand ready to aid in presenting solutions. For example, UNCFI and its members may be prepared to suggest possible means of working out settlement of boundary lines, solution of various problems incidental to the transfer of debts and assets to the new nation, and the control of armed forces during the initial period of sovereignty prior to the formation of a cohesive federal security system.

In accordance with the recommendations of the parties in the June 22 memo of agreement and the tenor of the January 28 resolution, it will be desirable that a U.N. Organ observe the implementation of the

agreement for transfer of sovereignty. This may be done, as the Netherlands and the Republic have suggested, through UNCFI, or through a successor U.N. body. The participation of this Organ will be carried out with a view to the Security Council's dropping the case from its consideration when the settlement has been accomplished with substantial fidelity to the foregoing principles.²

ACHESON

² For a summary account of The Hague conference held between August 23 and November 2, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1949, pp. 953-969; for UN doc. S/1417, November 10, 1949, see SC, *4th yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 6*, pp. 1 ff.

501.BC Indonesia/8-2949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, August 29, 1949—11 a. m.

742. Hicus 14. Van Royen visited me Sunday,¹ Monday. Said Prime Minister Drees requested he inform me contents long message received from Lovink this week-end. Van Royen read excerpts therefrom.

General tenor message was concern re conditions East and Central Java and fear deterioration might spread to West Java. General Engles reported satisfactory cooperation presently received from TNI West Java particularly in matter division patrolling areas although some tendency part TNI insist upon running civil administration. Principal problem apparently that of suppressing Daral Islam.

In Central and East Java TNI reportedly moving considerable numbers to "envelop" Dutch outposts and lines communication. Instances cited of armed TNI lining railway for long distances with result maintenance employees refuse work and trains able move only slowly if at all. Lovink reported Indonesian civilian authorities these areas sometimes kidnapped but more frequently fled because intimidation on part TNI. Feared disappearance such civilian officers would lead to general break-up of authority and such poor administration that economic situation, well as that of law and order will worsen. Lovink said circumstances called for exercise extreme self-control on part Netherlands military.

Report suggested younger TNI officers, including one colonel, were evidently trying see "how much they could get away with". Sultan Jogja reported as hesitant intervene alleging instructions should emanate from Sukarno or Sudirman. Answer my question, Van Royen said he would bring reported situation to attention Hatta. I suggested he

¹ August 28.

also consult Leimena and Simatupang, arrived Saturday night via India.

Van Royen said Lovink and he both thought best hope obtaining amelioration situation is through UNCI acting independently or through CJB to emphasize strongly to Republicans that TNI violating cease hostilities orders when they move to improve their situation even though they may not fire and when they threaten or intimidate other party. I said I would pass this to Department and Dow although sure latter doing everything possible to achieve desired end. Van Royen agrees that RTC can result in satisfactory agreement notwithstanding several contentious issues provided military situation Indonesia permits. I discussed with Roem recently idea letting few reputable representatives return Indonesia soon to report on conference progress and seek full cooperation from authorities Indonesia.

Van Royen asked me if I giving consideration NEI economic and financial troubles. I said planned attend any [subcommittee] meetings this coming week and obtain fullest possible data from all sides. Reminded him of our conversations Batavia and my willingness he approach me any time on this subject. Told him ECA representatives Hague already pressing me on ECA revival. Hunter had talked with me again Saturday morning his request and with his deputy again advancing arguments. But I still thought premature any action this direction. I said I especially opposed ECA suggestion of sending survey group to Indonesia. Van Royen agreed this should not be done. He thought someone in ConGen Batavia could do whatever necessary when time came for checking needs, deliveries, et cetera. I said would follow developments closely and would not fail recommend action soon as I thought it could be helpfully and safely undertaken.

Leimena and Simatupang called Sunday night. Had left Batavia August 20. Simatupang confident TNI can control military situation accordance cease hostilities agreement. Regretted what he thought nervous tendency part NEI officials including Lovink and Jacob to overstress minor incidents and expect too complete compliance too soon. Explained lack coordination in TNI as result separated commands over many months and present difficult communication.

I told visitors of vital importance peace in Indonesia to success RTC. I said possibility expressed at opening conference of suspension thereof if cessation hostilities not effective. I said I had strongly advised Netherlands against any consideration such possibility and now believe it will not arise if Netherlands can be assured of good intent and serious efforts TNI. Simatupang said any break in RTC would have disastrous effect with complete loss confidence on part TNI.

Told visitors unhappy reports still coming from Lovink. Said Van

Royen had earlier in day mentioned them to me and I thought he would also tell Hatta. Told them I had urged Van Royen speak with them soonest. I emphasized that Drees, Stikker and others all look to Van Royen for explanation Indonesian developments and that failure on part TNI abide by agreements would weaken Van Royen's position and great helpfulness which he desires continue extend Indonesia.

When I told Simatupang of Lovink's story of infiltration incidents, mentioned herein above, Simatupang ridiculed most of them. He said Netherlands took serious offense at such petty matters as one group TNI politely asking permission use swimming pool in area barely within Netherlands patrolling district. Said most so-called infiltrants had actually been in areas where now in evidence but had simply kept out of sight of Netherlands patrols until cease hostilities ordered. Confirmed that his commanders could and should order back troops which had actually improved situation since cease hostilities order.

Visitors stated departure Netherlands delegation and UNCI representatives had been seriously felt. Said Lovink, Jacob and De Beus lack sympathetic understanding and tact of Van Royen. Mentioned Lovink's insistence Sultan Jogja come Batavia August 17 in spite urgent necessity his being Jogja as acting Prime Minister on that Independence Day. Said when Sultan and Simatupang arrived Batavia by UNCI plane August 18, were not met by Netherlands officials and Sultan only summoned hours later to appear at Palace. Lovink then talked with him from 9 until 1:30 a. m., criticizing his lack of effectiveness but refusing radio equipment which Sultan required for better communication with scattered forces. Nevertheless, Sultan remained calm and proceeded Surabaya 4 hours after conversation ended to investigate complaints against TNI there.

I told Simatupang Lovink reported better situation West Java than Central and East Java. Simatupang insisted this resulted from personal visits by Sultan and Colonel Nasution to various parts West Java and contact with both TNI and Netherlands commanders. Said Netherlands military made big mistake preventing Sultan from continuing visits this type and hoped arrangements now working for Sultan resume personal contacts in all areas. Said this only effective means for achieving best results and thought unselfish and courageous efforts Sultan should be appreciated. Visitors agreed my idea at least one TNI officer and one civilian member Republican delegation should go Indonesia within few days taking first-hand news of conference and either returning or being replaced at Hague by fresh arrivals from Indonesia. They also promised give Van Royen frank statement situation and reassure latter of soundness his decision taken in Indo-

nesia. They hope we continue strengthen MilEx, support UNCI Batavia and encourage latter render own reports and not let itself be used as messenger for Netherlands delegation. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 742, repeated Batavia 41.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/8-2949 : Telegram

The Consul at Batavia (Abbey) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, August 29, 1949—2 p. m.

711. Gocus 794. Gocus 792.¹ Situation at Semarang reported considerably relieved by both military observer and Dutch sources, remaining Republic unit no longer vicinity city. Position generally good in Sumatra where Colonel Hidayat has made energetic and extensive efforts emphasize cease hostilities provisions to local Republic commanders. Local joint committees have begun delineation work Sumatra and west Java but east and central Java situation remains confused most areas due delay in operation local committees and constant movement TNI forces in borderline areas. Sultan Jogja sent advance contact party to operate out of Semarang beginning Sunday and will go Semarang himself Tuesday spend two days central Java area to visit TNI forces on itinerary cleared with Dutch central Java commander.

Dutch concern at moment chiefly concentrated Surabaya area, where they state widespread infiltration taking place. Local joint Committee not yet functioning Surabaya but military observer team reports generally bear out Dutch contention of TNI movement into sectors near city which they did not hold prior August 10. Forces in Surabaya district belong First TNI Division under command Colonel Sunkono. Palace alleges Sunkono not prepared obey Jogja directives and believes Sultan deliberately "stalling off" visit to east Java to avoid embarrassing situation. I passed substance this to Wongsonegoro (Republic Minister Interior and chief representative CJB) who insisted Sultan's trips proceeding "according to plan" but admitted Sunkono "difficult man to handle."

Can perhaps best describe situation many areas east and central Java by quoting typical telegram just received from military observer team at Bodjonegoro. "What constitutes a military post in case of Republic forces? If small TNI force lived in a kampong where there were no Dutch troops and based their guerrilla war from there but did not openly wear uniform prior to cease fire, then after cease fire wear uniform and claim kampong as TNI post, is this permissible?" This

¹ Not printed.

and not armed attacks is type of activity which when multiplied many times is real basis of Netherlands irritation and concern as expressed here and to Embassy Hague and Department. Note that "kampong" may be near or in Dutch held town. I continue to agree with MilEx and other UNCI deputies that problem is for present at least one which must be solved by patient work local committees assisted by rulings CJB when necessary. Simultaneous efforts Sultan also most important. If local committees and Sultan's visits prove ineffectual, different approach may be necessary but feel they should be given full chance.

Netherlands delegation, Republic delegation, BFO and UNCI met Friday. Set up new subcommittees (Gocus 793²). RTC receiving great and helpful publicity here. Grateful for repeats Hicus and Ushic telegrams. Signed Dow.

Repeated The Hague for Cochran.

ABBEY

² Not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/8-2949 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1949—7 p. m.

748. Ushic 10. Dept has adopted following general criteria and procedures for issuance of export licenses for arms to Neth: "That Policy Committee on Arms authorize issuance of export licenses to and transfers to Neth, on same basis as that which applies to other Brussels Pact countries; provided that:

Pending successful outcome of current negots looking toward a settlement of the Indo question, concurrence of all interested offices shall be obtained prior to issuance of export licenses or approval of transfers or retransfers in cases where application or surrounding circumstances indicate use or possibility of use in Indo. Requests accompanied by satisfactory evidence, including assurances from Neth Govt as to end-use, that the arms or other military equipment are required for Brussels Pact or North Atlantic Treaty defense arrangements, shall be considered as requests for material which will not be used in Indo.

Prior to transfer of sovereignty in Indo the Dept may approve transfers or retransfers, or the issuance of export licenses for material destined for Indo only where the proposed shipment to Indo will be consistent with maintenance of cease-hostilities agreement and negots looking toward final settlement of Indo dispute under UN auspices."

Dept does not wish to implement above, which would include noti-

fiction to Dutch, until receipt of comments from you as to timing thereof in relation to RTC.¹

There are at present on file with Dept a number of requests for export licenses which we will forward to you separately² for your comments. Meanwhile, however, there are two requests of an urgent nature upon which we request your comments immediately in that they involve Neth credits in U.K. which expire Aug 31. These two requests are for US consent to transfer by U.K. to Neth of 39 M-24 tanks and 630,000 cartridges 50 cal. of U.S. Lend-lease origin to be paid for by pounds 70,000 Neth credit in U.K. Equipment not for use Indo. Army Dept has no objection these transfers. Emb London has recommended favorable action earliest on basis such transfer consistent with most effective disposition U.K. surplus and reserve stock. U.K. Reps on W.U. Mil Supply Board have emphasized need for action. Dept will approve these two cases immediately unless you perceive serious objection.³

ACHESON

¹ Mr. Cochran's reply (telegram 745, Hicus 15, August 30, 1 p. m.) did not favor notification at "this stage RTC".

² This was done in telegram 800, Ushic 17, September 17, 1 p. m., not printed.

³ Mr. Cochran having assented, the Department notified the British authorities on September 2 of its approval. As no unfavorable reaction was evident at the RTC, the Department planned to approve two further cases (out of nine) and to await developments before approving additional cases. (Memorandum of October 3 to the Department of Defense) Telegram 882, Ushic 27, October 11, 6 p. m., to The Hague, informed Mr. Cochran that three cases had been approved (501.BC Indonesia/8-3049, 10-349, and 10-1149).

856d.00/9-1449

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 14, 1949.

Participants: Mr. Soedjatmoko, Representative of the Indonesian Republic.

Jacob Beam, American Consul General designate at Batavia.

William S. B. Lacy, Assistant Chief, Division of Southeast Asian Affairs.

Mr. Soedjatmoko, acting under instructions from his government, called at his request. He said he had been directed to advise the Department that Dr. Hatta and his associates at the Round Table Conference at The Hague believed that negotiations had reached a serious

¹ Reported in telegram 791, Ushic 14, September 15, 7 p. m., to The Hague and repeated as 463, Usgoc 427, to Batavia (501.BC Indonesia/9-1549).

impasse. He said that his principals were coming to believe that the Netherlands negotiators were bound by the intransigence of the Dutch Estates General and that it was unlikely that the Netherlands would recede from its present firm position in respect of the outstanding issues presently subject to negotiation. He continued to say that his principals believed the Netherlands would continue to "stall" in the hope that the responsibility for breaking off negotiations could be imposed on the Indonesians. When asked what he believed the ultimate Dutch objective might be of such tactics he replied he believed the Dutch had no particular objective in mind, that he believed during the past several years the Dutch had often embarked upon courses of action without carefully considering in advance the end result thereof.

I asked Mr. Soedjatmoko to enumerate and describe the issues upon which negotiations appeared to have stalemated. From his reply it is apparent that the Indonesians believe the unsolved problems may be categorized as follows:

(1) *Political*: The Netherlands is determined that the statute of the union contain provisions for a supreme judiciary to which appeal may be sought from lower courts in the Netherlands and in Indonesia. The Indonesians regard such an arrangement as an abridgement of the sovereignty of both partners to the union and believe, moreover, that through some legerdemain of their own the Dutch could make use of the court to their advantage.

The Netherlands wishes the Council of Ministers (the highest expression of the union) to have certain executive powers which shall be effective on both members of the union. The Indonesians resist this proposal, again on the grounds it is, *pro tanto*, an abridgement of their sovereignty. The Indonesians prefer that the Council of Ministers functions be limited to those of consultation and they cite the constitutional precedents provided by the experience of the British Commonwealth in support of their position.

(2) *Economic and Financial*: The Indonesians are unwilling to accept the three and a half billion guilder debt which the Netherlands believes they should assume. The Indonesian position is that the new Indonesian state should assume indebtedness incurred up to the time of the Japanese invasion; that the Indonesian states should assume a negotiated portion of the debts assumed on behalf of Indonesia during the Japanese war; but that the Indonesian state should assume none of the indebtedness incurred as a consequence of the first and second military actions of the Netherlands Government.

(3) *Strategic*: The Indonesians are unwilling to provide the Netherlands bases of a military or naval character on the grounds that the presence of Netherlands forces in Indonesia would serve to fan the flames of exorbitant nationalism, thus making it difficult if not impossible for Indonesian leadership to bring Indonesia into the regional anti-Communist arrangement which the Indonesians believed to be forming.

(4) *Miscellaneous*: The Indonesians are unwilling to allow New Guinea to establish a special relationship with the Netherlands outside the new Indonesian state. The Indonesians maintain that New Guinea under such a special relationship would be nothing but another Dutch colony in a Southeast Asia freed of colonialism, the presence of which would be a troublemaking anachronism.

In regard to all the above points Mr. Beam and I undertook to remind Mr. Soedjatmoko of the overriding importance of a continued association of a real and lasting character between the Netherlands and the new Indonesian state. Mr. Soedjatmoko expressed his entire general agreement with our views.

In respect to point (3) of the foregoing, Mr. Beam and I tried to impress upon Mr. Soedjatmoko the importance to the Indonesian state of bases as a part of both short-term and long-term plans for Indonesian defense against outside aggression. Mr. Soedjatmoko countered with the suggestion that the Dutch might lend or lease elements of their Navy to the Indonesians for the latter's use in repelling external aggression and repressing smuggling and other illegal maritime activities. Mr. Beam and I did not evidence any interest in this proposal. In reply to Mr. Soedjatmoko's question we assured him that the United States had made no representations whatsoever to either Indonesians or Dutch concerning United States interest in acquiring bases in Indonesia. I recited again the Department's desire that the Indonesians accord the Netherlands base rights on a voluntary basis, pointing out that such arrangements had been highly satisfactory to the Filipinos and to various members of the British Commonwealth.

During the course of the conversation Mr. Soedjatmoko made two interesting remarks:

(a) That the Dutch intention, in imposing a tremendous debt to the Netherlands on the emerging Indonesian state, was to compel the Indonesians to trade with the outside world through Holland in order to liquidate the debt. He asked point blank if the United States did not desire Indonesia to have direct access to the dollar area. We replied that this was a matter for negotiation between them and the Dutch but that speaking generally it seemed to us a sensible resolution of the problem of debt assumption by Indonesia would provide the new Indonesian state with a wide latitude of choice as between the several currency areas of the world. At the same time we made it clear that the United States could not be expected to make its policy on the basis of acquiring new members of a dollar area.

(b) Mr. Soedjatmoko stated that Mr. Nehru was waiting only for a settlement of the Indonesian dispute to commence to call into being a coalition of Southeast Asian states for the purpose of offering regional resistance to Communist aggression.

501.BC Indonesia/9-1449: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*SECRET PRIORITY
NIACT

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1949—7 p. m.

786. Ushic 12. [For Cochran:] Stikker has private appt with Sec Sep 16.

Dept desires your comments on portion draft briefing memo [for the Secretary] qtd below having to do with Indo settlement, in event Stikker raises this question.

"If Stikker raises specific issues re Indo and inquires concerning US attitude thereon, it is suggested you tell him frankly that we wld not want to make any binding commitments here, believing all of these matters can best be worked out in free negotiations at RTC. Our general attitude on them, however, is as fol:

"*Neth-Indo Union.* US desires to do what it can to help make Neth-Indo Union a meaningful and mutually beneficial alliance.

"*Financial Aid to Indo.* It appears to Dept that various econ issues to be negotiated at RTC, including in particular ques of assumption of debts, might be more easily handled if both Dutch and Indos know in general terms what might be expected from US in way of future Fin aid. You may wish to tell Stikker we are studying problem with view toward determining what we can do to ease the impact of transfer of sovereignty; but we are not yet ready to give any definite indication on subject, beyond the expression of our intention to help. (For your info, Cochran's position re resumption ECA aid to Indo is unchanged—i.e., he does not favor resumption at this time.)

"*Maintenance of the Truce.* If Stikker raises ques of truce violations by Repubs, and possible Dutch counter-moves, you might wish to say we regard over-all effectiveness of truce as gratifying (Dutch sources report 75 percent reduction in casualties), that we trust truce infringements will not be allowed to interfere with rapid progress of conference. You may wish also to mention our continuing efforts to aid in maintaining truce.

"*Dutch Bases in Indo.* If Stikker raises this ques, you may wish to say that US has always considered retention by Dutch of mil bases in Indo for purposes of external defense a highly desirable part of final settlement. Precisely what can be done in this direction seems to us a matter for negotiation between parties.

"In brief, it is recommended you be as responsive to Stikker as possible, while at same time preserving Cochran's freedom of action in current negotiations."

Regret shortness of time, but request any comment or possible additional subjects.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/9-1549 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET
PRIORITY
NIACT

THE HAGUE, September 15, 1949—noon.

793. Hicus 30. Following observations Ushic 12:¹ Financial aid. Recommend second sentence Department's paragraph be replaced by one encouraging parties work out fair and practical settlement debt question and achieve economic-financial agreement which will be mutually advantageous but without prejudice to third parties. Agreeable to telling Stikker we are studying financial problem with view determining what we can do to ease impact of transfer sovereignty, but would stress duty Netherlands to give in on workable arrangements consistent with sovereignty status. Neither Netherlands nor Indonesia should get impression US intends be sole financial underwriter Indonesia although both should be assured of our intention help.

Following for secret background as to why I stress above point and oppose resumption now ECA aid to Indonesia. Netherlands authorities continue play up non-compliance TNI with cease hostilities orders. Their accumulating evidence thereon and their refusal reveal situation in proper perspective, namely admit casualties down more than 75 percent, would tend confirm suspicion had from beginning that Netherlands Government would utilize plausible excuse to suspend or break up RTC. While such move would of course be fatal, it would not be inconsistent with policy followed by Netherlands Government in subsidizing trip of American journalists to Indonesia and publishing posthumous reports which at best could only belatedly justify to some extent position which Netherlands endeavored maintain but now has irretrievably lost. As long as Netherlands authorities contend military situation unsatisfactory in considerable part Indonesia, believe US would be both technically and politically wrong in resuming ECA aid considering ground on which suspended.

Indonesians oppose both resumption ECA aid while basic issues unsolved RTC and Netherlands making important financial plans and commitments for which USI would be eventually irresponsible. They are aware Stikker particularly concerned over support his own party, including estate owners and others who would benefit from early

¹ *Supra.*

rehabilitation their properties, etc. Indonesians have told me members NethDel financial committee have expressed opinion I might be responsible for impeding progress in financial and economic committee. I have had nothing to do so far with that committee except attend silently one formal meeting with other UNCI members. My opposition to ECA aid revival is of course known as is my determination to see that Indonesia gets square deal in financial and economic settlement. Indonesians have told me they thought Stikker accompanied by strong financial group to US would endeavor get agreement with US by-passing me and anticipating RTC. I gave strongest arguments I could against such possibility in Hicus 2.² Stikker's statement to press on arrival New York twelfth indicates emphasis which he places on international financial aid for Netherlands and Indonesia and his tendency to over-emphasize Netherlands' share toward common effort for peaceful development Far East.

As my cables have reported, I have succeeded this week in getting Indonesians move considerably toward Netherlands position on difficult subject of hearing "significant interests" and on vital issue of union statute. I have done this since I genuinely feel Indonesian position has been unsound on significant interests and not in harmony with spirit Linggadjati and *Renville* on union statute or even good long-time policy on this latter subject. When financial and economic agreement comes to point of negotiation, I am convinced I shall have to press NethDel to withdraw somewhat from position set forth working paper enclosed my letter September 5 to Lacy.³ If statement should now come out from Washington that Stikker has influenced us toward supporting Netherlands position in financial negotiations RTC, this would be disastrous. In fact, hope any communiqué following Stikker's conversations Washington will contain no reference to RTC issues.

Following on Netherlands bases: Would refer only to possible retention by Netherlands of "naval" bases in Indonesia. Inter-Indonesian conference August 2 contained recommendation that "Netherlands armed forces (KL) should be entirely withdrawn from the Republic of United Indonesia". Since failure second police action and obvious necessity Netherlands transfer sovereignty soonest, am doubtful whether agreement would be accepted by Indonesians permitting military garrisons after certain date. Considering small number military forces that Netherlands could afford to leave in Indonesia, doubt real value thereof if any attack against Indonesia by third party. Foreign military instructors will be required. Believe we must however look to Indonesians themselves to police country, pro-

² See footnote 1, p. 474.

³ Not attached to file copy.

tect foreign interests and defend their land. Would be especially cautious any commitment our part this time favoring retention Netherlands armed forces in Indonesia considering bitterness of Republic on this subject and tendency Netherlands to exaggerate necessity for their troops remaining Indonesia and "law and order" that might be expected therefrom. Unwilling give final and definite view this subject pending progress overall negotiations, awaiting further evidence effectiveness TNI and watching Communist moves SEA.

While confident settlement acceptable both sides can be worked out RTC in two-month period, believe still likelihood NethDel balking at certain necessary concessions on ground these might upset government. Believe best chance achieving balanced settlement which Netherlands Parliament will be obliged ratify to keep government commitments and meet international opinion will result from free negotiations RTC without evidence pressure from US or elsewhere. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 793; repeated Batavia 58.

STEEER

856d.00/9-1649

*The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Stikker) to the Secretary of State*¹

RESTRICTED

1. So far, the Round Table Conference (RTC) has done useful exploratory work, but it is only beginning to deal with substantive questions. The pace is slow. The Indonesians should not be hurried. If they want to move faster, the Netherlands are ready to do so.

2. The Indonesians are hyper-sensitive in matters of sovereignty, and inclined to sacrifice workable solutions to an excessive care of prestige. The Netherlands are constantly watchful not to hurt their feelings, but it must remain our fundamental purpose not to accept paper solutions which, in the aggregate or separately, are certain to bring about chaotic conditions in an exposed part of the world where the common interest of the western nations requires at least a modicum of stability and sound administration. To harmonize this preoccupation with full Indonesian sovereignty should not be too difficult so long as both parties avoid giving that notion an exaggerated meaning at variance with accepted standards.

3. There is a difficulty of a general character in the fact that the Indonesians are by nature particularly prone to press for more and more concessions, irrespective of the question whether a desirable solution is not sacrificed in the process of haggling.

¹ Handed to Mr. Acheson by Foreign Minister Stikker on September 16.

4. The general method employed by the Indonesians to counter a proposal which for some reason they do not like is to allege the undesirable psychological effect the measure in question, if adopted, would have on their home-front. Reasonable debate becomes difficult in these circumstances.

5. It is at times difficult to discard the impression that an appreciable number of the Indonesians would not be averse from letting the RTC drag on and end in a stalemate in an attempt to force the Netherlands to transfer sovereignty at the end of this year without *any* settlement having been reached. It will be necessary to watch this dangerous tendency carefully.

The key to obtain a more cooperative attitude on these very important points on the part of the Indonesians, though nominally resting with UNCI, rests in point of fact with the United States Member. The Indonesians will remain difficult and distrustful, but it will make a very great difference when the United States Member of UNCI tells them that he cannot subscribe to their methods or to the stand they take.

It may be recalled in this connection that, especially in the earlier stages of the controversy, the Government of the Republic has always pressed for an arbitral decision. The reason was that they wished to be able to say to those of their followers who, like the armed elements, were disinclined to obey them, that they had done their best, but that a solution had been imposed on them by an agency other than the Netherlands. Similarly, any reasonable outside persuasion will strengthen the hand of the Republican Government, not weaken it.

In the eyes of the Netherlands Government, the art of diplomacy in this matter consists for all concerned in finding the boundary where recognition of the claims of Indonesian nationalism and generous concessions to those claims degenerate into solutions which, so far from promoting stability in this corner of South East Asia, sow the seeds of economic disruption and political disintegration.

Another failure in the negotiations would be a serious setback for the western powers in general and for the Netherlands in particular. It is not likely that, given the peculiar character of the Indonesians, it will be possible for the Netherlands without some outside help to avoid failure despite anything the Netherlands Government can and will do within the limits of a tense internal political situation and of the revised Constitution.

There are four specific areas of contention which will present serious difficulties:

1. *Union*. The Indonesians are very suspicious that the Netherlands aim at a super-state with powers of its own, so as to impair Indonesia's newly won sovereignty.

The Netherlands have no designs of this nature, since for obvious reasons they are no more in favor of a super-state than are the Indonesians.

In the opinion of the Netherlands, the Netherlands-Indonesian Union is not to be a super-state, but a form of close cooperation between two independent sovereign states.

This Union must have machinery for consultation of ministers in equal numbers from both states and an interparliamentary consultative committee.

If a decision is arrived at in these consultative bodies, the governments remain responsible to their respective parliaments and not to any organ of the Union.

There should be a Union-tribunal for the amicable settlement of disputes between the partners to the Union. The judges are to be appointed in equal numbers by both states. In case of dead-lock, the President of the International Court of Justice should appoint one more member.

2. *Finance.* The Indonesians are naturally unwilling to assume for their new State a greater portion of the debt of Indonesia than is warranted.

The Netherlands wish to be generous in this—as in other respects; the settlement they have in mind is as follows:

A. Debts incurred before 1942 to be recognized in full.

Interior debts since 1942: the same; a devaluation is unavoidable, in consequence whereof these debts should not be too heavy a burden.

Exterior debts since 1942 to be negotiated with the Netherlands for a broad settlement with due regard to the economical possibilities of both states. As Indonesia is in the near future going to be a borrowing country this settlement will give reasonable prospects of repayment of new loans.

B. Permanent consultation with the Netherlands in the management of the national bank and currency control, and an appropriate voice therein so long as Indonesia remains heavily indebted to the Netherlands.

3. *New Guinea.*

Although New Guinea is a backward area which ethnographically and biologically does not form part of Indonesia and formed part of the Netherlands Indies merely in the interest of administration, the Indonesians claim its western half (the eastern half is under a trusteeship by Australia). By any standard, it is incapable of governing itself. There would be more justification for Indonesia to claim North Borneo or Malaya than any part of New Guinea.

It is the set purpose of the Netherlands Government that New Guinea remain under Dutch control so as to offer the best guarantees for expert improvement and development of this area in conformity with the principles of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. *Military.*

The line of defense in the Far East against communism needs some bases: Hongkong, Philippines, Singapore and Surabaja.

The naval base in Surabaja can only be run by the Dutch Navy. For the foreseeable future the Indonesians have no navy.

An arrangement on these lines should be acceptable to the Indonesian delegation. It is doubtful whether this arrangement offers adequate guarantees to prevent chaos, but less than this would lead in a few months to Burmese conditions.

[WASHINGTON,] September 16, 1949.

856d.00/9-1649 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, September 16, 1949—6 p. m.

801. Embassy takes somewhat different view than Cochran in Hicus 30 (Embtel 793, September 15, 12 noon) re Netherlands attitudes and intentions. We do not believe that "Netherlands Government would utilize plausible excuse to suspend or break up RTC." Dutch contacts of Embassy, including officials, politicians and businessmen, generally consider breakdown of RTC would lead inevitably to chaos Indonesia, withdrawal Dutch forces and nationals and loss of most if not all investments. Common expression is "conference *must* succeed."

Actually Dutch Government (and informed people generally) feel Netherlands is in extremely difficult position vis-à-vis Indonesians, has few cards can play, and that position will deteriorate if progress is not made in negotiations. Dutch attitude, we believe, entirely defensive one, motivated by desire to salvage as much as possible Dutch investment Indonesia and regain Dutch standing internationally. These considerations certainly behind journalists' trip.

Dutch concern about military (particularly guerrilla) situation is, we believe from our contacts, based fundamentally on belief or fear that Indonesian Government after regaining sovereignty will be unable to maintain order essential to implement economic and financial agreements it may accept in RTC. Dutch therefore probably emphasizing unsatisfactory features military situation in effort secure best possible agreement on provisions for withdrawal military forces. We do not believe Dutch here have any illusions about effectiveness of military pressure on Republican authorities, and at best hope formula can be found for RIS to use Dutch forces help maintain order while building up own strength. If this impossible, Dutch will have retired. There is strong underlying sentiment in Holland get troops home; replacement unit recently sailed for Indonesia with 132 desertions.

As for resumption ECA aid, Embassy agrees entirely present time unpropitious. However, we are surprised that Cochran should apparently feel that he will have to exert great pressure "to see that Indonesians get square deal" in financial and economic settlement. We have

felt Indonesians are in driver's seat this matter and that great persuasion probably would be necessary insure Indonesian agreement to economic financial terms which are both fair to Dutch and of character to induce continued ready availability of foreign capital and technical skills to Indonesia. We doubt whether Dutch in event treatment they consider unfair are going to send good money after bad and continue in large numbers to devote their undoubtedly great talents and experience to Indonesian development. We believe, therefore, that it in interests of both parties and of wider US interests in that area that economic and financial arrangements arrived at RTC are generally held to be fair and reasonable to both sides.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/9-1649 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1949—8 p. m.

799. Ushic 16. Fol receipt Hicus 30,¹ Sec had discussion with Stikker covering wide range subjects, centering in Indon settlement. Conversations went smoothly and cordially. Stikker expressed gratitude your labors and said you fully acquainted with all points he made here. He frankly sought US support through you for Dutch position on major issues outlined in verbal note presented by him to Sec. He gave as his opinion that "crucial time" wld be next week, at which time it likely become clear whether agreement possible on major issues.

Stikker pointed out verbal note was his own draft after ten days absence from RTC, but believed it represented accurately position NethDel.

Sec expressed his gratification progress achieved to date; agreed give close study points enumerated verbal note; made no commitments as to US position on UNCFI.

Verbal note fol.

[Here follows quotation of text printed on page 489.]

In discussion, Stikker reiterated fact that NEI guilder wld have to be devalued in near future in order "enable us to keep going". Significance this statement not clear.

At close of meeting, Neth FonMin gave press brief general statement subjects discussed, without further comment.

Request your estimate results week-end talks in Belgium and comments on Stikker's memo.

ACHESON

¹ Telegram 793, September 15, p. 487.

856d.00/9-1749 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, September 17, 1949—1 p. m.

805. Boon expressed optimism last night about prospects agreement RTC and said UNCI had been extremely effective and helpful in Hague. At same time he was pessimistic, even somewhat bitter, about certain aspects RTC and its aftermath.

Said Indos were unqualified and unwilling reach reasonable financial-economic agreement and that Netherlands inevitably would have write off large share Indo debt for sake agreement. Said financial negotiations made most difficult for both sides by lack any indication outside help, particularly US, which could be counted upon. Insisted Netherlands authorities and realists generally are reckoning upon prolonged highly insecure and unsettled post-sovereignty conditions; that numbers Netherlands interests in Indo being sold chiefly to Chinese and that large evacuation Netherlands nationals will accompany withdrawal Netherlands troops.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/9-1949 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, September 19, 1949—1 p. m.

807. Hicus 32. With 17 other members steering committee and Prime Minister Drees left Hague 2 p. m. 16th, had tea with Netherlands Ambassador Brussels and arrived Namur 8 p. m. Met after dinner to arrange schedule. Maarseveen recommended committee meet as whole next morning to consider general program for conference and resolve differences so far revealed. Subsequent discussion showed no chance advance conference until Union statute settled. At instance Hatta, I suggested and Maarseveen accepted that Van Royen, Roem and Anakagung meet alone 9 a. m. on Union problems. Remainder group to hold general discussion and receive report from small group when latter finished.

Saturday morning Maarseveen, Hamid, Blom, Leimena and Supomo met separately to discuss military affairs so no general meeting held but scattered talks took place. Trio on Union met all morning, with Prime Minister Drees called in at noon. Trio plus Drees resumed at 2:30 and at four o'clock asked me join. I worked with them until 7 p. m. Considerable progress made with difficulty. Trio recommended to Maarseveen that I meet with them again Sunday morning with hope Union problems could be resolved by 12:30 and then reported

to whole group. Decision taken by chairman Sunday morning, however, that they, Maarseveen, Hatta and Hamid, would also meet with trio. Drees had left for Hague early morning on call for special Cabinet meeting Sunday afternoon presumably account devaluation. Six asked me work with them.

Seven of us discussed Union steadily from 10 a. m. to 3 p. m. Then reported results to whole committee, lunched and returned Hague. No news given to press at Namur but short communiqué agreed upon for issuance Hague this morning reporting satisfactory progress.

Just before departing for Namur Friday received USHC 14¹ giving Soedjatmoko's version of difficulties experienced by Hatta RTC [apparent garble] Netherlands tactics. Upon return last night found Ushic 16² reporting Stikker's discussion with Secretary and quoting his verbal note on necessity US intervention to prevent Indonesians wrecking conference. In light these two indications of divergent positions, I feel Department should understand strongly conflicting attitudes represented in RTC and problems that naturally ensue.

Only accomplishment at Namur was progress on smoothing out most difficult problems on Union statute but feel this entirely worthwhile if decisions taken there adopted by respective delegations Hague. These concerned principally (1) character Union statute, (2) meetings between representatives of Union partners, and (3) position and function of head of Union. Each delegation had separate draft document on Union statute. Working committee had made some progress.

In two sessions in which I participated Namur negotiations considerably more complicated as result presence BFO than when working with Roem and Van Royen alone Batavia. Anakagung, while competent, made things exceedingly difficult for Netherlands delegation since less experienced and more sensitive and suspicious than Republican leaders and also harassed by large delegation lacking discipline and understanding of international negotiations. BFO, far from being "stooge" of Netherland delegation, is more resistant than Republican delegation. Maarseveen unfortunately has offended both Indonesian delegations by his naturally forceful and impetuous manner in conferences, announcing decisions as taken before Indonesians really aware what going on. Van Royen and I have had to plead with Hamid and Anakagung not to by-pass Maarseveen since he is one who has to convince government and then Parliament of acceptability any agreement reached. Indonesians complained to me of attitude Drees in Saturday morning meeting since they found him more difficult to deal with than Van Royen alone and since he inclined fre-

¹ See footnote 1, p. 483.

² Telegram 799, September 16, p. 493.

quently to state that if he yielded further his government could not succeed in getting agreement ratified. In both Saturday and Sunday meetings of small group, I emphasized necessity both Netherlands and Indonesian groups realize political problems of other and strive fairly for workable agreement that could be ratified by all.

Not submitting Union statute working papers at present stage and feel not worthwhile recount various problems of drafting met and dealt with Namur. Am happy report, however, that in almost every instance suggestion which I brought forth after others had argued their positions was accepted. Of troublesome points which were considered, there was only one sentence dealing with decision to be taken by Union which was not resolved and was left for consideration Hague. Will require time and effort get decisions taken Namur agreed to by delegation Hague. For instance, on one point Anakagung was so difficult we finally had three drafts which Netherlands would accept and left choice of one thereof to his delegation, including his own draft to which a time schedule had been added by me. Just before leaving Namur, he wanted know if he could take what he wished from each of three drafts. Delegations meeting separately today. Tuesday morning working group from three delegations meet on Union statute. No chance having consolidated draft Union statute before end week but if progress made at Namur confirmed and continues, outlook is satisfactory. Roem and Anakagung promised help straighten out "significant interests" problem steering committee Tuesday.

I do not subscribe to belief that impasse be reached or that either side "is willing". Positions are so divergent and interests at stake so important that negotiations difficult and tedious, particularly with large delegations including many inexperienced Indonesians. Hard for UNCI help as unit since Critchley definitely marked as advisor to Republicans and not trusted by Netherlands and Herremans found so ineffectual that rarely consulted even by Netherlands.

I shall not attempt comment on separate points raised by Stikker and Soedjatmoko. Several of their observations obvious to Department as unduly biased while others already out of date by progress made. Notwithstanding troublesome and dangerous factors involved, I feel satisfactory settlement can be worked out if RTC left alone to follow such plodding course as that adopted Namur. Van Royen suggested to me last night we have weekend somewhere in Holland of small group soon as economic-financial matters are negotiated to point where final decisions necessary. Serious problems will be faced there as will also on New Guinea. For UNCI or its members to endeavor prepare draft solutions in advance would not be wise. Each delegation already has much drafting prepared and feels it must present this and

its arguments therefore to convince political members and supporters that best efforts being made to achieve desired ends. We can only help in resolving differences when negotiations between parties approach exhaustion. My position not easy as only UNCI member called in to small meetings. Unless I am strictly objective, my usefulness ends. I have much contact with various leaders and appear have confidence Hamid and Anakagung well as leaders Netherlands delegation and Republican delegation. All sides thanked me cordially upon leaving Namur for help they thought I had contributed. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 807; repeated Batavia 60.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/9-2249: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, September 22, 1949—7 p. m.

809. Ushic 18. Dept judges from Hicus 33 and 34¹ negotiating situation becoming increasingly difficult. In circumstances, if Dept can be of assistance to you by placing you in receipt of statement of its position (which you may wish use as instrs in event impasse), advise and give substance differences presently separating parties. Dept prefers, of course, parties work out sound solution of all matters at issue between them. If, however, they are unable to do so, it has always been, as you know, our idea that we make recommendations to them through you as member UNCFI.

WEBB

¹ Telegrams 814 and 817, September 21, neither printed.

501.BC Indonesia/9-2349: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY THE HAGUE, September 23, 1949—3 p. m.

826. Hicus 36. Participated 3 hours afternoon 22nd in meeting with 3 members from each of 3 delegations on union statute. Chairmen revealed amendments desired by their delegates to points covered by Namur "meeting of minds". With reasonableness shown by Indonesians and generous attitude by Maarseveen, agreement achieved on all points covered Namur subject further confirmation by entire delegates. Arranged for delegates be consulted night 22nd and steering committee meeting scheduled 9 am 23rd be postponed until 10:30.

I met again with above-mentioned group of 9 at 9 am today. Found

that delegates confirmed all decisions reached by their president preceding evening except for translation one word which confident can be settled.

At ensuing meeting steering committee, I was asked make following announcement: "Through informal discussions held since return of their steering committee from Namur, 3 delegates have agreed in principle on following points re union statute: (1) Character of union statute; (2) Position and functions of head of union; (3) Duties and composition of conference of ministers of union partners which are to be held at regular intervals; (4) Duties and composition of court of arbitration of union; (5) Good contact and regular cooperation between parliaments of union partners".

It was agreed that foregoing should be issued in press release. Our group of 9 arranged one member from each delegation, namely Supomo, Blom and Anakagung, should continue work on union statute and endeavor have full coordinated draft thereon by end next week. Also requested they endeavor complete draft of charter for transfer sovereignty. Believe after achieving above described agreement that remaining points in union statute will not cause too much difficulty.

Steering committee heard chairman Djuanda read report of financial-economic committee as of 23rd. This to be studied over weekend and representatives from that committee to meet on Tuesday next with steering committee for discussion.

Appreciate Ushic 18.¹ With today's happy outcome, however, believe agreement of major political matters now certain. UNCI requested full English documentation of economic-financial committee to supplement today's report. This material will be forwarded Department soon as available. It is likely group will be set up to work out serious differences already apparent this field. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 826, repeated Batavia 64.

STEERE

¹ *Supra.*

501.BC Indonesia/9-2649: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steele) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY THE HAGUE, September 26, 1949—noon.

830. Hicus 39. Reference paragraph c, January 28 SC resolution re duty UNCI once agreement reached to recommend to SC nature, powers and functions of UN agency to remain Indonesia assist implementing agreement until sovereignty transferred.

In memorandum Batavia, June 22, parties agreed item VII D of

agenda on "observation of implementation of agreements" that "UNCI or another UN agency shall observe in Indonesia implementation of agreements reached RTC". This item assigned to Political Committee but "not be considered for time being".

There have been no arranged discussions so far on this subject among delegations or within UNCI. Netherlands well as Indonesia favor maintenance UN agency, former believing necessary to guarantee holding of proper elections and latter desiring presence during and to insure Netherlands will withdraw also. Members each side have expressed hope to me that strong and competent body exist for these purposes.

Current week steps anticipated by Steering Committee to hasten progress RTC. Possible, therefore, that discussions may begin in Political Committee or in UNCI on future setup and functions UN agency Indonesia. Submit, therefore, my following rough, tentative ideas for such early comment Department may make. I suggest that:

1. UNCI should be continued as such after sovereignty transferred. Title would appear appropriate for subsequent functioning. To reopen question in SC might arouse debate and afford possibility other countries acquiring participation.

2. Military observers be retained with UNCI for further observing compliance with cessation hostilities orders, Netherlands troop withdrawals, maintenance order by subsequently responsible authorities and finally preparing and witnessing elections.

3. As elections approach, which not likely for several months, more trained observers might replace and supplement military observers and expert on elections and plebiscites be sent Indonesia. Decision could be taken in light circumstances that time as to whether specialists should constitute new body whose sole function would be to arrange and observe elections and should succeed UNCI with new designation, or whether such experts should simply be attached to UNCI.

4. No change in membership USDel be made in foreseeable future. I see no need my returning Indonesia if RTC ends successfully as anticipated. After their handling difficult situation respect cease hostilities, am sure deputies can take care future tasks. Am not aware whether Herremans and Critchley will return Indonesia. Former has frequently indicated desire terminate UNCI assignment and receive independent post. Conceivable, Critchley might desire return because of close connection Republicans and possibility enjoying position of influence.

5. While deputy representatives of Belgium and Australia are from respective consulates Batavia, recommend no change in Dow's independent status now. Once diplomatic missions established, this point could be reconsidered. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 830, repeated Batavia 67.

STEEER

501.BC Indonesia/9-2949: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1949—10 a. m.

NIACT

834. Eyes only for Cochran from Butterworth. In fulfillment my promise to keep you serviced, I think I shd let you know before week-end Indo-Dutch conference (Hicus 40¹) not inconsiderable importance, which has not been dimmed by Burma experience, is attached here to incorporation specific safeguards against confiscatory taxation, etc., for foreign including Amer investments USI as you envisaged in Cochran Plan. Our thought from this distance is that ability to influence Indos to take fixed policy of enlightened character is now. [Butterworth.]

WEBB

¹ Telegram 849, September 28, not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/9-2949: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1949—2 p. m.

836. Ushic 20. Re Hicus 39¹ Dept agrees in general your ideas and has fol comments:

You shld take position in mtgs UNCFI and polit comite that UNCFI, as such, shld continue after conclusion RTC and transfer of sovereignty to observe implementation agreements reached RTC.

Under terms entire SC Jan 28 res, as applicable present developments toward settlement dispute and transfer sovereignty, not clear whether or when UNCFI obliged under para 4(c) make recommendations SC re nature UN agency to remain in Indo. Other subparas, notably 4(e) and 4(f), indicate UNCFI as such and without further SC action may be authorized continue functioning Indo re observation elections, assisting restoration civil admin, and arrangements re Neth forces. Hence altho SC pursuant to para 4(c) may wish take some action in respect future role UNCFI, in Dept's view UNCFI cld continue under present terms of ref even without further SC action.

Consequently, altho desirable UNCFI report SC at conclusion RTC agreements, report shld state broadly UNCFI intends continue functions in Indo under terms of ref Jan 28 SC res. Such statement wld in Dept's opinion be adequate ref to cover para 4(c) at that stage.

¹ Telegram 830, September 26, p. 498.

Formulation this statement by UNCFI shld not prejudice flexibility SC action under circumstances at time report considered. If RTC results as expected in substantial agreement major issues, Dept believes preferable SC action upon receipt UNCFI report wld be to note with gratification successful results RTC and intention UNCFI observe implementation of agreements under SC res.

In event SC discussion, US prepared support or sponsor brief SC res to general effect above para and hopes that such action on receipt UNCFI report wld not reopen serious debate or result in other countries' acquiring participation UNCFI. View joint Neth and Indo support for continuation UNCFI, Dept believes such a res shld receive quick SC approval. Difficult avoid some SC discussion after RTC, and general approval desirable at that time to show SC affirmation favorable results negots. Against outside chance Sov may veto general approval res, Dept repeats importance of phrasing UNCFI report to SC so no doubt raised whether UNCFI may continue under Jan 28 res.

Re agreements and reports to be drafted RTC, desirable future participation UNCFI be stated briefly in broad terms as in June 22 memo Batavia "UNCFI or another UN agency shall observe in Indo implementation agreements reached RTC". Any RTC effort define precisely future UNCFI role might have unfortunate results at this time, especially in view SC opinion UNCFI participation defined by SC rather than by parties.

No need detailed ref future function mil observers in either RTC agreement or UNCFI report, as terms Jan 28 res flexible enough cover eventualities.

Similarly, desirable that, beyond general statement re observation of elections, no special ref be made now to arrangements for elections participation. Exact terms UN participation Indo elections best worked out as time for elections approaches. Principle of UN observation already established para 4(e) Jan 28 res and statements of parties.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/9-2849: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1949—8 p. m.

842. Ushic 21. As you know Dept has long held view that best interest of both Neth and USI as well as strategic interest US best served by retention by Neth on voluntary and agreed basis of naval bases Sourabaya and possibly elsewhere. Apparent there are several serious indications including your conversations Darma Setiawan and

Subyakto (Hicus 41¹) that Indos have set face against such arrangement. Dept. believes it might be wise in premise to defer substantive discussions matter of bases until settlement has been reached on remaining outstanding issues including status New Guinea (telegram will follow²), withdrawal Neth forces, economic and financial arrangements, representation of "significant interests". This view, incidentally, coincides with that of Brit as expressed in conversation with Dening.³

Dept thinks your reply to Subyakto proper in the circumstances since it leaves US position flexible. It would be desirable for you meanwhile to impress upon Indos when appropriate occasion arises fact that provision of base rights in itself no derogation sovereignty of grantor. In this connection you could cite happy experience US base rights Philippines, UK base rights with various members Brit Commonwealth.

Indos probably partly influenced toward their present negative position by belief that USSR and satellites would veto UN membership if such base rights granted. If you think desirable you should tell Indos that in view US if USSR vetoes USI membership UN it will do so for other reasons than base rights, including democratic political orientation Indos. Here you might find useful cite history recent Sov vetoes application membership UN including Ceylon.

WEBB

¹ Telegram 852, September 28, not printed.

² Not printed.

³ Maberly E. Dening, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

501.BC Indonesia/10-749: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1949—8 p. m.

868. Ushic 24. Neth Amb Wash called his request Asst Sec Far East² to say he had been advised by Hague that RepDel had shown in past few hours sudden indisposition proceed negotiations in spirit which had characterized past few weeks; that RepDel had in fact indicated desire to "pull out" of agreement heretofore reached on Union Statute; that in respect of all other issues except mil issues RepDel showing alarming unwillingness proceed negots.

Neth Amb continued to speculate on cause this alleged change in heart. He referred to presence Palar at Hague; described Palar's

¹ Repeated as 504 to Batavia.

² W. Walton Butterworth.

attitude toward Hatta but considered that Palar's influence by itself insufficient cause. He at last concluded that explanation lay in fear on part of RepDel at Hague of assumption power in Indo by mil elements. In support this hypothesis Neth Amb read memo, later handed to Asst Sec which fols: ³ [Here follows text of memorandum, not printed.]

Neth Amb said foregoing memo prepared by Hague Govt on basis reports of polit and mil reps in Indo. He then read tel from Lovink addressed Hague repeated Neth Emb Wash which covered much same ground foregoing memo, characterized situation as extremely serious and suggested that Repub Govt, which he said had been cooperative, should be convinced of seriousness situation to the end that it would, abandoning attitude of indolence and fatalism, make resolute effort to impose discipline on lower levels Repub mil. In answer to Asst Sec's question Neth Amb was at pains to make clear that Lovink considered trouble arose from activities extremist elements in the field and not from intentional lack of cooperation on part Jogja Govt.

In answer further question by Asst Sec, Neth Amb stated that in his view Repub Govt Jogja was able impose requisite discipline if properly approached.

Asking that foregoing representations be regarded for moment as confidential (by which he meant not to be communicated to Repub) Neth Amb went on to say that Neth Govt had prepared note, which he described as entirely friendly in tone, to Repub Govt asking that latter take energetic steps to repress activities extremists and offering cooperate with Repub Govt to that end. Neth Amb said that he would notify Dept of date delivery this note and expected that he would be instructed within next day or so to ask US request Repub Govt to take action in premises. Asst Sec made no commitments.

Since preparation foregoing, Hicus 48 and 49⁴ received indicating you have been apprised same situation at Hague.

WEBB

³ Not printed.

⁴ Telegrams 889 and 890, October 6, neither printed.

501.BC Indonesia/10-849 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET NIACT

THE HAGUE, October 8, 1949—1 a. m.

907. Hicus 52. Following text secret memo basis my Hicus 53²:

"Following suggestions based on calculation that foreign debt Indo-

¹ Repeated in telegram Gadel 48, October 11, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² *Infra.*

nesia is 3.3 billion Netherlands guilders, divided approximately as follows:

900,000,000 consolidated debt,
400,000,000 foreign credits guaranteed by Netherlands,
2,000,000,000 floating and other debts to Netherlands, (total)
3,300,000,000; and that internal debt is approximately 3 billion Indonesian guilders.

It is recommended that:

1. Netherlands cancel 'floating and other debts due Netherlands' to extent of 2 billion Netherlands guilders.

2. Netherlands, as creditor on consolidated debt, and as guarantor on foreign credits, assume full contractual obligations for servicing debt of 1.3 billion guilders compromising these two items for period of four years from date of transfer of sovereignty.

3. Netherlands suspend applicability of 'tin pledge' for same period of four years.

4. Netherlands maintain lines of credit to Indonesia for minimum of four years, in amount of blank million guilders.

5. Netherlands provide Indonesia with such technical experts and advice as may be helpful in securing efficient and sound management of finances and economic Indonesia.

It is further recommended that:

A. Indonesia continue responsible for internal debt of 3 billion guilders.

B. Indonesia take advantage of readiness of Netherlands to provide technical experts and advice and enter into consultations with Netherlands in sense on which there has already been 'meeting of minds'.

C. Indonesia consult with Netherlands, and possibly with experts from international bank or fund, with view to determining what decision should be taken by Indonesia in handling internal debt and preparing for assumption of management of economy of Indonesia from date of sovereignty transfer.

D. No decision be taken at this time as to how internal debt may be dealt with—as, for example, by consolidated loan or by monetary operation. It is suggested that any further monetary operation affecting value of currency would, if taken during period of RTC, upset conditions Indonesia and possible RTC negotiations. It would even be dangerous take such step prior ratification RTC agreement. Any necessary operation might even be more successful if undertaken by new government, on its own initiative, after transfer of sovereignty.

E. Indonesia undertake follow economic and monetary practices approved by international standards and endeavor achieve and maintain sound economic and monetary system, including balanced budget.

F. Indonesia consult with Netherlands with view ascertaining whether there may be made available to Indonesia, for application on reduction of its internal debt, sum of approximately 100 million Indonesian guilders on deposit in Java Bank, to credit of Netherlands bank and under joint control of Netherlands Government and ECA.

G. Indonesia benefit from revival of ECA aid, which is to be recommended on successful consummation of an RTC agreement.

H. Indonesia be prepared as early as possible, with assistance of Netherlands, to submit pertinent data to international organizations or foreign governments which might normally be looked to for advice or credits." Signed Cochran.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-849: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steele) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET NIACT

THE HAGUE, October 8, 1949—2 a. m.

908. Hicus 53. Ten a. m. October 7. Read to Stikker, Van Royen, Hatta, Djuanda, Hamid and Indrakusuma in top secret meeting my quarters informal and personal suggestion quoted Hicus 52.² Upon request Van Royen, gave him copy well as others. In discussion that followed I corrected orally point three memo to explain suspension applicability in pledge only concerned 1.3 billion outlined point two and that pledge would be operative with respect present and future indebtedness to Netherlands in excess 1.3.

When group assembled I said that since Baarn talks³ two or three of their group had asked me what should be done. I considered it urgent we get results shortly on debt settlement and financial agreement. I regretted publicity which was making negotiations more difficult. I said that if we could not soon report success on union statute and financial problems world would look pessimistically on RTC. I said I had not discussed with my government, my UNCI colleagues or anyone else idea I was going "try out" on them in accordance request from both parties I take helpful initiative. I said purely personal and probably would not please either delegation.

I said was convinced Netherlands would not wipe out debt for extraordinary military expenses as such or reduce total debt to figures stipulated by Republicans. I said I could understand political difficulties Netherlands Government but convinced they must reduce by greater figure than offered. I said place to reduce was on state-to-state

¹ Repeated in telegram Gadel 48, October 11, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² *Supra*.

³ For talks October 2, see SC, 4th yr., *Spec. Suppl. No. 6*, p. 21.

debt and place to give service respite was on bonds and Netherlands guaranteed foreign credits. I said Indonesians themselves should have responsibility for internal debt. I said my whole thesis was that no matter how carefully we draft and how long we talk over amounts and plans nothing would be of avail if USI does not succeed. I said we had to go limit in making sacrifices all sides to get plan that will work.

I said concerned over burden Indonesia will have initial period. I was against their trying do whole thing through foreign borrowing, particularly if they have their exchange from exports pledged to considerable extent. I said if they assume too heavy borrowing load they could never emerge from morass of indebtedness. I said they would have to conduct Spartan economy at best. I knew Hatta, Hamid and others realized they could not make go of it unless they looked to Netherlands for technical assistance and aid. I thought they might also desire consult International Bank or Fund. I said be most difficult get new government started under conditions which have been inherited. Said would like see termination discussions on finance and debts soonest with generous attitude and sacrifice both sides. I thought this would do much to show world union partners are going to shoulder and share burden as business partners. I then read text memo. I added that at Baarn I had suggested there might be group of experts selected to look into settlement as long-term proposition with only general lines agreement to be reached RTC. I reminded Stikker he had told me definitely his government could not accept such suggestion but wanted whole problem settled now. I said Hatta had spoken with me of this same expert group idea but I realized it futile.

In discussion that ensued I said I did not have knowledge of contracts under which US credits outstanding in total under reference but would try get this reduced if possible.

When Djuanda asked re tin pledge, I gave explanation in first paragraph this message. I said Netherlands had sought "agreement" on Indonesian financial aid related matters well as tin pledge and setting aside percentage foreign exchange from exports. I said they were willing waive "agreement" if obtaining "consultation." Furthermore my recommendation did not include export percentage arrangement. I was therefore favoring tin pledge as above indicated although from standpoint Indonesia procuring needed new loans from abroad realized this would be handicap. I said had received tin pledge descriptive document which I had requested at Baarn only last night and had not yet studied it carefully. Van Royen spoke of heavy load plan would oblige Netherlands carry coming four years. Stikker said if they cannot come to compromise with Indonesians no hope of solving problem but difficult Netherlands accept whole my plan and go on giving credits.

I thought unwise attempt monetary purge now. Said if we could get out announcement of broad-minded settlement with mutual sacrifices more favorable atmosphere would be created for any debt consolidation or monetary operation. There would be more confidence in monetary future and currency unit that Indonesia is to utilize. I said happy agreement and good press would improve chances for domestic and foreign support.

Hatta and Djuanda spoke of deficit budgetary situation inherited and said actual debt between 10 and 12 billion rather than between 6 and 7 as Netherlands figures utilized by me indicate. We pledged secrecy and early study my paper since Stikker and other ministers leaving next Wednesday for Luxembourg. Was agreed suggestion would be discussed with limited top colleagues and group would inform me whether they found paper basis for any further discussion. If so, we would meet again secretly my quarters. Meeting was entirely cordial.

At end Steering Committee meeting 4:30 p. m., Stikker asked if I would be available in evening. I said 5 o'clock meeting on union statute but would be in quarters thereafter. Made real progress in meeting with one from each delegation on union statute and all of us confident we could get this satisfactorily completed first of next week. On call from Stikker I went directly from meeting to residence Prime Minister 8 p. m. where talked with Drees and Stikker alone for hour and half.

Drees said Finance Minister Lieftinck insisted my suggestion impractical and he unwilling assume responsibility therefor. Said few members government had talked over situation and thought inevitable government tender resignation. Said intended telegraph Netherlands Embassy Washington to report situation to Department. I said had already informed Department, had made suggestion to group, and had let Department know of impasse and of request from Stikker that I push matters and his receptiveness to idea of my getting group together and giving my suggestions. I said I had not cabled text, preferring wait see whether group willing accept it as basis for discussion.

Drees and Stikker took turns telling how difficult their situation was politically and financially and how my suggestion now made their going on in government and RTC impossible. I reviewed figures with Stikker in endeavor convince him margin of charge to Netherlands thereunder as compared with their plan advanced Baarn should certainly not be considered as constituting item to make government resign. I said they must realize SC and world would not consider this satisfactory reason for government falling and RTC failing.

Drees then referred to unfavorable reports from Indonesia. I said aware of them just as I had been familiar with other fears which Netherlands had held over Indonesian problems. I said casualties

had ceased and was confident situation could be worked out once RTC ended and Indonesian leaders return from Hague to Indonesia.

Stikker said my suggestion not only unacceptable as basis negotiation but would make impossible get Indonesians accept anything less since they have seen it. I said I never sounded out either party in advance when requested offer compromise formula. I reminded him he had been one to urge me most strongly get Hatta into negotiations some way, had made no suggestion himself for basis thereof and Netherlands oral note following Baarn gives no lead. Only answer he had was that his people could show costs military operations much less than Indonesian figure mentioned 700 or 800 million as correct. Department knows this ridiculously low.

When both Drees and Stikker reiterated necessity cabinet resigning, I said this absolutely foolish. I said I had worked with their government through lot of difficulties and was willing go ahead and help get fair settlement now but did not desire participate in agreement which would leave such burden on Indonesia that I, with some little technical experience, was absolutely sure would not give Indonesia ghost of chance of either succeeding or surviving. I said I would gladly discuss my suggestion with Lieftinck or any their experts. I repeated I had not submitted my suggestion to Department and had not acted under any instructions. I said I was acting on own responsibility but entirely happy have my government review my suggestion.

I said naturally regretted if any well-intentioned moves my part upset them. I insisted suggestion had been purely informal and that I would not even have circulated copies if Van Royen had not requested this or if any one of group had opposed suggestion going beyond oral stages. I reminded them that suggestion had only been advanced as possible basis for discussion and group members were to let me know before Sunday whether they accepted it as such basis. I would, however, seek withdraw memo with explanation I had been given understand it was not acceptable as basis for Sunday's discussion.

When Stikker spoke rather strongly of alleged harm I had done, I recalled to him many services I had performed for him and his government. I said he and Drees had volunteered to me last February that Netherlands did not have manpower and money to carry through second police action. I said they realized well as I that course we have taken under SC directive only possible way out. I said I had taken whole responsibility on USDel side in spite warnings from friends that Netherlands Government might walk out when situation got tight and blame SC and US particularly therefor. I said I had never believed this and could not believe for one minute now that government would quit and invite chaos and Communism in Indonesia.

I said optimistic over chances new state if only can be given breathing spell. Said intended proceed Department immediately after termination RTC and help obtain financial assistance needed to give Indonesia fair start. Said I would likewise be interested and active in seeing Netherlands supported during difficult period. Thought better that both partners to union seek outside aid rather than Netherlands look to Indonesia for payment of debts and interest during critical stage and oblige foreign lenders largely finance Indonesia including debt service to Netherlands.

When I spoke of willingness intercede for both partners, Drees and Stikker became interested. I said I had not favored any understanding between Netherlands and US Government before or during RTC on what settlement should be or what assistance could be expected from US later. They then said would proceed with cable to Ambassador Washington and needed my memo as basis thereof. Said might ask me talk with Lieftinck and others. Said we should not, however, have Sunday meeting or endeavor negotiate on financial problem in RTC next few days.

I spoke with Hatta by phone when he became available. 11:30 p. m. Told him suggestion had been found unacceptable as basis further discussion and I would see him 10 a. m. Saturday for return of memo. Asked he inform Djuanda and keep strictly secret. Endeavored contact Hamid. Unsuccessful but will try later.

Suggest Department review OIR report No. 4947 of Aug. 17 on Indonesian public debt which I have used importantly as basis my reasoning in suggestion under reference. Am convinced my suggestion technically sound and fair. Felt it absolutely imperative I take this informal initiative or risk seeing conference break down. At same time feel withdrawal memo only way remove from government technical excuse to resign on Indonesian issue. Signed Cochran.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-849: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steele) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET NIACT

THE HAGUE, October 8, 1949—4 p. m.

909. Hicus 54. Reached Hamid by phone 7:30 this morning. Told him understood my memo unacceptable as basis negotiation financial settlement. Consequently I desired withdraw it and would see him 10 o'clock for this purpose. I asked he inform Indrakusuma.

At 10 o'clock received by Hatta with Djuanda present. We had

¹ Repeated in telegram Gadel 48, October 11, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

Hamid and Indrakusuma join us. I said Drees and Stikker had informed me Lieftinck found my suggestion impossible and could not take responsibility therefor. Consequently Netherlands considered suggestion unsatisfactory as basis for negotiation and I offered withdraw memo. I said there would be no Sunday meeting. Was handed back four copies my memo. All four Indonesians expressed keen regret this development and appreciation my effort. Hatta and Hamid said memo was by no means one-sided but represented middle course which involved inconveniences and hardships for them. Hatta said had asked Minister Goetzen explain budget figures for Indonesians and had found them not at all convincingly in support Netherlands attitude. Hatta said financial and monetary situation so bad, including budget deficit, that unless at least as reasonable plan as mine can be agreed upon by Netherlands, he, Hatta, might as well suggest sovereignty be transferred directly to Communists rather than first to his group.

All four said lead from me had been only hope out of deadlock. Said they were unable make any offer above that submitted Baarn and Netherlands gave no indication of yielding from their position. Said work of military and other main committees well as all sub-committees in financial and economic field will be held up pending solution vital point debt settlement and financial arrangement. Said conference will definitely break down if we cannot therefore move out of this impasse. Hamid said even some members Netherlands delegation indicate lack sympathy with official position taken Baarn. For example, Hamid said, he was asked last night at dinner given by Blom how financial negotiations were progressing. When he said outlook unsatisfactory, Wisaksono, Agriculture and Fisheries Secretary of State in provisional Federal Government and member its delegation to RTC working with Netherlands delegation, said absolutely impossible USI start with debt around six billion. Four Indonesians promised keep my suggestion and developments thereon secret. I made no mention to Indonesians of possibility resignation Netherlands Government.

Hatta said if Netherlands will not accept my suggestion, only way out is for conference to work on other matters and leave financial settlement in suspense for investigation by international group. Hamid thought Netherlands would still oppose latter idea and that no settlement on other points such as taking care of Netherlands military withdrawals could be achieved in absence overall financial agreement. Saw Van Royen this noon my request. Told him desired withdraw his copy my memo. He said he would consider null and void but had given copy someone else. I reviewed last night's talk with Drees and Stikker. Also asked he tell Stikker I had seen four Indonesians this morning and had received their copies. I summarized my talk with Indonesians, stressing Hatta's worries.

Van Royen said he had participated in meeting last evening with small Cabinet group that preceded my meeting with Drees and Stikker. Said aside from conviction that Parliament would not accept my idea of settlement Cabinet members themselves thought it more than they could recommend. He volunteered that Drees gave disproportionate importance to submission suggestion. Said Drees felt however that he would have to resign rather than ask Parliament approve such plan after promises he has made that further Netherlands sacrifices for Indonesia would not be necessary. I said I did not question Drees' sincerity but did not see that resignation Cabinet would help anyone. Van Royen even more positive on this point, saying resignation not warranted and would hurt Indonesia well as Netherlands.

Stikker sent word to me in Van Royen's office that Lieftinck desired see me Tuesday morning with Goetzen present. I agreed. I asked Van Royen if this meant there would be no precipitate government action. He said he thought there would not unless something might "blow up". I assured him Indonesians had pledged secrecy to me. He said Stikker also wanted me to know he and Maarseveen had decided cable report to Washington of all dangerous factors Indonesian situation and seriousness Netherlands Government attaches thereto. Sending telegram today and would cable copy Batavia for information Dow and Beam.² I told him Beam leaving for Batavia today and entirely familiar with importance Netherlands attaches to better order Indonesia and was confident Beam could have stiffening influence on UNCI and on responsible Indonesian authorities. Van Royen said RTC situation bad but shared my view we could still work out of it. He said he was convinced his financial people would seek my help Tuesday. I said would do whatever possible but wish restrain my initiative and let parties show they are willing make some move on own account. Signed Cochran.

STEERE

² Consul General Jacob D. Beam was en route to his post at Batavia, succeeding Consul General Livengood.

501.BC Indonesia/10-849 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1949—6 p. m.

870. Ushic 25. Hicus 52 and 53.² Neth Amb called Oct 8 his request express his govt's deep concern developments resulting from your

¹ Repeated in telegram Gadel 48, October 11, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² Telegram 907 and 908, October 8, pp. 503, 505.

effort resolve impasse ec-financial negots emphasizing possibility resignation present Cabinet and breakdown RTC DepUnderSec.³ emphasized purely personal character your proposal, fact that such technique had been used successfully before and expressed hope that Tues meeting would resolve present tension. DepUnderSec added he did not believe Neth Govt justified in making such heavy weather of incident.

Hicus 54⁴ received after Amb departed.

WEBB

³ Dean Rusk.

⁴ *Supra*.

856d.00/10-949 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 9, 1949—4 p. m.

913. Hicus 55. Rusk eyes only. Sorry bad connection but hope you understood (1) Cabinet situation settling down, (2) this reported in Hicus 54² early Saturday afternoon which had not reached you when you phoned and (3) I had been to Schipol Airfield seeing Beam off on 8 p. m. KLM for Batavia and having last talk.

Considering potential danger present stage RTC, believe should give you calm Sunday analysis. Since coming Hague I have been personally active mainly on (1) getting rules of procedure that guarantee for UNCI appropriate participation in RTC (which are working satisfactorily), (2) pressuring Indonesians to agree to hearing significant interests (which is to begin this coming week), (3) serving as intermediary in union statute group with purpose (which hope will be accomplished next two or three days) of achieving middle course draft that can be accepted politically all sides, (4) making Indonesians realize they cannot get complete wiping out of debt arising from police actions and other causes considered by them "not to benefit of people of Indonesia" and making Netherlands realize it is to their own interest give Indonesian financial settlement that will not impair sovereignty, but will be politically acceptable and so fair as to afford USI reasonable chance to succeed.

Positions assumed by parties in Baarn talks and adhered to succeeding days revealed divergency that could never be eliminated by normal inter-party negotiation. Conscious of this and urged by leaders in three delegations and most of all by Stikker to take initiative, I personally ventured suggestion which I knew did not take care joint

¹ Repeated in telegram Gadel 48, October 11, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² Telegram 909, October 8, p. 509.

Indonesian determination not to pay extraordinary military debts and which I fully realized would be considered drastic by Netherlands. I thought time had come to let Stikker know it is out of question for me support Netherlands cause to extent he would like and is imperative Netherlands demonstrate more generosity in financial field if they are to have successful RTC and viable union.

I did not expect either side accept my hurriedly put together plan as such but did hope it might—and still hope it may—get them started on realistic talks toward debt solution, etc. Stikker now has arranged for me to meet with Lieftinck and Goetzen Tuesday morning and Van Royen has intimated Netherlands still look to me to help them get out of impasse. With two Netherlands Ministers I will not of course insist on my own plan, especially since Drees said it not acceptable as basis. I will put burden on them of suggesting something better and at least find out whether they are ready move in any helpful degree toward middle ground agreement. I may even ask them give me plan whereunder they think Hatta government could handle finances of USI during first four years and seek their assurance they would be willing undertake its implementation if chosen as responsible officials for this purpose. If Lieftinck cannot see light, he might make way for more constructive realist.

At this point should recall that Stikker and Hirschfeld were most insistent to me on early monetary purge Indonesia while Jacob has let Dow know he would resign if such adventure attempted. Hirschfeld admitted to me that Hoogstraten and other economic and financial officials NEI Government are not "one hundred percent" and would have to come out. My point is that Netherlands officials here are not sound in their ideas as to what should be done to take care of internal debt situation Indonesia and that Netherlands officials there aside from Jacob are not likely be great help.

Unless Netherlands may move fairly far in giving relief on lines comparable to these I have suggested, believe Hatta will adhere demand international group study problem and only general lines of financial settlement be included in RTC agreement. If Netherlands then does not accept this, result will be deadlock. If UNCI or member thereof makes compromise proposal to Netherlands, danger would be risked of Drees Ministry falling rather than take responsibility for asking Parliament make more "sacrifices," to use Prime Minister's words.

In negotiations Indonesia and here Netherlands always allege Hatta unable take responsible decisions and unsure of support. Evident here Netherlands negotiators themselves in difficult position self-made by Netherlands. For instance, Stikker and Van Royen told me

Baarn Netherlands offer reduction debt could be raised from 500 to 700 million but not more since decision had already been taken by government in liaison with Parliament that this would be maximum. Stikker told me Cabinet had just completed plans for next budget to be in balance which counted on interest from Indonesians on state to state debt, consequently this could not be reduced as I suggested. In my conversation with Drees and Stikker, Prime Minister found my suggestion unacceptable since he said he had given pledge to Parliament further sacrifices in favor Indonesia would not be sought from them. Difficult believe reduction by another billion or two would mean sacrifices by Netherlands anything like comparable those Indonesians have suffered already and would bear in monetary purge wiping out at least two-thirds remaining value of currency after 30 percent devaluation few weeks ago.

With Stikker and few other Netherlands ministers absenting themselves most this week, little prospect early progress on financial problem. Stikker and Van Royen told me hoped we could talk on other matters and leave financial problem dormant few days. With Indonesians realizing Baarn talks meant deadlock, I consider unlikely much advance can be made in related or most other committees until settlement debt and financial problems in prospect. Some Indonesians already pressing for return home and Hatta himself may find it imperative go unless outlook entirely favorable by end two month period RTC, that is October 24, for early successful conclusion. With Hatta gone, hopes for achieving results would diminish.

Situation is therefore that unless Netherlands willing soon accept realistic arrangement on debts, conference hopelessly deadlocked. If Drees Cabinet resigns on financial or other RTC issue, then RTC ends. If government falls on financial issue, feel Netherlands would have very poor case before SC. While Republicans would of course report SC, I am sure they would not remain Hague after conference breaks down but return Indonesia. Believe Indonesians will insist on sovereignty January 1, 1950 whether transferred by agreement with Netherlands for union or whether Indonesians take their own decision and declare themselves entirely independent. RTC following inter-Indonesian conferences Jogja and Batavia has provided really pre-sovereignty convention for Republicans and BFO where they have smoothed out their divergent views and coordinated their policies and plans. Draft constitution should be finished this week. Much other drafting requisite to setting up independent government already accomplished or well underway.

Sukarno and Sultan in meantime have widened authority Indonesia. With return Indonesia leaders from RTC, really strong organization

throughout greater part Indonesia could be realized. Stikker took pains assure me in conversation with Drees that Netherlands planning no third police action. My feeling is that next police action more likely come from Indonesians if conference fails. Prior cease hostilities agreement, Netherlands spread troops widest possible Indonesia and in agreement insisted on maintenance such outposts and patrols. Instead proving element of strength, this has made Netherlands forces more vulnerable. Through cold infiltrations TNI and Republic sympathizers evidently now have created situation where Netherlands forces would be dangerously threatened and might conceivably be annihilated if new action should come.

I do not seek Department approve plan which I suggested. I do recommend however that if and when Van Kleffens approaches Department he be made clearly understand danger to conference that is resulting from Netherlands inability see problems as they are and to pay price of extra one or two billion guilders required get workable solution. Stikker returned from US with belief American opinion towards Netherlands has been greatly improved by ill-fated journalists and by convening RTC. I have never been able reconcile Netherlands alleged determination transfer sovereignty soonest and unconditionally with attempt convince US through publicity agents and otherwise that Indonesians incapable self-government. Sovereignty likely pass to Indonesians January 1 whatever Netherlands does. Circularizing friendly nations by Netherlands re their fears and troubles will not stop it. If they desire have sovereignty transfer within union, should treat Indonesians as partners and not seek tie them up like bad debtors and deprive them support essential to live.

Ushic 24³ and 25⁴ and Lacy's 867⁵ received as present message being filed. Signed Cochran.

STEERE

³ Telegram 868, October 7, p. 502.

⁴ Telegram 870, October 8, p. 511.

⁵ October 7, 8 p. m., not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/10-1049: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, October 10, 1949—1 p. m.

914. Hicus 56. Ushic 24:¹ Feel obliged deny allegation by Netherlands that RepDel endeavoring "pull out" of agreement on Union Statute. Have attended most meetings Union Statute group and have reported difficulties met therein. These have resulted from great im-

¹ Telegram 868, October 7, p. 502.

portance politically each side attaches to precise wording of almost every one of 30 articles herein. As Dow has reported (Gocus 804²), draft which I have so far influenced Indonesians to take represents limit to which Masjumi would support Hatta. On remaining points I have submitted drafts and participated in long discussions with view to completing arrangement on terms which would still safeguard political position each party. Indonesians have been no stiffer these negotiations than Netherlands. On contrary, have been more willing endeavor expedite conclusion. Maarseveen as chairman last week was definitely not helpful at Thursday night meeting and I so commented to Van Royen afterwards. Meeting tonight at 9 with drafting group of three. This should indicate whether agreement on entire statute can be reached.

When Drees and Stikker told me Friday night Indonesians were delaying discussions most committees and disrupting conference, I said Indonesians made almost same allegation to me re Netherlands tactics. I said I had opinion and had so reported to my Department that neither side was stalling but that both faced with difficulty decisions on matters vital importance. I told them I shared their view Palar had been disconcerting influence and I had lectured him thereon. I said key to situation was for Netherlands approve financial settlement bearable Indonesians. I thought once this accomplished, RTC could be wound up in comparatively short time. Without such step I feared consequences.

When Stikker and Van Royen talked with Beam and me, we assured them Beam would do everything possible upon arrival Batavia to help achieve better order. Believe, however, Netherlands raising this issue to undue height. Believe TNI has shown remarkable control and discipline in avoiding fatal incidents in difficult situation which was left under cease-hostilities plan. Convinced way out is for rapid and successful termination RTC Hague and return Indonesians soonest. With fair agreement achieved, I feel these political leaders could handle military forces effectively. Fact that various groups have affiliated with TNI might be looked upon as helpful rather than dangerous moves since this may eliminate necessity for much actual fighting. Success depends, of course, on TNI maintaining conservative leadership and USI in due time eliminating undesirable elements when constituting regular army.

Hearing of first significant interests group scheduled this afternoon. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department, repeated Batavia 81.

STERR

² Telegram 790, October 5, from Batavia, not printed.

856d.00/10-1049 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

THE HAGUE, October 10, 1949—3 p. m.

916. Called on Stikker his home yesterday asking him bring me up-to-date recent developments RTC, particularly the indications to Cochran of likelihood Cabinet will resign. Said to him could not understand how Cabinet resignation this juncture could possibly serve Netherlands' interests Indonesia or at home, on contrary, could only lead disaster, and asked for explanation of reasons for entertaining such.

Stikker, after reviewing recent negotiations, said, in effect, that Cochran's recent personal proposals had had practical effect of setting limits beyond which Indonesians would not go and which Cabinet could not possibly recommend to Parliament. The difference between them remained so great Cabinet could see no solution and therefore felt impelled resign.

Said to Stikker my personal opinion last thing Cabinet should do was resign this juncture after six months' patient negotiation and close approach acceptable agreement. Felt that record, as far as I knew it, would not show that all possibilities of financial-economic agreement had been exhausted. On contrary, thought parties had largely sparred for position thus far, and that world would quickly come that conclusion if breakdown occurred and record made public.

Stikker replied that Netherlands' Cabinet was getting to point where it did not care what world thought. There was such a thing as being pushed too far. Cabinet had been through 15 months sustained pressure, with severe internal stresses and strains on all important decisions, constantly subjected to party criticism and intrigues (which had led to departure of Sassen and Beel) and now was confronted with whole new series of internal problems incident to devaluation. In these circumstances, and with Netherlands' foreign assets sadly diminished and country running large trade deficit, it should occasion no surprise if Cabinet felt unable recommend further staggering sacrifice. Should be remembered that Netherlands' Government has been financing Indonesia since war and that Government has promised Parliament an early end to this drain. Holland was in difficult financial position close to end its resources, and point had been reached where it could not agree assume added burdens beyond its strength to carry and in face great uncertainties.

Cabinet fully aware that breakdown RTC meant chaos Indonesia and probably Holland (where stoppage ECA might ensue) but felt they were confronted with such decision. Added with touch of bitter-

ness that Netherlands' Government and people felt (and he cited talks with Hatta past week by himself, Hirschfeld and others indicating fundamental basis understanding existed) that real conflict is between US and Netherlands and not Indonesia and Netherlands. Supported that by stating only on that ground could he understand repeated US refusals support Netherlands' proposals, however reasonable, or indicate clearly what solution it would support. Added that any Dutch proposal seemed to be regarded with suspicion by Indonesians and UNCI regardless of merits.

I replied was extremely difficult for any country play impartial role (as US is) particularly when both parties wanted support of that country; that American Government had repeatedly demonstrated its readiness accord tangible friendly aid to Netherlands and approval of declared objectives Netherlands in Indonesia which seemed on point realization.

Stikker acknowledged these arguments, but added that time had come when more positive US support for workable solution was imperative. Said he had had definite impression that Netherlands' approach to financial solution was regarded as sound and that Netherlands had been taken by surprise by Cochran proposal cancel two billion Indonesian floating debt to Netherlands' Government. Stikker proceeded criticize "fantastic" Indonesian calculation. In oral note following Baarn meeting (of Netherlands' military expenditures at Indonesian cost as 3.7 billion guilders) some 100,000 soldiers at 30 guilders per day (and deduction thereof from 6.3 billion total debt) said resultant 2.6 billion implied further Netherlands' contribution 1.7 billion to Indonesia after cancellation 1.5 billion (though 1.7 billion presumably would be reduced by internal purge measures).

I commented my understanding Netherlands' insistence upon final settlement debt question at RTC and said this seemed imply drastic cancellation inter-government debt if Indonesian Government to carry burden remaining debt in difficult years ahead. Personally did not understand such insistence when financial position so difficult and outlook so obscure. Would have thought it wiser to make generous cancellation for military expenditures and postponed decision on balance for three or four years with agreement now that international commission experts should then recommend or decide fair solution. Stikker pondered this for some time, but did not react, and finally said Cochran would be discussing whole question with Lieftinck and Goetzen on Tuesday. Stikker was at pains to make clear that while he felt Cochran did not fully appreciate difficulties confronting Netherlands' Government, that Netherlands' Government was not criticizing Cochran and had faith in his intentions and confidence that he would do utmost to resolve dilemma.

Came away from meeting with feeling that Stikker had given vent to his feelings, as he is prone to in tight positions, and that, having done so, now, with colleagues, anxiously awaits compromise proposals that will save day. They are thoroughly alarmed both at deteriorating situation militarily in Indonesia and at recent tendency of Indonesians here to harden and even withdraw from previous understandings. Their real hope is that US may find it possible to advance suggestions that both parties can accept with honor. Doubt that Cabinet will resign (a) unless bad press leak should give rise to public furor, (b) unless negotiations should take decided turn for worse, or (c) as long as the still-friendly relations between the parties give some hope for reaching agreement.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-1049

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 10, 1949.

The Netherlands Ambassador left with me today the attached note concerning Indonesia.² He asked that it be brought to your personal attention.

The note states the concern of the Netherlands Government arising from reported infiltrations of Republican troops in Java, which the Dutch regard as violations of the truce. While admitting that there has been a sharp decline in the use of armed forces, the Dutch note states that as a result of infiltrations the civil administrations in various parts of Java are being ousted by the military and that the regular Republican forces are being greatly augmented by extremist elements which are not subject to the control of the Republican Government. In the opinion of the Netherlands Government, this situation has resulted in an inability or unwillingness on the part of the Indonesian delegation at The Hague Conference to enter into binding commitments with the Dutch, because of fear that they will not have the political power to make these commitments stick. In his oral remarks, Ambassador van Kleffens stressed his government's fear that the control of the Republican Army was shifting to radicals who might turn out to be communists.

The note states that the Netherlands Government has done all in its power to persuade the Republican leaders to take a stand against this trend in Indonesia, without avail. It requests the U.S. Govern-

¹ Notation: "The Sec has seen".

² Not printed.

ment to attempt to persuade Soekarno, Hatta and other Indonesian leaders to take the necessary measures to restore their authority.

I am having the contents of the note transmitted to Cochran at The Hague³ and to our Consul General in Batavia to get their reactions before taking further action.

³ Telegram 876, Ushic 27, October 10, 7 p. m., to The Hague (repeated as 506, Usgoc 433, to Batavia), not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/10-1149: Telegram

The Consul at Batavia (Abbey) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, October 11, 1949—2 p. m.

802. Gocus 807. For Cochran. Reference penultimate paragraph Ushic 24¹ indicating Department may be requested by Netherlands to intervene with Republican Government re alleged cease hostility violations, following comments are submitted on contents Netherlands memo handed to Assistant Secretary:

1. No one here denies that cease fire proper has been most successful. For last three weeks, official Netherlands and NEI army casualty lists have reported total of four killed. While even this deplorable in itself, it compares with average weekly totals of between 40 and 45 killed prior to cease fire order. No official figures from Republicans but TNI casualties unofficially reported as negligible. In view intricate intermingling of military posts in densely populated Java, these figures indicate excellent discipline both sides.

2. Chief Netherlands complaints are of two types (a) improvement Republican military position by cold infiltrations, i.e. alleged setting up of TNI posts where none existed prior cease fire order, and (b) undermining of *negara* administrations through setting up of local Republican counter administrations.

3. As regards (a), Republican argument from Sultan down is that TNI were already in positions prior to cease fire order, but only appeared openly after they learned of cease fire order. Most military observers are inclined to view this argument with skepticism, but neither they nor Dutch have any way of proving what was TNI position before cease fire order. Interrogation of population has proved useless. Only solution appears to be to continue work delineation of zones. This has progressed slowly in LJC's and has recently almost

¹ Telegram 868, October 7, p. 502.

ceased in view discussions for overall Java solution (Gocus 803²). Meanwhile, virtually no clashes are taking place although it cannot be denied that from Dutch military point of view tactical position is unsatisfactory. It is not correct, however, that "TNI takes no notice of cease fire order and infiltrates into Dutch patrolling areas agreed upon in LJC's".

4. Reference (b) above, believe that these Netherlands allegations have considerably stronger basis although here again Republicans claim local administrations have existed in *negaras* since before first police action in form of "shadow administrations" which controlled villages and countryside, leaving towns and main roads to Dutch or *negaras*. Even if this true, emergence of such administrations and efforts to take over authority would appear to violate inter-Indonesian agreements and, I believe, may be tolerated if not ordered by Jogja in desire to strengthen future Republican political position on old ground that "Republic is not a geographical concept".

5. Question arises as to extent UNCI is competent, or US acting separately would desire, to intervene in this matter. UNCI deputies have already pointed out to Republicans that although UNCI not anxious to enter into inter-Indonesian politics, it would do so if cease fire order were threatened. I have privately and on personal responsibility urged Republican Minister Interior, who is powerful internal politician, to restrain local Republicans in *negaras*. He takes attitude that *negaras* will not long survive transfer sovereignty but agreed emphatically that "patience is needed" especially during RTC and has promised to prevent any more shadow administrations coming to light at least in West Java (Pasundan).

6. In speaking to Minister Interior, I stressed concern was over administrations locations which might interfere with supply and consequently affect cease fire order. Seriously doubt whether UNCI or US representatives should go further at present. There is danger that we might place ourselves in position of defenders of *negaras* which have no roots in population and whose governments are staffed either with those permanently identified with old Dutch rule or persons whose Republican sympathies are transparent, [as] was clear at least in Pasundan during recent visit there. The *negara* problem is likely to be a continuing one and any instructions or comments from Department or Cochran will, of course, be appreciated. Signed Dow.

ABBEY

² Telegram 783, October 4, not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/10-1149: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

THE HAGUE, October 11, 1949—7 p. m.

927. Hicus 57. Met 9 p. m. last night with usual three on draft union statute. Agreement reached on all remaining points of draft for recommendation to larger group meeting Thursday. It was hoped, however, each delegation could be consulted today on amendments we have proposed and that we could perhaps have provisional approval which would permit us at another meeting 6 p. m. today put document in shape. Still have annex to complete of points to be included under declaration human rights but anticipate no trouble.

Received by Minister Finance Lief tinck and Minister without portfolio Goetzen 9:30 this morning and talked two hours. I took lead thanking them for accepting offer I had made Drees and Stikker to confer with them. Said did not insist on personal plan I had put forward when pressed by three delegations to help get out of deadlock financial-economic negotiations which impeding progress and threatening RTC breakdown. Lief tinck said understood thoroughly spirit and motive well as technical approach. Said he realized necessity compromise and desired I consider personal plan which he had just drawn up.

This would involve:

1. Indonesians assume immediate interest and amortization obligations on consolidated and foreign debt totaling 1.3 billion guilders;
2. Indonesians assume 33 year debt to Netherlands with first tranche 700 million guilders obligations bearing interest immediately 3% and amortization starting after three years;
3. And second tranche 36 years of 600 million, interest 3% starting after three years and amortization starting after six years;
4. Cancellation of 700 million;
5. Netherlands credit line to Indonesia beginning 195[0] at minimum 300 million.

I did not oppose idea Indonesians being responsible for pre-war consolidated debt of 900 million and foreign credit of 400. I considered, however, no chance Indonesians accepting proposal if no more than 700 million to be cancelled. Netherlands argued this was really total of extraordinary million [*military*] expenditures involved. I said irrespective basis of calculations, this amount would not give adequate relief from debt burden to permit Hatta succeed with USIP [*USI?*].

Netherlands finally suggested arbitration committee with Indonesians having one vote, Netherlands one and neutral to be selected

¹ Repeated in telegram 538, October 13, 1 p. m., to New York (USUN).

by both one vote, be set up to determine amount extraordinary military expenditures. Lieftinck would undertake recommend to his Govt and to part [apparent garble] reduction of total debt by amount of such expenditures as established by arbitration committee. Negotiations would then take place directly between parties on debt service to be worked out on remainder debt to Netherlands. Again I argued all planning would be no avail if Indonesians should be burdened with unbearable load of obligations. Netherlands conceded provide escape clause in settlement which would permit Indonesians raise question through conference of union ministers in event Indonesians find debt burden unbearable. Netherlands unwilling, however, leave overall settlement figure open, feeling definite agreement must be reached RTC.

In agreement with Netherlands, I called immediately on Hatta. I told him Lieftinck willing sound out his cabinet and liaison members Parliament on personal plan of debt settlement if Hatta and top Indonesians thought it could be accepted as basis negotiation. In understanding with Netherlands, I did not give Hatta details debt service scheme or mention amount of credit line. I simply put up idea Indonesians assume entirely responsibility consolidated debt and foreign credit; arbitration committee determine on basis extraordinary war expenditures amount floating debt should be cancelled; negotiations determine service scheme on remaining floating debt to Netherlands; Netherlands indicate amount credit line to be kept open; and escape clause as above mentioned be included.

Hatta told me Hirschfeld called on him yesterday trying work out some plan. Hatta had proposed only general financial agreement be made at conference with total for settlement left open to be determined subsequently by international study group. Hirschfeld had offered consider this but was sure his people preferred definite settlement RTC and would look upon Hatta's scheme only as last resort. Hatta said personally willing accept Lieftinck plan as basis discussion and was sure Djuanda would agree with him. Said he would consult Hamid and Indrakusuma and let me know at three o'clock steering committee whether they would go along with idea. He said I could tell Netherlands at once that he personally favored his basis for negotiations. I proceeded Minister Finance. Lieftinck absent but I reported results to Goetzen. He said he and Lieftinck lunching with Maarseveen and he would inform his colleagues.

In my conversation with Hatta and as I reported to Netherlands, I insisted that Indonesians should not consider plan which I had suggested informally to them (Hicus 52²) as indicating any position which I thought inflexible or which I would endeavor insist upon

² Telegram 907, October 8, p. 503.

any [inter-]party negotiations. Hatta said he had understood this thoroughly. Since returning from above meetings, I find *aide-mémoire* reissued by Indonesian delegation under date October 10 which sets forth in detail their basis for discussion economic-financial relations, including cancellation 900 million consolidated and 2 billion floating, etc.

In my talks with Netherlands, I gave no commitment that I considered interest and amortization schedule. I said much would depend upon size to which debt reduced and on which schedule would apply. At steering committee Hatta told me Djuanda approved Lieftinck idea as basis. Had not had opportunity talk with Hamid and Indrakusuma. I phoned Lieftinck this information 5 p. m. He said he had discussed matter with PriMin and Stikker and had their approval. Suggested I carry on from this point with Stikker. Phoned latter who confirmed Drees and he approved idea as basis discussion. Asked I endeavor get answer as to BFO attitude tonight. I phoned Hatta who said he would try have answer for me when I attend union statute meeting his hotel this evening.

My shock proposal has thus evoked results in form detailed oral note from Indonesians and constructive suggestion from Netherlands. Atmosphere fine.

Talking with Hatta and Roem this forenoon, I urged their approval of last night's drafting on statute, emphasizing how much it would help on vital financial-economic issue if union statute and charter out of way. They said they would approve our draft. I talked at steering committee meeting with Anakagung thereon. He still had one question which I hope we can solve at tonight's meeting of four of us. Signed Cochran.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-1249: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 12, 1949—3 p. m.

931. Hicus 59. Believe Department understands from my Hicus series I consider imperative early successful conclusion RTC irrespective conditions obtaining Indonesia described by Van Kleffens (Ushic 27¹). Deem transfer sovereignty January 1 inevitable.

Recognize of course relationship law and order Indonesia with Netherlands willingness reach and ratify agreement. Believe Sukarno should therefore be impressed with need for compliance with cease

¹ See footnote 3, p. 520.

hostilities orders. I must leave to Dow, however, estimate as to accuracy Netherlands understanding of situation and recommendation as to how far representations to Sukarno should go. I prefer not take this up further with Republican delegation RTC which could only relay to Sukarno. Think better I reserve any influence my part to forcing thru RTC agreement soonest. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 931, repeated Batavia 83.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-1249: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 12, 1949—7 p. m.

935. Hicus 60. Anakagung phoned 3 p. m. both Indonesian groups at Maarseveen's luncheon had agreed Lieftinck idea as basis negotiation and had insisted on me as third man on arbitration committee to serve with Netherlands Hirschfeld and Indonesian Djuanda. Said Maarseveen and Stikker were to consult Van Royen re third member.

Roem telephoned me later to inform UNCI that press communiqué had been issued following luncheon meeting of three chairmen and three vice chairmen of delegations to effect they had met in cordial atmosphere and decided on means to end RTC successfully this month.

Visited Van Royen 4 to 5. He said Maarseveen and Stikker had talked with him for only ten minutes following lunch, and Stikker then left with group for Luxembourg. Said three of them agreed ask me be third man on arbitration committee. Hirschfeld had not yet been consulted, being absent in Luxembourg, but Netherlands assumed he would accept. I said I would do whatever parties agreed upon as helpful, but would insist that terms of reference for our committee and consequences of its decision be defined specifically before task undertaken. I had asked Van Royen how far details of Lieftinck's overall plan had been disclosed to Indonesians. He was not sure on one or two points and phoned Maarseveen in my presence, but still could not clear up all questions for me.

Since returning from Van Royen, have received request from Roem for talk at 6:30. Should there get first-hand account of Indonesian understanding of what was explained and agreed upon at luncheon. Van Royen did not have text communiqué and I have not yet seen it. Main development is that six top men apparently realize RTC must end successfully October and are reconciled to tackling key problem of debts, starting with arbitration committee. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 935, Batavia 84.

STEERE

856d.01/10-1449: Telegram

*The Consul at Batavia (Abbey) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, October 14, 1949—5 p. m.

812. For Butterworth eyes only. Beam, in first formal interview with Lovink lasting over hour, received full treatment and was given darkest view re present situation here described as critical. Doubtless this intended produce desired effect provoking pressure on Republicans but at same time consider that comments highest responsible resident Dutch official must be given due account.

According Lovink, Republicans being forced to yield pressure extremist nationalist elements composed leftist TNI, revived Tan Malaka PKI and Darul Islam, all stated to be leagued together according developing Communist plan. Republicans described as being persuaded political necessity of making concessions now to these influences with hope they may later master them when sovereignty achieved. Lovink considered this vain hope since extremists apparently gaining control. Doubted Republican and federation Hague delegates informed true situation.

Lovink said Djocja Sultan called on him this morning present virtual ultimatum demanding withdrawal and concentration Dutch forces in residencies and districts throughtout Java, including *negaras*. Sultan silent on question present police remaining but Lovink thought latter would stand little chance against TNI which would move in. According Lovink, Sultan stated Republicans could no longer be responsible avoidance serious incident in event non-acceptance his proposal made with full Republican authority. Lovink told Sultan he could not consider proposal which he would have to transmit his government. Said he had not yet reported his government pending meeting this evening his military staff to consider status whole question cease-fire and local administrative arrangements.

In reply repeated suggestion, Lovink stated matter too basic to be referred to UNCI deputies and military observers here since this would lead to taking of positions and press leaks. Insisted he required highest government instructions. Said had obtained Sultan's promise no publicity, impressing on him seriousness repercussion in RTC. In reply further questioning and warning against precipitate action, Lovink said Dutch military would take no overt military steps and he acknowledged his course to be a move to gain time and to obtain possible withdrawal Republican proposal.

Some of Lovink's statements to Beam completely out of line best information here, such as assertion 15,000 Tan Malaka and 15,000

¹ Repeated in telegram 549, October 18, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

Darul Islam forces working together West Java. Lovink asserted several times absolutely nothing to be done here for moment since situation would soon become matter for governments. It appears his aim to make it so, taking advantage of seemingly extravagant and precipitate Republican demands. Put Beam under pledge his statements be confined most restricted circle and no specific steps be initiated Washington or Hague before his report to Dutch Government which would doubtless immediately inform Cochran. For sake future relationships Dutch here, request this be observed. Lovink adamant insisting by-passing local UNCI. Beam and I unable leave for Jogja before Tuesday, but will keep in touch with Lovink and will endeavor impress on Sultan through Dow need for restraint.

ABBEY

501.BC Indonesia/10-1449 : Telegram

*The Consul at Batavia (Abbey) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

BATAVIA, October 14, 1949—6 p. m.

813. Gocus 808. Reference Usgoc 433 (Ushic 27).² Netherlands note delivered Assistant Secretary contains series of general statements which appear to be partially based on understandable concern regarding present Netherlands tactical situation, but also contains exaggerated view of political situation which has always existed in some measure within Republic. It has always been known that there are strong elements professing allegiance to Republic which have been opposed to securing of independence by negotiation rather than force of arms. These groups may be either rightwing or leftwing in character, but they have not refused their support to Republic Government in its policy of negotiation at Hague and, despite frequent verbal expressions of impatience, have not created any disturbances. Republican leaders have always so far been able to handle these elements and to allege now that Republican administration under Sukarno and Hatta is either so weak or so inept that it is allowing itself to be undermined by extremist elements is equivalent to bringing into doubt entire basis on which conference Hague is being conducted and on which US has in past lent its support, with other nations, to Republic at Lake Success.

It is, of course, true that any undue delay in RTC settlement would play into hands of those who criticize Hatta Government for policy of peaceful negotiation with Dutch. Budiardjo said today, for instance, that political critics are becoming more vocal and TNI more

¹ Repeated in telegram 899, Ushic 30, October 17, 8 p. m., to The Hague.

² See footnote 3, p. 520.

impatient and that considerable sentiment exists within Jogja Government for adjourning RTC and continuing it in Batavia after very brief recess to allow travelling time, such adjournment to take place unless RTC were successfully concluded by October 31. This solution not regarded as ideal and only being suggested as possible way out if RTC cannot be concluded within next two or three weeks.

When Netherlands request to Department is analyzed, it appears that we are being asked to make strong high level approach to Republican Government on basis of vague allegations which would almost certainly be instantly denied by Republicans and identified by them with Netherlands military intelligence of which we would then be thought to be the spokesmen.

Have spoken with Beam and Abbey at length concerning this question, importance of which is recognized by all of us. Suggested to Beam and Abbey that since they intend in any case to proceed Jogja Tuesday in order pay formal call on Sukarno, excellent opportunity exists to review entire situation with President, bringing into conversation such portions of Netherlands' note to Department as deem suitable subject of reasonable inquiry on part of new US representative desirous of full information on local situation. Abbey and Beam concur. Signed Dow.

ABBAY

501.BC Indonesia/10-1149: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1949—8 p. m.

894. Ushic 28. Hicus 57, T-927, Oct 11. Highly approve your view Neth proposal sound basis negotiation, particularly principle isolating external debt settlement from problems internal debt and monetary purge, and concentrating on examination external military expenditures. Unspecified but inferred from urtel that Indonesians understand reexamination does not entail discussion internal debt or internally met military expenditures. It wld seem as indicated fol para that debt burden involved Neth proposal not intolerable or unmanageable but nonetheless uncomfortable burden on USI. Particularly desirable ease or completely relieve burden next 3 or 4 years by extending moratorium or omitting amortization or by shift from first *tranche* to second *tranche* or combination. For debts such origin and settlement this character, interest rate also furnishes possible point of attack, as compare rates US and Canadian credits involved in settlement.

¹ Repeated in telegram 549, October 18, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

Assuming reasonably stable and not grossly inefficient RIS Govt, Dept provisionally estimates Indonesian balance payments might be in approx balance 1952-53 without any govt debt service and assuming no inward capital movement which would expedite rehabilitation and improve Indonesian ability service debt. Forecast further future unavailable and not fruitful tho unlikely suggest worse position. Maximum yearly debt service in dollars implied by Neth proposal wld appear be about 45 million in 1956 or 7% of estimates 1952-53 export receipts 675 million or 8% of estimates same basis 1952-53 imports.

Altho as above wish abstract from internal monetary questions Dept wld like you consider desirability international monetary mission study and advise Republic re internal debt budget fiscal questions under auspices of say internatl monetary fund. No Dept position established and understand request wld have been made by one or both participants. Appreciate ur views substance proposal also usefulness to negots.

Fyi alone, Dept only wld place before Secy for consideration as last resort cancellation in whole or in part FLC credit if political factors warrant, that is, if absolutely necessary obtain RTC agreement or induce concessions other parties, aid peace, stability, increase probability free and viable Indonesia, etc. In view Dept's past statements and commitments in congressional relations and otherwise such action wld be extremely difficult decision without congressional action. Problem similar debts other countries also involved. Wld consider approach Canadian and Australian creditors to aid achievement such objectives. Ur views desired.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/10-1549: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, October 15, 1949—3 p. m.

814. Gocus 809. Sultan came Batavia yesterday and saw Lovink immediately on what Republican officials allege to be dangerous situation East Java as result Netherlands actions in arresting and imprisoning TNI members and Republican civil administrators that area. Sultan left with Lovink *aide-mémoire*, copy of which was furnished UNCI by Republican delegation. Translation from Dutch follows:

"Military situation, especially East Java, is cause great concern to Republican Government.

"Action of Netherlands militia in East Java resulting in disarming and imprisonment of units Indonesian National Army and jailing Republican officials there cannot but lead to repercussions on part Indonesian National Army.

"Also in eastern portion West Java, where so far military situation could be called favorable, difficulties are rapidly increasing.

"Already earlier it foreseen on Republican side that situation East Java must lead to worsening of relationships.

"In interview 6 September between Minister Defense and Dr. Van Diffelen, special representative of HRC, His Excellency already invited attention state of affairs East Java and His Excellency insisted measures should be rapidly taken:

"Unless positive measures are taken immediately in military sense, Republican Government fears situation will arise in which solution of difficulties will become almost impossible.

"Republican Government therefore urges most strongly that conversations should take place as quickly as possible between military staffs of both parties in order see that in whole of Java arrangements should be made for:

"(a) Coordinated action in military sense between both parties for restoration or maintenance of law and order.

"(b) In connection therewith, arrangements for effective dislocation of Republican and Netherlands units, and this in light of coming transfer of sovereignty and also in connection with informal promises made at one time by HRC."

Last sentence of *aide-mémoire* refers to oral understanding given to Hatta by Van Royen and Lovink regarding progressive withdrawal and concentration Netherlands troops reported Gocus 770, July 29 and Gocus 771, July 31.

Lovink's comment on interview with Sultan was that it was "most ineffective." Sultan's impression of interview not as gloomy, but he obtained no commitments from Lovink who stated that he must communicate with Hague. Sultan seeing Lovink again tonight or early tomorrow morning. Have impression from Republican quarters that mere fact Sultan made trip will temporarily ease East Java situation.

Cabinet met last evening and agreed postpone consideration East Java difficulties for two or three days, pending outcome Sultan's talks with Lovink. Signed Dow.

Department pass Hague for Cochran.¹

BEAM

¹ This was done the same day.

856d.00/10-1649 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

BATAVIA, October 16, 1949—11 p. m.

815. Consulate telegram 812.² Lovink called me late Saturday night, gave me his account views day's events. After meeting his advisors,

¹ Repeated in telegram 549, October 18, 2 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² October 14, p. 526.

decided not report Sultan's demands to Hague Friday but to have further discussion with him hope he would withdraw them. This occurred Saturday morning. Sultan's proposal as contained annex and oral explanation in essence was that Dutch Military begin withdrawal to regencies and residencies all Java, receiving communications corridors which Republics would likewise use. Lovink rejected pointing out lack guarantees for police and *negara* Administrations. Claims Sultan acknowledged his demands contrary cease-fire agreement. As concession Lovink then indicated willingness to make beginning applying Republic plan certain agreed areas. Said Sultan rejected insisting acceptance total plan needed avoid incidents. Lovink then said must report Hague which he did Saturday night. I mentioned Republic assurances UNCI delegation strict orders against opening fire. Said Sultan's proposal might be maneuver anticipate and enhance bargain-ity restrain extremists. I mentioned consternation caused by Dutch concentration and withdrawal in connection RTC.

Stressed that if both parties issued and observed prohibition against opening fire, incidents could be avoided pending resolution impasse here. Lovink said he had given such orders but doubted Republic ability restrain extremists. I mentioned consternation caused by Dutch sweeps and indiscriminate arrests infiltrates which Lovink at first denied. He agreed, however, order his commanders review arrest situation standpoint local reaction.

Dow and I constantly in touch. Unable contact palace today re Sultan's press statement. Please repeat immediately to Hague for Cochran this and Consulate's 812 but urgently request that both in Washington and Hague no indication be given that Consulate had sent report prior to Lovink's report his Government.³

BEAM

³ Repeated to The Hague, October 16, 3:45 p. m., together with telegram 812, October 14, from Batavia.

501.BC Indonesia/10-1749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 17, 1949—7 p. m.

898. Ushic 29. Neth Amb called his request Asst. Sec Far East. He said his govt, fearing that transfer sovereignty would result in some sort of power vacuum in Indo, was eager that clear definition of Neth responsibility for the maintenance of maritime security throughout Indo be incorporated in the agreements now in course of negot at

¹ Repeated as 513 to Batavia.

RTC. At Asst Sec's request Neth Amb later dictated fol notes to describe his Govt's position this matter:

"Indo delegates at Hague at present advocate an agreement on naval affairs according to which all naval forces of Neth would be withdrawn from Indo at transfer of sovereignty, it being understood that within four months thereafter the URI would ask Neth Govt for help in naval matters.

According to Neth view, settlement would be acceptable and show promise of giving satisfactory results along fol lines:

a. Soon as sovereignty is transferred, maintenance of security at sea throughout Indo is matter for URI along [*alone*].

b. Therefore, there is no further task from that moment for Neth Navy in Indo as an organ of Neth.

c. Insofar as maintenance of security at sea in Indo cannot be assured at once by URI, URI would ask at once for Neth assistance which then would be rendered on basis of naval aid on behalf of Indo (and not of Neth).

Duties any navy operating in Indo would have undertake at once are broadly:

Immediate organization of a navy for URI. Assuring security at sea in broadest sense, so as to include collection customs revenue, prevention of piracy and illicit traffic in arms and narcotic drugs;

Sweeping such Japanese mines as remain;

Hydrographic work, including maintenance of lighthouses and buoys, etc.;

Salvage activities in ports and their approaches;

Maintenance and repair of naval units operating in Indo (this would make it indispensable that naval base Soerabaja be left intact)."

In answer to questions Neth Amb stated that his approach had nothing to do with Neth desire to retain bases since it was his information that Indos would not accord Neth bases under conditions which his Govt would regard as practical. When asked if considerations he had set forth would be placed in different light if Neth and Indos agreed on Neth retention of bases, Neth Amb replied that it did not. As his answer seemed illogical, further questions were directed at Neth Amb which resulted in his reading portion of his tel instruction some phrases of which revealed that Neth Govt wished to seek US, UK and Australian expression of their interest in Neth retention of bases and Neth continuance maintenance security at sea.

Asst Sec asked Neth Amb if, in view Brit interest in protection trade and commerce Southeast Asia, similar approach had been made to Brit. Neth Amb replied that telegram he recd had been repeated to Neth Amb London and Canberra. Asst Sec took this occasion to tell Neth Amb that Dening had left him and other officers under impression that Brit had informed Neth that problem of bases had best be left to gentlemen's agreement, not for agreement RTC. Neth

Amb evidenced keen interest this matter saying he had no previous knowledge thereof.

In answer to Asst Sec's question Neth Amb said he did not believe Indians could be useful in this matter.

It is not clear to Dept what Neth Amb or his Govt meant to achieve by this approach. Two possibilities seem plausible (a) that in this manner Neth means to draw attention of US to eminence [*imminence?*] of assumption of maritime security by Indo state and to emphasize importance of function which navy in Indo must perform, none of which, in Neth belief, can be performed by Indos; (b) that Neth means to suggest possible basis for agreement with Indos on bases: Indos will grant base rights to Neth in return for Neth assurance that it will intrude on Indo scene only at request of USI.

Please comment.²

ACHESON

² In repeating this telegram in 3785, October 20, 8 p. m., to London and as 154 to Canberra, the Department added that it wished to know the character of Netherlands representations regarding maritime security and retention of bases in Indonesia by the Netherlands and the reaction of the British/Australian Government thereto. "If US position this matter queried you may say Dept engaged in careful study this subject." (501.BC Indonesia/10-2049)

501.BC Indonesia/10-1849: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 18, 1949—3 p. m.

962. Hicus 66. Van Royen phoned last evening and sought my ideas on "self-determination", particularly for areas which Republicans claim but under Netherlands' control since second police action. I mentioned New Guinea problem. Van Royen advanced idea application being made to UN for Netherlands' trusteeship over specific number years. Said action on application would require perhaps one year and situation could be better judged within that time.

Van Royen phoned again 10 p. m. Said Cabinet seriously concerned over reports from Indonesia and was issuing statement to effect it supported position taken by Lovink. I said conditions Indonesia made it all more urgent we rush conference to termination. Van Royen agreed.

Roem phoned 11:30 p. m. Said Republicans just finished meeting with BFO and thought they had "terms reference" that would be satisfactory for small committee. Arranged I should get details this morning.

Called on Roem 9:30 a. m., he translated from document in Indo-

nesian which represented result Indonesian meeting on debt problem and terms reference small committee. Following is summary translation thereof:

"Debt commission" to be established by steering committee to include one representative each from Netherlands' delegation, RepDel, BFO and UNCI. Purpose is to seek agreement concerning amount of debt at time of transfer sovereignty, it being understood that in [tin] pledge and percentage of exports will not be used as guarantee. Commission will decide amount of debt. Procedure of commission to be left to agreement within commission itself. Amount of settlement can be changed if proved later that commission decision based on erroneous data. If debt burden unbearable, schedule of amortization can be changed. Points covered 32 contingencies would be decided by committee of 3 to be set up by Netherlands appointing one member, Indonesians, second, and 2 members to choose third. Their decisions would be binding.

I asked Roem if small committee would definitely have authority to fix full terms debt settlement. He said this was his understanding. I said Indonesians anticipating negotiations by excluding tin pledge, etc. Roem still thought terms would be acceptable Netherlands. In answer my query, said Indonesians had not yet informed Netherlands of terms. Asked me convey them to Van Royen. I said I would act as intermediary only to point of getting Netherlands directly in touch with Republicans through Roem or Djuanda.

As I was leaving I said if we could once get financial problems settled, I was sure conference would end successfully. Roem said we would still have New Guinea. I asked what he thought of Netherlands' trusteeship. Roem pled for transfer sovereignty to include New Guinea with understanding negotiations be entered subsequently with Netherlands and foreign countries perhaps through UN as to how New Guinea should be handled. He opposed trusteeship in lieu transfer sovereignty.

Called Foreign Office and shortly received by Stikker, Van Royen and Hirschfeld. I gave them information on Indonesian terms reference. Van Royen argued tin pledge essential. Stikker agreed with me that Lieftinck had not included this in five points his original memorandum which had provided basis my first approach to Hatta and Stikker's subsequent talk with Hatta at luncheon. When Van Royen urged necessity of security, I said I had not argued one way or another but stressed importance to Indonesians of honoring contracts, whether any revenues pledged, if USI to have credit standing. Said exacting of pledge in partnership arrangement might be questioned. I said pledge certainly insufficient ground for breakdown negotiations on financial settlement upon which entire success RTC depends.

Stikker thought hopeless try get question terms reference for committee worked out in time for action by steering committee this afternoon. Van Royen suggested Stikker see Hatta soonest. This was not immediately possible since Drees talking with Hatta on Indonesian situation. I urged and Netherlands trio agreed Hirschfeld should see Djuanda at once and get Indonesian terms reference directly from latter in Dutch and not depend upon my message as official. I said Hirschfeld and Djuanda should discuss terms with Hirschfeld raising any objections Netherlands desired and Djuanda being given chance explain or seek amendments. I recommended further that Hirschfeld report back promptly to Stikker and latter still see Hatta before steering committee meeting and endeavor get terms reference agreed upon.

Upon leaving meeting Van Royen told me Stikker and he had been meeting with Maarseveen and entire government considered Indonesian situation critical. I said we all recognized some deterioration. I reminded him, however, that he and I had seen no alternative but follow course we had in line with SC directive. I stressed urgent now every one keep steady and finish RTC in few days. I thought conservative leaders here could handle situation once returned to Indonesia with successful agreement. I cautioned Van Royen against taking Lovink too seriously, reminding him of Lovink's tendency to see Communists in every shadow. Van Royen assured me he was mindful thereof. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 962, repeated Batavia 90.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-1849: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1949—7 p. m.

903. Ushic 31. Neth Amb called at his request on Secy handing him fol Memo:

[Here follows text of memorandum on New Guinea, not printed.]

Secy assured Neth Amb this matter would receive Dept's careful study.

Neth Amb then dilated on pol and mil situation Indo and its effect on Indo Reps Hague covering virtually identical considerations embodied in note previously handed Asst Secy for Europe. (Ushic 27²)

Secy replied that Dept had given this matter careful study and that Beam was discussing this and related matters with Soekarno Oct 18.

¹ Repeated as 517 to Batavia "for Beam and Dow".

² See footnote 3, p. 520.

Neth Amb expressed gratification and asked to be informed result Beam's conversations.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/10-1849: Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 18, 1949—9 p. m.

969. Hicus 68. As Steering Committee assembled 3 p. m., Stikker told me Hirschfeld had not been able contact Djuanda (see Hicus 66¹). Stikker had seen Hatta only few minutes before meeting. Hatta desired bring up in Steering Committee meeting question establishing small debt committee. Stikker replied they had not yet agreed on terms reference and this could better be done inside with result then brought to Steering Committee. Consequently debt item eliminated from agenda.

At end meeting I got Stikker, Van Royen, Hatta, Roem, Hamid and Anak Agung together with Critchley present. I referred inability Hirschfeld find Djuanda to see whether terms reference could have been agreed for submission Steering Committee meeting. I referred urgency situation and obvious tendency toward misunderstanding unless top policy and responsible technical representatives discuss terms reference for debt problem directly and fully. It was decided technicians Hirschfeld, Djuanda and Indrakusuma should meet me my quarters Wednesday 9 a. m. to see if we could agree on terms reference and make recommendations to policy heads of three delegations.

Steering Committee meeting routine until Van Royen read prepared statement referring remarks Sultan Jogja 14th on grave situation. Said Sultan had given HRC plan of "dislocation of troops" which meant concentration Netherlands troops in main cities with Netherlands having strips of communication between which would have to share with TNI on notice from latter. Said Sultan and HRC had agreed no publicity should be given to discussions thereon but Sultan had revealed details in public statement. Alleged Sultan acted in contradiction actual situation and moreover in contravention Article 17 Chapter II of "Netherlands-Indonesian Manual for Implementation Cessation Hostilities".

Van Royen continued Netherlands' authorities had been concerned since cease hostilities order over TNI infiltrations and the contravention. Said HRC had handed Sultan *aide-mémoire* 15th setting forth

¹ Telegram 962, October 18, p. 533.

Netherlands' position and pointing out that Republican demands were those set forth by TNI when cease hostilities agreement being negotiated and which were turned down. Van Royen concluded by asking UNCI bring his statement to attention SC.

Hatta replied saying he had no advance notice of this sudden move on part Netherlands' delegation and would appreciate having copy statement before replying thereto. Said he would not object to matter being referred to SC in which Indonesia has much confidence. Chairman Hamid suggested copies be given all delegations well as UNCI. I do not yet have text.

As UNCI chairman, I raised question of procedure whether UNCI should act simply as agency of transmittal at request either party. I said both parties have permanent representatives SC through whom they may submit any statements they desire. I said I appreciated confidence Hatta and Indonesians in SC but doubted reference matter to SC this juncture would have helpful effect. I said UNCI deputies doing everything possible cooperate Netherlands and Indonesian officials to steady situation and achieve best possible compliance with cease hostilities order. I said our duty at Hague is to bring RTC successfully to close and I thought it would be great reflection on all of us if we failed after approaching our goal so closely. I appealed to parties get together and discuss situation rather than ask UNCI bring matter under present reference to SC attention. I said long debate there probably not help conclusion RTC which vital to peace Indonesia.

Van Royen replied appreciatively of my past and present efforts reach settlement. He insisted, however, that Netherlands' delegation has obligation inform SC of situation and that less upset would result if UNCI transmitted communication rather than Netherlands' representative SC submitted it directly. He said UNCI could let SC understand immediate consideration of statement not required.

I countered that UNCI itself ordinarily determines when it should make reports to SC. I said we planned none on RTC until successfully concluded. I said we desired be available for extending our good offices and even making recommendations to parties if their own negotiations threaten breakdown. I personally hoped report would not be insisted upon unless and until such situation arose and UNCI intervened. I said in any event I would have to consult my UNCI colleagues on matter of procedure but definitely felt UNCI should not simply transmit Van Royen's statement and perhaps Hatta's answer without commenting thereon. Furthermore, UNCI would not be prepared comment thereon without seeking and obtaining full report from UNCI deputies Indonesia. Van Royen continued insistence UNCI should be medium transmittal.

After meeting adjourned, informal debate continued between Maarseveen, Van Royen, Hatta, Anak Agung, Roem, Critchley, Herremans and myself. Critchley and I held out that if Netherlands' delegation desired send statement to UNCI we would seek Hatta's comments thereon and then inform both parties what we intended to do. Our immediate idea was that we should do nothing until we had sought and received report from Batavia. Van Royen argued we should send statement to SC with explanation that report would follow and statements required no immediate attention. We refused accept responsibility for any remarks to effect whatever we turned in did not require early attention. Discussion closed with my telling both parties I thought they were wrong to cast doubt on success RTC by bringing complaint to SC this juncture but UNCI would of course consider whatever requests submitted to us.

Netherlands desired include in Steering Committee communiqué information to effect both parties were giving statements to UNCI in good spirit for bringing to attention SC. I opposed such publicity, saying this would give cause for speculation and doubt and hurt chances of conference. Finally agreed make simple statement in communiqué that committee had given careful consideration to Indonesian situation. Indonesians were downcast over surprise move by Van Royen, Pringgo Digdo for instance remarking to me this move might mean end of Union.

In last word with Maarseveen, I pled with him not risk upsetting conference and arousing Indonesia further by alarm such as might be caused by referring matter to SC just when successful finish to RTC expected. He said would do everything to conclude RTC quickly but said sovereignty could not be transferred in circumstances of chaos. I said unless conference does end quickly and successfully chaos likely result which SC might not be able stop. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 969; repeated Batavia 93.

STEERE

501.BC Indonesia/10-1249: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1949—1 p. m.

518. Ref Ushic 24² and 27.³ For Beam: Dept has concluded after much consideration that it is desirable you make friendly but firm representations to Soekarno or Sultan Jogja or both in matter of in-

¹ Repeated as 906, Ushic 32, to The Hague.

² Telegram 868, October 7, p. 502.

³ Telegram 876, October 10; see footnote 3, p. 520.

filtration of TNI and noncompliance with cease-fire and stand-still. Dept is influenced in this matter less by Neth representations than by info originating US Reps Indo including controlled Amer sources. You will observe Cochran not opposed such representations (Hicus 59⁴). Finally, Neth Amb Wash states that Van Royen advises him that Hatta would welcome such representations on part US as he believes they would strengthen position Repub Govt as against extremists.

Dept believes you shld not make reference to Neth representation to Dept in your conversations Repub officials. Instead, predicate your approach on info recd through or by Amer sources.

This tel rptd to Cochran with request he comment simultaneously to you and Dept. If you and Cochran agree, you may, together with Dow, make such representations as you believe appropriate and effective, addressing yourself in the main to such considerations set forth by Neth Amb in his note to Dept as you consider valid. You may add that Dept keenly aware correlation between situation Indo and speedy and successful conclusion RTC; and that US Govt making every effort to expedite fair and practical solution at Hague which Dept believes to be forthcoming. You may point out if you wish that Dept fears the effect on world opinion inability Indo Govt to perform under such agreement a contingency by no means impossible if immediate steps are not taken to consolidate its civil and mil control terrs for which it is responsible.⁵

ACHESON

⁴ Telegram 931, October 12, p. 524.

⁵ Telegram 526, October 21, 6 p. m., to Batavia, authorized Messrs. Beam and Dow to disregard specific instructions in 518 "while continuing your influence in manner you think most effective". (501.BC Indonesia/10-2149)

501.BC Indonesia/10-1949: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BATAVIA, October 19, 1949—5 p. m.

827. Abbey and I just returned from Jogja where cordially received by Sukarno, Sultan and Acting Foreign Minister.

Sultan made no reference his recent provocative press statement but volunteered information excitement of last few days seems to be blowing over. Said no further incidents last two days and he wished discussions further military arrangements continue UNCI. Complained Dutch had failed notify him withdrawals to certain regencies, which was first news to us such withdrawals actually taking place (Congental

820¹). In reply my question re rumors that Communists, extremists and Darul Islam getting out of hand, Sultan said Republican Government at present in full control. He considered PKI under skillful direction Alimin greatest potential danger. Said Republicans just approached by Darul Islam leader for possible truce (this may or may not be significant drawing together Indonesia arrangements through recent fears new Dutch military action). Sultan calm, however, and thought military situation both sides could be held in check. Referred to report he had received that announcement would be made shortly at RTC of definite date transfer sovereignty and he thought this would have beneficial effect here.

Sukarno was considerably more radical in his statements, saying he was under great pressure Communists and "young TNI" regarding lack of RTC progress. He urged US force Dutch be reasonable particularly re finance and expressed fear Dutch following sovereignty transfer would only reluctantly relax controls. He continued he did not wish to drive Dutch out of Indonesia but would gladly have some stay as advisers. He expressed bitterness re artificial *negaras*, claiming spot check had convinced him population would vote 80 percent for Republicans and he would welcome earliest plebiscite.

In firm but friendly reply we pointed out RTC must remain primarily negotiate conference between Indonesians and Dutch and that US representative UNCI had already demonstrated willingness to be of help when needed. We said Indonesia had much to gain from final workable cooperative solution with Dutch. We expressed view RTC had made remarkable progress considering magnitude of problems and that Sukarno himself had perhaps been too modest in not wishing to boast of substantial advantages Indonesians had gained RTC. Urged him to make greater effort inform his people favorable course RTC with view tranquilizing local situation and refuting Communist charges. With both Sukarno and Sultan we stressed most strongly importance preventing local disturbances disturbing RTC and I mentioned I had made RTC representations to Dutch. Said it inconceivable that Indonesians would jeopardize through lack of patience or restraint favorable results that would accrue to them within matter of few months if not weeks.

For the moment recent flare-up seems to have calmed down here and Dow and I hopeful latest crisis may have been surmounted (Hicus 67²). As first impression, am struck by nationalism prevalent Jogja and by lack effective contact between Indonesians and Dutch here and absence goodwill in measure evident The Hague. When agreements

¹ October 17, not printed.

² Telegram 964, October 18, not printed.

ripen at RTC, formal announcement re date conference conclusion and sovereignty transfer might be of help as above indicated by Sultan.

Sent Department 827; Department pass The Hague for Cochran.³

BEAM

³ This was done the same day.

856d.00/10-1949: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

THE HAGUE, October 19, 1949—6 p. m.

973. Called on Stikker this morning to discuss latest Indonesian and RTC developments. Found him extremely tired, discouraged, and rather apathetic.

Stikker began by saying he thought he sensed Indonesians might be "backing down" a little, although he could point to nothing very tangible. Said Netherlands Government felt events beginning take course which Netherlands powerless to influence. He had given repeated warnings of developments which have come and had sought outside assistance in preventing them but without avail. Netherlands Government had no intention of making any further *démarche* and would have to accept whatever came.

He said he thought rift was developing between Hatta and Sultan Jogja. The latter was proving in his view to be opportunist. Netherlands had been surprised that Sultan with his background had early espoused Republic cause when it was clearly extremist movement. Now, with clear sense of impending events, Sultan was espousing and seeking assume leadership of extremist wing Republican movement (Stikker feared Hatta might well lose ascendancy).

Stikker professed great discouragement RTC prospects in view of week's loss of time in getting small financial committee to work. He had gone Luxembourg Conference last week believing all agreed. Netherlands proposal (Lieftinck plan) had aimed at short cut to enable successful completion of conference this month. Present efforts to broaden terms reference, he feared, would doom committee to failure complete work in few days remaining. Indonesians giving many indications intention return Indonesia end of month while he and Hirschfeld must go to Paris for OEEC October 27. He said Indonesians, particularly Djuanda, bore heavy responsibility for delaying tactics. He referred to Netherlands Government *aide-mémoire* on Indonesian developments which UNCI had been requested to forward to SC. Said it was not Netherlands desire to precipitate any discussion

¹ Repeated in telegram 522, October 20, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

SC which would jeopardize RTC. Their desire was to make Netherlands position a matter of record; as they might have to raise matter later.

Impression gained from Stikker was that Netherlands have not given up all hope that something might yet be salvaged from conference; but that they are discouraged, somewhat embittered and beginning to show signs of confusion. Government obviously does not know what to do if impasse comes. They will not ask for it but they are undoubtedly hoping against hope that the US will at the last moment intervene to save the situation.

In latter connection, British Ambassador called last night for discussion and reported talks with Stikker and Cochran under instructions from Bevin. Ambassador said as result these conferences he would be making certain suggestions his Foreign Office. This morning he has handed me copy of suggestions reading as follows:

"HMG should consider with State Department the following action:

"a. Instruct British, US and Indian representatives in Batavia to bring pressure to bear on both sides, but primarily Indonesians, to ensure that spirit as well as letter of the cease-fire regulations are meticulously observed, thus giving conference time to end its labors.

"b. British, French and Indian representatives at The Hague to speak to Hatta in similar sense as a above and to urge him to bring the whole weight of his influence to bear in Indonesia in this direction.

"c. British, US and Indian representatives at Hague to urge Dutch Government to make announcement as soon as feasible designed to prevent further deterioration of local situation in Indonesia. This would in effect mean, I believe, publication of actual date when sovereignty would be transferred.

"d. Tell each party what we are saying to the other. Other alternatives may commend themselves to you and to State Department but it seems to me essential that effort should be made at this moment by outside powers or by UNCI to ensure that situation does not further deteriorate in Indonesia, for, if it does, Hatta's position will be undermined and chaotic conditions will supervene."

Embassy view is that while every possible step must be taken to prevent outbreak hostilities Indonesia it is equally important, if not more urgent, to prevent termination or breakdown of RTC without achievement of success so near at hand. Cochran is doing masterly job but he may need Department's help at last moment.

Embassy has watched carefully development and evolution of Dutch feelings on Indonesian crisis and wishes to emphasize once again the strength and depth of underlying Dutch sentiments that the course they have followed the past six months has been taken because the US advised and, in fact, desired and insisted upon it. Dutch feel they have made a genuine, generous and all-out effort to reach agreement

and that if there is failure, it is because the Indonesians have felt that they have American backing in this conflict and can reach agreement on their own terms. In these circumstances Embassy believes that breakdown of conference and resultant deterioration of conditions in Indonesia would have the inevitable result in the Netherlands of an outburst of bitterly anti-American sentiment and other consequences which it is hard to foresee. As for Indonesia, we have been repeatedly told by high Dutch authorities that if they are forced to withdraw their armed forces from Indonesia under conditions of a breakdown of efforts to reach peaceful conclusion, there inevitably will be an immediate great exodus of Dutch nationals, in fear of their lives, regardless of the effect this will have upon their property interests. This, of course, would be catastrophic for Indonesia, not to mention the damaging effect upon Holland's overall economic position.

STEERE

856d.00/10-2049

*Memorandum by Mr. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., of the Office of
Western European Affairs, to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 20, 1949.

Following Ambassador van Kleffens' conversation with you on October 18, in which he sought US support for the Dutch position regarding Netherlands New Guinea and in which he expressed his Government's concern at the increasing tension in Indonesia, the following actions have been taken :

1. Our Consul General at Batavia, Jake Beam, has made a trip to the Republican capital, Jogjakarta, where he impressed upon Soekarno the necessity of strict compliance with the truce. While we have not yet had a report from Beam,¹ the Netherlands Counselor called on October 19 to say that Soekarno had issued a conciliatory and optimistic statement, which the Netherlands attributed to our influence. The Netherlands Counselor said that while it was too early to see the effect of Soekarno's statement, he personally believed that it would ease the tension in Java. He thanked us for our action in this matter.

2. On the question of New Guinea, a telegram has been dispatched which requests Cochran to support the Dutch position as outlined in van Kleffens' memorandum—to wit, that a final settlement of the issue of New Guinea be deferred, with the understanding that the Netherlands would seek a Dutch trusteeship over the area within the trusteeship system of the United Nations and would, after the establishment of the USI, seek further negotiations with the USI "with a view toward reaching agreement on the proper distribution of responsibili-

¹ See telegram 827, October 19, p. 539.

ties for the area in conformity with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations".

While there are reports from Dutch sources, as noted above, of a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Republican President, we think it is too early to conclude that the Republican Government can or will take the steps necessary to control its extremists. We recognize that the maintenance of the truce in Indonesia depends upon swift progress at The Hague Conference, and are doing our utmost to promote a successful conclusion of that conference.

501.BC Indonesia/10-2149 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET PRIORITY BATAVIA, October 21, 1949—10 a. m.

831. Emphasis has shifted in local scene last few days and accordingly I would hesitate make representations Sukarno basis outlined Deptel 518.² Despite last week-end flurry cease-fire, infringements were not a major issue and are not now since cease-fire on the whole being observed. Matter of fact, there has been increase local patrol agreements between Indonesian and Dutch due reportedly desire TNI officers free their hands deal with Tan Malaka, extremists and Darul Islam elements. Dutch acknowledge there has been improvement contacts with Indonesian local commands. Reported turnover additional areas in East Java to Republican state police mobile brigade and turning over civil service in residency Madiun to Republican resident has also helped relieve situation there.

Standstill is extremely complicated matter, unlikely susceptible early agreement. Lovink told me he would not permit destruction *negara* administration. On other hand Federalists, possibly through absence their strongest leaders at Hague, said to be yielding Republic pressure and infiltration their areas. This respect Republic greatly aided growing nationalism encouraged by expectation early Indonesian independence.

Real point of gravity is question whether Republic able resist and control extremist pressure all sides. Dutch and certain US and other military reports certainly alarming. Consulate General has benefitted cooperation US-controlled sources and their reports give good picture tensions at play. Present unrest apparently due three factors:

1. Lack information re RTC which in eyes susceptible isolated Jogja politicians has bogged down in primary and relatively simple task

¹ Repeated in telegram 558, October 24, 3 p. m., to New York (USUN).

² October 19, p. 538.

providing earliest Indonesian independence. Consequently delay or rupture RTC proceedings would strengthen radical forces here.

2. Republic policy attempting disband, disarm hostile Communists and extremist guerrillas. **Certain** cases effort made to brigade the loyal TNI to detriment latter's morale. Clashes also result information leaks to guerrillas scheduled for disarmament.

3. Probable struggle for power anticipation formation USI Government.

Certain military observers just returned believe Republicans have lost control south Bantam and that Tan Malaka elements are astride important Republic lines of communication west Java. Others acknowledge seriousness Republic predicament, particularly in political sphere, but consider latter are still masters of situation. Picture greatly confused through emotions interested parties compounded by lack of communications and first-hand information. Dutch talk of possible split Republic Cabinet on hypothesis local commanders in concluding agreements with Dutch are disobeying orders Sultan who is described as being in hands extremists and who is still insisting earliest implementation his program comprehensive Dutch withdrawals.

If Department and Cochran still consider it desirable I see Sukarno and Sultan,* Dow and I recommend approach not take form representations re infringements cease-fire and standstill agreements except in general terms stress importance maximum observance. These matters now brought back into UNCI sphere where we feel efforts should be concentrated as long as possible. Most important question seems now relate internal Indonesian politics. If considered advisable I could with propriety request further interview with Sukarno who said he would welcome closer US contact. Reports involving specific allegations are current in sufficient number to make source disclosure unnecessary. Could express anxiety for Republic safety caused these reports. While Sukarno might not wish or be in position comment in detail, trust would be able keep exploratory conversation on equitable plane as legitimate inquiry which US official entitled to make direct to highest Republic authority. Would recommend such approach, if authorized, not be made before October 24 since events next day or so might influence above considerations.

Sent Department 831; repeated The Hague 20.

BEAM

* For the Department's reply, see footnote 5, p. 539.

501.BC Indonesia/10-2349 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 23, 1949—noon.

989. Hicus 75. Debt Commission met my quarters forenoon, afternoon and night 22nd. At 1 this morning unanimous agreement reached in good spirit without arbitration and following top secret document dated October 23 signed by Hirschfeld, Djuanda, Indrakasuma and Cochran:

“Debt Commission’ as established by RTC, acting in accordance its terms reference as granted by meeting of Steering Committee on October 21, 1949, has agreed and recommends:

That as of date of transfer of sovereignty to Republic USI latter assume responsibility for debt comprising:

A. Consolidated external debt, calculated as of December 31, 1949, at 871 million guilders;

B. Debt to third countries, calculated as of December 31, 1949, at 420 million guilders;

C. Following items in external floating debt, calculated as of December 31, 1949 to the maximum amounts indicated:

1. Swing British monetary agreement, account F 53.5 million guilders;
2. Swing C account 40 million guilders;
3. HI/HG account 80 million guilders;
4. Bretton Woods (opposite this is an asset of same amount as participation in International Fund and International Bank) 95 million guilders; (total) 1,559.5 million guilders.

That Government of Republic of USI assume responsibility for both interest and amortization of debts covered by items A and B and take over rights and liabilities under existing agreements for items listed under C.

In arriving at amount of debt to be assumed by RUSI at date of transfer of sovereignty, commission has given due consideration to amount of extra military expenditures and to amount of other expenditures which commission attributes to military action.

Foregoing involves reduction of external debt due to Netherlands by sum, calculated as of December 31, 1949, of 2 billion Netherlands guilders.

Internal debt at date of transfer of sovereignty is to charge of RUSI. Without giving possibility of reopening major questions that have been decided by this commission, foregoing shall not prejudice outcome of discussions now in progress in committees of RTC in regard to certain undetermined obligations, for example, those of pensions and rehabilitation.”

¹ Repeated in telegram 558, October 24, 3 p. m., to New York (USUN).

Hirschfeld had provided projection of statement liabilities Indonesia as of August 31, 1949 (Appendix I document RTC not/CC/8 dated September 23) to December 31, 1949. Latter gives consolidated debt 871 million guilders, foreign 420, floating 2.268 or total external 3.559.

Since agreement wipes out state to state external debt of 2 billion, nothing remained to be consolidated so we included nothing on "undertakings" or "escape clause" (see Hicus) 69 items 5 (b) and (c) of terms reference ²).

Each of three members provided one copy signed agreement for delivery chairman respective delegation prior Stikker's luncheon to be attended by Maarseveen, Stikker, Hatta, Roem, Hamid and Anak Agung today to plan means reconciling remaining RTC differences. Signed Cochran.³

STEEER

² Telegram 970, October 19, not printed.

³ Telegram 931, Ushic 35, October 24, 7 p. m., to The Hague, stated that the Department was gratified over the unanimous agreement on the Debt Commission deliberations and appreciated Mr. Cochran's efforts as UNCFI member in aiding the parties to reach a final solution of issues at the RTC "soonest".

501.BC Indonesia/10-2549: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1949—5 p. m.

936. Ushic 36. Brit Counselor called his request to advise Director Office Phil and SEA Affairs ¹ that FonOff, feeling considerable concern at deterioration mil conditions Indo, had considered suggesting to UNCI desirability latter making report to SC; Counselor said FonOff wished Dept's views. Brit Counselor advised that Dept considered conditions Indo had improved perceptibly last few days; that notable progress made at Hague, that reference such matters to SC likely to provoke recriminations and disruptive discussions and that for these reasons Dept did not believe suggested report by UNCI necessary or desirable unless conditions Indo worsen. Brit Counselor, expressing his personal concurrence Dept's views, said he wld advise Brit FonOff Dept position.

ACHESON

¹ Charles S. Reed, II.

501.BC Indonesia/10-2649 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 26, 1949—4 a. m.

998. Hicus 79. UNCI attended Steering Committee meeting 25th from 3 to 5:30 p. m. I told Hatta aside that Netherlands concerned with statement by Republican Government supporting Sultan's notes to Lovink. I said would not endeavor pass on merits this correspondence but had telegraphed Beam and Dow to use best influence toward keeping everyone quiet and reasonable until we may conclude within next few days successful RTC and permit Indonesians return with fair agreement and in atmosphere conducive to ratification. I hoped Hatta would use influence in same direction. I then told Van Royen of talk with Hatta. He thanked me sincerely.

Chairman Maarseveen pursued same policy on 24th in seeking solution differences. Delegations reported in accord on two or three matters which had been held in suspense for approval by their full membership. Delegates accepted compromise which UNCI had drawn up on question of union participating in foreign relations which had been referred to it 24th.

Economic and financial committee explained their differences. After long debate on "national treatment" and no decision reached, question referred to UNCI for mediation. We asked meeting proceed with the points of difference with understanding we would give our recommendation at next meeting.

Reconvened at 8:30 p. m. and worked until 1 a. m. On one point of difference Netherlands delegation abandoned its position, on one agreement reached and one more referred to UNCI. Several points not reached and next economic financial meeting of Steering Committee fixed for 3 p. m. today.

UNCI met with Steering Committee 9 a. m. until 1:30 p. m. today with military affairs committee present. No agreement reached on contentious policy on command Surabaya naval base and extent Netherlands Navy to be disposal US [USI]. Both points referred to UNCI for consideration and mediation. Meeting adjourned until 3 p. m. Thursday for consideration other points and receipt UNCI recommendations. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 998, repeated Batavia 100, from The Hague.

STEEER

501.BC Indonesia/10-2949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 29, 1949—1 p. m.

1021. Hicus 83. Steering Committee met 3 to 6 p. m. 28th with Military Committee present. UNCI presented compromise draft on question Netherlands troop withdrawals which had been referred to it. Netherlands delegation objected one paragraph. UNCI amended on spot and following text then accepted by all parties:

"1. It is agreed that Netherlands troops will be withdrawn from Indonesia within short a time as possible after transfer sovereignty.

2. To this end Netherlands and RIS Governments will cooperate to take advantage all means available.

3. Should it become evident, as Netherlands Government regretfully foresees, that lack of shipping or other technical difficulties will prevent completion withdrawal within 6 months from transfer sovereignty, Netherlands Government will gladly give RIS authorities free access to details of arrangements and endeavors of Netherlands Government for repatriation of troops.

4. Joint technical committee might be established to study technical possibilities of repatriating Netherlands forces and ways and means overcoming difficulties.

5. Under its terms reference, and as anticipated by agreement in 22 June memo, UNCI or its successor should be in position to assist."

Military Committee reported agreement has been reached between its members on question transfer KNIL arms to RIS which Steering Committee had not been able settle. Discussion followed on reorganization KNIL and financial and pension arrangements for various units. Debate brought position three parties to such point on these problems that military group said they could continue therewith and find agreement themselves. Chairman Netherlands Military Committee brought up problem of military arrangements to be carried out Indonesia before transfer sovereignty. Maarseveen said hoped make progress on this outside RTC with heads three delegations in next few days. Roem revived idea Netherlands withdrawing all forces from Republican (*Renville*) territory soon as sovereignty transferred. Van Royen opposed this contending Roem endeavoring go back to Paragraph 4 (F) (28) SC resolution while Netherlands still based policy on March 23 directive. Maarseveen asked further discussion this point be suspended. Both Roem and Van Royen reserved their positions. Military session thus ended.

Steering Committee decided meet forenoon 29th on miscellaneous unfinished business and begin New Guinea discussion in afternoon. Committee appointed on self-determination hopes report Steering

Committee Sunday. This should conclude negotiations. Committees requested formulate their decisions Tuesday so draft resolutions may then be presented to Steering Committee. Plenary session RTC fixed Wednesday November 2, 2 p. m. Signed Cochran.¹

Sent Department 1021; repeated Batavia 105.

CHAPIN

¹ In telegram 1022, Hicus 84, October 29, 1 p. m., Mr. Cochran agreed that "ECA be officially notified Department favors resumption ECA aid to Indonesia immediately upon announcement successful conclusion RTC".

501.BC Indonesia/10-3049: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 30, 1949—noon.

1023. Hicus 85. Van Royen phoned morning 29th. Said question New Guinea would be difficult. Said though Hatta indicated he not personally interested his delegation still likely support BFO. Netherlands Government considered question too delicate to leave to UNCI. He personally thought trusteeship answer. I said had not discussed question with Indonesians for some time and did not know just how they felt.

I have revealed no one my knowledge Netherlands had approached Department seeking support Netherlands trusteeship (Ushic 31¹) or that Britain has sought our support (Ushic 37 and 38²) for Netherlands keeping New Guinea colony. I thought advisable, however, let Van Royen know how I was likely act if my opinion sought either independently or through UNCI, lest he feel we had not been fair with Netherlands following their representations Washington. Consequently I said I preferred idea leaving Netherlands sovereign over New Guinea for present with stipulation negotiations be entered into by Netherlands and RIS within comparatively short period to decide future status. I agreed with Van Royen that long period would result in strife and uncertainty, with little likelihood for investments, et cetera. I preferred period of not more than two years or better one year. This would not exclude possibility trusteeship being advocated by Netherlands when negotiations opened. I said could not, of course, anticipate what UNCI position might be on New Guinea.

I referred to advance copy Netherlands Delegation draft agreement on self-determination which Van Royen had provided me. I told

¹ Telegram 903, October 18, p. 535.

² Neither printed.

him sure UNCI would oppose arrangement whereunder RTC parties would provide for organ to be instituted by SC which would be entrusted with organizing and supervising exercise of right of self-determination wherein 5 Indonesian and 2 Netherlands assessors would take part. I told Van Royen SC fixes its terms reference for UNCI and leaves to latter working out of any local arrangements.

UNCI met with Steering Committee 11:30 morning 29th. As we were assembling Pringgo Digdo said Sukiman has just returned from trip Indonesia and stressed necessity New Guinea being included in transfer sovereignty, even if special arrangements had to be made whereunder Indonesians would leave much to Netherlands. Pringgo said he planned remain Hague few days after RTC to plan setting up "Union" offices, Indonesia participating in transfer sovereignty formalities to take place Amsterdam prior December 30 and also outline procedure by which Indonesian Government would start functioning after transfer sovereignty. He asked if I could stay and help him. I told him would be necessary UNCI representatives remain four or five days after close RTC to finish our report thereon and I would be glad to give him any help during those days or perhaps for day or two longer.

In meeting was agreed chairmen of three delegations and UNCI would give maximum five-minute speeches plenary session second to be presided by Drees. Agreed representatives minority interests be invited participate plenary session but not speak. Representatives significant interests would be invited as part of public. Republicans refused accept Netherlands idea of Indonesian and Netherlands High Commissioners taking precedence over Ambassadors. Will have status of Ambassadors but nothing more.

Question of observation implementation RTC agreements arose. Indonesia favored UNCI continuing under broad terms reference set forth June 22 memorandum. Van Royen and Blom argued only functions which could be given UN Agency after transfer sovereignty would be to supervise military matters and elections or plebiscites. They contended UNCI authority did not continue beyond transfer sovereignty date but arrangements should be made for UNCI or successor have new terms reference. Hatta suggested UNCI draft recommendations. UNCI stated our position. It followed lines of Ushic 20,³ of which I have made extract and to which Herremans and Critchley had agreed October 21 as reported Hicus 74,⁴ Van Royen asked matter be held suspense until after decision on self-determination, since this would involve utilizing UNCI. Republicans replied ques-

³ Telegram 836, September 29, p. 500.

⁴ Telegram 988, October 22, not printed.

tion observation had been referred to Political Committee other than that on self-determination and that former should decide. Was agreed hold in suspense but drafting be done by original committee after self-determination question decided.

Steering Committee met 3 to 6:30 p. m. 29th with working group on New Guinea. Indonesian argued original text transfer sovereignty which Netherlands promised must include New Guinea and that this was envisaged by Linggadjati. Netherlands replied they had realized impossibility population New Guinea expressing its desires accordance with Article 3 Linggadjati and had consequently made reservations thereon. Hatta said must consider Netherlands East Indies one entity and one unit from which no part should be separated. Saw no reason why independence should be granted RIS if New Guinea was not to be included. Said Linggadjati meant much to Indonesians and that principles expressed in Article 3 should not be considered nullified by statements of Van Mook or any other Netherlands official. Said since people of New Guinea not yet ready speak their own minds, New Guinea should continue part of whole NEI to constitute sovereign RIS.

Maarseveen stopped debate after three hours with blunt statement Netherlands Government could not transfer sovereignty over New Guinea to RIS. Said he knew this statement would be painful to Indonesians and particularly BFO. Said if Indonesians willing accept sovereignty without New Guinea, this did not mean RIS would be deprived of hope acquiring New Guinea later, but this should not be interpreted on other hand as encouraging such hope. Maarseveen promised Netherlands would not transfer New Guinea to any third power. Furthermore, Netherlands would not place New Guinea under trusteeship or grant autonomy thereto without consulting RIS. Said this was very definite position Netherlands Government. Meeting adjourned until 9:30 p. m.

As night session assembled Hamid told me Indonesians had in meantime asked New Guinea problem be referred UNCI but Netherlands refused. He urged UNCI do something. Hamid was first speaker. Said BFO appreciated difficult position Netherlands Delegation and Netherlands Government. BFO had reviewed situation thoroughly since afternoon session and had come to decision BFO could not abandon position it had indicated. He said Anak Agung had shown how seriously parliament's BFO areas would regard Netherlands attitude as set forth by Maarseveen. Supomo said Republican Delegation endorsed BFO statement. Maarseveen asked if anyone else desired speak. No response. He recommended adjournment until Sunday afternoon or removal New Guinea from agenda.

UNCI suggested recess. [Both of?]-UNCI colleagues accept follow-

ing text of compromise idea I had drafted between sessions, thinking this plan would make it difficult for Netherlands further to risk break Indonesians conference through intransigent attitude and would at same time provide Indonesians with reasonable excuse for non-complete success:

"It is recommended,

(a) In view of desirability RTC concluding successfully on November 2, 1949,

(b) In view of important factors which should be taken into account in settling question of New Guinea,

(c) In view of limited research that has been undertaken and completed with respect to problems involved in question of New Guinea, and

(d) In view of heavy tasks with which Union partners will initially be confronted;

That Residency of New Guinea continue under Government of Netherlands, with stipulation that by end of first year of sovereignty of RIS, question of future political status of New Guinea be determined by negotiations between the RIS and Netherlands."

When meeting reconvened, Maarseveen said informal talks between delegations in recess had made no progress. He again prepared adjourn meeting. UNCI asked meeting be declared informal to permit UNCI present suggestion. UNCI seriously concerned lest attitude delegations would result in most regrettable impasse when RTC so near successful conclusion. Foregoing text then read. Delegations discussed this between themselves. After half hour Indonesians asked adjournment to permit careful study by entire delegations. Meeting adjourned 11:15 to meet 4 p. m. today.

After session Van Royen spoke with UNCI trio. Said feared Netherlands Government could not accept our suggestion. We told him Maarseveen had given Indonesians serious shock by his announcement at end afternoon session. It appeared conference would break down unless compromise found on New Guinea. We said not opposed Netherlands trusteeship and thought our plan might even result in such arrangement within one year. Van Royen asked [*added?*] Maarseveen had approached Indonesians with suggestion trusteeship and had offered try get his government's approval thereof if they were receptive. Indonesians opposed. We pointed out our plan close to Netherlands idea. That is, no transfer sovereignty over New Guinea now but question of status to be resolved by discussions within one year.

Maarseveen and Van Royen said Netherlands Government and Parliament desired complete and final Indonesian settlement now. Both men thought Indonesians would continue agitation until New Guinea in their possession and would bring pressure on Netherlands

as end first year approached. We insisted Indonesians have more opportunity or [for?] pressure now when RTC is at stake and thousands Netherlands troops in Indonesia than they would have after achieving sovereignty and Netherlands troops withdrawn. We hoped several months of Union partnership would make both partners appreciative dependence upon each other and that really happy solution could be worked out in specified time. When Maarseveen told how critical Romme was becoming of agreements, UNCI trio offered talk with him if Maarseveen thought this would help. Again we envisaged possibility that within one year Indonesians might themselves come to idea of trusteeship.

Maarseveen said Netherlands Delegation would have serious conference on New Guinea before this afternoon's meeting. He feared question self-determination would also cause trouble. As indicated above, Netherlands Delegation has submitted draft which calls for agreement between parties on recommendation to be made to SC for having an agency in Indonesia into which could be brought 5 Indonesians and 2 Netherlanders organize and supervise elections and other means self-determination along lines definitely prescribed in RTC agreement. Indonesians will oppose this on ground their draft provisional constitution provides for self-determination and that sovereign RIS will take care its responsibility under observation UNCI. UNCI will, of course, object to parties prescribing method in which SC agency should be created and instructed. We do not desire any arrangement be made which might terminate UNCI with transfer sovereignty and cause necessity debate in SC over successor to UNCI with possible vacuum period between date transfer sovereignty and creation and functioning such agency. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department, repeated Batavia 107.

CHAPIN

501.BC Indonesia/10-3149: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, October 31, 1949—3 p. m.

1024. Hicus 86. Steering Committee met on New Guinea and self-determination from 4 p. m., 30th, until 2:30 a. m., 31st, with two-hour recess for dinner. Prior session I talked with Hamid who said Indonesians so far found impossible withdraw from positions indicated on New Guinea. He favored acceptance UNCI compromise. I spoke with Anak Agung, Roem and Sastroamidjojo, urging them not let

¹ Repeated in telegram 552, November 4, 4 p. m., to Batavia.

RTC break down on New Guinea. I pictured great results Indonesians were achieving and future ahead. I said could make no promise what decision on New Guinea might be year from now but felt they should go home with success now gained and depend on later negotiations for determination New Guinea. I said was convinced Netherlands would not move beyond UNCI compromise. Was not sure they would even accept this but hoped so and felt Netherlands would be in serious position with SC if refused and let RTC collapse.

Pringgo Digdo told me first Indonesians to depart, including Roem, will leave Hague 4th; Hatta will go 6th and spend two days Cairo en route; Pringgo will be last remaining until 14th to make plans for union offices, etc. Said Hatta with Djuanda and Indrakasuma scheduled meet Lieftinck 9:30 this morning for hour's talk on tin pledge before Lieftinck leaves town. Pringgo said no chance Indonesians making any concession.

Session gave priority discussion New Guinea over self-determination. In response inquiry Chairman Maarseveen, meeting decided ask UNCI put formally on record proposal re New Guinea suggested informally previous session (Hicus 85²). Supomo said RepDel had studied UNCI proposal carefully but regretted could not see way accept since it does not include transfer sovereignty and no explanation as to how this could be achieved in future. Van Royen said since success RTC at stake, NethDel willing to limit transfer though not sure Parliament would accept New Guinea compromise. Since sovereignty would not now be transferred and both sides would have opportunity consider and negotiate one year hence, NethDel willing accept UNCI compromise but positively last concession. Anak Agung said BFO had made known its position. Said sovereignty must be transferred but BFO prepared make arrangements thereunder with Netherlands.

Maarseveen attempted close subject abruptly but Van Royen questioned procedure. Anak Agung then explained concessions BFO willing undertake. His statement read:

"Without prejudice to terms charter transfer sovereignty two parties agree residency New Guinea shall remain for period not exceeding one year after transfer sovereignty under administration Kingdom of Netherlands on understanding that within this time limit Netherlands authorities concerned in New Guinea shall be obliged supply such information regarding all acts of government which RIS may request. Further understood that upon proposal of one of parties and in agreement between both parties directives may be given to local authorities in New Guinea during one year. During period of one year

² *Supra.*

RIS and Netherlands shall conduct negotiations concerning regulation of administration territory in question after end one year."

Anak Agung said this proposal made with understanding charter transfer of sovereignty would include no restriction on territory covered, meaning that no exception as to New Guinea would be mentioned.

Van Royen said appreciated difficulties of Indonesians and particularly Anak Agung on New Guinea but could not accept proposal for several reasons. Mentioned only one, namely, Netherlands could not undertake transfer sovereignty over New Guinea.

Recess followed. Therein Hamid asked UNCI if we could not let Indonesians know their position with SC would suffer if they now refused accept compromise which Netherlands had taken. We told Hamid we had put forth this compromise as what we considered fairest way out for all parties and thought no one should let RTC break down through failure accept this. We were not willing, however, make any statement before meeting as to how SC might look upon either party. Anak Agung also spoke with us. We said convinced our compromise was best deal Indonesians could get from Netherlands. Since recess failed bring agreement, Hatta recommended further consideration New Guinea be deferred.

Maarseveen asked Chairman Netherlands Committee on self-determination indicate points of difference. They follow: (1) No agreement on external rights self-determination, Netherlands insisting Article III Linggadjati³ require [apparent garble] while BFO admit only internal self-determination. (2) Netherlands sought clarification Indonesian position on South Asahan and another former Republican territorial unit joining South Sumatra. (3) Netherlands desires provisional recognition TBA territories in Sumatra as autonomous units while RepDel says considered in Republic with BFO approval. (4) NethDel desired see Minahassa, Timor and Celebes permitted exercise right self-determination while Indonesians contend such right already exercised and opportunity in elections for Constituent Assembly to indicate wishes. (5) Indonesians refused accept Netherlands draft agreement on self-determination.

In long debate Indonesians said once sovereignty transferred RIS latter will not admit right external self-determination or secession. Point finally referred to UNCI. With respect Point Two, argument revealed BFO and Republic had agreed inter-Indonesian conference *status quo* with respect two territorial units should be accepted with later opportunity for them indicate in which state they desire be incorporated. Referring Point Three, Indonesians argued strongly that TVA [TBA] areas such as Djambi and Tapanuli belonged Republic,

³ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 14, 1948, p. 325.

as recognized by *Renville*, by SC Resolution January 28 and by inter-Indonesia conference, and would concede no change in status temporarily resulting from second police action. Hatta refused Maarseveen suggestion problem be referred UNCI. Hatta said could not go back to Indonesia if weakened on this point. Maarseveen finally stated debate revealed Indonesians accepted principle internal self-determination.

On Point Four, Indonesians said recent general elections in areas concerned showed parties favoring secession or non-entrance RIS polled minorities. Netherlands argued general elections should not count but plebiscites be provided on this special issue. Argument on draft agreement (Point Five interwoven with foregoing points). During debate Maarseveen withdrew with apology draft submitted by NethDel to amend Article II Indonesian Provisional Constitution.

Debate on observation implementation RTC agreements participated in by Catholic leader Romme. Said parties in agreement as reached RTC memo June 22 that UNCI or another UN organization should observe implementation RTC agreements Indonesia. Thought such body should also be given executive duties. Indonesians indicated entire willingness have UNCI observe, well as advise and assist when necessary, but insisted sovereign state RIS should itself be trusted execute agreements it enters. Finally Maarseveen asked whether UNCI desired indicate its own position this subject perhaps in informal session or with committee officers who would continue drafting on implementation agreements. UNCI preferred record at once opinions on (1) external self-determination and (2) observation implementation agreements. Following statement made on (1) :

"Commission has not yet seen provisional constitution. We assume it provides for democratic procedure both for elections to Constituent Assembly and manner in which assembly finally determines boundaries of states of Republic of USI.

In determining its position in relation to rights of self-determination, commission in addition to making this assumption has taken into account number of principles which in accordance with its terms reference from SC are relevant.

1. Linggadjati Agreement, Articles III and IV.
2. *Renville* Agreement, Article VI of 12 principles.
3. *Renville* Agreement, Article VI of 6 additional principles: 'Should any state decide not ratify constitution and desire, in accordance with Articles III and IV of Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate special relationship with USI and Kingdom of Netherlands, neither party will object'.

In accordance with foregoing, it is suggested that delineation of state boundaries should be determined by Constituent Assembly. After states have been constituted each state should be given opportunity to ratify constitution and in event of its deciding not ratify, it should

be given opportunity to negotiate special relationship with Republic of USI and Kingdom of Netherlands. Any area less than state would not have such special rights."

Following statement made on (2) :

"Irrespective of question of sovereignty, commission will endeavor carry out its functions as directed by SC. It does not feel that this is place to endeavor define precisely what those functions are.

Right of self-determination may be associated with elections to Constituent Assembly. By agreement of 22 June, UNCI or its successor is required observe implementation of results of RTC. In accordance with its terms reference [apparent garble] its successor is also required to observe elections to Constituent Assembly.

It would be premature for commission to consider details of how such supervision should be conducted. These should be worked out with experts who will become available through commission or such other successor-organization as may be established."

Meeting adjourned with understanding delegation study position on New Guinea will as [*stress?*] self-determination, particularly UNCI suggestions, and reconvene 4 p. m., today. Following session Van Royen insisted to UNCI we not following Linggadjati and Graham⁴ when advancing idea no population less than that of state should exercise right external self-determination. UNCI held to last of six additional *Renville* principles and argued any different policy would incite dissident and revolutionary groups Indonesia just at time sovereignty transferred over entire area and when both parties should exert best efforts toward strong RIS. UNCI made clear its opinions of self-determination constituted basis for realistic discussion but were not intended as arbitrary decision which had to be taken word-for-word. Signed Cochran.

CHAPIN

⁴Dr. Frank P. Graham, then President of the University of North Carolina and U.S. member of the UN Security Council GOC, Batavia, until March 30, 1948.

856d.00/11-149 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

THE HAGUE, November 1, 1949—7 p. m.

1037. My arrival here coincided with termination long difficult negotiations RTC. Final plenary session scheduled afternoon November 2. Assume that you will wish to make statement of satisfaction at solu-

¹Repeated in telegram 553, November 4, 5 p. m., to Batavia.

tion dangerous Indonesian question for press release immediately thereafter. Strongly recommend that any such statement would include complimentary remarks re Dutch contributions at RTC towards the settlement. My reasons for this recommendation are:

1. Dutch have made many far-reaching concessions in face of violent domestic opposition, by the public, in the press, and among political leaders. As a result, it is now generally felt throughout the country that because of their great sacrifices Dutch are running great risk of being reduced financially and economically to status of a Denmark. We have indicated publicly that in solution Indonesian problem independence Indonesia is one of two objectives, the other being preservation of Holland as a going concern. Many Dutch feel that our expressions of desirability Indonesian independence have taken precedence over Holland's future strength, remarking that if Holland cannot be strong economically and financially how can she play her part in Western Union and Atlantic Pact.

2. Present Dutch Cabinet is coalition of uneasy bedfellows thrown together in summer 1948 after six weeks of no government. There are already signs of strain between two most prominent parties (Catholic and Labor) and it is possible that coalition government will dissolve. If Cabinet falls a scapegoat will be sought and the US might well be selected for this role.

3. Undoubtedly traditional ties of friendship between Holland and US have been damaged by Indonesian problem. Embassy staff seriously concerned over latent anti-American feeling. This, however, at present remains under cover as Dutch recognize and appreciate large measure of assistance given by US to Western Europe and Holland through our generous economic assistance and projected military aid. Nevertheless, we fear that once Holland is no longer subjected to pressure from SC, and by same token feels it has reestablished its honor in international field, this latent anti-Americanism may well come into the open.

The Dutch believe that they have been disregarded and unappreciated at the international bar, despite, in their opinion, their firm belief that Dutch handling of Indonesian problem if unhampered by outside interference would have been fully justified by results and that Indonesian independence should not have been established without guarantees of stability in Indonesia and of undamaged economic and financial position of Holland. They believe that they have bowed now to international opinion and pressure and have loosed Indonesia prematurely without any firm guarantees as to Indonesia's stability or Holland's future strength. The Dutch are sore and we fear that this resentment will be aimed at us. They think they have had enough castigation and therefore I urge that a bouquet be given them in any statement re RTC with view to retrieving some of our former popularity in Holland.

CHAPIN

501.BC Indonesia/11-249 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary
of State*

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY THE HAGUE, November 2, 1949—noon.

1039. Hicus 88. Steering Committee had final session 3 to 7 p. m. November 1. Anak Agung said BFO not willing accept draft on right self-determination proposed for article 2 of "agreement on transitional measures." As this stood close preceding session, Roem pointed out Republic objections thereto. Blom regretted Indonesian non-acceptance and argued Netherlands insistence on draft which would take care of situation such as Minahassa. Hatta limited debate this subject. When deadlock obvious, he set up Drafting Committee of 2 from each delegation plus myself. We were given 15 minutes but took hour and half to reach text which was approved by individual delegations and then by Steering Committee. Following is rough literal English translation thereof.

1. Division of Republic of USI into component states shall be established finally by Constituent Assembly in conformity with provisions of provisional constitution of Republic of USI with understanding that a plebiscite will be held among population of territories thereto indicated by Government of Republic of USI upon recommendation of UNCI or another organ of UN, under supervision of UNCI or other UN organ referred to, on question whether they shall form separate component state.

2. Each component state shall be given opportunity to ratify final constitution. In case component state does not ratify that constitution it will be allowed negotiate about special relationship towards Republic of USI and Kingdom of Netherlands.

Supomo promised foregoing text would be incorporated in Indonesia provisional constitution as article 189.

While we were meeting apart, Steering Committee added as paragraph VI to draft of covering resolution for plenary RTC session following provision taken verbatim from June 22 memorandum: "UNCI or another UN agency shall observe in Indonesia implementation of agreements reached at RTC."

Netherlands delegation revived issue of TBA territories in Sumatra. Hatta said this subject had been discussed at length. Said areas under reference would soon find proper place in RIS with opportunity express their wishes in election and let it be determined whether actually is TBA problem.

Debate closed on this point.

Session then considered and accepted reports and results of various

committees and determined manner in which documents would be submitted to plenary session. Documentation voluminous and several days may be required to complete copies and translations.

Excellent spirit pervaded close of session with congratulations exchanged. Stikker and Van Royen especially cordial in their thanks to me as were Indonesians. This was first session for Stikker to attend recently as he had been absent Paris. He said Hoffman told him there that arrangements made to resume ECA aid to Indonesia soon as agreement reached. I confirmed had recommended Department issue statement to this effect soon as RTC successfully concluded. Stikker said any kind deeds and words we could offer soonest would be most appreciated.

Upon returning from session I found ECA Hague had phoned that Hirschfeld's office had suggested their being given few days notice before announcement resumption of aid released. Have not had opportunity discuss this with Hunter but would strongly favor issuance announcement immediately after successful plenary session together with generous statement of US appreciation of results achieved and attitude of parties RTC. UNCI chairman Herremans will speak plenary session. I plan no statements. Signed Cochran.

CHAPIN

501.BC Indonesia/11-249 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949—1 p. m.

966. Ushic 42. For Cochran from Secy: Upon successful conclusion RTC, if you consider it helpful to do so, pls convey van Royen, Hatta, and Hamid as Reps of three Dels, my personal congratulations on statesmanlike manner in which conference has been conducted. I have faith in the wisdom of the course they have pursued. While fully conscious of difficult adjustments that lie ahead, I believe that conference will mark a renewed growth of friendship and cooperation between people of Neth and people of Indon, which will lead to the increasing prosperity of both. You may assure them that US stands ready to help promote that objective.

For your info, I have requested Chapin convey similar msg to Stikker.¹

ACHESON

¹ Telegram 968, November 2, 1 p. m., not printed (856d.00/11-249). For statement by Secretary Acheson issued as a press release on November 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1949, p. 752; for statement by Senator Frank P. Graham, issued as a press release the same day, see *ibid.*, p. 753.

501.BC Indonesia/11-249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1949—3 p. m.

970. [Ushic 41?] For Cochran: Dept suggests you may wish without commitment alert Indo and Neth officials desirability they prepare earliest enter econ discussions with US if USI concerned about possibility any early tech assistance from or loan applications to this govt. Presumably Wash best location. Technically competent spokesman necessary for particular industries or projects as well as for general econ programs.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/11-349: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE, November 3, 1949—1 p. m.

1049. Hicus 89. Plenary session 2 p. m. November 2 ended RTC successfully.¹ Speech of UNCI chairman Herremans telegraphed directly Omnipress, New York, N.Y., UNCI principal secretary. Secretary General RTC promises all agreement documents available within 4 days. Drafting committee of two from each delegation set up to check texts and translations. UNCI will assist. Today I meet with small committee to check Union Statute. UNCI working on its report SC. East Sumatra signed Constitution yesterday thus completing adherence all BFO areas.

Netherlands Government gave dinner last night presided over by Prime Minister for RTC, Del and UNCI. Informal speeches extremely friendly and excellent spirit prevailed. Speakers of three delegations all expressed appreciation assistance UNCI, particularly our policy of letting parties endeavor settle own problems but always being able offer solutions when called upon as difficulties arose.

After dinner, Drees, Stikker, Maarseveen and Van Royen were very kind in thanking me personally. Drees said he knew I had always been optimistic and said he now optimistic for first time. Indonesians likewise appreciative. Roem and Simatupang leaving this evening for Indonesia in order carry true RTC story before any political advisors

¹ See report based on excerpts from UN document S/1417, November 10, in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 26, 1949, pp. 958-969; and draft charter of transfer of sovereignty, November 2, in document 156, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49*, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 81st Cong., 1st sess., doc. no. 123 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 802. For texts of final report dated November 8 and its enclosures, see SC, 4th yr., *Spec. Suppl. No. 6*.

go. Before dinner, Simatupang told me he pleased with progress made outside RTC past few days on military matters. Said principles of agreement concluded whereunder Netherlands troops will be withdrawn from certain area toward concentration points prior transfer sovereignty. Said Netherlands not yet agreed to complete withdrawal from *Renville* territories by transfer but Simatupang still hopes this can be achieved. Said suggestion had been made that Secretary State for War Fockema Andreae proceed Indonesia shortly to consummate and supervise these arrangements. This official has been found sympathetic and realistic by Indonesians who would welcome his visit warmly.

After dinner, Stikker asked what I thought should be done immediately in Indonesia. I told him first move should be to send Fockema. As Van Royen and I came home he said Drees and Stikker had just agreed that Fockema should go Indonesia. Simatupang and other Indonesian leaders stressed necessity military observers remaining to observe withdrawals at least until transfer sovereignty. They thought military observers might also help thereafter depending upon how far Netherlands withdrawals may be accomplished by transfer date and how much difficulty may be experienced with dissident elements. Believe therefore any decision toward cutting down or withdrawing military observers should be postponed.

Sumitro expects return US November 11, remain there one week and then go Indonesia. After surveying situation Indonesia hopes accompany Djuanda on special mission to US, of which I had not previously heard. I shall ask Hatta directly about this. Stikker mentioned question announcement ECA aid. Said it really did not matter to him whether it came today or few days later. This should depend upon results his Embassy's talks with Department. He thought US should consult with Netherlands before extending any financial assistance Indonesia. I gave no undertakings but told him I had made no commitments on loans to Indonesians. Simply had said I would help see what could be done when I go US. I did state, however, I was sure US did not intend be least bit reckless. Signed Cochran.

Sent Department 1049; repeated Batavia 108.

CHAPIN

501.BC Indonesia/11-449: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1949—1 p. m.

982. Ushic 46. Ur 634 July 27.¹ Wld it not be desirable for you solicit Hatta's views on desirability IMF mission to Indo. It occurs to

¹ Not printed.

Dept presence such mission in Indo might be extremely helpful in connection monetary and currency reforms which Indo Govt must undertake in near future.

ACHESON

.01.BC Indonesia/11-449

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] November 4, 1949.

Participants: The Netherlands Ambassador, Mr. van Kleffens
The Deputy Under Secretary, Mr. Rusk
WE—Mr. Nolting

Ambassador van Kleffens called and presented the attached note¹ in which the Netherlands Government expresses its appreciation of Mr. Cochran's work on the Indonesian case.

Ambassador van Kleffens then discussed several matters of "past history". He remarked that while he had not always seen eye to eye with us on the Indonesian problem, he felt that we had always been in agreement on the end result to be sought—namely, a stable, orderly, and independent Indonesia. He then remarked that he thought that order and stability would have been better assured had the Dutch been allowed to "complete" their last police action without interference from the Security Council.

The Ambassador did not mention our press release of yesterday² in which we congratulated the parties, but in answer to a question from me regarding the best way to handle the item of Indonesia on the agenda of the General Assembly, he said that he judged that his government and people were not in a mood to be congratulated, and felt that a resolution by the General Assembly to congratulate the parties would be misunderstood in Holland. On the subject of New Guinea, which I raised, he said he felt that we should commence immediately to help persuade the Indonesians that New Guinea should remain under Dutch administration. I told him that we considered the Dutch position on New Guinea a reasonable one, but that perhaps we had best let things settle down a bit before working on this.

In answer to another question, Ambassador van Kleffens said that he thought the most helpful thing we could do would be to continue to impress upon the Indonesians the necessity of "putting their own house in order".

¹ Dated November 4, not printed.

² Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1949, p. 752.

I thanked Ambassador van Kleffens for his note concerning Mr. Cochran and told him that while we appreciated the difficulties that lay ahead not only in Indonesia but in Holland, we felt that his government had acted wisely and we for our part were prepared to help make the arrangements of The Hague Agreement work out in practice. I invited him to consult with us and to suggest how we might help toward this end.

501.BC Indonesia/11-449 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands

SECRET PRIORITY WASHINGTON, November 4, 1949—6 p. m.

985. Ushic 47. Dept considering desirability three main UNCFI reps attend as body SC meetings at which forthcoming UNCFI report considered by SC. Fol are most important of several reasons favoring UNCFI attendance:

1. Presence of and statement from each UNCFI member during SC consid Indo case likely aid formulation strong expression of SC approval results of Batavia and Hague consultations, with consequent beneficial effect upon ratification RTC agreements Neth and Indo;

2. Attendance all three UNCFI members will accord recognition role of three nations represented UNCFI during negotiations under UNCFI auspices, and make it clear that each member stands behind settlement;

3. Such a step shld aid in focussing attention of UN and world opinion upon notable statesmanship of parties in reaching agreement difficult issues.

Wld appreciate your evaluation impact foregoing on Dutch Governmental and public opinion. Do you perceive any other possibly serious objection such procedure? If not, suggest you discuss with colleagues and advise Dept UNCFI's views.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/11-749 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY THE HAGUE, November 7, 1949—2 p. m.

1066. Hicus 94. UNCI held Sunday forenoon last formal meeting intended Hague. Text report to SC on RTC¹ approved in draft. Conclusion thereof read as follows:

"At conclusion its first interim report commission had stated it looked forward with hope to settlement of Indonesian dispute at RTC

¹ See SC, 4th yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 6.

and, as a result, to beginning of new era for peoples of Netherlands and Indonesia.

Results achieved have justified this hope. Commission takes pleasure in reporting that in its judgment negotiations conducted at Hague were eminently successful. Commission is confident that as result of transfer of real, complete and unconditional sovereignty, the new relationship between peoples of Netherlands and Indonesia can evolve to mutual advantage of partners of Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

Commission, having participated in conference in compliance with directive of SC, and having assisted parties to reach agreement, will continue to carry out its functions in accordance with its terms reference, and observe in Indonesia implementation of agreements reached at RTC."

Mimeographed text reports would be available Tuesday morning and will be forwarded SC without awaiting enclosures since some delay expected in receiving translated documents.

Shortly after meeting ended I received Ushic 47.² As will be noted from report above quoted, UNCI does not consider task finished and expects carry on as anticipated SC resolution and directive and as approved in RTC agreements. Incidentally wording re UNCI in agreement resulted in no small part from position I took following receipt Ushic 20.³

In this meeting it was understood that upon my return US I would carry with me copy text report but would not submit UNCI's report to SC or in any other manner endeavor speak for trip [*trio?*]. We had previously agreed that we should be available for any emergencies in Indonesia prior transfer sovereignty and should so guard our status and terms reference as to be able continue thereafter without necessity any new authority from SC. Herremans and Critchley have already made plans for travel in Europe in anticipation likely return Batavia by December 1. Secretariat returning few days after task forwarding documents and closing out office completed.

With reference paragraph 1 Ushic 47, am sure SC will find UNCI forthright and unanimous report sufficient basis for strong expression approval results of Batavia and Hague consultations. Disagree entirely with thought that UNCI participation SC meeting this stage would assist ratification either Netherlands or Indonesia. Our strength has come through following policy of modest readiness be of assistance when needed and be able help constructively and objectively when so required. Parties have revealed at Hague they look upon US as trustworthy collaborators and freinds. They have given evidence of this confidence through requesting our continued presence as observers after sovereignty transferred. In our report we have not been hesitant in claiming credit for assistance rendered by UNCI

² Telegram 985, November 4, *supra*.

³ Telegram 836, September 29, p. 500.

and acknowledged by parties. Believe it would be entirely wrong however for US not [now] to participate in SC meetings in manner that might detract from degree to which parties themselves achieved agreement at conference sponsored by Netherlands Government. Netherlands delegation members and political leaders with whom I have spoken feel confident Netherlands ratification. Believe chances would be impaired rather than improved if part of UNCI in achieving agreement might be overplayed or if it appeared we were going SC there to make doubly sure that Netherlands would have to yield sovereignty. Ample opportunity for influencing Netherlands Government on ratification through diplomatic channels if necessary. Believe those UNCI representatives returning Batavia shortly can contribute more to Indonesian ratification there than if they were in US.

Reference paragraph 2. UNCI members have agreed entirely on all matters pertinent RTC agreement. Since I first went Batavia August '48, UNCI has not had single split vote on substantive matters. Doubt wisdom claiming for three states represented on UNCI credit for RTC success especially when realizing that circumstances have occasionally been such during GOC and UNCI negotiations that tendency was attribute entire responsibility to SC.

Reference paragraph 3. Believe all parties receiving due appreciation in press for agreement reached. Too full measure praise should not be extended before ratification consummated. Strongly feel UNCI should not step forward too boldly this juncture recalling celebration and ceremonies that attended *Renville* and conscious of dangers still existing Indonesia. We have no reason give impression our task finished before sovereignty actually transferred and should be alert to render every assistance up to that date. Even then tasks are assigned to UNCI or another UN organ to be carried out after transfer.

Feeling strongly as I have here in above indicated on points at issue, I am not discussing Ushic 47 with UNCI colleagues. I regret exceedingly be called upon suggest plan now which they would know to be contrary sentiments I have consistently expressed. According to present schedule, leaving Hague tomorrow for Paris and sailing *Ile de France* 10th. Signed Cochran.

CHAPIN

856d.00/11-749

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William S. B. Lacy, of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 7, 1949.

Mr. Soedjatmoko called at his request bringing with him Mr. Abikusno whom he identified to me privately as the most powerful leader

of the Darul Islam. Mr. Abikusno is to return to Indonesia on Monday, having spent some time in Surinam, in contact with Islamic leaders there.

I opened the conversation by soliciting Mr. Soedjatmoko's reaction to the agreement reached at the Round Table Conference at The Hague. Mr. Soedjatmoko deferred to Mr. Abikusno, explaining that Mr. Abikusno would have to convince his followers of the justice of the settlement. Questioning revealed that Mr. Abikusno considered the agreement probably unsatisfactory to his constituents in two particulars: (a) the acceptance of the Netherlands Crown as a symbol of the Union, and (b) the assumption of debt by the Indonesian State in a larger sum than they had desired. Mr. Nolting told Mr. Abikusno that the Department considered the settlement remarkably favorable to the Indonesians; that the debt provisions were particularly favorable to the Indonesians in that the Netherlands had been obliged to concede one and ½ billion guilders to achieve agreement; and that of the 4.3 billion guilders assumed by the Indonesians, all but 1.3 was internal debt which any successor state must be expected to assume from its predecessor. Mr. Abikusno seemed impressed.

I then showed Mr. Abikusno and Mr. Soedjatmoko the press statements on the Indonesian settlement by the Secretary and Senator Graham ¹ which Mr. Abikusno read with obvious satisfaction expressing particular pleasure with paragraphs 2, 5, and 6 of the Secretary's statement. He explained that Dr. Hatta's predecessor, Sjafruddin [Communist traitor in September 1948] ² had clapped him in jail for nine months because of his anti-Communist activities. He added that Islam and Communism were absolutely incompatible and Islam would continue to fight Communism in every way it thought effective.

There followed a long discussion of the significance of Paragraph 5 of the Secretary's press statement. Mr. Nolting and I explained that ECA would be resumed and we discussed with the Indonesians the composition of the ECA program. It was agreed that the commodities most urgently needed within the next few months, in order of preference, in Indonesia were: (1) textiles, (2) rice, (3) transportation items and (4) agricultural instruments.

The Indonesians made general inquiry of the functioning of the Export-Import Bank. It was explained to them that the Bank advanced loans against specific projects which must be proved self-liquidating; that there was no application for a loan to Indonesia outstanding at the present time; and that the United States would take no action on a loan to Indonesia through the Export-Import Bank or

¹ November 3, Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1949, pp. 752, 753.

² Brackets in the source text.

any other agency until the Indonesian State had made formal application. I further explained that the United States was determined to avoid even the appearance of what our enemy described as "financial imperialism" and would not therefore press financial assistance upon the Indonesian State in any form. I went on to say that the United States Government was of the view that loans to Indonesia should be made on a strictly bankable proposition and that I thought the Indonesian State would find this politically advantageous since they could thereby refute any charge that they were accepting political financing from the United States. At this point both Mr. Soedjatmoko and Mr. Abikusno showed lively approval of this policy and Mr. Abikusno said that he thought this attitude on the part of the Department of State would be most useful to him in his efforts to "sell" the Hague Agreement to Darul Islam.

Mr. Abikusno then stated that the Indonesian State desired, above all things, American technicians in Indonesia and the education of young Indonesians in the United States. He was told that the United States Government was particularly eager that Indonesians come to the United States on scholarship exchanges and that the United States would make every possible contribution to relieve the present dearth of technical skill in Indonesia. He was reminded, however, that the United States had many calls upon its limited exportable complement of technicians. Moreover that the schedule of pay for American technicians was relatively high. Mr. Nolting and I expressed the hope that the Indonesian State would therefore make the fullest possible use of Dutch technicians on an employee basis. After much discussion it seemed clear that Mr. Abikusno harbored considerable resentment against the Dutch; that he would not encourage Indonesians to go to school in the Netherlands nor would he abandon his conviction that English should be the second language in Indonesia rather than Dutch. He was agreed, however, that the Indonesians should make full use of Netherlands technical and administrative experience. [Three of Mr. Abikusno's sons were executed by the Netherlands military in his presence.]³

Mr. Nolting and I took this occasion to explain the Department's hope that the Statute of the Union would enable the Indonesian and Dutch people to discover anew their dependence on each other. It was apparent that however much or little Mr. Abikusno was impressed with this part of U.S. policy toward Indonesia, he was visibly impressed by the absence of American ambitions in the area.

During the course of conversation, Mr. Abikusno referred several times to the urgent need for a rehabilitation of the communications

³ Brackets in the source text.

and transportation system in Indonesia. He said that he, as an architect, was eager to consult with American architects on prefabricated housing. I placed him in touch with Jacob L. Crane, Adviser to the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

Toward the end of the conversation, Mr. Abikusno expressed great satisfaction with the course of the interview and said that it should help him on his return to Indonesia to explain the sympathetic and unselfish attitude of the Department of State.

Mr. Abikusno said in an aside to Mr. Nolting that he realized the creation and maintenance of law and order in Indonesia was the Indonesian Government's first concern.

Mr. Soedjatmoko remained behind for a brief moment after Mr. Abikusno's departure to say that he thought Mr. Abikusno had been totally convinced of the Department's genuine and non-imperialistic interest in Indonesia and that nothing would mean as much to the acceptance of The Hague Agreement in Indonesia as Mr. Abikusno's approval thereof.

501.BC Indonesia/11-1049: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1949—7 p. m.

563. (For Beam) Usgoc 438. (For Dow).

1. Presence Indo item on agenda GA and necessity discussion in SC of forthcoming UNCFI report raise question of what effect, if any, the timing and scope of discussion Indo case in GA and SC may have upon ratification RTC agreements.

2. Dept wld appreciate your comments on possible timing and effect of discussion SC and GA. Fol questions in particular are pertinent:

a. Does factor of UN discussion in SC have any bearing upon ratification of RTC docs by Repub. Govt., BFO? (If not, Dept is of view that consideration shld take normal course.)

b. If so, is it desirable that SC consideration be prior to or after ratification?

3. Fyi in considering problem, an assessment of possible action in UN follows:

a. Indo is last item on agenda of GA's *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite. Wld be difficult to alter timing of consideration of Indo case by more than few days. Not likely item will come up for discussion until end Nov, but in view of GA determination to end session ample time before Christmas, item in all likelihood will be considered comite by Dec. 10. In comite, Chairman (Entezam, Iran) has some discretion re extent

¹ Repeated as 536 to New York (USUN).

and direction of discussion and possibly cld either extend or contract length and number of comments dels in comite.

After comite action, item comes under consideration plenary GA mtg where discussion is more limited but important in light of character of plenary mtgs. GA Pres (Romulo) possesses some power to determine scope of plenary discussion.

Dept expects that probable action in both comite and plenary wld be to congratulate parties. Soviet States likely to criticize developments. Attitude of Asiatic dels (especially those represented Jan 1949 New Delhi conference) not certain.

b. SC has broader latitude in timing mtgs. Most improbable that SC mtg wld be called to discuss Indo case prior to receipt UNCFI report. Yet after receipt, mtg for that purpose cld be scheduled almost any time. Although SC Pres (Nov-Arce, Arg; Dec-McNaughton, Canada) must call a mtg at request of any SC member, in practice Pres exercises certain amount of discretion as to time SC meets and subjects considered at particular mtgs. Consequently, SC consideration UNCFI report cld be undertaken either immediately fol receipt report or at considerably later date, such as middle of Dec. Dept believes that timing of SC discussion UNCFI report might be arranged to coincide most desirable date in light of ratification RTC documents.

In SC mtg re Indo reps of Austral and Belg may participate discussion without vote by virtue of membership UNCFI, and likely also that India may participate without vote as UN member whose interests "are specially affected".

We expect that gen tenor SC discussion will be to give strong approbation parties for reaching agreement RTC and to approve continuance UNCFI for observation implementation of agreements. Not unlikely that USSR and Ukraine SSR will attack settlement as creature of US imperialism.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/11-1649 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY BATAVIA, November 16, 1949—11 a. m.

909. Usgoc 438¹ and Contel 903.² From Beam and Dow: Following is Hatta's reply as received in writing from Republican delegation re timing UN discussion RTC results.

"Dr. Hatta is of opinion that it might be very much helpful if discussions in UN on results of RTC would be held before ratifications, in particular in connection with discussions in Netherlands Parliament of which outcome is rather uncertain. As far as the (Republican) working committee is concerned, Dr. Hatta is of opinion that agreements will be ratified, indifferent from discussion in GA or in SC."

¹ Telegram 563, November 10, *supra*.

² November 14, not printed.

In absence Anak Agung who is probably only authoritative Federation spokesman, we did not approach BFO delegation here since latter is weak and we feel discussion with them would only confuse issue. Hatta's reply interesting as indicating confidence RTC ratification irrespective timing UN debates. Assume Department is consulting Embassy Hague concerning effect of timing of discussions on ratification by Dutch Parliament, since latter now seems to be determining factor.

Department pass USUN and Hague.³ [Beam and Dow.]

BEAM

* This was done November 17.

501.BB/11-2349 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1949—7 p. m.

112. For USGADel: The delay in transmission of Appendices to UNCFI report indicates that discussion of Indo case in both SC and GA will take place early in Dec. Inasmuch as somewhat different considerations govern extent of discussion of Indo item in GA and SC, Dept is transmitting certain observations looking forward to coordinated treatment of this case in forthcoming debates. The precise lines of treatment and discussion can be determined, of course, only immed prior to and during course of GA and SC consideration. Therefore, the fol principles are presented for gen guidance in planning treatment of Indo case.

1. A gen US objective is that all discussion and action in UN at this time be of a character which will aid parties in carrying out agreements for transfer of sovereignty and final settlement of Indo question. Hence strategy in both GA and SC shld be: *a.* to show parties full UN approval and appreciation of statesmanlike measures taken by them toward settlement; *b.* to avoid prompting any action which might have effect of blocking or deterring ratification of Hague agreements by either Neth, Republic or BFO components; and *c.* to lay as solid a groundwork as possible for favorable reception in UN of prospective Indo application for UN membership. Stemming from these objectives, certain specific considerations affecting GA and SC discussion are set forth in succeeding paras.

2. *GA.* As indicated in GA position paper (SD/A/C.1/253) Dept feels that most desirable GA action in light of complete agreement of

¹ Repeated as 1057 to The Hague and as 590, Usgoc 441, to Batavia.

parties at Hague conference wld be to note results of Conference with gratification and drop from agenda. In this respect Dept believes tentative position of India and Austral (ur tel-1352, Nov 18 1949²) that item shld remain on agenda for 5th Session GA was ill considered and inconsistent with those del's other objective that UN action be directed toward establishing favorable case for Indo UN membership. US Del may find it appropriate to discuss this question with Austral and India del's, pointing out that rationale for placing Indo case on agenda at 2d part 3rd session wld, if applicable at end of 4th and beginning of 5th sessions, possibly cast doubt upon existence of internal stability in Indo which has important bearing upon membership qualifications.

Moreover, 4th session action placing item on agenda fifth session wld have no necessary substantive advantage over dropping item at end of 4th session. If Indo situation were to become grave again, matter can easily be placed again on agenda for consideration at 5th session.

It is not unlikely, of course, that Soviet Dels will be critical of Indo settlement in both Comite and plenary GA discussion. Yet, as noted in No. 1105 of Nov 14, 1949 from the Hague,² the expected adverse Soviet discussion in all likelihood will not be harmful but may even help ratification by solidifying support of otherwise divergent local elements for ratification of agreements promising an effective bulwark against Communism in Indo.

Important goal of debate in Comite and plenary is that Indo settlement receive approbation of non-Soviet world. In particular it is desirable that nations participating in Jan 1949 New Delhi conference show at this point that they appreciate wisdom of current measures toward settlement. Indo-Neth relations wld be strengthened by affirmations from New Delhi nations that the concern they showed in Jan 1949 has now been dissipated by constructive action Batavia and the Hague. New Delhi group, although legitimately casting cautious eye on future, shld be forthright in congratulating parties, including Neth, for salutary Indo developments.

With respect to US comment, all GA discussion shld desirably be short, emphasizing voluntary and constructive character of action by Indo and Neth reps in reaching agreement Batavia and Hague. Proper recognition of role of UN in aiding settlement shld be made, with emphasis upon primary rôle of SC in handling item within UN and furnishing means for mediation through UNCFI. US shld not discuss in GA details of Indo settlement, and in particular shld refrain from being drawn into discussion of New Guinea problem. Some emphasis may appropriately be placed, however, upon prospective attributes of new Indo nation as likely candidate for UN membership.

² Not printed.

In light of US membership UNCFI and claims from various sources that US has dictated terms of Indo settlement, preferable that US not sponsor GA res, although USDel may wish to coop with other Dels in discussing presentation of res by other Dels (desirably, from New Delhi group), commending parties for statesmanlike steps in accomplishing cessation hostilities and arranging for early transfer of sovereignty.

3. *SC. a.* Current SC consideration shld cover both First Interim Report UNCFI (S/1373³ dated 10 Aug 1949) and UNCFI's Special Report on RTC (S/1417⁴ dated Nov 1949).

b. Dept believes that SC in current discussion shld not undertake to alter or redefine UNCFI terms of reference or to establish a new Comm for observation of elections and the implementation of RTC agreements. In brief the fol are primary reasons:

(1) It is important for beneficial effect upon ratification and implementation of Hague agreements and prospects for internal stability in Indo fol transfer of sovereignty that primary UN action be to express gratification and approval of conduct of parties in achieving the current settlement. This objective might needlessly be jeopardized if extensive debate were to take place now upon precise terms of future functions of UN Commission in Indo, involving probable differences of opinion not only between Soviet and Western reps but also between reps of colonial and non-colonial members.

(2) As UNCFI reports indicate, there is still a substantial job ahead for UNCFI, and terms of SC Jan 28 res are broad enough to permit continuation UNCFI functions under terms of reference delineated Jan 28. (See Ushic 20, Sept 29, 1949.) (a) If question is raised, it is US view that Para 116 of UNCFI Special Report constitutes "recommendation" to SC under Para 4(c) of Jan 28 res that UNCFI continue without change in terms of reference. Reason for continuation UNCFI after transfer of sovereignty is that under current agreement several aspects of settlement, e.g., elections, will be carried out after transfer instead of prior to, as generally contemplated before accelerated transfer plan was agreed upon by parties. (b) Further, it wld be difficult technically for SC to evaluate now performance of UNCFI under Jan 28 res because two UNCFI reports do not cover all of UNCFI's responsibilities delineated then. In the main these reports describe Batavia Agreements re cease-fire, etc. and Hague Agreements re transfer of sovereignty, without reference to manner or extent to which terms of agreements have been or are being complied with by parties. In particular there is as yet no report to the

³ August 4, SC, 4th yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 5.

⁴ November 8, SC, 4th yr., Spec. Suppl. No. 6.

Council on following points: The extent to which cease hostilities and maintenance of law and order by parties have been accomplished; the degree of compliance with the provision of Jan 28 res re release of Polit prisoners; details concerning the return of the civil Admin of the Republic of Indo; discussion of final recommendations and action concerning withdrawal Neth troops; and description of arrangements for observation of elections in Indo. Likely these matters covered subsequent report, and parties will describe satis conditions. (c) SC res, if any, should preferably assume fol pattern (along the lines of Feb 28, 1948 res fol *Renville* Agreement): considering UNCFI reports, noting with satisfaction results of parties' deliberations Batavia and Hague, congratulate parties, express confidence in successful transfer of sovereignty, urge parties to continue efforts toward complete attainment of stability and order in Indo, and request UNCFI to continue functioning under previous terms of reference, observing implementation of agreements, and to report developments from time to time to SC.

For same reasons governing GA position Dept believes it preferable that US not introduce draft res. This position is, of course, subj to reconsideration as SC discussion develops.

(d) US rep shld, of course, express hearty US approval of steps toward complete solution and of high statesmanship displayed Neth and Indo, and mention US hopes for harmonious and constructive coop between Indo and the Neth in the future. In contrast to GA discussion US rep may find it advisable to deal with specific items in two UNCFI reports. Outline of elements desirable for inclusion in initial statement of US rep being prepared in Dept and will be transmitted after receipt of appendices to RTC report. Reference to and tenor of comments upon particular subjs will be covered therein.

WEBB

501.BC Indonesia/11-2549: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1949—8 a. m.

In Usgadel No. 112 Nov 23, 1949 Dept outlined to US Del GA and US Rep SC certain principles governing treatment of Indo case in forthcoming discussion GA and SC. [Here follows report and summary of telegram printed *supra*.]

In ur discretion inform FonOff substance US position this matter,

¹ At 14 posts (Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Syria, Philippines, Siam); and repeated in airgram A-145, November 29, to Ceylon.

emphasizing desirability strong support New Delhi group for new Indo nation, and suggesting that such assistance can be given helpful initial impetus by expression approval in UN.

Ur comments FonOff reactions requested.²

WEBB

² A circular telegram of December 1, 2 p. m., to the above 14 posts (other than Australia) and to New Zealand quoted comment from the USDel (telegram 1386, December 1, from New York) that the Australian delegation had been instructed to negotiate a resolution, to be cosponsored by 16 New Delhi powers, congratulating the RTC parties on their success and making it clear the Indonesian case should not be kept on the agenda. (501.BC Indonesia/12-149)

501.BC Indonesia/11-2949: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BATAVIA, November 29, 1949—noon.

944. Gocus 828. At meeting Batavia evening 26 Republican and BFO representatives agreed on resolution setting up "National Preparatory Committee" to make arrangements between Republicans and BFO and between latter two and Dutch re details sovereignty transfer. Committee will consist 32 members, but Steering Committee of five Republicans and five BFO has been created with Roem as chairman and Anak Agung as vice chairman. Committee is to begin work immediately.

Resolution consists 14 articles, most important of which provide as follows:

a. Tasks of NPC include election president of RIS as stipulated in Article 69 (2) of provisional constitution and nomination of cabinet formateurs as well as of actual taking over sovereignty and regulation of necessary formalities, at same time maintaining close contact with UNCI in accordance with Article 6 of covering resolution of RTC.

b. NPC will immediately enter into consultation with present government of Indonesia and with heads of departments of central administration.

c. NPC will nominate persons who, on behalf NPC, will be informed about departmental organization.

d. NPC will continue work of now existing delegations of Republican and BFO towards Netherlands delegation and UNCI.

Understand in practice NPC will in effect replace existing Republican delegation and BFO delegation, but that Netherlands delegation will continue with present composition under chairmanship Jacob. One of most important tasks will of course be preparation details military part of sovereignty transfer and consideration Republican working paper listing arms and ammo requirements (Gocus 827¹).

¹ Not printed.

UNCI deputies take usual position with both sides that it is of course desirable that parties reach as many agreements as they can between themselves, but that we are prepared at any moment to render any such assistance as may be requested. Informally we shall of course keep informed of course of discussions and actively offer cooperation if they appear to be bogging down.

Stikker and Schaik due here today. Dutch state they are merely coming for wider range of general discussions on details of transfer and that advantage of their visit will lie in fact that they have been delegated very broad powers by cabinet to take decisions locally with our [without?] reference Hague. Understand from Jacob that Fockema is due Friday. Signed Dow.

BEAM

701.56d11/11-2949: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 29, 1949—7 p. m.

598. Eyes only Beam and Dow from Cochran: Will Beam kindly convey orally to Hatta substance of fol strictly personal topsec message from Cochran:

"Believe Indo interests in US can best be served by appt as Amb someone intimately familiar concept RIS and Hague negots. Lemeina by experience, character and dependability shld be ideal.

"Have recently consulted with Sumitro and introduced him ExImBank. With revived ECA funds going principally for textiles and rice, emphasis now being placed on need for financing transportation including harbor improvements, road building machinery, railroad rolling stock and automotive vehicles, and agri production including irrigation developments and farm implements. Sumitro gave general outline needs to be supplemented by data to be assembled soonest. He promised accept proffered cooperation by Neth officials NY and Wash in gathering and presenting data for use ExImBank. In Sumitro absence Besoeki can pursue this task. Sumitro and I agreed no internatl financial mission shld go Indo prior sovereignty transfer.

"Had long visit with ExImBank subsequent Sumitro's departure. Bank will let Besoeki know its requirements as to program justification and its recommendations re visit of Indo officials to consummate any contract and arrange orders. Even in advance their possible decisions, I suggest Djuanda himself come early Jan since task calls for Cabinet member of highest qualifications.

"Djuanda shld be especially helpful in judging and recommending to you and possibly in selecting appropriate reps for implementing

purchase program taking into consideration practices preferred or required by official lending agencies such as ExImBank. Until Djuanda has made necessary survey, believe inadvisable you decide upon or contemplate any exclusive arrangements such as Fox contract.

"Present plan is for Dow to continue as Acting UNCIRep after sovereignty transfer. I will shortly resign from Pakistan and UNCI on understanding agreeable to Hatta (as he proposed to me personally) that I be first USAmb RIS.¹ In such event Dept wld take matter up formally through Beam toward end I be in Batavia for inauguration new Govt and possibly in Hague for transfer formalities. This depends, of course on arrangements to be made by Neth and Indo and on schedule involved. I shld naturally like to be ranking Amb after Neth Comm. You will appreciate that no word of my appointment shd get out before announcement Wash made.

"I am assembling some material of possible use to new FonOff as promised Pringo and will be glad to explain opportunities for training Indos in Dept soon as I arrive but suggest this matter be held in abeyance for present."

Pls see Hatta soonest and give me his reaction, also any pertinent information for my guidance in arranging while here for housing, equipment, staff, etc.

WEBB

¹ Premier Hatta was highly gratified to hear of Mr. Cochran's prospective appointment and sent his best wishes (telegram 967, December 4, 10 a. m.).

501.BC Indonesia/12-149 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, December 1, 1949—4 p. m.

953. Gocus 830. At reception given by HRC last evening for Ministers Stikker and Schaik, NethDel and RepubDel, I had opportunity speaking with Stikker who said he had so far had no formal talks with Repubs but would proceed today to Jogja to meet with top leaders. He said object trip was to reassure himself on probabilities law and order Indonesia so that he might be able to report to Parliamentary commissions Hague. In view probable debate on RTC ratification on December 5 in Hague, he is returning Saturday but Schaik will remain in Indonesia until mid December.

Stikker said he thought Second Chamber approval RTC was "almost sure" but said it should be borne in mind that First Chamber approval also necessary and he less confident favorable action by First Chamber although he did not seem seriously to doubt this. I did not discuss

this latter point with Stikker but spoke later with Gieben who said he thought First Chamber approval might be difficult to secure but that there was no doubt in his mind as to favorable action. Gieben mentioned over-riding influence which Crown could exert if necessary on First Chamber, adding that it was known that Queen Juliana desired Parliamentary approval re RTC agreements.

Simatupang, acting Chief Staff TNI, in press interview Batavia last evening stated six battalions of TNI troops and military police would be used to maintain law and order Batavia as of sovereignty transfer date. He told press these Batavia troops would not come under command of West Java commander but would be directly under orders High Command Jogja, in view "special status" Batavia as capital RIS. Signed Dow.

Department pass Hague.¹

BEAM

¹ This was done the same day.

501.BC Indonesia/12-449: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

BATAVIA, December 4, 1949—2 p. m.

965. Gocus 831. Gocus 828.¹ First formal meeting held last evening between combined Republican-BFO National Preparatory Committee and Netherlands delegation. NPC has established working committee of eight, under chairmanship Roem. Dutch have set up similar eight man "contact" committee under Jacob. At end Indonesian initiative UNCI deputies were invited attend. Roem told me Indonesians desired UNCI take part in pre-transfer negotiations on generally same basis that UNCI participated RTC, i.e., attending all formal central committee meetings and subcommittee meetings whenever this seemed desirable to either side. Roem at meeting again praised UNCI role at RTC and emphasized desire for cooperation with deputies as specified in Article 6 of covering resolution of RTC.

At meeting, three joint subcommittees were established to carry on specific discussions on following: (1) Procedural questions, (2) Military and security affairs, (3) Transfer of administrative services. On Indonesian side, these will be headed respectively by Supomo, Leimena and Djuanda. Dutch expect to nominate their appointees tomorrow.

During past few days, several informal meetings of above groups have taken place, but difficult to see that any very concrete results

¹ Telegram 944, November 29, p. 576.

have been arrived at. Both sides, however, insist they recognize extreme urgency of early intensive work if smooth transfer is to be assured.

Roem told Australian deputy today that Jogja considering as first Foreign Minister Palar or Hadji Agus Salim or Sjahrir. Said Sjahrir had strong support partly owing his known international negotiating ability and partly because this would keep him from acting as opposition center. Despite fact he was in certain disfavor due to his failure to cooperate during RTC, it felt he could clear himself with government by issuing statement agreeing to or praising RTC results. Signed Dow.

BEAM

501.BC Indonesia/12-649 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1949—noon.

611. For Beam from Dept and Cochran : Altho New Delhi sponsored res congratulating Neth and Indos and welcoming estab RIS as sovereign state was overwhelmingly adopted by *Ad Hoc* Polit Comite of UN GA over Soviet opposition, portions of statements by reps of USSR (Tsarapkin), Ukrainian SSR (Manuilsky) and Poland (Katz Suchy) might be harmful Indo settlement if broadcast to peoples of Indo without adequate refutation.

Indonesian item, particularly UNCFI report RTC, probably comes before SC Mon, Dec 12 and Dept feels that SC discussion offers perhaps best forum for detailed refutation Sov charges that settlement is creature of US capitalistic imperialism, that RTC agreements make RIS a Dutch puppet state, and that Hatta and Sukarno are "traitors" to Indo people.

US and other reps will make appropriate SC statements,² but it is preferable, of course, that detailed defense of RTC agreements be made by parties thereto, particularly by rep of Indo. From standpoint of both internal and external positions RIS govt now being formed it appears important that vicious and irresponsible Sov charges be answered in SC.

In SC Palar may speak in this vein on own initiative, but in view of doubts raised by previous experience re consistency of Palar's statements with views of Repub leaders believed desirable to ensure that he express his govt's position fully. We suggest therefore that you dis-

¹ Repeated as 631 to New York (USUN) and as 1100 to The Hague.

² For UN GA action on the Indonesian case, passage of a resolution on December 7 after debate, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1949, pp. 902-903; for Mr. Austin's speech at Rochester, N.Y., on December 7, with special reference to Soviet tactics, see *ibid.*, December 26, 1949, pp. 970-974.

cuss this with Hatta soonest, recommending that prior to Dec 12 Repubs instruct Palar make forthright defense of RTC settlement.

Recognizing delicacy of Indo position re prospective application for UN membership, Dept recommends that Indo SC statements be cast not as direct answers to Sov attacks but primarily as straightforward exposition character of agreements from Indo position. Judging from line of Sov attack in GA Comite, a brief explanation of fol points in SC by Indo rep wld be of particular value in showing falsity and distortion in Sov arguments: unqualified nature of RIS independence under terms of Charter of transfer of sovereignty, equality of RIS with Neth in prospective Union (stressing fact that Union can take no decisions without RIS consent), fairness of agreement re assumption of debt in light of controversial amounts involved, and fairness of commercial agreement which conforms with generally accepted intl standards and practice.

ACHESON

501.BC Indonesia/12-849 : Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

BATAVIA, December 8, 1949—9 a. m.

978. Deptel 611.¹ In Hatta's absence, delivered message to Roem last night who said it corresponded exactly his ideas and would so instruct Republic delegation UN.

According Roem, KNIP would ratify RTC December 12 and subscribe to provisional constitution.² Election committee would choose president December 15.³ Sukarno would name three "formateurs" (Hatta, Jogja Sultan, Anakagung) who would form government for installation December 20. Plan Sukarno would visit Batavia December 28.

Referring preparatory discussions which he said continue to go well, Roem stated Dutch memo submitted yesterday in reply Indonesian request for arms set forth minimum offer which could be considered by Republicans. While not fully meeting their requirements, paper acceptable basis of discussion. Roem said new difficulty had arisen from Dutch objections to turn over security large cities December 15 to TNI (already announced) on grounds this would anticipate Hague RTC ratification. Now being considered TNI would assume this responsibility December 23 although would have privilege stationing officers mak-

¹ *Supra.*

² These took place December 14.

³ On December 17 Mr. Beam sent a personal message of congratulation to Mr. Sukarno on his election to the "historic position first President of the future United States of Indonesia". (856d.00/12-1749)

ing preparations principal cities December 15. Elsewhere in Java TNI would take over security responsibility December 15. Roem enigmatic replying my question how long *negara* administrations west and east Java could retain effective authority under new arrangements.

BEAM

856d.00/12-1449: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1949—7 p. m.

4464. Fol sent Batavia: ¹“Sov veto of Canad resolution calling upon SC to congratulate Neth and Indos on successful conclusion RTC ² reveals true Sov attitude toward genuine nationalism SEA. You shld seek opportunity make this point clear to Hatta and other Indo leaders. You shld emphasize that Sov and its satellites were alone in rejecting a settlement which provides complete independence to USI only because leaders of USI have demonstrated that they will not submit to fon domination, Commie or otherwise. You shld point out that Sov veto constitutes repudiation of policies adopted at New Delhi Conference earlier this year.

Pls advise Dept your opinion of effect Sov veto on (a) acceptability terms of agreement Indo; (b) attitude Indo leaders; (c) attitude Hatta and Sukarno toward recognition Chi Commies; (d) attitude USI Govt toward exchange diplomatic representation USSR.”

Pls give Dept your views foregoing after consultation FonOff.

ACHESON

¹ 622, December 15, noon; it was repeated as 923 to Moscow, 1137 to The Hague, and 908 to New Delhi.

² For text of Canadian resolution of December 12, see SC, *4th yr., Suppl.* (Oct.-Dec.), p. 13; for account of SC action, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1949, p. 934.

856d.00/12-849: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1949—7 p. m.

627. Your 979 ¹ much appreciated. ECA shipments will be marked with US flag and preparations now in process to insure full propaganda capitalizing arrival ECA sums Indo. Similar treatment will be accorded ExImBank announcement extension credit to USI. Technical missions and suggested visit fleet will be discussed by Cochran upon arrival.

ACHESON

¹ December 8, 10 a. m., not printed.

501.BC Indonesia/12-1749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1949—1 p. m.

644. Reurtel No. 1443, Dec 17,² please advise Palar orally that the US Govt appreciates invitation send delegation attend celebration transfer of sovereignty to Repub of US of Indonesia, and accepts invitation, designating Mr. Jacob Beam, US ConGen, Batavia, as Rep of U.S. Govt. All arrangements re US Representation and transportation of Reprs will be made thru office of US ConGen, Batavia.

Please confirm orally Mr. Cochran's appreciation and acceptance of invitation to be present ceremonies, explaining that Mr. Cochran will attend as U.S. Rep UNCFI. Mr. Cochran leaving NY Dec 21 by plane for Batavia.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 632 to Batavia.

² Not printed; it gave the text of the Indonesian invitation to attend ceremonies at Jakarta (Batavia), December 27-28.

840.50 Recovery/12-2049: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1949—7 p. m.

637. Position proposed ECA bilateral agreement with Neth covering deliveries by that country of tin metal and tin concentrates obscured as stated in ECA Hague tel 696, Dec 13² by "uncertainty re USI handling of entire question". Reftel being rptd Batavia. Para 6 reftel clearly implies Neth Gov understands similar agreement from USI Gov necessary.

In view these uncertainties and in view contentious part tin exports played in RTC agreements, Dept and other US agencies concerned, namely, ECA, RFC, and Bureau of Supply, have agreed necessary advise Neth that neither bilateral inter-governmental agreement nor actual contracts can be concluded until full understanding and concurrence USI auths obtained. Dept continues regard bilateral and contracts as in best interests US stockpiling and operation Texas City smelter, so long as policy dictates RFC operation smelter. Dept also regards above agreement and contract arrangements completely in USI interest except in unlikely contingency they would permit Neth

¹ Repeated as 1163 to The Hague.

² Not printed.

to exercise control over Indo tin not otherwise exercisable and in degree undesired by USI.

Particularly in view strong desire avoid interruption receipts metal and ore of Indo origin, would be highly desirable you join with ECA Batavia acquainting USI auths now of US proposals under discussion with Neth, pointing out that so far as intergovernmental obligation involved in bilateral, US would look to Neth for performance and that such agreement is not intended and would not be vehicle for creation intergovernmental obligation upon USI. Attempt secure that USI Amb Wash and/or Djuanda or other responsible USI officials who will be in Wash during Jan will be briefed by their Gov on this matter and on proposed contracts.

ECA Wash will advise its Batavia reps re nature and objectives proposed arrangements and present status negots.

ACHESON

856d.00/12-2249 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

PRIORITY

THE HAGUE, December 22, 1949.

1289. Indicative of general feeling here Queen promptly signed (as required by Netherlands Constitution) transfer sovereignty bill within few hours after acceptance by First Chamber¹ (this last step in executing and legalizing entire proceeding so that stage set for actual transfer at special ceremony in Amsterdam on December 27, Hatta and his delegation expected here to accept on behalf Indonesia). Little publicity has heretofore been given this ceremony for obvious reason that First Chamber action had to come first.

Excluding CP *De Waarheid*, press united in urging cooperation with new nation.

Sent Dept, repeated Batavia 144, Dept pass Batavia.²

CHAPIN

¹ By 34 to 15.

² This was done the same day.

856d.01/12-2249

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 22, 1949.

Participants: Mr. H. A. Helb, Counselor Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Sadarpo, Representative of the Emerging Republic of the United States of Indonesia
Mr. Butterworth—FE
Mr. Landon¹—PSA
Mr. Nolting—WE

Mr. Helb and Mr. Sadarpo called by appointment in order to announce the transfer of sovereignty by the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia on December 27, 1949. Their call marked a historic occasion of considerable significance in the development of new nations in the Far East as the United States of Indonesia will be the second largest Moslem nation in the world, second only to Pakistan.

The atmosphere of the new situation was signalized by the fact that Messrs. Helb and Sadarpo came together as friends to make the announcement, with Mr. Sadarpo acting as spokesman. This seemed symbolic of the future relations between the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia and was a fulfillment of United States policy during the past three years when the concept of the mutual need of the Netherlands and of Indonesia for each other was repeatedly emphasized to both.

Mr. Sadarpo extended an invitation to the Government of the United States of America to be represented at the ceremonies in Indonesia on December 27. He apologized for the inadequate accommodations at Batavia indicating, for example, their difficulties in providing flagstuffs for visiting guests. He expressed the hope that their physical limitations would be overlooked. He stated that he was disappointed in not being able to extend a similar invitation to Mr. H. Merle Cochran as United States representative of the United Nations Delegation. He explained that he had been prevented by Mr. Cochran's departure before authorization to extend the invitation had been received. I assured Mr. Sadarpo that I would telegraph this invitation to Mr. Cochran in his behalf.

I expressed my gratification to Messrs. Sadarpo and Helb at this historic development and said that all officers in the United States Government who had been concerned with the recent negotiations would similarly feel profound pleasure at the prospects for the future.

¹ Kenneth P. Landon, of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.

At this point Mr. Sadarpo left to catch a plane to New York and Mr. Helb remained to hand me a copy of a note which will be presented tomorrow by the Netherlands Ambassador to the Secretary to the effect that the Netherlands Government would formally recognize the United States of Indonesia as an independent and sovereign state in a ceremony at Amsterdam on December 27, and expressed the hope that the Government of the United States of America would similarly recognize the new state after the transfer of sovereignty. Mr. Helb repeated that this was an advance notice which would be formalized tomorrow.

I informed Mr. Helb that Mr. Cochran would be our first Ambassador to the U.S.I.; that he was selected in the light of favorable comments made concerning him at The Hague; and that I would promptly inform Mr. Cochran of these developments. Mr. Helb expressed his personal satisfaction at the selection of Mr. Cochran as first Ambassador to the U.S.I.²

² The Department reported this exchange of views in telegram 650, December 23, 2 p. m., to Batavia (from Lacy for Cochran and Beam), and concluded as follows: "Accordingly Dept believes Beam may seek Cochran's agreement immed after conclusion ceremonies and Cochran may present his letters of credence soonest thereafter. President's statement on *Voice* will be timed in accordance Cochran's advice as previously agreed." (856d.01/12-2349) For *Voice of America* broadcasts to Indonesia, starting December 27; see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1950, p. 65.

501.BC Indonesia/12-2449: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Beam) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BATAVIA, December 24, 1949—1 p. m.

1026. Gocus 835. At meeting Netherlands Delegation [and] Republican Delegation with UNCI last evening it was decided formally to end functions Central Joint Board and local joint committees as of December 27, Central Board to be replaced by another body to deal with military problems arising after transfer. Composition this committee still under discussion but established that UNCI will be given full opportunity participation.

Assembly sectors Dutch troops after transfer agreed as follows in Java: Areas surrounding Batavia, Seuarang, Bandung and Surabaya. In Sumatra: Medan, Palembang, Padang and probably Djambi. This represents victory for Dutch idea of concentrating their troops in main port areas as opposed to original Republican desire to remove Netherlands troops from main cities and place them in camps elsewhere while

awaiting embarkation. Netherlands military headquarters will remain Batavia under present plan.

Roem told me after meeting that in his capacity as Minister without portfolio RIS Government, he expected to be able to devote special attention to working with UNCI and proposed to suggest to Cabinet that he be made (informally) Minister for United Nations Affairs. Signed Dow.¹

[BEAM]

¹ Mr. Dow succeeded Mr. Cochran as U.S. Representative, UN Commission for Indonesia, and the UN Secretary-General was so informed (telegram 661, December 29, 1 p. m., to New York (USUN)).

856d.01/12-2749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Batavia*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1949—4 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

656. [For] Cochran and Beam: Pres has approved fol msg for Cochran to deliver to Pres Sukarno:²

"My dear Mr. President: I wish to offer to you on this historic occasion my heartiest personal congratulations and those of the Amer people on the independence of the Repub of the US of Indo. I have followed the course of events in your country very closely for the past several years. I have greatly admired the high statesmanship with which you, Dr. Hatta and your colleagues contributed with such distinction to the splendid settlements at The Hague which have provided independence and sovereignty to your country.

"The US welcomes Indo into the family of independent peace-loving nations. May God grant you and your people peace and prosperity in the years to come."

You shld advise Pres Sukarno that this msg, together with the presentation by you of your credentials, constitutes the recognition of the Repub of the US of Indo by the US of Amer.

You shld also advise Pres Sukarno that the Pres of the US will make public announcement concerning Indo on the VOA. You will advise Dept timing that statement.³

Rptd Hague for info.

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 1179 to The Hague.

² Mr. Beam reported attending the sovereignty-transfer ceremonies at Batavia on December 27, receiving USI agrément to Mr. Cochran as "first USA Ambassador", and arranging for him to see President Sukarno the next day. (123 Cochran, H. Merle)

³ Text sent in telegram 659, December 27, 6 p. m., to Batavia; for text issued as a press release December 28, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1950, p. 55.

856d.01/12-2749: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1949—4 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

1180. For Amb: Pls arrange earliest suitable delivery fol msg from Pres to Queen. Msg is not being released to press here. Text fols:

"Her Majesty, Queen Juliana, The Netherlands: The occasion of the transfer of sovereignty by you to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia gives me a welcome opportunity to express my appreciation and my understanding of the course of action you have taken. All who are seeking peace realize the major contribution you have made to the fulfillment of that great purpose.

I assure you of my hope and confidence that the fulfillment of the agreements reached at The Hague will be mutually beneficial to the Netherlands and to Indonesia."

ACHESON

¹ Repeated as 657 to Batavia.

856d.01/12-2749: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

THE HAGUE, December 27, 1949—6 p. m.

1302. Sent Department 1302, repeated Batavia 147. Department pass Batavia.¹ Transfer of sovereignty ceremony took place 10 a. m. today, Royal Palace, Amsterdam, and was both solemn and moving. Queen's address, which Stikker informed me written by herself, very human in its appeal to two countries to forget past differences, accept solution and strive earnestly "to cooperate loyally in the new system". After stating readiness of Netherlands "to render assistance as soon as and when Indonesia should ask for it," address concluded with these extraordinary words: "It is a privilege to perform this act of transfer as it stands in history, or rather in the face of God, who knows why this march hand-in-hand in freedom was not achieved sooner nor later, and who knows the feelings of generations, but who also watches whether we can use this plan for the progress of mankind. May this now be so".

Following conclusion of ceremony I proceeded with Canadian and Indian Ambassadors to informal reception at Groote Club, where my colleagues delivered formal written messages of congratulation to Prime Ministers of Netherlands and Indonesia, and the British Am-

¹ This was done the same day

bassador presented note to Hatta formally recognizing Indonesian Government. I, therefore, took occasion to present orally to both Prime Ministers the message contained in Department's 1171 of December 22, 5 p. m.²

I presume formal recognition being extended to Indonesia directly through our representative in Batavia.

CHAPIN

² Not printed, but see telegram 656, December 27, to Batavia, p. 587.

501.BC Indonesia/12-3049: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1949—8 p. m.

672. For Cochran: On Dec 28 Matthew Fox, with his counsel Robert Nathan, discussed his Indo relationships with UnSecy, who was unacquainted with details this matter and referred him to Butterworth, who explained in general terms difficulties we find with contract. UnSecy later saw Nathan without Fox present and explained to him, as counsel, that he entertained greatest doubts that Dept cld ever approve any kind contract giving exclusive and preclusive rights; that Dept fundamentally believed such contract unwise for Indo Repub and also for Amer industry. He suggested Nathan endeavor find formula which wld give best protection Fox interests but not go beyond framework of kind of relationships Dept cld approve and remaining substantially similar relationships obtainable other Amer businessmen, particularly removing monopolistic features. Nathan expressed desire serve both his client and Govt by finding some formula or arrangement along above lines and is working on this problem.

Meantime, Fox states Hatta has requested him visit Indo and expects leave US Sun. He urgently desires meet you and at suggestion UnSecy, Nathan has submitted fol request:

"Am writing this letter on behalf of Matthew Fox with whom I have been working for past two years on Indo. As you know, Mr. Fox has a contract with the Repub of Indo providing for establishment of the Amer-Indo Corp. At invitation of Premier of the new US of Indo, Mr. Hatta, Mr. Fox is proceeding to Jakarta on Sunday, Jan 1. There he will discuss relationship of this contract with US of Indo.

"Mr. Fox is anxious to establish a relationship with the Indos which will in no way conflict with Amer commercial and fon policy. He is more than anxious to establish his arrangement in such way as to coincide fully with objectives of our Govt and to maximum benefit of Indo people. As you have been advised, he has devoted two years and substantial resources on behalf of Indo people and, frankly, he feels he

is warranted in being given fullest and friendliest ear by our Govt officials as wld be afforded any Amer business enterprise. On other hand, he does not request Govt approval nor Govt assistance in his economic undertaking.

"Mr. Fox wld like very much to see Amb Cochran in Jakarta. Again, his purpose in desiring meeting with our Amb is not to secure his assistance or his approval but rather to be able undertake full and frank discussion of his relationships with the Indos and to avoid any misunderstanding and any inconsistencies with Amer policy.

"Mr. Fox and I wld be most appreciative of your assistance in transmitting this requests to Amb Cochran."

In view attitude Nathan find mutually acceptable formula and Fox's stated desire adjust his differences with Dept, believe it desirable you at least listen to his statements along this line. Fox had opinion you had stated both in Wash and to Indo officials your opposition his contract and that this was your personal view. UnSecy forcefully informed him your expressions of views were those of the Dept and completely official.

Pls advise if you are willing receive Fox.

ACHESON

PHILIPPINES

COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES¹

711.9612/10-2648 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1949.

A-36. Dept agrees statement third par. your 1147, June 25, 1948,² that withdrawal previous notes should be separate and apart from new exchange of notes.

In addition to reference to Emb's 1147, June 25, reference is to Dept's 952 July 28, Emb's 1795 Sept. 17, and 2104 Oct. 26, all 1948.³

In conformity with Dept's 952, July 28, and for your convenience, Dept suggests following text of note be sent FonOff, after first taking up matter informally with FonOff, which with FonOff's reply quoting Emb note and accepting US interpretation in note, would constitute the exchange of notes as to the meaning of Art. 3.

"Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the last paragraph of Article III of the Treaty of Conciliation signed at Manila on November 16, 1946, by representatives of our two Governments,⁴ which reads as follows:

'Should no definite settlement be reached, notwithstanding the report and recommendations of the International Commission on the matter in dispute, the High Contracting Parties agree to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice conformably with Article 36 of its Statute, and further agree to be bound without need of special agreement by the decision of the Court.'

It is suggested that this note and your reply thereto, shall record the agreement of our respective Governments that the paragraph relates, so far as reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice is concerned, to disputes of a legal character.

I am directed by my Government to inform Your Excellency that it is recognized that, if a difference of view should arise in a particular case on the point of whether a dispute is or is not of a legal character, that point of character ultimately would be for decision by the International Court of Justice.

It is further suggested that the phrase 'without need of special agree-

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 625-644.

² Not printed.

³ None printed.

⁴ See telegram 780, November 16, 1946, from Manila, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VIII, p. 931.

ment' should be transferred from its present position to follow the words 'Article 36 of its Statute'.

It is understood that the two Governments desire and intend to negotiate as soon as possible a treaty of arbitration.

Accept, Excellency, etc."

Note Dept would not describe even generally jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals in present exchange of notes.

At the time of delivery of the above note you should also make the following statement:

"It is of course understood that the reference in Article III to submission to the International Court of Justice 'conformably with Article 36 of its Statute' means as provided in Article 36 of the Statute, including under such conditions as the two Governments may have stipulated in their respective acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court."

ACHESON

811.24596/4-1949

The Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 19 April 1949.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On 14 March 1947 the United States and Philippine Republic concluded a Military Base Agreement,¹ currently in force between the two countries. At the time of signing, it was the hope of this Government that Article XIII of the Agreement would provide satisfactory criminal jurisdiction for offenses against the United States.

In the intervening two years, however, a condition of lawlessness in the Philippines, as evidenced by numerous acts of violence against United States personnel and property, has grown to serious proportions. I enclose for your information copies of two reports prepared in 1948 by the Commanding General, Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines,² to indicate the nature and extent of the offenses to which I refer, as well as the measures taken by these commanders to cope with this situation.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the matter at length. They consider that from a military viewpoint these acts of violence do not in themselves affect the security of the United States, but that they do seriously hamper the proper conduct of the affairs of our armed forces in the Philippines, and also affect adversely the security of armed

¹ Signed at Manila; 61 Stat. 4019. See footnote to telegram 448, March 14, 1947, *Foreign Relations, 1947*, vol. VI, p. 1108.

² Dated May 10, 1948, and July 6, 1948, neither printed.

forces personnel and Government property in the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs believe, and I agree, that this situation is principally the result of reluctance by Philippine authorities to enforce their own criminal laws in the case of offenses against the personnel and property of the Armed Forces of the United States.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the Philippine Government be requested to bring about more adequate enforcement of its criminal laws, and I accordingly ask you to make formal representations in this connection. I recognize that a variety of factors may contribute to anti-United States sentiment in the Philippines, in which this Government may not be entirely without fault. However, I think you will agree that the incidents cited by the Army and Navy commanders reflect failure by the Philippine Republic properly to fulfil its obligations under the Agreement, and may therefore be made the subject of direct representation by the Department of State.

Article I, Section 4 of the Military Bases Agreement states that an exact description of the bases listed in the Agreement "will be agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments as soon as possible". The lack of exact metes and bounds has proved a source of conflict between United States and Philippine jurisdiction. I wish to emphasize the importance of concluding an agreement on this matter during the current negotiations which I understand are now in progress in the Philippines.

For your information, the Secretary of the Army is formulating proposals for a revision of Article XIII of the Military Bases Agreement, in the event that conditions do not improve. The Department of State would then be in a position to negotiate on this question with the Philippine Republic at such time as you may deem politically appropriate. However, I believe that the United States Government should, as a matter of urgency, make representations now to the Philippine Government concerning lax criminal prosecution under the Military Bases Agreement in its current form.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON

711.962/5-549 : Airgram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1949.

A-196. On April 26 and 27 officers of the Dept reviewed with Amb Cowen, Mr. Hester and Dr. Wilson¹ the status of the draft treaty of

¹ Ambassador Myron M. Cowen assumed charge of the Embassy at Manila on May 23; Evett D. Hester, Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs at Manila; Dr. Robert R. Wilson, Professor of Political Science at Duke University, had been assisting with treaty negotiations.

FCN between the US and Philippines which has been under negotiation for nearly three years.²

For the confidential information of the Embassy the Dept made the following observations on the procedure which should be followed in the next few months in breaking the present impasse in treaty negotiations:

1. The Dept recognizes that the present Philippine Administration may feel that it is not prepared to act on the treaty before the elections in 1949 and that therefore unless a favorable opportunity arises the Philippine Government need not be pressed for a decision on the outstanding issues at the present time.

2. It would be appropriate, however, for the Embassy to remind the Philippine Government on all appropriate occasions before the election of the desirability of concluding a mutually satisfactory and comprehensive treaty at an early date and of the advantages of such a treaty to the Philippines.

3. Following the election, the Philippine Government should be pressed for a decision on all of the outstanding treaty issues.

4. The Embassy should be mindful of the importance which the Dept attaches to the principles set forth in the draft treaty of FCN which has been proposed to the Philippines. These principles are the basis of this Government's foreign economic policy. They are directed toward the objective of placing world trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis and of providing the maximum protection for the rights and interests of American nationals and companies abroad consistent with the treatment which the US can accord aliens on a reciprocal basis. They are found in commitments which the US has made with many countries and are involved in commitments likely to be proposed to many other countries. Any major deviation from these principles is therefore undesirable, and rather than to accept any fundamental change, the Dept probably would prefer to forgo a treaty of FCN with the Philippines.

ACHESON

² See instruction 263, December 13, 1948, to Manila, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, vol. VI, p. 640.

811.24596/5-2349

The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State

No. 502

MANILA, May 23, 1949.

[Received June 6.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the telegram of the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. No. 1281 of May 16, 1948 [1949],¹ reporting the completion of the exchange of notes with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines² accomplishing the relinquishment

¹ Not printed; Thomas H. Lockett was Chargé.

² Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines.

of the use of, and the transfer of such right and title as the United States may have had in certain military reservations in the Philippines, and the temporary retention of certain other military reservations in the Philippines by the United States Armed Forces in accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, of the United States-Philippine Agreement concerning Military Bases.³

There are transmitted herewith⁴ for the attention of Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Advisor, certified copies of the Chargé d'Affaires' notes No. 310 (B), March 26, 1949; No. 509 [0509], May 14, 1949; and No. 0510, May 14, 1949 to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and there are also enclosed the signed originals of the latter's notes in reply, and unnumbered, undated note received at the Embassy at 10:35 p. m., March 26, 1949; note No. 12388, May 16, 1949; and note No. 12389, May 16, 1949. In addition there is also enclosed the original of initialed Memorandum from the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs No. 12428 dated May 16, 1949, to be considered in connection with the above-mentioned note from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs No. 12388.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

THOMAS H. LOCKETT

Counselor of Embassy

³ For exchange of notes on May 14 and 16, see 63 Stat. (pt. 3) 2660, 2666, 2670, 2672. For agreement respecting hospitals and medical care for Philippine veterans, signed at Manila, June 7, see *ibid.*, 2593.

⁴ Enclosures not printed.

811.24596/4-1949

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Philippines

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1949.

No. 114

The Secretary of State transmits a copy of a letter to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of Defense dated April 19, 1949 regarding acts of violence against personnel of the armed forces in the Philippines. A copy of the Department's reply¹ is also attached for the information and guidance of the Embassy. The Department desires that the Embassy lend all possible cooperation and support to the representatives of the National Military Establishment in the Philippines where, in the opinion of the Embassy, either the jurisdiction clauses of the Military Bases Agreement are not being observed or the Philippine Government does not display a disposition to enforce its own criminal laws. As stated in the letter to the Secretary of Defense, the

¹ Not printed.

Department believes that such matters can be handled in the Philippines. In view of the very delicate and troublesome nature of this problem, consultation with the Department is desired before taking action on border line cases and for the records of the Department a complete report of all cases which arise is desired.

The Department would also appreciate receiving any information available on the current status of the project for delimiting the metes and bounds of Bases, with particular reference to the mention of this subject which is made in the attached letters of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State.

896.001 Quirino/8-849 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Philippines (Lockett) to the Secretary of State

NIACT

MANILA, August 8, 1949.

1916. Ref Deptel 941, August 7.¹ According Malacanan press office, following is statement made August 6 by President Quirino at Manila airport before emplaning for United States:²

"I wish to thank you all for seeing me off. I am going to Washington officially as President of the Philippines. I shall be received there in that capacity. The name Elpidio Quirino is only incidental to official title. I have a delicate mission to perform. Its significance and importance to the welfare and stability of our country and people and to the relations between the Philippines and the United States are far-reaching. I must make it plain that I am not going merely to ask or beg. In honor and dignity as befits our sovereign status, I will, as your spokesman, convey your message of good-will and gratitude to the American people.

There are many spiritual and moral ties that bind us to America. It is necessary that we cultivate them. This is part of my mission. This is not a political junket. At this juncture in our history, it is imperative that your President should make this trip. While I am away, may I plead to all and sundry to hold your peace and maintain your serenity and calm. Above all, I wish you all to forget that I am a candidate. You can say what you please on that score when I come back.

I ask you to leave aside for the moment our partisan political differences and help me concentrate on the interest of our country while abroad. I rely on the high minded loyalty and devotion of every

¹Not printed.

²For White House press release of July 27 on President Quirino's visit, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1949, p. 199. For President Truman's welcoming remarks, see White House press release of August 8, *ibid.*, August 22, 1949, p. 276.

Filipino, to his homeland and people, to cooperate and to wish success to our mission. If you cannot pray for my personal safety, please pray at least for the safety of our national interests which I carry deep in my heart.

God keep our people.

Until we meet again, mabuhay."

LOCKETT

896.00/8-949

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Philippine Affairs (Ely)¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1949.

Subject: Matters taken up on the occasion of President Quirino's call on President Truman at 3:15 p. m. on August 9, 1949.

Participants:	President Truman	Secretary of Finance
	President Quirino	P. O. Pedrosa
	Secretary Acheson	Mr. José Yulo
	Ambassador J. M. Elizalde	Ambassador Cowen

(The following brief résumé of matters which were discussed is based on notes and verbal report by Ambassador Cowen.)

President Truman brought up the question of the financial budgetary situation of the Philippine Government, making reference to the report of the Joint Philippine-American Finance Commission, and inquired as to the progress being made by the Philippine Government in implementing the recommendations of the Commission. He made it clear that this government was somewhat concerned at the future outlook of the Philippine Government and their ability to get their finances and currency on a sound and stable basis. Secretary Pedrosa replied for President Quirino indicating that they were aware of the importance of this question and were trying to do everything possible to get their financial house in order.

There was some discussion of the peace and order situation throughout the country generally but with specific reference to the area around Clark Field and the so-called Huk territory in central Luzon. President Quirino was informed that this government was concerned that the military authorities were compelled to take unusual precautions to try to protect their personnel at Clark Field. President Quirino stated in reply that they were rapidly bringing the Huk movement under control; that the number of these people who had been involved

¹ Notation about August 17 by the Secretary of State: "I think that it is correct as written. DA."

in the Huk movement had been cut down to a point where they were no longer a source of worry.

President Quirino raised the question of possible additional benefits for Philippine veterans, reminding President Truman that he (President Truman) had previously endorsed certain legislation upon which Congress had failed to take action. President Truman confirmed this, saying that he had been strongly in sympathy with this proposal but that he had not been able to get Congress to take favorable action, and he made no commitment that he would undertake to try to do so again.

President Quirino also raised the question as to the possibility of further recognition of Philippine guerrillas but President Truman told him definitely that this matter had been carefully considered and the issue was closed as far as the United States was concerned. President Quirino then asked President Truman not to make a public statement to that effect as he (President Quirino) had appointed a board to make a study of the problem and that the Philippine Government might undertake to do something for the guerrillas with its own resources.

President Quirino and the members of his staff then brought up a new question which had not been anticipated. They referred to an executive order issued by the Philippine Government during the war, relating to pay of Filipino soldiers which was apparently intended to fix pay scales of Filipino soldiers on a par with American troops. As Army refused to accept, this order was never implemented and the Philippine Government now wishes to reopen the question. The matter was discussed only briefly, with no encouragement given by President Truman.

President Quirino made a strong plea for military assistance and for the appropriation of further funds for the payment of war damages, arguing that the United States Government, by public announcements early in the war, had a commitment particularly on the war damage question. President Truman was noncommittal on both questions, saying that they were still under consideration but he remarked that on any such programs involving expenditure of additional United States' funds it was a cause of concern that this money would be largely wasted unless the Philippine Government put its financial house in order. It was at this point that President Quirino countered with the argument that the United States was committed on these two matters.

President Quirino raised the question of the extent to which the Philippines might expect to participate in the Point Four program and President Truman explained what his original concept of the

Point Four program was but that he could not at this time tell President Quirino what the United States would be able to do.

President Quirino brought up the question of the appropriation of 23.8 million dollars authorized to be appropriated in 1934 to reimburse the Philippine Government for losses arising from the devaluation of the dollar, again taking the position that this government had an obligation to make this money available. President Truman remarked that he remembered the debates on this question in the Senate and referred particularly to strong opposition by the late Senator Glass of Virginia, intimating that he thought there might be opposition in Congress to taking any action on the question, but he threw out the suggestion that the Philippine Government might wish to try to offset this claim against funds owed to the United States and Secretary Pedrosa said that they had had the same idea.

896.20/12-949 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

MANILA, December 9, 1949—10 p. m.

2787. President Quirino last night approved Military Assistance program in form agreed upon between MAP mission and chief of staff HNDF. President expressed appreciation for this assistance and promised all cooperation his government. He said he hoped it would possible to formalize agreement by means of exchange of notes amending military assistance treaty rather than by new bilateral in order to avoid necessity of consulting the Senate.

I am departing Manila tonight ETA Washington December 14.

COWEN

896.001 Quirino/12-3049 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

MANILA, December 30, 1949—1 p. m.

2962. Principal foreign diplomatic consular officers, Manila, called in body on Quirino afternoon December 29 offer congratulations on his inauguration. In course this call Quirino made to me following statements re his forthcoming visit US:

He will leave Manila by regular Philippine Airlines' plane January 5 accompanied by members family and probably also by one or two secretaries but by none of top government officials. Plane will fly New York without touching Washington. At New York he will board

another plane for Baltimore (Embassy will transmit flight schedule and list members official party soon as available).

President asked I make completely clear purpose his trip is receive medical attention Johns Hopkins and that he expects no official entertaining or other official notice taken of his trip except that he would appreciate opportunity call on Truman either before entering Johns Hopkins or afterwards whichever President Truman may prefer (I would suggest he be invited for small informal lunch or dinner with Truman at which it would be desirable for Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury be present).

Incidentally, Quirino informed us he proposes keep his concurrent portfolio of Secretary Foreign Affairs during his forthcoming term.

COWEN

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1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions and activities. It emphasizes that this is essential for ensuring transparency and accountability in the organization's operations.

2. The second part of the document outlines the specific procedures and protocols that must be followed to ensure that all records are properly maintained and updated. It details the roles and responsibilities of various staff members in this process.

3. The third part of the document provides a detailed overview of the financial reporting requirements and the timeline for submitting reports. It includes information on the types of reports required and the consequences of non-compliance.

4. The fourth part of the document discusses the importance of regular audits and reviews to ensure that all records and reports are accurate and complete. It outlines the process for conducting these audits and the role of external auditors.

5. The fifth part of the document provides a summary of the key points discussed in the previous sections and offers final recommendations for ensuring the highest standards of record-keeping and reporting.

6. The sixth part of the document includes a list of references and resources that are relevant to the topics discussed in the document. This includes links to external websites, books, and other documents that provide further information on the subject.

7. The seventh part of the document contains a list of appendices that provide additional details and data related to the main text. These appendices are intended to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the organization's operations and financial performance.

8. The eighth part of the document includes a list of contact information for the various departments and individuals mentioned in the document. This information is provided to facilitate communication and coordination between different parts of the organization.



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