



LIBRARIES

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Refugee affairs. 1963

[s.l.]: [s.n.], 1963

<https://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/5YKWHIG5BUG4H9B>

This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17, US Code).

For information on re-use see:

<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright>

The libraries provide public access to a wide range of material, including online exhibits, digitized collections, archival finding aids, our catalog, online articles, and a growing range of materials in many media.

When possible, we provide rights information in catalog records, finding aids, and other metadata that accompanies collections or items. However, it is always the user's obligation to evaluate copyright and rights issues in light of their own use.

Refugee Movements - Report 1
April 11, 1963

The following information was presented to me by Mr. Tom Ward. Successive data re subject will be given on a day-to-day basis. In the case of a negative or no-infor report, I will telephone your office.

When possible an accompanying map will show related movements.

Within the last three days April 7- 10, 1963, the following movements are noted:

	<u>Ethnic Origin</u>	<u>Families</u>	<u>People</u>	<u>Origin of Flight</u>	<u>Arrived Destination</u>
1]	50% Meo 25% Lao 25% LT	50	350	4 burned villages near XK City	Ta Lin Noi
2]	90% Lao 10% LT	200	1400	Pho Keng Military families of Kong Le	Houei Ki Nin
3]	100% LT	25	146	Between XK & Thu Thom Route 4	Ban Pha Kha
4]	100% Lao	30	200	Ban Ban	Phu Nong

COMMENT: (Pop, V.P.)

If present situation continues, we can expect up to 10,000 refugees to come into the areas of Phu Nong, Ban Vieng and Houei Sa Ann.

The ethnic breakdown will be Lao 50%, Meo 25%, Lao Thong 25%.

The expected areas of flight will be from Ban Ban and Nong Het. (6000 mostly Lao, Ban Ban, 4000, Lao Theung and Meo - Nong Het).

Refugee Relief
October 24, 1963

HISTORY OF THE PROGRAM

Refugee Relief in Laos really began as an Emergency Assistance Program to the embattled city of Vientiane in late December 1960. By March of 1961, emergency assistance gave way to refugee relief. It was administered in Laos by the U. S. Mission Task Force and in Bangkok by the BASG. Great quantities of relief supplies (blankets, medicines, and kitchen utensils) were purchased and airlifted from Bangkok to Vientiane and other major provincial cities. In order to meet the growing need for commodity assistance, the airlift was expanded to include rice, salt, and iron bars as well as the original items mentioned previously and flights were made to villages in the interior. Fighting in Laos extended northward from Vientiane, creating more and more displaced persons; rice fields and villages were over-run and burned. By the spring of 1962 there were more than sixty thousand refugees being totally supported by USAID airdrops. Simultaneously, MAAG was air-dropping rice and salt to eighty thousand hill-tribe refugees farther to the North. When the Geneva Accords were signed and MAAG withdrew from Laos, these refugees were added to the refugee load already being supported by the USAID Mission.

Thus, October 1962, found the U. S. Mission faced with a refugee relief program consisting of approximately 140,000 (reduced to 120,000 between October 1962 and April 1962)* people of varying ethnic origin: Meo, Lao Theung, Lao, Yao, etc. These people had fled their usual places of abode, but tired of running, the majority now are willing to stand and defend their small rice fields that checkered the mountain sides and valleys in the provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khoueng. Militarily, it was essential that these hill tribes remain in the area to prevent the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh from over-running not only the mountainous areas of Laos, but, more important, the rich riparian plains of the Mekong. From a humanitarian standpoint, it was mandatory that these people be given the opportunity to resettle and make new homes for themselves. Moreover, the U. S. had a moral obligation to continue to sustain those who, under the direction of U. S. advisors, had contributed to the fight against Communist military aggression.

* Increased again to 140,000 by a second wave of urban refugees (mostly Lao) from Ban Ban and Xieng Khouang ville subsequent to April 1963.

Also, as a result of leader programs and other methods of propaganda, groups of people are leaving PL areas and joining friendly forces. (See Attachment B). Recent reports coming from friendly held areas indicate that PL centers and other enemy divisions

* Also, the 20,000 urban refugees will continue to require discharging amounts of subsistence.

In spite of sporadic fighting and infrequent incursions of the PL into the villages of the tribes people, it was hoped at the time (October) that the USAID Mission could gradually reduce and eventually cease its activities in the relief field and turn its efforts to less transitory pursuits. From October 1962, to April 1963, fighting diminished sufficiently to give credence to these hopes. However, in April relations between the Neutralists and the PL became severely strained, and the tempo of military action increased. This schism occurred at the crucial period of the 1963 rice-~~ox~~ planting season. It is not conclusively known to what extent the subsequent fighting has affected the 1963 rice harvest; undoubtedly the yield will not be as great as previously anticipated. Early reports, however, indicate certain refugee areas will be able to have a substantial harvest, while others will not realize a twenty percent yield.

RELIEF REQUIREMENTS

It is essential to keep in mind that under the present circumstances any projection of refugee requirements to supplement the Fall harvest would have to be in probables. We estimate that if the PL do not interfere with the harvest, there can be a substantial reduction, beginning in December of this year, in the amount of relief rice required by the original 120,000 recipients (using April 1963, as the base figure). If the harvest is good, approximately 60,000 hill people will be almost self-sufficient by the end of this calendar year, at least with regard to rice requirements. For these people, USAID will be required to provide enough tools, vegetable seeds, and clothing to carry them through the next planting season. Attention is invited to Attachments A and A-1 which show considerable changes in self-sufficiency estimates since July 1963. These changes mainly are a result of the shifting military situation.*

There will remain another 60,000 requiring continued substantial assistance through air drops. This group is composed of hill-tribesmen who are strategically located to offer the best protection to the Mekong valley against future attacks by the enemy. Their positions are on mountain tops or in such rugged terrain that it is unreasonable to expect them to do any type of cultivation.

In addition to requirements for the original group of refugees, the USAID has been confronted periodically with the requirements for other refugees (up to 3,000 people) whose lives have been disrupted by continued hostilities in various parts of Laos. These refugees continually move from one area to another. Also, as a result of leaflet programs and other methods of propaganda, groups of people are leaving PL areas and joining friendly forces. (See Attachment B). Recent reports coming from friendly held areas indicate that PL centers and other enemy bivouacs

* Also, the 20,000 urban refugees will continue to require diminishing amounts of subsistence.

(including areas in North Vietnam adjacent to Laos) are suffering from an acute shortage of rice. The shortage has motivated two distinct actions on the part of the PL forces: attack, to gain rice fields; defect, in order to be fed. The approach of the harvest may trigger stepped-up enemy action, or it may result in a marked increase in the number of PL desertions.

It now appears that the planned expansion of military operations on the part of friendly forces to regain areas lost after the signing of the Geneva Accords and to enlarge the sphere of influence of the Government of National Union will surely create new refugees.

...the original wave consisted of...
...and light were made to...
...northward from Vietnam, bringing more and more displaced persons...
...and villages were over-run and burned. By the spring of 1952...
...more than eight thousand refugees being totally supported by USAID...
...air-dropping rice and salt to...
...the Geneva Accords...
...these refugees were added to the...
...already being supported by the USAID...
...October 1962, found the U.S. Mission faced with a refugee relief program...
...of approximately 140,000 increased to 320,000 between October 1962...
...and April 1963. People of varying ethnic origin: also, Lao, Thai, Lao, Yao,
...These people had lost their usual places of abode, but tried to remain, the...
...majority now are willing to stand and defend their small rice fields...
...the mountains sides and valleys in the provinces of Ban Heng and Xiang Khouang...
...Militarily, it was essential that these hill tribes remain in the area to prevent...
...the Pathet Lao and that their base was running out and the mountainous areas...
...of Laos, but, more important, the strategic position of the Mekong. From a...
...humanitarian standpoint, it was essential that these people be given the...
...opportunity to resettle and make new homes for themselves. Moreover, the...
...U.S. had a moral obligation to continue to provide these people, under the direction...
...of U.S. advisors, had contributed to the fight against Communist military...
...aggression.

...increased again to 140,000 by a second wave of...
...from Ban Heng and Xiang Khouang...
...April 1963.

ZONE ONE

DZs that will not be self-sufficient December 1963:

A) Military Outposts

- 1) Hin Tang TG-8827
- 2) Phou Pha Sai TG-9422
- 3) Nam Kok TG-9115

These outposts line the western edge of the PDJ on ridges too steep to be resupplied by horse, yet must be held at all costs if Sam Tong Long Thieng and Pha Khao are to remain secure. It is a problem complicated by the fact that none of these areas were former farming areas. There is nothing but rare wild vegetables and bamboo. These positions have been and must continue to be supported from Long Thieng. Long Thieng and Zone One, however, cannot support these positions with meat as livestock here is close to non-existent. Furthermore, these areas do not have a civilian population to serve as a backup.

- 4) Phou Ban Yai TG-7595
- 5) Pha Khe TF-8299

Located to the southwest of Pha Khao and protecting the Zone One area from PL locations at Ban Son TF-5791, these posts face a similar problem as those above to a lesser degree. This area is good farmland and has been used as such before the PL forced the Meo out. Again the protection of the Nam Ngum valley to the north, makes these positions indispensable.

- 6) The Pha Khao TG-9307

Pha Khao seems designated to the any constructive ideas proposed. The swarming population of 9000 have made any previous attempts at making the area self-sufficient something less than successful. However, the following recent events promise a change for the better. In the next three months, some 5000 will move out of Pha Khao into zone One's Golden Triangle, a rich area roughly demarkated by Pha Khao, Phou San Yai and Long Thieng. Remaining in Pha Khao will be the families of soldiers, cripples and the "urban population; Local leaders estimate that 2000 of this number can feed themselves. Allowing for over-optimism of this program, by next December we believe that all but 3000 will be self supporting.

B) DZs that will be self-supporting December 1963

- 1) Sam Thong TG-8226
- 2) Long Thieng TG-8213
- 3) Muong Ohm (FAR) UF-1996
- 4) Pha Phai UG-1710

The area of Pha Phai will be self supporting if the population, currently about 23000, remains the same. However, if there is any serious disruption in the south PDJ area, this is not likely. The outpost has grown close to 100% in the last year.

ZONE 2A

(A) DZs that will not be self-supporting December 1963

- 1) Ban Na TG-8535

The land in this area is extremely poor and at present supports about one third of the three thousand in the area. A relocation program currently underway will resettle about 1500 in new arable lands. However, Ban Na is the main entry point for refugees from the Plains and it is anticipated that we will get in refugees what we have been able to relocate.

- 2) San Than Noi TG-9233
- 3) Phou Tham Noi TG-9140

These two DZs serve as a depot for four to five outposts in the vicinity that border on the Plains and serve the same function to the Ban Na area that Hin Tang, Phou Pha Sai, and Nam Kok do for Long Thieng and Sam Tong. Distribution to these outposts is done by horse. Maintenance of these outposts is ~~not~~ crucial as they about the new KL positions in the western PDJ. As Ban Na cannot support even itself, it is quite doubtful that Ban Na can support these positions.

(B) DZs that will be self supporting in December 1963

- 1) Tham Herb TG-7844
- 2) Houei Ki Nin TG-8148

ZONE 2B

(A) DZs that will not be self-supporting in December 1963.

- 1) San Louang TG-7250

For similar reasons as Ban Na, it is not expected that this area will be able to support itself. Any increase in refugees from the Plains or,

as recent reports have indicated, from the west in the region of Muong Chia TG-4141, will doom any hope of self sufficiency. Moves of the surplus population into the interior are being effected but the outflow is expected to just match the influx.

2) Nam Chang TG-7044

Poor soil is the basic problem in this area. Along the banks of the Nam Ngum, the soil is better but the security poor. Recently Colonel Vang Pao ordered movement into the lowlands and if fully accomplished, the area will be self supporting. This is assuming, however, that the PL buildup in Muong Chia is of a non-aggressive nature - a difficult point to impress on those who witnessed the Xieng Dat coup last summer.

3) Phou Da Pho TG-5645

Our main outpost between the Xieng Dat valley and the PL at Muong Chim. Strictly military and acting as a secure DZ for numerous smaller positions

(B) DZs that will be self sufficient in December 1963

1) Sam Sen TG-5841

2) Nam Pong TG-7044

If not overcrowded by refugees, can supply its own needs.

3) Xieng Dat TG-6048

Currently few civilians and therefore can be self-sufficient. However, this area is extremely vulnerable to both enemy activity and any influx of Lao or Laotheung refugees.

ZONE 3

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient in December 1963

1) Bouam Lao TG-7488

2) Phou Sang Nao TG-8686

Military centers as protecting Zone Three from PL to the north and at long distance from rice growing area of the zone.

3) Phou Xieng Pet TG-6165

4) Phou Tin TH-9000. Similar to the above in character.

5)

(B) DZs that will be self sufficient in December 1963

1) Phou Nong Phi TG-7373

- 2) Houei Tad TG-6880
- 3) Phou Fa Noi TG-6570
- 4) Phou So TG-8271

Given the current relations between this zone and the KL in Muong Soui, the more vulnerable DZs such as Phou So, will be able to plant and grow sufficient rice. Any change in relations, or PL occupation of Muong Soui would make this optimistic estimate look ridiculous. The four above DZs account for the most of the soldiers and all of the refugees in the zone.

ZONE 4A

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December 1963.

- 1) Phou Bia UG-1789
- 2) San Pa Ja UG-1182
- 3) Phou Se UG-0481

As long as the KL hold the immediate area to the south, the chances for these combined military civilian outposts to achieve self-sufficiency is good especially Phou Se. Distance however, from main rice areas is a consideration and although horses are used extensively in the area, the terrain around Phou Bia is extremely rugged, thus limiting their effectiveness.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient in December 1963

- 1) Phou Vieng UG-0884

The zone headquarters and supply point for most of the zone.

ZONE 4B

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient in December 1963

- 1) Houi Chon UH-1519

Primarily a refugee village, but which serves as supply point for zone forces arrayed against Muong Heim UH-2836

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient in December 1963

- 1) Ban San Pha Kha UH-0607
- 2) Phou Cum UH-0404

ZONE 5A

(A) DZs that will not be self-~~suffi~~ supporting by December 1963:

Military outpost (1) Nong Onne TG-6186

(B) DZs that will ~~not~~ be self-supporting by December 1963

- 1) Houei Sa An UG-3995
- 2) Ban Tham La UH;3911
- 3) Ban Hin Tat ~~UH~~- 7000
- 4) Ban Tha UG-5284

ZONE 5B

Any estimate in this zone at this time is perhaps immature, due to the current arrivals of Nong Het refugees. Until a better estimate of the number that will eventually come can be made, it is safer to say that this area with the exception of Phieng Liou UG-7393. Will still require some assistance by the end of the year. It is also possible that the ~~V~~PL in Ban San may take action against the zone. If this happens assistance will certainly be needed at the following DZs.

- 1) San Bouac Xang UG-7886
- 2) Ban Vieng UG-7381
- 3) Som Poi UG-8980
- 4) Phou Se Bott UG-7680

ZONE 5C

(A) ZDs that will not be self-supporting by December 1963

- 1) Pha Tamg UG-2785
- 2) Phou Khe UG-2783
- 3) Phou San UG-2876

These ~~Z~~DZs all in the vicinity of Phou ~~B~~ San are vital to the protection of the zone and have been in contact with the PL frequently since the cease fire. The terrain is similar to that on the east flank of zone One high and rugged making resupply by horse impossible.

(B) DZs that will be self-supporting ~~y~~ by December 1963

- 1) Bouam Long UG-2686

Currently producing half of its needs, it will be self-sufficient if Phou San remains in friendly hands.

ZONE 6A

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient in December 1963

- 1) Ban Pha Khe UG-4649

Large refugee concentration makes self-sufficiency possible but not probable by next December

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Tha Lin Noi UG-3552
- 2) Kang Heng UG-2847
- 3) Houei Ray UG-3749
- 4) Phieng Leuang UG-4642

To date, the PL have made no strong moves against this area. If this continues the zone is fully capable of supplying its own needs. It remains, however, in a vulnerable position.

ZONE 6 B

This zone was organized later than neighboring zones and information on current crops is incomplete.

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

-believe none at present time

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December 1963

- 1) Bor Onne UG-5832
- 2) Nam Kuang UG-7831
- 3) Nam Bong UG-7422
- 4) Han Ka Kang UG-7024
- 5) Houri Youang UG4832

ZONE 7

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Ban Nong UG-3726

Primarily a military position and point through which Xieng Khouang refugees usually pass.

- 2) Pha Pheung UG-3819

Large refugee population and current inability to provide enough rice for the inhabitants, coupled with the importance of its military position make it questionable if this DZ will be completely self-supporting.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Ban Kai Phou UG-4123
- 2) Pha Daeng UG-4230
- 3) Houa Phieng UG-4413
- 4) Ban Pheung UG-4422

ZONE 8

(A) DZS that will not be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Tham Sorn Yai TG-3728

This DZ and surrounding areas can and have been attacked by PL units located to the north and west. This pressure has shown no signs of slackening. It is unlikely that much rice will be planted under these conditions.

- 2) Phou Houat TG-4231

This area, close to the one above, but more secure, will in all likely events serve as a refugee center. Not as much help will be needed, yet it is not expected to become completely self-sufficient.

- 3) Tin Bong TG-4721

At present, this area would be fully self-sufficient by December. However, if the PL make any move which threatens the two positions immediately north (above) this area will be inundated with refugees.

- 4) Long Pot TG-3539

This DZ has been cut off the drop list following the crash of the PV-2, but remains an important outpost now completely resupplied by horse.

(B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Ban Pha Khe TG-6113
- 2) Nam Deng TG-5613
- 3) Pha En TG-5418
- 4) Ban Ma Kaow TG-4811
- 5) Muong Phoun TG-5914
- 6) Phou Pha Deng TG-5206

ZONE 9

The area of Phou Jia SG-9848 will be self-sufficient by December.

ZONE 10

The entire zone should be self-sufficient by next December. The ~~only~~ only mitigating factors involved is the movement of DRV refugees into the area of Tham Tat VG-9416 and Muong Ngat VG-0311 and PL pressure now being exerted on Muong Xang VG-2203, Sam Tong VG-2708 and Muong Tiouen VF-3685.

The following DZs should be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Nam Thon VG-1517
- 2) San Hgat VF-0698
- 3) Muong Moc UF-9690
- 4) Nam Peua UG-7207
- 5) ----- UG-8107
- 6) Chiang Sa Ni VF-1989

ZONE 11

Phou Nong will need assistance after December 1963, the soil is good but the Phou Nong leads a precarious existence. Approximately 700 to 800 Ban Ban Lao-theung refugees are expected shortly as well as 600 Nong Het refugees will further complicate the situation.

ZONE 12.

- (A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December with any lack, none.
- (B) DZs that will be self-sufficient by December.

- 1) Pha Bong UH-4152
- 2) Houei Tong UH-1516
- 3) Houei Ngao UH-1418
- 4) Houa Muong UH-6329
- 5) Nam Tat UH-7731

ZONE 13

~~11/11/71~~ Of all the Sam Kuea zones, this zone has the most favorable terrain

military. However, such of the rice producing land lies at low altitudes where the securing is not assured. Given the uncertain situation, it is not that ~~at~~ either of the two DZs listed below will be self-sufficient by December.

- 1) Phou Pha Thi UH-6653
- 2) Houei Ka Moun UH-7068

ZONE 14

(A) DZs that will not be self-sufficient by December

- 1) Hong Nong UH-8255
- 2) Phou Kout UH-8225
- 3) Phou ~~C~~ Bouc UH-9268

The above DZs, lying close to Sam Neua and highly vulnerable, are clearing ground and preparing to plant. Their morale is not low, there seems little question that they will stay if physically able to do so. However, they do not have the manpower to provide both crops and protection and it cannot be expected that they will produce all their needs unless enemy pressure completely disappears, something that the PL and VM have shown no particular willingness to do.

ZONE 15

Phia Kham UH-9970

The leaders in this area have recently begun to send their families to more protected areas to begin farming. Phia Kham will likely become completely military in the future and remain dependent upon our support to ~~some~~ some degree. As is the case in Zone 14, they have little intention of giving up Phia Kham by default, yet they will need continued assistance to more agree.

SAYABOURY ZONE

Only unforeseen difficulties will prevent all of the DZs listed below from attaining full self-sufficiency. Major problems at present are the refugees from Nam Tha and serious lack of salt. The only possible exception to the above is Pho Kong QB-4451 which is to be the Headquarters of the Meo in the area. We are not in the best position at #98 to make recommendations or judgements on this area.

DZs in the area currently receiving support:

- 1) Phou Houa Moui QB-7961
- 2) Phou Ming QV-2155
- 3) Phou Kong QB-4451

- 4) Phou Cham QB-3542
- 5) Nong Sa Kha QB-5533
- 6) Ban Nam Hin QB-5219

NAM THA ZONE

As in Sayaboury Zone, we are not best qualified to judge if these areas will be self-sufficient by December 1963. The following is an estimate made on our limited information:

- 1) Ban Na Woua PC-7385
Reported heavy concentration of refugees in this area, extent of local farming unknown.
- 2) Ban Pha Deng PC-6412
No information
- 3) Ban Kha QD-0614

Situation here is known to be extremely critical. We have reports that PL have burned all the local rice crop and storage. We have not been able to drop rice here with any regularity. It is doubtful if there will be any seed rice to plant or any security to protect it.....

Subject: The degree of rice self-sufficiency that each DZ can be expected to have attained by December 1963.

The following conditions must be ~~not~~ met in each zone if the estimate is to anywhere near valid.

(A) The period from January 1963 to June 1963 must be calm enough militarily to permit adequate slash/burn acreage for next rice crop. Once planted, the problem becomes one of physical protection and maintenance. Women perform the maintenance of the fields but the clearing and burning of the land is done by men released from military duty.

(B) Refugees: Any large movement of refugees into a zone after the rice has been planted must obviously effect the per capital rice available after the fall harvest. Zone populations must remain close to the present levels. Zone 1, 2A, and 2B face the problem of virtual insufficient orable land if defections and refugees in any number arrive from PDJ. Zones 5B, and 10B face a similar situation with respect to Nong Het and DRV refugees. Such a possibility exists in Sam Neua as well.

(C) Morale: To exert the effort to clear the land, each must have decided that they will be around what it comes time to harvest it. In all zones-including Sam Neua land is being cleared. This appears to indicate that the Meo are optimistic about the coming year and their ability to hold their land.

Any attempt on our part to relocate large members in new areas would shake

this growing morale and lower their conficents in the willingness of the US to back them this optain and voiced by local leaders here when the discus- sion of where would the Meo go if.....

(D) Continued effective support of protective military positions around zone rice growing areas and when needed, the ability to resupply with ammunition.

GENERAL:

(A) Use of Horses:

Horses provided some months age are being used extensively in all zones especially in resupplying military outposts from secure, near area DZs. There are two areas, Zones one in the vacinity of Phou Bia and zones 4C in the vacinity of Phou San where the are too steep for horses carrying rice.

(B) a Problem related to that of ~~self~~ self-sufficiency is that of the extreme cost and inadequate supply of animals in zone one. This is not a refugee problem but a military one as it is the soldiers on the outpost who need the meat, not the civilians. New livestock we introduced some months ago but have yet not produced any tangible results not can they be expected to for some months. In the interin, supply of meat from is recommenden is well as the assistance in transporting a young animals to rebuild live ... supplies for the future.

(C) Accompanying this estimate is a revised drop list and new (lower) quotas. It has been accomplished by much sweat. (ours) and Tears (Meo) but no blood to speak of.

ORA:ps:8-16-71