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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943

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# Foreign Relations of the United States

The Conferences at  
Washington and Quebec  
1943



United States  
Government Printing Office  
Washington : 1970

DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 8552

HISTORICAL OFFICE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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## PREFACE

This volume of documents on the conferences at Washington and Quebec (1943) is published in continuation of the special series of *Foreign Relations* volumes on the World War II conferences attended by President Roosevelt or President Truman, along with Prime Minister Churchill or Marshal Stalin, or both of the latter. Volumes previously published in this series were entitled *The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942*, and *Casablanca, 1943*; *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*; *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*; and *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945*. The second Quebec Conference of 1944 will complete the series.

The principal compilers and editors of the present volume were William Slany (for the Washington Conference) and Richardson Dougall (for the Quebec Conference). Substantial preliminary work was done by Fredrick Aandahl, Velma Hastings Cassidy, John P. Glennon, Robert W. Lambert, and Richard S. Patterson. The volume was reviewed by the undersigned.

The technical editing of the volume was the responsibility of the Publishing and Reproduction Services Division, Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief.

In order to make this volume as complete and accurate as possible, the editors supplemented the documentation and data available in the Department of State by obtaining source material and information from a number of individuals and agencies outside the Department. The Historical Office would like to express its sincere appreciation for this assistance. Particular acknowledgment is made of the extensive help received from the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, New York. Quotations from certain manuscript collections listed in the Introduction to the volume have been made with the kind permission of the respective owners and archival authorities. The British Foreign Office and the Canadian Department of External Affairs generously made available a number QUADRANT papers which were referred to in United States documentation but which could not be located in American files. The photographs were supplied through the courtesy of the National Archives, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, and the United States Army Photographic Agency.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN  
*Director, Historical Office*  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*



# CONTENTS

	<b>Page</b>
LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS . . . . .	<b>XIII</b>
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	<b>XV</b>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES . . . . .	<b>XXV</b>
LIST OF PAPERS . . . . .	<b>XXXI</b>

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

### 1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS:

A. Papers on atomic energy . . . . .	1
B. Arrangements for the conference . . . . .	11

### 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE:

#### *Wednesday, May 12, 1943*

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	24
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	24

#### *Thursday, May 13, 1943*

Roosevelt-Churchill-Beneš meeting, forenoon . . . . .	33
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	34
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	48
Hull-Churchill meeting . . . . .	49
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11 p.m. . . . .	51

#### *Friday, May 14, 1943*

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	52
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 2 p.m. . . . .	66

#### *Saturday, May 15, 1943*

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	77
---	----

#### *Sunday, May 16, 1943*

Editorial note . . . . .	86
--------------------------	----

#### *Monday, May 17, 1943*

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	86
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	96
Leahy-Soong meeting, afternoon . . . . .	97

	Page
<i>Tuesday, May 18, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	97
Roosevelt-Soong conversation, 11:50 a.m. . . . .	108
Roosevelt press conference, 4:10 p.m. . . . .	109
McNarney-Soong meeting, afternoon . . . . .	110
Smith-Brooke conversation, evening . . . . .	110
<i>Wednesday, May 19, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	111
Churchill address to a joint meeting of the Houses of Congress, noon . . . . .	117
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4:30 p.m. . . . .	117
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 6 p.m. . . . .	119
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King conversation, evening . . .	123
Roosevelt-Mackenzie King conversation, evening . . . . .	123
<i>Thursday, May 20, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	124
Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 12:05 p.m. . . . .	134
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. .	141
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m. . . . .	142
Hull-Mackenzie King dinner meeting . . . . .	143
<i>Friday, May 21, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	143
Roosevelt press conference, 10:50 a.m. . . . .	149
Leahy-Soong meeting . . . . .	150
Roosevelt-Mackenzie King meeting, 12:30 p.m. . . . .	151
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	151
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m. . . . .	152
<i>Saturday, May 22, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	160
Stilwell-Churchill meeting, forenoon . . . . .	165
American-British luncheon meeting, 1:15 p.m. . . . .	166
Stimson-Churchill meeting, 3 p.m. . . . .	172
Hull-Halifax conversation . . . . .	173
Churchill meeting with members of Congress . . . . .	174
Meetings of American and British shipping experts, beginning at 4 p.m. . . . .	175
<i>Sunday, May 23, 1943</i>	
Phillips-Churchill meeting, forenoon . . . . .	177
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2 p.m. . . . .	178
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening . . . . .	183
<i>Monday, May 24, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m. . . . .	184
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	188
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 4:45 p.m. . . . .	189
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening . . . . .	197

*Tuesday, May 25, 1943***Page**

Hopkins-Churchill meeting, forenoon . . . . .	198
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	199
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:30 a.m. . . . .	203
Roosevelt-Soong meeting, 2:45 p.m. . . . .	208
Marshall-Chu conversation, [3 p.m.?] . . . . .	208
Hopkins-Bush-Cherwell meeting, 3:30 p.m. . . . .	209
Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference, 4:03 p.m. . . . .	211
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening . . . . .	229

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS:

A. Global strategy . . . . .	222
B. Strategy in Europe . . . . .	238
C. Strategy in Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	288
D. Bases in the Azores . . . . .	304
E. Supplies and shipping . . . . .	312
F. French liberation movement in North Africa . . . . .	320
G. Polish-Soviet dispute . . . . .	324
H. Policy of unconditional surrender . . . . .	326
I. Visit of Prime Minister Mackenzie King . . . . .	332
J. Emergency measures for refugees . . . . .	336
K. Final report to the President and Prime Minister . . . . .	346
L. Proposed communiqué . . . . .	373
M. Reports on the conference to Stalin and Chiang . . . . .	377

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 4. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE . . . . . 391

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS:

A. The war in Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	415
B. The war in Europe and the Mediterranean. . . . .	443
C. Special questions relating to Italy: peace feelers, surrender terms, declaration of Rome as an open city . . . . .	516
D. Bases in the Azores . . . . .	609
E. Bases in Ireland . . . . .	616
F. The Soviet Union and the war . . . . .	624
G. Cooperation with the United Kingdom in research on atomic energy . . . . .	630
H. Creation of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States- Canada . . . . .	653
I. Representation on the Combined Food Board . . . . .	660
J. Possible recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation . . . . .	661
K. General policy toward Iran . . . . .	672
L. Issuance of an Anglo-American statement on Palestine . . . . .	674
M. Postwar civil aviation policy . . . . .	679
N. Postwar world organization . . . . .	681
O. German territorial questions . . . . .	730
P. Italian territorial questions and the political reconstruction of Italy . . . . .	788

6. PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK:	Page
Editorial note . . . . .	830
<i>Saturday, August 14, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting . . . . .	832
7. LOG OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CANADA . . . . .	835
8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE:	
<i>Saturday, August 14, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	849
Luncheon, 1:30 p.m. . . . .	855
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4:30 p.m. . . . .	856
<i>Sunday, August 15, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	862
Marshall-Churchill meeting, evening . . . . .	869
<i>Monday, August 16, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	870
Harriman-Churchill meeting, afternoon . . . . .	874
<i>Tuesday, August 17, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	875
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11:30 p.m. . . . .	880
<i>Wednesday, August 18, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m. . . . .	881
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon . . . . .	887
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon . . . . .	888
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, late evening . . . .	888
<i>Thursday, August 19, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m. . . . .	888
Hopkins-Eden meeting . . . . .	889
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	889
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, afternoon . . . . .	894
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m. . . . .	894
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 9:30 p.m. . . . .	903
<i>Friday, August 20, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill discussions . . . . .	903
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	904
Hull-Eden meeting, afternoon . . . . .	912
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 9:30 p.m. . . . .	917

*Saturday, August 21, 1943*

	Page
Roosevelt meeting with his advisers, forenoon . . . . .	918
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, early afternoon . . . . .	918
Hull-Eden meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	918
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	920
Hull-Mackenzie King meeting, about 4 p.m. . . . .	921
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, late afternoon . . . . .	922
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening . . . . .	922
Hull-Eden meeting, 9 p.m. . . . .	922
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King meeting, evening . . . . .	928

*Sunday, August 22, 1943*

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1 p.m. . . . .	929
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:30 p.m. . . . .	930
Harriman-Bracken meeting, early evening . . . . .	934
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m. . . . .	935
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11 p.m. . . . .	935

*Monday, August 23, 1943*

Roosevelt-Robertson meeting, forenoon . . . . .	935
Roosevelt-Churchill-Soong luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m. . . . .	936
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	936
Roosevelt-Mountbatten meeting, 5 p.m. . . . .	941
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m. . . . .	941
Hull-Eden meeting . . . . .	949
Dunn-Cadogan meeting . . . . .	950
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening . . . . .	952
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10 p.m. . . . .	952

*Tuesday, August 24, 1943*

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, forenoon . . . . .	953
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m. . . . .	954
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King press conference, 12:15 p.m. . . . .	964
Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King luncheon meeting, early afternoon . . . . .	965
Harriman-Eden conversation, afternoon . . . . .	965
Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, evening . . . . .	965
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening . . . . .	966

9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS:

A. The war in Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	968
B. The war in Europe and the Mediterranean . . . . .	1008
C. Special questions relating to Italy: peace feelers, surrender terms, declaration of Rome as an open city, military operations. . . . .	1054
D. Bases in the Azores . . . . .	1091
E. Scale of possible attack on North America . . . . .	1092
F. Tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union . . . . .	1095
G. Cooperation with the United Kingdom in research on atomic energy . . . . .	1096

	Page
H. Propaganda coordination . . . . .	1097
I. Policy toward Spain . . . . .	1099
J. Possible recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation . . . . .	1101
K. Policy toward Austria . . . . .	1111
L. The Soviet-Polish boundary . . . . .	1113
M. Issuance of an Anglo-American statement on Palestine . . . . .	1116
N. Final documents of the First Quebec Conference:	
(1) Agreement relating to atomic energy . . . . .	1117
(2) Press release announcing the creation of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada . . . . .	1119
(3) Declaration on German crimes in Poland . . . . .	1120
(4) Reports of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff . . . . .	1121
(5) Communiqué . . . . .	1157
(6) Reports on the conference to Stalin and Chiang . . . . .	1159
(7) Directive to Eisenhower transmitting surrender terms for Italy . . . . .	1161
(8) Statements on relations with the French Committee of National Liberation . . . . .	1169
10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION . . . . .	1173
11. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON:	
Editorial note . . . . .	1197
<i>Wednesday, September 1, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 11:30 p.m. . . . .	1198
<i>Thursday, September 2, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 11:25 a.m. . . . .	1198
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, noon . . . . .	1199
Leahy-Cadogan meeting . . . . .	1199
Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 11:30 p.m. . . . .	1200
<i>Friday, September 3, 1943</i>	
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m. . . . .	1200
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 4:40 p.m. . . . .	1207
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:50 p.m. . . . .	1208
<i>Tuesday, September 7, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10:50 a.m. . . . .	1209
<i>Wednesday, September 8, 1943</i>	
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10:55 a.m. . . . .	1209
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1 p.m. . . . .	1209
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, early afternoon . . . . .	1210
<i>Thursday, September 9, 1943</i>	
Marshall-Churchill meeting, 12:30 p.m. . . . .	1211
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m. . . . .	1212
Harriman-Churchill conversation, 11 p.m. . . . .	1216

*Friday, September 10, 1943*

	<b>Page</b>
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m. . . . .	1218
Meeting of Churchill with an <i>ad hoc</i> committee, noon . . . . .	1226

*Saturday, September 11, 1943*

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Churchill, 11 a.m. . . . .	1229
Hull-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m. . . . .	1236

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS:

A. The war in Asia and the Pacific . . . . .	1237
B. The war in Europe . . . . .	1243
C. The surrender of Italy and the Allied invasion of the Italian peninsula . . . . .	1257
D. Review of the strategic situation in light of the Italian surrender . . . . .	1287
E. Bases in the Azores . . . . .	1293
F. Anti-submarine warfare . . . . .	1294
G. Tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union and establishment of a military-political commission . . . . .	1303
H. Cooperation with the United Kingdom in research on atomic energy . . . . .	1310
I. Propaganda coordination . . . . .	1313
J. Hospital ships . . . . .	1318
K. Postwar civil aviation policy . . . . .	1319
L. Need for a conference on postwar employment policies . . . . .	1332
M. Dependent peoples . . . . .	1333
N. Publication of minutes of meetings of the Council of Four during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 . . . . .	1334

## 13. CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK . . . . . 1336

## INDEX OF SUBJECTS . . . . . 1343

## INDEX OF PERSONS . . . . . 1361



## LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

(These photographs will be found in a group following page 387.)

	Plate
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Washington, May 14, 1943 . . . . .	1
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at Shangri La, weekend of May 14-17, 1943 . . . . .	2
Meeting of the Pacific War Council, Washington, May 20, 1943 . . . . .	3
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, Washington, May 24, 1943 . . . . .	4
Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Washington, May 24, 1943 . . . . .	5
Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, President Roosevelt, and the Earl of Athlone, Quebec, August 18, 1943 . . . . .	6
President Roosevelt, Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, the Earl and Countess of Athlone, and British advisers, Quebec, August 18, 1943 . . . . .	7
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Quebec, August 18, 1943 . . . . .	8
Secretary of State Hull and Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Quebec, August 20, 1943 . . . . .	9
Prime Minister Churchill, Minister of Information Bracken, and Mr. Harry Hopkins, Quebec, August 22, 1943 . . . . .	10
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with their aides, Quebec, August 23, 1943 . . . . .	11
The Combined Chiefs of Staff, Quebec, August 23, 1943 . . . . .	12



# INTRODUCTION

## SCOPE OF COVERAGE

This volume presents documentation on the fourth and fifth conferences participated in by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill after the United States became a belligerent in World War II. These are the Third Washington Conference of May 1943 and the First Quebec Conference of the following August. These conferences are also known by their code names: TRIDENT for the Washington Conference and QUADRANT for the meeting at Quebec. The Third Washington Conference was a single unit comprising two weeks of discussions in the capital. The First Quebec Conference, however, was accompanied by meetings at Hyde Park, New York, both before and after the Quebec meetings, and Churchill was a guest for more than a week in early September 1943 in the White House at Washington, where his presence gave rise to an ancillary series of meetings on problems related to the war. At both conferences there was participation in some meetings by Canadian and Chinese officials; and a meeting of the Pacific War Council was held during the TRIDENT Conference.

Advisers, both civilian and military, assisted Roosevelt and Churchill at Washington and Quebec, but the predominant concerns of the conferences were military. Accordingly, the documentation on military subjects bulks large. But Secretary of State Cordell Hull participated to some extent in the conversations at Washington, and both Hull and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden were major participants in the political discussions at Quebec, in preparation for which the Department of State assembled elaborate background documentation. Additional and extensive background information on the subjects discussed at the Washington and Quebec Conferences has previously been published in the annual volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States* and in the series *United States Army in World War II*, published by the Department of the Army.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The volume is divided into two parts, one devoted to each of the conferences. The organization of each of the parts is similar—pre-conference papers, minutes of meetings, and conference documents and

papers—but the greater bulk of documentation for the Quebec Conference and the desirability of including material on the related Hyde Park and Washington conversations dictated organization of the material into a larger number of chapters and a different arrangement of the pre-conference papers.

The volume opens with a section of previously unpublished papers on atomic energy in the period from February 1943 to the opening of the Third Washington Conference. This section is followed by a group of documents, arranged chronologically, on arrangements for the conference.

The chapter on proceedings of the TRIDENT Conference (as is the case also with QUADRANT) is organized chronologically by meetings. Every meeting attended by a senior American official is accounted for. All minutes and memoranda of conversation are included; where none was found, the editors have supplied an editorial note, embodying what information was available on that particular meeting. There were no general meetings of the American delegation at either of the conferences; what little information has been found on President Roosevelt's consultations with his advisers is included in the chapters on proceedings.

The TRIDENT chapter entitled "Conference Documents and Supplementary Papers" contains the documents presented and discussed at the conference, together with related papers pertinent to conference subjects which were prepared during the period of the conference.

The preparatory papers for the First Quebec Conference, being much more numerous than those for the Third Washington Conference, are organized somewhat differently. They begin with a chapter on agenda and arrangements, followed by a chapter containing substantive preparatory papers, divided among sixteen subjects. This chapter includes pre-conference papers later circulated or discussed at the conference as well as official background memoranda and recommendations prepared specifically for possible use at Quebec.

The papers on the proceedings at Quebec (identical in scope and arrangement with the documentation on the TRIDENT proceedings) are preceded in the volume by a brief chapter containing all the documentation found on the preliminary conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill which took place at Hyde Park, and by a log of the President's visit to Canada. The chapter on proceedings is followed by the conference documents and related papers, arranged by subject, concluding with the final documents of the QUADRANT Conference.

At the end of the First Quebec Conference, there was an interval of a week before Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Washington to resume his consultations with the President. A separate chapter is de-

voted to the arrangements for the Prime Minister's visit to the United States and to the developments in the war against Italy, then reaching a climax. Documentation on this subject during this period is included in this volume because it is needed to bridge the gap between the Quebec discussions and the signature of the Italian armistice, which took place while Churchill was in Washington. There is then a chapter on the proceedings of the conversations at Washington, followed by a chapter which includes the documents discussed during those conversations and related papers bearing directly on the President's meetings with Churchill.

When Churchill left Washington, he stopped again briefly to see Roosevelt at Hyde Park, and the final chapter of the present volume includes all the documentation which has been found on their conversations there.

### UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Since the conferences at Washington and Quebec documented in this volume dealt to a very large extent with questions outside the jurisdiction of the Department of State, the editors sought and obtained the assistance of several other Government departments and agencies in gathering much of the source material for this publication. Of particular importance were the Presidential papers in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, military papers in the files of the Department of Defense (principally in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and documents on cooperation with the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research in the files of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The Roosevelt Library provided photocopies of all Presidential papers (including the papers of Harry L. Hopkins) that could be found relating to either of the conferences. The Department of Defense provided all papers that could be found documenting the official position or advice of the War and Navy Departments on politico-military subjects discussed at the international level, as presented by the civilian leaders of those departments and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The papers printed in this volume which are in the Central Files of the Department of State are indicated by means of a file number in the headnote, in the usual style of *Foreign Relations*. The provenance of papers obtained from other sources is also shown in headnotes, as indicated on the following list:

#### A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Lot 57 D 688*—An unindexed collection of papers relating to diplomatic aspects of the question of atomic energy.

2. *Lot 60 D 224*—An unindexed collection of papers produced by the postwar planning group in the Department, containing, for 1943, important planning papers in the fields of international organization and territorial studies.

#### B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *A.E.C. Files*—The files of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

2. *Department of the Army Files*—Files for 1943 of the War Department, now under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army.

3. *Harriman Papers*—The papers of W. Averell Harriman.

4. *Hopkins Papers*—The papers of Harry L. Hopkins, deposited in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.

5. *Hull Papers*—The papers of Cordell Hull, deposited in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress.

6. *J.C.S. Files*—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These files provided documentation of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the American-British Combined Chiefs of Staff. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff, along with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for declassification of the Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation published in this volume.

7. *Leahy Papers*—The diary of Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, deposited in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, has been used with the permission of his son, Rear Admiral William H. Leahy.

8. *Roosevelt Papers*—The papers of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, deposited in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.

9. *Stimson Papers*—The diary of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, deposited in the Yale University Library, has been used with the permission of the Library and the Henry L. Stimson Literary Trust.

10. *War Shipping Administration Files*—The files of the War Shipping Administration, now in the National Archives.

#### PUBLISHED SOURCES

##### A. OFFICIAL

In addition to *Foreign Relations of the United States* and the Department of State *Bulletin*, the official publications listed below were found to be of particular value in the preparation of this volume. Other official publications consulted by the editors are identified in editorial notes and footnotes.

##### AMERICAN

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## B. UNOFFICIAL

Much authoritative information is to be found in unofficial publications written by those who participated in the conferences (or in matters closely related to the conferences) or by authors who have used the papers of conference participants. In view of the incompleteness of the official record, in many respects, for the conferences presented in this volume, the editors have cited such unofficial publications frequently for factual information not found in official files. The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or

interpretation in these unofficial publications. The principal publications of this type which have been consulted in the preparation of this volume are listed below. Other works also consulted on particular points are identified in editorial notes and footnotes at the appropriate places.

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#### EDITORIAL TREATMENT

In the preparation of this volume the editors have been guided by the regulations of the Department applicable to the *Foreign Relations* series, viz.:

##### 1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

###### 1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

###### 1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the De-

partment of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons.

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

#### 1353 Clearance

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office :

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS, AND CODE NAMES

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage or unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified in footnotes to the text.

- A-26**, twin-engine light bomber aircraft (Invader) (United States)
- AA**, anti-aircraft
- ABRAHAM**, Quebec
- A/c**, aircraft
- ACV**, auxiliary aircraft carrier or tender
- AEC**, Atomic Energy Commission (United States)
- AFHQ**, Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers
- AFofL**, American Federation of Labor
- AGC**, combined operations communications headquarters ship
- AGWar**, Adjutant General, War Department (United States)
- AK**, cargo ship (including ships of the Liberty and Victory classes)
- AKA**, cargo vessel, attack
- ALACRITY**, plan for the entry of a British force into the Azores on October 8, 1943
- ALCOVE**, communications indicator used on telegrams from the British Government in London to the British Delegation attending the Third Washington Conference
- ALUSNA**, United States Naval Attaché
- AMCO**, the United States telephone exchange established at the Citadel, Quebec
- AMG**, Allied Military Government
- AMGOT**, Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories
- ANAKIM**, Allied plan to retake Burma and open the line of communications to China through the port of Rangoon
- ANFA**, the Casablanca Conference, January 14-24, 1943
- AOC-in-C**, Air Officer Commanding in Chief
- AP**, transport ship, armor piercing
- APA**, transport, attack
- APD**, high-speed troop transport
- ARCADIA**, the First Washington Conference, December 1941-January 1942
- Armd**, armoured
- A/S**, anti-submarine
- ASW**, anti-submarine warfare
- AT**, ocean tug
- AT(E)**, Administration of Enemy Territories (Europe)
- ATR**, ocean tug, rescue
- AUS**, Army of the United States
- AVALANCHE**, Allied amphibious assault at Salerno
- B**, "Baker" time (the local time in Algiers)
- B-17**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Flying Fortress) (United States)
- B-17 F**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Flying Fortress, Series F) (United States)
- B-24**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Liberator) (United States)
- B-24 C and D**, four-engine heavy bomber aircraft (Liberator, Series C and D) (United States)
- B-25**, twin-engine medium bomber aircraft (Mitchell) (United States)
- B-29**, four-engine very heavy bomber aircraft (Superfortress) (United States)
- BACKBONE**, plan for possible military operations against Spanish Morocco
- Baker**, military expression for the letter B
- BARRACUDA**, plan for an Allied sea and airborne assault on Naples

- BAYTOWN**, British invasion of the Calabrian coast opposite Messina
- BB**, battleship
- BIGOT**, special security procedure for future operations
- BLACK**, communications indicator used on telegrams sent to the White House Map Room by President Roosevelt when the latter was away from Washington
- BMWT**, British Ministry of War Transport
- BOAC**, British Overseas Airways Corporation
- BOLERO**, build-up of United States forces and supplies in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel attack; sometimes used to refer to the attack itself
- Bosco**, United States Army communications center at the Château Frontenac, Quebec; communications indicator used on certain messages handled by that center
- BOSCO-IN**, communications indicator used on incoming messages handled by the United States Army communications center at the Château Frontenac, Quebec
- BRACKEN**, the Azores
- BRIMSTONE**, plan for the capture of Sardinia
- BRISK**, plan for acquiring bases in the Azores
- BULLFROG**, plan for an operation against the Arakan coast in Burma
- BUTTRESS**, British operation against the toe of Italy
- C-47**, twin-engine transport aircraft (Skytrain) (United States)
- CA**, heavy cruiser
- CANNIBAL**, British offensive against Akyab in 1943
- CARTWHEEL**, converging drives on Rabaul by forces from the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas
- Catalina**, twin-engine naval patrol bomber aircraft (PB2B or PBY) (United States)
- Cav**, cavalry
- CC**, military communications indicator
- CCAC**, Combined Civil Affairs Committee (United States-British)
- CC of S**, Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States-British)
- CCOS**, Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States-British)
- CCS**, Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States-British); document symbol used by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
- CCWD**, classified communication, War Department
- CG**, Commanding General; Consul General
- CGS**, military communications indicator
- Charlie**, military expression for the letter C
- Churchill**, heavy tank (British)
- CIC**, Combined Intelligence Committee (United States-British); document symbol used by the Combined Intelligence Committee
- CIGS**, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (British)
- CinC**, Commander in Chief
- CIO**, Congress of Industrial Organizations (United States)
- CKS**, Chiang Kai-shek
- CL**, light cruiser
- CM-IN**, classified message, incoming
- Colonel Warden**, Prime Minister Churchill
- ComAirLant**, Commander, Air Forces, Atlantic Area
- CominCh**, Commander in Chief
- CONCRETE**, communications indicator used on telegrams from the British Government in London to the British Delegation attending the First Quebec Conference
- COS**, Chiefs of Staff (British); document symbol used by the British Chiefs of Staff
- COSSAC**, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate; document symbol used by COSSAC
- CPS**, Combined Staff Planners (United States-British); document symbol used by the Combined Staff Planners
- Cromwell**, medium tank (British)
- CUDGEL**, plan for small-scale operations against the Arakan coast in Burma
- CULVERIN**, plan for an assault on Sumatra

- CV**, aircraft carrier
- CVE**, aircraft carrier, escort
- D**, day
- D-1**, one day before the date of a planned military operation
- D+1, D+2, etc.**, one, two, etc., days after the date of a planned military operation
- DD**, destroyer
- D Day**, the date of a planned military operation
- DE**, destroyer escort
- Div(s)**, division(s)
- DMI**, Director(ate) of Military Intelligence, War Office (British)
- DNB**, German News Agency (owned by the German Ministry of Propaganda)
- DSIRN**, a section of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (British)
- DUKW**, 2½-ton amphibian truck
- EAM**, National Liberation Front (Greek)
- E-boat**, anti-submarine naval craft
- ETO**, European Theater of Operations
- Eu**, Division of European Affairs, Department of State (United States)
- EW**, European War
- Eyes Only**, communications indicator used on messages which were to receive extremely limited distribution
- FAN**, communications indicator used on messages from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers
- FCB**, Federal Communication Board (United States)
- FE**, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State (United States)
- FEB**, Far Eastern Bureau (British)
- FHCIC**, reference symbol used by the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers
- FHCOS**, reference symbol used by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters
- FHDSC**, reference symbol used by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters
- FHGBI**, reference symbol used by the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Allied Force Headquarters
- FHGCT**, reference symbol used by the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3), Allied Force Headquarters
- FIREBRAND**, plan for the invasion of Corsica
- FO**, Foreign Office (British)
- Former Naval Person**, Prime Minister Churchill
- FORTUNE**, military communications indicator used by a planning group located in Algiers
- FREEDOM**, communications indicator used on certain messages to General Eisenhower; Eisenhower's headquarters at Algiers
- ft**, fighter
- FW**, file with
- G-2, G-3**, intelligence and operations sections, respectively, of a divisional or higher staff
- GAF**, German Air Force
- Gestapo**, Secret State Police (German)
- GHQ**, General Headquarters
- GIANT 2**, plan for an air drop near Rome
- GOBLET**, plan for an invasion of Italy at Crotone (Cotrone)
- GR**, general range
- GRT**, gross registered tonnage
- GSC**, General Staff Corps, United States Army
- H**, document symbol used by the Division of Political Studies, Department of State, for policy summaries
- H2S**, radar aid to navigation and target identification (British)
- HABBAKUK**, a floating airfield to be used as a substitute for an aircraft carrier
- HABBAKUK I**, a floating airfield made of wood
- HABBAKUK II**, a large floating airfield made of steel or pykrete (frozen pulp and water)
- HABBAKUK III**, a small floating airfield made of steel
- HARDHOOD**, aid to Turkey
- HM**, His Majesty's
- HMG**, His Majesty's (i.e., the British) Government

- Husky**, the Allied invasion of Sicily  
**HX**, cargo convoy to the United Kingdom from New York or Halifax
- ICAN**, International Commission for Aerial Navigation  
**ICI**, Imperial Chemical Industries (British)  
**IE**, initial equipment  
**ILO**, International Labor Organization  
**Inf**, infantry  
**IRA**, Irish Republican Army
- JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff (United States)  
**ig**, junior grade  
**JIC**, Joint Intelligence Committee; document symbol used by the Joint Intelligence Committee  
**JPS**, Joint Planning Staff  
**JP(T)**, document symbol used by the British Planning Staff  
**Ju 52**, transport aircraft (Junkers 52) (German)  
**JUGGLER**, operation against fighter aircraft production complexes at Regensburg and Wiener Neustadt  
**JUPITER**, plan for operations in Norway
- KKAD**, communications indicator used on certain telegrams sent to Quebec  
**KMS**, cargo convoy from the United Kingdom to Gibraltar
- Lady Warden**, Mrs. Winston S. Churchill  
**LCA**, landing craft, assault  
**LCF(L)**, landing craft, flak, large  
**LCG(L)**, landing craft, gun, large  
**LCG(M)**, landing craft, gun, medium  
**LCI(L)**, landing craft, infantry, large  
**LCM**, landing craft, mechanized  
**LCM 3**, landing craft, mechanized (Mark III)  
**LCP(L)**, landing craft, personnel, large  
**LCS(M)**, landing craft, support, medium  
**LCT**, landing craft, tank  
**LCT(2)** to **LCT(6)**, landing craft, tank (Mark II to VI)  
**LCT(R)**, landing craft, tank, rocket  
**Liberator**, *see* B-24  
**LIFEBELT**, the Azores; plan for an assault on the Azores
- L of C**, line(s) of communications  
**LR**, long range  
**LRP**, long-range penetration  
**LRPGs**, long-range penetration groups  
**LSC**, landing ship, carrier, derrick-hoisting  
**LSD**, landing ship, dock  
**LSE**, landing ship, emergency repair  
**LSH**, landing ship, headquarters  
**LSI(H)**, landing ship, infantry, hand-hoisted boats  
**LSI(L)**, landing ship, infantry, large  
**LSP**, landing ship, personnel  
**LST**, landing ship, tank  
**LST(2)**, landing ship, tank (Mark II)  
**LVT II**, landing vehicle, tracked, unarmored (Mark II) (Water Buffalo)  
**LVT(A)II**, landing vehicle, tracked, armored (Mark II) (Water Buffalo, canopy type)
- MANHATTAN Engineer District**, atomic bomb development project  
**MAP**, Ministry of Aircraft Production (British)  
**Mariner**, *see* PBM  
**MAT**, military communications indicator  
**MAUD Committee**, scientific committee established to examine fission phenomena (British)  
**MAYSON**, atomic energy research  
**MC**, Medical Corps, United States Navy; Military Cross (British)  
**Me 323**, transport aircraft (Messerschmitt 323) (German)  
**Med**, Mediterranean  
**MEW**, Ministry of Economic Warfare (British)  
**Min**, minutes  
**Misc**, miscellaneous  
**MONKEY**, communications channel between Italy and Eisenhower's headquarters  
**Mosquito**, twin-engine bomber aircraft (British)  
**Mrs. Warden**, Mrs. Winston S. Churchill  
**MT**, motor transport  
**Mtg**, meeting  
**MUSKET**, projected landing on the heel of Italy near Taranto  
**MVSN**, Fascist Militia (Italian)

- N**, night
- NAF**, communications indicator used on telegrams from Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
- NATO**, North African Theater of Operations
- NATS**, Naval Air Transport Service
- NDRC**, National Defense Research Committee (United States)
- NE**, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State (United States); northeastern
- NL**, naval lighter
- NOTEBOOK**, build-up of the air transport route to China
- OATMEAL**, plan for landing in the Azores
- OBB**, old battleship
- OEWE**, Office of Economic Warfare (United States)
- OSRD**, Office of Scientific Research and Development (United States)
- OSS**, Office of Strategic Services (United States)
- OVERLORD**, plan for an Allied cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe in 1944
- OVRA**, Secret Police (Italian)
- OWI**, Office of War Information (United States)
- P**, document symbol used by the Subcommittee on Political Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (United States)
- P-38**, twin-engine fighter aircraft (Lightning) (United States)
- PA/H**, Office of the Adviser on Political Relations (Mr. Hornbeck), Department of State (United States)
- PBM**, twin-engine naval patrol bomber aircraft (Mariner) (United States)
- PENCIL**, communications indicator used on telegrams to the British Government in London from the British Delegation to the Third Washington Conference
- P-IO**, document symbol used by the Special Subcommittee on International Organization of the Subcommittee on Political Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (United States)
- PLOUGH Force**, project for training United States and Canadian volunteers for snow operations in northern Norway
- PM**, Prime Minister, i.e., Churchill
- POINTBLANK**, combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom
- PQ**, President Roosevelt; Province of Quebec
- Present Aerial Person**, Prime Minister Churchill
- PRICELESS**, Mediterranean operations following the Allied invasion of Sicily
- PRIME**, Prime Minister Churchill
- PRU**, photographic reconnaissance unit
- PT**, motor torpedo boat
- PW**, Pacific War
- PWE**, Psychological Warfare Executive (British)
- Qtr**, quarter
- QUADRANT**, First Quebec Conference, August 11-24, 1943; Quebec
- RAF**, Royal Air Force (British)
- RANKIN**, plans for a return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position
- RAVENOUS**, plan for the recapture of northern Burma
- RCAF**, Royal Canadian Air Force
- RCMP**, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- RDF**, radio direction finder
- Recce**, reconnaissance
- Recn**, reconnaissance
- Reconn**, reconnaissance
- Rept'g**, representing
- RN**, Royal Navy (British)
- RNA**, Royal Netherlands Army
- RNN**, Royal Netherlands Navy
- ROUNDHAMMER**, plan for a cross-Channel operation intermediate in size between **SLEDGEHAMMER** and **ROUNDUP**
- ROUNDUP**, plan for a major Allied cross-Channel operation in 1943
- S**, Office of the Secretary of State (United States)
- S-1**, atomic energy research and development

- SAM**, United States ships transferred to British flag on bareboat charter (for seamen and manning)
- SAUCY**, limited offensive to reopen a land route from Burma to China
- SC**, cargo convoy to the United Kingdom from Halifax or Sydney, Cape Breton Island
- SE**, single-engine
- SEF**, single-engine fighter
- Sherman**, medium tank (M-4) (United States)
- SICKLE**, build-up for a bomber offensive against Germany
- SIS**, Secret Intelligence Service (British)
- SLEDGEHAMMER**, plan for a limited cross-Channel attack in 1942
- SOAPSUDS**, early code word for TIDALWAVE
- SOE**, Special Operations Executive (British)
- SOS**, Services of Supply
- Spitfire**, single-engine fighter aircraft (British)
- Sqns**, squadrons
- SS**, submarine; National Socialist Elite Guard (German)
- Stat**, United States *Statutes at Large*
- T**, document symbol used by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (United States)
- T-20**, medium tank (United States)
- T/C**, navigation trainer aircraft
- TEF**, twin-engine fighter
- TIDALWAVE**, low-level heavy bomber attack on Ploesti, Rumania
- tk bdes**, tank brigades
- TORCH**, Northwest Africa; Allied invasion of Northwest Africa
- TRIDENT**, the Third Washington Conference, May 12-25, 1943
- TROOPERS**, War Office (British)
- TUBEALLOY**, *see* TUBE ALLOYS
- TUBE ALLOYS**, atomic energy research and development
- U-boat**, submarine
- UE**, unit equipment
- UGF**, troop convoy from New York to Gibraltar
- UGS**, cargo convoy from New York to Gibraltar
- UJ**, Uncle Joe, i.e., Stalin
- Uncle Joe**, Stalin
- UNRRA**, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
- UPKEEP**, bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams in Germany
- USA**, United States Army; United States of America
- USAAF**, United States Army Air Forces
- USCOS**, United States Chiefs of Staff, i.e., the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- USFOr**, United States Forces in the United Kingdom
- USN**, United States Navy
- USNR**, United States Naval Reserve
- Ventura**, twin-engine naval patrol aircraft (PV-1 or PV-3) (United States)
- VLR**, very long range
- VULCAN**, final ground offensive to clear Tunisia
- W**, communications indicator used on telegrams from Allied Force Headquarters at Algiers to the War Department
- WDCSA**, War Department, Chief of Staff, United States Army
- WELFARE**, communications indicator used on telegrams to the British Government in London from the British Delegation attending the First Quebec Conference
- WHITE**, communications indicator used on telegrams sent from the White House Map Room to President Roosevelt when the latter was away from Washington
- WPB**, War Production Board (United States)
- WSA**, War Shipping Administration (United States)
- W/T**, wireless telegraphy
- XAP**, merchant transport
- YMS**, motor mine sweeper
- Z**, "Zebra", Greenwich mean time

# LIST OF PAPERS

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

### 1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

#### A. PAPERS ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Feb. 16	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Reminder about reciprocity in the matter of atomic energy research (TUBE ALLOYS).	1
Feb. 24	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Request for precise information about the misunderstanding over TUBE ALLOYS.	1
Feb. 27	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Request for resumption of American-British cooperation on the atomic bomb project.	2
Feb. 27	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Memorandum summarizing the history of American-British relations regarding TUBE ALLOYS.	3
Mar. 20	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Request for a reply about collaboration on TUBE ALLOYS.	5
Mar. 20	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Assurance that a reply on TUBE ALLOYS will be made soon.	5
Mar. 31	<i>The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Analysis of the state of American-British relations on the atomic bomb project.	6
Apr. 14	<i>The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of a query from Eden regarding the American answer.	10
Apr. 15	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)</i> Assurance that a message would be sent by the following Monday.	10

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS—Continued

## B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Mar. 30	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Suggestion that Hopkins and Marshall meet with Churchill and Brooke to discuss operations after Sicily.	11
Apr. 1	<i>The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Churchill to Hopkins about a high-level meeting and TUBE ALLOYS.	12
Apr. 5	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of Churchill's thoughts on operations after Sicily.	12
Apr. 9	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Renewal of a plea for high-level discussions on future operations.	14
Apr. 9	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Denial of a plan to visit London in the immediate future.	15
Apr. 11	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Expression of regret at Hopkins' reply.	15
Apr. 29	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Proposal for a conference in Washington in May.	15
Apr. 30	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of a draft reply to Churchill, suggesting that a top-level conference be postponed until June but that staff talks on the Pacific war be held immediately in Washington.	16
May 2	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Renewal of request for a high-level conference in Washington in the immediate future.	16
May 2	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Agreement to Churchill's proposal to hold a conference in Washington as soon as possible.	17
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on a meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subjects of discussion included the impending conference with the British; contemplated military actions in Burma; and the supplying of material to the Chinese Army.	17
May 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Expression of satisfaction at Roosevelt's assent to the holding of a conference in Washington.	18
May 5	<i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Information on the impending conference with Churchill.	18

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS—Continued

## B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943	<i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on a meeting of Roosevelt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff; excerpt from the Stimson Diary for May 10, 1943. Subjects of discussion included a Joint Chiefs of Staff outline of policies to be pursued in the forthcoming conference with the British; a cross-Channel invasion of Europe; and use of air transport to send aviation material from India to China.	19
May 10	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Information on Churchill's trans-Atlantic voyage and his arrival in Washington.	19
[Undated]	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Revised information on Churchill's arrival plans.	20
May 13	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Secretary (Early)</i> Arrangements on publicity regarding Churchill's trans-Atlantic voyage.	20
May 16	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Information on Churchill's proposed engagements while in Washington.	21

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

1943 May 12	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	24
May 12	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> General review of global strategy.	24
May 13	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Benes Meeting, Forenoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Subjects of discussion: the treatment of Germany; postwar international security organization.	33
May 13	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> General review of global strategy and possible future operations.	34
May 13	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	48
May 13	<b>Hull-Churchill Meeting</b> <i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Policy toward the Vichy régime; need for an understanding with the Soviet Union; possible Soviet entry into the war against Japan; the question of de Gaulle.	49

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 13	<b>Roosevelt—Churchill Meeting, 11 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	51
May 14	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Global strategy; future operations in Burma.	52
May 14	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 2 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Future operations in the China—Burma—India Theater.	66
May 15	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Future operations in Burma and in Europe; expansion of the capacity of the air route to China; possible operations against the Azores.	77
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on a weekend trip by Roosevelt and Churchill to "Shangri La."	86
May 17	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> The situation in China; possible operations against the Azores; consideration of a paper on agreed essentials in the conduct of the war; agenda for the remainder of the conference; date for the Allied invasion of Sicily; bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams in Germany.	87
May 17	<b>Roosevelt—Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Magnesium supply; settlement of refugees in North Africa.	96
May 17	<b>Leahy—Soong Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Operations in Burma; shipment of aircraft material to China.	97
May 18	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Plans for the occupation and use of the Azores; policy for future operations regarding propaganda and subversive activities; British proposals for future operations in Europe; rearming of French forces in North Africa; plans for the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom; the bombing of Ploesti; bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams in Germany.	97
May 18	<b>Roosevelt—Soong Conversation, 11:50 a.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the conversation.	108
May 18	<b>Roosevelt Press Conference, 4:10 p.m.</b> <i>Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 897</i> Reference to a conversation with the Duke of Windsor; general progress of the conference; plans of Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King.	109

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 18	<b>McNarney-Soong Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting.	110
May 18	<b>Smith-Brooke Conversation, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the conversation. The discussion included the possibility that proposed strategic solutions would limit European operations for the benefit of the Pacific Theater.	110
May 19	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 :30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Proposals for future operations against the Axis in Europe.	111
May 19	<b>Churchill Address to a Joint Meeting of the Houses of Congress, Noon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on Churchill's visit to the Capitol.	117
May 19	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4 :30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Proposals for future operations against the Axis in Europe; operations from India; provision of transport aircraft for the proposed invasion of Sicily.	118
May 19	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 6 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Report on progress of the conference; anti-submarine warfare and the possible use of the Azores; planning for future operations in the Mediterranean and Western Europe.	119
May 19	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Conversation, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the conversation. Postwar international organization.	123
May 19	<b>Roosevelt-Mackenzie King Conversation, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the conversation. Possible meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin.	123
May 20	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 :30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Application of the unconditional surrender formula in propaganda activities in Italy; strategic plan for the defeat of Japan; operations in Burma to open and secure an overland route to China; potentialities of the air route from Assam to Burma.	124
May 20	<b>Meeting of the Pacific War Council, 12 :05 p.m.</b> <i>Memorandum by the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Review of operations in the Aleutians; air reinforcements to China; casualties in New Guinea; future operations in Burma; allocation of aircraft to Australia; Chinese intentions with respect to Tibet.	134

I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE  
 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 20	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Postwar international organization; elevation of the Canadian Legation at Washington to Embassy status.	141
May 20	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Future operations in Burma.	142
May 20	<b>Hull-Mackenzie King Dinner Meeting</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting.	143
May 21	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Selection of code names; military supplies for Turkey; operations in the Pacific and the Far East during 1943 and 1944; preparation of a report to Roosevelt and Churchill.	143
May 21	<b>Roosevelt Press Conference, 10:50 a.m.</b> <i>Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 898</i> War materials for China; Mackenzie King's visit to Washington; Roosevelt's meetings with Churchill; unconditional surrender for Italy.	149
May 21	<b>Leahy-Soong Meeting</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Operations in Burma.	150
May 21	<b>Roosevelt-Mackenzie King Meeting, 12:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Possible meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin; a possible trip to Canada by Roosevelt.	151
May 21	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	151
May 21	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Use of the Azores; the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom; plans for the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe; operations in the Burma-China Theater and the Pacific; rearming of French forces in North Africa; the bombing of Ploesti; action to be taken in case of a German evacuation of Norway	152
May 22	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Anti-submarine warfare; policy for coming operations regarding propaganda and subversive activities; sonic warfare; movement of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and <i>Queen Mary</i> .	160

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 22	<b>Stilwell-Churchill Meeting, Forenoon</b> <i>The Commanding General, United States Forces, China, Burma, India (Stilwell) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)</i> Report of a conversation with Churchill on the status of Chinese forces and future operations against Burma.	165
May 22	<b>American-British Luncheon Meeting, 1:15 p.m.</b> <i>Memorandum Prepared by the British Embassy</i> Structure of a postwar settlement through world and regional councils.	167
May 22	<b>Stimson-Churchill Meeting, 3 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Stimson Diary. Operations in Burma.	172
May 22	<b>Hull-Halifax Conversation</b> <i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> The trade agreements program; relations with the Soviet Union; the Third International; Soviet assistance in the war against Japan.	173
May 22	<b>Churchill Meeting With Members of Congress</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting.	174
May 22	<b>Meetings of American and British Shipping Experts, Beginning at 4 p.m.</b> <i>Douglas Notes</i> Agreement on availability of Allied shipping during 1943.	175
May 23	<b>Phillips-Churchill Meeting, Forenoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Conditions in India.	177
May 23	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Anti-submarine warfare; movement of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and <i>Queen Mary</i> ; policy for coming operations regarding propaganda and subversive activities; implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations for the conduct of the war in 1943 and 1944; dispatch of United States service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom; the Azores; the Third Soviet Supply Protocol.	178
May 23	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Probable subject of discussion: settlement of refugees in North Africa.	183
May 24	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Preparation of a report to Roosevelt and Churchill; directive for military government in Sicily; allocation of ships for conversion to landing ships, infantry; expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.	184

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 24	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting; letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins. Probable subjects of discussion: atomic energy research; postwar problems.	188
May 24	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 4:45 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Consideration of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; rearming of French forces; the Azores; a cross-Channel invasion of northwest Europe; operations in the Mediterranean to eliminate Italy from the war; the bombing of Ploesti; operations in the Burma-China Theater; equipment for Turkey.	189
May 24	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting; excerpt from the Stimson Diary. Roosevelt's consent to Churchill's request that Marshall accompany Churchill to North Africa; establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa.	197
May 25	<b>Hopkins-Churchill Meeting, Forenoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Possible changes in the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	198
May 25	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Amendment of the report to Roosevelt and Churchill; implementation of decisions reached at the conference; statement to be made to the Chinese; proposals for improved combined planning.	199
May 25	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 11:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Employment of Polish troops; approval of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; communication of certain decisions to the Chinese; statement to the press; visit of Stilwell and Chennault to the United Kingdom; operations following the invasion of Sicily; code names for future operations; use of forces with special training for snow operations; consultations with the Soviet Union.	203
May 25	<b>Roosevelt-Soong Meeting, 2:45 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Probable subject of discussion: results of the conference as they affected China.	208
May 25	<b>Marshall-Chu Conversation, [3 p.m.?]</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record and of positive evidence that the meeting took place as scheduled.	208
May 25	<b>Hopkins-Bush-Cherwell Meeting, 3:30 p.m.</b> <i>Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Interchange of information on atomic research between the United States and the United Kingdom.	209

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 25	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Joint Press Conference, 4:03 p.m.</b> <i>Record of the Joint Press Conference by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> General report on the progress of the war and on the conference.	211
May 25	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Probable subjects of discussion: message to Stalin; interchange of information on atomic research between the United States and the United Kingdom.	220

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

## A. GLOBAL STRATEGY

1943 [Undated]	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Review of global strategy.	222
May 12	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposals for future operations in Europe and the Far East; suggestion for a detailed examination of the question of shipping.	223
May 14	<i>Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners</i> Proposals for the conduct of the war in 1943 and 1944.	227
May 17	<i>Proposals by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Tentative program of work for the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the remainder of the conference.	229
May 18	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Draft of a paper on agreed essentials in the conduct of the war, showing items in agreement and disagreement.	231
May 25	<i>Report by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Report on the availability of resources to implement the policies and specific operations for 1943 and 1944 which had been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	233

## B. STRATEGY IN EUROPE

1943 May 13	<i>Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners</i> Proposals regarding the invasion of the European continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-1944.	238
May 14	<i>Plan Submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Plan for a combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom, attaching a letter on this subject from Portal to Arnold dated April 15, 1943.	239
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith)</i> Transmittal of the views of Eisenhower and Cunningham with respect to operations after the invasion of Sicily and of the dissenting views of Tedder.	253

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## B. STRATEGY IN EUROPE—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 14	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendations for military action between the completion of the Sicilian campaign and the invasion of France.	257
May 17	<i>Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff</i> Plan for the defeat of Germany by (1) eliminating Italy from the war through alternative courses of action and (2) invading northwest Europe with a target date of April 1944.	261
May 18	<i>Memorandum by the United States Joint Staff Planners</i> Plan for the defeat of Germany based on the concentration of the largest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom for an invasion of the Continent with a target date of April 1, 1944.	273
May 20	<i>Resolutions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Decisions on European and Mediterranean operations, including an invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom with a target date of May 1, 1944.	281
May 24	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of (1) a British Embassy paper on Eisenhower's organizational arrangements for the administration of Sicily and of (2) a minute by Churchill commenting on this subject, on Eisenhower's channels to the United States and British Governments with respect to military government, and on the use of Italian officials in military government.	282
May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Transmittal for approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of drafts of directives to Eisenhower and Morgan implementing the decisions reached at the conference; recommendation that Morgan be instructed to prepare an estimate of transport aircraft and glider requirements; suggestion that further consideration be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander for the invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom.	284

## C. STRATEGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

1943 May 12	<i>The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to President Roosevelt</i> Request that the entire India-China air transport capacity be devoted to delivering supplies to China for a period of three months.	288
May 13	<i>The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Request for Chinese participation in the Washington Conference when the war against Japan was being discussed.	288

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## C. STRATEGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 13	<i>The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to President Roosevelt</i> Report that Evatt had discussed with Churchill a plan for expanding the Australian Air Force; request that Roosevelt and Churchill consider the plan.	289
May 14	<i>Plan Prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners</i> Strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.	289
May 14	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal for operations in Burma in 1943 and 1944.	293
May 18	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President</i> Recommended allocation of tonnage on the India-China air transport route.	295
May 18	<i>The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal, for Roosevelt's approval, of a draft report to Chiang on Soong's conversations with Roosevelt and McNarney on the allocation of tonnage on the India-China air transport route and on future operations against Burma.	296
May 19	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Suggestion for amending Soong's report to Chiang on the former's conversation with Roosevelt.	297
May 19	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong)</i> Suggestion for amending Soong's report to Chiang on the former's conversation with Roosevelt.	298
May 21	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of a telegram from the British Foreign Office on the Chinese attitude toward Tibet.	298
May 22	<i>The Secretary of War (Stimson) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Report on airfields near Ledo in Assam.	301
May 23	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a report by the United States Joint Staff Planners on proposed operations in the Pacific and the Far East in 1943 and 1944.	302

## D. BASES IN THE AZORES

1943 May 7	<i>Report by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Evaluation of the usefulness of the Portuguese Atlantic islands for anti-submarine warfare.	304
May 18	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Recommendation that steps be taken to gain the use of the Azores.	307

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## D. BASES IN THE AZORES—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 19	<i>Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)</i> Transmittal of a proposed message from Roosevelt to Vargas requesting Brazilian assistance in steps aimed at obtaining use of the Azores.	308
May 21	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)</i> Review of issues relating to the acquisition and use of bases in the Azores.	309
May 21	<i>The British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Explanation of the position of the War Cabinet on Churchill's message concerning the Azores; request that a decision on this subject be postponed until after Churchill's return to London.	312

## E. SUPPLIES AND SHIPPING

1943 May 18	<i>President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch) to the President's Military Aide (Watson)</i> Transmittal of a memorandum on magnesium supplies.	312
May 23	<i>Memorandum by the Deputy War Shipping Administrator (Douglas) and the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers)</i> Statement on dry cargo shipping availabilities and requirements for 1943 and 1944.	313
May 25	<i>The President's Personal Representative (Harriman) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Recommendation that British tank production be reduced and that the United Kingdom obtain more tanks from the United States.	314
May 26	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) and the President's Personal Representative (Harriman)</i> Transmittal of Churchill's recommendations on the allocation of shipping resources.	317
May 28	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Review of shipbuilding arrangements between the United States and the United Kingdom; information on a directive to the War Shipping Administration to transfer to the British a minimum of fifteen ships per month over a period of ten months for temporary wartime duty.	318

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## F. FRENCH LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN NORTH AFRICA

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 8	<i>Draft Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i>	320
	Assessment of de Gaulle's leadership; request for a discussion to determine a common policy toward de Gaulle.	
May 10	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i>	322
	Expression of agreement with Roosevelt's analysis of the French situation and on the need to develop a common policy with the British.	
May 19	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i>	324
	Transmittal of reports on the French situation.	

## G. POLISH-SOVIET DISPUTE

1943 May 22	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i>	324
	Transmittal of a letter from Evatt to Churchill concerning Australian representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union.	
	<i>Editorial Note</i>	325
	Sources of information on the probable consideration of Polish-Soviet relations during the Washington Conference.	

## H. POLICY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

1943 May 17	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i>	326
	Recommendation with regard to a policy statement for psychological warfare for the invasion of Sicily.	
May 19	<i>The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)</i>	328
	Recommendation for amending a proposed letter from Hull to Leahy on the application to Italy of the principle of unconditional surrender.	
May 20	<i>The Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)</i>	328
	Agreement with Welles' suggestion; explanation of the purpose of the proposed letter from Hull to Leahy.	
May 22	<i>The Secretary of State to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)</i>	329
	Suggestions on the application to Italy of the principle of unconditional surrender.	

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## H. POLICY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 22	<i>Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a proposed telegram to Eisenhower on the principle of unconditional surrender as it relates to his planning for psychological warfare.	330
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Sources on probable discussions of the policy of unconditional surrender by Roosevelt and Churchill during the Washington Conference.	331

## I. VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING

1943 May 14	<i>The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State</i> Account of the circumstances leading to the invitation sent by Churchill to Mackenzie King to attend the Washington Conference; recommendation that a message of invitation be sent also by either Hull or Roosevelt.	332
May 14	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of a message from Churchill to Mackenzie King concerning the latter's participation in the conference.	333
May 14	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mackenzie King</i> Suggested plans for Mackenzie King for May 19 and 20.	333
May 14	<i>Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt</i> Expression of thanks for the invitation to come to Washington.	334
[May 20]	<i>The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State</i> Review of current relations between the United States and Canada.	334
May 24	<i>Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt</i> Expression of appreciation for the opportunity to attend the conference.	335

## J. EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR REFUGEES

1943 May 22	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to additional documentation on this subject.	336
May 22	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Recommendation that Roosevelt discuss with Churchill matters related to the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on refugee problems.	336
May 22	<i>Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy</i> Review of the possibilities for the settlement of refugees in Libya.	338

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## J. EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR REFUGEES—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 May 24	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Transmittal of a communication from Ismay to Churchill, a memorandum by Baruch, and a telegram from Eden to Churchill, all dealing with the possible settlement of refugees in North Africa.	342
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to documentation on the refugee problem following the Washington Conference.	346

## K. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1943 May 21	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Transmittal of a draft of agreed decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Washington Conference.	346
May 23	<i>Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Revised draft of agreed decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the conference; indication of matters still to be resolved.	351
May 24	<i>Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Further revision, incorporating amendments by Roosevelt and Churchill, of the draft of agreed decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the conference.	359
May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Churchill's proposed amendments to the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	363
May 25	<i>Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Final text of the agreed decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the conference, as approved by Roosevelt and Churchill.	364

## L. PROPOSED COMMUNIQUÉ

1943 [May 25]	<i>Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Draft statement prepared by Hopkins.	373
[May 25]	<i>Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Revised draft statement, with further amendments by Roosevelt and Churchill.	374

## I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

## 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## L. PROPOSED COMMUNIQUÉ—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [May 25]	<i>Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Final revision (not released) of the proposed joint statement.	375
[May 25]	<i>Statement by President Roosevelt</i> Announcement that the conference had ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theaters of the war.	377
[May 27]	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Expression of satisfaction at the success and timing of the conference.	377

## M. REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE TO STALIN AND CHIANG

1943 May 25	<i>Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggested statement to be made to the Chinese on the results of the conference.	377
[May 25]	<i>Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Revision of the proposed statement to be made to the Chinese on the results of the conference.	378
[May 25]	<i>Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Draft of a report to Stalin on decisions reached during the conference.	379
May 26	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a revised draft, prepared by Marshall, of a report to Stalin on decisions reached by the conference. (With minor revisions, this was the text actually sent.)	382
May 29	<i>Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt</i> Expression of appreciation for information on the conference decisions affecting China.	385
May 29	<i>Generalissimo Chiang to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) in Washington</i> Instruction to submit orally to Roosevelt certain points regarding future operations in Burma.	385
May 31	<i>The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)</i> Instruction for amending Marshall's draft of a message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin and for the delivery of the message.	386
June 2	<i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Information on the channel through which the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be delivered to Stalin.	387

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 4. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Date	Paper	Page
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Explanation of the scope of this chapter; references to related documentation.	391
1943 June 28	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill meet with their staffs at Quebec in August.	391
June 29	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Assent to a meeting at Quebec in August.	392
July 14	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion that the meeting be held about the first of September.	392
July 16	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that the meeting be held the middle of August; suggested topics for the agenda.	392
July 16	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Undertaking to send a further reply to Churchill when Roosevelt has heard from Stalin about a possible meeting.	393
July 19	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Request for an early message as to whether the proposed meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin will take place; information on Churchill's arrangements.	393
July 20	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Report that Mackenzie King has stated that Roosevelt, Churchill, and their staffs would be most welcome for a conference in Canada.	394
July 21	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Notification that Churchill plans to arrive at Quebec on August 11.	394
July 21	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that the code name for the Quebec Conference be QUADRANT.	394
July 21	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Assent to starting the QUADRANT Conference about August 15, in view of the fact that Roosevelt has had no word from Stalin.	395
July 22	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that the conference could start at any date between August 10 and August 17, but that military considerations point to as early a date as possible.	395
July 23	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of an exchange of messages between Churchill and the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Canada concerning conference arrangements.	395
July 24	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Enumeration of reasons for not inviting Canadian staff officers to attend plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference.	396
July 25	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that the military staffs begin discussions at Quebec before Roosevelt's arrival; agreement with Roosevelt's position as to Canadian participation in the conference; information on Churchill's party.	397

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 4. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 July 25	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Identification of "Colonel Warden" as Churchill.	398
July 25	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a paraphrase of a message from Churchill to Mackenzie King concerning conference arrangements.	398
July 25	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Identification of "PQ" as a code name for Roosevelt.	399
July 25	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Invitation to the Churchill family to visit Hyde Park while the military staffs begin their work at Quebec.	399
July 25	<i>The Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Mahoney) to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a message from Mackenzie King to Roosevelt assuring the President that Mackenzie King was not pressing for participation of the Canadian military staffs in the Quebec Conference.	400
July 26	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposed agenda for the conference.	400
July 26	<i>King George VI to President Roosevelt</i> Invitation to occupy the Governor General's quarters in the Citadel during the conference.	401
July 27	<i>President Roosevelt to King George VI</i> Acceptance of the invitation to occupy quarters in the Citadel.	402
July 27	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Agenda for the conference.	402
July 28	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Arrangements for Churchill's visit to Hyde Park; suggestion that Harriman attend the conference.	403
July 29	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Information that Churchill had heard Roosevelt's broadcast of July 28, 1943, and that he is looking forward to the QUADRANT Conference.	404
July 29	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Agenda for the conference.	404
July 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that Harriman has been asked to come to Quebec and that Douglas will be there with Roosevelt.	405
July 31	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Report on anti-submarine warfare in July; suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill agree upon an announcement on this subject at their meeting on August 12.	406
Aug. 1	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested text of a communiqué to be issued upon Churchill's arrival at Quebec.	406

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 4. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943		
Aug. 1	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Assent to Churchill's suggestion regarding an announcement on anti-submarine warfare.	407
Aug. 2	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Approval of Churchill's proposed announcement to be issued on his arrival at Quebec.	407
Aug. 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested amendment to the announcement to be issued on Churchill's arrival at Quebec.	408
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)</i> Information on a telephone call from the Minister in Canada concerning conference arrangements.	408
Aug. 7	<i>The Minister in Canada (Atherton) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)</i> Transmittal of the text of a proposed confidential release to the press concerning a meeting between Churchill and Mackenzie King.	409
Aug. 9	<i>The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)</i> Transmittal of a message from Roosevelt approving the proposed Canadian release.	409
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)</i> Record of a message from Mackenzie King to Roosevelt on Churchill's arrival in Canada.	410
Aug. 11	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Notification of arrival in Canada and of plans for visiting Hyde Park; suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill discuss there an announcement on anti-submarine warfare.	410
Aug. 11	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion concerning Churchill's wardrobe for Hyde Park.	411
Aug. 11	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Report on the weather at Quebec and arrangements for the conference.	411
Aug. 13	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill go directly to Quebec from Hyde Park.	412
Aug. 14	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Agenda for the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	412
Aug. 16	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Arrangements for Roosevelt's arrival at Quebec.	414
Aug. 16	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Approval of arrangements at Quebec.	414

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS

## A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Date	Paper	Page
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Explanation of the scope of this chapter; reference to related documentation.	415
1943 Aug. 6	<i>Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Directive on responsibility and procedure for the planning, coordination, and execution of deception measures against Japan.	415
Aug. 6	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Estimate of the enemy situation in the Pacific and Far East area as of July 20, 1943.	417
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Comments on a United States proposal to establish a Combined Liaison Committee to coordinate United States and British intelligence activities in and from India.	424
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Analysis of and recommendations for military operations in the Far East in 1943 and 1944.	426
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the United States Joint War Plans Committee</i> Strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.	432
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane)</i> Minutes of a meeting of Roosevelt with Stimson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at which Far Eastern operations were discussed.	434
Aug. 13	<i>The Commander in Chief, India (Auchinleck) to the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Plans for operations from India.	435
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Record of a discussion with Soong on China's desire to be represented at Allied conferences and on the procurement of supplies for China from Canada.	440
Aug. 18	<i>The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a memorandum on Chinese participation in Allied conferences touching on the Far East.	441
Aug. 19	<i>The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State</i> Recommendation, from a political point of view, that the proposed reconquest of Burma, with the objective of reopening the Burma Road, be implemented as soon as possible.	443

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Date	Paper	Page
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Explanation of the scope of this section; reference to related documentation.	443
1943 Aug. 4	<i>The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Transmittal of a report on Stimson's recent trip to Europe and North Africa; suggestion that Roosevelt should have this report before the Quebec Conference.	444
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Allocation of United States assault forces for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe.	452
Aug. 7	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Estimate of the enemy situation in the European area as of July 30, 1943.	453
Aug. 8	<i>Memorandum Prepared in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff</i> Recommendations concerning the conduct of the war in Europe.	467
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.	472
Aug. 9	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff (Handy)</i> Report of a conversation between Roosevelt and Marshall on allocation of forces to a cross-Channel invasion of Europe (Operation OVERLORD) or to Mediterranean operations following the invasion of Sicily (Operation PRICELESS).	482
Aug. 10	<i>Note by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Observations on COSSAC's outline plan for Operation OVERLORD (digest of the outline plan annexed); recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the plan and authorize Morgan to proceed with detailed planning.	483
Aug. 10	<i>The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President</i> Recommendation that Marshall be named to command the cross-Channel invasion of Europe.	496
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane)</i> Minutes of a meeting of Roosevelt with Stimson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at which future European operations were discussed.	498
Aug. 10	<i>The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of an <i>aide-memoire</i> on German measures for the extermination of Poles; Polish suggestion for a joint statement on the subject by the United States and the United Kingdom and for an examination of measures for reprisal.	503

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 11	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President</i> Comparative data on United States and British forces available for Operation OVERLORD.	506
Aug. 11	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a draft statement for possible issuance by Roosevelt and Churchill calling upon the Germans to surrender.	508
Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a report from the Allied Anti-Submarine Board on logistic organization to improve the mobility of anti-submarine squadrons.	509
Aug. 14	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State</i> Summary of a report by the Joint Intelligence Committee on German plans and intentions during the last half of 1943.	512
[Undated]	<i>Memorandum Prepared by the British Foreign Office</i> Statement of general principles for the guidance of British representatives in discussing arrangements for the civil administration of liberated territory with representatives of European Allied governments.	513

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY

1943 July 30	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to related documentation.	516
July 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggested lines of policy on Italy.	517
July 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggested text of "short" or "military" armistice terms for Eisenhower to use if the Italian Government were to ask for an armistice.	519
July 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification concerning Roosevelt's statement to the press that the Allies would treat with any person in Italy who could bring about disarmament and assurance against chaos.	521
July 31	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Approval of the lines of policy on Italy contained in Roosevelt's message of July 30.	521
July 31	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested amendments to the draft military armistice terms; request that Roosevelt give urgent consideration to a British draft of a comprehensive instrument of surrender.	522

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 July 31	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Statement of Churchill's position on dealing with the House of Savoy and Badoglio, and of his opposition to any statement about self-determination.	523
July 31	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested amendment to the lines of policy on Italy contained in Roosevelt's message of July 30.	523
July 31	<i>The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State</i> Report that the new Italian Foreign Minister had stated that he expected to make peace soon within the framework of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender.	524
[July 31]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on Badoglio's concern over German intentions; report on the possibility of little opposition to an Allied landing in Italy.	524
Aug. 1	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that Roosevelt has authorized Eisenhower to use the military armistice terms as amended in accordance with Churchill's suggestions of July 31, and that Roosevelt has asked for reports on the British draft of a comprehensive instrument of surrender.	525
Aug. 1	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President</i> Interim report on the British draft of a comprehensive instrument of surrender.	525
Aug. 2	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Expression of appreciation for Roosevelt's message of August 1.	526
Aug. 2	<i>The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond)</i> Transmittal of a message from Roosevelt for Churchill, Hull, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, expressing doubt as to the advisability of using the British draft of a comprehensive instrument of surrender.	527
Aug. 2	<i>The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) to the Secretary of State</i> Report that Badoglio may be going as far as possible to pave the way for an armistice.	527
Aug. 2	<i>The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)</i> Notification that the Italian Government had informed the Vatican on July 31 that it had decided to declare Rome an open city; request for Allied conditions for accepting such a declaration.	528

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 2	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President</i> Transmittal of messages exchanged with Eisenhower with regard to the bombing of Rome and the possibility that Rome would be declared an open city.	528
Aug. 2	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Authorization to bomb Rome if Eisenhower thinks this desirable.	530
[Aug. 2]	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a draft message to the Italian Government stating the essential conditions to be required if Rome were to be treated as an open city.	530
Aug. 2	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on two conversations between Turkish officials and the new Italian Foreign Minister as to the position of Italy.	531
Aug. 2	<i>The French Committee of National Liberation to the Department of State</i> Request for French participation in armistice negotiations with Italy and in the agencies established to assure the execution of the armistice terms; analysis of the French interests involved.	532
Aug. 3	<i>The British Minister (Campbell) to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)</i> Transmittal of (1) a message from Eden about Italian approaches in the nature of peace feelers through the Portuguese Government and a former Rumanian Minister to Portugal and (2) a message from the British Ambassador in Turkey reporting a conversation between the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Italian Ambassador to Turkey.	534
Aug. 3	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President</i> Joint report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State on the proposed comprehensive instrument of surrender (revised draft enclosed).	537
[Aug. 3]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Denial that either Tittmann or Osborne has been negotiating with Badoglio through the Vatican; report on the feeling in Vatican circles concerning the Italian situation.	548
[Aug. 3]	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President</i> Transmittal of a message from Eisenhower on the bombing of Rome and possible conditions for recognizing Rome as an open city.	549

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 3	<i>The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Report on the notification given to Marshall that Roosevelt had approved the conditions for recognizing Rome as an open city.	550
Aug. 3	<i>The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Leahy concerning Roosevelt's approval of the conditions for recognizing Rome as an open city.	550
Aug. 3	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Objection to negotiating on the status of Rome as an open city.	551
Aug. 3	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Observations on the bombing of Rome.	551
Aug. 3	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion that it would be difficult to refuse a plea to make Rome an open city; notification of Roosevelt's approval in principle of proposed conditions to be imposed.	552
Aug. 3	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Request to see the proposed conditions for making Rome an open city; observations on this subject.	552
Aug. 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Notification that the subject of Rome will be considered immediately by the War Cabinet.	553
Aug. 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Renewed objections to recognizing Rome as an open city; suggestion that the subject be discussed at Quebec.	553
Aug. 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Report on an approach (with no mention of peace terms) made to the British Ambassador in Portugal by Lanza d'Ajeta.	554
Aug. 5	<i>The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of three messages concerning Lanza d'Ajeta's approach in Lisbon.	556
Aug. 5	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested amendments to the lines of policy on Italy contained in Roosevelt's message of July 30.	556
Aug. 5	<i>The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State</i> Analysis of the declaration of open cities in international law.	557
Aug. 5	<i>Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee</i> Minutes of a meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, at which surrender terms for Italy were discussed.	559

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

#### C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [Aug. 5]	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President</i> Recommendation, from a military point of view, against recognizing Rome as an open city.	561
[Aug. 5]	<i>The British Consul General at Barcelona (Farquhar) to the British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare)</i> Report on the delivery to the Consulate General of a manifesto by the "Committee of Action of Free Italy".	563
[Aug. 5]	<i>The British Consul General at Barcelona (Farquhar) to the British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare)</i> Further details on the "Committee of Action of Free Italy" and the bearer of its manifesto.	564
Aug. 6	<i>The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Roosevelt approving in principle the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding recognition of Rome as an open city.	565
Aug. 6	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President</i> Notification that Eisenhower has been instructed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that, in using the terms of the military armistice already sent to him, he should make it clear that other conditions of a political, economic, and financial nature would be transmitted later.	565
Aug. 6	<i>The British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Walkinson) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)</i> Report on the arrival of Berio at Tangier charged with a mission from Badoglio to discuss negotiations between Italy and the Allies.	566
Aug. 6	<i>The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)</i> Comments on the Berio mission and on the Italian approach made to the British Consul General at Barcelona.	567
Aug. 6	<i>The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the objectives of the Badoglio government.	569
[Aug. 6]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the position of the Badoglio government and the desire of the Italian people for peace.	569
Aug. 8	<i>The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Eden on a Vatican approach with a view to making Rome an open city.	570
Aug. 8	<i>The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Eden concerning the Italian approaches at Lisbon, Tangier, and Barcelona.	570
Aug. 8	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State</i> Report that Italy is prepared to accept an armistice on honorable terms if Italy is not occupied.	571

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 8	<i>The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani)</i> Suggestion that there is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from acting unilaterally to declare Rome an open city.	572
[Aug. 8]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tiltmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the willingness of the Badoglio government to make peace immediately.	573
Aug. 9	<i>The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a further report from Tangier on the Berio mission, of Eden's comments on that mission, and of a message from Eden to the British Acting Consul General at Tangier insisting upon unconditional surrender.	574
Aug. 10	<i>Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)</i> Record of a conversation with the Greek Ambassador, who presented a memorandum (attached) concerning an initiative by the Papal Nuncio in Switzerland for the neutrals to exert efforts to get Italy out of the war.	576
Aug. 11	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggested reply to be given to Berio's approach at Tangier.	578
Aug. 11	<i>President Roosevelt to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)</i> Approval of the reply to be given to Berio.	579
Aug. 11	<i>The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State</i> Report that Badoglio had intended to capitulate if he had been able to arrange for the removal of German troops from Italy.	579
Aug. 12	<i>Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee</i> Minutes of a meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, at which surrender terms for Italy were discussed.	580
Aug. 12	<i>The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State</i> Report of rumors on Italian-German relations.	582
[Aug. 12]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tiltmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on preoccupations of the Badoglio government.	583
Aug. 12	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the War Department</i> Suggestion that the B-24's used for the bombing of Ploesti be used against targets in Italy.	584
Aug. 13	<i>The British Embassy in Turkey to the British Foreign Office</i> Report on a meeting between Guariglia and Ribbentrop.	584

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 14	<i>The British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Watkinson) to the British Foreign Office</i> Notification that the answer approved by Roosevelt and Churchill had been given to Berio; inquiry as to the form of and channel for an act of surrender by Italy.	585
Aug. 14	<i>The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office</i> Request for guidance in connection with the conversations at Tangier with Berio.	586
Aug. 14	<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the Soviet Union</i> Summary of information on Italian approaches given to the Soviet Chargé at London.	587
[Aug. 16]	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of four messages concerning statements made by General Castellano to the British Ambassador in Spain, which purported to be an official offer of unconditional surrender if Italy were permitted to join the Allies in fighting Germany; Churchill's suggestion for a reply to Castellano.	588
Aug. 16	<i>The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)</i> Notification that Rome was declared an open city as of August 14.	594
Aug. 16	<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne)</i> Instruction to inform Berio that he must present a document offering unconditional surrender.	595
Aug. 17	<i>The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office</i> Report that a reply has been made to Berio in accordance with instructions.	595
Aug. 19	<i>The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State</i> Precedents, relating to Brussels, Paris, and Belgrade, for the declaration of an open city.	596
Aug. 19	<i>Briefing Paper for the Secretary of State</i> Summary of approaches made by the Italian Government during the past two weeks; analysis of factors to be considered before accepting the military collaboration of the Badoglio government.	598
Aug. 19/23	<i>Draft of Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government</i> Composite text of drafts of August 19 and 23 of conditions to be imposed upon the Italian Government in addition to those contained in the approved military armistice terms.	601

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## D. BASES IN THE AZORES

Date	Paper	Page
1943 July 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Observations on the progress of anti-submarine warfare; need for bases in the Azores.	609
Aug. 4	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President and the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Eden concerning negotiations with Portugal on the Azores.	609
Aug. 9	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Summary of recent proposals and decisions with respect to the Azores.	610
Aug. 10	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal, for Roosevelt's approval, of a draft telegram to Winant in connection with the British negotiations with Portugal on the Azores.	612
Aug. 12	<i>The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)</i> Statement of United States policy on withdrawal of troops from the Azores and on respect for the sovereignty of Portugal in all Portuguese colonies; views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the importance of facilities in the Azores.	612
Aug. 13	<i>The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State</i> Notification that the United States view on the Azores has been communicated to Eden.	613
Aug. 18	<i>The British Embassy to the Department of State</i> <i>Aide-mémoire</i> reviewing the negotiations with Portugal; transmittal of an exchange of views on the subject between the British and United States Chiefs of Staff.	613

## E. BASES IN IRELAND

1943 Aug. 7	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President</i> Analysis of the value of bases in Ireland; recommendation that negotiations be undertaken to obtain such bases without committing the United States to a definite program for establishing them.	616
Aug. 16	<i>Draft Message From President Roosevelt to Prime Minister de Valera</i> Review of the position of Ireland during the war; suggestion that Ireland take part with the Allies in an inevitable victory over the Axis powers.	618

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## F. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WAR—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 10	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to related documentation.	624
Aug. 19	<i>The Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Burns) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Military strategic estimate of the Soviet position; suggestions for improving relations with the Soviet Union.	624
Aug. 19	<i>The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of an analysis of Soviet aims in the Far East.	627

## G. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY

1943 June 10	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Review of the decisions on cooperation on atomic energy reached at the Washington Conference; request to be notified as soon as Roosevelt has given the necessary instructions.	630
June 17	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Report that the question will be disposed of soon.	630
June 24	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Record of a conference with Roosevelt concerning interchange of information with the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research.	631
July 9	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Request to be informed of any difficulties which may have arisen.	632
July 14	<i>The President to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)</i> Request for advice in answering Churchill's message.	633
July 20	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President</i> Recommendation that Roosevelt go through with the commitment made to Churchill.	633
July 20	<i>The President to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Instruction to renew the full exchange of information with the United Kingdom in the field of atomic energy research.	633
July 22	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of War's Special Assistant (Bundy)</i> Record of a meeting in London between Stimson and Churchill on the subject of atomic energy.	634
July 26	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that Roosevelt has made arrangements concerning atomic energy research; suggestion that a British representative come to the United States for discussions.	636

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## G. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 July 29	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Notification that Sir John Anderson will come to the United States immediately for discussions.	637
[July 29]	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War (Stimson)</i> Transmittal of draft heads of an agreement between Roosevelt and Churchill on atomic energy.	637
July 30	<i>The Acting Chairman of the Military Policy Committee (Conant) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Expression of opposition to a complete interchange of information with the United Kingdom.	639
Aug. 3	<i>The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)</i> Transmittal of extracts from a report on United States policy regarding interchange of information with the United Kingdom.	640
Aug. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Record of the sequence of events from June 24 to August 3 with respect to negotiations for the interchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on atomic energy research.	642
Aug. 4	<i>The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Transmittal of a revised draft of heads of an agreement on atomic energy.	645
Aug. 6	<i>The Secretary of War's Special Assistant (Bundy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)</i> Explanation of the views of Bush and Conant with respect to an agreement with the United Kingdom on atomic energy.	648
Aug. 6	<i>The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)</i> Comment on the revised draft of heads of an agreement on atomic energy.	649
Aug. 6	<i>The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)</i> Clarification of questions relating to the proposed agreement on atomic energy.	651
Aug. 7	<i>The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the President</i> Report on Bush's negotiations with Anderson; transmittal of documents relating to the negotiations; request for further instructions.	651

II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

H. CREATION OF THE JOINT WAR AID COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES-CANADA

Date	Paper	Page
1943 July 30	<i>The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the President</i> Recommendation that Roosevelt approve a proposal to create a Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada; return of two papers on this subject.	653
July 31	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State</i> Background on the proposal to create a Joint War Aid Committee; recommendation that a Department of State representative be named to the Committee.	655
Aug. 6	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Approval of the proposal to create a Joint War Aid Committee; suggestion that a Department of State representative be named to the Committee.	656
Aug. 11	<i>The President's Secretary (Early) to the Secretary of State</i> Request for comments on the proposal to create a Joint War Aid Committee; transmittal of a memorandum on the subject by Lauchlin Currie.	657
Aug. 11	<i>The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the President's Secretary (Early)</i> Approval of a draft statement announcing the creation of a Joint War Aid Committee.	658
Aug. 13	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Approval of a draft statement announcing the creation of a Joint War Aid Committee.	658
Aug. 16	<i>The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State</i> Notification that Roosevelt has approved naming an officer of the Department of State as a member of the Joint War Aid Committee.	658
Aug. 18	<i>The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a memorandum requesting that the United States withdraw its objections to China's obtaining munitions from Canada under the Canadian mutual aid plan.	659

I. REPRESENTATION ON THE COMBINED FOOD BOARD

1943 Aug. 16	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Agreement with a proposal by the War Food Administrator for the enlargement of the Combined Food Board; suggestion that the question be discussed by Roosevelt with Churchill.	660
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II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

J. POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 3	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Comments on the possible recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.	661
Aug. 3	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a draft of a joint statement to be issued by the United States and the United Kingdom recognizing the French Committee of National Liberation.	662
Aug. 3	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Requests that nothing be done on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation until Roosevelt and Churchill can discuss the matter.	663
Aug. 4	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Agreement to postpone action pending the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill.	664
Aug. 5	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a draft statement on cooperation with the French Committee of National Liberation; analysis of the problem.	664
Aug. 7	<i>The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State</i> Report of the Canadian desire for prompt action on the question of the French Committee of National Liberation.	667
Aug. 9	<i>The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a message from Roosevelt to Hull concerning postponement of action on the French Committee of National Liberation.	668
Aug. 11	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a revised draft statement on relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.	668
Aug. 12	<i>The General Consultant (Savage) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a draft memorandum for the President (not sent) recommending that the French Committee of National Liberation be invited to adhere to the Declaration by United Nations.	670

K. GENERAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN

1943 Aug. 16	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal, for Roosevelt's consideration and possible presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of a memorandum on United States policy in Iran.	672
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## L. ISSUANCE OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON PALESTINE

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 16	<i>The Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a memorandum summarizing developments, since the spring of 1943, affecting the release of a proposed joint statement by the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of Palestine.	674

## M. POSTWAR CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

1943 Aug. 18	<i>The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State</i> Background on Anglo-American relations with respect to postwar commercial aviation and air rights; recommendation that the United States take the position at the Quebec Conference that it is not yet ready to enter negotiations toward an agreement on this question.	679
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## N. POSTWAR WORLD ORGANIZATION

1943 [Aug. 10]	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky)</i> Record of a discussion between Roosevelt and his advisers on questions relating to postwar world organization.	681
[Undated]	<i>Draft Protocol Prepared in the Department of State</i> Draft of a four-power security agreement for the transitional period pending a peace settlement.	682
[Aug. 10]	<i>Mr. Myron C. Taylor to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a memorandum of July 8 summarizing the status of the work of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy.	684
Aug. 11	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of (1) a revised draft of a four-power declaration on transitional security arrangements; (2) a draft United Nations protocol to establish a Provisional United Nations Council, with annexed papers on the composition of the Council and on a proposed Security and Armaments Commission; and (3) a memorandum by Pavolsky commenting on British proposals (attached) on postwar security arrangements.	691
Aug. 18	<i>The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of revised draft heads for a United Nations protocol to establish a Provisional Organization of the United Nations, and of a memorandum of August 9 by Pavolsky summarizing international activities in which the United States must participate to reestablish and maintain peace.	706

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS—Continued

## N. POSTWAR WORLD ORGANIZATION—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 18	<i>The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a draft, dated March 9, of a United Nations declaration on national independence, and of a background memorandum of April 15 on international trusteeship.	717
Aug. 19	<i>The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State</i> Comments on the draft four-power declaration on transitional security arrangements.	728

## O. GERMAN TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

1943 Aug. 18	<i>The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of background memoranda analyzing possible alternative solutions to the following German boundary problems: the Polish-German frontier from Silesia to the Baltic Sea; Upper Silesia; the German-Czechoslovak boundary; the Austro-German frontier; Alsace-Lorraine; Eupen, Malmédy, and Moresnet; and the German-Netherlands boundary at the mouth of the Ems River.	730
Aug. 18	<i>The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of a background memorandum analyzing possible solutions to the problem of partitioning Germany.	761

## P. ITALIAN TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS AND THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF ITALY

1943 Aug. 18	<i>The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pavolsky) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of background memoranda analyzing possible alternative solutions to the following problems: the South Tyrol; the Italian-Yugoslav frontier; the Dodecanese Islands; Libya; Eritrea and Italian Somaliland; Pantelleria; a national government for Italy during the transition period; establishment of a provisional Italian central government; the nature of a permanent Italian national government; the reconstruction of local government in Italy; and methods for the reform of local government.	788
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 6. PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

Date	Paper	Page
	<p><i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the conversations. Advisability of proceeding immediately to Quebec; anti-submarine warfare; appointment of an American officer to command the cross-Channel invasion of Europe; recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation; appointment of a Canadian representative on the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy; Churchill's visit to Hyde Park following the Quebec Conference; relations with Ireland; a postwar "fraternal relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom. Probable additional subjects of discussion: postwar world organization; recognition of Rome as an open city; conditions for an armistice to be demanded of Italy; Ethiopia; Libya; the possibility of a meeting with Stalin in Alaska.</p>	830
<p>1943 Aug. 14</p>	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from Harriman notes on the conversation. Policy toward Ireland; a postwar "fraternal relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom; shipping problems.</p>	832
<p>Aug. 14</p>	<p><i>White House Press Release</i> Announcement of results of anti-submarine warfare during July.</p>	833

## 7. LOG OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CANADA

<p>1943 Aug. 16-26</p>	<p><i>Editorial Note</i> Description of the Log.</p>	835
	<p><i>The President's Log</i> Chronological account of Presidential appointments, conferences, and other activities.</p>	835

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

<p>1943 Aug. 14</p>	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Conduct of the conference; acceptance of certain conclusions of the Third Washington Conference; agenda; review of the situation in the European Theater.</p>	849
<p>Aug. 14</p>	<p><b>Luncheon, 1:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.</p>	856
<p>Aug. 14</p>	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Review of the status of the war against Japan.</p>	856
<p>Aug. 15</p>	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Recognition of Rome as an open city; strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe; outline plan for a cross-Channel invasion of Europe (Operation OVERLORD); synthetic harbors; air and naval command for OVERLORD.</p>	862

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 15	<b>Marshall-Churchill Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from Joint Chiefs of Staff minutes for August 16 concerning Marshall's discussion with Churchill about OVERLORD.	869
Aug. 16	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe; the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom.	870
Aug. 16	<b>Harriman-Churchill Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes on the discussion. The Italian situation; OVERLORD; shipping questions.	874
Aug. 17	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe; Italian peace feelers; operations in the Pacific and the Far East in 1943 and 1944; operations against Japan from India.	875
Aug. 17	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 11:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting; list of subjects discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill during the Quebec Conference not specifically documented in the papers on individual meetings.	880
Aug. 18	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Italian peace feelers; operations against Japan from India; production of landing craft; establishment of a Southeast Asia Command; a deception plan for the war against Japan; anti-submarine warfare; bases in the Azores.	881
Aug. 18	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record. Probable subject of discussion: bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams.	887
Aug. 18	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record. Probable subject of discussion: jungle warfare against Japan through the use of long-range penetration groups.	888
Aug. 18	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Meeting, Late Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting.	888
Aug. 19	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	889

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 19	<b>Hopkins-Eden Meeting</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Proposed tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union; the second front; Soviet western frontiers; postwar treatment of Germany.	889
Aug. 19	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of a progress report to Roosevelt and Churchill; artificial aircraft carriers (HABBAKUKS); landing craft; use of a special force trained for snow operations; equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals; special operations in Sardinia.	890
Aug. 19	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record. Possible subject of discussion: approval of an agreement on collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in atomic energy matters.	894
Aug. 19	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Progress report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff; the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom; OVERLORD; landing craft; operations in Sardinia and southern France; operations in the Balkans in case of a German withdrawal; the war in the Mediterranean; bases in the Azores; the Southeast Asia Command; the war against Japan.	895
Aug. 19	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, 9:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	903
Aug. 20	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Discussions</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that possible operations against Burma and Sumatra were discussed.	903
Aug. 20	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Naval and air commanders for OVERLORD; equipping Allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals; operations in Sardinia; appreciation and plan for the defeat of Japan; immediate operations in the Mediterranean; military considerations in relation to Spain, Turkey, and the Soviet Union; synthetic harbors.	905
Aug. 20	<b>Hull-Eden Meeting, Afternoon</b> <i>Department of State Minutes</i> Bases in the Azores; surrender terms for Italy; relations with the Soviet Union; necessity for keeping China informed about the war; recognition of Rome as an open city; dependent peoples; message from the King of the Hellenes; transfer of the Yugoslav Government in exile from London to Cairo; Senate cooperation in the approval of wartime international agreements; recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.	912

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 20	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, 9:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. A proposed four-power declaration on security; a possible tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union.</p>	917
Aug. 21	<p><b>Roosevelt Meeting With His Advisers, Forenoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that shipping questions were discussed.</p>	918
Aug. 21	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, Early Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.</p>	918
Aug. 21	<p><b>Hull-Eden Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Department of State Minutes</i> Proposed declaration on Palestine; civilian administration in liberated areas; surrender terms for Italy; dependent peoples; recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.</p>	919
Aug. 21	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Approval of a progress report to Roosevelt and Churchill; the Southeast Asia Command; operations in the Pacific and the Far East in 1943 and 1944; supply routes in northeast India; air plan for the defeat of Japan.</p>	920
Aug. 21	<p><b>Hull-Mackenzie King Meeting, About 4 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Source of information on the meeting. Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.</p>	922
Aug. 21	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.</p>	922
Aug. 21	<p><b>Hull-Eden Meeting, 9 p.m.</b> <i>Department of State Minutes</i> Political and civilian aspects of future military operations in Europe; the proposed four-power declaration on security; conversations to be held on monetary stabilization and commercial policy; dependent peoples; postwar treatment of Germany.</p>	923
Aug. 21	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting. Postwar world organization; the international position of China; recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. Possible additional subject of discussion: creation of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada.</p>	928
Aug. 22	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, About 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Stimson Diary, which indicates that Stimson discussed with Roosevelt and Churchill, separately, the appointment of Marshall to command OVERLORD.</p>	929

II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 22	<p><b>Roosevelt–Churchill Meeting, 5:30 p.m.</b>  <i>Agenda Prepared by the British Delegation</i>  Proposed agenda for the meeting.</p>	930
	<p><i>Department of State Minutes</i>  Proposed statement on German atrocities in Poland; proposed statement on military government in liberated areas; convoys to the Soviet Union; proposed statement on Palestine; fraternization between United States and British soldiers in the British Isles; message from the King of the Hellenes; recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.</p>	931
Aug. 22	<p><b>Harriman–Bracken Meeting, Early Evening</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that the desirability of having a joint Roosevelt–Churchill press conference at Quebec was discussed.</p>	934
Aug. 22	<p><b>Roosevelt–Churchill Dinner Meeting, 8 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Absence of substantive record.</p>	935
Aug. 22	<p><b>Roosevelt–Churchill Meeting, 11 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Absence of substantive record.</p>	935
Aug. 23	<p><b>Roosevelt–Robertson Meeting, Forenoon</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Absence of substantive record.</p>	935
Aug. 23	<p><b>Roosevelt–Churchill–Soong Luncheon Meeting, 1:30 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Sources of information on the meeting. Possible subject of discussion: China's acquisition of munitions from Canada.</p>	936
Aug. 23	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b>  <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>  Amendment of the draft report to Roosevelt and Churchill; Japanese treatment of prisoners of war; a proposed pipeline from India to China; operations from India; movement of the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and the <i>Queen Mary</i>; deferment of discussion of amphibians for OVERLORD; equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals; approval of a plan for a return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position; rehabilitation of occupied and liberated territories; future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic.</p>	937
Aug. 23	<p><b>Roosevelt–Mountbatten Meeting, 5 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>  Absence of substantive record.</p>	941

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 23	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.</b>  <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>            Bases in the Azores; plan for a return to the Continent in the event of deterioration of the German position; Operation OVERLORD; operations in Italy and southern France; target date for ending the war against Japan; operations in the Central Pacific and the China-Burma-India Theater; the Southeast Asia Command; policy toward Spain and Turkey.</p>	942
Aug. 23	<p><b>Hull-Eden Meeting</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            Source of information on the meeting. Frontiers of the Soviet Union. Possible additional subject of discussion: recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.</p>	949
Aug. 23	<p><b>Dunn-Cadogan Meeting</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            Excerpt from a memorandum from Dunn to Hull of September 1, which indicates that surrender terms for Italy were discussed at this meeting.</p>	950
Aug. 23	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, Evening</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            Absence of substantive record.</p>	952
Aug. 23	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 10 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            Sources of information on the meeting. Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. Probable additional subject of discussion: text of the conference communiqué.</p>	953
Aug. 24	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Forenoon</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            Source of information on the meeting. Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.</p>	953
Aug. 24	<p><b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10:30 a.m.</b>  <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>            Amendments to the final report to Roosevelt and Churchill; operations in the Mediterranean; future convoy arrangements in the Atlantic; discussion with Soong of matters affecting China; relation of resources to military plans; announcement of Mountbatten's appointment as Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Command; proposal for a committee to coordinate propaganda; approval of a draft message to Stalin.</p>	954
Aug. 24	<p><b>Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Press Conference, 12:15 p.m.</b>  <i>Editorial Note</i>            References to the text of the conference communiqué and of informal remarks made at the press conference.</p>	964

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## S. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 24	<b>Roosevelt—Churchill—Mackenzie King Luncheon Meeting, Early Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	965
Aug. 24	<b>Harriman—Eden Conversation, Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that the proposed tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union was discussed.	965
Aug. 24	<b>Roosevelt—Churchill Dinner Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that a message which had been received from Stalin was discussed.	965
Aug. 24	<b>Roosevelt—Churchill Meeting, Evening</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Harriman notes, which indicate that the message from Stalin was discussed further.	966

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

## A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

1943 Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal for the creation of a Southeast Asia Command.	968
Aug. 18	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Revised draft of a paragraph on the air route into China.	971
Aug. 18	<i>Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Analysis of the allocation of tonnage in the India-China area; recommendation against abandoning offensives planned at Ledo and Imphal.	972
Aug. 18	<i>Report by the United States Joint Administrative Committee</i> Analysis of the problem of constructing a pipeline from India to China; recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the pipeline project.	973
Aug. 18	<i>The Combined Staff Planners to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Analysis of and recommendations concerning an appreciation and plan (summary attached) for the defeat of Japan.	975
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendations on the allocation of landing craft.	989
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Description of three types of artificial aircraft carriers (HABBAKUKS); recommendations concerning the construction of and experimentation with HABBAKUKS.	989

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943		
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Comments on the allocation of landing craft.	991
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Negative reply to the British recommendations on HABBAKUKS.	991
Aug. 19	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Progress report on conference discussions with regard to the war against Japan.	992
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Revised draft of a paragraph on the air route into China.	993
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve paragraph 20 of the appreciation and plan for the defeat of Japan.	994
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the United States Army Air Force Planners</i> Air plan for the defeat of Japan.	995
Aug. 21	<i>Paper Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Creation of a Southeast Asia Command.	1000
Aug. 21	<i>Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposal for a pipeline from India to China.	1003
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Quartermaster General (Riddell-Webster) and the Commanding General, United States Army Service Forces (Somervell)</i> Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in principle a project for a supply route to China through Burma and Assam.	1003
[Aug. 22]	<i>Memorandum by the Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet (Jacob)</i> Suggested statement to be made to Soong.	1005
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Possible courses of action with regard to operations from India.	1005
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to the conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference.	1007

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 14	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to related documentation.	1008
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Report on artificial harbors for combined operations.	1008
Aug. 14	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate (Morgan)</i> Digest of a plan for a return to the Continent in the event of a deterioration of the German position (Operation RANKIN).	1010
Aug. 15	<i>Memorandum by the Chief of the British Air Staff (Portal)</i> Transmittal of a British intelligence appreciation on the German Air Force in relation to the combined bomber offensive against Germany from the United Kingdom (Operation POINTBLANK).	1018
Aug. 16	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal that the Combined Chiefs of Staff assign to OVERLORD an overriding priority over other operations in the European Theater.	1023
Aug. 17	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.	1024
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal on assault forces for OVERLORD.	1026
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposal for overcoming a shortage of landing craft for OVERLORD.	1027
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Proposals for use of a force with special training for snow operations.	1028
Aug. 18	<i>Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners</i> Recommendations for equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals.	1029
Aug. 19	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Progress report on conference discussions with regard to the war in Europe and the Mediterranean.	1037
Aug. 20	<i>Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee</i> Recommendation on convoy allocations.	1040
Aug. 20	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggestion that the deficiencies in landing craft for OVERLORD will have to be made good from the Mediterranean.	1041
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that the <i>Queen Elizabeth</i> and the <i>Queen Mary</i> revert to a schedule based on a 21-day cycle.	1041

II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that production of amphibious trucks be increased if possible and that priority of allocation for amphibians be given to OVERLORD.	1042
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Delegation</i> Recommendation that the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees take over approaches to neutral countries on refugee questions from the British Foreign Office and the Department of State.	1043
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Delegation</i> Analysis of the problem of a return to Greece by the King of the Hellenes; suggestions for a reply to be made to the King's message to Churchill; instructions (attached) for Churchill's reply.	1044
Aug. 22	<i>Proposal by the United States Delegation</i> Draft statement on the role of military government in liberated areas.	1046
Aug. 22	<i>Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation on convoy priorities.	1047
Aug. 22	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Notification that the United States Chiefs of Staff have recommended approval of certain paragraphs of a paper on equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals.	1049
Aug. 22	<i>Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendations on the rehabilitation of occupied and liberated territories.	1049
Aug. 22	<i>The Netherlands Ambassador (London) to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a draft warning to Germany against committing atrocities or destruction before evacuating occupied territories.	1052
Aug. 23	<i>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Approval of part of a paper on equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals.	1053
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to the conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference.	1054

C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS

1943 Aug. 14	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a suggested message to Eisenhower asking him to make no further attacks on Rome pending further instructions.	1054
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 15	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Revocation of the previous day's standstill order on the bombing of Rome.	1055
Aug. 17	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Instruction to hold two staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon for possible conversations with General Castellano.	1055
Aug. 17	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggestions as to how to proceed with conversations with Castellano.	1056
Aug. 17	<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the United States</i> Background on the missions to Lisbon of Lanza d'Ajeta and Castellano.	1056
[Aug. 17]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Summary of a note from the Papal Secretary of State on the bombing of Rome and the recognition of Rome as an open city.	1057
[Aug. 17]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of an Italian declaration that anti-aircraft batteries at Rome would not react to air bombardments.	1059
Aug. 18	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification concerning the conquest of Sicily.	1059
Aug. 18	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Instruction to send two staff officers to Lisbon with the previously approved military armistice terms for presentation to Castellano; further details to be communicated to Castellano.	1060
[Aug. 19]	<i>The British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Notification that Roosevelt and Churchill have agreed to an amendment of the military armistice terms for Italy.	1061
[Aug. 19]	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification of the instructions sent to Eisenhower; information on the planned invasion of the Italian mainland.	1062

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 19	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Explanation of two code words; transmittal of the text of the instructions sent to Eisenhower.	1063
Aug. 19	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a summary of recent correspondence with Allied Force Headquarters concerning future operations against Italy.	1063
Aug. 19	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Suggested message to Eisenhower on fifth-column activities in Sardinia.	1068
Aug. 20	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Request for Eisenhower's recommendations on possible fifth-column activities in Sardinia and Corsica.	1059
[Aug. 20]	<i>The Chargé at Vatican City (Tiltmann) to the Acting Secretary of State</i> Report on measures taken to make Rome an open city.	1069
Aug. 21	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Minutes of the meeting held with Castellano at Lisbon on August 19, during which the approved military armistice terms were communicated to him.	1070
Aug. 21	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)</i> Report of general information obtained from Castellano on the German position and German intentions in Italy.	1074
Aug. 21	<i>The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office</i> Report of a further conversation with Berio.	1076
Aug. 21	<i>The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office</i> Supplemental report on a conversation with Berio.	1077
Aug. 21	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a note from the Apostolic Delegate enclosing two memoranda on the war against Italy.	1078
Aug. 21	<i>The Acting Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a memorandum of a conversation between Welles and the Apostolic Delegate concerning the desire of Italy to end its war against the United Nations.	1081
Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee</i> Minutes of a meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, at which surrender terms for Italy were discussed.	1082

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 22	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Complaint that the Soviet Union has not been fully and promptly informed on negotiations with Italy; suggestion that a tripartite military-political commission be established to consider questions concerning negotiations with governments disassociating themselves from Germany.	1086
Aug. 22	<i>Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)</i> Transmittal of a message received through the Office of Strategic Services concerning the intentions of Italy.	1087
Aug. 23	<i>Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)</i> Report on developments in the drafting of surrender terms for Italy.	1088
[Undated]	<i>The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sargent)</i> Instructions for the British Ambassador at Lisbon to give the comprehensive surrender terms to the Italian emissaries.	1090
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference concerning Italy.	1091

#### D. BASES IN THE AZORES

1943 [Aug. 19]	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification of Portuguese agreement to grant bases in the Azores for the use of British forces.	1091
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to the conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference concerning the Azores.	1092

#### E. SCALE OF POSSIBLE ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA

1943 Aug. 16	<i>Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee</i> Report on the probable scale of enemy attack on the east and west coasts of North America.	1092
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## J. POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [Aug. 21?]	<i>Draft of Joint Statement</i> Draft statement on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, for release by Roosevelt and Churchill.	1103
[Aug. 21?]	<i>Draft of Joint Statement</i> Composite text of two drafts of a statement on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, for release by Roosevelt and Churchill.	1104
Aug. 21	<i>Draft of Statement for President Roosevelt</i> Draft statement on the relationship of the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation, for release by Roosevelt.	1105
[Aug. 22]	<i>Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the United States Government</i> Draft statement on the relationship of the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation.	1106
[Aug. 22?]	<i>Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the United States Government</i> British redraft of a statement on the relationship of the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation.	1107
Aug. 22	<i>Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of a draft note to the French delegate at Ottawa concerning Canadian recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.	1108
[Aug. 23]	<i>Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the British Government</i> Draft statement on British recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.	1109
[Aug. 24]	<i>Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the British Government</i> Revised draft of a statement on British recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation.	1110
	<i>Editorial Note</i> Reference to the texts of the statements issued by the United States, British, and Canadian Governments at the conclusion of the Quebec Conference, concerning their relationship to the French Committee on National Liberation.	1111

## K. POLICY TOWARD AUSTRIA

1943 Aug. 20	<i>Archduke Otto of Austria to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of <i>aide-mémoire</i> calling for a declaration by the Quebec Conference that Austria is an occupied country; for a settlement of the question of southern Tyrol; and for the recognition by the United Nations of a provisional Austrian authority.	1111
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## L. THE SOVIET-POLISH BOUNDARY

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [Aug. 23]	<i>The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State</i> Suggestion as to an equitable solution of Soviet territorial claims; outline of reasons for discussions with the Soviet Union on this subject in the near future.	1113

## M. ISSUANCE OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON PALESTINE

1943 Aug. 21	<i>Memorandum by the British Delegation</i> Suggestion that a joint statement on Palestine be issued soon by the United States and the United Kingdom.	1116
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## N. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE

## (1) Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy

1943 Aug. 19	<i>Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy</i> Agreement on the future use of atomic weapons, on the communication to other parties of information on atomic energy, and on postwar industrial or commercial uses of atomic energy; establishment and functions of a Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy questions.	1117
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## (2) Press Release Announcing the Creation of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada

1943 Aug. 22	<i>Press Release Issued Jointly by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie King</i> Announcement of the creation, functions, and membership of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada.	1119
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## (3) Declaration on German Crimes in Poland

1943 [Aug. 22]	<i>Declaration on German Crimes in Poland</i> Declaration by the United States Government that the instigators and perpetrators of German crimes in Poland would be punished and that the war against Germany would be prosecuted with vigor.	1120
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### N. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE—continued

##### (4) Reports of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 24	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Report of the final agreed summary of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference on the prosecution of the war.	1121
Aug. 26	<i>Report by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Report, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the availability of resources to meet the requirements of strategy approved at the Quebec Conference.	1132

##### (5) Communiqué

1943 [Aug. 24]	<i>Communiqué</i> Announcement regarding discussions and decisions of the Quebec Conference.	1157
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##### (6) Reports on the Conference to Stalin and Chiang

1943 Aug. 24	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Report to Stalin on the decisions reached during the conference.	1159
Aug. 24	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang</i> Report to Chiang on the decisions reached during the conference.	1160

##### (7) Directive to Eisenhower Transmitting Surrender Terms for Italy

1943 Aug. 26	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Transmittal of comprehensive surrender terms for Italy, as approved by Roosevelt and Churchill; instruction to give these terms to the Italian representatives in any future negotiations.	1161
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##### (8) Statements on Relations With the French Committee of National Liberation

1943 Aug. 22	<i>Statement by the United States Government</i> Statement (released August 27) on the relationship of the United States to the French Committee of National Liberation.	1169
[Aug. 26]	<i>Statement by the British Government</i> Statement recognizing the French Committee of National Liberation.	1170
[Aug. 26]	<i>Statement by the Canadian Government</i> Statement recognizing the French Committee of National Liberation.	1171

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [Aug. 24]	<i>The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr) to the British Foreign Office</i> Report of a conversation with Molotov concerning Italian peace feelers and the establishment of a tripartite politico-military commission.	1173
[Aug. 24]	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Negative response to the invitation to meet Roosevelt and Churchill at Fairbanks; approval of a tripartite meeting of Foreign Ministers; approval of the instructions sent to Eisenhower; renewal of a proposal for a tripartite military-political commission on Italy.	1174
Aug. 25	<i>The Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State</i> Notification of steps taken by the Italian Government to make effective its declaration of Rome as an open city.	1175
Aug. 25	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Record of a conversation with the Minister of Portugal concerning the Italian situation.	1176
Aug. 26	<i>Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Secretary of State</i> Comments on Italian overtures to the Allies through Portuguese channels.	1177
Aug. 26	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that Churchill arrive in Washington on September 1.	1178
Aug. 26	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Assent to Churchill's plan to arrive in Washington on September 1; suggestion as to Mary Churchill's plans.	1178
Aug. 26	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Comment on a message received from Stalin.	1178
[Undated]	<i>The British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office</i> Report of the arrival of General Zanussi in Lisbon to discuss armistice terms.	1179
Aug. 26	<i>The British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office</i> Suggestion of alternative methods of communicating the approved comprehensive surrender terms to the Italian authorities.	1180
Aug. 26	<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell)</i> Instruction to communicate the comprehensive surrender terms to Zanussi.	1180
Aug. 27	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Confirmation of plans for arriving in Washington; suggested text for an interim reply to Stalin's most recent message; congratulations on Roosevelt's address at Ottawa.	1181
Aug. 28	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification that Roosevelt has sent to Stalin the interim reply suggested by Churchill.	1182

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 28	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Report on developments in the Italian situation since the Lisbon conversations with Castellano; plans for taking Zanussi from Lisbon to Algiers for discussions; suggestion that an armistice be concluded on the basis of the military terms if Castellano is empowered to accept those terms.	1182
Aug. 28	<i>The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State</i> Transmittal of the text of a note from Molotov to Clark Kerr giving Soviet approval to the comprehensive surrender terms for Italy.	1185
Aug. 28	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of an exchange of messages between Churchill and the military authorities in the Mediterranean concerning the plans for an invasion of the Italian mainland.	1186
Aug. 28	<i>The British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare) to the British Foreign Office</i> Reports from Spanish and Brazilian sources on the situation in Italy.	1188
Aug. 29	<i>The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Transmittal of Roosevelt's authorization to obtain signature of the military armistice terms and then to transmit the comprehensive surrender terms to the Italian representatives.	1188
Aug. 29	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Notification concerning the authorization given to Eisenhower with regard to Italian armistice terms.	1189
Aug. 30	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that Mrs. Churchill come to Washington with the Prime Minister.	1189
Aug. 30	<i>President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Expression of pleasure that Mrs. Churchill can come to Washington.	1189
Aug. 30	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Authorization to sign the Italian surrender on behalf of the Soviet Union; interpretation that Soviet approval may be taken to apply to either the military armistice terms or the comprehensive surrender terms.	1190
Aug. 30	<i>The President to the Secretary of State</i> Expression of the opinion that Italian measures for making Rome an open city are unsatisfactory.	1190
Aug. 30	<i>The British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office</i> Report that Castellano has reached Rome; speculation as to possible reasons for lack of a message from him.	1190

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 30	<i>The British Foreign Office to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters (Macmillan)</i> Notification that Eisenhower is empowered to sign the Italian surrender articles on behalf of Greece; inquiry as to possible arrangements for the presence of representatives of Greece and France.	1191
Aug. 31	<i>The British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters (Macmillan) to the British Foreign Office</i> Information that no arrangements can yet be made with regard to signature of the Italian armistice.	1191
Aug. 31	<i>The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)</i> Transmittal of a message from Eden to Macmillan on the possible signature of the comprehensive surrender terms by Castellano and stating that the Soviet Union has approved only the comprehensive terms; notification that the comprehensive terms have not been sent by messenger to Rome.	1192
Aug. 31	<i>The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) and the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)</i> Report on the Italian political situation based on conversations with Zanussi at Algiers.	1193
Aug. 31	<i>The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) and the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)</i> Report on a further conversation with Zanussi.	1195

## 11. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON

1943 Sept. 1	<i>Editorial Note</i> Character and scope of the conversations; references to documentation indicating that discussion took place on the following subjects: approval of joint messages to Stalin and Eisenhower; drafting of a message from Roosevelt to Stalin; addition of France to the politico-military commission proposed by Stalin; a declaration on gas warfare; Anglo-American interchange of atomic energy information; release of information on anti-submarine warfare in August; publication of minutes of the Council of Four during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.	1197
Sept. 1	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Conversation, 11:30 p.m.</b> <i>Entry in the White House Map Room Log Notebook</i> Receipt of and reply to three messages from Eisenhower.	1198
Sept. 2	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 11:25 a.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	1199

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 11. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 2	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Noon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	1199
Sept. 2	<b>Leahy-Cadogan Meeting</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Leahy Diary, which indicates that a request to the Soviet Union to approve the military armistice terms for Italy was discussed.	1199
Sept. 2	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Conversation, 11:30 p.m.</b> <i>Entry in the White House Map Room Log Notebook</i> Forthcoming tripartite meeting between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.	1200
Sept. 3	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i> Allocation of landing craft; hospital ships; propaganda; secrecy definitions; intelligence activities in India; civil affairs in enemy-occupied areas; reply to a Netherlands offer of a marine landing force.	1201
	<i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes</i> Progress in the invasion of Calabria; artificial harbors for combined operations; slowness of the build-up following the assault at Salerno; liberated Yugoslav prisoners; operations of the Soviet Air Force after the bombing of Ploesti; possible German use of gas warfare.	1205
Sept. 3	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 4:40 p.m.</b> <i>Minutes</i> Floating airfields; appointment of an <i>ad hoc</i> committee to study and report on this subject.	1207
Sept. 3	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 5:50 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	1208
Sept. 7	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 10:50 a.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	1209
Sept. 8	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, 10:55 a.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Absence of substantive record.	1209
Sept. 8	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Luncheon Meeting, 1 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Stimson Diary, which indicates that the surrender of Italy and postwar policy were discussed.	1209
Sept. 8	<b>Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, Early Afternoon</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Excerpt from the Stimson Diary, which indicates that the chairmanship of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy questions was discussed.	1210

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 11. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON—Continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 9	<b>Marshall-Churchill Meeting, 12:30 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i>	1211
	<p>Excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to which Marshall reported that Churchill had given him a memorandum which he wished to discuss with the Combined Chiefs of Staff later in the day.</p>	
Sept. 9	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Roosevelt and Churchill, 5 p.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>	1212
	<p>Possible acquisition of the Italian fleet; proposals for action in Italy; use of the British Navy in the Pacific war; possible use of captured Italian vessels; supplies for guerrillas in the Balkans; floating airfields.</p>	
Sept. 9	<b>Harriman-Churchill Conversation, 11 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i>	1216
	<p>Excerpt from a Harriman memorandum, which indicates that Italian developments, use of the British Navy in the Pacific, the Soviet Union, Churchill's views on Marshall, and the use of Italian liners as troop transports were discussed.</p>	
Sept. 10	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 11 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>	1219
	<p>Allocation of escort vessels to the French Navy; logistic organization to improve mobility of anti-submarine squadrons; use of escort carriers in offensive action against submarines; reply to a Netherlands offer of a marine landing force; approval of an intelligence report on the probable scale of attack against the east and west coasts of North America; code designators.</p>	
	<i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes</i> <p>Review of the strategic situation in the light of the collapse of Italy; floating airfields; operations of the Soviet Air Force following the bombing of Ploesti; use of the Azores; directive for the Control Commission and Allied military government in Italy; establishment of a Propaganda Committee.</p>	1222
Sept. 10	<b>Meeting of Churchill With an <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee, Noon</b> <i>Secretariat Minutes</i> Artificial airfields.	1227
Sept. 11	<b>Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff With Churchill, 11 a.m.</b> <i>Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes</i>	1229
	<p>Review of the strategic situation in the light of the collapse of Italy; possible use of Greek and Yugoslav forces; a possible Soviet follow-up to the bombing of Ploesti; the situation in Italy; military government; Hitler's speech of September 10; the situation in the Pacific; use of special forces trained for snow operations.</p>	
Sept. 11	<b>Hull-Churchill Dinner Meeting, 8 p.m.</b> <i>Editorial Note</i> Sources of information on the meeting.	1236

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

## A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Aug. 28	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of revised wording for a paper on civil affairs in enemy-occupied territories.	1237
Aug. 31	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Comment on British proposals concerning intelligence activities in India.	1237
Sept. 1	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a Netherlands offer of a marine landing force and of a draft reply thereto.	1238
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Record of a conversation with Soong about the matters discussed at the Quebec Conference.	1239
Sept. 4	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Record of approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the formation of a Combined Liaison Committee to coordinate intelligence activities in India; functions of the Committee.	1240
Sept. 7	<i>The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King) to the President</i> Transmittal of the report of an <i>ad hoc</i> committee on floating airfields (HABBAKUKS).	1242

## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE

1943 Sept. 2	<i>Report by the Combined Administrative Committee</i> Conclusions and recommendations concerning artificial harbors for combined operations.	1243
Sept. 3	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Renewed proposal concerning operations of the Soviet Air Force as a follow-up to the bombing of Ploesti.	1245
Sept. 3	<i>Report by the Combined Staff Planners</i> Transmittal of a draft reply by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to a message from Eisenhower (attached) asking for policy guidance on the use of liberated Yugoslav prisoners.	1246
Sept. 3	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Recommendation that Germany be warned against resorting to gas warfare.	1250
Sept. 3	<i>The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) to the Secretary of State</i> Report on the contest for control of the French Committee of National Liberation and the French military forces.	1251
Sept. 4	<i>Memorandum by the Secretary of State</i> Record of a conversation with the Danish Minister concerning a draft statement on Denmark (attached) for possible use by Roosevelt.	1252

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 7	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Transmittal of the text of a declaration on gas warfare approved by Roosevelt and Churchill.	1254
[Sept. 8]	<i>The British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cadogan) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Suggestion for a tripartite agreement among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on sharing information on weapons or processes used against the enemy.	1255
Sept. 10	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Transmittal of a draft message to Stalin suggesting that the Soviet Air Force bomb Ploesti.	1256

## C. THE SURRENDER OF ITALY AND THE ALLIED INVASION OF THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

1943 Sept. 1	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Report of armistice discussions with Castellano in Sicily; extension of the time limit for acceptance of the armistice terms to permit Castellano to consult his government again.	1257
Sept. 1	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Analysis of the Italian situation.	1259
Sept. 1	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Notification that Castellano has sent word of Italian acceptance of the armistice terms.	1261
Sept. 2	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Approval of Eisenhower's decision to launch an attack on Salerno (Operation AVALANCHE) and to land an airborne division near Rome.	1261
Sept. 2	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification of Italian willingness to sign an armistice; review of the Italian situation; statement of assumption that Stalin expects Eisenhower to sign the military terms on behalf of the Soviet Union if those are the terms accepted by Italy.	1262
Sept. 2	<i>Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a message from the British Chiefs of Staff expressing concern at the slowness of the build-up for Operation AVALANCHE.	1263

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### C. THE SURRENDER OF ITALY AND THE ALLIED INVASION OF THE ITALIAN PENINSULA—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 3	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Report that Castellano has signed the military armistice terms.	1264
Sept. 3	<i>The Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the Secretary of State</i> Review of the purposes of Allied military government in occupied territory.	1264
Sept. 4	<i>The Secretary of State to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)</i> Transmittal of a note from the Greek Embassy (not printed) asking for Greek representation on the armistice delegation to be set up in connection with the surrender of Italy and for the delivery to Greek authorities of certain Italian-occupied territories, including the Dodecanese and northern Epirus.	1265
Sept. 6	<i>The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Secretary of State</i> Notification that Roosevelt and Churchill are discussing the question of informing Eisenhower that the Greek Government has authorized him to sign the surrender terms on its behalf.	1266
Sept. 7	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Assent to Eisenhower's signing the military armistice terms on behalf of the Soviet Union.	1267
Sept. 7	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Text of the announcement of the Italian surrender to be made by Eisenhower before the attack on Salerno.	1267
Sept. 7	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Amendment to Eisenhower's proposed announcement of the Italian surrender.	1268
Sept. 7	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Transmittal of the text of a proposed joint press release on the Italian surrender to be issued in Washington on September 8.	1268
Sept. 8	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve a draft directive (attached) on military government in Italy.	1269

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## C. THE SURRENDER OF ITALY AND THE ALLIED INVASION OF THE ITALIAN PENINSULA—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 8	<i>The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a message from Badoglio stating that Italy can no longer accept an immediate armistice; comment on this message.	1273
Sept. 8	<i>The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Notification of the view of Roosevelt and Churchill that Eisenhower should announce the Italian armistice in such a way as to facilitate his military operations.	1274
Sept. 8	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Decision not to accept the change in the Italian attitude but to proceed with announcement of the armistice.	1274
Sept. 8	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)</i> Approval of Eisenhower's proposed course of action.	1275
Sept. 8	<i>The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) to the President</i> Account of the final negotiations for and the signing of the armistice with Italy.	1275
Sept. 9	<i>President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin</i> Notification of the signature of the Italian armistice and of the Allied invasion of the Italian peninsula near Naples.	1283
Sept. 10	<i>Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Congratulations on the Allied successes in Italy.	1284
Sept. 10	<i>The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of the text of a message urging Badoglio to strike against the Germans; suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill also urge Italian resistance to Germany.	1284
[Sept. 10]	<i>Draft by Prime Minister Churchill</i> Proposed message for Roosevelt and Churchill to send to Badoglio.	1285
Sept. 10	<i>The President to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Approval of Churchill's draft of a joint message to Badoglio, with a suggested amendment.	1286

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## D. REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LIGHT OF THE ITALIAN SURRENDER

Date	Paper	Page
1943 [Sept. 9]	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Suggestion that Roosevelt and Churchill consider with the Combined Chiefs of Staff the new world situation in the light of the Italian surrender; comments and suggestions on future strategy.	1287
Sept. 9	<i>Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Referral to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for study and report, of Churchill's minute to Roosevelt calling for a review of the world strategic situation.	1290
Sept. 10	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Review of the decisions of the Quebec Conference in the light of the collapse of Italy.	1290

## E. BASES IN THE AZORES

1943 Sept. 7	<i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Outline of operations in the Azores contemplated by the United States.	1293
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## F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1943 Aug. 28	<i>The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King)</i> Recommendations as to logistic organization to improve the mobility of anti-submarine squadrons.	1294
Sept. 3	<i>The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King) to the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Transmittal of a report from the Allied Anti-Submarine Board on the use of escort carriers in offensive action against submarines.	1296
Sept. 4	<i>The British First Lord of the Admiralty (Alexander) to Prime Minister Churchill and the British First Sea Lord (Pound)</i> Report on anti-submarine warfare; transmittal of a draft statement to be issued on anti-submarine warfare during August.	1300
Sept. 8	<i>Prime Minister Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Notification that Mackenzie King has no objection to the draft statement on anti-submarine warfare during August; request for United States approval of the draft.	1301
Sept. 9	<i>Memorandum by the President's Naval Aide (Brown)</i> Record of arrangements for the issuance of a press release on anti-submarine warfare during August.	1302

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

### 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

#### G. TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY-POLITICAL COMMISSION

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 4	<p><i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of a revised draft of a message from Roosevelt to Stalin on the time, place, and personnel for a meeting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and possibly France, and of a draft message from Churchill to Stalin on the proposed military-political commission.</p>	1303
Sept. 4	<p><i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Suggestions as to time, place, and personnel for a tripartite meeting; comments on Stalin's proposal for a military-political commission on Italian questions.</p>	1306
Sept. 8	<p><i>Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt</i> Comment on the urgency of establishing a military-political commission; suggestion that the tripartite meeting at a subordinate level be held at Moscow in October; suggestion that the three heads of government meet later in Iran.</p>	1308
Sept. 9	<p><i>President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin</i> Suggestion that the military-political commission meet at Algiers; assent to having a subordinate-level meeting at Moscow in October; counterproposal that the heads of government meet in Egypt in November.</p>	1309

#### H. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY

1943 Sept. 9	<p><i>Prime Minister Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin) to Prime Minister Churchill</i> Inquiry as to whether Roosevelt should be sent a file of messages (attached) between Churchill and Sir John Anderson regarding a trip by Sir Edward Appleton to the United States.</p>	1310
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#### I. PROPAGANDA COORDINATION

1943 Aug. 31	<p><i>Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff</i> Recommendation that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve a draft directive (attached) to all theater commanders on propaganda plans.</p>	1313
Sept. 3	<p><i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Transmittal of a recommendation for the establishment of committees for the coordination of propaganda.</p>	1314
Sept. 7	<p><i>The Director of the Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information (Sherwood) to the President</i> Concurrence in the proposal by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the creation of committees for the coordination of propaganda.</p>	1316

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## I. PROPAGANDA COORDINATION—continued

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 7	<i>The President to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)</i> Unfavorable reaction to the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.	1316
Sept. 10	<i>The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill</i> Further arguments in favor of creating committees for the coordination of propaganda; request for approval for establishing such procedures, at least provisionally.	1317

## J. HOSPITAL SHIPS

1943 [Sept. 4]	<i>Paper Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff</i> Policy on the identification and operation of hospital ships.	1318
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## K. POSTWAR CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

1943 Sept. 1	<i>Memorandum</i> Transmittal of briefing papers on various aspects of postwar civil aviation policy for possible discussion with Churchill.	1319
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## L. NEED FOR A CONFERENCE ON POSTWAR EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

1943 Sept. 4	<i>The Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith) to the President</i> Recommendation that Roosevelt discuss with Churchill the advisability of arranging for a technical conference on postwar employment policies.	1332
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## M. DEPENDENT PEOPLES

1943 Aug. 30	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Transmittal of a draft United Nations declaration on dependent peoples for use in Roosevelt's conversations with Churchill.	1333
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## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS—Continued

## N. PUBLICATION OF MINUTES OF MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF FOUR DURING THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1919

Date	Paper	Page
1943 Sept. 7	<i>The President to the Secretary of State</i> Request that Hull speak to Roosevelt about publication of the minutes of the Council of Four.	1334
Sept. 9	<i>The Secretary of State to the President</i> Background information on the proposed publication of the minutes of the Council of Four.	1334

## 13. CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK

1943 Sept. 13	<i>Editorial Note</i> Information on the conversations.	1336
Sept. 13	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Transmittal of copies of Churchill's telegrams to London concerning postwar world organization, establishment of propaganda committees, publication of the minutes of the Council of Four during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the return to Greece of the King of the Hellenes, and the proposed visit to the Mediterranean of Count Carlo Sforza.	1336
Sept. 13	<i>Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt</i> Summary of Roosevelt's views on civil aviation policy as expressed to Churchill.	1339
Sept. 16	<i>The President to the Secretary of Labor (Perkins)</i> Notification that Churchill favors calling a meeting of the International Labor Organization at Montreal.	1340



I. THE THIRD WASHINGTON CONFERENCE  
(May 12-25, 1943)



# 1. PRE-CONFERENCE PAPERS

## A. PAPERS ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, February 16, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mister Harry Hopkins personal and secret (signed Prime).

Do you remember our conversation about that very secret matter we called "TUBE ALLOYS" which you told me would be put right as soon as the President got home? <sup>2</sup> I should be very grateful for some news about this, as at present the American War Department is asking us to keep them informed of our experiments while refusing altogether any information about theirs.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably by military channels. The source text bears the following typewritten marginal notation dated February 19, 1943: "Remind Mr. Hopkins to speak to General Somervell on this next three or four days."

<sup>2</sup> Reference here is presumably to a conversation held at some time in the course of the Casablanca Conference. No record of such a conversation has been found, but see Martin's message of January 23, 1943, to Hopkins, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 803.

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister  
Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1943.

Propos of your request to me regarding TUBE ALLOYS, I have made some inquiry here.<sup>2</sup> It would be very helpful if Anderson could send me by pouch a full memorandum of what he considers to be the basis of the present misunderstanding, particularly the copies of the original memoranda or any references or conversations which form the bases

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<sup>1</sup> Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably by military channels.

<sup>2</sup> The Hopkins Papers include a memorandum of February 26, 1943, from Bush to Hopkins, and an enclosed 22-page file of documents bearing on the interchange of scientific information with the British, particularly the initial American-British arrangements of September and October, 1940. According to the Bush memorandum, the file was prepared following a conversation between Hopkins and Bush.

of the misunderstanding. In a casual inquiry here I find that our people feel that there has been no breach of agreement, but I want to go into it thoroughly and a memorandum from Anderson would help.

I do hope you are feeling better.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, February 27, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate and most secret. Yours of the 24th.

In my immediately following telegram I send you brief memorandum summarizing history of US UK relations on project known as S-1 or TUBE ALLOYS. If any of documents quoted therein are not available to you, please let me know at once so that I can send you copies by air.

There is no question of breach of agreement. Basis on which all interchange of information has taken place up to this time has been one of complete mutual confidence and of conviction that the most certain and most rapid realization of the project can be attained only through complete cooperation. Suggestion for formal agreement made from our side in August last<sup>2</sup> was concerned more with joint control and post war arrangements than with wartime collaboration in actual work which, after the President's approach to me in October 1941,<sup>3</sup> had always been taken for granted.

We believe that no one will dispute that the American and British scientists and technicians working together as a joint team must achieve success in this difficult and novel project more quickly and efficiently than either group working separately.

When the President and I talked of this matter at Hyde Park in June 1942, my whole understanding was that everything was on the basis of fully sharing the results as equal partners. I have no record, but I shall be very much surprised if the President's recollection does not square with this.<sup>4</sup>

I base my request to you to review the position and restore the

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> Reference here is to the proposals set forth in letters of August 5, 1942, from Anderson to Bush. The contents of these letters are described in detail in Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 261-263.

<sup>3</sup> The approach of October 1941 is described in the document printed *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> No record has been found of the Roosevelt-Churchill discussions of the atomic bomb project during their meetings at Hyde Park in June 1942; see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 432.

original policy of joint work on my conviction that this is necessary if the joint resources of the two countries are to be used most efficiently. But I think that memorandum in my immediately following telegram will show you that, if I had to justify my case on grounds of fair play, I should have little difficulty in doing so.

I must ask you to let me have very soon a firm decision on US policy in this matter, as urgent decisions about our programme here and in Canada depend on the extent to which full collaboration between us is restored.

PRIME

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, February 27, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal immediate and most secret. My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is memorandum summarizing history of US-UK relations on project known as S-1 or TUBE ALLOYS.<sup>2</sup> (*Memorandum begins.*)

After the discovery in Germany in December 1938 of the fission of U 235, research proceeded in France, USA and Britain on the possibility of using this as a source of energy both for power generation and as a military explosive.

From the middle of 1940 the work in USA was organized under the S-1 Committee of NDRC and in UK under the MAUD Committee of MAP and information was freely exchanged both in written documents and verbally.

Bainbridge and Lauritsen of NDRC attended MAUD Committee meetings in April and July 1941 at which complete reviews of the British work were given.

In a letter dated October 11, 1941 President Roosevelt suggested to Prime Minister that they should soon correspond or converse "In order that any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly conducted."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> For the authoritative American history of the collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom in the interchange of scientific information of military application, particularly atomic energy, from 1940 to January 1943, see Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 256-270.

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt's letter read as follows:

"It appears desirable that we should soon correspond or converse concerning the subject which is under study by your MAUD committee, and by Dr. Bush's organization in this country, in order that any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly conducted. I suggest, for identification, that we refer to this subject as MAYSON.

"I send this message by Mr. Hovde, head of the London office of our scientific organization, as he can, if necessary, identify the subject more explicitly, or answer your questions concerning the form of organization by which it is now being handled in this country." (Roosevelt Papers)

In December 1941 the Prime Minister replied "I need not assure you of our readiness to collaborate with the US administration in this matter".

Meanwhile British work had been reorganized and greatly expanded under a "Director of TUBE ALLOYS" directly responsible to the Lord President.<sup>4</sup> Similar reorganization took place in USA.

Professors Pegram and Urey visited Britain in November 1941. They were allowed free access to all our laboratories, so that they could study our work and new organization in detail.

Full information was also exchanged in writing (letters from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of December 23, from Mr. Brook to Mr. Hovde of January 20, from Sir J. Anderson to Dr. Bush of March 23 and from Dr. Bush to Sir J. Anderson of April 20.)

All these communications assumed on both sides complete collaboration at all stages of the project.

This policy was fully confirmed when Mr. Akers, British Director of TUBE ALLOYS, accompanied by Professors Simon, Halban and Peierls, visited America between February and June 1942. They gave full and detailed information about all our progress and plans and were able to discuss all aspects of the project with US scientists with complete frankness on both sides.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the question generally at Hyde Park in June 1942, and it is the Prime Minister's clear recollection that the whole basis of the conversation was that there was to be complete cooperation and sharing of results.<sup>5</sup>

Between June and October 1942 correspondence took place between Dr. Bush and the Lord President with the object of finding the most efficient way of using the combined industrial and scientific resources of the two countries to realize the TUBE ALLOY project in the best interests of the United Nations.

The Lord President suggested that this would best be achieved by arranging for the joint effort to be used in building a plant in North America.

The proposal to build a plant in North America rather than in Britain was not due to any technical inability on the part of the British but to the conviction that this was best on strategic grounds and would involve the minimum interference with the joint war effort.

Throughout this correspondence there is no hint that Dr. Bush contemplated any restriction in interchange of technical information. Wording shows that object of both parties at that time was still to find best means of forwarding a joint cooperative effort.

Contemporaneously with this correspondence there was also an exchange of letters between the Lord President and Dr. Bush in which the former emphasized his conviction that the closest cooperation and exchange of technical information was essential and should be safeguarded by an agreement between the two governments for joint execution of the project and joint wartime and post-war control.

At Dr. Bush's invitation Mr. Akers visited USA from November 1942 to end of January 1943 to inform him of our latest results and to discuss the interlocking of the programmes of the two countries.

<sup>4</sup> Sir John Anderson.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the Roosevelt-Churchill discussions of the atomic bomb project during their meetings at Hyde Park in June 1942, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 432.

After being informed that the US Army was now responsible for all work beyond laboratory research and that it was proposed to tighten up exchange of information solely in the interests of secrecy, Mr. Akers was eventually, on January 7, 1943, given by Dr. Conant a memorandum on the interchange with the British and Canadians on S-1.

This memorandum is stated to derive from the basic principle "That interchange on design and construction of new weapons and equipment is to be carried out only to the extent that the recipient of the information is in a position to take advantage of this information in this war."

The memorandum sets out the logical result of applying this principle to all phases of the S-1 project, in the light of the respective American and British programmes then envisaged. It limits drastically interchange of technical information and entirely destroys the original conception of "A coordinated or even jointly conducted effort between the two countries."

PRIME

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, March 20, 1943.

From Prime Minister to Mister Harry Hopkins personal and most secret.

I am hoping to receive a reply to my telegram to you of February 27 about TUBE ALLOYS. Time is passing and collaboration appears to be at a standstill. We have made some progress in the last three months.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably via military channels.

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1943.

From Mr. Harry L. Hopkins to the Prime Minister personal and most secret.

We have been having very satisfactory talks with Eden.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Manner of transmission not indicated, but presumably via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Washington, March 12-30, 1943, during which time he conferred with President Roosevelt, Hopkins, and other American officials. For documentation on the Eden visit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 1 ff. For accounts of Eden's discussions with American officials on the subject of American assistance to meet British shipping needs, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 699-700, and Behrens, pp. 363-364.

I am working on TUBE ALLOYS and will let you know as soon as I know something definite.

We are looking for good news from Tunisia and I think we are going to get it.

All well here.

HARRY

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Hopkins Papers

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

Re: Interchange on S-1.

On March twenty-fourth the President passed me the accompanying file on interchange with the British on S-1,<sup>2</sup> and instructed me to prepare a reply, undoubtedly by suggesting material for a reply to you, since the attached cables are marked for your attention.

There is no longer any assertion of breach of agreement. The objection of the British must hence be either to the adopted policy or to the way in which it is being applied. I have discussed this matter again with the Military Policy Committee on the subject, and briefly with Secretary Stimson. None of us can see that the present policy, which was approved by the President after it had had the careful review and approval of General Marshall, Secretary Stimson, and Vice President Wallace, is in any way unreasonable, or such as to impede the war effort on this matter. Neither can we see that the application is at present unwise. I believe, therefore, that it will be necessary to determine more explicitly why the British object, before any modification could be recommended. It is true, as indicated in the last paragraph of CCWD 1744,<sup>3</sup> that a prompt resolution of this matter is desirable. However, the present unwillingness of the British to conduct certain scientific interchange, to which we have invited them, merely means that our scientists do not have for the moment the benefit of their collaboration in the studies constantly being conducted. This is of much less importance than a clear understanding on a matter of the unique significance of this. I will therefore review the policy

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<sup>1</sup> The source text is accompanied by the following handwritten note of March 31 from Bush to Hopkins: "Dear Harry—You will probably wish to confer on this, and Conant and I will stand by. V.B."

<sup>2</sup> The file under reference apparently consisted of Churchill's two telegrams of February 27, 1943, to Hopkins, *ante*, pp. 2 and 3, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to Churchills' first message of February 27, 1943, to Hopkins, *ante*, p. 2.

and its application, and I suggest that you request the British for explicit criticism.

The adopted policy is that information on this subject will be furnished to individuals, either in this country or Great Britain, who need it and can use it now in the furtherance of the war effort, but that, in the interests of security, information interchanged will be restricted to this definite objective.

There is nothing new or unusual in such a policy. It is applied generally to military matters in this country and elsewhere. To step beyond it would mean to furnish information on secret military matters to individuals who wish it either because of general interest or because of its application to non-war or post-war matters. To do so would decrease security without advancing the war effort.

The application of this principle is in no way unilateral. In applying the policy in this instance full over-all information has been withheld, for example, from our own Naval Research Laboratory. This has been done with the concurrence of appropriate Naval authority, and in spite of the fact that the Naval Research Laboratory would like to have full information. That laboratory, like other laboratories engaged on the subject, is furnished with all the technical information necessary for full progress on the part of the program which it is carrying forward. To go further would decrease security, and security on this subject is important. In this connection it should be remembered that the Naval Research Laboratory was engaged on aspects of this research very early, in fact I believe as early as any group anywhere, under the guidance of a special committee appointed by the President. This committee was reorganized under NDRC when the latter was formed.

This same policy is applied throughout the OSRD organization. The principle is that no individual receives secret information except as it is necessary for his proper functioning in connection with his assigned duties. It is used by the British themselves, and they occasionally ask us to apply special restrictions on information they furnish us, beyond current practice, when especially secret matters are involved.

I find it hard to believe, therefore, that the present British objection is to the policy. However, the last two paragraphs of CCWD 1807 Z<sup>4</sup> are very pertinent in this connection. The first of these states the principle, and the second states that the application made is a logical result of the principle. It then goes on to say that this "destroys the original conception of 'a coordinated or even jointly conducted

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Churchill's second message to Hopkins of February 27, *ante*, p. 3.

effort between the two countries'." If the application is logical, then the objection must be to the principle itself. To step beyond this principle would, however, involve giving information to those who could use it, not for the best prosecution of the war effort, but rather for other purposes, such as after-the-war commercial advantages.

I have to conclude, therefore, that the British objection arises because of our withholding information which they consider might be of value in connection with their post-war situation. If that is really their position, then presumably it should be duly considered in connection with the entire post-war relationship between the two countries. It should be considered on its merits, and in due perspective to other relations. To transmit such information for such a purpose would involve our giving to Great Britain information obtained by this country as a result of great expense and effort, and, while we freely transmit for the purpose of furthering our joint war effort, we can hardly give away the fruits of our development as a part of post-war planning except on the basis of some over-all agreement on that subject, which agreement does not now exist. The proper conduct of the secure development of a potentially important weapon should not be modified to produce this further result simply as an incident. In this connection I draw your attention to the enclosed memorandum by Dr. Conant.<sup>5</sup>

My recommendation, therefore, is that the reply to the appended telegrams should attempt to fix the issue upon this point, if this is indeed, as I am inclined to believe, the point which is primarily in the mind of the British, in order that it may be considered in due time in connection with the broad problem of post-war relationships.

Specific points of application of the principle other than this are not, I believe, prominently in the British mind. However, it will be well to review them briefly; for they are consistent with the policy, applicable without distinction to UK and US groups, and, I believe, reasonable, and adapted to best progress with due regard to security.

There has been, from the beginning, full scientific interchange wherever scientific groups are working, in the two countries, on the same aspect of the subject. This it is proposed to continue. Recent failure to do so has been due entirely to British refusal thus to collaborate, while a policy to which they object stands.

Thus, there is a group in Chicago working on one part of the program, and a group on the same phase is being formed in Canada.

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<sup>5</sup> The reference is presumably to a six-page memorandum from Conant to Bush, dated March 25, 1943, setting forth Conant's thoughts concerning the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill on the question of American-British interchange on the atomic bomb project (Hopkins Papers). Conant's views are reflected in the Bush memorandum printed here.

We proposed complete scientific interchange between these groups as far as scientific research is concerned, but not on the details of the manufacturing process which we alone are prepared to carry on. Similarly there are groups on the scientific aspects of diffusion, and we proposed continued interchange here on a similar basis.

On the other hand, we have long worked at California on an electromagnetic process, and the British have not worked along these lines. We see no need for furnishing them information on our scientific results on this phase. They do not, I feel, object. They could not use such information, and our scientific group on this phase is fully adequate, and now includes as many scientific men as should work on this phase, at the expense of other scientific phases of the war effort.

We propose shortly to gather a special scientific group at an isolated site to work on some of the phases involved in actual bomb construction. It is essential that this be kept from the enemy at all costs. It is exceedingly difficult in this field, where the general background was known to all sorts of scientists all over the world before the work was brought under control, to secure adequate secrecy. Hence we propose to isolate this group, by special measures, from the rest of the world, including the bulk of our own scientists and of British scientists. However, we are quite willing to invite a British scientist or two to join the group, and have so indicated, provided they will render themselves subject to the same rigid control, for a period which may be several years, as apply to the American scientists that we invite.

We are now erecting manufacturing plants. The information gathered in reducing the manufacture to practice will be extensive, and many inventions will result in patent applications assigned to the United States Government. This is being handled through American companies in which we have confidence. We do not propose to make these manufacturing plans available to any group, British or American, unless it is fully necessary thus to extend information in order to maintain full speed. British commercial interests would like to have these plans, and an account of the operations of plants. So would, undoubtedly, various American companies that are not bound under contract to extend patent rights to the U.S. Government on any invention made by them in this connection.

Finally, there is the matter of military use. This will not come into question for some time. If the war is not of long duration, if there is no danger that the method may be used against us with disastrous results, it may never come into question. When it does, there will undoubtedly be set up special military channels for appropriate

consideration of strategy, tactics, and use. I feel sure there is no concern in the minds of the British on this point.

In conclusion, before making a final reply, it is my recommendation that you again state the case briefly, and inquire where the specific objection now rests.

V. BUSH

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Hopkins Papers

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1943.

MY DEAR HARRY: Anthony has asked me to give you the following message from him:—

“Have you any news for me about very secret matter we discussed? <sup>1</sup> You will realize we have various decisions to take if there has to be separate development.<sup>2</sup>

kindest regards.”

I was proposing to *write* him a secret word about the larger issues we raised together last night,<sup>3</sup> so that nobody but he would see it, and explain why for that reason you had nothing to say at the present moment. But you may like to send some message of your own in reply to this.

Yours very sincerely,

EDWARD

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<sup>1</sup> In his account of his visit to Washington in March 1943, Eden, p. 440, mentions that he had some discussions, principally with Hopkins, about the atomic bomb project. There is no mention of these discussions in the American records of the Eden visit.

<sup>2</sup> The message quoted here is dated April 13, 1943, in Eden, p. 657.

<sup>3</sup> Hopkins' conversation with Halifax on the evening of April 13, 1943, is described in Eden, p. 657.

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1943.

Personal and Secret to Anthony Eden from Harry Hopkins

Your message regarding secret matter received. I am going to send you on Monday a full telegram about the matter.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The source text is accompanied by the following covering note from Hopkins to Halifax, dated April 15, 1943: “Dear Edward: Could you send this to Anthony for me?”

<sup>2</sup> Such a communication has not been found and presumably was never sent. According to Eden, p. 658, the later telegram giving Hopkins' views was never received.

On further inquiry I find it has many ramifications and I therefore am anxious to send you my views fully.

Delighted that you returned safely.

HARRY

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## B. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, March 30, 1943.

Mr. Harry Hopkins from Prime Minister personal and most secret.

1. See BIGOR number 7892 of March 20, and particularly paragraph five.<sup>2</sup> I learned from Anthony that the President was worried about the difficulties which are being discovered in planning HUSKY, and so am I.<sup>3</sup> Do you think the President would send you and Marshall out there to meet me and Brooke in the latter part of April, in order to survey and if possible clinch the business or, in the last resort, to explore alternatives?

2. Personally I think they are making heavy weather of it. At present there are only 3 weak Italian Divisions there and no German. Events are moving in Tunisia and the enemy is already preparing to evacuate Sfax and Sousse.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 7892, NAF 182, March 20, 1943, from Eisenhower (in Algiers) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, reported that study of the original outline plan for HUSKY had revealed certain deficiencies; revision of the plan had been undertaken (*Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1045). For an account of the strategic planning for HUSKY, see Garland and Smyth, chapter III.

<sup>3</sup> The discussion of the planning for HUSKY may have arisen at the White House meeting of March 29, 1943, on the United Nations shipping situation and the capabilities for carrying out planned military operations; see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 699-700. In a note to Roosevelt, dated March 24, 1943, Eden transmitted a personal message from Churchill setting forth the Prime Minister's anxiety about the shipping situation, particularly the inability of the British to mount their share of the HUSKY operation without an additional allocation of ships. In a message to Churchill, dated March 29, 1943, Roosevelt stated the following:

"Replying to your message handed me by Anthony, we shall find all the ships for HUSKY and are going to scrape the bottom otherwise but we cannot escape the fact that something must give if all of our military operations are to be fully supported. I am going into this matter in detail and Anthony will bring you my immediate views." (Roosevelt Papers)

<sup>4</sup> See Howe, *passim*, concerning the Allied military campaigns in Northwest Africa culminating in the liberation of Tunisia in May 1943.

Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

URGENT

LONDON, April 1, 1943.

2326. Embassy has received for transmission the following message from the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins:

"1. Many thanks for yours of thirtieth.<sup>2</sup> I look for good and speedy results in Tunisia. I do trust you will give careful consideration to my proposal for a meeting. There are so many things that I want to talk over with you.

"2. I am much concerned at not hearing from you about TUBE ALLOYS. That we should work separately would be a sombre decision."<sup>3</sup>

MATTHEWS

<sup>1</sup> The Department of State's copy of this telegram is filed under 841.24/1788.

<sup>2</sup> The message under reference has not been found, but it may be Hopkins' telegram of March 29 to Churchill (Sherwood, p. 718) on the proposed award to MacArthur.

<sup>3</sup> For the earlier exchange of messages between Hopkins and Churchill on this subject, see *ante*, pp. 1-6.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, April 5, 1943.

No. 279. Personal and secret, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt.

1. I had a long talk with Anthony last night and I thank you for all your kind reassuring messages.

2. I am delighted to hear that there is a prospect of Harry coming here almost immediately. If you could let General Marshall come with him there would be enormous advantages and we could then settle about going on to TORCH area to discuss possibilities with all our people on the spot there. The battles impending in Tunisia this week should clarify the position a good deal.

3. From what Anthony told me about your ideas for HUSKY and its exploitation if successful, it seems that we are thinking along the same lines. I therefore send you a copy of the minute which I sent on the second instant to the Chief of Staffs Committee and on which they are now at work. Please keep this to yourself, Harry and General Marshall as I have not yet heard what our Chiefs of Staff have to say about it. It is only intended as a channel for thought and planning. Minute referred to in Paragraph 3 follows:

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

1. Assuming, first, that VULCAN is finished by the end of April, or, at worst, by May 15th and no large formed body of German or Italian troops escapes: secondly, that HUSKY takes place on July 10: thirdly, that there are not more than five Italian divisions, aggregating not more than 50,000 combatants, and not more than two German divisions, aggregating 20,000 combatants, total 70,000 combatants, in HUSKY-land, and furthermore that we place seven or eight British and American Divisions ashore, at a combatant strength of 15,000 each, total 105,000, and reinforce by another 30,000 British, grand total 135,000: and fourthly, that we win the intense battles which the landing involves:—how long is the subjugation of the armed forces of the enemy in HUSKY-land estimated to take?

2. In an operation of this kind, everything depends upon the initial battle lasting, say, a week, after which one might reasonably expect that the bulk of the enemy's forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the mountains. The distances are not great and the resources of the country are small and once we have the ports and the airfields we should be effectively the masters of HUSKY-land, and be able to disperse by air power, and sea power covered by air power, all attempts by the enemy to reconquer it.

3. Hitherto the capture of HUSKY-land has been regarded as an end in itself: but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. HUSKY-land is only a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local success. What has been done about this? Every reasonable alternative should be explored. Now that ANAKIM has receded owing to the shipping shortage, Mediterranean operations gain more prominence. If we take the end of July as the date by which we are established in HUSKY-land, what other operations are open? Of course our choice must depend upon what the enemy do. If large German forces are brought down into Italy and Italian morale and will to fight is thereby enhanced, the scale required for the taking of Rome and Naples might be beyond our power. In that case we must be ready with our plans in the Eastern Mediterranean, and put it hard across Turkey to come in with us. We must be ready for an attack on the Dodecanese and for supporting Turkey if she gets into trouble.

4. If however the Germans do not come, and the Italians crumple, there is no limit to the amount of Italian territory we may overrun. Italy may be forced out of the war. We may become possessed of Sardinia without fighting. Corsica may be liberated. All our available forces, including divisions in Africa not involved in HUSKY, will have to be moved northward into Italy till they come into contact with the Germans on the Brenner or along the French Riviera. How far have these possibilities been studied?

5. Even if Italy remains in the war with a certain amount of German help we ought, the moment we are masters of HUSKY-land, to try to get a footing both on the toe and heel of Italy. The possession of Taranto as well as the Isthmus governing the toe would confer great advantages upon us. The Italian fleet would have to decide on which side of Italy it would take refuge. We cannot tell what its position or condition will be as a result of the HUSKY operation. If it has not

retreated up the Adriatic before we are masters of HUSKY-land with our air force established there, it will not be able to do so and will have to content itself with Spezia and Genoa. In any case, it must be considered a most important objective to get a footing on the Dalmatian coast so that we can foment the insurgents of Albania and Yugoslavia by weapons, supplies and possibly Commandos. I believe that, in spite of his present naturally foxy attitude, Mihailovic will throw his whole weight against the Italians the moment we are able to give him any effective help. Evidently great possibilities are open in this theatre.

6. The object of this paper is to request with the utmost urgency the close study of these problems, and to obtain from the Chiefs of Staff their view of what can be done and what it is best to do. I hope this work may be pressed forward with the greatest speed because the mere capture of HUSKY-land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of 1943.

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, April 9, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins personal and most secret.

I am troubled at not receiving any answer to my telegram unnumbered of 30th March saying how vital it was for you and Marshall to meet me and the CIGS in TORCH Land in the near future. Since then I have been greatly cheered to hear that you had telephoned Anthony in Canada, that you would be over here almost immediately. I again telegraphed, see my No. 279 of 5th April to President,<sup>2</sup> pleading for Marshall too. Nothing could be better than a prompt meeting here and then going on to TORCH Land if we thought it necessary. Several days have passed since then and I have no further news of you.

Meanwhile a most depressing telegram No. NAF 201 about HUSKY has been sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by Ike,<sup>3</sup> and our Chiefs of Staff have sent a very strong rejoinder against it. There is also the question "Where do we go from HUSKY" on which I sent the President a note which I had prepared for the Chiefs of Staff.<sup>4</sup> All

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> Telegram NAF 201, April 7, 1943, from Eisenhower in Algiers to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, not printed; it expressed the view that operation HUSKY offered little promise for success should the area of the landings contain substantial numbers of well-armed German troops (J.C.S. Files).

<sup>4</sup> The text of Churchill's note or minute was included in his telegram 279, April 5, to Roosevelt, *supra.*

this emphasizes the need I have been pressing for nearly a fortnight past for your visit and that of General Marshall.

PRIME

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1943.

Mr. Harry Hopkins to Prime Minister personal and most secret.

Anthony must have misunderstood me relative to my coming to England immediately. The President feels that the time not propitious until situation in Tunisia clarified. He will be in direct touch with you soon.

HARRY

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably military.

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

[LONDON,] April 11, 1943.

I cannot help being much disappointed by your telegram.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, April 29, 1943.

PRIORITY

Former Naval Person to President, Personal and Secret Number 291.

It seems to me most necessary that we should all settle together now first HUSKY and exploitation thereof and secondly the future of ANAKIM in light of Burma campaign experiences and shipping stringency. There are also a number of other burning questions which you and I could with advantage bring up to date.

I think I could manage to be with you by Tuesday 11th May. I would bring Wavell, Peirse and Admiral Somerville as well as Pound, Brooke, Portal, Mountbatten and Leathers. Please say whether you

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

would like this or whether you would prefer to send your people over here which of course would be easier for us.

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Hopkins Papers

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 30, 1943.

The following is a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's radio which we discussed today. I have read it to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, to whom Admiral Leahy introduced the subject of the message. They are in agreement with me.

"Reference your radio number 291 regarding general meeting in Washington May 11th or in London:

"Marshall and King are due to leave here for Pacific on May 5th or 6th in order to be back in Washington first week in June for final consideration of post-HUSKY matters. Their Pacific trip at this time is most important relative to final adjustments of matters pertaining to combined operations in the South and Southwest Pacific areas about to be initiated.

"I suggest that the reactions of the British Chiefs of Staff to your minute of April 5th<sup>2</sup> reference post-HUSKY operations be made available to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and vice versa, this procedure preliminary to more formal and final consideration early in June in the light of Tunisian and HUSKY developments.

"I would also suggest that Wavell, Peirse, and Somerville come here immediately in time to discuss with Marshall and King and others in company with General Stilwell and Chennault now here, matters relative to ANAKIM."

G C MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

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<sup>1</sup> Marginal notation, apparently by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., Naval Aide to the President, reads "Not sent".

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to Churchill's note or minute included in his telegram 279, April 5, 1943, to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 13.

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Hopkins Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, May 2, 1943.

Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins. Personal and most especially secret.

I should be very glad to receive an answer to my No. 291 to the President. The doctors do not want me to fly at the very great

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated, but presumably military. Received May 2, 1943, 7:57 a. m.

heights required in a bomber and the northern route clippers cannot take off on account of late ice till after May 20. On the other hand, I cannot keep the Indian Commanders-in-Chief<sup>2</sup> here indefinitely and would not be willing to send them without their superiors the Chiefs-of-Staff.<sup>3</sup> We are therefore coming together by sea. All preparations are being made to start Tuesday<sup>4</sup> night and a good many naval and air movements are involved and actually going on.

Following is absolutely private for you alone. If, as I can well believe, the President is absorbed in the coal crisis and generally with domestic affairs, it might be more convenient for me to stay at the Embassy and come to see him every day from there. I should understand this perfectly and anyhow would like to spend part of the time at the Embassy. What is essential is that our plans should be made and thrashed out and decisions taken as at Casablanca.<sup>5</sup> I am conscious of serious divergences beneath the surface which, if not adjusted, will lead to grave difficulties and feeble action in the summer and autumn. These difficulties we must forestall.

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<sup>2</sup> i.e., Field Marshal Wavell, Air Chief Marshal Peirse, and Admiral Somerville.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., General Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, and Air Chief Marshal Portal.

<sup>4</sup> May 4.

<sup>5</sup> For documentation regarding the Casablanca Conference, January 14-24, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1943.

PRIORITY

To the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret No. 275.

I am really delighted you are coming. I agree most heartily that we have some important business to settle at once; the sooner the better. Marshall and King have postponed their Pacific trip. I want you of course to stay here with me.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels at 4:05 p. m.

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*Editorial Note*

President Roosevelt conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on May 2, 1943. No official record of this meeting has been found. Regarding the absence from the official files of such

records, see Matloff, p. 125, footnote 57. According to the very brief account in Leahy, p. 156, Roosevelt, Hopkins, Leahy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were present, and the subject of the discussion was the impending conference with the British. Leahy recalls in particular that consideration was given to the questions of the contemplated Allied military actions in Burma and the supplying of material to the Chinese Army.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, May 4, 1943.

No. 293. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Your no 275. Thank you very much. I look forward to our early meeting. Am bringing Averell.<sup>2</sup> Accept my warmest congratulations on the brilliant advance of United States Troops to Mateur.<sup>3</sup> This will greatly help the thrust which we shall make soon in the centre.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via military channels.

<sup>2</sup> W. Averell Harriman.

<sup>3</sup> The American 1st Armored Division captured Mateur in Tunisia on May 3, 1943. For the account of this action, see Howe, chapter xxxiii.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1943.

Personal and secret for Mr. Stalin from the President.

I want you to know that Mr. Churchill is coming to Washington next week to discuss our immediate next steps. We will of course keep General Belyaev currently informed.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. In a note of May 7, 1943, to Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov, the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, William D. Standley, transmitted a paraphrased text of the President's message with the request that it be conveyed to Marshal Stalin. For text of the message as delivered to Stalin and dated May 6, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, No. 84, p. 64.

President Roosevelt also sent a personal note to Marshal Stalin, dated May 5, 1943, proposing that the two leaders confer together sometime during the summer. The note, which also mentioned that the President and the Prime Minister would be conferring the following week, was delivered to Marshal Stalin on May 21, 1943, by the President's Special Representative, Joseph E. Davies. For text of note, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 3.

*Editorial Note*

President Roosevelt conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the White House on May 9, 1943. No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found. Regarding the absence from the official files of any records of this meeting, see Matloff, p. 125, footnote 57. According to Leahy, p. 157, and King, p. 435, it was determined at this meeting that a definite commitment from the British would be sought regarding a cross-Channel invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date and the making of preparations for such an operation by the spring of 1944. Leahy also recalls that his own proposal to grant the Chinese request for the use of available air transport for three months to send aviation material from India to China was not supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stimson, who was not a participant at the meeting, heard about it afterwards, and recorded the following in his Diary for May 10, 1943 :

“Marshall told me of the President’s conference yesterday with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and told me that he had ‘in principle’ agreed to the outline which our Chiefs of Staff had prepared as the American policy in the coming conference. Marshall, however, expressed his reservation as to how firmly the President would hold to his acquiescence. I fear it will be the same story over again. The man from London will arrive with a program of further expansion in the eastern Mediterranean and will have his way with our Chief, and the careful and deliberate plans of our Staff will be overridden. I feel very troubled about it. So I spent my morning in carefully going over the views of our Staff which accord with my own views very fully.” (Stimson Papers)

The plan presented to Roosevelt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this meeting appears to be J.C.S. 286/1, May 8, 1943, “Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conference”. This paper is described in detail in Matloff, pp. 123–124, and in Romanus and Sunderland, p. 327. The work of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning for the conference with the British is discussed in Matloff, pp. 120–125, and in Cline, pp. 219–220.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[ON BOARD THE “QUEEN MARY”,] May 10, 1943.

Naval Person to President most secret and personal number 294.

Since yesterday we have been surrounded by U. S. Navy and we all greatly appreciate high value you evidently set upon our continued

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the American Embassy at London, presumably via Navy channels.

survival. I look forward to being at White House with you tomorrow afternoon and also to going to Hyde Park with you at weekend.<sup>2</sup> The voyage has been so far most agreeable and Staff have done vast amount of work.

PRIME

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<sup>2</sup> In *Hinge of Fate*, p. 789, Churchill recalls that Roosevelt "brushed aside" his suggestion that he stay at the British Embassy. See *ante*, p. 17.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[ON BOARD THE "QUEEN MARY", undated.]

Admiralty have now routed us a somewhat longer course and we shall probably be several hours late. I should like to go by train to Washington and will arrive there during the afternoon. I shall be delighted to come to Hyde Park for the week-end, and I dare say we may have better news from North Africa than we did at the time of Tobruk in June.<sup>2</sup> Look forward to seeing you.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated. The receipt date of May 10 is recorded in a handwritten marginal notation.

<sup>2</sup> The reference here is to the fall of Tobruk in June, 1942, at the time of the Second Washington Conference; see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 433.

<sup>3</sup> Churchill's party, which had landed at Staten Island, arrived in Washington by train late on the afternoon of May 11, 1943.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Secretary (Early)*

WASHINGTON, 13 May, 1943.

MY DEAR EARLY,

1. I am extremely sorry about the misunderstanding about making public the mode of transport used by the Prime Minister to come to the United States.

The Prime Minister has agreed that it may now be stated that he came by sea, but of course no reference should be made to the name of the vessel, the port of entry and/or the route followed. This decision now supersedes the request made in the Prime Minister's telegram to the President,<sup>1</sup> to which you referred when we spoke, and you will certainly wish to have this on official record.

Mr. Morgan did try, I understand, to get in touch with you earlier to-day about this matter. He failed to do so but he hopes to get into touch with you later in order to arrange a co-ordinated release time.

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<sup>1</sup> The Churchill telegram under reference has not been found.

2. I have spoken to Mr. Morgan about the arrangement we made about releasing Prime Minister's engagements. He will ensure that the release of such information is co-ordinated with you.

Yours sincerely,

T. L. ROWAN

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 16, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS: I attach a list in duplicate of the Prime Minister's engagements. Perhaps you could kindly pass one copy on to Mrs. Roosevelt. I have no doubt that additional engagements, such as meetings with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, will arise.

Perhaps I may mention the following points to which I referred this morning:

a. Thursday, 20th, Admiral Brown and Tommy<sup>1</sup> are arranging the concert. We are fixing the meeting with Empire representatives at 5:45 in the Monroe Room at the White House, which you kindly said we could use.

b. I assume I may inform Mr. Early and Mr. Morgan, our information representative, that the Prime Minister has been invited and will attend Friday's press conference.<sup>2</sup>

c. Week-end. The P.M. feels he must stay at Washington and proposes then to see the many people he should see. He does not wish in any way to interfere with the President's arrangements and has accordingly asked us to arrange that he and his staff should go to the Embassy for the week-end.<sup>3</sup>

I attach a copy of the lists of people for the Prime Minister to see, suggested by the President, and by yourself and Lord Halifax. As I told you, the Prime Minister does not now propose to see Mr. Spangler and feels also that it is rather out of his beat to see Mr. Murray and Mr. Green. You said that if he did not see these two it would be inappropriate for him to see Mr. Tobin. Perhaps you could mention this to the President as it was he who suggested Mr. Tobin.

As regards the address to Congress, I am not certain at what time it is to start, as I have seen various reports.<sup>4</sup> Also, do you know whether it is to be broadcast in U.S. and the U.K. as last time?

T L ROWAN  
16.v.43.

<sup>1</sup> The reference here is presumably to Commander Thompson, the Prime Minister's Personal Assistant.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill did not, in fact, attend Roosevelt's press conference on May 21. Roosevelt and Churchill did hold a joint press conference on May 25, for the record of which see *post*, p. 211.

<sup>3</sup> Churchill apparently returned to the White House on the evening of May 23; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding Churchill's address to a joint session of the Houses of Congress at noon on May 19, 1943, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 117.

[Annex 1]

*List of Prime Minister Churchill's Engagements*

## ENGAGEMENTS

<i>Monday 17.</i>	Return White House for lunch. <sup>5</sup>
6:00 p. m.	Lord Knollys.
<i>Tuesday 18.</i>	
1:30 p. m.	Lunch Embassy, Duke of Windsor. Afternoon and after-dinner, prepare speech.
<i>Wednesday 19.</i>	
Noon ?	Address Congress. <sup>6</sup> Lunch at Capitol, followed by interview with Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses. <sup>7</sup>
5:30 p. m.	Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. (Not yet fixed) Mr. Mackenzie King comes to White House for night. <sup>8</sup>
<i>Thursday 20.</i>	
Noon	Pacific Council. <sup>9</sup>
5:00 p. m.	Band concert at White House.
5:45 p. m.	Empire Representatives at White House. Dinner at Embassy with Mr. and Mrs. Hopkins and Mr. and Mrs. Harriman.
<i>Friday 21.</i>	
10:30 a. m.	Press Conference. <sup>10</sup>
1:00 p. m.	Lunch with President and Mme. Chiang Kai Shek. <sup>11</sup> Dine at Embassy to meet U.S. Cabinet Ministers, etc. <sup>12</sup>
<i>Week-end</i>	Stay at Embassy.
<i>Monday 24.</i>	Return to White House. <sup>13</sup> Dine Embassy with Heads of Missions.

<sup>5</sup> Roosevelt and Churchill spent the weekend of May 14-17, 1943, at Shangri La, the President's mountain camp in Maryland; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 86.

<sup>6</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 117.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding Churchill's Congressional luncheon meeting, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> Regarding the Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King conversation on the evening of May 19, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 123.

<sup>9</sup> For the record of the meeting of the Pacific War Council on May 20, 1943, see *post*, p. 134.

<sup>10</sup> The Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference was not held until May 25; for the record of the conference, see *post*, p. 211.

<sup>11</sup> This luncheon appears to have been cancelled; for Churchill's own account of the abortive arrangements for the lunch, see *Hinge of Fate*, p. 797.

<sup>12</sup> No record has been found to indicate that Churchill dined with United States Cabinet officers on May 21; for the record of Prime Minister's luncheon meeting with several United States officials on May 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 167.

<sup>13</sup> Churchill appears to have returned to the White House on the evening of May 23; see the editorial note, *post*, p. 183.

[Annex 2]

*List of Persons Suggested to Prime Minister Churchill To See*<sup>14</sup>

The President Suggests:

Mr. Phillips—who was in India.<sup>15</sup>

Mr. Tobin.

The Ambassador and Mr. Hopkins Suggest:

The Vice President,<sup>16</sup>Colonel Stimson,<sup>17</sup>

Colonel Knox,

Mr. Morgenthau,

Mr. Welles,<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Walter Lippmann,

Mr. Harold Ickes,<sup>16</sup>

Mr. Donald Nelson,

General Stilwell,<sup>18</sup>General Chennault,<sup>19</sup>

Admiral Land,

Mr. Jesse Jones,

General Somervell

Mr. Phil Muray, C.I.O.,

Mr. Bill Green, A.F. of L.,

Mayor Kelly,

Mr. Spangler, Chairman,

Republican Party,

Mr. Frank Walker, Chairman,

Democratic Party and

Postmaster General.

<sup>14</sup> It is not known how many of the persons herein listed actually met with Churchill. Available information is set forth in the succeeding footnotes.

<sup>15</sup> Phillips, who returned from his mission to India at the beginning of May 1943, had an interview with Roosevelt on May 11 and gave the President some additional views in a letter dated May 14, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 220. Regarding the meeting between Phillips and Churchill on the morning of May 23, 1943, see the editorial note, *post*, p. 177.

<sup>16</sup> A participant in the American-British luncheon meeting of May 22, 1943; see *post*, p. 166.

<sup>17</sup> Stimson participated in the American-British luncheon of May 22, 1943, and met privately with Churchill directly afterwards; see *post*, pp. 166 and 172.

<sup>18</sup> For Stilwell's record of his meeting with Churchill on the morning of May 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 165.

<sup>19</sup> According to the account in Claire Lee Chennault, *Way of a Fighter* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), p. 227, Churchill held a private meeting with Chennault at breakfast sometime near the end of the Conference. No official record of the meeting has been found.

## 2. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 12, 1943, 1 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

### PRESENT

#### UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins

#### UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lord Beaverbrook

### *Editorial Note*

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 12, 1943, 2: 30 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

### PRESENT

#### UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

#### UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Lieutenant General Ismay

### *Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

### *Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up

to TORCH.<sup>1</sup> It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca<sup>2</sup> had set on foot operation HUSKY, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President's desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk.<sup>3</sup> He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. TORCH was over, HUSKY was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill

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<sup>1</sup> For documentation regarding the Second Washington Conference, June 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 417 ff.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation regarding the conference at Casablanca, January 1943, see *ibid.*, pp. 485 ff.

<sup>3</sup> For the circumstances in which Churchill learned of the surrender of Tobruk to the German-Italian armies, see Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, p. 382.

of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battleships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a *toe and heel* operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys.<sup>4</sup> For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies.<sup>5</sup> But we should never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian

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<sup>4</sup> For correspondence between Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin regarding the cessation in March 1943 of the Allied convoys to northern Russia, see Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 752-757, and S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea, 1939-1945*: vol. II: *The Period of Balance* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 400-401.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding Stalin's Order of the Day of May 1, 1943, see telegram 388, May 2, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, p. 519.

Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt—a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 Divisions in that theater. Supposing that HUSKY were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to BOLERO, SLEDGEHAMMER, and ROUNDUP. By BOLERO, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications, all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from HUSKY. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to HUSKY, and owing to priority having been rightly given to SICKLE, only one U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for opera-

tion ANAKIM, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, ANAKIM be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of ANAKIM. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in TORCH. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications

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<sup>6</sup> Regarding General Stilwell's effort to refute this British contention about the Burma Road in a memorandum to General Marshall, May 13, 1943, see Matloff, p. 140.

that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he has always been a firm believer in *attrition* as an effective weapon. He pointed to the North African campaign and suggested that it might not have been so successful had sufficient force been sent to capture Tunisia on the initial landing. As a result of the Tunisian campaign there will be perhaps some 200,000 enemy casualties. He felt there would have been considerably less had Tunisia been taken at the outset.

He pointed out that the United Nations are now out-producing both the Germans and the Japanese and that if we break even in our losses of airplanes and other munitions we are, in effect, forging ahead.

THE PRESIDENT then said that with the large armies and naval forces that are available to the United Nations every effort should be made to keep them engaged with the enemy. He felt that the United Nations were losing ground when their forces remain idle.

THE PRESIDENT expressed optimism as far as the situation in Turkey was concerned. When the Prime Minister went on his *fishing trip* after the Casablanca Conferences he, the President, had been surprised by the cordial reception that the Prime Minister had received.<sup>7</sup> He felt that Turkey was now in a better political position than she had ever been before. Perhaps Turkey could be brought to a favorable attitude toward the United Nations by diplomacy alone. If so, this would permit the use of her airfields for combined air operations against Ploesti and the Germans' right flank and their lines of communication. If Turkey could be brought into the war, there would be the possibility of combined operations toward the Adrianople line, thus threatening Bulgaria, and inducing that country to withdraw

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<sup>7</sup> Prime Minister Churchill met with Turkish President İnönü and Ministers at Adana, Turkey, January 30-31, 1943. For documentation regarding the exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and the Turkish President regarding the conference at Adana, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1058 ff.

from the war. He felt that the Russians would welcome any effort on the part of the United Nations which would result in breaking the Germans' lines of communication. He pointed out also that attrition would be at work during any operations from Turkey.

THE PRESIDENT then asked "Where do we go from HUSKY?" He said he had always shrunk from the thought of putting large armies in Italy. This might result in attrition for the United Nations and play into Germany's hand. He indicated that a thorough investigation should be made of what an occupation of Italy proper, or of the *heel* or *toe* of Italy, would mean as a drain on allied resources. At the same time, he pointed out that the Mediterranean area contained large armies of the United Nations, perhaps about a total of 25 divisions, and that these must be kept employed. He said there was not much time in 1943, because planning future operations is a lengthy procedure. The question to be decided quickly, is how to use the Mediterranean troops this year. He said that conditions in Italy are known to be precarious. Italy might drop into the lap of the United Nations, who would then have the responsibility of supplying the Italian people. Everyone was agreed that Italy must be reconstituted, but that the mistakes regarding possession of the Northern Adriatic, which occurred at the peace table after the last war, must not be repeated.

Summing up, the PRESIDENT said a survey should be made to determine the cost of occupying Italy or parts of it as opposed to the cost of achieving the same results by air offensives from Sicily or the *heel* and *toe* of Italy.<sup>8</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said that regardless of operations undertaken in the Mediterranean there would be a surplus of manpower. He said that this surplus should be used to build up BOLERO. Preparations for such build-up should begin at once. He felt that all were agreed that no ROUNDUP or SLEDGEHAMMER was possible of accomplishment this year, but if one or the other were to be mounted in the spring of 1944, preparations should begin now. ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER have been talked about for two years but as yet none of these operations had been accepted as a concrete plan to be carried out at a certain time. Therefore he wished to emphasize that SLEDGEHAMMER or ROUNDUP should be decided upon definitely as an operation for the spring of 1944.

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<sup>8</sup> According to the summary of remarks at the First Plenary Meeting in Leahy, p. 159, President Roosevelt directed his staff to look into the possibility, from a military point of view, of launching an attack upon Germany through Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey. The President, according to this same summary, said he would examine the political aspects of such a move. Leahy also indicates the readiness of the President to undertake the seizure of Sardinia.

THE PRESIDENT then directed his remarks toward the Pacific. He said that at the present time a landing was being made in the Aleutians, on the Island of Attu.<sup>9</sup> Approximately 3,000 men had already been put ashore. By this operation it was hoped to put Kiska in a *box* between Attu and Amchitka which would also result in imposing *attrition* on the enemy. So far, the operations in the Aleutians had resulted in a net gain to the United Nations. The operations in the Solomons and in New Guinea had had the same result.

THE PRESIDENT said that while things are apparently going along all right in the Pacific, attention must be devoted to the length of the Japanese supply lines. He likened them to a *segment of pie* in which Japan proper was at the apex, and the line from the Solomons through the Dutch East Indies to Burma represented the *outer crust*. While there was some attrition going on against the *outer crust*, the most effective way to get at the Japanese shipping was to strike at the apex. So far the United Nations have done well in sinking Japanese merchant tonnage. Proof of this has been in the fact that the Japanese have been taking shipping from the Yangtze and using it, together with junks they are building, for coastal runs, in order to release coastal shipping for ocean work. Since the war started the Japanese have suffered a net loss of 1,000,000 tons of shipping or approximately one-seventh of the shipping which they had available at the beginning of the war. If they continue to lose shipping at this rate they can not maintain the outer rim of the pie and will have to contract in their operations. THE PRESIDENT said that the same was true with regard to aircraft. Attrition suffered by the Japanese air forces has resulted in their having less strength available now than at the beginning of the war.

THE PRESIDENT repeated that the most effective way to strike the Japanese shipping was to strike it leaving Japan proper. This could best be done from bases either in China, or from China and Russia. Therefore much depends upon keeping China a *going concern*. He said he did not believe the Chinese were *crying wolf* when reporting the critical condition which exists in their country today. He said that the conference could not justify overlooking the possibility of a Chinese collapse. This brought up the question of the priority for aid to China with regard to 1943 and 1944.<sup>10</sup>

ANAKIM and similar plans proposed at Casablanca might not have an effect which would be immediate enough to keep China in the war;

<sup>9</sup> The U.S. 7th Division landed on Attu on May 11, 1943; the Japanese garrison was defeated and rounded up by the end of the month.

<sup>10</sup> For an account of the discussions in Washington in late April and early May 1943, involving the President and high-ranking War Department officials, regarding the various proposals on the scope and nature of aid to China, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 317-327.

the results of ANAKIM would not be felt until March or April of 1944 and the Burma Road would not be fully open to traffic until 1945. The necessity was for doing something for China now. THE PRESIDENT said that the question resolves itself to assisting China by air.

THE PRESIDENT said that to assist China by air it was essential to reconstruct and maintain the security of the airfields in Assam to the west of the mountains. They must be made secure regardless of the cost in manpower and matériel, and they must also be protected. On the east side of the mountains the Chinese are building landing fields and now have five or six fields in good condition. General Stilwell has two divisions in training for the protection of these fields. THE PRESIDENT said that the Generalissimo does not fear a ground attack in Yunnan.

He said that air in China would accomplish three objectives: it would be able to harass Japanese troops South of Hankow or those advancing from the South against Chungking; it could harass Japanese attacks against Chungking from the North; and it could stop Japanese attacks against Chungking which might be made up the Yangtze. THE PRESIDENT said he doubted if reliance could be placed on the Chinese army, excepting those troops being trained in Yunnan and Ramgarh. However, he thought it important to give the Generalissimo, who is the head of both the Army and the State, what he wants at this time. This, he said, is a strong build-up of the American-Chinese Air forces. Such an air force can be built up to strike against Japanese shipping and against Japan itself. He emphasized that the Chiefs of Staff must bear in mind the political fact that China is in danger of collapse.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that aid to China at the present time does not have an immediate effect of taking weight off Russia but that it would have an ultimate effect when Russia joins up with the United Nations in their war against Japan. This he predicted would take place within 48 hours after Germany has been defeated.

THE PRESIDENT said, with regard to taking weight off Russia, that the United Nations [should] continue with strategy which would compel the Germans to fight. It was for that reason that he questioned the occupation of Italy, feeling that this might result in releasing German troops now in that country. He said he felt the most effective way of forcing Germany to fight was by carrying out a cross-Channel operation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not feel that an occupation of Italy would be necessary. In the event of an Italian collapse, the United Nations would occupy the necessary ports and air bases from which to carry on operations against the Balkans and Southern

Europe, but they should let an Italian Government control the country, subject to supervision on the part of the United Nations.

THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER then indicated that the possibility of securing the use of the Azores was under consideration. An attempt would be made to accomplish this by diplomacy, and, if necessary, the diplomacy might be coupled with threats or an actual surprise arrival of forces. They thought that an arrangement might be made with Portugal whereby the use of the Azores could be obtained on a rental basis. However, they indicated that the question was largely political.

FIELD MARSHAL SIR JOHN DILL asked if consideration had been given to the present attitude of Spain.

Both the PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER indicated that they felt that Spain was much relieved by the turn of events in Africa, that it was becoming more favorably disposed toward the United Nations, and that it had in mind constantly the threat of the American forces facing Spanish Morocco.

THE PRESIDENT announced that the next meeting would be on Friday, 14th May, at 2:00 P. M., at which time it was desired to have the Commanders in Chief, India, and Generals Stilwell and Chennault present to discuss conditions in the Burma-China Theater.

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### THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1943

#### ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-BENEŠ MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, FORENOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

##### PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CZECHOSLOVAKIA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	President Beneš

##### *Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. President Beneš was on a wartime visit to the United States and Canada during May and early June 1943. According to the brief account of this meeting in *Memoirs of Dr. Edward Beneš: From Munich to New War and New Victory* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954), p. 187, Beneš had been invited to attend so that he could explain to Roosevelt and Churchill his views on the partition of Germany. Beneš also set forth his views regarding the necessity to try German war criminals, reeducate the German people, decentralize the German administration, and substantially change the German social structure. Accord-

ing to a summary of a report to the Czechoslovak State Council on Beneš' conversations in Washington, a copy of which was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 61, May 28, 1943, from the Ambassador to the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London (neither printed), numerous questions of European politics as well as problems of future international organization and the guaranteeing of peace and security were discussed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Beneš at this meeting.

For Beneš' own description of his other meetings with Roosevelt and other American officials during his Washington visit, see *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš*, pp. 180-187 and 193-196. For the memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with Beneš on May 18, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 529.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 13, 1943, 10:30  
A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, expressed his pleasure at having the British Chiefs of Staff present for this series of meetings. He appreciated that they have come so far and left their duties for this purpose. He felt that it was important that by personal conferences the problems which had arisen since their last meeting should be resolved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he would like to outline brief proposals with regard to the conduct of the Conference. He suggested the meetings

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<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 83rd Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of the organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 83rd Meeting was the first held in connection with the Third Washington Conference.

should take place daily, including Sundays, from 10:30 to 12:45, followed by a luncheon in the Map Room of the Public Health Building. If acceptable to the British Chiefs of Staff, the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to have with them at these meetings their three senior planning officers, together with one member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and two officers responsible for supply problems. These officers would not take part in the discussion nor sit at the table. He felt that many of the problems could be more quickly resolved if those involved were present and could hear at first hand the views of the Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the number should be kept down as much as possible but agreed with Admiral Leahy's suggestions. He would like the British Directors of Plans also to be present.

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that to assist the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in their duties after the Conference itself had ceased, it would be helpful if they also could attend.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that this was an excellent suggestion.

ADMIRAL LEAHY further suggested that with regard to the recording of decisions, nothing in the minutes should be regarded as an agreed decision unless it were recorded as such in the conclusions. Agreed decisions should be taken as the first item at the subsequent meeting. With regard to the final report to the President and the Prime Minister, he suggested that any preliminary reports presented should be regarded as tentative only and that in the final report an effort should be made to arrange approved existing and projected strategic undertakings in their order of priority. He suggested the first two sessions should be given up to a general discussion and exchange of ideas on global strategy, both in Europe and the Pacific; after that, post-HUSKY operations in 1943 and beyond, both in the Mediterranean and Western Europe; and finally a review of the China situation, operation ANAKIM and the Pacific. At the conclusion of these first two general discussions, the Combined Planners should be asked to prepare a detailed agenda. The war against Japan should perhaps be discussed first since the Commanders in Chief in the Far East might wish to return to their posts.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read out a memorandum giving the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the global strategy of the war (Annex "A" to these minutes).<sup>2</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE thanked Admiral Leahy for the warm welcome which he had given to the British Chiefs of Staff. He felt it was appropriate that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet at the

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<sup>2</sup> *Post*, p. 222.

conclusion of the successful operations in North Africa. It was also appropriate that he should choose this moment to express the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff for General Eisenhower's conduct of these operations, and above all, for his success in obtaining and maintaining the utmost cooperation and harmony throughout his command and complete absence of friction.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement with the proposals for the Conference suggested by Admiral Leahy. With regard to the memorandum on global strategy which Admiral Leahy had read, the British Chiefs of Staff would like time to consider this paper, since it embodied the foundations of our future strategy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then read out a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing their views on the conduct of the war in 1943-1944 (attached as Annex "B" to these minutes).<sup>3</sup> In reading this memorandum, he amplified in certain respects that part of paragraph 2 dealing with the directive to General Morgan. This directive included instructions to prepare for a feint designed to bring about an air battle on the western front, an operation (a reverse Dunkirk) in which all available forces should be put forth onto the Continent by any possible method to take advantage of a crack in German morale, and finally, instructions to prepare for a full-scale assault against opposition. Shipping remained the stranglehold on all our operations. It would be necessary to keep this factor in mind in all considerations. It was suggested, however, that the desirability of possible operations from a military viewpoint should first be assessed, and when agreement had been reached on this, the possibilities of carrying them out should be related to the shipping position. As regards the order of discussion, he suggested that since there was no immediate urgency for the return of the Commanders in Chief to India, the global strategy should first be discussed, then European strategy (since Germany was agreed to be the main enemy) and finally the Pacific.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if HUSKY was launched on the 10th of July, it was estimated that the operation should be completed within one month.<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Planners had estimated that the revised HUSKY might take until the middle of September.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he considered that the new plan with its stronger lodgments should not take much longer than the old one

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<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 223.

<sup>4</sup> On April 13, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had accepted July 10 as the date for Operation HUSKY. For a discussion of the selection of this invasion date, see Garland and Smyth, pp. 88-89.

since our air superiority should be able to cut the enemy's lines of reinforcement.<sup>5</sup>

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the rapid collapse of the Axis forces in Tunisia might be taken as indicative of what the future held for us.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the weakness of the new plan lay in its failure to seal the island to reinforcements. He agreed, however, that with our large air superiority, if sufficient pressure could be maintained, it would not be easy for the Axis to reinforce since they would find difficulty in keeping their ports open. The impression from General Eisenhower's signal on the revised plan<sup>6</sup> was that it inferred that he anticipated but little delay due to the changes made.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the results to be expected on Germany by the progressive and cumulative effect of the combined bomber offensive this summer up to the fall.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he built great hope on these attacks if the build-up could be maintained. It was hoped to have between eight and nine hundred United States heavy bombers and four hundred United States medium bombers in the United Kingdom by the 30th of June.

GENERAL McNARNEY confirmed that this number of heavy bombers would be available, though there might be a slight diminution in the number of mediums.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the effect of some thousand day bombers and between 1,000 and 1,200 night bombers would be considerable. The results of day bombing had been most encouraging and must achieve the withdrawal of German fighters from other fronts since the Germans could not afford to ignore the material and morale effect of these attacks. The American day bombing plan aimed not only to shoot down enemy fighters but to destroy fighter factories.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the Chief of Air Staff's views on the effect of concentrating all available air power in support of a land battle.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this largely depended on the targets offered. Our air superiority would be overwhelming within a circle of 120 to 150 miles. The Germans could only provide some two to three hundred bombers and five to six hundred fighters, whereas the British had some 1,500 fighters and the United States would have

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<sup>5</sup>The revised plan for HUSKY was accepted by Eisenhower in early May 1943. For an account of the formulation of this revised plan, see Garland and Smyth, chapter III.

<sup>6</sup>The reference here is presumably to telegram NAF 215, May 4, 1943, from Eisenhower in Algiers for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which outlined the revised plan for HUSKY. For text, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1112.

about a thousand. If replacements were available, this superiority after a few days would defeat the German fighter defense and enable the bombers to attack their targets relatively unmolested. The essential problem was to insure that the German Air Force gave battle.

GENERAL MARSHALL then raised the question of the results of turning our air power in North Africa onto the Italian fleet once bases were available in Sicily.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the present task of the Air in North Africa was to insure air superiority over Sicily. The northern Italian ports were out of range from the United Kingdom in the summer. The attack must be based either on Sicily or North Africa.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that if they were bombed out of Spezia, the Italian fleet might make for Toulon. The modern Italian battleships of the *Littorio* class had left Spezia after the last bombing, but had then returned. The older battleships were at Taranto and were immobilized for the present since the necessary destroyers had been used for ferrying troops to Tunisia. There they had sustained considerable losses, but he believed that there were still enough destroyers available to escort the Italian fleet to sea.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with Sir Dudley Pound that it was desirable to drive the Italian fleet into the Adriatic but doubted if those in the northwestern Italian ports would run the gauntlet through the Straits.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the Italian fleet in the north was only vulnerable to day attack by U.S. bombers since the short nights did not permit of British night bombers being used. He did not believe that the Italian fighter defense was good but ships were difficult to sink, particularly since the vessels of the *Littorio* class had heavy deck armor.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that all Italian ports, including Toulon and Trieste, were in easy range of B-17 and B-24 aircraft based on North Africa. American bombers were developing a new technique for low altitude attacks. Experience in the South Pacific went to show that good results could be achieved in spite of heavy anti-aircraft fire, though the question of defense against fighters was another matter and must be taken into account since the Italian ships would be in ports out of range of our escorting fighters.

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked for an estimate on a time basis of the vulnerability of the Ploesti oil fields to attack by aircraft based either on Aleppo or Libya.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he did not believe that an adequate scale of attack could be brought to bear except from Turkey or the mainland of Italy or Greece. Only B-24's based on North Africa could reach the oil fields, and these were neither numerous enough nor

were they as well able as the B-17's to beat off an attack. If Turkish, Italian or Greek bases could be used, an attack should produce a very serious effect on the refineries, and hence on Germany's petroleum situation.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that a plan which had great possibilities had been worked out for attacking Ploesti oil fields by low level bombing attacks from bases in Bengasi, using 500-pound delay action bombs, the force to consist of 153 Heavy Bombers.<sup>7</sup> He believed that such an attack would render any further operations against the refineries unnecessary for a period of some six months. This attack could be carried out without waiting for the Turkish or Italian air fields to be available, and the numbers required could easily be built up of B-24's with some additional B-17's temporarily diverted from the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important in considering our future strategy to carefully assess the possibilities and destructive capacity of air attacks. We should take advantage of this strength in planning our future operations, particularly in the Mediterranean where it should be possible to use air power rather than additional ground forces. The enemy must not be allowed to relax, however. Damage to the Italian fleet might prove sufficient to release British surface vessels for employment in the Far East. The plan for Ploesti outlined by General McNarney seemed well worth the gamble. The destructive power against fighters shown by the B-17's had been encouraging, as had also their accuracy in bombing which had forced enemy fighter reaction to their attacks. Attacks on the Italian fleet, and on the oil fields of Ploesti could be undertaken. These would not be too heavy a logistical burden. All these possibilities had a bearing on what could be achieved to hasten the collapse of Italy by air action alone. An Italian collapse might have a political reaction on the Turks which would enable us to get the use of their air bases. The results of our air superiority in Tunisia had proved crippling to the enemy.

Operation HUSKY should provoke further air fights which would weaken the enemy and might leave us in a position to bomb Italy almost unmolested. Since correct application of air power was all important, the Chiefs of Staff would deeply regret any failure to exploit a favorable opportunity which might be presented to use its cumulative effect in the Mediterranean at this time. Effective use of air power might enable us to economize in the use of ground forces in

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<sup>7</sup> The early planning for the air attack of August 1, 1943, against the Ploesti oil facilities is described in James Dugan and Carroll Stewart, *Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 August 1943* (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 36-39.

the Mediterranean Area. They would also deeply regret not being ready to make the final blow against Germany, if the opportunity presented itself, by reason of having dissipated ground forces in the Mediterranean Area.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for an estimate as to how long it would require to establish ourselves in a position in Turkey or in the *heel* of Italy to undertake air attacks on Ploești.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he estimated that from seven to nine weeks would be required before we could operate from Turkish air fields or from three to four weeks if a Turkish acceptance could be taken for granted and the necessary concentrations in Syria made beforehand. Air fields in Turkey sufficient to operate 25 squadrons were now available and air fields for another 20 squadrons should be ready by October. It was difficult to estimate the time factor if the *heel* of Italy was used. A considerable amount of shipping would be required, and the timing would depend on the amount of land forces engaged and requirements for tactical air forces which would take up the air fields otherwise available for the strategic bombing force. Broadly, he felt that it was unlikely that an air attack on Ploești could take place from Italian bases sooner than from seven to nine weeks after the launching of the land operations against the *heel*. He feared that an initial ineffective attack on Ploești might lead to great strengthening of the defenses. It was unwise to underestimate the meteorological and geographical difficulties in attacking this target. A very high degree of training and good luck with regard to the weather were essential.

ADMIRAL LEAHY emphasized the importance of the time element in bombing of the Ploești fields.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Russians might undertake an attack on Ploești since they had large air forces and bases near the target.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said this had been suggested to the Russians, but he believed their air forces were too closely committed to the ground battle.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that permission had been sought from the Russians, prior to the first Ploești raid, for the U.S. aircraft to land in Russia.<sup>8</sup> This permission, however, had been received a week too late to be of any use, and the Russians had never agreed to permit U.S. aircraft to take off for the raid from Russian fields.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff had brought with them their study on the possibility of bombing Ploești and the results which would be achieved. He suggested that the

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<sup>8</sup> For an account of the circumstances of the American air raid against Ploești on June 11, 1942, see Dugan and Stewart, *Ploesti*, chapter I; see also Craven and Cate, vol. II, p. 10.

Combined Chiefs of Staff should instruct the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a report on this matter.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Russians should again be approached on the desirability of bombing Ploesti or the use of their air fields by U.S. or British bombers for this purpose.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL concurred.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that full use must be made of air power in the Mediterranean but considered that this must be examined in relation to the whole picture of the value of knocking Italy out of the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL felt that in looking at the whole picture we should direct our attention to knocking Germany out of the war.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the enemy were certain to resist to the best of their ability our plans for putting shipping through the Mediterranean, and this should produce heavy air attacks. The enemy's one hope of victory lay in the success of his operations by submarine and air against our surface ships. The capture of Sicily would help us to open the Mediterranean route, but even then Axis air based on Sardinia would endeavor to cut the line of communication.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff doubted if bombing by air alone would cause the collapse of Italy. If Italy collapsed, Germany would be faced with the necessity of taking over the garrisoning of the Balkans from the Italians. Some 43 Italian divisions were now employed on this task. The Germans might use fewer. If they used only 20, it would mean 20 less on the Russian Front. Further, unless Germany allowed us to occupy the whole of Italy, including her northern airports, Germany would have to send troops to resist our attacks. The Balkans were economically valuable to Germany. Troops could not be withdrawn from them altogether since Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia would rise and Greece and Albania would be inflamed. If we could knock out Italy and thus divert at least 20 divisions from the Russian Front, and if the Russians could keep up the pressure during 1943, the Germans might crack. It was essential, therefore, that we must use every means to insure a collapse of Italy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that if Italy should crumble as a result of HUSKY, we must consider what action should be taken. Troops for the occupation of Italy would be necessary. He did not believe that Germany would try to control an Italy which was not fighting. Continental communications were designed for an east and west flow of traffic. Communications north and south were bad, as were lateral communications along the southern outposts of German power in the Mediterranean. German resistance in Tunisia had crumbled more quickly than we had been led to expect from our previous knowledge

of German troops. They had suffered a terrific defeat with loss of some 150,000 men. None of their North African troops were available to increase the defenses of Sicily. Operation HUSKY might be easier than we thought, and on the completion of a successful HUSKY, the Germans might be forced to divert troops to the various islands and threatened points in southern Europe.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that German strategy on the Eastern Front would be mainly an offensive-defensive. They now only had 185 divisions on this front. No Italian divisions were left there and far fewer Hungarians and Roumanians. Action of ours in the Mediterranean, which would force the collapse of Italy, would necessitate the Germans withdrawing additional troops from Russia to meet Italian commitments, including the 7 Italian Divisions in southern France which would then be threatened by the Allies. An Anti-Fascist Government might request our support against the Germans or a state of anarchy might exist. The first alternative would be more difficult to deal with. In any event, German commitments resulting from the collapse of Italy would help our final re-entry into northern France, since only from there or from the Russian Front could the necessary additional troops be found.

The capture of Corsica and Sardinia would assist an attack on southern France, and since German forces would have to be diverted for the protection of this coast, the re-entry into north France would be assisted. He was entirely in agreement that air forces should be used to the maximum but linked with appropriate ground forces.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the Germans now had a strong force including the *Tirpitz*, *Scharnhorst*, one pocket battleship, and one 8-inch cruiser concentrated in the north of Norway. An additional battle cruiser would not be fit for service for many months, and the aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin*, although completed, would probably not be operationally fit for several months. Admiral Doenitz, on assuming command, had stated that the whole German Navy would be used for an attack on shipping. This might mean that the crews of the surface ships might be used to reinforce the submarines or that the surface fleet itself would be used against our convoys. In this latter event the fleet could be more easily used to attack Russian convoys than to break out into the Atlantic. They were at present concentrated in the north in expectation of another convoy being run. The short nights of summer made it difficult for them to elude our very long range aircraft if they tried to break out in the Atlantic. No German tankers were known to have gone to sea, and this was usually the prelude to a breakout.

He did not believe that a breakout was likely until the autumn. The degree of cooperation between the German and Japanese fleets was not known, but it was possible that the Japanese had convinced the Germans that the most useful purpose which their fleet could serve was to remain in harbor thus containing a superior British force.

Reverting to the revised HUSKY plan, ADMIRAL KING said that he appreciated the arguments in its favor. He was anxious, however, as to the lack of ports available in the early stages through which our forces could be maintained. The revised plan, however, had the merit of simplicity and concentration. He did not believe that the Italian fleet would try to pass through the Sicilian narrows though it was possible that it might attempt a passage through the Straits of Messina. He felt it unwise to overlook enemy naval potentialities in the Mediterranean. He asked for information with regard to the rehabilitation of the French fleet.

SIR DUDLEY POUND agreed with Admiral King as to the advantages of the new plan in that only one end of the island required cover. He believed that two French 6-inch cruisers and a few *contre-torpilleurs* were being repaired.

ADMIRAL KING, referring to ROUNDUP, stated that the results of SICKLE might prove to be overwhelming. We must be ready to exploit this by cross-Channel operations. It appeared to him that our large air forces could be used for destruction of critical bridges such as those across the Seine, ammunition and supply dumps and lines of communication. We must therefore be very firm in our determination to mount ROUNDUP in April, 1944. He believed that the vast concentration of air forces available in the United Kingdom might prove the determining factor in the success of Continental operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was generally agreed that the elimination of Italy would have extremely valuable results, but he agreed with Admiral King's thought that it might be unwise to divert to or maintain in the Mediterranean forces which could be used in a cross-Channel assault or as a prelude to such an attack. If we weakened our potentialities for a cross-Channel assault by continuing to confine forces to the Mediterranean, it might preclude a major effort against Germany on the Western Front.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that if we did not continue operations in the Mediterranean, then no possibility of an attack into France would arise. Even after a bridgehead had been established, we could get no further. The troops employed would for the most part be inexperienced. The force available, some 15 to 20 divisions,

was small and could not be regarded in the same category as the vast Continental armies which were counted in 50's and 100's of divisions. Before undertaking operations across the Channel, it was essential that we should create the right situation to insure its success.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the discussion was now getting to the heart of the problem. Experience in HUSKY had shown that initial estimates of requirements were always exceeded. The only limit to TORCH had been the availability of shipping. The Tunisian campaign had sucked in more and more troops. Operations invariably created a vacuum in which it was essential to pour in more and more means. Once undertaken the operation must be backed to the limit. He felt deeply concerned that the landing of ground forces in Italy would establish a vacuum in the Mediterranean which would preclude the assembly of sufficient forces in the United Kingdom to execute a successful cross-Channel operation and Germany would not collapse unless this occurred from air bombardment alone. If further Mediterranean operations were undertaken, then in 1943 and virtually all of 1944 we should be committed, except for air attacks on Germany, to a Mediterranean policy. This would entail a very serious state of affairs in the Pacific. It would mean a prolongation of the war in Europe, and thus a delay in the ultimate defeat of Japan, which the people of the U. S. would not tolerate. We were now at the crossroads—if we were committed to the Mediterranean, except for air alone, it meant a prolonged struggle and one which was not acceptable to the United States.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Pacific could not be neglected; it was too vital to the United States. Immediate action was necessary to maintain China in the war. The war in Europe must be brought to a rapid decisive close at the earliest possible date.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he agreed that the European war must be ended as fast as possible. He believed, however, that to cease Mediterranean operations on the conclusion of HUSKY would lengthen the war. The seizure of the Brest Peninsula, which was all we could now achieve, would merely lock up 20 divisions. Russia was the only Ally in possession of large ground forces, and our strategy must aim to help her to the maximum possible extent. Only by continuing in the Mediterranean could we achieve the maximum diversion of German forces from Russia. The transshipment of Allied Divisions from the Mediterranean to England was a difficult shipping commitment. A lodgment in the Brest Peninsula would not be a decisive blow. There were only some ten to twelve British Divisions available in England.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a maximum effort was made, some

eleven U. S. Divisions could be made available in the United Kingdom by April, 1944.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that these combined forces would only be sufficient to hold a bridgehead and would not be large enough to debouch into the Continent. Now was the time when action was required to relieve the pressure on Russia. No major operations would be possible until 1945 or 1946, since it must be remembered that in previous wars there had always been some 80 French Divisions available on our side. Any advance towards the Ruhr would necessitate clearing up behind the advancing Army and would leave us with long lines of communications. Our air force in U.K. was at present largely on a static basis though it was being converted now for use with the expeditionary force. The British manpower position was weak, and to provide the necessary rearward services for continental warfare, two of our twelve divisions now in U. K. would probably have to be cannibalized.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it appeared that ROUNDUP was still regarded as a vague conception. Did this mean that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded Mediterranean operations as the key to a successful termination of the European war?

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that a force of some 20 to 25 divisions could achieve important results across the Channel on the Continent of Europe unless almost the entire bulk of the German Army was in Russia or the Balkans. Our ability to operate across the Channel later was dependent on the extent to which we could help Russia now. This in turn was dependent on the possibilities of knocking out Italy this year. If this could be achieved, then in 1944 a successful re-entry into northwest Europe might well be possible, but a re-entry now with some 12 to 15 divisions against the German forces available could achieve nothing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he did not visualize an increase in the existing ground forces in the Mediterranean. The only cost would be in shipping to mount subsequent operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL, referring again to the build-up for ROUNDUP, stated that if we were ever to get the forces in the United Kingdom, we must begin now. Further operations in the Mediterranean would, in his opinion, create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available resources.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if it was believed that the Russians would be satisfied with an attack on Italy if this meant postponement of ROUNDUP.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was convinced that a Russian failure would prolong the war for many years. He believed it far better, from the Russian point of view, that we should attack Italy now rather than start preparing for cross-Channel operations which could not be of any real importance until 1944. What the Russians wished us to achieve was a withdrawal of German forces from their front. The problem was how this could best be done. He believed that only by attacking in the Mediterranean could we achieve immediate results and that this was more valuable than building up for a 1944 ROUNDUP which might not even then be possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought that Sir Alan Brooke forgot the fact that there would be continual air operations in the Mediterranean. Germany would not know when we were about to strike a blow, and her troops would be contained in the area. We had built great hopes of crippling Germany by air attack, and he felt, therefore, that this would be more successful against Italy where the resistance would be less. He believed that land operations in the Mediterranean Area would prolong the European war and hence the time when a decision could be achieved in the Pacific. The build-up of forces in Great Britain for BOLERO would constitute a threat which would demand a German reaction.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would be satisfied with this plan if he believed that Italy could be knocked out by air alone and that we could thus gain the Italian air fields on the plains of Lombardy and the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. He was doubtful, however, if air alone would achieve the desired result. It had never been claimed that Germany could be knocked out by air alone, but rather that it would reduce her power to such an extent that her forces available against Russia and ourselves would be so weakened as to permit of her defeat. Our object was to assist Russia, and we must achieve this object as early as possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that operations in the Mediterranean were important from the Turkish point of view. The Turkish attitude depended both on Russian successes and our operations against Italy. The additional shipping for operations in the Mediterranean could only be found at the expense of BOLERO. The reduction in BOLERO build-up resulting from the undertaking of operations in the Mediterranean would only be some three to four divisions in 1943 and none in 1944. Operations in the Mediterranean were not an unlimited commitment. We must take immediate advantage of the deterioration in Italian morale. Even if we occupied all Italy, a serious shipping commitment would not arise since the Italian ships would them-

selves be sufficient to bring nearly all the necessary food to Italy, and only some 10 ships a month would be required for coal.

ADMIRAL KING reminded the Chiefs of Staff of the danger of [to] the lines of communication to the Mediterranean passing through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Germans had not yet taken action in this area, but we might be faced with a difficult position if they concentrated submarines in the approaches.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that on a previous occasion when the Germans had operated in the actual approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar, they had suffered serious losses.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the advantages of obtaining the Azores were obvious. An examination had been made of possible German reactions. A German advance into Spain and Portugal would require some 15 to 20 divisions and would be met with resistance, if only guerrilla. The Germans would then be faced with a difficult economic situation and the logistic problem of bad communications and different rail gauge. The British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that Germany would undertake this operation. A difficult situation, however, existed with regard to Portugal. If we ask the Portuguese to allow us the use of the Azores, she might well require a guarantee from us that she would be defended. This would be difficult to give since it would entail keeping forces and ships ready to meet this commitment. It would therefore be desirable, if possible, to give Portugal no guarantee and to assure her that the risk of a German reaction was very remote.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that this seemed largely a political question. It was unwise to offer guarantees and better to take the islands without previous notice, at the same time giving assurance that they would be returned to Portugal at the end of the war.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that the British were in a difficult position since they had entered into negotiations with the Portuguese and had staff conversations with a view to assisting Portugal in defending the islands against attack. It might therefore be better for the United States to occupy these islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that a possible timing for the occupation of the Azores might be just after HUSKY had been launched in order to utilize the shipping returning from this operation. There were sufficient troops in Northwest Africa for use in Portugal.

SIR HASTINGS ISMAY said that a telegram had just been received from the British Cabinet stating that the Foreign Secretary believed that the Portuguese might agree to an occupation of the islands. He

offered to circulate to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a British study on the whole problem.<sup>9</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed:

(1) That nothing be considered as an agreed decision during the TRIDENT Conferences which does not appear in the conclusions of the minutes.

(2) That during the TRIDENT Conferences the conclusions of each meeting be read and approved as the first item of the succeeding meeting.

(3) That when any Summaries of Conclusions are given to the President and the Prime Minister during the period of the Conference, it should be explained to them that these would only be tentative and that, at the end of the Conference, a final Agreed Summary of Conclusions would be submitted.

(4) That in the preparation of the Final Summary of Conclusions, effort should be made to set out an order of priority of existing and projected strategic undertakings.

(5) That at the end of the 84th Meeting the Combined Staff Planners should be directed to prepare a detailed agenda for the remaining Conferences.

b. Agreed that the possibilities of launching a decisive air attack on the Ploesti Oil Fields from Russia should be explored by the Combined Staff Planners.

c. Took note that a paper that had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the use of Portuguese Islands in the Atlantic would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a basis of future discussion.

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<sup>9</sup> Report by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee entitled "Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands" was circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 226, May 15, 1943, *post*, p. 304.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, 1 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Air Chief Marshal Portal

*Editorial Note*

No official record of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

## HULL-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, THE WHITE HOUSE

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

Secretary Hull

Prime Minister Churchill

740.0011 EW/29478

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Russia; Trade Agreements Program; de Gaulle

I called on Prime Minister Churchill at the White House at his request. He proceeded first to express his extreme gratification at the final and complete military victory in Africa. I interjected to say that "your" and our Vichy policy has been justified and vindicated 100 percent. He promptly replied with enthusiasm that it had been vindicated 140 percent, and then went on to say that it was one of the greatest classical operations, perfect in every essential respect in that the air, land and naval forces and the diplomatic activities of our Governments were all synchronized together with marvelous precision and thrown against the enemy with the most powerful effect. He said that the United States had not received credit for the two years' work of preparation and of paving the way for the African expedition under our Vichy policy. I said I must agree with him on that, but that one of these days the full facts would come out.

I brought up the need for a more full and complete understanding with Russia on the part of Great Britain and the United States and went on to repeat in substance what I had said to Foreign Minister Eden on his recent visit here in regard to the extreme importance of our two countries proceeding systematically through carefully selected persons to talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, away from his aloofness, secretiveness and suspiciousness until he broadened his views and visualized a more practical international cooperation in the future; at the same time indicating Russia's intentions both in the East and the West.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Churchill thought that Russia would help fight Japan when the war in the West was over, to which

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<sup>1</sup> For documentation regarding Eden's visit to Washington in March 1943, see *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

I replied that so far as I knew, there was no evidence or intimation of any kind as to what Russia would do in this respect; that it was my opinion that if she eventually should come into the war in the Pacific, it would probably be two or three weeks before victory, during which time she could spread out over Manchuria and other large areas and then be assured of sitting in at the peace conference. I said she may come into the war in the East, but the point I was emphasizing was that I could not get any intimation as to her future plans except in regard to certain territorial matters on her borders in Europe.

I then referred to our commercial policy and trade agreements program and elaborated on that in ways that are familiar to all. I expressed the opinion that we would receive the support of the public in carrying forward this combined program of liberal commercial, monetary and other related policies. He said very little on this question but appeared definitely interested.

He then said that the President had suggested that he might talk to me about de Gaulle. He proceeded to say that he was not pushing forward de Gaulle, although he had heard it reported that we felt that de Gaulle was receiving British financial support with which to do the things that are most objectionable to us. The Prime Minister said that he and Eden found de Gaulle terrible to get on with and that he wanted it understood that they were not undertaking to build him up. He added that we on the other hand must not get behind Giraud and pit him against de Gaulle, one reason being that de Gaulle was considered a symbol of French resistance and the British just could not throw him overboard, notwithstanding his many very objectionable and difficult ways. I said that the one big point in the situation that should appeal to both Governments alike was that if this de Gaulle matter is allowed to go forward as it has been, it will undoubtedly bring about serious friction between our two Governments; that large cross sections of people in this country will finally become aroused through false propaganda and constant agitations and machinations on the part of the de Gaulle organization, and in turn the Governments will be subject to repercussions that will seriously affect the relations between the two. I said that there was nothing personal implied in my remarks but I wished to point out with emphasis the poisonous propaganda activities of the de Gaulle organization both in this country and in North Africa where the purpose seemed to be to under-

mine and break down support for Giraud and then for de Gaulle to take charge politically from the top to the bottom and transplant this organization to Metropolitan France. I repeated with emphasis that inevitably friction will arise between our two Governments if this sort of propaganda work, which is so false and misleading in so many ways, is kept up by the de Gaulle organization. I elaborated in other ways in regard to the offer of higher wages to take sailors off their ships and for similar purposes thereby keeping everything in an uproar wherever a de Gaulle representative goes. I also made it very emphatic more than once the universal belief that the British are definitely behind these operations with money, the aid of the radio and with other methods. The Prime Minister maintained, first, that he personally was utterly disgusted with de Gaulle and, second, that the British were not aiding him as much as I seemed to think. I then suggested that there were numerous ways for the British to get away from their build-up of de Gaulle both rapid and gradual, if the latter course should prove necessary. I do not think that I made any special impression on the Prime Minister in this regard as he continued to urge that this Government should not support Giraud to the point of engaging in a quarrel with de Gaulle and the British. I, of course, maintained that this would be the inevitable outcome of the British policy in regard to de Gaulle.<sup>2</sup>

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>2</sup> For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 23 ff.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 13, 1943, 11 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this evening meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

FRIDAY, MAY 14, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 14, 1943, 10:30  
A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE  
BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Lieutenant General Embick  
Lieutenant General Stilwell<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Horne  
Major General Streett  
Major General Chennault<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Colonel Smart  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Field Marshal Dill  
Field Marshal Wavell<sup>2</sup>  
Admiral Somerville<sup>2</sup>  
Air Chief Marshal Peirse<sup>2</sup>  
Admiral Noble  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Lieutenant General Maccready  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

Without discussion, the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF accepted the record and conclusions of the 83rd Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. GLOBAL STRATEGY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff on the Global Strategy of the War.\* There were certain points in this paper with which they were not in entire agreement. They adhered to the views agreed to at Casablanca as set out in C.C.S. 155/1.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 84th meeting.<sup>2</sup> Present for discussions of Burma operations only.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 34.\*Annex "A" to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 222.]<sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 774.

The British Chiefs of Staff had two main points of difference which he would like to mention. Firstly, paragraph 2*b* of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper referred to an extension of pressure against Japan. Such extension might well cause a vacuum into which forces would have to be poured and would thereby depart from the object set out in paragraph 2*a* of the same paper, i.e., to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe. Action in the Pacific must be coordinated with that in Europe and must not prejudice the defeat of Germany or the war would drag on indefinitely.

The second point of difference was in connection with paragraph 3 of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper, i.e., ROUNDUP and its possibilities. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the possibilities of ROUNDUP were dependent on the success or failure of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Allied cross-Channel operations could only form a very small part of the whole continental land war, and our effort must be aimed therefore at supporting Russia and thereby creating a situation in which ROUNDUP was possible.

The views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to ROUNDUP might be summed up as follows:

It was their firm intention to carry out ROUNDUP at the first moment when the conditions were such that the operations would contribute decisively to the defeat of Germany. These conditions might arise this year, but in any case, it was the firm belief of the British Chiefs of Staff that they would arise next year. They could be created only by the Russian Army. Our action, therefore, must consist of:

- a.* Continuing our increasing bombardment of Germany; and
- b.* Drawing off from the Russian Front as many forces as possible.

On the basis of this definition of ROUNDUP the British Chiefs of Staff had put forward their views on operations in the Mediterranean.

Paragraph 5 of the U. S. paper pointed out how essential it was that Russia should be kept in the war. The British Chiefs of Staff looked on the matter differently and regarded it as essential not only that Russia should be kept in the war but that we should create a situation whereby Russian victories could be achieved.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was unable to see that the U. S. conception of global strategy differed materially from that set out at Casablanca. The intention was now and was then to prepare for and launch cross-Channel operations. The African venture was undertaken in order to do something this year while preparing for cross-Channel operations. Little preparation for the latter had, in fact, been made, since all available U. S. resources had been sent to North Africa. The North African campaign was now completed. If we launched a new campaign in the Mediterranean, then we should con-

tinue to use our resources in that area. This would again postpone help to Russia since we should not be able to concentrate forces in the U. K. and thus cause a withdrawal of German troops to western Europe. If new operations in the Mediterranean were the best way to bring the European war to a conclusion, then they must be undertaken; but if these operations would have the effect of prolonging the war, he saw great difficulties in committing U. S. resources to them.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR ALAN BROOKE confirmed that, in the British view, Mediterranean operations would shorten the European war.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Planners in reporting to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff had pointed out the necessity of shortening the war in the Pacific and thus preventing Japan from consolidating her gains.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then read out a paper† giving the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on global strategy.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared two papers—one on operations in the European Theater and one on operations from India for 1943–1944, which he would like to hand over to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting.‡

ADMIRAL LEAHY drew attention to paragraph 11 of the British Chiefs of Staff paper contained in Annex “B” to C.C.S. 83rd Meeting<sup>5</sup> with regard to a combined examination of the method by which the defeat of Japan was ultimately brought about. He thought it would be helpful if Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell were asked to give their views on this subject. An examination should be made of each plan and of what it would accomplish. He suggested that there should also be a combined examination as to how to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany. He would like to have the views of the British Chiefs of Staff on the Pacific campaign as a whole.

### E[3]. OPERATIONS IN BURMA

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that after the Casablanca Conference, plans had been drawn up for operations from India. Field Marshal Wavell would outline the plan which had been decided on as being the best; but this plan did not, in his opinion, hold out great hopes. Even when Burma was cleared and the Burma Road opened, it would take from six to nine months to develop it to a capacity of 10,000 tons per month. Was ANAKIM the best plan? He believed that we should examine other lines of approach to the problem and whatever action was de-

†C.C.S. 219. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 227.]

‡C.C.S. 224 and C.C.S. 225. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, pp. 257, 293.]

<sup>5</sup>Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, May 12, 1943, *post*, p. 223.

cided on from India this should be coordinated as part of a complete plan for the defeat of Japan. One possibility was to seize the Kra Isthmus and to punch through to Bangkok, thereby cutting the main Japanese line of communications to Burma and obtaining bases from which to threaten Japanese oil traffic. There was no communication by rail with Bangkok from the west coast of the Kra Peninsula, and the roads were poor; but the principal difficulty was the lack of adequate port facilities on the Kra Isthmus.

Another alternative was to capture northern Sumatra and Penang. This operation again would give us air bases to cover the Japanese oil routes.

The third alternative would be to take the whole of Sumatra and then Java, the latter either from the east or west.

Only preliminary examination had been given to these plans. It was essential to decide whether one of these or operation ANAKIM held out the best hopes. The latter might prove to be the most valuable, but the very poor lines of communication through Assam must be remembered. The Brahmaputra River had to be crossed by train ferries since there was no bridge, and the only railways available were single track meter gauge. It was planned to use more shipping on the Brahmaputra when it could be returned from Iraq. Rather than undertake ANAKIM, it might be better to develop new airports and to increase the capacity of the air ferry service into China to the maximum.

Land operations would have to take place down the two roads from Imphal and Ledo at the end of which roads, when built, our forces would have to be maintained through the monsoon season, when no operations could take place. A thrust from the north would have to be accompanied by landings on the west coast designed to secure air fields. These landings would require carrier-based air support, and only relatively small forces could infiltrate over the mountains. To capture southern Burma an assault on Rangoon would be necessary. Owing to the delta and mangrove swamps, no landings on the coast were possible, so that a hazardous operation up the Irrawaddy was required. Even when Rangoon was captured, there would be a continuous threat on our eastern flank; and once committed in this area, we might be drawn on into further operations against Thailand and the consequent difficulties of maintaining ourselves.

If on examination operation ANAKIM proved to be the best answer, it must be done; but any action we took must be coordinated with United States thrusts from the east. In any event, the air route to China should be developed. It must be remembered, too, that suc-

cessful operations against Germany in Europe might well bring Russia to our assistance in the Far East.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the object of the Burma Campaign was to assist China by opening the Burma Road. Alternative operations did not appear to afford immediate relief to China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that unless the Burma Road was opened, no immediate relief to China would be given except by air. He considered that the moral effect of recapturing Burma would be great both in China and in India; and it was, therefore, desirable to do this operation if possible; but from the material point of view we must consider whether operations to open the Burma Road would produce sufficient result to warrant the scale of effort which would be necessary and the commitments which would arise. The actual supplies which the Road could take through to China were relatively small.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was essential to do something for China. We must maintain the air route whose capacity was now relatively small and which would fall further during the monsoon season.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was important to appreciate the fact that operations to recapture Burma would interfere with developing facilities for increasing the capacity of the air route.

ADMIRAL KING said that he understood that air fields in Assam were now being developed though slowly. As in Europe, where Russia's geographical and manpower position were regarded as vital to the defeat of Germany, so China's geographical position and manpower were vital to the defeat of Japan and must be used. A collapse of China would vastly prolong the war and vitally affect the whole situation *vis-à-vis* Japan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he fully appreciated this point. The value of Russian bases for use against Japan was also great.

ADMIRAL KING said that he was attracted toward the Bangkok operation, but it must be remembered that this was of no direct assistance to China. The Japanese attitude toward the Puppet Government in Nanking had changed, and the people in the occupied area were being offered supplies and facilities which were not available to Free China. Morale was weakening, and if China went out of the war, the task of the United Nations in defeating Japan would be terrific.

(At this point, Field Marshal Wavell, Admiral Somerville, and the Air Chief Marshal Peirse entered the meeting)

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the Chiefs of Staff had just been discussing the Burma situation. They would like very much to hear Field Marshal Wavell's idea on the best methods of procedure.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that, considering such operations, the first thing necessary to make clear was the administrative situation in India, which would of necessity be used as a base for operations in Burma. The communications in eastern India and Assam are very poor. One means of communication is the Brahmaputra River, but the value of the river ports is limited by the fact that the seasonal rise and fall is as much as 25 feet. On the other hand, the river constitutes a formidable barrier, as it is unbridged throughout its length and frequent changes of course make it difficult if not impossible to bridge. The result is that the bottleneck of transportation from India to Assam is the ferries which operate across this river. It has railroads on either side which are of meter gauge, single line, and in poor condition. A year ago this railroad carried only three or four trains a day, had no modern methods for operation, and few crossings. Improvements have made it possible to operate 14 pairs of trains a day up as far as Manipur Road. Beyond that point 12 pairs a day is the maximum capacity. Unless this rail route is double tracked, which would be a tremendous undertaking and would take from two to three years, the present volume of traffic cannot be increased. There is one stretch of the railroad north of the Brahmaputra which runs along the south of the Himalayas. This part of the road is frequently broken by floods. Last year it was out of action for five months during the monsoon season. The only other approach to Assam was through Bengal, which is a single-track route. There were no satisfactory road communications between India and Assam. Such as there were, were poor in the dry season and impossible during the wet season. This necessitated sending by rail all vehicles for use in Assam or Burma. Before the Japanese entered the war, one of the principal tasks for India was to establish a line of communications to Russia through Iraq. Therefore, most of the steamers from the Brahmaputra were sent into Iraq for this purpose. It is now difficult and a long haul to get them back, but an effort was being made. The ultimate result is that the amount of supplies which can be sent into northeast Assam is limited. The scope of the operations which can be conducted is in turn dependent upon this volume of supplies.

In referring to conditions in Assam and northern Burma, GENERAL WAVELL stated that it was one of the rainiest spots in the world. Recently over 22 inches of rain fell in a period of three weeks, in the dry season. During the wet season it rains continuously. There are few roads, and those which do exist are in poor condition. There is very little stone or other suitable building material which could be used for the purpose of constructing roads or airdromes, and such as there is usually has to be carried great distances. The entire country

is intensely malarial resulting in a high casualty rate. At present they are very short of engineering equipment such as bulldozers, rollers, etc., as well as qualified personnel to operate this machinery.

When the Japanese entered the war, there were approximately thirty air fields in India. Last year over 200 were constructed at a very great effort, which demanded practically all of the resources which could be made available in India. The original layout of these air fields had to be defensive and therefore further back than now required. There were only a limited number in the forward area including Assam. The conditions there are therefore unfavorable for offensive operations.

Work is going on on three or four projects, but each of these projects demands the same thing. There are two bases being constructed, also the road from Manipur to Imphal and on to Tamur. This was originally a one-way road as far as Imphal only. It has now been made two-way as far as Imphal; and work is in hand to extend it as a two-way, all-weather road as far as Tamu. Beyond Tamu and into Burma it is at present a fair-weather road only. This project is not completed. Malaria is intense in the area. The road to Imphal, over 200 miles, all requires fill. It would have to be doubled in some places in order to bear the traffic. When this road gets into Burma, it will still have another seventy miles to go to get into the Chindwin Valley, across a route which a year ago was nothing more than a mule track.

The other base is at Ledo from which it is intended to construct a road by the Hukaung Valley to Myitkyina. Here again a road needs to be constructed approximately 200 miles in length, for most of which there has formerly been not even a mule track, although a road alignment had been surveyed for part of the way.

General Wheeler had taken over the construction of this road and had at present gone about 50 miles. In the Hukaung Valley section the only way to get a road through was to stick to the hills; otherwise in the rainy season this section will be covered with water. Whether or not a road could be constructed to open the line of communication from India to China was open to doubt. However, General Stilwell, who has recently seen General Wheeler, could give a more accurate report. The moral effect on the Chinese would be good if such a project were undertaken, even though the carrying capacity might prove small.

They had tried to run two roads from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley. One is through, but the other is considered as being a much greater undertaking.

With regard to air fields, the original requirement had been three fields in the northeast corner of Assam. These were in use but not quite completed but had encountered various delays, particularly because of labor and equipment shortages. These air fields now are operating with runways complete. However, the standings are limited; and with the increase in the numbers of aircraft, the demands for standings are increasing proportionately. After the visit of Generals Arnold and Somervell, three more air fields had been requested.<sup>6</sup> The sites had been selected. The target date for their completion was 1 October, but a great deal will depend on monsoons and the availability of labor. It was difficult to get native labor to work during the rainy season. It was proposed to use on these fields steel mats, which in turn mean an added burden on the railway—6,000 tons per runway.

He had had another administrative survey made just before leaving India; the conclusion reached was that the facilities were not available both to establish communications for the maintenance of the large force necessary to invade Burma successfully and to provide sufficient air fields for the support of China. He had left instructions to put the construction of the air fields on top priority.

The land route to Akyab was extremely difficult. The sea landing could have been successfully made, but he did not have the shipping, landing craft, and other essential equipment available. Therefore he tried the operation overland down the coast. The essence of this operation should have been speed in order to arrive at Akyab before the Japanese were able to reinforce. However, the conditions encountered proved extremely difficult and provided the time necessary for the Japanese to reinforce and eventually drive the British out. Operations on a small scale against Akyab could not have had any major effect. The original plan was to have been coordinated with a Chinese offensive beginning in March. He had not been told that the Chinese had abandoned their operation until well into February, when his arrangements were already under way. He had continued with the operation, but the Japanese had been able to move reinforcements from Upper Burma and use them against his force. While Akyab had not been captured, the Japanese had suffered heavily, and air operations against them had been effective.

Further north, it had been the intention that one brigade should advance from the Fourth Corps Area and penetrate deeply beyond the Chindwin Valley to cover work taking place on the road and to help Chinese operations. This brigade had been specially trained to

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<sup>6</sup> For accounts of the Arnold-Somervell-Dill Mission to China and India in February 1943, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 269-277, Arnold, pp. 407-430, Craven and Cate, vol. iv, pp. 438-439, and Leighton and Coakley, pp. 545-546.

live on the country and operate without communications. When he had learned that the Chinese did not intend to take any action, he had decided to send the brigade in to gain experience in this form of fighting. They crossed the Chindwin early in February and went through to the Irrawaddy, cut the railway in 75 places, and put it out of action for several months. The commander of the brigade then decided to try to operate against Japanese communications near Lashio. However, in crossing the Irrawaddy, he had lost many of his transport animals and some of the remainder had died of disease. After being in action with the Japanese, he decided to break up the brigade into small columns, as had been arranged, and up to date some 1,500 of the original 2,500 had gotten back. Of the remainder, some were still on their way back while some were making for China. Casualties amounted to some 18 percent. The brigade consisted of British, Burmese and Ghurka troops. The Burmese had been included to assist the command with their local knowledge, and some had been deliberately left behind for future use. As a result of the experience gained, it had been decided to train one or possibly more brigades for this type of fighting.

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved disappointing, and we had failed to capture Akyab. This failure, together with the possible loss of Maungdaw, had strategic disadvantages in that it gave the Japanese an advance base for air attack on India and denied us bases.

In view of the difficulties of warfare in Upper Burma, it would never be possible to complete the conquest by land alone and a sea-borne invasion of Lower Burma was essential. Landings on the Arakan Coast down to Cape Negrais would be cut off from the mainland by the Arakan Hills, through which there was only one bad road to Prome. It was impossible to land in the delta of the Irrawaddy; and, though landing at Moulmein was possible, these forces would be separated from Rangoon by big rivers and a flank guard against Siam would be essential.

Operations down the Arakan coast were designed to obtain air bases to give air cover for successive landings and finally for assault on Rangoon, but the latter town could not thus be captured in one season.

When Generals Arnold and Somervell had arrived from Casablanca with the proposal that a plan to capture Burma in one campaigning season should be drawn up, it was decided that the object could only be achieved in one way.

An advance by land must be made in Upper Burma to contain Japanese forces. This must be followed by landings on the Arakan coast to provide bases for air cover for a direct assault on Rangoon

by going up the river. Forces from Assam and the Chinese from Yunnan would join up. The final assault up the Rangoon River was extremely difficult and hazardous. Though the river was not at present heavily defended, this could quickly be done if the Japanese learned of our intentions.

Certain conditions were essential if this plan was to be successful. Sufficient forces must be available, fully trained and fully equipped with all the necessary supplies and specialized equipment, and be ready to start operations at the beginning of the dry season during the first fortnight of November. Planning and Operational staffs were gotten together to prepare for the operation; and it was estimated that 180,000 tons of supplies a month, loading during March, April, May and June, were essential in order to mount the operation. In fact, in March and April only 70,000 and 65,000 tons respectively had been loaded. This was approximately half the normal maintenance requirements, and the operation was thus put back from two to three months.

The operations on the Arakan coast had proved that the Japanese were as good in defense as in attack and that our troops would require careful and lengthy training. Training in India was a difficult process due to the climate, and took longer than elsewhere. It was unlikely that the necessary shipping or naval forces would be available and therefore ANAKIM as originally planned was not possible of execution in full during the coming cold weather season. He was prepared to undertake the operation only if fully trained and equipped troops were available with the necessary amphibious transport assault and landing ships and specialized equipment. However much shipping was sent now it would not be in time for the forces to be ready in early November.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Field Marshal Wavell what he considered to be the best practicable action which could be taken to keep China in the war.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he fully realized the political importance of the recapture of Burma, both on China and on India. Even if operation ANAKIM was undertaken in full and was successful the Burma Road was unlikely to attain a capacity of 20,000 tons per month until June 1945. He believed the U. S. Air Force was now ferrying some 6,000 tons per month into China and hoped to work up to 10,000 tons per month. This was a greater capacity than the road would have for a long time and it might be possible to raise even this figure. He believed that the best way to help China was to increase the strength of General Chennault's forces and that this, together with an increase of air-borne supplies, would have more material re-

sults than operation ANAKIM. An unsuccessful operation into Burma would be almost worse than no operation at all. General Chennault's forces could bring pressure to bear both against Japanese air and their shipping and port facilities. These were their weak links. It was not easy to construct more air fields in Assam since the requirements of gasoline and of construction material, including steel tracks, were heavy. If large-scale operations into Burma were not undertaken, then it would be easier to construct the air fields required to increase the flow into China. Thus it would be feasible to increase General Chennault's forces which could then achieve bigger results.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Field Marshal Wavell for his description of the position in Burma.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that it was essential that we should find some method of giving assistance to China so that we could take advantage of Chinese manpower and eventually have bases in China for direct attack against Japan proper. He asked General Stilwell for his views on this subject.

GENERAL STILWELL stated that in his opinion it was absolutely necessary that we give the Chinese assistance in the near future. Their economic situation is rapidly deteriorating and the morale of the people and the army is bad. At present there is a great need to build up ground forces to make the route safe to the bases in China we hope eventually to establish. He had been worried since last summer lest the Japanese should undertake operations for the purpose of seizing Kunming. If the Japanese could successfully accomplish this, even a recaptured Burma would be of no use to us, and China would be lost. He was firmly of the opinion that Yunnan Province must be held and at present saw no way to accomplish this except by the use of the Chinese Army. He felt that if a route for supplying China could be made safe, everything else would follow; and conversely, if the route were lost, all of China would be lost. Therefore, the fundamental necessity was to insure the retention of our present route and its terminals and to conduct offensive operations to improve the supply situation. He stated that other things which we might undertake against the Japanese from China, such as conducting air offensives against their shipping and ground installations, would hurt the Japanese to some extent, but could not be decisive. On the other hand, they might provoke violent and fatal reaction on the part of the Japanese. In referring to Field Marshal Wavell's statement with reference to 6,000 tons per month being moved into China by air, he stated that 3,400 tons per month was the greatest air load yet shipped over the hump, and that was under the most favorable conditions. He was of the opinion that this volume could not be materially increased

within the next six months. If all the tonnage of the air transport were devoted to air effort, that is, for use by the 14th Air Force, it would hearten the Chinese to some extent, but with the means available, nothing really effective could be done to help the Chinese. He believed that the 14th Air Force should continue on a defensive mission in order that the minimum essential equipment could be supplied the Chinese troops in Yunnan. There were now 32 divisions in Yunnan, and the goal set was to try to carry 10,000 tons of equipment for this force. That, together with what could be scraped together in China, would enable this force to be put in the field at least partly equipped by the fall. He was firmly of the opinion that the best way to help the Chinese situation was to reassure the Chinese that a main effort was being made to reopen the supply route from India. If this were not done, he believed the Chinese reaction would be very serious. There were certain pro-Japanese elements in China that were taking advantage of an increasing feeling in the minds of some Chinese that no material help could be made available. Unless this condition could be remedied promptly, the situation would become dangerous. Delay might make it impossible for us to seize the bases which we needed in south and east China.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Stilwell what he meant by "something must be done."

GENERAL STILWELL replied that we must open the road to China—undertake operation ANAKIM.

In reply to a question asked by Sir Alan Brooke as to when he considered it essential to have the road opened, GENERAL STILWELL replied, by January '44, or as soon as possible. The limiting date is a year from now. China can not be expected to hold out for another year and a half, if for that long.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that General Stilwell meant that although the road might not actually be completed or in a condition to carry an appreciable volume of traffic, the psychological reaction on China in allaying their fears would keep them from cracking.

GENERAL STILWELL agreed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked whether or not it was correct that if we were to undertake operations to open the Burma Road, the cost would have to be borne by the air effort in China and if he recommended undertaking such operations at the expense of the air effort.

GENERAL STILWELL replied that the air effort could be supported with 3,000 tons a month. That amounted to only one train a day at most. The bases at Imphal and Ledo were pretty well stocked by now, and he did not see why any material reduction in the air effort should be caused. If 10,000 tons per month could be made available

to the Chinese Divisions in Yunnan, they would be in suitable state for use in the fall.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL stated that he had never intended to convey that limited ground operations could not be carried out at the same time as full-scale air operations.

In answer to a question by Admiral Leahy as to whether or not limited operations would help the situation in China, GENERAL STILWELL stated that such operations would help materially. Any way in which the line of communications could be improved would provide appreciable assistance. It was his opinion that operations to clear Burma, north of a northeast and southwest line through Lashio, should be undertaken.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he gravely doubted the ability to maintain forces in that area during the rainy season unless they were able during the dry season, in addition to conducting the offensive, to build approximately 200 miles of road.

GENERAL STILWELL stated that he was fully aware of this condition and that the plans called for building the road.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL pointed out the enormous effort involved and stated that it would utilize practically all of the engineering personnel and equipment. He stated that the basic objection to seizing northern Burma was that once occupied it could not be maintained, especially if we were to go as far as Mandalay. The Japanese have railroad, river, and road communications from Rangoon and can develop and support a much larger force. Also they would be operating out of a dry area, which extends to the north of Prome, where movement and operations are possible during the wet season. We, on the other hand, could reach only the northern edge of this dry area from which the Japanese would be operating and would be confronted with immense supply problems; in addition, we would have no air support unless air fields could be constructed in northern Burma. This would be a gigantic undertaking.

AIR MARSHAL PEIRSE pointed out that the movement of supplies for the air force used in support of the ground operations in north Burma would be of such volume that it would cut down materially supplies by air to China.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that part of the plan called for a pipeline to Imphal and Ledo to supply gasoline for the support of the operations. This would effect a great reduction in the load on rail, river and road and also on the amounting of trucking. However, at present there was only a limited amount of pipe available.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that a limited operation for the purpose of opening a road in northern Burma would require practically

the whole of the force involved to protect the road and in turn demand a greater volume of supplies over the road for the support and maintenance of troops. He believed that the only effective way of opening a supply route to China was to recapture the whole of Burma.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if the present air route could be shifted further to the south, where the mountains were not so high, each of the planes could carry a greater load and therefore materially increase the volume of supplies.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that, of course, we could expect the Japanese to attack the road, but would they have enough troops available to attack it in greater strength than we could support in the same area?

ADMIRAL KING, referring to a possible operation against Bangkok previously mentioned by Sir Alan Brooke, stated that he felt that such an operation would get at the root of the Japanese communications, and if undertaken, would cut their supply.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed that an operation against Bangkok would develop a vacuum, and that we should not launch such an operation until we were ready to carry it through to completion. He agreed with Admiral King that it was a vital spot in the center of the Japanese communications system.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the whole problem of maintaining China in the war was one of logistic difficulties which must be linked to our capabilities of overcoming them. He would like Field Marshal Wavell to prepare his views on this so that the U. S. Planners, General Stilwell and General Somervell could examine them. The object of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff was to maintain China in the war since they assigned immense strategic importance to this in relation to the ultimate outcome of the war with Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that all of this discussion on Burma had been very interesting. It was clearly indicated that we had a very difficult problem before us and that we must do something to improve the conditions in China. This resolved itself into a study of the logistic problems incident to her supply. He agreed with General Marshall that the best line of approach would be to study these logistic problems which should indicate a line of action to be followed.

#### 4. FUTURE BUSINESS

SIR ALAN BROOKE, in answer to a question by Admiral Leahy, suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff have one more meeting before directing the Planners to prepare an agenda.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed that after the discussion with the President and the Prime Minister that afternoon, the Combined Chiefs of Staff

would be better able to give the Planners instructions for the preparation of the agenda. It may well prove desirable to discuss the Oriental problem first. He suggested that the question of the agenda be taken as the first item at tomorrow's meeting.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed his appreciation to Field Marshal Wavell and General Stilwell for the information presented at the Conference.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Approved the conclusions of the 83rd Meeting as recorded in the minutes.

b. Agreed:

(1) That, with reference to Conclusion a(5) of the 83rd Meeting, the Combined Planners would require general directions to enable them to prepare an agenda for the remaining Conferences.

(2) That these directions should be considered at the beginning of their next meeting.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 14, 1943, 2 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General Stilwell  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Major General Chennault

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
Field Marshal Wavell  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Admiral Somerville  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Air Chief Marshal Peirse  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Brigadier Jacob

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT said that this Conference had been called to talk about the local situation in the India-Burma-China Theater because that area presented problems which were extremely difficult. The United Nations were now on deadcenter with regard to operations in that area. The thought on the subject must be simplified. He said the problem should be divided into two main subdivisions: first, operations to be carried out forthwith and, second, operations to be carried out at the end of the present monsoon season. The two should not be confused. Preparations for operations in November and December

of 1943 must certainly start now, but preparations for operations to be carried out forthwith must be rushed.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that China is now in a dangerous political condition. The United Nations could not let China go to pieces. It should be remembered, when discussing demands of the Generalissimo,<sup>1</sup> that he was the head of the Army and of the State. It was imperative that the United Nations not be put in the position of being responsible in any way for the collapse of China. It was no longer possible to simply tell China to take what she was given. There must be active cooperation on the part of the United Nations. An attitude of *It can't be done* could not be tolerated because it was certain that something must be done. He said there would have to be a 1943 *affirmative*.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there must be a 1943 and a 1944 *affirmative*.

THE PRESIDENT then asked those present to express their convictions freely on the subject of China and asked the Prime Minister to present his views.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he felt that the President had put the case very clearly. He himself had once been keen on action of the ANAKIM type and two years ago had written a memorandum on the subject, a copy of which he had given to Admiral King at Casablanca, in which he had proposed an operation through Rangoon on Bangkok.<sup>2</sup> A decision had been made at Casablanca that ANAKIM was to be mounted. Accordingly, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared a plan which was in his opinion the best method for accomplishing the recapture of Burma. THE PRIME MINISTER said he now gathered that Field Marshal Wavell considered the outlook for the accomplishment of this plan to be bleak, but he still held it feasible if and when the necessary material was provided.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that operations in Burma so far had not been effective. However, they had taught lessons. He said when he looked at Field Marshal Wavell's plan, in the light of results to date, he did not like the looks of it. He questioned the value of trying to retake Burma now, and asked if it could not be by-passed. If so, would not the construction and defense of air fields be sufficient to insure a flow of supplies into China? The question was how to construct these air fields quickly and to insure their protection. He said that, for himself, he had little inclination to go to swampy jungles in

<sup>1</sup>Chiang Kai-shek.

<sup>2</sup>The Churchill memorandum described here has not been found. On the evening of January 17, 1943, in the course of the Casablanca Conference, Admiral King and Churchill did have a conversation during which the Prime Minister apparently expressed himself in favor of operations in the Burma area in 1943; see the editorial note, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, pp. 612-613.

which operations could be conducted for only five months of the year, country infested with malaria, where modern equipment could not be used. The idea of making four attacks from the sea, to say nothing of the advance up the Rangoon River to Rangoon, subject to attack from shore defenses of various kinds, did not present a favorable outlook. All of these factors, together with the long lines of communications, made the prospects for ANAKIM, as now planned, extremely gloomy, a view that was shared by his military advisers.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that he could not see how operations in the swamps of Burma would help the Chinese. The factor that had turned him against the plan, more than any other, was that only 20,000 tons could be transported over the Burma Road, and then only in early 1945, even though ANAKIM were completely successful. He questioned what would happen to the Chinese in the interval. He felt that the above considerations indicated that there should be a *passionate* development of air transport into China, and the build-up of air forces in China, as the objectives for 1943.

THE PRIME MINISTER then turned the discussion to 1944. He indicated an Asiatic TORCH should be sought. A blow should be struck where it could be accomplished with complete surprise. It would, of necessity, have to be an operation which would attract enemy reaction and thus take the pressure off China and the South Pacific. He suggested the possibility of seizing the northern tip of Sumatra. It would be much better to baffle the enemy by surprise than to continue with the *development of the obvious*.

THE PRESIDENT said that in the TORCH operation the objective had been to drive the Axis forces out of Africa, or at least to form a junction between Generals Alexander and Montgomery in the East and General Eisenhower's forces in the West. Our objectives in China should be: first, to save China and keep it going and, second, to continue to increase the rate of attrition on Japan in ships and airplanes. He said that until now the United Nations have met with considerable success in their battle of attrition against Japan, but the pace would have to be stepped up. He then asked Field Marshal Wavell to express his views on the Burma and ANAKIM operation.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he had had the Burma campaign and Burma constantly in mind for two years. He considered it to be the most important pivot in the war against Japan. After war had been declared, it became impossible to defend Burma once the United Nations had lost control of the seas. He had been thinking of the reconquest of that country ever since. He said he was convinced that a reconquest could not be accomplished by land operations alone but must be combined with amphibious operations and naval action. He

had always realized the political effect that the loss of Burma had on China and also upon India. The moral effect on both countries was also of extreme importance.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that the more he had planned for reconquest the more difficult it had become. Communications to northeast India, which must be a base for land operations, are extremely difficult. They are dependent upon a railroad which has small capacity and is often out of operation for long periods. Air fields must have metal or concrete surfaces. To illustrate the difficulties in communications, he said that his troops at Manipur had never been on full rations during the last monsoon period because of the effect of rain on the roads. Current operations have shown that the Japanese have good troops for defensive fighting, whereas the Indian forces, accustomed to the open plains, require intensive training for this type of warfare.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that when he was asked to produce a plan to conquer Burma in the next dry season, he had had prepared what he thought was the best plan possible. Even so, it was a hazardous one and difficult of accomplishment. He felt it had a reasonable chance of success if his troops were fully trained and equipped. The plan required a considerable increase of supplies which had to be sent to the theater at once. It was necessary that 180,000 tons per month be sent to India. Actually, in March and April only 65,000 and 70,000 tons respectively had been shipped. He felt that therefore the operation could not start in November as originally planned. Unless the operation could start in November, it could not succeed in the coming dry season. It would be necessary to get land-based air cover on the Arakan coast first, then capture Rangoon, while, at the same time, conducting operations in the north with British and Chinese troops. The Chinese forces from the north and the British-Indian forces from the south would then attempt to form a junction. After that it would be necessary to repair the railroads and bring supplies in through Rangoon and ship them north in order to start repair of the Burma Road. His administrative experts had informed him that the road could not be fully opened to traffic until the middle of 1945.

THE FIELD MARSHAL indicated that relief to China would therefore not be effective until 1945, but that the moral effect, on the other hand, would be considerable at once to both China and India. If success was assured, it would be worth hazarding the losses. He said, however, that an unsuccessful expedition would be much worse than none at all.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that his Planners had been examining alternatives. He said that, in the long run, it was probable that more supplies could be sent into China by air alone in the next 18 months than would be the case if the air transport was required to use much of its capacity for operations leading to the construction of the Burma Road.

The possibility of using troops in the India Theater for some other operation was being examined. An effort was being made to determine the effect of creating a break or landing somewhere in the semi-circle from Burma through the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and Java. Possible objectives were Bangkok via the Kra Isthmus, northern Sumatra, and Malaya, or the Sunda Straits. Bangkok was considered to be impracticable because there was no adequate port or routes across the Kra Isthmus. Sunda Straits was an attractive objective because it threatens the Palembang oil fields. This, however, was not possible within the resources available. An operation which did appear to be promising was one which would seize three or four air fields in northern Sumatra and from there drive on into the Malayan Peninsula at Penang, where there were four or five additional air fields. The object of such an expedition would be to place large air forces in Sumatra and Malaya from where they could attack Bangkok, Singapore, the Palembang oil fields, and Japanese shipping. If it were possible to place strong air forces on northern Sumatra and protect them, a bad situation would be created for the Japanese and cause them considerable air losses. The expedition would probably require about the same forces as would be required by ANAKIM. It would have the advantage that the operation would not be dependent on the monsoon. It would be an expensive operation in aircraft because of the distance from air bases and it would also require considerable shipping. The proposed operation, if feasible, however, would cause considerable attrition to Japanese air power and shipping. The Japanese would have to react to the United Nations' operations and this would bring on air battles. Considerable further study would be required before an opinion could be given as to the possibility of the operation.

In reply to a question by the Prime Minister, the FIELD MARSHAL said the operation proposed could not take place until 1944.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that there were many naval problems involved in the capture of Rangoon. He questioned whether sufficient carriers could be made available.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the Rangoon operation was not attractive. Even to seize the air fields on the Arakan coast would require carriers standing off from one to three weeks, which was too long against Japanese land-based air attack. Seizure of Rangoon

was not feasible unless it could be covered to some extent by land-based aircraft from the Arakan coast.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND indicated that carriers could not be made available until they could be released from the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE said that the naval approach to Rangoon was narrow and could be easily defended. He doubted if the operation was feasible from the naval point of view.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that, from an airman's point of view, air development appeared to meet the requirements, which were

- a.* to defeat the enemy air forces;
- b.* to assure military aid to China; and
- c.* to bring support in the form of supplies at the earliest date.

One thing was essential and that was that we should have adequate air forces operating from India to neutralize Japanese air forces which might interfere with the air route. He pointed out that it had become clear that the development of land operations through Assam into China and development of the facilities required both for the Royal Air Force and the American Ferry Command were mutually antagonistic. He continued that, in his opinion, if all the effort was put into building up the air forces operating under General Chennault and the air transport into China, much more could be done than is at present planned. He felt that the tonnage over the air transport route to China could be considerably increased. He further considered that, for the defense of this air route, it was not necessary to reconquer Burmese territory, provided that Allied Air Forces were adequate for the neutralization of the enemy air forces.

Referring to ANAKIM, AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that he had never considered the plan to be sound since the sea-borne expedition and the landings could not be supported by land-based aircraft. The plan was based on the assumption that the enemy might have 300 to 350 aircraft and that of these, 100 might attack any landing operation. Clearly the defense which one or two carriers could oppose would be quite inadequate to a scale of attack of this order.

THE PRESIDENT asked how many airports there were in the area from Assam to Chittagong.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that at the present moment he was operating 14 squadrons from forward airdromes between northeast Assam and Chittagong, exclusive of those used by the American Air Force.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the runways were long enough for bombers.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE replied that there were six air fields with hard runways from which medium and heavy bombers could

operate. For the most part, heavy bombers operated from air fields further back. He said that the plan to capture Sumatra has considerable merit because it extends our air cover eastward and interferes with the Japanese shipping lanes. The radius of bomber aircraft operating from Malaya to northern Sumatra will extend far enough to meet that of bombers operating through southern China. He considered that air operations undertaken from Malaya in conjunction with offensive air operations undertaken from China would be bound to draw considerable enemy air forces into these areas to oppose them. Such air forces the enemy could ill spare.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the weight of opinion was apparently against him. To his mind China represented a base which the United Nations wanted. They wanted it both for its geographic position and for the use of Chinese manpower. He felt that ultimately the United Nations must meet the Japanese Army on the mainland of Asia. If China were allowed to fall now, it would be a long road back before the United Nations would be in a position to meet Japan on Chinese soil. He said that to keep China in the war it was essential to retain control of Yunnan.

GENERAL STILWELL said that he had been worried for a long time over the possibilities of a Japanese attack against Kunming, particularly one from the south. The Japanese have the forces available in Indo China to make such an attack. He said that if we are to hold Yunnan, ground forces must be trained to do it, and they must be Chinese forces.

GENERAL STILWELL said that there are now 32 divisions in training which will be available for the defense of Yunnan. At the present time they have a strength of about 8,100. However, it is planned to inactivate one out of each three divisions so as to bring the remainder to a total strength of 10,000 each. This will result in 22 divisions being available as soon as their equipment is received and the others will be brought up to strength later. He felt that if this force could be trained and equipped, it would be capable of defending Yunnan Province. Sufficient equipment would be available if 10,000 tons capacity were utilized for this purpose over the air transport route between now and September.

GENERAL STILWELL indicated that it was absolutely essential to open land communications to China. Even though the initial supplies were small, they would have a tremendous moral effect on China and munitions thus transported would be used to build up a second group of 30 divisions which had been promised by the Generalissimo. He said that under this program there would ultimately be a force capable of fighting the Japanese. If supplies for these

ground forces were not sent at once, it would be impossible to train and equip the Chinese Yunnan forces and the Chinese Army would disappear. He admitted that if all supplies were devoted to building up the Chinese Air Forces, it would have an effect on the Japanese shipping lanes, and it would be a shot in the arm to Chinese morale, but he felt that it would not lead to decisive results. He said as soon as the build-up of American forces begins to sting the Japanese too much, they will launch an attack from Indo China to capture the Kunming Area. If that proved to be the case, the eastern terminal of the air route would disappear and China would be out of the war. It was imperative, therefore, that Yunnan Province be defended and the only way this could be accomplished was by the build-up of Chinese Ground Forces.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had never accepted such a low tonnage figure for the air route, that it must be divided up between Air and Ground equipment. Why should not sufficient be conveyed for both?

GENERAL STILWELL said that up to the present, 3,400 tons had been the maximum conveyed in any one month. Increased quantities were certainly possible on paper, but it must always be remembered that we were fighting the conditions of the country, the monsoon, and inadequate air fields, and there was always the danger that the Japanese would interfere with the route.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that there was no great danger to the Assam air fields from land attack. The warning system was reasonably adequate, giving 13 minutes warning.

GENERAL STILWELL thought that the warning system required improvement. He thought that all possible steps had already been taken by Field Marshal Wavell to speed up the development of the air fields. Labor had already been switched from the Ledo Road.

In response to an inquiry by the President, GENERAL STILWELL said that his requirements for the Chinese Army in Yunnan were 2,000 tons a month in the next five months; and GENERAL CHENNAULT said that he required 4,700 tons a month for four months, and after that 7,000 tons a month.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the immediate objective for the air route should therefore be 7,000 tons a month.

In further discussion, it was pointed out that the plan was already to achieve 10,000 tons per month by November, though something might be done to speed up matters so as to try to achieve 7,000 tons a month by July.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the only way of getting large quantities of material into China was by road. We might, by a great effort,

achieve 10,000 tons by air, but a land route would ultimately be essential.

THE PRESIDENT said that it must be borne in mind that the Generalissimo was head of the State, as well as Commander in Chief. General Stilwell and General Chennault were thus in a sense under him when they were in his territory. It was difficult from the psychological point of view to tell the Generalissimo that we thought things should be done in some manner different from his ideas.

GENERAL CHENNAULT agreed that it was necessary to listen to what the Generalissimo said. His own plan was first to use his air forces to protect the terminal base in Yunnan, and then to operate from another area farther east from which Japanese shipping could be attacked in the Hong Kong-Formosa area. He doubted whether the Japanese could advance across-country and capture Yunnan. They had never yet succeeded in such an operation. They had always advanced up rivers which they used for their line of communication, and the traffic on the rivers was thus open to air attack. The Generalissimo certainly feared an attack up the Yangtze, but quite a small force, say two Fighter squadrons and one Bomber squadron, would be enough to prevent such an advance.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that if all efforts now concentrating on the Ledo Road and on supporting the troops in Burma were concentrated on developing the air fields, the progress might be more rapid, and the higher tonnage might be achieved earlier.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that a certain amount of resources might be saved from the Ledo Road, though it was in itself of some importance for improving the warning system. Air fields already had first priority.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that several steel mats for air fields were on their way, and General Wheeler's demand for two or three more Engineer Battalions was under examination. It might be possible to supply these from the Middle East.

THE PRESIDENT inquired what would be the effect on the Generalissimo if Operation ANAKIM were not carried out.

GENERAL STILLWELL said that the effect was unpredictable, but there was no doubt that the Generalissimo was relying on the operation.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that the Generalissimo always wanted definite commitments on dates and size of forces. He believed that if 7,000 tons a month were flown in the Generalissimo would be satisfied.

FIELD MARSHAL DILL pointed out that the Generalissimo knew about the plan for 10,000 tons a month, and was expecting this to be carried

out in addition to ANAKIM. A 7,000 ton project would thus not be anything new to him.

GENERAL STILWELL said that the Generalissimo felt that he had been himself concerned in the making of the ANAKIM plan, and was committed to it. He expected the operation to be carried out as planned. If it were not, he would feel deserted. Operations against Sumatra or Malaya would have no bearing on the opening of the Burma Road, and would thus greatly prolong the period during which no steps were being taken to reopen it. The Chinese were suspicious of the British, and it would be necessary for the British to prove to them that they were in earnest. The effect of the cancellation of ANAKIM would be very bad on the Chinese people, and the development of the air supply route would not be regarded as an adequate substitute.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not prepared to undertake something foolish purely in order to placate the Chinese. He was not prepared to make war that way. He would do anything that was sensible to help the Chinese in exactly the same way as he would do anything that was sensible to help the Russians; but he did not see any particular value in carrying out costly operations to no purpose.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Burma Road was a symbol to the Chinese, and operations in Burma would make them feel that at any rate the reopening was on the way.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that a possible alternative solution would be to make use of the forces designed for ANAKIM for an advance towards China, opening the Road as the advance progressed.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that this possibility had been carefully studied. The question was how could a force advancing in this manner be sustained? The railhead in Assam was already overloaded. Beyond that there were 200 miles of hill road already completed. Then came 80 miles of partly made hill road to a point still west of the Chindwin River. After that point there was no all-weather road at all in Upper Burma north of Mandalay. The Japanese had built a dry-weather road towards the Chin hills, but it was separated from the end of our road by 120 miles. We should have to build 250 miles of all-weather road in 4/5 months—an engineering effort entirely beyond the capacity of the line of communication through Assam to support. Upper Burma was the most malarial country in the world, and if operations were continued there in the rainy season, 25% casualties per month must be expected. It might be better to go down to Mandalay, rather than to try to go due east, but after we got to Mandalay, we should then be trying to maintain our forces over 300 miles of road of which 150 miles were

not all-weather. We could not possibly meet the Japanese on even terms as they would have behind them the railway, the road, and the river. He did not think it would be possible to cut their line of communication decisively by air.

GENERAL STILWELL, in reply to a question by the President, said that he agreed with Field Marshal Wavell that an attack on Rangoon would be very hazardous. He thought it might be better to go in through Bassein.

ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE observed that an attack on Bassein was open to the same objection, that for two or three weeks air support would have to be provided by carriers.

THE PRIME MINISTER, reverting to General Stilwell's statement about the attitude of the Chinese, said that he was sorry to hear that the Chinese were suspicious of the British. The British had asked nothing of the Chinese and were prepared to do anything that would really contribute to their safety. He was not prepared, however, to undertake months of unprofitable operations in order to remove the unfounded suspicions of the Chinese. The United States would realize that it was not a question of saving the expenditure of British blood. The British were perfectly prepared to fight in true brotherhood with their Allies.

GENERAL STILWELL explained that it was only because China was essential ultimately as a base that it was so necessary to undertake operations to open the way thereto.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not at present convinced that this was so. However, he saw no reason openly to abandon the operation at present. He thought that moves in preparation should continue provided they did not hamper the development of the air route. Further study would be necessary before a decision could be taken on the actual operation to be carried out.

THE PRESIDENT said that he thought the two objectives should be to get 7,000 tons a month by air into China by July; and, secondly, to open land communication with China. It was for the Military advisers to suggest the best way in which the latter objective could be carried out.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thought that the task for the staffs was to find out the most promising operation to open the way to China irrespective of any agreement actually to carry it out in the immediate future.

GENERAL MARSHALL urged that no suggestion be made to the Generalissimo that 7,000 tons per month was the target as this would appear to the latter as a reduction from the 10,000 tons per month which he knows to be the objective. He said that in the development

of ANAKIM, RAVENOUS had been the first approach. Field Marshal Wavell had objected to RAVENOUS as being unsound for supply reasons, Sir Alan Brooke had objected because of the insecurity of the south flank, and the Generalissimo had objected because it was not coupled with naval action. Finally, ANAKIM in its present form had been agreed upon by all. This was now considered to be impracticable. He said that the plan proposed by General Stilwell was new in many of its features and should be thoroughly explored.

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SATURDAY, MAY 15, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 15, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Horne  
 Vice Admiral Willson  
 Major General Streett  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Colonel Smart  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Macready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Captain Lambe  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the 84th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.<sup>2</sup>

2. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Committee had not yet directed the Planners to prepare an agenda for future work. He suggested that

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 85th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 66.

the Combined Chiefs of Staff should first consider various courses of action open to achieve the defeat of the Axis in Europe and then similarly the defeat of Japan.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff held much the same views. He felt that ROUNDUP should first be considered, and for this it would be desirable to have expositions of the U.S. conception of this operation and a study of conditions and feasibility; next, operations in the Mediterranean might be discussed based on the British Chiefs of Staff memorandum; and, lastly, the war with Japan, considering operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and their coordination.

When the scope and requirements of operations in the theaters had been defined, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would then proceed to examine the extent to which our demands for shipping resources could meet what was proposed. After that, the Committee would consider the global strategy in terms of concrete facts and deal with miscellaneous points such as the Portuguese islands and Ploesti.

ADMIRAL KING felt that the first step should be to set out agreed basic fundamentals: for instance, the vital importance of Atlantic and Pacific lines of communications, security of the citadel of Britain, and the fact that the full weight must be thrown first on the defeat of Germany. To this might be added others. Was China essential as a basis for the defeat of Japan? These fundamentals, when agreed, would constitute a point of departure and yardsticks by which our strategy could be judged. Many of these points had been contained in previous papers, but he felt it important that a fresh statement should be got out as early as possible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with Admiral King's views and suggested that the Planners should be instructed to prepare a document on those lines.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

a. That the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May:

(1) A statement of agreed essentials for the effective prosecution of the war, which would serve as a background for the formulation of future plans, e.g., security of essential sea communications; security of the citadel of Britain; etc.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> In pursuance of these instructions, the Combined Staff Planners prepared and circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, a report designated C.C.S. 232, not printed. The report was discussed and agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 93 subject to certain emendations. For text of the final version of the report, designated C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 231.

(2) A draft agenda for the remaining conferences in the light of the discussion which had taken place.<sup>4</sup>

### 3. OPERATIONS IN BURMA

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the White House the previous day<sup>5</sup> it had been agreed that the staffs should, in consultation with the U.S. and British commanders in the area, examine the best means of expanding the air route to China and of opening a land route from India.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he considered it important that the commanders concerned should be consulted so that the orders the Combined Chiefs of Staff would give as a result of their deliberations would be related to practical possibilities.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it would be desirable that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should offer Dr. T. V. Soong and General Chu an opportunity to express the views of General Chiang Kai-shek at an early date.<sup>6</sup>

THE COMMITTEE then discussed a draft directive to the Combined Planners with reference to a study of operations in Burma.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed:

*a.* That the Combined Staff Planners, in consultation as necessary with the British and U.S. Commanders in Chief, India and China Theaters, should examine and report on:

(1) The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China given complete priority for its development except for the minimum requirements of the forces defending the air field areas, and whether any further steps can now be taken to enable these potentialities to be realized.<sup>7</sup>

(2) The most promising operation, having regard to the various considerations brought to light in previous discussions, for the opening of a land route to China, and what resources and conditions are necessary for carrying it out without prejudicing the development of the air route.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Pursuant to this directive, the Combined Staff Planners prepared a draft agenda which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, 1943, as C.C.S. 233, not printed. At their meeting on May 17, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and approved the draft agenda, subject to certain amendments; the revised agenda was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1, May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 229.

<sup>5</sup> For record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 14, 1943, see *ante*, p. 66.

<sup>6</sup> Regarding Soong's request to be allowed to participate in the Conference, see the letter of May 13, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins, *post*, p. 288.

<sup>7</sup> C.C.S. 229, "Potentialities of Air Route From Assam to China", circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 229 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see *post*, p. 142.

<sup>8</sup> C.C.S. 231, "Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China", circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, not printed. At their meeting on May 20, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that C.C.S. 231 be withdrawn from the Agenda; see *post*, p. 142.

b. That Dr. T. V. Soong and Major General Shih-ming Chu should be invited to appear at the meeting on Monday, 17 May, and express the views of the Generalissimo regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4. OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

SIR ALAN BROOKE considered the possibilities of undertaking ROUNDUP should be examined in relation to the results which would accrue from the shutting down of future operations in the Mediterranean. United States views on the possibilities of the BOLERO build-up and their conception of the scope and results of cross-Channel operations would be of value. Similarly, operations in the Mediterranean should be examined with the British Chiefs of Staff paper as a basis for discussion.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the acceptance of General Eaker's plan for the build-up of SICKLE as one of the fundamentals of our agreed strategy.<sup>10</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE believed that at this stage SICKLE should not be accepted as a fundamental since it might on further examination be found to tie our hands with regard to future plans.

After further discussion, the COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were in general agreement that SICKLE should not at this stage be accepted as a fundamental, though it was obvious that the intensity of our air bombardment would have a material effect on any land operations, whether undertaken across the Channel or in the Mediterranean and should not therefore be reduced except after critical examination.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the most important point was to decide whether the defeat of Germany would be brought nearer by immediate Mediterranean operations at some expense to BOLERO, or, alternatively, by stopping operations in the Mediterranean in order to build up at the maximum rate for cross-Channel operations. The Planners should examine this problem with a view to a combined assessment of the effect on Germany of the two alternatives.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were agreed that ROUNDUP must be undertaken as early as possible, but in the British view it was necessary, before ROUNDUP could be successful, to create a suitable situation by diversion of German forces. The United States view was that the war could be won by cross-Channel operations in 1944, but he was not clear as to the exact plan by which decisive results would be achieved.

<sup>9</sup> See *post*, p. 87.

<sup>10</sup> A brief presentation of Eaker's plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom is set forth in enclosure B to C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, *post*, p. 241.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that great faith was being pinned to the results of the bomber offensive. We must be ready to take advantage of these results. He was concerned lest any delay in building up forces in the United Kingdom would result in our not being ready when the moment presented itself. The British believed that operations in the Mediterranean would not materially slow up the BOLERO movement. The exact results of the air attacks might be problematical, but the availability of tonnage to move troops could be calculated.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was estimated that further operations in the Mediterranean would only result in some three to four fewer U.S. Divisions being available in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had last year considered the necessity of undertaking operation SLEDGEHAMMER to relieve pressure on the Russian Front, but the situation there was now very different. The landing of 25 divisions in France at that time might have been suicidal, but now there was the possibility of concentrating our vast air superiority in direct support of the land forces in the bridgehead, thereby materially altering the balance of force in our favor.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that our air power could be withdrawn from attacks on German industry and transferred to the direct aid of our land forces, but even if the area of ground operations could thereby be isolated, the penetration of these forces inland could not be assisted since the British Air Force was not yet fully on a mobile basis.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that certain U.S. fighter units in the U.K. were on a fully mobile basis. He stressed the psychological effect of a landing in France. He did not believe that the effect of overwhelming air superiority on the Continent had been appreciated, whereas great stress had been laid on its value in the Mediterranean.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in considering the results to be expected from air support of ground operations, it must be remembered that, in North Africa, though we had had air superiority since El Alamein, Rommel had been able to move his army back into Tunisia relatively intact. Similarly in Tunisia the enemy had been able to reinforce by some 100,000 men.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the outstanding results achieved by the use of air power in Tunisia as soon as the weather had improved.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out with regard to air power that fighter cover was essential.

GENERAL MCNARNEY agreed but said that he believed that a bridgehead in France would enable us to move forward the necessary fighter cover. Air power must be related to our ground power. For instance, it might well be that the correct application of air power might

halve the number of divisions required to overcome a given resistance. The seizure of the bridgehead would insure that the fighter line could be advanced and air power applied at the correct moment in support of ground operations.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he entirely agreed in the abstract with General McNarney's last statement but it was important that in considering the seizure of, say, the Brest Peninsula, the Planners should carefully work out the rate at which fighter cover could be developed in that area in order that the plan could be assessed on a sound tactical and logistic basis.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out the further limitations of port capacity in the bridgehead.

ADMIRAL LEAHY agreed to the study suggested by Sir Charles Portal. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff had prepared a brief outline plan for ROUNDUP which would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff.<sup>11</sup> He believed that the results expected from the air bombardment of Germany should be taken into consideration both in connection with cross-Channel and Mediterranean operations.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that one of the main features of the air plan outlined by General Eaker was not only its tremendous effect both on production and morale, but also, and perhaps most important, the elimination of the German fighter force. This would have an immense effect on any operations against Germany, whether across the Channel, in the Mediterranean, or on the Russian Front. He did not maintain that the utmost priority should continuously be accorded to SICKLE, but it must be realized that its value was fundamental. The longer the destruction of the German fighter force was delayed, the longer would the ultimate defeat of Germany be delayed.

ADMIRAL KING said that operation ROUNDUP must be carefully examined. While it had originally been believed that cross-Channel operations could be undertaken in 1943, April of 1944 now appeared to be the earliest possible date. This must be fixed as a firm date, or we should never come to grips with Germany by cross-Channel operations in 1944. He appreciated the value of operations in the Mediterranean, but they would, he believed, render cross-Channel operations in 1944 impossible.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that only by Mediterranean operations to draw off and hold German forces could a situation be achieved in which a successful ROUNDUP is possible. Otherwise at best only SLEDGEHAMMER could be undertaken and we should then be committed in France and pinned down to a bridgehead.

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<sup>11</sup> The plan under reference was circulated on May 15 as C.C.S. 215, May 13, 1943, "Invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1943-1944", *post*, p. 238.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that all were agreed that ROUNDUP was essential and that a strategy should be adopted which would produce the earliest possible successful invasion of the Continent. The British believed that Mediterranean operations were first necessary, whereas the United States Chiefs of Staff believed in piling up forces in the United Kingdom to give more strength to the blow. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that the balance of force on the Continent would alter more rapidly in our favor if Mediterranean operations were undertaken.

ADMIRAL KING said that he did not believe it would be possible to build up sufficient forces in the United Kingdom if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, since these would cause a vacuum into which our forces would be sucked.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said it must be remembered that this vacuum would suck in not only Allied Forces, but also Axis Forces.

With regard to General Morgan's plans, GENERAL MARSHALL said that these, without forces to implement them, were of little value. He feared that unless we concentrated on the United Kingdom build-up, we should lack the necessary punch to undertake cross-Channel operations when the critical moment arose.

SIR ALAN BROOKE undertook to circulate a note giving an estimate of the shipping commitment to meet the economic situation that would arise in the event of an Italian collapse.<sup>12</sup>

ADMIRAL KING drew attention to the dangers of tying down forces and equipment to await eventualities. If a definite date was not decided on for ROUNDUP, valuable equipment, such as landing craft, which was urgently required in the Pacific, would be lying idle in England.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that this also applied to air-borne forces which were also essentially offensive and absorbed much air power which might well be used in active attack, but he believed that both with landing craft and air-borne troops their use was so essential to achieve success at the critical moment that their inactivity until this moment arrived must be accepted.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he regarded SLEDGEHAMMER as a preliminary to ROUNDUP. Even a bridgehead was valuable in that it

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<sup>12</sup> The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, entitled "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories" (not printed). This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 16, estimated the monthly food and fuel requirements for Italy, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia to be provided from United Nations stocks and the number and type of ships needed to move such relief supplies.

would bring ground and air forces into active contact with the enemy, diverting German forces from the Russian Front and inducing attrition. When, during operation TORCH, it had been obvious to the Germans that no cross-Channel operations were possible, they had sent part of their garrison from Western France to the Eastern Front at a critical moment.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the commitment of our forces to a bridge-head such as the Brest Peninsula would enable the enemy to concentrate rather than force him to disperse.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that on two previous occasions the forces which it had been believed would be available for cross-Channel operations had dwindled to very small numbers due to the demands of operations TORCH and HUSKY, which had exceeded expectations. Unless BOLERO build-up was now given priority over operations in the Mediterranean, similar results might be expected and no forces would be available to undertake the operation at the critical moment.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that it had always been agreed that the build-up in the United Kingdom should take place subject to the requirements of the agreed operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. These requirements had not greatly exceeded expectations but rather the availability of shipping had not proved so large as had been expected.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the Combined Staff Planners should prepare for consideration on Monday morning, 17 May, two papers as follows:

(1) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the U.K. as soon as possible. This paper to be prepared by the U.S. planners in consultation with the British.<sup>13</sup>

(2) A plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) which accepts the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary. This paper to be prepared by the British Planners in consultation with the U. S.<sup>14</sup>

In the preparation of the above plans cognizance should be taken of the effects of a full-scale SICKLE.

In submitting the above two papers, the Combined Staff Planners should make such recommendations as they feel able to on the respective plans.

<sup>13</sup> The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 235, May 18, 1943, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe", *post*, p. 273.

<sup>14</sup> The paper prepared was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, "Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First)", *post*, p. 261.

b. Took note that a paper which had been prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff on the economic results of the defeat of Italy would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>15</sup>

#### 5. DIRECTIVE TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES IN THE FAR EAST

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed the terms of a directive to the U.S. and British authorities in the Far East on the expansion of the capacity of the air route to China.

In the course of discussion, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined certain steps which General Wheeler, in cooperation with the British authorities concerned, was taking for the improvement of these facilities. He mentioned the difficulties with which General Stilwell was faced, and in this connection paid tribute to the outstanding success achieved by Sir John Dill on his visit to Chungking, in convincing the Chinese of British good will.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

That the following telegram should be despatched forthwith by the appropriate Chiefs of Staff to the appropriate Commanders in Chief:<sup>16</sup>

“Give first priority to effort to prepare Assam air fields in order that not less than 7,000 tons per month may be transported to China by 1 July 1943.

“It is considered essential that facilities for the monthly transportation of 10,000 tons should be provided at the earliest practicable date and not later than 1 September, and that adequate defensive measures for the air field area must be maintained.”

#### 6. THE AZORES

ADMIRAL KING, in stressing the urgency of action with regard to the Azores as a vital factor in the battle of the Atlantic, asked if any further developments had taken place.

7. GENERAL ISMAY stated that the British Chiefs of Staff had prepared a paper on this subject which had been submitted to the Prime Minister and which he had invited them to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff.<sup>17</sup> This paper will be circulated. The military desirability of obtaining these islands was generally agreed. He believed that the Prime Minister and President were discussing means of achieving our object.

<sup>15</sup> The reference is presumably to C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, “Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories”; see *ante*, p. 83, footnote 12.

<sup>16</sup> The telegram was sent as No. 1371, May 15, 1943, from Marshall to Wheeler (J.C.S. Files). For an indication of parallel action by the British Chiefs of Staff, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 17, *post*, p. 87.

<sup>17</sup> The reference is to C.C.S. 226, *post*, p. 304.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the paper on the Portuguese Atlantic Islands, by the British Chiefs of Staff, which is now being circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, should be considered at the meeting on Monday, 17 May.

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 SUNDAY, MAY 16, 1943
*Editorial Note*

Roosevelt and Churchill spent the weekend of May 14–17, 1943, at Shangri La, the President's mountain camp in Maryland. According to the Shangri La guest book, also present were Mrs. Roosevelt, Anna Roosevelt Boettiger, Thomas Rowan, Harry Hopkins, Commander Thompson, Rear Admiral Brown, Lord Beaverbrook, Brigadier General Smith, and General Marshall. No official record of any of the conversations held during this weekend have been found. Churchill (*Hinge of Fate*, pp. 795–798) gives an account of the holiday.

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 MONDAY, MAY 17, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 17, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CHINA
Admiral Leahy	General Brooke	Foreign Minister
General Marshall	Admiral of the Fleet	Soong <sup>2</sup>
Admiral King	Pound	Major General Chu <sup>2</sup>
Lieutenant General McNarney	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
Lieutenant General Somervell	Field Marshal Dill	
Vice Admiral Horne	Lieutenant General Ismay	
Major General Fairchild	Admiral Noble	
Major General Streett	Lieutenant General Macready	
Rear Admiral Cooke	Air Marshal Welsh	
Brigadier General Wedemeyer	Captain Lambe	
Colonel Smart	Brigadier Porter	
Commander Freseman	Air Commodore Elliot	
Commander Long	Brigadier Macleod	

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

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<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 86th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of China only.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. VISIT TO ANNAPOLIS

ADMIRAL KING invited the Combined Chiefs of Staff to visit Annapolis on Sunday, 23 May, leaving Washington at approximately 9 A. M.

## 2. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that with reference to Item 5 of the 85th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,<sup>3</sup> the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing to the appropriate British authorities in the Far East, had thought it wise to add to the last sentence of the draft telegram the words "including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the conclusions of the 85th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes.

*b.* Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff, in telegraphing the British authorities in the Far East, had added to the last sentence of the draft telegram contained in the conclusion to Item 5 of C.C.S. 85th Meeting the words "including air fields necessary for maintaining air superiority."

(At this point Dr. T. V. Soong and General Shih-ming Chu entered the meeting.)

## 3. SITUATION IN CHINA

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked Dr. Soong to give the Combined Chiefs of Staff the benefit of his views on the Chinese situation, with particular reference to Chinese needs and the opening of a land route to China.

DR. SOONG said that it must be remembered that China had been in a state of siege for five years. The Japanese had seized the Chinese coast, then Indo China and finally, with the occupation of Burma, the investment had been completed save for the air route. The resultant economic pressure, deterioration of morale and lack of supplies made the situation very grave. After Casablanca Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had been informed in a message from the President and Prime Minister, firstly, that the U.S. Air Force under General Chennault would be strengthened with a view not only to attacking the Japanese in China but also Japan itself, and secondly, that a combined *all-out* assault on Burma by naval, ground and air forces would

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 85.

be undertaken at the conclusion of this year's monsoon.<sup>4</sup> These assurances were naturally very welcome to the Generalissimo.

It was appreciated that the existing air route, with a capacity of only a few thousand tons per month, would not permit the implementation of a strong air offensive from China and, at the same time, the supply of the Chinese troops in Yunnan. The Generalissimo had therefore asked the President that for the next three months all supplies carried by the air route should be those for General Chennault's air force.<sup>5</sup> The General had worked out a plan for attacking the Japanese air forces, their lines of communication, and most important of all, for providing air support for the Chinese ground forces. So far these forces had received no air support, and this was vitally important. The Japanese not only had better lines of communication but also better equipment, and were assisted by their air. Recent Japanese attacks in the neighborhood of Ichang had enabled them to capture territory on the south of the Yangtze. This provided them with an excellent line of communication via the Yangtze; and unless they were dislodged, it would enable them to attack Chang Sha and Chungking itself, since their logistic situation was far more favorable than that of the Chinese, whose lines of communication, now that the use of the Yangtze could be denied them by Japanese air power, were over most difficult mountainous country. Air power, and air power alone, would be of any value in the present situation, and it was for this reason that the Generalissimo asked that, for three months, supplies to General Chennault's air forces should take priority over everything else so that these could be used in support of the Chinese Army.

The situation was, frankly, very bad. General Chiang Kai-shek's military views had been guided over a period of years not only by United States and British advisers but by a series of outstanding German and Russian general officers. General Chiang Kai-shek was the

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<sup>4</sup> For text of the message of January 25, 1943, from Roosevelt and Churchill to Chiang, setting forth some of the results of the Casablanca Conference, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 807. This message did not explain American-British intentions with regard to the reconquest of Burma. The basic decisions of the Casablanca Conference with regard to future operations in Burma were included in the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill, C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 797. Beginning on February 1, 1943, a high-level mission composed of Arnold, Somervell, and Dill met in New Delhi with key British and American officers in the China-Burma area to prepare detailed proposals for Burma operations based on the Casablanca decisions. Arnold and Dill subsequently discussed these proposals with Chiang at Chungking on February 6 and 7, 1943. For accounts of the New Delhi conferences and the discussions in Chungking, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 272-275 and S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, vol. II: *India's Most Dangerous Hour* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1958), pp. 298-305.

<sup>5</sup> For text of Chiang's message to Roosevelt as transmitted in a note of April 29, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 319-320. For Roosevelt's response of May 4, 1943, to Chiang, see *post*, p. 288, footnote 2.

Supreme Commander in the Chinese Theater of War, and for this theater he was responsible. On him depended the safety of China. His military views, therefore, must, unless he were absolved of this responsibility, be given overriding consideration.

With regard to the first promise made by the President and Prime Minister, i.e., the strengthening of General Chennault's air forces, the Generalissimo regarded this as all-important. Japan had changed her policy vis-à-vis China. She had now given the puppet government in Nanking many concessions, including the control of currency. She had restored factories in the occupied area. This new policy of conciliation was far harder for the national government to combat than her previous line of action and called for strong positive steps.

With regard to the second promise, i.e., that the United Nations would undertake a full-scale offensive in Burma towards the end of 1943 the official record of the meeting held in Calcutta between the British, American and Chinese representatives gave a clear picture of the situation.<sup>6</sup>

This discussion was regarded as one to insure that the decisions reached at Casablanca and Chungking should be perfectly clear to all concerned. General Ho had outlined the action to be taken by the Chinese forces. All had agreed that the provision of naval forces was essential and that success would be impossible without them. The importance of air superiority had been emphasized and General Arnold had pointed out that, even if the Japanese Air Force were as strong as believed by the Chinese representatives, the British/American air force would be considerably stronger. The Chinese representatives had agreed to provide three extra air fields at the China end and additional facilities to match those provided by the British at the Indian end. Field Marshal Wavell had said he had not had time to work out details. He must consider the needs of his own troops in the area who were dependent on difficult lines of communication. The Generalissimo might be assured that he would do his utmost to meet his request. He was confident that it would be possible to carry up to the air fields as much as the ferry service could carry forward.

From all this it was clear that the Burma plan for 1943 was a definite U.S./British commitment and he must therefore ask for its fulfillment and would be interested to know further details of it.

As a background to this request the Chinese situation must be borne in mind. Inflation had taken place; there was economic distress; China had borne long years of war; and the Japanese were adopting

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<sup>6</sup> For brief accounts of the Allied military conference held at Calcutta on February 9, 1943, see Romanus and Sunderland, p. 276, Arnold, p. 428, and Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, vol. II, p. 306.

the policy of *wheedling* rather than *terrorizing* the people. Throughout the Chinese Army and indeed the people, the plan to retake Burma in 1943 was an open secret. If not undertaken, they would believe themselves abandoned by the Allies and suspect that the latter did not intend to achieve the unconditional surrender of Japan by force of arms.

Prior to the Casablanca Conference other plans had been suggested for limited operations and General Stilwell, who had a profound knowledge of China, had in January proposed the launching of an offensive by Chinese troops in North Burma at the beginning of March, with the object of opening an all-land route to China. The Generalissimo, however, both then and now, was in disagreement with this plan believing it to be logistically impracticable since, while the Allied forces would be operating from very limited lines of communication from Ledo onwards, the Japanese would have the use both of the Irrawaddy River and the railroad. The Generalissimo felt that even if this plan achieved initial success, we should eventually be faced with the Japanese being able to maintain stronger forces at the ends of their good lines of communication than could we.

With regard to the state of preparedness of the Chinese troops, everything possible had been done to fulfill their commitment for a full-scale attack on Burma, and forces had been drawn from many parts of the area, some having marched 2,000 kilometers. The troops required for the full Burmese operation were now all available within one week's march of Kunming. The promised air fields in China had been built, and though painfully constructed by manual labor, the preparations at the Chinese end were further forward than those in India. General Chen Cheng, considered by General Stilwell as the ablest Chinese commander under the Generalissimo, had been placed in command of the Chinese forces in Yunnan. The general situation in China was bad. The Yangtze had been cut; Chang Sha, and Chungking which was of immense economic, moral and military importance, were threatened. The Chinese would do everything possible to meet their share of the operation. He hoped to be informed of the availability of the Allied forces. He asked only that the decisions taken at Casablanca with regard to the offensive in Burma be implemented.

ADMIRAL LEAHY thanked Dr. Soong for his most interesting talk on the situation in China. He asked how many Chinese troops would be available for the Burma operation.

DR. SOONG said that there would be 32 divisions, though these would not be at full strength and would amount to the equivalent of some 22

full-scale divisions, i.e., about 220,000 men. In addition, there were the Chinese forces training at Ramgarh and further troops held in readiness for holding operations to prevent the Japanese attacking Kunming from the south.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, Dr. Soong said that the operations near Ichang were being undertaken by the 5th and 6th Armies. These forces were short of artillery since the Chinese had received no additional guns except Polish artillery captured by the Russians. In spite of the general lack of artillery, the Chinese ground forces would be able to undertake their part in the proposed operations, and their degree of readiness was evinced by the fact that in January General Stilwell had been prepared to launch an offensive in March.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Chu if he wished to add anything to Dr. Soong's statement.

GENERAL CHU stated that he had nothing to add at this time but would be available later if the need should arise.

#### 4. PORTUGUESE ISLANDS (C.C.S. 226)<sup>7</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 226, with a short preamble explaining the vital military needs for these islands as aids to maintaining the security of our Atlantic communications, should be used as a basis of a recommendation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister.

ADMIRAL POUND presented a chart showing the vital role which the Portuguese Islands would play in maintaining the security of our sea routes.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested alternatively that it might be wiser to delay the approach to the Portuguese Government until such time as sufficient forces were available in the U.K. to seize the Islands in the event of Portuguese refusal. If necessary, a European front in Portugal could be opened.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that since all were agreed on the strategic importance of the Islands and since time was of the essence, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should make plans and agree, during the course of the Conference, that the Islands must be seized by force if diplomatic action failed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that this possibility should be examined and a decision taken as to whether the operation was better undertaken by U.S. or British forces and as to the strength of the forces required. With regard to the opening of a second front in Portugal,

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<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 304.

he saw certain advantages in this course, but it must be considered in relation to projected operations in the whole of the European Theater.

ADMIRAL KING then explained that his proposal had been that the possibility of seizing the Islands without diplomatic negotiations should be considered since this course might render it easier for the Portuguese to say that action had been taken against their will and therefore action in defense of Portugal itself might be avoided. The time factor was vital. More and more traffic would be routed through the Mediterranean. The Portuguese Islands were very important to the security of the U.S.-U.K. sea lane, but vital to the U.S.-Mediterranean route.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, SIR DUDLEY POUND said that he could see no advantage in postponing action with regard to the Islands. They were vitally important at all times of the year but more particularly so in the winter. The use of the southern route, with its better weather, was important and only escort carrier air protection could be given unless we held the Azores.

Discussion then took place on the strength and source of forces required in the light of possible resistance.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

a. Agreed to recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:

(1) That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943-1944.

(2) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.

b. Agreed:

(1) That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.<sup>8</sup>

(2) That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.

c. Directed that the secretaries, in consultation with the Chief of the British Air Staff, should prepare for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft letter for submission to the President

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<sup>8</sup> The wording of this paragraph is the version as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 87th Meeting; see *post*, p. 99. The original language of the paragraph had not specifically assigned the preparation of the plan to the British Chiefs of Staff.

and the Prime Minister which would include the above recommendations and proposals.<sup>9</sup>

5. AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR  
(C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 *a* (1))<sup>10</sup>  
(C.C.S. 232)

THE COMMITTEE considered a report by the Combined Staff Planners.<sup>11</sup> The British Chiefs of Staff presented a memorandum suggesting certain amendments to the paper.<sup>12</sup> In the course of discussion on paragraph 2 *b* of the paper, on the desirability of relating the extension of unremitting pressure against Japan to the agreement that the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe must be brought about at the earliest possible date, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that this British suggestion would not be acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff. The defeat of Japan was a matter of vital importance to the United States. A situation might arise in which an extension of effort against Japan, if necessary, even at the expense of the European Theater, would be essential to maintain the integrity of the United States and her interests in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the so-called *adequate* forces for the Pacific had always been a matter susceptible to differences of opinion. It must be remembered that while the Casablanca Conference dealt only with operations in 1943, the present deliberations aimed at deciding on the strategy to be adopted to bring the war as a whole to a successful conclusion. In his view, C.C.S. 155/1<sup>13</sup> did, in fact, visualize the extension of pressure against Japan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that operations in the Pacific had actually been extended since Casablanca and there was no doubt that adequate forces for further extension were available. The only shortage was of shipping. If an unfavorable situation arose in the Pacific, all would realize that whatever agreements were in existence, the United States would have to divert forces to meet this eventuality.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that shipping alone prohibited an equal effort in the Pacific Theater. He was convinced that it was not possible to achieve the defeat of both Germany and Japan at the same

<sup>9</sup> In pursuance of this directive, the Secretaries prepared a draft memorandum, designated C.C.S. 226/1, May 17, 1943, which was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 98. For final text of the memorandum, see C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 307.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 78.

<sup>11</sup> C.C.S. 232, May 16, 1943, not printed. For the amended version, showing items of agreement and disagreement, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 231.

<sup>12</sup> Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff is not printed, but for the amendments proposed therein, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 231.

<sup>13</sup> For text of C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Conduct of the War in 1943", see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 774.

time, and the maximum effort must be made against one or the other. There was no possibility of holding Germany while concentrating on Japan, and therefore it was essential that the defeat of Germany should first be accomplished. This would be the best method of ending the war as a whole at the earliest possible date.

With regard to paragraph 3 *b*, it was generally agreed that this paragraph should be recast in order to clarify its intention.

With regard to paragraph 3 *d*, GENERAL MCNARNEY agreed on the importance of both the air offensive against the Axis Powers and of relieving pressure on the Russian Front, but considered that concentration of air effort was essential. The British proposals left the way open to a dispersal of air forces from Norway to Greece which, while it might take pressure from the Russians, would not be the best application of our air power.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF: <sup>14</sup>

*a.* Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word "fixed" and substitute the word "first" therefor.

(2) Delete the captions "Priority Group 1" and "Priority Group 2" immediately preceding paragraphs 3 *a* and 3 *e*, respectively.

(3) Delete the words "in the Atlantic and Pacific" from paragraph 3 *e*.

*b.* Agreed that paragraph 2 *b*, 3 *b*, 3 *d*, and 3 *f* of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.

*c.* Directed the secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.<sup>15</sup>)

#### 6. AGENDA FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE CONFERENCE (C.C.S. 233)

THE COMMITTEE had before them a note by the Combined Staff Planners setting forward a tentative agenda for the remainder of the conference.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>The wording of these conclusions respecting C.C.S. 232 is the version approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18; see *post*, p. 98. The original version stated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had approved C.C.S. 232 subject to certain changes, including the deletion of paragraphs on which there had not been agreement, and that they had agreed to consider those paragraphs further should agreement be reached on the issues in question. (J.C.S. Files)

<sup>15</sup>*Post*, p. 231.

<sup>16</sup>C.C.S. 233, May 16, 1943, not printed; the agenda for the remainder of the conference, as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this meeting, was subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 233/1, May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 229.

With regard to Item 6, SIR JOHN DILL reminded the Committee of the importance of discussing the action being taken with regard to rearming Turkey in relation to our plans for the conduct of the war in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the agenda for the remainder of the conference shown in C.C.S. 233, with the following exceptions:

- (1) Delegate paragraph (1), discussion on Global Strategy.
- (2) Delete reference to the report of the Kauffman-Mansfield Committee<sup>17</sup> under the heading of U-boat Campaign in paragraph (4).
- (3) Insert a new item immediately following paragraph (5) entitled "Turkish Situation, General Discussion."

(Revised agenda subsequently published as C.C.S. 233/1.)

b. Agreed that the papers being prepared by the U.S. and British Planners on "The Defeat of Germany" would, in order to save time, be circulated as C.C.S. papers without receiving prior approval of their respective Chiefs of Staff.

c. Agreed that if necessary the Combined Chiefs of Staff would meet in an afternoon conference on Friday, 21 May, to consider papers receiving their attention which have no special reference to the subject matter of the TRIDENT Conference.

(At this point the following left the meeting:

General Somervell	Admiral Noble
Admiral Horne	Lt. General Macready
General Fairchild	Air Marshal Welsh
General Streett	Captain Lambe
Admiral Cooke	Brigadier Porter
General Wedemeyer	Air Commodore Elliot
Colonel Smart	Brigadier Macleod)
Commander Freseman	
Commander Long	

#### 7. OPERATION "HUSKY"

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Committee of certain information which pointed to the desirability of advancing the date of Operation HUSKY.

<sup>17</sup>The reference is presumably to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, a combined American-British body, created in March 1943 and dissolved in September 1943, with the responsibility for surveying all matters relating to anti-submarine work in the Atlantic Ocean. For brief descriptions of this body, see Samuel Eliot Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. x: *The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1945* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), p. 16, and S. W. Roskill, *The War at Sea, 1939-1945*, vol. II, p. 360.

The Committee discussed the advisability of asking General Eisenhower to consider the mounting of an earlier operation against HUSKY-land but it was pointed out that General Eisenhower had already given his views on this matter and had received all the available information referred to above. It was generally agreed that any specific action to draw General Eisenhower's attention to this information might suggest a lack of confidence in his judgment, which most certainly did not exist.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that they should take no action on this matter.

#### 8. OPERATION "UPKEEP"

SIR CHARLES PORTAL outlined Operation UPKEEP and the results which it was hoped had been attained.<sup>18</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of this statement.

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<sup>18</sup> The reference is to the bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams in West Germany by Royal Air Force aircraft on the night of May 16, 1943. The preparation and execution of this operation is described in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, 1939-1945*, vol. II: *Endeavor* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), chapter x, part 4.

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### ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 17, 1943, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

#### PRESENT

##### UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Baruch

##### UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

#### *Editorial Note*

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from Bernard M. Baruch, *Baruch: The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 300; from the memorandum of May 18, 1943, from Baruch to Watson, *post*, p. 312; and from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). Baruch's memorandum to Watson indicates that the supply of magnesium was one of the questions raised during the luncheon. The possibility of settling refugees in North Africa also appears to have been discussed at this meeting; see Baruch's undated memorandum on this subject, *post*, p. 344.

**LEAHY-SOONG MEETING, MAY 17, 1943, AFTERNOON, LEAHY'S OFFICE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy

CHINA

Foreign Minister Soong

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. According to the account in Leahy, p. 160, Soong sought to obtain assurances for the carrying out of the Burma operation and immediate and exclusive shipment of aircraft material to China.

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TUESDAY, MAY 18, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 18, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Lieutenant General Embick  
 Vice Admiral Horne  
 Major General Smith  
 Major General Streett  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Colonel Smart  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Macready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Captain Lambé  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff did not consider that the conclusion to Item 5 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 87th meeting.

Chiefs of Staff was correctly worded. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had not approved C.C.S. 232<sup>2</sup> subject to the deletion of certain paragraphs, but rather had accepted certain paragraphs, had amended others, and agreed to reconsider those upon which there was disagreement.

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—**

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held on Monday, 17 May 1943, except that the conclusions under Item 5 were changed to read as follows:

**“THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—**

*a.* Agreed to the following changes in C.C.S. 232:

(1) In the third line of paragraph 3 delete the word ‘fixed’ and substitute the word ‘first’ therefor.

(2) Delete the captions ‘Priority Group 1’ and ‘Priority Group 2’ immediately preceding paragraphs 3 *a* and 3 *e* respectively.

(3) Delete the words ‘in the Atlantic and Pacific’ from paragraph 3 *c*.

*b.* Agreed that paragraphs 2 *b*, 3 *b*, 3 *d*, and 3 *f* of C.C.S. 232 should be considered further.

*c.* Directed the Secretaries to publish an amended version of C.C.S. 232 which will show the items of agreement and disagreement. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 232/1.)”

**2. PORTUGUESE ISLANDS**

(C.C.S. 226/1)<sup>3</sup>

(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 6)<sup>4</sup>

**THE COMMITTEE** had before them a draft memorandum for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the Secretaries in collaboration with the British Chief of the Air Staff.

**SIR ALAN BROOKE** said that he considered that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide who should be responsible for providing the necessary forces and preparing a plan for seizing the Islands should this be necessary. The Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility. There was available a British Royal Marine Division which could undertake the task though the availability of landing craft and shipping would have to be further considered. If the U. S. Chiefs of Staff accepted British responsibility for the planning of this operation and for the provision of the troops, then he suggested that conclusion

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; for the amended version, showing items of agreement and disagreement, see C.C.S. 232/1, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 231.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; for text of this paper as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 307.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 85.

*b* (1) of Item 4 of the 86th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be altered to read :

“That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings, and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.”

ADMIRAL KING suggested that in view of the British alliance with Portugal, it might, for diplomatic and psychological reasons, be better for U. S. troops to undertake the operation even though the Azores were in a British sphere of responsibility.

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed that the British should undertake this commitment, but GENERAL McNARNEY pointed out in connection with the alternative conclusion suggested by Sir Alan Brooke that, since the Azores should be put to the earliest possible use, plans must be prepared to provide the necessary facilities in the Islands. He suggested therefore that the words “and use” should be inserted after the words “for the occupation” in the draft.

In discussing the draft memorandum to the President, it was generally agreed that the urgency of obtaining facilities in the Portuguese Islands should be stressed and that it should be made clear that the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed that, while the diplomatic approach was being made, they should prepare forces for the prompt seizure of the Islands in the event of this approach failing.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

*a.* Agreed to amend the conclusion in paragraph *b* (1) of Item 4 of the Minutes of the 86th Meeting<sup>5</sup> to read as follows :

“That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.”

*b.* Approved the draft memorandum to the President and the Prime Minister, shown in C.C.S. 226/1, subject to the following changes :<sup>6</sup>

(1) Insert the words “earliest possible” before the word “use” at the beginning of line 3.

(2) Change the first sentence of the second paragraph to read :

“In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made, forces

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed ; for the amended version circulated as C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 307.

should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails."<sup>7</sup>

(Amended version, as prepared for the signature of Sir Alan Brooke and Admiral Leahy, subsequently published as C.C.S. 226/2.)

### 3. FUTURE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

With regard to future discussions on the essentials to the conduct of the war, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he believed the Committee should consider and first agree on European and Pacific strategy, and it would then be found that global strategy and agreed essentials could more easily and quickly be set out.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed it was wise to agree on the essentials prior to considering theater strategies.

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that it was necessary that the U. S. views on the existing points of difference with regard to the essentials should at least be stated as early as possible.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would wish to discuss C.C.S. 232/1<sup>8</sup> at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be held on Wednesday, 19 May 1943.

### 4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES (C.C.S. 185/3)<sup>9</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that this matter was one of urgency and should receive the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible. It might be necessary to consult the Foreign Office and State Department. The views of the theater commander must, he felt, be given full weight.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 185/3 at their meeting to be held on the following day.

### 5. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 234)<sup>10</sup>

THE COMMITTEE had before them a memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were in general agreement with the views set out in this paper.

<sup>7</sup> The reading of this sentence as it appeared in C.C.S. 226/1 is given in footnote 3 to C.C.S. 226/2, *post*, p. 307.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 231.

<sup>9</sup> See *post*, p. 326, footnote 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 261.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the short time he had had to examine this paper he hesitated to bring out points of detail. The general impression he received was that in the early part of the paper it was pointed out that a cross-Channel operation in April 1944 would be impossible, not only on account of the shortage of landing craft, but also because the risks would be unacceptable. Later on, however, it appeared that if Mediterranean operations were undertaken in the interval, a target date for April 1944 should be agreed on for cross-Channel operations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it was believed that April 1944 as a target date would not be possible of achievement unless Mediterranean operations were undertaken. These would influence the strength of the opposition and should create a situation permitting cross-Channel operations. Landing craft alone were not the bottleneck, and one of the difficulties was the provision of the necessary personnel to man them. The rate of build-up of German forces in western Europe would greatly exceed our own build-up on the Continent unless Mediterranean operations were first undertaken to divert or occupy German reinforcements. If these operations were undertaken, April 1944 might well be right for a target date, though the actual operation would be more likely to be possible of achievement in May or June. The knocking of Italy out of the war would be the greatest factor in using up Germany's reserves and enabling our own build-up to exceed the enemy's.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he appreciated that it was the British view that by continuing SICKLE and by undertaking Mediterranean operations, a situation would be created permitting of a reasonable chance of successful cross-Channel operations in the spring of 1944. The point on which he was extremely doubtful was whether, if these Mediterranean operations were undertaken, sufficient forces would be available in the United Kingdom to exploit the situation which the Mediterranean operations might have created. It might well be that operations in the Mediterranean would of necessity exceed in magnitude those now visualized, and that therefore the forces available in the United Kingdom would be correspondingly diminished. Thus when the moment to strike across the Channel arrived, we should be unable to reap the benefits of the effect of Mediterranean operations and of the vast concentration of air forces, and our resources in the U. K. would permit of nothing more than an unopposed landing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the cost of Mediterranean operations on the build-up in the United Kingdom was estimated to be no more than from three and a half to four divisions, and this he believed was a cheap price to pay for the immense advantages and consequent

diversion of German troops which knocking out Italy would insure. Italy might drop out of the war as a result of a successful HUSKY, but at any rate the elimination of Italy was, he believed, the best and only way of helping Russia this year. If we caused the Germans to disperse their forces and therefore to slow up their possible rate of build-up against cross-Channel operations, the loss of three and a half divisions would be more than counterbalanced. The Mediterranean operations visualized were not interdependent, and each or any of them could be undertaken separately as the situation developed. For instance, it might be desirable, though perhaps not essential, to go into western Greece with the object of rallying General Mihailovitch and the partisans. The cost value of each operation could be assessed at the appropriate time. Landings in Italy or in Sardinia were alternatives. If the situation on the Russian Front was bad and the Germans stronger in the Mediterranean, we might have to forego a direct attack on Italy and capture Sardinia and possibly Corsica instead. These latter would prove valuable air bases for increasing the air bombardment of Italy, as well as being stepping stones for an invasion of southern France. In any event, all calculations had been made on the basis of the SICKLE build-up remaining unaffected.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would like further time to examine the figures given in the British paper. He feared that the cost had been assessed too low since the wish might have been the father to the thought. If the ends could be achieved as cheaply as was visualized in the British paper, then the plan was worthy of further consideration, but he feared that the momentum consequent on the launching of Mediterranean operations would be difficult to check.

Both ADMIRAL LEAHY and GENERAL MARSHALL said that they wished further time to consider the British paper before expressing definite opinions and to have available to them at the same time the United States paper with regard to cross-Channel operations.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Deferred action on this paper pending further study by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

## 6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that it was his personal opinion that in order to utilize the French forces to the maximum, they should be provided with equipment and instructed in its use as rapidly as possible. At present somewhat more than three divisions had been equipped, but the remainder of the existing 11 divisions were almost without modern equipment. Early action to supply these seemed wise in view of their potential value in the invasion of France.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the importance of re-arming the French, but considered that it was a matter of timing and of the availability of shipping. French forces fighting in North Africa had shown themselves to be good soldiers. They would certainly prove useful in continental operations, but particularly as garrison troops in North Africa, Corsica and Sicily. It was important, however, not to use shipping to reequip the French at the expense of a build-up of Allied forces for important operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL reminded the Committee of the Presidential memorandum given to General Giraud, which the latter had in some ways misinterpreted.<sup>11</sup> He asked General Smith to give his views on the reequipment of the French.

GENERAL SMITH said that Allied Force Headquarters had been guided by the ANFA decisions. 25,000 tons of shipping per month had been made available for reequipping the French forces and 35,000 tons a month for civilian supplies. A possible use for French troops was for the assault of Corsica, if this and an attack on Sardinia were undertaken simultaneously. For this operation there would be available two divisions, one of them trained in mountain warfare. No armored division would be fit for combat duty until September, and no other troops could be prepared for offensive fighting in 1943. Captured German and Italian equipment was being issued to accelerate the rate of reequipment and certain of this was found to be of French manufacture. It was hoped that the lines of communications and the majority of the anti-aircraft defenses in North Africa could be manned by the French at an early date. French troops used in the recent fighting had not been issued new equipment from America, but had had their existing equipment made up by allotments from the British and United States forces. In general, the French had fought excellently.

General Giraud used the equipment shipped to train and equip those divisions which were not actively engaged in operations. General Eisenhower's policy was, in general, to equip as many French troops as possible for garrison and line of communication duties. French Divisions were being provided with equipment on a 50 to 60 percent basis for training. General Giraud, on the other hand, was naturally anxious to equip on an expeditionary force basis. He (General Smith) believed that in three to four months sufficient French Divisions would be available to undertake the defense of Morocco. Equipment was arriving at a rate sufficient to provide 50 percent of the equip-

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<sup>11</sup> Presumably, the reference is to the memorandum of January 24, 1943, by Giraud entitled "Résumé of the Agreements in Principle Resulting from the ANFA Conversations," which was presented to Roosevelt on the last day of the Casablanca Conference; for the English text of the memorandum, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 823.

ment for one division every convoy. Though this rate did not satisfy General Giraud, it was the maximum which, at present, could be achieved. He believed that though the French must be equipped as rapidly as possible, it would be unwise to sacrifice any tonnage required for our own forces for the benefit of the French since it was unwise to count on an adequate return in combat value in the near future. 25,000 tons per month was the maximum which could be found from the shipping resources allocated to General Eisenhower. Unless the Combined Shipping and Adjustment Board could provide additional tonnage, General Giraud's requirements of 100,000 tons per month could not be met.<sup>12</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that in the event of the U. S. Divisions being moved to the U. K., their equipment would be turned over to the French.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that in general the correct policy was initially to equip the French forces for a static role to enable them to relieve Allied forces for offensive operations. At a later stage the French could be equipped as an expeditionary force.

GENERAL SMITH pointed out that in general this was being done but that General Giraud was not anxious that all his troops should be assigned to defensive roles. Coast and A.A. defenses were being taken over by the French.

SIR JOHN DILL asked if the possibility had been considered of supplying captured material to the Turks, particularly that of French manufacture, since they already possessed ammunition of this type.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces in the various theaters.

#### 7. PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM (C.C.S. 217)<sup>13</sup>

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider giving their approval to General Eaker's plan for the combined bomber offensive outlined in C.C.S. 217. He invited General McNarney to explain the main points of this plan.

<sup>12</sup> For an account of the development of the program for the rearmament of French forces in North Africa during the first half of 1943, see Vigneras, chapters II, III, and IV.

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 239.

GENERAL McNARNEY explained that a committee of Industrial and Engineering Experts with first-hand experience of Germany had thoroughly surveyed the German industrial organization with a view to selecting systems of targets which, if destroyed, would produce the maximum reduction of the German war potential. A plan based on this survey had then been worked out by General Eaker and had been shown to and agreed with by the Royal Air Force Staff in London. To implement the plan certain minimum forces were required. These were set out in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 217. The most important feature of the plan was the reduction of the German fighter force which would be achieved not only by air fighting but by systematic precision bombing of air fields, aircraft manufacturing plants, and ball-bearing factories. Fifty percent of German ball-bearing manufacturing capacity was in two plants, one in Germany and one in Paris.

The plan was in four phases which were described in maps 1, 2, 3 and 4 and legends thereon, C.C.S. 217. The whole plan was based on 6 raids per month backed up by R.A.F. night bombing on the same objectives. The United States Planners had estimated that the necessary forces could be made available except for a minor deficiency in the first phase. One important point was, that, unless the plan was approved and put into immediate effect, the German fighter strength would expand. The Germans had switched over much of their productive capacity from bombers to fighters, and unless the German fighter potential was attacked at once, not only the task of the bombers in carrying out the plan would become more difficult but also German air strength would render all our operations against them more hazardous. The ground echelons required for this plan were estimated to amount to some 375,000 men by the first of April, 1944. He believed, however, that this figure might be exceeded and the total ground echelons for air forces in the U. K. might amount to some 400,000 to 425,000 men.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that General Eaker's plan had been based on all the information available to the Air Ministry. He (General Eaker) had worked out the plan himself and had then put it to the Air Ministry for consideration. In spite of the most critical examination by all available experts, the Air Ministry was convinced that, if given the resources asked for, General Eaker would achieve the results he claimed. He (Sir Charles Portal) was one hundred percent in favor of the plan. The figure of 6 raids per month had been based on weather statistics collected over a period of years, but it was hoped that by the use of special equipment (H2S) which General Eaker proposed to fit to his leading bombers, attacks through overcast or cloud could be made on targets the size of a city. Raids

undertaken under these conditions would be in addition to the 6 precision attacks per month in clear weather. He had no doubt that the result of a salvo of bombs falling from some one hundred unseen B-17's in daylight would be tremendous. General Eaker hoped to use these methods beginning in the autumn. It must be remembered that when bombing from above the clouds, reaction from German fighters was to be expected, with resulting fighter attrition. A somewhat similar device to the H2S was already in use for night bombing but, since once discovered by the enemy it would have no further value to us, it was only employed in Mosquito aircraft used to lead in night attacks.

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should give their approval to the plan for the combined bomber offensive set out in C.C.S. 217 and agree to the provision of the necessary forces to implement it.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the plan for the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom which is set forth in C.C.S. 217.

#### 8. BOMBING OF PLOEȘTI

Referring to the plan for the attack on the refineries at Ploesti by heavy bombers operating from North Africa or the Middle East, GENERAL McNARNEY stressed the importance of timing in particular reference to the German commitment on the Russian Front. An early and successful attack on the refineries would, be felt, be the greatest single contribution which could be made to assist the Russians this year. If we waited to capture bases nearer the objective, the delay would detract from the decisive value of the operation. The ranges from Ploesti of possible bases now available were:

Tobruk .....	857 miles
Aleppo .....	835 miles
Alexandria .....	963 miles
Cyprus .....	755 miles
Tripoli .....	1,080 miles

From all these bases Ploesti was within range of B-24 D's with a load of 6,000 pounds; B-24 C's with 3,000 pounds and B-17 F's. It was estimated that a total of 155 aircraft were required. More than sufficient were available in North Africa and the United Kingdom. An early decision to carry out the attack was necessary since not only was the weather best in June and early July, but also an attack at this time would interfere less with air preparations for HUSKY and possible subsequent operations. The exact defenses of Ploesti were not known but it was believed that only a few, if any, fighters were available and the main defense was provided by a balloon barrage, mainly to the

south. If bombers operated from Tobruk, it was estimated that they could pass northward out of radar range of Crete and might thus achieve surprise without interference from fighters. If the attack took place at dusk they could return in darkness.

The method of attack would probably be low level bombing with delay action bombs. If command of these forces were given to General Doolittle, who was available and in whom he had great confidence, he, General McNarney, was convinced that success would be achieved. Losses might be heavy, but would be more than offset by results. If the raid could be carried out prior to HUSKY, this example of overwhelming Allied air power would have profound effects, both on the Russian Front and Italian morale.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would be prepared to recommend the operation if he were certain that a large proportion of the attacking aircraft armed with 6,000 pound bombs would reach the objective before dusk, but he was doubtful if this could be achieved since the operation was essentially dependent on accurate weather forecasting.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that this point had been carefully considered and it was believed that in June or early July a forecast could be made of the weather at Ploëști and en route twenty-four hours ahead with 85 percent accuracy.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that if this accuracy of forecasting could be achieved, the operation should have good prospects of success. Its effect, however, on HUSKY and other operations must be borne in mind. He would like to ask the commanders in the theater for their views on the advisability of undertaking this operation in the light of the necessity for concentrating our air resources in support of operation HUSKY.

SIR ALAN BROOKE also stressed the disadvantage of the dispersal of air forces prior to operation HUSKY and the great results it was hoped to achieve by the concentration of our air power on Italy. If Italy could be knocked out, bases closer to the Ploëști objective could be obtained, enabling us to undertake sustained bombing of the refineries.

GENERAL McNARNEY pointed out that the attainment of these bases in Italy might be delayed for some six or seven months, and by then the weather would be far less favorable.

THE COMMITTEE then discussed the availability of aircraft and the periods during which they would be diverted either from the United Kingdom or their tasks in the Mediterranean.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that if the operation succeeded, it would certainly have more effect than almost any other on softening up Germany for operations in 1944. There was, therefore, a case for careful examination of this project, even though it might reduce our air preparations prior to HUSKY.

GENERAL McNARNEY undertook immediately to arrange for the necessary special sights to be sent to North Africa together with personnel fully conversant with the plan who could discuss it with General Eisenhower, Air Marshal Tedder, and their staffs.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian Oil Fields, and that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

b. Took note that special bomb sights and instructor personnel needed for such an operation would be sent to the North African Theater by the United States Army Air Forces as soon as practicable.

9. OPERATION "UPKEEP"

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff offered Sir Charles Portal congratulations on the success of the R.A.F. force in this operation.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, in thanking Admiral Leahy, said that the success attributed to the operation in the newspapers was borne out by aerial photographs.

10. MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

ADMIRAL LEAHY informed the Committee that the President and Prime Minister wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 6 P. M. tomorrow, Wednesday, 19 May, for a short discussion on the schedule for the future work of the Conference. The Prime Minister and President also wished to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 21 May, and for final meetings on Monday and Tuesday, the 24th and 25th.

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ROOSEVELT-SOONG CONVERSATION, MAY 18, 1943, 11:50 A. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

CHINA  
Foreign Minister Soong

*Editorial Note*

No record of this conversation was made by Roosevelt. Soong's report on the meeting is contained in his letter of May 18, 1943, to

Roosevelt, *post*, p. 296. The information set forth above respecting the place and time of the meeting is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

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**ROOSEVELT PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 18, 1943, 4: 10 P. M., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE**

Roosevelt Papers

*Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 897*

[Extracts]<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.]

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I have anything of any importance.

I have just had—in the past hour—a very satisfactory conference with the Duke of Windsor. And as you probably know, we are bringing a large number—several thousand—of laborers from the Bahamas, and others from Jamaica, to help out the farm labor this summer and autumn. And I think it's progressing very well.<sup>2</sup>

The talks of the Prime Minister are going along very satisfactorily. They are not finished yet.

I think that's about all.

Q. Is the Prime Minister going to be subjected to the tender mercies of a Press Conference, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think so. He doesn't worry about it any more than I do. (laughter)

Q. Would Friday be a good guess, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I have no idea about it.

. . . . .

Q. Mr. President, has Prime Minister Mackenzie King (of Canada) joined the conferences yet?

THE PRESIDENT: No. He—I understand that he just got into town this afternoon, and he is coming to the White House in the morning, to spend the night.

. . . . .

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<sup>1</sup> Only those portions of the press conference dealing with the TRIDENT Conference and related matters are printed here.

<sup>2</sup> No other record of the substance of Roosevelt's meeting with the Duke of Windsor has been found.

Q. Mr. President, I didn't understand you a moment ago to say that the Prime Minister met the Duke of Windsor?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I did.

Q. He did?

Q. The Prime Minister did not meet him.

THE PRESIDENT: The Prime Minister—I don't know, this is society column—(laughter)—the Prime Minister lunched up at the British Embassy. The Duke and Duchess were there, I think. And afterwards, the Prime Minister brought the Duke of Windsor down, and the Duke and I talked for about an hour; and we would be talking longer if I hadn't noticed that it was four o'clock.

. . . . .

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McNARNEY-SOONG MEETING, MAY 18, 1943, AFTERNOON

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

CHINA

Lieutenant General McNarney

Foreign Minister Soong

*Editorial Note*

No official American record of this conversation has been found. Soong's report of the meeting is contained in his letter of May 18, 1943, to Roosevelt, *post*, p. 297.

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SMITH-BROOKE CONVERSATION, MAY 18, 1943, EVENING

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

Major General Smith

General Brooke

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this conversation has been found. According to the very brief mention in Alanbrooke, pp. 507-508, Smith anticipated that a solution to the problems regarding future strategy would be put forward which would limit operations in the European area for the benefit of the Pacific theater.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 19, 1943, 10:30  
A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Horne  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Major General Smith  
Major General Streett  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Colonel Smart  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Major General Holmes  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that it might be preferable to eliminate the words "and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces" in the conclusion to item 6 of the 87th Meeting.<sup>2</sup>

THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF agreed with this view.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 87th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Tuesday, 18 May 1943, subject to the deletion of the words "and in the light of the probable operation and employment of the French forces" at the end of the conclusion to item 6.

2. AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR  
(C.C.S. 87th Mtg., Item 3)

ADMIRAL LEAHY stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff wished to defer consideration of C.C.S. 232/1.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 88th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 104.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 231.

### 3. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 234 and 235)<sup>4</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked for the comments of the British Chiefs of Staff on the United States Planners' paper, C.C.S. 235.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that it appeared from the two papers before the Committee that there were certain basic factors on which the U. S. and British Staffs were in agreement. On others there were differences of opinion which must be eliminated.

With regard to the target date for cross-Channel operations, April 1 had been selected for two reasons. This date coincided with the conclusion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive, and it was the earliest practicable from the point of view of weather. He would like to suggest, however, that April 1 might be too early a date to select. At that time the Russian Front was likely to be static since it was the period of the thaw. The weather conditions in western Europe would not be as favorable on that date as later, say the end of May or early June, which would also coincide with the end of the thaw in Russia. If the first of May or the first of June was accepted as the target date, the build-up in the United Kingdom would also be further advanced.

Though in the United States paper the elimination of Italy was considered and accepted as a possibility, yet no appreciation was given as to the steps necessary to deal with this or to take advantage of it. We might be called upon by some political party other than the Fascists to enter Italy, or we might be confronted with complete collapse and a state of chaos. In either case we should be faced with a decision as to what action was necessary to take advantage of this situation, and the result such action would have on other operations. There were obvious advantages in going into Italy which could be used as a naval and an air base, but how far we should be drawn in was a matter for discussion. There were great advantages in obtaining the northern plains for use as an air base. German air defense was not organized on this sector, and its occupation would force the Germans to detach forces to protect the northern and western frontiers of Italy. We should also examine the possibility of limiting the extent of our occupation of Italy and examine the magnitude of the commitments and the action required to implement our plans.

The next point in the United States proposals was the period of inactivity on land for a period of some six to seven months after HUSKY. In paragraph 5 *c* it was pointed out that Germany intended to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943

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<sup>4</sup> *Post*, pp. 261 and 273, respectively.

and that Germany would either fail or succeed in Russia this summer. This year was the most critical time for Russia, and we must take all possible steps to assist her. It would, he felt, be most difficult to justify failure to use available forces for this purpose.

Without crippling ROUNDUP in 1944, we could, he believed, with the forces now available in the Mediterranean achieve important results and provide the greatest measure of assistance to Russia in this critical period and at the same time create a situation favorable for cross-Channel operations in 1944.

It was difficult from paragraph 17 of the paper to visualize the shape of operations to defeat Germany, but it appeared that it was proposed to capture ports to enable a direct build-up from the United States. This concept, he believed, would present considerable difficulties since a study of this problem had shown that the sustenance of the forces used to cover these ports would absorb the larger part of their capacity. After the capture of a bridgehead, Cherbourg might be seized, but the provision of the necessary forces to cover this would be difficult unless the Germans were greatly weakened or unable to find reserves. For this reason active Russian operations were essential. If the Russians suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing was bad.

In conclusion, he felt that the first of May or the first of June was a better target date for ROUNDUP since this would be the period when the summer fighting in Russia would be starting. By maintaining pressure with limited forces in the Mediterranean, German troops estimated at some 20 to 30 divisions would, by the elimination of Italy, be dispersed and tied down.

He would like to add one minor point. The United States' build-up envisaged would, he believed, require at an early date additional S.O.S. troops, possibly even at the expense of SICKLE, to prepare the depots to receive them. This was necessary since the manpower situation in England was very serious.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood the British proposal to be for Mediterranean operations and a magnified SLEDGEHAMMER. He was interested to know what effect the British proposals had on the ANAKIM operation since he believed some form of operation to help China to be essential.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British proposals for Mediterranean operations contemplated only a deduction of some 3½ to 4 divisions from the forces available for ROUNDUP. Landing craft was a critical item, and the shortage would anyhow necessitate the assault going in on a relatively narrow front. In any event it was not proposed to move any forces from the Mediterranean for use in

ANAKIM since all the troops required were already in India, but any operations in Burma would be hampered by a shortage of shipping, naval covering forces, and landing craft. If it was decided only to open the Ledo Road to China, then, of course, naval operations could be dispensed with, but this operation would probably be at the expense of the capacity of the air route. Before discussing Burmese operations in detail, he felt it wise to await the report of the Combined Staff Planners.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he personally believed that the postponement of the target date for ROUNDUP to the first of May would be acceptable in view of its relation to Russian operations, and the extra time given for the build-up. He agreed also that the action required in the event of the collapse of Italy must be studied and preparations made to meet it.

He agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's view on the importance of helping Russia in 1943, but he believed that it would take some time to mount any operation subsequent to HUSKY which itself might not be completed until September. We should, therefore, be helping Russia up until the end of the period of the German campaign.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that he considered that operations in the Mediterranean, with a consequent diversion of German forces, were important throughout the entire year.

GENERAL MARSHALL, commenting further on the British plan, believed that the calculated build-up through the ports was pessimistic. Experience had shown that estimated port capacities were likely, in practice, to be doubled.

In general he believed that the British plan magnified the results to be obtained by Mediterranean operations and minimized the forces which would have to be used and the logistic requirements. It was too sanguine with regard to the results of enemy reaction, and in this connection it must be remembered that in North Africa a relatively small German force had produced a serious factor of delay to our operations. A German decision to support Italy might make intended operations extremely difficult and time consuming.

GENERAL MARSHALL then turned to detailed comments of the British plan.<sup>5</sup> Paragraph 2 *a* visualized it as essential for invasion that the initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale to enable the rate of our build-up to compete with that of the enemy. In this connection a deteriorating German situation was visualized earlier in the paper. As he saw it, the first step was aimed, not at the immediate defeat of the German Army, but at the establishment of a bridgehead which would have results not only psychologically, but on the U-boat

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<sup>5</sup> C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 261.

campaign, and would provide air fields, giving better bases for operations against the enemy which in turn would result in the destruction of a growing percentage of the enemy's air fighting capacity. These were immediate and important results, and these, rather than an immediate advance to the Rhine, should be our first objective. He did not believe that the British paper gave sufficient weight to the devastating effect of our air bombardments with the resulting diminution not only of Germany's power but of her ability rapidly to build up forces in western Europe. The effects of the bombing offensive were becoming more and more apparent daily.

Paragraph 7 of the British paper, while showing the limitations imposed on cross-Channel operations by lack of landing craft, did not sufficiently stress the expenditure of these craft in Mediterranean operations. The limitations of landing craft production in the United States must be remembered. In addition, the need for these craft for operation ANAKIM was not brought out.

In paragraph 27 it was suggested that Ploesti could not be attacked except from bases in Italy. This matter had, of course, been discussed at the previous meeting when it had been agreed that an attack could be carried out from bases already in our hands.

In paragraph 35 he believed that the Italian people's will to deal with the Allies was overestimated. If Germany decided to support her to the full, serious delay might be imposed on our plans, our resources would be sucked into the Mediterranean, and we should find ourselves completely involved in operations in that theater to the exclusion of all else.

With regard to the proposal in paragraph 38, that, during the period of confusion after the collapse of Italy, we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo, he believed that such an operation would so commit us that through shipping and landing craft limitations no other important operations would be possible.

The summary of commitments contained in paragraph 42 might be an accurate estimate but it was axiomatic that every commander invariably asked for more troops than were originally estimated as being necessary. We should, he believed, if Mediterranean operations were undertaken, find ourselves overwhelmed with demands for resources over and above our original estimates.

He had read the British estimate on the shipping requirements to sustain Italian economy in the event of her collapse.<sup>6</sup> He believed that

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<sup>6</sup> C.C.S. 227, May 16, 1943, memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff entitled "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories", not printed, estimated the total shipping commitment for Italy at 10-12 store ships and about 8 tankers.

these were too optimistic and that some 32 to 40 sailings a month would be required. It must be remembered that there was a large Italian element in the United States who were politically powerful and who would not permit the undue curtailment of supplies to Italy.

He believed that the shipping requirement for the BOLERO build-up was larger than had been estimated. Even if the personnel and cargo shipping required was available, the limitations of escorts would curtail the full BOLERO build-up if operations in the Mediterranean continued. If operations in any magnitude were undertaken in the Mediterranean after HUSKY there would, in all probability, be no landing craft available to be returned to the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations.

In general, he considered that the British paper throughout was over-pessimistic with regard to the possibilities of cross-Channel operations, particularly in so far as the results of our vast air power and its relation to ground operations. On the other hand, in considering Mediterranean operations, the British paper was very optimistic with regard to the forces required, the Axis reaction and the logistic problem.

ADMIRAL KING, with reference to the suggestion that the target date for ROUNDUP should be postponed to the 1st May or 1st June, agreed that the weather would be better at a later date but considered that to achieve the maximum results in relation to the operations on the Eastern Front, it should take place before the thaw finished. The target date was seldom met, but he believed that it would be wise to plan the target date for 1 May which would be reasonable in all the circumstances.

(At this point all officers with the exception of the Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, left the meeting.)<sup>7</sup>

After a full discussion the Secretaries were recalled.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Informed the Secretaries of the lines on which draft resolutions were to be drawn up.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> According to Brooke's Diary (Alanbrooke, p. 509), the "off the record" discussion between the American and British Chiefs of Staff alone was suggested by Marshall. Brooke viewed the agreement reached during the discussion as "not altogether a satisfactory one, but far better than a break-up of the Conference."

<sup>8</sup> The draft resolutions determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237, not printed. They were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the afternoon of May 19; see *post*, p. 118. The resolutions as amended and agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were incorporated in C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, *post*, p. 281.

b. Instructed the Secretaries to prepare these draft resolutions for their consideration at a meeting to be held later that day.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See *post*, p. 118.

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**CHURCHILL ADDRESS TO A JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSES OF  
CONGRESS, MAY 19, 1943, NOON**

*Editorial Note*

For text of Churchill's address, see House Document No. 217, 78th Congress, 1st session, *Congressional Record*, vol. 89, pt. 4, p. 4619, or Churchill, *War Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 449-460. According to the account in Pickersgill, pp. 505-506, Prime Minister Mackenzie King accompanied Prime Minister Churchill's party from the White House to the Capitol. The address was also heard by the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, then on a brief visit to Washington, who shared the Executive Box with Prime Minister Mackenzie King. Arrangements for Churchill's party at the Capitol are briefly described in Grace Tully, *F.D.R. My Boss* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. 327-329.

Following his address, Churchill met with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the brief account in *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), p. 50, Churchill was questioned by Senator Vandenberg regarding postwar Anglo-American cooperation and the hazards of wartime partnership with the U.S.S.R. Pickersgill, p. 506, indicates that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was also present at this meeting but that the questioning was directed to Churchill.

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**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 19, 1943, 4: 30 P. M.,  
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

**UNITED KINGDOM**

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge

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<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 89th meeting.

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. DEFEAT OF THE AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE  
(C.C.S. 237)<sup>2</sup>(Previous Reference: C.C.S. 88th Meeting, Item 3)<sup>3</sup>

THE COMMITTEE considered the draft resolutions contained in C.C.S. 237 and agreed to certain amendments which are incorporated below.

[Here follows text of C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, *post*, p. 281.]

(These resolutions to be subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 237/1.)

(At this point the Secretaries entered the meeting.)

## 2. OPERATIONS FROM INDIA

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he understood the term ANAKIM to mean operations in Burma and not to cover other operations based on India against such places as Sumatra or the Malayan Peninsula. The Chinese believed that they had received a firm promise that the British and Americans would, towards the end of 1943, undertake operations in Burma aimed at opening a road to China. He personally now accepted that the original operations which included the capture of Rangoon were impracticable, but he believed nevertheless that an operation to open a land route to China must be undertaken. This might take the form of attacking in North Burma with a view to capturing Mandalay and opening a route through Ledo, at the same time seizing Akyab and Ramree Island.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Andaman Islands contained only one small air field and their capture, except as part of large scale operations, was not worth while.

## 3. PROVISION OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR HUSKY

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that despite the additional aircraft promised there was still a deficiency of 80 transports for the new HUSKY plan. He had discussed the subject with General Smith who was most anxious that every possible step should be taken to provide them. If trained crews were the bottleneck the Royal Air Force could pro-

<sup>2</sup> This paper, not printed, was prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff along lines set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the "off the record" portion of their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943; see *ante*, p. 116.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 112.

vide them. He suggested that this matter might be further discussed at a future meeting, say Friday, of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that crews were not the limiting factor. The additional 80 aircraft required could only be provided at the expense of the South Pacific. He believed that if the air-borne troops visualized were essential to the success of the plan, these could all be dropped by using the same aircraft for two drops. He fully appreciated the timing of these drops would not be perfect, but was convinced that by this means all the air-borne troops required could be put across.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the theater commander must be and had been backed to the limit but in this case the limit had been reached and the aircraft required were not available.

GENERAL McNARNEY agreed.

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT AND CHURCHILL, MAY 19, 1943, 6 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt  
 Mr. Hopkins  
 Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
 Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

**1. PROGRESS OF CONFERENCE**

THE PRESIDENT inquired what progress had been achieved in the Conferences between the Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he hoped that it would be possible to furnish the President and the Prime Minister with some tentative conclusions in time for the week end. ANAKIM had only been dealt with in a very general way up to the present, but would be considered in more detail the following day.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was entirely in favor of carrying out whatever operations might be possible in Burma without trench-

ing too deeply on shipping and naval resources. Of course any troops who could be placed in contact with the enemy should not be allowed to stand idle.

GENERAL BROOKE agreed.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he very much hoped it would be possible in time to arrange for some British squadrons to take part in the operations in China. SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that it would be very desirable.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that logistical difficulties would prevent any employment of British squadrons in the near future.

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the importance of political and personal considerations in planning action in China.

## 2. THE U-BOAT WAR AND THE USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether in the opinion of the First Sea Lord the U-boat war was proceeding reasonably well.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that results recently had been fairly satisfactory.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the air operations against submarines were being extended and it was hoped to increase not only the total sinkings by this means but also the rate of sinkings per aircraft employed.

GENERAL MARSHALL inquired whether the President had yet considered the possibility of securing the use of the Azores.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had been considering the matter and he thought that one method of procedure might be to ask President Vargas of Brazil to make a secret approach to the Portuguese Government. The President then read to the meeting a telegram drafted by the Secretary of State putting the matter to President Vargas.<sup>1</sup> He said that he had mentioned the idea to President Vargas when he had last seen him, and had suggested that if a token Brazilian force were sent to the Islands, the Portuguese might be enabled to transfer back to the mainland some of the good troops which they had serving in the Islands.<sup>2</sup> This might be an added inducement to the Portuguese to allow the United Nations to make use of bases in their Island territory.

In the discussion that followed the following were the main points made:

*a.* The Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed as to the great military advantages which would follow the occupation of the Azores and considered that no time should be lost in carrying it out.

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 308.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation regarding the conference between Roosevelt and Vargas at Natal, Brazil, on January 28, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. v, pp. 653 ff.

b. **MR. HOPKINS** thought the chances of the Portuguese willingly conceding the use of bases in the Azores were extremely remote. He thought therefore that before any approach was made we should be quite sure in our minds that we were prepared to occupy the Islands by force if our request was refused.

c. Although on the face of it it might appear to be an action savoring somewhat of German or Japanese technique, the occupation by force of the Azores could hardly be condemned when it is remembered that Portugal, together with the other small nations depended for their very existence upon the victory of the United Nations, and that as long as the latter were debarred from making use of the Azores, their shipping was subjected to damaging attacks, against which a proper defense could not be provided. In the last war it had been found necessary to make a technical breach of neutrality by occupying the Piraeus, but the incident had eventually been settled to everyone's satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that it was on the margin of shipping that the Allies depended for their warmaking capacity.

d. Probably the best way of handling the matter would be to have ample force available off the Islands, and to inform the Portuguese Government that the Islands would be occupied the following morning and that resistance would be hopeless. Solid inducements would be offered, and if the Portuguese desired it, the Brazilians could ostensibly provide the occupying troops.

In conclusion, it was agreed that the Prime Minister should telegraph proposals on these lines to the British Government for their comments,<sup>3</sup> and that in the meanwhile the Combined Chiefs of Staff should have a plan prepared for carrying out the operation as soon as possible. The plan should be ready for examination by the President and Prime Minister on Monday, 24 May.

**THE PRIME MINISTER** asked how the discussions regarding the Mediterranean and **BOLERO** had been progressing.

**SIR ALAN BROOKE** said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had today reached an agreement which provided for a build-up in England of a sufficient force to secure a bridgehead on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be carried out. This was to involve approximately nine divisions in the assault and a build-up of twenty additional divisions. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff had agreed that the Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of **HUSKY** as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and contain the maximum number of German forces. These operations would, of course, be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to be told that he might use for this purpose those forces available in the Mediterranean Theater except that four Ameri-

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<sup>3</sup> For Churchill's telegram of May 21, 1943, to Attlee and Eden, see *post*, p. 309.

can divisions and three British divisions would be held in readiness from the first of November onward for withdrawal to take part in the operations from the United Kingdom. SIR ALAN BROOKE said it was also agreed that these decisions would be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August in order that the situation might be reexamined in the light of the results of HUSKY and the situation then existing in Russia.

THE PRESIDENT asked what the situation concerning the troops in Syria was at the present time.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the President that there were not many divisions available in Syria at this time. Most of them were being trained for HUSKY either in Syria or in Egypt. There were two Polish divisions now in Iraq.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed the Polish troops would be much improved if they could be actively engaged.

THE PRESIDENT asked what use could be made of Yugoslav troops.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there was only a handful of these troops, about a battalion. He said the Greeks had also organized one brigade.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he thought September of this year would be a good time to urge Turkey to permit the United Nations to use air bases in that country. He felt that the relations with Turkey would have been considerably strengthened by that time because of having supplied them with considerable munitions of war and that they might be receptive to such an approach.

In reply to a question from the President, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that weather for flying conditions out of Turkey was not too reliable after the late summer.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that it would be desirable, of course, to obtain Turkey's permission to use her air bases prior to September and thought it might be possible if Italy were to be eliminated from the war. In the latter case, we should get free access to Rhodes and the Dodecanese.

THE PRESIDENT then indicated to General Marshall that he had sent him a message concerning General Eisenhower's proposals that pre-HUSKY propaganda should contain a promise of peace *with honor* to Italy.<sup>4</sup> THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER both agreed that such a promise should not be made.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated his pleasure that the Conference was progressing as well as it was and also that a cross-Channel operation had finally been agreed upon. He had always been in favor of such

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<sup>4</sup> For Eisenhower's message of May 17, 1943, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 326.

an operation and had to submit to its delay in the past for reasons beyond control of the United Nations. He said that he thought Premier Stalin would be disappointed at not having an invasion of northern France in 1943 but was certain that Mr. Stalin would be gratified by the results from HUSKY and the further events that were to take place this year.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be held at 5:00 P. M. on Friday, 21 May.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING CONVERSATION, MAY 19, 1943, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

No American record of this conversation has been found. According to Pickersgill, p. 510, from which the information set forth above has been derived, this conversation followed a dinner at the White House attended by Roosevelt, Churchill, Mackenzie King, and several other unnamed guests. During the conversation, peacemaking and postwar international organizations were discussed, and Roosevelt set forth his proposal for a Supreme Council of the United Nations.

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ROOSEVELT-MACKENZIE KING CONVERSATION, MAY 19, 1943, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

No American record of this conversation has been found. According to the account in Pickersgill, p. 513, from which the information set forth above has been derived, Roosevelt told Mackenzie King that he had sent a message to Stalin asking for a bilateral meeting. Roosevelt was concerned about Churchill's possible reaction to the proposal. For text of Roosevelt's May 5, 1943, message to Stalin, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 3.

THURSDAY, MAY 20, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 20, 1943, 10:30  
A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney  
 Lieutenant General Stilwell  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Horne  
 Major General Streett  
 Major General Chennault  
 Major General Fairchild  
 Major General Smith  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Colonel Cabell  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Field Marshal Wavell  
 Admiral Somerville  
 Air Chief Marshal Peirse  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Macready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Major General Holmes  
 Captain Lambe  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 88th and

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 90th meeting. Regarding this meeting and the 91st meeting (*post*, p. 142), the Stimson Diary for May 21, 1943, records the following observations:

"The minutes of the proceedings of yesterday by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were not so encouraging. They dealt with the serious situation in Burma and the possibilities of action there. The conclusions evidenced in their final resolution in the afternoon seem to me so inconclusive and unsatisfactory that I called in General Stilwell who had been there and got him to explain to me and to McCloy on the maps his own plans and the extent and method in which the British propositions fell short of what Stilwell thought were the requirements of the situation. Later in the afternoon I had a talk with Marshall over it and he gave me his difficulties. He agreed that the matter had been left in a very unsatisfactory situation. The President has gone over solid to the support of an air attack by Chennault as sufficient to secure China and to that end he is giving to Chennault the lion's share of the capacity of the Burma airline during the first approaching months. This will cut off the indispensable supply for the ground troops in Yunnan which Stilwell is laboring so hard to get. Marshall told me of his difficulties in getting Stilwell to report clearly and intelligently to the conferees. I told him that in my interview with him this morning I found that, while he was shy, by proper questions I could get it all out and I wished very much that someone had been able and willing to do that yesterday in the conferences but apparently Stilwell shut up like a clam and made therefore an unfavorable impression." (Stimson Papers)

89th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held on Wednesday, 19 May.<sup>2</sup>

2. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES  
(C.C.S. 185/3)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that at the meeting at the White House on the previous day, the President and Prime Minister had signified their disagreement with certain points in General Eisenhower's proposals put forward in NAF 221.<sup>4</sup>

The U. S. Chiefs of Staff recommended therefore that General Eisenhower should be informed that his proposals were not approved and that he should continue to base his propaganda policy on the previous directive.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that this matter had been referred to the Foreign Office and he would like to await their reply before giving any instructions to General Eisenhower. Until such instructions were issued General Eisenhower would, of course, continue to act on his previous directive.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 185/3 pending the receipt of the views of the Foreign Office.

3. STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN  
(C.C.S. 220)<sup>5</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had examined this plan with great interest. The plan was, however, not in any great detail. The ways and means of achieving the various courses outlined had not been examined nor their possibilities assessed. He suggested that machinery should be set up at once to examine the proposals and to draw up a more detailed plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that C.C.S. 220 was not intended to be a detailed plan. He suggested that it might be accepted as a basis for study and elaboration.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was very important to examine carefully this great field of operations. He believed that a full appreciation should be prepared. The facts should be assembled, the objects set out, together with alternative courses of action to achieve these objects with full facts and arguments for and against each course. Only by starting from first principles could we decide on the most advantageous plan.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 111 and 118, respectively.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 326, footnote 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 326.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 289.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was in entire agreement with Sir Charles Portal's views.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Accepted C.C.S. 220 as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans.

b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.<sup>6</sup>

#### 4. OPERATIONS IN BURMA TO OPEN AND SECURE AN OVERLAND ROUTE TO CHINA (C.C.S. 231)<sup>7</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said the British Chiefs of Staff believed there was great danger in extensive operations from Ledo and Imphal, which would be dependent on two very precarious roads, whereas the Japanese forces would be supplied by road, rail and river, and would be operating out of a relatively dry area. The maintenance of our forces at the ends of their lines of communication would be particularly difficult during the monsoon season. Even if a road to China were opened, he believed that the Japanese could bring stronger forces to bear than we could maintain to defend it. With regard to operations on the coast, he believed that the capture of Akyab and Ramree was feasible but we had not the resources or the necessary landing craft to undertake the two more southerly amphibious assaults. The danger, as he saw it, was that by aiming both to build up the air route to the maximum capacity and to undertake a land offensive, we should do neither very efficiently. The undertaking of land operations would limit the amount of supplies which could be taken up to the air bases. He believed that the right course was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and to provide limited maintenance of the Chinese ground forces. Dr. T. V. Soong, in his memorandum, had emphasized the necessity for maintaining General Chennault's force at the highest possible level.<sup>8</sup> Sir Alan Brooke believed that operations aimed at

<sup>6</sup> American and British planners began work on the plan requested by the Combined Chiefs of Staff only after the conclusion of the Third Washington Conference. The preparation of the paper subsequently submitted by the Combined Staff Planners, C.P.S. 83, August 8, 1943, "Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan", is described in Matloff, pp. 207-208. This paper is not printed as a whole, but a summary is appended to C.C.S. 313, *post*, p. 981.

<sup>7</sup> "Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China", May 19, 1943, not printed.

<sup>8</sup> The Soong "memorandum" under reference is presumably Soong's letter of April 29, 1943, to Hopkins, transmitting Chiang's request to Roosevelt to devote the air transport tonnage to building up Chennault's force; see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 319-320.

the capture of Mandalay were not possible of achievement and that instead we should concentrate on building up the air route and at the same time undertake limited operations from Ledo and Imphal in order to protect it, and capture Akyab and Ramree.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said he had only had a short time to examine the paper under discussion<sup>9</sup> and was therefore not in a position to comment in detail. In general, however, he believed the possibilities outlined in the paper to be far too optimistic. He reminded the Committee of the administrative difficulties in connection with operations in Burma. The lines of communication were bad, heavy casualties had to be expected from malaria, trained lorry drivers were scarce, and, in general, the administrative difficulties invariably exceeded paper calculations of their magnitude. A margin of some 50 to 100 per cent had to be allowed on this account.

There were obviously great advantages to be derived from the capture of Mandalay and the control of Upper Burma to the northward of it. A land route would be open to China with consequent effect on Chinese morale, though it would be but an indifferent route and would carry but little for a long time. He was quite certain that even if Mandalay could be captured, it would be impossible, certainly during the monsoon season, to maintain there forces large enough to withstand the scale of attack which the Japanese, with their better lines of communication, could bring against them.

In planning, his personal tendency had always been to be optimistic, but after 18 months' experience in the area, he felt it only right to warn the Committee that he believed it unlikely to be feasible to maintain forces as far south as Mandalay. In his opinion, the correct and possible courses of action were: Firstly, to make every effort to increase the air ferry route to its maximum capacity and to build up our own air superiority over Burma. These two objects should be our first charge. Then if the required resources, engineering facilities, boats and vehicles were made available, it should be possible to make attacks by land into Upper Burma from Yunnan on Lashio, from Ledo on Myitkyina and Bhamo, and from Imphal into the Chindwin Valley whence touch would be gained to the eastward with the Chinese moving in from Yunnan. These three advances must keep step, and our first objective should be a line from a point where the Burma Road crossed the Burma-Chinese border, through Bhamo, Katha, Pinlebo, Kalewa, and thence to the west. To gain a line of that kind might well be possible, and it would give sufficient cover to the Myitkyina air fields and the route to Burma. If on achieving this line the Japanese

<sup>9</sup> C.C.S. 231, not printed.

were weakened, we should then consider the possibility of going further south, but any idea, at this stage, that the capture of and subsequent maintenance of our forces in Mandalay was possible was likely to be falsified. We must decide our future operations in the light of events.

With regard to coastal operations, he believed we should most certainly try to capture Ramree and Akyab, though this was a difficult proposition since it was now heavily defended. It was not, in his view, worthwhile to endeavor to capture Sandoway and Taungup since they would be difficult to maintain during the monsoon owing to sea conditions and would be cut off from the rest of Burma by the Arakan range. The paper suggested the use of the long-range penetration brigade on An and Mimbua. He would examine this, but he believed that a better use for this unit would be in Upper Burma to maintain contact between the Chinese and the British. The possibility of an attack on Rangoon through Bassein had been examined by his Planning Staff, but they had reported adversely on its practicability, since it entailed a long and difficult advance through thick jungle country interspersed with creeks. Another possibility was to proceed up the railroad from Bassein to Henzada, using trucks on the railway, but from that point there were 40 miles of difficult jungle before the good road north of Rangoon was met. It had been judged that a direct assault on Rangoon up the river was less hazardous and more likely to succeed than either of these two plans.

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL PEIRSE said that he wished to emphasize that wherever operations in Burma were undertaken air superiority was essential, both to defend the air route and to assist in land operations. Additional air fields for the fighting air force would therefore be required. If land operations were undertaken stronger air forces would be required including transport aircraft to maintain ground forces, particularly during the monsoon season. This necessity would probably cause a diversion of transports from the air ferry route.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that as he understood it, the British proposals consisted of a maximum concentration on the air route and limited ground operations, including the capture of Ramree and Akyab.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was impressed both with General Wavell's comments on the magnitude of the logistic problem and Air Marshal Peirse's on the air diversion resulting from land operations. In his view, however, a great increase in the air route alone without offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. He believed ground operations to be essential for their effect both on Chinese morale and on operations in the South and Southwest Pacific. If no aggressive action were undertaken in Burma the results on

Pacific operations would be most unfortunate. Similarly, if no aggressive action were taken in the Pacific it would have a serious effect on the Burmese operations.

Operations in New Guinea and Guadalcanal under somewhat similar conditions, with disease, monsoon and logistic difficulties had been successfully accomplished. Bombers had been used for supplies when transports had not been available.

He believed that lack of real aggressive action in Burma would be unfortunate for the South and Southwest Pacific and fatal to China. He did not believe that we should bank all on the attractive proposition of *do everything by air*. He realized that full-scale ground operations might limit supplies to China by air, but the Japanese must be threatened on the ground and this could only be achieved by hard fighting. Results on other theaters must be considered. Adequate shipping must be provided to build up the necessary resources. He was in no doubt as to the difficulties of the operations but equally he was in no doubt as to their vital importance.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that without aggressive action by ground forces we should lose the air route. How far it was possible to go was a matter of some doubt but he believed that we should direct our attack on Mandalay in order to occupy the Japanese to the full, to save the air route and to insure Japanese withdrawals from other theaters. It must always be remembered that Japanese communications were open to sea and air attack. The two Governments were, he believed, decided that operations in North Burma must be undertaken.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the main difference of opinion appeared to be as to whether or not limited land operations could succeed in insuring the safety of the air route. He believed that the maximum effect against the Japanese could be achieved by air superiority and the build-up of the air route into China, thus freeing our lines of communications and our air forces from the need to support and feed troops engaged in extensive ground operations. He firmly believed that we should put all our resources into the air and that the problem as a whole must be regarded as a military one, the object of which was to achieve the maximum effect on the Japanese.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he had always been surprised that the Japanese had not made more effort to cut the air supply route, particularly Myitkyina where it was very exposed to fighter attack. He believed that they would do this as soon as the air effort being built up in China was sufficient to cause them serious worry. To prevent the air line being cut, it was necessary to advance our fighter

bases as far as Myitkyina and the air warning line still further. Unless Mandalay and Lashio were captured, we should not have sufficiently far advanced bases for the air warning system to cover the fighters at Myitkyina. He did not believe that the necessity for supplying ground forces by air would necessarily limit the supplies taken into China. There were some 90 C-47's in India used for this purpose, and this number could possibly be increased. Further, heavy bombers could be used for this purpose.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL pointed out that he was concerned not only with the problem of maintaining the supplies to our forces as far south as Mandalay, but also with the fact that the Japanese could bring and maintain stronger forces to bear at that point.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL, with regard to the vulnerability of the air route to China, said that he believed if adequate airdromes were available in Assam, the Japanese fighters could be bombed out of their bases.

GENERAL CHENNAULT said that he believed it to be practicable to defend the two terminals of the air route with the air forces now available, since these could prevent the Japanese from concentrating and maintaining heavy air forces within range of these terminals. The major attack which had occurred at the Chinese end was against Kunming on the 8th of May, when 40 fighters and 36 bombers had attacked. Out of these, 13 fighters and 2 bombers had been shot down, with 10 further probables. No confirmed attacks on transports had been made. Occasional fighter patrols were flown from both ends, with an overlap at the center. The Japanese could, in any event, only maintain sporadic attacks on the route, and the forces available to the 10th and 14th Air Forces could reach all the Japanese airdromes within range of the route. If attacks developed, the route could be moved some 60 miles further north in the area of Myitkyina, which, though over higher mountains, would only increase the distance by 15 miles.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that General Chennault had expressed his own views exactly.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he was in entire agreement that some sort of aggressive action was required and the forces available used, but, if operations were carried beyond a certain point, we should face a possible defeat with its consequent bad effects both on China and in the Pacific. An advance far to the south would put us at a severe logistic disadvantage with regard to the Japanese. In Assam we were relatively safe since the Japanese would have to operate over bad lines of communication to reach our own forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the Japanese now possessed an air barrier from Bougainville to Burma, along which they could rapidly effect concentrations in any area. The Japanese had not yet concentrated at the Burma end, but he believed that when powerful bombing from China was undertaken, the Japanese reaction against the air route would be strong, unless the Japanese air forces were tied down by active operations elsewhere.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the Japanese must be prevented from attacking the air line to China. The maintenance of China was essential to successful operations against Japan, and therefore we must conduct operations toward Mandalay.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that General Wavell's calculated requirements were some 180,000 tons per month. A large part of this, however, had no relation to the operations envisaged. There were 33 divisions in India, with a further 10½ overseas, but only 12 engaged in the operation. He believed there was no real justification for a tonnage greater than 90,000 per month for ANAKIM. 27,000 tons a month of the requirement was for civilian supplies.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL and SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that India must be maintained and this could not be divorced from the operational requirement. India's requirements had already been cut in order to make good the British import program. If the so-called civilian requirements were not met, India's output of munitions could not be maintained.

With the aid of a map, GENERAL SOMERVELL then outlined the amounts which he believed could be supplied over the various routes.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he believed that the industrial capacity of India could be maintained without the figure of 180,000 tons per month being met. Many of the requirements would not bear examination in detail and some could be cut in half. For instance, the Indian requirement of 4,000 amphibious or special vehicles appeared excessive. It was greater than the number available to the entire United States Army.

He believed that the river route to Ledo had not been expanded to its maximum capacity. He outlined his views on the logistic possibilities of the routes to Mandalay and Lashio. The Japanese had only some four or five divisions in Burma and he saw no reason why stronger forces could not be maintained on the Mandalay line against them.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he could not agree with this estimate. The Japanese had excellent lines of communication available to them. It was not wise to decide on operations which were not feasible. These operations had to be carried out by the British. He believed that

the maximum possible land operations should be undertaken but it must be appreciated that these would encroach upon the air route tonnage. An advance to a line through Bhamo and Kalewa was as far as the Commander in Chief considered possible.

In reply to a question, GENERAL STILWELL said that if they moved at all, he believed that the Chinese forces could get as far as Mandalay. He could see no object in stopping operations on the edge of the good road network. If the British forces could be supplied at Katha and Kalewa, the two rivers would permit their supply at Mandalay. The Chinese had been promised a major effort in Burma. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would probably make any action by his forces conditional on the recapture of the whole of Burma.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Chiefs of Staff should project the campaign towards the seizure of Mandalay, and proceed as far as possible with this object in view. The Japanese might stop us, but he believed it to be a wasted effort to limit the objective to Kalewa.

FIELD MARSHAL WAVELL said that he was prepared to go as far as he could while maintaining a force equal to the Japanese. If the Japanese proved weaker than was expected, or, if he found he could maintain a stronger force than he believed, he was naturally prepared to advance further, but he believed it useless to accept a liability until he was certain he could carry it out. Any operations he undertook were dependent on the action taken by the Chinese forces since, if they did not advance, his eastern flank would be exposed. The Chinese and British must keep in step.

#### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :

Agreed to postpone further discussion on this matter until a later meeting to be held in closed session at 3 : 30 p. m. the same day.

#### 5. POTENTIALITIES OF THE AIR ROUTE FROM ASSAM TO BURMA [CHINA] (C.C.S. 229) <sup>10</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that all reference to the expansion of the air route to more than 10,000 tons should be deleted from the paper. The possibilities of any increase above 10,000 tons was problematical.

In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal as regards the limiting factor to the expansion of the air route, GENERAL MCNARNEY said that the Planners' estimate had been based solely on the availability of aircraft from factories and not in relation to other demands for them. It would be dangerous to put forward a figure of 20,000 tons based on the premise that no other commitments existed for these aircraft. Fur-

<sup>10</sup> "Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China", May 19, 1943, not printed.

ther, an examination had shown that to increase the air route to 20,000 tons would mean getting some 50,000 tons per month into Assam which would require a large number of additional transports. The total requirements were higher than could be met by the end of December.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that although there might be a limit to the aircraft, he considered it wise for the terminals to be developed on the basis of a load of 20,000 tons/month. The development of the air route terminals would take far longer than the provision of additional transport aircraft. It might be possible for the British to provide certain of these.

ADMIRAL KING said that it appeared to be the suggestion that the Generalissimo should be offered 20,000 tons a month by air as an alternative to the opening of the Burma Road. His fear was that the increased bomber effort from China, resulting from the increased capacity of the air route, would force the Japanese to take strong action and the terminal points would be attacked. Even if the bases in Assam were secure those in Kunming were open to attack. The retention of China as a base for the defeat of Japan was as essential as the continuance of Russia in the war as a factor in the defeat of Germany.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that he saw no objection to expanding the facilities for the air route to 20,000 tons. The present limiting factor was hard standings<sup>11</sup> rather than air fields.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that the date for the achievement of 20,000 tons might be optimistic, but believed that it should be laid down as the ultimate objective.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the President had laid down, and the Prime Minister concurred in, a figure of 10,000 tons a month for the air route being achieved by November.<sup>12</sup> Anything we could do above this figure would provide a cushion which could be used for the support of ground operations against Mandalay. Though the opening of the Burma Road was a symbol to China, it might be possible to convince them that an air route would achieve the same results.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to consider C.C.S. 229 further at 3:30 p. m. that afternoon in closed session.

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<sup>11</sup> Concrete parking areas for aircraft located along the edges of taxi-strips of airfields.

<sup>12</sup> According to Soong's report on the President's decisions on supplies to China, Roosevelt ordered that the 10,000 tons per month goal be reached by September; see *post*, p. 297. There is no record indicating when Churchill concurred in the decision.

**MEETING OF THE PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL, MAY 20, 1943, 12: 05 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE<sup>1</sup>**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins	Prime Minister Churchill Ambassador Halifax	Prime Minister Mackenzie King <sup>2</sup> Minister McCarthy
CHINA	AUSTRALIA	NEW ZEALAND
Foreign Minister Soong	Minister for External Affairs Evatt	First Secretary of Legation Cox (representing Minister Nash)
NETHERLANDS		PHILIPPINES
Ambassador Loudon		President Quezon

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Naval Aide (Brown)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1943.

The thirty-first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:05 o'clock p. m., Thursday, May 20, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

*Present:*

[The list is printed above.]

The President informed the Council that he considers the Prime Minister's address to the Congress to be the clearest and best exposition of global war that has ever been given.<sup>3</sup> There appeared to be general agreement with this statement.

President Roosevelt then, with the aid of a chart, gave a brief explanation of the operations now in progress for the capture of the Island of Attu—the westernmost of the Aleutians.<sup>4</sup> He described the physical difficulties that had to be overcome and laid special stress on the almost continuous bad weather that has prevailed during the month of the year when the best weather of the year is to be expected in the Bering Sea area. The commencement of the attack had to be delayed several days because of fog and gales; fog and occasional

<sup>1</sup> Regarding the origin of the Pacific War Council, see the editorial note relating to the 12th meeting, June 25, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 448.

<sup>2</sup> For the exchange of telegrams regarding Roosevelt's invitation to Mackenzie King to attend the meeting of the Pacific War Council, see *post*, pp. 333-334.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 117.

<sup>4</sup> The United States 7th Division landed on Attu on May 11, 1943; the Japanese garrison was defeated and rounded up by the end of the month.

gales have kept up ever since; we have rarely been able to use either aerial or gun support; the physical difficulty of moving through the tundra is great; snow has impaired progress in the high spots; more men have been hospitalized with frozen feet than from enemy bullets; but nevertheless we have progressed and have now squeezed the defending forces into the high land surrounding Chicagof Harbor where they are making a final stand. The President stated that so much misinformation has been written and expressed about the significance of the capture of Attu Island that he thought members of the Council should have in mind that the capture of Attu and the establishment of an air field there will not open the way to bombing the Japanese homeland even though we have moved appreciably nearer our final objective. The reason Attu will not facilitate bombing of Japan is due to the tremendously uncertain weather which is such that, even if we launched attacking squadrons, the chances of their return would be very slim. The occupation of Attu will secure and tend to neutralize the value of enemy bases at Kiska. This should enable us, in time, to push the Japanese out of the Aleutians. When, and if, Russia should join in the war against Japan, our position in Attu will help very much to take full advantage of Siberian bases. The Honorable Mackenzie King stated that the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians had been a matter of grave concern to Canada and that Canada welcomes and applauds every measure to evict the Japanese from the Aleutian Area.

President Roosevelt stated that he had not any further information to give the Council except that throughout the world we are assiduously continuing our pressure on our enemies and weakening his [*their*] position by daily attrition of his land, sea and air forces. In the case of Japan, the combined submarine and air action is steadily reducing the Japanese merchant marine to the point where the maintenance of her outlying stations will become more and more difficult. He wished to inform Dr. Soong that the Prime Minister plans to lend material help in revitalizing the air forces in China and that British air squadrons are to be added to the American and Chinese air forces in order that we may create in China a united Allied force that may learn by experience to work together effectively.

Dr. Soong stated that this prospect of additional aid would be highly valued by China.

President Roosevelt stated that, of course, everyone realized the principal difficulty of building up a powerful air force in China is in providing sufficient petrol; but that General Chennault, who is now here, feels perfectly confident that sufficient petrol can be brought in by air and that if we will give him sufficient planes he can accomplish

two very positive things:—(a) He can break up any extensive Japanese land offensive that aims at the demolition of Chinese air fields; (b) Within a year he can destroy 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping by constantly raiding their sea lanes and their river boat supplies. Dr. Soong stated that the people of China are very much heartened by the Prime Minister's speech to Congress yesterday and that they, too, are very hopeful that the difficulties of maintaining a strong air force in China will be solved. However, he wishes to state with all earnestness that it is the opinion of his government and of all the Chinese that it is essential that we must continue the offensive in Burma for the purpose of restoring the Burma Road, as it is through the Burma Road alone that sufficient supplies can be brought into China to enable that country to drive out her invaders. Dr. Soong stated that he felt sure everyone would agree that air force alone can not win the war and that we must provide a land route to equip Chinese armies. To do this we must carry out the promises made at Casablanca and send a combined naval and land expedition to recapture Burma.<sup>5</sup>

The Prime Minister said that (while we will continue our offensive in Burma when the weather permits) it is his understanding that the Burma Road has been so damaged by the Chinese and Japanese that it could not possibly be restored to a point where it would be of any value in bringing in supplies until the year 1945.

Dr. Soong stated that, although it had been badly damaged, the Japanese are repairing their part of the road and the Chinese are repairing the part they still control, so that the road could be restored to useful condition very soon after we gain physical control.

Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, stated that he thought perhaps all of the members of the Council failed to realize what extremely heavy casualties are involved in tropical warfare. He stated that in New Guinea the combined Australian and American forces have suffered nearly 45,000 casualties up to February and that of the 50,000 Australians who had fought in New Guinea, over 7,000 have been lost in [action?] killed or missing, but that malaria had run the combined casualties up to above 40,000. President Roosevelt agreed that in the New Guinea campaign the casualties had amounted to nearly fifty percent of the forces involved, and that this was, of course, a terribly high mortality rate; but that, on the other hand, we must remember that the Japanese losses had been very much greater than ours and that he thought, in general, the

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding the Casablanca Conference decisions with regard to future operations in Burma, see *ante*, p. 88, footnote 4.

proportion was nearly three to one. It was agreed by the President and Dr. Evatt that the bad cases of malaria should not be sent back into malaria countries, but it was also agreed that patients who have recovered could be used very effectively for garrisoning important non-malarial stations and thereby release other men to fight who had not been exposed to malaria.

The President asked Prime Minister Churchill whether he had anything to say to the Council.

The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the opportunity to inform the Council of several problems that he had very much in mind. He then delivered a very able brief statement of his theory of the general strategy that should be followed by the Allies now that we have gained the initiative and while we are building up an overpowering superiority in all weapons. In brief, the Prime Minister stated that we must recognize that we are limited in what we can do by the number of ships we have available to carry men and supplies to the chosen theatres of war and that, therefore, our purpose must be to force the enemy to fight in areas that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him. Tunisia was selected as a fine example of what the Prime Minister considers sound strategy. The enemy was compelled to lengthen his lines of communications; to overstrain his line of supply and to eventual collapse, because of his inability to maintain and reinforce his armies.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that an extensive campaign in Burma, instead of putting the enemy at a disadvantage, would place all of these burdens on our forces, because the rainy season would give us only six months to gain our objective; the heat of the jungle would decimate our forces, as had been demonstrated by our fighting in New Guinea; and that the problems of supply for our troops would be tremendous. The Prime Minister stated that he noted a comment of an American Senator that the British had two million men in India who were apparently unable to drive a few thousand Japanese out of Burma. The Prime Minister stated that such a declaration completely ignored the practical problems of logistics; that the forest and swamps of Burma are such that only a limited number of men can work and fight in any given area, and that, therefore, it becomes a question of quality rather than quantity—when we put troops into Burma they must be experienced fighters who can overcome difficulties and defeat superior numbers of the enemy; and it is for that reason that the Prime Minister has offered British air squadrons to fight in China as the most effective assistance that Great Britain can contribute at this

time. The Prime Minister stated that this is in support of the view that President Roosevelt has held and enforced for the past several months. Mr. Churchill said that he wished to go on record as believing that President Roosevelt has a penetrating insight into the sound strategy of the present world war and that his instinct for lending immediate air support to China is wholly sound.

The Prime Minister also stated that, as a result of recent conferences, he was pleased to be able to announce for himself and for President Roosevelt that at least 450 planes would be added to the Australian Air Force for the prosecution of the war in that area. He stated that everyone knows that the Australian fliers are among the best in the world and that the planes would be provided for the Australians to man in order that they might take a more active part in the defense of their homeland.<sup>6</sup>

The Prime Minister said there was only one other subject that he wished to touch on and that was that a disturbing rumor had reached him that China is massing troops on the borders of Tibet, and that he hoped that it was in error, both because the borders of Tibet had been secure for so many years and, also, because it would mean diverting forces away from the true enemy—Japan—and that he would regret to see the Chinese take offensive action against a neutral.<sup>7</sup>

Dr. Soong stated emphatically that there was no truth whatsoever to the rumor, either that troops were being massed on the border or that China had any present intention of attacking Tibet. He stated, however, that Tibet is not a separate nation; that it is a part of China and that eventually China may have to take necessary action to maintain her sovereignty, but that they have no intentions of taking such action at the present time. Dr. Soong went on with considerable heat to state that he can not accept the Prime Minister's statement about the impossibility of undertaking a campaign in Burma. He stated that his people are greatly cheered by Allied successes in Tunisia and that it has demonstrated to the people of China that the Allies are able to defend their own. He stated that in his country the question is often asked, "How can the Englishmen, who were so feeble in their conduct of the war in Malaya, fight such magnificent battles as they have fought in Africa?" Dr. Soong said that his answer is that the Briton is always a good soldier when properly led

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<sup>6</sup> For a letter from Evatt to Roosevelt on this subject, see *post*, p. 289.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding Churchill's concern over Chinese policy toward Tibet, see Churchill's informal note of May 21 to Hopkins and the attached telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, *post*, pp. 298 and 299.

and that perhaps the difficulty in Burma rested with the leadership. The Prime Minister interrupted to say that he hoped that no country would feel that it was their privilege to select the generals for the armies of their allies and that he believed that the leadership in Burma left little to be desired.

Dr. Soong stated with great earnestness that China expects and hopes that the United States and Great Britain will live up to their commitments.

The Prime Minister stated emphatically that he denied that any commitments had ever been made.

Some discussion continued, during which Dr. Soong held that the military discussions at Casablanca and later at Calcutta and Chungking<sup>8</sup> were definite commitments; whereas, Mr. Churchill held that the Allied governments had never made any pledges to recapture Burma but that they had lent their full support to military studies which necessarily had to be modified from time to time as conditions changed. He stated that he had not seen the plans of attack until February. Dr. Soong said he did not understand how that could be so. The Prime Minister stated that it would be of no help to an ally to do anything foolish and that it would be a very foolish thing to consider pushing troops into Burma at the present time.

President Roosevelt intervened to state that he thought perhaps we were talking at cross purposes and about different things and that if Dr. Soong had gotten the impression that we had abandoned all thought of a Burma campaign that he was entirely wrong; we do expect to prosecute that campaign as soon as conditions will permit, but in the meantime our present need is to provide something that will benefit China at once and that there is a general agreement that air power can do this more effectively than any other way. He repeated that there was no change in intention and that the general policy remains the same, whereas the tactics of the situation had to be modified since the studies were initiated at Casablanca.

President Quezon stated that when an authority like Mr. Churchill informed him that an actual invasion and restoration of Burma was not practical at this time, he fully accepts that statement. He is, therefore, glad to support the request for additional aircraft for the Western Pacific as the best step that can be taken now to bring about the eventual defeat of Japan.

Dr. Evatt asked to be informed of the Japanese troop strength in China at present. He said that he had been given to understand that

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<sup>8</sup> Regarding the Casablanca, Calcutta, and Chungking discussions with regard to future Burma operations, see *ante*, pp. 88 and 89, footnotes 4 and 6, respectively.

the Japanese had been withdrawing troops from China for some time and that, therefore, it would appear that the threat to China is not as great now as it has been at times in the past. Dr. Soong stated emphatically that he believes Japan will try to finish China this summer and that rather than removing troops from China they have merely replaced some of their troops that have been there for some time and are using China as a training ground for inexperienced troops.

The Prime Minister stated that Russia is, of course, the real answer to bringing about the *coup de grâce* of Japan, but because of the tremendous burden Russia is already bearing, neither the Prime Minister nor the President had ever requested Russia to join in the war against Japan as she is already doing her full share. When Germany is defeated, however, it is the Prime Minister's personal opinion (he gave it only as a personal opinion without any suggestion that he had received any assurances) the Russians will be glad to join in the final defeat of Japan, as Russia disapproves of Japan's treachery and her menace to stability as much as any other country.

Dr. Soong stated with considerable feeling and emotion that he must impress on the Council that the situation of China is indeed desperate and that she requires help by land as well as by air. He stated that the recovery of the Burma Road is not only a material necessity; that its recovery is necessary for the psychology of the Chinese people; that they regard it a symbol of the armed support of their allies.

Dr. Evatt stated that Australia also feels that she is seriously threatened and that the Japanese must be pressed on all fronts in order to prevent them from again assuming the initiative.

President Roosevelt reminded the Council that one of our most serious problems has been the German submarines in the North Atlantic. He stated that measures taken recently to increase our offensive action against enemy submarines, both by surface craft and by aircraft, encourage us to hope that our shipping situation will improve rapidly and that we may then develop more ambitious plans of action. However, he pointed out that the Japanese submarines have had marked success against our shipping in the South Pacific during the past month and that this requires more planes and more escort vessels to keep existing lines of communication open.

Mr. Churchill stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the British Empire would do everything humanly possible to support China but that he is convinced that the only effective aid we can give

to China this summer is an increase of her air power and that this measure will be pressed with every possible atom of our energy. He hopes that Dr. Soong will not send a report home that will be too discouraging to his people. We must all try to maintain the morale of all of our allies.

Dr. Soong said that he greatly appreciated the Prime Minister's assurances; that he had the highest respect for Mr. Churchill's great ability as a strategist and an authority on war and that he begged the Prime Minister to devote his great talent to the relief of the people of "Tortured China", to whom he had referred in his speech the day before. Dr. Soong repeated that the people of China are indeed a tortured people after four years of war and that the results of the failure to help them in time could not be predicted.

Mr. Evatt stated that before the Council adjourned he wished to express his sincere thanks to the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Holland who have continued to render outstanding services in the war against Japan.

At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Council then adjourned to have a photograph of the group taken by news photographers.

WILSON BROWN

*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy*

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING LUNCHEON MEETING,  
MAY 20, 1943, 1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

No official American record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). According to Pickersgill, pp. 511-513, the post-luncheon conversation (at which Hopkins was not present) was given over to a consideration of postwar international organizations. Roosevelt also took the opportunity to suggest the raising of the Canadian Legation in Washington to Embassy rank.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 20, 1943, 3: 30 P. M.,  
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF met in closed session and resolved on:<sup>2</sup>

a. The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

- (1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
- (2) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China;
- (3) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

b. Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

c. The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.

d. The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF also directed that C.C.S. 229, C.C.S. 231, and C.C.S. 238 be withdrawn from the agenda.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 91st meeting.

<sup>2</sup> For Stimson's impressions of these resolutions, see *ante*, p. 124, footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> None printed; these papers were entitled as follows: C.C.S. 229, "Potentialities of Air Route from Assam to China," C.C.S. 231, "Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China," and C.C.S. 238, "Operations in Burma 1943-44."

HULL-MACKENZIE KING DINNER MEETING, MAY 20, 1943

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

CANADA

Secretary Hull

Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this discussion has been found; see the memorandum prepared by Hickerson and dated May 20, 1943, for the use of the Secretary in connection with the conversation anticipated at this meeting, *post*, p. 334.

FRIDAY, MAY 21, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 21, 1943, 10: 30 A. M.,  
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Commander Long<sup>2</sup>

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Ismay<sup>2</sup>  
Admiral Noble<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Macready<sup>2</sup>  
Air Marshal Welsh<sup>2</sup>  
Field Marshal Wavell<sup>3</sup>  
Admiral Somerville<sup>3</sup>  
Air Chief Marshal Peirse<sup>3</sup>  
Captain Lambe<sup>3</sup>  
Brigadier Porter<sup>3</sup>  
Air Commodore Elliot<sup>3</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 90TH AND 91ST MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the conclusions of the Minutes of the 90th Meeting

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 92nd meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for items 4 and 5.

<sup>3</sup> Present for item 4.

subject to substituting the words "an outline plan" for the words "a plan" in paragraph *b*, Item 3.<sup>4</sup>

*b*. Approved the conclusions of the 91st Meeting.<sup>5</sup>

## 2. SELECTION OF CODE NAMES

### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a*. Agreed that for purposes of the TRIDENT Conference only, the word ROUNDHAMMER should be used to designate cross-Channel operations.

*b*. Directed the Secretaries to obtain recommendations from appropriate military security agencies in the U.S. and U.K. regarding code names for all operations agreed upon in the TRIDENT Conferences.

## 3. MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR TURKEY

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that at the ANFA Conference (C.C.S. 63rd Meeting), it was agreed that Turkey lay within a theater of British responsibility and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British.<sup>6</sup> It was also agreed that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. He pointed out that no decision has been recorded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the priority to be accorded to the supply of equipment for Turkey as compared with other commitments and no instructions have yet been issued by the American Chiefs of Staff to their representatives on the various Assignments Committees in Washington as to the attitude to be adopted towards British bids for equipment on behalf of Turkey. As a result, there had been some inclination to treat Turkish requirements as unimportant.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in C.C.S. 206, dated 30 April, the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff informed the American Chiefs of Staff of the British view with regard to the provision of equipment for Turkey, and enclosed a list of the proposed supplies.<sup>7</sup> This list has recently been somewhat increased.

GENERAL MARSHALL questioned what was included in the words "important commitments" in the conclusion proposed by the British. He said the proposal was acceptable to him with the understanding that requirements for training of U.S. forces and the rearmament of French forces were considered as "important commitments."

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 126.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 142.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 659.

<sup>7</sup> C.C.S. 206, April 30, 1943, proposed that the policy with regard to military supplies for Turkey be referred to the Combined Munitions Assignments Board with the advice from the Combined Chiefs of Staff that requests for Turkey were to be met "insofar as other important commitments allow." (J.C.S. Files)

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of the action already taken or proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the provision of military supplies for Turkey.

b. Agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.

(At this point the following entered the meeting:

Field Marshal Dill	Admiral Somerville
General Ismay	Air Chief Marshal Peirse
Admiral Noble	Captain Lambe
Admiral Macready	Brigadier Porter
Air Marshal Welsh	Air Commodore Elliot
Field Marshal Wavell	Commander Long)

## 4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

ADMIRAL KING first related C.C.S. 239<sup>8</sup> to C.C.S. 168<sup>9</sup> and C.C.S. 155/1,<sup>10</sup> and then gave a statement of the proposed strategy in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING stated that the remarks he would make would give a general outline of the situation in the Pacific and the scope of the operations visualized in the paper which had been submitted for consideration (C.C.S. 239).

During the past 30 or 40 years, since acquisition of the Philippines, the United States had been studying the possible courses of action which might have to be undertaken in the Pacific. A great number of studies prepared at the Naval War College had been premised on the necessity for supporting or recovering the Philippines. Briefly, there were three routes, one straight through from the Hawaiian Islands, the others detouring to the north or south of that line. The increase in the capabilities of aircraft had necessitated a revision of some of the previous plans. In any case, decisive action against the Japanese Fleet and the seizure of the Marianas Islands were of primary importance.

On December 30, 1941, when he took office as Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, there were numerous plans in existence for operations in the Pacific. He had, however, immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaiian-Midway line and the com-

<sup>8</sup> Not printed; for the amended version of this paper, circulated as C.C.S. 239/1, May 23, 1943, see *post*, p. 302.

<sup>9</sup> For text of C.C.S. 168, January 22, 1943, see Morton, Appendix H, p. 627.

<sup>10</sup> C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled "Conduct of the War in 1943"; see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 774.

munications with the Pacific Coast, and, secondly, to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.<sup>11</sup> Prior to the fall of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies, plans for the employment of naval forces presumed fueling in that area; however, with their loss, it was essential to establish safe bases elsewhere. One of the most urgent uses of naval forces during the early stages of the war in the Pacific had been in the support of the lines of communication from Hawaii to Australia. The U.S. Navy had, therefore, established refueling points in Bora Bora, in the Fijis and in New Caledonia. Ground forces had been sent for the protection of these bases. Operations during the recent months had rendered these lines of communication to Australia relatively safe, except in the case of Samoa, which was still exposed to some possibility of attack.

All operations in the Pacific should be directed toward severing the Japanese lines of communication and the recapture of the Philippines. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action, whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The intermediate objectives should be Rabaul, Truk and thence to the Marianas. Regardless of which route might be taken, the Marianas are the key to the situation because of their location on the Japanese lines of communication.

In referring to the situation in the Aleutians, he stated that the United States had bided its time in undertaking the operation against Attu. He considered that there was little danger to Alaska or the western part of the North American continent unless the Japanese should succeed in reaching Kodiak Island. This probability, in his opinion, was remote. An effort on our part to reach Japan by way of the northern route and the Kurile Islands would be beset with difficulties because of the rugged nature of the latter. According to reports received from our submarines, the Japanese were now actively engaged in fortifying the Kurile Islands.

The ultimate defeat of Japan would be accomplished by blockade, bombing, and assault. Of these measures, attacks on warships and shipping along enemy lines of communication were inherent in all offensive operations. It has been our purpose to work toward positions of readiness from which Japan can be attacked. Allied offensive measures comprise continued and intensified attacks on enemy ships and shipping, in cutting or threatening to cut enemy lines of communication between Japan and Japanese holdings and in attack on enemy sea, air, and ground forces, thereby obliging them to fight to retain

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<sup>11</sup> King's despatch of December 30, 1941, to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, is described in King, pp. 353-354.

their holdings and retain their lines of communication. The scope and intensity of the Allied war effort in the Pacific must insure that the means at hand are actively employed to the best advantage.

The general capabilities of the Allied effort comprise :

- a.* Keep Japan from further expansion and from consolidating and exploiting her current holdings.
- b.* Maintain the vital Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
- c.* Secure the lines of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
- d.* Block the enemy approaches to Australia from the northward by way of Rabaul and from the northwestward by way of the Malay barrier.
- e.* Attain positions which menace enemy lines of communication with the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, and the South China Sea.
- f.* Open the line of communications with China by way of Burma.
- g.* Make ready to support Russia in case of war with Japan.
- h.* Continue to intensify attrition of enemy strength by land, air, and sea (including submarine) action.

In referring to Japan's potentialities for offensive action, he listed as possibilities :

- a.* The Maritime Provinces, Eastern Siberia-Russia.
- b.* Alaska by way of the Aleutians.
- c.* Midway-Hawaii line (key to the Pacific).
- d.* The Hawaii-Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line which covers the line of communication to Australia and New Zealand.
- e.* Australia and New Zealand—by way of the Bismarck Archipelago and/or the Solomons.
- f.* Australia by way of Malay barrier.
- g.* India—by way of Burma.
- h.* China.

He summed up his comments on Japan's potentialities and their probable courses of action with the general statements :

- a.* That there was an impending threat to the Maritime Provinces; why action had not been precipitated only the Japanese could answer.
- b.* That the developing situation may dictate that the Japanese undertake completion of the conquest of China.
- c.* That it was unlikely that the Japanese would undertake major operations against Alaska.
- d.* That, since the decrease in the scale of activity in the Solomon[s] area, Japan had not given any definite indication of where she would strike next. Her reserve potentialities were certainly great enough to permit offensive action. It was, therefore, necessary that the United Nations be alert to anticipate the direction of this attack.

He stated that it was necessary to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan, particularly by intensifying action to cut her lines of communication and to attain positions of readiness from which

a full-scale offensive could be launched as soon as the full resources of the United Nations could be made available. The yardstick which must be used in measuring any operation undertaken in the Pacific was:

a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communication;

b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against Japan.

It was with these objects in mind that the conclusions reached in C.C.S. 239 have been set out; namely, offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44 have the following objectives:

a. Conduct of air operations in and from China.

b. Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.

c. Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

d. Seizure of the Marshalls and Caroline Islands.

e. Seizure of the Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese held New Guinea.

To these should be added: "Intensification of operations against Japanese lines of communication."

ADMIRAL KING, in response to several questions, explained briefly the methods used by the Japanese in employing their submarines and the results which had been attained by the United States submarines operating against Japanese shipping.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 239 subject to the following amendments:

Deletion of the word "retain" on pages 1 and 2;

Deletion of subparagraph 2b (6) on page 2 and substitution for it of:

"(6) *Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication*

"All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific."

Addition of subparagraph 3 a (6) as follows:

"(6) *Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication.*"

(At this point the following withdrew from the meeting:

Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell

Admiral Sir James Somerville

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse

Captain C. E. Lambe, RN

Brigadier W. Porter

Air Commodore W. Elliot)

5. REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Directed the Secretaries to prepare a report to the President and Prime Minister on the results of the Conference thus far.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The report prepared in response to this directive is C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, *post*, p. 346.

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ROOSEVELT PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 21, 1943, 10: 50 A. M., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE HOUSE

Roosevelt Papers

*Record of Presidential Press Conference No. 898*

[Extracts]<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.]

. . . . .  
 Q. Mr. President, you have had a number of recent conferences with Dr. (T. V.) Soong. Is there anything you can tell us about that?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. There isn't any particular news, one way or another.

Q. I wondered if there was anything special you had up between you?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I suppose the—the principal thing relates to getting war materials of all kinds into China.

Q. Did you say *more* material?

THE PRESIDENT: *War* materials—and medical things—things of that kind. That is going along pretty well.

. . . . .  
 Q. Mr. President, is there anything you can tell us about the visit of Prime Minister Mackenzie King (of Canada) here?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. He is just—just down here on the same—same thing that everybody else is here—furtherance of the war. I am seeing him again this morning.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . .  
 Q. Mr. President, back to Dr. Soong, we have noticed that he has been in here, particularly since Prime Minister Churchill arrived. Could you say if your talks with the Prime Minister concerned something about China?

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<sup>1</sup> Only those portions of the press conference record dealing with the TRIDENT Conference and related matters have been printed. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text and were presumably supplied by the White House Press Office.

<sup>2</sup> No official record of the substance of Roosevelt's meeting with Mackenzie King has been found; see the editorial note *post*, p. 151.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, sure. We talked about China. It isn't the only place we have been talking about.

Q. Mr. President, when you referred to the majority of our forces, you were speaking then of a majority of these forces which are outside the continental United States?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

MR. GODWIN: (aside) How about it?

Q. Mr. President, any sort of progress report you can give us on your talks with the Prime Minister (Churchill)?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I suppose the best way to put it is this: that, so far, most of the work has been done by the Combined Staffs. And they have been at it, and we expect to get some preliminary recommendations from the Combined Staffs—you might call them tentative recommendations—probably in tonight's meeting. Then those will be gone over—and I might say the Combined Staffs have been getting along extremely well—and then over the weekend we will be going over them, and take up the preliminary recommendations next week and iron out any kinks that are in them and make them final.

Q. Mr. President, has any consideration been given to the political future of Italy?

MR. GODWIN: (aside) What?

THE PRESIDENT: Unconditional surrender. I think that—

Q. (interposing) Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing)—speaks for itself.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

MR. GODWIN: Italy?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

MR. GODWIN: Italy?

THE PRESIDENT: Italy.

MR. GODWIN: He asked about Italy?

THE PRESIDENT: Unconditional surrender.

#### LEAHY-SOONG MEETING, MAY 21, 1943

#### PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy

CHINA

Foreign Minister Soong

#### *Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. According to the very brief account in Leahy, p. 160, Soong spoke of Burma and made a

“categorical statement” that Chinese forces would not undertake a campaign in Burma unless an attack were launched on Rangoon. The President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers) lists an appointment at noon on this date between Roosevelt and Soong, but no other record of such a meeting has been found. It appears likely that Leahy handled Roosevelt’s scheduled appointment with Soong.

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ROOSEVELT-MACKENZIE KING MEETING, MAY 21, 1943, 12: 30 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

CANADA  
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

Roosevelt made no record of this conversation. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). According to the account in Pickersgill, pp. 513–514, this was a farewell meeting between the President and the Prime Minister. Matters discussed included Roosevelt’s letter of May 5, 1943, to Stalin asking the Soviet leader for an informal meeting, and Roosevelt’s proposal for a summer trip to Canada. For the text of the letter from Roosevelt to Stalin, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 3. On May 24, 1943, following his return to Ottawa, Prime Minister Mackenzie King sent a message of thanks to the President; see *post*, p. 335.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 21, 1943, 1 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No record of the substance of this discussion has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President’s Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 21, 1943, 5 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## INTERIM REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

The Meeting had before them a draft of agreed decisions prepared by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and submitted to the President and the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242).<sup>1</sup> The draft was considered paragraph by paragraph.

## 1. AZORES ISLANDS

THE PRIME MINISTER reiterated the view which he had expressed at the previous meeting that nothing would be gained by a diplomatic approach to the Portuguese Government which was not backed up immediately by force.<sup>2</sup> In his opinion, the Portuguese should be presented with the fact of an imminent occupation with only sufficient time in which to send a message to order that there should be no resistance. He therefore suggested that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff were in agreement, it would be better to omit from this paragraph of the agreed decisions the following words: "(b) That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these Islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese" and also in the last sentence of the paragraph the words "in case diplomatic efforts should fail."<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would certainly agree to the omission of these words which had only been

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 346.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> The language quoted here is from section 1, subparagraph *b* and from the last sentence of section 1, C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, *post*, p. 347.

inserted because it was understood that it was the wish of the Governments to proceed in this manner.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the question of the diplomatic approach should be left to the President and himself and he hoped shortly to have the views of the British Government on the subject. At the same time it would be necessary to have on record a statement by the Combined Chiefs of Staff showing the reasons why it was of such importance to occupy the Islands without delay. This could be achieved by expanding paragraph 1 (*a*).

It was agreed that in their final report the Combined Chiefs of Staff should expand their recommendation in the manner suggested by the Prime Minister and should omit the words quoted above.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

GENERAL McNARNEY gave the meeting a short account of the process which had been gone through in building up the plan for the combined bomber offensive.<sup>5</sup> In view of the expansion of the German fighter forces, it had been found necessary to include in the plan attacks on the manufacturing plants. According to a conservative estimate based on experience, it was hoped to reduce the German fighter strength down to 500 as against the 3,000 to which it would otherwise rise in the middle of 1944. 25% of the bomber effort would go on submarine targets. About 425,000 ground personnel would be required to implement the plan.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that this figure included the ground personnel for ROUNDHAMMER.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked whether the figure could not be reduced. He recalled that when he had asked Monsieur Maisky why the Russians had refused the 20 squadrons for the Caucasus, the latter had pointed to the large number of ground personnel who would have to accompany the aircraft and the complication this would cause to the Russian communications.<sup>6</sup> Every man brought to the U. K. on the ground staff of the Air Force would exclude a soldier. He earnestly hoped there could be a reduction.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had appointed a special group under an experienced and capable officer whose duty it was to survey the establishments of the Army and of the Air Corps. General

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<sup>4</sup> In the subsequent revision of the draft report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the decisions regarding the Azores were included under part iv, section 1, paragraph *a*; see C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, *post*, p. 353.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the plan for the combined offensive from the United Kingdom, see C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, *post*, p. 239.

<sup>6</sup> For the exchange of messages between Roosevelt and Stalin in October and December 1942 regarding the proposed assignment of Anglo-American air squadrons in the Caucasus under Soviet command, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 677, 731, and 733.

Arnold had already made an arbitrary cut in the numbers of ground personnel for the United Kingdom and it was hoped that a further reduction might be secured, though the figure was already lower than that set by General Arnold.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached the greatest importance to this combined plan. There had not yet been an opportunity for the American scheme of daylight bombing to be applied in full, and he had been from time to time critical of the account of the few occasions when the bombers could go out and the comparatively small loads thus delivered on Germany; but he could see in the future, when several raids could be made in one day, most deadly results would be produced. He therefore welcomed the plan and hoped that it could be developed to the full.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that in the latest raid which the U. S. B-17's had carried out from England three separate forces had been employed on three different objectives. One had had 6% casualties, and the other[s] had had nil. The over-all loss had been 3½%. This was as [an] indication of what might be achieved in the future. He assured the Prime Minister that he was just as anxious as he was to reduce the number of ground personnel to be transported to the United Kingdom.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked General Marshall for this assurance.

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the value of occasional raids, say 5% of the effort, on the smaller towns where factories were known to exist. It would greatly depress the Germans if they felt that even the smaller towns could not escape.

General agreement was expressed with this view.

### 3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the forces listed in paragraph 3 (a) would be sufficient to hold the Brest Peninsula.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they should be sufficient to enable this area to be held and extended. The latter would be most necessary in order to secure more ports for the build-up.

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired what would be the build-up after that shown in this paragraph. Could not something be added to indicate the subsequent rate?

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he would very much like to include something to show the subsequent build-up. It would be purely a matter of shipping and this was being examined. The probable rate would be three to four divisions per month.

In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, it was pointed out that the "Air Forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY" consisted of certain British and American air reinforcements which had

been specially lent to the Mediterranean Theater from the United Kingdom for a short period immediately around the HUSKY date.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be desirable to include a statement to show what Army forces would be available in the Mediterranean Theater for use after HUSKY. He did not think it would be right to leave North Africa entirely in the hands of the French, some of whom should certainly move forward in the general advance.

THE PRESIDENT said that no French Division was shown as taking part in the first attack on the Continent: he thought that politically it might be very desirable that one should be included. He agreed that a statement of forces which would be available in the Mediterranean Area should be drawn up. For example, it would be well to know what would be available to send into, say Salonika, if the Germans withdrew from the Balkans. One would also want to know what could be done supposing Italy collapsed immediately after HUSKY.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that this matter had been considered, and a survey of the troops in the Mediterranean Area, and of the various garrisons required, had been drawn up.

After further discussion it was agreed that the final report should include a statement of the troops which would be available in the Mediterranean Area after HUSKY, excluding the American and British Divisions earmarked for the United Kingdom.

It was also agreed that the words "Italy and" should be inserted before the word "Russia" at the end of paragraph 3 (c).<sup>7</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER drew attention to the need for a new code word to cover post-HUSKY operations in general.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the security staffs had already been instructed to propose code words for a number of different operations and final suggestions would be put forward by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### 4. BURMA-CHINA THEATER

THE PRESIDENT read the Combined Chiefs of Staff's decision concerning the Burma-China Theater.<sup>8</sup> At the conclusion, he questioned the statement given in paragraph 4 *d* with regard to interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma. He wished to know if it implied an operation against Rangoon.

<sup>7</sup> In the subsequent revision of the draft report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, the paragraph under reference, as revised, became part VII, paragraph *b*, *post*, p. 358.

<sup>8</sup> The decision under reference is section 4 of C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, *post*, p. 349.

ADMIRAL KING replied that it did not, that actually it envisaged submarine operations against Japanese communications in the Bay of Bengal and the approaches to all the ports of Burma.

THE PRIME MINISTER then stated that he was in agreement with paragraph 4 of the Chiefs of Staff's report on the proposed Burma operations, but was unhappy that it did not include any mention of offensive action against Kra, Sumatra, or Penang.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the whole conception for the defeat of Japan was now the subject of study by the Combined Staff Planners and all of the operations which the Prime Minister had referred to would be considered in this study; the present report included only the operations proposed for Burma.

THE PRESIDENT was concerned about the failure to mention Rangoon in the decision. He thought the Chinese would be much happier if some mention of Rangoon was included and thought it would be wise to do so if only for political reasons.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that paragraph 4 *c* might be amended to read: "The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations with possible exploitation toward Rangoon." After some discussion it was agreed that the words "toward Rangoon" should be deleted from the amendment suggested by the Prime Minister in order that it would not be interpreted as a promise by the Chinese.<sup>9</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER informed Admiral King that as soon as the Italian Fleet had been neutralized the First Sea Lord intended to send six or seven battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, from the Indian Ocean to operate in coordination with the United States Fleet in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING felt that mounting operations against Sumatra, Kra, or Penang, would depend upon the availability of shipping. He doubted if they could be mounted in conjunction with the operations planned in the report under consideration. He pointed out that the shortage of shipping also limited the use of troops from India in the Burma Theater. He said, however, that he felt some such operation as an attack on Sumatra or the Kra Peninsula was eventually indispensable to induce the Japanese to split their naval forces. If this could be accomplished, an augmented Indian Ocean Fleet, operating in coordination with the U. S. Pacific Fleet, might inflict severe damage on the enemy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the Chiefs of Staff had shown in their report that they had considered all of the operations that are

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<sup>9</sup> In the subsequent revision of the draft report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, the paragraph under reference, as revised, became part iv, section 3, paragraph *a*, subsection (3), *post*, p. 356.

essential. He felt that subsidiary plans should also be worked out in order to be prepared to take advantage of opportunities that might present themselves.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the program under discussion would probably take all of the resources available. As a matter of fact the Planners were now investigating to see whether or not the operations envisaged could actually be carried out with the resources available.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the relating of resources to the operations would occur on Saturday and Sunday and the results would be included in the final report to be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister on Monday.<sup>10</sup>

#### 5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC 1943-44

THE PRESIDENT, after reading paragraph 5, concerning operations in the Pacific, commented that it included no sub-paragraph concerning air coverage for U. S. convoys, or regarding patrolling for enemy submarines.

ADMIRAL KING said that aircraft were being sent to the Pacific for this purpose as rapidly as possible but there are not sufficient numbers available to give the complete cover everywhere. He pointed out that other operations, particularly HUSKY, absorb many aircraft of the types necessary for this work.

THE PRESIDENT said that while everything possible was being done in this regard nothing was said concerning it in the report.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the submarine situation in the Pacific was difficult to explain. He could not understand why the Japanese had not attacked our West Coast. He felt that they had great potentialities which they were not using, and indicated that he was concerned constantly over the possibility of a Japanese submarine effort carried out in accordance with a well conceived plan.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said he thought the President had made a good point and suggested adding paragraph 5 *b* (7) which would make provision for the protection of the U. S. lines of communications.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that the question of security to lines of communications would be covered in a paper that was being prepared on global strategy.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought perhaps it would be better to leave the question of protection of the lines of communications out of the report under consideration as most of the decisions recorded were conceptions of the offensive. Defensive measures, therefore, might more properly be included in the global strategy paper. He asked

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<sup>10</sup> May 24; see C.C.S. 242/3, "Report to the President and Prime Minister," *post*, p. 359.

Sir Dudley Pound how many submarines had been sunk in the last four days, to which the ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET replied that the United Nations had been maintaining an average of about one per day.

#### 6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA

After the President had read a paragraph on this subject, the PRIME MINISTER asked for further information. He pointed out that large quantities of captured material had been taken from the Germans and suggested that investigation be made to determine whether it would be worthwhile to start manufacturing a limited amount of ammunition of German calibers.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Prime Minister that General Smith, the Chief of Staff at Allied Force Headquarters, had informed him that a rapid survey was being made to determine what captured material could be used for equipping the French forces.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked Admiral King if ammunition was being manufactured for use on the *Richelieu*. When Admiral King replied in the affirmative, the PRIME MINISTER suggested that something of similar nature might be accomplished with regard to manufacturing ammunition for captured German weapons.

GENERAL MARSHALL said he would have General Somervell make an immediate investigation of the possibilities in this connection.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked how many French Divisions were to be armed.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that it was proposed to rearm a maximum of eleven. At the present time three and a half divisions have been reequipped, including two and a half infantry divisions and one armored division.

THE PRESIDENT asked if use was being made of French pilots.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that the British have provided airplanes for one French squadron, and the United States has equipped another.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL pointed out that the British were also supplying the French with airplanes for patrolling purposes off the coast of West Africa. However, apart from the one squadron which they had already given the French toward the build-up of a French Air Force, the entire project was in the hands of the United States.

#### 7. BOMBING OF PLOEȘTI

After reading a paragraph on this subject, the PRESIDENT asked how far the Ploești oil fields were from North Africa.

GENERAL McNARNEY replied that Ploești was 895 miles from Tobruk and 875 miles from Aleppo.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked when it was envisaged conducting the proposed operation.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that it should be accomplished either in June or early July because of the excellent weather conditions which obtain in those months, and also because a blow struck then would coincide with the summer campaign in Russia. He said it would require two B-24 groups to be taken from the United Kingdom for a period of about four weeks, that is, two weeks prior to mounting the operation and two weeks after it had been completed. Additionally, one B-24 group on its way to the United Kingdom would be diverted to this operation and thus be about two weeks late in its arrival in Great Britain. He said that officers with special sights for low level bombing which would be required for the attack on Ploëști were now on their way to England and North Africa to give instructions in the use of these sights. Those going to North Africa were to present the plan to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, who was then to submit his comments to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that there were two considerations which were of paramount importance in deciding whether the proposed bombing of Ploëști should be undertaken. The first was whether or not aircraft should be diverted from pre-HUSKY preparation. The British Chiefs of Staff were doubtful if this should be done. The second consideration was that unless the operation was fully successful, it would make subsequent operations from more suitable bases, which might later become available, more difficult. This could be attributed to the additional defenses that the enemy would install. He added, however, that since the prize was so great and because of weather conditions, the subject should be thoroughly explored before a decision was made.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if there was a fair degree of success, an attack against Ploëști would be a staggering blow to the enemy, probably the greatest single blow that could be struck.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that even if the operation were not successful, it would result in diverting considerable German anti-aircraft equipment from the Russian Front.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked the Chiefs of Staff to consider the subject report in the light of the discussion that had taken place, with a view to making appropriate amendments.

SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Prime Minister that the report submitted included only those decisions which had been agreed upon thus far. They were still to be related with the resources that are available. When this was done, the items which had been considered would be incorporated in a final report, which would be submitted on Monday.

THE PRESIDENT called attention to a news report concerning the German evacuation of Norway and suggested that the staffs might consider what action should be taken in the event such report proved true.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER both expressed their gratification regarding the work accomplished by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and regarding the decisions which had been reached.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that what appealed to him most was the spirit of the offensive that permeated the paper, and the provisions which it made for the full utilization of our troops and resources.

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SATURDAY, MAY 22, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 22, 1943, 10:30 A. M., BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney  
 Lieutenant General Embick  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Horne  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Major General Streett  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Colonel Cabell  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long  
 Major Wildman

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Macready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 Captain Lambe  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 92ND MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 92nd Meeting held on Friday, 21 May.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 93rd meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 143.

## 2. ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE (C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)<sup>3</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, after examining the British paper (C.C.S. 241), were contained in C.C.S. 241/1.

ADMIRAL POUND, in discussing the British proposals, emphasized the importance of the support groups and of their flexibility. He believed that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, since they were continually examining the situation, were in the best position to advise on the transfer of the support groups north or south of 40° North. They could, of course, only make recommendations and the final decisions for such transfers would rest with Admiral King and himself.

ADMIRAL KING said that he accepted the importance of the principle of flexibility, but he did not believe the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be charged with the responsibility for recommending transfer of support groups, nor that the Admiralty and Navy Department should await such recommendations before taking action.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he believed that the Admiralty and Navy Department, rather than the Survey Board, were in the best position to review the situation and decide on the necessary allocation of means. He considered the duties of the Survey Board were to study and make recommendations with regard to facilities and methods of attack.

ADMIRAL POUND said that it had been suggested that unified control over the whole of the North Atlantic should be instituted by the appointment of a supreme commander. This was, however, in his view, impracticable since no one commander could have sufficiently detailed knowledge of all the areas concerned. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, on the other hand, since it could continually travel and thus cover the whole area, should have an intimate knowledge of conditions throughout, and would be in a better position to assess the requirements of all areas and recommend the transfer of forces. He believed this to be an important part of their functions, but, of course their recommendations would not tie either Admiral King or himself, with whom the final decision would rest. While the Admiralty and Admiral King's headquarters each had an intimate knowledge of the requirements and conditions on their own side of the Atlantic, neither was in a position to assess completely

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<sup>3</sup> Neither printed. C.C.S. 241 was a paper from the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting lines of discussion on the question of anti-U-boat warfare. C.C.S. 241/1 set forth the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after examining the British paper.

the situation on the other's side. The whole picture, however, was available to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

ADMIRAL KING said that he could not agree with Admiral Pound's views. The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board had done, and would continue to do, most useful work but they were in no better position than the First Sea Lord and himself to assess the transfer of forces. He was apprehensive that, if the responsibility for recommending transfers was placed on the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, the Admiralty and Navy Department would feel tied down by their recommendations, and no action to transfer would be taken without such recommendations. The function of the Board was to survey conditions and not to exercise the function of command as regards the allocation of forces. The Survey Board was not an executive agency. As he saw it, the British proposal tended to delegate executive responsibility to the Board.

ADMIRAL POUND said that this was not the intention. It would not be necessary for the executive authorities to await recommendations from the Board before taking action to transfer forces.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out with regard to V.L.R. aircraft that the arguments put forward in the British paper were misleading since the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February were largely done by short-range aircraft and those of the civilian air patrols. Only 4,500 hours had been flown by L.R. and V.L.R. aircraft. Further, he was in general opposed to a mixed command which was envisaged in the British paper.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated that only 4,500 of the 26,000 hours flown in the Gulf and Eastern Sea Frontiers in February had been flown by V.L.R. or L.R. aircraft. Even on the figure of 4,500 there was, however, still a case for the transfer of aircraft from this area to the Bay.<sup>4</sup> He would be interested to know in which areas it was proposed to relieve British aircraft in order that these could then operate in the Bay. He appreciated the advantages derived from the maintenance of homogeneous forces, but a firm decision to insist on this would be disappointing since it would cut across the principle of flexibility. A committee was now drawing up a simple standard procedure for the operation of A/S aircraft which should increase the efficiency of mixed forces and thus improve flexibility. There were disadvantages in mixed commands but he did not feel that too much importance should be attached to these.

ADMIRAL KING said that he agreed that homogeneous forces were not essential, but mixed forces, in his opinion, should be avoided as much as possible.

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<sup>4</sup> i.e., Bay of Biscay.

ADMIRAL POUND explained that after a review of the advantages of an increased air effort over the Bay of Biscay, all possible British aircraft had been transferred to this duty. Squadrons had been removed from the East Coast and the North of Scotland. No further aircraft could be provided except at the expense of Bomber Command, a diversion from which, he believed, was not justifiable.

ADMIRAL KING said that it was essential to maintain a certain irreducible minimum of A/S air forces on the East Coast of America, even though their proportion of sightings was lower than that in other areas. The locality of submarine activity could be more rapidly transferred than could aircraft. Certain U.S. PBM's were not yet operational but drastic measures were being taken to render them effective. When this had been done, they could be used to release aircraft for the Bay. He was fully in agreement with the principle that the Bay provided an excellent hunting ground for anti-submarine operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then suggested certain amendments to paragraph 4 of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff paper (C.C.S. 241/1).

ADMIRAL POUND explained that the British proposals with regard to the Bay offensive should not be taken to mean that action would only be effective if the full number of 72 aircraft were provided. Every aircraft would be of great value.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Deferred action on these papers until the next meeting.

### 3. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES (C.C.S. 185/3)<sup>5</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this was largely a political matter. The views of the Prime Minister had not yet been received.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the President had expressed the following views. We certainly could not tell the Italians that if they ceased hostilities they would have *peace with honor*: we could not get away from unconditional surrender: all we could tell them was that they would be treated by the United States and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people should be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination: this latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that on receipt of this message from the President, he had prepared a draft telegram to General Eisenhower based on the President's views and instructing General Eisen-

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 326, footnote 1.

hower to adhere to his original directive with regard to propaganda. He would like to send this message to the President for his approval.<sup>6</sup>

GENERAL ISMAY explained that this matter had also been put in very similar terms to the Prime Minister whose decision was awaited.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL explained that the Foreign Office considered that, if too soft a line were taken now, its effects would wear off before operation HUSKY and even further promises would then be required.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that he should send the President the draft reply to General Eisenhower with a notation that it had not as yet received the concurrence of the British Chiefs of Staff nor of the Prime Minister.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper pending reference to the Prime Minister and the President by General Ismay and General Marshall respectively.

#### 4. SONIC WARFARE (C.C.S. 240)<sup>7</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it was important that this form of warfare should be designated by a code name.

ADMIRAL KING said he believed that it might be found necessary that sonic warfare should be used for the first time in operation HUSKY.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Approved the recommendations contained in this paper.
- b. Directed the secretaries to request the security authorities to recommend a code name to cover this type of warfare.

#### 5. MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"

ADMIRAL POUND said that from his experience on the trip over, he was convinced that the *Queens*<sup>8</sup> should not be allowed to pass through the submarine area except in dark periods. This would entail the cycle for the *Queens* being opened out to 28 days. The loss in troop lift which this would entail had been estimated at 15,000 for the third quarter of the year and 31,000 for the fourth quarter, making a total of 46,000 for the remainder of the year. If one of these ships were torpedoed, the resulting loss to our troop lift would far exceed 46,000.

In reply to a question by General Marshall as to the extra degree of safety which could be expected from his proposal, ADMIRAL POUND said that, when considering the possibilities of the Prime Minister travelling in one of these ships, he had taken the view that, while

<sup>6</sup> For the draft telegram to Eisenhower, see the enclosure to C.C.S. 185/4, May 22, 1943, *post*, p. 330.

<sup>7</sup> C.C.S. 240, "Sonic Warfare", May 21, 1943, not printed.

<sup>8</sup> i.e., the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Queen Mary*, being used as trans-Atlantic troop transports.

it was a fair risk during a dark period of the moon, he would have strongly advised against it being undertaken during a light period. Similar considerations applied to the movement of 15,000 troops. In an emergency, he believed that one of these ships could be used in a light period, but only as a very special case. Boats were available for only 3,000 of the 15,000 passengers carried. Owing to the congestion on board and the fact that there might be no vessels capable of rescuing the personnel within several hundred miles, the loss of life, if a *Queen* were sunk, would be appalling.

The United States Chiefs of Staff stated that they would like to examine the implications of the British proposal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would present a paper recommending a change in the cycle of military transport vessels of the *Queen* type with a view to lessening the risk of passage.

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STILWELL-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, FORENOON<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Lieutenant General Stilwell

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

Department of the Army Files

*The Commanding General, United States Forces, China, Burma, India  
(Stilwell) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The Prime Minister listened sympathetically Saturday, while I presented the case.

He asked if I thought the British had been dilatory and lacked energy. I said "yes." He thought so too.

He asked if the decisions reached were satisfactory, barring the allotment of tonnage by air, which would starve the Yunnan force. I said "no," because there was no definite objective assigned, because the offensive was not all-out against all of Burma, and because the advance was conditional on being kept "in step." I said that a really

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding this meeting, which probably took place at the British Embassy, the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, records the following observations: "Stilwell was going to see him [Churchill] this morning for a short talk and I coached Stilwell on how to act with him so as to get some punch into his remarks and not be afraid of him and, as it happens, it worked like a charm because when I met the Prime Minister he told me he liked Stilwell very much in what he had said to him in the morning." (Stimson Papers)

aggressive commander could operate under the plan, but that as written there were too many loop-holes for one who did not mean business.

He said he meant business and wanted to put into action every man he possibly could. In this case, he said the only way to give China any help within two or three months was by air. He realized the necessity of keeping China in the war and the value of the China base.

He asked if I accepted the estimate that the Burma Road could not be built before the middle of 1945. I told him "no," and that it should be operating by the middle of 1944.

In connection with Chinese policy, I told him that I thought CKS was trying to substitute American air power for Chinese ground troops. Last summer during the operations in Chekiang, I heard from a fairly reliable source that Ho Ying Chin, who would not have done it without the Generalissimo's acquiescence, had told the Chekiang Commander to take it easy and withdraw as the Japs advanced, adding that the allies could now see to defeating Japan, and that the Chinese could coast. I could never definitely trace these remarks, but that was what the Chinese did, and Ku Chu Tung, the commander, is still there, although I tried to get him relieved and the Generalissimo indicated that he was going to remove him. In my opinion, the Generalissimo will continue on this line, asking for more and more U.S. aviation, and letting the ground forces, except for certain units under his direct control, deteriorate beyond redemption by neglect, and that if it went any further, our progress in Yunnan would be lost, and that it would be practically impossible to re-establish it later.

He reiterated that he wanted to help in every way possible, and would try and see me again on this subject.

JOSEPH W. STILWELL  
*Lieut. General, U.S. Army*

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AMERICAN-BRITISH LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, 1:15 P. M.,  
BRITISH EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Vice President Wallace  
Secretary of War Stimson  
Secretary of the Interior Ickes  
Senator Connally  
Under Secretary of State Welles

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Ambassador Halifax

Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum Prepared by the British Embassy*<sup>1</sup>

MEMORANDUM

The Prime Minister met the following at luncheon at the Embassy on May 22nd, 1943:—

The Vice President (Mr. Wallace), the Secretary of War (Mr. Stimson), the Secretary of the Interior (Mr. Ickes), the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate (Senator Connally) and the Under-Secretary of State (Mr. Sumner Welles).

*World and Regional Councils*

In the course of a general talk about the structure of a post-war settlement, Mr. Churchill said that the first preoccupation must be to prevent further aggression in the future by Germany or Japan. To this end he contemplated an association of the United States, Great Britain and Russia. If, as he understood, the United States wished to include China in an association with the other three, he was perfectly willing that this should be done; but however great the importance of China, she was not comparable to the others. On these Powers would rest the real responsibility for peace. They together with certain other Powers should form a Supreme World Council.

Subordinate to this World Council there should be three Regional Councils, one for Europe, one for the American Hemisphere and one for the Pacific.

*Europe*

Mr. Churchill thought that after the war Europe might consist of some twelve states or confederations who would form the Regional

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<sup>1</sup> The source text was sent to Roosevelt by Halifax on May 28, 1943 with the following explanation: "Winston has asked me to send you the enclosed record of a conversation at the Embassy on May 22nd when he gave an outline of his ideas about the post-war security order. He tells me that he expressed similar views to you, but thought you might like to see this note. He wishes to make it clear that on all occasions he stated that he was expressing only personal views."

In the Stimson Diary, this meeting is recorded in the following manner: "The conversation started with Russia—the Prime Minister's views of Stalin; then it went on to the postwar problems that confront us; there the Prime Minister held forth at length on his views and towards the end I got into it and he and I had a duet; it was rather good fun talking again on that subject which I know quite a good deal about. Everybody emphasized the need of force but I warned them not [to] rely solely upon force created by treaty; it must be something that grows out of the war itself—an alliance between the people who are really fighting now and whom our people have grown to trust. I also emphasized the necessity of preparing against a great depression like the last one which is bound to follow the war some years afterwards and to prepare for it by avoiding tariff barriers and also clearing the currency. They told me I made quite an impression—several people speaking to me—Ickes and Sumner Welles particularly." (Stimson Papers)

European Council. It was important to recreate a strong France, whatever we might think about French deserts or the probable difficulty of achieving our purpose. For the prospect of having no strong country on the map between England and Russia was not attractive. Moreover the Prime Minister could not easily foresee the United States being able to keep large numbers of men indefinitely on guard in Europe. If such an experiment were tried he could not believe it would last for more than one Presidential election. Great Britain could not do so either. No doubt it would be necessary, and he thought it would be possible, that the United States should be associated in the same way in the policing of Europe, in which Great Britain would obviously also have to take part; but France also must assist.

Then there would be Spain and Italy. He also hoped that in South Eastern Europe there might be several confederations; a Danubian federation based on Vienna and doing something to fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Bavaria might join this group. Then there should be a Balkan federation.

He would like to see Prussia divided from the rest of Germany, forty million Prussians being a manageable European unit. Many people wished to carry the process of division further and divide Prussia itself into component parts, but on this question the Prime Minister reserved judgment. Poland and Czechoslovakia he hoped would stand together in friendly relations with Russia. This left the Scandinavian countries, and Turkey, which last might or might not be willing with Greece to play some part in the Balkan system.

Mr. Wallace asked about Belgium and Holland suggesting that they might join France. Mr. Churchill said that was a possibility, or alternatively they might form a group of the Low Countries with Denmark. Mr. Wallace asked whether the Prime Minister contemplated the possibility of Switzerland joining with France, but the Prime Minister was disposed to regard Switzerland as a special case.

In his view each of the dozen or so of the European countries should appoint a representative to the European Regional Council thus creating a form of United States of Europe. He thought Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's ideas on this subject had much to recommend them.

#### *The American Hemisphere*

Similarly there might be a Regional Council for the Americas of which the Prime Minister thought Canada would naturally be a member and would represent the British Commonwealth.

*The Pacific*

There should be a Regional Council for the Pacific in which he supposed that Russia would participate. He thought it was quite possible that when the pressure on her western frontiers had been relieved Russia would turn her attention to the Far East.

*Relation of the Regional Councils to the Supreme World Council*

The Regional Councils should be subordinate in the Prime Minister's view to the World Council. The members of the World Council should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly interested and he hoped that in addition to being represented on the American Regional Council and the Pacific Regional Council, the United States would also be represented on the European Regional Council. However this might be, the last word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of interest to the World Council and bring the World Council in.

Mr. Wallace thought that the other countries would not agree that the World Council should consist of the four major Powers alone. Mr. Churchill agreed and expressed the view that to the four Powers should be added others by election in rotation from the Regional Councils. The central idea of the structure was that of a three-legged stool—the World Council resting on three Regional Councils. But he attached great importance to the regional principle. It was only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to secure a settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a settlement the result was likely to be merely rapid and academic discussion.

Mr. Wallace asked what in practice would be the procedure if, for example, there were a dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Mr. Churchill said that such a dispute would fall to be dealt with in the first place by the American Regional Council but always under the general overriding authority of the World Council. In the instance chosen the interests of countries outside the American Hemisphere would hardly be affected; but plainly a dispute which threatened the peace of the world might very well not be susceptible to being treated only on a regional basis and the Supreme World Council would quickly be brought in.

*Neutrality*

Mr. Churchill was asked whether the association of nations which he contemplated would be confined to the United Nations, or include

the neutrals. He said that in his view there was advantage in trying to induce those nations at present neutral to join the United Nations before the end of the war. He thought we ought to use all possible persuasion and pressure to secure this when it could be done with safety to the nation concerned. An example was Turkey. His policy was to help Turkey to build up her own forces to the point where, at the right moment she could and would effectively intervene. When the United Nations brought the guilty nations to the bar of justice, he could see little but an ineffective and inglorious role for Mr. de Valera and others who might remain neutral to the end.

*The Lessons of the League of Nations*

Mr. Churchill maintained that we had much to learn from the experience of the League of Nations. It was wrong to say that the League had failed. It was rather the member States who had failed the League. Senator Connally agreed and pointed to the achievements of the League in the years immediately after 1919. Mr. Stimson also agreed and thought that if the original guarantee to France had not fallen through subsequent French policy and also the history of the League would have been very different.

*National and International Forces*

Mr. Churchill said that force would clearly be required to see that peace was preserved. He suggested that there should be an agreement between the United Nations as to the minimum and maximum armed forces which each would maintain. The forces of each country might be divided into two contingents, the one to form the national forces of that country, and the other to form its contingent to an international police force at the disposal of the Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World Council. Thus if one country out of twelve in Europe threatened the peace, eleven contingents would be ready to deal with that country if necessary. The personnel of the international contingent provided by each country would be bound, if it were so decided by the World Council, to undertake operations against any country other than their own. Mr. Wallace said that bases would be required for these contingents. Mr. Churchill agreed. In this connection he said that he would place a total prohibition for an indefinite time upon the practice in the enemy countries, and certainly in Germany, of the art of flying. There should be international air lines, for example, operating in and through Prussia which would give the Prussians as good a service at as cheap rates as obtained elsewhere, but they should neither be allowed to fly themselves nor to build aircraft.

*Fraternal Association Between Great Britain and the United States*

Mr. Churchill said that there was something else in his mind which was complementary to the ideas he had just expressed. The proposals for a world security organization did not exclude special friendships devoid of sinister purpose against others. He could see small hope for the world unless the United States and the British Commonwealth worked together in what he would call fraternal association. He believed that this could take a form which would confer on each advantages without sacrifice. He would like the citizens of each without losing their present nationality to be able to come and settle and trade with freedom and equal rights in the territories of the other. There might be a common passport or a special form of passport or visa. There might even be some common form of citizenship, under which citizens of the United States and of the British Commonwealth might enjoy voting privileges after residential qualification and be eligible for public office in the territories of the other, subject of course to the laws and institutions there prevailing.

Then there were bases. He had himself welcomed the Destroyer-Bases deal not for the sake of the destroyers, useful as these were, but because he felt it was to the advantage of both countries that the United States should have the use of such bases in British territory as she might find necessary to her own defence, for a strong United States was a vital interest of the British Commonwealth and vice versa. He looked forward therefore to an extension of the practice of common user [*use*] of bases for the common defence of common interests. Take the Pacific where there were countless islands possessed by enemy powers. There were also British islands and harbours. If he had anything to do with the direction of public affairs after the war, he would certainly advocate that the United States had the use of those that they might require for bases.

*American Opinion. Importance of Concluding an Agreement During the War*

All the American guests present said that they had been thinking on more or less the lines propounded by the Prime Minister, and thought that it was not impossible that American opinion would accept them or something like them. The Ambassador asked Mr. Welles whether he thought that the establishment of a Regional Council for Europe would have the effect of leading United States opinion to disinterest itself in European affairs. Mr. Welles was not afraid of this, having regard to the overriding responsibility of the Supreme World

Council and the relation between it and the Regional Councils. Mr. Stimson said most emphatically that in his opinion there would be a tendency to relax after hostilities ceased, and a reluctance to embark upon new international experience. He believed that it would be much easier to secure American agreement during the war; indeed that it was a case of during the war or never. The others were disposed to agree, and all felt that the best approach to future cooperation was to present such plans for the future as a continuation of the cooperation now in force, and to do so while the war was still proceeding.

The Prime Minister made two other suggestions both of which carried the warm assent of those present. First, that after the war we should continue the practice of Combined Staff conversations, and second, that we should by constant contact, take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that the main lines of our foreign policy ran closely together.

Mr. Wallace said to the Ambassador as he left that it was the most encouraging conversation in which he had taken part for the last two years.

Mr. Churchill on all occasions stated that he was expressing only personal views.

#### STIMSON-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 22, 1943, 3 P. M., BRITISH EMBASSY

##### PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Secretary of War Stimson

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

##### *Editorial Note*

No official record of this conversation has been found. The Stimson Diary, May 22, 1943, records the course of the meeting in the following manner:

"Then after the round table conference was over about three o'clock I had a half hour more alone with the Prime Minister and I took up with him the Burma problem. I gave him my views on that, talking very frankly, and he answered me frankly. He told me he was thoroughly dissatisfied with the way his commanders there had acted; he was going to change them all and put in some new punch to it. I said that was the only way in which the thing could be made to work. I brought out the resolutions which he hadn't seen yet and he asked me to prepare a map showing the place where the new airfields were to be built to strengthen the Burma air route and what work the difficulties required. I told him I would do so."

For the text of the letter of May 22, 1943, to Churchill which Stimson prepared as a result of this conversation, see *post*, p. 301.

Stimson's preparations for his meeting with Churchill are described in the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, as follows:

"I at last got a chance to put in my oar and do my stick of work for the cause covered by these conferences today and I have an idea that I accomplished something. My reading of the minutes has shown pretty well what the situation is. The European situation is covered fairly well, but the Burma situation, as shown by the resolution adopted yesterday, is in very poor shape and that of course is vitally important on account of China. So this morning I spent time on that. I talked with Jack McCloy who had dined with the Prime Minister and had heard him say that he wanted to talk with me. I had in General Stilwell and went over the situation in Burma, getting his ideas as clearly as I could of what was necessary to make the resolutions which had been adopted have a little life in them. The thing had been pretty well gummed up. A step backward has even been taken in giving all of the capacity of the Burma air route to Chennault as against Stilwell. Therefore the only help that we can see in sight is to increase the capacity of the road and that depends upon getting more steam into the British commanders out there. So Stilwell and McCloy and I went over our maps in my room and we called in Colonel Timberman who had just been out there for the Operations Division of the General Staff and I got myself pretty well primed up by the time of the approach for my going to lunch at the Embassy where I was for the first time to get a whack at the Prime Minister." (Stimson Papers)

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**HULL-HALIFAX CONVERSATION, MAY 22, 1943, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

Secretary Hull

Ambassador Halifax

740.0011 EW/29737

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

The British Ambassador called at his request. He inquired if I had seen Mr. Churchill and I proceeded to give him the substance of what was said between Churchill and myself:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In addition to the topics covered in this memorandum, Hull and Halifax apparently also discussed the possibility of establishing a camp in North Africa for refugees from Spain. See Halifax's telegram of May 22 to Eden, *post*, p. 342, footnote 3.

<sup>2</sup> For the record of the Hull-Churchill meeting of May 13, 1943, see the Secretary of State's memorandum of conversation of the same date, *ante*, p. 49.

I said that I had brought up our trade agreements program and our entire commercial and related policies, such as monetary exchange and others. It is not necessary here to repeat any of these statements in detail.

I then took up Russia and said that Great Britain and the United States must by persistent effort talk Mr. Stalin out of his shell, so to speak, that is, out of his aloofness, secretiveness and suspicion. I elaborated on what I had said on previous occasions with respect to each of these points, including the vital step of calling off all communistic activities in other countries under the direction of the Third Internationale at Moscow.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Churchill had expressed the view that Russia would aid us in defeating Japan after Germany is defeated. I stated that I hoped she would, but added that this illustrates her secretive attitude compared with that of Great Britain and the United States; that Russia has not, so far as I knew, intimated even in a confidential way what she may have in mind in this connection.

The Ambassador said that the President requested him to talk to me about de Gaulle. I thereupon related substantially what I had said during my recent conversation with the Prime Minister,<sup>4</sup> which need not be repeated here.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>3</sup> Regarding Hull's views on the necessity for the dissolution of the Third International, see the memorandum of his conversation with Beneš, May 18, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 529. For documentation regarding the announcement in Moscow on May 22, 1943, of the decision to dissolve the International and Hull's reaction to that decision, see *ibid.*, pp. 531-536.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 50.

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#### CHURCHILL MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, MAY 22, 1943, BRITISH EMBASSY

##### *Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. According to the account of the meeting in *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, p. 50, Halifax had invited some 15 Senators and 15 Representatives to the British Embassy for the meeting. The same meeting is probably referred to in Earl of Halifax, *Fulness of Days* (London: Collins, 1957), p. 273, where Halifax recalls a meeting which took place at 6 p.m. and was marked by a speech by Churchill.

MEETINGS OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH SHIPPING EXPERTS, MAY 22,  
1943, BEGINNING AT 4 P. M.<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Deputy War Shipping Administrator  
Douglas  
Mr. Bissell  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Major General Gross  
Colonel Stokes

## UNITED KINGDOM

Minister of War Transport Leathers  
Mr. Maclay  
Major General Holmes  
Brigadier Williams  
Mr. Harvey

War Shipping Administration Files

*Douglas Notes*<sup>2</sup>

Lord Leathers, Mr. Maclay, Brig. [*Major*] General Holmes, Brig. General Williams, Mr. Harvey joined the meeting, which, therefore became Combined, at 4:00.

Considerable discussion was had on the subject of the U. K. port capacity, with the American military insisting in effect that it was illogical for Lord Leathers to insist that more than 150 ships could not be accommodated on U. S. Army account in the ports while more than that number could be accommodated on account of the U.K. import program. It seemed to be clear that the Army was trying to use port capacity to restrict the U.K. import program. LWD<sup>3</sup> observed that the matter might well be resolved by advancing the volume of the U.K. import program into the summer months of 1943 when the U.S. Army program was at its lowest tide, thus making available places during the winter months in the U.K. ports for ships carrying U.S. Army cargo.

India was then discussed. Brigadier Williams very tenaciously but pleasantly inquired as to whether or not there had been duplications in the American statement of requirements of the items carried in the

<sup>1</sup> This appears to be the same meeting, or series of meetings, described in Behrens, p. 371 as having covered the better part of May 22 and the early morning hours of May 23, 1943. This American-British meeting was preceded by a 2-hour meeting of the American conferees. Not all the persons listed above were present for the entire series of meetings.

<sup>2</sup> The source text is a carbon copy of a five-page document labelled "Diary" and obviously prepared by Douglas. The whole document, which included notes of the American meeting of May 22, the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 11 a. m., May 23, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of 2 p. m., May 23, 1943, is included in the Lewis W. Douglas File, folder—Allocations General.

<sup>3</sup> Lewis W. Douglas.

British statement.<sup>4</sup> He pointed out that the British had reduced their deficit by 155 and had brought their shipping position into a complete balance. Most of the shrinkages had been made on the military side, and he thought our military, too, might do some shrinking.

The Italian requirement was discussed, and, interestingly enough, Lord Leathers took very much the same position that the WSA at the Joint meeting had expressed.<sup>5</sup>

Paragraph 47 of the C.C.S. paper,<sup>6</sup> the part regarding the Army statement was brought up by General Somervell. Maclay finally got the point of it and indicated that the British would have to disagree to the language of the paragraph as Somervell interpreted it.

The meeting then adjourned. The WSA and the British retired to prepare a consolidated statement and the Army retired to revise their statement of requirements.

Several modifications were telephoned subsequently to Mr. Schneider. India was reduced, etc. About 2:30 Sunday morning Colonel Stokes and General Gross came over with their finished statement. Shortly thereafter Mr. Bissell's estimate of availables was completed for the year 1943. When matched together the deficit of 155 was shown on the American side and no deficit on the British side. General Somervell, who arrived about 4:00 a.m. suggested that the British pick up half of the deficit. Brigadier Williams and Maclay very categorically stated that they had already eliminated their deficit of 155 and had brought their shipping position into equilibrium, and that they positively would not and could not shrink any further. General Somervell then remarked to me that he thought it could be picked up on his side. He indicated that very substantial shrinkages had taken place in the Army requirements but that it would be possible to reduce further the requirements. He made specific reference to Alaska, but qualified that Kiska had not yet been taken; that, moreover, there were no ships in the Alaskan service which were suitable to overseas voyages.

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<sup>4</sup>Neither the American nor the British statements of shipping requirements referred to here have been printed. The shipping deficits foreseen in these statements are discussed in Behrens, pp. 368-371 and 382-383.

<sup>5</sup>At the meeting of the American conferees at 2 p. m., officials of the War Shipping Administration had taken the position that 40 sailings per month to liberated countries, particularly Italy, as had been advocated by the military experts, were too many.

<sup>6</sup>The reference is presumably to paragraph 47 of C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 270.

I pointed out to him that there were something like 20 to 22 Liberty ships and that they, of course, were exactly what we needed in the long ocean trips. At any rate, he made it very clear to me and to others that this deficit of 155 could be managed by reductions in the military requirements. He concurred that the deficit of 155 would be eliminated in practice.

The requirements for the first nine months of 1944 on the British side, including the U.K. import program and the usual Lend-Lease aid had been discussed and reduced very substantially below the original figure, hastily calculated, if indeed calculated at all, by the British.

Statements were prepared, one by Lord Leathers and LWD, one by the military, and at about 6:30 a.m. the meeting broke up with everyone well satisfied.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> For text of the memorandum by Douglas and Leathers, dated May 23, 1943, see *post*, p. 313.

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SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1943

PHILLIPS-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 23, 1943, FORENOON, BRITISH  
EMBASSY

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Phillips

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No official record of the substance of this meeting has been found, but William Phillips gives an account of the conversation in his volume of memoirs *Ventures in Diplomacy* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 389-390. According to this account, Roosevelt asked Phillips to see Churchill and give him his frank impressions of conditions in India. Churchill apparently took strong exception to Phillips' proposal that Indian leaders be given a measure of authority to deal with domestic affairs. Phillips also relates that he immediately reported upon his private talk with Churchill to Roosevelt during a luncheon conversation with the President.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 23, 1943, 2 P. M.,  
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ROOM, FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Lieutenant General Embick  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Horne  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Major General Streett  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Colonel Cabell  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long  
Mr. Douglas<sup>2</sup>

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Minister of War Transport Leathers<sup>3</sup>  
Lord Cherwell<sup>2</sup>  
Field Marshal Dill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Major General Holmes  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 93RD MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions as shown in the Minutes of the 93rd Meeting held on Saturday, the 22nd May.<sup>3</sup>

## 2. ANTI-U-BOAT WARFARE

(C.C.S. 241 and 241/1)<sup>4</sup>Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 2.<sup>5</sup>

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that C.C.S. 241 and 241/1 should each

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 94th meeting.<sup>2</sup> Present for items 1-6.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 160.<sup>4</sup> Neither printed. C.C.S. 241 was a paper from the British Chiefs of Staff suggesting lines of discussion on the question of anti-U-boat warfare. C.C.S. 241/1 set forth the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff after examining the British paper.<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 161.

be altered in certain respects and then noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested a minor amendment to paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 241/1.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read out a draft conclusion with reference to the work of the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Took note of C.C.S. 241 and deleted the phrase “and that the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board should be responsible for recommending any such transfer” at the end of the last paragraph of page 1. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/3.<sup>6</sup>)

*b.* Took note of C.C.S. 241/1 and directed that the words “relieve British planes in certain areas” should be deleted and the words “provide planes” substituted. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 241/4.<sup>7</sup>)

*c.* Agreed that in view of the fact that the directive under which the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board operates requires them to report on any aspect of the Allied Anti-Submarine Organization in which they consider the Allied resources are not being used to the best advantage, it is not considered necessary that the Board should have any special responsibility laid on them in the case quoted in C.C.S. 241.

### 3. MOVEMENTS OF THE “QUEENS” (C.C.S. 246)<sup>8</sup>

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 5.<sup>9</sup>

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the proposals for the future movement of the *Queens* as set out in paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 246.

<sup>6</sup> C.C.S. 241/3, May 24, 1943, “Anti-U-Boat Warfare”, not printed.

<sup>7</sup> C.C.S. 241/4, May 24, 1943, “Anti-U-Boat Warfare”, not printed.

<sup>8</sup> C.C.S. 246, May 23, 1943, memorandum by British Chiefs of Staff, not printed, reviewed the current danger posed by German submarines to the *Queens* in their trans-Atlantic passages and the desirability to arrange for these passages to be made under the most favorable conditions. The memorandum concluded: “Taking the above factors into consideration, it is considered that these ships should be run on the 28 day cycle and that the consequent loss in lift should be accepted.” (J. C. S. Files)

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 164.

4. POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES  
(C.C.S. 185/4) <sup>10</sup>

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 93rd Meeting, Item 3.<sup>11</sup>

GENERAL ISMAY informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister had agreed to the draft telegram to General Eisenhower, contained in C.C.S. 185/4.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Took note that the President and Prime Minister had decided that the policy set forth in C.C.S. 185/2/D <sup>12</sup> should be adhered to.

*b.* Agreed to send the message contained in C.C.S. 185/4 to General Eisenhower.

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944  
(C.C.S. 244) <sup>13</sup>

THE COMMITTEE had before them C.C.S. 244 together with an addendum and corrigendum to it containing Annex VII, and a summary of conclusions and a corrigendum to Annex II.

Certain amendments to the paper were suggested and accepted.

LORD LEATHERS said that Annex VII represented the agreed views of himself, Mr. Lewis Douglas and General Somervell and was a submission of the shipping position for the period under discussion. He and his colleagues believed the deficiencies were relatively small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect would not be unmanageable. The requirements set out in the paper had, in most cases, been cut as far as was possible. The deficiency was only a small percentage of the total. This small percentage of deficiency when taking into consideration the various assumptions, including losses, building rates, etc., was so small that it could be spread and absorbed and gave, in his opinion, no grounds for anxiety.

LORD LEATHERS then suggested a minor amendment to the note following paragraph 3 of Annex VII, Part I.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 330.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 163.

<sup>12</sup> For text of the paper under reference, see footnote 2 to Eisenhower's telegram of May 17 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *post*, p. 326.

<sup>13</sup> C.C.S. 244, May 23, 1943, not printed. For text of the revised version of this paper, C.C.S. 244/1, May 25, 1943, which incorporated the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the course of this meeting, see *post*, p. 233. Neither annex II, a review of land force availabilities, nor annex VI, a review of shipping availabilities, is printed.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the reduced troop lift due to the proposed opening out of the cycle of movement for the *Queens* had been taken into account—the bottleneck was dry cargo and not personnel shipping.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, LORD LEATHERS explained that shortly after the Casablanca Conference the loss rate had been carefully examined and agreed rates accepted. These were 2.39 percent per month for the first half of the year and 1.9 percent per month for the second half. The present paper had been based on these calculations, though in fact the loss rate so far this year had worked out at slightly less than 1.9 percent. An agreed and accurate loss rate was a most important factor in all calculations dealing with shipping requirements and availability. He agreed with Admiral King that the loss rate should be subjected to frequent review.

MR. DOUGLAS said that he agreed with Lord Leathers that the deficit with regard to dry cargo shipping was not unmanageable.

In reply to a question by General Marshall, GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he agreed with Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas that shipping was available for the undertakings set out in C.C.S. 244, subject to the slight deficit which he considered could be absorbed by spreading it over the entire period.<sup>14</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt sure the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to express appreciation of the excellent work accomplished in so short a time by the Combined Staff Planners and shipping experts, both civil and military. All present agreed.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 244, as amended in Annex "B" to these Minutes,\* except that paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Summary of Conclusions should be taken note of as recommendations only.

#### 6. DESPATCH OF U. S. SERVICE AND ENGINEER TROOPS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

SIR ALAN BROOKE read out a brief memorandum† on the importance of the early despatch of certain service and engineer troops to the United Kingdom. This movement would not interfere with the scheduled SICKLE build-up but was essential due to the shortage of manpower in England.

<sup>14</sup> For the memorandum by Douglas and Leathers regarding dry cargo shipping availabilities and requirements, dated May 23, 1943, see *post*, p. 313.

\*Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 244/1. [Footnote in the source text. This paper, *post*, p. 233, incorporated the amendments to C.C.S. 244 which were agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during this meeting.]

†Annex "A" to these minutes. [Footnote in the source text. Annex "A" not printed.]

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that he entirely agreed with Sir Alan Brooke's view that the early arrival of S.O.S. and engineer troops was essential to prepare for the arrival of the fighting forces.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present plan already provided for the movement of 40,000 men per division which included a large proportion of service units. The required priority could be arranged for early sailing of necessary service elements.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was prepared to accept this movement provided that it was not at the expense of SICKLE, the priority of which must not be disturbed.

ADMIRAL KING said that the picture as a whole must be considered. It might prove necessary for the SICKLE movement to be modified slightly in the light of these requirements.

LORD LEATHERS pointed out the necessity for port battalions for discharging the ships at the landing points.

Both General McNarney and Sir Charles Portal pointed out that SICKLE was an essential prelude to and an integral part of cross-Channel operations as a whole and that the ground operations could not be undertaken without it.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops without prejudice to SICKLE.

(At this point Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell, and Mr. Douglas left the meeting.)

#### 7. OPERATION "BRISK"

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 87th Meeting, Item 2.<sup>15</sup>

THE COMMITTEE had before them a draft report by the British Planning Staff. (J.P.(T) 17 (Final))<sup>16</sup>

In the course of discussion it was pointed out that the Prime Minister and President had made it clear that the decision with regard to diplomatic action should rest with them, and had asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement of the military reasons necessitating the occupation of the Portuguese Islands, a military plan to effect their capture and to give a target date on which this operation could be undertaken.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed certain alternative

<sup>15</sup> *Ante*, p. 98.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

proposals for obtaining the use of these Islands at an earlier date than that indicated in the plan.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the British Staff Planners were preparing a statement for inclusion in the final report to the President and Prime Minister, which would set forth the urgent military reasons for this operation.<sup>17</sup>

#### 8. THIRD SOVIET PROTOCOL

(C.C.S. 243)<sup>18</sup>

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that this matter should be considered after the conclusion of the TRIDENT Conferences.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> For the statement regarding the advantages to be gained from the use of the Azores, included as the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", see *post*, p. 371.

<sup>18</sup> C.C.S. 243, May 22, 1943, "Third Soviet Protocol", not printed.

<sup>19</sup> The Third Soviet Supply Protocol was signed at London, October 19, 1943. See Department of State publication 2759, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 51. For additional documentation regarding the continuation and enlargement of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union in 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 737 ff.

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#### ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 23, 1943, EVENING, THE WHITE HOUSE

##### PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

##### *Editorial Note*

Roosevelt made no record of the discussion at this meeting. On May 24, 1943, Presidential Assistant Secretary Early announced that Churchill had returned to the White House the previous evening after having spent the weekend as guest of the British Embassy. According to the Early announcement, Roosevelt and Churchill conferred together until 2:30 in the morning. It is likely that at this meeting, Roosevelt and Churchill took up the Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, May 22, 1943, *post*, p. 338.

MONDAY, MAY 24, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 24, 1943, 11:30  
A. M., ROOM 240, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 Lieutenant General McNarney  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Horne  
 Vice Admiral Willson  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Major General Streett  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Colonel Cabell  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Macready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Major General Holmes  
 Captain Lambe  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
 Brigadier General Deane  
 Commander Coleridge  
 Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

## SECRET

## 1. APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES OF THE 94TH MEETING

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the 94th meeting except that the conclusion under Item 6 was changed to read as follows:

“Agreed that the necessary service troops for the build-up of the BOLERO force will be given priorities in sailings as necessary to service the build-up of the combat troops, without prejudice to SICKLE.”<sup>2</sup>

## 2. DRAFT REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

(C.C.S. 242/2)<sup>3</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered C.C.S. 242/2 paragraph by paragraph and agreed to certain amendments.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the British proposal relating to the extension of pressure in the Pacific for the earliest defeat of the Axis was, in his opinion, unacceptable since, should the situation in the Pacific become dangerous to U. S. interests or to U. S. itself, it

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 95th meeting.<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 182.<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 351.

would be necessary to supplement U. S. forces in this theater even at the expense of the early defeat of Germany.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British proposal was not intended to restrict operations in the Pacific but rather to insure that any surplus forces which might become available could be concentrated on the early defeat of Germany, thus bringing the war as a whole to an end more rapidly.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that with regard to air forces, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed to put into the United Kingdom the maximum number of groups which could be maintained there. If, therefore, there was a surplus of air forces he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific which at present was operating on a shoestring and where great results could be achieved by relatively small additions to the forces in that area.

The U. S. Air Staff were more than anxious to implement the SICKLE plan since they believed that air superiority properly applied would produce devastating results. They were reluctant, therefore, to divert forces elsewhere at the expense of SICKLE. On the other hand, in the Pacific the Japanese with their good interior lines of communication could more rapidly concentrate their air forces and it was essential, therefore, to have a numerical as well as a combat ascendancy. No major concentration of Japanese forces had yet taken place in the Pacific; but if this should occur, our own forces might find themselves in a most difficult situation from which they would have to be retrieved. Public opinion in the United States would not permit the acceptance of major reverses in the Pacific. If, therefore, there was any surplus of forces above those required to undertake agreed operations, he believed that they should be sent to the Southwest Pacific to exploit and improve our position in that area.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he entirely agreed that any surplus forces, which might exist, should be sent to the Pacific, either for agreed operations or to defend the United States; but what he had meant to imply was that if operations in the Pacific were going well, it would be wiser, in order to eliminate Germany from the war, to send any surplus there might be either to the United Kingdom or to the Mediterranean.

THE COMMITTEE then accepted the addition of certain words to paragraph II *b* suggested by Sir Dudley Pound [*Sir Charles Portal?*].<sup>4</sup>

In discussing the subparagraph of paragraph III dealing with the concentration of maximum resources in a selected area, SIR CHARLES

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<sup>4</sup> According to King, p. 441, Portal's amendment reads as follows: "The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken".

PORTAL said that the words "in a selected area" might prove restrictive, since, as regards air forces, a saturation point might be reached in the United Kingdom. He believed that if additional forces were available they should attack the citadel of Europe from bases on all sides.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that it had already been agreed that the air offensive in Europe should be intensified without restricting the bases from which the forces should operate. He believed that all the decisions of the Conference must be reviewed at the next meeting or earlier if necessary, since, should Russia fall or make peace with Germany, it would be impossible to accomplish ROUNDHAMMER. It might therefore be necessary to reorient our strategy with a view to undertaking the defeat of Japan prior to that of Germany.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed as to the necessity of reviewing at the next conference all the decisions now taken, since it was vital to exploit any opportunities which arose. The position in southern Europe might well be such that we should take advantage of it.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph VII *b* dealing with the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be amended to make it clear that the decisions reached at the present conference should be examined in the light of the situation then existing.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested certain amendments to the Annex aimed at strengthening the case, on military grounds, for obtaining the Islands.

In discussing the amendment to paragraph III *i* of the Annex, which pointed out that the Islands provided the most direct all-weather air supply routes to Europe, Africa and the Far East, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would like it to be agreed that the requirements of anti-U-boat warfare must take first priority.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in C.C.S. 242/3.<sup>5</sup>

*b.* Agreed that with reference to Section IV, paragraph 3 *a* (5), no additional administrative or logistic commitments would be entered into without the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

*c.* Agreed that the security control agencies of the U.S. and U.K. should arrange for the necessary machinery for the production of deception policy and the coordination of cover plans for operations in the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters (Including Burma).

*d.* Agreed, with regard to paragraph 3 *i* of the Annex to C.C.S. 242/2, that when the use of the Azores is obtained, first priority must be given to the needs of anti-submarine warfare.

<sup>5</sup> For text of C.C.S. 242/3, see *post*, p. 359.

3. DIRECTIVE ON ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR HUSKY  
(C.C.S. 247)<sup>6</sup>

Without discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that consideration of this matter should be deferred until after the TRIDENT Conference.<sup>7</sup>

4. PROVISION OF NEW L.S.I. (L)'s  
(C.C.S. 248)<sup>8</sup>

SIR DUDLEY POUND asked that the following amendments should be made to this paper:

Paragraph 5 *b* (1), first sentence, to read: "the allocation for use by the British services of as many *Jay* ships as are suitable for conversion to L.S.I. (L)'s."

The final sentence of paragraph 5 *b* (2) to read: "and then after conversion temporarily allocated to British control."

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like further time to consider this paper.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

*a.* That certain amendments should be made to C.C.S. 248 as incorporated in C.C.S. 248/1.<sup>9</sup>

*b.* That action on this paper should be deferred.

5. REQUIREMENTS TO EXPAND THE CAPACITY OF THE AIR ROUTE TO CHINA

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a memorandum setting out certain requirements to enable the capacity of the air route to China to be expanded.<sup>10</sup>

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in view of the fact that a directive setting out the priority to be accorded to the expansion of the air route had already been sent to the U. S. and British authorities concerned

<sup>6</sup> C.C.S. 247, May 23, 1943, "Directive on Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY", not printed.

<sup>7</sup> For the text of the Directive on Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY as later agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 247/5/D, June 28, 1943, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 177, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: Special Studies*. For additional documentation regarding the American-British planning for military government in Sicily, see *ibid.*, chapter VII.

<sup>8</sup> C.C.S. 248, May 23, 1943, memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, not printed, recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be asked to authorize the allocation for use by the British of certain ships suitable for conversion to large landing ships (J.C.S. Files).

<sup>9</sup> C.C.S. 248/1, not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Not found.

in India and China, these requirements should also be transmitted to the authorities concerned.<sup>11</sup>

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:**

Agreed that the suggestion at *x* above<sup>12</sup> should be implemented by the U. S. and British Air Staffs in direct collaboration.

<sup>11</sup> For a summary of the Marshall directive of May 22, 1943, see Romanus and Sunderland, p. 342.

<sup>12</sup> An *x* appears in the source text alongside the latter part of the immediately preceding paragraph.

**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, MAY 24, 1943, 1 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**PRESENT**

**UNITED STATES**

President Roosevelt  
Vice President Wallace  
Mr. Hopkins

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lord Cherwell

*Editorial Note*

No official record of the substance of the discussion at this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). The following letter of May 30, 1943, from Cherwell to Hopkins indicates the general nature of the discussion:

"I was so sorry not to see you again on Tuesday [May 25] to make my adieux, especially as I wanted to thank you for all you had done to make my stay pleasant and profitable.

I understand that the matter we discussed was concluded satisfactorily and I am sure that this is largely due to your efforts. I am very glad, as it is certainly to everyone's advantage that the old conditions should be restored.

It was a great pleasure to have an opportunity of talking to the President and Vice-President on Post-war topics and I was delighted to find how closely I agreed with their line of thought. For arranging this once again, I am sure I must thank you.

I trust you will forgive this hasty typed note; it will at any rate save you the trouble of trying to decipher my handwriting." (Hopkins Papers)

The presence of Wallace, who was a member of the top American policy-making group on atomic energy, and Cherwell, who was intimately connected with the British atomic energy program, indicates that the atomic bomb project may also have been raised at this luncheon meeting. The Hopkins-Bush-Cherwell discussion on May 25 of the question of resuming the exchange of information on the

atomic bomb project (see Bush's memorandum of conversation, *post*, p. 209) was held after Churchill formally raised the matter, perhaps at this meeting.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 24, 1943, 4: 45 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
(C.C.S. 242/3)<sup>1</sup>

THE PRESIDENT indicated his satisfaction and that of the Prime Minister with regard to the unanimity of opinion and the satisfactory decisions that had been arrived at by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was particularly grateful that so much had been accomplished in such a short time. He said the Prime Minister recalled that in the last war decisions were made with undue speed. There was no organized group which corresponded to our Combined Chiefs of Staff which was able to provide continuity in the strategic direction of the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that "today we meet in the presence of a new fact"; namely, what might prove to be decisive progress in the anti-U-boat war. There were indications that there might be as many as 30 sinkings in May. If this continued, a striking change would come over the scene.

THE PRESIDENT then read the draft report contained in C.C.S. 242/3. There was complete agreement on all items until he came to paragraphs 6 and 7 under Section III. These were amended slightly.

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 359.

## SECTION III, PARAGRAPH 9—REARMAMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

With regard to paragraph 9 under Section III, ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the original paper provided only for the equipment of French Army Forces in North Africa. At his suggestion the paragraph was changed to apply to French Forces in Africa.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that Admiral Godefroy had received an order from Vichy to scuttle his ships in Alexandria. He had replied that he had definitely thrown in his lot with General Giraud's forces. As a result of this action the British Government would probably lift the pay ban on Godefroy's squadron. It was now Admiral Godefroy's desire that his heavy ships would proceed around the Cape, call at Dakar, and then proceed to the United States for refitting.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 1*a*—OPERATION TO SEIZE THE AZORES

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the political considerations involved in the seizure of the Azores must be considered. There was a possibility that the Islands might be secured without the necessity of utilizing a force as strong as 9 battalions. He suggested that a smaller force might approach the Azores in June. From 7 to 10 hours before its arrival, the Portuguese Government might be approached diplomatically and told that the force was en route. If they were received without opposition, the Portuguese Government would be reimbursed by whatever figure might be set. He thought the chances were possibly 3 to 1 that the Portuguese Government would submit.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he personally favored an expedition in sufficient force to take the Islands. His government, however, had not as yet authorized him to approve such action. The British cabinet members felt that the matter should be further discussed on his return.<sup>2</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if a smaller force could be assembled in June which would act as a threat to back up a diplomatic approach, he would favor such action. He thought the present success in the anti-submarine warfare made it even more imperative that the use of the Islands be obtained as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that if President Salazar refused to give his assent and the smaller force failed to attack, the Allied Forces would be in a bad position. They would have the humiliation of withdrawing; the Germans would know of the diplomatic approach and, as a result, would stiffen the resistance of the Islands.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had never liked the idea of being put in a position of permitting President Salazar to *call our bluff*. He was

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<sup>2</sup>The views of the British War Cabinet on this matter are set forth in the telegram of May 21, 1943, from Eden and Attlee to Churchill, *post*, p. 312, and the telegram of May 24, 1943, from Eden and Attlee, quoted in Eden, p. 455.

inclined to favor the approach with sufficient force to take the Islands in the event that President Salazar refused to permit a peaceful occupation.

GENERAL McNARNEY suggested the possibility of reinforcing the bluff by timing it with the sailing of a HUSKY convoy from the United Kingdom.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the earlier operation would have a good prospect of success as the Portuguese would have no way of knowing how strong the force was with which they were threatened.

GENERAL ISMAY said that a plan was being examined to see if something less than a full-scale operation could be mounted.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was content to leave paragraph 1 *a* of Section IV as it was written, and that he would discuss the matter with his government upon his return to England and let the President know the outcome of these discussions. He suggested the addition of the following sentences to the end of the paragraph: "The possibility of an earlier move will receive further study. The political decision involved will be settled in the meanwhile by the two governments."

THE PRESIDENT suggested that in his discussions with the Cabinet the Prime Minister might bear in mind the alternative of an approach to the Portuguese Government by the U.S.A. and Brazil. In any case, the idea that Brazil might provide the occupying force would be a strong factor in influencing the Portuguese Government to submit.

#### SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2*b*—CROSS-CHANNEL OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT then read paragraph 2 of Section IV regarding the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom and the cross-Channel operations. He asked if the decision as written in paragraph 2 *b* precluded the use of French Divisions in the assault to be made on the Continent.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the use of French Forces might be covered if the last subparagraph of paragraph 2 *b* could be changed to read "that the follow-up divisions might come from the United States or elsewhere."

THE PRESIDENT said, however, that he was considering the advisability of having a French Division as either one of the 9 assault divisions, or, at least, as one of the first 20 build-up divisions. He thought that politically it was of great importance to have the French represented in the first attempt to reconquer French soil.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if there was any possibility of this decision being communicated to the French.

THE PRIME MINISTER replied that he thought that would be extremely dangerous. General Giraud and General de Gaulle were soon

to have another meeting. He felt that this meeting might result in violent disputes. General Giraud had become stronger because of the Tunisian victories while de Gaulle would think, of course, that he was about to regain control. The important thing was not to let these two French generals create discord between the United States and the British. He did not feel reassured regarding the outcome of the Giraud-de Gaulle conference. He thought it extremely important not to inform the French of our decisions when there was the prospect of a split.<sup>3</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said he thought it was entirely satisfactory to leave any mention of the utilization of French Forces in the assault on the Continent out of the paper which was under consideration provided it was recorded in the minutes of the present meeting and if it was understood by the Staffs that serious consideration should be given to the participation of some French Forces early in the operation.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the decision regarding cross-Channel operations, as set forth in paragraph 2 *b* of Section IV, failed to make any mention of the month by month planning that was being undertaken by General Morgan in London for the purpose of insuring readiness on the part of such forces as were available in the United Kingdom in the event of the German crackup.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRESIDENT agreed that it would be a good idea to put agreed decisions concerning month by month planning in the report. He pointed out that it was impossible to tell when a break in the German resistance might take place. In the last war the first element of the German Forces to crack was the submarine crews. He felt that at the rate they were now losing submarines, that is, one a day, the crews would be unable to *stick it*. German submarine losses in 1918 were not as great as those they are now experiencing and yet they had induced a break in the German morale. Recently airplanes have entered two theaters of operations with definite objectives. These had failed to reach their objective by 10 or 20 miles, but it is known that the reports they rendered when they returned to their bases stated that the objectives had been reached. He thought that this

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<sup>3</sup> Discussions between de Gaulle and Giraud began at Algiers on May 31, 1943, and resulted in the agreement of June 3, 1943, providing for the unification of the French liberation movement and the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. For documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle in French North Africa and the steps leading to the recognition by the United States of the administrative authority of the French Committee of National Liberation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 23 ff., and *post*, pp. 320 ff.

<sup>4</sup> The planning done by General Morgan's staff during the first half of 1943 for the occupation of the Continent in case of a German collapse is described in Harrison, pp. 79-82.

was indicative of a bad state of morale and efficiency in the German Air Force. These conditions were bound to spread. As soon as the German ground forces learned that they did not have adequate air protection and that the U-boat campaign had failed, the news would spread rapidly and a serious break in morale might come unexpectedly. For these reasons it was essential that the Allies be prepared to take advantage of such conditions whenever they might occur. THE PRESIDENT also said that there had been rumors of a German evacuation of Norway. He thought that plans should be under preparation to take advantage of such a contingency.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that a subparagraph be put into the paper at the end of paragraph 2 *b* of Section IV which would read as follows: "Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date in order to take advantage of a collapse of the enemy in France, or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in the event of a German withdrawal."

In reply to a question by the President, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that for bombing operations, air bases in Norway would not be of great assistance. It would be more economical to utilize those in England than it would be to build new ones in Norway, especially since Norway would not greatly extend the bombing range. He added, however, that it would have a very beneficial effect if fighters could be based on air fields in southern Norway.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that if Norway could be occupied, it would reopen our communications with Russia. This fact, in itself, would make it imperative that immediate advantage be taken of the situation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the United States authorities would be kept informed of studies being made by General Morgan's Staff in this regard.

#### SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 2*c*—OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO ELIMINATE ITALY FROM THE WAR

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether the Poles were included in the forces detailed in this paragraph as available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean.

SIR ALAN BROOKE confirmed that these were included in the 19 British or Allied Divisions.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped that it was not the intention of this paragraph to commit us to carrying out particular operations. For example, he would be very much opposed to any idea of an operation to capture Sardinia as a sequel to HUSKY. This would be an eccentric operation, which would have no influence on the secur-

ing of the great prize open to us if we could take the *toe* and *heel* of Italy, and gain touch with the insurgents of the Balkan countries.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that it was stated in the paragraph that each specific operation would be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that General Eisenhower would not be able to tell which operation he could do after HUSKY until the situation had declared itself. The idea, therefore, was to plan several operations and to decide, at the meeting to be held after HUSKY had been launched, which of them to carry out.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was certainly difficult to foretell what the conditions would be. For example, it might be that a movement in Sardinia to separate from Mussolini's regime might gain way, and consequently comparatively small forces could gain possession of the island. Or again, as one report suggested, the Germans might decide to withdraw their forces behind the Po, in which case entry into southern Italy would be easy. It might be better to widen the instructions to General Eisenhower, and to tell him to prepare operations against all parts of southern Europe.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that General Eisenhower would prepare a number of different operations, and which of them was adopted would be determined when we saw how HUSKY went. General Eisenhower had already put in summaries of plans against the *heel* and *toe* of Italy, and against Sardinia, and had expressed a preference for Sardinia. Air Chief Marshal Tedder had dissented from this conclusion, mainly on account of the difficulties of staging an attack on Sardinia with adequate air support.<sup>5</sup>

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Air Chief Marshal Tedder had also thought that the value of northern Italy as a base from which to bomb Germany had been underrated.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that the prime factor which should be kept in mind was the position in the Balkans, where 34 Axis Divisions were held in play by rebels, who would become much more active if we could gain touch with them through Durazzo, or any other suitable point. Of course, if Italy went out of the war, then the Italian Divisions would have to withdraw, and Germany would either have to fill the gap, or retire to the Danube. The effect on Turkey would be very important. None of these effects could possibly accrue from an operation against Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that General Eisenhower would be instructed to prepare those operations which were best calculated to

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<sup>5</sup> The views of Eisenhower and Tedder regarding operations to be pursued after HUSKY are set forth in C.C.S. 223, May 14, 1943, *post*, p. 253.

eliminate Italy. It was the elimination of Italy which would place these prizes within our grasp, and the right operation to bring this about would depend upon the situation after HUSKY. Moreover, much would depend upon events on the Russian Front. It might be that the presence of large numbers of Germans in the *toe* and *heel* would make a direct assault on this unprofitable—in which case Sardinia would be a better choice.

THE PRIME MINISTER did not agree that Sardinia could be an acceptable alternative. Operations in the general direction of the Balkans opened up very wide prospects, whereas the capture of Sardinia would merely place in our possession a desirable island. There was nothing in the paper which would indicate to General Eisenhower that we held a view on this matter. The politico-strategic aspect would not be present in his mind.

THE PRESIDENT said he did not feel ready to make up his mind on this matter. Certainly there were greater advantages in going to places other than Sardinia, but he did not think we were ready yet to say where.

Discussion then took place on the exact meaning of the word to *mount* an operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that to mount an operation meant to draw up the plans, to allocate the forces, and to give them the necessary special training. HUSKY, for example, had been mounted during VULCAN. It was quite possible to mount more than one operation at a time, as considerable changes could always be made, and, indeed, had been made quite recently in the HUSKY plan.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that the word *mount* meant the fixing on a particular operation for execution to the exclusion of others. He did not think more than one operation at a time could be mounted with the same resources.

After some further discussion, THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that he should take further time to consider this paragraph, and said that he would propose certain amendments for consideration.

#### SECTION IV. PARAGRAPH 2*d*—THE BOMBING OF PLOEȘTI

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he hoped the bombing of Ploesti would not be carried out if it meant a considerable inroad into the preparatory aerial bombardment for HUSKY.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that the bombers which would be taken from the North African Theater to bomb Ploesti would only be away for four or five days. It was the units which would come from the United Kingdom which would be absent for a longer period.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the type of aircraft to be used was the B-24, which was not of such value for the HUSKY preparatory bombardment as the B-17. He thought that if Ploesti could be seriously damaged, it would be a blow of tremendous importance in support of operations on the Russian Front. The decision depended upon the comments and recommendations of the Commander in Chief, North African Theater.

SECTION IV, PARAGRAPH 3a—OPERATIONS IN THE BURMA-CHINA THEATER

THE PRESIDENT asked Mr. Hopkins what he thought the Generalissimo's reactions would be to these proposals.

MR. HOPKINS replied that he did not think that the Generalissimo should be told of the decisions reached in the Conference. He predicted that if he were told, he would not agree with them, although secretly he would not be unhappy about them. He would resent more than anything else not having been consulted. Mr. Hopkins suggested that Mr. Soong be told tomorrow that ANAKIM is to go on.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the Chinese would have to be told a little more about the operations than was proposed by Mr. Hopkins. The Chinese were constantly pressing to see him concerning the decisions that were made, and he felt it wise to tell them everything except the details concerning the capture of Akyab and Ramree Islands.

THE PRESIDENT said in this regard they simply should be told that an occupation of a base on the Burma Coast by amphibious operations was included in the decision but that the details would have to be worked out after further consideration.

THE PRIME MINISTER proposed that the Chinese should be informed as follows:

"Further study of ANAKIM has led to the following plan:

"1. A large scale build-up of air combat forces and a rapid build-up of the air transport route to China.

"2. A vigorous offensive in the northern part of Burma with the purpose of opening the Burma Road and regaining contact with China.

"3. Amphibious operations against the coast of Burma with the view to controlling communications in the Bay of Bengal."

THE PRIME MINISTER however, indicated that he would prepare a written suggestion as to what should be told to the Chinese.<sup>6</sup>

SECTION VI, PARAGRAPH 1—EQUIPMENT FOR TURKEY

THE PRIME MINISTER said he wished it definitely understood that the Turks would be informed regarding the origin of any equipment that

<sup>6</sup> For text of the draft statement considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 377.

was given to them from United States production. He felt that the same rule should apply to equipment given to Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in discussing the paragraph regarding equipment for Turkey, the United States Chiefs of Staff had been concerned more with the availability of the equipment and its effects on our training than they were with who received the credit for giving it to the Turks.

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood the situation perfectly.

THE PRESIDENT went on to consider the remainder of the paper which was agreed to in all its details by both him and the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that he would like to give further consideration to the paper. He proposed to submit a suggestion regarding the post-HUSKY operations in the Mediterranean and also a proposal regarding the information that was to be given to the Chinese concerning the Burma decisions. He suggested, therefore, that the meeting adjourn at this time to meet again at 1130 on Tuesday morning, 25 May 1943.

This was agreed to.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 24, 1943, EVENING,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Editorial Note*

None of the American participants made a record of the discussion at this meeting. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). Harriman's memorandum to Churchill, *post*, p. 314, indicates that such matters as tank production were considered. Ismay's presence at this meeting suggests that the British proposal for the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa may also have been discussed. Ismay, who was responsible for keeping Churchill apprised of the American-British negotiations on this issue, urged the Prime Minister on May 24 (see Ismay's memorandum, *post*, p. 342) to "go into action" with Roosevelt on this question.

At this meeting, but quite possibly after their advisers had departed.

Churchill requested of Roosevelt that Marshall be allowed to accompany the Prime Minister's party on a visit to Algiers following the conclusion of the Conference in Washington. The Stimson Diary for May 25, 1943 relates the following information regarding the Churchill request:

"Before luncheon I learned that last night in a solitary debate between the President and the Prime Minister over some one of the points in which they both differed and differed vigorously, the Prime Minister . . . fought to the end and finally said, 'Well, I will give up my part of this if you will let me have George Marshall to go for a trip to Africa'; and the President traded on the spot, took the point, and let Marshall go. Marshall told me of it and said he rather hated to be traded like a piece of baggage. I think I know pretty well what the Prime Minister has in prospect. He is going to take Marshall along with him in order to work on him to yield on some of the points that Marshall has held out in regard to the Prime Minister's desired excursions in the eastern Mediterranean; but to think of picking out the strongest man there is in America, and Marshall is surely that today, the one on whom the fate of the war depends, and then to deprive him in a gamble of a much needed opportunity to recoup his strength by about three days' rest and send him off on a difficult and rather dangerous trip across the Atlantic Ocean where he is not needed except for Churchill's purposes is I think going pretty far. But nobody has any say and Marshall is going to pack up his bag tonight and start on his hard trip tomorrow morning on about twelve hours' notice." (Stimson Papers)

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TUESDAY, MAY 25, 1943

HOPKINS-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, FORENOON,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this conversation has been found. The information set forth above is derived from the account in Alanbrooke (p. 514) which indicates that Hopkins persuaded Churchill to give up his attempt to obtain a radical revision of the Final Report and to settle, instead, for some minor changes. Churchill (*Hinge of Fate*, p. 810) recalls having been warned by Hopkins of the futility of pressing his recommendations regarding post-HUSKY operations.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, MAY 25, 1943,  
10:30 A. M., ROOM 240, COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Horne  
Major General Fairchild  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Major General Streett  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Colonel Cabell  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Major General Holmes  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Jacob  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier Redman  
Brigadier General Deane  
Commander Coleridge  
Lieutenant Colonel Vittrup

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MINUTES OF THE 95TH MEETING<sup>2</sup>

ADMIRAL KING suggested an amendment to Conclusion *c* of Item 2.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the Conclusions of the 95th Meeting as recorded in the Minutes, but with the substitution of the word "Pacific" for "Indian" in Conclusion *c* of Item 2 and the addition of the words "(including Burma)" after the words "Far Eastern Theaters."

## 2. FINAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

(C.C.S. 242/4 and 242/5)<sup>3</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them C.C.S. 242/4, together with certain amendments suggested by the Prime Minister (C.C.S. 242/5).

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 96th meeting.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 184.

<sup>3</sup> C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, *post*, p. 359, as considered and revised during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24 (*ante*, p. 189), was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, not printed. C.C.S. 242/5, May 25, 1943, is printed *post*, p. 363. C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 364, the approved version of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, incorporated the amendments suggested by Churchill as well as the revisions of C.C.S. 242/4 made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the course of this meeting.

Certain other minor amendments were suggested and approved.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the final report to the President and Prime Minister, as modified by C.C.S. 242/5 and as amended in the course of discussion.

3. IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TRIDENT  
CONFERENCE  
(C.C.S. 250) <sup>4</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering suggested directives and instructions to General Eisenhower and General Morgan, prepared in the light of the decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conference.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested an amendment to paragraph 1 *c* of the Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered certain amendments to the draft directives contained in Enclosures "A" and "B."

GENERAL MARSHALL presented a proposal that an additional statement be added at the end of paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 250 to the effect that shipping available for Post-HUSKY Mediterranean operations would amount to 15 combat loaders and 90 cargo ships.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL indicated that he thought that before the British Chiefs of Staff could agree to specify an exact number of ships the matter would have to be explored further.

ADMIRAL KING suggested adding the statement at the end of paragraph one: "Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships."

ADMIRAL KING's proposal was agreed to.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the recommendations in the covering Memorandum to the Combined Staff Planners, as amended, be approved, but that the final directives be prepared by the Secretariat in the light of the discussion and of the latest decisions.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved the covering memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners as amended in the course of discussion.<sup>5</sup>

*b.* Approved the draft directive to General Eisenhower (Enclosure "A") and the draft supplementary directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate) (Enclosure "B"), subject to the incorporation therein by the Secretaries of the agreed decisions that had been arrived at subsequent to the preparation of these draft directives.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> C.C.S. 250, May 24, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners, not printed. For the final version of the memorandum as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 250/1, *post*, p. 284.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 284.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, pp. 284 and 286.

#### 4. SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE (Unnumbered C.C.S. Memorandum dated 25 May 1943)<sup>7</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that since he had a meeting with the Chinese Representatives at 3 p. m. that afternoon he would like guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to the form in which the decisions of the Conference should be conveyed to the Chinese.<sup>8</sup> He urged that the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with reference to Burma be presented as proposals since it would be improper to imply a decision had been made regarding the use of the Generalissimo's forces.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were of the opinion that the formal transmission of the decisions to the Chinese should be made by the President and Prime Minister to the Generalissimo.

Certain amendments to the draft contained in the memorandum under discussion were then inserted in order to conform to this conception.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved with minor amendments, the suggested statement to be made to the Chinese.\*

#### 5. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING COMBINED PLANNING (C.C.S. 251)<sup>9</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain proposals for improving Combined Planning.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested an amendment to paragraph 2 *a* of the Memorandum designed to make it clear that the war against Japan should be considered as a whole.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that paragraph 2 *b* should be eliminated since, in his view, the function of the Combined Staff Planners was to advise the Combined Chiefs of Staff on plans prepared by theater commanders and not to personally assist theater commanders. He felt that the presence of the Combined Staff Planners at theater headquarters might interfere with the function of theater commanders and their staffs.

ADMIRAL COOKE and CAPTAIN LAMBE explained that this paragraph had been inserted since it was believed that the Combined Staff Plan-

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 377.

<sup>8</sup> No record has been found of Marshall's meeting with the Chinese representatives. See the editorial note, *post*, p. 208.

<sup>\*</sup> Subsequently published as Annex to the White House Minutes, 25 May 1943. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 204.]

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

ners could, if they visited General Eisenhower's headquarters, prove useful by imparting information and data as regards resources which would assist him in drawing up his plans and, at the same time, themselves learn at an early stage of the possible plans and requirements.

**THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—**

Approved the proposals put forward by the Combined Staff Planners, subject to certain amendments which have been incorporated in C.C.S. 251/1.<sup>10</sup>

**6. CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE**

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would like to express most heartfelt thanks for the kindness, both official and unofficial, which the British Chiefs of Staff had received during their visit. They had been met in a spirit of cooperation which had proved most helpful. The fundamental value of the exchange of views between the Chiefs of Staff of the two Nations had been proved by the fact that they had agreed to hold the next Conference at an early date. Short periods between meetings were, he felt, essential. If the lapse of time between successive meetings was too long, the views of each nation were more likely to become divergent.

SIR ALAN BROOKE paid tribute to the Combined Staff Planners who had worked at great pressure and whose high standard of work had gone far to assist the Combined Chiefs of Staff in reaching rapid decisions.

With regard to the results of the Conference, agreement had been reached on all vital points and through the process of reaching agreement, each side had achieved a clearer appreciation of the outlook and conception of the other. Finally, the Conference had strengthened those ties of friendship between the two Staffs, which was so essential to true cooperation in the war.

ADMIRAL LEAHY, on behalf of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, said that they too had an equal appreciation of the value of this conference and looked forward with assurance to equally successful results from future conferences. Frequent meetings were, in his opinion, essential. It had been a great pleasure to him to assist, for the first time, in personal consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff. This Conference had enabled the Chiefs of Staff to clarify the outlook for the immediate future and subsequent conferences would enable them to deal as successfully with future problems.

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, MAY 25, 1943, 11:30 A. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
Lieutenant General McNarney

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Brigadier Jacob

J. C. S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. EMPLOYMENT OF THE POLES

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had had a strong appeal from General Sikorski for the employment of the Polish troops in battle in the near future. He hoped that these good troops could be made use of.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the Polish troops in the United Kingdom, which amounted to one armored division and one brigade, had been included in the forces earmarked for ROUNDHAMMER; and the two Polish Divisions and certain minor formations now in Iraq had been included in the 19 British and Allied Divisions available for further operations in the Mediterranean.<sup>1</sup>

2. FINAL REPORT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
AND PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/4); AND AMENDMENTS THERETO  
SUGGESTED BY THE PRIME MINISTER (C.C.S. 242/5)<sup>2</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF reported that they were in entire agreement with the amendments proposed by the Prime Minister and would incorporate these in the final edition of the report.

<sup>1</sup> For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the evacuation of Polish troops and civilians from the Soviet Union to Iran in the spring of 1942, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 100-185, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, *post*, p. 359, as considered and revised during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24 (*ante*, p. 189), was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, not printed. C.C.S. 242/5, May 25, 1943, is printed *post*, p. 363. C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 364, the approved version of the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, incorporated the amendments suggested by Churchill as well as the revisions of C.C.S. 242/4 made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their meeting on the morning of May 25 (*supra*).

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that it would be necessary to give a version of the report to the Russians. This version could be drawn up in suitable form for handing to the Russians through the normal official channels. This would obviate the necessity for an explanatory telegram from the President and himself. The message could simply be sent saying that a full report would be reaching them through the American and British representatives in Moscow.

THE PRESIDENT and the PRIME MINISTER:—

*a.* Gave final approval to the report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended in accordance with the Prime Minister's suggestions.

*b.* Instructed the Secretaries to prepare for their approval a version of the report suitable for communication to the Russians through the normal official channels.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. COMMUNICATION OF CERTAIN DECISIONS TO THE CHINESE

THE CONFERENCE had before them a suggested phraseology to be employed in communicating to the Chinese the decisions regarding operations in the Burma-China Theater, which had been suggested by the Prime Minister. (Shown in the Annex to these Minutes.)<sup>4</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had certain minor modifications to propose (which he read to the President and the Prime Minister), apart from which they were in entire agreement with the Prime Minister's suggestion.

After further discussion, it was agreed:—

That the President and General Marshall should make use of the form of words contained in the Annex to these minutes in conversation with Dr. Soong and General Chu respectively, and should hand them copies of the document for their retention.<sup>5</sup>

### 4. OFFICIAL STATEMENT FOR THE PRESS

THE PRESIDENT said that it would be necessary to consider the terms of a statement to be given to the Press at a suitable moment after the Prime Minister had left Washington.

MR. HARRY HOPKINS said that he had drafted a statement, and he proceeded to read his draft to the Conference.<sup>6</sup>

General agreement was expressed with the terms of the draft, and Mr. Hopkins was asked to prepare it in final form for issue.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> For the draft report for transmission to Stalin, prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 379.

<sup>4</sup> Text of the proposed communication to the Chinese authorities is printed *post*, p. 378. For the original text of the proposed communication to the Chinese, prior to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. unnumbered memorandum, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 377.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the Roosevelt-Soong and Marshall-Chu meetings, see the editorial notes, *post*, p. 208.

<sup>6</sup> For text of the draft statement referred to here, see *post*, p. 373.

<sup>7</sup> For revised draft statement, see *post*, p. 374.

#### 5. VISIT OF GENERAL STILWELL AND GENERAL CHENNAULT TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

THE PRIME MINISTER said that it would be of very great value if General Stilwell and General Chennault, with their unrivaled knowledge of the Burma-China Theater, could return to their posts via London. He understood that the route through London was actually three days shorter than the route across the Southern Atlantic; and since Field Marshal Wavell and Admiral Somerville would also be going to London, the visit of the two generals would serve to give a great impetus to the work necessary to enable the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Burma-China Theater to be implemented.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he was entirely agreeable to this suggestion and would issue the necessary orders.<sup>8</sup>

#### 6. POST-HUSKY OPERATIONS

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister would shortly have an opportunity of talking to the Commanders in Chief in North Africa on post-HUSKY policy, and had suggested that it would be of great value if General Marshall could accompany him.<sup>9</sup> He (the President) had accordingly spoken to General Marshall,<sup>10</sup> and asked whether he could defer his visit to the Southwest Pacific in order to fall in with the Prime Minister's request. General Marshall had said that he was perfectly willing to do this.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained that he would feel awkward in discussing these matters with General Eisenhower without the presence of a United States representative on the highest level. If decisions were taken, it might subsequently be thought that he had exerted undue influence. It was accordingly a source of great gratification to him to hear that General Marshall would accompany him; and he was sure that it would now be possible to arrange everything satisfactorily

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<sup>8</sup> According to the account in Chennault, *Way of a Fighter*, p. 227, Churchill had earlier invited Chennault to return with him to England for a visit, but Chennault's anxiety over the operations in China had forced him to decline the invitation. On his return trip to China, Stilwell did stop at London, where he conferred with British officials regarding future operations in the China-Burma area. Stilwell's undated summary of the events of the Conference in Washington are printed in Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), pp. 204-206.

<sup>9</sup> Churchill's request that Marshall accompany him to North Africa was made during the meeting with Roosevelt on the evening of May 24; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 198.

<sup>10</sup> According to the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers), Marshall met with Roosevelt at 11:20 a. m., just prior to this meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill.

in Algiers, and for a report to be sent back to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.<sup>11</sup>

#### 7. CODE NAMES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended the adoption of certain code names, a list of which he handed to the President.

In discussion, certain modifications to the list were agreed upon.

The final list as approved has been given to those immediately concerned.<sup>12</sup>

#### 8. THE PLOUGH SCHEME

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Conference a report which he had received upon the state of training and readiness for action of the force which had been specially set aside and trained for the PLOUGH scheme. It was the firm opinion of all the United States and British officers concerned in the matter that this force, which numbered some 2,500 men, should be given battle experience as soon as possible. The force, which had been given amphibious training in addition to the special training for the PLOUGH scheme, had been worked up to a high pitch of readiness, and provided it were not uselessly dissipated, it would greatly benefit by coming into action. It could be reassembled for its proper role before the winter. There were a number of possible places where the force might be utilized, such as the Aleutians, or post-HUSKY operations, or for commando raids from the U.K. or even in the Azores. It was perhaps a pity that they had not been employed in the operations against Attu, but an opportunity might occur for using them in another operation in that area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the value of the force would be greatly increased by early participation in battle.

GENERAL MCNARNEY said that the improved type of vehicle for use by the force would be ready about the middle of October.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this force had been designed for a particular type of warfare and it would be a great pity to dissipate it if there were a chance of its real role coming to the fore. Nevertheless, he thought that it would be quite easy to create an opportunity for its employment if it was sent to the United Kingdom. It might be possible, for example, to repeat a raid on the coast of Norway of the type of the raid on the Lofoten Islands.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that it would be necessary also to consider the utilization of the Norwegian battalion now in the United States.

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<sup>11</sup> For accounts of the Algiers Conference, May 20–June 3, 1943, see Matloff, pp. 153–155, and Garland and Smyth, chapter II.

<sup>12</sup> C.C.S. 249, not printed.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed. He suggested that the British Chiefs of Staff should consider this matter immediately and make specific proposals to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

This suggestion was agreed to.

#### 9. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

THE PRESIDENT asked whether any steps had been taken to concert measures with the Russians in case of an attack by Japan on Russia.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that an attempt had been made to discuss this eventuality with the Russians, and General Bradley had been sent to Moscow for the purpose. After three months' negotiation, it had been agreed that he should survey the air fields in Siberia, but the Russians had then reversed the decision and the whole proposal had fallen to the ground.<sup>13</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said that the Russians naturally did not wish to permit any act which might compromise them in the eyes of the Japanese. Nevertheless, it would be a pity if the occasion arose and no plans had been made. It might be desirable, for example, to send forces to help the Russians to hold Kamchatka.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed, but thought the Russians would be unlikely to be forthcoming. He suggested that one way of making progress would be to say to the Russians that we would be prepared to send them so many squadrons of aircraft so many days after the outbreak of the war with Japan. We could tell the Russians that they could count on this reinforcement in making their plans. This might lead them on to discussion.

GENERAL McNARNEY said that this proposal had in fact been made, but the only Russian response had been to suggest that the aircraft should be given to them so that they could fly them themselves.

ADMIRAL KING said that a running study was in existence of the possibilities presented by a Russo-Japanese war, and this had been reviewed three months previously. Little, however, could be done without additional data.

THE CONFERENCE took note of the above discussion.

#### 10. ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONFERENCE

The TRIDENT Conference then adjourned, the Prime Minister expressing his gratitude for the warm welcome which he had received and his appreciation of the work which had been accomplished.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> For an account of the Bradley Mission to the Soviet Union, July–November 1942, see Matloff and Snell, pp. 339–346. For documentation regarding the Mission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 607–622 and 720–726, *passim*.

<sup>14</sup> After the conclusion of the meeting, a luncheon was held at the White House for the participants in the Conference and for other high-ranking officials. The guest list is given in Sherwood, pp. 729–730.

ROOSEVELT-SOONG MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, 2:45 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

CHINA  
Foreign Minister Soong

*Editorial Note*

Roosevelt made no record of the discussion at this meeting. The information set forth above is derived from the President's Appointment Calendar (Roosevelt Papers). At this meeting, Roosevelt presumably transmitted to Soong the report to the Chinese authorities on the results of the Conference. The text of the proposed communication to the Chinese, which is printed *post*, p. 378, was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, *ante*, p. 204. Chiang's message of May 29, 1943, to Roosevelt, replying to the communication transmitted to Soong, is printed *post*, p. 385.

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MARSHALL-CHU CONVERSATION, MAY 25, 1943, [3 P. M.?]

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
General Marshall

CHINA  
Major General Chu

*Editorial Note*

No records have been found which would confirm the holding of this conversation. The scheduling of the meeting, the purpose of which was the transmission to the Chinese authorities of a report on the Conference, is referred to in Marshall's remarks during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, *ante*, p. 201, as well as in the conclusion to item 3 of the record of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25, *ante*, p. 204. A memorandum of May 24, 1943, from Deane to Marshall, not printed, indicates that Chu planned to call on Marshall at 9 a. m. on May 25 (J.C.S. Files). There is no evidence that such a meeting was held, and it appears probable that the meeting scheduled for 9 a. m. was postponed to 3 p. m. The text of the proposed communication to the Chinese authorities is printed *post*, p. 378.

HOPKINS-BUSH-CHERWELL MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, 3:30 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Bush

UNITED KINGDOM

Lord Cherwell

Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research  
and Development (Bush)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1943.

Mr. Hopkins called me on the telephone and told me that the Prime Minister had formally raised the question of interchange on S-1, and asked me to confer with Lord Cherwell in his office to see if there could be a meeting of minds.

I met Mr. Hopkins and Lord Cherwell at 3:30. Lord Cherwell asked that I state why we had altered our policy in regard to interchange on this subject. In reply, I traced the entire subject from the standpoint of its organization, beginning with the Briggs Committee and going through the NDRC handling, the taking over by the military, the existence of the Military Committee, and the Policy Group consisting of the Vice President and others.<sup>2</sup> I then outlined the way in which the present policy had been adopted by these groups, making it clear that a new policy was needed at the time that the matter went into production in the hands of the Army, inasmuch as OSRD previously had had to do only with the scientific angles. I then outlined the principle which was adopted and outlined its application. I then asked Lord Cherwell whether they disagreed with the principle itself or with the way in which it was being applied. He stated that he disagreed with the principle itself.

We then had a considerable discussion in which I outlined that this was a principle that was applied generally. I also made it clear that the reason for the restriction of information to those who could use it in this war was for security purposes. I made it clear that this

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<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt apparently first learned of the substance of this meeting from Bush on June 24, 1943. For an account of the President's reaction to the report on the meeting, see *post*, p. 631. Also in connection with this meeting, see Cherwell's letter of May 30, 1943, to Hopkins, which is quoted in the editorial note to the Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting of May 24, 1943, *ante*, p. 188.

<sup>2</sup> The committees referred to in this sentence were those United States bodies established at various times from 1939 onward to deal with the atomic bomb project. For a narrative account of the organizational development of the project, see Hewlett and Anderson, chapters 2 and 3.

was being applied impartially and that there were groups such as the Naval Research Laboratory which wished much more information but were not being given it because they could not utilize it in this war.

Incidentally, in discussing the reasons for a restricted policy, namely security, I told Lord Cherwell that, if we were to furnish the manufacturing information freely at all points to the British, we could not then very well refuse to pass similar information from one American company to another, that we had at the present time each company confined to its proper field, that no information was being passed beyond that necessary for each company to operate properly therein, and that we would feel that it was undesirable from a security standpoint to pass the information around more freely than this in American companies. He stated that of course if we furnished the manufacturing information it would be to the British Government, and I stated that of course I would assume that the British Government would immediately have to work with some company such as I.C.I. in order to utilize the information effectively, which he did not contest.

On my insistence that, under the present plans, the British could not use for the purposes of this war the information on the manufacturing process, Lord Cherwell agreed that this was true as far as the present plans go. He also stated, however, that, unless this manufacturing information was furnished to the British, they might feel impelled to alter the plans and go into manufacturing themselves, to the disadvantage of the balance of the war effort. I pressed him on the question as to whether they would expect in this way to attain results useful in this war, and he did not insist that they could. The matter finally came down to the point where he admitted rather freely that the real reason they wished this information at this time was so that after the war they could then at that time go into manufacture and produce the weapon for themselves, so that they would depend upon us during this war for the weapon but would be prepared after this war to put themselves in a position to do the job promptly themselves. He disclaimed the commercial aspects. He felt that it would be five or ten years before the matter came into use commercially, and that if commercial usage was indicated after study the British could readily go into that aspect of the subject. It was quite clear, and Mr. Hopkins reiterated it and emphasized it, that the reason the British wish the information was so that in the period immediately after this war they would be able to develop the weapon for themselves very promptly and not after a considerable interval.

The matter having gotten very definitely boiled down to this one point, I took the point of view, in which Mr. Hopkins joined me, that delivery of information to the British for after-the-war military rea-

sons was a subject which needed to be approached quite on its own merits, and that this question is tied up with the large problem of international relations on this whole subject from a long-term viewpoint. Lord Cherwell stated that there was a connection, because unless the British could now be assured that they would have this information for the above purpose they might have to divert some of their war effort in order to get it. He stated that he did not wish to say that they would do this, that it was up to the Prime Minister, but that they might feel that they were constrained to do so in order that their position immediately after the war might be properly secure. He made it clear, of course, that he did not mean secure as against the United States, but rather as against some other country which might have it far developed at that time. Mr. Hopkins said some things about one administration not being able to commit a succeeding one, except where the matter was incorporated in a treaty.

In conclusion, Mr. Hopkins stated that he now had the point very definitely in mind for the first time, and that he understood now exactly what was the point at issue. He evidently intends to talk to the President about it, although he did not say so. I asked him whether he wished me at this time, in view of the new angle of the matter, to discuss it in any way with Mr. Wallace or Mr. Stimson. He stated that there was nothing further that he wished me to do, that he did not think that I should take the matter up with either of those men at the present time, and I said to him that I would sit tight and do nothing unless and until I heard from him further on the matter.

V. BUSH

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, MAY 25, 1943,  
4:03 P. M., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE WHITE  
HOUSE

Roosevelt Papers

*Record of the Joint Press Conference by President Roosevelt and  
Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

THE PRESIDENT: (to the Prime Minister) If you don't mind, I will make these three little announcements first.

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<sup>1</sup>Presidential Press Conference No. 899. The parenthetical insertions appear in the source text and were presumably supplied by the White House Press Office. For full text of this press conference, see Rosenman, pp. 214-224. Another version of Churchill's remarks during this conference is printed in Churchill, *War Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 461-463, where it is noted that some 150 press representatives were present.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Yes.

(a long wait here as newspapermen continue to file in)

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I think, if our old-time friend will pardon me for about five minutes or less, I will give you one or two things that really ought to be said.

[Here follow statements by the President regarding certain domestic matters.]

And at this point I think I had better go off the record, and turn the meeting over to my distinguished colleague.

We are awfully glad to have Mr. Churchill back here. I don't have—I don't have to tell him that. All he has to do is to read the papers, and look into the faces of any American. He is very welcome.

I don't think we have very much to tell you, except that we are making exceedingly good progress, and taking up a—a matter which I spoke of the other day, the total war—the global war, which considering the—the size of our problems, these discussions have been done in practically record time.

And so I am going to turn the meeting over to Mr. Churchill, and I—I think that he will be willing to answer almost—with stress on the *almost*—any question. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in Australia there is a very great fear as to the Japanese threat in that area. What is your feeling about the matter?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The threat is certainly, in our opinion, less serious than it was when I saw you last in this room (December 23, 1941).

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what can you tell us generally about the plans for the future, probably beginning with Europe?

THE PRIME MINISTER: A very expansive topic,—(laughter)—

Q. (interjecting) Yes, sir.

Q. (aside) Expansive?

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing)—and one which leads very early to difficult country; but our plans for the future are to wage this war until unconditional surrender is procured from all those who have molested us, and—and this applies equally to Asia and to Europe. It used to apply to—quite recently—to Africa.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that word “molestation,” or “molesting” is one of the best examples of your habitual understatement that I know. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, could you say anything about how well satisfied you are with the way things are going on the fighting fronts?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much more satisfied than I was

when I was here last (June 18, 1942). (laughter) It was within this—this—not in this room—that the President handed me the telegram of the surrender of Tobruk. And as I have mentioned to him, I don't think there was anybody—any Englishman in the United States so unhappy, as I was that day, since Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga. (loud laughter)

But the situation is very different now. The—the plans which were made then in June, and before June, and the movements of troops which were set in motion before June last, enabled us to alter the balance of the affairs in Africa entirely. And we opened our offensive in Alamein on the 23rd of October. The United States and British descent upon North Africa began on the eighth of November, and since then we have already had a very great measure of—of success, culminating in decisive victory of proportions equal to any of the great victories that have been—that have been won: complete obliteration of the enemy.

And too, while this has been going on, our Russian Ally who this time last year was subject to very—well, who in June last year was subject to the beginning of a very heavy and possibly deadly offensive by the Germans, and it seemed that they might well lose the Caucasus, has gained another series of successes, culminating in Stalingrad.

And Hitler has been struck with two—two immense blows, tremendous shattering blows: in Tunisia, and at Stalingrad. And from every point of view we must regard the last ten or eleven months as examples of highly successful war—a perfectly indisputable turning of the tide.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, on this question of Russia. After you spoke to Congress,<sup>2</sup> Senator (Albert B.) Chandler (Democrat of Kentucky), who is from my State, issued a statement saying that while you had promised Great Britain would stay to fight Japan to the end, you could not promise Russia would. Of course, there are reasons for this, but do you care to say anything? In your opinion of Russia's self-interest, would it lead her to fight Japan after the European war?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh well, it's one of those oversights that I haven't been placed in the position to give directions to Russia, as he mentions. (laughter)

And I have this feeling, that those people have been doing such a tremendous job facing this enormous mass—they have done what nobody else was in a position to do: torn a large part of the guts out of the German army. And they have suffered very grievous losses. They are battling with, as I said to the Congress, 190 German divisions—not up to strength, of course—and 28 satellite divisions from the

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<sup>2</sup> See the editorial note, *ante*, p. 117.

different countries that Hitler gathered around him in his attack on Russia. They are bearing all that weight, and I certainly have not felt that I ought to suggest to my government asking more of them.

But their strength may grow as time goes on. They must know that Japan has watched them with a purely opportunist eye. But it isn't for me at all to make any suggestions to them at all.

They have been grand Allies; and of course they have shown it in heroic fashion. They have struck blows that no one else could strike, and they have endured losses that no one power has ever been capable of enduring, and continuing an effective and even a growing factor in the field.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, what do you think of the dissolution of the Comintern? <sup>3</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I like it—(laughter)—I like it.

Q. To get back to Russia, sir, are you confident that the Russians will be able to hold out this year, as they have in past years?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly think that they have a much better prospect of holding out this year than they had the previous time. Indeed, I must express my full confidence that they will hurl back any attack which is made upon them.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, in the light of developments since your speech to Congress, would you care to make any general statement concerning the experiment of bombing Germany into submission?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I haven't had very much time to go on with the experiment since I spoke to Congress. (laughter)

We have had the heaviest raid we have ever had, the—the raid on Dortmund (Germany), where 2 thousand tons were cast down upon them with, I believe, highly satisfactory results.

And also, it has been an extremely good week for the United States air forces in Great Britain—in the United Kingdom. They—they made, I think, four heavy daylight attacks, which are judged to be extremely successful. Precision bombing in the daylight, of course, in proportion to the weight of bombs dropped, produces a more decisive effect—more than the night bombing, because it goes to more specific targets precise and accurate.

THE PRESIDENT: You know, I think that's something that hasn't been brought out, and that is that the night bombing over Europe carries more weight of explosives; but of course being night-time the precision of the actual bombing can't be so great as the day bombing, which carries less explosives but with more precision because it's daylight. On the whole, the combination of the two, day *and* night, is achieving a more and more satisfactory result.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 174, footnote 3.

THE PRIME MINISTER: It's like running a twenty-four hour service. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you any comment to make upon relations between General (Henri Honoré) Giraud and General (Charles) de Gaulle?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I have—I am very glad to see that apparently it's improved, and that there is to be a meeting, judging only from what I read in the—in the organs which you gentlemen sustain—(laughter)—and serve.

But certainly it is—it will be very satisfactory if all this backchat comes to an end, and Frenchmen who are fighting to relieve and liberate their country get together and look forward to the future instead of backward on the past, and think of the great duty they owe to France rather than to any factional interest.

MR. GODWIN: Mr. Prime Minister, the last time you spoke to us you used a term that I have remembered, because you said that you were not going to rely on an internal collapse of Germany, rather would you rely on an external knockout, at that time. Well, since then you have worked on Germany and the Occupied countries a good deal, and there are constantly recurring evidences that the German people may be getting close to "had enough." We still are working for this knockout, but have you any further light on that for us—on the internal collapse?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I stand pat on the knockout. (laughter) But, of course, any windfall will be gratefully accepted. (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, some quarters interpret your remarks to Congress on bombing to mean that other methods, which you said should not be excluded, should be postponed until the termination of the experiment.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Oh, No. That would be a most—a most distorted deduction to draw. I said—I said there is no reason why the experiment should not be continued, provided other methods are not excluded—I mean other simultaneous methods, or current methods, are not excluded.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, whenever you and the President confer, the rumor always goes around that you are about to pick an Allied commander in the European theatre. Could you tell us whether you have done that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Done what?

Q. Picked an Allied commander for the European theatre?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, we have—we have an Allied commander in the theatre that is at present in force in Northwest Africa.

Q. I was thinking of the next one, sir? (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: No step of that kind has been taken at the present moment, because the great preparations that are going forward—

Q. (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, back to Australia—

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing)—haven't got to the point where the executive commander has to be chosen.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister,—

MISS MAY CRAIG: (interposing) Mr. Prime Minister, this may be an oversight, or you might not have been informed of this either, but I am curious to know what you think is going on in Hitler's mind now? (much laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have very little doubt that if he could have the past back he would probably play his hand a little differently. I think he would have hesitated long, before he rejected all the repeated peace efforts that were made by Great Britain, which even brought the name of our government into disrepute, so far did we go on the path of trying to placate and appease.

But he then got out of the period where he was restoring his country to its place among the countries of Europe. He had achieved that, but that wasn't what he was after at all. Appetite unbridled, ambition unmeasured—all the world! There was no end to the appetite of this—of this wicked man. I should say he repents now that he did not curb his passion before he brought such a great portion of the world against him and his country.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you think it's a sound assumption that he still has a mind? (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: Do I think what?

Q. Do you think it's a sound assumption that he still has a mind?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I have no reason to suppose that he isn't in control of his faculties, and of the resources of his country. But, of course, I haven't the same facilities of acquainting myself with what is going on there, as I fortunately have on what is going on in the United States. (laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, do you care to say anything about Mussolini, and Italy? Is there any hint or news that you can bring us on that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: You know as much as I do about that. I think they are a softer proposition than Germany—

Q. (interposing) What kind of proposition?

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) softer.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Softer—but I wouldn't count on anything but the force of arms. It may be aided at any time by a change of

heart on the part of the enemy's country—countries, a weakening of morale.

Italy—nobody proposes to take the native soil of Italy away from the Italian people. They will have their life. They will have their life in the new Europe. They have sinned—erred—by allowing themselves to be led by the nose by a very elaborate tyranny which was imposed upon them so that it gripped every part of their life. The one-party totalitarian system, plus the secret police applied over a number of years is capable of completely obliterating the sense of personal liberty.

And thus they were led by intriguing leaders—who thought they had got the chance of five thousand years in aggrandizing themselves by the misfortunes of their neighbors who had not offended them in any way—into this terrible plight in which they find themselves.

I think they would be very well advised to dismiss those leaders, and—and throw themselves upon the—upon the justice of those they have so grievously offended. We—we should not stain our names before posterity by cruel and inhuman acts. We have our own reputation to consider. But after all it really is a matter for them to settle among themselves, and settle with their leaders.

All we can do is to apply those physical stimuli—(laughter)—which in default of moral sanctions are—are sometimes capable of inducing a better state of mind in recalcitrant individuals and recalcitrant nations. (more laughter)

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there has been a lot of interest in the experts from India you brought with you. Would you care to comment about the situation in India, or China?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I am very anxious to increase the intensity of the war effort against Japan, and therefore brought these commanders-in-chief in order that they could meet with the United States officers, and particularly with those who have been serving with such effect in China, like General (Claire) Chennault and General (Joseph W.) Stilwell, and the high officers here, because it is evident that the war in that theatre must be prosecuted with the very greatest vigor, and on the best lines. And we have been talking a great deal about that, and thinking a great deal, and have arrived at conclusions which I believe are sound—are good.

When I was here—when I saw you last in—in December 1941, or January 1942—I forget which it was—when I did, of course, this question of priority—which was first and which was second of the two great theatres and antagonists—assumed a much more sharp form than at the present time. Our resources have greatly expanded. If

the war continues on both fronts the war will be waged with equal force as our resources grow. Instead of being consecutive our efforts will be concurrent, and that great degree of effort will be capable of being applied at the same time in both directions. They have been already applied.

The forces that we have are becoming very respectable in munitions, and in men trained to war of all kinds; but as I pointed out to Congress, the problem is one of application, and that problem of application is limited by distance, and the U-boat war, the amount of shipping, the character of the communications, the vast distances of the ocean. Our forces are growing and gathering their ambition, but to apply it is a matter of time, and it is exceedingly difficult to apply.

But we follow out this principle, that all soldiers must be engaged, and ships and airplanes must be engaged on the widest possible fronts, the broadest possible superficies, and maintain the fighting with the utmost intensity, because we are the stronger animal; we are the stronger combination; we are shaking the life out of the enemy; and as we are able to continue, we will not give him a moment's surcease.

This is particularly true of the air, where they are already beginning to fail to keep up at all to the necessary strength on the various fronts. Neither Japan nor Germany is able to maintain equality with Britain, the United States and Russia on all the fronts.

Still less are they able to do so in the field of production. Immense plurality—the superiority of production—is on our side. And although it takes a certain number of months after planes are made before they come into action—perhaps a good many months, having regard to all the distances to be covered, and to the large ground staffs that have to be transported—but in spite of that, at the end of certain periods, the great superiority in numbers of our manufacture and of our trading is bound to have effect, which so far as the air war is concerned will be decisive.

Whether the ending of the air war—the deciding of the air war will entail a similar ending of the other forms of warfare has yet to be seen. But the air was the weapon these people chose to subjugate the world.

Q. (interjecting) That's right.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) This was the weapon they struck at Pearl Harbor with. This was the weapon with which they boasted—the Germans boasted they would terrorize all the countries of the world. And it is an example of poetic justice that this should be the weapon in which they should find themselves most out-matched and first out-matched in the ensuing struggle.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, have you anything to say about the submarine side of the situation?

THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very much encouraged by all that has happened there since the turn of the year. Really, it has been—it has been very encouraging. The—the output from the United States' shipyards is prodigious and has fulfilled all hopes, hopes which, when the—the plans were first made and published, seemed to be excessive. But they have been made good. The movement of supplies across the ocean has been on an increasing scale. The surplus of—of new building over sinkings over the last six months has been substantial, especially in the later months; and the killings of U-boats have improved and reached a very high pitch—never better than in the last month.

MR. GODWIN: What was that word, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) Killings.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Killings—

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing)—of U-boats. I mean the killings of U-boats by our forces.

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) That is due, of course, to the increasing numbers of U-boats,—

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing)—but it is also due to the improved methods, and some wonderful things—wonderful things that have been thought of on both sides of the Atlantic. And, of course, we interchange everything immediately. Anything we have we share and bring into action. A lot of clever people are thinking a lot about these things.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, there is—there is a great deal more confidence in the Allied commanders in the field than there was a year ago. Would you care to comment on that?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, they have had a chance to come into action on reasonable terms. Indeed, on advantageous terms, because we—we struck with superior forces at the right spot. We—as your Confederate general (Nathan Bedford Forrest, a Cavalry commander in the Civil War) used to say, "We got there firstest with the mostest." (laughter)

MR. GODWIN: (aside) That's right.

THE PRIME MINISTER: (continuing) And also, because our troops have—since I was here last—been equipped with all the best weapons. You have only got to turn the industry of the United States and Britain over from peace to war. It undoubtedly takes a couple of

years or more to get it running, but when it does run it gives you a flow of weapons which certainly neither Germany nor Japan possibly can beat us.

Q. Mr. Prime Minister, would you undertake to make a prediction on the progress of the war for the rest of this year? I have in mind your—this statement you and the President made at Casablanca, on new and heavier blows against all of the Axis members in 1943?

THE PRIME MINISTER: Well, I think—I think that seems to be a very sound prediction, and couched in terms which are unexceptionable from the point of view of military security. (laughter)

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

Q. Thank you.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Thank you very much.

(the newspapermen started to leave rather slowly, and the Prime Minister climbed onto his chair and gave the "V" for Victory sign with his fingers, which was accompanied by much applause)

THE PRESIDENT: May I say one word, please? Don't get the idea that the conferences are concluded. They are not. They are continuing. (laughter)

THE PRIME MINISTER: We have a lot of ground to cover.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Thank you.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, MAY 25, 1943, EVENING,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. The information set forth above is derived from Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, p. 811, where it is recalled that the meeting was given over to a prolonged consideration of several drafts of a message to Stalin on the results of the conference. Finally, at 2 a. m., it was agreed that Churchill would take the draft message with him and work on it during his flight to Newfoundland en route to Africa. Also according to Churchill's account, Marshall appeared at the meeting and was persuaded to accompany Churchill on his flight and help prepare the draft message to Stalin. For the draft message to Stalin dated May 25, as annotated by Roose-

velt, see *post*, p. 379. For the message to Stalin subsequently prepared by Marshall en route by air to Algiers, see *post*, p. 383.

It appears likely that it was also at this meeting that Roosevelt and Churchill agreed on the resumption of the exchange of information between the United States and the United Kingdom on the atomic bomb project. Cherwell's letter on May 30, 1943, to Hopkins (quoted in the editorial note, *ante*, p. 188) indicates that a decision on this matter was not forthcoming until after the Hopkins-Bush-Cherwell meeting on the afternoon of May 25. According to the account in Gowing, p. 164, Churchill, who had taken with him to the Conference a dossier of papers on the possibility of an independent British atomic energy program, received messages from London during the Conference regarding the increased urgency of restored American-British collaboration in this field. Sometime "towards the end of May", this account continues, Churchill sent reassuring messages to London that he had had an "entirely satisfactory" conversation with Roosevelt about TUBE ALLOYS, and that Roosevelt had agreed to the resumption of the exchange of information on the project. References were also made to this Roosevelt-Churchill conversation on atomic energy in a number of post-Conference communications. In his message No. 374, June 10, 1943, to Hopkins (*post*, p. 630), Churchill wrote as follows:

"As you will remember, the President agreed that the exchange of information on TUBE ALLOYS should be resumed and that the enterprise should be considered a joint one to which both countries would contribute their best endeavors. I understood that his ruling would be based upon the fact that this weapon may be developed in time for the present war and that it thus falls within the general agreement covering the inter-change of research and invention secrets."

In a letter of July 20, 1943, to Bush (*post*, p. 633), Roosevelt wrote:

"While the Prime Minister was here we discussed the whole question of exchange of information regarding TUBE ALLOYS, including the building project.

"While I am mindful of the vital necessity for security in regard to this, I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information."

For an account of American-British relations in this period in connection with the atomic bomb project, see Hewlett and Anderson, chapter 8.

At this meeting Roosevelt and Churchill also apparently sought to perfect a draft joint statement or final conference communiqué. For the texts of the drafts under consideration, see *post*, pp. 374, 375. For the text of the brief statement by Roosevelt, given to the press on May 27, 1943, but probably agreed upon at this meeting, see *post*, p. 377.

### 3. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

#### A. GLOBAL STRATEGY

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

#### GLOBAL STRATEGY OF THE WAR

1. It would appear that the first steps in an approach to our problem should cover the broad field of global strategy. Our two principal enemies, widely separated and constituting threats to our home theaters that differ in imminence and gravity, present problems that are inextricably interrelated. We are compelled, therefore, to view the problem as a whole, and in that light to test all proposals.

2. The United States concept of the global strategy of the war, reduced to its simplest terms, is to win the war as decisively and speedily as possible. We have stated this more formally, as follows:

*a.* In cooperation with Russia and the lesser Allies, to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

*b.* Simultaneously, in cooperation with our Allies, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan in the Pacific and from China.

*c.* Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

3. The United States accepts the strategic concept that the war will be won most speedily by first defeating Germany, and thereafter by completing the defeat of Japan.

From our standpoint the concept of defeating Germany first involves making a determined attack against Germany on the Continent at the earliest practicable date; and we consider that all proposed operations in Europe should be judged primarily on the basis of the contribution to that end. Similarly, we believe that all proposed operations now or later in the Pacific should be judged primarily on the basis of their contribution to defeating Japan in the shortest practicable time.

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<sup>1</sup> Read by Leahy in the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 13; see *ante*, p. 35. This memorandum comprised annex A to the minutes of that meeting.

It is the opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a cross-Channel invasion of Europe is necessary to an early conclusion of the war with Germany, and that an early opening of communications with China is necessary in order to keep China in the war and to bring to a successful conclusion the war with Japan.

4. We recognize that we have before us a difficult problem in how best to employ our resources in support of these concepts. Any major course of action against one enemy has a direct effect upon the timing, scope, and objective of action against the other. The global concept must, therefore, be kept constantly in mind.

5. We believe that keeping Russia and China actively in the war effort is essential to our successful conclusion of the war in any reasonable time.

6. We are confident that this Conference will find common ground upon which to reach sound solutions for this basic global problem, and the more specific problems which will appear in connection therewith.

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J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-44

1. We have asked for this meeting because we think the time has come to carry a stage further the combined plans agreed upon at Casablanca. We have no intention of suggesting any departure from the principles underlying the decisions taken at that Conference (see C.C.S. 155/1 and 170/2<sup>2</sup>). We feel, however, that their application requires review and development in the light of the progress of the war in the last four months, the detailed studies which have been carried out, and the experience which has been gained.

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

2. The decisions reached at Casablanca (see C.C.S. 155/1, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5) were as follows:—

“Operations in the European Theater will be conducted with the object of defeating Germany in 1943 with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations.

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<sup>1</sup> Read by Brooke in the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 13; see *ante*, p. 36. This memorandum comprised annex B to the minutes of that meeting.

<sup>2</sup> For texts of C.C.S. 155/1, January 19, 1943, memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff entitled “Conduct of the War in 1943,” and C.C.S. 170/2, January 23, 1943, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister Summarizing Decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 774 and 791.

The main lines of offensive action will be:—

*In the Mediterranean*

(a) The occupation of Sicily with the object of:—

- (i) Making the Mediterranean line of communication more secure.
- (ii) Diverting German pressure from the Russian Front.
- (iii) Intensifying the pressure on Italy.

(b) To create a situation in which Turkey can be enlisted as an active Ally.

*In the United Kingdom*

(c) The heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort.

(d) Such limited offensive operations as may be practicable with the amphibious forces available.

(e) The assembly of the strongest possible force (subject to (a) and (b) above and paragraph 6 below (Operations in the Pacific and Far East)) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent.

In order to insure that these operations and preparations are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces to retrieve an adverse situation elsewhere, adequate forces shall be allocated to the Pacific and Far Eastern Theaters.”

3. So far as amphibious operations from the United Kingdom are concerned, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have since approved a directive to General Morgan to prepare plans, among other things, for a “full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.”<sup>3</sup> So far as operations in the Mediterranean were concerned, the Casablanca Conference did not look beyond the capture of Sicily. It is therefore now for consideration what action should be taken in the European Theater between the capture of Sicily and the mounting of the full scale offensive in 1944—a period of anything up to nine or ten months—for the furtherance of the objects agreed at Casablanca which have just been referred to.

4. It seems to us unthinkable that we should be inactive during these critical months when Russia is engaging about 185 German divisions.\* This is just the time when we ought to be exerting all the pressure that we can. It would be fatal to give Germany so long a breathing space in the west, and thus possibly enable her to avert collapse.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of the discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in early 1943 leading to the directive of April 23, 1943, on the preparation of plans for the cross-Channel invasion of the continent, see Harrison, pp. 45–49.

\*This does not include 14 G.A.F. divisions on the Eastern front. [Footnote in the source text.]

5. In our view, the main task which lies before us this year in the European Theater is the elimination of Italy. If we could achieve this, it is our opinion that we should have gone a very long way towards defeating Germany. The break-up of the Axis would inevitably have a most serious effect on the psychological and material strength of Germany. The effects would be:—

(a) The withdrawal of some 35 Italian Divisions from Greece, Yugoslavia, and southern France. Germany would either have to let go of one or more of these countries, with all that this implies in loss of raw materials and prestige, and in the extension of the range of the Allied bomber offensive, or alternatively she would have to substitute German for Italian troops at substantial cost to the Russian Front.

(b) The elimination of the Italian Navy would enable us to transfer very considerable naval forces from the Mediterranean to the Pacific or to the Indian Ocean, whichever is thought preferable. If we were able to take over the Italian Fleet, the naval position would be still more favorable.

(c) We should be able to mount a threat through Sardinia and Corsica against the south of France in the spring of 1944, which would greatly increase the chances of success of cross-Channel operations from the United Kingdom.

(d) The collapse of Italy would have a big effect on Turkey, and hasten her readiness to make common cause with the Allies.

6. It is of course possible that we might eliminate Italy after the fall of Sicily by air action alone. We think, however, that it would be most unwise to bank on this or to transfer any substantial part of our bomber force from the United Kingdom. We therefore consider it essential that we should follow up a successful HUSKY by amphibious operations against either the Italian islands or the mainland, backed up, if possible, by operations in other parts of the Mediterranean. Only in this way can we reap the full benefit of our victories in Africa and in HUSKY, and employ the powerful and experienced Anglo-American forces gathered in the Mediterranean Theater and their assault craft. We have considered various alternatives, and have formed provisional views as to which should be undertaken. We will explain these in detail later on.

7. The provision of the shipping required to deliver a second amphibious blow in the Mediterranean this year will of course have repercussions elsewhere and will affect BOLERO. But even if Italy collapses as a result of the first blow (HUSKY), we shall still need considerable shipping in the Mediterranean to exploit this success by installing air bases on the Italian Mainland and Islands, by increasing supplies to the Balkan resistance groups, and by speeding up our aid to Turkey. In either case some delay is likely to be caused to the build-up of BOLERO, but we believe that this disadvantage will be greatly outweighed by the fact that successful Mediterranean operations, and

still more the elimination of Italy, will ease the task confronting an army landing in Europe from the United Kingdom.

8. We do not believe that there is any method of giving effectual help to the Russian Front throughout this year other than a continuance of Mediterranean operations, and the intensification of our bomber offensive. It was decided at Casablanca that the heaviest possible bomber offensive against the German war effort should be a feature of the campaign of 1943. Nothing has occurred in the interval to alter the wisdom of this decision, and we think that SICKLE should continue to have a high priority.

#### PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

9. At Casablanca it was agreed that certain operations should take place in the Pacific Theater (see C.C.S. 170/2 paragraph 5(a)), and that subject to certain reservations, plans and preparations should be made for the recapture of Burma to take place in the winter of 1943-44. The 15th November was approved as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault. We do not know whether the experience of the last four months, and the studies which have been made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff have caused them to confirm or modify the program for Pacific operations which was drawn up. We should like to hear their views on this. As to ANAKIM, the position is that after Casablanca, the Commander in Chief, India, was at once invited to frame the best possible plan, and to state his requirements. We are prepared to explain this plan and its implications in detail if the U.S. Chiefs of Staff so desire. We think the plan represents the best that can be made having regard to the resources which will be available. But it is necessary to say straight away that we are of the opinion that the full operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Our main reasons are:—

(a) The magnitude of the assault and the scope of the operations to which it would be the prelude, are such that we do not feel able to undertake them at a critical period in the war with Germany, on whom we cannot afford to relax the pressure.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation at the present time. For any reasonable prospect of success it would demand a sufficiency of forces specially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation ANAKIM, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

10. Although we cannot do ANAKIM this year, we recommend that everything possible should be done, with the resources available to

keep up the pressure on Japan from the west and to support China. We have various alternatives to propose, and would welcome discussion of any suggestions which the U.S. Chiefs of Staff may desire to put forward.

11. The results of our examination of ANAKIM make us feel that we should together examine more closely the method by which the defeat of Japan is ultimately to be brought about. This is essential so that all preliminary operations can be arranged to fit into the ultimate design, and so that Commanders in Chief in the Far East Theater and Indian Ocean may have a firm basis on which to frame their long-term plans and preparations. This will insure that the right sort of equipment of all kinds will be available in the necessary quantities when the time comes.

#### SHIPPING

12. It is clear that the availability of shipping will be one of the main governing factors as to what can and what cannot be done in 1943 and also in 1944. We suggest, however, that before going into details on shipping, we should clear our minds on the strategical issues, and decide, on merits, on the course of action at which we should aim. Thereafter we should examine the extent to which the shipping available will enable us to fulfill our program. We think it essential that the shipping question should be examined in detail, and settled before the Conference breaks up.

WASHINGTON, 12 May, 1943.

J. C. S. Files

*Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 219

### CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-1944

#### 1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of the United Nations, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, is to bring the war against Germany, Japan, and Italy to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

#### 2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943, under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosed study was prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." It was read by Leahy during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14; see *ante*, p. 54.

*b.* Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

*c.* Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

### 3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN-AFRICAN AREAS

*a.* Secure the lines of communications in the Atlantic by defeating the U-boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

#### *b.* European Area

(1) Conduct a full-scale assault from the United Kingdom against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing Germany's war potential and to making feasible a cross-Channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the United Kingdom for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

#### *c.* African Area

(1) Accomplish **HUSKY**.

(2) After the completion of **HUSKY**, or in the event that **HUSKY** is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the Mediterranean Area. These operations will be designed:

(*a*) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from Mediterranean bases;

(*b*) To continue support to Russia by the diversion of Axis forces and materials;

(*c*) To force dispersion of Axis forces in order to facilitate a cross-Channel operation; and

(*d*) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the Mediterranean Area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the Mediterranean will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-Channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the Mediterranean east of Sicily.

## 4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the Pacific, particularly to Australia; to maintain pressure on Japan, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against Japan; and to keep China in the war.

b. For these purposes, U. S. Naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the Atlantic. With due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European Axis, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. Naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 will have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Seizure of Burma.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.

## 5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

b. Sustain China by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in North-west Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

J.C.S. Files

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*Proposals by the Combined Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1943.

C.C.S. 233/1

TRIDENT CONFERENCE  
TENTATIVE PROGRAM OF WORK

1. We submit the following tentative program of work. It is based on the assumption that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will have a full

<sup>1</sup> At their meeting on May 15, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a draft agenda for the remainder of the Conference in the light of the discussion which had taken place; see item 2 of the record of that meeting, *ante*, p. 79. At their meeting on May 17, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered and approved the draft agenda prepared by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 233, May 16, 1943, not printed), subject to certain changes incorporated in the revised version printed here. See item 6 of the 86th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 94.

discussion on the "statement of agreed essentials" on Monday, 17 May. Thereafter, the program should be broadly as set out below.

- Tuesday*            1. *The Defeat of Germany*  
     18th                    a. A United States paper on the bomber offensive against Germany.<sup>2</sup>  
                               b. Plan for the defeat of Germany by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.
- and*                    Paper under preparation by U.S. Planners in consultation with the British.<sup>3</sup>  
                               c. Plan for the defeat of Germany accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary.  
                               Paper under preparation by the British Planners in consultation with the U.S.<sup>4</sup>
- Wednesday*        d. The possibility of an air offensive against Ploesti.  
     19th                    Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.<sup>5</sup>
- Thursday*            2. *The Defeat of Japan*  
     20th                    a. A paper showing proposals for operations in the Pacific is under preparation by the United States Staffs.<sup>6</sup>  
                               b. The potentialities of the air route from Assam to China.  
                               Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.<sup>7</sup>  
                               c. Study of the most promising operation for opening a land route to China.  
                               Paper under preparation by the Combined Staff Planners.<sup>8</sup>
- Friday*              3. *The U-Boat Campaign* (Discussion)  
     21st                    4. *Rearming of French Forces in North Africa*  
                               5. *Turkish Situation* (General Discussion)  
                               6. *Miscellaneous Items Arising During the Week*

<sup>2</sup> C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, *post*, p. 239.

<sup>3</sup> The paper under reference was circulated as C.C.S. 235, May 18, 1943, *post*, p. 273.

<sup>4</sup> The paper under reference was circulated as C.C.S. 234, May 17, 1943, *post*, p. 261.

<sup>5</sup> No combined paper on this subject was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For the early planning for the air attack of August 1, 1943, against Ploesti, see Dugan and Stewart, *Ploesti*, pp. 36-39.

<sup>6</sup> See C.C.S. 230/1, May 23, 1943, *post*, p. 302.

<sup>7</sup> The paper under reference, C.C.S. 229, May 19, 1943, is not printed.

<sup>8</sup> The paper under reference, C.C.S. 231, May 19, 1943, is not printed.

*Saturday* 7. *Relation of Resources to Agreed Strategy With*  
*22nd Particular Reference to Shipping and Landing*  
*Craft*

Although these problems will be considered in the discussion on all the various plans for the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan, it will not be possible to collate a paper on the subject until all these various plans have been discussed. Once Items 2 and 3 have been cleared out of the way, the Combined Staff Planners will have to prepare a paper on this subject relating resources to agreed strategy.

*Sunday* 8. *Global Strategy: Final Consideration*  
*23rd*

*Monday* 9. *Final Report to the President and the Prime*  
*24th Minister*

This report is visualized as including agreed statements on global strategy, and on existing and projected undertakings arranged if possible in order of priority.

J. C. S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 May 1943.

C.C.S. 232/1

#### AGREED ESSENTIALS IN THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Reference: a. C.C.S. 85th Meeting, Item 2 a (1)

Of the following items, all except those in the split columns have been agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Those in the split columns have not so far been agreed upon but are subject to further consideration.

##### 1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The overall objective of the United Nations is:

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

##### 2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the

<sup>1</sup>This paper is an amended version of C.C.S. 232, May 16, 1943, not printed, and was prepared at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to show the items of agreement and disagreement. For the discussion of C.C.S. 232 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, see *ante*, p. 93; see also the record of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting of May 18, 1943, *ante*, p. 98. At their meeting on May 19, the Combined Chiefs of Staff deferred further consideration of C.C.S. 232/1; see *ante*, p. 111. The final decisions with regard to this paper are contained in C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", *post*, p. 364.

earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*b.* Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

*c.* Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

### 3. ESTABLISHED UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

*a.* Maintain the security and warmaking capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*b.* Support and maintain the warmaking capacity of our forces in all areas to which committed.

*c.* Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*d.* Intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

*Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Alter to read:

"To maintain, and so far as is consistent with *a* above, to extend . . ."

*Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Omit.

*Amendments Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Re-letter as *c* and amend to read:

"Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe."

Add new paragraph:

"*d.* Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian front."

e. Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*Amendment Proposed by British  
Chiefs of Staff*

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

**Amend to read:**

"f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war against Japan."

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

J. C. S. Files

*Report by the Combined Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 244/1

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943-1944: AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as the basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.

3. Our conclusions are set out below.

*Ground Forces* (Annex II)<sup>2</sup>

4. All the ground forces required can be made available.

*Naval Forces* (Annex III)<sup>2</sup>

5. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated,

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached revision of C.C.S. 244 incorporates the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 94th Meeting and certain changes requested by the Combined Staff Planners for purposes of necessary editing and clarification." C.C.S. 244, May 22, 1943, is not printed. For the minutes of the 94th meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *ante*, p. 180.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required (see Annex III, paras. 7 to 10). Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

*Air Forces* (Annex IV)<sup>3</sup>

6. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

7. For Operation ROUNDHAMMER there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation (see Appendix "A" to Annex IV). In the absence of any detailed plan for ROUNDHAMMER, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study by the ROUNDHAMMER planners.

8. For operations in Burma it will be seen there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater. (See Annex IV, Appendix "C").

9. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

*Assault Shipping and Landing Craft* (Annex V)<sup>4</sup>

10. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available.

11. The allocations set out in Appendix "B" to Annex V are recommended.

12. Further recommendations are:

(a) If production permits 6 naval pontoon causeways or treadway bridges should be supplied to the Indian Ocean Area, to arrive simultaneously with the L.S.T. from the U.S., and 56 should be supplied for ROUNDHAMMER.

(b) There is need for one floating dock capable of docking an L.S.T. in the Indian Ocean Area.

*Supply of Critical Items* (Annex VI)<sup>3</sup>

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, these deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> See Coakley and Leighton, pp. 72, 75.

that the possibilities of providing these items, and particularly the steel should be further examined.

*Shipping* (Annex VII)<sup>5</sup>

14. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate (C.C.S. 174),\* personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.<sup>6</sup>

*Oil*

15. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

Annex I

BASIS OF INVESTIGATION

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

I. USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS

Preparation and earmarking of the necessary British forces for the occupation of the Azores.

<sup>5</sup> See Coakley and Leighton, pp. 77, 85.

<sup>\*</sup> See paragraph 6 of annex II. [Footnote in the source text. Neither annex II nor C.C.S. 174 is printed. The "agreed estimate" referred to here was as follows:

(a) For non-tankers permanently in use for the fighting services—

0.91 percent per month for the whole of 1943 (to be adjusted for planned operational hazards).

(b) For other non-tanker shipping:—

2.39 percent per month for the first half of 1943.

1.91 percent per month for the second half of 1943.

This "agreed estimate" was subject to revision on July 1, 1943.]

<sup>6</sup> See the "Combined Statement Covering Dry Cargo Shipping Availabilities and Requirements," May 23, 1945, by Douglas and Leathers, *post*, p. 313.

## II. OPERATIONS IN NORTHWESTERN EUROPE

- (1) Combined air offensive from the United Kingdom.
- (2) Cross-Channel operations.

To be launched from the United Kingdom with a target date of 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944.

<i>Assault:</i>	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
	2	Air-borne Divisions
Total:	9	Divisions in the assault
<i>Build-up:</i>		Available for movement into lodgment area—20 Divisions.

## III. OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

(1) Bombing of Ploesti by U.S. Army Air Forces from bases in North Africa.

(2) Continuing directed operations against Sicily.

(3) Such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British Divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available.

## IV. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC—FAR EAST THEATER

(1) Operations in Burma

(a) The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

- (i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma.
- (ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China.
- (iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(b) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

(c) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitations.

(d) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(2) Conduct air operations in and from China.

(3) Continue the directed operations in the Solomons-Bismarck-New Guinea Area.

(4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago and Japanese-held New Guinea.

(5) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.

(6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communications.

(7) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.

#### V. OTHER UNDERTAKINGS

(1) Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

(2) Support and maintain the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

(3) Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

(4) Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

(5) To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

(6) To provide for the fulfillment of British undertakings to Turkey with due regard to other important commitments.

(7) To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

(8) To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

(9) To rearm and reequip French forces in North Africa as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.

## B. STRATEGY IN EUROPE

J.C.S. Files

*Study by the United States Joint Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 13 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 215

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM IN  
1943-1944

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the European Axis by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom has been made by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

2. It is estimated that Germany has 32 divisions in France and the low countries. Seven of these divisions are highly mobile and could on short notice be moved to oppose an invasion effort. These forces could be increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the Mediterranean and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four defensive belts which must be reduced or neutralized before the West Wall is reached.

3. The projected bomber offensive against Germany may be expected to so reduce her ability to wage war as to create favorable conditions for a reentry to the Continent unless Germany is able to develop timely and effective counter-measures.

4. By maximum utilization of shipping and United Kingdom port facilities for the movement of United States forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into offensive units, it is estimated that 36 United Nations Divisions can be made available for cross-Channel operations by 1 April 1944.

5. Whether the available shipping is used to move forces from the United States or the Mediterranean, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom will be the same. However, the addition of battle seasoned troops from the Mediterranean will provide an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

6. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the Caen and Cotentin Peninsula sectors, will afford port facilities for a build-

<sup>1</sup> At the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15, 1943, Leahy stated that this paper would be circulated for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff; see *ante*, p. 82. Although dated May 13, this paper was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15 under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosed study [w]as prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners and meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff. It is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." Final action on the subject dealt with in this paper was taken in C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister," *post*, p. 364.

up in 12 months of about 1,000,000 men. By extending this bridge-head to include the Seine River and the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, the build-up in 12 months would be about 4,000,000 men, or about 100 divisions.

7. It should be noted that consideration of cross-Channel operations in this study has been confined to the initial movement. Landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 105/2<sup>2</sup> may be met, but at the expense of some operations in other theaters. The build-up immediately thereafter and the requirements in APA's, AKA's, AP's, AK's, etc., have not been examined.

8. It is recommended that:

*a.* The combined bomber offensive be given first priority in build-up and its execution be facilitated.

*b.* As the combined bomber offensive progresses, its effects should be continuously examined and integrated with other factors, the results of these examinations to be used in determining the date for cross-Channel operations.

*c.* A balanced invasion force be built up in the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the event of a collapse of Germany (SLEDGEHAMMER).

*d.* No operations be undertaken in the Mediterranean which will interfere with the build-up of maximum forces in the United Kingdom for SLEDGEHAMMER as well as for ROUNDUP.

*e.* Production of landing craft be increased to the maximum without undue interference with the construction of other essential war materials.

*f.* The target date of 1 April 1944 be accepted for operations from the United Kingdom. The target date coincides with the completion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject to revision in the light of the results obtained.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; regarding the nature of the C.C.S. 105 series, on landing-craft deliveries, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 483-484.

J. C. S. Files

*Plan Submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 217

PLAN FOR COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. *Problem:* To provide a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the "progressive destruction and dislocation of

<sup>1</sup> This plan was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 15, 1943 under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The attached plan for a combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff, and is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

The plan was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, *ante*, p. 80, and was approved by them at their meeting on May 18, *ante*, p. 104. The plan was also discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 21, *ante*, p. 153.

the Germany Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened;" as directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca.<sup>2</sup>

2. Under the direction of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, a plan to accomplish the above objective in early 1944 has been prepared. The complete plan is on file with the Secretary, U. S. Chiefs of Staff. A brief presentation of the plan is contained in Enclosure "B".

3. Representatives of the R.A.F. collaborated in the preparation of this plan which has been approved by the British Air Ministry (See Enclosure "A").

4. The plan establishes requirements for U. S. aircraft in the United Kingdom as follows:

	<i>Heavy Bombers</i>	<i>Medium Bombers</i>
By 30 June 1943	944	200
By 30 September 1943	1192	400
By 31 December 1943	1746	600
By 31 March 1944	2702	800

5. The Present U. S. Army Air Forces expansion program provides the air units and aircraft necessary to implement the above program, after provision has been made for meeting all present and planned undertakings in other theaters with reasonable balance in estimated aircraft production for unforeseen contingencies that may arise.

6. *It is recommended:*

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the "Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom," presented in Enclosure "B" and direct its implementation to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with meeting aircraft production objectives, with the availability of combined shipping, and with proper relationship to strategic objectives given in Item 5, Minutes, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 76th Meeting.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The quoted portion is from paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 166/1/D, January 21, 1943, the directive on the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Casablanca Conference. See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 781.

<sup>3</sup> Under agenda item 5 of its 76th meeting, March 19, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that if a special board were established to study the Allied shipping situation, it should be furnished with broad strategic guidance in the form of a priority for military operations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the following order of priority to be followed in the allocation of dry cargo shipping: (1) HUSKY, (2) SICKLE and the South Pacific, (3) ANAKIM, (4) BOLERO. As a concurrent item the Combined Chiefs approved a statement regarding the necessity of providing shipping for minimum essential fixed charges for the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and other areas being supplied from United Nations' resources. For brief descriptions of this meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see Matloff, p. 45, and Leighton and Coakley, pp. 696-697.

Enclosure "A"

*The Chief of the British Air Staff (Portal) to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (Arnold)*

LONDON, 15th April, 1943.

MY DEAR ARNOLD, As you know, the Eighth Air Force has been engaged with the Air Staff in drawing up a detailed plan for the purpose of discharging the responsibilities laid upon our combined bomber forces at the Casablanca Conference.

The plan is now complete. It is based on our combined resources in the matter of intelligence and operational data including the very valuable report of your Operations Analysts and has been drawn up in close consultation with the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

I have carefully examined the plan and discussed it in all its aspects with the Commanding General, Eighth Air Force. I take this opportunity of saying that I believe it to be entirely sound and that it has my full support.

The plan includes an estimate of the rate at which the strength of the Eighth Air Force must be developed in order to achieve the planned effect. I believe this rate of build-up and the time factor generally to be of primary importance. The German Fighter strength is increasing rapidly and every week's delay will make the task more difficult to accomplish. We cannot afford to miss the good bombing weather which will soon be due. We cannot exploit to the full the great potentialities of the daylight bombing technique if the requisite numbers are not available.

For all these reasons I earnestly hope that every effort will be made to achieve and if possible to exceed the programme.

The plan has been carefully examined by the Commander in Chief, Bomber Command, and he too is convinced of its soundness and importance.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

C. PORTAL

Enclosure "B"

*Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom*

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. *The Mission*

a. The mission of the U. S. and British bomber forces, as prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca, is as follows:

To conduct a joint U. S.-British air offensive to accomplish the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, in-

dustrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. This is constructed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent.

## 2. *The Principal Objectives*

a. A thorough study of those elements of the German Military, industrial, and economic system which appeared to be profitable as bombing objectives was made by a group of Operations Analysts consisting of eminent U. S. experts. The report of the Operations Analysts concludes that:

The destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the western Axis war effort. There are several combinations of targets from among the industries studied which might achieve this result.

b. Examination of this report shows complete agreement by U. S. and British experts. From the systems proposed by the Operations Analysts, six systems, comprising *seventy-six (76) precision targets* have been selected. These targets are located within the tactical radius of action of the two air forces, and their destruction is directed against the three major elements of the German Military machine: its submarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces, and certain industries vital to their support.

c. The six systems are:

- Submarine construction yards and bases.
- German aircraft industry.
- Ball bearings.
- Oil.
- Synthetic rubber and tires.
- Military transport vehicles.

Concentration of effort against these systems will have the following effect. The percentage of destruction is as indicated by the Operations Analysts.

### (1) Submarine Construction Yards and Bases

Destruction of the submarine building yards selected will reduce present submarine construction by eighty-nine percent (89%). Attack of submarine bases will affect the submarine effort at sea. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary.

### (2) German Aircraft Industry

Depletion of the German Air Force will fatally weaken German capacity to resist our air and surface operations. Complete domination of the air is essential for our ultimate decisive effort. Destruc-

tion of forty-three percent (43%) of the German fighter capacity and sixty-five percent (65%) of the German bomber capacity is provided for in this plan, and will produce the effect required.

(3) Ball Bearings

The critical condition of the ball bearing industry in Germany is startling. The concentration of that industry renders it outstandingly vulnerable to air attack. Seventy-six percent (76%) of the ball bearing production can be eliminated by destruction of the targets selected. This will have immediate and critical repercussions on the production of tanks, airplanes, artillery, diesel engines—in fact, upon nearly all the special weapons of modern war.

(4) Oil

The quantities of petroleum and synthetic oil products now available to the German is barely adequate to supply the life blood which is vital to the German war machine. The oil situation is made more critical by failure of the Germans to secure and retain the Russian supplies. If the Ploëști refineries, which process thirty-five percent (35%) of current refined oil products available to the Axis are destroyed, and the synthetic oil plants in Germany which process an additional thirteen percent (13%) are also destroyed, the resulting disruption will have a disastrous effect upon the supply of finished oil products available to the Axis.

(5) Synthetic Rubber and tires

These products are vital to all phases of German Military strength on land and in the air. Provision is made for destruction of fifty percent (50%) of the synthetic rubber capacity and nearly all of the tire production. This destruction will have a crippling effect.

(6) Military Transport Vehicles

Seven (7) plants produce a large proportion of the military transport and armored vehicles. The precise proportion in [*is*] unknown. Loss of these plants will strike directly at the German Military strength. *The cumulative effect of the destruction of the targets comprising the systems just listed will fatally weaken the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.*

*d.* The selection of these objectives is confirmed by the fact that the systems about which the Germans are most sensitive and about which they have concentrated their defenses such as balloons, camouflage, anti-aircraft, searchlights, decoys, and smoke are :

Aircraft factories.  
Submarine construction yards.  
Ball bearings.  
Oil.

3. *Intermediate Objective*

*a.* The Germans, recognizing the vulnerability of their vital industries, are rapidly increasing the strength of their fighter defenses. The German fighter strength in western Europe is being augmented. *If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly,*

*it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive action by our combined forces on the Continent.*

b. Hence the successful prosecution of the air offensive against the principal objectives is dependent upon a prior (or simultaneous) offensive against the German fighter strength.

c. To carry out the Eighth Air Force's part of this combined bomber offensive it will be necessary to attack precision targets deep in German territory in daylight. The principal obstacle to this is the growing strength of the German Air Force. The growth of this fighter force has become so pronounced as to warrant a brief review of this development (Chart A<sup>4</sup>).

d. The upper curve shows what has been happening to the German Air Force in the past nine months. The bomber strength has been sharply reduced from 1760 bombers to 1450 in operational units. The fighters, on the other hand, increased from 1690 to 1710. They suffered a reduction in strength doubtless caused by the intense operations in Russia and the Mediterranean as well as in the Western Front, but those losses have been made good at the expense of the bombers. That same trend is reflected in the lower curve, which shows production was maintained fairly constantly for about five months and then increased so that fighter production has risen from 720 to 810 per month. Over a longer period of time, from the entrance of the U. S. into the war until the present time, the trend has been even more pronounced. German fighter strength has increased by forty-four percent (44%) in that period in spite of the heavy losses. This chart shows the margin of production over average monthly wastage in German fighters. Of course, the monthly wastage has not been constant over the past seven months, as shown on the chart,<sup>5</sup> but the average for that period has been fairly accurately determined at 655 fighters per month. The production rate as of last February showed 810 fighters per month. The average increase in production over the six month period depicted indicates a monthly surplus of production over average wastage of 108 airplanes. If this trend simply continues in its present ratio, it is well within the capacity of the Germans to produce enough fighter airplanes over and above wastage to provide a strength of 3,000 fighters by this time next year. (See Chart D<sup>4</sup>). This is, of course, a capability and not necessarily a German intention, although current German development points very strongly in that direction. The increase in fighter strength is not reflected in this curve covering the past eight months;

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Chart B; not printed.

however, during that period the Germans diverted a great many fighter type airplanes into fighter bombers and fighter reconnaissance airplanes. The wastage rate was very high in those units and that probably accounts for the temporary decline in German fighter strength; however, in the last three months it has shown a sharp uprise.

e. The disposition of German fighters is also significant. (See Chart C<sup>6</sup>). The top line shows the number of fighters on the Western Front. Since we entered the war, that strength has nearly doubled. It has risen from 420 to 830. This, in spite of the heavy drains on the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts. When we entered the war only thirty-six percent (36%) of German fighters were concentrated on the Western Front; today, fifty percent (50%) of all fighters available to the German Air Force are concentrated in opposition to our principal bombing effort from the United Kingdom. The German fighter force is taking a toll of our forces both by day and by night, not only in terms of combat losses but more especially in terms of reduced tactical effectiveness. If the German fighters are materially increased in number it is quite conceivable that they could make our daylight bombing unprofitable and perhaps our night bombing too. On the other hand, if the German fighter force is partially neutralized our effectiveness will be vastly improved.

f. For this reason German fighter strength must be considered as an *Intermediate* objective second to none in priority.

#### 4. *Integrated R.A.F.-U. S. Army Air Forces Offensive*

a. The combined efforts of the entire U. S. and British bomber forces can produce the results required to achieve the mission prescribed for this theater. Fortunately the capabilities of the two forces are entirely complementary.

b. The tremendous and ever increasing striking power of the R.A.F. bombing is designed to so destroy German material facilities as to undermine the willingness and ability of the German worker to continue the war. Because of this, there is great flexibility in the ability of the R.A.F. to direct its material destruction against those objectives which are closely related to the U. S. bombing effort which is directed toward the destruction of specific essential industrial targets. It is considered that the most effective results from strategic bombing will be obtained by directing the combined day and night effort of the U. S. and British bomber forces to all-out attacks against targets which are mutually complementary in undermining a limited number of selected objective systems. All-out attacks imply precision bombing of related targets by day and night where tactical conditions permit, and

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

area bombing by night against the cities associated with these targets. The timing of the related day and night attacks will be determined by tactical considerations.

*c.* This plan does not attempt to prescribe the major effort of the R.A.F. Bomber Command. It simply recognizes the fact that when precision targets are bombed by the Eighth Air Force in daylight, the effort should be complemented and completed by R.A.F. bombing attacks against the surrounding industrial area at night. Fortunately the industrial areas to be attacked are in most cases identical with the industrial areas which the British Bomber Command has selected for mass destruction anyway. They include Hamburg, Bremen, Hanover, Berlin, Leipzig, Wilhelmshaven, Bremershire [*Bremerhaven?*], Cologne, Stuttgart, and many other principal cities. They also, of course, include smaller towns whose principal significance is coupled with the precision targets prescribed for the Eighth Air Force.

### 5. *General Plan of Operations*

*a.* It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minimum operating force necessary to make deep penetrations.

*b.* The general tactical plan of operations with this minimum force involves the following general conception. A holding attack intending to attract German fighters to a particular area and prevent their massing against the main attacking force. For this purpose 50 heavy bombers with fighter escort are required. Second, a main striking force to penetrate through the fighter defenses and carry out the destruction of targets in Germany and return. Two hundred bombers is considered the minimum requirement to provide self-protection and at the same time carry out worthwhile destruction. Third, the covering force to attack still another area and attract fighters in order to divert them from the main force on withdrawal. Again, 50 bombers with fighter escort is the minimum force to carry out such a function.

*c.* In order to establish a yardstick to be used in the determination of the number of bombers required to destroy the objectives desired, the following procedure was employed :

Twelve successful missions were conducted in January, February, and March. Approximately 100 bombers were dispatched on each. It was found that sufficient bombs fell within a circle of 1000 foot radius centered about the aiming point to cause the desired destruction.

For each prospective target the number of 1000 foot radius circles necessary to cover it has been calculated. The yardstick as determined by experience is therefore: the number of 1000 foot radius circles of destruction, each requiring 100 bombers.

*d.* The plan of operations is divided into four phases. (See Maps 1, 2, 3, & 4<sup>7</sup>). The depth of penetration, the number of targets available, and the capacity of the bombing forces increases successively with each phase.

*e.* Seventy-six precision targets have been selected for Eighth Air Force bombing operations. Having selected these 76 targets the questions arise: Can they be effectively destroyed, and if so, how many bombers will be required? As to the first question, operational experience answers yes.

#### 6. *Effectiveness of Eighth Air Force*

*a.* The operations of the U. S. Army Air Force in daylight bombing of defended objectives in German occupied Europe have been sufficient to establish a criterion of precision daylight bombing effectiveness; the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Command leave no room for doubt of the ability of that force to devastate industrial areas.

*b.* The daylight operations of the Eighth Air Force from 3 January 1943 to 6 April 1943 definitely establish the fact that it is possible to conduct precision pattern bombing operations against selected precision targets from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 30,000 feet in the face of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter defenses.

*c.* Of 20 missions dispatched by the U. S. Eighth Air Force in that period, 12 have been highly effective. These 12 daylight missions have been directed against a variety of targets, including:

- Submarine bases.
- Locomotive shops.
- Power houses.
- Marshalling yards.
- Shipbuilding yards.
- Motor vehicle and armament works.
- Airplane engine factories.

The average number of aircraft dispatched against these targets has been eighty-six. The destructive effect has, in every case, been highly

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<sup>7</sup>The maps referred to are not reproduced here. They indicated the location and type of precision bombing targets to be attacked by the United States Army Air Forces in the four phases of the Combined Bomber Offensive and the towns related to these precision objectives which would be appropriate targets for the complementary effort of the Royal Air Force. Legends or charts accompanying each map identified the precision bombing targets for each phase and listed them in accordance with the six systems described in paragraph 2 *c* above. The dates of the phases were as follows: Phase I, April-July 1943; Phase II, July-September 1943; Phase III, September-December 1943; Phase IV, December 1943-April 1944.

satisfactory. From this experience it may be definitely accepted that 100 bombers dispatched on each successful mission will provide entirely satisfactory destructive effect of that part of the target area within 1000 feet of the aiming point; and that two-thirds of the missions dispatched each month will be successful to this extent.

### 7. *Forces Required*

#### *a. Heavy Bombers*

(1) In computing the force required, a yardstick of 100 bombers dispatched per target area of 1000 feet about each aiming point has been accepted as a reasonable product of actual experience to date. Each target has been evaluated in terms of these *Target Units*, or the number of 1000 foot radius circles in which this destructive effect must be produced.

(2) Experience in the European Theater to date indicates that at least 800 airplanes must be in the theater to dispatch 300 bombers on operations. Hence, until the level of U. S. bomber strength in this theater reaches approximately 800, it will not be feasible to sustain a precision bombing offensive against the German fighter factories. It is estimated that we will be able to accommodate and train a force of this capacity by July of this year. In the interim every effort should be made to reduce the German fighter force by attack of those fighter factories which can be reached, and by combat under favorable conditions. The repair depots and airdromes are included for the purpose of giving commanders the necessary tactical latitude. Concurrently, operations can be conducted against submarine installations within reach and against other targets contributing directly to the principal objectives which are within covering range of our own fighters, or which do not require deep penetration. Some operations will have to be conducted to provide the necessary training for the incoming forces; such operations must be conducted against objectives within the listed categories.

(3) During the next phase, from July to October, in which it is estimated that we will be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 miles, a determined effort must be made to break down the German fighter strength by every means at our disposal, concentrating primarily upon fighter aircraft factories. During this time interim an additional increment of 258 bombers is required so that the strength in the theater by October should be approximately 1192. This would provide a striking force of 450 bombers at the end of this period. The average striking force during this period would be 400.

(4) During the third phase, the German fighter force must be kept depleted, and the other sources of German strength must also

be undermined. During this phase our bombing offensive forces must be adequate to perform all their major tasks.

(5) From October to January an additional increment of 554 bombers is required, bringing the total to 1746. This should provide an operational striking force of 655 bombers at the end of that time. The average striking force during this period will be 550 bombers.

(6) During the last phase—early 1944—the entire force should be used to sustain the effect already produced and to pave the way for a combined operation on the Continent. This will require a force of 2702 heavy bombers.

(7) It will be observed that the charts of the actual location of the targets to be attacked in each phase show the joint bombing effort of each phase. It will be noted that in the first phase (see Map 1), operations are limited to relatively shallow penetration. They include submarine bases along the coast, submarine construction yards, and the Focke Wulf airplane factory at Bremen. Actually, of course, these operations have all been undertaken with the small forces available and in the case of the submarine yards at Vegesack and the Focke Wulf plant at Bremen, a long step has already been taken toward completion of the plan. There are two other systems of operations calling for deep penetrations shown in this phase. One of them calls for an attack against oil installations in the Ruhr. This operation is entirely contingent upon an earlier attack from the Mediterranean Area against the oil refineries at Ploesti in Rumania. Such an attack is under consideration now and if it is carried out we will be forced to operate against the Ruhr refineries in order to exploit the advantage achieved in Rumania. The other attack calls for a very deep penetration at Schweinfurt. This operation might be undertaken as a surprise attack in view of the tremendous advantages accrued from a successful destruction of these plants; however, it would be most unwise to attempt it until we are perfectly sure we have enough force to destroy the objective in a single operation. Any attempt to repeat such an attack will meet with very bitter opposition. In the second phase (see Map 2), the plan calls for a concentration of effort against the German fighter assembly and fighter aircraft factories as well as attacks against airdromes and repair facilities. It is anticipated that approximately 75% of the striking force will be applied to this end during this phase. The other 25% is directed against submarine construction yards. In the third phase (see Map 3), an all-out attack against all the principal objectives is provided as well as repeat operations to continue neutralization of installations which have been destroyed and which can be repaired. During the fourth phase (see Map 4), these operations are continued and allowances

made for concentration of attacks against installations more directly associated with a cross-Channel operation such as rail transportation, arsenals, Military installations, etc.

(8) The determination of the number of aircraft required in each phase has been based strictly upon past experience. As to rate of operations, the Eighth Air Force has averaged six per month over the past six months. In the past three months, it has actually carried out twelve highly successful operations out of a total of 20. This plan is based on a total of 12 successful operations in each three month phase and recognizes the probability that the other six will for one reason or another be less satisfactory. Experience has shown that about  $\frac{3}{8}$  of the total number of airplanes in the theater can be dispatched on operational missions at any one time. This makes allowances for the airplanes in depot reserve, those in depot repair, and those being ferried and modified. There is every reason to believe that our forces will be more effective in the future than these figures indicate. In order to be as realistic as possible, however, the plan has been based in each case upon actual past experience.

(9) Charts appended to Maps 1, 2, 3, and 4 tabulate all the targets for contemplated destruction by the U. S. and British bomber forces to carry out the mission. The precision targets for attacks by the U. S. Bomber Command are shown as small symbols. The cities and towns in or near those precision targets and which constitute the complementary targets of the R.A.F. are shown as in circles. The German fighters are at present deployed in four main concentrations positioned well forward toward the coast. In general, the day fighters are in four lots of approximately 100 each in the general areas of northwest coastal Germany, Holland and Belgium, the Channel coast of France and western France in the vicinity of the submarine pens. These fighters are capable of concentrating laterally from bases at least 200 miles away so that forces of 300 fighters might be employed against our main efforts if we penetrated directly toward the Ruhr without distracting or diverting part of them.

(10) Chart D is illustrative of the effect of this plan of operations upon the intermediate objective, German fighter strength. This chart must be considered as pictorial rather than precise. The top line shows the increase in German fighter strength. That is a German capability if they choose to follow it. If German production is not interrupted and if German wastage is not increased it is possible for Germany to have in operation 3,000 fighters by next April. The broken line shows the effect of our operations upon that German fighter strength. In the first phase we do not expect to accomplish a great deal because our forces will not have been built up to decisive

proportions. In the second phase, our attacks against German fighter factory and engine factories and the increased attrition should cause the levelling off of the German fighter strength. In the third phase the full effect of the attacks against German fighter production should make themselves felt so that German fighter strength should fall off rapidly in this phase. In the fourth phase that German fighter strength should decline at a precipitant rate. This second line has been computed in the following manner. The decrease in German fighter strength is the result of two factors. One is the attacks against German fighter factories, the other the accelerated rate of combat wastage caused by our increased bomber forces. This wastage rate has been computed in an extremely conservative manner. It is realized that past claims of enemy aircraft shot down may seem high, although our evaluation of them is very careful; nevertheless, in order to avoid any charge of unwarranted optimism combat claims have been arbitrarily divided by four, the resulting decrease in German fighter strength dependent upon expected combat wastage is at a rate only one quarter as great as our present combat claims. Even under these very conservative assumptions it is apparent that the German fighter strength will have passed its limit by the end of the second phase and its powers of resistance should decline very rapidly thereafter.

*b. Medium Bombers*

It will be noted that no U. S. medium bombardment aircraft have been specifically included in the computation of force required above. That does not mean that medium bombardment is not necessary to implement this plan. Supplementary attacks against all strategic targets within range of medium bombers are anticipated as necessary adjuncts to the heavy bomber attacks. In addition, medium bombardment is required in order to conduct repeated attacks against German fighter airdromes, to aid the passage of the heavy bombers until the attacks against the German aircraft industry make themselves felt. Medium bombardment will be necessary to support combined operations in early 1944. The crews must be operationally trained in this theater by that date.

*c. Fighters*

At all times there is a need for an extensive U. S. fighter force both to protect the bombers and to assist in the reduction of the German fighter strength. Prior to the initiation of operations on the Continent, this fighter strength must be at a maximum, and must be fully trained for operations in this theater.

NOTE: This plan deals entirely with the requirements for the strategic bombing force, except for its use in the 4th phase on missions which will render most effective support to surface operations on the Continent, which may begin in early 1944. In order to supplement this force in providing the close support required for the surface operations, steps must be taken early to create and train a tactical force in this theater. This force must include light bomber, reconnaissance fighter, and troop carrier elements.

## 8. *Conclusions*

### a. Recapitulation of U. S. Bomber Forces Required

	<i>Heavy</i>	<i>Medium</i>	
1st Phase	944	200	Bombers required by 30 June 1943
2nd Phase	1192	400	Bombers required by 30 September 1943
3rd Phase	1746	600	Bombers required by 31 December 1943
4th Phase	2702	800	Bombers required by 31 March 1944

b. If the forces required as set forth above are made available on the dates indicated, it will be possible to carry out the mission prescribed in the Casablanca Conference. If those forces are not made available, then that mission is not attainable by mid-1944.

c. Depletion of the German fighter strength must be accomplished first. Failure to neutralize that force will jeopardize the prosecution of the war toward a favorable decision in this theater.

d. The following bombing objectives should be destroyed under the provisions of the general directive issued at the Casablanca Conference:

- (1) Intermediate Objectives:
  - German fighter strength.
- (2) Primary Objectives:
  - German submarine yards and bases.
  - The remainder of the German aircraft industry.
  - Ball bearings.\*
  - Oil.\* (Contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean).
- (3) Secondary objectives in order of priority:
  - Synthetic rubber and tires.
  - Military motor transport vehicles.

e. The following statement of principle, expressed by the Operations Analysts, is concurred in:

In view of the ability of adequate and properly utilized air power to impair the industrial source of the enemy's Military strength, only

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\*A successful initial attack on the key element of either of those systems would demand the immediate concentration of effort on the remaining elements of that system to exploit the initial success. [Footnote in the source text.]

the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert the application of an adequate air striking force to this task.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters  
(Smith)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
C.C.S. 223

[ALGIERS,] 14 May 1943.

#### OPERATIONS AFTER HUSKY

The attached paper (Enclosure "A") prepared by the Operations Division, Allied Force Headquarters, represents the views of General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham with respect to operations after HUSKY. It is not concurred in by Air Chief Marshal Tedder whose comments are attached (Enclosure "B"). It is requested that both papers be submitted for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as representative of the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Allied Force, from the local viewpoint only.

#### Enclosure "A"

*The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Allied Force Headquarters (Rooks)  
to the Chief of Staff, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith)*

SECRET

[ALGIERS,] 7 May 1943.

Subject: Operations after HUSKY

1. After Operation HUSKY there are two immediate possibilities:  
a. To continue operations against the Italian mainland by action against:

- (1) The Reggio-Sangiovanni area (Operation BUTTRESS)
- (2) The Crotone area (Operation GOBLET)
- (3) The Heel of Italy (Operation MUSKET)

These operations would be preparatory to an advance into Italy in the direction of Naples.

b. To occupy Sardinia and Corsica as a preparatory measure to such further operations as may be decided upon.

<sup>1</sup>This memorandum was circulated on May 14, 1943 for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The views of Eisenhower and Tedder regarding operations to be undertaken after HUSKY, which are set forth in the enclosures to this memorandum, were considered in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943, *ante*, p. 194.

## 2. *Object*

To discuss the relative merits of the two courses of action referred to above.

## 3. *Operations BUTTRESS, GOBLET and MUSKET*

### a. The advantages of this course of action are:

(1) Operations on the Italian mainland even though confined to one area might be sufficient to compel Italy to ask for terms.

(2) Operation BUTTRESS and possibly GOBLET might be undertaken so as to coincide with the final stages of Operation HUSKY thus taking direct advantage of the disorganization and confusion which may occur as a result of a rapid success in HUSKY.

(3) The fact that operations were carried into the mainland of Europe would have considerable political value.

(4) Bases would be obtained from which operations in the Balkans could be supported if this strategy is decided upon.

### b. The disadvantages are:

(1) The operations themselves will require considerable forces. Should Italy not ask for terms as a result, we may be committed to a major campaign on the Italian mainland possibly involving all the forces available in the Mediterranean.

(2) Should Germany be in a position strongly to reinforce Italy and should she so decide, we might be involved in a campaign against superior German forces in country in which superiority in numbers would have full weight.

(3) Both during and after the operations a considerable garrison commitment will be involved, since we shall be operating in enemy as opposed to occupied territory.

(4) We shall be responsible for the administration and supply of such areas of the mainland as we occupy. This will constitute a heavy shipping and economic commitment.

(5) Even if it is decided to limit the area of operations to the Toe and Heel of Italy, considerable forces will be required to defend these areas unless Italy has gone out of the war.

c. It is estimated that some 4-5 divisions would be required for Operations BUTTRESS and GOBLET. For Operation MUSKET it is estimated that 4-5 divisions would be required initially. The force in this area would probably have to be built up to a total of approximately 10 divisions (including two Armored divisions) if further operations are to be undertaken on the mainland.

The above requirements would be to some extent counterbalanced by the reduction which it would be possible to make in the garrison of HUSKY. It is clear, however, that operations on the mainland are likely to involve all the resources which we can make available.

#### 4. *Operations BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND*

*a.* The advantages of this course of action are:

(1) It will place the whole of Italy within easy bombing range. This fact alone might be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.

(2) A threat of invasion will exist over the entire length of the west coast of Italy. This is likely to cause the Italians to withdraw troops from the Balkans and will cause the maximum dispersion of Axis troops on the mainland.

(3) It will constitute a threat to southern France and thereby tend to retain German troops in that area.

(4) It renders our sea communications in the western Mediterranean secure and reduces the air threat to North Africa thus freeing air and AA resources.

(5) The operational commitment is limited and the subsequent garrison requirement will be small. Operation FIREBRAND can be undertaken by French forces.

*b.* The disadvantages are:

(1) If the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica does not induce Italy to ask for terms, we should still be faced with the necessity for conducting operations on the mainland in order to achieve that end.

(2) We shall not be taking advantage of the disorganization which may be caused on the mainland by the success of HUSKY.

(3) We shall not reap the political advantages which will accrue from the opening of a campaign on the mainland of Europe.

*c.* It is estimated that Operation BRIMSTONE will require about 5 Inf Divs and one Armd Div; the garrison commitment is unlikely to be greater than 2 Inf Divs. On the other hand, it must be remembered that if this course is adopted it may be necessary to retain the maximum garrison in HUSKY.

#### 5. *Summary*

The position may therefore be summarized as follows:

*a.* Operations BUTTRESS, GOBLET and MUSKET require considerable forces and once we have embarked upon this course we are committed. Unless Italian morale is already weakening, we may be involved in a major campaign the duration and requirements of which it is not possible to foresee.

*b.* Operations BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND can be carried out with comparatively limited forces and after these operations we shall still retain full liberty of action to strike in whatever direction may seem advisable. If Italian morale is weakening after HUSKY, the threat of heavy bombing which these operations will produce may be sufficient to induce Italy to ask for terms.

*c.* The decision between these two courses of action must depend to a great extent upon the state of Italian morale after HUSKY. It will not be easy to assess this accurately and it is therefore considered that the course of action which does not definitely commit us to the mainland is preferable.

6. *Conclusion*

It is concluded that the next operations after HUSKY should be BRIMSTONE and FIREBRAND in preference to BUTTRESS, GOBLET and MUSKET.

LOWELL W. ROOKS  
*Brigadier General, G.S.C.*  
*Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3*

Enclosure "B"

*The Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command (Tedder)*  
*to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

MOST SECRET

[ALGIERS,] 8 May 1943.

Ref: ACMT/S. 515.

MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY

I have just seen a paper prepared by G.3. section for the Chief of Staff. This paper has not been considered by the J.P.S. Previous editions of the paper (P/68) have been considered by the J.P.S. and I have instructed my representative to emphasize certain factors. This final paper does not, in my opinion, give these factors due weight. I cannot, therefore, agree with it or with its conclusions. The main points on which I am in disagreement are the following:

1. Firstly, the difficulties of the capture of Sardinia are completely glossed over. In my opinion, owing to the distance from air bases the capture of Sardinia would be a more difficult problem than HUSKY.

2. The alleged advantage that "It placed the whole of the Italian mainland within easy bombing range" is true, but misleading. The whole Italian mainland is already within easy bombing range from Tunisia and Sicily. The value of additional bases in Sardinia is more than balanced by the additional maintenance and supply involved.

3. The value of Sardinia is, in my opinion, almost entirely a defensive one, in that it would reduce the commitment for the protection of shipping passing along the North African coast.

4. I do not agree that the capture of Sardinia would free considerable A.A. resources in North Africa, since North African bases are within reasonable operation range of enemy bases in Italy.

5. As regards Italy itself, the paper does point out that the establishment of air bases in central Italy would bring within range of our heavy bombers the main Axis industrial centers in southern Germany, etc., also the Roumanian oil fields. This is true, but the main advantage of using Italy as a base is omitted. The main value of such an air base is that heavy bomber attacks on the majority of the most

vital centers in Germany, and other Axis countries pass through routes which completely evade the great belt of fighter and A.A. defenses which Germany has set up along the whole North and North Western approaches. These defenses are exacting an increasing toll on our bomber offensive. It would be quite impossible from every point of view for the enemy to create a similar organization covering the Southern approach, and bomber offensive directed from the South, especially when coordinated with that of U.K. would have enormously increased material and moral effects.

6. I must emphasize, therefore, that in my opinion the conclusions to paper No. P/69 are unsound insofar as they fail to pay due weight to the air aspect which I am sure you will agree has already proved itself to be one of the vital factors.

A. W. TEDDER  
*Air Chief Marshal*  
*Air Commander in Chief*

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
 C.C.S. 224

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

OPERATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER BETWEEN "HUSKY" AND  
 "ROUNDUP"

1. The object of this paper is to indicate the action we recommend in the period which will elapse between the completion of HUSKY, which we assume will be about the middle of August, and the invasion of France.

2. In the Mediterranean Theater, Germany will be occupying a long and vulnerable front with poor north and south and even worse lateral communications. In this area large hostile populations are being, with difficulty, held down mainly by Italian troops. On the other hand, we shall be firmly established on the whole North African shore and will have developed a superior combination and structure of sea and air power. We shall have mastered an important stepping-stone to Europe, and we shall have large and experienced forces standing ready for fresh enterprises. We cannot afford to keep those forces out of action for a period of nine or ten months before we can launch an

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum, which was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943, apparently was prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff during their trans-Atlantic voyage aboard the *Queen Mary* en route to the Conference.

offensive from the United Kingdom into northern France. During this time, the battles on the Russian Front will be raging, and Germany will require all the forces that she can muster against the Russians. The first essential, therefore, will be to make certain that there will be no diminution of the threat to Germany's Southern Front, the vulnerability of which is proved by the tenacity with which she has clung regardless of cost to Tunisia. So long as she is faced by our formidable Mediterranean forces, she cannot be certain where the next blow will fall, and must lock up resources she can ill afford to spare in unsuitable localities for the prosecution of the war.

3. It will not be sufficient to exercise a threat across the Mediterranean. The attack on Italy must be carried out relentlessly to insure her elimination from the war. We believe that this, more than any other single event, would hasten the early defeat of Germany. Through the fall of Italy, Germany must be forced to divert large forces from the Russian Front to Yugoslavia, Greece and France, thus relieving the pressure on Russia. The way would thus be paved for the defeat of Germany on the Russian Front, and thus for a successful return to the Continent from the United Kingdom in 1944. We think these events, coupled with a great increase in the air bombardment of Germany possibly from Northern Italy as well as from the United Kingdom, may well bring about her collapse.

4. We have examined very carefully the various operations which we might carry out after *HUSKY* in the Mediterranean, with the object of eliminating Italy. The alternatives are:

*a.* Operations against the Mainland of Italy

These would take the form of the capture during or immediately after *HUSKY* of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, to be followed by the seizing of Cotrone and further assault on the heel as a prelude to an advance on Bari and Naples. These operations present many difficulties and their practicability must depend on the situation prevailing in Russia and its repercussions on German assistance to Italy. Success must contribute materially to the disintegration of Italy and provide useful bases for further action against the Balkans.

*b.* The Capture of Sardinia

Much will depend on the extent to which this island is reinforced after *HUSKY*, particularly by the Germans. If strongly defended, the operation would be comparable to *HUSKY*. On the other hand we should enjoy the benefit of the experience gained in a successful *HUSKY* and be able to apply this to good effect against Sardinia. After Sardinia we should capture Corsica, which should not present undue difficulties.

The capture of the island would assist us to increase the intensity of our air attack against Italy, would threaten the south of France and increase the security of our sea communications in the Mediterranean.

5. Further alternatives, not so directly connected with the elimination of Italy, have also been examined. Of these the most promising are:

*a. An Assault on Greece from the West*

The capture of the Athens Area and the establishment of a front in Greece would enable us to increase the pressure on Germany, interrupt sea communications to Crete and the islands in the Aegean and would give us air fields from which the Roumanian oil fields could be attacked. In view, however, of the strength of the German garrison, the difficulty of providing fighter cover, and the lack of ports in the Gulf of Corinth this operation does not appear a practicable one at the present time.

*b. Operations against the Dodecanese*

These operations have been fully examined in the Middle East. In our view, they cannot be carried out simultaneously with amphibious operations in the Central Mediterranean. The use of air fields in Turkey would greatly simplify the air problem. We consider that the right time to carry out these operations is simultaneously with the entry of Turkey into the war. This contingency is considered later in this paper.

6. Our conclusion, after prolonged study of these alternatives, is that we ought to undertake those which not only contribute most directly to the elimination of Italy, but which also relate themselves naturally to operations from the United Kingdom in 1944. Our proposal, therefore, is as follows:

*a. That preparations should be made forthwith for the establishment of a bridgehead on the toe of Italy, during or immediately after HUSKY.*

*b. That alternative plans should be made by General Eisenhower for operations against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of Sardinia. A decision on which of these two operations should actually be undertaken should be made when we see how matters stand at the conclusion of HUSKY. If as a result of Russian successes and the consequent lack of German reinforcements for Italy and the weakening or withdrawal of German air forces, Italy is on the point of collapse, then we should enter the heel so as to administer the *coup de grâce*, and prepare for exploitation across the Adriatic. If, on the other hand, Germany diverts large force to Italy—an event which in itself would relieve the pressure on the Russian Front—we could go for Sardinia and Corsica. The seizure of these islands would not only increase the pressure on northern Italy early next year, but would provide stepping-stones from which to threaten and perhaps invade the south of France, and thus ease the cross-Channel operation. At the same time it would add to the security of our communications through the Mediterranean.*

7. It is quite possible, of course, that Italy may collapse before any of the operations discussed above have been carried out. The moral

and material effects of her crushing defeats in Africa, the fall of HUSKYLAND, and the effects of our air attack on Italy herself, may prove decisive. If this proves to be so, then we shall have reached at an early stage the favorable position in the Mediterranean at which we are aiming, and which, if properly exploited, should insure the earliest possible defeat of Germany. We must act quickly in the confusion before the Germans have time to regroup their forces. This would be the moment to bring pressure to bear on Turkey, either to permit the use of Turkish bases by our forces, or to enter the war on our side. Provided the Russians are doing well, there is no other time when a Turkish entry would be so opportune or so likely.

8. If, therefore, Italy collapses after HUSKY, our immediate action should be:

*a.* To occupy southern Italy, taking over air bases and at least one port in the heel, an air field at Reggio or Cotrone, and the air fields in the Rome-Naples Area.

*b.* To establish a bridgehead in the Durazzo area, and introduce supplies and long-range penetration groups to rally and support the guerrillas.

*c.* To seize the Dodecanese, and if possible move into Turkey and attack Ploesti.

*d.* To occupy Corsica and the key points in Sardinia, and to complete the occupation of Sicily.

*e.* To land forces in central Italy to prevent German infiltration from the north.

9. The further exploitation of the situation must depend upon the progress of events and the German reaction. More than one possible theater of operations would be available. We do not believe that Germany can hold both northern Italy and the Balkans without risking a collapse on the Russian Front. Even if she decides to abandon Italy, and hold the Balkans, her task will be by no means easy, especially if Turkey comes into the war. We would carry out our plans for going to the support of Turkey in the first place with air and specialized units, and we should be prepared to exploit any weakening of the German position in the Balkans.

10. A further promising line of action would be to direct forces towards southern France from Corsica and northern Italy. Such a movement would fit in well with a simultaneous operation into northern France from the United Kingdom.

11. These projects should, we think, be further examined and we should like to hear the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

12. Our final conclusion is that the Mediterranean offers us opportunities for action in the coming autumn and winter, which may be decisive, and at the least will do far more to prepare the way for a

successful cross-Channel operation in 1944 than we should achieve by attempting to transfer back to the United Kingdom any of the forces now in the Mediterranean Theater. If we take these opportunities, we shall have every chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a successful conclusion in 1944.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 17 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 234

BRITISH PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

OBJECT

The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

SECTION I—INVASION OF N.W. EUROPE

1. A necessary prerequisite to a re-entry on the Continent across the Channel is the initial softening of German war potential by the intensified combined bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian offensive on the Eastern Front. Since this re-entry will ultimately be necessary, no plan for the defeat of Germany can be drawn up without first examining the essential features of the operation.

2. The essentials for invasion are as follows:—

a. A high degree of air superiority must be achieved during the assault and build-up.

b. Air fields must be captured at an early date.

c. The Coast defences must be sufficiently reduced by the employment of all available means, both before and during the assault.

d. The initial assault must be on a sufficiently large scale and our rate of build-up must compete with that of the enemy.

e. The beach capacity must be sufficient to allow of the subsequent maintenance of the force landed in the first seven days. Sufficient ports must be captured and available for use early.

f. Weather conditions must be suitable.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 17, 1943, under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The attached memorandum by the British Joint Planning Staff, prepared after consultation with the U. S. Joint Planners, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany, showing the course of operations and their feasibility[,] accepting the elimination of Italy as a necessary preliminary." This memorandum was prepared pursuant to a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, 1943; see *ante*, p. 84. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum together with a companion American memorandum, C.C.S. 235, *infra*, at their meeting on May 18 and their morning meeting on May 19; see *ante*, pp. 100 and 112. The consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of these papers resulted in their agreement upon certain resolutions incorporated in C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, *post*, p. 281.

3. There are two main factors in this problem. These are:—

*a.* The size of force which can be employed in the assault, which in general is limited by the assault shipping and landing craft available.

*b.* The relative rate of build-up of our own force, compared to that of the enemy, which can be achieved after the initial assault.

*Assault Shipping and Landing Craft Requirements*

4. Any assault is likely to meet not less than three divisions in the coastal zone reinforced by up to four divisions after 24 hours. The scale of assault cannot therefore be less than 10 divisions.

The assault shipping and landing craft required for an operation involving a force of this nature, run into large figures owing to the necessity for seven of these divisions being afloat simultaneously.

The scale of craft has been worked out in great detail by the British Planners in conjunction with the ROUNDUP Combined Planners. The number of craft required to cross the Channel is higher than in other parts of the world on account of the need for a quicker rate of build-up and of the higher degree of resistance expected.

5. Of the total force of 10 Divisions, the British can provide 2 assault and 3 *immediate* follow-up divisions provided that the Americans allot the following assault shipping and craft:—

L.S.T.2	122	) All required in
L.S.E.	6	
L.C.I.(L)	140	) U.K. by 1st
L.C.T.5 or 6	125	
L.C.M.3	280	) February, 1944.
Certain maintenance equipment	)	

The above figures are based on the assumption that operations after HUSKY will take place in the Mediterranean, resulting in additional casualties to landing craft and ships.

6. The American contribution in the assault will amount to two assault divisions and three follow-up divisions. The two assault divisions which must be assault trained before arrival in U.K. must be carried in American assault shipping and American manned craft. The three follow-up divisions will be carried in the first turn-round of the ships and craft employed in the British and American assaults.

7. We understand that it is very doubtful if the total requirements could be found by 1 February 1944—to permit an assault date of 1 April 1944. This would mean either a reduction in the scale of the assault or a rate of build-up too slow to be acceptable.

*Rate of Build-Up for Invasion*

8. The most favourable area for build-up is that of the North Seine ports—Dieppe to Rouen, in which we estimate that there would be by D plus 7 ten Divisions ashore. Allowing for the build-up of reserves and for ports being put into working order, we estimate that by D plus 90—twenty Divisions would be ashore, and by D plus 125—twenty-five Divisions would be ashore. Thereafter additional ports would have to be used for the maintenance of a force of more than twenty-five Divisions.

9. The maximum maintenance capacity of the ports in the Cotentin peninsula is ten Divisions by D plus 90. Any build-up in this area can only be accomplished if additional ports outside the peninsula are captured.

*Enemy Strength*

10. The estimated German strength in France and the Low Countries in 1944 is 35 Divisions, of which at least four would be available as a mobile reserve. In addition there are some 100,000 static internal security defence troops. Reinforcing divisions would have to come from Germany or the Eastern Front. Up to ten under-strength divisions might conceivably be available in Germany, but would almost certainly not be available if Turkey were already in the war. Advance units of these might arrive four days after the decision to reinforce and might arrive thereafter in France (but not necessarily in the threatened area) at the rate of six divisions a week. The arrival of reinforcements from Russia must depend on the situation on that front. None could in any case arrive in less than 14 days, after which any available could come at the rate of 2 divisions a week. The defection of Italy would, however, have already reduced the German strength in Russia. Assuming, therefore, that the initial assault is faced by four divisions, our forces would, in the worst case, be faced by eighteen German divisions within the first fortnight, after which mobile reinforcements could only come at the expense of the Russian Front.

11. These rates of reinforcement might be considerably reduced by successful Allied air action, but the extent of this reduction would depend on a number of factors and cannot be assessed until the outline plan is firm.

12. Over and above the fixed defences the *minimum* Axis garrison which might be in France and the Low Countries, short of a complete withdrawal, is estimated at twenty-two divisions of which three would be in mobile reserve.

13. It is clear that unless Russian action or Allied action elsewhere reduces the enemy potential in France from the figures in paragraph

10 to something approaching those given in paragraph 12, we are unlikely to be able to retain a foothold in France until our rate of build-up gives us superiority over the enemy.

14. Another most important factor, though it cannot be defined as one that is limiting, is the achievement of a high degree of air superiority during the assault and build-up. The Combined Intelligence Staffs have agreed:—

*a.* If the exploitation of HUSKY is abandoned, the opposition to cross-Channel operations at 1 May 1944 will be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by some 10 squadrons, say 100 planes. Within a week 50 additional squadrons, 450 planes, would be concentrated in the area, giving a total, without losses, of 165 squadrons or 1,485 planes. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany's will to strip the Russian Front.

*b.* If Italy is out of the war the early opposition to cross-Channel operations will also be 105 squadrons or 950 combat planes. *But the enemy's ability to reinforce this force, will be negligible unless he is prepared to strip the Russian Front.*

#### *Deductions*

15. To ignore the limitations of a cross-Channel operation outlined above would be to invite the danger of entering on a build-up race in which we could probably never obtain the necessary margin of superiority for success. If, however, the German strength in France can be reduced to the required extent—and we feel confident that it can—without too serious an effect on the availability of our forces in the U.K., successful invasion should be possible with the forces outlined above in the spring or summer of 1944.

16. The Mediterranean commitment which would result from a collapse of Italy would cause a reduction from some 1,480 to 950 aircraft in the potential ability of Germany to resist our cross-Channel operations. Only some unknown and incalculable weakness on the part of Russia could ease this situation for Germany.

#### *Method of Defeating Germany*

17. After HUSKY we must intensify, with every means at our disposal, the process of weakening Germany sufficiently to ensure a successful invasion across the Channel in 1944. To the effect of the intensified bomber offensive, the naval blockade and the Russian war, we must therefore add continued pressure by our combined forces further to stretch the enemy without respite, and if possible win new bases from which to hit him.

#### *Potentialities of the Mediterranean Theatre*

18. We have in the Mediterranean powerful and seasoned forces, whose attack is now gaining its full impetus, destroying the enemy

and forcing him to give ground. This momentum must be sustained till we have reaped the great advantages in weakening Germany which it promises. Not to do so would be to cast away an unrivalled opportunity of inflicting on Germany a mortal injury and, instead, to give her a chance to parry the final blow and delay her defeat for at least another year.

19. This final blow can only be struck across the Channel; it cannot be delivered from the Mediterranean—but the peculiar nature of the cross-Channel operation sets limits to the weight of this blow.

We therefore strongly hold the belief that to make this blow possible every opportunity must be taken between now and its delivery to exhaust and weaken Germany.

#### *Deception*

20. Moreover, apart from weakening the Germans, it is an essential part of this preparation to deceive them as to our intentions. To discontinue operations in the Mediterranean and concentrate our forces in the United Kingdom in a series of moves which could not be concealed, would be to invite them to take appropriate measures to meet what would become an obvious threat.

#### *Immediate Effects of an Italian Collapse*

21. After a successful HUSKY the greatest aid we could give to Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done to Germany, would be to tear Italy from the Axis.

22. Seven Italian divisions in France and Corsica, and 32 in the Balkans and the Aegean would lay down their arms and Germany would have to find at least fifteen divisions to replace them or so weaken her hold on the Balkans that she would be in danger of losing control in this vital area—a prospect which she could not tolerate. The loss of some 1,400 Italian aircraft, and the approach of the war towards the southern boundaries of the Reich would cost the extended *Luftwaffe* at least 450 fighters, half of which would have to be found by improvisation. The enemy's total air commitments would reduce his ability to reinforce the Western Front to negligible proportions unless he were prepared to strip the Russian Front. The Italian fleet, though admittedly no great menace, contains valuable British heavy units which would be immediately released to engage the Japanese.

23. Apart, therefore, from the moral and political effects of the collapse of Italy, this calamity would immediately prove for Germany a military disaster of the first magnitude.

#### *Subsequent Effects*

24. In the West, the occupation of key points in Sardinia and the restoration of Corsica to France would create a threat to southern

France which the Germans could not ignore. The Germans would either have to occupy and fight for northern Italy, which they might well be unable to do, or yield air bases which could place 500 bombers within range of a large number of important German targets—notably aircraft factories and oil plants—which cannot be attacked from England, North Africa or Sicily. The *safe areas* to which the population of western Germany are being evacuated would come under constant threat of air attack, with serious effect on morale. The German air defences would be split and the effectiveness of the air offensive greatly increased. Moreover, the threat of invasion to southern France would be increased, together with the potentialities of diversionary action to coincide with our invasion across the Channel.

25. In Russia the German forces on land and in the air would have to be reduced below the strength that was already inadequate during the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43.

26. In the East, the Germans would have great difficulty in controlling the Balkans. Sustained at comparatively little cost to the Allies, and supported by air action, up to 300,000 guerillas could harass the enemy's vulnerable communications, denying him important economic resources in Yugoslavia and Greece, facing him with seriously increasing recalcitrance and throttling his garrisons in Greece to such an extent that it is difficult to see how they could be maintained.

27. Added to this, Ploëști itself would, for the first time, be brought within range of effective air attack, from Italy; great—possibly vital—damage could be done, and the German air defence commitments would once more be increased. The Roumanians are, moreover, unlikely to show much firmness under air bombardment and only a small proportion of the 38,000 operatives are thought to be Germans.

28. In the Aegean, the Dodecanese would be weakened and might well be taken, and the way opened for Turkey to enter the lists. This event would be a further heavy blow. Its political effect would be immense, Ploëști would be threatened, together with the eastern Balkan and Black Sea communications, and Germany would be faced with a land front in Thrace which she could only attack if she were to find 7 to 8 more divisions and allot proportionate air squadrons from her already attenuated air forces. We are committed to support Turkey if she is attacked with 48 squadrons and two armoured divisions. These forces must, therefore, be held ready in the Mediterranean against this possibility.

#### *Deduction*

29. Collectively, all these strategic prizes might even be decisive. This policy, together with the effects of the Eastern Front and the

weighty air offensive, is bound to produce powerful results. The results in our opinion will create a situation which will make the difference between success or failure of a re-entry into northwest Europe in 1944.

SECTION II—SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

*The Collapse of Italy*

30. The Tunisian disaster has been a severe shock to the Italians. While HUSKY is being mounted, southern Italy will be bombed, and virtually blockaded at sea. Success in HUSKY will be a further blow to Italian morale. Whether Italy will collapse at once will depend to a great extent on the degree of support which she receives from Germany and on events on the Eastern Front.

31. If HUSKY does not bring about a collapse, Italy can be subjected to a heavy scale of air attack. From August onwards, the bomber force from the United Kingdom could develop a scale of attack on the industrial areas concentrated in the North which would create conditions in which the supply and maintenance of the Italian armed forces would become precarious. Concurrently an even heavier attack could be directed from North Africa and Sicily against the South. The combined effects of these attacks might well bring about the collapse of Italy.

32. It is, however, so important to knock Italy out quickly that we cannot rely on air attack alone. We, therefore, consider that limited combined operations should be developed to support the air offensive, maintain the momentum of the onslaught and tip the scales in our favor, as this can be done at reasonable cost and with the resources present on the spot.

33. In the Central Mediterranean, we have the choice of two lines of advance, one northeastwards into the Toe and Heel of Italy to threaten, if necessary, the Rome-Naples area, the other northwestwards to Sardinia and Corsica. An Aegean advance by the Dodecanese would not have an immediate or speedy effect on the collapse of Italy. Operations against the Mainland are more continuous than an attack on Sardinia and are more likely to collapse Italy this autumn. The capture of Sardinia would cost the equivalent of seven divisions. The capture of the Heel of Italy would involve a total of nine divisions. In either case we should employ the bulk of our resources in present Allied air forces in the Mediterranean. The selection of the course to be pursued must await HUSKY and will turn on such factors as the general air and land situation at the time, German reinforcement, if any, of the objectives, and the morale of the Army and people of Italy.

34. We feel that either of these operations following rapidly upon a successful HUSKY and in conditions of rising air bombardment would tip the scale in our favor.

*Situation After an Italian Collapse*

35. The general war weariness and dissatisfaction of all sections of the Italian people will dispose them towards dealing with the Allies. Owing to the heavy commitment imposed by an Italian default, Germany will be forced to cut her unessential commitments and dispose her available forces so as to hold the areas which she considers essential to her security. These are, we consider:

a. The Maritime Alps between France and Italy which she will hold with some two or three divisions.

b. The area east of the River Adige towards the Yugoslav frontier held with some two or three divisions.

36. The fear of air attack on south Germany from airdromes in the Milan and Turin areas, might force the enemy to fight a delaying action on the line Ravenna-Pisa. In this case five low category divisions would be required for internal security in north Italy, twelve divisions for a determined stand on the line Ravenna-Pisa or four divisions for a token stand to delay our progress northward. The provision of these forces would leave the Balkans disastrously weak.

*Operations After an Italian Collapse*

37. After an Italian collapse we must take full advantage of the situation, to give the maximum further aid to Russia and to facilitate cross-Channel operations in 1944.

38. During the period of confusion we should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo. This would cost four assault brigades and two infantry divisions with one mixed division in reserve in Italy, and might be accomplished with little opposition. We should thus put in a total force of three divisions. This force would activate the guerillas, and we could support it with up to 500 bombers and 300 transport aircraft from the mainland.

39. On an Italian collapse, we should forestall the Germans in the Dodecanese and bring pressure on Turkey to enter the war, and so make available to us the benefits we have already noted, and in particular the use of air bases from which to bomb Ploesti.

40. Should the Germans decide to remain on the Ravenna-Pisa line, three divisions would be required in the Rome-Naples area to stop German infiltration to the southward. An enemy withdrawal from the Milan-Turin area would leave the air fields open to occupation by us, if we wished to do so. A force of six divisions would

be required to secure the air fields against an estimated scale of German attack of 4-6 divisions, but only minor forces would then be required in the Rome-Naples area.

#### *Garrison Commitments*

41. We should occupy the Cagliari and Alghero areas of Sardinia and Corsica and occupy, or remain in occupation of, the Trapani, Messina and possibly the Catania areas of Sicily. This commitment would amount to about 15 battalions and 3 brigades.

#### *Summary of Commitments*

42. Our proposals for meeting these commitments and our commitments in North Africa are detailed in Appendix "A".<sup>2</sup> After they have been met, we estimate that we shall have available in reserve, or for further operations such as an attack on the south of France:

5 American Divisions  
4-7 British Divisions  
1 French Division

In any event our total commitment on the Italian mainland in the event of a collapse will not exceed 9 divisions.

43. The economic commitment which may have to be shouldered is described in C.C.S. 227.<sup>3</sup> This problem will have to be faced in the event of an Italian collapse, whether or not we carry out any further operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY.

#### SECTION III—EFFECT OF MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY ON THE BUILD-UP OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

##### *Assault Ships and Craft*

44. Allowing for casualties at the agreed rate, any of the above courses of action can be carried out with the assault shipping and landing craft (British and American combined) allocated to the Mediterranean Theatre for HUSKY, together with one or two minor reinforcements of certain specialized British types.

45. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to HUSKY would only reduce the amount of assault shipping and landing craft for

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. This appendix set forth an estimate of Allied ground force commitments in the Mediterranean area after the elimination of Italy from the war. Of a total of 8 American, 23 British, and 4 French divisions available, 1½ British divisions would be in Sicily and the Toe and Heel of Italy, 1 British division would be assigned to the enforcement of the armistice, 3-6 British divisions would be in Central Italy, 1 American division in Sardinia, 1 French division in Corsica, 4½ British, 2 American, and 2 French divisions in North Africa and the Levant, 1 British division in the Dodecanese, 3 British divisions in the Durazzo bridgehead, and 2 British divisions for the commitment for Turkey. The remaining 5 American, 4-7 British, and 1 French divisions would be available in the Mediterranean as reserve and for other employment.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff, May 16, 1943, "Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories", not printed.

cross-Channel operations in 1944, by the equivalent of 10% of the total personnel and 6% of the total number of vehicles to be landed. The reduction in personnel lift is not serious as the numbers could be ferried from ship to shore.

Thus, in terms of assault shipping and craft, it is evident that the continuance of Mediterranean operations after HUSKY has comparatively little effect on cross-Channel operations in 1944.

### *BOLERO Build-Up*

46. After allowing for a SICKLE movement of 380,000 men as well as for the necessary R.N., R.A.F. and Canadian troop movements by 1st April, 1944, the number of U.S. divisions which will be in the U.K. by this date will be:

- |   |     |
|---|-----|
| <i>a.</i> Assuming no further Mediterranean operation after HUSKY       | 20  |
| <i>b.</i> Assuming a continuance of Mediterranean operation after HUSKY | 14½ |

Of the above divisions under *a*, two will be in process of disembarkation and two will be linking up with their equipment; but under *b*, owing to the slower rate of movement to the United Kingdom, only one will be in process of disembarkation and one linking up with its equipment. The total number of U.S. divisions which will, therefore, be available for operations from the U.K. on 1st April 1944, under the two above hypotheses will be:

- |                         |
|-------------------------|
| <i>a.</i> 16 divisions  |
| <i>b.</i> 12½ divisions |

47. In this connection, the two examinations of the cargo shipping position just completed by the British and United States Committees on Shipping Availability reveal an apparent deficiency against total requirements, other than post-HUSKY, of 336 sailings for the rest of the year.

Losses have so far been less than the agreed rate taken as the basis of the calculations. In view of this and the economies that could be effected by the Combined Loading of British imports and U.S. Army supplies in the North Atlantic, this deficiency may be largely eliminated and all calculations in the above paragraph are based on the realization of this hope. It may even happen that the reduction in the programmed BOLERO movement shown above due to the additional requirement of some 90 ships for post-HUSKY operations, may not be fully necessary.

*British Forces Available in the U.K.*

48. The British forces available in the U.K. for cross-Channel operations by 1st April 1944 amount to 10–14 divisions dependent on whether cannibalization proves necessary or not.

*Return of Land Forces From the Mediterranean*

49. The size of the cross-Channel assault, as we have already shown, is limited by the number of landing craft that will be available. It would be possible to bring two additional British divisions ex North Africa to U.K. in the first quarter of 1944 without materially affecting the BOLERO program as planned for that quarter.

50. It will be seen from Appendix "A" that after the elimination of Italy there will be some ten divisions (British and American) in the Mediterranean available for other employment. Even if we halted in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, there will be no object in bringing these forces back to U.K. except that they are battle experienced troops, since the availability of landing craft and maintenance limitations will preclude their use in ROUNDUP.

*Deduction*

51. Thus, if we continue operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, there can be available in the United Kingdom by 1st April 1944 for cross-Channel operations some 22½–26½ divisions, United States and British. These figures could be increased by a further two divisions if it is decided to bring two British divisions back from North Africa (see paragraph 49 above). Even if no post-HUSKY operations are carried out, the total number of divisions available in the United Kingdom would only be increased by 3½.

*Air Forces*

52. There are sufficient air forces in the Mediterranean to implement the strategy recommended. Allowing for the bombing of Italy and necessary air striking forces, defensive fighter commitments and air forces for Turkey, we could possibly return to United Kingdom, if offensive amphibious operations in the Mediterranean stopped after HUSKY, up to the following strength of air forces :

<i>Type</i>	<i>U.S.</i>		<i>British</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Sqns.</i>	<i>A/c</i>	<i>Sqns.</i>	<i>A/c</i>	<i>Sqns.</i>	<i>A/c</i>
Fighter	16	400	9	144	25	544
Fighter/Recce	2	36	2	32	4	68
Light Bomber	12	156	5	80	17	236
P.R.U.	1	13	2	24	3	37
Transport	20	250	—	—	20	258

53. It is at present impossible to say to what extent this would actually increase the air forces available in U.K. in April, 1944, since only a proportion of these units could actually be reconstituted in the line. Additional strength would, however, be given to existing formations by additional reserves of aircraft and personnel.

54. If amphibious operations were continued in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, the air forces stated in paragraph 52 would have to remain until offensive operations were concluded. There should then still be time to bring back a proportion before April, 1944, but there would be no fighter squadrons to spare, and extra transport aircraft would have to be retained. The retention of fighter squadrons in the Mediterranean would, in addition to the considerations stated in paragraph 53, probably not have a restricting effect on fighter reserves for cross-Channel operations.

#### SECTION IV—CONCLUSIONS

55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of HUSKY solely upon ROUNDUP is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, to adopt a defensive attitude on land and to allow Germany to concentrate for the defense of France and the Low Countries against our invasion.

56. Our plan for the defeat of Germany is therefore:

*a.* To eliminate Italy by:

(1) Air action and one of the following alternatives:

*Either*

(2) During or immediately after HUSKY, a landing in the Reggio area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible on the mainland by landing first at Cotrone and then in the Heel.

We estimate that the approximate timings of those operations might be mid-August, 1st September, and mid-October.

*Or*

(3) During or immediately after HUSKY a landing in the Reggio area and thereafter continuing operations as soon as possible by a landing in Sardinia followed by one in Corsica.

We estimate that the approximate timing of these operations might be mid-August, mid-October, and mid-November, respectively.

*b.* To invade northwest Europe with the target date of April 1944.

C. E. LAMBE

W. PORTER

W. ELLIOT

WASHINGTON, 17th May 1943.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Joint Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 235

## DEFEAT OF GERMANY FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

## PROBLEM

1. To present a plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating on the biggest possible invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.

## ASSUMPTIONS, 1943-44

2. *a.* Russia remains an effective Ally in the war and is containing the bulk of the German forces. She is at peace with Japan.

*b.* No amphibious operations will be undertaken in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY.

*c.* HUSKY starts on the date at present planned and all organized opposition in the island ceases by 31 August. Landing craft can be released by 15 August for movement to other areas for further operations by 15 August.

*d.* SICKLE continues at full scale as planned.

*e.* Air operations in the Mediterranean area will be limited to the protection of shipping and the bombing of Italy and other remunerative Axis targets.

*f.* Spain remains neutral.

*g.* Turkey is either neutral or an active Ally.

## OBJECTIVE

3. The decisive defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe as early as practicable.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The attached memorandum by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners, prepared after consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, contains a plan for the defeat of Germany showing the course of operations and their feasibility by concentrating the biggest possible invasion force in the U. K. as soon as possible." This memorandum was prepared pursuant to a directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 15, 1943; see *ante*, p. 84. The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered this memorandum together with a companion British memorandum, C.C.S. 234, *supra*, at their morning meeting on May 19; see *ante*, p. 112. The consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of these papers resulted in their agreement upon certain resolutions incorporated into C.C.S. 237/1, May 20, 1943, *post*, p. 281.

GENERAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS EUROPEAN-MEDITERRANEAN  
AREA, 1943-44

4. To attain this objective we believe that the courses of action outlined below are essential:

- a.* SICKLE, and the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom.
- b.* BOLERO, in order to achieve the primary objective, ROUNDUP, in the spring of 1944.
- c.* Keep Russia in the war.
- d.* Mediterranean air operations after HUSKY must not prejudice SICKLE, the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP.

5. A sound strategic concept for the defeat of Germany at the earliest possible date can only be developed after careful analysis of existing and anticipated conditions in the entire European-Mediterranean area in 1943-44. Our strategic concept is firmly based on such an assessment, and accepts the following premises:

- a.* Defeat of the Western Axis by means of an invasion from the Mediterranean is unsound strategically and logistically.
- b.* The United Kingdom is an unparalleled base from which to create conditions for a successful landing on the Continent and to launch the decisive invasion of the Fortress of Europe.
- c.* Germany intends to concentrate on the defeat of the Russian armed forces in 1943. Only a major threat from another direction will divert Germany from this purpose, as she is fully conscious that failure on the Russian Front means her ultimate defeat by the United Nations. The minor operations in the Mediterranean which could be conducted after HUSKY, within the limited capabilities of the United Nations, even if they resulted in the defection or collapse of Italy, would be of lesser importance to Germany than the defeat of Russia. The United States and British forces are incapable of interfering seriously, by Military action other than air, with Axis operations against Russia in 1943. Germany will either fail or succeed in Russia this summer.
- d.* We believe that Russia will continue to require the major part of the Axis effort in 1944. The heavy pressure on the Axis by the Russian armies, together with the devastating results of an overwhelming and uninterrupted bomber offensive from the United Kingdom, Africa, and Sicily, will create a situation favorable for ROUNDUP in April 1944.
- e.* We further believe: that the elimination of Italy is not a prerequisite for the creation of conditions favorable for ROUNDUP; that the elimination of Italy may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in the Mediterranean, by a successful HUSKY and an intensified bomber offensive against Italy—in fact Italian defection might precede HUSKY; that if, after HUSKY, Italy has not surrendered or collapsed, the advantages to be gained in eliminating Italy by conducting further amphibious operations are not

worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time; that secondary operations after HUSKY to eliminate Italy will have a drastic effect in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment, and time on our main effort—SICKLE, the bomber offensive, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP.

f. Experience in TORCH and in preparation for HUSKY has shown that once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces. Such would undoubtedly be the case with secondary operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY, especially if directed against Italy. The additional forces can only be provided at the direct expense of SICKLE, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP.

#### AXIS CAPABILITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1944

(Reference C.I.C. 24, 16 May 1943)<sup>2</sup>

##### *General*

6. Germany will be increasingly war weary and will be faced with an economy inadequate to a prolonged war, resulting, among other things, in the armed forces beginning to experience shortages in supply. The presence of Russia on the East and the Allied threat on the West will prevent the hoped for remanning of industry by men released from the armed forces. Her total number of divisions will remain approximately static, but they will be under strength. Our build-up in the United Kingdom will offer for the first time a positive threat of a war on a second front. While this build-up is being effected, the bomber offensive will be carrying the striking power of the United Nations to the Germans and creating conditions favorable for a successful invasion.

##### *Ground Forces*

7. In the spring of 1944, German ground forces may be estimated at about 280 combat divisions, which could be distributed as follows:

Eastern Front (including Finland)	195
Norway	11
Poland	2
Denmark	2
Southeastern Europe	11
France and Low Countries	32 ( $\frac{1}{3}$ refitting)
Germany (Strategic reserve)	27 ( $\frac{1}{3}$ refitting)

8. An attack against the European coast would be met by coastal divisions varying, with the area attacked, from 2-3 to 3-5. The mobile reserves of 2 to 4 divisions could begin to arrive after 24 hours, but the movement of these divisions can reasonably be expected to be delayed by aerial action.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

9. The strategic reserve in Germany will total a maximum of 18 understrength divisions. Units could begin to arrive in 4 days and the total could be in France, but not in the areas of operations, in 3½ weeks. If this movement were not undertaken prior to our attack, it would require 5 weeks to complete the move to France. If units could be spared from the Eastern Front, the first division would arrive in 14 days and 2 each week thereafter. Continued air attack on these units while enroute will materially reduce their combat effectiveness.

#### *Air Forces*

10. The number of airplanes is difficult to determine, but after planes have been allocated to the Russian Front, it is estimated that there will be 2050 planes available for all other areas.

11. It is estimated that on 1 May 1944 there will be 950 combat airplanes in France and the Low Countries. These might be reinforced immediately by 100 additional planes. Within a week, 450 planes probably could be concentrated in the area giving a total of 1500 planes, assuming no losses. Further reinforcements would depend on Germany's will to strip the Russian Front, but in any event the absolute number of German planes is of relatively minor importance due to the United Nations' preponderance (8 to 1) of air power, in the United Kingdom.

#### *Naval Forces*

12. An invasion would probably be opposed at sea by 70 E-boats, 17 destroyers, 30 torpedo boats, and a large but indeterminate number of submarines.

#### *Summary*

13. A cross-Channel assault would be faced, initially, with from 2 to 5 coastal defense divisions which might be reinforced by 2 to 4 mobile divisions after a minimum of 24 hours. A minimum delay of from 3 to 5 weeks can be expected before the 18 understrength divisions in Germany could be moved to France. Additional time would be required to move them to the combat zone.

14. Our overwhelming air superiority (8 to 1) could seriously delay, or even prevent, the arrival of reserves, if not eliminate them entirely from early arrival in combat. This applies equally to the mobile reserves in France as well as to the 18 understrength divisions in Germany. Therefore, 3 to 4 coastal divisions must be defeated initially and a build-up effected to face a reinforcement of 2 to 4 divisions which may arrive in a depleted and disorganized condition, as a result of our air attacks. After 30 to 60 days, Germany might be in a position to face us with a maximum of 15-20 understrength

divisions. At this time their air strength would be negligible unless they chose to strip other areas including the Russian Front.

#### CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

##### *Target Date*

15. Because 1 April 1944 coincides with the completion of the 4th phase of the Allied bomber offensive against Germany, and is the earliest date on which the weather becomes favorable for a cross-Channel operation, it should be accepted for planning purposes as the date on which we must be prepared to re-enter the Continent. The continued examination of the results of the bomber offensive and the integration of its effects with other factors, including events on the Russian Front and in the Mediterranean, will enable the United Nations to decide by November, 1943, if a change in the proposed target date should be necessary.

##### *General Concept*

16. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations has been directed to study and prepare plans for invasion at any time with whatever forces may be available. This planning is proceeding, but has not yet progressed to a full study of ROUNDUP.<sup>3</sup> Lacking complete examination of this problem, only the broader aspects of a plan can be presented. Detailed examination may therefore result in some modifications to the plan presented herewith.

17. In general, it is proposed that an operation be conducted to secure a lodgment in the north of France. It is estimated that ten divisions will be required for the initial cross-Channel movement, and that sufficient amphibious assault craft will be available to float those required in the initial assault provided those now in the Mediterranean are moved to the United Kingdom on the completion of HUSKY, and that no other major amphibious operations in the Mediterranean are undertaken. Thereafter, a build-up of forces [should?] be accomplished at the maximum rate consistent with available port capacities together with an exploitation of the lodgment to secure additional ports and air bases. When a sufficient build-up of forces and the organization of logistical establishments have been accomplished, and when the effect of the air offensive has been reflected in decreased German resistance, the advance to the heart of the German citadel can be accomplished.

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<sup>3</sup> For an account of the planning in the first half of 1943 for a cross Channel invasion of the continent, see Harrison, chapter II.

## AVAILABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS FORCES

*Air Forces*

18. The U.S.A.A.F. program and the R.A.F. projected order of battle for April, 1944, is indicated below. The U.S.A.A.F. must be given first priority on shipping if the bomber offensive program is to be accomplished.

	U.S.A.A.F.		R.A.F.	
	Groups	Aircraft (U.E.)	Squadrons	Aircraft (U.E.)
Heavy Bombers	51	2448	80	1600
Medium Bombers	9	576	12	240
Light and Dive Bombers	13	832	13	260
Bomber Recon.			1	14
Day Fighter	25	2500	62	1116
Night Fighter			19	412
Fighter Recon.			15	231
Army Support (Fighters)			8	112
Army Support (Bombers)			4	56
Photo Recon.	2	168	5	100
Observation	4	336	10	160
Air/Sea Rescue			8½	170
Transport	8½	442	7	190
	<hr/> 112½	<hr/> 7302	<hr/> 244½	<hr/> 4661

*Ground Forces*

19. If commitments to other theaters remain at the 1943 level there will be available in the United States, through 1944, more divisions than can be shipped to the United Kingdom. After HUSKY, 6 additional U. S. divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

20. The British will have 10 offensive divisions available in the United Kingdom by October, 1943. This may be increased to 14 divisions by 1 April 1944. After HUSKY, 11 additional British divisions in the Mediterranean will be available for use elsewhere.

*Build-up in the United Kingdom*

21. The build-up in the United Kingdom for a cross-Channel operation can be obtained by the movement of forces from the United States only, or by moving troops from the United States and transferring surplus U. S. and British formations from North Africa. The two methods of build-up are indicated below (priority on shipping has been given to the air force units and provides for completion of U.S.A.A.F. build-up by May, 1944). These figures are based on British estimates of the numbers that can be processed through U. K.

ports rather than on a larger number which can actually be moved by available shipping.

*Build-up (divs.) From the United States Only (See Appendix "A" <sup>4</sup>)*

	1 Oct 1943	1 Jan 1944	1 Apr 1944	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
U. S.	7	13	20	25	28	31
British	10	10	14*	14	14	14
Total	17	23	34	39	42	45

22. It is reasonable to assume that operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, and that the flow through U. K. ports has been increased, thus permitting the following build-up:

	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
Total divisions	43	50	64

23. *Build-up (divs.) From the United States and North Africa (See Appendix "A")*

	1 Oct 1943	1 Jan 1944	1 Apr 1944	1 Jul 1944	1 Oct 1944	1 Jan 1945
U. S.	6	8	10	18	24	27
British	10	14	24	25	25	25
Total	16	22	34	43	49	52

These figures are based on what the British have indicated can be processed through U. K. ports and not on the availability of shipping. The latter would permit a material increase in the build-up indicated were it not for the limitations imposed by the port capacities of the United Kingdom.

24. The second method of build-up, from the United States and North Africa, is presented because of the desirability of using battle seasoned units for the initial cross-Channel operations. Units can be found in the Mediterranean that are not only composed of veterans, but that have also participated in large-scale amphibious operations.

#### *Amphibious Assault Craft*

25. Appendix "B" lists the amphibious assault craft which will be available after HUSKY, and also after each of two major amphibious operations subsequent to HUSKY, if such operations are conducted.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

\*These 4 additional British divisions are dependent on the present program of conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive type. [Footnote in the source text.]

*Garrisons in the Mediterranean*

26. Proposed garrisons in the Mediterranean are contained in Appendix "C."<sup>5</sup>

## EFFECT OF OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO HUSKY ON ROUNDUP AND SICKLE

*Ground Forces*

27. If major operations, other than by air, are undertaken in the Mediterranean after the successful completion of HUSKY, no ground forces may be released for BOLERO until after the collapse of Italy.

28. Such operations may interfere seriously with ROUNDUP if shipping available for BOLERO has to be diverted to reinforce and support the forces engaged in the Mediterranean.

29. The time required to gain the objective of the Mediterranean operations—the collapse of Italy—is indefinite. Success cannot be expected before 1 January 1944. After that date sufficient time remains to move two divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom before the target date selected for ROUNDUP, but there can be no assurance that shipping will be available. ROUNDUP would probably be deprived, therefore, of battle-experienced troops.

30. Little would be gained in the build-up following ROUNDUP by moving any other available forces from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom over the movement of similar numbers from the United States.

*Air Forces*

31. After providing for an air offensive against Italy, convoy protection, and defense, about 900 combat aircraft and 250 transports will be available and could be moved to the United Kingdom following the completion of HUSKY. However, if further advances are undertaken, all aircraft employed at the time of HUSKY will remain in the Mediterranean until offensive operations are completed. All of the fighters (550), most of which are first line, and 250 transports, sufficient to lift two parachute regiments simultaneously, would be retained in the Mediterranean for garrison and supply of additionally occupied areas. Only light bombers and special purpose airplanes (about 350) could be released for transfer to the United Kingdom.

*Amphibious Assault Craft (see Appendix "B")*

32. If no operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY, the number of amphibious assault craft available for ROUNDUP will total 4,657 of all types.

33. After one major amphibious operation subsequent to HUSKY, the total will be reduced to 3,540, or 76 percent of the maximum.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

34. A second major amphibious operation subsequent to HUSKY will reduce the total to 2,461 or 53 percent of the total.

35. If the second operation is not undertaken until the middle of November 1943, the amphibious assault craft remaining cannot arrive in the United Kingdom until about 1 March 1944.

36. It is probable that the amphibious assault craft available after HUSKY will not meet fully the maximum vehicle requirements of a large scale ROUNDUP. It is apparent, therefore, that any lesser number would be entirely inadequate.

#### CONCLUSIONS

37. After HUSKY, the main effort of the United Nations should be concentrated on executing SICKLE, the bomber offensive, BOLERO, and ROUNDUP.

38. The planning date for ROUNDUP should be 1 April 1944.

39. The launching of a ROUNDUP operation about 1 April 1944 is considered entirely feasible, and the movement of United States and British resources to the United Kingdom, therefore, should be executed.

40. Operations in the Mediterranean subsequent to HUSKY should be limited to the air offensive, because any other operations would use resources vital to ROUNDUP and present the risk of a limitless commitment of United Nations resources to the Mediterranean vacuum, thus needlessly prolonging the war.

J.C.S. Files

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#### *Resolutions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
C.C.S. 237/1

[WASHINGTON,] 20 May 1943.

#### EUROPEAN OPERATIONS

Reference: C.C.S. 89th Meeting, Item 1

#### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

##### Resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date

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<sup>1</sup>The first version of this paper, C.C.S. 237, not printed, was prepared by the Secretaries along lines set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff after the "off the record" portion of their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943 (*ante*, p. 116). At their meeting on the afternoon of May 19, 1943 (*ante*, p. 118), the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed upon certain amendments to C.C.S. 237 which are included in this final approved version of the resolutions. These resolutions were also included in the "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister," C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 364.

1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

<i>Assault:</i>	5 Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
	2 Airborne Divisions
<b>Total:</b>	<b>9 Divisions in the Assault</b>
<i>Build-up:</i>	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
<b>Total:</b>	<b>29 Divisions</b>

*b.* That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available.

*c.* The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of HUSKY and the situation in Russia.

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Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, [May 24, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS.

The Prime Minister wishes you to see the attached minute.

2(a) of Flag 'Z' is set out in the attached extract<sup>1</sup> from our papers. If this does not make the matter clear, I can show you the file.

T. L. ROWAN  
24.5.43

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<sup>1</sup> Enclosure 2 to this document.

[Enclosure 1]

*Minute by Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>2</sup>

[WASHINGTON, May 24, 1943.]

LORD HALIFAX.

GENERAL ISMAY.

1. I might talk 2(a) of Flag 'Z' over with General Eisenhower when we meet, but in principle his wishes should be met about his own organization.

2. He should certainly communicate with the Combined General Staffs, and all official communications should pass by this channel.

3. Incidents may however arise which will be immediately published by the Press, on which it may be necessary to take rapid political decisions on the highest level. Therefore it would be wise for Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan to be kept in touch with what is passing and to report, as they now do, direct to the Heads of Governments. Neither I nor I expect the President wishes to be involved in the regular routine. But political questions of the highest importance may arise on which we must be constantly informed by our two representatives on the spot, and the good relations prevailing between them and General Eisenhower should render this process smooth and easy.

4. The more Italian functionaries we have to replace by military officers, the greater will be our difficulties. It certainly seems desirable to take all we can get in the way of trustworthy help for running the country, except where malignant Fascists are concerned. It is probable that the local Italian officials will fall over each other in their desire to serve once the fighting is over. It would be a great mistake for us to establish an Anglo-American military bureaucracy if we can get the Italians to do the work.

5. I am not aware who is dealing with this subject on the American side. I should think the matter could be quite easily settled round a table today or tomorrow by the four or five people involved, and could then be submitted to the President for his approval. I do not wish to address the President on the subject until it is reduced to some particular, precise point of difference.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

24.5.43

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<sup>2</sup> This paper has the following typed endorsement: "Mr. Hopkins to See."

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1943.

EXTRACT FROM A PAPER BY MR. HAYTER OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, ON  
ADMINISTRATION OF HUSKYLAND

2. (a) They (His Majesty's Government) do not see the need for the proposed appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and would prefer a small political section with an American Chief and a British Assistant Chief. On this point the United States Government, while not acquiescing, have said that the organization is principally a matter for General Eisenhower. The latter's Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, is now in Washington and is believed to share the views of His Majesty's Government on this point.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

Attachment to C.C.S. 250/1

## IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE TRIDENT CONFERENCE

1. In order that there may be no delay in action to implement the decisions arrived at the TRIDENT Conference, the Combined Staff Planners recommend as follows:

a. That a directive be issued to General Eisenhower for operations after HUSKY (Enclosure A).

b. That a supplementary directive be issued to General Morgan (Enclosure B).

c. That General Morgan should be instructed to give, as soon as possible, a preliminary estimate of the requirements for operation ROUNDHAMMER in transport aircraft and gliders.

2. In view of the urgency of completing the ROUNDHAMMER plan, we suggest that further consideration should be given to the early appointment of the Supreme Commander.

## Enclosure A

## DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

a. That forces and equipment shall be established in the United

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners is in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 96th Meeting." For the record of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff under reference, held on May 25, 1943, see *ante*, p. 200.

Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

<i>Assault:</i>	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
	2	Air-borne Divisions
	—	
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault
<i>Build-up:</i>	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
	—	
Total	29	Divisions

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

b. That the Allied Commander in Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It

is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives. Further instructions will be issued as to the availability of combat loaders and cargo ships.

2. You are directed to submit proposals with appropriate recommendations for operations in the Mediterranean Area, to be carried out concurrently with or subsequent to a successful HUSKY. All considerations related to your proposed operations must be [in] consonance with the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreements quoted in paragraph 1 above. Proposals will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 July 1943.

3. *Landing Craft.* In view of necessity for starting preparations in the United Kingdom at once for cross-Channel operations referred to in paragraph 1 *a* above, it may be necessary after HUSKY to withdraw from the Mediterranean and Levant:

*a.* The crews of all landing craft that may be lost in HUSKY.

*b.* Maintenance and base staffs, with repair equipment and spare gear surplus to those required for the upkeep of landing ships and craft then remaining.

The landing craft available for operations in the Mediterranean after HUSKY are based on an estimate of 50 per cent loss in that operation. If the losses are less than this, surplus crews and craft may have to be returned to the U. K. This does not necessarily apply to special ships.

#### Enclosure B

### DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY DIRECTIVE TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER (DESIGNATE)

#### AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM THE U. K.

1. Under the terms of your present directive<sup>2</sup> you have been instructed to prepare plans for:

*a.* An elaborate camouflage and deception scheme extending over the whole summer with a view to pinning the enemy in the West and keeping alive the expectation of large-scale cross-Channel operations in 1943. This would include at least one amphibious feint with the

<sup>2</sup>The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of April 26, 1943, is described in Sir Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1950), pp. 54, 55, and 57. For an account of the genesis of the directive, see Harrison, pp. 46-49.

object of bringing on an air battle employing the Metropolitan Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force.

*b.* A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

*c.* A full-scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. In amplification of paragraph *c* above the Combined Chiefs of Staff have now resolved that forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out.

3. You will, therefore, plan an operation based on the presence of the following ground forces available for use in the U.K. on 1 May 1944:

<i>Assault:</i>	5 Infantry Divisions simultaneously loaded in landing craft.
	2 Infantry Divisions—follow up.
	2 Air-borne Divisions.
Total:	9 Divisions in the assault.
<i>Build-up:</i>	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
Total:	29 Divisions.

A detailed statement of the forces which it is estimated will be available for this operation will be provided separately, and the possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

4. The expansion of logistical facilities in the U. K. will be undertaken immediately. You should plan for the development and seizure of Continental ports, after the initial assault, in order that the build-up forces may be augmented, and follow-up shipments may be made from the United States, or elsewhere, of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to you. In addition, you will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.

5. Your *outline plan* for this operation should be prepared and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as early as possible and not later than 1 August 1943.

## C. STRATEGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Hopkins Papers

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Much as I dislike to impose on your time at this moment, I am very anxious about the decision on the Generalissimo's request to devote the entire India-China air transport capacity in the next three months to air supplies.<sup>2</sup>

All the complicated factors in the China theatre call for immediate remedial action. It is the considered judgement of the Generalissimo as the responsible commander of the theatre that this can only be achieved by an immediate air offensive, both to strike at the enemy air force and shipping, and to support the Chinese ground forces.

With the limited air freight capacity at present available, no half way measures are possible. May I add my own personal plea that the Generalissimo's views will prevail, as I am convinced that the facts will support no other conclusion.

I hope you will understand the deep anxiety which leads me to send you these few words.

Very sincerely yours,

TSE VUN SOONG

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<sup>1</sup> The source text is in Soong's handwriting.

<sup>2</sup> Chiang's request had been contained in a message to Roosevelt transmitted in a note of April 29, 1943, from Soong to Hopkins; for the text, see Romanus and Sunderland, pp. 319-320. According to the same source (p. 326), Roosevelt had sent a letter to Chiang on May 4, 1943, pointing out the disadvantages of diverting the total tonnage of the ferry line to serve only the needs of the air offensive. For an account of the discussions in Washington during the first few days of May 1943 regarding Chiang's request, see *ibid.*, pp. 320-326.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: At the Casablanca conference when Far Eastern matters were discussed, China was not consulted as there were no representatives present. Only after decisions were made, were they communicated to the Chinese Government.<sup>1</sup>

At the present interallied conferences, when the war against Japan is discussed, I trust I may be called in to participate so that the Gen-

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding the manner in which the Casablanca Conference decisions on Far Eastern matters were communicated to the Chinese Government, see *ante*, p. 88, footnote 4.

eralissimo may be continuously consulted.<sup>2</sup> I shall appreciate it if you could do anything to ensure it.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,

TSE VUN SOONG

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 717, May 15, 1943, from Chungking, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, p. 53, reported the request by Chiang that Madame Chiang and Soong should serve as the Chinese representatives in any consultations made necessary on Chinese questions raised in the course of the discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill.

<sup>3</sup> At the proposal of Leahy, the Combined Chiefs, at their meeting on May 15, 1943, agreed to invite Soong and Chu to express the views of Chiang regarding operations in the Burma-China theater; see *ante*, p. 80. For the record of Soong's presentation at the May 17 meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *ante*, p. 87.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, May 13th, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, In relation to the alternative plan for expanding the Royal Australian Air Force—now under your consideration—I have the honour to inform you that, in duty bound, I raised the matter in the course of my discussions yesterday with the Prime Minister.

In view of the supreme responsibility vested jointly in yourself and the Prime Minister in connection with such matters, I am expecting that in due course the plan will be considered by you both.<sup>1</sup>

Yours sincerely,

H V EVATT

<sup>1</sup> At the meeting of the Pacific War Council on May 20, Churchill announced that he and Roosevelt had reached agreement on the matter of allocating additional aircraft to Australia; see *ante*, p. 138.

J. C. S. Files

*Plan Prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

Attachment to C.C.S. 220

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

1. A brief discussion of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The plan is based on the following overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943, under cover of a memorandum by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff reading as follows: "The attached strategic plan, prepared by the United States Joint Staff Planners, meets with the approval of the United States Chiefs of Staff and is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration." This plan was discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 20, 1943, and it was accepted as a basis for a combined study and elaboration for future plans; see *ante*, p. 126.

a. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan. If, however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against Japan, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. In view of the long period covered and the inevitable changes in conditions that cannot be foreseen, it is not practicable to divide the plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows:

*Phase I*

a. *Continue and Augment Existing Undertakings in and From China.*

Chinese Forces assisted by U. S. Forces.

b. *Recapture Burma.*

British Forces assisted by U. S. and Chinese Forces.

c. *Open a Line of Communications to the Celebes Sea.*

United States Forces.

*Phase II*

a. *Operations To Open the Strait of Malacca and To Compel Wide Dispersion of Enemy Forces.*

British Forces.

b. *Recapture the Philippines.*

United States Forces.

c. *Prepare To Capture Hong Kong.*

Chinese Forces.

*Phase III*

a. *Continue Operations To Open the Strait of Malacca and To Compel Wide Dispersion of Enemy Forces.*

British Forces.

b. *Secure Control of the Northern Part of the South China Sea, and Assist in the Capture of Hong Kong.*

United States Forces.

c. *Capture Hong Kong.*

Chinese Forces.

*Phase IV*

*Establish Air Bases in Japanese Occupied China From Which To Launch an Overwhelming Bombing Offensive Against Japan.*

Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U. S. Forces.

*Phase V*

*Conduct an Overwhelming Air Offensive Against Japan.*  
U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

*Phase VI*

*Invade Japan.*  
U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

## Enclosure "A"

## STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

4.<sup>2</sup> *Objective of the Plan*

The United Nations war objective is the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the invasion of Japan.

5. *Most Probable Japanese Courses of Action*

Japan's most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating China from the war.

6. *The Invasion of Japan*

Since the invasion of Japan is a vast undertaking, it should not be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of Japan is considered feasible.

It is probable that the reduction of Japan's power and will to resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against Japan itself.

7. *An Overwhelming Air Offensive Against Japan*

An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in China.

8. *Recapture Burma*

The attainment of bases in China for the air offensive against Japan is dependent on the continuation of China in the war, and on the establishment of adequate supply routes, not only to maintain China, but also to maintain United Nations forces which are to operate in and from China. The recapture of Burma is a prerequisite to the attainment of adequate bases in China. The capacity of the Burma Road supplemented by the air route from India is inadequate to support the air and ground forces required to implement an air offensive on the required scale. The seizure of a port in China to augment the supply routes through Burma is essential.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure "A" begins with paragraph 4.

### 9. *The Seizure of a Port in China*

Hong Kong is the most suitable port which may be seized initially. Its seizure requires an offensive from the interior of China by forces supported through Burma, and, probably by supplementary amphibious operations. Control of the South China Sea by the United Nations will be necessary to prevent Japan from successfully opposing these measures.

### 10. *A Line of Communications to Hong Kong*

The most feasible sea route from the United States to Hong Kong is through the Celebes and Sulu Seas; that from the United Kingdom is through the Strait of Malacca. The establishment of these routes will require the neutralization of Japanese bases in the northern East Indies, the Philippines, Formosa, and on the Asiatic mainland south of Hong Kong. Control of these areas will prevent Japan from supporting her forces in the Netherlands East Indies and will deny her the economic advantages she receives from that area. Operations to open a line of communications to Hong Kong and to control the South China Sea are considered feasible.

### 11. *A Line of Communications From Hawaii to the Celebes Sea*

This line of communications to the Celebes Sea will be established by advancing in the Central and Southwest Pacific areas with a view to shortening the sea route, providing for its security, and denying to the enemy bases and means by which he may interfere with the line of communications.

### 12. *A Line of Communications Through the Strait of Malacca*

Although the supply of forces in China will come mainly from the United States, operations to open the Strait of Malacca, after the reconquest of Burma, are a vital part of the plan. The enemy must be continuously compelled to disperse his forces throughout the Pacific and Asiatic areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in Southeastern Asia. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.

### 13. *Control of the Seas*

Since control of the seas in the western Pacific by the United Nations may force the unconditional surrender of Japan before invasion and even before Japan is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means to gain this control will be undertaken by the United States. The establishment of the line of communications to the Celebes Sea will be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be seized.

Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to Japan itself, will be implemented as our naval strength increases.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 14 May 1943.

C.C.S. 225

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA, 1943-44

1. At the Casablanca Conference the following were agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approved by the President and the Prime Minister, to cover operations from India into Burma and China during 1943-44 (C.C.S. 170/2, Section V (b)).<sup>2</sup>

(a) Operations aimed at the capture of Akyab before May, 1943 (CANNIBAL).

(b) A limited forward advance from Assam before May, 1943, to gain bridgeheads for further operations; to improve the air route to China; and possibly to gain additional air fields.

(c) The improvement of the air transportation services into China with the object of enabling a larger air striking force to be maintained.

(d) A provisional date of 15 November 1943, and a schedule of forces required for launching an assault on Burma (ANAKIM). This date to be subject to the availability of the necessary forces and to be reviewed in July, 1943.

2. Since the Casablanca Conference, the following developments have taken place:

(a) The advance on Akyab has not succeeded, and the capture of this place before the monsoon must now be ruled out.

(b) The forward advance from Assam has not been undertaken because of administrative difficulties and the inability of the Chinese to advance from Yunnan during the spring.

(c) Some increase has been made in the air transport available for the China route, but it has been established that the full development of the air route and the full requirements of land operations towards Central Burma cannot both be provided by the engineering and transportation resources available.

(d) The ANAKIM plan has been prepared in outline and has been examined by the British Chiefs of Staff with the Commanders in Chief.

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was handed to the United States Chiefs of Staff by the British Chiefs of Staff at the conclusion of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 14, 1943; see item 2 of the record of that meeting, *ante*, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> The paper under reference is the "Final Report to the President and the Prime Minister"; see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942*, and *Casablanca, 1943*, p. 797.

3. In the light of all the above developments, and of the competing claims of all theaters of war for the available resources and shipping, we consider it essential that the review of ANAKIM, previously arranged for July, should take place now.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the full ANAKIM operation should not be attempted in the winter of 1943-44. Their main reasons are:

(a) The re-conquest of Burma involves a large-scale combined operation, followed by extended operations in very difficult country. These operations must be brought to a conclusion in a limited period of time, otherwise the onset of the monsoon will find us in a position of great difficulty. Even when Burma is once more in our hands, the operation is by no means finished. The Japanese have a good reinforcement route from Siam and we should become involved in ever extending operations in that country and in the Malay Peninsula. Operation ANAKIM is thus a very heavy commitment which we do not feel we can undertake at a time when the war with Germany is approaching its climax and when we cannot afford to relax the pressure for an instant.

(b) We are very doubtful of the feasibility of the operation if undertaken this year. Burma is a country whose topography is far more suited to Japanese tactics and equipment than to our own. The assault on Rangoon involves a difficult combined operation which depends for its success or [on?] failure by the Japanese to fortify the river approach. For there to be any reasonable prospect of success, we must have a sufficiency of forces especially trained and equipped, and backed up by ample reserves of men and material. These conditions cannot be fulfilled in the coming winter.

(c) Until long-term plans for the ultimate defeat of Japan have been decided upon, it cannot be assumed that the re-conquest of Burma, however desirable the political effect, especially on China and India, is indispensable from the military point of view.

(d) Operation ANAKIM, even if successful in 1943-44, would not be likely to reopen the Burma Road until the middle of 1945.

5. We do nevertheless fully recognize that the objects which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had in mind at Casablanca still hold good, namely:

- (a) Increase in the air effort against Japanese sea communications.
- (b) Pressure on the Japanese forces in the Burma-China Theater.
- (c) Help to China.

We should do everything we can to achieve these objects and we must also bear in mind the effect on India of inaction and failure to remove the air threat to Bengal.

6. The following are some suggestions which we would like to discuss with the United States Chiefs of Staff, together with any which they themselves may desire to propose:

- (a) The concentration of available resources on building up and

increasing the capacity of the air route to China, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

- (i) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
- (ii) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China with the object of striking at Japanese ports and shipping;
- (iii) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(b) Limited land operations in Assam with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, and covering the air route to China. These operations would, however, be limited to a scale which would not prejudice the development of the air facilities by excessive demands on engineer and transportation resources.

(c) The capture of Akyab. This would contribute to the main object of developing an air offensive, as it is possible from this air base to attack Japanese air fields and communications in Central Burma; while an attack on this island would bring on an air battle which would help to stretch the Japanese. Its capture would also provide a base from which we could increase our control of the Bay of Bengal, and from which coastal operations southwards could be covered.

(d) The capture of Ramree Island. The possession of this island is of assistance to the position, gives a good advance base for light naval forces, and, by threatening a landing at Taungup, from which there is a possible route inland to Prome, is likely to contain Japanese Air Forces.

7. The ways and means of providing the resources for these operations require examination, but we think they are likely to be within our power.

8. Whether or not ANAKIM should be undertaken at a later date must, we suggest, depend upon whether the reconquest of Burma is found to be essential to the ultimate defeat of Japan. We have already suggested to the United States Chiefs of Staff that steps should be taken forthwith to set up the machinery for evolving the plan for bringing about the defeat of Japan after Germany has sued for peace. Early and effective British participation must depend largely upon long-term preparations in India and Ceylon, which will be the bases for British operations. These preparations can only be made effectively in the light of an agreed plan.

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Department of Defense Files

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I recommend that you approve the allocation of tonnage on the India-China Air Transport Route as follows:

*May and June 1943*

500 tons per month for Ground Force requirements

All remaining available tonnage for Air Force requirements

*July–August–September–October 1943*

As first priority, 4700 tons per month for Air Force requirements  
 As second priority, 2250 tons per month for Ground Force requirements  
 with the proviso that Ground Force requirements will be shipped concurrently with Air Force requirements as long as a daily average tonnage of 157 tons for the Air Forces is maintained.

Dr. Soong concurs and has agreed to recommend this allocation to the Generalissimo.

The above agreement should provide 10,000 tons for Stilwell by November 1st, 1943.

[G. C. MARSHALL]  
*Chief of Staff*

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Hopkins Papers

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: On the basis of my conversation with the President this morning,<sup>1</sup> I am sending a draft of my telegram to the Generalissimo for the President's approval, as it is important that there be no misunderstanding in so vital a matter.

I shall be grateful if you could lay it before the President as soon as possible, and give me his reply.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. [SOONG]

[Enclosure]

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to President Roosevelt*<sup>2</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following our conversation today I wish to submit for your approval the following draft report to the Generalissimo on the decisions you have reached:

"I saw the President today, who told me he fully understands and is concerned over the military and economic crisis confronting you and is anxious the airforce be immediately strengthened to support you. He has accordingly made the following decisions:

"1. Starting July 1, 1943, the first 4700 tons of supplies per month flown into China over the India–China route shall be for General Chennault's Air Force; after this priority is fully satisfied, the next

<sup>1</sup> No other record of the Roosevelt–Soong conversation has been found.

<sup>2</sup> The text of this message was read by Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 19, 1943.

2000 tons per month shall be for other purposes including ground forces; thereafter the next 300 tons per month shall also be for the Air Force.

"2. President has ordered that starting September 1, the original goal of 10,000 tons per month shall be reached and even stepped up.

"3. I asked the President for all the tonnage for the remainder of May and June 1943 on both Air Transport Command and CNAC planes for air force supplies for the 14th Air Force. The President replied that certain small exceptions might be needed for ground forces and asked me to work this problem out with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

"I saw the Deputy [Chief] of Staff this afternoon and we came to the following conclusions. Ground forces will have 500 tons each month in May and June, and all the rest goes to airforce. From July 1 onward Chennault will have absolute priority of 4700 tons monthly, and the balance, whatever it may be, goes to Stilwell until he has received in all 10,000 tons.

"4. General Wheeler has been ordered to take an engineering detachment from the road project and use it to rush to completion the Assamese airports now being constructed and repaired.

"5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that there is a firm commitment for the ANAKIM project this fall and that he has advised the British that he expects them to carry out their part of this commitment. Definite and detailed plans for this project will, I trust, be communicated to me for presentation to you before the conclusion of the conferences now going on with the President and the Prime Minister, so that you may make your own observations."<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,

TSE VUN SOONG

<sup>3</sup> Numbered paragraph 5 of the signed original copy of this draft letter, as it appears in the Hopkins Papers, is crossed out and covered over by the following insert:

"5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that ANAKIM will be undertaken this fall in conjunction with the British. Definite plans for this project are now being considered from the viewpoint of the allotment of tonnage and special equipment, preliminary to detailed plans for each phase of the operation, which will be communicated to me for your consideration as they are prepared."

The word "fall" in the first sentence is crossed out and replaced by the word "winter" in Roosevelt's writing. What appears to be Roosevelt's handwritten "OK" appears in the margin of the insert. This insert appears to be the same one prepared by Marshall and referred to in his memorandum of May 19, 1943, to Hopkins, *infra*.

Hopkins Papers

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President's  
Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: I am returning the papers that you sent me from Dr. Soong.<sup>1</sup>

His outline of the tonnage agreements lacks certain small provisos,

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

but I do not think it is necessary to propose a modification of his statements.

As to paragraph 5, I am attaching a proposed substitute.<sup>2</sup> The fact is, we have not yet taken up the detailed consideration of ANAKIM, though we have heard Dr. Soong on the subject as well as Wavell, Stilwell and Chennault. I assume that nothing must be said at this time that in any way conveys the idea that ANAKIM is definitely to be modified; as a matter of fact we have not reached a final decision in this matter. Therefore the suggested paragraph.

There is a further complication in this matter, which involves the question of landing craft and the fact that we have not yet reached an agreement regarding the Mediterranean and a modified ROUNDUP. These matters of course affect the landing craft situation, and the Mediterranean decision will have a direct bearing on the question of the availability of a British fleet in the Indian Ocean next November.

Faithfully yours,

[G. C. MARSHALL]

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<sup>2</sup> This apparently is a reference to the revised paragraph 5 of Soong's draft letter of May 18 to Roosevelt, *supra*. For text of the revised paragraph, see footnote 3 to that letter.

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

DEAR DR. SOONG: Apropos of your note of May 18th,<sup>1</sup> the only amendment I have to suggest relates to paragraph 5 of your proposed wire to the Generalissimo. I think the following wording would more appropriately indicate the President's purposes:

"5. The President told me that it is the position of the United States that ANAKIM will be undertaken this winter in conjunction with the British. Definite plans for this project are now being considered from the viewpoint of the allotment of tonnage and special equipment, preliminary to detailed plans for each phase of the operation, which will be communicated to me for your consideration as they are prepared."

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 296.

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Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, [May 21, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS. I should be glad if you could show this to the Presi-

dent. I think the Chinese ought to be told to lay off this aggressive policy while they themselves are so dependent on the help of others.<sup>1</sup>

W[INSTON] S C[HIRCHILL]  
21.5.43

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington*

[LONDON,] 7 May, 1943.

My telegram No. 301 Saving of 1942 (of 15th August: Tibet).<sup>2</sup>

Chinese insistence on treating Tibet as a vassal state and the determination of the Tibetans to safeguard their independence have continued to prevent the establishment of a pack supply route and have hampered recent attempts on our part to arrange matters on a commercial basis through Tibetan merchants without raising political issues.

2. In early March the Tibetan Government held up all goods transiting the country from India and destined for the Chinese Government pending a settlement of the transport problem in accordance with their earlier stipulations, *i.e.* no warlike stores to be carried, no Chinese supervisors on the route, and a tripartite agreement including the Government of India guaranteeing observance of these conditions. Government of India continued to urge on Tibetan Government, who have now agreed, that civil supplies for China should be permitted to pass provided the Chinese Government refrained from sending inspectors or communication experts to Tibet.

3. Meanwhile it would seem that Chiang Kai-shek became exasperated at what he regarded as Tibetan *intransigence* and decided to adopt a threatening attitude. Reports have been received from various sources that he has ordered the concentration of Chinese forces at widely separated points near the Tibetan border allegedly for the reassertion of Chinese influence in Tibet, although they may also be connected with manoeuvres for strengthening Central Government's influence in Western Szechuan.

<sup>1</sup> Regarding Churchill's concern over Chinese policy toward Tibet, see his remarks during the meeting of the Pacific War Council, May 20, *ante*, p. 138.

<sup>2</sup> For text of a telegram of August 15, 1942, from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, transmitted to the Department of State on August 27, 1942, on the subject of the establishment of a supply route to China through Tibet and the British attitude toward the status of Tibet, see *Foreign Relations, 1942, China*, p. 630.

4. An American officer<sup>3</sup> recently returned from Sining has stated that he was informed by the Secretary of the Chinese Governor of the Ching Hai province that the latter had received orders from Chiang Kai-shek to prepare for an attack by the Tibetans. The Governor was alleged to have sent 10,000 troops to the border and there was also a story that the Japanese were sending munitions to the Tibetans who were preparing airfields for the Japanese.<sup>4</sup>

5. The Tibetan Government have also complained to our representative in Lhasa of warlike preparations by the Chinese and have appealed to His Majesty's Government for assistance. Our obligations to the Tibetan Government require that we give them diplomatic support against any Chinese military aggression (see my telegram No. 3884 of 1942). His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking has therefore been instructed to inform the Chinese Government that we have been approached by the Tibetan Government regarding the alleged Chinese military movements and to ask for a confirmation of our assumption that these reports are without foundation. If the Chinese Government admit the military preparations and justify them on the ground that the Tibetans are preparing to attack or are permitting Japanese activities in their territory, Sir H. Seymour is to express incredulity and to undertake to obtain assurances from the Tibetan Government on the subject. He is to ask that pending their receipt Chinese troop movements be stopped. His Majesty's Ambassador has been directed not to link his communication with the transport question but to deal with the latter separately if the Chinese raise it.

6. In the meantime His Majesty's Representative at Lhasa is being instructed to ask the Tibetan Government for a denial of aggressive intentions and an assurance that they will allow no Japanese activity in their territory.

7. Please explain the situation to the United States Government and request their support in deterring the Chinese Government from aggressive action against Tibet, if this is indeed contemplated. Apart from other obvious reasons it would have the most serious results on Sino-British relations since, in view of our commitments to the Tibetans, it would be intolerable for India to be used as a source or channel of war supplies to China for an attack on Tibet.

<sup>3</sup> Apparent reference to Lt. S. H. Hitch, Assistant Naval Attaché in China.

<sup>4</sup> The information contained in this telegram also reached the Department of State through the British Embassy and prompted an exchange of telegrams between the Department and the Chargé in China. See telegrams 633, May 18, 1943, to Chungking and 777, May 25, 1943, from Chungking, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 632-633. For additional documentation regarding the efforts to establish a supply route to China through Tibet and the attitude of the United States toward the status of Tibet, see *ibid.*, pp. 620 ff.

Department of the Army Files

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER: I send you herewith the map which you requested, showing the four airfields to be completed in the neighborhood of Ledo in Assam.<sup>2</sup>

The names of the sites are shown in large type as follows: Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating and Jorhat. These four fields have been selected by men of our General Staff and Air Corps who have recently personally visited the spot, and the sites have been checked up with and approved by General Stilwell. These fields have been chosen after a careful examination of all those in that locality and these officers estimate that, if first priorities are given on the shipment of cement, gravel, asphalt and equipment for the completion of these airfields, and an intense effort is concentrated upon these four fields, they may be ready by July first.

They also estimate that, if this is accomplished, our people will be able by intense effort to increase materially the capacity of the air route to Kunming during July possibly up to a capacity of seven thousand tons per month. They also think that it is possible but not probable that, if three additional fields are made available, they will be able to raise this capacity up to ten thousand tons in September. Success will depend upon the keenest concentrated effort in bringing in the fields and in the subsequent management of the route.

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<sup>1</sup>According to the following concluding portion of the Stimson Diary for May 22, 1943, preparation of this letter began immediately after Stimson's conversation with Churchill on May 22 (see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 172):

"When I got through with him [Churchill] and had left him, I got back to Woodley and got hold of Timberman and got the necessary facts and after dinner I dictated a letter to the Prime Minister and got a map from the General Staff and had that all ready for the next morning."

The Stimson Diary entry for Sunday, May 23, 1943, gives the following account of the further preparation and dispatch of the letter:

"On Sunday morning I sent for Wright, gave him the letter which Miss Neary had written out for me last night and the map, and sent them down to be checked off by the people in the Operations Division (Timberman) and then I went off for a horseback ride. When I got back from my horseback ride to the Meadowbrook Stable I found waiting there for me Wright and Timberman with my letter checked up and rewritten and I signed it there and sent it down to the Prime Minister by Wright who delivered it to the Embassy in person. The whole day was an example of a concrete boost being given on a key point in a snarl which the whole conferences had been unable to resolve during the last week. I hope it will be effective. I telephoned Marshall about it and he was delighted with what I had done, particularly with my coaching of Stilwell and securing finally the approval of the Prime Minister to Stilwell." (Stimson Papers)

<sup>2</sup>No map found with source text. For a map of Air Transport Command airfields in Assam, including the airfields referred to in the following paragraph, see Map No. 7, "Transportation System, 1942-1943", inside the back cover of Romanus and Sunderland.

The Brahmaputra River is reported to me as now high, thus making difficult the obtaining of gravel from its bed. I am told that during the course of the monsoon it will tend to rise higher. If so, this means that the gravel will have to be obtained from quarries and this would necessitate its being hauled to the fields by overtaxed railway and highway routes.

But the possibility of General Stilwell's receiving enough equipment under his allotment to arm and equip the divisions which are to defend Kunming, as well as those which are to be in readiness to enter the Burma campaign from Yunnan, depends upon this enlargement of the capacity of the route at the times estimated. This indicates the importance of speed in the project.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

J. C. S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.

C.C.S. 239/1

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Reference: *a.* C.C.S. 220<sup>1</sup>

*b.* C.C.S. 92nd Mtg., Item 4<sup>2</sup>

1. The enclosed report by the United States Joint Staff Planners, in the form as amended and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in their 92nd Meeting, is circulated for the information of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The operations set forth in this paper are in support of the overall "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan" as set forth in C.C.S. 220, already noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This plan for 1943-1944 operations is based on the premises:

*a.* That China must be retained as a base for operations against Japan.

*b.* That Japanese lines of communication must be subjected to continuous attack.

*c.* That Japanese Military forces must be subjected to continuous and increasing pressure to prevent consolidation and to effect attrition on Japanese Military power.

*d.* That positions must be secured in readiness for full-scale operations when such operations can be undertaken.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 289.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 145.

[Enclosure]

*Report by the United States Joint Staff Planners*<sup>3</sup>

## OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

1. An analysis has been made of possible United Nations courses of action in the Pacific-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 219.<sup>4</sup> The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A".<sup>5</sup>

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

*a. Far Eastern Theater*

(1) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

(2) Air Operations in and from China

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

*b. Pacific Theater*

(1) Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

(2) Operations in New Guinea

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

(3) Operations in eastern Netherlands East Indies

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

(4) Operations in the Marshall Islands

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

(5) Operations in the Caroline Islands

Necessary to gain control of Central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Intensification of Operations against Enemy Lines of Communication.

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

<sup>3</sup> The conclusions set forth in this report were later included in the "Report to the President and Prime Minister," C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 364.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

## 3. CONCLUSIONS:

a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
- (6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

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#### D. BASES IN THE AZORES

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

S.S. "QUEEN MARY," 7 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 226

#### USE OF PORTUGUESE ATLANTIC ISLANDS

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow a route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time we have to forego a considerable measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and southerly route which had equal air protection it would be a great advantage and consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he has lost the Battle of the Atlantic.

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira and San Miguel Islands for operating V.L.R. and L.R. aircraft;

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<sup>1</sup> This report was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following memorandum of May 15, 1943, from the British Chiefs of Staff: "The enclosure is a report prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which is submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." For the record of the discussion of this report and the decisions reached thereon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 17, 1943, see *ante*, p. 91.

*b.* Unrestricted fuelling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal;

*c.* Facilities in the Cape Verde Islands for operating G.R. aircraft. These, though desirable, are not comparable in importance to *a* above.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarised as follows:—

*a.* They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between—

- (1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
- (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
- (3) South America and the U.K.;
- (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
- (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

*b.* The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrating in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route.

*c.* Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres.

*d.* We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

*e.* We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting, refuelling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

*f.* Unrestricted fuelling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

*g.* Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

*h.* German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

*i.* The islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theatres of operations.

4. We shall clearly have to pay a price and undertake new commitments in order to induce Portugal to give us the facilities in question. The extent of the price and the character of those commitments will depend upon our, and still more important the Portuguese, estimate of the way in which the Axis is likely to react to the transaction. Although we cannot be certain of it, strong reasons can be advanced for thinking that Germany will not, in fact, attack the Iberian Peninsula.

It would, however, be clearly wrong to discount such an attack altogether, and we have, therefore, examined its possibilities. If we assume the worst case, i.e., that the Axis powers would at once make war upon Portugal and attack her metropolitan [and?] overseas territory by all the means at their disposal, the commitments which Portugal would require us to undertake in the face of this possibility would probably include:—

- a.* The defence of Portugal against land and air attack;
- b.* The protection of Portuguese shipping; and
- c.* Assistance in the local defence of Portuguese ports.

5. Of the above, only *a* calls for detailed consideration. The Portuguese Army is practically negligible and could not, of itself, offer any appreciable resistance. We have made a Staff study of the maximum scale of attack which could be built up against Portugal, with Spain's acquiescence (which is doubtful), without regard to the possible availability of enemy forces. This works out at 2 divisions ten days after crossing the Spanish frontier, rising to 8 divisions after seven weeks. It is certain that the Germans could concentrate forces overland in Portugal more quickly than we could by sea. To fulfil a guarantee to go to the assistance of Portugal against such a scale of attack we should have to earmark and prepare now between 9 and 11 divisions and some 20 squadrons of aircraft, and hold these forces in readiness together with their shipping. This course could only be followed at the expense of HUSKY and other future operations in the Mediterranean. Even if this could be done, there would be no certainty that we could protect more than a portion of Portuguese territory.

In the event of the Germans moving into the Iberian Peninsula, our interests would be to cover the Straits of Gibraltar, not to protect Portugal, and this again would be an undertaking we could not hope to fulfil except at the expense of other Mediterranean operations.

If we take the risk of provoking a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even if we consider such an invasion unlikely, we must do so with our eyes open to what the consequences may be. In fact, we may well find that we shall be left without a footing in the Peninsula, except at Gibraltar itself.

6. A base in the Azores would be of particular value during the winter, when the weather in the north frequently interferes with flying. From this aspect therefore, it is desirable to make our approach to the Portuguese sufficiently early to allow the base to be in full working order by the autumn. A particularly favourable moment to open negotiations is now when victory in Tunis is in sight. The Portuguese

are less likely to make high demands for protection and the Spaniards are more likely to resist German pressure.

7. Having regard to the fact that we consider Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula, and the tremendous benefits we would gain from the use of the Islands, which are set out in paragraph 3, we feel the risk is acceptable. We therefore recommend that the War Cabinet should authorise an approach to the Portuguese Government now, but no guarantee should be given, and every endeavour should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists.

A. F. BROOKE  
DUDLEY POUND  
C. PORTAL

J. C. S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 18 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 226/2

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER :

Subject: Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed as to the tremendous benefits which the United Nations would gain from the earliest possible<sup>2</sup> use of the Azores Islands. They recommend that the Portuguese Government should be approached at once on this subject, but that no guarantee should be given and that every endeavor should be made to persuade the Portuguese that no threat exists. They consider that Germany is unlikely to invade the Iberian Peninsula if the Azores Islands are so used, and that the risk is acceptable.

In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff propose that while the diplomatic approach is being made forces should be prepared for the prompt seizure and use of the Azores if diplomacy fails.<sup>3</sup> Plans are therefore being prepared and will be submitted.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated in the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries: "The enclosure is a memorandum for the President and the Prime Minister which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." This memorandum is a revision of an early version, C.C.S. 226/1, May 17, 1943 (not printed), which was considered and amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943; see *ante*, p. 98. The revisions made in C.C.S. 226/1 are indicated in the two following footnotes. The memorandum was signed by Leahy and delivered to Roosevelt and Churchill on May 19.

<sup>2</sup> The words "earliest possible" did not appear in C.C.S. 226/1.

<sup>3</sup> In C.C.S. 226/1, this sentence reads as follows: "In submitting this recommendation the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggest that any diplomatic approach should be backed by readiness for forcible occupation if diplomacy fails." (J.C.S. Files)

showing the earliest date for their execution and how, if at all, they will affect operations now in view.

A. F. BROOKE  
*General*  
*Chief of the Imperial*  
*General Staff*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy*  
*Chief of Staff to the*  
*Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1943.

Secret from the Secretary for the Ambassador.

Please communicate orally and in the utmost secrecy the following message from the President to President Vargas:

You will remember that when I had the opportunity of meeting with you at Natal last winter and of talking over with you the problems with which our two countries are confronted, we agreed upon the necessity of taking every precaution to see that certain islands of the Atlantic should not become a source of grave danger to the defense of the interests of the Western Hemisphere.<sup>2</sup>

As you know, this Government has stated officially and publicly to the governments of both Spain and Portugal that it harbored no aggressive intentions against the sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country. The policy of the United States today, like the policy of Brazil, is based upon the inalienable right of self-defense which we recognize as the rightful policy of other sovereign nations.

Since the time of our meeting I have become increasingly anxious because of the constantly expanding acts on the part of the German Government to extend the theater of operations of its submarines and particularly because of the efforts which the Germans are making to establish bases either openly or secretly on islands which by their very situation in the Atlantic threaten the shipping routes and, consequently, the security of the Western Hemisphere. As far back as 1941 I pointed out the dangers to our hemisphere which would result if certain of these Atlantic islands were to come under the control or occupation of forces which solely pursue a policy of world conquest.

Information is now at hand which indicates that the German Government has actually under contemplation the establishment of U-boat

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted to the President under cover of a memorandum by the Secretary of State dated May 19, 1943, and reading as follows: "In accordance with our personal conversation I herewith enclose a draft of the proposed message from you to President Vargas. Please advise me as to whether you approve its sending. CH" The memorandum bears the handwritten marginal notation: "Not sent". This is presumably the draft telegram read by the President to the Third Plenary Meeting, May 19, 1943, *ante*, p. 120.

<sup>2</sup> For documentation regarding the conference between President Roosevelt and President Vargas of Brazil at Natal on January 29, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. v, pp. 653 ff.

bases and U-boat supply stations in the Azores without any previous warning to the Government of Portugal. We may at any time be faced with a *fait accompli*.

Your own deep interest in this question and your own offer of helpful cooperation in the solution of this problem should the need therefor arise leads me now to ask whether you would be disposed to consider a secret approach on your part to the Government of Portugal in order to ascertain whether the Portuguese Government would be willing for the period of the war either to lease these islands to the Government of Brazil or to authorize the Government of Brazil together with the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain to establish such air bases and security controls in the Azores as would protect them not only from aggression by the Axis powers, but which would likewise prevent the use of the harbors and local resources of the islands by enemy submarines now preying on United Nations shipping.

Should you be willing to consider such an approach to the Portuguese Government I would of course be glad to have you restate the assurances I have offered in the name of this Government regarding the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Portuguese territories as set forth in my message to General Carmona in November 1942.<sup>3</sup> I would assume that the terms of the British-Portuguese alliance would need no reaffirmation.

Because of the special ties which unite Brazil and Portugal, I feel as I have already said to you that any confidential and friendly approach which you would be willing to make in this matter to the Portuguese Government would be exceptionally helpful.

I shall be most grateful if you will let me have your views with regard to this question and inform me whether you would consider it possible for you now to take the initiative in this matter on behalf of the three Governments, Brazil, Great Britain and the United States, which are primarily concerned in maintaining the security of the Atlantic.

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<sup>3</sup> For text of the message from President Roosevelt to the President of Portugal, General Antonio Oscar de Fragoso Carmona, in connection with the Allied invasion of French North Africa, which was released to the press on November 8, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VII, November 14, 1942, p. 905.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 21 May, 1943.

IMMEDIATE

PENCIL No. 159. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably, this is the message which Churchill, during his conference with Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, promised to send to the British Government; see *ante*, p. 121.

1. I cannot feel that the proposed request to the Portuguese Government will lead to any useful result.<sup>2</sup> As indicated in my PENCIL No. 18, I do not think there is a chance of procuring Portuguese agreement.<sup>3</sup> They might submit under protest, but they could not agree.

Proceeding as is proposed will only incur a rebuff. The Portuguese will make a virtue of their refusal to Germany, and measures will be taken to increase the resisting power of the Islands. The only way in my opinion is to confront them the night before with the fact that occupation is about to take place, and to warn them of the dangers of bloodshed, leaving them time to stop it. Then there is a good chance of none occurring.

2. We have now received a formal statement from the Combined Chiefs of Staff which stresses the extreme importance of our acquiring the use of these islands at the earliest moment.<sup>4</sup> The gist of this will follow.

In conference Admirals King and Pound have spoken with the utmost emphasis of the advantages to be gained and the losses to be avoided. My estimate that 1,000,000 tons of shipping and several thousand lives might be saved was regarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a serious underestimate. In short, military necessity is established in the most solid manner.

3. The President had drafted a telegram to President Vargas of Brazil, hoping that he might use his good offices with the Portuguese to persuade them to come over quietly,<sup>5</sup> but this method is open to the same fatal objections as attach to our appeal to them to remember the old alliance. After discussion with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and myself the President recognized this.

4. The Chiefs of Staff have been directed to prepare a plan for immediate action, i.e., within the next three or four weeks, and this should be ready by Monday.<sup>6</sup> I wish to be in a position to inform the President that in principle His Majesty's Government are willing to act provided that the United States is similarly committed.

5. I have read the assurances given to Salazar on the eve of TORCH and do not consider they constitute any additional barrier to action since they are related to the operation TORCH and its consequences whereas the present need arises from a wholly different cause.

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<sup>2</sup> Attlee and Eden had telegraphed to Churchill a proposal that the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of 1373 be invoked in the effort to secure military facilities for the United Kingdom in the Azores; see Eden, p. 454.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is presumably to Churchill's telegram of May 10, 1943, to the British War Cabinet; for discussion of telegram, see *ibid.*, p. 453.

<sup>4</sup> See C.C.S. 226/2, May 18, 1943, *ante*, p. 307.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the draft message from Roosevelt to Vargas, see *supra*.

<sup>6</sup> May 24, 1943.

6. I cannot see that there is any moral substance in the legalistic point involved in overriding the neutrality of Portugal in respect of these islands which are of no peace-time consequence but have now acquired vital war significance. The fate of all these small nations depends entirely upon our victory. Both the German and the Japanese have openly violated all neutralities. Timor is the latest example.<sup>7</sup> Are we not putting the good cause to an undue disadvantage if in these circumstances we are not to take the steps which are necessary for the future law and freedom of the world? It is a painful responsibility to condemn so many great ships of the British and American flag to destruction and so many of our merchant seamen to drowning because our inhibitions prevent us from taking the action which would save them. I do not fear, nor does the President, any adverse reaction in our own countries though, of course, Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo will be inexpressibly shocked. I beg you to look up what we did in Greece in 1916. We went to war in 1914 because of the violated neutrality of little Belgium and a vast volume of rhetoric and argument was presented on that theme. However by 1916 the struggle had become so severe that the allies had no hesitation in violating the neutrality of Greece and landing at the Pyraeus [*Piraeus*] by force of arms, and installing a Government favourable to their interests. I have not the records with me, but I cannot recall the slightest protest that was made by any of those who wished to see us win. In this case the issue is far more precisely pointed because the rate of new buildings over sinkings is the measure of our power to wage war and so to bring this pouring out of blood and money to a timely end.

7. Accordingly I ask to be empowered to state in your name on Monday next that if the President agrees to share the responsibility we will authorize the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make and execute a plan to take these islands at the earliest possible moment. As it is most undesirable that their names should be mentioned again I have agreed with the President that the code name for the operation shall be LIFE BELT.

8. We should, of course, offer the Portuguese several million pounds for the lease of the islands during the war and promise them their return at the end, plus all the improvements we shall have made to the air-transport facilities. It might also be desirable to associate Brazil with the occupation. This can be discussed later.

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<sup>7</sup> Japanese forces landed on the island of Timor, in the areas both of Dutch and Portuguese sovereignty, in February 1942. The events incident to this attack are set forth in Woodward, pp. 376-377.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[LONDON,] 21 May, 1943.

IMMEDIATE

ALCOVE No. 334. For the Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

YOUR PENCIL 159.<sup>2</sup>

1. We very much hope that you will not press the War Cabinet to give the decision you asked for by Monday.

2. At a full discussion this afternoon the War Cabinet felt very strong objection to the course proposed on grounds of principle. Moreover, the only disadvantage of the Diplomatic approach is that it would give some warning. We think that this cannot be rated very high from the military point of view and is outweighed by the objection of principle the course proposed.

3. We also feel very doubtful whether action in the next few weeks is:—

(a) Practicable without impairment of other vital operations, e.g., HUSKY or the Battle of the Atlantic, or

(b) Presents any great advantage over the same course of action taken a few weeks or months later.

4. We therefore ask that a decision should be postponed until the matter can be discussed with you after your return.

5. Meanwhile, the military authorities are pushing ahead on all preparatory work which can be carried out without prejudice to other operations.

<sup>1</sup> The views set forth in this telegram appear to be the basis for the statements made by Churchill during the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 24, 1943, regarding the attitude of the British Cabinet on the matter of the Azores Islands; for the record of that meeting, see *ante*, p. 190. The source text, designated as copy No. 15, was apparently passed to Roosevelt during the Conference.

A subsequent exchange of messages between Churchill and the British War Cabinet on this same subject during the last days of the Conference is discussed in Eden, pp. 454-455.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

## E. SUPPLIES AND SHIPPING

Hopkins Papers

*President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch) to the President's Military Aide (Watson)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 18, 1943.

MY DEAR GENERAL: Herewith, are two reports<sup>1</sup> on Magnesium con-

<sup>1</sup> Only one report was found attached to the source text.

cerning which the President and the Prime Minister asked me about yesterday at luncheon.<sup>2</sup>

I am enclosing one other duplicate, in case the President wishes to give it to the Prime Minister.

Sincerely,

BERNARD M. BARUCH

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch)*

[WASHINGTON, May 17 (?), 1943.]

MEMORANDUM ON MAGNESIUM:

Unless there are demands for lend-lease and for our Armed Forces, which were not ordered up to the *afternoon of May 17, 1943*, supply has overtaken demand.

All bins have been filled. Two months advanced shipment have been made to China and Russia.

A stock pile is now accumulating here at the rate of 7,500,000 lbs. per month.

All listed demands up to Dec. 31, 1943, will be met by production and a stock pile of 50,000,000 will be accumulated by Dec. 31, 1943.

There need be no anxiety over this metal unless much larger demands are contemplated than have been placed. If—there are any such future requirements, it should be immediately presented to the Magnesium unit of the W.P.B.

B. M. BARUCH

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<sup>2</sup> No official record of the luncheon under reference has been found.

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum by the Deputy War Shipping Administrator (Douglas) and the British Minister of War Transport (Leathers)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.

COMBINED STATEMENT COVERING DRY CARGO SHIPPING AVAILABILITIES AND REQUIREMENTS

This statement commenting on the schedules of cargo shipping is divided into two parts. The first summarizes the estimates of requirements for dry cargo ships and the ships available for loading during the period 1 June 1943 to 1 January 1944; the second summa-

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was subsequently included as an appendix to annex VII to C.C.S. 244/1, May 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 233. For the Douglas notes of the American-British meeting of May 22-23, 1943, at which this memorandum was prepared, see *ante*, p. 175.

rizes the estimated requirements and availables for the period 1 January 1944 through September 1944.

The Statement is divided in this manner because the method of determining the estimates during the last half of 1943 is quite different from the method employed for the nine months period in 1944. The first period, being closer to hand, is less liable to error than the second. Moreover, there are certain important still undetermined factors such, for example, as the ship construction program, that render estimates for the nine months period of 1944 subject to a more considerable variation.

1 JUNE 1943-1 JANUARY 1944

Based upon the statement of estimated requirements and available dry cargo ships in paragraph 3, there appears to be a deficiency of 155 U.S. controlled ships available for loading during the period in question. This deficit, if properly spread, is not unmanageable.

1 JANUARY 1944-1 OCTOBER 1944

There are at the moment so many undetermined factors in the estimates of requirements and availables for this period that further review of the position is necessary. It does not now, however, appear to present insurmountable difficulties.

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

LEATHERS

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Hopkins Papers

*The President's Personal Representative (Harriman) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.

PERSONAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

In accordance with your request of last night <sup>1</sup> I am listing below the salient reasons why I urge that you increase your tank demands on us, reducing proportionally United Kingdom production. I realize that you are fully familiar with the subject and therefore I am not setting forth the details.

1) The United States faces a substantial overproduction of Sherman tanks, even after a deep cut in the program made last autumn in order partially to meet the prior demands of the shipbuilding and

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<sup>1</sup> Harriman had attended the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill on the evening of May 24; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 197.

escort vessel building program. Splendid production facilities have been created which have been highly advertised as a great war achievement of the Administration and of American industry. Should this production be now further substantially cut thousands of men will be thrown out of work and these facilities if only partially used will be a target for criticism instead of a monument of achievement. Politically it will be difficult for the President to explain and it will give ammunition to the ever vigilant critics of the conduct of the war.

2) You personally and members of your Government share the responsibility for the establishment of the very high tank production objective. The President, against the advice of some of his advisors, set the target at the figure recommended by Lord Beaverbrook in January of last year.<sup>2</sup> As late as last November Lyttelton presented requests for about 17,000 Sherman tanks and when we said that these could not be met by some 4,000 he urged that tank production be expanded to take care of this additional requirement.<sup>3</sup> Fortunately, as things have turned out, this request was resisted by our army.

3) As the Russians are now no longer requesting shipment of tanks, we find ourselves with surplus production which is sufficient to meet your demands made in November. These 4,000 Shermans were therefore offered to you. In the meantime, however, your army estimates have been reduced and we have been advised that you cannot now use the additional tanks offered.

4) The present U. K. production program has also been reduced—to 7,000 tanks per year of the medium and heavy type. For certain tactical reasons your army consider that they would like to have this production of Churchill and Cromwell type tanks. In addition, as a matter of high policy, the substantial abandonment of the art of producing tanks is not considered in the British national interest.

5) I accept without qualification the national need for the continuance of the art of producing tanks in the United Kingdom. What is the proper minimum is of course a matter of opinion. After weighing all of the factors, however, I strongly urge that your tank production in the U. K. be reduced by 2,000 to 4,000 tanks, and that you increase your requests on us by a similar number for the following reasons:

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<sup>2</sup> For documentation regarding the discussions during the First Washington Conference (ARCADIA), December 1941–January 1942, of the problems of tank production and allocation, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942*, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 328 ff., and the editorial note on the meeting between Roosevelt and Beaverbrook on the afternoon of December 26, 1941, *ibid.*, p. 99.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of the discussions regarding tank production during Lyttelton's visit to Washington in November 1942, see Leighton and Coakley, p. 290.

A) You have made from time to time important requests on the United States for your war requirements. These have been accepted in many cases at great inconvenience to our own program. In the friendly and intimate spirit in which our relationships have developed in the conduct of the war it seems only appropriate for you to consider sympathetically an earnest request made by us even at some inconvenience or sacrifice. Your decision in this matter will be accepted in good faith but if it is adverse it cannot help but have some influence in dealing with future requests.

B) Labor required for the production of tanks in England is urgently needed in other directions, notably locomotive construction, locomotive maintenance, construction equipment, etc. We have urgently asked that you increase your allocations of labor for these purposes as we are not equipped to deal with our combined demands for these items.

C) I do not pretend to be able to judge the tactical advantages of the tanks that you propose building. We do know, however, that the Sherman is a good tank, thoroughly tried in battle, whereas the Cromwell series is still to be blooded. A fact not known in England when I left is that the production of our T-20 series has been agreed upon to start early next year and be in full swing by the early spring. The design of this tank was undertaken about a year after the Cromwell was conceived and gives promise of tactical advantages in advance of any other machine with which we are familiar, including those produced in Germany.

D) I have consulted Lord Leathers and Mr. Douglas on the shipping aspect and they agree that this additional number of tanks can be lifted.

I have discussed this matter at great length with Weeks and Lyttelton before coming to America. I believe that unless you take a strong position Lyttelton's attitude will continue to be negative. May I suggest if you cable that you emphasize the political situation you have found to exist here and our plans to commence production of the T-20 series early next year.<sup>4</sup>

AVERELL

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 4920, July 27, 1943, from London (not printed), Harriman reported to Hopkins as follows:

"British tank production program for 1944 has been given exhaustive study since the Prime Minister's return and is now finally settled by the War Cabinet.

"The Prime Minister advises me that British production has been further reduced which will make possible requisitions on United States in 1944 for [one] thousand medium tanks additional to the two thousand agreed to while the Prime Minister was in Washington. This means total requests on United States production in 1944 of 8500 medium tanks.

"I believe the President will be interested particularly as the Prime Minister has personally been the motivating force in the reaching of the decision in the desire to cooperate with our production problems." (841.24/1965)

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) and the President's Personal Representative (Harriman)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[EN ROUTE BY AIR TO ALGIERS, May 26, 1943.]

PENCIL NO. 406. Prime Minister to Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Most secret.

I suggest the remodelling of the last paragraph to bring it into line with our somewhat different procedure.

Please also see General Marshall's suggested amendment.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

26. 5. 43

[Enclosure]

*Recommendations Regarding Shipping, Prepared by Prime Minister Churchill*

[EN ROUTE BY AIR TO ALGIERS, May 26, 1943.]

Present estimates of shipping facilities indicate that there will be up to the middle of 1944 no surplus for any additional military operation that may become necessary.

Searching and continued examination on a combined basis of civilian requirements has set free a very large tonnage of shipping for military purposes.

As the major portion of our combined shipping resources is employed on military work, notable gain for additional operations might be made by subjecting military overseas supply requirements of both countries to an immediate scrutiny, conducted by appropriate officers of our two armies.

The President requests the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, through his nominee, to conduct (in Washington) this scrutiny, in consultation with the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board.<sup>2</sup>

The Prime Minister will institute a similar enquiry in London by means of a Cabinet Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Production, with the Secretaries of State for War and Air, the Minister of War Transport and the Paymaster-

<sup>1</sup>This message and the enclosed paper on recommendations regarding shipping were apparently flown to Washington from Botwood, Newfoundland, where the Prime Minister's aircraft stopped for refueling en route to Algiers.

<sup>2</sup>A marginal note in Churchill's handwriting indicates that this sentence was subject to the "amendment suggested by Gen. Marshall." Marshall's interlinear alterations made the sentence read: "The President requests the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, through their nominee, to conduct (in Washington) this scrutiny, in consultation with the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board."

General (Lord Cherwell) as members. The reports will be interchanged between the two countries, and will be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister jointly and severally.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]  
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Hopkins Papers

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 28, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:—When you were with us during the latter part of December, 1941, and the first few days of 1942, after we had become active participants in the war, plans for a division of responsibilities between your country and mine became generally fixed in certain understandings. In matters of production as well as in other matters, we agreed that mutual advantages were to be gained by concentrating, in so far as it was practical, our energies on doing those things which each of us was best qualified to do.

Here in this country in abundance were the natural resources of critical materials. Here there had been developed the welding technique which enables us to construct a standard merchant ship with a speed unequalled in the history of merchant shipping. Here there was waiting cargo to be moved in ships to your Island and to other theatres. If your country was to have carried out its contemplated ship construction program, it would have been necessary to move large tonnages of the raw materials that we have here across the Atlantic to your mills and yards, and then in the form of a finished ship to send them back to our ports for the cargo that was waiting to be carried.

Obviously, this would have entailed a waste of materials and time. It was only natural for us then to decide that this country was to be the predominant cargo shipbuilding area for us both, while your coun-

<sup>1</sup>The source text is marked "copy", bears no letterhead, and is signed "Pres. Roosevelt" in an unidentifiable handwriting. There appears to be no doubt, however, that this is a true copy of the signed original.

Churchill's message No. 301, June 6, 1943, to Roosevelt, read as follows:

"Have just received your letter of May 28th about ships. Let me thank you from the bottom of my heart for this broadminded, just and comprehending treatment of this problem. Let me know whether you would care to have the letter published. If so, I would write a suitable acknowledgement and would also like to refer to the matter when I speak to the House of Commons on Tuesday. However, naturally, it is entirely for you to say and I do not press for publication unless you think it would be advantageous to our partnership." (Roosevelt Papers)

In his message No. 279 to Churchill, June 7, 1943, Roosevelt replied as follows:

"I think it not advisable at this time to release my letter for publication and on the whole think it unwise to refer to the matter in your speech to the House on Tuesday." (Roosevelt Papers)

try was to devote its facilities and resources principally to the construction of combat vessels.

You, in your country, reduced your merchant shipbuilding program and directed your resources more particularly to other fields in which you were more favorably situated, while we became the merchant shipbuilder for the two of us and have built, and are continuing to build, a vast tonnage of cargo vessels.

Our merchant fleet has become larger and will continue to grow at a rapid rate. To man its ever increasing number of vessels will, we foresee, present difficulties of no mean proportion. On your side, the British Merchant fleet has been steadily dwindling. Depending upon the way in which the calculation is made, it has shrunk somewhere between six to nine million deadweight tons since the war began, and you have in your pool as a consequence about 10,000 trained seamen and licensed personnel. Clearly it would be extravagant were this body of experienced men of the sea not to be used as promptly as possible. To fail to use them would result in a wastage of manpower on your side, a wastage of manpower on our side, and what is of equal importance, a wastage of shipping facilities. We cannot afford this waste.

In order that the general understanding that we reached during the early days of our engagement together in this war may be more perfectly carried out and in order, as a practical matter, to avoid the prodigal use of manpower and shipping that would result from pursuing any other course, I am directing the WSA, under appropriate bareboat arrangements, to transfer to your flag for temporary wartime duty during each of the suggested next ten months a minimum of fifteen. I have furthermore suggested to them that this be increased to twenty.

We have, as you know, been allocating to the British services on a voyage-to-voyage basis large numbers of American controlled ships. What I am now suggesting to you and what I am directing the WSA to carry out will be in the nature of a substitution, to the extent of the tonnage transferred, for the American tonnage that has been usually employed in your war program. The details of the arrangements we can properly leave to the national shipping authorities for settlement through the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board whose function it is to concert the employment of all merchant vessels and will, in accordance with its usual practice, do so in connection with these particular ships.<sup>2</sup>

Always sincerely,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

<sup>2</sup> For a brief account of the implementation of the arrangement for the transfer of ships to the British, see Behrens, p. 375.

## F. FRENCH LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN NORTH AFRICA

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR W.S.C.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the Bride<sup>2</sup> continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from de Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that Macmillan concurs in this.

However, de Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know de Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about de Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of de Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be

<sup>1</sup> This draft memorandum was transmitted to Hull under cover of the following initialed memorandum by Roosevelt: "I enclose copy of memorandum I thought of taking up with the Prime Minister." No official record has been found as to whether Roosevelt did take up this memorandum with Churchill.

<sup>2</sup> In connection with the efforts at the Casablanca Conference to reconcile the factions in the French liberation movement, Roosevelt had referred to de Gaulle as the "Bride" and Giraud as the "Bridegroom"; see Roosevelt's telegram of January 18, 1943, to Hull, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 816.

impossible such as Philippe [*André Philip?*], and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud's North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to de Gaulle.<sup>3</sup>

"De Gaulle's dictatorial speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux's role as negotiator has been ended, because de Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches.

"De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose.

"De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Catroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that de Gaulle's speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power.

"Monnet thought the speech sounded like pages out of *Mein Kampf*.

"Macmillan felt that de Gaulle's speech dodged every question of principle involved.

"In de Gaulle's telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces."

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.

I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National

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<sup>3</sup> The following quoted paragraphs appear to be paraphrased excerpts from telegram 805, May 6, 1943, from Algiers, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 168.

Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with de Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar!

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

P.S. I hear the rumor that Leclerc forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclerc offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud's men got.<sup>4</sup> I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the de Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda.

F.D.R.

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<sup>4</sup> Regarding the differences between Leclerc and the French military forces under Giraud, see Howe, pp. 669-671.

Roosevelt Papers

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*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of May 8 for W.S.C., I am in complete agreement that the issue presented in the French situation has come to a head and we must take a definite position that will determine the future of this controversy which, although outwardly between two French factions, may, if permitted to continue, involve both the British and American Governments in difficulties. I say this because the issue at stake is not only the success of our future military operations, but the very future of France itself. I am in complete agreement that either Allied or United Nations military must at the

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<sup>1</sup> The Department of State's file copy of this memorandum bears the following handwritten notation by James C. Dunn, Adviser on Political Relations: "Original handed to the President by the Secretary May 10, 1943." (851.01/2138) According to Hull, vol. II, p. 1218, the President, after reading this memorandum, readily agreed with the Secretary's various points and said he would take them up with Prime Minister Churchill. No American records have been found of the discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill on this subject. In *Hinge of Fate*, p. 801, Churchill does record, however, that during the time of the Conference, "Not a day passed that the President did not mention the subject [of de Gaulle] to me." According to the account in Eden, pp. 447-449, Churchill was subjected to "repeated American denunciation" of de Gaulle during the early part of the Conference. Finally, on May 21, 1943, Churchill telegraphed to the British War Cabinet the suggestion that urgent consideration be given to the possibility of withdrawing support from de Gaulle. Eden recalls that after the War Cabinet had counseled against taking such action, Churchill agreed to await the results of negotiations among the French leaders. Churchill telegraphed the War Cabinet on May 24, 1943, that he would tell Roosevelt that the problem would be considered again after he returned to London.

For additional documentation regarding the concern of the United States over the disunity between Giraud and de Gaulle, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 23 ff.

conclusion of hostilities be on hand in France to prevent anarchy and remain just so long as the French people in Metropolitan France, unhampered and unthreatened, need to formulate machinery to carry on a French Government.

It is very evident that the French National Committee is basing its whole policy on the idea that when France is liberated from the Germans, organized elements under de Gaulle may be in control. At the moment, this policy is leading the de Gaullists to attack all French and other elements not with them. To obtain this control, de Gaulle has permitted to come under his umbrella all the most radical elements in France. Under their statement of April 1, the Communists in France, probably the most highly organized political group there today, have announced their insistence that de Gaulle be their leader. The British Government has given its full weight, both financial and official, to the de Gaulle movement so that the active propaganda which has been carried on in this country and in North Africa against any or all elements believed to be insistent upon the free and untrammled will of the French people to determine their own future has had more weight than would have been otherwise possible. Today, however, we face a situation where de Gaulle's active political propaganda directed from London immediately threatens the military success against the Axis powers to which we have dedicated our every effort. It cannot but be realized from your message of congratulation for the Allied victory in North Africa<sup>2</sup> that the real French contribution was given by the French forces under General Giraud, while throughout the period of the battle de Gaulle, through his political agitation directed from London, caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders.

The remedy for this situation is in our hands today but, if not used, may not be tomorrow. We must reach agreement with the British on the fundamental question as to the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will as to their Government may be obtained. Once this is determined neither de Gaulle nor Giraud personally is an issue. If we cannot reach agreement with the British on this fundamental point, then the one thing left is candidly to state in your forthcoming conversation that since General Giraud is fully cooperating and contributing to the military purposes we have in view and his military aid in North Africa is an essential in our war effort, we intend to support him in every way as military head of the French Allied forces whose collaboration is not only essential to the British and Americans, but to the cause of the United Nations as well.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of Roosevelt's message of May 9, 1943, to Giraud, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VIII, May 15, 1943, p. 427.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I herewith send you despatch 906 from Algiers,<sup>1</sup> in particular, and also 3412 from London,<sup>2</sup> regarding the de Gaulle-French situation. You will notice that despatch 906 quotes General Catroux directly and personally with regard to the inside of the present de Gaulle situation. I feel that you and Prime Minister Churchill are becoming more and more equally interested in disposing of this increasingly troublesome, serious, and not to say, dangerous problem.

I am also sending you Algiers 902 of May 17 containing Giraud's last proposal to de Gaulle.<sup>3</sup> I call your special attention to the marked paragraph in Section Two urging the importance of you and Mr. Churchill now reaching an agreement regarding this entire matter.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>1</sup> Telegram 906, May 18, 1943, from Algiers, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 121.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3412, May 17, 1943, from London, not printed. In this telegram, Ambassador Winant reported on a conversation with former French Senator Henri Queille, who had recently been brought from France by General de Gaulle's "British facilities". Queille spoke at some length about the growing spirit of resistance in France, the gratitude of the French people to President Roosevelt and the Anglo-American liberation of North Africa, and the "mystique" of de Gaulle. Queille's principal plea was the importance of unity among the two factions of the French liberation movement, and he urged that the United States Government do what it could to bring about this union (851.00/3088).

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 902, May 17, 1943, from Murphy for the President and the Secretary of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 119.

## G. POLISH-SOVIET DISPUTE

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan)  
to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, [May 22, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS.

The Prime Minister has received a letter from Dr. Evatt about the representation of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R., and would be glad if you would bring it to the attention of the President.

I accordingly enclose a copy.

T L ROWAN  
22.5.43

[Enclosure]

*The Australian Minister for External Affairs (Evatt) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER, Our Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow visited M. Molotov with the British Ambassador<sup>2</sup> and presented formal notification of Australia's willingness to take over the representation of Polish interests in the U.S.S.R. M. Molotov expressed his agreement. It was understood that no publication of the new arrangement would be made until a later stage when a formal reply will be received.

The message handed to M. Molotov stated that "the proposal of Australia is made solely with the desire to promote the common interests of the United Nations and is animated by a warm admiration for the peoples of Soviet Russia and Poland alike".

Would you be kind enough to inform the President of the informal acceptance of Australia's offer which, as you know, was made with the cordial approval of the President.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,

H. V. EVATT

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<sup>1</sup> During April, May, and June, 1943, Evatt was in Washington on a special wartime mission.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

<sup>3</sup> Evatt sent a letter similar to this one to the Secretary of State on May 21, 1943. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 422. For additional documentation regarding the assumption by the Australian Government of the representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, pp. 418-422, *passim*.

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#### *Editorial Note*

The question of a joint American-British approach to the Soviet Government with regard to the evacuation from the Soviet Union of certain categories of Polish citizens appears to have been discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at some time in the course of the Conference. According to the memorandum of conversation by Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of European Affairs, dated June 2, 1943 (*Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 424), an officer of the British Embassy in Washington informed the Department of State that Churchill, at the suggestion of the British Foreign Office, had taken up with Roosevelt the question of American support of the British position with respect to the evacuation of Poles from the Soviet Union and that Roosevelt and Hopkins had agreed to send appropriate instructions to the American Embassy in Moscow. Those American instructions are set forth in telegram 427, June 12, 1943, to Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 428. No official record of any Roosevelt-Churchill discussion on this subject has been found.

## H. POLICY OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, May 17, 1943.

NAF 221. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. BIGOR HUSKY. To USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff.

I wish to draw your urgent attention to importance of psychological warfare for the HUSKY operation. Having regard to risks we are accepting, I consider it essential every effort should be made in advance to weaken resistance of enemy. All our information goes to show that Italian Troops will fight bravely in defense of their own territory. In consequence, cost to us of the operation may depend very largely on the extent to which we can undermine their morale beforehand.

In my opinion policy of psychological warfare for HUSKY laid down in your telegram number FORTUNE 111 of April 16th<sup>2</sup> is not sufficient

<sup>1</sup> This telegram was circulated by the Secretaries to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as document C.C.S. 185/3, May 18, 1943, entitled "Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities." The telegram was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 19, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see *ante*, p. 122. The telegram first came before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 18, 1943, but the Combined Chiefs deferred discussion until their meeting on May 20, 1943; for the records of the meetings under reference, see *ante*, pp. 100 and 125. For the reply of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower, see C.C.S. 185/4, May 22, 1943, *post*, p. 330.

<sup>2</sup> In C.C.S. 185/2/D, April 26, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of the Department of State and the British Foreign Office, had approved a statement of policy upon which plans for psychological warfare including propaganda were to be developed with regard to Operation HUSKY. The text of this directive was cabled to Eisenhower in Algiers in telegram FORTUNE 111 (FAN 117), April 16, 1943. The text of the directive, which was entitled "Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities," was as follows:

"It is important to distinguish between the policy to be pursued up to the moment of the invasion of Italy and the policy to be pursued after that period. In the first period a firm line should be followed, without any promises, and should emphasize the following four points as the basis of combined British-American propaganda:

"1. We should lose no opportunity to point out the hopelessness of Italy's present position in the war to the Italian people.

"2. The war against Italy should be pursued by attacking by land and sea and air upon all possible occasions and with all possible force.

"3. By all possible means passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort should be encouraged.

"4. Appeals to premature revolt or ridicule of the Italian armed forces or the Italian people should be avoided.

"Immediately before invasion takes place, and for the period succeeding the assault, this line should be modified to the extent of holding out some ray of hope to the Italians about their future, the Allies being presented in the guise not of conquerors but of liberators. The following point should then be added:

"5. We should hold out assurances that Italy will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government, without making any specific territorial commitments." (J.C.S. Files)

for this purpose and will not succeed in making any substantial contribution to the operation. The reasons on which I base this opinion are:

A. Intimidation of the Italians by threats, as directed in points 1 and 2, will not itself achieve our object. Unless we can offer them a way out from the war, they will see no alternative other than to rally round their leaders. This is exactly what we wish to avoid.

B. The encouragement of passive resistance and sabotage of the Italian war effort, recommended in point 3, is unlikely to produce results which will be of any real assistance to HUSKY.

C. The assurances about Italy's future to be given under point 5 are not sufficiently explicit to be convincing, while the withholding of such assurance until immediately before the invasion takes place deprives them of any value for the operation. In view of the time required, even under the best conditions for propaganda to take effect, and of the measures taken by the enemy to prevent us reaching our audience, we shall need all the interval between now and D-day to put our message across and if we postpone it until the eve of the operation, it will be entirely lost in the heat of the battle.

I therefore strongly recommend that the statement of policy be amended as follows:

Point 5. During the period before invasion takes place, we should constantly emphasize to the Italians:

A. That the choice between a continuation and a cessation of hostilities rests with them.

B. That a cessation of hostilities on their part will be accepted by the Allies as evidence of good judgment, entitling them eventually to a "Peace with Honor."

C. That the policy of the Allied Governments pledges full nationhood for Italy after the defeat of the Axis and the removal of the Fascist Government and assures full benefits as provided in the Atlantic Charter.<sup>3</sup>

D. That in consequence Italy has every interest in ceasing hostilities and that the only obstacle to honorable peace is the policy of the Fascist Government.

Our propaganda would be much strengthened if an Official Allied statement on the above lines were issued as soon as possible. Basing itself on such a statement, our propaganda could develop between now and D-day an effective campaign in which the advantages of surrendering would be balanced against the consequences of resisting, and in which blame for continuing a hopeless and unpopular war could be placed squarely on the Fascist Government.

The above recommendations are in line with those sent to you by CinC Mideast in their telegram number CC/227 of April 26th in

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<sup>3</sup> Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 368-369.

which I entirely concur. Action AGWar, information USFor and Mideast.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30394

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1943.

Eu—MR. ATHERTON: I suggest that this letter<sup>1</sup> be re-drafted in the second paragraph rather along the lines of the statement made by Mr. Churchill this afternoon in executive session with the Senate and House Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.<sup>2</sup> His whole emphasis—quite properly in my judgment—was that the Italian people themselves had not wanted the war which had been forced upon them by the Fascist regime and that the United Nations should have no desire after the end of the war in seeing the Italian people deprived of their position as one of the family of European nations. In my judgment, however, a statement of this character, made for propaganda purposes, should initially be made either by the President or by Mr. Churchill or by both. It may perhaps be expedient to outline this suggestion in this letter.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

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<sup>1</sup> The draft letter under reference was the one from Hull to Leahy which had been prepared on May 18 and was subsequently sent without alteration on May 22, 1943; see *post*, p. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Regarding Churchill's luncheon meeting with members of Congress, see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 117.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30395

*The Acting Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 20, 1943.

I quite agree with your suggestions concerning the tenor of our propaganda to Italy at this time and the desirability of statements by the President and the British Prime Minister. We will be glad to draft a suggested text if you consider that would be useful.<sup>1</sup>

With respect to the present communication to the Joint Chiefs we are merely requesting that one of several basic points, which was approved by the President and agreed to by the British Government and the Combined Chiefs of Staff after considerable correspondence,

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<sup>1</sup> Welles' handwritten endorsement above this paragraph in the source text reads: "Please do so—SW". For text of the message from Roosevelt and Churchill to the people of Italy, July 16, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 330; Rosenman, p. 305.

be released from a limitation which we consider unnecessary and even dangerous to our national security. Until that condition is removed and appropriate directives received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff our propaganda agencies do not feel themselves free to give the emphasis to Italian propaganda suggested in your memorandum.<sup>2</sup> The policy, in line with the suggestions made by you, has, as I have said, been agreed upon. The present question is really an administrative one. Consequently, I hope you will agree that the attached draft to Admiral Leahy can go forward.

RAY ATHERTON

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

740.0011 European War 1939/30395a

*The Secretary of State to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: I refer to Mr. Berle's letter of March 17, 1943 to General Deane enclosing a copy of an *aide-mémoire* of even date from the British Embassy concurring in certain proposals of policy with respect to Italy. A copy of the British *aide-mémoire* is enclosed for your reference. These proposals were subsequently accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with some modification of point five.<sup>2</sup>

The British Government requested that no use be made of point five until certain conditions were imminent or had been fulfilled. This was agreed to by the Department at that time and apparently accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I now feel that the fifth point, as modified by the Chiefs of Staff, should be freed from the conditions specified in the British note of March 17. It is my opinion that the moment is opportune to hold out to the Italian people some hope or assurance that their country will survive as a nation after the defeat of the Fascist Government. This, of course, could and should be done without making any specific territorial commitments. I feel that if such assurances are considered effective propaganda under certain given circumstances, that they are also effective under present condi-

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<sup>1</sup> Welles' initials on the source text indicate his approval of this letter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff circulated the letter for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943, but the proposals it set forth were not taken up by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until after the TRIDENT Conference.

<sup>2</sup> The letter of March 17, 1943, from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., to General Deane is not printed. For text of the *aide-mémoire* of March 17, 1943, from the British Embassy to the Department of State, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 324. For text of the Combined Chiefs of Staff directive on the policy for propaganda in Operation HUSKY, see footnote 2 to telegram NAF 221, May 17, 1943, from Eisenhower to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 326.

tions. Furthermore, it appears to me that a question of security is involved which makes it undesirable to associate a specific piece of propaganda with a possible major military operation.

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in my views, perhaps they would secure the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 22 May 1943.

C.C.S. 185/4

POLICY FOR COMING OPERATIONS REGARDING PROPAGANDA AND  
SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

The enclosure is a proposed reply to the request of General Eisenhower contained in C.C.S. 185/3.<sup>1</sup> It has the approval of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the President.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

Enclosure

*Draft Telegram From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*<sup>2</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

PROPOSED TELEGRAM TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

The President has expressed the following views on psychological warfare for HUSKY. The Prime Minister concurs: Reference your telegram of 17 May on the subject.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 326, footnote 1.

<sup>2</sup> During the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on May 19, 1943 (*ante*, p. 122), the President stated that he had sent a message to Marshall regarding Eisenhower's proposals on pre-HUSKY propaganda. Marshall explained to the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 22, 1943 (*ante*, p. 163) that he had prepared this draft telegram to Eisenhower on the basis of Roosevelt's views. At their meeting on May 23, 1943 (*ante*, p. 180), the Combined Chiefs of Staff were informed by Ismay that Churchill had agreed to this draft telegram, the text of which was then sent by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower in Algiers as telegram FAN 127, May 24, 1943. At a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on June 8, 1943, Marshall stated that "the original proposal from General Eisenhower's headquarters, which had included the phrase 'peace with honor', had been sent without the personal knowledge of General Eisenhower." (J.C.S. Files) Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1161-1162.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 326.

"Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they cease hostilities they will have a peace with honor. We cannot get away from unconditional surrender. All we can tell them is that they will be treated by us and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination. This latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship."

Accordingly, the existing approved statement of policy, transmitted in our FORTUNE 111 of April 16,<sup>4</sup> will be adhered to in your planning for psychological warfare.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2 to Eisenhower's telegram of May 17 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 326.

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*Editorial Note*

Aside from the brief references to surrender policy in connection with pre-HUSKY propaganda, no record has been found of any consideration by Roosevelt and Churchill of the policy of unconditional surrender. An exchange of telegrams between the American Embassy in London and the Department of State immediately following the conference, however, indicates that this policy was reaffirmed in the course of the Washington meetings. In his telegram 3594, May 25, 1943, not printed, Ambassador John G. Winant reported having been informed the previous day by an official of the British Foreign Office that the British regarded favorably the preliminary report of the Foreign Ministers of the exiled governments in London on draft armistice terms for the Axis countries. Winant further reported that the British would shortly have their own armistice terms in sufficiently tangible form to communicate them to the United States Government. The following reply to Winant, which was prepared at the White House and initialed by Roosevelt, was sent as telegram 3367, May 27, 1943, to London: "Personal for the Ambassador to take up with Mr. Eden. The President is greatly concerned by report in your 3594, May 25th, relating to your talk with Ronald. The President and the Prime Minister were in complete agreement that our joint present position is that there shall be no armistice but that the policy of unconditional surrender be the sole criterion at this time. Therefore, the President is disturbed at any discussion of armistices in any place." (740.00119 EW/1478)

## I. VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER MACKENZIE KING

033.4211 King, W. L. Mackenzie/70

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)  
to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY I was told in confidence by a member of the Canadian Legation late yesterday afternoon that the circumstances in connection with Mr. King's announcement that he would come to Washington next week were as follows:

Almost immediately after the announcement that Mr. Churchill was here, Mr. Mackenzie King learned that the Opposition was preparing to question him in the House of Commons as to what part, if any, Canada would play in the conversations. He thereupon telegraphed urgently to Mr. Churchill expressing the hope that Mr. Churchill would be able to visit Ottawa to confer with him. Mr. Churchill replied (I gather that the Canadian Legation did some prodding to expedite a reply) to the effect that he would not be able to visit Ottawa but that he had discussed Mr. King's telegram with the President and that he and the President would be glad if Mr. King could come to Washington next week to confer with them.

You will note that the invitation to Mr. King was extended by Mr. Churchill in the name of the President and himself.<sup>1</sup> It seems to me that it would be desirable for you to send a message or alternatively for you to get the President's approval of a message in his own name to Mr. King along the lines of the enclosed alternative drafts.<sup>2</sup> My own preference is for the telegram signed by you.

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

<sup>1</sup> According to Pickersgill, p. 502. Prime Minister Mackenzie King received a telegram from Churchill on May 12, 1943, suggesting the visit to Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The draft message from Hull read as follows:

"The President and I are delighted that you can come to Washington next week and we are looking forward with real pleasure to seeing you and talking to you. Cordial regards."

The draft message from Roosevelt embodied substantially the same language. For text of the message as actually sent by Roosevelt, see *post*, p. 333.

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to  
the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, [May 14, 1943.]

MR. HOPKINS.

You asked me to remind you to speak to Mr. Mackenzie King about his visit to the White House—see telegram attached.

T. L. R[OWAN]  
14.5.43

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*Prime Minister Churchill to Prime Minister Mackenzie King*

[WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.]

Prime Minister to Mr. Mackenzie King. Personal and Secret.

I understand that the President is going to invite you to dine and sleep here on Wednesday night,<sup>1</sup> and we are arranging a Pacific Council for Thursday<sup>2</sup> and a meeting of the British Empire Delegations in the afternoon.<sup>3</sup> I shall of course be available to see you on Tuesday.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]  
14.5.43

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<sup>1</sup> May 19.

<sup>2</sup> For the record of the Pacific War Council meeting on May 20, see *ante*, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> For an account of the meeting of Commonwealth delegations, held at the White House on May 20, see Pickersgill, pp. 503–504.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Mackenzie King*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1943.

I am delighted that you could accept my invitation to come to Washington next week and I am looking forward with real anticipation to seeing you and talking to you.<sup>2</sup> I hope you can get here Wednesday

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<sup>1</sup> The Department's copy of this message is filed under 033.4211 King, W. L. Mackenzie/68a.

<sup>2</sup> No record has been found of previous correspondence between Roosevelt and Mackenzie King on the subject of the visit to Washington.

afternoon and come straight to White House. We will have Pacific War Council meeting Thursday at noon.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt*

OTTAWA, May 14, 1943.

Greatly pleased to receive your telegram expressing hope that I may be able to be in Washington Wednesday afternoon and to come direct to White House.<sup>1</sup> I thank you warmly for this invitation which I am more than pleased to accept. I am much looking forward to the opportunity of seeing and talking with you again. I also much welcome the opportunity of being present at the Pacific War Council meeting Thursday at noon. Kindest regards.

MACKENZIE KING

<sup>1</sup>At his press conference on May 18, 1943, Roosevelt told reporters that Mackenzie King had arrived in Washington that afternoon and would come to the White House the following day to spend the night.

711.42/255

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Wickerson)  
to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, [May 20, 1943.]

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY You will be seeing Mr. Mackenzie King at dinner tonight.<sup>1</sup> This brief memorandum on our relations with Canada may be of interest to you in connection with your conversation with Mr. King.

Our relations with Canada are excellent. The only cloud on the horizon is that the extent of our War Department expenditures and activities in western Canada has been so great in connection with the war effort that some people in Canada have privately expressed apprehension. In other words some people feel that we may have a vested interest there and be reluctant to leave when the war is over. That is of course nonsense but not all Canadians realize it. I don't think this is particularly serious. We have done everything we can to dispel any apprehensions on that point.

The only other thing about our relations with Canada which troubles me is the fact that in spite of the President's close personal rela-

<sup>1</sup> No record of such a meeting has been found.

tions with Mr. Mackenzie King and your own personal friendship and close relations with him, and in spite of the traditionally close and direct relations between our two Governments, Canada continues to receive what information she gets about high policy discussions between the White House and London from London rather than direct from Washington.

Mr. Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, whom you met during the Trade Agreement negotiations in 1938, is here with Mr. King. He told me at lunch today that the Prime Minister might discuss with you the advisability of appointing an American Minister to Canada at an early date.<sup>2</sup>

There is attached a brief telegram from our Legation in Ottawa summarizing the general political situation in Canada.<sup>3</sup>

J[OHN] D. H[ICKERSON]

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<sup>2</sup> The post of American Minister to Canada had been vacant since the death of Jay Pierrepont Moffat, January 24, 1943. The subject of raising the Canadian Legation to Embassy rank was discussed at the Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King conversation after luncheon on May 20, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 28, May 17, 1943, from Ottawa, not printed.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Mackenzie King to President Roosevelt*

OTTAWA, May 24, 1943.

On my return to Ottawa may I express anew my warm appreciation of my recent visit to the White House and of all your kindness throughout the entire period of my stay in Washington. The conversations with Winston and yourself,<sup>1</sup> the visit to the Capitol,<sup>2</sup> the meeting of the Pacific Relations Council<sup>3</sup> and other conferences all related to the most important of the world's events combined to give the occasion the most far reaching significance. I cannot be too grateful for all it has meant to me personally and for what the opportunities it afforded will always mean to the government and people of Canada.

Kindest personal regards.

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

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<sup>1</sup> Regarding the Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King and Roosevelt-Mackenzie King conversations of May 19, the Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King conversation of May 20, and the Roosevelt-Mackenzie King conversation of May 21, see the editorial notes, *ante*, pp. 123, 141, and 151.

<sup>2</sup> Mackenzie King attended the joint session of the houses of Congress on May 19 at which Churchill made his address. He also attended the Congressional luncheon and the meeting with the members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees which followed. See Pickersgill, pp. 505-506.

<sup>3</sup> For the record of the meeting of the Pacific War Council, see *ante*, p. 134.

## J. EMERGENCY MEASURES FOR REFUGEES

*Editorial Note*

For related documentation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, index entries under "Refugees From Europe and the Middle East, governmental efforts for relief of", and especially (for the immediate background of the discussions of the TRIDENT Conference) Hull's memorandum of May 7, 1943, and Roosevelt's reply of May 14, *ibid.*, pp. 176-179.

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840.48 Refugees/4034½

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I recently had occasion to direct your attention to the refugee situation in connection with the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference which proposed a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee to carry on the work.<sup>2</sup>

As my mind approaches the subject matter to be discussed and the questions to be decided by the Committee which it is now proposed to start in London and to continue in Washington, certain doubts assert themselves.

A meeting of that character would attract world-wide attention. It could not be allowed to fail. Unless the American and British Governments were determined in advance as to the purposes which they would pursue and as to the extent to which they would commit

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<sup>1</sup>The source text is endorsed "CH OK FDR" in Roosevelt's handwriting. It was returned to Hull from the White House under cover of the following memorandum, dated June 11, 1943, from Roosevelt: "Will you bring this up to date? I have heard nothing from Winston Churchill who said he would let me know and has done nothing further. I think it is just as well to send this as is. If you approve, go ahead. F.D.R." No record of any discussion between Roosevelt and Churchill regarding this paper or any other phase of the refugee problem has been found. Such a discussion was referred to in the memorandum of conversation by Assistant Secretary of State Long, dated June 4, 1943, the memorandum of conversation by Hull, dated June 17, 1943, the memorandum of conversation by Welles, dated June 24, 1943, the memorandum from Long to Hull, dated June 29, 1943, and the telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt, dated June 30, 1943. *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 309, 313, 319, and 321, respectively. These references indicate some discrepancy of views as to what Roosevelt and Churchill had actually discussed. In this connection, a memorandum of June 15, 1943, from R. Borden Reams of the Division of European Affairs to Long, not printed, reads in part as follows: "Mr. Hayter called today to state that a reply had been received from Mr. Churchill stating that he had not discussed the Intergovernmental Committee with the President. He had talked to the President about a refugee camp in North Africa." (840.48 Refugees/4034)

<sup>2</sup>See the letter from Hull to Roosevelt, May 7, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 176. For documentation regarding the Bermuda Conference on Refugees of April 1943, see *ibid.*, pp. 134 ff.

themselves on financial accounts, the Conference could not come to any satisfactory conclusions.

Attached is a telegram directed to London which was prepared after the receipt of your recent memorandum on this matter.<sup>3</sup> The Department has been in telegraphic correspondence with the British Foreign Office and has discussed the matter on several occasions with Mr. Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, now in the United States. Before proceeding further with it the thought occurs to me that its extreme importance from the psychological point of view would probably justify consultation by you with Mr. Churchill.

1. Expressed concretely, refugees who may need attention and protection are found in the following places in the following approximate number:

Iran	19,000
Cyprus	4,650
Spain	20,000
Bulgaria	4,500
France	10,000
Switzerland	13,500
Portugal	1,400
	<hr/>
Total	73,050

2. It is impractical to estimate accurately the cost of transfer by vessel and maintenance of the individual on a yearly basis, but considering the short haul to some part of Africa, a figure of \$2,000 per capita per annum is considered not unreasonable. The moving of all these 73,000 on that basis would cost \$150,000,000. The estimate should include repatriation at the end of the war.

3. The determination is to be made whether it would be possible to limit the Intergovernmental Committee's participation in the plan for the succor and transit of the refugees to a place of temporary refuge where Governor Lehman's relief organization could take up the relief activities during their temporary residence, provided there is legal authority under existing legislation to permit it and provided further that the British join on equal terms.

If you could present this matter to the consideration of Mr. Churchill and arrive at some common decision with him as to what extent our respective Governments could be committed at the suggested Intergovernmental Committee meeting it would seem to be justifiable to proceed with that meeting, with the assurance of achieving some

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<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt's memorandum of May 14, 1943, to Hull is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 179; telegram 3128, May 15, 1943, to London is printed *ibid.*, p. 180.

success. Lacking an understanding of the attitudes of our respective Governments it would seem that the Conference could not accomplish a very useful purpose.

Those persons who have escaped from German control or who may escape in the future can be forwarded to places of temporary refuge till the successful ending of the war will assure them the right to return to their homes.

I am attaching a telegram which I would propose to send to London in case it is justified by the conclusions you will reach with the Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup>

Respectfully,

CORDELL HULL

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<sup>4</sup> The draft telegram has not been found. For final text see telegram 3879, June 25, 1943, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 190.

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Lot 60 D 224

*Memorandum Prepared by the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems  
of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 22, 1943.

LIMITS OF LAND SETTLEMENT IN LIBYA

[The first four numbered sections of the memorandum consist of a ten-page survey of the geography of Libya, arranged under the following headings: I. *The Land*, A. Areas for European Settlement, (1) Tripolitania, (2) Cyrenaica; II. *Italian Improvements*, A. Dry-Farming, B. Subterranean Waters; III. *Population*, A. Number of Italian Colonists; IV. *Italian Colonization*, A. Size of Colonists' Holdings, B. Land Tenure, C. Factors in Italian Colonization.]

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the source text is a handwritten chit by Harley Notter, dated August 3, 1943, which reads: "This is that missing document that was prepared on secret instruces while Churchill was here." Notter's handwritten marginal notation on the first page of the source text reads as follows: "Sent to Pres. Roosevelt 8 p. m. May 22 by Dr. Bowman." In a memorandum of May 24, 1943, to Leo Pasvolosky (printed in Notter, p. 514), Isaiah Bowman, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, described the preparation and delivery of this memorandum. According to this account, Bowman met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on May 18, 1943, at the latter's request, and discussed the question of Libya. Roosevelt asked Bowman to prepare a memorandum on the subject for his personal use in connection with a conversation with Churchill scheduled for May 23. The memorandum, which was prepared by specialists on the Research Staff of the Department of State, was delivered to the White House late on May 22, 1943.

Included among the Roosevelt Papers is the following memorandum of May 21, 1943, from Roosevelt to Churchill: "I have started to get a brief report on Libya and Tripoli and we will have it by Sunday." It is likely that this memorandum was taken up by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting on the evening of Sunday, May 23, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 183

## V. POSSIBILITIES OF FUTURE LAND SETTLEMENT

Limits to future land settlement may be set by the technical aspects—the amounts of arable land available, the supply of water and the degree to which the land is already settled. The possibilities of settlement are also subject to political considerations.

Although no precise figures exist on the quantity of land available, an insight into the situation may be gained from Italian experience. In 1922 the Italian Government began to acquire land for settlement by dispossessing the Arab occupiers and by 1938 had acquired 875,000 acres. In view of the official objective, the Government probably selected the land best suited for agricultural settlement. Yet this amount was not entirely available for cultivation, including as it did, large areas of rocky land, sand dunes, ravines and eroded soil in addition to areas fit only for grazing, as in the coastal plains of Cyrenaica. It is not surprising, therefore, that of the 875,000 acres acquired by the Italian Government, only 200,000 acres had been developed by 1937 and an additional 160,000 acres by 1938, a total of 360,000 acres. On this area, including the large concessions, were settled from 1921 to 1938 only 30,000 Italian agriculturists. Settlement of an additional 20,000 persons was proposed by the Italian Government in 1939–40 for which the sum of 450,000,000 lire, or \$22,500,000, was budgeted. None of these persons were settled in Libya.

It has been suggested, on the basis of the Italian figures, that the best land has already been used for settlement. All the Italian settlers were placed in areas having 10 or more inches of rain. It seems certain that additional numbers of settlers, whether from Italy or from Central Europe, would find the land increasingly marginal for profitable exploitation.

It may be suggested also that, considering the population pressure in Italy, the nationalistic fervor of Fascism and the prestige factors involved, more Italians would have settled in Libya had land and water been available in sufficient quantities and quality. Italians did migrate to Libya but they found their places in the cities and not on the land.

In Libya, however, it is not so much a question of land, poor and scanty as it is, but rather a question of available water. It is also this factor which has limited Italian settlement and which must continue to limit large scale settlement.

From the evidence available it would seem that a large increase of cultivable area and of the agricultural population by use of surface water is impossible. Further increase by use of high-level wells must also be ruled out as these are already inadequate for present demands. Further drilling may endanger the present flow. This is a problem to be scientifically explored on the spot.

Increase of land through irrigation by artesian wells cannot be pronounced feasible on the basis of present information. The water table is not the only problem. There is also a question of the salinity of water, already necessitating the irrigation of crops only once every three years in areas where artesian wells are being used.

Some increase of agricultural land can be expected by the use of water pumped and brought in by aqueducts. The Italian authorities estimated that a total of 40,000 settlers or about 30,000 additional persons could be settled on Akhdar, with a provision of about 25 gallons of water per day per person, when the aqueduct is completed. An additional 1,500 or 2,000 persons were also expected to be settled on Jebel Nefusa in Tripolitania when the aqueduct and the canals on this mountain were completed. Some additional agricultural settlement may be made by the use of dry farming but it seems apparent that the Italians have pushed beyond the profitable limits, given the current yields and the competition of other areas as measured by market prices.

Additional land for settlement is also restricted by the fact that land both agricultural and pastoral, other than state domain, is becoming increasingly overpopulated in Libya. Approximately 625,000 of the 875,000 acres incorporated by the Italians into state domain was taken from the Arabs whose early resentment was manifested in rebellion. In the expropriation of 1937-38 clashes were reported between the Italian government and pastoral Arabs, who have remained sullen and restive at the loss of their lands. This attitude has continued notwithstanding the digging of new wells and the creation of new Arab agricultural settlements on marginal land.

Should additional land be acquired for agricultural settlements, particularly for settlers to whom the Arabs are hostile, the present competition between pastoral Arabs for grazing land for increasing herds and flocks and agriculturists for cultivable land, is likely to break into open conflict. The basic struggle between the economy of the Arabs and of European Jews now existing in Palestine would thus be carried into Libya.

Under these conditions it may be suggested that between 32,000 and 35,000 additional settlers or a total of about 60,000 to 65,000 could be settled on land in Libya. To settle even this number, consideration of other conditions seem essential. Among these are:

- (1) The placing of the entire holdings of the Italian settlers at the disposal of new settlers by expropriation or purchase.

- (2) The repairing and reconstruction of the buildings and public utilities on the present settlements, where they have been damaged by war and by pillaging Arabs;

- (3) Completion of aqueducts and canals;

(4) The clearance of land and construction of new buildings for the new settlers. It may be noted that it required 32,000 laborers seven months to prepare the land and buildings for settlement of 1,800 families in 1938;

(5) Provision of essential funds for these operations and for the maintenance of the settlers until they are self-supporting. In the case of Italian settlers, the Italian government expected to subsidize them for at least five years after settlement and in the case of settlers growing olives—which was the majority—to subsidize such settlers for 15 years;

(6) Settlement of political difficulties with the local Arab and Moslem population and with the Arab and Moslem world, not only in relation to the new settlers but also in relation to the place and prestige of the powers and International Organization among the Arabs and Moslems.

#### VI. ARAB AND MOSLEM OPPOSITION

The settlement of Libya by Jewish refugees would undoubtedly meet hostile opposition from local Arabs and from the Arab and Moslem world in general.

##### A. *Opposition of Libyan Arabs*

The Libyan Arabs would reject any settlement which would threaten their grazing land and facilitate the infiltration of European Jews into the cities. For political reasons also the settlement and the International Organization responsible for it, would be met with hostility, particularly by the Senussi.

The Senussi, who form the most powerful of the north African Arab brotherhoods, are already evincing increasing strength. The *London Times* has already written of their incipient nationalism, to which their recent employment as auxiliary troops by the British may have contributed. Mr. Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, on January 8, 1943 [1942], stated the determination of the British Government that the Senussi should not fall again under Italian domination.<sup>2</sup> It would seem probable that settlement of refugees could be made without use of force only if the acquiescence of the local Arabs is obtained through some form of negotiation.

##### B. *Opposition of Other Arab and Moslem Countries*

The settlement of Jews in Libya would undoubtedly lead to protests throughout the Arab and Moslem world. Part of the Arab hostility to Jewish immigration into Palestine has been occasioned by fear that Jews desired to acquire domination of other Arab countries. The establishment of Jews in Libya with the aid of the United Nations would presumably be regarded by Arabs as an indication that those ambitions had received the support of the responsible United Nations,

<sup>2</sup> For the statement referred to, see *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78.

which already are believed by most Arabs to desire the creation of the feared Jewish State in Palestine.

Egypt as a neighboring Arab state which has officially voiced its desire to further Arab interests and in which unofficial interest has been manifested in the extension of its frontier into Libya, would presumably not view with sympathy Jewish settlement in Libya. It has already opposed further Jewish immigration in Palestine.

Iraq, which officially and unofficially has shown its interest in Pan-Arabism and its opposition to Zionism might also be expected to oppose Jewish immigration into Libya unless the number of settlers were set at a definite limit and unless the settlement as a whole were related to a solution of the Palestine question in accordance with moderate Arab wishes.

The securing of acquiescence of Arabs and Moslems would undoubtedly involve negotiations with Arab leaders in Libya, notably in the Senussi, and in countries from Iraq to Morocco. In such negotiation, the solution of the Palestine question, the limitation of the number of settlers to be introduced into Libya, guarantees for Arab land holders, and provisions for capital expenditure on behalf of the Arabs would expectedly be put forward among the conditions which the Arabs might raise if their settlement in Libya is to be won.

[Here follow five pages of tables and bibliography.]

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Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 24 May, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER.

#### CAMP IN NORTH AFRICA FOR REFUGEES FROM SPAIN

With reference to your Minute on my note at Flag A.<sup>2</sup> The present position is shown in Lord Halifax's telegram to the Foreign Office at Flag B.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It cannot be ascertained when this document was passed to Roosevelt or Hopkins, but the available evidence indicates that this was done at the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on the evening of May 24 when the subject of refugees probably came up for discussion; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> "Flag A" marked Churchill's handwritten note at the end of Ismay's minute of May 21, 1943, to Churchill; see footnote 8 to Ismay's minute, below.

<sup>3</sup> "Flag B" marked a telegram of May 22, 1943, from Halifax to Eden which was attached to this minute. Halifax's telegram reads as follows:

"I reminded Mr. Hull today about the camp in North Africa for refugees from Spain. The present position is that the State Department have told us orally that agreement in principle will shortly be reached for the creation of a camp. But we have had no confirmation of this, and the United States Chiefs of Staff are still on record as opposing it. The question is now in the hands of the President. Mr. Hull promised to try and push it forward."

Hull's memorandum of his conversation with Halifax on May 22, 1943, printed *ante*, p. 173, makes no mention of this particular subject.

I submit that you should now go into action with the President on this matter.

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 1]

*Prime Minister Churchill's Chief of Staff (Ismay) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER.

CAMP IN NORTH AFRICA FOR REFUGEES FROM SPAIN

(See *ALCOVE* 305 attached) (Flag 'A')<sup>4</sup>

At the International Refugees Conference recently held in Bermuda, the British Delegates suggested the setting up of a small refugee camp in North Africa to which refugees in Spain, who had escaped from France, could be moved.<sup>5</sup> The proposal was that these refugees should be moved on to some more distant place of refuge when shipping was available. The reasons underlying these proposals are set out in *ALCOVE* 305.

The U.S. Delegation to the Refugee Conference felt themselves unable to agree without the approval of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was sought through the State Department.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff, however, recommended that the British proposals should not be accepted for the following military reasons:<sup>6</sup>

- (a) shortage of personnel shipping;
- (b) shortage of cargo shipping;
- (c) additional burden placed on the shoulders of the theatre commander;
- (d) possibility of Arab resentment to the influx of Jews which might cause disorder.

The Joint Staff Mission took the matter up with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and pointed out how important it was that the only effective channel of escape for refugees of all nationalities from occupied Europe should not be blocked, since if it were, admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government; the Allies would be deprived of useful personnel and public opinion throughout the world would believe that the Allies were making no serious effort to deal with the refugee problem. It was argued further that the establishment of a refugee camp in North Africa, far from the Allied lines of communication and under proper supervision, would be no embarrassment to the theatre commander.

<sup>4</sup> Printed as attachment 3, *post*, p. 345.

<sup>5</sup> The British proposal referred to here is described in telegram 127, April 21, 1943, from Hamilton, Bermuda, *Foreign Relations*, 1943. vol. I. p. 158.

<sup>6</sup> The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were set forth in Leahy's letter of April 26, 1943, to Hull, *ibid.*, p. 296.

It was also pointed out that if these refugees remained in Spain, the Spanish Government would be under continual pressure by the German Government to return them and that the shipping of relatively small numbers from Spain to North Africa would not be difficult.

The Joint Staff Mission suggested that, in view of the above arguments, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should inform the State Department and Foreign Office that they saw no objection, on military grounds, to the setting up of an internment camp in North Africa, at a spot to be selected in consultation with the theatre commander.

Later the U.S. Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Staff Mission that they adhered to their view that it was militarily undesirable to set up a refugee camp in North Africa for the reasons they had already stated.<sup>7</sup>

The Embassy then took the matter up with the State Department and the latter are understood to have suggested to the President that he should override the objections of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This they believe he will do.

The Ambassador was proposing to ask Mr. Hull tomorrow morning how the matter stood. You may wish to await the results of this interview before approaching the President.<sup>8</sup>

H. L. ISMAY

[Attachment 2]

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt's Adviser (Baruch)*<sup>9</sup>

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

SETTLEMENT IN NORTHERN AFRICA: RE REFUGEES: <sup>10</sup>

The President's suggestion to look up Italian plans for settlement might bring immediate practical results.<sup>11</sup>

Inquiry to be made as to titles of land, soil and possibilities of compounding water for power irrigation.

If titles are found to be in the Italian Government, matters will be simplified. It will also be satisfactory, if the Italians took over the land from the inhabitants.

<sup>7</sup> See the letter of May 7, 1943, from Leahy to Hull, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 299.

<sup>8</sup> Churchill wrote the following note at the end of this minute and connected it with a line to the word "President" in the final paragraph: "Yes. I will intervene if necessary. W.S.C. 22.V"

<sup>9</sup> There is no indication as to when and by what means this memorandum was transmitted to Churchill. A copy of this memorandum is included also in the Roosevelt Papers.

<sup>10</sup> The words "Re refugees" are written in Baruch's hand in the source text.

<sup>11</sup> Roosevelt's suggestion referred to here probably was made at the luncheon with Churchill on May 17, 1943, at which Baruch was present; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 96.

I am wondering if the doors of all countries cannot be opened to a few of the refugees. Each one taking a few, would soon take care of many.

The present position of the United States and Britain and the United Nations victories would make the opening up of that possibility greater now than at any other time. They might be persuaded in order to show their adherence to the four freedoms.

B M BARUCH

[Attachment 3—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*

SECRET

[LONDON,] 19 May, 1943.

IMMEDIATE

ALCOVE No. 305. Following for the Prime Minister from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Personal.

I am dismayed and depressed by the refusal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to agree to our recommendation that a small camp should be established in North Africa into which to draft refugees from Spain. This suggestion has long been pressed forward by us, on the most urgent representations from H.M. Ambassador in Madrid,<sup>12</sup> and has, I understand, the energetic support of the State Department. It is our main hope of getting refugees out of Spain and so not only satisfying British and American Public opinion, but also keeping open the escape routes from France into Spain which are essential to our military and intelligence services.

2. This is the only remaining way of getting our pilots and other prisoners out of France. The reasons given by the Chiefs of Staff for rejecting this suggestion are not very convincing, and should I think be overridden by the higher considerations mentioned. The numbers involved are not large and agreement to open a camp even for 1,000 would ease the situation. It is difficult to believe that this would put any particular strain on shipping, while as for administration it could be undertaken by Governor Lehman's organisation or we, as was suggested at the Bermuda Conference, would be willing to run the camp with our own officials. As for last objection, namely resentment on the part of the Arabs this could surely be eliminated by putting the camp in a place sufficiently remote from important Arab centres.

3. The refugees, even while they are in Spain, have to be fed and maintained to a considerable extent from American and British sources, and removal to North Africa, which appears to us essential if we are not to have a serious risk of the Spaniards closing their frontier tight, is we think the most economical suggestion from the point of

<sup>12</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

view of both shipping and supplies. It must inevitably become known in due course that failure to get the "Hard Core" of refugees in Spain removed to the nearest and most convenient alternative destination is due to American military objections which will hardly be accepted as plausible. In that case I foresee extremely serious Parliamentary criticism.

4. If you see no objection I should be most grateful if you could put all this personally to the President—it is our last hope of carrying through a modest suggestion to which we attach great political and military importance.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup>The source text bears the following notation in Churchill's handwriting: "Gen Ismay—Please report on this before I see the President. WSC-20. V"

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### *Editorial Note*

In the weeks following the TRIDENT Conference further discussions took place on refugee questions, and on July 9, 1943, Roosevelt informed Hull that he had approved and sent to Churchill a message prepared by the Department of State on the subject. This message proposed the transfer of some five or six thousand refugees from Spain to French North Africa and then to places of "more permanent settlement for the duration" of the war, with their continued care thereafter to be under the auspices and jurisdiction of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Churchill agreed to this proposal on July 10. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 322–324. For subsequent developments, see *ibid.*, pp. 324 ff.

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## K. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Hopkins Papers

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime  
Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
C.C.S. 242

[WASHINGTON,] 21 May 1943.

### DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS

The attached paper sets out the agreed decisions that have been reached so far by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the present

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<sup>1</sup>This paper was prepared by the Secretaries in pursuance of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff made at their meeting on May 21; see *ante*, p. 149. The paper was considered paragraph by paragraph in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 21; see *ante*, p. 152. As then revised, the paper was redesignated C.C.S. 242/1, May 23, 1943 (not printed). A revision of C.C.S. 242/1 was prepared by the Secretaries in the light of the most recent decisions and was designated C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943; that revision is printed *infra*.

conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These decisions still need to be related to the resources available and particularly to the availability of shipping and landing craft. This is being done and a final report will be submitted to you on Monday, 24 May 1943.<sup>2</sup>

[Attachment]

*Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*

[DRAFT OF AGREED DECISIONS]

#### 1. AZORES ISLANDS

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already submitted to the President and the Prime Minister the following recommendations:<sup>3</sup>

*a.* That the acquisition of the Azores Islands should be accomplished as soon as possible and, in any event, early enough for them to be utilized by the United Nations during the winter of 1943-1944.

*b.* That an effort should first be made to secure the use of these islands by diplomatic means without making military commitments to the Portuguese Government.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed:

*a.* That the British Chiefs of Staff should bring before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for the occupation and use of the Azores Islands. This plan, when approved, should be submitted to the President and Prime Minister with a covering note showing suggested timings and the effect of the plan on other military commitments now in view.

*b.* That as soon as these plans have been approved preparations should be made to implement them in case diplomatic efforts should fail.

#### 2. THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U.S.-British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>2</sup> See C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, *post*, p. 359.

<sup>3</sup> The recommendations and agreements regarding the Azores were formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meetings on May 15 and 17; see *ante*, pp. 85 and 91.

<sup>4</sup> Regarding the plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, see C.C.S. 217, May 14, 1943, *ante*, p. 239.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and April 1, 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

### 3. DEFEAT OF AXIS POWERS IN EUROPE

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:—<sup>5</sup>

*a.* That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

<i>Assault:</i>	5	Infantry Divisions (Simultaneously loaded in landing craft)
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up
	2	Airborne Divisions
	<hr/>	
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault
<i>Build-up:</i>	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area
	<hr/>	
Total	29	Divisions

*b.* That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available.

*c.* The above resolution shall be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at a meeting in July or early in August, the date to be decided later, in order that the situation may be examined in the light of the result of HUSKY and the situation in Russia.

<sup>5</sup> This resolution was formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the afternoon of May 19; see *ante*, p. 118.

## 4. BURMA—CHINA THEATER

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on :—<sup>6</sup>

*a.* The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam—Burma Theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to—

- (1) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
- (2) Maintaining increased American air forces in China;
- (3) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

*b.* Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

*c.* The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations.

*d.* The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

## 5. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC—1943—44

The courses of action examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the conclusions reached by them are as follows :—<sup>7</sup>

*a. Far Eastern Theater.*

(1) *Operations in Burma To Augment Supplies to China.*

Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of Japan and to keeping China in the war.

(2) *Air Operations in and From China.*

Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

*b. Pacific Theater.*

(1) *Operations in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago.*

Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on Japan, and the defense of Australia.

(2) *Operations in New Guinea.*

The capture of New Guinea will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the Celebes Sea and contribute to the defense of Australia.

<sup>6</sup> These resolutions were formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their closed session on the afternoon of May 20; see *ante*, p. 142.

<sup>7</sup> These conclusions are those set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 239/1, May 23, 1943, *ante*, p. 303, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 21; see *ante*, p. 148.

(3) *Operations in Eastern Netherlands East Indies.*

Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of New Guinea.

(4) *Operations in the Mashall Islands.*

Shortens line of communications to Southwest Pacific and Celebes Sea.

(5) *Operations in the Caroline Islands.*

Necessary to gain control of central Pacific, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to Celebes Sea. Will enable United Nations forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) *Intensification of Operations Against Enemy Lines of Communication.*

All the foregoing operations are essential to the attainment of positions which enable the intensification and expansion of attacks on the enemy lines of communication in the Pacific.

## CONCLUSIONS:

a. Offensive operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Operations in Burma to augment supplies to China.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (4) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (5) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
- (6) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

6. RE-ARMING OF THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA <sup>8</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the re-arming and re-equipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and United States forces in the various theaters.

7. BOMBING OF PLOESTI <sup>9</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the United States Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to pre-

<sup>8</sup> This agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reached at their meeting of May 18; see *ante*, p. 104.

<sup>9</sup> This agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was reached at their meeting of May 18; see *ante*, p. 108.

sent to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Roumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa or Syria. Further, that the Commander in Chief of the North African Theater should be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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J. C. S. Files

*Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 23 May 1943.

C.C.S. 242/2

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242)<sup>2</sup> the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

*a.* In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

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<sup>1</sup>This draft report was circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff: "The attached draft is a revision of C.C.S. 242/1. It has been prepared by the Combined Secretariat in the light of the most recent decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff." For the earlier version of this report, see C.C.S. 242, May 21, 1943, *supra*. This draft report was considered and revised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 24, 1943 (*ante*, p. 184). For the text as revised, see C.C.S. 242/3, May 24, 1943, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup>*Supra*.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*b.* Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

*c.* Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

### III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

*a.* Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*b.* Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas (to which committed).

*c.* Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*d.* Intensify the air offensive from the United Kingdom and concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

*Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Alter to read:

“To maintain, and so far as is consistent with *a* above, to extend . . .”

*Amendment Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Omit

*Amendments Proposed by British Chiefs of Staff*

Reletter as *c* and amend to read:

“Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.”

Add new paragraph:

“*d.* Take all necessary and practicable measures to draw land and air forces from the Russian Front.”

NOTE: The basic undertakings noted under *d* (proposed by C.P.S.) and *c* and *d* (proposed by British Chiefs of Staff) are now included under "Specific Operations," and should be omitted here.

*e.* Sustain the Soviet Forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the overall objectives.

*Proposed by C.P.S.*

*Amendment Proposed by British  
Chiefs of Staff*

*f.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies sufficient to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

Amend to read:

"*f.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war against Japan."

*g.* To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI *a.*)

*h.* To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI *b.*)

#### IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

##### 1. *The U-Boat War*

###### *a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the success of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex,<sup>3</sup> and that the preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for

<sup>3</sup> Not printed as such, but its text can be reconstructed from the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, *post*, p. 372, and from footnotes 5 and 7 thereto.

the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the middle of August.

*b. Other Anti-U-Boat Measures.*

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are possible are being taken.

*c. Flexibility of Forces.*

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

2. *Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe*

*a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.—British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

*b. Cross-Channel Operations.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944:

<i>Assault:</i>	5 Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2 Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2 Air borne Divisions.
	—
<b>Total</b>	9 Divisions in the Assault.
<i>Build-up:</i>	20 Divisions available for movement into lodgement area
	—
<b>Total</b>	29 Divisions

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be undertaken

in order that the initial assault and build-up forces may be augmented subsequent to 1 May 1944 by shipment from the United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

*c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be instructed to mount such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Each specific operation will be subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander-in-Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that 19 British and allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean Area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey.<sup>4</sup> It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,622 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 1,986 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

*d. Bombing of Ploesti.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa and Syria. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, should be

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<sup>4</sup>The British commitment of two armoured divisions was part of the planned military support which the British were to provide in the event of Turkey entering the war. The whole plan, which was known by the name HARDHOOD and which the British and Turks discussed in detail in mid-April 1943 in Ankara, is described in John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, vol. v: *August 1943-September 1944* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 90, in the series *History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series*.

asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

### 3. *Operations for the Defeat of Japan*

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

#### *a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on :

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to :

- (a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma ;
- (b) Maintaining increased American air forces in China ; and
- (c) Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM. (This has not yet been agreed.)

#### *b. Operations in the Pacific.*

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects :

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
- (5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

### V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT—1943-44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows :

*Ground Forces.*

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

*Naval Forces.*

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U.S. naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

*Air Forces.*

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For Cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U.K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for Cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements of gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

*Assault Shipping and Landing Craft.*

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U.S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

*Supply of Critical Items.*

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

*Shipping.*

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United

Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

*Oil.*

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters but we feel that the whole question of stocks and of tankers will require urgent examination in the light of decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

#### VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

##### 1. *Equipment for Turkey.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignment[s] Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey.<sup>5</sup> The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of the equipment as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least possible delay.

##### 2. *Rearming of the French in North Africa.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces in the various theaters. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

#### VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

*a.* Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

*b.* The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the situation in the light of the results of HUSKY and the situation in Italy and Russia.

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding the agreement referred to here, see item 2 of the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, January 20, 1943, 10 a. m., *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 659.

Hopkins Papers

*Draft Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President  
Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 24 May 1943.

C.C.S. 242/3

TRIDENT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COM-  
BINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first

<sup>1</sup>This draft report, which is a revision of the earlier draft, C.C.S. 242/2, May 23, 1943, *supra*, was reviewed and amended by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see *ante*, p. 189. As revised during that meeting, the draft report was circulated as C.C.S. 242/4, May 24, 1943, not printed. For the final version of the Report, see C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *post*, p. 364.

charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to keep Russia actively in the War.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to keep China actively in the war as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Army in North Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

#### IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interest should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

##### 1. *The U-Boat War*

###### *a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex.<sup>2</sup> The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor re-

<sup>2</sup> This annex is identical to the annex to C.C.S. 242/6, *post*, p. 371.

garding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

*b. Other Anti-U-Boat Measures.*

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 354.]

*c. Flexibility of Forces.*

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 354.]

2. *Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe*

*a. Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom.*

[This subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 354.]

*b. Cross-Channel Operations.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

<i>Assault:</i>	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2	Air borne Divisions.
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault.
<i>Build-up:</i>	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgement area.
Total	29	Divisions.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the initial assault and build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

*c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War.*

[This entire subsection is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 355.]

*d. Bombing of Ploesti.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander-in-Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

*3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan.*

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

*a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

[Subsection (1) of this section is identical with the same subsection in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 356.]

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

[Subsections (3) and (4) of this section are identical with the same subsections in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 356.]

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

*b. Operations in the Pacific.*

[This entire section is identical with the same section in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 356.]

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44

[With the exception of the last section, section 10 on Oil, this entire part is identical with the same part in C.C.S. 242/2, *ante*, p. 356.]

*Oil*

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. *Equipment for Turkey.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

2. *Rearming of the French in North Africa.*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

## VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

1. Decisions of the Casablanca conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

J. C. S. Files

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*Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

C.C.S. 242/5

## FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Following are changes in C.C.S. 242/4 which have been suggested by the Prime Minister:

1. At the bottom of page 4, add the following sentence:

"The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> At their meeting on May 25, 1943 (*ante*, p. 199), the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the amendments set forth in this memorandum. For the final version of the "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", see C.C.S. 242/6, May 25, 1943, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this sentence appears in section 2b, immediately following the projected listing of divisions present and available for cross-Channel operations, *post*, p. 367.

2. At the end of the first paragraph on page 5, add the following subparagraph:

“The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan. In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.”<sup>3</sup>

3. Subparagraph *c* on page 5, after the words “The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved” substitute the following:

“That the Allied Commander-in-Chief North Africa will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”<sup>4</sup>

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

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<sup>3</sup> As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this paragraph appears as the final paragraph in section 2*b*, *post*, p. 367.

<sup>4</sup> As approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and incorporated into the final version of the Report, C.C.S. 242/6, this section appears at the beginning of section 2*c*, *post*, p. 368.

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J.C.S. Files

*Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 242/6

TRIDENT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE  
FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COM-  
BINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In a previous memorandum (C.C.S. 242)<sup>2</sup> the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present

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<sup>1</sup> This report was circulated as an enclosure to the following memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff: “The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the TRIDENT Conference as approved by the President and the Prime Minister on 25 May 1943.” This text includes the changes to C.C.S. 242/3, *ante*, p. 359, made by Roosevelt and Churchill and incorporated in C.C.S. 242/4, not printed, as well as those further modifications to C.C.S. 242/4 contained in C.C.S. 242/5, *supra*, and the amendments agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on May 25, 1943, the record of which is printed *ante*, p. 199. Roosevelt and Churchill gave their final approval to this report during their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see *ante*, p. 203.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 346.

Conference regarding operations in the three main theaters. These conclusions have been amended to accord with the views expressed by the President and the Prime Minister. The amended conclusions, and others reached since the previous memorandum was submitted, have now been related to resources available, and a final agreed summary of conclusions is submitted herein.

#### I. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

#### II. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

#### III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

2. Support the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

4. Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

5. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

6. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in

order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

8. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section VI 1.)

9. To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis powers. (See also Section VI 2.)

#### IV. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the overall strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment. (See Section V.) If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

##### 1. *The U-boat War*

###### *a. Operation To Seize the Azores Islands*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the occupation of the Azores is essential to the efficient conduct of the anti-U-boat war for the reasons set out in the Annex. The preparation of the plan for the capture of the Azores Islands is a responsibility of the British Chiefs of Staff, and accordingly plans are actively in preparation under their authority. The British Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary examination of these plans. It is proposed that the expedition should be mounted from the United Kingdom and that in the first place the islands of Fayal and Terceira should be seized. It is expected that a force of about nine battalions will be required. The availability of landing craft is likely to be the limiting factor regarding the date of the operation and as far as can be seen at present the earliest date for the arrival of the force in the Azores will be about the end of August. It is agreed that the land, air, and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations forces.

The possibility of an earlier move on the Azores will receive further study. Meanwhile, the political decision involved will be settled by the two Governments.

###### *b. Other Anti-U-boat Measures*

All possible measures for strengthening the air forces engaged in the Bay of Biscay Offensive and for increasing the number of VLR aircraft engaged in convoy protection have been examined and such steps as are practicable are being taken.

###### *c. Flexibility of Forces*

The necessity for flexibility in the utilization of both air and sea forces has been agreed, and steps to improve matters in this respect are being constantly studied and implemented.

## 2. *Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe*

### a. *Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined U. S.—British air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter strength.

### b. *Cross-Channel Operations*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting an operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. The scope of the operation will be such as to necessitate the following forces being present and available for use in the United Kingdom by 1 May 1944, in addition to the air forces then available.

<i>Assault:</i>	5	Infantry Divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).
	2	Infantry Divisions—Follow-up.
	2	Air-borne Divisions.
	<hr/>	
Total	9	Divisions in the Assault.
<i>Build-up:</i>	20	Divisions available for movement into lodgment area.
	<hr/>	
Total	29	Divisions.

The possibility of adding one French Division will be considered at a later date.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately, and after the initial assault, the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of 3 to 5 divisions per month.

The preparation and constant keeping up to date of plans for an emergency crossing of the Channel in the event of a German collapse will proceed in accordance with the directive already given to General Morgan.<sup>3</sup> In addition, General Morgan will prepare and submit to

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion of the directive of April 23, 1943, to Morgan, see Harrison, pp. 46-49.

the Combined Chiefs of Staff a plan for sending forces to Norway in the event of a German evacuation becoming apparent.<sup>4</sup>

*c. Operations in the Mediterranean To Eliminate Italy From the War*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have resolved:

That the Allied Commander in Chief, North Africa, will be instructed, as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for his operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom, provided that the naval vessels required will be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff when the plans are submitted. The additional air forces provided on a temporary basis for HUSKY will not be considered available. It is estimated that the equivalent strength of 19 British and Allied, 4 United States, and 4 French divisions, or a total of 27 divisions will be available for garrisons and operations in the Mediterranean area subsequent to HUSKY. These figures exclude the 4 United States and 3 British divisions to be transferred to the United Kingdom and the 2 British divisions constituting the British commitment to Turkey. It is further estimated that there will be available after HUSKY a total of 3,648 aircraft including 242 heavy bombers (day and night), 519 medium bombers (day and night), 299 light and dive bombers, 2,012 fighters, 412 transports, and 164 army cooperatives.

*d. Bombing of Ploesti*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the U. S. Army Air Forces should send representatives, without delay, to present to the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, the plan which they have prepared concerning the bombing of the Rumanian oil fields from bases in North Africa. Further, they have agreed that the Commander in Chief, North African Theater, will be asked to submit appropriate comments and recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. These steps have been taken.

*3. Operations for the Defeat of Japan*

We have directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an ap-

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<sup>4</sup> See the supplementary directive to Morgan, enclosure B to C.C.S. 250/1, May 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 286.

preciation leading up to a plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required.

*a. Operations in the Burma-China Theater*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed on:

(1) The concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

- (a) Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
- (b) Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
- (c) Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

(2) Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations at the end of the 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

(3) The capture of Akyab and of Ramree Island by amphibious operations, with possible exploitation.

(4) The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

(5) The continuance of administrative preparations in India for the eventual launching of an overseas operation of about the size of ANAKIM.

*b. Operations in the Pacific*

Various courses of action have been examined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the operations they have agreed to undertake have the following objects:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from China.
- (2) Ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians.
- (3) Seizure of the Marshall and Caroline Islands.
- (4) Seizure of the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Japanese held New Guinea.
- (5) Intensification of operations against enemy lines of communication.

V. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT 1943-44

We have examined our resources with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the above operations and our conclusions are as follows:

*Ground Forces*

1. All the ground forces required can be made available.

*Naval Forces*

2. If a covering force is required for the operations to capture Akyab and Ramree, and if the Italian fleet has not been eliminated some diversion of U. S. Naval forces may be required. Subject to this, all the naval forces required can be made available.

*Air Forces*

3. Broadly there are sufficient air forces to meet all requirements in all theaters.

4. For cross-Channel operations there will be sufficient air forces in the U. K. with the exception of transport aircraft, the provision of which needs further investigation. In the absence of any detailed plan for cross-Channel operations, it has not been possible to estimate the requirements in gliders. This will have to be the subject of urgent study, which we are initiating.

5. For operations in Burma there are only small deficiencies which can probably be reconciled by adjustments within the theater.

6. Subject to the development of air fields and necessary communications in Assam, the air transport and defense requirements of the air route into China, up to 10,000 tons per month, can be met.

*Assault Shipping and Landing Craft*

7. Provided the casualties in operations are no greater than we have allowed for, and provided that the U. S. and British planned productions are maintained, all the assault shipping and landing craft required can be made available. We have agreed upon the necessary allocations.

*Supply of Critical Items*

8. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater it is not possible to give finalized requirements and to estimate detailed shortages of critical items. With the exception of steel for landing craft construction, deficiencies do not appear serious. We recommend that the possibilities of providing the necessary items, and particularly steel, should be further examined.

*Shipping*

9. The examination of the shipping resources of the United Nations shows that so far as can be foreseen now, and on the assumption that future losses do not exceed the agreed estimate, personnel shipping will be available to permit of the optimum deployment of United Nations forces up to the limits imposed by the availability of cargo shipping.

The optimum deployment of available United Nations cargo shipping to meet the requirements of the basic undertakings and projected

operations for 1943/1944 reveals small deficiencies in the third and fourth quarters of 1943 and first quarter of 1944 and a surplus of sailings in the second and third quarters in 1944. The deficiencies are small and, if properly spread over all the programs concerned, the effect will not be unmanageable.

### *Oil*

10. We have not been able to include a survey of the oil position in the various theaters, but the whole question of stocks and of tankers must receive urgent examination in the light of the decisions taken at the TRIDENT Conference.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

### 1. *Equipment for Turkey*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed at the ANFA Conference that the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to the Munitions Assignments Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have now agreed that, with due regard to other important commitments, the assignment of such equipment as may be agreed to by the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be made with the least practicable delay.

### 2. *Re-Arming of the French in North Africa*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the rearming and reequipping of the French forces in North Africa should be proceeded with as rapidly as the availability of shipping and equipment will allow, but as a secondary commitment to the requirements of British and U. S. forces. The use of captured German equipment for this purpose will be explored.

## VII. OTHER CONFERENCES

1. Decisions of the Casablanca Conference in conflict with the provisions of this report are modified or cancelled accordingly.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will meet in July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this Conference in the light of the situation existing at the time.

## Annex

### ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED BY THE USE OF THE AZORES

1. Experience has shown that so long as we can keep even a single aircraft with a convoy during the greater part of each day, the operation of U-boats is greatly hampered. In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for the U. S.-U. K. convoys to follow a northerly route which not only suffers from the dis-

advantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we lose shore-based air protection over a large part of the passage. There is the further peril of U-boat concentrations against the U. S.-Mediterranean convoys. We regard the immediate occupation of the Azores as imperative to conserve lives and shipping and, above all, to shorten the War.<sup>5</sup>

2. The facilities which we particularly require are as follows:

a. Facilities in the Azores on Terceira for operating V.L.R. aircraft;

b. Unrestricted fueling facilities for naval escorts at either San Miguel or Fayal.

3. The benefits which would accrue from these facilities may be summarized as follows:

a. They would give us a much extended air cover for all convoys plying between:

- (1) U.S.A. or West Indies and the Mediterranean;
- (2) West Indies and the U.K.;
- (3) South America and the U. K.;
- (4) U.K. and the Mediterranean;
- (5) U.K. and West Africa, and the Cape and Eastwards.

b. The increased areas under air cover would give us much greater scope for evasive routing, e.g., when U-boats were concentrated in northern waters, North Atlantic convoys could be routed via the Azores instead of always having to follow the Iceland (C) route. (See diagram.<sup>6</sup>)

c. Without the Azores we shall always be moving on the outside of the circle while the enemy operates inside it. Air forces there would be centrally placed to cover all varieties of the U-boat campaign against the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Theaters.

d. We should be able to increase our carrying capacity owing to the possibility of using more direct routes across the middle of the Atlantic.

e. We could increase our harassing action against U-boats not only when on passage to and from the Biscay bases, but also while resting,

<sup>5</sup> In the annex to C.C.S. 242/2 (see *ante*, p. 353) the last three sentences of this paragraph read as follows: "In order to obtain maximum air protection at the present time it is necessary for our convoys to follow a route which not only suffers from the disadvantages of bad weather and ice, but which inevitably becomes known to the enemy. If we take a southerly route at the present time, we have to forego a considerable measure of air protection. If we had both a northerly and a southerly route which had equal air protection, it would be a great advantage and consequently facilities in the Portuguese Atlantic Islands would be of outstanding value in shortening the war by convincing the enemy he has lost the Battle of the Atlantic."

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

refueling and recharging their batteries in mid-ocean where hitherto they have been practically immune from interference by aircraft. New detection and attacking devices, which are expected to come into service this spring, would enhance the effect of such action.

f. Unrestricted fueling facilities in the Islands would enable us to make better use of our inadequate numbers of surface escorts.

g. Blockade running between Germany and Japan would be rendered so hazardous as not to be worth the risk.

h. German warships and raiders would have greater difficulty in evading detection after breaking out into the Atlantic.

i. The Islands would provide more direct all-weather air supply routes from U. S. A. to Europe, Africa, and the Far East.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In the annex to C.C.S. 242/2 (see *ante*, p. 353) subparagraph *i* reads as follows: "The Islands would prove useful staging points on the air supply routes from the U.S.A. to the Mediterranean theaters of operations."

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## L. PROPOSED COMMUNIQUÉ

Hopkins Papers

*Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

There has been a complete meeting of minds on

- A. The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
- B. The war in China-southern Asia
- C. War in the Near East
- D. War in all parts of the Mediterranean
- E. War in the Atlantic N.-South

All related to each other in regard to transportation.

After successful completion of N. African campaign one phase of the Casablanca plans was completed and the next phase was initiated.

The need of a further staff conference was therefore clear in order to take up further steps. And the C. C. of S. has agreed on further steps in the overall planning.

It is important to state that these further steps included every theatre of the war.

This phase of the conduct of war affairs [is?] in a more satisfactory condition than when the C. C. of S. met in Casablanca.

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<sup>1</sup> This draft statement is in Hopkins' handwriting on White House stationery. It appears to be the statement prepared by Hopkins and read by him during the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 25, 1943, *ante*, p. 204.

This integrated with anti submarine campaign which is showing greater success last month.

The Pres, the Prime Minister and the staffs also discussed in greater detail the temporary civil-military organization to be put into effect when and as Nazi, Fascist or Jap occupied territories are freed.

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Hopkins Papers

*Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER<sup>2</sup>

The complete destruction of the Nazi *Afrika Korps* and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, are [*sic*] proceeding satisfactorily. Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore, the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. It is important to state that the operations which have been agreed to include every theater of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on—

- (a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia
- (b) The war in China and Southern Asia
- (c) The war in the Near East
- (d) The war in all parts of the Mediterranean
- (e) The war in the North and South Atlantic
- (f) The war in Europe

All of these plans are related to each other in regard to shipping, air support and the command of the seas by our navies.

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<sup>1</sup>This draft joint statement, which bears neither date nor indication of authorship, appears to be the revision of the earlier draft printed *supra*. In the course of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on the morning of May 25, it had been agreed that Hopkins should prepare such a revision; see *ante*, p. 204. The source text covers two typewritten pages. There are two identical copies of page 2, each of which bears a number of amendments in the handwriting of Roosevelt and Churchill. These amendments are indicated in footnotes. Roosevelt and Churchill presumably worked at revising this statement during their meeting on the evening of May 25; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 221.

<sup>2</sup>The word "Tentative" in Hopkins' handwriting appears above the title of the document.

The state of the war at this time is in a far more satisfactory condition than when the Chiefs of Staff met with the President and the Prime Minister in Casablanca. The unrelenting anti U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated.<sup>3</sup>

The vast production of war materials assures the United Nations of weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed<sup>4</sup> with the Chiefs of Staff the<sup>5</sup> temporary civil and military organizations to be put in effect<sup>6</sup> when and as Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

A complete report of the conference has been sent to Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The word "Air" in the President's handwriting appears in the margin at the beginning of this paragraph. The following sentence, in the Prime Minister's handwriting, appears at the end of this paragraph: "The weight & intensity of the air offensive grows continually."

<sup>4</sup> The word "discussed" is crossed out and replaced with the word "examined" in the Prime Minister's handwriting.

<sup>5</sup> Following the word "the" the phrase "form of" in the Prime Minister's handwriting is inserted.

<sup>6</sup> The phrase "put in effect" is crossed out and replaced by the phrase "set up" in the Prime Minister's handwriting.

<sup>7</sup> This paragraph is crossed out and the phrase "See amendment" in the President's handwriting appears in the margin. The paragraph is revised, in the Prime Minister's handwriting, to read: "A complete report of the conclusions of the conference is being sent to Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek." The introductory phrase "A complete report of the" is crossed out and replaced by the phrase "The fullest possible" in Hopkins' handwriting, which is also crossed out.

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Hopkins Papers

*Draft Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, [May 25, 1943.]

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

The complete destruction of the Nazi *Afrika Korps* and their Italian allies in North Africa completed one phase of the military

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<sup>1</sup> This joint statement, which is typed on White House stationery, bears the following marginal notation in Roosevelt's handwriting: "Not sent FDR—Evening of May 25 FDR and W.S.C." The Hopkins Papers also contain a nearly identical version, bearing a number of amendments and additions in Churchill's handwriting. All of those alterations are reflected in this version of the statement. Roosevelt and Churchill presumably considered this statement during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 221.

decisions made at Casablanca. Progress on other operations, determined at that time, is proceeding satisfactorily.

Aggressive warfare, however, requires a constant implementation of strategy, based upon military events. Further operations, in addition to those determined upon at Casablanca, must be set afoot. Therefore the President and the Prime Minister decided to meet again with their Chiefs of Staff.

They have agreed on further steps to be taken in the overall planning of a global war. The operations which have been approved include every theatre of war all over the world.

There has been a complete meeting of minds on :

- (a) The war in the Pacific from the Aleutians to Australia.
- (b) The war in China and Southern Asia.
- (c) The situation in the Middle East.
- (d) The war in the Mediterranean.
- (e) The war at sea in the North and South Atlantic.
- (f) The war in Western Europe.
- (g) The war in Eastern Europe—the Russian-German front.<sup>2</sup>

Action in all these theatres is inter-related in regard to shipping, air power and the command of the seas by our navies.

The war at this time stands far better than when the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at Casablanca.

Our unrelenting anti-U-boat campaign is prospering, with the result that there are far more merchant ships available than had been anticipated. The triumphs of the Russian Army have inflicted shattering blows upon the German forces. Heroic China still stands firm. The weight and intensity of the Allied air offensive grows continually.

The vast production of munitions assures to the United Nations the weapons with which to destroy the enemy.

However the Combined Chiefs of Staff remain convinced that all plans must be based on a complete military victory without counting on any possibility of the enemy's internal collapse.

The President and the Prime Minister also examined with the Chiefs of Staff the forms of temporary civil and military organizations to be set up when the Nazi, Fascist or Japanese occupied territories are freed.

The fullest possible contacts have been maintained with Marshal Stalin and the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, to whom the final reports have been submitted.

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<sup>2</sup> This line is crossed out in the source text.

Hopkins Papers

*Statement by President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

## STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT

The recent conference of the Combined Staffs in Washington has ended in complete agreement on future operations in all theatres of the war.

(To be given out in Washington on arrival of Prime Minister in TORCH.)

<sup>1</sup> There are no indications of the circumstances in which this statement was prepared, but the fact that it was used as a substitute for the much longer draft joint statement, *supra*, suggests that it was prepared by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 221. The statement was given to the press by the White House on the afternoon of May 27, 1943, as reported in Roosevelt's message No. 276 to Churchill, *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 27, 1943.]

276. We were all very happy to hear this afternoon that you have safely completed the second leg of the trip. I have given the one sentence announcement of the end of the conferences to the Press.<sup>2</sup> I miss you much. It was a highly successful meeting in every way and proved that it was well timed and necessary.

<sup>1</sup> This message was sent by Roosevelt to Eisenhower, in telegram FREEDOM 8961, May 27, 1943, 4 p. m., for delivery to Churchill.

<sup>2</sup> For the statement by Roosevelt, see *supra*.

M. REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE TO STALIN AND  
CHIANG

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 25 May 1943.

C.C.S. Unnumbered Memorandum

## SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO THE CHINESE

Following is a suggested statement to be made to the Chinese authorities with regard to decisions reached at the TRIDENT Conferences.

<sup>1</sup> The authorship of the suggested statement contained in this memorandum is not indicated, but in the course of the meeting of Roosevelt and Churchill with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 24, 1943 (*ante*, p. 196), the Prime Minister had indicated that he would prepare such a written statement. This memorandum was considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on the morning of May 25, 1943; for the record of that meeting, see *ante*, p. 201.

“It has been decided to pursue the operations in the ANAKIM theater which were discussed at the Calcutta Conference with certain modifications. The following are the decisions:—

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam–Burma area on the building up and increasing of the Air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early Fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:

- a. Intensifying Air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
- b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
- c. Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of cutting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.”

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

J. C. S. Files

*Memorandum Considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

#### PROPOSALS TO BE MADE TO GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The following are the proposals which will be made to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with regard to operations in the ANAKIM Theater:

First, the concentration of available resources as supreme priority within the Assam–Burma area on the building up and increasing of

<sup>1</sup> This paper, which appears to be a revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the memorandum printed *supra*, was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the morning of May 25; see *ante*, p. 204. At that meeting, it was agreed that Roosevelt and Marshall should make use of the wording of this paper in their conversations with Chinese authorities to whom copies of the document might be handed for retention. Regarding Roosevelt's meeting with Soong and Marshall's conversation with Chu on the afternoon of May 25, see the editorial notes, *ante*, p. 208.

the Air Route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons monthly by early fall, and the development of Air facilities in Assam with a view to:

- a. Intensifying Air operations against Japanese in Burma;
- b. Maintaining increased American Air forces in China; and
- c. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

Secondly, vigorous and aggressive land and Air operations will be begun at the end of 1943 monsoon from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing and engaging as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the Air Route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road.

Thirdly, amphibious operations against the Burmese coast with the purpose of interrupting Japanese communications between the coast and their northern front.

Fourthly, the interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.

For the above purposes all possible measures will be taken to secure the Naval Command of the Bay of Bengal by an adequate force. No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstances, will be placed on the above operations, which have for their object the relief of the siege of China.

---

Hopkins Papers

*Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, May 25, 1943.]

DRAFT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO  
PREMIER STALIN

Upon the conclusion of the conferences which we have been holding in Washington with our combined military staffs, we think it proper that the following comprehensive report concerning our decisions<sup>2</sup> should be sent to you.

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<sup>1</sup> This draft message, prepared by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was transmitted to Roosevelt under cover of the following memorandum from Deane, dated May 25, 1943:

"Attached hereto is a draft report prepared by the Secretariat for submission to Mr. Stalin.

"A questionable part may be the paragraph on U-boat warfare (par. 4 a) which might be taken as a promise to deliver more supplies to Russia. On the other hand it presents a hopeful outlook. I therefore left it in the draft but call your attention to it.

"An identical draft has been sent to the Prime Minister."

The changes written in by Roosevelt on this draft message are indicated in foot-notes. Roosevelt and Churchill worked at revising this message during their meeting on the evening of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 220.

<sup>2</sup> The word "decisions" was crossed out and replaced by the word "plans".

Throughout our conferences full recognition was given to the most important part which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is playing in the defeat of the European Axis Powers. Nearly all of the decisions enumerated below were made only after they had been measured against the yardstick of their aid <sup>3</sup> to your country's war effort. Briefly, our decisions may be summarized as follows:

#### 1. OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.

#### 2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

*a.* In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

*b.* Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

*c.* Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

#### 3. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

*a.* Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

*b.* Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

*c.* Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

*d.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

*e.* To prepare the French Forces in Africa <sup>4</sup> to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers.

#### 4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR 1943-44 IN EXECUTION OF OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT <sup>5</sup>

*a.* Certain detailed operations were decided upon to combat the U-boat menace. These operations, we feel certain, will enable us to

<sup>3</sup> The phrase "against the yardstick of their aid" was crossed out and replaced by the phrase "in relation".

<sup>4</sup> The phrase "in Africa" was crossed out.

<sup>5</sup> The phrase "In execution of overall strategic concept" was crossed out.

increase our capacity to transport troops and supplies to active theaters and to our allies.

*b. Combined Bomber Offensive.*

We have approved a plan to accomplish, by a combined *U.S.<sup>6</sup>-British* air offensive, the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military,<sup>7</sup> industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.

The plan will be accomplished in four phases between now and 1 April 1944. In each successive phase our increased strength will allow a deeper penetration into enemy territory. An intermediate objective of particular importance is the continuing reduction of German fighter<sup>8</sup> strength.

*c. Cross-Channel Operations.*

We have resolved:

That forces and equipment shall be established in the United Kingdom with the object of mounting a large scale operation with target date 1 May 1944 to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. French forces from North Africa may be represented in the initial assault or in the immediate build-up.

The expansion of logistical facilities in the United Kingdom will be undertaken immediately,<sup>9</sup> and after the initial assault the seizure and development of Continental ports will be expedited in order that the build-up forces may be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the fastest possible rate.

Meanwhile preparations will be continuously kept up to date to take advantage of a collapse in France or, alternatively, for the occupation of Norway in case of a German withdrawal.

*d. Operations in the Mediterranean.*

We have resolved to conduct such operations in exploitation of the forthcoming operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Alternative plans are to be prepared at once. Specific operations will be determined upon in the light of the situation developing from the coming operations. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these operations all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and

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<sup>6</sup> The words "United States" were spelled out.

<sup>7</sup> The "m" in military was reduced to lower case.

<sup>8</sup> The word "aircraft" was inserted after the word "fighter".

<sup>9</sup> The phrase "will be undertaken immediately" was crossed out and replaced with the phrase "has long been in progress".

three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in operations from the United Kingdom.<sup>10</sup>

*e. Operations for the Defeat of Japan.*<sup>11</sup>

Our plans also provide for extensive operations against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. While these operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater, they are within the scope of the overall strategic concept for the prosecution of the war as set forth above.<sup>12</sup>

5. AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS

After full and careful examination we have found that the above operations utilize our resources to the full. It has been our earnest desire to make the utmost use of our resources wherever they can be brought to bear upon the enemy and we believe that our object has been fulfilled in the statement of operations as set out above.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> This paragraph was extensively revised to read as follows: "We have resolved to exploit the forthcoming (HUSKY) operation, of which you are aware, as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Specific operations are to be determined upon in the light of the developing situation. The Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa may use for these purposes all those forces available in the Mediterranean Area except for four American and three British divisions which will be held in readiness from 1 November onward for withdrawal to take part in the main attack from the United Kingdom."

<sup>11</sup> This heading was revised to read "The defeat of Japan".

<sup>12</sup> This paragraph was revised to read as follows:

"Our plans also provide for waging war against Japan in the Far Eastern and Pacific Theaters. These operations will, of necessity, have repercussions on our efforts in the European Theater."

<sup>13</sup> The revisions of this paragraph seem to be incomplete and tentative. The word "operations" was crossed out and replaced by the word "undertakings". The following words are indicated as a possible substitution for the second sentence: "It is our earnest desire to engage the enemy to the utmost. We believe this object will be obtained by our proposed actions".

---

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[EN ROUTE BY AIR TO ALGIERS, May 26, 1943.]

PENCIL No. 400. Present Aerial Person to President Roosevelt.  
Most Secret.

General Marshall has himself prepared the following version of the approved decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to be sent to Rus-

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<sup>1</sup> According to the account in Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, pp. 812-813, this letter and the enclosed draft message from the President and the Prime Minister to Premier Stalin were flown to Washington from Botwood, Newfoundland, where Churchill's aircraft stopped for refueling en route from Washington to Algiers.

sia. C.I.G.S.<sup>2</sup> and I agree with every word of it, and strongly hope that it can be sent to Stalin as the statement by the Chief of the United States Staff, concurred in by the C.I.G.S., and that it has our (President and Prime Minister's) joint approval. If you agree, will you kindly implement without further reference to me.

W[INSTON] S. C[HIRCHILL]  
26. 5. 43

[Enclosure]

*Draft Message From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister  
Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>3</sup>

SECRET

1. In general, the overall strategy agreed upon is based upon the following decisions:

(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace and the security of our overseas lines of communication.

(b) Next in priority to employ every practicable means to support Russia.<sup>4</sup>

(c) To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies.

(d) To maintain an unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her Military power.

(e) To undertake such measures as may be practicable to maintain China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(f) To prepare the French forces in Africa for active participation in the assaults on Axis Europe.

2. With reference to (a) above regarding submarines, the immediate results of the recent deployment of long-range aircraft with new

<sup>2</sup> General Sir Alan Brooke.

<sup>3</sup> A memorandum of May 28, 1943, to the President by Lt. Col. Chester Hammond, Assistant to the President's Military Aide, Maj. Gen. Edwin M. Watson, indicates that this draft message and the covering letter from Churchill were received in the White House Map Room on May 28, 1943. The memorandum transmits the suggestion by Rear Adm. Wilson Brown, the President's Naval Aide, that the President might discuss with General Marshall the advisability of sending the message to Stalin by officer courier in order to avoid the dangerous risk of sending it to Moscow by any of the existing codes (Hopkins Papers).

With the exception of the changes indicated in the following footnote and certain minor typographical alterations, this text is identical with the message ultimately sent to Stalin on June 2, 1943; see the telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin, June 2, *post*, p. 387.

<sup>4</sup> In the text of this communication as ultimately transmitted to Stalin, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) were combined to read as follows:

"(a) To give first priority to the control of the submarine menace, the security of our overseas lines of communication, and to employ every practicable means to support Russia."

Sub-paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (f) were accordingly relettered (b), (c), (d), and (e), respectively, in the communication transmitted to Stalin.

equipment and special attack groups of naval vessels give great encouragement, better than one enemy submarine a day having been destroyed since May 1. If such a rate of destruction can be maintained it will greatly conserve, therefore increase, available shipping and will exert a powerful influence on the morale of the German submarine armada.

With reference to the support of Russia, agreement was reached as follows:

(a) To intensify the present air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe. This for the purpose of smashing German industry, destroying German fighter aircraft and breaking the morale of the German people. The rapid development of this air offensive is indicated by the events of the past three weeks in France, Germany and Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, and by the growth of the United States' heavy bomber force in England from some 350 planes in March to approximately 700 today with a schedule calling for 900 June 30, 1,150 September 30 and 2,500 April 1. The British bomber force will be constantly increasing.

(b) In the Mediterranean the decision was taken to eliminate Italy from the war as quickly as possible. General Eisenhower has been directed to prepare to launch offensives immediately following the successful completion of HUSKY the assault on Sicily, for the purpose of precipitating the collapse of Italy and thus facilitating our air offensive against Eastern and Southern Germany as well as continuing the attrition of German fighter aircraft and developing a heavy threat against German control in the Balkans. General Eisenhower may use for the Mediterranean operations all those forces now available in that area except for three British and four American Divisions which are to participate in the concentration in England, next to be referred to.

(c) It was decided that the resumption of the concentration of ground forces in England could now be undertaken with Africa securely in our hands and that while plans are being continuously kept up to date by a joint U.S.-British Staff in England to take instant advantage of a sudden weakness in France or Norway, the concentration of forces and landing equipment in the British Isles should proceed at a rate to permit a full-scale invasion of the Continent to be launched at the peak of the great air offensive in the Spring of 1944. Incidentally, the unavoidable absorption of large landing-craft in the Mediterranean, the South-West Pacific and the Aleutian Islands has been our most serious limiting factor regarding operations out of England.

3. We have found that the undertakings listed utilize our full resources. We believe that these operations will heavily engage the enemy in the air and will force a dispersion of his troops on the ground to meet both actual attacks and heavy threats of attack which can

readily be converted into successful operations whenever signs of Axis weakness become apparent.

G. C. M[ARSJALL]  
26. 5. 43

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

CHUNGKING, May 29, 1943.

I am in receipt of your telegram of May 25<sup>2</sup> and wish to express my deep appreciation of the measures you have taken to strengthen the United States Air Force in China, and to increase the capacity of air transport to China.

In regard to ANAKIM I feel assured that you already possess a comprehensive and well-prepared plan of strategy, and that you are resolutely determined on pressing it forward to victory. I feel particularly grateful for the patience and courage with which you have resolved the many difficulties arising on all sides so that ANAKIM can go through. I venture to make a few supplementary observations which I have asked Dr. T. V. Soong to submit to you for your consideration.<sup>3</sup>

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

<sup>1</sup> This message appears to have been handed to Hopkins by Foreign Minister Soong.

<sup>2</sup> No telegram direct from Roosevelt to Chiang has been found. Chiang's reference is presumably to the message that Roosevelt gave Soong on the afternoon of May 25, 1943; see the editorial note, *ante*, p. 208.

<sup>3</sup> *Infra*.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Generalissimo Chiang to the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) in Washington*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

CHUNGKING, May 29, 1943.

Please submit orally to the President the following points for his consideration:

(1) Has Great Britain committed herself to engage her navy in giving effective support for joint action in the Andaman Sea and is she determined to retake Rangoon?

(2) Is the United States providing the same naval strength for ANAKIM as that indicated by General Arnold in Chungking, and is

<sup>1</sup> This message appears to have been delivered by Soong to Hopkins at the same time that he delivered Chiang's telegram of May 29 to Roosevelt, *supra*. There is no record of Soong's oral presentation of the substance of this telegram to Roosevelt. Between May 28 and June 1, Roosevelt was at Hyde Park.

Great Britain sending an equal or greater number of naval units? Now that the North African campaign has come to a successful conclusion, is it possible to increase the strength of the naval participation for ANAKIM in order to accelerate the capture of Rangoon?

(3) Is the U. S. Army participating in the campaign, and if so, how many divisions will be engaged?

(4) While I do not doubt that Great Britain will be able to fulfill her commitments in regard to the plan decided upon by the President with Mr. Churchill, it seems to me that it is necessary for the President to exercise his influence continually in order to prevent delay in the execution of the plan.

(5) To carry out ANAKIM it is absolutely essential to synchronize the movements of the army attacking in the north with amphibious operations against Southern Burma so that both could take place at the same time. Otherwise, if the two operations were not coordinated in their movements or either of them should take independent action, they would be exposed to being defeated in detail by the enemy. It is earnestly hoped that the President would pay special attention to this point in regard to what the British propose to do.

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Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

For General Marshall from the President. Urgent and secret. Despatch for Stalin approved with following amendment: strike out under *b* following words, "n priority";<sup>2</sup> and include *a* and *b* as one priority. In order to protect security suggest you wire Stalin telling him you are sending courier by air to deliver message to him in Moscow or his agent at some convenient <sup>3</sup> place.<sup>4</sup> You may state that your message has my approval as well as Churchill's.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Presumably transmitted via military channels to Marshall, then at Algiers.

<sup>2</sup> In Roosevelt's handwritten draft of this telegram, the quoted phrase appears as "next in priority".

<sup>3</sup> In Roosevelt's handwritten draft of this telegram, the word "appropriate" is used rather than "convenient".

<sup>4</sup> The procedure recommended in this telegram for informing Stalin of the results of the conference in Washington was superseded by the procedure set forth in Roosevelt's telegram of June 2, 1943, to Stalin, *infra*. Roosevelt explained the change in the following telegram of June 2, 1943, to Marshall:

"Please inform Prime Minister Churchill that the message containing decisions of Combined Chiefs of Staff has been sent to Stalin together with suggested covering note of transmittal in code through the American Ambassador in Moscow but with reluctance because of the ever present danger of the code's being broken." (Roosevelt Papers)

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 2, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and most secret from the President to Premier Stalin.

I am sending you through Ambassador Standley the recently approved decisions of our Combined Chiefs of Staff. These decisions have the joint approval of both Mr. Churchill and myself. In view of their extremely secret nature I am asking Ambassador Standley to deliver them to you personally.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted via the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt's communication to Stalin, which was sent by telegram to the United States Naval Attaché in Moscow, is not printed here. The text was identical with the draft prepared by Marshall and printed *ante*, p. 383, with the exception of the change indicated in footnote 4 to that draft and certain minor typographical alterations. For a description of the manner in which the communication from Roosevelt to Stalin was received by Ambassador Standley in Moscow on June 4 and was delivered to Stalin in his Kremlin air raid shelter during an air raid alert, see William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, *Admiral Ambassador to Russia* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955), p. 429. For text of Stalin's reply to Roosevelt's message, sent on June 11, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. II, p. 70.





Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PLATE I

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill  
at Washington, May 14, 1943.



Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PLATE 2

Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt at Shangri La during the weekend of May 14-17, 1943.



International News photograph

PLATE 3

Meeting of the Pacific War Council at the White House, Washington, May 20, 1943. *Left to right:* Chargé Cox (New Zealand), Foreign Minister Soong (China), Ambassador Halifax (United Kingdom), Minister for External Affairs Evatt (Australia), Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Minister McCarthy (Canada), Ambassador Loudon (Netherlands), President Quezon (Philippines).



Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PLATE 4


Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt on the White House grounds, Washington, May 24, 1943.



Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PLATE 5

Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the White House grounds, Washington, May 24, 1943.  
*Standing, left to right:* Field Marshal Dill, Lieutenant General Ismay, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Brooke, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, Admiral King, Lieutenant General McNarney.



Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PLATE 6

Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, President Roosevelt, and the Earl of Athlone (Governor General of Canada) on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 7


President Roosevelt, Prime Ministers Mackenzie King and Churchill, the Earl and Countess of Athlone, and a group of British advisers on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943. *Seated, left to right:* Foreign Secretary Eden, President Roosevelt, Princess Alice, Countess of Athlone, Prime Minister Churchill. *Standing, left to right:* The Earl of Athlone, Governor General of Canada, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Minister of Information Bracken.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 8


Prime Minister Mackenzie King, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the terrace at the Citadel, Quebec, August 18, 1943. *Standing, left to right:* General Arnold, Air Chief Marshal Portal, General Brooke, Admiral King, Field Marshal Dill, General Marshall, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, Admiral Leahy.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 9

Secretary of State Hull and Prime Minister Mackenzie King on the station platform following Mr. Hull's arrival at Quebec, August 20, 1943. Standing behind Mr. Hull is Adviser on Political Relations James Clement Dunn.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 10

Prime Minister Churchill, Minister of Information Bracken, and Mr. Harry Hopkins (Special Assistant to President Roosevelt) at the Citadel, Quebec, August 22, 1943.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 11

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with their aides at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. *Seated, left to right:* General Marshall, General Arnold, Brigadier General Deane, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy. *Standing, left to right:* Vice Admiral Willson, Lieutenant General Somervell, Rear Admiral Cooke, Rear Admiral Badger, Lieutenant General Handy, Brigadier General Wedemeyer, Commander Freseman, Major General Fairchild, Brigadier General Kuter.



U.S. Army photograph

PLATE 12

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at the Château Frontenac, Quebec, August 23, 1943. *Left to right:* Vice Admiral Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Pound, General Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Portal, Field Marshal Dill, Lieutenant General Ismay, Brigadier Redman (partly hidden), Commander Coleridge, Brigadier General Deane, General Arnold, General Marshall, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Captain Royal.

## II. THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE

(August 14-24, 1943)

AND RELATED CONVERSATIONS  
AT HYDE PARK AND WASHINGTON

(August 12-14 and September 1-12, 1943)



## 4. AGENDA AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

### *Editorial Note*

Printed in this section are documents which deal with physical and personnel arrangements for the First Quebec Conference and documents relating to the agenda for the Conference. Papers which deal substantively with questions to be discussed are printed *post*, under the heading "Substantive Preparatory Papers", even though they may contain suggestions that the subjects under discussion be placed on the agenda. See particularly the Roosevelt-Churchill pre-conference correspondence on Italian problems, *post*, pp. 516 ff., and on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, *post*, pp. 661 ff. For pre-Quebec correspondence relating to a possible tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 8-20.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to the Former Naval Person<sup>2</sup> Number 297.

Your #328.<sup>3</sup> I did not suggest to UJ that we meet alone but he told Davies that he assumed (a) that we would meet alone and (b) that he agreed that we should not bring staffs to what would be a preliminary meeting.<sup>4</sup>

What would you think of coming over soon afterwards and that you and I with staffs should meet in the Citadel in Quebec? I am sure the Canadian Government would turn it over to us and it is a thoroughly comfortable spot, with thoroughly adequate accommodations there and at the Hotel Frontenac. It is far better than Washington at that time of year.

While UJ gave no definite dates he suggested the end of July or

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>4</sup> For the passages of this message omitted here, see *ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

early August. This is wholly tentative and I do not expect to hear anything further until about the fifteenth of July.

If he confirms this, I would be back about August fifteenth. I would have to be in Washington for a week but could easily get to some place in eastern Canada by the twenty-fifth of August.

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 29 June, 1943.

To President from Former Naval Person personal and secret. Number 336.<sup>2</sup>

I should be very glad to arrange for a meeting between us and our staffs about the end of August in Quebec which I am sure Mackenzie King would welcome. Later on I will put the point to him.

Many thanks for your very full message.

<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> For the paragraph omitted here, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 13.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret for Former Naval Person from the President. Number 314.

I have no further word from U.J. Even if he is unable to get away, I think the time would be ripe for a Staff Conference of all of us in General Wolfe's stronghold around the first of September.

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 16/7/43.

Number 366. Former Naval Person to President personal and secret. I like very much the plan of our meeting in Canada and think the

<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

Heights of Abraham most attractive. We think it most important to have the meeting earlier than September 1. The Combined Staffs at Washington agreed to meet again at the end of July or the beginning of August. We could come with our outfit by the same method as last time arriving at the very spot between the 12th and 15th of August. If this is agreeable to you, I will open the matter to Mackenzie King in the greatest secrecy.

Events in HUSKY are moving so fast and the degeneration of Italian resistance is so marked that decisions about the Toe, Ball and Heel, which were regarded as a part of HUSKY, will almost certainly have to be taken before we meet. We shall, however, need to meet together to settle the larger issues which the brilliant victories of our Forces are thrusting upon us about Italy as a whole. Mid-August will only just be in time for this work. This, also, will be the time to check up intimately upon de Gaulle, UJ and other equally agreeable topics. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to give me this date.

PRIME

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 Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 318 from the President to the Former Naval Person secret and personal.

I have still heard nothing from U.J. I wired him yesterday and should have an answer quickly. When I hear I will let you know at once about ABRAHAM and I like your suggested time.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

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 Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 19 July 1943.

371. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. Most immediate.

Should be most grateful to know at earliest moment whether your UJ plan is on. Meanwhile I am setting everything in train that can be done most secretly for our rendezvous on 15th. The development of post "HUSKY" seems to render this all the more urgent. Moreover I am most anxious to learn from you how we are to finish up Japan and

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

what is the best plan. You will readily understand that enormous preparations, moral, political and material, have to be made in this country in order that our power may be fully transferred to the Far East when the time comes. We cannot too early begin these studies. We will finish [*furnish*] your staffs with a synopsis of points for discussion before we set out.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 20 July 1943.

372. Former Naval Person to President personal private and most secret.

I have just heard from Mackenzie King that nothing could afford him more pleasure personally or be more welcome to the Canadian Government and people than a meeting any time during August between us and our staffs at the place mentioned and that we can count on everything in the way of accommodation and hospitality being provided.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. The text here printed is that received in the White House Map Room; a paraphrased text was forwarded to Roosevelt, who was at Hyde Park from the morning of July 17 until 10:30 p. m., July 20, as telegram No. WHITE 14.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 21 July, 1943.

374. Former Naval Person to President Personal.

Planning arrive ABRAHAM 11 [August]. For code name see my immediately following.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 21 July, 1943.

375. Former Naval Person to President Personal. QUADRANT.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 320 personal and secret from the President for the Former Naval Person.

Referring to your numbers 371 and 372,<sup>2</sup> in consideration of the fact that so far I have had no word from UJ though I have wired him, I am in agreement with your suggestion that the "QUADRANT" conference be started about August fifteenth in the location of Montcalm.

Please inform me as early as possible of exact date of meeting that will suit your arrangements for transportation. If UJ moves I think August seventeenth would suit me better.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 393, 394.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 22 July 1943.

376. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

1. Your number 320<sup>2</sup> we can make any date you like from 10th inclusive to 17th or even later, but on military grounds we think the sooner the better.

2. I send you in my immediately following a telegram from the High Commissioner<sup>3</sup> about the Canadian position and my reply, with which I hope you will be in agreement. If not, let me know.

3. As soon as I have your final date, I will tell Mackenzie King, as local preparations should not be begun till we are on the way.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Malcolm MacDonald.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 23/7/43.

Number 377. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is telegram from the High Commissioner Canada and my reply.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

High Commissioner Canada to Prime Minister number 1779. 21st July 1943.

I know that Mackenzie King is assuming that in any meeting on Canadian soil he would be present throughout as host and that he would be also a party in the discussions. He realizes, of course, that the President and the Prime Minister will wish to have a great deal of talk between themselves or with their staffs and every arrangement would be made for this. He also realizes that he could not be a full partner in the discussions without creating awkward (?) <sup>2</sup> problems about the position of other Dominion Prime Ministers. At the same time it would be extremely embarrassing politically to the Government here if the Canadian Prime Minister seemed to be less than a fairly full partner in a meeting in Canada and would cause undesirable comment from general point of view in Quebec and everywhere in Canada. On the other hand, a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister in Quebec with the Canadian Prime Minister attending would, of course, delight everyone here and do much solid good.

Prime Minister to High Commissioner Canada 23 July 1943. Your number 1779.

I do not anticipate any difficulty in arranging for Mackenzie King and his principal military advisers to be adequately associated with the conference. My idea is that Mackenzie King himself, together with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, should attend all *plenary* meetings over which the President and I preside and that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should attend all plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

2. These arrangements will not, of course, prevent my having private and off the record discussions alone with the President whenever he or I may think it necessary; nor will they prevent the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee (which consists of the American and British Chiefs of Staff) from meeting alone and *in camera* whenever the nature of the discussion renders this desirable.

3. The above is, of course, business only and apart from all social and personal meetings between hosts and guests and special Anglo-Canadian discussions to which I am looking forward.

4. Pray sound Mackenzie King on the above proposals and say that if they are agreeable to him I will seek the President's approval.

PRIME

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<sup>2</sup> This indication of a possible garble is in the source text.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1943.

Number 323 for the Former Naval Person personal and secret from the President.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Referring to your Number 377 of 23 July,<sup>2</sup> I cannot look with favor on the attendance of Canadian Staff officers at plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the QUADRANT Conference for the following reasons:

(1) Inclusion of the Canadian Staff in "QUADRANT" will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership on the Combined Staff in Washington.

(2) It will probably result in a similar demand from Mexico, our neighbor on the southern border, as Canada is on the northern border.

(3) We have until now succeeded in preventing the deterioration of our Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington into a debating society by refusing membership to representatives of other Allied Nations.

(4) It appears certain that inclusion of Canada in "QUADRANT" with its unavoidable attendant publicity would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to exclude from the Combined Chiefs of Staff representatives of the other Dominions and the other Allied Nations.

I had a long talk with Leighton McCarthy yesterday and he went to Ottawa last night to explain the whole thing to Mackenzie King, who will, I think, understand. As you know, Mackenzie King is one of my oldest personal friends.

Rather than face the difficulties that would follow admitting the Canadian Staff to "QUADRANT" I would prefer to have the meeting elsewhere—say Bermuda.

The 17th is the earliest day I can make it, so let us decide on that.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 25 July 1943.

378. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

1. Operation QUADRANT. As Colonel Warden (see my immediately following) is going by the same method as last time,<sup>2</sup> he will have to arrive at "ABRAHAM" during the 10th and will await you there. I should be glad to know if your delay till the 17th means that you are going to meet UJ. If this is so and you are not taking your staff with you, it has occurred to me that perhaps these might come to "ABRAHAM" a few days earlier so as to begin the discussions, which are always lengthy, with their opposite number. On military grounds, we are very anxious that the staffs should be in contact as soon as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., on the *Queen Mary*.

2. Your 323.<sup>3</sup> I quite understand your position and am supporting it by a message to Mackenzie King, which I am repeating to you.<sup>4</sup> I expect that McCarthy will be able to convince him, as he is very keen on the project.

3. Colonel Warden is bringing Mrs Warden with him as you have several times kindly suggested, also Lieutenant Mary Warden<sup>5</sup> as aide de camp. All three members of the Warden family are greatly looking forward to the trip.

4. The "HUSKY" news is very good and will be better. I trust we can keep all important options in this theatre open until we meet. I hope you are not too lonely now that Congress has departed. Up to date in July, we have caught 26 canaries,<sup>6</sup> which is good for 25 days. There should be quite a good meal for our cats when the time comes.

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<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> See Churchill's telegram No. 380 to Roosevelt, below.

<sup>5</sup> Churchill's daughter Mary.

<sup>6</sup> i.e., sunk 26 enemy submarines.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 25 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 379.

My immediately preceding telegram. Me. Beware of spurious imitations *vide* mission to Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is presumably to the motion picture, *Mission to Moscow*, in which the role of Churchill was portrayed by Dudley Field Malone, who had served as Third Assistant Secretary of State under President Wilson at a time when Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 25 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 380.

Following is paraphrase of message to Mackenzie King referred to in paragraph 2 of my number 378.<sup>2</sup> *Paraphrase begins* :

My telegram number 1783 for High Commissioner Canada (second telegram contained in Former Naval Person telegram number 377 to

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> See above.

President<sup>3</sup>) was submitted by me to the President. Insuperable difficulties are seen by him in the Canadian Chiefs of Staff attending plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. President points out that this will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from both Brazil and China for membership of the Combined Staffs in Washington, also from Mexico. And from other British Dominions and allied nations as well. McCarthy so President tells me has left for Ottawa to explain the position to you.

I must say I see the difficulties as very little business can of course be done when large numbers are present. It therefore seems to me that the British and Canadian staffs should confer together as may be necessary but that at the combined meetings of the two principal Allies, the British alone should be represented.

As he is coming by the same method as last time and runs on schedule Colonel Warden and the whole party will arrive on the 10th at "ABRAHAM". He hopes no preparations or plans of any kind will be made until he is well away. The British-Canadian staffs discussions can take place while awaiting the arrival of PQ and we can formally confer on various outstanding important imperial questions.

For meaning of PQ see my immediately following.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 395.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 25 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 381.

My immediately preceding telegram[—]yourself.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 25, 1943.

PRIORITY

Number 325 for the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret.

I am perfectly delighted. I wish much that Lady Warden and her daughter and the Colonel could come to Hyde Park on arrival as my wife leaves on a month's inspection trip on the 15th. If they cannot come then I would hope for a visit later in August.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

The Staffs can begin their work at ABRAHAM before the 17th and I will let you have a definite date shortly.

I hope to go on a short trip to fish and sleep next Saturday.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Counselor of the Canadian Legation (Mahoney) to  
President Roosevelt*

IMMEDIATE, MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1943.

AND PERSONAL

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, In the temporary absence of the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, I have been instructed to convey to you the following message from the Prime Minister:

"I have had a talk with Leighton this evening and hasten to let you know that I am not pressing for participation of Canadian staffs in discussions of Combined Staffs. You will realize that when the Combined Staffs are meeting in Canada, and matters affecting Canadian Forces may be a subject of consideration, our people would expect some opportunity of conference or consultation such as was given them at meeting in Washington. I would, however, not wish to have any conditions attached to proposed meeting and know that you and our friend will be only too ready to see that what may be advisable, all circumstances considered, is adequately met.

"As host, you may rely upon me not to permit any situation to arise which would be a source of embarrassment to other United Nations who will not be represented.

"I hope arrangements for your fishing trip are working out satisfactorily, and that we shall have pleasure of seeing you here at Ottawa on the 9th.<sup>1</sup>

"I have nothing to take up with you that could not stand over until then. On other hand, if there are matters you yourself wish to discuss with me before leaving on your trip I will gladly run down to Washington for a day."

I am [etc.]

MERCHANT MAHONEY  
for Chargé d'Affaires ad Interim

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<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt's contemplated trip to Ottawa was postponed until after the Quebec Conference.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*

MOST SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 July 1943.

C.C.S. 288

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

The following Agenda, proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff for QUADRANT, as approved by the Minister of Defense,<sup>1</sup> is submitted herewith for the agreement of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

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<sup>1</sup> Churchill.

1. It was decided at TRIDENT, that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet "In July or early August in order to examine the decisions reached at this conference in the light of the situation existing at the time". (See CCS 242/6<sup>2</sup> para (7) 2)

2. Strategy in Mediterranean. The main object of the above was to enable rapid decisions to be taken in light of results of HUSKY, on question of further operations in Mediterranean to eliminate Italy from the war. It is therefore suggested that first subject for discussion should be post-HUSKY operations followed by policy in event of an Italian collapse.

3. Defeat of Japan. In course of TRIDENT conference Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare an appreciation leading up to a plan "for the defeat of Japan". (See CCS 242/6 (4) 3.) It is suggested that if sufficient progress has been made this should be next subject for discussion together with following cognate matters.

(i) Progress report of operations in Pacific.

(ii) Progress report of preparations for operations from India with special reference to CCS 242/6 para (4) 3*a*.

(iii) Establishment of South East Asia Command organization and appointments.

4. Operations from U.K.

(i) U-Boat Warfare.

(ii) OVERLORD—Outline plan air organization and command.

(iii) BOLERO—SICKLE building up.

5. Miscellaneous.

(i) HABBAKUK.

(ii) Operation ALACRITY.

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 364.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*King George VI to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 26 July 1943.

From the King to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT: I greatly hope that throughout your forthcoming meeting with my Prime Minister at Quebec, you and he will occupy the Governor-General's quarters in the Citadel.

Lord Athlone tells me he will be delighted to arrange for them to be put at your joint disposal. As he himself will be leaving Ottawa on

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

August 8th for a long planned tour of the northwest, he regrets that it will not be possible for him to meet you in Quebec as he would otherwise have wished to do.

GEORGE R. I.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to King George VI*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret and personal number 328 from the President to the Former Naval Person for the King.

I accept with appreciation your invitation to occupy quarters jointly with our friend during our scheduled conference. I well remember a delightful visit there with Lord Tweedsmuir, but I hope I will not have to make another speech in French.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels, for delivery through Churchill.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to Roosevelt's visit to Quebec on July 31, 1936, at which time Tweedsmuir was Governor-General of Canada. See *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. v: 1936, *The People Approve* (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 276-279.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 July 1943.

C.C.S. 288/1

#### PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

The United States Chiefs of Staff have given their careful consideration to the agenda proposed by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 288.<sup>1</sup> They recommend that the agenda include the following:

I. Conference procedure.

II. Consideration of: Over-all Objective, Over-all Strategic Concept, and Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept. (Similar to Sections I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6.<sup>2</sup>)

III. *a.* Consideration of specific operations for 1943-44 in the European-Mediterranean area.

(1) Progress and planning report on BOLERO-OVERLORD.

(2) Progress report on SICKLE-POINTBLANK; use of Italian air bases to extend POINTBLANK.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 400.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 364.

- (3) Anti-submarine warfare.
- (4) Review of approved post-HUSKY operations.
- (5) Employment of French forces.
- (6) Subsequent operations in the Mediterranean.
- (7) Other European operations.
  - (a) Emergency invasion of the Continent in the event of an imminent German collapse.
  - (b) Emergency operations in the event of a German invasion of the Iberian Peninsula.

b. Consideration of specific operations for 1943-44 in the Pacific-Asiatic area.

(1) Appreciation and plan for the defeat of Japan, including preparation for maximum exploitation of air offensive against Japan.

(2) Progress and planning reports on NOTEBOOK, BULLFROG and SAUCY.

(3) Progress and planning reports on Pacific operations.

c. Miscellaneous considerations.

(1) HABBAKUK.

(2) Operation ALACRITY.

(3) Equipping of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals.

(4) Rehabilitation of occupied and liberated territories.

IV. Decisions as to 1943-44 operations.

V. Availability of resources to implement specific undertakings, to include timing.

VI. Final report to the President and the Prime Minister.

VII. Preparation of necessary directives.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 28 July 1943.

385. Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret.

1. Colonel and Mrs Warden with Lieut M Warden would like to spend the night of the 10th at ABRAHAM to arrange things, and could reach you<sup>2</sup> evening of 12th. They are all looking forward very much to this.

2. Anthony<sup>3</sup> will fly over to join me at ABRAHAM in time for our general meeting there. I am bringing Leathers who wants to contact Lew Douglas and also would like Averell<sup>4</sup> to come too if you approve.

<sup>1</sup> Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.

<sup>2</sup> At Hyde Park.

<sup>3</sup> Eden.

<sup>4</sup> Harriman.

3. Looking forward much to hearing you tonight. I was delighted at your rebuke to the foolish broadcast against the King of Italy.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The reference is to a remark made by Roosevelt in the course of his 911th press conference on July 27, 1943. See Rosenman, p. 323.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 29 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. No. 387.

I was so glad to hear your voice again<sup>2</sup> and that you were in such good spirits, and also that you like our plans for "QUADRANT" to which we are all ardently looking forward.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated. An information copy of this message was sent to Hull by the British Minister at Washington (Campbell) on July 30, 1943 (740.0011 EW/7-3043).

<sup>2</sup> The reference is probably to Roosevelt's broadcast of July 28, 1943. See Rosenman, pp. 326-336; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, July 31, 1943, pp. 57-62.

<sup>3</sup> For the full text of this message, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. ii, pp. 336-337.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*

MOST SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 29 July 1943.

C.C.S. 288/2

#### PROPOSED AGENDA FOR QUADRANT

The Agenda proposed for QUADRANT by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 288/1<sup>1</sup> has been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff and their reply has now been received. The following is the gist.

1. It is hoped that it may be possible to confine the Agenda as far as possible to those specific issues on which decisions are required to govern operations in the comparatively near future. It was on that principle that the Agenda suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff, as set out in C.C.S. 288,<sup>2</sup> was designed. The British Chiefs of Staff hope, therefore, that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will be willing to dispense with lengthy discussions on over-all strategic concepts or global strategy.

2. Section 3 of the U.S. proposed Agenda includes most of the points the British would like to discuss. If anything, they feel that it is perhaps a little too comprehensive.

3. In Section 3(a) (vi) it is assumed that "Action in the event of Italian collapse" will be included.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 402.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 400.

4. The British Chiefs of Staff are not anxious to discuss the item "Emergency Operations in the event of a German Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula" because they regard this as an exceedingly remote contingency.

5. Under "Miscellaneous Considerations" it is requested that an item on future allocation of landing craft should be included. At present, landing craft can only be allocated expressly for operations approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs of Staff do not think that this method should continue as it is unduly expensive and hampers future planning and training.

6. The British Chiefs of Staff note that the item "Establishment of South-East Asia Command: Organization and Appointments", suggested by them, has been excluded. The British Chiefs of Staff assume that this is because the U.S. Chiefs of Staff hope that all these questions will have been settled before the QUADRANT Conference. The position is, however, that the Prime Minister has decided that this must be dealt with at QUADRANT since there is much that can only be satisfactorily dealt with by personal discussion. In the meantime, General Auchinleck has been instructed to press on with all preparations for the agreed operation.

7. The British Chiefs of Staff foresee great difficulties in settling the Agenda by exchange of telegrams and therefore suggest that the first QUADRANT meeting should be limited to the Chiefs of Staff and that it should decide

- a. The composition of the Agenda;
- b. The order in which it should be taken; and
- c. The procedure to be followed at the Conference.

8. The British Chiefs of Staff think that it would be immensely helpful if an officer from AFHQ could be present at QUADRANT. General Bedell Smith was quite invaluable at TRIDENT.

9. They hope that their colleagues, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, will be able to arrive at ABRAHAM on August 10th or as soon as possible afterwards.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret Number 333.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Your Number 385.<sup>2</sup>

I have wired Harriman to come if possible.<sup>3</sup> Lew Douglas will be with us.

Delighted Leathers is coming.

We will be waiting for you and personal staff at H.P.<sup>4</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 403.

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt's telegram to Harriman, July 30, 1943, and Harriman's reply of August 2, 1943, stating that he was arranging to travel with the "Colonel", are not printed (Harriman Papers).

<sup>4</sup> Hyde Park.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 31 July 1943.

No. 392. Former Naval Person to President.

The July canaries<sup>2</sup> to date number 35 making a total of 85 in the 91 days since May 1. Good hunting. Instead of making any announcement as agreed on August 10 let us settle together on the 12th what food our cats are to have.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated. Presumably sent to Washington and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who had left Washington at 10:30 p. m. on July 30, 1943, and was then at Hyde Park en route to Canada. See *infra*, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., enemy submarines sunk.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 1st August 1943.

396. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

I have been considering the terms of the communiqué which I suggest should be issued immediately upon the arrival of the QUADRANT party in Canada, and I should be glad to have your comments on the following text. I am also consulting Mackenzie King. There are two

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who had left Washington at 10:30 p. m., July 30, 1943, and had arrived on August 1 at Birch Island, near Espanola, Ontario, Canada, where he stayed for a week on a fishing vacation. See Leahy, p. 174. Roosevelt crossed the border back into the United States at 1:30 p.m., August 8 and returned to Washington at 7:40 a.m., August 9.

points I should mention in connection with it: (a) On security grounds I have purposely not mentioned that our joint conference will be at ABRAHAM, so as to avoid indicating your future movements. (b) Anthony<sup>2</sup> is coming over later by air, and his presence will be announced on his arrival.

2. Text of draft communiqué. *Begins:*

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has arrived in Canada accompanied by Lord Leathers the Minister of War Transport of the United Kingdom and the British Chiefs of Staff.

Mr Churchill was received on arrival by Mr Mackenzie King and during his stay in Canada will be the guest of the Canadian Government. Mr Churchill will have discussions with Mr Mackenzie King and thereafter will attend a conference with President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United States and United Kingdom.

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<sup>2</sup> Eden.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
ROUTINE

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] August 1, 1943.

From President for Former Naval Person personal and secret.  
Number 336.

Your 392.<sup>2</sup> I agree.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 406.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
PRIORITY

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] August 2, 1943.

Number 340 from the President to the Former Naval Person.  
Personal and secret.

I fully approve of the text of your proposed announcement upon arrival of "QUADRANT" party as given in your 396.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 406.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 4 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Nr. 404.

Reference your telegram nr. 340.<sup>2</sup> On suggestion of Mr. Mackenzie King words "later on" will be substituted for "thereafter" in last sentence of proposed announcement and latter will not be issued until after arrival at ABRAHAM.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, as telegram No. WHITE 42.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

740.0011 European War 1939/30633

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM

Mr. Atherton, our Minister to Canada, informed me on the telephone (in carefully veiled and guarded language) this afternoon of the proposed Canadian procedure in connection with press announcements regarding Mr. Churchill's arrival. When Mr. Churchill lands at the Canadian port Monday evening,<sup>1</sup> the Canadian Government proposes to inform the press in strict secrecy that he has arrived and that his announcement will be made in Quebec Tuesday evening on the subject. This announcement will deal with Mr. Churchill's conversations with Mr. Mackenzie King but will also refer to later conversations (presumably with the President and the Staff talks). The Canadians will give the text of this proposed announcement to Mr. Atherton who will telegraph it to us. The Canadians would like White House clearance on the procedure and the text of the announcement. After consultation with Mr. Gray I discussed this with Colonel Hammond, of the Map Room, the White House. I told Colonel Hammond that the State Department watch officer would send a copy of Mr. Atherton's telegram giving the text of the announcement personally to Colonel Hammond immediately on its arrival. Colonel Hammond said that he would telegraph the announcement immediately to the President and ask for an urgent reply. He said that it might be possible to get back

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<sup>1</sup> August 9.

a reply by 6 p. m. tomorrow but that he of course could not be sure when the President would reply. Immediately upon receipt of a reply from the President he will let me know through the watch officer of the State Department in order that Mr. Atherton may be informed.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30633: Telegram

*The Minister in Canada (Atherton) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

OTTAWA, August 7, 1943.

U.S. URGENT

38. Secret for Hickerson.

Briefly confirming our telephone conversation.<sup>2</sup>

External Affairs advises that it is proposed to inform the press confidentially and under strict censorship next Monday evening<sup>3</sup> that an announcement will be made in Quebec on Tuesday evening regarding a meeting which will be held there between Prime Ministers Churchill and King.

The text of the announcement is as follows:

[Except for minor details, the text transmitted follows the text in Churchill's telegram No. 396 to Roosevelt, as amended by telegram No. 404. See *ante*, pp. 406, 408.]

External Affairs asks official U.S. approval (presumably White House) of the text of this announcement and whether we have any comment to make on the general schedule set forth herein.

ATHERTON

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Secretary of State.

<sup>2</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> August 9.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30634

*The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HICKERSON

The following message from the President was received in the White House Map Room during the night:

"Proposed Canadian release is approved as to text and procedure."

The duty officer in the office of the Secretary of State was notified August 8th at 2330.<sup>1</sup>

CHESTER HAMMOND  
*Lt. Colonel, General Staff*  
*Asst. to the Military Aide*

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<sup>1</sup> i.e., 11:30 p. m. This memorandum bears the following manuscript endorsement by Hickerson: "Telephoned to Mr. Atherton, Am. Legation, Ottawa 9:45 a. m. Aug. 9 J[ohn] D H[ickerson]".

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740.0011 European War 1939/30633

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 10, 1943, 12:45 p. m.

The following was dictated over the telephone by Mr. Atherton, American Minister to Canada:

To the President from Mr. Mackenzie King.

"Prime Minister Churchill has arrived in Canada. I am meeting Mr. Churchill and his party en route to Quebec. We will go direct to The Citadel where Mr. Churchill will be the guest of the Government of Canada during the course of his stay. Mr. Churchill's arrival in Canada will be announced at 4 o'clock in terms of the communiqué agreed upon. Communiqué will be issued under Quebec dateline."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum bears the following manuscript endorsement by Hickerson: "(Telephoned to Gen. Watson at the White House 12:50 p. m. Aug. 10. J[ohn] D H[ickerson])". Watson, in a memorandum of the same date, passed the message on to Roosevelt, who had returned to Washington from Birch Island on August 9. (Roosevelt Papers)

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>2</sup> 11 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Most secret and personal. Number 407.

I have just arrived after a most swift and agreeable journey on which it has been possible to work continuously. The Warden Family are looking forward keenly to their visit to Hyde Park where we pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London.

pose to arrive the afternoon of the 12th.<sup>3</sup> Are we right in thinking we should all bring our thinnest clothes?

I send you herewith (see my next telegram<sup>4</sup>) the draft of the monthly announcement about U-boats which I have prepared in concert with the Admiralty. Let us discuss it when we meet and a day or two's delay beyond the 10th in its release is not important.

Warmest greetings to all.

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<sup>3</sup> Churchill later notified Roosevelt in telegram No. 412 of August 12, 1943 (not printed), that Mrs. Churchill, on medical advice, would have to remain at Quebec to rest instead of accompanying Churchill and their daughter Mary to Hyde Park. This message was sent to Washington and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who had left for Hyde Park at 10:30 p. m., August 11, as telegram No. WHITE 2 (number later changed to WHITE 69), August 12, 1943 (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed. Some stylistic changes were later made in the draft contained in Churchill's telegram No. 408 to Roosevelt, but no changes of substance. For the joint statement on anti-submarine warfare issued by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1943, see *post*, p. 833.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 11 August 1943.

344. Your number 407.<sup>2</sup>

Regret delay in replying. Suggest thin clothes but be prepared for a variety of weather. Delighted to see you in any costume.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington for transmission to Churchill at Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>2</sup> 11 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 409.<sup>3</sup>

It is quite cool here and very pleasant and everything is ready for you in Citadel which is admirably suited to our needs. It was indeed a happy inspiration which led you to suggest this particular rendezvous at this particular moment in Canadian politics.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London.

<sup>3</sup> For the passages not printed here, see *post*, p. 578.

Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>[HYDE PARK,] 13 August [1943].  
(Blenheim Day)!

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, Thinking things over w[oul]d it not be better to go straight from here to the Citadel & let us (Clemmie<sup>2</sup> & I) come back here & to the White House *after* the Conference? The eyes of the world are upon the Conference & I doubt if much progress will be made till we are on the spot—w[hic]h I think sh[oul]d be by Sunday or Monday. I do not know of course how important or urgent is y[ou]r business in Washington,<sup>3</sup> but I am quite sure that the sooner we are up in the North the better. Will you think this over.

Yours always,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

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<sup>1</sup> This letter, on 10 Downing Street stationery, was handwritten by Churchill and given or delivered to Roosevelt, although both Roosevelt and Churchill were staying in Roosevelt's home at Hyde Park from August 12 to August 14, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Churchill.

<sup>3</sup> No written reply has been found to explain why Roosevelt preferred to return to Washington before proceeding to Quebec. Churchill left Hyde Park on the evening of August 14, and went to Quebec by train. See *post*, p. 833, fn. 3. Roosevelt remained at Hyde Park until the evening of August 15; traveled by train to Washington, where he arrived at 7:45 a. m., August 16; spent the day at the White House; and then left Washington by train at 8:20 p. m., August 16, to go to Quebec, where he arrived at 6 p. m., August 17. See *post*, p. 837.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
C.C.S. 288/3

[QUEBEC,] 14 August 1943.

QUADRANT CONFERENCE  
AGENDA

The following subjects will be considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the sequence in which they are listed. A detailed agenda will be issued daily.<sup>2</sup>

## A. EUROPEAN THEATER

1. Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (C.C.S. 303)<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Prepared by the Secretaries at the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 106th meeting, August 14, 1943 (see *post*, p. 850).

<sup>2</sup> The daily agenda are not printed.

<sup>3</sup> For the individual papers referred to in the agenda, see the notes to the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which the relevant agenda items were discussed, *post*.

2. "OVERLORD"
  - a. Outline Plan and Covering Note by British Chiefs of Staff.
  - b. Air and Naval Command.
3. "POINTBLANK"
 

(Paper by the Chief of the Air Staff)
4. Mediterranean Operations
5. "RANKIN"
 

(Progress Report)

#### B. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

6. Appreciation and Plan (Long Term)
7. Operations Against Japan 1943-44 (Short Term)
 

(In the Pacific.) (Paper by U.S. Chiefs of Staff, C.C.S. 301)
8. Operations Against Japan 1943-44 (Short Term)
 

(From India)
9. Southeast Asia Command
 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)
10. Deception Plan for the War Against Japan

#### C. THE U-BOAT WAR

11. General
12. "ALACRITY"

#### D. MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

13. "HABBAKUK"
 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff)
14. Landing Craft
  - a. Allocation.
  - b. Manning.
15. Use of "PLOUGH" Force
 

(Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff.)
16. Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces, Friendly Neutrals
17. Civil Affairs Matters

#### E. FINAL STAGES

18. Relation of Resources to Plans
19. Final Report to Prime Minister and President
20. Preparation and Approval of any Directives Arising from QUADRANT Decisions, and of any Reports to Other Allies

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>2</sup> 16 August 1943.

Most immediate. Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. No. 413.

First of all, the Governor General will meet you at a wayside station outside Quebec. Mackenzie King and I will also be there. The Governor General will drive you to the Citadel where a Guard of Honour will be paraded, and he would like to have a small reception immediately on your arrival where about forty principal persons could be presented to you. This can be cut out if you feel it would be tiring. In the evening, the Governor General will give a dinner in the Citadel to your personal party and mine to which Mackenzie King, the High Commissioner and one or two others will be asked—in all about twenty. I hope this will be agreeable to you. Anthony<sup>3</sup> and Brendan<sup>4</sup> will be there if they arrive in time.

<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London. Roosevelt received the message in Washington.

<sup>3</sup> Eden.

<sup>4</sup> Bracken.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 16 August 1943.

Personal and secret for the Former Naval Person. Number 345. Reference your 413.<sup>2</sup> Delighted with arrangements. Things are progressing everywhere.

ROOSEVELT

<sup>1</sup> Sent via Army channels as telegram No. WHITE 89 to the temporary White House Map Room established at Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

## 5. SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATORY PAPERS

### *Editorial Note*

Documents printed in this section are in general limited to (a) papers clearly prepared for use in the forthcoming discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill or their subordinates and (b) other preparatory papers specifically mentioned in the minutes of those discussions. Since the arrival at Quebec of the principal members of the United States Delegation took place over the course of a full week (the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 13, 1943, the President on August 17, and the Secretary of State on August 20) preparatory documents were being drafted in Washington some days after the first phases of the Quebec Conference had begun.

Further background information on most of the subjects treated in this section may be found in the other *Foreign Relations* volumes for 1943. Since those volumes, however, do not contain papers on Anglo-American cooperation in the field of atomic energy, documentation on this subject is included here for the period from the close of the TRIDENT Conference to the opening of the Quebec Conference.

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### A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

*Directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 284/3/D

#### DIRECTIVE COVERING RESPONSIBILITY AND PROCEDURE FOR PLANNING, COORDINATION AND EXECUTION OF DECEPTION MEASURES AGAINST JAPAN

##### 1. a. *Planning*

(1) Responsibility for the formulation for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of over-all deception plans with respect

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 284/3/D), August 6, 1943: "The enclosure which is a directive pertaining to the above subject [deception measures against Japan] was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 105th Meeting, 6 August 1943."

For the discussion of this paper at the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 884.

to the war against Japan rests with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Planning of deception measures by the various theater commanders including South East Asia must be within the framework of the over-all deception plans referred to in subpara (1) above. Responsibility for such planning rests with theater commanders subject to review and approval by appropriate Chiefs of Staff.

(3) Deception plans for combined United States-British operations will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

(4) All deception plans prepared within a theater will indicate the parts of the plan which are to be undertaken outside the theater of origin.

*b. Coordination*

(1) *Planning*

Coordination in the planning of deception measures is the responsibility of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) *Execution*

(a) Coordination for the execution of approved deception measures outside theaters of origin is the responsibility of Joint Security Control.

(b) Joint Security Control will also provide for continuity of deception during those periods when no deception plans relating to specific operations are in effect.

*c. Implementation*

(1) The coordination of implementation of general over-all deception plans approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff is the responsibility of the U.S. Joint Security Control.

(2) The implementation of approved deception measures within any theater of operations is a responsibility of the theater commander.

(3) U.S. Joint Security Control will provide for the implementation of such features of approved deception measures as require implementation outside the theater of origin of the plan.

(4) The London Controlling Section for the British Chiefs of Staff will by arrangement with U.S. Security Control provide for the implementation of such features of approved deception measures as require execution from London.

(5) Direct communication between theaters for the purpose of implementation of approved plans is authorized. U.S. Joint Security Control in Washington and the London Controlling Section will be furnished information copies of such communications when they contain matters of material interest to them.

(6) Close liaison will be maintained between all theaters engaged in the war against Japan.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 300

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44  
PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA  
(As of 20 July 1943)

## 1. Basic Factors in the Japanese Situation.

*a.* Japan's basic objective is to establish undisputed control of an area in East Asia and the Western Pacific which shall be militarily secure and as nearly self-sufficient economically as possible. The area now occupied by her approximates the territorial requirements of this objective, but is deficient in three respects, as follows: (1) the possession of eastern Siberia by a latently hostile power; (2) the existence in China of unoccupied areas within bombing range of Japan and of important Japanese communications; and (3) the presence of United Nations forces in the Japanese defensive perimeter in the Melanesia area and the Aleutians. Other territories beyond the limits of present occupation may be objects of ultimate Japanese aspiration, but only those specified are essential to the immediate basic objective.

*b. Relationship to the Axis.* Japan's connection with the Axis is a matter of expediency only. Her action will be coordinated with that of Germany only insofar as she estimates that such coordination will contribute to the realization of her basic objective or—in the long run—to her security.

*c. Relations With Russia.* There exists between Russia and Japan a basic conflict of interest. Japan cannot enjoy complete strategic security without gaining control of the eastern region of Siberia. Russia is determined to hold that region, the strategic security of which requires the ultimate expulsion of Japan from the mainland of Asia and from southern Sakhalin. For the present, however, both Russia and Japan desire to avoid war with each other in order to be free to direct their efforts against their respective enemies. Russia is likely to intervene in the war against Japan at some stage, but not before the German threat to her has been removed. After that, she will make her decision in the light of her own interests and will intervene only when she reckons that Japan can be defeated at a small cost to her.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 300), August 6, 1943: "The U.S. Chiefs of Staff submit herewith an estimate of the enemy situation, 1943-44, Pacific-Far East Area for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference."

*d. Time.* Japan will take maximum advantage of such time as is left to her to consolidate and, if possible, to improve her present position, hoping that, in the eventual reckoning, the United Nations, wearied by the war in Europe and perhaps divided among themselves, will attack her ineffectively or compromise to her advantage. We estimate that from mid-1943 to mid-1944 total Japanese industrial production will increase approximately ten per cent. However, the production of many critical categories—notably merchant ships, aircraft, trucks, and armored vehicles—will increase by more than ten per cent. Japan should expect that ultimately greatly superior forces can be directed against her.

## 2. The Existing Overall Situation.

*a. General.* Japan is on the strategic defensive. We estimate the present strength of her armed forces to be as follows: (1) *Naval*, 10 BB, 6 CV, 4 ACV, 14 CA, 16 CL, 81 DD, 84 SS; (2) *Air*, 1400 fighters, 1450 bombers, 850 other types. Of the total, 390 fighters and 120 bombers are ship-based; (3) *Ground*, 64 divisions, 17 independent mixed brigades, 1 infantry brigade, 3 cavalry brigades, 18 tank regiments and many independent units, totaling in round numbers 3,000,000 men (this total includes naval, ground, and air personnel, but not Puppet Troops).

Japan's position, facing United Nations forces from the North Pacific around to India, is one of great natural strength but requiring secure and sufficient ocean transport over long lines of communication. At this time, her position in China is secure because of the present inability of either China or the other United Nations to mount large-scale operations there. Russian commitments in Europe and Japanese strength in Manchuria insure for the time being the security of Japan's northern flank. Japan is able at present to direct her maximum effort toward building up her economic and military strength.

### *b. Limitations on Japanese Striking Power.*

(1) *Shipping.* The margin of Japanese shipping, after allowing for essential trade and the maintenance of Japan's many distant overseas commitments, is small and continues to fall. Additional tonnage might still be found for new operations by diverting it from trade, and, provided such diversions were temporary, this need not have serious effects on Japan's capacity to wage war. Since, however, Japan's rate of building, though on the increase, cannot keep pace with the present rate of sinkings, she would be reluctant to risk adding further to her shipping commitments or incurring losses such as she would have to expect from any further large-scale sea-borne offensive operations. Although attempts are being made to improve the position by building a large number of small and medium-size

wooden ships, the general shipping position is becoming increasingly difficult and may well become precarious in 1944.

The situation in regard to tankers is more critical. Japan is attempting to meet a deficiency in this respect by the use of dry-cargo ships as oil carriers.

(2) *Air Power*. We believe that lack of sufficient air strength will prevent Japan from engaging in more than one major operation at one time.

(3) *Naval Requirements*. Japan's naval strength is adequate for present requirements, but must be carefully husbanded for future decisive action. Her extended lines of communication already entail a large commitment of naval strength for the protection of essential shipping. Their further extension, or indecisive action entailing heavy attrition, might well be unacceptable.

(4) *Military Requirements*. A large proportion of Japanese ground forces is required for occupational duties and for concentration in Manchuria to balance Russian forces in Siberia. Japan, however, has ample ground forces for any probable combat requirements, inasmuch as the insular character of much of the occupied area and the topography of New Guinea, the Indo-Burmese frontier and China limit the scale of ground operations in those areas. Her ability to move her strategic reserve is limited by shortage of shipping.

### 3. The Existing Local Situation on Various Fronts.

*a. North Pacific*. Japan holds an exposed outpost at Kiska, but will not risk major forces in order to prevent its fall. We believe the Japanese are preparing for a determined defense in the Kuriles.

*b. Manchuria*. Japanese forces in Manchuria and Russian forces in eastern Siberia-Outer Mongolia are roughly in balance. Japan has the advantage in strategic position, equipment, and supply, but is deterred from aggression by a healthy respect for Russian armed forces; the vulnerability of Japan to bombing and submarine attack; and the additional strain which such a commitment would impose on her resources in general, including the strain on her shipping.

*c. China (Except Yunnan)*. The front has been largely stabilized for years, with the Japanese in possession of the country's principal productive areas and communications lines. The Japanese are deterred from further expansion primarily by logistical difficulties and secondarily by Chinese resistance. On occasion the Japanese engage in minor offensive operations to season inexperienced troops and accomplish limited objectives such as the temporary denial of facilities to the Chinese. Although nominally in overwhelming numerical strength, the Chinese forces are at present so poorly equipped, supplied, and

trained that they are unable to prevent these forays or to undertake other than local aggressive action. This Chinese military weakness springs in large part from China's generally anemic condition, which has resulted from loss of productive areas, disruption of internal communications, isolation from outside support, and war-weariness. Although a formal separate peace is highly improbable, it is possible that, if China's condition is not effectively relieved, an "undeclared peace" may eventually result.

*d. Yunnan.* Active operations are not indicated. The inconsiderable Japanese forces on the Indo-China and Burma frontiers are separated from Kunming by extremely rugged terrain. Malarial conditions in the area would impose a high rate of attrition on any troops operating there.

*e. Burma.* The wet monsoon precludes major operations from May to October. Present Japanese strength is sufficient for only local offensive action.

*f. Southwest Pacific.* The build-up of ground and air strength in the Timor-Inner Seas area and northeastern New Guinea appears to have been defensive in character. No important ground force movements have occurred since 1 March.

*g. Central Pacific.* Of the heavy naval units withdrawn from Truk to Japan at the time of the capture of Attu, some have returned to Truk. Air strength in Micronesia is being reinforced, but attrition and reinforcement are approximately in balance.

#### *h. Strategic Reserves*

(1) *Naval.* Normally Japan maintains her battleship and carrier strength in home waters and at Truk, shifting the center of gravity according to circumstances. A formidable striking force, which can reach any threatened point of the defensive perimeter in from six to nine days, can be quickly assembled in either of these central areas. However, destroyer shortage is becoming critical.

(2) *Air.* We believe no strategic reserve exists as such, but Japan's ability to fly even fighter planes to practically any part of her position enables her to reinforce quickly any threatened front at the expense of other theaters.

(3) *Ground.* Surplus ground strength in Central China constitutes Japan's initial reserve. If hard pressed, she can also draw surplus strength from Japan and North China and in extremity from Manchuria.

#### *i. Puppet Troops.*

##### (1) *Manchuria, Strength.*

(a) In Manchuria there are reported to be 328,000 Puppet Troops. They are organized both as combat divisions and as garrison troops.

Only in recent years have they received automatic weapons and artillery and, in view of apparent Japanese shortages in both these categories of weapons, it is not thought that the puppet units are completely equipped.

(b) *Disposition.* About 12,000 Manchurian Puppet Troops are reported to be in China. The mass of Manchurian Puppet Troops are stationed along the Siberian border, near the larger cities, and in strategic locations generally but never without sufficient Japanese units in the vicinity to keep them under control.

(c) *Effect on Japanese Strategy.* In the past the Manchurian Puppet Army has been maintained principally for political reasons, to maintain internal order, and to prevent former soldiers from resorting to banditry. However, in the event the Japanese-Soviet situation remains unchanged Japan may replace two or three of her divisions in Manchuria with Puppet Troops.

(2) (a) *China and Mongolia. Strength.* At present there are reported to be 366,000 Nanking Government Puppet Troops in China. They consist mainly of numerous small commands readily controlled by the Japanese. There are indications that these troops are now being reorganized into infantry divisions of three regiments each with a divisional strength of about 6,000. It is reported that light artillery and heavier machine guns will now be issued to Puppet Troops whereas these weapons were denied them in the past. Because of the unreliability and defection of Nanking Puppet Troops in the past, we believe that the Japanese will hesitate to increase them beyond 500,000 during 1943-1944. Rather than increase the Nanking Puppets, it is more likely that Manchurian Puppets will be brought south for garrison duties.

(b) *Disposition of Puppet Troops.* About 209,000 Puppet Troops are located in Central China, 93,000 in North China, 48,000 in South China, and 16,000, mostly cavalry units, in the Chahar-Suiyuan area. Future dispositions will not change radically except that the distribution of new contingents will be influenced by the location of the Japanese troops which they relieve.

(c) *Effect on Japanese Strategy.* Nanking Puppet Troops have been used as garrison troops for maintaining internal order and have been employed in no offensive to date. We believe that the Japanese may by the end of 1944 further reduce their forces by four divisions in North China and by two divisions in Central China, replacing them with Nanking and Manchurian Puppet Troops. At all times a nucleus of Japanese forces must remain in all strategic centers to keep the Puppet Troops in line.

## 4. China.

*a. Strength.* While China is reported to have over 300 divisions including Communist divisions, of about 7,000 men each, problems of equipment, training, leadership, supply, and loyalties to local military leaders make it improbable that one-fifth of that number are better than fairly reliable troops capable of defensive operations on any front. Even fewer are sufficiently well equipped, trained, and led to undertake offensive operations. If sufficient supplies get through and the United Nations program for equipping and training some of the Chinese is successful (the 30 division plan), the situation may improve and more of China's tremendous manpower may be effectively available for United Nations operations. However, it is improbable that the effect of this, at best, could be felt strategically before the summer of 1944.

China's guerrillas, estimated at some 500,000 men, in addition to many of her divisions are rendering excellent service in compelling Japan to keep a large occupational force in China.

*b. Capabilities.* If given adequate United Nations air support China may be able to defend her own strategic areas against anything but an all-out Japanese offensive. If given strong United Nations air support China might be able to execute a very limited objective offensive. It is doubted that she would have the ability to hold such an objective, if attained, against a determined Japanese counter offensive.

*c. Probable Intentions.* The Chinese probably intend to remain on the defensive and concentrate on reequipping and retraining their army for offensive action at a later date.

## 5. Prospective Overall Developments Through 1944.

*a. Naval strength.* Disregarding attrition, we estimate that Japanese naval strength should increase as a result of new construction, as follows:

	<i>BB</i>	<i>CV</i>	<i>ACV</i>	<i>CA</i>	<i>CL</i>	<i>DD</i>	<i>SS</i>
15 June 43	10	6	4	14	16	81	84
1 Nov. 43	12	8	7	16	18	93	102
1 May 44	13	10	10	18	20	105	120

*b. Air strength.* Aircraft production is expected to continue to increase gradually during 1943 and 1944. Present increase is balanced by present attrition.

*c. Ground strength.* It is expected that by the end of 1944 the strength of the Japanese army will have increased to 72 divisions and 14 independent mixed brigades, three cavalry brigades, and 20 or more tank regiments.

*d. War production.* During 1944 Japanese munitions and other war production is expected to show a substantial increase over 1943, provided that ocean shipments can be maintained and that industrial plants escape bombing. The overall rate of industrial production may increase by about 10 per cent. In addition to overall increased production, Japan is continuing to develop uneconomic production of materials in the "Inner Zone"\* (such as oil, coal, iron, aluminum) for strategic reasons. This work should be well advanced by the end of 1944.

*e. Shipping.* Despite Japan's strenuous shipbuilding efforts estimates of the rate of loss and rate of construction of steel ships indicate that the Japanese may suffer a net loss of 1,500,000 G.R.T. of steel operating tonnage from 1 June 1943 to the end of 1944. However, construction of wooden vessels and further substitution of land transport may offset a part of the estimated net loss of steel ships.

*f. Morale.* Japanese morale will remain high until, through an effective attack on vital areas or a major defeat which cannot be concealed, faith in their leaders has suffered severe impairment.

#### 6. Forecast for 1944.

*a. General.* Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from China, Japan would strike first; (3) if Japan had inflicted a severe defeat upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might follow up offensively; (4) if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet.

*b. North Pacific.* We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she would probably try to seize Kamchatka.

*c. Manchuria.* We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with Russia in all circumstances except those indicated in *a*(1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity.

*d. China (including Yunnan).* We believe that Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in *a*(2) above. In that case, her most likely

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\*Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, Formosa, and Karafuto (Japanese Sakhalin). [Footnote in the source text.]

objective would be Kunming and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

*e. Burma.* We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive.

*f. Southwest and Central Pacific.* We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 196/2

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

O.S.S. ORGANIZATION IN INDIA: INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI  
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

1. You will remember that at the end of the TRIDENT Conference attention was drawn to the necessity for co-ordination of U.S. and British Intelligence activities in or from India. The British proposals which had been in effect designed to secure an integration of U.S.-British Intelligence activities in every field in or from India did not meet the case from the U.S. point of view and an alternative proposal was put forward that a Combined Liaison Committee should be established. The American proposal was that this Committee should be established with the following purposes:—

*a.* To facilitate combat intelligence, both air and ground, being exchanged between G.H.Q. and Rear Echelon in New Delhi.

*b.* To enable co-operation to be facilitated between the American Joint Intelligence Collection Agency now being organized in the theater, and the British Joint Intelligence Committee.

*c.* To have referred to it as an additional function, and to go into, problems arising with respect to U.S. and British quasi military and civil organizations (Office of Strategic Services, Board of Economic Warfare, Federal Communications Commission, Office of War Information, etc.) and also to suggest to commanders on the ground solutions to these problems.

*d.* To constitute a central point through which the exchange of information from all these groups can be channelized, co-ordination arranged, and points of divergence ironed out.

2. The idea was that this Combined Liaison Committee, with British and American representation, should meet in New Delhi; that,

<sup>1</sup>For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *post*, p. 1204.

in addition to Intelligence representatives, both air and ground, the U.S. representatives should include a "Rear Echelon" officer conversant with the American quasi military and civilian agencies (Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, etc.).

3. This American proposal has been referred to India where it has been considered carefully by both the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief, India. They agree that the proposal forms a basis for reasonable compromise provided that in the future there will be a greater degree of frankness in respect of quasi military activities than has previously been shown by the U.S. Authorities concerned. They make two reservations which we hope that you will find acceptable.

4. They request that instructions should be issued that before any quasi military activities are undertaken by the U.S. Authorities in or from India, there must be full and frank discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee and that before such plans are put into operation the concurrence of the Government of India and/or the Commander in Chief, India, must be obtained. The U.S. would, of course, be fully informed of British plans and activities and would be entitled to discuss them.

This reservation has been made because in the past the practice has been for the local U.S. Authorities concerned with quasi military activities to present the British with a *fait accompli* whenever possible or, alternatively, to approach several local civil or military authorities for assistance without ever disclosing full intentions or the scope of the proposed activities to any of them.

5. The second reservation is in connection with the combining of resources in regard to combat intelligence. The present co-operation regarding the exchange of combat intelligence is relatively much more satisfactory and some slight progress has been made in the direction of combining resources. A specific request is now made, however, that where two parallel and independent U.S. and British sections already exist, British and U.S. personnel should be exchanged; that where parallel and independent sections do not exist inter-Allied sections should be formed by posting Americans to existing British sections and vice versa, these sections being regarded as working under the Combined Liaison Committee.

6. It is believed that if the instructions to General Stilwell could be extended to cover the points referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above the American proposal will be both acceptable and workable.

7. In conclusion, we would like to assure all concerned that there is every desire on the part of the British to be completely co-operative

in the sphere for which they are responsible. It is realized that arrangements regarding U.S.-British Intelligence activities will have to be co-ordinated with the needs of the new South-East Asian Command when it comes into being.

8. We should be glad to know whether the two reservations made by the Viceroy and the Commander in Chief, India, are acceptable to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. We feel that this Combined Liaison Committee has great possibilities and may well provide a really workable solution to the many difficulties that have been met in the past.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 301

### SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

#### PROBLEM

1. Prepare an outline plan for specific operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44 to be in consonance with the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that Italy is eliminated from the war in 1943; Germany will be defeated in the fall of 1944; Japan and Russia remain at peace.

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-44, PACIFIC-FAR EAST AREA

3. An estimate of the enemy situation is contained in C.C.S. 300.<sup>2</sup> This concludes that:

*a. General.* Japan will probably remain on the strategic defensive except in one or more of the following circumstances: (1) if convinced that Russia had decided to attack her or to grant to the other United Nations the use of Siberian air bases, Japan would strike first; (2) if convinced that there was real danger of serious United Nations operations against her from China, Japan would strike first; (3) if

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 301), August 9, 1943: "The enclosure, an outline plan for specific operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-44, which represents the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff, is presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

For the discussion of this paper at the 110th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 1943, see *post*, p. 876.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 417.

Japan had inflicted a severe defeat upon United Nations forces operating against her in the Pacific, she might follow up offensively; (4) if Russia met with serious reverses on the Western Front, Japan might take the opportunity to attack the Soviet.

*b. North Pacific.* We believe that Japan will continue to strengthen her defenses in the Kuriles as means become available, but is not likely to depart from the defensive except in case of war with Russia, in which case she would probably try to seize Kamchatka.

*c. Manchuria.* We believe that Japan will continue to seek to avoid war with Russia in all circumstances except those indicated in *a*(1) above. She will continue to match Russian strength in Siberia, reducing her forces in Manchuria only in case of extreme necessity.

*d. China (including Yunnan).* We believe that Japan will continue to seek a satisfactory solution in China by political means, but will probably engage in no decisive military operations there except in the circumstances indicated in *a*(2) above. In that case, her most likely objective would be Kunming and probably the determining factor would be relative air strength there.

*e. Burma.* We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive.

*f. Southwest and Central Pacific.* We believe that Japan will remain on the strategic defensive, continuing to build up her local defensive forces and facilities and her naval striking force.

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

4. The Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan (C.C.S. 220) <sup>3</sup> envisages the actual invasion of Japan following an overwhelming air offensive from bases in China. This requires the opening of lines of communication to China which, in turn, involves the early recapture of Burma and the seizure of a port in China. This requires a westward advance by the United States through the Central and South-Southwest Pacific. Operations during this period must have as their objectives those stated in C.C.S. 242/6: <sup>4</sup> "to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced." An analysis of our capabilities prior to 1945 indicates that we can conduct operations in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters which will be in consonance with the above objective.

5. A phase in the North Pacific, now drawing to a close, deals with the ejection of the Japanese from the Aleutians. Consideration is

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 289.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 365.

being given to plans for an operation against Paramushiru in 1944 considering means available and feasibility in connection with our other operations in the Pacific.

6. In the Central and South-Southwest Pacific during 1943-44, we can continue our objective of reaching positions for an all out effort against Japan by attaining a line that runs roughly through the Palaus and the Vogelkop in western New Guinea. At the same time we will constantly be restricting Japanese communications. It may be found desirable or necessary to seize Guam and the Japanese Marianas, possibly the Bonins, in conjunction with the seizure of the western Carolines, and in particular with the attack on the Palaus. The Mariana-Bonin attack would have profound effects on the Japanese because of its serious threat to the homeland.

7. In the Asiatic Theater, during this period, the British will begin the ejection of the Japanese from Burma. This will constitute a further pressure against the Japanese and will increase the attrition of their military power. The early increase in assistance to China is of the utmost importance in keeping her in the war. In addition to assisting China materially, our air efforts in China will be furthered. The British forces are scheduled to complete the conquest of Burma with operations beginning in late 1944.

8. The various operations required in the several theaters, during 1943-44, together with a brief statement of the concept of each operation, are listed below. These operations further the objectives stated in C.C.S. 242/6 and, as will be shown later, are within our capabilities during the period under consideration. Outline plans for these operations are available.

*a. Gilberts*

This is a plan for the seizure and consolidation of the Gilberts preparatory to a further advance into the Marshalls. Nauru, Tarawa, and Makin are to be captured by simultaneous assault followed by the rapid development of airfields in the forward (Tarawa-Makin) area and staging fields along the Gilbert line.

*b. Marshalls*

This is a plan for the seizure of the Marshall Islands (including Wake and Kusaie) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central Pacific. Initial operations envisage either the seizure of the center nucleus by simultaneous assault or a step-by-step advance up from the Gilberts through Jaluit and Mili.

*c. Ponape*

This is a plan for the capture of Ponape preparatory to operations against the Truk area. The main effort is to be against the northern

(Ponape Town) area. Subsequent operations provide for the elimination of enemy forces by successive seizure of their positions.

*d. Carolines (Truk area)*

This is a plan for the seizure of the eastern Carolines as far west at [as] Woleai and the establishment of a fleet base at Truk. Atolls to the southeastward of Truk are to be captured first, followed by the rapid development of airfields in the area. These will provide bases for a sustained fighter-supported bombing offensive against Truk. Subsequent operations provide for capture of Truk and the reduction as necessary of the remaining enemy positions as far west as Woleai.

*e. Palau Islands*

This is a plan for the capture of the Palaus including Yap. The plan calls for the initial capture of Yap and other suitable islands in the neighboring atolls from which to conduct a more intensified air attack against the Palaus. The initial phases of the final assault against the Palaus center largely on the Malakal-Koror Harbor area, with the objective of seizing airfields. Subsequent operations provide for the capture or neutralization of all the islands.

*f. Operations against Guam and the Japanese Marianas (In preparation)*

This is a plan for the seizure of Guam and the Japanese Marianas.

*g. Operations in the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Admiralty Islands subsequent to CARTWHEEL*

This is a plan for the seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured. Airfields are to be developed throughout the area and advanced naval anchorages are to be established at Kavieng and Manus Island. The plan envisages: (1) an advance to Wewak, (2) the seizure of New Ireland and the outlying islands of New Hanover and St. Matthias, and (3) the seizure of the Admiralty Islands in the order listed. Concurrently with these operations, Rabaul is to be neutralized by an air offensive of increasing intensity.

*h. Operations in New Guinea subsequent to the Wewak-Kavieng Operation*

This is a plan for an advance along the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop. It provides for step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances. Each successive offensive is predicated on the consolidation of earlier seizures, including the activation of airfields from which to provide close land-based aircraft support for subsequent operations.

*i. Operations in Burma at end of 1943 monsoon (to be presented by British)*

These are plans for advances, with limited objectives, in both north and southwest (Arakan coast) Burma in November 1943. The northern advance will be made by Chinese troops from Yunnan and Ledo and by British forces from Imphal. The objective of this operation is to clear the Japanese from northern Burma and allow the completion of the Ledo Road to a junction with the Burma Road. The operation in the southwest is to be an overland advance and an amphibious assault against Akyab. The capture of Akyab will be followed by operations for the seizure of Ramree Island. The objective of these operations is to place our forces in a position to interdict Rangoon, and Japanese lines of communication into Burma.

*j. Operations in Burma at end of 1944 monsoon (to be presented by British)*

These are plans for an overseas operation to drive the Japanese from Burma, with the objective of opening additional routes to China and increasing the flow of supplies at the earliest practicable date.

*k. Operations in China*

These operations are of a continuing nature, being increased as our resources permit. They envisage the maximum possible flow of supplies to China and the maintaining of increased American Air Forces in China.

*l. Operations against Paramushiru*

A plan for operations against Paramushiru is under consideration.

9. Increased bombing of the Kuriles from the Aleutians and possibly an amphibious movement against Paramushiru would have a measurable effect on other operations against the Japanese. The Kuriles are a part of the Japanese Archipelago and a threat against them also threatens the Empire and will tend to pin down forces at home.

10. The two areas where operations come nearest to being mutually supporting are the Central Pacific and South-Southwest Pacific. An advance in either of these two Theaters will either increase the threat to the other or increase the difficulties of its logistic support. Our seizure of the Bismarcks would place Truk under threat. Our seizure of Truk would tend to flank western New Guinea, thereby increasing the difficulties of its supply. The fleet can operate to support operations in both Theaters simultaneously. Diversions can frequently be made from one Theater to the other without adversely affecting planned operations.

## TARGET DATES

11. The target dates shown below are for the most part tentative and are listed only for planning purposes.

<i>Target Dates</i>	<i>Central Pacific</i>	<i>Southwest Pacific</i>	<i>China-Burma-India</i>
15 Aug. 1943	Kiska	—	—
1 Sep. 1943	—	Lae-Madang	—
15 Oct. 1943	—	Buin-Faisi	—
1 Nov. 1943	—	—	(1) Upper Burma (2) Akyab-Ramree
15 Nov. 1943	Gilberts	—	—
1 Dec. 1943	—	(1) W. New Britain (2) Kieta (3) Buka (Neutralize)	—
1 Jan. 1944	Marshalls	—	—
1 Feb. 1944	—	(1) Rabaul (Neutralize) (2) Wewak	—
1 May 1944	—	Kavieng	—
1 June 1944	Ponape	Manus	—
1 Aug. 1944	—	Hollandia	—
1 Sep. 1944	Truk	—	—
15 Sep. 1944	—	Wadke	—
15 Oct. 1944	—	Japen	—
1 Nov. 1944	—	—	Complete Burma
30 Nov. 1944	—	Manokwari	—
31 Dec. 1944	Palau	—	—

## AVAILABILITY OF MEANS

12. An analysis indicates that, provided the shipping needs of the Pacific will continue to be fulfilled, the requirements for the above operations can be met by presently planned deployments.

## CONCLUSION

13. Specific operations in the Pacific and Far East for 1943-44 should include the recapture of Burma and the opening of a land route to China through Northern Burma, meanwhile furnishing all possible logistic and air support to China in order to insure the availability of Chinese areas suitable for operations of United Nations forces against Japan, and a westward advance in the Pacific to the Palau-Vogelkop line. An analysis of the separate operations indicated

in paragraph 11 above shows that sufficient means can be made available for their accomplishment in 1943-44. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in a position to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Joint War Plans Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

Subject: Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan.

1. During the period in which we have worked with our British colleagues in the preparation of the Plan for the Defeat of Japan,<sup>2</sup> we have had an opportunity to hear many expressions of the British point of view. From these expressions, we believe we have gained a clear picture of the case which the British will present at the forthcoming conference.

2. These matters do not always appear in full clarity in the Plan itself, since the paper, as written, is a compromise in its form and tenor.

3. The basic difference between the two planning groups, which required constant compromise, is the different evaluation placed on *the importance of keeping China in the war*.

4. *a.* From this basic difference, almost all the implications arise.

*b.* Fundamentally, it is believed that the British are guided by the aim to re-establish the prestige of the British Empire in the Far East (with which we have no quarrel). This cannot be achieved if the primary objective (Hongkong) is captured for us by Chinese forces and British-U.S. forces merely follow up to insure its success.

*c.* On the other hand, they recognize that after Germany is defeated there will be a tremendous and probably irresistible demand in England for partial demobilization, which will at least delay, if not postpone to an unacceptable degree, the time at which the operations in the Far East can be undertaken, *unless* they can persuade the United States to embark on Combined Operations where the United States will furnish the deficiencies of troops and equipment under British leadership.

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<sup>1</sup>The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement by Marshall: "Copy was handed President by Admiral Leahy 8/10/43. GCM".

<sup>2</sup>The paper referred to is the appreciation and plan for the defeat of Japan prepared by the Combined Staff Planners (C.P.S. 83). This paper is not printed as a whole, but a summary is appended to C.C.S. 313, *post*, p. 981.

5. We point out the following implications:

a. The British do not attach the same degree of importance to the value of China in our war as does the United States. Therefore, in considering the measures that we must undertake to keep China in the war, there is a divergence as to the risk we can assume to maintain China as an ally.

b. The British contend even though we lose China as an active ally, we can re-establish our position in China by amphibious assaults and seize the area required for the air offensive against Japan. The U.S. Planners do not feel that this risk can be taken, in that logistical difficulties alone would probably prevent sufficient build-up of forces to maintain our position against the enemy.

6. The British look on the campaign in the west (Burma-Singapore and advance northward) as a *combined* effort, and not one of *British responsibility alone*. Therefore, once the United States has recognized the acceptability of the Malaya-Singapore-Camranh Bay-Hongkong amphibious advance, the British consider that both she and the United States should pool their resources (divisions, air, navy, landing craft, service forces, and shipping) to carry out the campaign. The U.S. Planners have refrained from indicating any agreement to making this a combined effort.

7. We believe the British definitely do not intend to capture Rangoon, at least until after they have captured Singapore. The primary reason for this they contend is their inability to divert resources from Europe to Southeast Asia until Germany has been defeated. After Germany's defeat they feel the next major campaign should be a bold stroke to capture Singapore. Thereafter they consider that operations in South Burma would become relatively unimportant.

8. In line with their evaluation of the importance of China, the British are inclined to emphasize the importance of Formosa as a possible substitute in the role that the U.S. envisages for bases in China. The U.S. Planners agree that Formosa has many desirable features and preliminary logistic estimates indicate the possibility of operating 15 B-29 groups from that area. We do not believe, however, that Formosa would be a satisfactory substitute for China. We are informed that the British are making a detailed examination of this subject in London and it is possible that they will use the results of this study at the conference in order to further emphasize Formosa's importance, and to minimize the importance the United States places in China.

9. Attention is particularly invited to the role which the U.S. Planners envisage for the Chinese Army. In order for them (and

U.S. Army Air Forces in China) to perform this role, tremendous efforts on the part of British and the United States must be exerted.

10. *If the Joint Staff Planners feel that this role has been over-emphasized, then the plan should be modified accordingly.* Specifically, the operations for the recapture of Burma would have to be completely re-evaluated before we become committed to an unacceptable effort in that area which will be costly both in men and matériel.

11. It is urged that Parts VIII, and the Annex of the Plan, be carefully studied in view of the fact that they will be of immediate concern during the forthcoming conference.

H. B. SLOCUM, *Capt., U.S. Navy*

E. H. MCDANIEL, *Col., U.S. Army*

W. R. WOLFINBARGER, *Col., U.S. Army*

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN THE  
PRESIDENT AND THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ON 10 AUGUST 1943 AT 1415<sup>2</sup>

*Present*

The President

The Secretary of War<sup>3</sup>

Admiral W. D. Leahy

General G. C. Marshall

Admiral E. J. King

General H. H. Arnold

Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane

## 2. *Far East Operations*

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the President endeavor to persuade the Prime Minister to use his best efforts to stimulate and hasten the Burma operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that as yet a commander in chief had not been selected.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Burma operation was now only two and one half months distant and the planning was still in the hands of General Auchinleck.

GENERAL MARSHALL, in reply to a question by the President, said that the British would probably make another attempt to designate General Sholto Douglas as in command. If they did insist upon him as the commander, they would have to take the responsibility for the difficulties that might result.

ADMIRAL KING said that the British had issued a "standfast" order

<sup>1</sup> For the portion of this memorandum relating to the war in Europe and the Mediterranean, omitted here, see *post*, p. 498.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., at 2:15 p. m.

<sup>3</sup> Henry L. Stimson.

with regard to moving ships and other munitions from the Mediterranean that were needed in the Burma operations. As the matter now stood, they suggested that BULLFROG be set for 1 January. If this were done, it would mean that air coverage for the north Burma operations would be lacking.

THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral King if he thought the Prime Minister still had an invasion of Sumatra in mind, to which ADMIRAL KING replied in the affirmative.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that it was essential that an early decision be made as to what our ultimate plans were in southeastern Asia in order that he could provide for the preparation of airfields that would be necessary to carry out such plans.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read a report from the U.S. Planners<sup>4</sup> which gave the impressions that they had obtained from the British Planners as follows:

a. The British do not appreciate the value of China as an ally in the war.

b. The British feel that if we lose China we can still obtain air bases for an attack against Japan by amphibious operations on the east coast of China.

c. The British look on Burma as a combined operation and not just a British operation. They also feel that eventually the British and Americans should pool their resources for an attack from Singapore to Hongkong.

d. The British anticipate a possible partial demobilization upon the defeat of Germany which will mean that more U.S. troops will be necessary to carry on the operations in the Far East.

THE PRESIDENT said he had heard from several sources that the British did plan to demobilize many of their ground forces, but he anticipated that we would receive all-out help from their air and naval forces.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. the memorandum by the Joint War Plans Committee, August 9, 1943, *supra*.

J.C.S. Files: Paraphrase of Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, India (Auchinleck) to the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

NEW DELHI, 13th August 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

65566/COS. Following from General Auchinleck for Chiefs of Staff:

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<sup>1</sup> This paraphrase was circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 305, August 14, 1943, with a covering note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the effect that it had been referred to an *ad hoc* committee for study and report. Concerning the appointment of this committee, see *post*, p. 862.

Program of planning for operations from India :

1. On receipt of decisions of Washington Conference <sup>2</sup> a first appreciation of the possibility of carrying out the tasks allotted to this Command was produced.

2. Salient point in this was that while requirements were in the neighborhood of 4,300 tons a day, theoretical maximum we could hope for was a lift into Assam of 3,400 tons a day. It seemed at the time that requirements for the operations could probably be reduced to this figure.

3. The two months which have followed have revealed in the first place increased requirements. This is mainly due to the continuance into October, November and December of engineer stores for Airfield Program which has first priority and must be met in full. Airfield Program and connected activities have resulted in an increase of personnel in Assam for which no allowance had been made. Further, we had reckoned on using some of the oil production for our own requirements, but the Americans now ask for the total output which means we must import more petrol and lubricants into Assam than we had anticipated.

4. While requirements have increased lift which we can count on getting has been reduced. In the first place the figure of 3,400 included no margin for contingencies which must be reckoned at absolute minimum of 15 per cent. Secondly, the stepping up of the previous lift which was only about 1700-1800 does not take effect until mid-September and in the meantime arrears are accumulating of essential stores which must be lifted. Shortage of locomotives will not be made good until October. Greatest factor, however, in reducing figure has been breaches near Burdwan owing to floods on the Damodar River subsequent breach at Ghatsila and floods at Parhatipur.

5. Result of factors in Paras. 3 and 4 above is that we are faced with a total deficiency of lift into Assam of about 128,000 tons by 1st March. If reductions are made to the limit which we consider possible in tonnages allotted for our own purposes and to the Americans this deficiency can be reduced but not by more than 20,000 tons in total which leaves a daily deficiency of about 600 tons for six months.

6. Problem is thus in first place whether L of C can be stepped up still further and secondly if no increase possible in L of C how reduction in requirements can be effected.

7. Whole question discussed today with Benthall, Member in Charge War Transport Department and with American Generals Ferris and Bissell.

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 369.

8. Majority of improvements to L of C into Assam are long term projects which cannot help our immediate problem such as doubling railway lines, building increased River Fleet, and increasing capacity of River Ports. Much of this is already in hand but will not be effective before October 1944. Proposals for short term improvement are as follows:—

(i) Increasing number of train paths by improving the operation of the railway system through supervision by Military personnel, and by relaxing certain precautions thus taking risks which would not be acceptable in normal times. War Transport Department is immediately starting inquiry into possibility of this. Representative of Wheeler will be associated with inquiry and also Representative of Transportation Directorate.

(ii) Immediate increase in locomotive and rolling stock on Bengal and Assam Railway from other parts of India to be replaced by fresh stock from U.S.A. on arrival. War Transportation Department is inquiring into possibility.

(iii) Quickening of turn round on river by installation of navigational lights and of night running. We are inquiring into this.

(iv) Flying Stores for China from Calcutta into Assam Airfields. This can only be done with help of additional aircraft from U.S.A.

9. While we may be able to achieve some improvement by these methods or by a combination of them and are doing all we can to do so, I feel it is probable that an over-all deficiency will remain. The L of C into Assam has never fulfilled expectations and this must be borne in mind. Possibility must, therefore, be faced of having to call off either the advance from Ledo or the advance from Imphal or both.

10. If we call off the former, and the Road Construction project, troops required for defensive would probably be not more than one infantry brigade which was all we had there before the Americans took over this area. This would effect a saving of between four and five hundred tons a day. If we call off the latter we should still need two divisions forward for defensive purposes, with one division in reserve. This would mean a saving of only about two hundred tons a day. Thus if we remain on the defensive on both fronts saving effected would be six or seven hundred tons a day against anticipated deficiency of about six hundred tons a day. We should then be able to meet fully demands of air ferry route and later in the season when construction of airfields is reduced, while capacity of L of C is increased by fresh stock from U.S.A. and completion of pipelines, we should have a growing capacity to spare for increased lift to China.

11. Question now arises whether the land operation in Arakan, CUDGEL and the assault on Akyab should be carried out without opera-

tions in North at the same time. We should carry out raids and simulate activity by all means in our power in order to induce Japanese to believe that we were contemplating an offensive in the North. I consider therefore that it is unlikely that they would appreciate that we had abandoned the Imphal advance in time to enable them to alter the dispositions of their land forces substantially before the monsoon. As far as land forces are concerned, therefore, containing effect would be approximately the same as that of the Imphal advance. Unlikely however that a similar containing effect would be exerted in case of Air Forces. On balance I do not think abandonment of the land and air operations in Northern Burma should rule [out] Arakan operations and Akyab.

12. I do however consider that Akyab should not be attempted without the land operations in Arakan. Examination of the L of C required for the latter reveals that this also is insufficient for full requirements. Bottleneck is Chittagong. Everything possible is being done to increase capacity here by extension of wharfage use of country craft at improvised jetties etc. but it appears unlikely that it will ever be possible to carry out both the raising to heavy bomber standard of the Eastern Bengal Group of airfields before next monsoon and the Arakan operation.

13. The A.O.C.-in-C. points out that if these airfields are not completed to heavy bomber standard in the winter of 1943-44 they will not be ready for operations either this year or in 1944-45. They are needed at once for deeper penetration in Burma. They would be essential for increased air offensive over Burma and particularly were it decided to carry out at a later date an airborne attack on Mandalay or Rangoon and they may also be required for supplying Allied Air Forces in China. I am not in a position to assess the relative probabilities of these operations.

14. I am in doubt as to whether priority given at TRIDENT<sup>3</sup> to air operations means that preparations for air operations mentioned above should take absolute precedence over land operations which I have been instructed to carry out this winter. But if Akyab is to take place this winter I consider that Arakan operations must have precedence over raising the standard of these airfields.

15. It remains to consider whether, if Akyab is unavoidably delayed, the Arakan operations should be given priority over the raising of the standard of Eastern Bengal airfields. I think that the Arakan

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<sup>3</sup> See *antc.*, p. 369.

operations might be successful by themselves and that we should have a fair chance of capturing Akyab overland. Setting aside any non-military reasons for its capture main military reasons are :

(i.) containing effect on Japanese forces in Burma and particularly Air Forces.

(ii.) possession of a more advanced airfield. These must be weighed against completion of airfields in Eastern Bengal.

16. We should maintain continuous air offensive against Burma and in particular Akyab whether amphibious operations were postponed or not. Japanese would remain in uncertainty until weather had deteriorated to such an extent as to make it difficult for them to move large forces. Consider therefore containing effect is likely to be the same in either case.

17. Regarding airfields A.O.C.-in-C. would prefer raising Eastern Bengal airfield to heavy bomber standard to acquiring new airfields at Akyab.

18. In these circumstances therefore there would be little military advantage in taking Akyab beyond raising morale and killing Japanese. Do not consider this would justify failure to raise standard of airfields. If therefore Akyab were abandoned I should recommend that the Arakan operations also should be abandoned and priority given to airfields.

19. Fully appreciate anxiety which exists to start large-scale offensive operations against Burma this coming winter. The course of planning for even the limited operations intended in Northern Burma has brought me to the conclusion that best military course would be to avoid such operations and to concentrate on supply to China by air, at the same time increasing and conserving strength of India and preparing resources for large scale amphibious operations against Malaya next winter. Preparation for these would enable us to bring training of troops to high standard. If they were definitely decided on for 1944-45 it would be desirable to divert resources earmarked for Akyab to taking Andamans in the late spring of 1944. We are urgently examining the possibility of this and will signal results to you.

20. Americans are examining effect of changed situation on their plans in more detail and I cannot send final recommendations until results of War Transport Departments inquiry regarding railways is known but it seems desirable to let you know probabilities at once.

21. This signal has been discussed with and agreed to by C.-in-C. Eastern Fleet who is in Delhi and A.O.C.-in-C.

740.0011 P.W./3427

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: China's Desire To Be Represented at Allied Conferences  
Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Foreign Minister of  
China, Dr. T. V. Soong

Dr. T. V. Soong, Foreign Minister of China, called at his request, having just returned from London. I inquired as to how he felt about the results of his visit. He promptly said that he thought they were good and that he was much encouraged by his trip. He stated that, while the British are not idealistic like the United States and some other countries, they did show a prompt disposition to discuss frankly and reasonably each and all questions that were presented to them.

Dr. Soong said that his Government feels that the four great nations largely directing the war should have their unity made a reality by taking China into the military and other conferences and that his Government is very earnest in this plea.

The Foreign Minister then said that he was most desirous to take up with the British the question as to their plans to open up the Burma area, primarily from the standpoint of China. He stated that the British had agreed to engage in certain further military movements, but he did not undertake to be specific as to just where and in what particular territory. Dr. Soong said that his Government felt very strongly that it should be consulted about any fighting with Japan, or plans for fighting with Japan. I stated that this question is one of a military nature and does not come within my function. He then requested me to speak to the President about these matters, especially about his Government's desire that the Burma area be opened up, and I said I would be pleased to do so.

The Foreign Minister then said that his Government felt that it should be a member of the committee which deals with munitions assignments; that in Great Britain they are even proposing to take in some other European countries, including the French Committee of National Liberation; whereas China, one of the four large nations, is not a member.

Dr. Soong said off the record that he had secured an agreement with the Government of Canada to furnish China with 60,000 tons of munitions; that these munitions were not susceptible of use by the United States or Great Britain, but that Mr. Lauchlin Currie had prevailed on the Canadian Government to abandon her agreement by

saying that China was in a confused state at present, et cetera, and that the Government of Canada had so informed him.<sup>1</sup>

I told the Minister that we looked upon China as having great potential strength and development, politically, economically, et cetera, and that that development is reasonably certain in the not distant future, and that, therefore, we are showing China every consideration at all practicable. Dr. Soong said that this was true, but that some other countries like Great Britain do not seem to have that idea.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 659.

740.0011 Pacific War/3428

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I enclose herewith a memorandum on the question on China's representation on various inter-allied committees, which we discussed when I saw you this morning.<sup>1</sup>

I am [etc.]

TSE VUN SOONG

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong)*

1. On many occasions the United States Government has declared it to be its policy that four amongst the United Nations, namely the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China, which are bearing the main burden of the war effort, shall also assume the responsibility for the conduct of the war and for the maintenance of peace.

2. Indeed, on one notable occasion when a joint United Nations agreement, that relating to Relief and Rehabilitation, was being elaborated, the four Governments, upon the invitation of the U.S. Department of State entered into protracted discussions and secured agreement amongst themselves before the draft instrument was presented to other United Nations.<sup>2</sup>

3. The necessity for such prior consultations was stressed on many occasions in official pronouncements by the United States and British Governments. On no major issue, however, either relative to the

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<sup>1</sup> For the second paragraph of this letter, omitted here, see *post*, p. 659.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 851 ff.

conduct of the war or to preparations for the future peace, has this practice been followed so far.

4. Since that date there have been formed numerous inter-Allied agencies, civilian and military, for the daily conduct of the war and for the preparation of the transition from war to peace, and in each case their membership was limited to United States and British representatives, although these agencies are assumed to be acting on behalf of the United Nations.

Repeated inquiries by Chinese representatives as to their participation in these agencies have met with negative replies. Moreover, the Chinese representatives have not even been called upon to present China's programs or plans themselves when China's case is under deliberation before these agencies. On the one or two occasions when Chinese representatives did present statements before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, they were heard rather as witnesses and did not participate in the actual deliberations, nor were they parties to the final recommendations although these related to war operations of vital interest to China.

5. While the assumed existence of the Four Power leadership continued to be emphasized by American and British officials, no Chinese representative was invited to the Casablanca or Washington conferences at which plans were adopted affecting the China theatre of war of the United Nations, over which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is in supreme command. These decisions were only communicated afterwards and the consequential misunderstandings in the interpretation of the commitments made to China would have been avoided, had a procedure for genuine joint collaboration been established and acted upon.

6. While the Chinese Government fully appreciates the courtesy of being informed in informal conversations of some of the matters under discussion between the United States and British Governments, yet in its view this procedure falls far short of the political consultation which is implied by its membership of the group of Four leading powers, and which was followed in regard to "Relief and Rehabilitation."

7. The new war situation in Europe and the new strategy against Japan are now again under review by the United States and British Governments at Quebec. Their conclusions will affect the future structure of world relationship and of post-war alignments. The Chinese Government can no longer hide from its people, whose will determined the decision to oppose Japan in 1937, and from the army, the

fact that China is not a party to either the consultations or the decisions for the conduct of Allied war operations and Allied peace plans.

8. The Chinese Government therefore in all earnestness proposes that:

(a) existing joint and combined agencies, such as the Munitions Assignment[s] Board, be enlarged to include Chinese representation on a footing of equality;

(b) inter-Allied machinery, with equal Chinese representation, be created with a view to insuring coordination of efforts to carry into effect all decisions jointly reached;

(c) upon the occasion of the Quebec Conference a joint declaration be made in the above sense.

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

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893.154/469

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

S MR. SECRETARY: Important among the questions which it may be assumed will come in for some discussion at Quebec is the question of campaign for the re-conquest of Burma, or at least a part of Burma, toward the objective of reopening the Burma Road into China.

In the opinion of Far Eastern officers of the Department, it is highly desirable *from a political point of view* that plans for proceeding with this operation be implemented and proceeded with at the earliest possible moment after the end of the present monsoon, (i.e. this Fall) and that nothing be permitted to occur which would give the Chinese the impression that this campaign is being arbitrarily delayed or deferred.

S[TANLEY] K H[ORNBECK]

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## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

### *Editorial Note*

General aspects of the war in Europe, including planning for Operation OVERLORD, are included in this section. Papers, however, which deal exclusively with Italian questions (peace feelers, surrender terms, and the status of Rome as an open city) and with the question of bases in the Azores and in Ireland are printed in separate sections below.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 4, 1943.

DEAR HARRY: As a preliminary to my talk with him, it may help the President to read the enclosed memorandum which I have drawn up as a summary of my observations on Italy and OVERLORD. I shall be very grateful if you would read over this memorandum and, if you think it would help as a guide to our conversations, ask the President to read it.

The Prime Minister also asked me to speak to the President on two other subjects of lesser complexity but major importance, as to one of which he has given me a memorandum for the President which I can bring up.<sup>2</sup> I really think the President should have all of this information before the coming Quebec conference.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

SECRET

## BRIEF REPORT ON CERTAIN FEATURES OF OVERSEAS TRIP

## I. ENGLAND

1. My principal objective had been to visit troops. But when I reached London the P.M. virtually took possession of my movements for the first week and I found myself launched in the discussion of subjects and with people which I had not expected. These unexpected subjects were so important that I devoted the bulk of my time to their consideration and altered my trip accordingly.

Although I have known the P.M. for many years and had talked freely with him, I have never had such a series of important and confidential discussions as this time. He was extremely kind and, although we discussed subjects on which we differed with extreme

<sup>1</sup> This letter and the enclosed memorandum were delivered to Hopkins in Washington shortly before his departure to join Roosevelt, who was vacationing at Birch Island, Ontario. Hopkins passed the memorandum on to Roosevelt, who sent word to Stimson on August 5 that he had read it. After Roosevelt and Hopkins had returned to Washington, Stimson discussed the memorandum with Hopkins at lunch on August 9 and with Roosevelt at lunch on August 10. See Stimson and Bundy, pp. 434-435.

<sup>2</sup> The two subjects referred to were Anglo-American cooperation with respect to atomic energy (see *post*, p. 637) and the organization of anti-submarine warfare within the United States armed forces.

frankness, I think the result was to achieve a relation between us of greater mutual respect and friendship than ever before. I know that was the case on my side. Although I differed with him with the utmost freedom and outspokenness, he never took offense and seemed to respect my position. At the end I felt that I had achieved a better understanding with him than ever before.

2. On the day of my arrival I dined with him at a family dinner at which were present only Winant and Eden besides Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Winant. He plunged at once into a discussion of the various theatres of the war which of course revived discussion of subjects on which we had had previous differences, including his penchant for various Mediterranean operations and my penchant for the Channel. He opened the door for me to bring up an argument which was new to him. He criticized our American system of fixed presidential terms and deplored the fact that we face an election in 1944 with all its distractions and disadvantages, including the possibility of the disaster of a change of administration in a critical period of the war. He commented that in this way we might be deprived of the immense asset of Mr. Roosevelt's leadership. I at once rejoined that I agreed with him as to the danger involved in such a contingency and pointed out to him in detail how that danger might be accentuated by getting the United States involved in a theatre like the eastern Mediterranean in which our people were less intelligently interested and would be undoubtedly subjected to campaign arguments to the effect that we were being made to fight for interests which were really those of the British Empire; in other words, that the war leadership in that respect was not good.

I told him that the American people did not hate the Italians but took them rather as a joke as fighters; that only by an intellectual effort had they been convinced that Germany was their most dangerous enemy and should be disposed of before Japan; that the enemy whom the American people really hated, if they hated anyone, was Japan which had dealt them a foul blow. After setting out all the details upon which my conclusion was predicated, I asserted that it was my considered opinion that, if we allow ourselves to become so entangled with matters of the Balkans, Greece, and the Middle East that we could not fulfill our purpose of ROUNDHAMMER in 1944, that situation would be a serious blow to the prestige of the President's war policy and therefore to the interests of the United States.

The P.M. apparently had not had that matter presented to him in that light before. He had no answer to it except that any such blow could be cured by victories. I answered that that would not be so if the victories were such that the people were not interested in and could

not see any really strategic importance for them. Towards the end he confined his position to favoring a march on Rome with its prestige and the possibility of knocking Italy out of the war. Eden on the other hand continued to contend for carrying the war into the Balkans and Greece. At the end the P.M. reaffirmed his fidelity to the pledge of ROUNDHAMMER "unless his military advisers could present him with some better opportunity" not yet disclosed.

3. On Thursday, July 15th, I called at the office which has been set up to prepare plans for ROUNDHAMMER under Lt. Gen. Morgan of the British Army as Chief of Staff and Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker of the U.S.A. as his deputy. They had just completed their long study of such plans which had been going on for some months and were sending their report to the British Chiefs of Staff.<sup>3</sup> General Surles was with me and they carefully explained in detail to us the location and details of the proposed attack. I was much impressed with General Morgan's directness and sincerity. He gave us his mature opinion on the operation, with carefully stated provisos, to the effect that he believed that with the present allocated forces it could be successfully accomplished. He was very frank, however, in stating his fear of delays which might be caused by getting too deep into commitments in the Mediterranean. In particular he was fearful that divisions to be liberated from the Mediterranean on the first of November might not be actually free to move back on that date which he thought was an ultimate date, taking into account their subsequent training. He was fearful also of other commitments which would interfere with the accumulation of matériel, cantonments and other forces in the U.K. He said that he believed that the chief danger was of commitments made in perfectly good faith and in the belief that the delay proposed might be made up for by subsequent speed, when as a matter of fact the effect of the delay would be to lose the favorable summer and autumn season and throw the work of preparation into the winter season when such accentuated speed could not be attained. Barker who explained the details of the plan to us shared the same fear. In other words, they both felt that the plan was sound and safe but there might be a subsequent yielding to temptation to undertake new activities which would interfere with the long stage of preparation in the false hope that such interference could be atoned for by subsequent speeding up.

During the fortnight that I spent in England I found the same fear pervaded our own officers who were engaged in ROUNDHAMMER preparations. General Lee of the SOS told me that our preparations were safe up to date, although the margin had been greatly narrowed

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<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 436.

by recent commitments, but he went on to say that he did not think we could stand any further interference with the timetable without blocking the whole plan. General Eaker and his air men were working steadily and hard on their portion of the ROUNDHAMMER proposition, namely the bombing of Germany. They were all confident that the plan was feasible. On one particular danger which the P.M. had frequently urged upon me, namely the fear of a successful German counterattack after the landing had been made, the air men were confident that they could by their overwhelming superiority in the air block the advances of the German re-enforcements and thus defeat the counterattack. The matter had been carefully studied by them. They told me that their confidence was shared by the officers of the RAF.

I later found in Tunis that Spaatz and Doolittle felt that the German counterattack could be blocked in France just as they had blocked it in Sicily. They even had studied the number of roads necessary to be covered in that operation.

4. I saw the P.M. again at a dinner given by Devers on Wednesday where I sat beside him, and again on Saturday I was with him nearly all day when he took me to Dover with a smaller family party in his special train. Mrs. Churchill and Mr. and Mrs. Winant were present; also the P.M.'s brother, General Devers, Minister Casey of Australia, and one or two others. I sat with him and Winant at breakfast and with him and Mrs. Churchill and Mrs. Winant at lunch. During the trip back he brought me with evident delight a telegram which he had just received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, telling him that General Marshall had proposed that a study be made of the operation known as AVALANCHE. He took this as an endorsement by Marshall of his whole Italian policy and was greatly delighted. I pointed out to him that it probably meant that Marshall had proposed this as a shortcut intended to hasten the completion of the Italian adventure so that there would be no danger of clashing with the preparations for ROUNDHAMMER.

Later in the day he took me aside again and brought up the entirely different subject of S-1 in which matters had arisen which greatly troubled him. I was able to give him some reassurance on this subject as to my own feelings although of course I told him that I could only promise to report the matter to the President for the final decision.

5. On Monday, July 19th, I talked over the new telephone with Marshall and found that my assumption of Marshall's position was correct and that he had only suggested AVALANCHE so as to leave more time for ROUNDHAMMER and to obviate the danger of a long slow progress "up the leg" which might eliminate ROUNDHAMMER altogether. I told him also of my talks with the P.M. and with the other military

men, including particularly Morgan, and at the close of my statement he suggested to me that I should go as promptly as possible to Africa to see Eisenhower, where I should be able to round out what I had gotten in London with the views of the people in Africa. He said, "Then you will have all sides and I think it is very important for you to go and to go quickly". Information which I subsequently received from the P.M. as to his proposed early visit to America caused me to understand why Marshall urged haste.

6. On Thursday, July 22nd, I had a conference at 10 Downing Street with the P.M. and others in respect to the subject he had brought up on the Dover trip in regard to S-1.<sup>4</sup> After that conference was over and the others had departed, I told the P.M. of my talk with Marshall and his confirmation of my interpretation of his support of AVA-LANCHE, namely that he favored it only for the purpose of expediting the march up the peninsula and that he was still as firmly in favor of ROUNDHAMMER as ever. I pointed out to the P.M. that Marshall's view as to ROUNDHAMMER had always been supported by the whole Operation[s] Division of the American General Staff. I also told him of my talk with Generals Morgan and Barker and of their full support of the ROUNDHAMMER proposition.

He at once broke out into a new attack upon ROUNDHAMMER. The check received by the British attack at Catania, Sicily, during the past few days had evidently alarmed him. He referred to it and praised the superlative fighting ability of the Germans. He said that if he had fifty thousand men ashore on the French channel coast, he would not have an easy moment because he would feel that the Germans could rush up sufficient forces to drive them back into the sea. He repeated assertions he had made to me in previous conversations as to the disastrous effect of having the Channel full of corpses of defeated allies. This stirred me up and for a few minutes we had [at] it hammer and tongs. I directly charged him that he was not in favor of the ROUNDHAMMER operation and that such statements as he made were "like hitting us in the eye" in respect to a project which we had all deliberately adopted and in which we were comrades. I told him we could never win any battle by talking about corpses. On this he said that, while he admitted that if he was C-in-C he would not set up the ROUNDHAMMER operation, yet having made his pledge he would go through with it loyally. I then told him that, while I did not at all question the sincerity of his promise to go with us, I was afraid he did not make sufficient allowance for the necessary long distance planning and I feared that fatal curtailments might be made impulsively in the vain hope that those curtailments could be later repaid. I stressed

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<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 634.

the dangers of too great entanglement in an Italian expedition and the loss of time to ROUNDHAMMER which it would involve. He then told me that he was not insisting on going further than Rome unless we should by good luck obtain a complete Italian capitulation throwing open the whole of Italy as far as the north boundary. He asserted that he was not in favor of entering the Balkans with troops but merely wished to supply them with munitions and supplies. He told me that they were now doing magnificiently when only being supplied ten tons a month. (*Note:* In these limitations he thus took a more conservative position than Eden had taken at the dinner on July 12th.)

When I parted with him I felt that, if pressed by us, he would sincerely go ahead with the ROUNDHAMMER commitment but that he was looking so constantly and vigorously for an easy way of ending the war without a trans-Channel assault that, if we expected to be ready for a ROUNDHAMMER which would be early enough in 1944 to avoid the dangers of bad weather, we must be constantly on the lookout against Mediterranean diversions. I think it was at this meeting that he told me of his intention of coming to America and that he expected to come in the first half of August. I then understood what Marshall had meant in his telephone message as to promptness on my part and I thereafter aimed my movements so as to be able to return to America in time to report to the President before such meeting.

## II. NORTH AFRICA

I spent three nights with General Eisenhower at his quarters in Algiers. During that time he discussed with Surles and myself the proposed post-HUSKY operations in all their aspects and bearings. On the evening before I left I got him to sum up his views, jotting down a memorandum of them to be sure that there was no misunderstanding.

1. He pointed out that the first decision to be made was one of the highest policy for the chiefs of the two governments—whether such a collapse of the entire Italian forces will occur as to offer an opportunity to occupy the whole peninsula with the subsequent purpose of moving troops from northern Italy into France or the Balkans with sufficient facility to make it worthwhile to give up ROUNDHAMMER.

He indicated that even at that time the chance of a prompt entire collapse of resistance throughout the boundaries of Italy looked slim to him. Subsequent events would seem to have added confirmation to his view. The Badoglio government has not surrendered. The Germans are rapidly pouring troops into northern Italy with the evident intention of making a stand there which would be comparable to what they would offer in northern France. They have already seized Fiume, the northern gate to the Balkans.

2. Until otherwise ordered from above Eisenhower would adhere to the ROUNDHAMMER program.

3. He gave me his estimated timetable (*a*) for the final attack on Catania; (*b*) for the full occupation of Sicily; (*c*) for the launching of AVALANCHE (if decided upon); (*d*) the units which would be used in each of these projects.

4. He said that if we were to be obliged to "merely crawl up the leg", it would be so slow that he thought [we] had better jump at once to ROUNDHAMMER.

5. He therefore very fully discussed the possibilities of AVALANCHE as a means of speeding up.

*a.* He would under no circumstances launch AVALANCHE until he was across the Messina Strait. He explained that such a crossing of troops and the seizure of the toe of Italy must be made to contain German forces from being free to rush back up the leg and meet us at Naples or Rome. He then and subsequently in cables has discussed such a transit as a most important first step and the various means of taking it.

*b.* He discussed with us the problem of air coverage for AVALANCHE. He was not so confident as to the solution of this problem as were Spaatz and Doolittle with whom we discussed it at Tunis. The air men believed that from bases in Sicily they could furnish the air coverage required provided they were given sufficient P-38's and Spitfires with belly tanks. Eisenhower was still carefully canvassing this problem.

*c.* Eisenhower had already earmarked the troops which he could use in AVALANCHE.

6. When I asked him as to the possibility of any feasible alternative to AVALANCHE which would speed up the advance to Rome, he suggested, but did not endorse, a possible landing at the instep and going straight up the leg. He evidently had not fully studied such a move but believed it would be faster than moving up from the toe at Messina. On this last proposition he had decided views that it was too difficult, slow, and costly. He described it as just a series of inching up operations in a very difficult terrain which would take much time and very considerable losses.

7. He estimated that the Germans already had at least three divisions of troops in the leg at or below Naples.

8. Eisenhower said that he had plenty of landing boats for the AVALANCHE operation and was not concerned about getting any more.

9. Eisenhower impressed me favorably in having preserved his balance in the consideration of the various post-HUSKY plans. He was anxious to find a quick, bold stroke which would permit us to conquer the leg of Italy as far as Rome. He was still considering AVALANCHE

as the most promising suggestion yet made to that end. He was evidently impressed by the character of the German resistance in the rough terrain of Sicily and did not like the prospect of facing such resistance in the similar terrain on the toe and leg if we attempted to go all the way by land.

### III. MY OWN RESULTING VIEWS FROM THE FOREGOING TALKS IN ENGLAND AND IN AFRICA

1. Some sort of post-HUSKY operation seems strongly advisable if it can be made to assist and supplement and not destroy the mounting of the powerful threat of invasion across the Channel.

2. This is the view of our American military leaders in Washington, in London, and in Africa. Their purpose is to secure additional air bases for an attack on southern Germany and possibly other satellite or occupied territory.

3. The need of such bases is becoming constantly more apparent. The number of bombing sorties from the U.K. is limited (*a*) by the location, (*b*) by the adverse weather conditions, and (*c*) by the constantly increasing strength of German air defenses in the north.

Eaker's losses are approaching the margin of safety and his continuity of operations is greatly interfered with by the weather. On the other hand, our air forces in the south are able to operate almost every day and their percentage of losses has been a mere fraction of those incurred by Eaker's forces in the north.

4. If we could establish air bases in Italy as far north as Rome, our air men told me that they could institute regular attacks upon Germany from the south with the above favorable results.

5. Such a project if feasible would not only not impair ROUNDHAMMER but it would greatly aid and facilitate it and would have the maximum advantage in effect upon Germany both psychologically and materially.

6. This conception of the American staff of an Italian operation is entirely different from the conception put forward at times to me by the P.M. and Eden and also made by certain others, notably General Smuts in a letter to the P.M. This last, which for brevity I will call the British conception, is not put forward as an aid to ROUNDHAMMER but as a substitute to supplant it. It contemplates an invasion from the south—in the direction of the Balkans and Greece or possibly towards southern France though this last suggestion has not been pressed. Such a southern invasion and the ROUNDHAMMER invasion cannot be both maintained. On the contrary, if they are both held in contemplation, they will be in constant interference and will tend to neutralize each other. For example, under the American conception it is absolutely essential to have a speedy daring operation which will not draw upon

or interfere with the mounting of ROUNDHAMMER. A slow progressive infiltration of the Italian boot from the bottom, time consuming and costly, would be sure to make ROUNDHAMMER impossible.

7. The main thing therefore to keep constantly in mind is that the Italian effort must be strictly confined to the objective of securing bases for an air attack and there must be no further diversions of forces or matériel which will interfere with the coincident mounting of the ROUNDHAMMER project.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 August 1943.

C.C.S. 286/2

FORMATION BY U.S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR OPERATION OVERLORD

Reference: C.C.S. 286/1<sup>1</sup>

1. In C.C.S. 286/1 the British Chiefs of Staff advise that, in order to meet the manning stringency in OVERLORD, they find it necessary to ask that the American Navy take over and man the following British assault, support, and special craft designated by the Allied Naval Commander in Chief to Assault Force "O," the American Naval Assault Forces based in Plymouth Command:—

- 16 L.C.S. (M)
- 15 Hedgerow fitted L.C.A.
- 12 L.C.T. (2)
- 5 L.C.G. (L)
- 11 L.C.F. (L)
- 48 L.C.P. (L) fitted for smoke laying
- 60 L.C.A.

2. The personnel required to man the above craft, including flotilla and squadron staff, and reserve to scale, is 215 officers and 2283 ratings, of which 192 are communication ratings and 227 tradesmen (artificers).

3. It is presumed that the ship-borne types of the British landing craft listed above, namely, 16 L.C.S.(M)'s, 60 L.C.A.'s, and 48 L.C.P.(L)'s, will be carried on British combat loaders during assaults. If this is correct, the admixture of American boat crews on British ships would bring about a situation more undesirable than the one to be corrected.

4. The landing craft in question, British designed and fitted with British equipment, should be manned by crews trained with that type of craft. There is none of these types in this country available

<sup>1</sup> "Formation by U.S. Assault Forces for Operation 'OVERLORD'", August 4, 1943; not printed.

for training purposes. It would, therefore, be necessary to send personnel to the United Kingdom for training. At the same time the British are bringing officers and crews to the United States to man and train themselves in the use of United States built landing craft.

5. 110 LST's, U.S. manned, are allocated to OVERLORD, —83 are assigned to U.S. troop lift—, the remaining 27 to allow for casualties and, it now appears, to assist in British troop lift. From 20 to 24 of these should be available for the assault and, if assigned to British troop lift, this will result in about 168 officers and 1512 men of the U.S. Navy participating in the operation with British Assault Forces.

6. In C.C.S. 244/1<sup>2</sup> the British have indicated the need of additional L.C.I.(L)'s (the number dependent upon the losses in HUSKY) to be furnished from United States' production for British use in OVERLORD. In furtherance of this need, the British have submitted a lend-lease requisition for 18 L.C.I.(L)'s from United States' production.

7. In addition to delivery of the above-mentioned landing craft (as well as other landing craft), there are being delivered from United States' production 20 merchant ships per month up to 150 to 200, to be manned by British personnel.

8. It would appear that the need of personnel for British produced landing craft should take precedence over the manning of craft requested from United States' production.

9. In view of the above consideration, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff feel that subject landing craft should be manned and operated by British personnel.

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 233.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 300/1

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION, 1943-1944, EUROPEAN AREA  
(As of 30 July 1943)

NOTE: In view of very recent developments in Italy, the ultimate consequences of which are as yet unpredictable, related paragraphs of this paper must be regarded as tentative.

1. Basic Factors in the European Situation.

a. *Predominance of Germany.* The enemy situation in Europe must be estimated in terms of the German situation. Italy, Hungary, Ruma-

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated as an enclosure to the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 300/1), August 7, 1943: "The enclosure is submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the QUADRANT Conference."

nia, Bulgaria, and Finland are merely satellites of Germany and, to a considerable degree, prisoners of circumstances. None of them could offer prolonged resistance without effective German support; any of them would now dissociate itself from Germany if it could do so without fear of Germany or of the U.S.S.R. Italy's special position as a nominally equal partner with Germany would, however, make her surrender more impressive than that of any of the others.

b. *Germany's Basic Task* is now to defend "Festung Europa,"\* with such assistance as she can extort from satellite and occupied countries. Although she may no longer expect to impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, she can still hope to avert surrender and even to gain an advantageous negotiated peace by dividing her enemies politically (in particular, by dividing the U.S.S.R. from Great Britain and the United States), by beating off their attacks, or by making her defeat so costly as to dissuade them from the task. This hope, as long as it persists, will justify and support a determined resistance.

c. "*Festung Europa*." Germany now controls, directly or indirectly all of continental Europe west of the Russian front, except the territories of five neutral states (Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey). This control extends to include the Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas and the Mediterranean islands of Corsica, Sardinia, Crete and Rhodes. This whole area is encircled by blockade, but contains within itself the requisites of a practical military self-sufficiency.

The western and southern faces of this position are subject to invasion only by difficult amphibious attack (assuming the continued neutrality of Spain and Turkey). The western face has been strengthened by extensive fortification; the southern face is backed by formidable mountainous terrain. Major industrial areas in western territory under German control, however, are subject to heavy aerial attack.

The eastern face of "Festung Europa" is without clear natural definition. For that reason, and because of the immense forces deployed by the U.S.S.R., the eastern front must continue to be Germany's chief preoccupation in land operations.

Despite the best efforts of German propaganda, the inhabitants of "Festung Europa" are not united in its defense. That fact entails not only the employment of considerable occupational forces, but also the necessity of bolstering wavering allies.

## 2. The Existing Overall Situation.

a. *Ground Forces.* The Axis armies are now all at or near peak strength in number of combat divisions—German, 311; Italian, 74;

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\*As herein conceived, "Festung Europa" consists of an essential core (roughly Germany itself, most of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania), surrounded by outer defensive and auxiliary areas. [Footnote in the source text.]

Rumanian, 27; Hungarian, 21; Bulgarian, 20; Croat, 8; Slovak, 4; total, 465. The German Army in particular has been brought to such strength only by lowering physical standards, combing out industrial personnel hitherto deferred, and enlisting considerable numbers of non-Germans. In consequence, the average quality of German divisions has declined and war production will be adversely affected. Replacement of future losses will augment those tendencies and may be inadequate to maintain existing strength.

*b. Air Forces.* We estimate that the total first-line strength of the German Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 4,600 aircraft. Of these, approximately 1,500 are on the Western Front, 1950 in the Russian Front and 1125 in the Mediterranean. In addition, approximately 450 are in Germany for refitting. In structure the German Air Force lacks strength in depth because it has no substantial Stored Reserves of aircraft to back up the first-line units. Opposed upon all fronts by United Nations air forces greatly superior in numbers and in offensive power, the German Air Force has been forced to adopt a defensive role but this defensive role is rendered even more difficult due to its extended commitments. In an effort to meet this situation its defensive strength has been increased by concentration upon production of fighter types at the expense of other categories. Because of the comparative ease of manufacture of the fighter type, this has resulted in a slight upward trend in total production and has improved the defensive power of the German Air Force while the offensive power has further deteriorated. Due largely to the shortage of trained crews, the efficiency of the long-range bomber force is at its lowest point since the beginning of the war. In equipment some improvement in present types is noted, but no important production of radically new types is expected.

We estimate that the total first line strength of the Italian Air Force (as of 31 July 1943) is approximately 1,400 aircraft, of which 1,050 are disposed in the Central Mediterranean and 350 in the Eastern. In addition approximately 250 are in Italy for refitting. During the past year this air force has been deteriorating in numerical strength, in rate of new production, in pilot and crew training, and in combat efficiency. Due to these factors the figures given should be discounted by at least 30% for purposes of comparing the fighting effectiveness of the Italian Air Force with that of the German. Under existing conditions continuance of this downward trend in overall effectiveness is to be expected.

*c. Naval Forces.*

(1) *Submarines.* As of 27 July 1943, the estimated numbers of European Axis submarines were 436 German and 74 Italian. Of these 211 German and 45 Italian were operational and were in the Atlantic or

Mediterranean or in waters accessible to those areas, 43 German were used only for training purposes, and 176 German were undergoing trials, training, or repairs in the Baltic. The average rates of completion of new submarines are estimated to be 25 German a month, or possibly a few more, and between one and two Italian (if construction still continues).

(2) *Surface Vessels*. As of 27 July, all effective *German* major units (2 BB, 4 CA, and 4 CL) were divided between the Baltic and Norwegian waters. All effective German light forces (40 DD, and perhaps 150 PT) were in waters from the Bay of Biscay northward, except for perhaps 45 PT in the Mediterranean. It is possible that the experienced personnel have been largely transferred from the major units other than *Tirpitz*, *Scharnhorst*, *Luetzow* (the three in northern Norwegian waters) to the submarine service and that the newly completed aircraft carrier *Graf Zeppelin* has been laid up. Subject to that, the effectiveness of both the major units and light forces, especially the latter, is believed to be high. The new construction of combatant surface vessels is believed to be confined to about 21 DD and a large but uncertain number of PT.

As of 27 July, the larger portion of the effective *Italian* surface forces (consisting of 2/3 BB, 1 CA, 5 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 40 PT) were in the Western Basin of the Mediterranean. Except for a few motor torpedo boats in the Black Sea, the rest (consisting of 3/4 BB, 1 CL, 15/20 DD, and perhaps 60 PT) were in the Eastern Basin. The effectiveness of the major units is believed to be low. The effectiveness of the light forces, especially the motor torpedo boats, is believed to be fairly high. Repair work on combatant surface vessels and new construction (if still continuing) is believed to cover 0/1 BB, 1 CA, 3 CV (under conversion from other types), and 1 CL—all in the Western Basin; 1/2 BB and 2/3 CL—all in the Eastern Basin; and an uncertain number of DD and PT in each basin.

*d. Munitions Production*. There is no reason to believe that decline in munitions production has as yet affected German tactical efficiency. However, labor shortage and bomb damage have more than balanced German progress in organizing the exploitation of non-German labor and facilities. Even with further civilian sacrifices, output of finished munitions may have declined about five percent net from the 1941-42 peak. The capacity of the area integrated under German control would have permitted a substantial expansion of output if the manpower shortage and bomb damage had not interfered.

A scale of military activity involving attrition at 1942 rates could be maintained only by drawing on stocks of most major items. Output of fighter aircraft, however, is increasing and has been well in excess

of wastage in recent months. Fighter wastage could increase by one-third to one-half during the coming year without occasioning a decline in fighter strength.

*e. German Morale.* The two big factors in German morale are the attitude towards (1) the outcome of the war and (2) the treatment of Germany in the event of her defeat. There is evidence that a considerable part of German military personnel still believe that Germany will not be defeated, but belief in total victory seems to be fading. Civilian morale is undoubtedly lower than military morale, but has demonstrated no positive tendency toward defeatism. Morale is supported by the widespread conviction that Germany would be ruined if defeated and German propaganda zealously engenders this belief. In consequence, most German civilians appear reconciled to the prevailing standard of living, which is far from intolerable, for as long as is necessary to secure an acceptable peace. Morale is being increasingly affected by air attack. There are indications of growing uneasiness over the presence of so many foreign workmen and prisoners of war in Germany. Continuation of reverses may weaken German morale further by spreading conviction of inevitable defeat.

### 3. The Situation by Fronts.

*a. The Russian Front.* Since early spring two-thirds of Germany's ground strength (203 divisions) has been on the Russian front, with very heavy offensive concentrations near Orel and Belgorod. It is believed that the Germans planned an early operation to pinch off the Kursk salient at least, but that it was suspended on account of the sudden collapse in Tunisia. On 5 July, the Germans launched a violent attack northward and eastward from Belgorod, which failed, apparently with severe losses. A complementary attack southward from Orel made no headway. The Russians seized the initiative and launched a heavy converging attack on Orel, where the German position now appears to be precarious. This situation, if not preliminary to more extensive operations (as was the Russian Kharkov offensive in the spring of 1942), marks a new phase in the war in the east, with the Russians conducting a mid-summer offensive and the Germans professing to welcome a positional battle of attrition.

On the whole front, Russian ground strength is to the German as three to two. The superiority of German communications, staff work, and fighting skill may yet compensate for this disparity. Russian staff planning, however, has improved since 1941-42.

Germany has, on the Russian front, some 2,000 aircraft, of which 1,170 are bombers of all types. Available information indicates that the U.S.S.R. air strength is numerically superior in the ratio of approximately two to one. But due to a large proportion of obsolescent

aircraft and to a low rate of serviceability its overall effectiveness has until recently been low. As a result, the Germans have been able to prevent the U.S.S.R. from establishing effective air superiority in any large sector. This advantage is rapidly being lost as the proportion of first-line aircraft is increased and combat efficiency improved.

*b. Mediterranean Front.* The Axis forces available for the defense of this front are for the most part Italian, although Germany has recently sent ground reinforcements to both Italy and the Balkans. Axis ground strength in this area is believed to be disposed as follows (28 July) :

	<i>Italian divisions</i>		<i>German divisions</i>	<i>Bulgarian divisions</i>
	<i>Field</i>	<i>Coastal</i>		
French Coast	5	2	6	—
Corsica	2	2	—	—
Sardinia	3	2	1	—
Sicily	5†	2‡	3½	—
Italy	11	6	3	—
Balkans—Aegean	31	—	18§	20

Axis air strength in this area was approximately as follows (24 July) :

	<i>Italian Total</i>	<i>(Fighter)</i>	<i>German Total</i>	<i>(Fighters)</i>
Central Med.	1050	(475)	945	(320)
Eastern Med.	350	(100)	180	(45)

The Italian battleships and cruisers seem likely to continue inactive. Naval defense will depend primarily on Italian and German submarines, motor torpedo boats, and possibly destroyers.

Movement of German ground forces into and within Italy has hitherto indicated an intention to defend the peninsula. Twelve additional divisions are available in France for reinforcement. However, the apparent reluctance of the Italians to fight, and the instability of the internal situation in Italy brings the capability into question. The repercussions of an Italian collapse would be particularly serious in the Balkans.

*c. Western Front.* Germany has fortified the coast from Hendaye to Petsamo and can offer formidable resistance to any attempted landing. She cannot, however, prevent heavy aerial bombardment of the industrial bases of her military power in western Germany.

The coastal defenses are particularly strong and in depth from Brittany to Holland (the area in which a landing could be supported by land-based fighters) and are backed by two interior defensive zones in advance of the reversed Maginot Line and the West Wall. There are in

†Four badly depleted. One fresh regiment has arrived. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡Three others have disintegrated. [Footnote in the source text.]

§ Six defensive. [Footnote in the source text.]

France and the Low Countries 44 German divisions, 14 more than the estimated defensive minimum.

In Norway (exclusive of the Kirkenes area) there are 12 German divisions supported by approximately 200 aircraft. German defensive capabilities are enhanced by the presence of major naval units (*Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Luetzow*).

*d. The Bomber Offensive.* The scale of bombing attacks on Germany's vital centers is steadily increasing. Due to improvements in equipment and bombing technique the weight of bombs now being dropped monthly is more than three times that of a year ago. Far greater precision, penetration and saturation of targets is being achieved. This rising scale of effectiveness must be considered in any assessment based upon past results.

In the Ruhr, where German heavy industry is principally concentrated, the bomber offensive has effected a reduction of about 30% in normal production. In Axis Europe as a whole, it is believed to have effected a gross reduction in mine and manufacturing output of between 5 and 10%. Due to the fact that the reduction in industrial production to date has been largely confined to primary and semi-fabricated materials, its effect upon the military potential cannot be expected to be immediate and direct. However, since no considerable relocation of vital war industries is practicable, and since the range of bombing flights is increasing, the results so far achieved justify the expectation that the long-range effects of bombing attacks, if continued and intensified, will seriously impair the ability of the Axis to equip and supply its forces in the field.

The possibility of offsetting production losses in part by utilizing spare capacity exists in the coke and iron and steel industries as well as certain branches of the chemical industry; cuts in non-military consumption of some chemical products can be made without serious sacrifice.

Of great importance in a general assessment of the results of the offensive, is the consideration of the imponderable effects upon the civil population. Increasing casualties, extensive destruction of housing (about 16% of the population of the Ruhr have already been made homeless), disruption of transportation and public services with consequent food and water shortages, constant fear and nights of sleeplessness, have greatly increased the strain upon the people. With no prospect of relief from continuous and more intense bombing, and with hope of ultimate victory waning, further deterioration in morale may be expected.

*e. The War Against Shipping.* The destruction of shipping by the European Axis, after rising to almost two million G.R.T. during the

second quarter of 1942 and continuing near that level during the two remaining quarters of the year, dropped sharply to 1.3 million G.R.T. during the first quarter of 1943 and to 0.6 million during the second. Attacks by German and Italian submarines accounted during each of these periods for 80 to 95% of the destruction of tonnage by the European Axis—90% or more during the last three—and for 70 to 80% of the combined destruction of tonnage by the European Axis and by Japan.

The net results of all efforts at destruction by the European Axis and by Japan, of the losses of vessels from all other causes, and of new construction, on the tonnage available to the United Nations have been approximately as follows:

(1) The *tanker* tonnage available on 1 July 1943 was less by 700,000 G.R.T. than at the beginning of 1942, but was greater by 400,000 G.R.T. than at its low points reached during that year. This tonnage increased 300,000 G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 470,000 less losses of 170,000 G.R.T.).

(2) The *non-tanker* tonnage available was greater by nearly four million G.R.T. on 1 July 1943 than at the beginning of 1942. This tonnage increased 2.6 million G.R.T. during the second quarter of 1943 (new construction of 3.3 less losses of 0.7 million G.R.T.).

A great increase has unquestionably occurred during the past year or more in the difficulties and hazards experienced by Axis submarines in locating and attacking suitable shipping targets. This has resulted not only in a marked downward trend in the rate of destruction of shipping, but also in a marked upward trend in the rate of loss of submarines. During May, June, and July of this year the losses of German submarines may have equalled their average rate of production; and the losses of Italian submarines probably exceeded theirs. Another result in evidence during July has been a marked shift of German and Italian submarines from the main convoy routes to other areas where targets, though fewer, tend to be less well protected by anti-submarine forces.

No marked drop in the morale of German submarine personnel can be said to have occurred, though there have been various indications of some degree of deterioration, especially in security consciousness. There are many indications of a shortage of well trained personnel.

Whatever steps Germany may now take to overcome her loss of headway in the war against shipping must be taken in face of large increases in the advantage and momentum gained by the United Nations and in face of the persistent tendency of technical developments to be more favorable to the anti-submarine forces than to the submarine. But by continuing her submarine warfare against shipping Germany can at least prevent the United Nations from diverting to

other channels the huge amounts of manpower, energy, and materials which they must then devote to countermeasures.

#### 4. The Situation in the Satellite Countries.

*a. Italy.* The fall of Mussolini is indicative of the unstable situation in Italy. The immediate purpose of Badoglio's appointment appears to have been to arrest serious internal disintegration. Although he may succeed in rallying the Italians for the time being, increased resistance, even with German reinforcement, cannot now protect Italy from the ravages of war, and so offers no escape from the predicament which produced the internal crisis. On the other hand, the presence of German forces and absence from the peninsula of the greater portion of the Italian Army (45 out of 57 firstline divisions) may prevent Badoglio from escape by negotiation with the United Nations. If effective relief from Allied attack is not soon obtained, the internal situation will continue to disintegrate.

*b. Hungary and Rumania.* Because of the vital importance to her of Rumanian oil and of Hungarian communications and oil, Germany will maintain a firm grip on both countries as long as she is able, but each would be glad to escape (unless the tide turns toward Germany). Both fear the U.S.S.R. Each is hostile toward the other. Each would seek terms guaranteeing protection against the other and against the U.S.S.R. as well as against Germany.

*c. Bulgaria* has undertaken no more than the defense of her sphere of interest in the Balkans (including Greek and Yugoslav territory) and particularly has insisted on maintaining diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.

*d. Finland* is bound to Germany by her fear of the U.S.S.R., her dependence on Germany for essential supplies, and the presence of German troops. She would willingly withdraw from the war if these problems could be solved. She maintains contact with the United Nations through continued relations with the United States.

#### 5. The Situation in Occupied Countries.

*a. Norway.* Strong undercover resistance to German occupation continues unabated.

*b. Denmark.* Although Denmark has been set up as a model for the "New Order," receiving exceptionally mild treatment, anti-German sentiment continues in relatively passive form.

*c. The Low Countries.* Hostility toward Germany exists in both countries, although less bitter in Belgium than in Holland.

*d. France.* Although the puppet regime at Vichy is being forced into closer collaboration, hostility toward Germany is general and underground resistance appears to be well organized.

*e. Poland.* Although an effective national underground organization exists, the situation is complicated by a boundary dispute with the U.S.S.R. and the presence of Russian guerrillas and various Russian-influenced underground organizations independent of the Polish government in London.

*f. Yugoslavia.* German and Italian forces have conducted extensive operations to eliminate guerrilla activity, but such resistance continues on a reduced scale. Although guerrilla forces which recognize the government-in-exile and others which are influenced by the U.S.S.R. have clashed, latest reports indicate that some degree of coordination between them may have been established.

*g. Greece.* Some underground and guerrilla activity exists, but the country is so exhausted that little effective military assistance can be expected. There is considerable opposition to a restoration of the government of King George II.

*h. Occupied Russia.* Considerable guerrilla activity continues behind the German lines. German efforts to organize anti-Communist Russian forces have had only limited success.

#### 6. The Attitudes of European Neutrals.

*a. Sweden* is firm in her neutrality and is taking a stronger attitude than formerly in her relations with Germany. Public expression of sympathy with the United Nations, especially with Norway, is increasingly permitted.

*b. Switzerland.* Despite their isolation, the Swiss have succeeded in maintaining a firmly neutral attitude.

*c. Spain.* The steadily mounting show of power of the Western United Nations in the Mediterranean area has impressed the high command of the Spanish Army that Franco's past alignment was wrong. The Falange is very unpopular with the people in Spain. Liberals and conservatives including those elements in favor of a restoration of the monarchy have been estranged by Franco pronouncements and it is now clear that the Army holds the key to the Spanish situation.

Franco himself has given no indication of abandoning his proposed belief in the Spanish types of totalitarianism which he has rechristened "Unitarianism" and which he claims is peculiarly suited to the Spanish people. He has maintained that all nations, including the United Nations, will emerge from the war with some form of totalitarianism. Whether these beliefs arise from sincere conviction or whether it is that he has been so sheltered and isolated that he has recently been unable to gauge the sentiments and strength of the United Nations or the feeling of his own people cannot be ascertained.

The Army high command, convinced of the change in the international and domestic situation, have let it be known that they intend to confront Franco with the true picture, and call for an immediate restoration of the monarchy with a liberalized constitution before it is too late.

Franco has said that he would resist any invasion of Spanish soil, whether by the Western United Nations or by the Axis, and it is generally believed that he would keep his word. A *junta* of generals representing the most popular element in the army are reported to have agreed that they would resist any such invasion, irrespective of Franco's decision, and would depose him if he declined to take the leadership or showed signs of aligning himself more closely with the Axis.

It is therefore considered possible that under increasing pressure of events, Franco may, in order to hold his position, seek United Nations support.

*d. Portugal.* Although remaining neutral, Portugal now leans toward the United Nations.

*e. Turkey.* Although well disposed toward Great Britain and the United States, Turkey is not apt to make an early departure from her position of neutrality. Her fear of Soviet domination of the Balkans, however, will probably lead her to active participation in the war, when it can be done at minimum cost, in order to obtain a voice in the peace settlement.

## 7. Summary of the Existing Situation.

The situation of the European Axis has definitely deteriorated during the past year. The war against shipping, which was to prevent effective support of United Nations operations from overseas, has failed to accomplish that purpose. German air strength has proved insufficient to meet all defensive requirements; in particular, the G.A.F. has been unable to challenge Allied air superiority in the Mediterranean or to prevent devastating aerial bombardment of western Germany. Although the German Army has been brought to peak strength by scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel, it has not been able, at that strength, to eliminate the Russian threat in time to gain for Germany freedom of action in dealing with attack from the west and south. As a result of aerial bombardment and manpower shortage, German war production has begun to decline. Italy is reeling under direct attack, and the other satellites cannot be relied upon in similar circumstances.

Although Germany cannot now impose her will on the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in combination, the High Com-

mand, the armed forces, and the German people still hope to gain an acceptable and even advantageous negotiated peace by stubborn resistance and by diplomacy.

#### 8. Courses of Action Open to Germany, 1943-44.

*a. To Continue the War Against Shipping.* Germany will follow this course to the end, to the best of her ability, regardless of what other courses she may adopt.

*b. To Seek a Decision in Russia.* Only by the destruction of the Soviet armies can Germany completely free herself of her huge commitment in the east in order to concentrate her forces against her enemies in the west. The lateness of the season and the course of operations around Kursk would seem to indicate that she cannot accomplish this in 1943. In 1944 she will have less force available for the purpose.

*c. To Seek During 1943 To Improve Her Defensive Position in the U.S.S.R. and To Impair or Destroy Soviet Offensive Capabilities.* This would be the best alternative to *b* as a means of reducing her commitment in the east in order to meet attack in the west in 1944. It may be the object of current German operations in Russia. So far the Germans have failed to straighten their Russian front by the recapture of Kursk. They may hope that the battle of attrition at Orel will significantly impair Soviet strength. Attrition, however, is double-edged.

*d. To Undertake Offensive Operations in the West or South.* Such a course would sacrifice her advantage of position and expose the forces engaged to destruction. Moreover, she lacks the requisite air and naval strength to conduct such an operation. The present deployment of the German Army indicates that this course has been discarded for 1943. It will be even less feasible in 1944.

Since an invasion of Spain is the only overland operation which Germany can undertake in this direction, we examine that capability in greater detail.

By crossing the Pyrenees, where the rail net changes to a different gauge from that standard in central Europe, and where both road and rail communications are subject to interdiction by aerial attack, any forces so committed are subject to denial of supply and reinforcement.

At present Germany is believed to have 186 operational aircraft (mostly long-range bombers) now disposed in Southern France. Any build-up of air support for an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula at this time could be made only by a transfer of operational aircraft from other theaters where German air strength is inadequate to meet, suc-

cessfully, its commitments. The Germans *have* the capability of increasing the strength now in Southern France to from 500 to 600 aircraft by withdrawals from Italy and the Western front. In the event such an undertaking were accepted as a calculated risk, the complications of supply and maintenance will reduce effectiveness to below 30% by the end of the first month. Germany could presumably divert 250 transport aircraft (Ju-52) to this zone of operations within a week, from her strength of 1250 transports (of which 40% are non-operational in Central Germany), and possibly another 250, including 25 Me 323's, within two weeks; but this would leave her practically without transport aircraft on other fronts. The Ju-52 has a range of about 780 miles, which would enable it to be flown from southern France (Bayonne) to Madrid and return without refueling. It is not believed that, except for limited offensive strikes, the German Air Force could advance through a hostile Spain any more rapidly than the ground force, owing to logistical problems and inability to protect advanced airdromes. The available airdromes, though scattered, are believed to be adequate for such aircraft as might be used, apart from logistical considerations.

It is estimated that 12 German divisions will be required in Italy, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Seven divisions have actually been identified in those areas and there are indications that an additional five are "ear marked" for Italy. In France, where we believe the German strategic reserve to be stationed, there will then remain 11 divisions available for use in Spain above what we believe to be the minimum defensive commitment there. To these could be added one division from Germany and another from Denmark. We believe that none of these 13 divisions are up to pre-Stalingrad standards in training and combat efficiency. We further believe that to successfully accomplish an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, even with no Spanish resistance, would require 12 German divisions. We believe that the Spanish will not cooperate. We believe that to accomplish this mission at least 20 German divisions would be required against Spanish resistance augmented by United Nations forces as they become available. We believe that such an operation would originate from Southern France where, along the Spanish border there are now only two divisions disposed.

The German comb-out and call-up of the fall of 1942 has we believe, extracted practically all available German man-power except oncoming classes. If casualties continue at approximately the same rate as 1941 and 1942, Germany will not be able to maintain existing Army strength. As the Western United Nations continue to expand their capabilities in England and the Mediterranean, German defensive com-

mitments will increase and in consequence less force will be available in 1944 for such an invasion.

Such a course of action might, in desperation, be adopted by Germany, in order to create a situation for the negotiation of an acceptable peace with the United States and Great Britain. The poorly equipped Spanish ground forces, with practically no air support, are not presently deployed to resist Axis penetration. Even if the military successes or diplomatic pressure of the United Nations should bring about the redistribution of these Spanish forces essentially to block the Pyrenees, German forces would probably still be capable of occupying strategic areas threatening the Straits of Gibraltar unless United Nations' forces intervene. From bases in southern Spain, the German Air Force might temporarily interrupt the passage of our convoys through the Straits of Gibraltar. Should the United Nations increase their commitments in the Central Mediterranean and penetrate deeper into the Axis Citadel from this area, the temptation to interdict their vital artery of communication correspondingly increases.

*e. To Stand on the Strategic Defensive.* This is the present German attitude in the west and south and may be forced upon Germany in the east as well. It is a negative course which cannot bring victory, but may serve to avert complete defeat. Its adoption would not preclude counter-offensive action to destroy or expel any United Nations force which gained a lodgment on the continent.

*f. To Abandon Outlying Territory (e.g., Norway, France, Italy, Greece, portions of Russia, Finland) in order to conserve and concentrate strength.* The consequent impairment of her military, economic, political, or psychological situation will not permit Germany to adopt this course voluntarily.

*g. To Sue for Peace.* Germany is probably already willing to accept a negotiated peace, but is unable to obtain acceptable terms from the United Nations. In this situation, if she cannot conduct a successful defense on all fronts, she will seek to divide her enemies and obtain an acceptable negotiated peace with one party in order to concentrate against the other. Although a separate peace with Great Britain and the United States might be preferable to her, one with the U.S.S.R. might be more practicable and might appear to be advantageous.

Actual or virtual surrender will remain unacceptable so long as there is hope of achieving a stalemate or a negotiated peace. Should the High Command conclude that surrender is inevitable, it may try to yield to the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States separately, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time, meanwhile trying to hold off the other party.

## 9. Germany's Most Probable Courses of Action, 1943-1944.

- a. To continue the war against shipping.
- b. To endeavor, during 1943, to improve her defensive position in Russia and to impair Soviet offensive capabilities by attrition.
- c. To stand on the strategic defensive in the west and south during 1943 and on all fronts during 1944.
- d. To abandon outlying territory only under compulsion.
- e. If surrender becomes inevitable, to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or to Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect at that time.

## 10. Forecast for 1943-1944.

- a. The German war against shipping will continue, but probably with diminishing effect.
- b. The bomber offensive against Germany will have cumulative effect destructive of the German industrial potential, the G.A.F. fighter force, the air defenses, and morale. It may create conditions within the country which will facilitate and hasten complete military defeat.
- c. Germany will continue to resist as long as hope persists that thereby she may gain a negotiated peace. When surrender becomes inevitable, she may seek to yield to either the U.S.S.R. or Great Britain and the United States, whichever course offers the better prospect to her at that time.
- d. The German satellites (Italy, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland) will collapse or come to terms whenever forced to bear the brunt of direct and sustained attack or whenever relieved of fear of Germany and of the U.S.S.R.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum Prepared in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 August 1943.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Conduct of the War in Europe.

1. *The United Nations have failed during the past year and a half to concentrate their forces and to hold to decisions.* The violation of these basic principles has resulted in the assembly of a much smaller military force against the European Axis than would otherwise have been possible. Since April, 1942, the United States and Great Britain

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<sup>1</sup> Copies of this memorandum were sent to Roosevelt and to each United States officer designated to attend the Quebec Conference. See Matloff, p. 176.

have maintained verbal adherence to the decision that the main and decisive effort would be a cross-channel operation and that forces and supplies would be built up in the U.K. for that purpose. The giving bit by bit of resources to the Mediterranean, which has always been regarded as a secondary theater, has resulted in a net decrease in the U.S. forces and resources which could have been brought to bear against the enemy. After deciding firmly to attack across channel and to build up the necessary forces in accordance with the BOLERO plan, it was decided to do TORCH. There was to be no change in the U.S.-British main decisive effort. A net result of the disruptions of personnel and cargo shipping caused by this shift, originally considered as temporary, and by the day to day allotment of men and resources for the Mediterranean was that by 1 April 1943 the U.S. had only approximately 452,000 men facing the European Axis from the U.K. and from the Mediterranean, instead of the 1,074,000 scheduled for the U.K. by 1 April 1943 in the original BOLERO plan—a net loss in U.S. troop movements overseas of over 600,000 men prior to April 1943. We have every reason to believe that the figure of approximately 1,000,000 men in the U.K. by 1 April 1943 could have been attained. It was based on a careful investigation of possibilities by British as well as by American authorities. The British who worked on BOLERO will doubtless agree that the project could have been carried out. The loss of 600,000 men can be attributed mainly to the movement of 150,000 U.S. and 250,000 British troops to North Africa from [the] U.K.; the delays caused by readjustment of shipping schedules in preparation for the North Africa move; the meager port capacities in North Africa which limited the number of ships that could be handled in each convoy from the U.S. to a troop list of about 40,000 during the early period of the occupation; the lack of sufficient naval escorts for convoys to the U.K. at the same time they were being run to North Africa.

2. *The above is by no means a complete measure of the waste which has resulted from reversal of decisions and from day-to-day variations from programs established and accepted as the basis for training men, producing equipment and deploying these resources throughout the world.* Included in this waste are: the loss in cargo lift due to the transshipment of hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies through the U.K. to North Africa rather than directly; the waste of U.S. manpower resulting from pressing at high speed the training and equipment of units for an agreed major operation which is continually postponed, while a series of secondary operations are undertaken for which they are either not required or unsuitable; the waste in moving units great distances into staging areas and then failing to ship them overseas because of sudden changes in plans; the uneconomic use of

U.S. and British labor and production facilities in straining every effort to produce equipment and provide a base in time for a major scheduled operation which is not carried out according to plan. These disruptions are relatively much greater in the U.S. than in the U.K. The bulk of the supplies come from here. The great distances in the United States between depots, military camps and ports and the distances between bases serving theaters and sub-theaters of war must be kept always in mind when any change in a course of action is suggested. A diversion of any part of the flow of men and supplies once started towards a particular sub-theater results in delays and wastes which the United Nations cannot afford. Unsound practices such as those listed above, if continued, will certainly postpone victory, and may result in only a partial defeat of the Axis.

3. *In showing the cost of the change from the Channel to Africa there is no intention to belittle the effects of TORCH.* TORCH was successful and has brought great results. The Mediterranean has been opened, Italy is trembling in the balance, southern and eastern Germany have been placed under threat of air attack, the vitally important Ploesti oil fields have been attacked. Much has been gained. BOLERO was not carried out and any appraisal of what might have resulted can be questioned. However, this direct action was the one chance to end the war in Europe this year. If this had happened, all that has been gained would be insignificant in comparison. It is particularly pertinent now to note that if we can put our air far enough north in Italy to bomb southern Germany, all the major military gains to be gotten from the African operation will have been attained. Decisive military action against Germany cannot come from that area. We recognize that plans must be flexible. We do not advocate sticking blindly to a plan regardless of what happens. All military undertakings are uncertain. We cannot control what the enemy does nor predict definitely his reaction. Changes should and must be made. Minor changes can be made. What we are trying to bring out is that major changes are terribly destructive and wasteful.

4. *Today the United States and Great Britain have two forces of limited size located in widely separated areas facing the European Axis.* Neither of these forces nor their bases are at present adequate to launch an offensive which will bring victory, quick and complete. Furthermore, it is doubtful that they are now sufficient to take full advantage of an opportunity presented by a major weakening of Axis power. The price of variations and reversals in decisions is now and will continue to be the failure to economize in our use of resources and the failure to concentrate such resources in a way to assure complete victory. A firm decision with determination to stick to the agreed

decision is now a "must." Any variations, no matter how attractive, may endanger the entire program. Small diversions create grossly disproportionate disruptions and delays in preparations for the decisive effort. These may culminate in unforeseen demands for major portions of U.S.-British resources. The United States and Great Britain have now reached the crossroads in the war where perseverance in the practice of dispersing the limited resources and reversing or amending decisions, involves a grave danger that the war will become stalemated or that decisive action leading to complete victory will be indefinitely postponed.

5. *In order to clinch at the earliest practicable moment, the victory now in sight the United States and Great Britain must decide on a main effort, must stick to that decision, must concentrate overwhelming air, sea, and land power for that main effort, must launch the main effort with skillful and explosive force, and must assign to all other efforts the task of preparation for and support of the decisive blow. A failure to adopt this overall policy will imperil the final victory.*

6. *The United States and Great Britain must, at QUADRANT, choose between attempting a decisive effort from the Mediterranean and reaffirming again the decision taken in London in April 1942 and affirmed at ANFA and TRIDENT Conferences<sup>2</sup> to launch a decisive main effort across the channel.* The choice made must be supported by a strong resolution to carry out the decision with completely adequate resources and without variation or delay.

7. *The allocation of additional forces to the Mediterranean is uneconomical and assists Germany to create a strategic stalemate in Europe.* The returns which can be foreseen from such commitments are based upon speculative political considerations. The terrain and communications systems prevent [the] United States and Great Britain from effectively using large forces and enable the Germans to effect a stalemate in the rugged areas bordering the Mediterranean using comparatively small forces which may be little more than present garrisons. The quantity and effectiveness of aid or opposition to be expected from Turks, Bulgars, Rumanians, Hungarians, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs and Greeks cannot be assessed. The area of operations is distant from major United Nations bases, particularly those suitable for supporting the first and critical phases of an amphibious assault.

8. *In short, the Mediterranean does not offer an opportunity for decisive military action against Germany, does not present an opportunity to draw continually increasing forces from Russia, and does not provide the opportunity to place effectively in combat the ground forces of the United States and Britain.* Furthermore, operations in

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 796, and *ante*, p. 365.

the Mediterranean do not contribute to the defeat of the submarine and do not force Germany to expose her air force to the destructive losses inherent in a defense against a decisive U.S.-British air-ground offensive.

9. *A cross-channel offensive contributes directly and with ever-increasing impact toward the essentials of military victory over the Axis.* It can be launched from the U.K. which is the only U.S.-British base capable of unleashing a mass explosive air, sea and land attack directly against the German army. It will destroy or neutralize the most important German submarine bases. It will bring on an air battle which will result in the destruction of the German air force. It will bring our forces to grips with the German army in an area where all available British and U.S. air and ground forces can be used effectively and decisively. Germany must then choose between a retreat which will allow the assault forces to seize decisive land areas, and the transfer of divisions from the Russian front and other areas. Such transfers must quickly lead to the crumbling of her defenses and the attainment by the United Nations of complete victory.

10. *The choice between Mediterranean operations and a decisive cross-channel operation is a decision between:*

a. Trusting that the Germans and Russians will continue to weaken and destroy each other while the U.S. and Great Britain succeed in crumbling the internal support of the German war machine by raids, limited operations, propaganda, sabotage, strategic bombardment and political disintegration *and*

b. Accepting that Germany cannot be defeated without bringing to bear against the German army the maximum military power of the U.S., Britain and Russia with the objective of defeating the German army by coordinated offensive air-ground action across the channel and from the Eastern front.

An expansion of operations in the Mediterranean is consistent with the first course of action. This area offers only an opportunity for gambling that victory can be achieved as a primary result of psychological and political pressure. The estimates governing the detailed course of action and the appraisal of the likelihood of success must be based primarily on political speculations and hopes concerning the weaknesses of our enemies and strengths of our allies. Military action is not and will not be the decisive factor. On the other hand a cross-channel operation is consistent with the second course of action set forth above. The opposition to be overcome and the cost in men and resources can be appraised in terms of military action. Men, guns and planes and not political and psychological imponderables, determine ultimate success or failure.

11. *It is very doubtful that the Russian Army supplemented by the effects of strategic bombardment will, unaided by a major U.S.-British air-ground operation, be sufficient to destroy the fighting power of Axis ground forces.* It is certain that dependence upon the Russian army alone for major ground operations will result in a protracted European war and may lead to unilateral action culminating in peace short of complete victory. Such a course of action is unacceptable.

12. *It is clear that the soundest course of action is to mass air, sea, and land power in the U.K. for a cross-channel assault. But even more vital to the achievement of victory than the particular course of action chosen, is the pressing necessity of deciding what that course of action shall be and then sticking vigorously and wholeheartedly to that decision.*

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 303

## STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

### THE PROBLEM

1. To develop a strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

### DISCUSSION

2. *Axis Strategic Situation and United Nations Strategy.* From the Axis point of view, objective evaluation of the events of the past year must present a discouraging picture. At sea, the effectiveness of the U-boat campaign has decreased sharply. In the air, the Axis has seen its enemies achieve varying degrees of superiority on all fronts. Meanwhile, the Combined Bomber Offensive accelerates. On the ground, the Axis has seen initial successes in both Egypt and Russia degenerate into a steady series of military reverses; El Alamein—Stalingrad—winter defeat in Russia—Tunisia—Belgorod—Sicily—and now Orel.

Due primarily to inadequate air power, the Axis now lacks the capability of destroying the Russian armed forces, particularly while engaged in containing or parrying the blows of the increasing Anglo-American sea, air, and ground forces in Western Europe. As long as the bulk of the German forces is contained on the Russian front,

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 303), August 9, 1943, presenting the enclosure to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. For the discussion of this paper at the 108th, 109th, and 110th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 16, and 17, 1943, see *post*, pp. 864, 870, 875.

the Axis has very limited offensive capabilities, including invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, which is now considered unlikely.

It is difficult to believe that current Axis strategy still visualizes total victory, as once conceived. There are as yet no definite indications, but it is reasonable to suppose that the Axis leadership may now seek a satisfactory negotiated peace. Failing in this, an "honorable" surrender might be the next Axis objective. The Axis, however, still retains strong defensive power. A defensive strategy on the part of the Axis might develop into a protracted struggle and result in a stalemate on the Continent. It is imperative, therefore, that the Allied Powers penetrate to the heart of the fortress of Europe, come to grips with the enemy and thus bring about the early and decisive defeat of the Axis.

In the early stages of the present war, the United Nations of necessity pursued an opportunistic strategy forced upon them by their comparative weakness. However, the present rapidly improving position of the United Nations in relation to the Axis in Europe demands an abrogation of opportunistic strategy and requires the adoption of and adherence to sound strategic plans which envisage decisive military operations conducted at times and places of our choosing—not the enemy's.

*If present conditions justify our principal effort in the Mediterranean, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve plans:*

*a. That would require the concentration of our strength in that area, and concurrently*

*b. That would provide only sufficient forces in the British Isles to secure this important base and to make available opportunistic forces to cross the channel if a German collapse should occur.*

*However, conditions have not so changed as to justify on sound military grounds the renunciation of the TRIDENT concept.<sup>2</sup> We must not jeopardize our sound over-all strategy simply to exploit local successes in a generally accepted secondary theater, the Mediterranean, where logistical and terrain difficulties preclude decisive and final operations designed to reach the heart of Germany.*

A careful evaluation of the march of events in the world and particularly in the European-Mediterranean area indicates that the strategy enunciated in TRIDENT is sound—specifically:

*a. That Operation OVERLORD, carefully synchronized with the Combined Bomber offensive, if given whole-hearted and immediate support, would result in an early and decisive victory in Europe;*

*b. That continued operations in the Mediterranean should be conducted with available Allied resources as stipulated in TRIDENT in*

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<sup>2</sup> The various TRIDENT decisions referred to in this paper are recorded in C.C.S. 242/6, *ante*, p. 364.

order to cause the collapse of Italy, to create diversions of enemy forces and to destroy vital Axis installations on the Continent.

It is on this basis that the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe is developed in the present paper.

### 3. *Operations in Russia*

It is assumed that Russia will continue to exert increasing and eventually crushing pressure against the German armies massed against her. In the unlikely event of either a separate Russo-German armistice or peace, the strategy of the United Nations will require reexamination. In that case, the defeat of Japan would probably take priority over the defeat of Germany.

4. *European Strategic Concept 1943-44.* For the purposes of clarity and analysis, the concept of operations here recommended is outlined first in its entirety; thereafter, its component elements are discussed.

#### a. *Operation POINTBLANK*

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

#### b. *Operation OVERLORD*

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944.) After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(2) Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

(3) As between the operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources OVERLORD will have an overriding priority.

#### c. *Operations in Italy*

(1) *First Phase.* The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases at least as far north as the Rome area, and, if feasible, to include the Ancona area.

(2) *Second Phase.* Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

(3) *Third Phase.* The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in northern Italy, and the creation, *with available Mediterranean* forces, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into southern France.

*d. Operations in Southern France*

Offensive operations against southern France, utilizing available Mediterranean forces (to include trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD.

*e. Air Operations*

(1) Strategic bombing operations from central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

(2) Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

(3) Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.

(4) Air supply of Balkan guerrillas (see *g* below).

*f. Operations at Sea*

(1) Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the Azores.

(2) Security of our sea communications.

(3) Continued disruption of Axis sea communications.

(4) Support of amphibious operations.

*g. Operations in the Balkans*

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of Ploesti and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

*h. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean*

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix "A") in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

*5. Operation OVERLORD*

This is the main U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. In consonance with the decisions made at TRIDENT and reaffirmed for QUADRANT (par. 5, Section III, Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-all Strategic Concept), maximum resources will be concentrated in the U.K. "as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel." Target date for

execution of plans now being prepared by COSSAC is 1 May 1944. After a firm lodgment has been established and adequate channel and Atlantic ports secured, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

By TRIDENT decisions, OVERLORD will consist of 29 divisions of which seven are to be HUSKY veterans withdrawn from the Mediterranean. If only three of these divisions were moved to the U.K., enough personnel shipping would be available to move four additional U.S. divisions to the U.K., and thus our strength in the Mediterranean would be increased by four divisions without decrease in the planned number for OVERLORD. However, there would then be only three instead of seven battle-tested divisions for OVERLORD, a disadvantage which cannot be accepted. The maximum support should be given the main effort. Hence, the TRIDENT decision to move seven divisions to the U.K. should not be changed.

#### 6. *Operations in Italy and Her Possessions*

a. *General Objectives.* Our immediate objective (TRIDENT) in the Mediterranean is to knock Italy out of the war. This will open the door to the accomplishment of many other important objectives. These are:

(1) The progressive establishment of air bases in Italy, at least as far north as the Ancona area, and the initiation of a strategic bombing offensive therefrom against the Reich and the Balkans, coordinated with and complementing POINTBLANK.

(2) The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation, *with available Mediterranean forces*, of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army, into Southern France.

(3) The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war.

(4) The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet.

(5) The occupation of Sardinia and Corsica.

b. *Specific Operations.* The elimination of Italy as a belligerent does not necessarily mean that the Germans will withdraw behind the Alps. The more likely German reaction will be to defend on the Rimini-Pisa line. Regardless of where Germany may defend in Italy, our strategy must contemplate maintaining steady pressure against her forces. In our view, however, the mere maintenance of pressure on German forces remaining in Italy does not constitute an adequate mission for the powerful forces we will have in the Mediterranean after Italy is knocked out of the war. Including the French, there will be approxi-

mately 4,500 combat aircraft and at least 24 offensive divisions above and beyond garrison and security requirements. Our strategy must provide an appropriate task for these forces in the Mediterranean. Such a task should, if possible, lend support to our main effort across the Channel. Broadly speaking, there are but three places where the ground element of these forces could be utilized: The Balkans, the Trieste-Vienna region, or in Southern France. Each of these warrants brief discussion:

(1) *Balkans*. The Balkans are unsuitable for large scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. This course, therefore, is rejected. (We do recommend special operations in the Balkans. These are discussed in paragraph 9 below).

(2) *Trieste-Vienna*. Offensive operations, either limited or unlimited in their scope and objective, along the Trieste-Vienna line would strike directly at the German heartland. Consequently, such operations would insure a swift and positive German reaction. The nature of the terrain, however, is such that great German forces would not be required to halt our advance. There is no reason to believe that a limited-objective operation in this area would contribute materially to OVERLORD success by drawing significant German forces out of France. The establishment of a new front, moreover, in this area would undoubtedly guarantee the continuous separation of our forces between the Mediterranean and Western France for the duration of the war. Lastly, and by no means of least importance, the French Army wants to fight in France and will have little stomach for operations in the Trieste-Vienna region. Consequently this course is also rejected.

(3) *Southern France*. Southern France is retained as being the only suitable area in which ultimately to utilize the forces that will be available in the Mediterranean after Italy is knocked out of the war. Our concept for the eventual operations in Southern France is developed in paragraph 7, below.

*c. Elimination of the Italian Fleet*. The final elimination of the Italian fleet as a military factor in the war will release the larger units of the British fleet for use in other theaters.

*d. Italian Merchant Fleet*. The acquisition of the Italian merchant fleet will be of assistance to the United Nations in the rehabilitation of Italy.

*e. Occupation of Sardinia and Corsica*. Our forward advance on the mainland of Italy, before Italy is knocked out of the war, need not be restricted by continuing Axis occupation of Sardinia and Corsica. These two islands are very likely to fall when Italy goes out of the war. If not, their reduction and occupation must be accomplished before operations in Southern France are undertaken.

### 7. *Operations in Southern France*

*a.* After Italy is eliminated and the Germans are forced back into Northern Italy, France becomes a vulnerable salient to Germany. At first glance, this salient appears most formidable, bounded as it is on the three exposed sides by heavily-defended seacoasts and neutral Spanish territory. If, however, Russian pressure continues undiminished, the intensity of POINTBLANK is augmented from bases in Italy, our pressure in Italy remains steady, and appropriate political and economic measures are taken with regard to Spain, the adequate defense by the Axis of the French salient will have become a confounding problem. Exposed to steady and increasing pressure, Germany will not have the air power required to adequately maintain her perimeter and internal defense. The German air force will be stretched some 3,000 to 4,000 miles around three sides of the continent of Europe. In view of present estimates that the over-all German strategic situation will continue to deteriorate, we believe that operations for the conquest of France can be initiated in the spring of 1944.

*b.* On the assumption that conditions are substantially as stated in paragraph *a* above, operations in Southern France coordinated with OVERLORD are believed feasible with the first objective the establishment of a firm lodgment in the Marseilles area. The sequence of operations is envisaged as follows:

- (1) Holding attack with strong ground forces in Northern Italy.
- (2) Amphibious invasion of Southern France, under carrier and land-based air support, with relatively small forces. Due to the distances involved, only limited land-based air support can be expected for this operation.
- (3) Security of the lodgment by rapid introduction of strong reinforcements, overland if feasible, from Northern Italy, and by sea within the limits of available shipping.
- (4) Exploitation to secure the Port of Marseilles, and airfields in the area.
- (5) Offensive operations designed to assist OVERLORD by containing maximum German forces.

*c.* For available means see Appendices "A" and "B." Exclusive of garrison and security requirements in the Mediterranean area and the seven divisions transferred to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD, and assuming that 10 divisions will be adequate to maintain pressure against the Germans in Northern Italy, it is estimated that the following forces will be available for offensive operations against Southern France:

- 10 U.S. and British divisions.
- 4 French divisions.
- 4,500 U.S. and British combat aircraft.

Approximately enough amphibious lift for at least two reinforced divisions (44,000). (If LCM's can be used, the lift can be increased to three divisions.)

Adequate Naval escort vessels are now allocated for Mediterranean operations.

#### 8. *Air Operations*

a. The main effort of our Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom progresses and should accomplish the expected results in the destruction of German air power, air defenses, war-making resources, and general morale. This bomber offensive will be carefully integrated with OVERLORD and should be directed so as to reach its greatest effectiveness in the spring of 1944 and thereby create conditions favorable for the OVERLORD operation.

b. A strategic bombing offensive from Italian air bases as far north as Ancona and from other Mediterranean air bases would complement the POINTBLANK offensive. With our Mediterranean air power advanced to bases in the Ancona area of Italy, many critical Axis war industries and resources, including fighter aircraft and oil production, would be within operating radius of our medium as well as heavy bombers.

c. Provision for air support of surface operations requires careful and timely planning. Carrier-borne air cover will probably be required in support of amphibious operations in the Mediterranean beyond the radius of action of land-based fighters.

d. The necessity for air staging points and anti-submarine bases in the Azores was recognized at TRIDENT.<sup>3</sup> Reduced flying time and better weather along this route would result in combat units in the European, Mediterranean, and Far East theaters receiving initial and replacement equipment more expeditiously and in better condition. Anti-submarine bases would complete the air and surface coverage of the central and north Atlantic. Hence, air and naval bases in the Azores should be secured as early as possible.

#### 9. *Operations in the Balkans*

The Balkans are unsuitable for large-scale offensive operations, due to terrain and communication difficulties. Nevertheless, as long as Germans occupy the Balkans there remains a problem as to how to deal with them. It is our view that our strategy is best served if Germany should continue to hold the Balkans, provided Germany can be forced to garrison heavily and be made to pay a high price in attrition of personnel and matériel.

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 366.

Therefore, our strategy should be to supply the Balkan guerrillas by air and sea, with the object of enabling them to compel the Germans to maintain not only present forces of 12 divisions in that region, but also to provide additional divisions to replace the 30 Italian divisions now there.

10. *Policy Toward Spain and Turkey*

a. *Spain*

Spain is assisting the Axis with her economic resources and even with armed forces. The United Nations have endured Spanish official approval of Axis war aims and denunciation of our own with an attitude of conciliation. At the present moment we find Spanish troops defensively disposed against us, with little or no disposition facing our enemy. We are forced by this disposition to maintain large forces ready to protect our lifeline through the Straits of Gibraltar and constantly to plan for immediate provision of additional forces to hold Gibraltar should Spain permit a German offensive through her territory. Indications are that Franco is realizing the final United Nations' victory and is tending toward a position of real neutrality.

The time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy toward Spain. The United Nations should require Spain, for the price of wartime economic assistance and postwar friendship, to:

(1) Shift the bulk of her defensive forces from Morocco and Southern Spain to Northern Spain.

(2) Cease military and economic aid to Germany.

b. *Turkey*

To date, the United Nations have devoted—and, by TRIDENT,<sup>4</sup> are continuing to devote—considerable effort toward bringing Turkey into the war as an ally. This effort takes the form of very sizeable economic aid and involves a United Nations military commitment of considerable proportions. This policy toward Turkey has not been fruitful. The current estimate is that the Turkish attitude is unlikely to change. It is believed, therefore, that the continuation of aid to Turkey, at the present scale, is not warranted.

11. *Relations With Patriot Forces in Europe.* Within the limits of available means and without prejudice to major operations, patriot forces, everywhere within enemy-occupied territory in Europe, should be furnished supplies to enable them to conduct sabotage, propaganda, intelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Since our strategy contemplates the

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<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 371.

conquest of France, the French underground can be expected to make a very important and direct contribution to the U.S. and British effort in Western Europe. The supply of the French underground, and the development of plans for the use of these Patriot Forces, therefore, should have a relatively high priority in our program.

12. *Operations in Liberated Areas.* Should Germany, of her own volition, withdraw her forces from Norway or the Southern Balkans, our policy will be limited to the economic and military supply of the liberated nations to the extent of our capabilities without prejudice to military operations in more vital areas. The advisability of conducting military operations in and from Norway, in the event of German withdrawal therefrom, will be assessed in the light of the then-existing over-all strategic situation.

Appendix "A"

SUGGESTED DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IN THE  
MEDITERRANEAN AFTER THE CONQUEST OF ITALY

	<i>British &amp; Others</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>French</i>	<i>Total</i>
Available in divs. and equivalent				
divs . . . . .	28	9	5	42
<i>Garrisons and Commitments</i>				
Sicily and So. Italy . . . . .	2			2
Central Italy . . . . .	2			2
Sardinia . . . . .	1			1
Corsica . . . . .			1	1
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica . . . . .	1			1
Egypt and Palestine . . . . .	2			2
Syria and Cyprus . . . . .	1			1
North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria, and French Morocco) . . . . .		1	*	1*
Recommended commitment to OVERLORD . . . . .	3	4		7
	12	5	1*	18*
Available for operation in North Italy and Southern France . . . . .	16	4	4	24

\*Six additional French divisions, begin [*being*] equipped and trained in North Africa. [Footnote in the source text.]

## Appendix "B"

## DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN

Unit equipment and total airplanes available as of August 2, 1943:

Types	U.S.		R.A.F.		French	
	UE	Total	UE	Total	UE	Total
Heavy Bombers (D) . . .	262	393	—	—	—	—
Heavy Bombers (N) . . .	—	—	48	72	—	—
Medium Bombers (D) . .	389	588	—	—	—	—
Medium Bombers (N) . .	—	—	183	275	—	—
Light Bombers . . . . .	57	86	384	576	—	—
SEF, TEF, Ftr Bombers . .	1, 069	1, 604	942	1, 413	60	90
TEF (N) . . . . .	24	36	120	180	—	—
Recn and Photo . . . . .	78	116	72	108	3	3
T/C . . . . .	364	546	—	—	—	—
Torpedo Bombers . . . . .	—	—	160	240	3	3
Totals . . . . .	2, 246	3, 369	1, 909	2, 864	66	96
Grand Totals—Unit Equipment . . . . .					4, 221	
Total Airplanes . . . . .					6, 329	
Less for garrison and security in Mediterranean (fighters only):†			Unit equipment . .		1, 164	
			Total Airplanes . .		1, 747	
Balance remaining for offensive operations:			Unit equipment . .		3, 057	
			Total Airplanes . .		4, 582	

NOTES: *a.* Total R.A.F. strength is figured as follows: Number of squadrons  $\times$  authorized strength plus 50% reserve. There is not a definite figure set as a reserve but 50% is known to be very conservative as far as fighters are concerned.

*b.* It is contemplated that the number of U.S. planes will be reduced 365 by Jan. 1944 if proposed planning is carried out.

*c.* Reductions or additions in R.A.F. strength not included.

†Figures based on TRIDENT Estimates. [Footnote in the source text.]

Department of the Army Files

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff (Handy)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

WDCA/381

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HANDY

The President saw me at 2:00 P. M. today. He put the following proposition to me, for which I shall have to have an answer in some form by 11:00 A. M. tomorrow:

Stating that the Planners were always conservative and saw all the difficulties, and that more could usually be done than they were willing to admit, he outlined the following as his desire:

That between OVERLORD and PRICELESS he was insistent on OVERLORD but felt that we could do more than was now proposed for PRICELESS. His idea was that the seven battle-experienced divisions should be provided for OVERLORD but that an equal number of divisions from the U.S. should be routed to PRICELESS.

He stated that he did not wish to have anything to do with an operation into the Balkans, nor to agree to a British expedition which would cost us ships, landing craft, withdrawals, etc. But he did feel that we should secure a position in Italy to the north of Rome and that we should take over Sardinia and Corsica and thus set up a serious threat to southern France.

I told him I would not express an opinion at the moment other than to state that we had strained programmed resources well to the limit in the agreements now standing regarding OVERLORD and PRICELESS, that the movement of three divisions from PRICELESS forces to OVERLORD could be undertaken without expense in troop lift and with advantage to equipment of French divisions; that beyond this the movements to OVERLORD of veteran units would cost us troop lift and I very much feared that a corresponding movement from the U.S. to PRICELESS would impose just that much of a reduction on OVERLORD. However, I told the President I would have a critical review of the logistical involvements by tomorrow morning. Incidentally, he said he did not like my use of the word "critical" because he wanted assistance in carrying out his conception rather than difficulties placed in the way of it—all of this in humorous vein.

As I left he spoke of seeing me at noon tomorrow, and I judge from this that that hour will be proposed for the JCS to meet him. In that event I should have a critical analysis of the effect of his conception in my hands by 11:00 o'clock as I assume we would have the JCS meeting at least an hour before we went to the White House.

G. C. M[ARSHALL]<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The initials are typed on the source text, which has an endorsement indicating that the original was sent to Handy at 3:30 p. m. on August 9, 1943.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 304

#### OPERATION "OVERLORD"—OUTLINE PLAN

1. We have examined carefully the outline plan for operation OVERLORD which General Morgan has submitted.<sup>2</sup> We have the following observations:—

<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of this paper at the 108th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1943, see *post*, p. 864.

<sup>2</sup> The full text of the outline plan referred to, identified as C.O.S. (43) 416 (O), is not printed. For a digest of the outline plan, see the attachment to annex B, p. 488.

*a.* It will be observed that General Morgan lays down three main conditions which must be created if the operation is to have a reasonable prospect of success. These are:—

(1) There must be an overall reduction in the strength of the German Fighter forces between now and the time of the assault.

(2) German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding Divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions, and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 12 full strength, first quality, divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than 15 first quality divisions from Russia during the first two months.

(3) The problem of beach maintenance over a prolonged period in the Channel must be overcome.

We entirely agree with General Morgan that these conditions are essential, and we shall have certain proposals to make during the QUADRANT discussions with a view to their fulfillment.

*b.* The annexed table (Annex "A") shows:—

(1) The Allied rate of build-up as planned by General Morgan.

(2) The maximum rate of German build-up which General Morgan considers acceptable.

From this table it will be seen that our margin of superiority over the maximum acceptable rate of German build-up, particularly during the first two critical days, is small. Moreover, the figures in the Table do not sufficiently reflect the handicap under which our newly-landed divisions must suffer when engaging the enemy's divisions which have all along been established on land. We think it important, therefore, that the scale of German reserves should be reduced by some means below the maximum specified by General Morgan in his second condition. Otherwise, the operation may not succeed.

*c.* We think the general rate of advance planned by General Morgan is optimistic. Recent experience in Sicily shows that if the enemy is resisting fiercely, and if the country lends itself to defense, the advance is bound to be slow. The country south of the Caen beaches is in many respects admirable for delaying actions. We think that this part of General Morgan's plan should be carefully re-examined.

2. Subject to the above observations, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve General Morgan's outline plan and authorize him to proceed with detailed planning, and with full preparations. We gave instructions to this effect before leaving England, in order that no time should be lost, and we ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to endorse our action.

S.S. QUEEN MARY, 10th August, 1943.

## Annex A

*Tabulation by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander  
Designate (Morgan)*

MOST SECRET

COMPARISON OF OUR OWN BUILDUP WITH THE GERMAN RATE OF  
REINFORCEMENT, WHICH C.O.S.S.A.C. STATES CAN BE ACCEPTED

Day	COSSAC's Build-up Detail	German rate of reinforcement that can be accepted	Totals (equivalent divs.)		Comments
			Allied	German	
(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
D Day	Three assault divs. One bde. gp. Three tk. bdes. ¾ airborne div.	One def. div. (coastal) Three divs. (one armd.)	5	4	
D+1	Three assault divs. One follow-up div. Three tk. bdes. 1½ airborne div.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	6½	6	There will be one additional Brit- ish follow-up div. actually landed but not operational until D+2.
D+2	Three assault divs. Two follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	8	6	There will be one additional Brit- ish follow-up div. and one build-up div. actually landed but not opera- tional until D+3.
D+3	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. One build-up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	10	8	There will be one and one-third additional Brit- ish build-up divs. in addition, actually landed, but not opera- tional until D+4.
D+4	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two-third build- up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	11½	8	There will be two tk. bdes. and two-third British build-up div. in addition, actu- ally landed but not operational until D+5.

## Annex B

*The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate  
(Morgan) to the Secretary of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee  
(Redman)*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 15th July, 1943.

C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 28

1. In my original Directive (C.O.S. (43) 215 (O))<sup>3</sup> I was charged with the duty of preparing a plan for a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. This part of my Directive was subsequently amplified (see C.O.S. (43) 113th Meeting (O), Item 4),<sup>3</sup> in that I was ordered to submit an outline plan for an assault, with certain specified forces, on a target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. It was indicated to me, in the course of this amplification, that the lodgement area should include ports that, suitably developed, could be used by ocean-going ships for the build-up of the initial assault forces from the United Kingdom, and for their further build-up with additional divisions and supporting units that might be shipped from the United States or elsewhere.

3. I have the honour now to report that, in my opinion, it is possible to undertake the operation described, on or about the target date named, with the sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain set of circumstances in existence at that time.

4. These governing circumstances are partly within our direct control and partly without. Those within our control relate first to the problem of beach maintenance, and secondly to the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft. Wherever we may attempt to land, and however many ports we capture, we cannot escape the fact that we shall be forced to maintain a high proportion of our forces over the beaches for the first two or three months while port facilities are being restored; and that, in view of the variability of the weather in the Channel, this will not be feasible unless we are able rapidly to improvise sheltered anchorages off the beaches. New methods of overcoming this problem are now being examined. There is no reason to suppose that these methods will be ineffective, but I feel it my duty to point out that this operation is not to be contemplated unless this problem of prolonged cross-beach maintenance and the provision of artificial anchorages shall have been solved.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

5. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption of one course only, or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success in the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up production, of strategical re-allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement of the date of assault.

6. I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources imposed by my directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May, 1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches about Bayeux.

7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in my opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time, both on land in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organised, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at the end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced to the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom to influence these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will take place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now and the date of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation "OVERLORD" is even now in progress, and to take all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are, from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on the chosen day of assault.

9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct comparisons between operation "HUSKY" and operation "OVERLORD." No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for "OVERLORD" is reached, but viewed as a whole the two operations could hardly be more dissimilar. In "HUSKY," the bases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault against an island, whereas in "OVERLORD" it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore,

while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably reliable, in the English Channel the tidal range is considerable and the weather capricious.

10. Attached hereto are papers setting forth the plan that I recommend for adoption.

F. E. MORGAN

*Lieutenant-General, Chief of Staff  
to the Supreme Commander (Designate)*

[Attachment to Annex B]

*Memorandum by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander  
Designate (Morgan)*

MOST SECRET

[LONDON,] 27th July, 1943.<sup>4</sup>

C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 32 (Final)

C.O.S. (43) 415 (O)

### DIGEST OF OPERATION "OVERLORD"

#### OBJECT

1. The object of Operation "OVERLORD" is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units of the rate of three to five divisions per month.

#### SELECTION OF A LODGEMENT AREA

2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an extended period.

3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and

<sup>4</sup>The version of this paper circulated at the Quebec Conference has been substituted for the version originally attached to Morgan's memorandum of July 15, 1943, above. Cf. the date which appears at the end of the paper.

stores inland are those in the Pas de Calais,\* and the Caen†-Cotentin‡ area. Of these, the Caen beaches are the most favourable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable alternative.

4. Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen-Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main landing.

5. As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick turn round for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defence, and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. The defences would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be slow, and the result of the bombardment of beach exits would severely limit the rate of build-up. Further, this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse.

6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches is, however, considered to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low-lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in detail.

7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early capture of the port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the

\*"Pas de Calais area" has been assumed as the area between Gravelines and the River Somme. [Footnote in the source text.]

†"Caen area" is taken as that between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡The "Cotentin" Peninsula is the peninsula in which Cherbourg is situated. [Footnote in the source text.]

Cotentin, and that area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us from breaking out and expanding our initial bridgehead. Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult.

8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly held; the defences are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by *Panzer* divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air defence screen covering the approaches to Germany; and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralisation of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port.

After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final advance Eastwards.

Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages.

#### THE LODGEMENT AREA SELECTED

9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in Caen area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg to Nantes).

#### OPENING PHASE UP TO THE CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG

10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen area, and of the port of Cherbourg.

11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation; the number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector.

12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious tactical disadvantages in the early stages, which will largely offset their numerical superiority. Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be brought to bear against the Caen area.

13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defence in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the over-all strength of the German fighter force between now and the date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganisation of G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area.

14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944, while, on the other hand, the forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine the maximum number of German formations which they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over-riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below (paragraph 35).

15. A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-

Channel operations on the 1st May 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow-up divisions, without "over-heads," and it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in ships.

17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or six parachute regiments will be available, but, largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts.

18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all-round increase of at least 10 per cent in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches.

19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore, of necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open up the port of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered waters.

20. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some eleven divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24.

#### PROPOSED PLAN

##### *Preliminary Phase.*

21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale.

22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of France.

*Preparatory Phase.*

23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., particularly in North-West France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in that area, and will be extended to include attacks against communications more directly associated with movement of German reserves which might affect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast.

*The Assault.*

24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defences three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed up on D day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same time, airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be undertaken to neutralise certain coast defences and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line of Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen.

*Follow-up and Build-up Phase.*

25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards and South-Westwards with a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites for airfields, and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards in order to cover the construction and operation of additional airfields in the area South-East of Caen.

26. It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the general line Trouville-Alençon-Mont St. Michel. By this date, moreover it should have been possible to land some eighteen divisions and to have in operation about fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three fighter-type squadrons should be operating.

## FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AFTER CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG

27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision he will have to be guided largely by

the situation of the enemy forces. If the German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance could be made to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany.

It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany ports first, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine.

28. Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would appear to be to secure first the left flank and to gain sufficient airfields for subsequent operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orléans and Tours.

29. Under cover of these operations a force would be employed in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust Southwards to seize Nantes and St. Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small ports of the Brittany Peninsula.

30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least thirty divisions. As soon as the organisation of the L. of C. in this lodgement area allowed, and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture Paris and the Seine ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population.

#### COMMAND AND CONTROL

31. In carrying out Operation "OVERLORD" administrative control would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces were normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left.

#### MAJOR CONDITIONS AFFECTING SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION

32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles—concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentration of the assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has been made to obtain tactical

surprise by landing in a lightly defended area—presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port, the Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of course, presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be accomplished.

33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training.

34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be employed. This condition, above all others, will dictate the date by which the amphibious assault can be launched.

35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions in reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault twelve full-strength first-quality divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than fifteen first-quality divisions from Russia during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D day, five divisions by D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus 8.

During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and disrupt communications.

36. Finally, there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number of formations, varying from a maximum of eighteen divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered waters by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential.

37. Given these conditions—a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France,

and adequate arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters—it is considered that Operation “OVERLORD” has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start *now* and every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften German resistance and to speed up our own preparations.<sup>5</sup>

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, S.W.1, 30th July 1943.

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<sup>5</sup>The following notation appears at the end of the text on the source copy: “Note: C.O.S. (43) 416 (O), Report and Appreciation, with Appendices, is filed in the Offices of the Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff.”

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In my memorandum of last week,<sup>2</sup> which was intended to be as factual as possible, I did not include certain conclusions to which I was driven by the experiences of my trip. For a year and a half they have been looming more and more clearly through the fog of our successive conferences with the British. The personal contacts, talks, and observations of my visit made them very distinct.

First: We cannot now rationally hope to be able to cross the Channel and come to grips with our German enemy under a British commander. His Prime Minister and his Chief of the Imperial Staff are frankly at variance with such a proposal. The shadows of Passchendaele and Dunkerque still hang too heavily over the imaginations of these leaders of his government. Though they have rendered lip service to the operation, their hearts are not in it and it will require more independence, more faith, and more vigor than it is reasonable to expect we can find in any British commander to overcome the natural difficulties of such an operation carried on in such an atmosphere of his government. There are too many natural obstacles to be overcome, too many possible side avenues of diversion which are capable of stalling and thus thwarting such an operation.

Second: The difference between us is a vital difference of faith. The American staff believes that only by massing the immense vigor and power of the American and British nations under the overwhelming mastery of the air, which they already exercise far into the north of

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<sup>1</sup> With respect to the preparation and presentation of this memorandum, see Stimson and Bundy, pp. 435–436, 438

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 444.

France and which can be made to cover our subsequent advance in France just as it has in Tunis and Sicily, can Germany be really defeated and the war brought to a real victory.

On the other side, the British theory (which cropped out again and again in unguarded sentences of the British leaders with whom I have just been talking) is that Germany can be beaten by a series of attritions in northern Italy, in the eastern Mediterranean, in Greece, in the Balkans, in Rumania and other satellite countries, and that the only fighting which needs to be done will be done by Russia.

To me, in the light of the post-war problems which we shall face, that attitude towards Russia seems terribly dangerous. We are pledged quite as clearly as Great Britain to the opening of a real second front. None of these methods of pinprick warfare can be counted on by us to fool Stalin into the belief that we have kept that pledge.

Third: I believe therefore that the time has come for you to decide that your government must assume the responsibility of leadership in this great final movement of the European war which is now confronting us. We cannot afford to confer again and close with a lip tribute to *BOLERO* which we have tried twice and failed to carry out. We cannot afford to begin the most dangerous operation of the war under half-hearted leadership which will invite failure or at least disappointing results. Nearly two years ago the British offered us this command. I think that now it should be accepted—if necessary, insisted on.

We are facing a difficult year at home with timid and hostile hearts ready to seize and exploit any wavering on the part of our war leadership. A firm resolute leadership, on the other hand, will go far to silence such voices. The American people showed this in the terrible year of 1864 when the firm unfaltering tactics of the Virginia campaign were endorsed by the people of the United States in spite of the hideous losses of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, and Cold Harbor.

Finally, I believe that the time has come when we must put our most commanding soldier in charge of this critical operation at this critical time. You are far more fortunate than was Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Wilson in the ease with which that selection can be made. Mr. Lincoln had to fumble through a process of trial and error with dreadful losses until he was able to discover the right choice. Mr. Wilson had to choose a man who was virtually unknown to the American people and to the foreign armies with which he was to serve. General Marshall already has a towering eminence of reputation as a tried soldier and as a broad-minded and skillful administrator. This was shown by the suggestion of him on the part of the British for this very post a

year and a half ago.<sup>3</sup> I believe that he is the man who most surely can now by his character and skill furnish the military leadership which is necessary to bring our two nations together in confident joint action in this great operation. No one knows better than I the loss in the problems of organization and worldwide strategy centered in Washington which such a solution would cause, but I see no other alternative to which we can turn in the great effort which confronts us.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON  
*Secretary of War*

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<sup>3</sup> See Churchill's telegram to Roosevelt of July 31, 1942, printed in Churchill, *Hinge of Fate*, p. 450. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 435.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane)*

SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT THE WHITE HOUSE BETWEEN THE  
PRESIDENT AND THE CHIEFS OF STAFF ON 10 AUGUST 1943 AT 1415<sup>1</sup>

*Present*

The President	Admiral E. J. King
The Secretary of War	General H. H. Arnold
Admiral W. D. Leahy	Brig. Gen. J. R. Deane
General G. C. Marshall	

1. *Eur-African Operations*

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had just been talking with the Secretary of War who indicated that he gathered from conversation in England that the Prime Minister was opposed to an operation against Sardinia but favored operations against the Balkans.

MR. STIMSON said that in his final discussions with Mr. Churchill the latter had disclaimed any desire to land any troops in the Balkans. Rather, he wished to give them supplies. He indicated that the total supplies furnished the Balkans now amounted to 10 to 12 tons per month. The Prime Minister feels that considering what is being done with this small amount, much could be expected in the Balkan area if the Allies could give them additional supplies. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, wants the United Nations to invade the Balkans.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR said that the Prime Minister was rather apathetic and somewhat apprehensive with regard to BOLERO. His attitude is reflected by the British Chiefs of Staff.

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<sup>1</sup> i.e., at 2: 15 p. m.

THE PRESIDENT said that the British Foreign Office does not want the Balkans to come under the Russian influence. Britain wants to get to the Balkans first. He said that personally he could not see the logic of this reasoning. He did not believe that Russians would desire to take over the Balkan states. Their wish is to establish kinship with the other Slavic people. In any event, he thought it unwise to plan military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.

SECRETARY STIMSON said he had talked to General Spaatz about the relative effectiveness of bombing Germany from northern or southern Italy. General Spaatz had said that it was not necessary to have bases north of the Po. The bombing would be just as effective from fields north of Rome as it would be further north.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he agreed, but that it was absolutely essential that Rome not be declared an open city. If fields north of Rome were to be used, the railway facilities of Rome would be an essential in supplying them.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that with the forces that General Eisenhower would have available, it would be possible to conquer southern Italy and obtain air bases north of Rome. It would not be necessary to leave the seven trained divisions in Italy that are now scheduled for BOLERO.

THE PRESIDENT suggested, as an alternative, that the 7 trained divisions might be taken from the Mediterranean but be replaced with an equivalent number from the United States.

ADMIRAL KING said that this procedure would cut into the troop lift in the Pacific.

GENERAL MARSHALL concurred, stating that there is a backlog of 87,000 troops needed in the Pacific. He had had a study made in the War Department which stated that if nothing was lost by submarine action, all convoys were to sail on schedule, and if the *Monticello* and *West Point*, two ships now scheduled for the Pacific troop lift, were allowed to remain in the Atlantic, there could be 7 divisions transported from the United States to North Africa by the end of June, 1944. This would still permit the planned troop lift to OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL indicated that in addition to garrison troops, General Eisenhower will have 24 divisions and 4500 aircraft available for operations in the Mediterranean. If 7 divisions were to be added, this would make a total of 31. In messages received, General Eisenhower himself has said that without the 7 divisions he will have sufficient force to take care of planned operations in Italy which will carry him well north of Rome, capture Sardinia and Corsica, and still have 14 divisions available for an invasion of southern France and coordination with OVERLORD.

GENERAL MARSHALL added that the study which he had referred to did not take into consideration whether or not the landing craft or combat loaders would be available to utilize all the divisions that will be in North Africa. The views of General Eisenhower had been confirmed by his chief planner, Major General Rooks, who is now in the United States. However, General Rooks had said that one additional division would be desirable but not essential.<sup>2</sup>

He said that in the Mediterranean after HUSKY there will be 11 French divisions, 28 British divisions, and 9 U.S. divisions, or a total of 48. Four of the French divisions will be available for combat by 1 November and the remainder will be ready for combat in the spring of 1944. The 28 British divisions include 2 Polish divisions and 1 Greek division.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that if the contemplated operations in the Mediterranean can be carried on without sending 7 additional divisions, to do so would simply invite having these extra divisions used for an invasion in the Balkans. This would meet the Prime Minister's and Mr. Eden's desires, but would make the Mediterranean operation so extensive as to have a disastrous effect on the main effort from England. He said that there will be but little difficulty in moving the 7 trained divisions from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom. A British convoy leaving the United States will proceed to England and thence to the Mediterranean, picking up 3 divisions and returning them to England. The remaining 4 divisions will be brought from the Mediterranean by troop ships returning from India and the Middle East.

THE PRESIDENT asked Admiral King if he considered the Mediterranean was now open to traffic.

ADMIRAL KING replied that it is at the present time, and that the situation will steadily improve. Cargo convoys are moving through the Mediterranean now. However, there is some hesitancy about troop convoys moving through the Mediterranean because of a possible threat from Crete.

ADMIRAL KING said that the principal factor which must be met is the troop lift that will be available to General Eisenhower to conduct his operations in Italy, Sardinia, and possibly southern France.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed, saying the principal factor is the troop lift and secondly the provision of adequate service troops. He said he was going to get General Eisenhower's recommendations as to whether it would be necessary to send an additional division to the Mediterranean as had been suggested by General Rooks.

ADMIRAL KING suggested to the President that if the British insist upon abandoning OVERLORD or postponing the operation indefinitely,

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1331-1333.

we should abandon the project as in carrying it on we would simply waste our substance.

THE PRESIDENT said we can, if necessary, carry out the project ourselves. He was certain that the British would be glad to make the necessary bases in England available to us.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the trouble with that plan would be that it would greatly overlook the availability of 15 British divisions available now in the United Kingdom. There is no other spot in the world where 15 divisions can be placed into an operation without large transportation and supply problems.

THE PRESIDENT said he was anxious to have American preponderance in the OVERLORD operation, starting from the first day of the assault.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the OVERLORD plans called for 29 divisions being available for combat immediately. As he recalled it, there were to be 14 American divisions and 15 British divisions in England at the time. In addition, there were to be about 6 American divisions just arriving in England which could not be considered as available for combat during the first two months after the OVERLORD assault took place. During this period these divisions would be assembling equipment, completing their training, and preparing themselves for combat.

THE PRESIDENT stated that, frankly, his reason for desiring American preponderance in force was to have the basis for insisting upon an American commander. He wished that preponderance of force to be sufficient to make it impossible for the British to disagree with the suggestion. He said that the British had once offered that the commander be American. He said he was anxious to get 14 or 15 divisions into France in the first action if possible, with several divisions left in England which could be shipped over later.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the coming conferences one of the most important points to be insisted upon by the American delegation would be that there should be no cuts made in the OVERLORD buildup.

THE PRESIDENT stated definitely that he was going to advocate leaving General Eisenhower with his present buildup, less the 7 divisions scheduled to go to England.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the destructive effects of any divergence from the main plan. He said the 2d Division and one other American division would be in England now had it not been necessary to divert an entire convoy from England to the Mediterranean in order to deliver 66,000 troops needed by General Eisenhower. He said we must avoid being committed to some operation that would have to be done "on a shoestring." The question of infantry divisions was not serious. He pointed out that we have a reserve of infantry divisions,

but as far as shipping and all other munitions of war are concerned, we have been living from hand to mouth, utilizing them as fast as they become available, and as yet no reserve has been built up.

THE PRESIDENT then asked if the French would occupy Corsica.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that that was the present plan and it was also anticipated that they should have a part in any operation against Sardinia. He hoped, however, that Sardinia would eventually fall of its own weight, and that the operations necessary to occupy it would be relatively insignificant.

THE PRESIDENT then summed up the discussion by stating that our available means seem to fit in pretty well with our plans. He outlined these as insistence upon continuation of the present OVERLORD buildup and carrying out that operation as our main effort. He desired that every effort be made to have additional American divisions available at the time OVERLORD is mounted in order to justify an American commander. He said he proposed leaving in the Mediterranean those forces now available to General Eisenhower and that he was opposed to operations into the Balkans.<sup>3</sup>

### 3. *Other Operations*

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary of War if the British were still interested in an operation against Norway.

MR. STIMSON replied that the British staff gave the Prime Minister more opposition on this subject than on any other. The staff is definitely opposed to it, although the Prime Minister still believes such an operation is feasible.

THE PRESIDENT asked the Secretary how many troops he thought it was necessary for the United States to have in Iceland.

MR. STIMSON said certainly far less than two years ago.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that at present there are 31,000 troops in Iceland and that the 5th division was on its way to England. In his opinion, the garrison should be cut to about 16,000.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that in order to obtain more shipping, a survey should be made of the necessities for large British stock piles of raw materials and munitions. He felt that with the improved submarine situation, the British could cut their stock piles from a six months' supply to a three months' supply.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he imagined that such a proposal would meet with opposition from the British, since the situation has now arisen in which there is ample cargo shipping and more than enough to keep up with our available troop lift.

<sup>3</sup> For the section of this memorandum headed "Far East Operations", omitted here, see *ante*, p. 434.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out, however, that there were certain items in which it would be well to cut the size of the British stock piles. He said that Britain now has a six months' supply of gasoline. If this were to be cut to a three months' supply, there would be sufficient gasoline available in the United States to carry out training programs on schedule and thus increase the flow of trained personnel.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that there might be a possibility of converting cargo ships that are about three quarters completed into troop ships.

ADMIRAL KING said that as new escort vessels become available, he has undertaken to convert the old four-stacker destroyers to A.P.D.'s. These give a troop lift of about 250 people and are well suited for moving reinforced companies in the Pacific. He said that nearly all of the fast ships of the C type being constructed by the Maritime Commission are now being converted from cargo ships to some other use. These uses include conversion into small aircraft carriers and transports. He said, however, he would cause an investigation to be made as to whether or not more cargo ships could not be converted.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that again he wished to emphasize to the President that no future changes should be made in basic decisions. He said that the main plan should be carried through and only small diversions from this plan made when necessary. It is impossible to calculate the wastage that has accrued to the United Nations war effort from changes made in basic decisions. The first instance was carrying out TORCH which involved moving troops set up from the United States to England and thence to Africa. Every such change has effects which reach as far back as the Middle West in the United States, caused by the necessity for altering production schedules, special loadings of convoys, etc.

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*The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 369

LONDON, August 10, 1943.

Subject: Attaching copies of confidential *Aide-Mémoire* handed me by Polish Foreign Minister Romer containing a very recent report on the ruthless measures of extermination presently being applied by the Germans against the Poles.

SIR: I have the honor to forward the attached copies of a confidential *Aide-Mémoire*<sup>2</sup> handed me by Polish Foreign Minister Romer, con-

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<sup>1</sup> Received in Washington, August 18, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Romer apparently made a similar communication to the British Government (see *post*, p. 930) and the British Delegation to the Quebec Conference introduced the text of a joint declaration on German crimes in Poland on August 22, 1943 (see *post*, p. 931).

taining a very recent report upon the ruthless measures of extermination presently being applied by the Germans against the Poles.

In handing me this *Aide-Mémoire*, Minister Romer drew my attention to certain suggestions as to measures to prevent further murders, namely (a) widespread radio broadcasting to Germany and the occupied countries of the character and extent and purpose of the mass murders committed against the Polish people; (b) the issue of an official statement by our Government—and if possible jointly with the British Government—embodying certain arguments and the essence of the proposed broadcast action; (c) an examination of measures for immediate reprisals.

Minister Romer furthermore said that notwithstanding certain objections on the part of the British Government to the Polish Government's suggestion, when the Polish Government had discussed the problem of reprisals in connection with the extermination of the Jewish population, the Polish Government felt that the present grave situation in Poland, and the danger of its becoming worse, might oblige the Polish Government to suggest to our and the British Government the need for renewed consideration by the three Governments of the principle of reprisals as such, and in event this were positively settled, of their character and scope.

Respectfully yours,

A. J. DREXEL BIDDLE JR.

[Enclosure]

*The Polish Foreign Ministry to the Embassy Near the Polish Government in Exile*

#### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Polish Government along with the Governments of other Allied countries received with great satisfaction the announcement that neutral countries had been warned against granting asylum to war criminals.<sup>3</sup> Information received from Poland, and referred to in Paragraph 2 below, impels the Polish Government to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the fact that, apart from the punishment of war criminals for the crimes they have committed, it has become more imperative than ever to restrain the Germans from committing further the mass murder of the Polish population in Poland. This becomes all the more urgent since it may be anticipated that the policy of exterminating the population of entire provinces, as is practised in Poland, may also be applied by the Germans in the present final stage of the war to the people

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of Roosevelt's statement of July 30, 1943, on this subject, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, July 31, 1943, p. 62; Rosenman, pp. 338-339.

in other German-occupied territories, like the Czechs, Yugoslavs, French and those in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R.

2. According to news received from Poland, after exterminating the majority of the Jewish population there, the Germans have since the autumn [of] 1942 begun to deport hundreds of thousands of Poles whose homes lie along a 100 kilometer broad belt to the West of a line reaching from Białystok along the rivers Bug and Zbrucz.

A large proportion of those intended for deportation were murdered. In addition thousands of Polish children were separated from their parents and sent to Germany to be brought up as Germans. A considerable number of the Polish minorities living in East-Prussia farther to the North of the Białystok area, was deported to the Reich proper.

The inhabitants of the province of Lublin to the West of the belt which had been cleared of its population were not deported; the Germans began to murder them in July 1943. Men from 14 to 50 are taken to Germany. Women, children and old people are sent to camps to be killed in gas chambers which previously served to exterminate the Jewish population of Poland.

On July 26th the Polish Government learned from the Homeland that the Germans are adopting the same methods in the provinces of Radom and Cracow. The population of the provinces of Lublin, Radom and Cracow total more than 7 million. Details regarding the above information are given in an Appendix.<sup>4</sup>

3. It may be presumed that the Germans are reckoning on the possibility of a defeat, and have consequently decided to exterminate the largest possible proportion of the Polish population with a view to assuring to the German race, after the war, a numerical superiority over its neighbours in the aggregate. If no preventive measures are taken, these mass murders in the provinces of Lublin, Radom and Cracow may be extended to the inhabitants of the remaining Polish provinces, as well as to war prisoners and Polish forced labourers in Germany, in other words to the whole Polish Nation.

There is no reason to believe that this mass extermination will not also be applied to other occupied countries in Europe. As a matter of fact Sauckel, the Reich's plenipotentiary for labour, declared at a public meeting in Cracow on the 19th June 1943: "If the Germans lose the war, we shall see that nothing remains either *here* or *elsewhere* in Europe."

4. Faced with the possible extermination of further millions of Poles, the Polish government feel compelled to appeal to the Government of the United States of America to do all in their power to prevent further murders. In the view of the Polish Government, the

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

application of the following measures might be effective and as such are worthy of consideration :

(a) A widespread broadcasting, over the radio and otherwise, to Germany and also to occupied countries of the character, extent and purpose of the mass-murders committed against the Polish people. This should be amplified by repeated categorical warnings to the German criminals, their families in Germany, and to the whole German people wherever they may be, that all those guilty of such deeds will be held responsible for them. It may be expected that if such warnings are given drastically and repeatedly today when Germany listens to the overseas wireless more than at any other time, it will not only in a certain measure have the desired effect, but will also be instrumental in splitting German public opinion by supplying facts and providing arguments for the opposition, thus deepening the defeatist attitude already noticeable in Germany.

(b) The issue of an official statement by the Government of the United States of America, (if possible jointly with the British Government) embodying the arguments and the essence of the proposed broadcast action. The statement itself should also be the subject of broadcasts and should be dropped in the form of printed leaflets over Germany including, if possible, Eastern Germany.

(c) The campaign of broadcasting warnings might also be extended to broadcasts to the satellites of the Reich, for under certain conditions those nations may also become the victims of German murders; such a measure may also have important consequences by contributing to the distrust of these satellites of Germany and influencing their political relations with the Reich.

(d) An examination of measures for immediate reprisals.

When the Polish Government discussed the problem of reprisals with the British Government in connection with the extermination of the Jewish population, they met with certain objections on the part of that Government. However, the present grave situation in Poland and the danger of its worsening still further, may oblige the Polish Government to suggest to the United States and British Governments the need for a renewed consideration by the three Governments of principle of reprisals as such, and should this be positively settled, of their choice, character and scope.

LONDON, August 5th, 1943.

J.C.S. Files

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Divisions for OVERLORD on May 1, 1944.

With reference to the discussion yesterday afternoon<sup>1</sup> and your instructions to have a preponderance of U.S. divisions available in the

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 501.

United Kingdom on the target date for OVERLORD, the following is submitted:

At the TRIDENT Conference it was agreed that the British would provide a minimum of 14 divisions with a possibility of an increase to 18, if it did not prove necessary to cannibalize these 4 divisions in order to provide replacements and supporting units for the minimum number of 14. (This British contribution of between 14 to 18 divisions would include 4 or 5 Canadian divisions.)

The U.S. agreed to provide a total of 18½ divisions on the target date. 6½ of these would not be completely equipped and ready for combat until a later period of from two to eight weeks but they would be in England. (I will see that the 18½ figure is lifted to 19 without any further discussion.)

*Note:* In discussions regarding U.S. troop strengths in the United Kingdom on the target date, the British have presented the problem of limiting our divisional strength in England on that date to the 18½ referred to because of transportation, depot, and cantonment complications. As troops cross the Channel additional divisions can be moved into Great Britain, though it is desired that the bulk of the flow of reinforcements should be transported direct from the U.S. into France.

Computations indicate that when the OVERLORD build-up in France had reached 60 divisions the composition of the forces would be about as follows:

United States	42 divisions
British	13 divisions
Canadian	5 divisions

This represents the total possible contribution of British troops unless transfers are made from the Mediterranean or elsewhere.

The TRIDENT decisions provided that on May 1, 1944, there would be 7,302 U.S. combat planes and 4,075 British.

Present tonnage figures indicate the possibility of increasing shipments to England between now and May 1st up to 100,000 men, of course providing we do not divert this shipping to send additional men to the Mediterranean. General Devers is pressing us to increase the number of technical units to support the Air Forces and the special anti-tank, artillery, and other separate units to support the Ground Forces, by a total of 100,000, which would absorb this tonnage if it materializes.

It appears to me that rather than base the American preponderance on the number of divisions alone it would be more effective to base it on the strength of the forces involved. We will have 3200 more combat planes, from 1 to 4 more combat divisions, and apparently a considerably greater number of Corps and Army supporting troops. We have not the detailed British figures on the last factor mentioned but

their shortages in supporting troops along with those in manpower would indicate that our Corps and Army organization will be much stronger than theirs.

G. C. MARSHALL  
*Chief of Staff*

Roosevelt Papers

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*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a draft of a possible statement to be issued by you and Mr. Churchill in the same way as you issued your statement jointly with respect to the Italian situation.<sup>1</sup>

I am laying it before you, and you may or may not wish to use it.<sup>2</sup> In the event that you both decided to make a statement along these lines, as it bears on the German situation you might also wish to consider whether you would not wish to have it sent to Stalin for his information and comment before you gave it out. It seems to me that we should probably all be careful these days to keep the Soviets informed of anything we can with respect to moves of this kind.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

*Draft Statement*

Mussolini has fallen, Italy has disintegrated. The Axis thus ceases to exist as a political and military instrument. The forces of the United Nations stand inside Europe. They are prepared to crush the German armies from the South, from the East, from the West and from the North. They are prepared to continue their shattering attacks by air upon your centers of production and transportation. They are prepared to continue to send your submarines to the bottom of the oceans.

The military end of the war is clear for all to see. You have lost millions of men, your cities are being laid waste. You have suffered terribly and grown poor under the Nazis. Hitler and his accomplices and the National Socialist Party have terrorized you, looted you,

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<sup>1</sup> For the text of the joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement referred to, released on July 16, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, July 17, 1943, pp. 27-28; Roseman, pp. 305-306.

<sup>2</sup> It is not known whether Roosevelt discussed the attached draft with Churchill, but no such statement was issued. On August 6, 1943, William C. Bullitt had sent to Hull (with a suggestion that Hull sign it and send it to Roosevelt) a draft letter which dealt with Soviet policy and the advisability of an Allied strike through the Balkans and which also recommended issuance of a statement of American war aims (Hull Papers). Hull did not send this letter to the President, but Bullitt himself sent it to Roosevelt on August 10 (Roosevelt Papers). A few phrases in the Department of State draft statement printed below are strikingly similar to language in the statement proposed by Bullitt.

ruined you for ten long years. They have plunged you needlessly into a terrible war which has earned Germany only hatred and brought her only to the brink of disaster.

It is the inexorable intention of the United Nations to bring to bear on Germany every ounce of the crushing, superior military force which they control, to the end that the leaders of Germany who have brought about this war may be destroyed. Those leaders sought to impose their rule and their false doctrines upon the democratic nations at a moment when the latter were militarily weak. They sought by treachery to destroy their neighbors to the east. But the moral strength of liberty and justice has proven itself and the sword which was drawn by the Nazis has turned back upon them.

The needless prolongation of your suffering and moral slavery rests in your hands. The United Nations demand your honorable surrender, your unconditional military surrender. Overthrow Hitler and his corrupt colleagues, turn your arms against their Gestapo and their SS. Thus will you speed the day of Germany's restoration to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

The United Nations demand your surrender, not your destruction. If you surrender now to the United Nations, Germany will not be destroyed, the German people will not be destroyed. The United Nations *do* intend to destroy Nazism, its leaders, its organization, and its doctrine. They intend to put an end to militarism and its destructive threat to the peace and happiness of all peoples including the Germans.

These are the principles on which we fight. These are the principles on which we base our appeal to you to surrender and so to spare yourselves the agony of a continued struggle which can only temporarily benefit the criminal leaders of your country. The end is inevitable in the face of the overwhelming power which confronts a Germany fighting alone. Regain your self respect, rejoin the world of free men, and redeem Germany.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 12 August 1943.

C.C.S. 272/1

LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE MOBILITY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE  
SQUADRONS

Reference: *a.* C.C.S. 101st Meeting,<sup>2</sup> Item 5

1. There is transmitted herewith the report of the Allied Anti-Submarine Board submitted in obedience to conclusion *a* of reference *a*.

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 885.

<sup>2</sup> Held at Washington, July 9, 1943; minutes not printed.

2. It is noted that the Board has so far concerned itself almost wholly with U.S. sea frontiers.

3. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the Board should complete its directive by appropriate survey and recommendations as to transfer of anti-submarine air units between the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, N.W. Africa, W. Africa, etc.

4. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggest that the services concerned (British, Canadian, U.S.) should take appropriate steps to implement, where applicable and not already in force, the recommendations of paragraph 22 of the report pending the survey and recommendations indicated in paragraph 3 above.

5. As to paragraph 23 of the report, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the view that if each service concerned plans and perfects its own supply and maintenance organization and promulgates this information to other services, all will have been accomplished that conclusion *b* of reference *a* was calculated to achieve, and they therefore recommend the cancellation of conclusion *b*.

Enclosure

*The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 6 August 1943.

Serial: 0010

Subject: Logistic Organization to Improve Mobility of Anti-Submarine Squadrons.

Reference: (a) CominCh Secret Serial 001425 of 15 July 1943.<sup>3</sup>

1. In accordance with the reference the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board have considered conclusion (a) of the reference which is quoted:

“Agreed to refer this problem to the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Committee (Kauffman-Mansfield Committee) for study and recommendation as to the mobility requirements for anti-submarine squadrons.”<sup>4</sup>

22. The following recommendations are made:

(a) That definite and immediate steps be taken to rectify the existing deplorable situation in regard to aircraft spare parts at the expense, if necessary, of curtailing new production.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Details of the Board's consideration of this subject and the factors leading to the Board's recommendations are omitted here.

(b) That only types of aircraft in common use in various services be considered mobile, namely Liberator, Venturas, Catalinas and Mariners.

(c) That Frontier Commanders designate the air fields in their commands best suited to handle emergency reinforcements.

(d) That all Frontier Commanders prepare plans immediately for the handling of additional aircraft at each of these air fields in an emergency.

(e) That the *normal* and *emergency* capacity of all air fields operating A/S squadrons should be generally promulgated.

(f) That operating authorities consider delays consequent on climatic conditions when planning movement of A/S squadrons on short notice.

(g) That one air field be established in each Frontier as a "Strategic Supply Center."

(h) That the desirability of allocating a few U.S. Navy transport planes for the sole purpose of ferrying aircraft spares, etc., to and from outlying A/S air bases should be taken note of.

(i) That orders be issued with a view to achieving better standardization in modification of A/S aircraft after they leave the production line.

(j) That all B-24 aircraft for A/S squadrons should come from one production line; namely from the Consolidated Aircraft Company.

(k) That all squadrons engaged in A/S Warfare be maintained on a mobile basis and that plans to achieve this be drawn up by individual squadron and base commanders now.

(l) That whenever possible the movements of A/S squadrons be confined within their own service areas and bases.

23. With reference to conclusion (b) which reads as follows:

"Agreed that upon approval of the recommendations received as a result of sub-paragraph (a) above this Committee would be directed to study and submit recommendations concerning the logistical requirements necessary to attain the desired mobility."

While this Board can make recommendations of a very general character, it is desired to point out that detailed recommendations on the logistics side of mobility can only be given by technical experts which it would be necessary to call from the U.S. Navy, R.A.F. (Coastal Command), R.C.A.F. and the supply organization of the three countries. Moreover it is the Board's considered opinion that even with all the technical experts necessary it is unlikely that any common answer which would be satisfactory to all services could be arrived at. The only solution appears to be for the various services to

plan and perfect their own individual supply and maintenance organization and to promulgate the results to all concerned.

J. M. MANSFIELD  
*Rear Admiral, R.N.*

J. L. KAUFFMAN  
*Rear Admiral, U.S.N.*

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740.0011 European War 1939/30684 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 14, 1943.

5356. The sub-committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee has prepared for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff a highly secret report on German plans and intentions during the second half of 1943. (The paper's number is JIC 43 (324) Final and it is dated August 3rd.)

In the introduction, the report states that it is very difficult to make an estimate of Germany's intentions at the present time, as the initiative has passed to the Allies in every theatre of war and Germany can have no planned strategy in a broad sense other than to counter Allied strategy.

The introduction goes on to say that the Germans are probably in somewhat the same state of mind as was Great Britain after the collapse of France, and that the Germans may be still hoping that the Italian Government may be coerced into some form of continued resistance. The Allies must therefore be prepared to see a limited number of additional German troops being moved into Northern Italy. This, however, would be a temporary phase, and German plans must be based on the inevitability of Italian capitulation in the near future and Allied occupation of Italy.

The second point made in the introduction is that a major crisis may be brought about in Germany because of the growing air offensive and the possibility that this threat may be developed soon against southeast Germany, plus a major setback in the U-boat campaign and military reverses on all fronts.

The conclusions of the report are as follows :

The Germans were taken by surprise by the speed with which events moved in Italy, and are resigned to Italy's early capitulation. In the face of this situation, Germany's general strategy would be to remain strictly on the defensive on all fronts and hope to meet Allied threats as they develop.

When Italy has capitulated Germany will have to withdraw her forces from the south of Italy and may, though in British opinion it would be unsound strategy, try with inadequate resources to hold a line from Pisa to Rimini, or the line of the Po River. It is most likely

that she will withdraw to the Maritime Alps and to positions covering Venetia and the Tyrol.

The breaches following Italy's defection must be filled, and, as Germany has no general reserve, she must draw on other fronts to do so. Perhaps nine divisions might be taken from France and the low countries, and three divisions from Norway and Denmark. It is, however, doubtful if any forces will be released from the Russian front, unless the Allies are threatening area vital to the safety of Germany herself or the lines of communication of her armies in Russia. Such withdrawals from the Russian front will only be made if there is no risk of disaster involved in Russia. A threat to the Maritime Alps and the positions covering Venetia and the Tyrol might result in reinforcements from the Russian front.

Germany will attempt to hold substantially the present front in Russia, and the security of this front will remain her principal pre-occupation to the end.

Germany will continue to hold France, and the low countries, Norway, and Denmark, but will reduce her garrisons there in order to strengthen her southern front.

Germany will attempt to hold the Balkans and make the reinforcement of this area a primary charge on her available resources.

It is unlikely that Germany and Russia will conclude a separate peace, but Germany might attempt to negotiate a compromise peace with the United States and Great Britain.

Finally, the report states that if at any stage the authorities in control in Germany recognize that they no longer have sufficient forces to hold the fronts both in Russia and in southern and western Europe, they might abandon the latter, preferring the occupation of Germany by Anglo-American rather than by Russian forces.

WINANT

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PR 10 "Foreign Relations of U.S.,"/9-1069

*Memorandum Prepared in the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

[Undated.]

MEMORANDUM OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR GUIDANCE OF BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES IN DISCUSSING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF EUROPEAN ALLIED GOVERNMENTS ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF LIBERATED ALLIED TERRITORY

1. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to give each Allied Government every opportunity at as early a stage as possible to re-

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<sup>1</sup> Not found in United States files; printed from a copy obtained by the editors from the British Foreign Office. This memorandum, which had been drafted in the Foreign Office before the First Quebec Conference, was "produced" by Eden during his meeting with Hull at 9 p.m., August 21, 1943. See *post*, p. 923.

establish its authority in its own country, since it will be in the interests of military operations that the Commander-in-Chief of the liberating expeditionary force shall be able to co-operate with, and count upon, a friendly local administration. The moment at which *responsibility* for the civil administration can be transferred from the military commander-in-chief to the Allied Government must be decided by the commander-in-chief acting in consultation with the United Kingdom Government and/or United States Government as the case may be and cannot be fixed in advance. It will, however, be desirable to keep in touch with the Allied Government in regard to the conduct of civil administration during the first, military, phase when the British commander's authority is paramount, and, as account will have to be taken of representations which the Allied Government may wish to make on the subject, it will be desirable to consult them as far as possible on major issues, and in general to associate them with the administration so far as military considerations permit. It will in particular be necessary to consult them as regards the initiation of the second phase by the transfer of responsibility to an Allied administration.

2. During the first, military, phase, while the supreme responsibility rests solely with the commander-in-chief, it will be advisable, and no doubt expedient, for a measure of administrative power to be entrusted by the commander-in-chief to the Allied local authorities. The extent to which this can be done must also be governed by the circumstances existing at the time and which may well vary from district to district. Here again the decision will lie with the commander-in-chief, acting where possible in consultation with the United Kingdom Government and/or United States Government as the case may be.

3. It is important that the exercise of administrative authority by the commander-in-chief shall receive the formal support of the Allied Sovereign or Government and that compliance with his orders shall be enjoined by them upon the population. This is one of the objects which it is hoped to attain by preliminary negotiations with the Allied Government.

4. In order to reach agreement with the Allied Government and in pursuance of the general political policy referred to in paragraph 1 above, it will be necessary to associate the Allied Government in an advisory capacity with the civil administration during the first, military, phase, without however, impugning the paramount authority and sole responsibility of the commander-in-chief. This can best be done by agreeing with the Allied Government upon the inclusion of liaison officers on all aspects of the civil administration in a Military Mission which the Allied Government will be invited to appoint to the com-

commander-in-chief's staff, the Mission being drawn from Allied personnel in free territory. During the first phase relations between the commander-in-chief and any civilian holding a political appointment from the Allied Government would be the subject of special arrangements between the Governments. (As regards judges etc., see paragraph 8.)

5. While thus giving each Allied Government all reasonable facilities and assistance it is not however the policy of His Majesty's Government to impose any such Government on an unwilling people or to maintain it in power against the wish of the people. To that extent our policy towards each Government will have to be decided according to circumstances when the process of liberation has been carried sufficiently far to enable us to judge of the capacity of the Government on the one hand and the feelings of the liberated people on the other.

6. Most of the Allied Governments already feel that they are so out of touch with their people that they have decided to resign as soon as they return to their country. This will be all to the good in those cases where the executive power, e.g. the Sovereign or President, is strong enough to form at once a new Government on a broader and more representative basis. But there may be cases where he or she will not have sufficient authority to rally the leaders of public opinion, or the state of the country owing either to military operations or to internal chaos may be such as to make it impossible to constitute a new Government during the early phase of liberation. In such cases it may be necessary to insist upon the old government's remaining in power until circumstances make it possible to change it without detriment to military operations.

7. In every case the returning Government will naturally wish to remove from office as many officials belonging to the quisling régime as possible, and in general it will be in our interests that this should be done, but it would be dangerous for us to commit ourselves during negotiations to any hard and fast rule on this subject, or to undertake to instal in office any particular persons whom the Government have already in mind for certain posts. The Allied Government must be allowed, however, to represent its views concerning the replacement or appointment of individuals through its advisers and liaison officers on the commander-in-chief's staff and the views of the Allied Government should be respected as far as possible as serious difficulties are likely to arise in practice if individuals whom the Allied Government regard as unsuitable, either on account of their association with the enemy or for other reasons, are maintained or placed in office.

8. It is desirable as far as possible to allow jurisdiction over criminal offences by the civilian population to be exercised by Allied national

courts, and the preliminary negotiations with the Allied Government should be on this basis. This could be done in the first phase either by the commander-in-chief's licensing local Allied courts, in consultation with the appropriate adviser of the Allied Government on his staff, or by allowing the Allied Government to set up its national military courts, composed of officers from the Allied contingent, who will probably be included in the expeditionary force, or by a combination of both methods, subject to due safeguards for the adequate repression of offences against the members[,] property and security of the expeditionary force.

9. Certain territories may be liberated not by British military action but merely as a result of the withdrawal of enemy forces. If in such territory the Allied Government is able to establish its authority either in person or through a local organisation it should be our policy to recognise the authority of that Government in that territory and to give it all assistance and facilities.

10. The case of France must be completely separate and any negotiations with the National Committee must be restricted by the mere fact that we do not recognise the Committee as the future government of France or even as the body through whom the local administration will be carried on during military operations. At the outset of any negotiations with the French National Committee it will be essential to lay down the limits within which we desire their collaboration or assistance, and at this stage it will be impossible to enter into any commitments with them as regards the exercise of governmental functions in any part of France which may be liberated by Allied military action. If possible, we should put off discussing these matters with the French National Committee, in the hope that we may be able shortly to deal with a unified French organisation, composed of the Fighting French and General Giraud's supporters.

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### C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY

#### *Editorial Note*

For documents concerning consultation with the Soviet Government with respect to Italy in the period immediately preceding the First Quebec Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 335, 340-350.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret Number 331.

Your message No. 383 dated 26 July 1943<sup>2</sup> expresses generally my thoughts of today on prospects and methods of handling the Italian situation with which we are now confronted.

In the following draft I have suggested for consideration certain minor changes, the reasons for which if they are not obvious we can discuss at our next meeting.

1. It seems highly probable that the fall of Mussolini will involve the overthrow of the Fascist régime and that the new government of the King and Badoglio will seek to negotiate a separate arrangement with the Allies for an armistice. Should this prove to be the case it will be necessary for us to make up our minds first of all upon what we want and secondly upon the measures and conditions required to gain it for us.

2. At this moment above all others our thoughts must be concentrated upon the supreme aim namely the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism. Every military advantage arising out of the surrender of Italy (should that occur) must be sought for this purpose.

3. The first of these is the control of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula as well as the use of airfields of all kinds. This must include the surrender to our garrisons of Sardinia, the Dodecanese and Corfu as well as of all the naval and air bases in the Italian mainland as soon as they can be taken over.

4. Secondly and of equal importance the immediate surrender to the Allies of the Italian Fleet, or at least its effective demobilization and the disarmament of the Italian air and ground forces to *whatever* extent we find needful and useful. The surrender of the fleet will liberate powerful British naval forces for service in the Indian Ocean against Japan and will be most agreeable to the United States.

5. Also of equal consequence the immediate surrender or withdrawal to Italy of all Italian forces wherever they may be outside of Italy proper.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. A paraphrase was sent to Hull by the White House Map Room on August 1, 1943, with the following notation:

"The President desires comments and advice in regard to this matter by the Secretary of State at the earliest practicable date.

"The President wishes to inform the Secretary of State that the message No. 331 of July 30 was arrived at after several exchanges of messages between the Prime Minister and the President. The President states that it appears to him to be entirely satisfactory." (740.0011 EW/8-143)

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 332-335.

6. Another objective of the highest importance about which there will be passionate feeling in this country and Britain is the immediate liberation of all United Nations prisoners of war in Italian hands and the prevention which can in the first instance only be by the Italians of their being transported northwards to Germany. We regard it as a matter of honor and humanity to get our own flesh and blood back as soon as possible and spare them the measureless horrors of incarceration in Germany during the final stages of the war.

7. The fate of the German troops in Italy and particularly of those south of Rome will probably lead to fighting between the Germans and the Italian army and population.

8. When we see how this process goes we can take a further view about action to be taken north of Rome. We should however try to get possession at the earliest moment of a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany and of points on both the west coast and east coast railways of Italy as far north as we dare. This is a time to dare.

9. In our struggle with Hitler and the German army we cannot afford to deny ourselves any assistance that will kill Germans. The fury of the Italian population may now be turned against the German intruders who have, as they will feel, brought these miseries upon Italy and then come so scantily and grudgingly to her aid. We should stimulate this process in order that the new liberated Anti-Fascist Italy shall afford us at the earliest moment a safe and friendly area on which we can base the whole forward air attack upon south and central Germany.

10. This air attack is a new advantage of the first order as it brings the whole of the Mediterranean Air Forces into action from a direction which turns the entire line of air defenses in the west and which furthermore exposes all those centers of war production which have been increasingly developed to escape air attack from Great Britain. It will become urgent in the highest degree to get agents commandos and supplies by sea across the Adriatic into Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. It must be remembered that there are fifteen German divisions in the Balkan Peninsula of which ten are mobile. Nevertheless once we have control of the Italian Peninsula and of the Adriatic and the Italian armies in the Balkans withdraw or lay down their arms it is by no means unlikely that the Hun will be forced to withdraw northwards to the line of the Save and Danube thus liberating Greece and other tortured countries.

11. We cannot yet measure the effects of Mussolini's fall and of Italian capitulation upon Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary. They may be profound. In connection with this situation the collapse of Italy should fix the moment for putting the strongest pressure on Turkey to act in accordance with the spirit of the alliance and in this Britain and the United States should if possible be joined or at least supported by Russia. I believe that in any important negotiations affecting the Balkans the concurrence of Russia should be obtained if practicable.

12. It is my opinion that an effort to seize the "head devil" in the early future would prejudice our primary objective which is to get

Italy out of the war. We can endeavor to secure the person of the "head devil" and his assistants in due time, and to then determine their individual degrees of guilt for which "the punishment should fit the crime".

ROOSEVELT

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Number 332 from the President to the Former Naval Person secret and personal.

Referring to your No. 389 of July 30<sup>2</sup> I am in agreement that it is more likely Italy will negotiate for peace through neutral diplomatic channels but believe it necessary for Eisenhower to have precise terms of an armistice agreement which he may use in the event of his being suddenly approached by the Italian Government with a proposal to cease hostilities between the Italian forces and the United Nations forces.

I am agreeable to your proposed amendments to NAF 302,<sup>3</sup> and suggest that Eisenhower be authorized to make the following conditions in case the Italian Government asks him for an armistice, these conditions not to be made public:

1. Immediate cessation of all hostile activity by the Italian Armed Forces.

2. Italy will use its best endeavors to deny to the Germans facilities that might be used against the United Nations.

3. All prisoners or internees of the United Nations to be immediately turned over to the Allied Commander in Chief, and none of these may from the beginning of these negotiations be evacuated to Germany.

4. Immediate transfer of the Italian fleet to such points as may be designated by the Allied Commander in Chief, with details of disarmament to be prescribed by him.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the proposed "short" or "military" armistice terms contained in Eisenhower's telegram No. NAF 302, July 27, 1943, see Garland and Smyth, p. 270; *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1289. This text had apparently been drafted by Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters. See Macmillan, p. 307. In the United States Government this text had been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the War Department, and the Department of State. The text had been submitted also to London, and Churchill had telegraphed his comments (not printed) to Roosevelt. The revised draft text of the "short" terms contained in Roosevelt's telegram No. 332 to Churchill represent, therefore, a distillation of British and American views in London, Washington, and Algiers. For subsequent amendments to the "short" terms, see *post*, pp. 522, 565, 1062.

5. Agreement that Italian merchant shipping may be requisitioned by the Allied Commander in Chief to meet the needs of his military-naval program.

6. Immediate surrender of Corsica and of all Italian territory both islands and mainland to the Allies, for such use as operational bases and other purposes as the Allies may see fit.

7. Immediate guarantee of the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italian territory, regardless of the rate of evacuation of the Italian territory by the German Forces. These ports and fields to be protected by Italian Armed Forces until this function is taken over by the Allies.

8. Immediate withdrawal to Italy of Italian armed forces from all participation in the current war from whatever areas in which they may be now engaged.

9. Guarantee by the Italian Government that if necessary it will employ all its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice.

10. The Commander in Chief of the Allied forces reserves to himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied forces or for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests of the Allied Nations.

11. The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces will have a full right to impose measures of disarmament, demobilization, and demilitarization.

It is my opinion that the question of war criminals should not be brought up by General Eisenhower in a statement of his terms for an armistice.

The war criminal problem can be taken up later, and I believe that all demands by the Allied Nations that are not essential at the present time should be postponed with the purpose of getting Italy out of the war at the earliest possible date.

If the armistice terms proposed in this message are acceptable to you I will, immediately upon the receipt of your approval, send them to Eisenhower to be used when and if he receives from the Italian Government a request for a general armistice.

I am sending a copy of this message to Eisenhower for his information.<sup>4</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>4</sup>The text was quoted in Marshall's telegram No. 3824 to Eisenhower, July 30, 1943. The introductory paragraph of that telegram stated: "He [Roosevelt] directed that it be repeated to you for your information but not for action." (740.00119 European War 1939/7-3043; 740.00119 EW/8-143)

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

From the President to the Former Naval Person secret and personal Number 334.

There are some contentious people here who are getting ready to make a row if we seem to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio. They are the same element which made such a fuss over North Africa.

I told the press today<sup>2</sup> that we have to treat with any person or persons in Italy who can best give us first disarmament and second assurance against chaos, and I think also that you and I after an armistice comes could say something about self determination in Italy at the proper time.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> See Rosenman, pp. 344-345.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, 31 July 1943.

Prime Minister to President personal and secret number 391.

Your 331.<sup>2</sup>

I have not had time to consult my colleagues but I have no doubt whatever that our joint draft as amended<sup>3</sup> expresses in perfect harmony the minds of our 2 governments on the broad policy to be pursued. It seems to be a case of "Two hearts that beat as one".

I suggest if you agree that in Paragraph 6 last sentence "We" should be substituted for "I" and that the document becomes a joint directive conveying the instructions of our 2 governments to all authorities charged with their execution.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park. A paraphrase was sent to Hull by the White House Map Room on August 1, 1943 (740.0011 EW/8-143).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 517.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., Churchill's "Thoughts on the Fall of Mussolini" (*Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 332-335) as modified by Roosevelt's telegram No. 331.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 31st July 1943.

No. 393. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret. Your number 332.<sup>2</sup>

We agree that Eisenhower be authorized to prescribe the conditions contained in your Paragraphs 1 to 11 inclusive in case the Italian government ask him for an armistice. These conditions should not be made public without the prior approval of our two governments.

2. We suggest, if there is time as there probably will be, he should add in Paragraph 4, after the words "The Italian fleet" the words "And Italian aircraft."<sup>3</sup>

3. We also agree that the war criminal problem can be taken up later.

4. So much for the immediate emergency. We hope however that you will also urgently have our instrument of surrender<sup>4</sup> examined, so that we reach full agreement on it. There are several points in this not dealt with in the emergency terms, and it is couched in a precise, formal and legal vein, on which much thought has been bestowed here. We are rather puzzled to know why you never refer to this document, as it seems to us to be in fact only a more careful and comprehensive version of the emergency armistice terms. We should be very grateful if you would let us know how you feel about it. We ought certainly to have it, or something like it, ready as soon as possible.

5. To save time, I am repeating this present message to Eisenhower, who will thus be fully empowered to act should a sudden emergency occur.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. WHITE 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 519.

<sup>3</sup> The War Department sent the following telegram No. 3974 to Eisenhower on August 1, 1943: "In case the Italian Government asks for an armistice (for Eisenhower's Eyes Only from Marshall) you are authorized to prescribe conditions contained in President's 332 of 30 July to PRIME (as contained in our 3824 July 30) [see *ante*, p. 519] with the following additions: 'In Paragraph 4 of conditions after the words "Italian Fleet" add the words "and Italian aircraft". These conditions will not be made public without prior approval of our two governments.' (740.00119 EW/8-143)

<sup>4</sup> The British draft of a "long" or "comprehensive" instrument of surrender had been circulated as annex 1 to C.C.S. 258, "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943 (not printed). For a revision of the "comprehensive" instrument, sent to Roosevelt and the Department of State on August 3, 1943, see *post*, p. 538.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 31st July 1943.

No. 394. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret. Your 334.<sup>2</sup>

My position is that once Mussolini and the Fascists are gone, I will deal with any Italian authority who can deliver the goods. I am not in the least afraid for this purpose of seeming to recognize the House of Savoy or Badoglio, provided they are the ones who can make the Italians do what we need for our war purposes. Those purposes would certainly be hindered by chaos, bolshevisation or civil war. We have no right to lay undue burdens on our troops. It may well be that after the armistice terms have been accepted, both the King and Badoglio will sink under the odium of surrender and that the Crown Prince and a new Prime Minister may be chosen.

I should deprecate any pronouncement about self determination at the present time, beyond what is implicit in the Atlantic charter.<sup>3</sup> I agree with you that we must be very careful not to throw everything into the melting pot.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. WHITE 6. Concerning Roosevelt's movements from July 30 to August 9, 1943, see *ante*, p. 406, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 521.

<sup>3</sup> Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 368-369.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 31 July 1943.

395. Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Your number 331.<sup>2</sup>

It occurs to me on reflection that your proposed omission of "Nazi Germany" might be misunderstood. It might mean that if the Germans did what the Italians have done we should have no further quarrel with them. I, therefore, suggest that Paragraph 2 should read "namely, the destruction of Hitler and the total defeat of Germany."

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 517.

740.00119 European War 1939/1550 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Istanbul (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

ISTANBUL, July 31, 1943.

275R67. On good authority I am informed that just before leaving Turkey for Italy Guariglia, the new Italian Foreign Minister, told Vörnle, the Hungarian Minister to Turkey, that he expected to make peace soon, if terms beneficial to Italy, within the framework of the Allied unconditional surrender demand.

Guariglia asked Vörnle if his government wanted him to include Hungary in the peace negotiations. Vörnle cabled his conversation to Budapest and ask[ed] that a [reply be? <sup>1</sup>] transmitted to Rome.

BERRY

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<sup>1</sup> Garbled as received.

740.00119 European War 1939/1556 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[VATICAN CITY, July 31, 1943.]

138. My 131, July 26.<sup>2</sup>

1. For the moment it would appear Badoglio Government less pre-occupied by prospect unconditional surrender to Allies than by possibility public disorder and uncertainty as to intentions of Germans. I am told of indications that predominant emotion Italian official circles today is fear and that this possibility should not be lost sight of when evaluating situation.

[2.] Vatican officials are following closely all Allied pronouncements with regard to surrender of Italy and are on lookout for any-

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 4659 of August 2, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State; received in Washington at 6:20 p. m., August 2.

<sup>2</sup> In this telegram, sent to the Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 4618 of July 31, 1943, from Harrison to the Secretary of State, Tittmann had reported:

"5. Allies should pay close attention developments in Italy and be ready intervene in case public disorder or German reprisals. It has been suggested we would meet little opposition if we attempted land on Italian peninsula and that this might be best way bring war to early conclusion.

"6. Cardinal Secretary [of] State [Maglione] expressed hope we may display patience and understanding of difficulties of new [Badoglio] government.

"7. Cardinal Maglione, on July 23 formally asked former Italian Government to remove everything and everybody of military importance from Rome in order to enable it to be designated as 'open city' and has now made similar appeal to new government. Cardinal is aware this would mean elimination all military traffic through Rome.

"8. Osborne believes, and I agree with him, that we should not bomb Rome or other populous centers again or at least until new government has had time establish its authority. We should attempt to fortify position of new government by not saddling it with odium of partial responsibility for further loss of civilian life." (865.00/2114)

thing that might imply "terms". Thus far however efforts to assess in this light various public statements made by Allies would seem to have resulted only in their confusion. In some quarters suggestion has been reiterated that an early landing on peninsula by Allied forces would be desirable from point of view Italian security and that we would meet with little opposition if we attempted to do so.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] August 1, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

President to Former Naval Person. Personal and secret. Number 338.

Referring to your 393 of 31 July,<sup>2</sup> I have authorized Eisenhower to prescribe the conditions of armistice exactly as stated by you in 393 and in the event of a request from the Italian Government.

Referring to your proposed "Instrument of Surrender"<sup>3</sup> which is now being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Department of State in Washington, I am in general agreement therewith but must have further advice from the above mentioned agencies of this Government before acting thereon. I am directing the Joint Staff and the State Department to report to me on this document at the earliest possible date.<sup>4</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 522.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., the British draft of the "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender which Churchill had referred to in his telegram No. 393 to Roosevelt.

<sup>4</sup> The following message from Leahy was forwarded to Hull by the White House Map Room on August 1, 1943: "Please inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department that the President desires their advice by telegram at the earliest practicable date on the draft instrument of surrender of Italy, proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff." (740.00119 EW/8-143)

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 1 August 1943.

The Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff (CCS 258),<sup>2</sup> is both a political and military document.

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the White House Map Room on August 2, 1943, and forwarded on that date in telegram No. WHITE 18 to Leahy (who was with Roosevelt at Birch Island) with the following introductory paragraph: "Your BLACK 7 [see *supra*, fn. 4]. Following is memorandum to the President which has the approval of the Chief of Staff and the State Department. It will be followed by an additional reply as indicated." (Roosevelt Papers)

<sup>2</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943; not printed.

It proposes the "terms of surrender on the collapse of Italy, should there be a Government whose signature the United Nations are prepared to recognize", and as an alternative, contains the "declaration and proclamation on collapse of Italy, should there be chaos in Italy and no Government which the United Nations are prepared to recognize". It is apparent that the document was prepared on the assumption that the Allied Commander-in-Chief would be authorized to deal with an existing Italian Government, both with respect to military and political matters, after the agreement referred to above had received the prior approval of the interested United Nations.

It is the understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that under present instructions approved by you and the Prime Minister,<sup>3</sup> General Eisenhower is to deal only with the military aspects of the unconditional surrender, and that the political considerations are to be settled by the heads of the interested Nations.

The military conditions which General Eisenhower has been directed to impose cover approximately the same ground as the military conditions laid down in CCS 258, though in less detail. For this reason, and particularly to avoid further delay, it is recommended that no amendment of the authority already granted General Eisenhower be undertaken.

Because of its political aspects, the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, as proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, is believed to be inappropriate for use by the Allied Commander-in-Chief under the authority he has been granted.

The British document may serve a useful purpose in a later phase of negotiations with Italy, or it might constitute a satisfactory basis for unconditional surrender initially if the tender of surrender were made to one of the Allied governments directly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department are studying the British proposal from these standpoints and will report their joint recommendations to you in the near future, probably tomorrow.<sup>4</sup>

Secretary Hull concurs.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522.

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 537.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

LONDON, 2 August 1943.

Number 397. Former Naval Person to President personal. Your number 338.<sup>2</sup> Many thanks.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 525.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Assistant to the  
President's Military Aide (Hammond)*

SECRET

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] August 2, 1943.

BLACK 8. Transmit following message to the Prime Minister, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State :

"I have read instrument of surrender<sup>1</sup> and while the language seems on the whole good, I seriously doubt advisability of using it at all. After all, the terms of surrender already approved and sent to Eisenhower<sup>2</sup> ought to be all that is necessary. Why tie his hands by an instrument that may be oversufficient or insufficient? Why not let him act to meet situations as they arise? Signed Roosevelt."

Add the following sentence just before signature in the message to the Prime Minister only :

"You and I can discuss this matter at QUADRANT."<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Although the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington had circulated a new draft of "long" or "comprehensive" surrender terms on August 2, 1943 (see *post*, p. 537, fn. 1), the British draft available to Roosevelt at Birch Island on that date was that annexed to C.C.S. 258, cited *ante*, p. 525, fn. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 519, 522.

<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt's message to Churchill, based on this instruction, was dispatched by the White House Map Room at Washington as Roosevelt's telegram No. 339.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30487 : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy)  
to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, August 2, 1943.

US URGENT

1361. Immediate and secret from Murphy. Your 1406, July 31, 2 p.m.<sup>2</sup>

Carroll believes that Badoglio Government is going as far as it possibly can to pave the way for an armistice, its limitations being prescribed by a fear of German reprisals if it steps out of bounds. In his opinion, a landing on the mainland is a *sine qua non* of an Italian demand for an armistice. He believes that military success in Sicily, additional bombing of strategic points in Italy (he emphasizes that church opinion opposes further bombing of the city of Rome) and a landing on the mainland will be necessary to elicit the desired Italian offer.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent over the signature of the Consul General at Algiers (Wiley).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed (740.0011 European War 1939/30236).

740.0011 European War 1939/31287

*The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State  
(Welles)*

No 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State,<sup>1</sup> has just informed me that, continuing its previous efforts<sup>2</sup> to spare Rome the destruction occasioned by aerial bombardment, the Holy See has made representations to the present military government of Italy in order to have Rome recognized as an open city.

Subsequently to these representations, the new Italian government advised the Cardinal Secretary in writing, on July 31st, that it has decided to declare Rome an open city. It has furthermore requested His Eminence to ascertain the essential conditions which will be imposed by the Allies before the aforesaid declaration will be accepted. I shall be honored to transmit the reply of the United States government to this inquiry.<sup>3</sup>

With sentiments of esteem [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea  
Apostolic Delegate*

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<sup>1</sup> Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

<sup>2</sup> For earlier papers concerning the protection of Rome and the Vatican City, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 910-938.

<sup>3</sup> Welles informed Cicognani on August 4, 1943, that the questions involved in this letter had been "submitted immediately to the consideration of the highest appropriate authorities of this Government". (740.0011 European War 1939/31287)

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 2 August 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Following the receipt of information from the State Department<sup>2</sup> that the Italians intended to declare Rome an open city, the War Department sent to General Eisenhower in Algiers the following radio:

"The Italian Government through the Vatican has requested the U.S. Government to prescribe the essential conditions to recognizing Rome as an open city. This is for your information only. Pending further instructions it would appear desirable to refrain from air

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the White House Map Room at Washington; forwarded to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, as telegram No. WHITE 22.

<sup>2</sup> Cicognani's letter to Welles of August 2, 1943, *supra*, had been communicated to Marshall, first by telephone and then in writing, shortly after its receipt (740.0011 European War 1939/31287).

activities against the city of Rome proper. I am taking this up with the CCS but meanwhile pass this view informally on to you. You certainly should continue to strike at such airfields in the vicinity of Rome as give evidence of being used by either the Germans or Italians."

2. A few minutes after this message was dispatched, the following message was received from General Eisenhower's headquarters:

"Stand by flash release Rome raid approximately 1300 hours 3rd August same targets same reasons."

3. As a result of this message, the following was then transmitted to General Eisenhower, and receipt of this and the first message has been acknowledged by his headquarters:

"About thirty minutes ago I advised you that the Vatican through our State Department informed us that the new Italian Government was prepared to declare Rome an open city and wished to know the essential requirements. In that message I passed on to you my view informally to the effect that pending further instructions it would appear desirable to refrain from air activities against the city of Rome proper.

"A few moments ago message number 1735 your headquarters arrived, 'From Martelli. Stand by flash release. Rome raid approximately 1300 hours third of August same targets same reasons', message to be passed to OWI."

4. At approximately 5:30 Eastern War Time, following concurrence with the British Chiefs of Staff, the following additional message was sent to General Eisenhower:

"The Italian Government through the Vatican has requested the U.S. Government [to prescribe<sup>3</sup>] the essential conditions the Allies will impose before recognizing Rome as an open city. Pending further instructions the Combined Chiefs of Staff desire that you refrain from air activities against the city of Rome proper. You should continue to strike at such airfields in the vicinity of Rome as give evidence of being used by either the Germans or the Italians. Please acknowledge."<sup>4</sup>

G C MARSHALL  
*Chief of Staff*

<sup>3</sup> These two words were not in Marshall's memorandum, but were inserted when the memorandum was telegraphed to Roosevelt.

<sup>4</sup> A typed notation on the J.C.S. file copy of telegram No. WHITE 22 indicates that the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane) telephoned the following additional paragraph to the White House Map Room for inclusion in Marshall's message to Roosevelt:

"Since dispatching the above the Prime Minister called me by phone and stated the British Cabinet and he personally thinks it may be a good thing at this moment to go ahead with the bombing. Accordingly and pending your instruction to the contrary, I have taken the responsibility of authorizing Eisenhower to go ahead if he desires to do so. Signed Marshall."

For Marshall's message to Eisenhower, see *infra*.

740.0011 EW/8-243 : Telegram

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 2, 1943.

4061. Reference my number 4005<sup>1</sup> and FAN 181<sup>2</sup> regarding your plans for 1300 hours Tuesday bombing of Rome, British cabinet now agree that you should go ahead under your original instructions, that is using your own judgment as to desirability of bombing. Prime Minister personally thinks it may be a good thing at this moment. (From Marshall to Eisenhower).

We here have been unable to get approval of President due to his absence from city. In the interim, while we are endeavoring to secure President's views, if you desire to go ahead with bombing I accept responsibility for US approval.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 528.<sup>2</sup> i.e., the message from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 529.

740.0011 EW/8-243

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [August 2, 1943.]

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HULL

Attached hereto is a draft of the essential conditions which the War Department believes should be imposed in order that Rome may be considered an open city.

I assume that you will take this matter up with the British.

G C MARSHALL

[Attachment]

*Draft Message to the Italian Government*

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS, FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, REQUIRED FROM THE ITALIANS IF ROME IS TO BE DECLARED AN OPEN CITY<sup>1</sup>

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain will recognize the city of Rome as an open city when the following essential

<sup>1</sup> A copy of these conditions, without this heading, was forwarded to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, in telegram No. WHITE 25 of August 2, 1943, by the White House Map Room (Roosevelt Papers). A copy was given to the British Embassy at Washington on the same date.

requirements respecting Rome and its immediate surroundings are met by the Italian Government:

(1) All agencies of the Italian Government directly concerned in the conduct of the war will be immediately removed.

(2) All armed forces, Naval, Air and Ground, of the Italian, German and associated governments will be immediately removed.

(3) The communication system of Rome, including railroads, roads, airways, and waterways passing through or entering Rome will not be used for the passage of military forces or movement of military supplies of any of the Axis Powers.

(4) All military and civilian use of airfields in Rome and its immediate surroundings will cease.

(5) The industrial plants in Rome engaged primarily in the production of supplies for the Axis Armed Forces, Naval, Air and Ground, will cease production.<sup>2</sup> Plants engaged in the storage, maintenance and repair of any military supplies will also cease operations.

(6) The steps listed above will be accomplished not later than 7 days after the acceptance by the Italian Government of these conditions.

(7) The Italian Government will notify the United States Government<sup>3</sup> when the measures listed herein have been effected. The Italian Government will permit inspection, by representatives of a neutral government acting for the United States and Great Britain, to determine compliance.

None of the provisions given herein apply to the Vatican City State.

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<sup>2</sup> In the source text, the word "primarily" has been deleted by hand and the end of the sentence changed to read: "will cease such production." These changes were not made, however, in the text forwarded to Roosevelt.

<sup>3</sup> In the source text this passage has been changed by hand to read: "notify the United States and British Governments". The text forwarded to Roosevelt read: "notify the United States and the British Government".

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865.00/2129 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, August 2, 1943.

1332. In conversation with the British Ambassador<sup>1</sup> he told me that Guariglia had called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>2</sup> about a week before Mussolini's resignation and had remarked that Italy was "finished." On a second visit to Numan after his appointment as Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Guariglia said Italy did not fear Great Britain or the U.S. but was concerned about complete occupation by the Germans. Numan suggested to Hugessen that he inform London of the foregoing which the Ambassador has done<sup>3</sup> but has received no reply.

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen.

<sup>2</sup> Numan Menemencioğlu.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 536.

Hugessen also told me that Numan had stated to him that in his talk with Guariglia prior to his departure for Rome the latter had neither suggested nor even intimated that Italy desired Turk mediation.

STEINHARDT

Roosevelt Papers

*The French Committee of National Liberation to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

ALGIERS, August 2, 1943.

TEXT OF THE NOTE FOR THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS

At the moment when the possibility of an early Italian capitulation becomes definite, which would have the widest repercussions, in occupied Europe and particularly as regards France, the French Committee of National Liberation has the imperative duty of calling the attention of the American and British Governments to the essential importance of a French participation, first in the armistice negotiations, (and) then in the deliberations and decisions of the agencies which will have the duty of assuring the execution of the terms which are imposed on Italy.

The collapse of fascism marks a first and decisive victory of the democratic powers. The French nation is proud that its military effort and its sacrifices have been able to contribute honorably thereto. All Frenchmen, those of the Empire as well as those who are still under the enemy yoke, would see with the keenest satisfaction the Committee of National Liberation associated tomorrow in the preliminary negotiations which will confirm the Italian defeat and then the restoration of a democratic régime which, with the American and British Governments, it deems indispensable. This restoration involves the total disappearance of the juridical structure of the Fascist State.

It is on this condition that one of the essential aims of the war can be realized and that it will become possible for the Italian people, by the full reestablishment of its liberties, to find among the European nations a place worthy of it.

Allied France, which itself has been able to measure the ravages caused by the ideologies from which the war arose, has the ardent desire to see itself associated in this work.

The Allied Governments have often assailed the circumstances under which Italy entered the war against France; they do not for-

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the Department of State jointly by Major General M. E. Béthouart and Philippe Baudet. Hull transmitted a copy of this translation to Roosevelt as enclosure 3 to his memorandum of August 5, 1943, *post*, p. 664. No direct reply to this communication has been found.

get, assuredly, how the Italian forces joined in the pillage of its territory. The presence of French troops side by side with the armies of occupation and the presence of French representatives on the armistice commissions must constitute, after so many trials, a first and legitimate reparation. It is certain that those who are still living under German domination will find stimulation and promise of early liberation in the news that, three years after the aggression, their flag reappears in Italy among those of the victorious armies. For the population, and for the forces supporting the Committee of Liberation, it will be an encouragement to new efforts.

Aside from these considerations, which cannot leave indifferent anyone who measures the importance of the moral values of which this war is the stake, the request of the Committee of Liberation finds ample justification in the protection of French interests. It will doubtless fall to an inter-Allied commission on which the French Command will be represented, to prepare the armistice clauses which, when the time comes, the Italian Government would have to sign. The French delegation on that commission will present the matters of concern to the Committee of Liberation. It has none the less seemed opportune to call attention to some of the French interests involved :

(a) In the first place it goes without saying that the Allied Armies must be able to use Italian territory immediately as a base for their further operations, particularly for the liberation of France, whose territory the Italian troops will have to evacuate.

(b) The prisoners of war, not very numerous to be sure, and the French nationals sentenced for political reasons must be immediately set free, as well as French civilians who may have been the object of measures of internment.

(c) French war material as well as merchant vessels and other materials, tools and equipment of all kind[s], some surrendered in virtue of the armistice of 1940 or subsequent agreements, others purely and simply seized, must be returned. These will be assigned to the war effort, increasing the French participation in that effort.

(d) The sequestration placed on French public or private property must be lifted. The large properties of the French State in Rome, confiscated in July 1940, must be returned. By these examples, the Committee of National Liberation does not in any way mean to exhaust the list of the claims which the care of the French general interests will oblige it to present at the right time and the measures in the preparation and application of which it will ask to be associated. In the ignorance in which it still is of the thoughts of the Allied Governments and of the character which the Armistice Commission will have, the Committee can not, moreover, formulate any definitive proposal. In any case, this brief enumeration of some of the questions which will necessarily have to be settled at the cessation of hostilities would suffice, taking into account the considerations discussed at the beginning of this note, to justify its request to be associated with the coming negotiations.

Besides, it can not have escaped the American and British Governments that, if it is desired to base in the future Franco-Italian relations on a firm foundation without which no enduring collaboration could be instituted, it is important that from the beginning France shall occupy her proper place in the conversations which are to begin. The Committee of Liberation does not doubt the intention of the Allied Governments as to the purpose to be attained. Neither does it doubt the reception which they will give to this communication.

740.00119 EW/8-343

*The British Minister (Campbell) to the Adviser on Political Relations  
(Dunn)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 3rd, 1943.

MY DEAR JIMMY, I enclose a copy of a telegram from the Foreign Office on the subject of an approach made to our Ambassador at Lisbon.<sup>1</sup> Although the peace feeler described in this telegram has been overtaken by events, the Foreign Office thought that you would be interested to have an account of it.

I also enclose a copy of a telegram received from the Ambassador in Ankara recording approaches made by the Italian Ambassador there to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. You may have received a report of this from Ankara through your own channels,<sup>2</sup> but if not you may find it interesting to have this telegram.

Yours ever,

(for Sir R. Campbell)

W G HAYTER

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in  
the United States (Halifax)*<sup>3</sup>

Dr. Salazar sent for His Majesty's Ambassador on July 22nd and said that he wished to speak about the situation in Italy as a result of an approach which had been made to him by certain elements in the country. He did not feel able to reveal the identity of these persons until he knew whether His Majesty's Government were interested in the approach. The Ambassador surmised that Crown Prince and certain army leaders, perhaps with the complicity of the King were authors of the approach.

Dr. Salazar suggested that to insist on "unconditional surrender" would only serve to unite all the Italians. Resistance might then con-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 531.

<sup>3</sup> Received by the British Embassy at Washington on July 31, 1943.

tinue until there was a complete breakdown and chaos followed. In these circumstances, we should be obliged to condemn the whole country for a considerable period and Dr. Salazar wondered whether it would not suit us better to have some entity to deal with (possibly a military government) which with our help could carry on life of the country.

Dr. Salazar said that he quite understood that Mussolini and his gang must be eliminated. Of the remaining elements in Italy he thought that only dynasty and the army were capable of effective action and then only if they were given some incentive to do so.

Finally, Dr. Salazar said that he had not undertaken to pass on this approach but felt it was his duty to do so. In reply His Majesty's Ambassador explained our attitude and said that while he would of course pass on Dr. Salazar's communication, he did not think that His Majesty's Government would be interested since he did not suppose any grounds would be seen for modifying decision not to negotiate in advance of complete surrender whatever government was responsible for the offer of surrender.

A similar approach to the Embassy has been made by M. Pangal, the former Roumanian Minister in Lisbon, representing the views of Signor Prunas and Signor Fransoni, the present and former Italian Ministers to Portugal.

M. Pangal reported that both Italian diplomats had shown anxiety about the meaning of an "honourable peace" which was the way in which they had interpreted message from the President and the Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup> Their chief anxiety had been to learn whether by capitulation Italy could be prevented from becoming a battlefield between the Allies and Germany and whether Allied military occupation could be limited to a part of the country and that the remainder should be left under an Italian administration.

In reply, M. Pangal was told that the keystone to our policy remained "unconditional surrender" and that this could only be negotiated by government other than that of Mussolini. It was also pointed out to him that if Italians did not capitulate nothing could save the whole of the country from becoming a battlefield subject to attacks by both sides.

His Majesty's Ambassador adds that M. Pangal has also been in touch with German Minister<sup>5</sup> and it is therefore probable that the latter knows and probably agrees with approach made by M. Pangal to try to sound his "English friends" about terms which would be

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<sup>4</sup> For the text of the Roosevelt-Churchill joint message to the people of Italy, July 16, 1943, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, July 17, 1943, pp. 27-28; Rosenman, pp. 305-306.

<sup>5</sup> Oswald, Baron von Hoyningen genannt Huene.

accorded to Germany in the event of her throwing over Hitler and the Nazi party.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

*The British Ambassador in Turkey (Knatchbull-Hugessen) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*<sup>6</sup>

MOST SECRET

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me on his return from Istanbul this morning.

2. While there he had had two conversations with the Italian Ambassador.

3. First on July 21st when the Ambassador had said that Italy was finished. In reply to appeal for tanks the Germans had stated they could supply 15 *per mensem* in 1944 but nothing until then. Ambassador asked if the Turkish press could publish unfavourable comments on the bombardment of Rome. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that this would be entirely out of place.

4. Second conversation was on the morning of July 27th. Ambassador stated that he was not yet in touch with Marshal Badoglio and did not know his views but he was sufficiently acquainted with the situation to be able to talk.

5. In Italy there was no Anglo-American problem. It was impossible for Italy to stand up against maritime powers.

6. Also there was no Fascist problem. Fascism had collapsed and could not be revived.

7. On the other hand there was the German problem. Italian Ambassador asked whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not appeal to the United States and to ourselves to adopt an "understanding" policy. Minister for Foreign Affairs asked what he meant by this. Ambassador explained that if we pressed the war in Italy too hard and too rapidly the country would become squeezed between the Allies and the Germans. There were Germans in every Government office, railway station, bank, etc., and they were all armed. Ambassador also spoke of large German concentrations in the south of France. If we landed in Southern Italy, Italy would be powerless to resist and the result would be that Italy would become the battleground between the Allies and the Germans. In such circumstances Italy could do nothing and would unavoidably be destroyed.

8. Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that the Ambassador was using arguments of beaten man. It would serve little purpose

<sup>6</sup> Repetition received by the British Embassy at Washington on August 2, 1943. On August 4 Campbell informed Dunn, with reference to this message: "Mr. Eden has asked me to let you know that His Majesty's Government attach no importance to these conversations." (740.00119 EW/8-443)

to put up such arguments to us. Could he make some more concrete suggestion?

9. In reply the Ambassador muttered something about Sardinia. Minister for Foreign Affairs owing to his deafness had to make the Ambassador repeat it three times. Upshot was that the Italian Ambassador was suggesting that if the Allies followed the policy of carrying the war on *slowly* Italy would escape the above fate and avoid the impossible task of turning the Germans out in quick time; she could continue on the surface as an Ally of Germany but would in point of fact help in turning the Germans out gradually and would move towards cooperation with the Allies. He suggested that if the Allies did not attack the Italian mainland but invaded Sardinia there would be no Italian resistance nor would there be opposition to action against the Greek islands in the Southern Mediterranean (Crete, etc.). In this way the Allies could strengthen their general position round Italy against Germany without Italian opposition while Italy did what she could to get the Germans out gradually. Minister for Foreign Affairs in speaking to me summed up the Ambassador's proposals as a "policy of treachery".

10. Italian Ambassador said that after reaching Rome he would establish contact with Osborne who is old friend. He leaves immediately. Germans have refused to supply petrol for his flight.

11. Minister for Foreign Affairs undertook to pass the above on to me. I said that I would refrain from comment except to remark that the Italian Ambassador would since have seen the Prime Minister's speech.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See Churchill's speech of July 27, 1943, reported in *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons, Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 391, cols. 1397-1402.

J.C.S. Files

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 August 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State have the following comments to make concerning the British document:<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On August 2, 1943, the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington had circulated a paper headed "Document 'A'" (slightly modified by a corrigendum circulated later the same day) which superseded in later discussions the British draft of "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender for Italy which had been circulated as annex 1 to C.C.S. 258, "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943 (not printed). The comments in the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt of August 3, 1943, pertain to Document "A". (740.00119 EW/8-243)

*a.* There is no statement in the document itself providing for unconditional surrender, or referring to the fact that such a surrender has taken place.

*b.* Reference is made to "Supreme Command of the United Nations," a title which does not appear to exist.

*c.* No consideration is given to the fact that German troops are now in Italy and probably will be at the time of cessation of hostilities, nor is any provision made for dealing with them.

*d.* The document provides for implementing its terms by a "Control Commission" under the authority of the United Nations, rather than by General Eisenhower under the authority of the U. S. and British Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State agree with the view expressed in your message yesterday,<sup>2</sup> i.e., to allow General Eisenhower to act to meet the situations as they arise, and to use as he sees fit the terms of surrender already furnished to him.<sup>3</sup>

3. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the British proposal, as amended by the U. S. changes,<sup>4</sup> may serve a useful purpose for later phases of the Italian situation, in that it combines in a single document many well considered military, political and economic conditions to be imposed on Italy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

G C MARSHALL

*Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

[Enclosure]

*Draft of a Comprehensive Instrument of Surrender*<sup>5</sup>

#### DRAFT INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER OF ITALY<sup>6</sup>

Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledges that the Italian forces have been totally defeated

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 527.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., the "short" or "military" terms. See *ante*, pp. 519, 522.

<sup>4</sup> See fn. 6, below.

<sup>5</sup> The enclosure is printed from the mimeographed copy transmitted to the Department of State by the War Department on August 3, 1943 (740.00119 EW/8-343).

<sup>6</sup> According to a handwritten memorandum of August 3, 1943, from Colonel T. W. Hammond to the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn), this draft contained changes in Document "A" agreed upon in a meeting held in Dunn's office on the preceding day, plus two additional changes (printed in italics in articles 3 and 19) suggested by the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff (740.00119 EW/8-343). The suggested changes were indicated in the source text by underscoring proposed additions (here printed in italics) and by showing proposed deletions in canceled type. This document was further modified in a series of drafting meetings and was approved, as revised, at a special meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on August 21, 1943 (see *post*, p. 1084). For the final text approved by Roosevelt and Churchill and telegraphed to Eisenhower on August 26, 1943, see *post*, p. 1161.

and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities.

And whereas *the United States and United Kingdom acting on behalf of the United Nations* are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her Allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with requirements of ~~United Nations~~ *these governments*.

The following terms have been presented by . . .<sup>7</sup> ~~on behalf of the Supreme Command of the United Nations~~ duly authorized to that effect, and have been accepted by . . . representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.

1. a. *The Italian ground, sea and air forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces.*

b. *The Italian Supreme Command will order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the forces of the United Nations and will direct the Naval, Military and Air Forces authorities in all theaters to issue forthwith the appropriate instructions to those under their command.*

c. Italian participation in the war in all theaters will cease immediately. There shall be no opposition to landings, *movements* or other operations of the sea, land and air forces of the United Nations.

d. *The Italian Supreme Command will further order all Naval, Military and Air Forces or authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or damage to any real or personal property, whether public or private.*

2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian land, sea and air forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian-occupied territory.

3. *The Supreme Italian Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities and other installations against seizure or attack by the Germans. The Supreme Italian Command will take the necessary measures to insure law and order, and to use its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of this armistice. Subject to the use of Italian troops for the above purposes, all other Italian land, sea and air forces will proceed to and remain in their barracks camps or ships pending directions*

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<sup>7</sup> Ellipses in this paragraph and in articles 44 and 45 appear in the source text.

from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal. Exceptionally such naval personnel shall proceed to shore establishments as the United Nations may direct.

4. Italian land, sea and air forces will within the periods to be laid down by the United Nations withdraw from all areas outside Italian territory notified to the Italian Government by the United Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Nations. Such movement of Italian land, sea and air forces will be carried out in conditions to be laid down by the United Nations and in accordance with the orders to be issued by them. All Italian officials will similarly leave the areas notified except any who may be permitted to remain by the United Nations. Those permitted to remain will comply with the instructions of the ~~United Nations~~: *Allied Commander in Chief*.

5. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian land, sea and air forces or officials in regard to persons or property in the areas notified under Article 4.

6. The demobilization of Italian land, sea and air forces in excess of such establishments as shall be notified will take place as prescribed by the ~~United Nations~~: *Allied Commander in Chief acting for and in behalf of the two governments*.

7. Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will be assembled as directed in ports to be specified by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* and will be dealt with as prescribed by the ~~United Nations~~: *Allied Commander in Chief*. (Note. If at the date of the armistice the whole of the Italian Fleet has been assembled in Allied ports, this article would run—"Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries, and transports will remain until further notice in the ports where they are at present assembled, and will be dealt with as prescribed by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief*".)

8. Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as directed by the ~~United Nations~~: *Allied Commander in Chief*.

9. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 14, 16 and 29 below, all merchant ships, fishing or other craft of whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of their identity and status, be prevented from leaving.

10. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, military and air devices, installations, and defences, about all transport and intercommunication systems established by Italy or her Allies on Italian territory or in the approaches thereto, about minefields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and

such other particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, or with the operations, security, or welfare of the United Nations land, sea or air forces. Italian forces and equipment will be made available as required by the United Nations for the removal of the above mentioned obstacles.

11. The Italian Government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. *Subject to such uses as the Allied Commander in Chief may make*, the war material will be placed in store under such control as ~~the United Nations~~ *he* may direct. The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations.

12. There shall be no destruction of nor damage to nor except as authorized or directed by the United Nations any removal of war material, wireless, radiolocation or meteorological stations, rail, road, port or other installations or in general, public or private utilities or property of any kind, wherever situated, and the necessary maintenance and repair will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities.

13. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian Government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

14. *a.* All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. ~~Crews shall remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or disposal.~~ Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war shall forthwith be exercised and the above provisions shall apply to all such vessels and their crews.

*b.* All Italian inland transport shall be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct.

15. ~~The United Nations will endeavor to provide for the essential economic needs of the Italian people so far as circumstances permit but they reserve the right to recover the cost of supplies and transport for the purpose from the Italian Government. It is to the interest of the Italian Government and people to insure that Italian ships and equipment are made available in good and serviceable condition together with their crews as required.~~

16. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Italy, whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of Prize Court proceedings or otherwise) will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled in ports to be specified by the United Nations for disposal as directed by them. The Italian Government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of title. Any neutral merchant ship, fishing or other craft under Italian operations or control will be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. Any necessary repairs to any of the above mentioned vessels will be effected by the Italian Government, if required, and at their expense. *The Italian Government will take the necessary measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged.*

17. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication, ashore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other than the United Nations will transmit until directions for the control of these installations have been prescribed by the United Nations. The Italian Authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as United Nations may direct. The United Nations may, at their discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

18. The warships, auxiliaries, transports and merchant and other vessels and aircraft in the service of the United Nations will have the right freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.

19. The United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian land, sea and air forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the United Nations. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to those of Article 4 above. *The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italy regardless of the rate of evacuation of German forces.*

20. In the territories or areas referred to in Article 19 all naval, military and air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all intercommunication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by

the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian Government will ~~also supply free of cost~~ *make available* such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

21. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power in the territories or areas referred to in Article 19, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian Administrative, Judicial and Public Services will carry out their functions under the control of the ~~United Nations Supreme Command~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* unless otherwise directed.

22. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in Articles 19–21,

*a.* members of the land, sea or air forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions,

*b.* the Italian authorities will make available in non-occupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power-stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

23. The Italian Government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations. The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lock-outs, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.

24. The Italian Government will supply free of cost such Italian currency as the United Nations may require. The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time-limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian Govern-

ment will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and businesses in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

25. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries.

26. *a.* Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of Italian land, sea and air forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe.

*b.* The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing procedure for and methods of communication between Italian Government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory.

27. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be prevented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the United Nations and will not in any event take service with any of the countries referred to in Article 26, nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country. Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as directed by the ~~United Nations~~. *Allied Commander in Chief.*

28. The Military, Naval and Air personnel and material and the merchant shipping, fishing and other craft and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country, remain liable to attack or seizure wherever found in or over Italian territory or waters.

29. *a.* The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in Article 28 in Italian or Italian-occupied ports and waters and the aircraft vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian-occupied territory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving.

b. The Military, Naval and Air personnel and the Civilian Nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

c. All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its Nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

d. The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilization or employment of any of the above mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property.

30. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

31. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police (OVRA) and Fascist Youth Organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief*, ~~except any such organizations or parts thereof as may be specified by the United Nations~~. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

32. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed, ~~religion~~ or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian Government will comply with all such further directions as ~~United Nations~~ *the Allied Commander in Chief* may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

33. a. Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any Nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory *and none of these* will ~~not~~ be removed *from the beginning of these negotiations* and will forth-

with be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct.

b. Persons of whatever nationality including Albanians who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected.

c. The Italian Government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign Nationals and property of foreign states and Nationals.

34. a. The Italian Government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution deliveries services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.

b. The Italian Government will give to the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets whether inside or outside Italian territory of the Italian State, the Bank of Italy, any Italian State or semi-State institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and [will not dispose or allow the disposal outside Italian territory of <sup>8</sup>] any such assets except with the permission of the United Nations.

35. The Italian Government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament *demobilization* and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief*.

36. The Italian Government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

37. The Italian Government will ~~pass take~~ and enforce such ~~legislative and administrative~~ measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the ~~United Nations~~ *Allied Commander in Chief* for the same purpose.

38. The term "~~The United Nations~~" in the present instrument includes the control commission referred to in Article 42 below, the Supreme Command of the United Nations and any other authority which the United Nations may designate for the purpose.

39. Reference to Italian land, sea and air forces in the present instrument shall be deemed to include Fascist Militia and all such

<sup>8</sup> The words in brackets, which had been added in the corrigendum to Document "A" mentioned *ante*, p. 537, fn. 1, were omitted inadvertently from the draft forwarded to Roosevelt.

other military or para-military units, formations or bodies as the United Nations *Allied Commander in Chief* may prescribe.

40. The term "War Material" in the present instrument denotes all material specified in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the Control Commission referred to in Article 42 below.

41. The term "Italian Territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and shall for the purposes of the present instrument (but without prejudice to the question of sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided however that except in such cases and to such extent as the United Nations may direct the provisions of the present instrument shall not apply in or affect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them.

42. A Control Commission appointed by the United Nations will regulate and control the execution of the present instrument. Any disagreement regarding the interpretation or execution of the present instrument will be decided by the Control Commission whose decision will be final.

43. The Italian Government will send a delegation to the headquarters of the Control Commission to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the Commission to the competent Italian authorities.

44. *The present instrument shall enter into force as of the date and hour of signature.*

44. The present instrument shall be confirmed by the Italian Government. It will enter into force . . . hours after the instrument of confirmation has been received at . . . and hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will cease in all theaters of war at that time. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

45. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or as an alternative the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the areas of military occupation or air or other punitive action. Drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic and signed on the . . . at . . . (hour) . . . (time) at . . . (place).

(Signatures)

740.0011 European War 1939/30562: Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[VATICAN CITY, August 3, 1943.]

140. My 131, July 31 [26].<sup>2</sup>

1. There is of course no truth in report appearing Swiss press to effect that either my British colleague or myself have been "negotiating" with Badoglio Government through Vatican.

2. General feeling Vatican circles appears to be that German menace to assume political control of Italy has become very real and consequently position of Badoglio Government extremely difficult. Possibility that Germans may recall Fascists and even insist upon substitution of a *Gauleiter* of Farinacci type for present government does not seem to be excluded. Completely lacking in aviation and modern armor, Italian armed forces are not considered to be in a position effectively to oppose military occupation of Rome. It is believed there is at present time German armored division within 50 miles of capital ready to move in at moment's notice. Under circumstances it is felt temporizing tactics or [on] part of Badoglio Government are justifiable on grounds that if Germans could be held off long enough some military or other event might intervene to ease situation. Suggestion has again been heard that early Allied landing on peninsula would be desirable and that if this could be effected in north of Italy Germans would be obliged to retire immediately from south and center. It has been intimated that good will toward Allies of Italian people at present time is evident and Allies should not fail to take advantage this state of mind while it lasts.

3. I understand that Badoglio Government now has internal situation under control and that fear of social disorders is for moment in abeyance. Apparent apathy of people suggests popular uprising against Germans near future is unlikely. Also suggests that while desire for peace undoubtedly very strong people are counting on us rather than own efforts to get them out of war.

4. Great deal of forego is of course speculative and question also arises as to how Vatican may be playing game of Badoglio Government. In any event it seems to be fact that this government has had support of Vatican from beginning.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 4742 of August 5, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State; received in Washington at 6:46 p. m., August 5.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 524, fn. 2.

740.0011 EW/8-343

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943.]

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following is a paraphrase of a message just received from General Eisenhower:

When your first message<sup>2</sup> was received, informing me that the Italian Government had requested the terms the Allies would impose before recognizing Rome an open city, the mission against Rome scheduled for August 3rd was cancelled. Your last message<sup>3</sup> authorizing me to proceed with the operation came too late to return to the original plan. Arrangements are now being made to attack the railroad yards at Rome tomorrow afternoon, August 4th. We are briefing the pilots on suitable alternative targets, should it again appear desirable to cancel the mission.<sup>4</sup> Pending the decision to recognize Rome as an open city, it may be preferable to refrain from bombing the city. It should not take the Badoglio Government long to act on the Allied conditions. These conditions should be simple, and should require the complete demilitarization of Rome and the complete cessation of all movements of troops and military supplies through the city. All factories engaged in the manufacture of munitions and military supplies, and all airdromes in the close vicinity of Rome should be closed. The designation of Rome as an open city should become effective within seven days from the time the Italian Government accepts our requirements. Whether the Italians are acting in good faith is the important question. If they are, our terms will be accepted promptly, as they will certainly be reasonable. If there is evidence of a temporizing policy on their part, and they do not act promptly, we should return to the attack whenever planes can be spared from more important targets. I fully realize all the complications and repercussions which are bound to result from operations against Rome, and for this reason, I do not intend to over-do the matter. There is no question, however, that a marked effect results from the presence of our planes over the city dropping leaflets and, when appropriate, bombs. *End of Eisenhower's message.*

We understand that the Secretary of State dispatched to you last night the conditions we propose the Italian Government be required

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from an information copy sent to Hull on August 3, 1943, by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane). The memorandum was presumably telegraphed to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, by the White House Map Room. Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1310.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 528.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 530.

<sup>4</sup> The mission planned for August 4, 1943, was canceled because of bad weather in the vicinity of Rome. See Garland and Smyth, p. 279; *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1313.

to meet before recognizing Rome as an open city.<sup>5</sup> Until we receive your approval to these proposed terms and they are coordinated with the British, nothing can be sent to the Italian Government.

[G C MARSHALL]  
Chief of Staff

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<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 530.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)* <sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 3 August 1943.

WHITE 30. In our telephone conversation at 11:10 a.m. August 3 we decided if you did not call me back in 15 minutes I could assume the President had approved the conditions to make Rome an open city as set out in WHITE 25.<sup>2</sup> When you did not call by 11:30 a.m. in accordance with the above agreement I notified General Marshall the President had approved the conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> Brown was with Roosevelt at Birch Island.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 530, fn. 1.

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740.0011 EW/8-343

*The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1. The following message from Admiral Leahy was received in the White House Map Room this date:

"Please inform General Marshall and State Department that the President approves in principle WHITE Number 25<sup>1</sup> but that we must be very sure of the inspection if these terms are accepted."

2. General Marshall has been informed of the above message.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> i.e., the conditions enclosed with Marshall's memorandum of August 2, 1943, to Hull, *ante*, p. 530.

<sup>2</sup> Hull was informed on August 3, 1943, by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane) that the latter had informed the British Staff Mission in Washington of Roosevelt's approval of the proposed conditions for declaring Rome an open city (740.0011 EW/8-343).

3. For your information, a copy of WHITE Number 25 is attached hereto.

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND  
Lt. Colonel, General Staff  
Assistant to the Military Aide

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 3 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 398.

War Cabinet think that the time for negotiating about Rome being an open city has passed. Surely there would be the utmost danger that any such bargain would encourage the Italians to make a try on for a neutralization of Italy itself. Anyhow, that is the way it would be viewed here.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. An information copy was sent to Hull on August 3, 1943, by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane) (740.0011 EW/8-343).

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] August 3, 1943.

PRIORITY

Former Naval Person from the President, Number 341, secret and personal.

Receipt is acknowledged of your message 398.<sup>2</sup>

I consider it unwise in the time available to interfere with the military plans of General Eisenhower to attack with bombs today the Marshalling Yards and airfields in Rome.

However, I believe further raids should not continue pending outcome of Vatican efforts.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels. An information copy was sent to Hull on August 3, 1943, by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane) (740.0011 EW/8-343). For Eisenhower's comments on this message and the preceding document, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1311.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>SECRET  
PRIORITY

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] 3 August 1943.

Secret and personal from the President to the Former Naval Person Number 342.

I think we would be in a difficult position if we were to turn down the plea to make Rome an open city. I have just received from Washington the proposed conditions<sup>2</sup> and given my approval in principle<sup>3</sup> but I think we must be very sure of the inspection if the terms are accepted by Italy.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 530.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 550.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>MOST SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

LONDON, 3 August 1943.

Prime Minister to President. Personal and most secret. Number 401.

Your number 342.<sup>2</sup> We have not yet received the proposed conditions and we ask that, as you assure us, we may be allowed to see them before decision is taken.

As at present informed we doubt the wisdom of declaring Rome an open city in the prevailing circumstance. We think piecemeal neutralization may be very dangerous at this juncture. We think it unwise to make things easier for the Italians before they have taken any decision to yield. Nor do we know, for instance, whether declaring Rome an open city now would preclude our using the communications through Rome, should it later fall into our possession, and thus destroy prospects of the campaign.

I must expect a serious reaction in British public opinion, and until we have seen the conditions, I beg that we may not be committed finally.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. Information copies were sent to Hull by the White House Map Room and by the British Ambassador (Halifax) on August 4, 1943 (740.0011 EW/8-443).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 4 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret number 402.

[Reference my 401.<sup>2</sup>]

I find we had already received the proposed terms but by an oversight they were not placed before me at the time of my telegraphing to you. They and the question of declaring Rome an Open City will be immediately considered by the Cabinet and I hope to send you a reply today.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. Information copies were sent to Hull by the White House Map Room and by Halifax on August 4, 1943 (740.0011 EW/8-443).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*. The reference in brackets was not in the message as first received, but was added by a correction telegraphed from London on August 4, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 4 August 1943.

403. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

1. Your number 342.<sup>2</sup> War Cabinet have now given most careful consideration to proposals to make Rome an open city on the conditions specified. We are sure that the effect on public opinion here would be most unfortunate. What will the Russians say? It would be taken as a proof that we were going to make a patched-up peace with the King and Badoglio and had abandoned the principle of unconditional surrender. It would be taken all over the world and throughout Italy as a success for the new Italian Government who would have rescued Rome from all further danger. No doubt their greatest hope is to have Italy recognized as a neutral area, and Rome would seem to be a first instalment. Considering that Badoglio, according to all our information and especially the most secret, is giving repeated assurances to Germany and Japan that they mean to carry on the war and be faithful to their engagements, and that they are even repeating this kind of statements on the radio, we do not think they should be given the slightest encouragement. Although in the interval it would be

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. Information copies were sent to Hull by the White House Map Room and by Halifax on August 4 and August 6, 1943, respectively (740.0011 EW/8-343; *id.*/8-643).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 552.

convenient to secure the conditions proposed for Rome, this advantage in our opinion is far outweighed by the political misunderstanding which would arise among our own people and the stimulus given to a hostile Italian Government.

2. We hope that in a few months Rome will be in our hands, and we shall need to use its facilities for the northward advance. If Rome has been declared an open city by us, it will be practically impossible for us to take away its status when we want to use it and its communications and airfields. The British Chiefs of Staff say these "open city" conditions, applied to us, would paralyze the whole further campaign: and certainly the Germans would threaten Rome with bombardment if they were altered or broken. We think this a great danger.

3. In these circumstances would it not be better for us to talk the matter over when we meet? In the interest of putting the maximum political and military pressure on the Italian people and Government as well as for strictly military reasons we are most reluctant to interrupt such bombing of the marshalling yards, etc., as Eisenhower evidently thought desirable: but if you so desire it must be postponed until you and I have met.<sup>3</sup>

PRIME

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<sup>3</sup> For paragraph 4 of this message, omitted here, see *post*, p. 664.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 4 August, 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret nr 405.

The following story has been told to British Ambassador Campbell at Lisbon by newly arrived Italian Counsellor, Marquis D'Ajeta, who had been sent to get into touch with him by the Badoglio Government with the knowledge of the King and the General Staff. I send it to you for what it is worth which is substantial. Ambassador Campbell was instructed to make no comment. It certainly seems to give inside information. Though I am starting now Anthony<sup>2</sup> will be here and you can communicate both with him and me.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Washington by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels; forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario. An information copy was sent to Hull by Halifax on August 5, 1943 (740.00119 EW/8-543).

<sup>2</sup> Eden.

The King and the Army leaders have been preparing *Coup D'État* but this was precipitated (probably by a few days only) by the action of the Grand Fascist Council. Fascism in Italy is extinct.

Every vestige has been swept away. Italy turned Red overnight. In Turin and Milan there were Communist demonstrations which had to be put down by armed force. 20 years of Fascism has obliterated the middle class. There is nothing between the King and the patriots who have rallied round him and rampant Bolshevism (Corrupt passage<sup>3</sup>). They are in complete control. They have an armoured division just outside Rome and will march in if there is any sign of Italians weakening. There are 10,000 scattered about inside Rome, mostly with machine guns. If we bomb Rome again there will be a popular rising and the Germans will then march in and slaughter everybody. They have actually threatened use of gas. As many Italian troops as possible have been concentrated round Rome but they have no stomach for fighting. They have practically no weapons and are no match for even 1 well equipped German division.

In these circumstances, the King and Badoglio whose first thought was to make peace have no alternative but to put up a show of going on with the fight. Guariglia is to meet Ribbentrop (perhaps tomorrow) as a result of which there will be a communiqué stating in plainer terms than hitherto, that Italy is still the active ally of Germany. But this will be only pretence. The whole country is only longing for peace and above all to be rid of the Germans who are universally execrated.

If we cannot attack Germany immediately through the Balkans thus causing German withdrawal from Italy the sooner we land in Italy the better. The Germans, however, are resolved to defend it line by line. When we land in Italy we shall find little opposition and perhaps even active cooperation on the part of the Italians.

He never from start to finish made any mention of peace terms and his whole story as you will have observed was no more than a plea that we should save Italy from the Germans as well as from herself and do it as quickly as possible.

He expressed the hope that we should not heap abuse on the King and Badoglio (which would precipitate the blood bath) although a little of this would help them to keep up the pretence *vis-à-vis* the Germans.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This parenthetical phrase occurs in the source text. The missing garbled passage presumably referred to the Germans, since "Germans" must be the antecedent for "they" in the following sentence.

<sup>4</sup> For further details of Lanza d'Ajeta's conference with Campbell, see Eden's telegram to Roosevelt of August 5, 1943, *infra*. Cf. Garland and Smyth, pp. 297-298. For Lanza d'Ajeta's own account of his mission to Lisbon, see Consiglio di Stato, Sezione speciale per l'epurazione, *Memoria a svolgimento del ricorso del Consigliere di Legazione Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta contro la decisione della Commissione per l'epurazione del personale dipendente dal Ministero degli Affari Esteri* (Rome: Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 79-81, 84-87; *Documenti prodotti a corredo della memoria del Consigliere di Legazione Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta* (Rome: Tipografia Ferraiolo, 1946), pp. 17-35.

740.00119 EW/8-643: Telegram

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 5, 1943.

In the Prime Minister's absence I am sending you the following further information which has come in from Lisbon since he sent you his telegram No. 405.<sup>2</sup> *Begins*:

*Telegram No. 1456.*

Informant gave the following military information. The Germans have an armoured division in Calabria and a division (not armoured) he thought in Puglia. They have an armoured division just outside Rome and one or two battalions (he thought armoured) near the coast north of Rome, where they were expecting us to land. They are in possession of Bolzano and are massing troops round Innsbruck (the Italian Consul there gave figure of 150,000). Two divisions are coming in from Provence. Germans are in control of communications with the Balkans as well as with France, this making it impossible for the Italian forces to be withdrawn.

*2. Telegram No. 1457.*

According to informant, Farinacci escaped to Germany by air and is at Hitler's headquarters. Mussolini is in detention somewhere. Place is being kept secret as there is reason to know that Hitler is hoping to rescue him. Ciano whom informant knows intimately is in a miserable situation. He never wanted the war and did what he would [*could?*] to prevent it. But having stuck to his post he is tarred with Mussolini's brush. The German Consul at Turin was beaten up.

*3. Telegram 1458.*

Informant naturally begged that no public use should be made of his information and that his own name should never be mentioned. He was terrified of coming to the Embassy. His mother is of American origin and he asked that if any communication was made to the United States Government, Mr. Sumner Welles who is godfather to one of his children should be informed he was the bearer of the message and that he is in Lisbon.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from the information copy sent to Hull by Halifax on August 6, 1943.<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>2</sup> August 5, 1943.

406. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.

Your number 331 and my numbers 391 and 395.<sup>3</sup><sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. The text printed here contains a correction telegraphed from London on August 6, 1943. An information copy was sent to Hull by Halifax on August 6 (740.0011 EW/8-643).<sup>2</sup> Churchill had left London en route for Quebec on the evening of August 4, 1943, but the message was sent via London.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 517, 521, and 523, respectively.

I have now consulted my colleagues who entirely agree with your suggested amendments on the paper which I called "The Fall of Musolini",<sup>4</sup> subject to the 2 following points:

(a) We feel that paragraph 11 as now drafted might seem to imply that we had not kept in touch with the Russian Government on our policy in regard to Italy. The Foreign Secretary has however informed the Russian Government of our general intentions in regard to the draft armistice terms<sup>5</sup> and they have expressed themselves as satisfied. To cover this point we suggest the omission of the words "affecting the Balkans" in our paragraph 11, which have a narrowing effect.

(b) The point about paragraph 2 which I put to you in my number 395, suggesting "namely the destruction of Hitler and the total defeat of Germany".

If you will let me know that you agree to these 2 further amendments, let us regard the document as amended as constituting a joint directive to the United Kingdom and United States Governments on the broad policy to be pursued.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 332-335.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 341-343.

<sup>6</sup> No reply by Roosevelt to this message has been found.

Hull Papers

*The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1943.

THE SECRETARY: The question whether we should recognize Rome as an open city brings into relief several considerations which may or may not be of importance depending upon the state and future course of military operations. The term "open city" means an undefended place. The only effect of recognizing a place as open or undefended is to relieve it from the consequences of attack or bombardment. As early as 1874 an effort was made in the Declaration of Brussels to declare that "Fortified places are alone liable to be besieged" and that "Towns, agglomerations of houses or open villages which are undefended, cannot be attacked or bombarded." (Art. 15.) This statement of rules was based upon a previously time-honored practice of laying siege to fortified places, such as fortresses or walled cities as distinguished from unfortified or open cities which could be taken without the use of heavy artillery. The Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 discarded the test of fortified or unfortified places and adopted instead, in view of the changed practice in methods of warfare, the test of defended or undefended places.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from an uninitialed copy attached to Hackworth's memorandum to Hull of August 19, 1943, *post*, p. 596.

Article XXV of the Rules attached to Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, relating to Laws and Customs of War on Land, provides that—

“The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.”

Similar provisions are contained in Article I of Hague Convention No. IX, 1907, regarding bombardment by naval forces.

The Basic Field Manual issued by the War Department in 1940 containing the “Rules of Land Warfare” incorporates the provisions of Hague Convention No. IV, 1907, and states in paragraph 47, as follows:

*“Defended place defined.*—Investment, bombardment, assault, and siege have always been recognized as legitimate means of warfare, but under the foregoing rule (par. 45) their use is limited to defended places which certainly will include the following:

*a.* A fort or fortified place.

*b.* A town surrounded by detached forts, which is considered jointly with such forts as an indivisible whole.

*c.* A place that is occupied by a combatant military force or through which such a force is passing. The occupation of such a place by sanitary troops alone is not sufficient to make it a defended place.”

It is to be noted that the Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare also incorporate the corresponding provisions of Hague Convention IX of 1907.

It is to be borne in mind that Rome constitutes the most important railway center of Southwestern Italy. While I have not found this subject discussed, it stands to reason that if we should now agree that Rome should be declared an open city and treated as such, we could not later use the facilities of the city, such as railroad terminals, for the movement of troops, supplies, etc. or use air bases or industrial plants within the city, without laying ourselves open to the charge that we had breached the agreement and had rendered the city subject to bombardment by Germany. Attention is called to the fact that the War Department's Basic Field Manual of 1940 provides in paragraph 47(c) that “A place that is occupied by a combatant military force or through which such a force is passing” will certainly be regarded as a defended place.

When Italy felt more certain of her success in the war, she did not see fit to declare Rome an open city despite the existence there of historic monuments; instead, she used the city as a center of military operations. Now that she finds herself in a precarious position, she is willing to declare it an open city—she has little to lose and much to gain. She would preserve the city, public buildings, utilities, and places of historic interest. She would prevent her enemies from using the facilities there available for war operations which would be of benefit to herself as well as to her cobelligerents.

We could, of course, say that by waiting until this late date, when the Italian military effort is disintegrating, the Italian Government has deprived itself of the right to have the city recognized as an undefended place, or we could state that the only conditions under which the Allied Governments will agree to refrain from bombing the war installations and facilities in the city is for Italy to agree to remove her war operations from the city and not to defend the place against occupation by the Allied forces if, and when, such occupation shall be deemed to be desirable. Subsequent occupation of the city by our military forces would subject it to bombardment by Germany, but this would be a matter between Italy and Germany. In other words, while we would agree not to bomb the place we would not agree not to occupy or use it at some future time.

The difficulties involved in our refusal to regard Rome as an open city are that Italy will immediately make known the fact that she has indicated readiness to declare it as such and that we have refused the offer. Our enemies and people who have expressed an interest in the preservation of historic monuments will make capital of our refusal. They will lose sight of the fact that the move on the part of Italy is a last moment effort to save herself from the consequences of an impending defeat and to cripple as much as possible our war effort.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee*

SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING <sup>1</sup> HELD IN ROOM 4 E 859, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR, ON THURSDAY, 5 AUGUST 1943 AT 1600 <sup>2</sup>

*Members Present*

Hon. John J. McCloy (Chairman)  
 Mr. James C. Dunn  
 Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring  
 Capt. H. L. Pence, USN

Lieut. Gen. G. N. Macready  
 Sir David Waley (Rept'g Sir  
 Frederick Phillips)  
 Mr. R. E. Barclay (Rept'g  
 Sir Ronald Campbell)  
 Mr. A. D. Marris

*Others Present*

Col. John H. F. Haskell  
 (For items 1 and 2 only)

Mr. Wm. Hayter  
 Col. Rex Benson

*Secretariat*

Colonel T. W. Hammond, Jr.

Major C. W. Garnett

<sup>1</sup> C.C.A.C. 4th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., at 4 p. m.

5. *Surrender Terms for Italy (C.C.S. 258<sup>3</sup> and 258/1<sup>4</sup>)*

MR. McCLOY invited a discussion by the Committee of the procedure to follow in attempting to settle the matter. Mr. McCloy reviewed the fact that the President and the Prime Minister recently settled the question of military terms of surrender for Italy by furnishing General Eisenhower a military document with which he is authorized to accept an Italian surrender.<sup>5</sup>

MR. McCLOY pointed out that the document did not contain a "saving" clause which would authorize him to act, if desirable, in effecting *political conditions*, as well as military. He further stated that the additional conditions should be drawn up, agreed upon and made available to General Eisenhower as soon as possible.

GENERAL MACREADY stated that the War Cabinet feels that a comprehensive, all-inclusive paper should be available, and that General Eisenhower should have all the terms available which will be imposed upon the Italians. The so-called Document A<sup>6</sup> (Amended version of Annex 1, C.C.S. 258) would be an appropriate document.

GENERAL HILDRING stated that the President and the Prime Minister have now decided on a military armistice. General Hildring agreed that preparations should begin at once on the more inclusive terms mentioned above.

MR. HAYTER stated that although the Prime Minister had agreed with the President on the military armistice furnished to General Eisenhower, he did so only because it was essential for General Eisenhower to have some form of document at once. The Prime Minister adheres, however, to the view that an all-inclusive document should be furnished to him.

MR. DUNN stated that in his opinion, it appeared desirable to prepare two documents: The first, an agreed version of the so-called Document A mentioned above, which would tell the Italians what they were to do. The second document should be a directive telling General Eisenhower how to implement the first document.

<sup>3</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943; not printed.

<sup>4</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", July 1, 1943; not printed.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 537, fn. 1, and p. 538, fn. 6.

THE COMMITTEE:—

Agreed:

a. That a draft cable to General Eisenhower be prepared by the Secretaries and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and submission to the President and Prime Minister for their approval. The draft cable should inform General Eisenhower that the matter of an all-inclusive surrender document was now under consideration, and if approved, would be transmitted at a later date. However, in the meantime, if he is called upon to impose the military terms now in his possession, he should make it clear to the surrendering authority that these terms are purely of a military nature, and that further all-embracing conditions will follow.<sup>7</sup>

b. That a meeting be held in Mr. Dunn's Office at 9:30 A. M., 6 August, for the purpose of revising Document "A".

c. That after the action in c [b] above has been completed to prepare a Directive to General Eisenhower to implement the revised Document "A".

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<sup>7</sup> For the action taken on this subject at the 105th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 6, 1943, see *post*, p. 565.

J.C.S. Files

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943.]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord that it is inadvisable, from a purely military viewpoint, to decide the question of the recognizing of Rome as an open city at the present time. By such recognition we would deny ourselves the use of communications through Rome which would be vital to operations to the north. On the other hand, our willingness to recognize Rome as an open city has been mentioned in press conferences.<sup>2</sup>

The Italian Government through the Vatican has stated its intention to declare Rome an open city and has asked for the conditions

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<sup>1</sup> The source text has neither a typed date nor a signature, but bears the following manuscript endorsement: "Sent to the President 8/5/43 1700", i.e., at 5 p. m., August 5, 1943. A draft of this memorandum in Department of State files is endorsed "OK CH" in Hull's handwriting, and an accompanying manuscript memorandum indicates that the War Department was informed at 3:30 p. m. on August 5 that Hull approved the memorandum as amended (740.0011 EW/8-543).

<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt had stated in a press conference on July 23, 1943: "We have been very anxious to have Rome declared an open city." See Rosenman, p. 309.

we would impose before acceptance of this arrangement.<sup>3</sup> For political reasons it would appear that the necessity of a direct denial of this request should be avoided. It seems advisable, particularly in view of the channel of communication use[d] and the special status of Rome, to delay answering this request as long as practicable. This action is justified by the fact that Rome has been within range of Allied bombers for a long time during which the Germans have profited by the use of rail communications through that city. Now that our use of these same communications appears probable, the Italians propose that it be made an open city. Their delay justifies our delay.

The action we propose is—furnish the State Department the views given in the preceding paragraph as a guide for their immediate action with a request that prior to any positive and final action the matter be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views from the viewpoint of the military situation existing at the time. The present military situation is subject to a decided change in a short time.

As to the matter of “military necessity for future bombing raids on Rome” General Eisenhower, in his W-6509 4 August<sup>4</sup> has indicated that for the present, at least, there are more important targets for the forces he has available. It is our view, and upon it was based the original recommendation for bombing Rome, that the communication facilities, plants, and airfields in Rome and its immediate vicinity are important military targets and should be attacked. In the Italian Peninsula there are 4 railroad routes from north to south, 2 of these pass through the city. A severance of railroad facilities at Rome would prevent movement of troops from northern to southern Italy except by 2 routes. Probably General Eisenhower’s views just referred to have been influenced by the delicacy of the situation and the differences of opinion of which he is aware.

In Rome or its immediate surroundings are factories, plants, and installations producing small arms of various types, heavy machine guns, hand grenades, mortar bombs, rifles, fuses, and fire control instruments, such as artillery sights, range finders, telescopes, etc.

There are 12 airfields in Rome or immediately adjacent thereto within a radius of 10 miles. Rome is the seat of the Italian Government. It is a focal point of wire communications. There are 5 principal radio broadcasting stations in Rome. All of the above indicate the importance of Rome to Italy from the standpoint of prosecution of the

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 528.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1313.

war. This is further emphasized by the immediate and decided reaction of the Italian Government to our first attack on Rome.

The Secretary of State has read this paper and concurs.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The British Consul General at Barcelona (Farquhar) to the British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare)*<sup>1</sup>

[BARCELONA, August 5, 1943.]

An Italian called here today, stated that he wished to see you on important business, asked me to facilitate interview, and enquired whether you were in Madrid or had gone to San Sebastián. I told him he must first establish his bona fides and disclose his business. He then stated that his name was Pierino Busseti, had spent most of his time in Spain since 1939, address being Velásquez 71 Madrid, that he was engaged in business, had gone to Rome on June 9th then returned by aeroplane on August 2nd. He claims to be bearer of formal communication to His Majesty's Government from following political parties, namely, Italian Democratic Party under leadership of Bonomi ex-Prime Minister, Italian Socialist Party (leader Vernocchi), Liberal Party (Orlando), Italian Popular Party (Saraceni), Republican Party (Comandini) and the Garibaldian Party (Pocci), who had on July 30 formed themselves into a "Committee of Action of Free Italy".

2. This communication, which is in the form of a manifesto, and which bearer had memorized before leaving Rome and then wrote down here, states that the Committee is of the opinion that the Government of Marshal Badoglio does not express the present wishes and desires of the Italian people; that this Government is attempting to make a compromise peace which is foredoomed to fail; and that the re-institution of repressive measures on Fascist morale [*model ?*] makes it impossible for the Italian people to regain their freedom without armed assistance from the outside by the United Nations. This committee, representing as they do all shades of political opinion in Italy and confident that the recent declarations of His Majesty's Government and the United States Government still hold good, propose to His Majesty's Government, who would duly communicate with the Government[s] of Allied nations, that recognition be given to the Committee as their Allies in the fight against Fascism and Naziism. If this recognition is given, the Committee affirms its intention of taking all

<sup>1</sup>The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, was delivered to the White House Map Room by the Department during the evening of August 6, 1943, and was forwarded by the Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario, by telegram during the night of August 6-7.

possible measures against the Germans who occupy Italy and of acting in concert with the Allies to this end. The Committee considers itself a form of provisional government and hopes to concert concrete measures with His Majesty's Government.

3. The communication ends by stating that the bearer is their accredited representative and that he has been instructed to remain in Spain for the purpose of taking back to Italy any answer you may think fit to give.

4. Translation by next bag.

5. Please see my immediately following telegram.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The British Consul General at Barcelona (Farquhar) to the British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare)* <sup>1</sup>

[BARCELONA, August 5, 1943.]

Bearer of the communication <sup>2</sup> requested that his name and mission be treated with the utmost secrecy.

2. In course of conversation he volunteered the statement that Italian Communist party had attempted to join this Committee of Action but had been more or less cold-shouldered, that if the present situation dragged on much longer conditions in Italy would become chaotic and grave disorder would ensue, but that Italian Army was still respected by mass of population, which had not been the case in 1921 and 1922. He mentioned that Mussolini was under surveillance in the fort of Boccea near Rome.

3. He also stated for reasons of safety the Committee had made no attempt to make contact through His Majesty's Minister at the Vatican.<sup>3</sup>

4. He will remain here until further notice.

5. General impression which I derived from this conversation was that this so-called Committee of Action was prepared to turn out Badoglio Government and to instigate the Army to turn against the Germans but was powerless to act and perhaps too frightened to act without active support of armed forces of the Allies on the mainland

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, was delivered to the White House Map Room by the Department during the evening of August 6, 1943, and was forwarded by the Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario, by telegram during the night of August 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> See the telegram printed *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

of Italy. At the back of his mind was perhaps the fear that "honourable capitulation" with the possibility of lenient treatment no longer held good in view of failure of Badoglio Government to surrender promptly, mixed with the hope that the Committee, if it obtained recognition and support from the Allies, would succeed where Badoglio had failed.

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740.0011 EW/8-643

*The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message from the President was received in the White House Map Room this date :

"Please inform the Secretary of State and General Marshall that I approve in principle the report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the recognition of Rome as an open city."<sup>1</sup>

General Marshall has been informed of the above message.

CHESTER HAMMOND

*Lt. Colonel, General Staff**Assistant to the Military Aide*


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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 561.

J.C.S. Files

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*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] 6 August 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Surrender Terms for Italy.

At their meeting today the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the following message should be sent to General Eisenhower. The Prime Minister is being informed of this message by Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff :

"You have no doubt observed that the terms of surrender furnished to you by the President and Prime Minister relate entirely to the military aspects of unconditional surrender.<sup>1</sup> Should you be called upon to impose the terms now in your possession, you should make it clear to the surrendering authority that these terms are purely of a military

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522.

nature and that other conditions of a political, economic and financial nature will be transmitted at a later date."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
G C MARSHALL  
*Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Watkinson) to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 6, 1943.

Signor Berio, Counsellor of Embassy at present employed in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs arrived today from Rome, which he left yesterday. He states that he was instructed by Marshal Badoglio on the advice of his son, Mario Badoglio, Italian Consul-General at Tangier, to establish contact with Mr. Gascoigne<sup>2</sup> in Tangier in order to discuss possible negotiations with the present Italian Government.

2. A similar emissary, the Marquis Lanza d'Ajeta, former *Chef de Cabinet* of Ciano, has gone to Lisbon with a similar mission to British or American representative.<sup>3</sup>

3. I was informed during the course of the evening that a member of the Italian Consulate-General wished to see me urgently and I agreed with him to meet the Italian Vice-Consul and to accompany him to the house of the Italian Chargé d'Affaires where I met Signor Berio.

4. Berio states that he has been sent on a special mission by Marshal Badoglio, as negotiations through our mission at the Vatican are impracticable. As a cover for this he is to assume charge temporarily of Italian Consulate-General here.

5. He is instructed to request me to inform you that Marshal Badoglio is ready to treat with His Majesty's Government but is quite unable to do so openly at present, being entirely under the control of the Germans. In a few days he will have a conference with Hitler or other German representative and, under compulsion, will issue a further proclamation that the war will continue and that alli-

<sup>1</sup> The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, was delivered to the White House Map Room by the Department during the evening of August 6, 1943, and was forwarded by the Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario, by telegram during the night of August 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Alvary Douglas Frederick Gascoigne, the British Consul General, was absent from Tangier.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 554.

ance with Germany cannot be broken. These are, of course, not his real sentiments or those of the Italian Government or people, but it is necessary to gain time.

6. It is most urgently necessary to help Badoglio to stay in power and to assist him to maintain internal order. Should Badoglio fall, the Germans will seize Rome—armoured divisions are in waiting for this purpose—and will form a military government under a Quisling.

7. The way to assist the present Italian Government is:—

(a) To refrain from bombardments which will cause panic among the population. Badoglio is powerless to maintain order if the people become demoralised and no other government would be capable of resisting the German occupation which would seriously delay the advance of the Allies. Italy has no military force at present which could resist the German advance as all forces are employed to maintain public order.

(b) To create an immediate diversion by a landing in the south of France or the Balkans.

(c) To continue propaganda against Badoglio in radio and the press in order to lull German suspicions.

8. Signor Berio states that he is ready and authorised to negotiate with any British representative here or with a representative of General Eisenhower. He does not at present propose to establish contact with American Legation here.

9. He hopes that a reply may be received at the earliest possible moment for communication to Marshal Badoglio.

10. According to Signor Berio, most Italian troops have been recalled from France and none from Albania or Greece.

11. Signor Berio gives as personal references Sir P. Loraine and Mr. James Morgan.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>For Berio's account of his mission to Tangier, see Alberto Berio, *Missione segreta (Tangeri: Agosto 1943)* (Milan: Enrico Dall'Oglio, 1947).

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 6, 1943.

My comments on Tangier telegram<sup>2</sup> are as follows.

2. Berio is an Italian professional diplomat. Sir P. Loraine just remembers meeting him as Counsellor of Italian Embassy at Ankara.

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<sup>1</sup>The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, was delivered to the White House Map Room by the Department during the evening of August 6, 1943, and was forwarded by the Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, by telegram during the night of August 6-7.

<sup>2</sup>*Supra.*

Member of my Department recalls him as an unassuming pleasant little man.

3. Berio's approach is substantially the same as d'Ajeta's, though more definite. We are entitled to regard it as an offer by Badoglio Government to negotiate on terms.

4. There can of course be no question of any negotiation. On the other hand we believe that this is an official approach from Badoglio Government and I think it might be difficult to justify ignoring it altogether.

5. Should we not then reply that as is well known we insist on unconditional surrender and Badoglio Government must as a first step notify us that Italy surrenders unconditionally?

6. Subsequently at a later stage if Badoglio Government were to do this we should then inform them of terms on which we should be prepared to cease hostilities against Italy.

7. The following are my comments on Barcelona telegrams.<sup>3</sup>

8. Busseti is unknown to us. Though we had not heard that political parties mentioned had formed themselves into a Committee of Action we think this quite credible. Further enquiries are being made. But we doubt whether Committee of Action hastily formed out of liberal groups which have been suppressed for the past 20 years and excluding Communist and apparently other groups such as *Partito d'Azione* can represent a serious political force. Committee makes no claim to speak for Italian Army who so far as we know are still loyal to Badoglio and are perhaps the most powerful factor in the country.

9. We conclude that Committee's claim to be able to turn out Badoglio Government and instigate the Army to turn against the Germans should be discounted. I therefore consider it would not be in our interest to recognize this group as a provisional government. Moreover, if we are to try out Badoglio on the lines of paragraph 5 above we do not at present at least wish to support any opposition against him.

10. At the same time Committee of Action may be useful to us hereafter since they apparently represent, we presume, moderate opinion which might eventually come into its own. They should therefore not be discouraged. Busseti might be told that Committee's communication has been considered, that without further assurance that they are in a position to replace existing Government we cannot enter into any undertakings with them, but that in any case the first step must be for Italy to surrender. Meanwhile best advice we can give is that all patriots should turn their efforts towards bringing about that surrender and frustrating German designs on Italy.

11. Please inform President of the foregoing.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 563, 564.

865.00/2143 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

MOST SECRET

ANKARA, August 6, 1943.

1370. I have learned from a high official of the Turk[ish] Foreign Office that the Turk Ambassador in Rome<sup>1</sup> has reported that the Badoglio Government seeks to achieve four objectives.

- (1) To take Italy out of the war.
- (2) To save the dynasty.
- (3) To maintain order throughout the country.
- (4) To check the growth of a movement in certain provinces of north-western Italy to become part of France.

STEINHARDT

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<sup>1</sup> Ruşen Eşref Unaydin.

740.0011 European War 1939/30612 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[VATICAN CITY, August 6, 1943.]

144. My 140.<sup>2</sup>

1. Although speculation as to developments is dilemma in which Badoglio Government finds itself, little concrete has emerged since my last telegram. General tone Vatican circles continues pessimistic.

2. There is still Italian people's overwhelming desire for peace that must be satisfied yet they seem incapable of taking initiative themselves either because they lack experience in democratic processes or because of presence of German military power—probably combination of both. It is difficult to escape conclusion that Italian people are relying on United States to large extent to get them out of war. To illustrate I have heard Italians frequently say that if as charged by Allies, Badoglio Government lost opportunity to get rid of Germans by not taking action against them immediately after fall of Fascist régime, Allies themselves are guilty same mistake because they failed to land military forces on Peninsula while Germans were still in confusion.

3. Meanwhile liquidation of Fascism by Badoglio Government seems to be making good progress. Recent provision for establishment of commission for investigation rapid accumulation fortunes by Fascists who held public office especially popular.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 4846 of August 9, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State; received in Washington at 10:59 a. m., August 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 548.

740.0011 EW/8-843

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 8th, 1943.

DEAR MR. HULL, I send you herewith a copy of a telegram received from Mr. Eden on August 7th about the proposal to make Rome an open city.

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)*

The Apostolic delegate<sup>1</sup> handed to Sir A. Cadogan on August 4th an *aide-mémoire* in which he recalled that the Holy See had suggested to the new Italian Government that Rome should be declared and effectively made, an open city. The Italian Government had replied on July 31st that it had been decided to declare Rome an open city. They therefore desired to know what essential conditions must be fulfilled in order that such a declaration could be recognised by the Allied nations.

2. Sir A. Cadogan said that we had already heard of this proposal through the United States Government,<sup>2</sup> and that it was under discussion. He reminded the Archbishop that the proposal had already been put forward recently but no solution had been found. There did not seem to be any fresh elements in the situation which would make it any easier to find a solution now. The Archbishop observed that the question had been raised when Mussolini was in power. Sir A. Cadogan replied that he did not see how fact that a different régime was in power in any way affected the sanctity of the city of Rome. But the matter was being examined and the Archbishop would be informed of our decision eventually.

3. We are taking no action on this approach.

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<sup>1</sup> William Godfrey.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 530, fn. 1.

740.00119 EW/8-843

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 8th, 1943.

DEAR MR. HULL, I send you herewith a copy of a telegram received from Mr. Eden on August 7th about approaches received from certain Italian sources.

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<sup>1</sup> The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement: "August 8. Copy of enclosure delivered to the White House for forwarding to the President. Eu--Bobbright."

I should be very grateful if you would pass on the contents to the President.

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)*

MOST SECRET

Sir A. Cadogan has informed the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires<sup>2</sup> of the Italian [approach through?<sup>3</sup>] d'Ajeta at Lisbon<sup>4</sup> and also of subsequent approach at Tangier<sup>5</sup> and Barcelona.<sup>6</sup>

2. Sir A. Cadogan pointed out that the first and second approaches were evidently parallel but that there was this difference in that the approach made in Tangier professed to be an official request for some kind of negotiation. He explained that this was of course out of the question though he did not know whether His Majesty's Government would decide that this approach was serious enough for them to use as a channel for demanding unconditional surrender and presenting surrender terms. As regards the third approach in Barcelona, Sir A. Cadogan pointed out that this could be ignored entirely as it emanated from parties who so far as we know exercise little if any influence in Italy.

3. I have also instructed Sir A. Clark Kerr to inform the Soviet Government.

4. Please inform the President of the foregoing.

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<sup>2</sup>Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev.

<sup>3</sup>The two words in brackets appear in the typed source text, with a query, as a possible correction for a garble in the message as received.

<sup>4</sup>See *ante*, p. 554.

<sup>5</sup>See *ante*, p. 566.

<sup>6</sup>See *ante*, p. 563.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1567: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

BERN, August 8, 1943.

4815. My Greek colleague<sup>1</sup> tells me that the Papal Nuncio<sup>2</sup> called upon him and asked him to pass on to me and to my British colleague<sup>3</sup> the following as coming from an Italian source here without revealing

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<sup>1</sup>Spyro Marchetti.

<sup>2</sup>Filippo Bernardini.

<sup>3</sup>Clifford John Norton.

his name: the Badoglio Government is prepared to accept immediately armistice on "honorable terms" provided Italy is not occupied. This only way for B to get Germans out. If Germans refuse B will ask Allied assistance.

My Greek colleague suggests action of Nuncio may well have been inspired by the Vatican. Am inclined believe *Nonce* acted on his own initiative.

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/31288

*The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 8, 1943.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP CICOGNANI: I have received this morning your letter of August 7<sup>1</sup> in which you inform me that you have just received from His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State a radiogram urgently requesting a definitive reply to his previous message<sup>2</sup> advising of the decision of the new Italian Government to declare Rome an open city. You add that you will be grateful for anything that I can do to expedite the securing of the desired response so that you may be in a position to report such reply to the Cardinal Secretary of State.

As I informed Your Excellency in my letter of August 4,<sup>3</sup> the message under reference was immediately submitted by me to the highest authorities of the Government of the United States. The matter is receiving their fullest consideration.

In the meantime I am instructed by the President<sup>4</sup> to state that, in accordance with the accepted principles of international law and of pertinent international agreements, there is nothing to prevent the Italian Government from undertaking unilaterally to declare Rome an open city.

With the assurances [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

<sup>1</sup> Not printed (740.0011 European War 1939/31288).

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 528.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 528, fn. 3.

<sup>4</sup> After consultation with Hull, Welles had submitted a draft of this letter to Roosevelt, who was then en route from Birch Island to Washington, for the latter's approval earlier on August 8 (740.0011 European War 1939/31288). Roosevelt's approval had been communicated by telegram to the White House, which had notified Welles by telephone (*id.*/31289).

740.00119 European War 1939/1579 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[VATICAN CITY, August 8, 1943.]

US URGENT

This is Tittmann's 145, August 8. Most secret.

Following is from a sure source :

1. The Badoglio Government would like to make peace with the Allies immediately.

2. It is prevented from doing so by German threat to occupy Italy and to take over control of the Italian Government in Rome.

3. Italian armed forces now in Italy are not strong enough successfully oppose the Germans. Two German armored divisions are at present moment in proximity of Rome.

4. Badoglio must therefore play for time in hope that Allies will be in a position to come to help of the Italians in opposing the Germans with sufficient aviation or possibly by effecting a landing on the peninsula, preferably in the north.

5. The suggestion that Badoglio Government may be playing the Germans against the Allies in hope of obtaining better terms from latter is to be excluded. The Government is motivated solely by fear of the Germans.

6. Hitler is in a vengeful mood against Italy and the Germans are seeking a pre[te]xt to occupy the country. German occupation would mean bloodshed.

7. Tension Italian and German troops is growing and an incident arising therefrom may furnish the Germans with the desired pretext. Popular uprisings could also furnish a pretext and could conceivably end in revolution and anarchy. The present state of tension cannot last for more than a few weeks at the most.

8. It is therefore necessary for the Badoglio Government to maintain its authority. In order not to undermine this authority the Allies should (a) refrain from attacking the Badoglio Government and (b) refrain from bombing the civilian population. It would also help if the Allies could inform the Badoglio Government as to any plans they may have in mind for Italy.

9. Attempts have been made to make known the foregoing to the authorities in Washington and London through Lisbon and Tangier. Recent indiscriminate bombings of Naples and cities in northern Italy, however, suggest that the information may not have reached its destinations.

Please inform London.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Lisbon and transmitted in telegram No. 1799 of August 14, 1943, from the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State; received in Washington in two parts at 5:05 and 10:30 p.m., August 14. The White House Map Room forwarded the text to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 85, August 15, 1943. A paraphrase was telegraphed on the same date to the United States Delegation at Quebec by the War Department.

740.00119 EW/S-943

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the Secretary of State*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 9th, 1943.

DEAR MR. HULL, On returning to the Embassy<sup>1</sup> I found that three further telegrams had come in on the subject of Italian surrender. I enclose copies, and will be grateful if you could inform the President as soon as possible.<sup>2</sup>

Yours very sincerely,

HALIFAX

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 8, 1943.

*Text of a telegram of August 8th from the British Consul-General at Tangier to Mr. Eden. Most secret.*

I had further conversation last night with Signor Berio at his request. Signor Castronuovo was present. I told him that I have received no reply to my telegram sent on August 6th at 4:30 a. m.<sup>3</sup> after our previous talk and I asked him whether he had any further instructions from Rome. He said that he had not and that he supposed that his Government was waiting for a reply from London through this or some other channel indicating whether His Majesty's Government wishes to initiate some sort of negotiation.

2. Signor Berio produced Tangier *Gazette* (French edition) of August 7th and he showed me an article headed "*La Guerre Continue*". He asked whether this article could be considered to be a reply to his *démarche*. I told him from the time of publication and from its language it was quite clear to me that it was not. He asked whether such an article was officially inspired and I replied that, without giving away secrets, he could be assured that it was based on a telegram received from London but it might be an editorial from London press and not officially inspired but approved for publication here.

3. He then asked me to allow him to go through the article paragraph by paragraph and to forward his comments to the Foreign Office if I thought fit.

4. Paragraph 2 reads "The new Italian Government has sent no official communication to the Allies in reply to speeches pronounced by Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, nor to the warnings given

<sup>1</sup> No record has been found of a conversation between Hull and Halifax on August 9, 1943, concerning Italy.

<sup>2</sup> Hull showed the enclosures to Roosevelt on either August 9 or August 10. Attached to copies of the enclosures in the Roosevelt Papers is the following memorandum from George W. Renchard of Hull's office to Roosevelt's secretary (Tully): "Although I believe the President read the attached messages during the Secretary's call on him the other day, I am sending them to you in the event you wish to retain them in your files for future reference." (Roosevelt Papers)

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 566.

by the radio to the Italian people in the name of General Eisenhower". Signor Berio said that an official communication by speech or wireless would be impossible owing to immediate effect it would have on the Germans, but that his communication to me on Thursday was intended to be official.

5. Paragraph 4 reads "It is difficult to understand what Badoglio hopes to gain by his policy of temporization". Signor Berio replies to this that Marshal Badoglio is temporizing with the Germans and not with us for he has decided to make peace but what can he do until we say what we want.

6. In paragraph 5 it is stated "It is asked why he delays so long in accepting the terms proposed by Allies". What are these terms? asked Signor Berio.

7. Paragraph 6 reads "The only conclusion which the Allies can draw from policy at present adopted by Badoglio is that he and his Government have decided to help the Germans". This is absolutely denied. Why should they do so? Surely complete suppression of the Fascist Party shows that Marshal Badoglio's Government is not prepared to help Germans any more than it is compelled to do by circumstances. Badoglio is doing all he can to establish a channel for negotiation with Allies. If he continues to give lip-service to the Germans that is merely eye-wash for their consumption and he is giving them no physical help of any kind and is encouraging every obstruction.

8. Signor Berio asked me to give my personal opinion as to what further reply Badoglio could give pending the receipt of news of reaction in London to his message. I said that we must wait but that I thought he might state definitely that he is prepared to place himself unreservedly in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief trusting in the honourable conditions which have been promised by Eisenhower and by Churchill and that he therefore begs to be informed as to what the terms are.

9. Signor Berio then asked me what I thought was likely to be the nature of those terms and whether they would include any decision about colonies. I replied that I did not know and that I must await instructions before having such discussions.

10. He finally said that he knew that much harm had been done to us by Fascist Government but that it was the work of one man who had now gone. I said that the one man was apparently supported by the majority of his countrymen for a very long time and that the evil that they had done could not be put right by a stroke of the pen nor by the mere announcement that Mussolini had been replaced and his Party dissolved.

11. We parted on very friendly terms.

12. I do not propose to have any further discussions with the Italians until I receive your instruction. *Ends.*

Please inform the President.

For my comments see my immediately following telegram.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See enclosure 2, below.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Ambassador in the United States (Halifax)*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 8, 1943.

My immediately preceding telegram.<sup>5</sup>

I think we should reply to this on lines previously suggested in paragraphs 5 and 6 of my telegram of August 6th.<sup>6</sup> You will see that Acting Consul-General in speaking to Berio has already on his own authority used similar language when he said that he thought that if Badoglio wished to make any further move it must be to state definitely that he was prepared to place himself unreservedly in the hands of Allied Governments.

2. May I now send reply as suggested in my previous telegram saying that I am sure we should insist expressly on unconditional surrender before we name our terms. Apart from our public declaration any other course would inevitably involve us in long and tortuous negotiations.

3. Please inform President of foregoing.

[Enclosure 3—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Watkinson)*

SECRET

LONDON, August 9, 1943.

I approve your decision to have no further meeting with the Italians until you receive instructions which I hope to send you shortly.

2. For your own guidance, our position is that we must insist on unconditional surrender before we name our terms.

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<sup>5</sup> See enclosure 1, above.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 567.

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*

[WASHINGTON.] August 10, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Request of Papal Nuncio to commence negotiations for Italy's exit from the war.

Participants: The Greek Ambassador, Mr. Cimon P. Diamantopoulos,  
The Under Secretary, Mr. Welles.

The Greek Ambassador called to see me this afternoon at his request. By instruction of his Government the Ambassador handed me the memorandum attached herewith and asked what the opinion of this Government might be with regard to the initiative undertaken by the Papal Nuncio in Bern.<sup>1</sup> I said to the Ambassador that it seemed to me that the reply was a very simple one, namely, that in as much as the United Nations had announced that the only terms for peace with Italy were unconditional surrender, there was no possibility of the negotiations urged by the Papal Nuncio, and that if any neutral nations endeavored to intercede in the manner suggested a reply in that sense would necessarily be made to them. The Ambassador said he fully understood and was completely in accord.

S[UMNER] W[ELLES]

[Attachment]

*The Greek Ambassador (Diamantopoulos) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL  
No. 1889

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The Ambassador of Greece presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to transmit herewith, for the consideration of the State Department, a translation of a telegram addressed by the Greek Legation at Berne to the Prime Minister of Greece<sup>2</sup> at Cairo:

"The Papal Nuncio returned from Rome a few days ago and told me that although the Holy See does not wish to involve the Swiss Government in Italian affairs and that he had no instructions on the matter, he believes, nevertheless, that the neutral nations should intercede and exert efforts to commence negotiations for Italy's exit from the war, and he expressed the hope that they would wish to secure for her an honorable peace.

"The Nuncio requested me to help him in this matter and to exchange views concerning it with my Government. He assured me that as he was in a position to know Italy has definitely abandoned her fantastic

<sup>1</sup> Filippo Bernardini.

<sup>2</sup> Emmanuel J. Tsouderos.

claims on Greek territories and that he perceived that the people of Italy desire not only reconciliation but also close cooperation with us. I replied that I do not know the views of my Government and had no instructions on the point, but that in my personal opinion not only was reconciliation and cooperation impossible, but even simple friendly relations, before there is a satisfactory solution for Greece of the questions of the Dodecanese Islands and Northern Epirus, which have for a long time divided the two countries. He assured me that he was absolutely in accord. Please let me have your advice on the matter."

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>2</sup> 11 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 409.

Eden suggests that our Tangier representative replies to Badoglio's Emissary Berio as follows. *Begins*:

"Badoglio must understand that we cannot negotiate but require unconditional surrender which means that the Italian Government should place themselves in hands of Allied Governments who will then state their terms. These will provide for an honourable capitulation."

The instructions would continue: *begins*:

"Badoglio's Emissary should be reminded at the same time that Prime Minister and President have already stated that we desire that in due course Italy should occupy a respected place in New Europe when peace has been reestablished and that General Eisenhower has announced that Italian prisoners taken in Tunisia and Sicily will be released providing all British and Allied prisoners now in Italian hands are released."

This is simply made up of our existing declarations. If you approve it in principle, please cable at once direct Eden at Foreign Office as I shall be on the move. If text does not meet your view, we can discuss it on arrival. I think Italians ought to have an answer as soon as possible. It will, at any rate, make it easier for them to decide who to double cross.

I have also received what follows in my next from U.J. You will see

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The message originated at Quebec but was apparently transmitted via London.

I am restored, if not to favour, at any rate to the court. I have sent reply which also follows.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For Churchill's telegrams Nos. 410 and 411 to Roosevelt, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 19–20. Cf. *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 142–143.

For the final paragraph of Churchill's telegram No. 409, omitted here, see *ante*, p. 411.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

PRIORITY

Personal and secret to Winant for Eden from the President.

I fully approve Former Naval Person's proposed reply to Badoglio's emissary Berio in Tangier as recommended by you.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*. Eden sent the approved instructions to Tangier on August 13, 1943, on which date a copy of them was sent to Hull by the British Embassy at Washington (740.00119 European War 1939/1578).

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740.0011 European War 1939/30658 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 11, 1943.

2516. Acting Chief Political Division Foreign Office states that reports from Rome have convinced Foreign Office that Badoglio tried to make an arrangement with Germany for removal of German troops from Italian soil. If successful, he had intended to capitulate, but as he was unable to persuade Germans to agree to this his next step is indefinite.

Same officer states as his personal belief that holding tactics still in practice on eastern front indicate continuation of modified "Hitler strategy" hence he believes Hitler still controls military forces and that this will shorten war by causing a quicker depletion of German military power than if generals had their way and shortened front immediately without sure loss of men and material as present strategy demands.

JOHNSON

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee*

SECRET

MINUTES OF MEETING<sup>1</sup> HELD IN ROOM 4 E 859, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR, ON THURSDAY, 12TH AUGUST 1943 AT 1500<sup>2</sup>*Members Present*

Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring  
 (Acting Chairman)  
 Mr. James C. Dunn  
 Captain H. L. Pence, USN

Sir David Waley (Rept'g Sir  
 Frederick Phillips)  
 Sir Ronald Campbell  
 Mr. R. E. Barclay

*Others Present*

Col. John H. F. Haskell  
 Col. David Marcus  
 Major C. C. Hilliard  
 Lt. F. F. Fowle, USNR

Col. G. A. Rickards  
 Col. Rex Benson

*Secretariat*

Col. R. J. Laux (Acting)

Major C. W. Garnett

1. *Surrender Terms for Italy (C.C.S. 258<sup>3</sup> and 258/1<sup>4</sup>)*

The Committee had before them for their consideration, a comprehensive document containing all the terms of surrender for Italy, which is a revised version of Annex I to C.C.S. 258.<sup>5</sup>

GENERAL HILLDRING stated that the U.S. views concerning this document are as follows:

*a.* Since the President appears satisfied with the purely military terms of surrender, furnished by himself and the Prime Minister to General Eisenhower,<sup>6</sup> he may be reluctant to have these terms superseded by the comprehensive document presently before the Committee, which contains all the terms of surrender, military as well as non-military.

*b.* Nonetheless, a comprehensive document, including all terms of surrender, as distinguished from the purely military terms, should be available in the event that Italy should offer to surrender directly to either the British or the U.S. Governments.

*c.* To supplement the present military terms of surrender, there should be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a document containing the non-military terms of surrender to be forwarded to General Eisenhower.

<sup>1</sup> C.C.A.C. 5th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> i.e., at 3 p. m.<sup>3</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943; not printed.<sup>4</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", July 1, 1943; not printed.<sup>5</sup> For a draft of this paper as of August 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 539.<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565.

*d.* There should also be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a directive which would serve as a guide for General Eisenhower in effecting and implementing the terms of surrender, whatever they may be, after the Italians have surrendered.

SIR RONALD CAMPBELL stated that it was his belief that the Prime Minister had agreed to the military terms now in General Eisenhower's possession as an emergency matter, but that the British Government hoped that there would be time to prepare and furnish to General Eisenhower a comprehensive document, including both the military and non-military terms of surrender. He further stated that both he and British authorities in London had encountered certain difficulties in attempting to separate the military and non-military terms into two separate documents, because of the necessary inter-relation between the two types of terms. In addition to this it was felt that the military terms in the comprehensive document covered points other than those already submitted to General Eisenhower.

GENERAL HILLDRING then suggested that the matter could be handled by presenting to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for submission to the President and the Prime Minister at the QUADRANT Conference the following alternatives:

- a.* A comprehensive document including all the terms of surrender.
- b.* A document including merely the non-military terms (political, economic, and fiscal), which would supplement the military terms now in General Eisenhower's possession, to be used in the event that the President and the Prime Minister decide not to furnish General Eisenhower with the comprehensive document.

MR. DUNN stated that he saw no objection to presenting two such alternatives, together with the views of the American and British members.

SIR RONALD CAMPBELL requested that in view of the fact that London regarded the present military terms as requiring amplification, those charged with the drafting of the document containing the non-military terms should, at the same time, indicate in this document such supplementary military terms as might be considered necessary.

THE COMMITTEE:—

Agreed:

- a.* That a meeting be held in Mr. Dunn's Office at 9:30 on 13 August, to:

(1) Revise the comprehensive document now before the Committee.

(2) Draft a document containing the political, economic, and fiscal conditions to supplement the military terms already furnished General Eisenhower.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For the text of the "further" or "additional" terms prepared under this decision which Dunn took with him to the First Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 602.

(3) Draft a proposed directive for General Eisenhower to serve as a guide in effecting and implementing the terms of surrender.

b. That the persons charged with drafting the document referred to in paragraph a. (2) above shall also indicate such supplementary military terms as they may consider necessary.

c. That, when completed, the documents be considered at a special meeting of the Committee, with a view to their approval and submission, as alternatives, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30659: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, August 12, 1943.

4921. Have been unable obtain authentic account Guariglia-Ribbentrop meeting.<sup>1</sup> Rumor current however Ribbentrop "promised" 15 divisions (some of which are already crossing frontier into Italy) and 3000 airplanes. Ribbentrop stated to have told Guariglia Italy must decide whether these German armed forces would come as allies or as foes.

2. It is pointed out that if Germany does in fact intend send troops Italy in considerable numbers, their adequate protection might easily require German control of political and police powers of country.

3. Another rumor is that leaders of opposition parties in Italy visited various localities in north of Italy during past week to assess political temper of masses and returned here disillusioned. It appears that working classes as a whole were apathetic showing little interest in political situation and asking only for sufficient food and to be left alone. Even among Communists it is said revolutionary fervor was lacking. If this were true impassivity thus revealed would suggest German occupation would meet with little active opposition from masses.

4. It remains to be appraised how much of foregoing speculative material should be attributed to present German war of nerves on Italy. German strategic plans in Italy have not, I understand, been

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning the Tarvis conference of August 6, 1943, in which the German and Italian Chiefs of Staff also took part, see Garland and Smyth, pp. 369-371 and the sources cited there; Helmuth Greiner and Percy Ernst Schramm, eds., *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab), 1940-1945* (Frankfurt am Main: Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1961-1965), vol. III/2, pp. 906-909; Records of the Italian Armed Forces available on microfilm in the National Archives, item rr 3029, roll 251, frames 777 ff.

made clear even to the Italians but it seems doubtful that Germany is in position at present juncture to send armed forces to Italy in quantity allegedly stated by Ribbentrop.

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/30711 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

US URGENT

[VATICAN CITY, August 12, 1943.]

This is Tittmann's 153, August 12. My 145, August 8.<sup>2</sup>

1. Chief pre-occupation Badoglio Government remains German menace, to occupy country and to gain control of Government very probably by recalling Fascists to power. I have heard it stated authoritative[ly] that Germans are in fact seeking pretext to carry out their threat and that should Italians for instance attempt surrender [to] Allies Germans would undoubtedly take over within two hours after learning of attempt.

2. Another excuse which Germans would in all probability seize upon is outbreak internal disorder and this Badoglio Government dreads and is endeavoring avoid at all costs. It is stated in general leaders moderate political parties aware situation and are cooperating with Government in effort to maintain order but attitude Communists uncertain. According to reliable source investigation made by Ministry of Interior after fall Fascist régime revealed Communists in Italy are well organized, not without financial resources, and even to some extent armed. The present situation would appear to be that popular feeling is under control but that any agitation would be dangerous.

3. Am reliably informed that Badoglio Government is of opinion indiscriminate bombings by Allies such as Naples August 4 Genoa, Turin and Milan August 7 will if continued have a disturbing effect upon masses with grave risk inciting them to public protests and demonstrations. If such disorders should take place Germans would be presented with pretext for which they are looking and result would be German occupation of country and return of Fascist régime or worse. Government circles are urging very strongly that Allied bombings be confined to military objectives only with least possible derangement

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 5012 of August 17, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State; received in Washington at 12:38 p. m., August 17. A paraphrase was forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec by the White House Map Room in telegrams Nos. WHITE 97 and 98, August 18, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 573.

of civilian population especially poorer classes. I myself believe that Badoglio Government is sincere when it solemnly warns of this danger but I have too few elements available on which to base independent judgment.

4. I am told that Rome is at present surrounded by both German and Italian armed forces. German forces form outer ring and Italians inner, latter apparently drawn up to protect capital in case Germans should attempt move in.

Tension continues.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the War Department*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 12th August 1943.

URGENT

W 7138 NAF 319. In view of the critical situation in Italy we consider that the B-24 force which carried out the attack on TIDALWAVE and which is now awaiting suitable weather conditions for attack on JUGGLER coordinated with B-17 force from 8th Bomber Command should, immediately on completion of JUGGLER, be concentrated on targets in Italy. We consider that at this juncture every available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in Italy. Once we are established in Italy follow up attacks on TIDALWAVE will from every point of view be easier to carry out than they now are from African bases.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 252/2, August 12, 1943. For the consideration of this message at the 109th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 16, 1943, see *post*, p. 871. For later messages from Eisenhower on this subject, see *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1339, 1347.

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740.00119 EW/8-1443 : Telegram

*The British Embassy in Turkey to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ANKARA, August 13, 1943.

Turkish Ambassador at Rome<sup>2</sup> saw Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>3</sup> on August 7th immediately after latter's return from meeting Ribbentrop on the previous day at Italo-German frontier.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to Hull on August 14, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Ruşen Esref Unaydin.

<sup>3</sup> Raffaele Guariglia, formerly Italian Ambassador to Turkey.

2. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Ribbentrop had conveyed German decision to continue war resistance on Italian soil. Italian statesmen were convinced that this decision was based not on desire to help Italy but to postpone the approach of the war to Germany. Germans were sending considerable land forces which Italians could not oppose, since they had no armed forces such as the Germans have in Italy. Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that large forces could be introduced across Italo-German frontier in a short time.

3. Turkish Ambassador has the impression that Guariglia has found the position much worse than he anticipated when he left Turkey. If Italy tried to compound with Allies, Germany would step in and take complete control which in effect they exercise today. Ambassador therefore reaches conclusion that Italy cannot escape becoming a battlefield.

4. Ambassador continues that Italian people are clamouring for peace. If this is delayed, internal tension and social troubles are capable of causing early and general disintegration. Italian Government are in impasse, sandwiched between Germans and Allies and with acute economic and other internal problems. In these circumstances he doubts whether Badoglio can somehow retain power.

5. Ambassador concludes the telegram by saying that he found Guariglia in state of complete despair.

6. Assistant Secretary General requested that we should treat the above information as most confidential and that the source should not be quoted.

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740.00119 EW/8-1443 : Telegram

*The British Acting Consul General at Tangier (Watkinson) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 14, 1943.

I dictated tonight to Signor Berio a literal version in French of the message contained in paragraph 1<sup>2</sup> and I reminded him of the facts mentioned in paragraph 2.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to Hull on August 14, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington. The source text states that this telegram was from the Acting Consul General (Watkinson), but in a telegram of August 17, 1943, from the British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the Foreign Office (printed *post*, p. 595) Gascoigne refers to this message as "my telegram" and indicates that he participated in the conversation here reported.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the first quoted paragraph in Churchill's telegram No. 409 to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 578.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., the second quoted paragraph in Churchill's telegram No. 409 to Roosevelt, *ibid*.

2. Signor Berio expressed considerable disappointment as he said that this did not get us any further. Badoglio, he said, wanted peace but he was menaced by (a) Germans (b) revolution. What the Marshal wanted was a breathing space which would permit him to formulate his plans for bringing peace to Italy without risking destruction by the Germans or anarchists. Badoglio hoped for the assistance of the Allies [in the ?] bringing about of an honourable peace but the continued bombing of Italy including Rome would only create chaos and bring on revolution which would be disastrous both to the Badoglio Government and to the Allies.

3. I said that obviously no progress could be made towards peace until Badoglio had made unconditional surrender.

4. Signor Berio then asked me in what form this surrender should be made; should it be transmitted through him and me to you or was a public declaration of surrender expected? Latter, he said, would be impossible because of immediate German reaction.

5. I replied that I did not know exactly what form this must take but that if the Marshal sent a clear-cut official communication declaring his unconditional surrender through this channel it would at least be a beginning. Would we then, Signor Berio asked, make known our terms to Badoglio through that channel? I replied that I could not say.

6. Interview ended by Signor Berio stating that he would immediately forward your message to Rome but he did not seem to be very sanguine of results.

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740.00119 EW/8-1643 : Telegram

*The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 14, 1943.

It seems obvious from what Signor Berio said last night that Badoglio, probably in cooperation with the Germans, means to do all he can to play for time before surrendering. Signor Berio earnestly stressed the German menace to Italy if the present Italian Government showed signs of surrender and asked me what Badoglio could do if the Germans were actually to start fighting Italian troops. The Italians, he said, could not successfully resist, and the situation would become chaotic.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to Hull on August 16, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

2. May I have some information on the following points:

(a) In what form should Badoglio's unconditional surrender be made and through what channel?

(b) What military action should we take on receipt of such surrender? i.e. should we be able, now that the Sicilian campaign is coming to a close, immediately to land troops in Italy and assist Badoglio to counter the Germans' moves?

3. I would propose to communicate your reply to (a) above to Signor Berio, while particulars asked for under (b) would be for my own information to assist me with any future conversations which I may hold with Signor Berio. At the same time I shall be most careful not to be drawn into a polemic and to say anything to B. which you have not actually authorized me to mention.

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740.00119 EW/8-1643 : Telegram

*The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 14, 1943.

Sir Orme Sargent told Soviet Chargé d'Affaires<sup>2</sup> on August 14th that His Majesty's Government had reached the conclusion, after consultation with United States Government, that of the three approaches at Lisbon and Tangier and Barcelona, the one through Signor Berio at Tangier should be regarded as an official approach from Badoglio Government which should be used as a channel for demanding unconditional surrender. No reply is being sent to other approaches through d'Ajeta at Lisbon and Busseti at Barcelona. Gascoigne who had now returned to Tangier had therefore been instructed to give Signor B. a reply . . .<sup>3</sup>

2. As the Soviet Government might have doubts about the phrase "honourable capitulation" in our reply, it was explained to Monsieur Sobolev that the terms we would impose are in fact those with which the Soviet Government have already expressed agreement.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to Hull on August 16, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Arkady Alexandrovich Sobolev.

<sup>3</sup> At this point in the source text appears the following explanatory passage inserted by the British Embassy at Washington: "(the text of which was enclosed in a letter from Sir. R. Campbell to Mr. Hull dated August 13th)." See *ante*, p. 579, fn. 2.

<sup>4</sup> The reference is to the Soviet response to a summary of a draft of the "long" or "comprehensive" surrender terms which the British Foreign Office had made available to Sobolev on July 30, 1943. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 341-342.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET &amp; PERSONAL

[QUEBEC, August 16, 1943.]

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following from Former Naval Person to President dated August 16th.

1. I send you herewith 4 telegrams I have received from London about a renewed approach by Badoglio. The following is the kind of answer which I suggest should be made. *Begins*. We note the following statement of the Italian Envoy. "We are not in a position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional surrender provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans." We for our part cannot make any bargain about Italy changing sides nor can we make plans in common at this stage. If, however, serious fighting breaks out between the Italian Army and the German intruders, a new situation would be created. The Italians know quite well that the British and United States Governments do not seek to deny to Italy her respected place in a [future<sup>2</sup>] Europe. The Italian Government should therefore resist the Germans to the best of their ability as soon as possible pending the arrival of the Anglo-American Armies. In particular they should stop further invasion of Italy by the German troops by blowing up bridges and tunnels and tearing up railways lines and roads in the north of Italy and thus cutting the communications of the German troops in the South of Italy. Effective action of this kind would be regarded by the victorious Allies as a valuable service and would render further co-operation possible against the common foe. There is no doubt of the ability of the Italian government and people to destroy and paralyse the German communications and action of this kind would be a proof of their sincerity. Another proof would be the safeguarding of British and Allied prisoners from being taken away to Germany, in any case where this is attempted by the Germans

<sup>1</sup> This message is endorsed as follows in Roosevelt's handwriting: "Given me by Ronny Campbell at White H[ouse] 4:30 p. m. Aug. 16. I told him to tell WSC. in Quebec that I approve his 'kind of answer'. FDR". There is also an endorsement recording that this message and its attachments had been shown to General Marshall on August 18, 1943. Copies were forwarded to Hull on August 16, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington (740.00119 EW/8-1643).

On August 17 the following telegram of the same date from Ambassador Winant was forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec by the White House Map Room in telegram No. WHITE 92: "To the President only, from Winant. An approach has been made by Italians to the British Ambassador in Madrid. Their letter of introduction to him came from the British Minister at the Vatican. The British have the detailed story and I think it has also been called to [the attention of?] the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I can not evaluate the weighting of it. It recognizes the principle of unconditional surrender. I assume you have already been informed but I had no way of being certain so am forwarding this brief notice." (Roosevelt Papers)

<sup>2</sup> This word is a manuscript interpolation on the source text.

and the Italian Government have not the power to resist the prisoners should be set free and succoured by the Italian people. A further vital service which the Italian Government certainly has it in its power to render to the Allies is to sail the Italian warships to any ports in Allied occupation. Fourthly the furnishing by the Italian Government of any information of the German dispositions and any assistance given by the Italian troops and people to the disembarkations of the Allies when they take place, especially if accompanied by fighting between the Italians and the Germans, would be favourably recognised. Fifthly, any co-operation between the Italian troops in the Balkan peninsula and the various patriot forces in the field, taking the form of resistance to the Germans and leading to bloodshed, would be favourably viewed. Thus, by taking hostile action against the common enemy, the Italian Government, Army and people could, without any bargain, facilitate a more friendly relationship with the United Nations. In particular, we state that if the Allied troops arrive at any point where they find Italians fighting Germans, we shall aid the Italians to our utmost. *Ends.* Eden should be here tomorrow and we can discuss the whole position together. I send you this budget in order that you may see the way my mind is working.

[Attachment 1—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill* <sup>3</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 16, 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONCRETE No. 231—16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Following Telegram No. 1404 of August 15th just received from His Majesty's Ambassador, Madrid.<sup>4</sup> *Begins:*

A letter was handed me this morning from His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See<sup>5</sup> asking me to see the bearer. When I agreed two Italians entered the room who introduced themselves as General Castellano,<sup>6</sup> Chief of General Ambrosio's Military Office, and Signor Montanari of *Consulta*.<sup>7</sup> General Castellano informed me that he came officially and with full authority from Marshal Badoglio to put before

<sup>3</sup> Copies of this message and the three following telegrams were forwarded to Hull by Leahy on August 18, 1943 (J.C.S. Files). These four messages were also forwarded to Eisenhower.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

<sup>5</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

<sup>6</sup> This name was garbled as received, and has been corrected both here and later in the message.

<sup>7</sup> This is apparently another garble in the message as received. Franco Montanari was a Consul Third Class in the Italian Foreign Service.

His Majesty's Government the Italian position and to make a specific and very urgent proposal. The Marshal wished His Majesty's Government to know that Italy was in a terrible position. Practically the whole country was in favour of peace, the Italian Army was badly armed, there was no Italian Aviation and German Troops were streaming in by the Brenner and Riviera. Feeling against the Germans was intense. The Italian Government however felt powerless to act until the Allies landed on the mainland. If and when however the Allies landed, Italy was prepared to join the Allies and to fight against Germany. If the Allies agreed in principle to this proposal General Castellano would immediately give detailed information as to the disposition of German troops and stores and as to co-operation that the Italians would offer Mihailovitch in the Balkans. General Castellano was also empowered to concert operations e.g. connected with the Allied landings from Sicily. Marshal Badoglio regarded it as essential that action should be taken immediately as every hour meant the arrival of more German Units in Italy and at present there were thirteen Divisions and the German plan was to hold the line of the Apennines and Ravenna.

2. I then put the following questions—What would the Italian Government do in answer to the Allied demand of unconditional surrender? The General's answer was "We are not in a position to make any terms. We will accept unconditional surrender provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans". I then asked whether similar proposal had been made to the United States Government or in other Quarter? He replied "No. This was the first official proposal". I then asked how he had got out of Italy. He answered on a false passport under the name of Raimondi as a member of the Italian Mission en route for Lisbon to meet returning Italian Ambassador from [to] Chile.<sup>8</sup> He would have to return to Rome with the Ambassador on August 20th. He then asked whether I could give him an immediate answer and said that if so he would at once give my military Attaché complete military information about German and Italian Dispositions. I said I could not do this but that I would telegraph urgently and ask His Majesty's Government to send instructions to His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon.<sup>9</sup> I then gave him a letter asking His Majesty's Ambassador to see him. He said provided he could rejoin his Mission by August 20th he would be ready to fly to London.

3. I made it clear that I was expressing no opinion whatever on the offer but that I would transmit it most urgently and secretly to His Majesty's Government. He impressed me as a man of weight and sincerity. He arrives at Lisbon tomorrow Monday afternoon and will immediately give my letter to His Majesty's Ambassador. The letter merely introduces him. I assume that you will send His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon instructions as to the next step. General Castellano insisted repeatedly on the great urgency.<sup>10</sup> *Ends.*

<sup>8</sup> Pier Filippo de Rossi del Lion Nero. Chile had severed diplomatic relations with Italy.

<sup>9</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>10</sup> For Castellano's accounts of his peace missions, see Giuseppe Castellano, *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile* (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1945); Giuseppe Castellano, *La guerra continua* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1963).

Following are our comments on the above. *Begins:*

It is to be noted that the whole of this Italian approach is based on combined operations with us against Germans. "Italian Government feel powerless to act until Allies land on Mainland". General Castellano says he is empowered to "concert operations, e.g. connected with the Allied landings from Sicily". As regards unconditional surrender, he says "We will accept provided we can join the Allies in fighting the Germans". The only military advantages which these proposals offer are unopposed landings by Army and Navy and Italian co-operation in running railways, ports, etc. but if conditions in Italy are as stated by Castellano we are reasonably sure of this co-operation even though we insist on unconditional surrender. In view of the quality and morale of the Italian Troops in the Balkans, the offer of co-operation with Mihailovitch is not likely to be a very substantial contribution to military operations and would give rise to considerable political complications. Moreover military co-operation would mean at least that the Italians retained their Arms, including the Fleet and would probably eventually claim Allied status and advantages. We could not in any case concert operations with them if that means revealing any of our plans. I am instructing His Majesty's Ambassador to hold these Envoys in Lisbon where it appears that they contemplate staying until August 20th. At the moment, of course, he can only listen to what they have to say and tell them he is seeking instructions. I presume you will wish to return the answer, already given through Signor Berio at Tangier,<sup>11</sup> that the Italian Government should place themselves in the hands of the Allied Governments, who will then state their terms adding that the question of the assistance that Italy could give us against the Germans cannot be determined until this has been done. Although at first sight this offer of co-operation sounds tempting I feel that if we accept it will land us in all sorts of difficulties both military and political with few if any corresponding advantages. If this judgement is correct I am sure we ought to stick to our present policy of refusing to make the Italian Government any promises or enter into any bargain with them in return for their surrender. It is notable that General Castellano has produced no written credentials, though that may be explained by the furtive manner of his departure from Italy. I am telegraphing to Vatican to ask for further information and am asking His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon to try to extract more from the Envoys as to their bona fides. I am not repeating this Telegram or Madrid Telegrams to Washington or to Algiers. Leaving it to you to act as you think fit about communicating with Americans.

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<sup>11</sup> See *ante*, p. 578.

[Attachment 2—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 16, 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONCRETE 232—16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1405 of 15th August. *Begins:*

General C. has called again to ask whether General Eisenhower could send a senior staff officer to join the Lisbon talks. I said I would immediately transmit to you this request. When I asked General C. why Marshal Badoglio had not made these proposals direct to General Eisenhower he said the Italian Government was so closely watched by the Germans that they did not dare and that it seemed safest to use the pretext of Lisbon mission for talks in Madrid or Lisbon. Marshal Badoglio, knowing me personally as a result of my military service in Italy, had hoped for talks in Madrid but General C. understood that [as] I was neither authorised to give him any discussions, authorised to give him any answer nor was my Military Attaché available for discussions, they must be transferred to Lisbon. I should be grateful of course if you could keep me generally in touch with any developments. See my immediately following telegram. *Ends.*

[Attachment 3—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 16, 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONCRETE No. 233 16th August. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1406 of August 15th. *Begins.*

General C. made following additional points.

(a) Fascist militia has been disarmed. Their hostility to the Army is however very bitter and if the Government cannot reach agreement with the Allies on basis of Marshal B's proposals, Germans may try to stage a comeback for Mussolini militia and Fascist leaders although Mussolini and Fascism are discredited.

(b) Although the country is almost solidly for peace, the inhabitants scarcely less solid against the Germans and will consequently support an Italian military alignment with the Allies.

(c) Germans are deeply entrenched in Government machine and Hitler sent the 2 S.S. Division[s] Adolf Hitler and Deutschland to Reggio Emilia to intensify German control.

(d) All the Italian troops have been withdrawn from the Russian front. German troops have taken over garrison of Greece. Salonika in particular is in exclusively German hands.

(e) Italian Government if aligned with the Allies is ready to repudiate the independence of Croatia and to reach agreement with Yugoslavia over Dalmatia.

(f) Line that the Germans intend to hold in Italy is Genoa to Ravenna. They are threatening the Italian Government with air and gas reprisals if they do not continue resistance.

(g) Recent Allied air attacks particularly the last on Rome and Milan have done great damage but almost exclusively to Italians. The Italian Staff in the event of an agreement will give the Allies fullest possible details for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage on German troops and stocks. The Italian Army could in this event do much to cut the Germany supply line. Pope knows nothing of General C's proposals but Cardinal Maglione helped to obtain letter of introduction from His Majesty's Minister at the Holy See to me.

(h) General C. and Signor M. although they possess individual passports are travelling on omnibus papers covering the whole mission en route for Lisbon; if Germans discover General C's identity they will kill him on his return to Italy.

(i) Chilean [*Italian*] Ambassador [to Chile] and Staff are on the Spanish S.S. *Cabo De Buena Esperanza* and General C. and Signor M. will have to return with them immediately after her arrival, e.g. August 20th or August 21st in Lisbon.

See my immediately following telegram. *Ends.*

[Attachment 4—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 16, 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONCRETE No. 234. Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary. My immediately preceding telegram. Following telegram received from Madrid No. 1407 of August 15th. *Begins:*

3.<sup>12</sup> My comment, based of course solely on this interview, is that Italian Government seem definitely prepared to accept unconditional surrender provided

- (1) Allies land on the mainland.
- (2) Italian army fights the Germans.

Without these two conditions Italian Government will not have sufficient courage or justification to make a complete *volte-face* and will drift impotently into chaos. Whilst His Majesty's Government alone can judge of wider issues at stake, my advice would be to give urgent

<sup>12</sup> It is not clear from the source text why the paragraphs in this message are numbered 3 and 4. There appear to be no omissions.

and serious attention to General C's proposal if for no other reason than to obtain intelligence about the German intentions and dispositions. These he will only disclose to a senior military officer after agreement has been reached upon for this alignment of Italy with the Allies. This being so, you may wish to send immediately some senior staff officer to meet him in Lisbon. [Garble] he was careful to say that whilst his mission was military, he was authorised to speak for the whole of the Government including Minister for Foreign Affairs. Italian Embassy in Madrid know nothing of the mission or proposals. He had, however, been given a message for Marquis Ajeta, Italian Chargé d'Affaires [*Counselor of Legation*] at Lisbon, but in view introduction to His Majesty's Ambassador and of the need of great secrecy, he does not propose to deliver it. He will therefore appear in Lisbon as Signor Raimondi official of Italian [Ministry] of Finance and member of delegation of welcome to Chilean Ambassador.

4. You will note that I had no opportunity of consulting you as to my meeting these enemy subjects. Until they started talking, I had no idea of their nationality and their apparent bona fides and letter of introduction from His Majesty's Minister at the Holy See convinced me that you would wish me to listen very carefully to their statements. Signor M. took no part in the discussion except to clear up one or two points on which I needed an interpreter. He speaks English perfectly.  
*Ends.*

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740.0011 European War 1939/31291

*The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Under Secretary of State (Welles)*<sup>1</sup>

No. 492/42

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES, Immediately upon receipt of your esteemed communication of August 8th,<sup>2</sup> informing me of the reply of the United States Government to the request for information on the conditions for declaring Rome an open city, I advised the Cardinal Secretary of State of the contents of your message.

His Eminence now advises me of notification from the Italian Government, as of Saturday evening, August 14th, that Rome has been officially declared an open city, and that the government authorities are taking the necessary measures, conformably to the provisions of international law, to make this declaration effective.

The Holy See would be grateful if further discussion of the conditions to be imposed by the Allies were expedited as promptly as possible.

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<sup>1</sup> The contents of this note were telephoned to General Hull's office in the War Department at 5 p. m., August 16, 1943, and the text was sent to the White House Map Room, which forwarded it to Roosevelt at Quebec in telegram No. WHITE 96 on August 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 572.

In the meantime, it has every confidence that the Eternal City will not be subjected to further bombardment.

Assuring you [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*  
*Apostolic Delegate*

740.00119 EW/S-1743 : Telegram

*The British Foreign Office to the British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 16, 1943.

You should tell Berio in answer to his questions<sup>2</sup> that he must present a document offering unconditional surrender and asking to be informed of the requirements which the Italian Government will have to sign in order to give effect to their surrender. This written offer of unconditional surrender need not be published at this stage. But Berio should understand that both this offer of surrender and terms signed by the Italian Government will have to be published immediately after signature of the armistice.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to Hull on August 17, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> See paragraph 4 of the telegram of August 14, 1943, from the British Consulate General at Tangier to the Foreign Office, *ante*, p. 586.

740.00119 EW/S-1743 : Telegram

*The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 17, 1943.

I spoke to Berio this afternoon. He said that he would immediately convey the information to Rome but he seemed anxious that it should be made quite clear to you that the question asked by him as set forth in paragraph 4 of my telegram of August 14th\* (to which your telegram of August 16th† gave reply) was put as from him himself and did not emanate as such from Marshal Badoglio. He furthermore wished to make it clear that his mission here was only so far one of contact and that he had not as yet received any precise instructions from home as regards negotiation.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington.

\* Enclosed in Sir R. Campbell's letter to Mr. Hull of August 14th. [Footnote in the source text. For the telegram of August 14 referred to, see *ante*, p. 585.]

† Enclosed in Sir R. Campbell's letter to Mr. Hull of August 17th. [Footnote in the source text. The telegram referred to is printed *supra*.]

2. Signor Berio at least now understands the procedure to be adopted by his Government prior to their obtaining an armistice but he explained that he (personally) could not see how the Marshal could carry out the terms likely to be imposed by us. Immediately the Marshal tried to do so he (Berio) considered the Germans who were all round the Marshal and his Government would put them in prison and form a Government of their own (Quisling or purely German).

3. Berio also again referred to the Marshal's necessity for time which I countered by demonstrating to him that obviously every hour of delay would be disastrous for Italy and that it would in my opinion become more and more difficult for the Marshal to capitulate the longer he hesitated about it.

4. Finally Berio, after fishing for particulars regarding surrender terms, asked me whether any approaches had been made to us by the Italian Government agents in places other than Lisbon and Tangier. I thought it more prudent to say I had no information on this point.

5. Signor Berio made a good impression at this our second interview and I have as yet no reason to distrust him.

Hull Papers

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*The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

#### OPEN CITIES

THE SECRETARY: The following paragraphs are supplementary to my memorandum to you of August 5 (attached)<sup>2</sup> regarding the possible recognition of Rome as an open city, which has since been declared by the Badoglio regime to be such.

1. *Brussels*:—On May 10, 1940 the Department, at the request of the Belgian Government, instructed the American Embassy at Berlin to inform the German Government that Brussels was an open city.<sup>3</sup>

On May 11 the Foreign Office acknowledged the Embassy's note and stated that the competent authorities had been appropriately informed. On the same day the DNB News Service announced that the German Air Force would respect the status of Brussels as an open city as long as there were no street barriers or troop movements in Brussels. However, on May 15 the German Army High Command issued a statement that German air reconnaissance had established the passage through

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<sup>1</sup> An unsigned copy of this memorandum is in the central files of the Department of State (740.00116 EW/8-1943).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 557.

<sup>3</sup> This is probably a reference to the Department's telegram No. 1278 of May 16, 1940, to the Chargé in Germany. See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 201.

Brussels of military columns as well as military transports through the railway junctions. It declared, therefore, that it could no longer recognize Brussels as an undefended city. This statement was confirmed by the Foreign Office on May 16.

2. *Paris*:—On June 13, 1940 the French Government declared Paris an open city, and on June 18 of that year it declared all other French cities of more than 20,000 population to be open.

On March 8, 1942 Admiral Darlan presented a note of protest<sup>4</sup> to the American Embassy in Vichy in regard to the bombardment of the suburbs of Paris and suggested that the Government of the United States intervene with the British Government to prevent the recurrence "of such atrocities". He referred also to the bombardment of other French cities, such as Dunkirk, Cherbourg, Brest, and Le Havre. The Department instructed the Embassy on March 11 to reply that this Government deplored the methods of warfare forced on humanity by the German Government. It pointed out that the areas in suburban Paris in question were entirely under German occupation and that the factories in that area which were bombed were working full time for the Germans. It declared that the Government of the United States considered that the bombing operations were "against legitimate military objectives". The Department said that it was not in a position to act as a channel of communication for such a protest.

On September 7, 1942 M. Laval made an oral, official protest to Mr. Tuck of the American Embassy in Vichy against the bombardment of the docks at Le Havre and the railway yards at Rouen by the American Air Force. Mr. Tuck replied that the attacks had been on military objectives and were, therefore, fully justified. The Department approved this statement.<sup>5</sup>

It will be seen that while Paris and the other French cities referred to in this numbered paragraph were declared to be open cities, they were used by the Germans for their war purposes and hence were not thereafter to be regarded as open cities.

3. *Belgrade*:—On April 10, 1941 the spokesman at the German Foreign Office in Berlin stated that it was, in the German view, ridiculous to regard Belgrade as an open city since it had been considered an important fortress for a century. The Embassy reported: "The qualifications of an open city were described as (1) no military garrison, (2) no installations of military significance, (3) transport facilities may not be used for military purposes, and (4) the city must be open for entry and passage by enemy troops without molestation". The Foreign Office spokesman added that Belgrade, in addition to

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 196, 197.

being a fortress, was actually a seat of great military importance and that one proof of its failure to meet the requirements of an open city was the erection and use by the Serbian army of a pontoon bridge there.

Here we have tests laid down by the German Government as to the qualifications for an open city. It will be noted from the fourth qualification that, in the view of the German Government, the city "must be open for entry and passage by enemy troops without molestation."

4. If the condition just referred to should be attached to our recognition of Rome as an open city, we would be entitled to have our troops pass through the city without molestation. If our troops were in Rome or passing through Rome, they would be subject to bombardment by Germany and hence the city would be in the same position as French cities, including Paris, were after they were occupied by German forces or were being used for military purposes. It appears that in the last war French cities, such as Vouziers, Charleville, and Mézières, regarded as open cities, were bombarded by the French after they had been occupied by Germany. The sum and substance of these examples is that the status of a city may change from an undefended to a defended place as military operations change, and that recognition by us of Rome as an open city would mean only that we could not bomb it while it was so recognized, but that if we later used it ourselves, it would again become subject to bombardment.

G[REEN] H H[ACKWORTH]

740.00119 EW/8-1943

*Briefing Paper for the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY: It may be useful for you to have a brief review of the various serious approaches made by the Italian Government to British or American officials abroad during the past two weeks.

1. On August 5 the Foreign Office informed Lord Halifax that the British Minister [*Ambassador*] at Lisbon had been approached by the new Italian Counselor of Legation, Marquis Lanza d'Ajeta. While he declared himself to be acting on behalf of and under orders from the Marshal and his Government, he was authorized apparently only to explain the present Government's predicament in the face of the immediate German threat and to beg the Allies' forbearance and assistance by diverting the Germans to another front.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This paper was prepared in the Division of European Affairs, but the source text does not indicate who initialed it for transmittal to Hull.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *ante*, pp. 554, 556.

2. On August 6 the [Acting] British Consul General at Tangier reported that he had been approached by Signor Berio, the recently arrived Italian Chargé d'Affaires of the Italian Consulate General in that city. He stated that Marshal Badoglio's government was ready to treat with the British but were prevented from doing so because entirely under German control. He warned that if Badoglio's government should fall, it would be replaced by a German government with a suitable Italian quisling in power. The Italian stated that he was authorized to treat with the British official or a representative of General Eisenhower. He asked that we cease bombing Italian cities to make Badoglio's task of policing the country easier and come to the assistance of the Italians by creating a diversion for the Germans in the Balkans or France.<sup>3</sup>

3. On August 14 the American Legation at Lisbon forwarded a message of August 8 from Mr. Tittmann at Vatican City.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Tittmann had been approached by a representative of the Italian Government. Although he did not reveal the source he said that it was "sure". He reported that Marshal Badoglio desired immediate peace, that fear of the Germans prevented him from acting, that he was trying desperately to maintain authority in the face of our bombing of civilian populations, that the Marshal would like to know our plans for Italy and that he had already tried to communicate with us through Lisbon and Tangier.

4. The Prime Minister informed the President on August 16 of the following message from the British Ambassador at Madrid. [Here follows a summary of Hoare's telegram No. 1404, quoted in Eden's telegram No. CONCRETE 231, *ante*, p. 589.]

Only one reply has been made thus far to any of these various approaches, so far as we are informed. On August 13 the British Consul General at Tangier was instructed to give Signor Berio a reply along the following lines:

[Here follows a summary of the two quoted paragraphs in Churchill's telegram No. 409 to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 578.]

In reply to the military approach through Madrid, the Prime Minister suggested to the President on August 16 a reply along the following lines:

[Here follows a summary of the suggestion contained in Churchill's telegram to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 588.]

The various channels which the Badoglio Government has chosen tend to confirm each other and in sum emphasize Italian desire for peace, fear of the Germans, and their helpless and hopeless attitude unless or until we come to their aid by an invasion of the mainland.

On the assumption that from a military point of view it is desirable to facilitate our occupation of at least southern and central Italy in the most expeditious manner possible and at minimum cost, we

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *ante*, pp. 563, 564.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 573.

think the formula suggested in Mr. Churchill's draft reply of August 16 is the best that could be devised in the circumstances. It extracts all the cooperation from the Italians that they may be in a position to give and avoids the political disadvantages arising from any preliminary bargains with the present government.

However, in following such a line of action we run the following risks:

Unless we are prepared to move in with a considerable military force in a reasonable time and thus capitalize on the wishes of the people to get out of the Axis, it is quite possible that the Italians may not be able to resist the Germans, the country will be thrown into further chaos and might be occupied more fully than present reports indicate (the Po Valley) and thus make it more difficult for us to obtain air bases in the near future in central and southern Italy.

In accepting military collaboration from the Badoglio Government and its temporary maintenance in power, careful consideration should be given to and plans made to meet the various implications of such policy and the possible repercussions which might arise therefrom.

Some of these would be:

1. In maintaining the Badoglio Government in power we lay ourselves open to the criticism that we are backing a reactionary, "semi-Fascist" régime.

The criticism of that Government so far has reached such proportions in the American press that it is probable that far-reaching repercussions might ensue if it could be alleged that we were collaborating with such a "reactionary" Government. Furthermore, it will be recalled that Marshal Stalin last week indicated to the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow his distrust of Badoglio.

It should be borne in mind that it became apparent in connection with the North African difficulties that there are in the United States, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Great Britain, powerful ideological groups who seek to convince the world that we desire to back only reactionary elements in Europe in contrast to the attitude of the Soviet Union which is endeavoring to encourage the establishment of really "democratic" régimes.

2. In order to minimize such criticism there should be inserted in any terms we make after unconditional surrender, a definite stipulation to the effect that free elections, supervised by impartial observers, are to be held in Italy in order that the people may determine the type and form of government they desire.

Furthermore, in the post-armistice period definite provisions should be made to have a United Nations advisory body to control the provisional government until a permanent national government is established.

3. In accepting Italian military collaboration we, morally at least, admit Italian participation in the United Nations peace arrangements, with the implication that she can lay claim to the return of at least part of her Colonial Empire.

4. In regard to the proposal that the Italian troops assist General Mihailovich in Yugoslavia in his resistance to the Germans, we should be most careful to avoid any commitments of this kind unless it should be made with the approval of the Soviet Government and with the definite stipulations that the Italian troops should also assist the Communist controlled partisan groups in that country or unless in our basic strategy a decision had already been taken to make our principal attack against the Germans through the Balkans. As a matter of fact, if neither one of these conditions are fulfilled we should indicate emphatically to Badoglio that we would not countenance any assistance whatsoever from Italian troops in Yugoslavia. In this connection the possibility should be borne in mind that if any encouragement whatsoever is given to the Italian Government to assist General Mihailovich in Yugoslavia it is possible that these groups might not concentrate their entire efforts against the Nazis but might join forces in an attempt to liquidate the Communist partisan groups.

5. In continuing the Badoglio Government in power we would give official recognition to a new government in Italy which on the surface at least would be similar to the government envisaged in the recently announced Free Germany manifesto in Moscow.<sup>5</sup> By such action we would make it possible for the Soviet Government to openly and officially sanction the Free Germany movement which so far has studiously maintained the façade of a purely private organization. By maintaining the Badoglio Government in power, even temporarily, it would be difficult for us to resist any attempt on the part of the Soviets to establish a somewhat similar Soviet-controlled government in Germany.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that from all indications the "democratic" government envisaged in the Free Germany manifesto would have little if anything in common with the type of democratic government which we eventually hope to establish in Italy or in other countries.

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<sup>5</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 552.

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740.00119 EW/8-2043; *id.*/8-2343

*Draft of Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government*

[*Editorial Note.*—The editor has prepared the following composite text of the "further" or "additional" terms (i.e., terms in addition to the "short" or "military" terms) to be imposed upon Italy from two separate drafts of this instrument, one dated August 19, 1943, and the other undated but prepared on August 23, 1943. The text of this document as mimeographed on August 19, and taken to the Quebec Conference by Dunn, who left Washington on that date, is printed below in roman and canceled roman type. Changes in the text were made in Washington (while Dunn was at Quebec) in three stages: in a revised draft dated August 20 (not printed); during a special meeting of the

Combined Civil Affairs Committee on August 21 (for minutes, see *post*, p. 1082); and at a drafting meeting on August 23 (see *post*, p. 1088). Deletions made from the August 19 draft during this consideration of the text in Washington are represented here by canceled type; additions made to the draft, by italics. The text as it stood on August 23, therefore, is that printed here in plain roman type and italics. Dunn is known to have discussed these "further" or "additional" terms at Quebec within the United States Delegation, but no minutes of such discussions have been found, and no evidence has been found that this subject was discussed at Quebec with members of the British Delegation, although it had been anticipated in Washington that Dunn would probably discuss it at Quebec with Gladwyn Jebb (J.C.S. Files). At no stage of its development did this draft represent an agreed Anglo-American text. As of August 23, all of the text except articles 3, 4, 5*a*, and 29 had working-level approval of both British and United States officials working on the text in Washington (see *post*, p. 1088), but it was never approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and it was never submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (see *post*, p. 1089, fn. 6). The approach of using the text of "further" or "additional" terms was dropped when the text of the "long" or "comprehensive" terms was telegraphed to Eisenhower on August 26, 1943, following approval by Roosevelt and Churchill (see *post*, p. 1161).]

SECRET

19 August 1943.

~~ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FURTHER TERMS TO BE IMPOSED UPON  
THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT~~

*Whereas the Italian Government and the Italian Supreme Command in acknowledgment of total defeat have accepted on the basis of unconditional surrender the military terms on which the United States and United Kingdom Governments acting on behalf of the United Nations were prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy.*

*The following further terms have been presented by . . . ,<sup>1</sup> duly authorized to that effect, and have been accepted by . . . , representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian Government.*

1. ~~The Italian land, sea and air forces wherever located hereby surrender unconditionally. The whole resources of Italy will be placed at the disposal of the Allied Commander in Chief.~~

2. ~~Unilateral decrees issued by Italy and all conditions, conventions, and treaties entered into between Italy and any conquered or~~

<sup>1</sup> The blanks in this paragraph and in article 30 and the final paragraph, below, appear in the source text.

occupied country since 1 January 1935 shall be considered null and void.

3. All restrictions imposed by Italy upon neutral shipping or the shipping of any conquered or occupied country are considered null and void.

1. *Allied Forces reserve the right to occupy and establish military government in the whole of Italy or any parts thereof.*

4. 2. a. Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, (or in any other territory specified by the United Nations) will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of Italian land, sea and air forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe. Military, naval and air missions will be recalled from all neutral countries.

b. The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for and methods of communication between the Italian government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory.

c. Italian subjects will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event take service with any of the countries at war with any of the United Nations or occupied by such country, countries, nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country countries. Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

5. ~~Allied forces preserve the right to occupy and establish military government in the whole of Italy or any parts thereof.~~

6. 3. *The exercise of the prerogatives of the Crown will be suspended throughout Italy in all Italian territories.* The powers of the central Italian government will be suspended in all occupied areas and in such other areas as are designated as military districts by the Allied Commander-in-Chief as *Military Districts*.

7. 4. In all occupied areas and military districts, the ~~Allied~~ United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power. Complete freedom of movement will be accorded to forces of the United Nations within the limits of Italian territory.

8. 5. a. Subject to the supreme authority of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the Italian government will exercise legislative, judicial and

executive powers in all unoccupied areas, *these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country. In all unoccupied areas, facilities will be made available to the Allied Commander-in-Chief as are requested by him.*

*b. In all unoccupied areas, all naval, military and air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all intercommunication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.*

~~9.~~ 6. The Italian government and the Italian Supreme Command will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. Subject to such uses as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may make of it, the war material will be placed in store under such control as he may direct. The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations.

~~10.~~ 7. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian land, sea and air forces or officials in regard to persons or property in all areas outside of ~~Continental Europe~~ *Metropolitan Italy.*

~~11.~~ 8. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, military and air devices, installations, and defenses, about all transport and inter-communication systems established by Italy or her Allies on Italian territory or in the approaches thereto, about minefields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and such other particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, or with the operations, security, or welfare of the United Nations land, sea or air forces. Italian forces and equipment will be made available as required by the United Nations for the removal of the above-mentioned obstacles.

~~12.~~ 9. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian land, sea and air forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's Allies as are situated in Italian or Italian-occupied territory.

~~13.~~ 10. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

~~14.~~ 11. a. All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other crafts, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews.

b. All Italian inland transport and aircraft and all port equipment will be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct.

~~15.~~ 12. a. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Italy) whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of Prize Court proceedings or otherwise, will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled in ports to be specified by the United Nations for ~~the~~ disposal as directed by them. The Italian government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of title. Any neutral merchant ship, fishing or other craft under Italian operations or control will be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. Any necessary repairs to any of the above-mentioned vessels will be effected by the Italian government, if required, and at their expense. The Italian government will take the necessary measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged.

12. b. *The Italian Government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal or employment of any persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country.*

c. *The Italian Government will comply with the directions of the Control Commission, referred to in Article 25a below, relating to all existing restrictions, regulations, and laws imposed by Italy upon neutral shipping or the shipping of any conquered or occupied countries.*

~~16.~~ 13. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of inter-communication, ashore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other than the United Nations will

transmit until directions for the control of these installations have been prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian Authorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of inter-communication as the *Allied Commander-in-Chief* may direct. The *Allied Commander-in-Chief* may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

17. 14. The Italian government will take the necessary steps to insure that all lawfully established local administrative authorities and all officers and employees of all government, provincial, municipal and other public services are required to continue to execute and discharge their duties, powers and functions, subject to such conditions or limitations as may be prescribed by the *Allied Commander-in-Chief*.

18. 15. The Italian government will take the necessary steps to insure that all *military installations*, roads, railroads, *public or private utilities*, waterways, bridges, telegraph and telephone nets, and communications of every kind in Metropolitan Italy shall in no manner be impaired *and the necessary maintenance and repair will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities*. All civil and military personnel now employed on these communications shall remain until further notice from the appropriate authorities.

19. 16. The Italian government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the *Allied Commander-in-Chief*. The Italian government ~~will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations~~ *and the Italian Supreme Command will order all Italian naval, military and air forces, all authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or damage to any movable or immovable property, whether public or private.*

20. 17. The Italian government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations may require. The Italian government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time-limits and on such terms as the ~~Allied Commander-in-Chief~~ *United Nations* may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian government will take such measures as may be required by the ~~Allied Commander-in-Chief~~ *United Nations* for the control of banks and businesses in Italian territory, for the control of

foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

~~21. a.~~ 18. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Commander-in-Chief or designated officials.

~~b. The Italian government will immediately surrender all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with the plants for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in all occupied countries, and all enemy countries.~~

~~22.~~ 19. The Italian government will comply with such directions as the ~~Allied Commander-in-Chief~~ *United Nations* may prescribe regarding restitution, delivery, services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.

~~23.~~ 20. a. The Italian government will give to the Allied Commander-in-Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets whether inside or outside Italian territory of the Italian State, the Bank of Italy, ~~any~~ *and*<sup>2</sup> Italian State or semi-State institution or Fascist organizations or any residents in Italian territory and any such assets except with the permission of the Allied Commander-in-Chief will not be disposed of or allowed to be disposed of outside Italian territories.

b. The Italian government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

~~24.~~ 21. a. Insofar as this is not already accomplished all Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist Militia (MVSN), the Secret Police (OVRA) and Fascist Youth Organizations will be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

b. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offenses whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the ~~Allied~~

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<sup>2</sup> This change was probably a typographical error.

~~Commander-in-Chief~~ *United Nations* will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. Any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for this purpose will be complied with.

25. 22. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons of whatsoever nationality detained on such grounds will, as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian government will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

26. 23. The Italian government will take and enforce such measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the same purpose.

27. 24. The Italian government will take such steps as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign Nationals and property of foreign States and Nationals.

25. a. *There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this Instrument under the orders and general directives of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.*

28. b. The Italian government will send a delegation to the headquarters of the ~~Allied Commander-in-Chief~~ *Control Commission* to represent Italian interests and to transmit the orders of the ~~Allied Commander-in-Chief~~ *Control Commission* to competent Italian authorities.

26. *The term "War Material" in the present Instrument denotes all material specified in such lists or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the Control Commission.*

27. *The term "Italian Territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and shall for the purposes of the present Instrument (but without prejudice to the question of sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided however that except in such cases and to such extent as the United Nations may direct, the provisions of the present Instrument shall not apply in or affect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them.*

28. a. *The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the Control Commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.*

b. The term "Allied Commander-in-Chief" in the present instrument includes the Control Commission and such other officers and representatives as the Commander-in-Chief may designate.

29. "Military District" is defined as any port, road, locality, or other area over which the Military Governor has determined it to be necessary to exercise military jurisdiction.

30. The present instrument shall enter into force . . . hours after its signature.

It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or until the coming into force of the Peace Treaty with Italy.

31. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or, as an alternative, the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the areas of military occupation or air or other punitive action.

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the Control Commission will prevail.

Signed on the . . . at . . . (hour) . . . (time) at . . . (place).

(Signatures)

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#### D. BASES IN THE AZORES

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 July 1943.

PRIORITY

For the Former Naval Person from the President personal and secret. Number 335.

Your number 390.<sup>2</sup>

Grand hunting in the Bay of Biscay. We got one too off Recife, Brazil. We still need LIFEBELT nevertheless.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. In this message Churchill had informed Roosevelt of the sinking of three enemy submarines in the Bay of Biscay.

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741.53/121 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the President and the Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, August 4, 1943.

U.S. URGENT

5051. Most secret for the President and the Secretary.

In talking with Eden today he brought up a matter which has pre-

viously been brought to the Department's attention (my 4285 June 29, 10 p. m.<sup>1</sup> and other message). I asked him to put this request in writing. He has just sent me the following letter:

"You will remember that on the 29th June I handed you a message for communication to President Roosevelt on the subject of LIFEBELT.

In that message the hope was expressed that the President would authorize us to inform the Portuguese Government that in the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached the United States Government would be willing to associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. The Portuguese Government had asked specifically that we should approach the United States Government on this point.

The negotiations are now reaching a decisive stage and it is becoming urgently necessary for us to be able to inform the Portuguese Government that we are authorized by the United States Government to state that the latter associate themselves with the assurances already given by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty over all Portuguese colonies. I should be glad if you would let me know as soon as possible whether the United States Government are willing to authorize His Majesty's Government to do this."

WINANT

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 534-535.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 August 1943.

C.C.S. 270/5

#### LAND AIRPORT FACILITIES IN THE AZORES

1. Further information has now been received from the British Chiefs of Staff in relation to the subject of the facilities in the Azores.

2. As you know, both diplomatic and neutral [*military?*] channels have been concerned and we feel that perhaps a brief summary of the action that has taken place in this matter may be of value.

3. As long ago as 29 June the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs handed the U.S. Ambassador in London a message from the Prime Minister for the President,<sup>2</sup> informing him of the progress then made in connection with our request to the Portuguese for facilities and in particular of Salazar's stipulation that under no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, except perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. In this message hope

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of the subject of this paper at the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 18, 1943, see *post*, p. 886.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 534-535.

was expressed that in view of approach to the Portuguese being made on the basis of Anglo-Portuguese alliance,<sup>3</sup> the President would agree that we should conclude an agreement with the Portuguese on the lines desired by Salazar. At a later stage it should be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by the forces of other of the United Nations. No reply had ever been received previously, indicating the views of the President, and in the absence of any expression of disagreement, it was reasonable to assume that no serious U.S. objection was seen to any of the proposals. The U.S. Government have been kept fully informed of the trend of the negotiations.

4. Subsequently, you will remember, came the U.S. proposal set out in C.C.S. 270.<sup>4</sup> This proposal, which was to the effect that landing rights should be granted to American land planes in the Islands, might have raised difficulties in the delicate negotiations that were then in progress and at the request of the British the U.S. Government agreed that their proposal should not to be pressed at the present time since no great difficulty was anticipated in arranging landing rights for American aircraft as soon as the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded. It was then decided on 16 July that this matter of landing rights for American aircraft should be left over pending the conclusion of the present negotiations and a notification to this effect was given through both diplomatic and military channels.<sup>5</sup>

5. It was in the light of the above, therefore, that the following decisions were taken :

*a.* To seek the inclusion of reference to transit facilities for aircraft of the United Nations in the agreement but not to press proposal so far as to risk breakdown on this issue.

*b.* Not at this stage to ask for full operational facilities in the islands for U.S. military, air ferry and transport operations.

*c.* To seek to extend benefit of our arrangements to the U.S. immediately we ourselves have entered the Islands.

6. We hope that this will make the situation clear. We have every intention of insuring that such facilities as may become available shall be at the disposal of both the U.S. and the British. The approach, however, is a delicate one and is based on the long-standing Anglo-

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<sup>3</sup> The Anglo-Portuguese alliance had its roots in the Treaty of London of June 16, 1373, and the Treaty of Windsor of May 9, 1386. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 462, 468.

<sup>4</sup> "Land Airport Facilities in the Azores (Negotiations by Pan American Airways, Inc.)", July 7, 1943; not printed as such, but see the letter from Leahy to Hull of the same date on this subject, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 538.

<sup>5</sup> For instructions of July 26, 1943, for Winant to take this subject up with the British Foreign Office and for his reply of August 5, 1943, to the effect that the Foreign Office felt "that this matter should be held in abeyance so as not to interfere with certain current negotiations", see *ibid.*, pp. 539-540.

Portuguese alliance. Once the scruples and fears of the Portuguese have been overcome we feel that everything should soon progress steadily.

741.53/157

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*The Secretary of State to the President*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is submitted herewith a draft of a telegram<sup>1</sup> which it is proposed to send to London in connection with the secret negotiations now in progress between the British Government and the Prime Minister of Portugal. The conditions set forth in London's telegram no. 4285 of June 29, 1943,<sup>2</sup> are as follows:

- (1) That at the close of hostilities British troops would be withdrawn from BRACKEN, and
- (2) That Portuguese sovereignty will be maintained over all Portuguese colonies.

There is attached a copy of a communication addressed to the Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 9, 1943,<sup>3</sup> upon which the second paragraph of the draft telegram is based.<sup>4</sup>

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>1</sup> The draft was approved without change. For the text of the telegram, as sent on August 12, 1943, see *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 534-535.

<sup>3</sup> The communication referred to has not been identified, but it was perhaps either a copy of the paper of August 4, 1943, *post*, p. 616, or an early draft of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper referred to in Hull's telegram to Winant, *infra*.

<sup>4</sup> Hull's memorandum was returned to the Department of State on August 11, 1943, bearing Roosevelt's handwritten endorsement "OK FDR".

741.53/121 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1943.

U.S. URGENT

4856. Secret for the Ambassador.

Your 5051, August 4, 4 p. m.<sup>2</sup> and 4285, June 29, 10 p. m.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to the British assurances, this Government is ready to communicate to the Portuguese Government (1) its concurrence

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<sup>1</sup> The Department's file copy of this telegram is endorsed "FDR" in Roosevelt's hand.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 609.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 534-535.

in the undertaking to withdraw troops upon the termination of hostilities and (2) its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese colonies.

With regard to the other conditions laid down by Dr. Salazar, our Chiefs of Staff, with the President's approval, have indicated to the British Chiefs of Staff that while appreciative of the delicacy of conversations now in progress between the British and the Portuguese, nevertheless any agreement restricting facilities in BRACKEN to British aircraft is unacceptable to this country and would not be in harmony with the TRIDENT Agreement.<sup>4</sup> They have further indicated the vital importance that BRACKEN facilities be accorded air ferry, transport and military operations for this country. Obviously this would necessitate adequate protective and ground maintenance personnel.

HULL

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<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 366.

741.53/122 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET  
US URGENT

LONDON, August 13, 1943.

5313. Your message 4856, August 12, 1 a. m.<sup>1</sup> was communicated by me to Mr. Eden last night. This afternoon the Foreign Office informed me that the British reply would be made through the British Embassy in Washington and the Chiefs of Staff.

WINANT

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

841.34553b/12

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

SECRET

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On June 29th Mr. Eden handed to Mr. Winant a message from the Prime Minister for the President informing him of the progress then made in connection with the British request to the Portuguese for facilities, and in particular of Dr. Salazar's stipulation that in no circumstances could he agree to admit forces other than British, ex-

cept perhaps in the event of Portugal becoming fully involved in the war. In this message the hope was expressed that since the approach to the Portuguese Government was being made on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the President would agree that His Majesty's Government should conclude an agreement with Portugal on the lines desired by Dr. Salazar. It was added that at a later stage it ought to be possible to secure Portuguese assent to the use of the facilities by other United Nations forces.

Copies of a message from the British Chiefs of Staff to the United States Chiefs of Staff of the 31st July, and of a reply from the latter of the 4th August are enclosed.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon <sup>1</sup> has now reported that to raise the request of the American Chiefs of Staff with Dr. Salazar at the present crucial stage in the negotiations would risk undoing all the progress made, and the complete failure of the negotiations, at a moment when it is hoped that the agreement is on the point of signature.<sup>2</sup> His Majesty's Government do not therefore feel able to press the matter at present but assure the United States Government that immediately they begin to enjoy the facilities granted by the Portuguese Government they will make every endeavour to extend the benefit of them to the United States, as the American Chiefs of Staff have already been informed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

At the same time His Majesty's Government have instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon to confine any written references to assurances concerning the Portuguese Colonies to those given by His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, the Union of South Africa and the Commonwealth of Australia, omitting references to the United States, in case the United States Government wishes to link any assurance from it about the future of the Portuguese Colonies with the grant of the facilities desired for the United States forces. If Dr. Salazar reverts to the question of the United States, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon has been instructed to say that His Majesty's Government understand that the United States Government is in fact willing to communicate to the Portuguese Government its agreement to respect Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies but that this matter is still under discussion between United

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>2</sup> The agreement had in fact been signed at Lisbon on August 17, 1943. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447; *Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional de Lisboa, 1946), p. 19.

States Government and His Majesty's Government. None the less, His Majesty's Government believe that an early communication from the United States Government to the Portuguese Government in respect of Portuguese sovereignty in all Portuguese Colonies might make it easier to obtain the Portuguese agreement now, and also in the future the facilities which the United States Government requires.

WASHINGTON, August 18th, 1943.

[Enclosure 1]

*The British Chiefs of Staff to the United States Chiefs of Staff*

[LONDON,] July 31st, 1943.

Our Delegation now negotiating in Lisbon have reached the stage of exchanging draft agreements. There are a number of important questions on which agreement has not yet been reached but it is essential that we reach finality shortly since break in the weather in the islands in October and November renders necessary the arrival of first convoy before October if we are to derive benefit from facilities this winter.

2. We have asked for "full and unrestricted use of the airfield of Lagens in Terceira". Portuguese counter proposal adds the words "by aircraft of the British Empire". We are pressing the Portuguese to add authorisation of transit facilities for the aircraft of the United Nations.

3. There will be included in any agreement reached a clause indicating that the facilities detailed in the agreement are our minimum immediate requirements but that it is understood that the Portuguese Government will give the most sympathetic consideration to any subsequent request for revision of the present arrangements in the light of future requirements.

4. The object of clause 3 referred to in the last paragraph is to ensure that once we are established in the Islands and it becomes clear to the Portuguese that as we expect their fears of German reactions are groundless we will be able to expand the facilities till we get all we want.

5. We will do our utmost to get Portuguese to agree to addition in agreement of reference to transit facilities mentioned in paragraph 2 above but you should explain to American Chiefs of Staff that if Portuguese refuse we may have to be content to rely on the clause

referred to in paragraph 3 to enable us to support American request for transit facilities later. Time is so short that we cannot risk a breakdown on this point.

[Enclosure 2]

*The United States Chiefs of Staff to the British Chiefs of Staff*

[WASHINGTON,] August 4th, 1943.

While appreciating the delicacy of the negotiations now being carried on between the British and Portuguese Governments the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to inform the British Chiefs of Staff:

a. That any British-Portuguese agreement limiting the use of facilities in the Azores to British Empire aircraft is not acceptable to the United States. Further, that such limitation would not be in consonance with the TRIDENT agreement that, "Land, air and sea facilities of the Azores will be available to all United Nations Forces."

b. That regardless of what may be agreed as to other United Nations Forces, it is of vital importance that Azores facilities be made available for United States military, air ferry and transport operations.

A study is now being made with a view to informing the British Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible of the United States Army and Navy estimated requirements for Azores facilities.

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## E. BASES IN IRELAND

Roosevelt Papers

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 August 1943.<sup>2</sup>

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Irish Air and Naval Bases

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military aspects of the acquisition of air and naval bases in Ireland.

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<sup>1</sup>This memorandum was submitted in response to Roosevelt's request for the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made in a letter to Leahy dated June 30, 1943. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 143.

<sup>2</sup>The copy of this memorandum sent to Hull for his information is dated August 11, 1943 (811.34541a/8-1143).

2. Air transport and air ferry operations will not be materially improved by acquiring such bases. Air operations by very long range aircraft for the protection of shipping would not be appreciable [*appreciably*] extended in range. In both instances, however, an additional degree of safety and flexibility would be had through the availability of additional fields.

3. Air operations against the European Continent would not be appreciable [*appreciably*] facilitated by use of bases in Eire except that bases for fighter planes in southwest Eire would be of advantage to the theater commander as bases to which he might move his fighter planes to oppose German air attacks on Allied convoys if they should be routed south of Ireland.

4. This air threat together with that of the German submarines operating from bases in western France are now deterrent factors in the routing of seaborne traffic to England through lanes south of Ireland. Air bases will reduce the air threat but naval bases will not materially reduce the existent submarine threat because present bases in southwest England are closer to the Bay of Biscay. However, naval bases will be useful when it is considered safe enough to route convoys south of Ireland and when invasion operations start in western Europe. They can be quickly established with floating equipment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that fighter air bases and naval bases in southern Eire will be strategically valuable to the United Nations when shipping is routed past southern Ireland or when an invasion of western Europe is undertaken.

6. A saving of American lives and the lives of nationals of those countries associated with us in the war, might result from availability of suitable emergency landing fields in Eire, and would result from availability of air and naval bases when it becomes feasible to route convoys south of Ireland.

7. It is recommended that negotiations be conducted without committing the U.S. at this time to a definite program for the establishment of air or naval bases in southern Ireland.

8. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to the Secretary of State, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been designated to consult with him in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff :

G C MARSHALL

*Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft Message From President Roosevelt to Prime Minister de Valera*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1943.

## DRAFT

In Your Excellency's speech at Cork on December 14, 1941, you expressed a special sympathy for the people of the United States on the occasion of their entry into the war and made acknowledgment of American assistance in the establishment of the free Irish nation. In this statement you reaffirmed your policy of neutrality with the added qualification that toward the United States it would be a friendly one. Excerpts of this speech were transmitted through your Minister to this Government<sup>2</sup> and were duly acknowledged by the President. In his note of appreciation he pointed out the danger threatening all free nations if they hesitated to unite in common defense of their liberties, trusting to fortune and the efforts of others for escape from the fate of those small states which elected the separatist policy.<sup>3</sup>

Since December 1941 the military situation has changed so fundamentally that it appears profitable to reexamine our respective policies in the light of our common interests. The obvious approach is now less from the viewpoint of war and more from the viewpoint of the peace that must follow. You have spoken of the ties of blood and sympathy that unite our two nations. It should be clear to you and to the Irish people that these considerations have continuously and notably shaped the policy of this Government toward Eire in spite of the exacting pressures of the war.

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by the Minister to Ireland (Gray) and forwarded under cover of the following note from Gray to Roosevelt's secretary (Tully) dated August 16, 1943: "Here are two copies of a draft which the President would [like?] to take along with him." The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement by Gray: "Copy for the President D.G." According to telegram No. 8903 from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to Hull, dated December 22, 1943 (not printed), a draft along these lines was given to Churchill by Roosevelt at Hyde Park in August 1943. From an earlier message from Hull to Winant (see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 151-152) it appears that it was Gray's draft which Roosevelt gave to Churchill. If this draft was in fact handed to Churchill at Hyde Park, however, this must have been done on September 12, 1943, the only day following the preparation of the draft when Roosevelt and Churchill were together at Hyde Park. If the draft was given to Churchill in August, on the other hand, it must have been at Quebec during the First Quebec Conference. It seems probable that Roosevelt discussed the subject of bases in Ireland with Churchill and Gray when they were at Hyde Park together in August (see *post*, p. 831), that Gray then prepared this draft and sent it to Miss Tully just before Roosevelt's departure from Washington for Quebec, and that a copy of the draft was given to Churchill at Quebec. For a revised draft submitted to the British Government in September 1943 and for further documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 147 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Brennan.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of Brennan's note transmitting extracts from de Valera's speech and for Roosevelt's message to de Valera, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 250-252.

In 1940 after the fall of France when the British Commonwealth of Nations was in desperate need of arms of every nature, when the American Government was anxiously preparing for the attack which reasonable foresight warned us would not be long delayed, we allotted you twenty thousand rifles which could ill be spared.

Although Eire with reason blocks the export of Irish funds to the United States and requisitions the property in the United States of Naturalized American citizens resident in Eire, who under your laws may also be regarded as Irish nationals, we have never interrupted the flow of American remittances to Ireland.

At a time when every ship was of vital importance we permitted you to charter two serviceable cargo vessels to assist you in importing your essential supplies. Both these vessels sailing under neutral markings and defenseless have been sunk by the Axis.

The American Red Cross is now in process of forwarding to you upwards of a half million dollars worth of medical supplies so that you may be prepared against attack either by the Axis Powers or by epidemic disease.

As long as possible we permitted the unregulated purchase and export of the things which your national economy required, though you very properly by executive order have conserved for your own people the things of which you had no surplus.

Requests for certain amounts of steel, copper and aluminum by the Irish Sugar Company for maintaining your nationally owned plants have been disallowed by the agencies charged with the allocation of strategic materials for our war effort. We have recently been informed that without these materials the 1944 crop of beet cannot be processed, thus leaving the Irish people without sugar. By direction of the President the request will now be approved.

It is believed that the Irish people should be informed that this is not an authorization for the sale of surplus commodities but the allocation of strategic materials in short supply for their special benefit. Though the amounts are small in relation to American production, the steel that will help to produce Irish sugar would have made either a certain number of tanks, the copper so many shell cases, the aluminum so many airplane parts or would have satisfied civilian needs which now will not be satisfied. It is as if you sent us foods which you need for your own people.

In accordance with this policy of special consideration for the Irish people, we have approved the reallocation to Eire by our Allies, the British Commonwealth of Nations, of various materials in short supply originating in the United States. In reduced quantity but nevertheless sufficient to maintain your national economy you have been

supplied with American petroleum products allocated to you by Britain. This has enabled you to transport by motor truck practically the entire required supply of domestic heating fuel from your peat bogs to your towns and cities. In 1942 this amounted to about a half million tons of turf (peat) for the city of Dublin alone, involving a truck mileage of between fifteen and twenty million miles. It may here be observed that American city dwellers denied the use of their motor cars for escape to sea and countryside, do not enjoy the thought of the representatives of Japan, Germany and Italy driving their automobiles about Ireland with American gasoline.

Though coal is temporarily in short supply in the United States, we permit your ships to refuel at our ports on equal terms with our combatant allies. By our contribution of American coal wherever practicable to the common war effort, Britain has been able to supply you with a coal ration, reduced to a third of your normal consumption, but still sufficient to operate your railways and permit a limited public gas service. Since 80 percent of the people of Dublin cook by gas some four hundred thousand persons have thus been preserved from serious hardship.

Enough steel has been furnished you for horseshoes and agricultural tools manufactured in Eire, enough woollen and cotton yarn to keep Irish mills operating. Irish manufacturers as a rule have profited financially by neutrality during this period.

In spite of great efforts on the part of the Irish farmer Eire, after the 1942 crop, was still in need of a considerable percentage of her wheat requirements. The United Nations without question granted export licenses for the amounts required.

For the year 1939-1940 during which war prevailed for six months, Irish imports appear to have been normal. For the following full year of war they rose by value, a half million pounds. For the following year they declined about one third. In the spring of this present year the Irish Minister for Finance,<sup>4</sup> presenting his budget to the Irish Dail pointed with pride to the fact that since the outbreak of the war Eire had imported goods to the value of seventeen million pounds in excess of what she had exported.<sup>5</sup>

Irish exports, chiefly live stock, have found a ready market in Britain. Britain has been fortunate in having them available at her door and Irish farmers have been fortunate in finding the only market open to them glad to receive all offerings.

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<sup>4</sup> Seán T. Ó Ceallaigh (O'Kelly).

<sup>5</sup> See *Parliamentary Debates: Dáil Eireann, Official Report*, vol. 89, col. 2266 (May 5, 1943).

Thanks to this policy of friendship and supply, normal standards of living have been less impaired in Eire as the result of war than in any country in Europe.

It has not always been easy in view of American opinion to maintain this policy. Friendship is not a one-way street and it cannot be denied that Americans were mystified and saddened by Your Excellency's public protest against the use of bases in Northern Ireland by American forces sent there specifically to forestall Axis attack.<sup>6</sup> Following this protest came the statement of the Cardinal Primate<sup>7</sup> that "British and United States troops are overrunning our country against the will of the Nation".<sup>8</sup> The official censorship approved the publication of this statement together with the publication of resolutions applauding it, adopted by the Corporation of the City of Cork, though suppressing that portion of a pastoral of the Bishop of Achonry<sup>9</sup> which condemned the bombing of Irish Nationals by the Germans.

While this government accepts the suggestion that Your Excellency's protest was not made in an unfriendly spirit but to assert a claim to sovereignty over Northern Ireland, it is unfortunate that your Government made no protest against the German bombing of the cities of Northern Ireland, with the attendant murder of Northern Irish people. Moreover, since the Irish Republican Army has issued a manifesto declaring war on the United States and is now presumably at war with us in conjunction with their Axis allies, Americans could only feel that pronouncements exciting antagonism against our troops in Northern Ireland constituted encouragement to this subversive organization and endangered the lives of American soldiers.

Many Americans understand and sympathize with the reasons which prompted Irish neutrality; how at the outbreak of the war Eire should wish to exercise her new sovereignty by declining to be involved in a conflict which at the time may have seemed not to involve her survival as a free nation and later after the fall of France when the victory of the Axis appeared inevitable, how prudence and self-interest dictated the continuance of that policy.

Your friendly promise that your neutrality should be benevolent toward the United States was duly appreciated by the American people, but unfortunately by reason of your geographical position it has operated in favor of the Axis Powers and against the United Nations. This has become increasingly apparent since the loss of the French channel ports. Every ship and airplane assigned to the defense of the

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<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. I, pp. 757-758.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph Cardinal MacRory.

<sup>8</sup> For an account of the statement referred to, datelined Dublin, September 26, 1942, see *New York Times*, September 28, 1942, p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Patrick Morrisroe.

Western approaches and the southern supply lines from the American continent would have its operating radius increased by two hundred miles were they based on Southwestern Eire rather than on Northern Ireland. Whether this unfavorable differential be measured in terms of increased fuel costs, diminished operating efficiency or in losses of ships and seamen who might otherwise have been saved is a problem for the military statisticians when the data are available. But the handicap is heavy and real and American opinion feels a sense of grievance that you make no contribution to the safety and maintenance of a supply line by which in so important measure your national economy is maintained.

The presence in Eire of representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan, the powers which treacherously attacked us, still further weighs down the balance of Irish neutrality in favor of our enemies. For on the territory of Eire they are in a favorable position to spy on us while we are not in a favorable position to spy on them. We recognize the good faith of the Irish Government in attempting to prevent and suppress the activities of enemy agents, but it is naive to believe that they are preventable as long as enemy missions enjoy diplomatic immunity to come and go, and to negotiate for espionage under the cover of correct social relations. The danger is the greater because of the number of misguided but reputable Irish nationals who oppose your Government and look to the Axis Powers as the hope of Irish liberty.

It is naive also to believe that the regime which prepared and precipitated the downfall of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, Greece and Jugoslavia by fifth column organization has not also laid the groundwork for an inside job on Eire, the key position for a major attack upon Britain. The recrudescence and mysterious financing of the banned I.R.A. in 1938, the capture of parachutists and sea borne agents in Eire possessing large sums of money, the strange escape from prison and long time harboring of a convicted German spy by respected Irish citizens point to such a conclusion. They raise the question also how many agents are now undetected and at large. We know that you have interned and jailed hundreds of members of these subversive groups, but their friends and sympathizers are free and constitute a depot of potential enemy agents. Since they work with honest convictions as well as for pay, they are faithful to their employers and often above suspicion.

The operation of these spy agencies is facilitated by the ease with which the border between Eire and Northern Ireland may be crossed. It is in fact like crossing from Connecticut to Massachusetts. North of the Border the military installations of the United States are readily

studied and estimated. Between Northern Ireland and Britain there is no political barrier and the agent returning with reports of United Nations military dispositions has no difficulty in re-entering Eire. Once there the coastline with its hundreds of fishing craft plying the coastal waters offers exceptional opportunity for rendezvous with enemy submarines. How disastrous has been the information as to United Nations shipping thus conveyed we do not know, but it is reasonable, knowing the efficiency of the German spy system, to believe that it has been costly to the people of the United States.

Despite these circumstances which have made Irish neutrality gravely disadvantageous to the American people, their Government, as you know, has scrupulously respected it and has never questioned your right as a free nation to maintain it. While the Irish nation was defenceless and while the American Government lacked the means to equip your army and assist adequately in the defense of your cities, they have never felt justified in suggesting the reorientation of your policy. Now, however, the outcome of the war is no longer in doubt. Our victory is assured though it is not yet won, and it appears to the American Government to be a friendly act to offer the Irish people a share in that victory as we have given them a share of our supply.

Since in view of the military situation, such an offer cannot be construed as a plea for aid or as an effort to purchase cooperation, it does not appear that your past policy should be a bar to the acceptance of it. While it is true that regardless of your decision we shall win the war, it is also true that Eire can play a notable and honorable part in contributing to the shortening of its duration by leasing us bases for the protection of the Atlantic supply lines and by the elimination of Axis spy centers on Eire territory.

Your Excellency's statement, made on leaving the United States in 1923 [1920], to the effect that if America ever needed Irish help it would not be lacking,<sup>10</sup> makes it clear that your personal inclination must now be to join us and hasten the retribution due the totalitarian powers which have plotted against you as against us and have murdered your people and destroyed your property. It was recently stated in your Dail that the Irish taxpayers had been mulcted a million dollars to pay for damages resulting from the German bombing of your lighted cities and the killing of seventy-eight Irish citizens. It has been announced that the Axis by submarine and air attack had sunk a dozen of your small fleet of ships. For these acts of war you now have the opportunity to exact satisfaction.

But in the American view, even more important than retribution is your place beside us in the post war future. The American people

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<sup>10</sup> For the text of the statement referred to, released at New York City on December 31, 1920, see *New York Times*, January 1, 1921, p. 4.

want your close friendship and the binding tie of common effort in the crushing of totalitarian lawlessness, and the reestablishment of international law. The American people wish to be able to share their supplies with you in the difficult years ahead when the needs of allies and enslaved peoples must be the first charge upon our resources. We believe that your interests both spiritual and material are bound up with ours and that if you fail to recognize the fact our traditional friendship must inevitably be weakened. We believe that we have done our part to maintain this friendship. It is for you to do yours.

The American Government trusts that Your Excellency will favor them with a reply at your early convenience and will understand that the American Government's obligation to the American people will require the publication of this note and your reply thereto.

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## F. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WAR

### *Editorial Note*

For documentation on the efforts of Roosevelt and Churchill, before the First Quebec Conference, to bring about a meeting with Stalin, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 3-20. With respect to Anglo-American consultation with the Soviet Union in the period before the Quebec Conference concerning the situation in Italy, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 335, 340-350.

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Hopkins Papers

*The Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Burns) to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

Subject: Russia.

1. A very high level United States military strategic estimate of Russia reads as follows:<sup>2</sup>

*"Russia's Position* 2 August, 1943.

*"Russia's position in War II is in marked contrast with that which she occupied in War I. She had collapsed before the termination of*

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<sup>1</sup> According to Sherwood, p. 748, Hopkins had this paper with him at the Quebec Conference.

<sup>2</sup> The primary source for this quotation has not been found in Department of Defense files and appears not to have been a formal official position. See Department of Defense, *The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945* (Washington, 1955), p. 20, fn. 5.

War I and had no effect whatsoever in the final defeat of Germany, which was accomplished by the Allies without her assistance. In War II Russia occupies a dominant position and is the decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis in Europe. While in Sicily the forces of Great Britain and the United States are being opposed by 2 German divisions, the Russian front is receiving attention of approximately 200 German divisions. Whenever the Allies open a second front on the Continent, it will be decidedly a *secondary* front to that of Russia; theirs will continue to be the main effort. Without Russia in the war, the Axis cannot be defeated in Europe, and the position of the United Nations becomes precarious.

"Similarly, Russia's post-war position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-à-vis Russia that she may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported.

"The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia.

*"Finally, the most important factor the United States has to consider in relation to Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and resources than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be carried on with an unfriendly or a negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive."*

2. The conclusion reached is that Russia is so necessary to victory and peace that we must give her maximum assistance and make every effort to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with her.

3. As you know, we are sending to Russia about the maximum amount of supplies that can be delivered by way of the Pacific and the Persian Gulf routes. Atlantic convoys to North Russia would permit us to send additional supplies. Assistance in the form of military action is in other hands.

4. With reference to the question of friendly relations, the above conclusion apparently conforms to the President's position for, in his recent speech, and referring to Russia, he stated:

" . . . This country should always be glad to be a good neighbor and a sincere friend in the world of the future."<sup>3</sup>

5. The question is—how can we establish and maintain such friendly relations?

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<sup>3</sup> Ellipsis in the source text. The quoted passage is from a "fireside chat" broadcast by Roosevelt on July 28, 1943. See Rosenman, p. 331.

It is believed they are dependent upon a number of steps, taken from day to day, which will constantly prove to Russia that we are genuinely anxious to be a real and sincere friend, not only in the present conflict but for many years to come.

The task is not too difficult, for the great masses of the Russian people admire and respect America and are instinctively friendly to us. It is believed they will respond generously to generous treatment by us.

Of course, we should neither do nor promise anything that is not in the interests of the United States or that is not in harmony with our principles and policies.

#### SUGGESTIONS

a. We now have a number of United States representatives in contact with Russian representatives who do not trust Russia and who do not follow a national policy of the "good neighbor and a sincere friend" to Russia. They obviously do not develop mutual trust and friendliness. These should either be replaced or they should be required to pledge loyal support to the above policy.

b. The recent public criticism of Russia by our Ambassador in Moscow with reference to her failure to acknowledge lend-lease aid <sup>4</sup> and its resultant worldwide publicity had the effect of branding her as an ingrate before the world. The incident is believed to have left a scar because it hurt Russia's pride. Very little has been done to correct this diplomatic mistake, although in fairness it should be admitted that the results were not all bad. While in Moscow, the Ambassador told me he had written the President to the effect that he did not desire to spend another winter in Russia. It is believed he should be succeeded by a top level civilian Ambassador who advocates the policy of the "good neighbor and sincere friend".

c. It is suspected that Russia feels England has established a position of such close relationship to America that it is quite difficult for us to treat Russia and England on a basis of equality. It is believed to be important that we maintain a reasonably independent position so that we can treat both of these countries as good neighbors and sincere friends and give fair consideration to the positions, aims and aspirations of both.

d. Speeches are sometimes made by high officials that we are fighting this war to eliminate dictatorships.

Russia is a dictatorship—perhaps the most complete one the world has ever known. Russia is very proud of the achievements of her dictatorship and, in truth, without it Germany would probably have won the war.

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<sup>4</sup> For the text of the remarks on this subject made by Ambassador Standley in a press conference of March 8, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 631-632.

e. Admiral King recently made a simple but effective statement with reference to Russia. He said in substance that Russia, because of her geographical position, is carrying the great part of the war against Germany and we must therefore send to her all of the supplies we can and, in addition, must take military steps that will withdraw from her front the maximum amount of German strength. Such a statement is sure to help establish a feeling of friendship in Russia towards the American Navy.

It is suggested that General Marshall send a telegram to the Red Army Chief of Staff congratulating the Red Army on its many achievements and recent victories and supporting the commitments made by Admiral King. This should tend to establish a friendly feeling towards the American Army.

f. One of the sore points with Russia is North Atlantic convoys. It is believed that heroic efforts should be made to send such convoys. It is realized this is primarily a British problem but Admiral King's statement indicates he might advocate and even assist such an effort.

g. A frank and thorough discussion between top level United States and U.S.S.R. representatives with reference to war and post war aims should be very helpful, but it is realized that several unsuccessful efforts to arrange such a conference have been made. Perhaps further efforts are justified.

J H BURNS

*Major General, U.S. Army*  
*Executive*

Hull Papers

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

MR. SECRETARY: Herewith a memorandum prepared by FE, in consultation with officers of Eu and of PA/H, in response to a question which you put to me a few days ago and to which I made at the moment a tentative oral reply: "What do the Russians want in the Far East?"

S[TANLEY] K H[ORNBECK]

[Attachment]

*Memorandum by Messrs. Joseph W. Ballantine and Max W. Bishop, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

U.S.S.R. AIMS IN THE FAR EAST

I

The fundamental aims in the Far East of the Soviet Union do not differ from its aims in Europe, in the Near East, or in other areas

adjacent to or near the U.S.S.R. The perhaps primary motivating factor in Soviet policy is a natural desire to promote national security.

The Soviet Government has as one of its paramount political objectives the creation of well disposed and ideologically sympathetic governments in nearby areas. As outstanding examples we have the Soviet Union's infiltration into Outer Mongolia (where a Soviet Government has been created) and its influence in Sinkiang and among the so-called Chinese Communists in northwest China. It is believed that Korean guerrillas operating in Manchuria have close Soviet connections.

The Soviet Government has a deep organic suspicion of any and all non-Soviet governments. This suspicion gives rise to determined efforts to bring neighboring governments and peoples into Soviet Russia's orbit, to exercise control over them, and to influence and gain control of radical social and economic movements.

The Soviet Government still has a strong desire for warm water ports. It is to be expected, therefore, that one of its basic objectives in the Far East is to obtain access to the Pacific through a port or ports in north China or in Korea. The Soviet Union would probably be satisfied if such port or ports were under a government subservient to the Soviet Union. As a corollary to this objective, we may also expect Soviet Russia to desire transit privileges via the railways across Manchuria to a warm water port or ports and to Vladivostok.

## II

So long as the military situation in Europe is such as to require the concentration of practically all of the offensive strength of the U.S.S.R. against Germany, it is probable that the implementation of Soviet policies in the Far East will be confined for the most part to political measures—including especially propaganda and intrigue. In the meantime the Soviet Government will take full advantage of every possible opportunity to prepare for more positive action in the future.

It is likely that the Soviet Union will at some time in the future depart from its present policy of not offering material assistance in substantial amounts to the Chinese Communists and of not openly opposing the Japanese. It is notable that *while the Soviet Union remains engaged in Europe on the present scale* it will continue to follow a policy of expedient stability in its relations with Japan and of maintaining at least openly a neutral attitude between the Chinese Communists and the Kuomintang.

One effect of peace in Europe will be to strengthen Soviet Russia's hand in the Far East.

Areas in the Far East where there exist social unrest and political instability, conducive to radical political and social movements, are likely to furnish fertile fields for the extension of Soviet influence. Such a development might take the form not of a positive move on the part of the Soviet Government with the objective of territorial aggrandizement but of gravitation by the peoples of those areas toward the Soviet Union in consequence of their dissatisfaction with their condition under the governments to which they have been and are subject. There will of course be a natural tendency on the part of the authorities in the areas concerned, such as in China, to blame those developments on Moscow rather than on their own failure to deal effectively with social unrest.

It is to be expected that the Soviet Union will seek to have an important voice in any conference in relation to the settlement of Far Eastern affairs and to influence post-war settlements relating to the Far East in a way favorable to the realization of fundamental Soviet desiderata. The Soviet Union will probably seek to gain control of or to create Sovietized governments among the peoples of Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and possibly other areas in the Western Pacific; in the matter of influence, Soviet desires would include substantial influence in and over Japan.

Should the Soviet Union, as is likely, enter the war against Japan in its later stages, she would probably endeavor to send troops into Manchuria, southern Sakhalin and Korea. Were she to achieve this, she would probably make demands for some territorial and/or administrative advantages in those areas for Soviet account; but this is problematical.

Should the Soviet Union not actively enter the war against Japan, it still probably would wish to move into areas, if any, in north China and possibly Korea, where a political vacuum might have been created by the defeat of Japan.

(The foregoing estimate takes no account of the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Should a separate peace be made between these two countries more active Soviet interference in China might well be forthcoming, as well as efforts to bring about peace between Japan and China in order for obvious reasons to prolong Japan's war with the United States and Great Britain.)

Existing conditions in China and the probable conditions throughout the Far East at the end of the war make it likely that the Soviet Union will be in a strong position toward achieving its fundamental aims in regard to those areas.

**G. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN  
RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY**

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to the President's Special Assistant  
(Hopkins)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

LONDON, June 10, 1943.

374. From the Prime Minister to Mr. Harry Hopkins personal.

As you will remember, the President agreed that the exchange of information on TUBE ALLOYS should be resumed and that the enterprise should be considered a joint one to which both countries would contribute their best endeavours.<sup>2</sup> I understood that his ruling would be based upon the fact that this weapon may be developed in time for the present war and that it thus falls within the general agreement covering the inter-change of research and invention secrets.

I am very grateful for all your help in getting this question settled so satisfactorily. I am sure that the President's decision will be to the best advantage of both our countries. We must lose no time in implementing it.

I have asked the Lord President<sup>3</sup> to make sure that the right people are on the spot and ready to resume active collaboration as soon as the President has given the necessary instructions. I should be grateful if you would telegraph me as soon as this has been done so that our people can be instructed to proceed to Washington and be at your disposal.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to discussions during the TRIDENT Conference held at Washington in May 1943. See *ante*, p. 221.

<sup>3</sup> Sir John Anderson.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to Prime Minister  
Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 17, 1943.

. . . . .

The matter of TUBE ALLOYS is in hand and I think will be disposed of completely the first of the week.

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 133)

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and  
Development (Bush)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President called me in to lunch today and the primary discussion was on S-1, although anti-submarine warfare and various other matters came in for partial discussion. I explained the reasons for my visit to England on anti-submarine warfare.<sup>1</sup>

The most important point, however, was when he asked me about how relations with the British now stood. I asked him whether Harry Hopkins had reported to him our conversation with Lord Cherwell and he told me that he had not done so. I therefore told him that we had had a most extraordinary interview with Cherwell which had left me completely amazed at the British point of view, and I recounted the substance of that interview as I have it recorded in a memorandum made just after the interview occurred.<sup>2</sup> I told the President that immediately after the conversation with Cherwell I had made careful record of the conversation and put it in my file, and he said "I am glad you did" or words to that effect. When I recounted that Cherwell had placed the whole affair on an after-the-war military basis, the President agreed that this was astounding. I said that I could not conceive of asking for an affair on that basis unless it were part of a trade, and that I thought we might as well sit tight on British relations, since our program is not suffering for lack of interchange and since the British had practically quit their efforts on the matter, and the President nodded rather vigorously and did not ask me to do anything more on this aspect of the subject. Several times in the conversation the subject came back to this matter of the British position and every time it was on a basis where the President seemed to be amazed that they could take such a point of view. He said at one point for example, he thought Cherwell was a rather queer-minded chap. The last words as I left the office he referred again to the extraordinary nature of the British position, and I suggested that he get Harry Hopkins to tell him about the conversation with Cherwell. It is quite

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning the subjects discussed by Roosevelt and Bush other than cooperation with the United Kingdom with respect to atomic energy, see Hewlett and Anderson, p. 274.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 209.

evident from this conversation that the President has no intention of proceeding farther on the matter of the relations with the British, for I doubt if he had really thought about the matter since he saw me last, and the fact that he had not even gotten the story from Hopkins is certainly significant. It is also very clear that I have no instructions to do anything except to proceed as we are.

We had a somewhat brief discussion of after-the-war aspects of this whole affair, and the President said he felt that it would probably be necessary to prevent commercial use, by which I understood he felt that all practice would need to be under government control on account of the dangers of various sorts. I told him at this point that I was following out his instructions and getting just as complete patent control in my hands as possible and that both industries and universities had cooperated in this generously by making complete assignments to the government of inventions made in the course of the program, and that there were very few outsiders or recalcitrants. I told him that there were one or two cases of patents in the hands of outsiders where I might find it desirable to purchase in order to clear up a possible threat, but I thought this would not cost more than \$100,000 and that I thought I ought to go ahead and do it in order to round out the patent situation. He did not say "go ahead", but neither did he make any comment to the contrary, but rather nodded and we went on to other aspects of the matter. I hence judge that it would be in accordance with his general opinion as to proper procedure for me to purchase outstanding rights to a reasonable extent if the matter so develops that this is possible.

The outcome of the conversation as far as possible actions are concerned seems to be as follows. I have no errand to carry on for the President while in England and I am not instructed to take any steps in regard to relations with the British. . . .

V. BUSH

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 9 July 1943.

Former Naval person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. Number 354.

Since Harry's telegram of 17th June<sup>2</sup> I have been anxiously awaiting further news about TUBE ALLOYS. My experts are standing by and I find it increasingly difficult to explain delay. If difficulties have

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 630.

arisen, I beg you to let me know at once what they are in case we may be able to help in solving them.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the President's Special Assistant (Hopkins)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR HON. HARRY HOPKINS

What should I do about this and the reply to Churchill's wire?

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the President*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think you made a firm commitment to Churchill in regard to this when he was here and there is nothing to do but go through with it.

HARRY

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A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 166)

*The President to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1943.

DEAR VAN: While the Prime Minister was here we discussed the whole question of exchange of information regarding TUBE ALLOYS, including the building project.

While I am mindful of the vital necessity for security in regard to this, I feel that our understanding with the British encompasses the complete exchange of all information.

I wish, therefore, that you would renew, in an inclusive manner, the full exchange of information with the British Government regarding TUBE ALLOYS.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup>This letter was delivered to Bush's office in Washington while Bush was in England, and he was informed of its contents by cable. Concerning the garble in the message as he received it, see *post*, p. 645.

Lot 57 D 688

*Memorandum by the Secretary of War's Special Assistant (Bundy)*

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING AT 10 DOWNING STREET ON JULY 22, 1943

*Present for Great Britain:* The Prime Minister,  
Sir John Anderson,  
Lord Cherwell.

*Present for the U.S.:* Secretary of War,<sup>1</sup>  
Dr. Vannevar Bush,  
H. H. Bundy

The Prime Minister opened the question of exchange of information on S-1 and stated that the President had agreed with him several times that the matter would be a joint enterprise, these agreements not having been reduced to writing but having been verbally expressed in June, 1942, and again at Casablanca and in U.S.\* The British, therefore, were very much concerned when they received on June [January] 7, 1943, a memorandum from Dr. Conant rigidly limiting the exchange of information.<sup>2</sup> This appeared to be about the time that the War Department took over the project in the U.S.A.† The British have been urging a reexamination of the question in order to carry out what the Prime Minister considers the President's agreement but no satisfactory assurances have been received.

The Prime Minister took the position that this particular matter was so important that it might affect seriously British-American relationships; that it would not be satisfactory for the United States to claim the right to sole knowledge in this matter. The Prime Minister further said that Britain was not interested in the commercial aspects but was vitally interested in the possession of all information because this will be necessary for Britain's independence in the future as well as for success during the war; that it would never do to have Germany or Russia win the race for something which might be used for international blackmail; and that Russia might be in a position to accomplish this result unless we worked together. The Prime Minister further said that at the Peace Conference the United States could never take the position that it alone should have control of this matter, and that if the United States took the position that it would not interchange

<sup>1</sup> Henry L. Stimson.

\*Note by General Groves: We have been unable to secure any confirmation of this. [Footnote in the source text. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 432, 803.]

<sup>2</sup> See Hewlett and Anderson, p. 268.

†Note by General Groves: The War Department (MANHATTAN Engineer District) started to take over the project in the summer of 1942 and to control the interchange of information in the fall of 1942. [Footnote in the source text.]

fully it would be necessary for Great Britain immediately to start a parallel development even though this was a most unwise use of energies during the war. Therefore, the Prime Minister stated that he thought it vital that the matter be reexamined and a free exchange brought about.

Dr. Bush stated that the U.S. had always been ready to exchange scientific information but there had been a limitation on exchange of manufacturing information unless it would help the recipient in the task of winning *this* war; that this limitation followed general security principles in war time. He further doubted that the Conant memorandum had been delivered to the British as the final American position; that the wording of this memorandum placed the matter in a negative light; and that the formula for exchange actually offered by the U.S.A.<sup>3</sup> was completely adequate to the best interests of both parties to winning this war; that post war problems were separate, and that the difficulties of complete exchange lay in respect to post war matters, both political and commercial. The Prime Minister placed no importance or emphasis on any hope of commercial advantage and Sir John Anderson stated that the commercial aspect had confused the issue and probably the United States received the idea of the British emphasis on commercial advantage because they had used the commercial possibilities as a camouflage for the real purposes in the effort.‡

The Secretary then stated his views of the present situation as follows, reading from a memorandum:

1. Two Governments in possession of an unfinished scientific hypothetical formula on which they are working.

2. Both Governments continue working on the development of that formula and are ready to interchange reports of their respective developments.

3. U.S. at large expenditure of public monies sets on foot construction out of which these formulae may be transformed into practical products; on the understanding that U.K. may share these products for the joint object of winning the war.

4. U.K. now asks U.S. for running reports on its constructive designs and other manufacturing experience, in order that U.K. after the war is ended and its present strain of other construction is over, may be in a position to prepare itself to promptly produce against the danger of a new threat or a new war.

5. Should the U.S. grant this request unequivocally? Should it seek safeguards against any use of product except under political restrictions? Should it refuse the request as entirely uncalled for, under the original agreement between the President and Prime Minister?

<sup>3</sup> Based on the policy of restricting information to those able to use it in furthering the war effort. See Hewlett and Anderson, p. 271.

‡Note by General Groves: It was clear to me that Mr. Akers was thinking primarily of commercial advantages to Britain after the war during his conferences in the fall of 1942. [Footnote in the source text.]

The Prime Minister remarked that this was a trenchant analysis of the situation. The Prime Minister then suggested that he would be in favor of an agreement between himself and the President of the United States having the following points:

1. A free interchange to the end that the matter be a completely joint enterprise.
2. That each Government should agree not to use this invention against the other.
3. That each Government should agree not to give information to any other parties without the consent of both.
4. That they should agree not to use it against any other parties without the consent of both.
5. That the commercial or industrial uses of Great Britain should be limited in such manner as the President might consider fair and equitable in view of the large additional expense incurred by the U.S.

The Secretary stated that he was not in a position to express any U.S. Government views on these suggestions but would be glad to present these to the President of the United States for his consideration.

After the adjournment of the meeting, Dr. Bush and I waited with Lord Cherwell while the Secretary was talking with the Prime Minister on other matters,<sup>4</sup> and I pointed out to Lord Cherwell the great difficulty of the President making any promises which were not strictly within the war powers and the political danger of such promises in the President's relation with Congress which might later seriously prejudice any attempt to reach a fair agreement between the United States and Great Britain.

H[ARVEY] H. B[UNDY]

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<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 448.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1943.

326. Personal and secret to the Former Naval Person from the President.

In reply to your 354.<sup>2</sup> I have arranged satisfactorily for the TUBE ALLOYS. Unless you have the proper person in this country now, it might be well if your top man in this enterprise comes over to get full understanding from our people.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 632.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 29 July 1943.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt personal and most secret. No. 388.

Your No. 326.<sup>2</sup> I am most grateful to you for your news. The Lord President of the Council, Sir John Anderson, has been responsible for handling this matter on our account for the last 2 years. I am sending him over by air immediately. He should arrive in Washington on Monday or Tuesday. He will make contact with our technical expert, Akers, and thereafter be at your disposal to discuss with anyone you wish. He will endeavor to meet Colonel Warden at ABRAHAM on August 10 or 11 on his way home.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Sent by the American Embassy, London.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

Lot 57 D 688

*Prime Minister Churchill to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, July, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

MY DEAR STIMSON, Since our talk about TUBE ALLOYS, I have had a message from the President which is very encouraging, and which suggests that it would be valuable if someone from here could go over to Washington to discuss arrangements for the resumption of collaboration.

I have accordingly asked the Lord President to leave as soon as possible, and attach a copy of a telegram which I have today sent to the President.<sup>2</sup>

The Lord President hopes to arrive in Washington on Monday or Tuesday and will then at once get in touch with you.

He will be taking with him the draft heads of agreement which I promised at our meeting that I would prepare. I am, however, also sending you a copy of the draft heads with this letter.

I feel sure that you and the Lord President will now be able to

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<sup>1</sup> Internal evidence indicates that this letter was written on July 29, 1943, although the day of the month was not typed on it.

<sup>2</sup> The enclosed copy (not printed) is a paraphrase of Churchill's telegram No. 388 to Roosevelt, *supra*.

work out the detailed arrangements for the resumption of collaboration which we all so much desire; and I am very grateful for the help which you have given in achieving this end.

Yours very sincerely,<sup>3</sup>

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

P.S. I hope you had a good time in TORCH & HUSKY lands.

[Enclosure 1]

*Draft Heads of Agreement*

DRAFT HEADS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN

1. Whereas it is vital to our common safety in the present War to bring the TUBE ALLOYS project to fruition at the earliest moment; and whereas this may be more speedily achieved if all available British and American brains and resources are pooled; and whereas owing to war conditions it would be an improvident use of war resources to duplicate the plants on a large scale on both sides of the Atlantic and therefore a far greater expense will fall upon the United States;

It is agreed between us

First, that we will never use this agency against each other.

Secondly, that we will not use it against third parties without each other's consent.

Thirdly, that we will not either of us communicate any information about TUBE ALLOYS to third parties except by mutual consent.

And Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

28. vii.

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<sup>3</sup>The complimentary close is in Churchill's handwriting and is not entirely clear; if this is a correct reading, it is much contracted.

Lot 57 D 688

*The Acting Chairman of the Military Policy Committee (Conant) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1943.

Subject: Exchange of Information on S-1 Project with the British.

A recent letter from President Roosevelt <sup>1</sup> awaits you directing you to exchange information on the S-1 project on an "inclusive basis". As your deputy *in re* chairmanship of the Military Policy Committee, this letter came to my attention. Two cables <sup>2</sup> were sent, copies of which are in Mr. C. L. Wilson's hands. I have taken no action pending word from you on your return. Since I now hear you will be in your office next week, the matter should surely await your consideration.

May I record the conviction expressed in previous memoranda in your files that a complete interchange with the British on the S-1 project is a mistake. The proposition put up officially by the American Government I firmly believe was in the best interests of the war effort, the United States and the eventual peace of the world. I can only express the hope that the President did not reverse his decision on a matter which may have such important bearings on the future of the United States without proper understanding of the potential possibilities of the weapon we are now engaged in developing, nor the difficulties of our enterprise.

It would not be proper for me to express an opinion now as to whether you as Chairman of the Military Policy Committee should protest this decision and once again explain to the President *all* the potentialities of our secret project. I should like, however, to be on record that in my opinion the reopening of the exchange with the British without reservation (as contrasted to our restricted offer of some months ago) cannot in any way assist the war effort and will greatly diminish our security provisions here in the United States. Whatever time and energy those concerned with the S-1 project devote to British interchange (outside of the areas we have already offered to open) will be a pure waste as far as the job of winning this war is concerned. You are, of course, free to quote me on this point to those in higher authority if you see fit.

JAMES B. CONANT

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 633.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. See *post*, p. 644.

A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 235)

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development  
(Bush) to the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1943.

DEAR SIR JOHN: In accordance with my conference this afternoon,<sup>1</sup> I transmit an extract from the report we discussed. I trust that you will soon have an opportunity to review this, and both Dr. Conant and I will be very much interested in your statement as to the ways in which this should now be extended in order to proceed with the war effort to full advantage.

I also enclose a copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> which you may not already have in your file and which covers some of the same ground.

As a further matter, I include a preliminary statement<sup>3</sup> on one aspect of this subject which was drafted on July first, and which is concerned with one exceedingly important technical point. You will note that this contains Dr. Conant's recommendation that the memorandum and the subsequent report<sup>4</sup> be transmitted to the British authorities. I felt that you might care to have this promptly, in order that our conversations might have one very prompt result in the transmission of a specific document, even although it had been planned to make this transmission before we conferred, and even although this is soon to be followed by a more detailed report on the same subject.

I will look forward to seeing you again shortly.

Cordially yours,

V. BUSH  
*Director*

[Enclosure]

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development  
(Bush) to the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)*<sup>5</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR SIR JOHN ANDERSON

*Extracts from a report dated December 15, 1942.*<sup>6</sup>

Rules regarding interchange as approved by the Policy Committee, included in the report and there approved by the President:

<sup>1</sup> See the last paragraph of Bush's memorandum of August 4, 1943, *infra*.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of this enclosure is attached to the A.E.C. file copy of Bush's letter to Anderson of August 3, 1943. It is probable that the paper enclosed was a copy of Conant's letter of January 2, 1943, to C. J. MacKenzie (not printed, but referred to in Hewlett and Anderson, p. 268, and Gowing, p. 155).

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>5</sup> This memorandum is designated A.E.C. Historical Doc. No. 236.

<sup>6</sup> The report as a whole is not printed.

Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it can be used now by the recipient.

The interpretation of this policy under present circumstances, would be as follows:

1. Electromagnetic method—no interchange. (British doing no work on this method.)

2. Diffusion—unrestricted interchange between the U.S. firms designing and constructing the Plant and the British concerned with the same project.

3. Manufacture of "49"<sup>7</sup> and heavy water—interchange only of scientific research; no interchange of the design of plants. If all of the information obtained would be made available to U.S. Engineers, the initial Trail product could be made available to the Canadian group to an extent sufficient for them to pursue their experimentation. Since there would be no developmental work in Canada, British or Canadian access to the design of our plants or to the plants after construction would not be provided for.

4. No interchange on research or development being conducted in special secret laboratory on bomb design.

Attached to the report was a more complete statement giving the reasoning behind each step in the interchange arrangements as follows:

*Principle*

Restricted interchange of information only to the extent that it can be used now by the recipient.

*Present interpretations*

As now set by Military Policy Committee:

1. *Electromagnetic method*—no interchange. On basis that British are doing no work on this method.

2. *Diffusion*—unrestricted interchange between U.S. firms designing and constructing the plant, and the British concerned with the same project. Based on plan to build full-scale plant in U.S., and belief that exchange of experimental results on models is all that is needed to enable this to go ahead effectively.

3. *Manufacture of "49"* and heavy water. Interchange only of scientific results; no interchange of the design of plants. If all of the information obtained would be made available to U.S. Engineers, the initial Trail product (heavy water made in a plant in Canada at U.S. expense) could be made available to the Canadian group to an extent sufficient for them to pursue their experimentation. Since there would be no developmental work in Canada, British or Canadian access to the design of U.S. plants or to the plants after construction, would not be provided for.

4. No interchange on research and development being conducted in special secret laboratory on *bomb design*. Continuation of theoretical interchange, except with the group to be isolated at this laboratory. Based on the need for the utmost security on this phase. It is the intention to isolate this special laboratory group from American as well as British scientists working outside.

<sup>7</sup> Informal code for element 94, i.e., plutonium.

A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 168)

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1943.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CONCERNING INTERCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH  
ON THE SUBJECT OF S-1

Before I left for England I lunched with the President on June 24, 1943. In the course of this conversation he asked me how interchange with the British was proceeding. I reviewed the situation for him, stating our policy of transmitting information wherever it could be used by the recipient for the purposes of this war, and reviewed my memory of the series of communications by cable which had occurred in the course of which the British had stated that they did not feel that any agreement was being violated but placed the matter on a more general basis. I also asked him if Mr. Hopkins had reported the conversation which he and I had with Lord Cherwell, and much to my surprise the President told me he had not had any report concerning that conference. I thereupon told him the substance, and a more extensive treatment of the matter occurs in the memorandum I wrote immediately after the conference with the President.<sup>2</sup> I was certainly left with the impression that the President felt that the subject of post-war relationships on this matter was the subject at issue and that this required careful study.

On proceeding to London I was invited to attend a meeting of the War Cabinet Anti-U-Boat Committee. Sir Stafford Cripps and I went to that meeting on July fifteenth. Just prior to the meeting Sir Stafford took me in to see the Prime Minister. At this session the Prime Minister stated very positively that he was not satisfied with the American-British arrangements for interchange. He stated that the President had given him his word of honor that the two nations would share equally in the effort. He stated that he felt that he and the President were in agreement, but that every time an attempt was made to modify the present arrangements it was knocked out by somebody in the American organization. I raised the point that one of the difficulties was the transmission of commercial manufacturing information, and the difficulties involved in doing this without violating security, and I also stated that I thought it was unfortunate that the war and post-war aspects of the subject were being approached together, resulting in some confusion. The Prime Minister stated very

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<sup>1</sup> The source copy bears the typed notations "Memorandum for the File" and "Made as original only".

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 631.

positively that he did not care about any post-war matter in connection with this subject and that he wanted to be in shape to handle the affair in this war and that alone. I told him that I felt that if it was approached fully on that basis there would be no disagreement and that I felt that the policy we had adopted, properly interpreted, was adequate for such a purpose. During the conversation it was evident that the Prime Minister was very stirred up on this subject, and it was also evident that he had not been fully advised as to all of the facts. For example, he did not know that the principal contribution on the heavy water aspect was an American one. I did not correct him at this time on some of his facts. I pointed out to him that the American policy had been approved by the policy determining committee including the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff,<sup>3</sup> and the Vice President<sup>4</sup> before being approved by the President. I stated that the Secretary of War was in London and suggested that the matter should be taken up with him, as he is decidedly senior to me in the organization in this country, to which the Prime Minister agreed.

I then reported to Mr. Bundy the general nature of the conference in order that he might inform the Secretary and in order that several important points might be clearly in the Secretary's mind before possible contact.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary had a conference on this subject at some time that I do not have definitely recorded.<sup>5</sup>

On July twenty-second Mr. Bundy and I had a long talk with Secretary Stimson at Claridge's. I outlined the American position and the Prime Minister's points. It was quite evident that the Secretary felt that the Prime Minister had a strong case for altering the present situation. The matter revolved about the post-war relationships. I agreed with the Secretary that good relationships between the U.S. and the U.K. subsequent to the war on this subject are essential, but I took the point of view strongly that these should be approached on their merits, and that the present difficulty arose by reason of the fact that they were being treated as a part of the war effort. The Secretary took the point of view that it was quite impossible to completely separate the two in consideration.

On July twenty-second, later in the day, there was a meeting at 10 Downing Street at which the Prime Minister, Sir John Anderson, and Lord Cherwell were present for Great Britain, and the Secretary of War, Mr. Bundy, and myself for the United States. Mr. Bundy has

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<sup>3</sup> General George C. Marshall.

<sup>4</sup> Henry A. Wallace.

<sup>5</sup> For a reference to Stimson's conversation with Churchill on July 17, 1943, see *ante*, p. 447.

written a memorandum summarizing the discussion at this meeting<sup>6</sup> which I have read and consider to be accurate. There are one or two points, however, that are not included in that memorandum. The Prime Minister presented as the American position a document sent to Mr. Akers by Dr. Conant which was a very positive affair.<sup>7</sup> I pointed out that this was simply an *aide-mémoire*, exchanged at the time the matter was under discussion and that the actual document approved by the Policy Committee and by the President presented the subject in a different light.<sup>8</sup> I reviewed this from memory, emphasizing that the American position was that we wished to make interchange wherever it would help the war effort, that this was the policy, and that we felt that the provisions we had made properly implemented that policy. I also took occasion to correct the idea which was apparently present in the Prime Minister's mind that they had started this whole affair and that we had come in later, pointing out that our work had been early and of very large magnitude. I also mentioned the fact that on the heavy water procedure British work was aimed at power development and that the subject became one concerned with explosives on the making of an American contribution. The most important matter of this conference was the statement by the Prime Minister that he would write a letter.

The Secretary left for Africa. Shortly after that I had a cable from the United States stating that I had a letter from the President<sup>9</sup> and that this letter instructed me to open up the entire question of interchange. I cabled this to Mr. Bundy.<sup>10</sup> At the same time I was visited by Mr. Barnes on behalf of Sir John Anderson, who told me that the President had cabled the Prime Minister.<sup>11</sup> I did not see the cablegram at this time but did see it later in Washington when it was shown to me by Sir John Anderson and it was a general cablegram indicating that it was hoped that the whole matter could be straightened out and suggesting that someone be sent to this country to make new arrangements. I told Mr. Barnes to tell Sir John Anderson that while I did not have any definite information to that effect it would seem to me that the Secretary must have cabled the President concerning our conference with this resulting cable from the President to the Prime Minister expressing the hope that negotiations would arrive at a solution which would be satisfactory to all concerned. On returning to this country I found out that this was not the case and that the

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<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 634.

<sup>7</sup> The reference is presumably to Conant's memorandum of January 7, 1943. See Hewlett and Anderson, p. 268; Gowing, pp. 155-156.

<sup>8</sup> See the enclosure to Bush's letter to Anderson of August 3, 1943, *supra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 633. The cable received by Bush in London is not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Cable not printed.

<sup>11</sup> See *ante*, p. 636.

President's cable and letter were apparently spontaneous. There was a very strange bit of confusion at this point. When I received the cable from the United States it had of course been coded and paraphrased. I thought I was instructed to review with the British the matter of interchange. On receiving the President's letter on returning to the United States I found that the wording was definitely "to renew full interchange". I thereupon visited Mr. Bundy and the Secretary and explained of course that I could not renew except as the method of renewal was agreeable to the Policy Committee. It was agreed that we should have discussions concerning the method of renewing.

On August third, therefore, Dr. Conant and I visited Sir John Anderson at the British Embassy. We again outlined the American position and had a long discussion on the whole matter. The upshot was that we asked Sir John to indicate explicitly how he would like to have the present American policy modified in order that the objective should be attained, namely to provide interchange which should to the best advantage aid in the prosecution of the war effort along these lines. After this conference I sent to Sir John the policy as it appeared adopted in the report, a copy of a letter from Conant to MacKenzie, and also a technical memorandum for transmission to the British authorities.<sup>12</sup> In a note<sup>13</sup> I reminded Sir John that he agreed that he would study this matter and indicate how he would care to have the procedure modified in order to meet the British views.<sup>14</sup>

V. BUSH

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<sup>12</sup> Bush's letter to Anderson and the first enclosure are printed *supra*. Concerning the other enclosures, see *ante*, p. 640, fns. 2 and 3.

<sup>13</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>14</sup> At the end of this memorandum appear two handwritten notes by Bush:

1. "Note. The President was out of town when Sir John & I both came to the U.S., so that I could not make immediate contact with him to clarify the somewhat general instructions in his letter to me. Aug 4 V.B."

2. "Letter from Sir John received Aug 4 [*infra*]. Arranged to discuss with Mr. Stimson."

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A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 225)

*The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, 4th August, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. BUSH, Many thanks for your letter of the 3rd August<sup>1</sup> and the documents which you kindly sent me with it.

As you know, the Prime Minister prepared some draft Heads of Agreement after our meeting in London and sent a copy of them to

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 640.

Mr. Stimson.<sup>2</sup> I have been working on this document in the light of our talk and I now send you an expanded version of it which I have entitled:—“Draft articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of TUBE ALLOYS”.

My idea is that we should try to reach agreement on a draft along these lines and submit it as soon as possible to the President and the Prime Minister for their consideration.

You will see that in the draft articles I have dealt with the broad principles on which interchange of information should be conducted. I contemplate, however, that there should be a second memorandum setting out with greater precision and detail the arrangements which should govern the direct interchange of information between the groups in our two countries working on each section of the project. If the wording of the document dated the 15th of December 1942,<sup>3</sup> and enclosed in your letter, were altered to make it clear that it applied to interchange on this level only, I agree with you that it might well serve as a basis for this second memorandum. The details would, of course, need modification in the light of the programme of work agreed by the combined Policy Committee; but I imagine that you always intended that these arrangements should be reviewed and amended in the light of alterations made from time to time in our respective programmes.

The draft articles have been prepared in a form suitable for an agreement between the U.S.A. and the U.K. only. We shall, I think, have to discuss together and with the Canadians the question of Canadian participation which would, of course, necessitate appropriate changes in the form and wording. But we need not let that delay us in our immediate task of settling the kind of clauses which should be contained in the agreement, whether the Canadians come in or not.

Finally, may I thank you very much for sending me the statement on the possible use of radio-active material in warfare.<sup>4</sup> This is a matter to which we also have given some attention. I shall look forward to receiving the more detailed report to which you refer, and I will, on my return, at once have the results of our studies checked against yours.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN ANDERSON

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 637.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 640.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure]

*Draft Agreement*DRAFT ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT GOVERNING COLLABORATION BETWEEN  
THE AUTHORITIES OF THE U.S.A. AND THE U.K. IN THE MATTER OF  
TUBE ALLOYS

1. Whereas it is vital to our common safety in the present War to bring the TUBE ALLOYS project to fruition at the earliest moment; and whereas this may be more speedily achieved if all available British and American brains and resources are pooled; and whereas owing to war conditions it would be an improvident use of war resources to duplicate plants on a large scale on both sides of the Atlantic and therefore a far greater expense will fall upon the United States;

It is agreed between us

First, that we will never use this agency against each other.

Secondly, that we will not use it against third parties without each other's consent.

Thirdly, that we will not either of us communicate any information about TUBE ALLOYS to third parties except by mutual consent.

Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.

And Fifthly, that the following arrangements shall be made to ensure full and effective collaboration between the two countries in bringing the project to fruition:—

(a) There shall be set up in Washington a Combined Policy Committee composed of:—[blank.] The functions of this Committee, subject to the control of the respective Governments, will be:—

(1) To agree from time to time upon the programme of work to be carried out in the two countries.

(2) To keep all sections of the project under constant review.

(3) To allocate materials, apparatus and plant, in limited supply, in accordance with the requirements of the programme agreed by the Committee.

(4) To settle any questions which may arise on the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

(b) There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the Policy Committee and their immediate technical advisers.

(c) In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.

(d) In the field of design, construction and operation of large-scale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such *ad hoc* arrangements as may, in each section of the field, appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to fruition at the earliest moment. Such *ad hoc* arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Policy Committee.

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Lot 57 D 688

*The Secretary of War's Special Assistant (Bundy) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

I know your views about the S-1 project and the advisability of its ultimately being the joint possession of the U.K. and the U.S.A.

If you take the matter up with the President, I think it vital that he should understand that what Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant\* are really trying to do is to work out the agreement for interchange of information so that nobody, including the political opponents of the President, will be in a position to say that he acted otherwise than under the war powers and for the sole purpose of winning the war. Therefore, they are strenuously of the opinion that the agreement should stand on a reasonable basis of *quid pro quo* and exchanges should be limited to the exchanges of information which will help expedite the S-1 development. They are trying to avoid at all costs the President being accused of dealing with hundreds of millions of taxpayers' money improvidently or acting for purposes beyond the winning of the war by turning over great power in the post war world to the U.K. without adequate consideration or without submitting such a vital question for consideration and action by both Executive and Legislative authority.

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to the source text is a copy of a memorandum of the same date from Bundy to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Marshall), reading: "I hope the attached is what you had in mind for me to say to the Secretary", and a notation that Marshall had written in pencil: "Mr. Bundy: I think it is o.k."

\*Note by General Groves: Their views were in complete accordance with the opinions of the Military Policy Committee. [Footnote in the source text.]

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development  
(Bush) to the British Lord President of the Council (Anderson)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 6, 1943.

MY DEAR SIR JOHN: I was glad to receive your letter of August 4<sup>1</sup> and I believe that it presents an excellent basis for settlement of the question of interchange of information which we discussed. It is evident that the subject matter of the suggested agreement falls into two categories. The first four points are concerned with matters of international understanding quite beyond the definite problem of appropriate arrangements for interchange. These four points, therefore, are for the consideration of the President and the Prime Minister.

I have reviewed the fifth point only, which is concerned with arrangements for full and effective collaboration on the research and development program, with Mr. Stimson and with General Marshall and have, of course, discussed it quite fully with Dr. Conant. All of us are in agreement that it presents a procedure by which interchange on this subject can now be carried on for the purpose of the most rapid possible development of this affair. Mr. Wallace, the remaining member of the Policy Committee to which the President referred the general handling of this subject, is absent from the city and I have not been able to discuss the matter with him. I am, however, confident that he will agree. The matter, therefore, appears to be now in form for presentation to the Prime Minister and to the President, and it is to be hoped that they will agree that a suitable solution has been reached.

The object of the arrangement is so to interchange information, as you state, as to bring the project to fruition at the earliest possible moment. This has in fact been definitely in the minds of our Policy Committee from the outset, and was in fact the basis for our recommendation that interchange should be made wherever the receipt of the information would definitely advance the project as a war measure. The implementation of this in its detail has in fact become confused in recent months, but I am glad to say that I now feel that on the basis of your memorandum we have arrived at a position where all possible misunderstandings may be promptly cleared away, and fully effective collaboration restored. In order that we may be sure that there is now no misunderstanding I will comment on a few points.

There is one very small point in your first clause of the draft. You state that a very much greater expense will fall upon the United States. I suggest that this might now be put in the past tense. The fact is, of

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 645.

course, as you know, that the United States has already committed itself to the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, and has employed the services of thousands of scientific and technical men on the project. It might, therefore, be well in the final draft to signify this fact by a minor change at this point.

As you state, the acceptance of this draft of principles will soon need to be followed by steps for implementing the arrangements in detail. I have now received your letter of August 5<sup>2</sup> along these lines, but have not placed it before our policy group. As a matter of procedure the first step after the formation of the Policy Committee would certainly seem to be the presentation to that Committee by American and British scientists [of] the over-all picture of the current situation in their respective countries and the plans for the future. On the basis of the evidence thus presented the Policy Committee would agree as to the method of providing specific interchange to carry out the provisions of the agreement.

One very important early step will be the selection of the Combined Policy Committee to which we will proceed to give thought immediately. The most important result of the creation of this Committee will, I think, be that it will provide for a thorough understanding of the general status and progress of the effort at the top level in the two Governments. It is our understanding that while the members of the Policy Committee will have access to all general information about all phases of the effort, the interchange of information about the detail of manufacture or construction of plants or of any final weapon will be governed by the provisions of (d), and that your suggested provision (b) merely is intended to provide that members of the Committee may interchange with their immediate scientific advisers the information they may have, in view of the fact that in some cases members of the Committee may not themselves be scientists. It is, of course, clear that this Committee is concerned with general policy, especially as to the extent and procedure on the interchange; and that its existence will not interfere with the control of the American program by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army. I trust that we may find it possible to select a very strong group indeed for this purpose.

I trust that you will present this matter to the Prime Minister when you meet, and if you will let me know that you intend to do so, I will simultaneously transmit our exchange of letters to the President, so that they may both be fully informed of the successful outcome of our discussions when they meet. I hope very much we will find that they are also in agreement on the procedure at which we have now arrived.

Very truly yours,

VANNEVAR BUSH

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

A.E.C. Files (Historical Doc. No. 226)

*The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush)*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, 6th August, 1943.

MY DEAR DR. BUSH, Thank you so much for your letter of the 6th August<sup>1</sup> which is entirely satisfactory from my point of view.

I am of course quite ready to make the small amendment which you suggest in the first clause of the draft agreement, and I am now proposing to submit the draft, with this alteration, to the Prime Minister for his consideration. I assume therefore that you will similarly submit it to the President.

As regards the point made regarding the interpretation of subparagraph (b) in the 5th clause of the draft, I agree, of course, that it will not be for the combined Policy Committee to interfere with the control of the American programme by the Corps of Engineers of the United States Army. My thought is that the members of the combined Policy Committee should have such information as may be necessary to enable all of us to be satisfied that we are making the greatest possible contribution towards bringing the project to fruition at the earliest possible moment.

I am afraid that, owing to the short notice which it was possible to give of my visit, you have been put to considerable inconvenience, and I am most grateful to you for the great trouble you have taken to round the matter off in the limited time which I have been able to spend here.

My visit has given me great pleasure personally & I hope we may meet again soon.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN ANDERSON

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the President*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to your instructions contained in your letter of July twentieth,<sup>1</sup> I have proceeded to arrange for further interchange with the British on the subject of TUBEALLOY.

This matter was, in fact, raised by the Prime Minister while I was in London and there were conferences there in which Secretary Stimson participated.<sup>2</sup> In response to your cable to the Prime

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 633.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 634.

Minister,<sup>3</sup> Sir John Anderson arrived in this country this week and there have been further conversations here. We asked him to indicate definitely the way in which the present American policy should be altered or supplemented in order to provide for interchange as desired by the British, and he has done so in a letter,<sup>4</sup> a copy of which I enclose. I have replied to this, and enclose a copy of my reply,<sup>5</sup> the substance of which has been approved by Secretary Stimson and General Marshall. Unfortunately, Mr. Wallace has been out of the city this week so that I could not consult him, but I feel sure that he will also approve the arrangements. I have also informed the members of the Military Committee on this subject, General Styer and Admiral Purnell, of developments. Finally, I enclose a copy of a brief letter dated August 6,<sup>6</sup> in which Sir John Anderson indicates that our agreement is satisfactory to him.

In my opinion this exchange of letters provides adequately for appropriate interchange, with due regard to the maintenance of security, and with the object of providing the British with all of the information which they can utilize in this connection in the prosecution of the war, in return for the benefit of the deliberations of their own scientific and technical groups.

Sir John Anderson has now written me a further letter<sup>7</sup> concerning details of interchange, but I feel this should go before the Combined Policy Committee as soon as it is formed.

You will note that my reply gave no comments concerning the first four points, which are matters of broad international agreement. I understand that the Prime Minister has advised Secretary Stimson of these suggestions. There has, of course, been some discussion of these during the course of my consultations, and I have encountered some strong opinions concerning them, but you will undoubtedly wish to consult on this broad aspect of the matter directly rather than through me.

I have attempted to bring about the extended and renewed interchange which you desire, in an appropriate and effective manner, without introducing any step which could be regarded as either improper or improvident. Our thought has been guided by the conviction that all steps taken at this time should be solely for the purpose of winning the war at the earliest possible moment. I trust you will feel that this attempt has been successful, and that we may have your further instructions.

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 636.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 645.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 649.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

At your convenience I shall of course be happy to report to you upon other aspects of my recent journey.

Respectfully yours,

V. BUSH  
*Director*

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## H. CREATION OF THE JOINT WAR AID COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES-CANADA

842.24/244

*The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thank you for your memorandum of July 29<sup>2</sup> enclosing Lauchlin Currie's memorandum to you of the 28th<sup>3</sup> relative to creating a Joint War Aid Committee, United States and Canada.

Lauchlin Currie had informally discussed this with me and we feel the idea is sound and constructive. The proposed membership of the American side of the Committee is also satisfactory to us. I recommend that the proposal be accepted and the Committee established promptly.

I am returning the enclosures which were forwarded with your memorandum.

E R STETTINIUS JR

[Enclosure 1]

*The President's Administrative Assistant (Currie) to the President*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Proposed Joint War Aid Committee, U.S. and Canada.

As you know, Canada now has a mutual aid program corresponding to our lend-lease. The need for coordinating these two programs is rather urgent. For example, Soong went to Canada and got more or less of a commitment from the Canadians to supply a long list of items

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum and its enclosures were forwarded to the Department of State under cover of the following memorandum by the President's Secretary (McIntyre) dated July 31, 1943: "Respectfully referred to the Secretary of State for recommendation to the President."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Enclosure 1, below.

(a) without consultation with us, (b) without knowing what we were sending and (c) without knowing whether they could be flown into China or not. One Canadian explained to me that we were looking after Stilwell's needs and they were looking after the Chinese unrestricted needs.

I proposed therefore that a coordinating committee be set up so that we could go over various countries' requirements with the Canadians for the purpose of deciding who should supply what before they negotiated directly with those countries. I cleared this idea with all the interested parties, Canadian and American, and it met with general assent. Mr. Hopkins has approved and asked me to handle the matter together with General Burns.

If you would OK this proposal I could then arrange with Steve Early for a simultaneous release here and in Ottawa of the attached statement.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

[Enclosure 2]

*Draft White House Press Release*

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1943.

JOINT WAR AID COMMITTEE, U.S. AND CANADA

There is as of today being instituted a Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.—Canada, to consider problems of mutual interest arising out of the Canadian Mutual Aid and the American Lend-Lease programs.

The initial membership of the Committee will be as follows:

*U.S. Members:*

Chairman, Major General J. H. Burns, Executive, Munitions Assignment[s] Board—United States and Great Britain.  
 William L. Batt, Vice Chairman, War Production Board.  
 Arthur B. Van Buskirk, Deputy Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration.  
 Brigadier General Boykin C. Wright, Director, International Aid Division, Army Service Forces.

*Canadian Members:*

Chairman, E. P. Taylor, Deputy Member, Canadian Section, Combined Production and Resources Board.  
 L. B. Pearson, Minister Counselor, Canadian Legation.  
 J. B. Carswell, Director-General, Washington Office, Department of Munitions and Supply of Canada.  
 Major General Maurice Pope, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff.

FW 842.24/244

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY: Your recommendation is asked by the President with regard to a joint United States-Canadian War Aid Committee. This is to consider problems of mutual interest arising out of Canadian "Mutual Aid"—the equivalent of our Lend-Lease authority—and our own Lend-Lease authority.

[Here follows a description of the proposed membership of the Committee as given in the draft press release of July 28, 1943, *supra*.]

It will be noticed that the Canadian Foreign Office is represented by Mr. Pearson. The State Department apparently is not represented, and if formation of this committee is adopted, I believe you should recommend that Mr. Hickerson of Eu be appointed an American member of the committee. Mr. Hickerson should report to you and to me on general political relations with Canada, and would keep in touch with Mr. Acheson in respect of the economic side. I suggest this because the economic men are fully represented and there is no representation on the political side comparable to Pearson.

You may wish to inform Mr. Acheson of this.

On the assumption that this recommendation may meet with your approval, I have drafted the attached letter to the White House.<sup>1</sup>

An incident in regard to the formation of this committee deserves notice. Following organization of the Canadian Mutual Aid, we called to the attention of Lend-Lease the necessity of working out a close relationship with the Canadian Mutual Aid. Plainly, we cannot have countries first coming to the United States and asking lend-lease, and at the same time going to Canada and asking free aid, thus working both sides at once.

Lend-Lease constituted a small committee and were preparing to discuss the matter with the Canadians. Mr. Currie paid a personal visit to Canada about this time and talked to the Canadians, and this is the result. His visit was the subject of slightly acid comment by Mackenzie King to Lewis Clark, our Chargé d'Affaires in Ottawa. Mackenzie King said that American representatives from various departments had showed up making arrangements, and he was beginning to be puzzled as to who represented what. I think, therefore, it would be highly desirable to suggest to the President that when joint Canadian-United States operations are contemplated, it would be well

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<sup>1</sup> *Infra*.

to clear the matter with the Department of State. I have included a paragraph along this line in the letter to the President.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE,] JR.

842.24/244

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 6, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have for recommendation Mr. McIntyre's memorandum of July 31, 1943<sup>1</sup> to which are attached memoranda of Mr. Lauchlin Currie dated July 28, 1943<sup>2</sup> and Mr. Stettinius dated July 30, 1943.<sup>2</sup> These papers propose the appointment of a Joint War Aid Committee of the United States and Canada, "to consider problems of mutual interest arising out of Canadian Mutual Aid and the American Lend-Lease programs."

The Canadian Mutual Aid is, in effect, a Canadian lend-lease organization. Obviously, some method of coordinated action is essential. We have already had the case of the Chinese asking lend-lease from us, and at the same time asking lend-lease aid from Canada, with the two organizations acting in that case independently. This incident, or others like it, had led the Canadians themselves to take the initiative in suggesting to us an informal advisory committee.

I gather that the arrangement now worked out by Mr. Lauchlin Currie supersedes those negotiations.

There is no objection to the proposed committee, except in one respect. The Canadian Section consists of three supply men and the Minister Counselor of the Canadian Legation who is primarily responsible for the political side. The American Section as outlined by Mr. Currie is composed of Major General Burns, Munitions Assignment Board; Mr. Batt of the War Production Board; Mr. Van Buskirk of the Lend-Lease Administration and General Boykin Wright of the International Aid Division Army Service Forces. None of these men has any great familiarity with Canadian political conditions and there is no link by which the State Department would be likely to get any information as to action taken.

I should suggest, accordingly, that Mr. J. D. Hickerson of this Department be appointed a member of the American Section of the committee; and that a directive should be issued to the American Section to have its records, or at least duplicate records, filed with the Department of State.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 653, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 653.

A number of Joint Canadian-American committees are operating now, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep track of the various commitments and understandings reached through them. Further, Prime Minister King has informally and rather plainly indicated to us that he would like to be able to consult with and get information from the American Legation in Ottawa on all matters he handles with this Government except, of course, where he is in direct communication with you.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

S42.24/245

*The President's Secretary (Early) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Attached is a copy of a memorandum the President has received from Mr. Lauchlin Currie.

The President, as the memorandum states, has been asked to approve this proposal.

Before doing this, he has requested me to check the proposal with the Department of State and the Office of the Lend-Lease Administrator.<sup>1</sup>

I will be grateful to you for any suggestions or comments you care to make.

STEPHEN EARLY

[Attachment]

*The President's Administrative Assistant (Currie) to the President*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Re: Proposed Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.—Canada.

This proposal has now been formally approved by the Canadian Mutual Aid Board. The following terms of reference proposed by the Canadians will, I am certain, be satisfactory to the American agencies involved:

<sup>1</sup> Early sent a parallel memorandum to Stettinius on the same date.

<sup>2</sup> Attached to the ribbon copy of this memorandum in the Roosevelt Papers is the following typed memorandum of August 10, 1943, from Roosevelt to Early: "Will you clear with Lend-Lease and the State Department? If they approve, go ahead with it. F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]."

There is also attached to the file a typed memorandum of August 16, 1943, from Roosevelt to Early, which reads as follows: "Give this to me today. I think I will give out the news of it when I get to Canada. F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt]." For the press release on this subject issued jointly by Roosevelt and Mackenzie King on August 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 1119.

"There has been instituted a Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.-Canada, to study problems that arise out of the operations of the United States Lend-Lease and the Canadian Mutual Aid programs, and, where necessary, to make recommendations concerning them to the proper authorities".

If you approve of this proposal I shall be happy to arrange with Steve for simultaneous release of a statement in both countries.

LAUCHLIN CURRIE

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Lend-Lease Administrator (Stettinius) to the President's Secretary (Early)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Proposed Release on Creation of Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.-Canada

The proposed release contained in Lauchlin Currie's memorandum to the President of August 3<sup>1</sup> enclosed with your letter<sup>2</sup> is entirely satisfactory to Lend-Lease.

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 657, fn. 1.

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842.24/245

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Reference is made to Mr. Early's memorandum of August 11 transmitting a memorandum dated August 3 from Mr. Lauchlin Currie in regard to a proposed statement concerning the Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada.

The proposed statement quoted in Mr. Early's memorandum is satisfactory to the Department of State.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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842.24/256

*The President's Special Assistant (Hopkins) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 16th, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The President referred to me your letter dated August 6th<sup>1</sup> relative to the establishment of a Joint War Aid Committee—United States and Canada.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 656.

The President agrees that Mr. J. D. Hickerson should be a member of the committee and that duplicates of all records will be filed in the State Department.

The American representatives will exercise care in making certain that all their work is properly related to the Department.

Cordially yours,

HARRY HOPKINS

740.0011 Pacific War/3428

*The Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: . . .<sup>1</sup>

I also enclose for your information a memorandum on our assignments of Canadian munitions. While it may not be as detailed as my verbal discussion with you,<sup>2</sup> it is an outline which includes the essential points.

I am [etc.]

TSE VUN SOONG

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by the Chinese Foreign Minister (Soong)*

#### MEMORANDUM REGARDING CANADIAN MUNITIONS

Many months ago the Chinese Government approached the Canadian Government for aid in supplying munitions under their Mutual Aid Plan. A definite program, embracing nearly 60,000 tons of ordnance and supplies for the next year, was mutually agreed upon between myself representing the Chinese Government, and Mr. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions. The program received the official sanction of the Canadian Government, and orders have been actually placed by them.

None of these munitions would involve taking away any essential supply of munitions required by the U.S. or British armies. Shipping for these supplies to India (where the Chinese Government intend to keep a stockpile of these goods until the Burma Road or some alternate route, such as the Iranian Highway through Central Asia, could be developed) are likewise available.

On various pretexts, technicalities were advanced by the American authorities through Dr. Lauchlin Currie to have the Canadian Government either stop or curtail these supplies.

The Secretary is earnestly requested to approach the President to give instructions that all objections, which are indeed not in line with

<sup>1</sup> For the first paragraph of this letter, omitted here, see *ante*, p. 441.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 440.

the broad and generous friendship of the United States for China, be withdrawn.

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

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## I. REPRESENTATION ON THE COMBINED FOOD BOARD

800.5018/162

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is enclosed a copy of a letter dated August 5, 1943,<sup>2</sup> which I have received from the Honorable Marvin Jones, War Food Administrator. The letter suggests that representation on the Combined Food Board should consist of the British Minister of Food and "the corresponding food authority of the United States and the other affected nations". I am in agreement with this suggestion. I believe that the problem of dividing equitably the limited supplies of food of the United Nations is of such magnitude and has such an important bearing on our foreign relations that the organization handling it should have the highest prestige and that its members should be in a position to speak definitively for their respective governments. I think that for these purposes the British Minister of Food and the United States War Food Administrator should be designated to the Combined Food Board by their respective Governments. In view of the fact that the Combined Food Board operates in Washington, it must of course be recognized that the British Minister of Food would presumably be unable to participate in all proceedings of the Board and would wish to designate a delegate to be generally available for discussions in this country.

The enclosed letter also refers to the desirability of expanding the Combined Food Board (on which, as you know, only the United States and the United Kingdom are represented) or substituting some other mechanism designed to permit closer relationships with other affected countries. I am heartily in accord with this objective, which has been given a great deal of consideration by this Department and the Department of Agriculture. In view of the large contribution to United Nations food supplies being made by Canada, Australia

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<sup>1</sup> A carbon copy of this letter which accompanied the ribbon copy when it was submitted to Roosevelt was returned to the Department of State endorsed "CH OK FDR".

<sup>2</sup> Not printed except for the paragraph quoted in fn. 3, below.

and New Zealand, I believe that it would be appropriate to invite them to be represented on the Board.<sup>3</sup>

With respect to other producing countries various factors must be fully considered to determine the desirability and effectiveness of their participation; this is a matter which I will be glad to explore with the War Food Administrator and the other interested agencies with the objective of making recommendations to you on the subject.

In the event of the expansion of the Combined Food Board as suggested, you may consider it desirable to name the Secretary of Agriculture as Chairman of the Board, in view of his intimate knowledge of the activities of the board and of the prestige of his office. Both Secretary Wickard and Judge Jones have informed me that such an arrangement would be agreeable to them.

Informal discussions on these subjects with officials of the British Government have been initiated through our Embassy in London, but we have not been advised as to their status. If you concur with the views expressed herein and in the letter from the War Food Administrator, I shall be glad to arrange for presenting them formally to the British Government. However, in view of the important bearing of the problem on the conduct of the War, you may feel it appropriate to discuss it directly with the Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup>

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

<sup>3</sup> Cf. the recommendation in Jones' letter of August 5, 1943: "In addition I believe it would be wise to expand the Combined Food Board or substitute some other suitable mechanism for closer relationships with other affected countries, particularly those in this hemisphere. Substantial gains through increased production in South American countries might be anticipated if we were better able to negotiate with their authorities on the kinds and amounts of commodities needed for war supplies." (800.5018/162)

<sup>4</sup> No evidence has been found to indicate that Roosevelt discussed this subject with Churchill during their meetings in August-September 1943.

## J. POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 3 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret.  
Number 399.

<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario, Canada. A copy was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington on August 3 (851.01/8-343).

I am sorry not to have answered your number 321<sup>2</sup> in reply to my 373.<sup>3</sup> I thought first that your proposed formula was rather chilling and would not end the agitation there is for recognition in both our countries. Meanwhile, events have moved in our favour. The Committee have felt acutely being ignored while the whole Italian problem is open. De Gaulle, I feel, has climbed down a good deal and is now more enclosed in the general body of the Committee. The arrangements for command also seem more satisfactory to us than the previous deadlock.

I have, therefore, asked the Foreign Office to suggest a certain modification in your formula designed to bring our two views into harmony. Please note especially the sentence "The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic *facilities* and *securities* in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war." This gives us complete power to override or break with them in the event of bad faith or misconduct. Revised formula follows in my next.<sup>4</sup> Please let me know what you think of it or how it could be improved. If we cannot agree we will talk it over at QUADRANT.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol II, pp. 175-177.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 173-175.

<sup>4</sup> *Infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 3 August 1943.

Former Naval Person to President. Personal and most secret. Number 400.

Following is revised draft formula "Recognition" of the French Committee of National Liberation referred to in my immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

"The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories<sup>3</sup> from the oppressions of the enemy.

"The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French

<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario. A copy was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington on August 3 (851.01/8-343).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> As originally received, this passage read "in French territories". An unnumbered supplementary telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt dated August 3 corrected it to "and French territories".

people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

“On this understanding the Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement:

“The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. The two Governments also recognize the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war, within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation. They take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this request in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

“The Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee’s determination to continue the common struggle, in close cooperation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. The Committee will, of course, afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

“In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United States or United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements: and the Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation.’”

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[BIRCH ISLAND, ONTARIO,] 3 August 1943.

PRIORITY

To the Former Naval Person from the President, secret and personal, Number 343.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room, Washington, and forwarded to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.

Referring to your numbers 399<sup>2</sup> and 400,<sup>3</sup> I earnestly hope that nothing will be done in the matter of recognition of the Committee of National Liberation until we have an opportunity to talk it over together.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 661.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, 4 August 1943.

403. Former Naval Person to President personal and most secret.<sup>2</sup>

. . . . .

4. Your number 343.<sup>3</sup> On this ground also I am so glad that we are going to meet. Pressure is growing from all quarters in this country, from the Dominions, particularly from Canada, and from several of the United Nations Governments with which we are in touch to "recognize" the French National Committee. Macmillan reports that he and Murphy are agreed in favouring this and that extreme bitterness and resentment will be caused among all classes of Frenchmen by continued refusal. In accordance with your wishes however we shall take no step pending our meeting to which I am keenly looking forward for reasons far removed from all this tiresome business.

PRIME

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission to Washington not indicated. Forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Birch Island. The source copy bears an endorsement indicating that copies were sent to Marshall and Hull for their information.

<sup>2</sup> For paragraphs 1-3 of this message, omitted here, see *ante*, p. 553.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The British Embassy has handed us a copy of Mr. Churchill's messages to you, nos. 399<sup>2</sup> and 400<sup>3</sup> of August 3, concerning a possible formula to govern our future relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered by courier to the President, who was then at Birch Island, Ontario.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 661.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 662.

We have endeavored to harmonize the formula which you sent to Mr. Churchill on July 22<sup>4</sup> with the latest Foreign Office formula, preserving the essential parts of each. A copy of our suggested draft is attached.

We have assumed that this Government has undertaken to equip a French army of approximately 300,000 men to serve, in the first instance, under the direct orders of General Giraud and, in the final analysis, under the orders of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. We likewise assume that this undertaking on our part was predicated on the understanding that General Giraud would have the final word with respect to the French forces which we are arming and that in military matters General Giraud would be the sole responsible French authority with whom the two Governments would deal with respect to the French armed forces.

You are of course aware that on July 31 the French Committee of National Liberation issued a new decree providing in part for the creation of a Committee of National Defense under the chairmanship of General de Gaulle and subject to the "directive" of the main Committee. The question of whether or not the present personnel of the Committee of National Defense is satisfactory appears to be irrelevant since its members are apparently subject to change at any time by the French Committee of National Liberation (which is of course dominated by de Gaulle). A copy of the communiqué from Algiers concerning the new set-up, as reported in the *New York Times* of August 1, is attached herewith.<sup>5</sup>

Although General Giraud has informed Mr. Murphy that he is fully satisfied with the new set-up, we have no knowledge as yet of General Eisenhower's opinion. It is our view that General Giraud has lost further ground and in view of the well-known attitude of General de Gaulle and his followers toward this country we feel it essential in our dealings with the Committee to make a clear-cut distinction between military and other questions. This distinction was not at all clear in the latest British formula which appears to us as being the same for all practical purposes as their formula of July 8.<sup>6</sup>

You will also have noted that in spite of your telling the Prime Minister that you objected to the use of the word "recognition" in any form, the British have come right back with the same phrase.

In our draft we have omitted the British reference to the Committee's position in the Levant and they may wish to handle this separately with the French. We likewise consider it wise to omit reference to past agreements, since we do not know what agreements the British may

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<sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 177.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 171-172.

have made with the Fighting French. This question can be taken up with the French under the general terms of our proposed declaration.

You may be interested in the attached note<sup>7</sup> left with us jointly by General Béthouart of the French Military Mission and Mr. Baudet of the Fighting French Delegation concerning the Committee's interest in being consulted in connection with Italian developments.

I am furnishing a copy of our latest revision of the formula to the War Department for its comment with respect to the safeguarding of the position of our military command.

If the formula is approved by the British we would wish, if possible, to postpone publication for a few days in order to notify the Soviet, Canadian, and certain other interested Governments of our intentions.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

*Draft Statement*

DRAFT FORMULA

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will deal with the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee

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<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 532

to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

851.01/2703

*The Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Hickerson)  
to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 7, 1943.

#### MEMORANDUM

S—THE SECRETARY     Mr. Atherton informed me over the telephone this afternoon that he had just had a long talk with Mr. Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, in regard to the French National Committee. He said that Mr. Robertson was very unhappy over the whole situation. Mr. Robertson felt that there had been too much delay about accepting or "recognizing" the Committee. On this point Mr. Atherton endeavored to explain to him that the American Government had not been responsible for this delay.

Mr. Robertson was especially unhappy over the fact that all of the discussions between the President and Mr. Churchill had looked to joint U.S. and U.K. action and a joint press statement in regard to the action of those two Governments alone without any reference to Canada or other countries. Mr. Robertson said that if that was the feeling of the President and Mr. Churchill that perhaps there had been no necessity for or point to Canada's delaying her own action. He said that the Canadian Government had communicated with Mr. Churchill along this line and that he had immediately suggested that Canada defer any action until his arrival at which time the whole matter would be discussed.

<sup>1</sup> Submitted through James C. H. Bonbright, of the Division of European Affairs, and the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn).

Mr. Robertson informed Mr. Atherton that this procedure was agreeable to Canada but that the Canadian Government hoped very much that action could be taken in respect to the French National Committee before the end of next week. Mr. Mackenzie King therefore proposes to discuss this matter with Mr. Churchill in Quebec on Wednesday.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Robertson told Mr. Atherton that Mr. Eden would be arriving week after next and that the Canadian Government particularly did not wish to see action in regard to the French National Committee deferred until Mr. Eden's arrival.

J[OHN] D H[ICKERSON]

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<sup>2</sup> August 11. King actually began his discussions on this subject with Churchill on August 10 and continued them on August 11. See Pickersgill, pp. 536, 541.

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740.0011 EW/8-943

*The Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The following message from the President to the Secretary of State was received in the White House Map Room during the night.

"I have yours of August fifth<sup>1</sup> relating to formula in regard to French committee. I feel strongly that nothing should be done on this until we have had a chance to talk personally with Prime Minister. I understand also that Eden is coming over a little later.

I cannot understand what the rush is about this, especially in view of the fact that we have been getting some new set-up of the Committee almost every week. It is much better to let the whole thing rock along. After all, its importance is now in a much lower category.

I hope you can lunch with me Monday."

Very respectfully,

CHESTER HAMMOND  
*Lt. Colonel, General Staff  
 Asst. to the Military Aide*

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 664.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a draft of statement, about which I spoke to you over the telephone this morning, for you to give out in connection with the

announcement as to relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

If you reach agreement in your talks with the Prime Minister with regard to the relations with the French Committee, I do hope you will have publicity withheld long enough for us to inform the Soviet Government before announcement in order to fill out our commitments to that Government.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

*Draft Statement*

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE OCCASION OF ANNOUNCING ESTABLISHMENT<sup>1</sup> OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have today made an announcement setting forth their relations with the French Committee of National Liberation subject to certain understandings. It is my firm hope that this Committee will demonstrate a single-minded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the French people.<sup>2</sup> Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves.

From the outset this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for all other matters is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French people and the United Nations and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to

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<sup>1</sup> In the source text Roosevelt has changed the word "establishment" by hand to "continuation".

<sup>2</sup> In the source text Roosevelt has changed the words "French people" by hand to "overseas French".

conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unify itself and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objections [*objectives*].

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Hull Papers

*The General Consultant (Savage) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

MR. SECRETARY: It seems to me that further consideration should be given two points in this memorandum for the President on the subject of possible adherence of the French to the United Nations Declaration.<sup>1</sup>

1. Under the Department's announcement of January 5, 1942,<sup>2</sup> adherence would not be to the Declaration but to its principles. Presumably, this would not satisfy the French since they may expect to be admitted as a full member under the final paragraph of the Declaration.

2. We have not taken any important step involving adherence without consulting the British, Chinese, and Soviet Governments. According to the attached memorandum, there would be consultation with the British only.

C[ARLTON] S[AVAGE]

[Attachment]

*Draft Memorandum for the President*<sup>3</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In our opinion a public announcement by the American and British Governments concerning the basis of their future relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation would be a propitious occasion for the two Governments to invite the Committee to adhere to the United Nations Declaration. As you are aware, such a step would not involve political recognition since the matter was covered in the following State Department announcement of January 5, 1942.

<sup>1</sup> i.e., the Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942. For text see Department of the State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1600; *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. 1, pp. 25-26.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in the attachment to this memorandum, below.

<sup>3</sup> This draft was prepared in the Division of European Affairs and approved by the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) and the Legal Adviser (Hackworth), but it was not forwarded by Hull to Roosevelt.

“In order that liberty-loving peoples silenced by military forces may have an opportunity to support the principles of the Declaration by United Nations, the Government of the United States, as the depository for that Declaration, will receive statements of adherence to its principles from appropriate authorities which are not governments.”

This step is recommended for the following reasons:

1) The absence of France from the list of the United Nations has long been an anomaly and a source of resentment not only to the French people themselves but to many people in this country. This is particularly true since French armed forces took part in the Libyan and Tunisian campaigns. The French military contribution may be expected to increase rather than diminish in the future and it will become increasingly difficult to justify the exclusion of the French when other countries whose contribution is insignificant in comparison are included.

2) Last summer we had correspondence with the British who proposed that the French National Committee in London be invited to adhere. At our suggestion final decision in the matter was postponed,<sup>4</sup> but with the formalizing of our relations with the Algiers Committee it is sure to be brought forward again in the near future, either by the British or by the French themselves. In the circumstances it would seem the part of wisdom to seek for ourselves the credit for initiating the proposal at this time.

3) There can be little doubt but that the basis which has been recommended for our relations with the French Committee of National Liberation will fall far short of French hopes and expectations. Consequently the act of simultaneously inviting the Committee to adhere to the United Nations Declaration would serve a double purpose. From the point of view of French prestige it would have the broadest kind of appeal to all Frenchmen and, at the same time, be a concrete manifestation of our good will which would place at a disadvantage those who may be inclined to criticize our formula as not going far enough along the road to political recognition.

If you think sufficiently well of this suggestion to take it up with the Prime Minister, I believe it will be useful for us to get off a telegram at once to Murphy in order that he may inform Massigli of our initiative in the matter. If we do not get off the first word Massigli may receive a somewhat different version.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Correspondence not printed.

<sup>5</sup> On September 1, 1943—the day of Churchill's arrival in Washington following the First Quebec Conference—the Department of State instructed the United States representatives at London, Moscow, and Chungking to approach the British, Soviet, and Chinese Governments on the subject of inviting the French Committee of National Liberation to adhere to the Declaration by United Nations (851.01/2829a). Correspondence on this subject continued for some time after Churchill had left Washington, and no evidence has been found to indicate that this subject was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill either at Quebec or during their Washington conversations.

## K. GENERAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN

891.00/2042a

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose herewith, for your consideration, a summary statement of policy which has, in general, served as the basis of the Department's attitude towards Iran during the past eight or nine months. I believe that you will agree with the fundamental principles expressed therein.

During recent months, it has become apparent that the political and economic situation in Iran is critical and may dissolve into chaos at any moment. I feel, therefore, that the Department's policy should be implemented more actively than heretofore, but before taking further steps along this line, I should like to have assurance that you are in accord.

It is clear that this policy can be implemented effectively only if it is followed by all interested agencies of this Government. In particular, it is important to have the support of the War Department authorities in Washington and of the American military commander in Iran.<sup>1</sup> At the present time, the instructions of the commander in Iran are understood to confine him strictly to the transportation of supplies to the Soviet Union. In consequence, he does not feel free to cooperate, even informally, with the efforts of American civilian representatives and agencies to solve the numerous, pressing, internal problems of Iran.

Accordingly, if you approve the course of action proposed in the enclosed memorandum,<sup>2</sup> I should like to suggest that it be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration. If they perceive no insuperable military objection, I believe it would be well to have instructions issued to the commander in Iran to lend such assistance as may be practicable to the carrying out of the policy in question. I hope, also, that following such consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the War Department will feel free to lend its assistance in other ways, perhaps, if need arises, through the provision of certain personnel and supplies to assist the American advisers now in Iran.

Faithfully yours,

CORDELL HULL

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<sup>1</sup>Major General Donald H. Connolly, Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command.

<sup>2</sup>No record has been found of action by Roosevelt on this memorandum. For information on the discussion of Iran at the Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 880.

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on American Policy in Iran*

## AMERICAN POLICY IN IRAN

The historic ambitions of Great Britain and Russia in Iran have made that country a diplomatic battleground for more than a century. The geographical, political and economic bases of those ambitions remain unchanged, and the present attitudes of the British and Soviet Governments and their representatives in Iran give strong reason to fear that their rivalry will break out again as soon as the military situation permits. This danger is greatly increased by the existing economic and political weakness of the Iranian Government and the presence on Iranian soil of British and Soviet armed forces.

If events are allowed to run their course unchecked, it seems likely that either Russia or Great Britain, or both, will be led to take action which will seriously abridge, if not destroy, effective Iranian independence. That such action would be contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter<sup>3</sup> is obvious. Its effect upon other peoples of the Near East, and elsewhere, might well be disastrous to our hopes for an equitable and lasting post-war settlement.

The best hope of avoiding such action lies in strengthening Iran to a point at which she will be able to stand on her own feet, without foreign control or "protection", and in calling upon our associates, when necessary, to respect their general commitments under the Atlantic Charter and their specific commitments to Iran under the Treaty of Alliance of 1942,<sup>4</sup> the provisions of which were noted by the President in a communication to the Shah of Iran.<sup>5</sup>

The United States is the only nation in a position to render effective aid to Iran, specifically through providing American advisers and technicians and financial and other material support. We are also the only nation in a position to exercise a restraining influence upon the two great powers directly concerned.

Since this country has a vital interest in the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the establishment of foundations for a lasting peace throughout the world, it is to the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity and independence are maintained and that she becomes prosperous and stable. Likewise, from a more directly selfish point of view, it is to our in-

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<sup>3</sup> Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 368-369.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of January 29, 1942, see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VI, March 21, 1942, pp. 249-252.

<sup>5</sup> Dated February 6, 1942. See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. IV, p. 269.

terest that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the United States should adopt a policy of positive action in Iran, with a view to facilitating not only the war operations of the United Nations in that country but also a sound post-war development. We should take the lead, wherever possible, in remedying internal difficulties, working as much as possible through American administrators freely employed by the Iranian Government. We should further endeavor to lend timely diplomatic support to Iran, to prevent the development of a situation in which an open threat to Iranian integrity might be presented. In carrying out this policy, we should enlist the support of all branches of the American Government.

The success of the proposed course of action is favored by the exceptionally high regard in which this country is held by the Iranian people. There is also reason to believe that the British Government would acquiesce, or even lend its active support. The attitude of the Soviet Government is doubtful, but this Government should be in a position to exert considerable influence if occasion should arise. It goes without saying that the safeguarding of legitimate British and Soviet economic interests in Iran should be a basic principle of American action.

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## L. ISSUANCE OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON PALESTINE

867n.01/1908½

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Murray) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

S—MR. SECRETARY: With reference to your recent request for an outline of developments relating to a proposed statement regarding Palestine, there is attached a memorandum setting forth these developments in chronological order.

WALLACE MURRAY

[Attachment]

*Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Murray)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1943.

The proposed joint statement by the American and British Governments regarding the situation in Palestine as it affected the security of

<sup>1</sup> Hull returned the enclosure to Murray with the suggestion that a change be made in paragraph 9, as noted below. Murray returned the paper, as amended, to Hull under cover of another memorandum (not printed) on August 17.

American and British military forces in the whole of the Middle East was, in agreement with the British Government, to have been issued on July 27, 1943.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of issuing some sort of statement on Palestine in order to ease the critical situation existing in the Middle East was not a new one. Information during the past two years or more has been accumulating in the War Department and this Department indicating that the security of our military forces in that area might be greatly compromised unless some action were taken by either the British Government, this Government, or both, with a view to countering the serious effects of Axis propaganda in that area based largely on irresponsible statements made in this country regarding Palestine.

The situation was brought to a head by a report submitted by Colonel Harold Hoskins who was sent . . . on a special mission to the Middle East in the Spring of 1943. A copy of Colonel Hoskins' preliminary telegraphic report on the situation, as well as a résumé of his longer report submitted subsequent to his return to this country, are attached.<sup>3</sup>

As will be noted, Colonel Hoskins, after consultation with highest British military and civilian authorities in that area, quoted them as convinced that hostilities in Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews would in any case break out at the close of the war in Europe and many authorities were of the opinion that the outbreak of such hostilities could not be avoided before the close of the war.

After his return to Washington, Colonel Hoskins reported on the situation in Palestine in greater detail to the Secretary of State and to other competent officials. After his talk with the Secretary, Colonel Hoskins reported to the Division of Near Eastern Affairs that the Secretary had asked him to prepare, in consultation with that Division, a statement on Palestine that might be submitted to the President for his consideration.

A statement was accordingly prepared in consultation between Colonel Hoskins and the Division of Near Eastern Affairs and submitted to the President on May 7, 1943. This statement was returned on the following day approved by the President.<sup>4</sup>

Certain minor modifications in the statement having been suggested in the Department, the statement was again returned to the President on June 9, 1943, and was again approved and sent back to the Department.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 798-801.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here. For texts, see *ibid.*, pp. 747-751, 782-785.

<sup>4</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 785 and 781 (fn. 55).

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 790-791.

Immediately prior to the proposed date of issue of the statement which had been agreed upon by the British Government, the Secretary again submitted the statement personally to the President, together with a draft letter of submittal which the Secretary contemplated signing. The President again approved the statement and asked the Secretary to sign the letter of submittal enclosing the final draft of the statement. This step was duly taken and the statement was once again returned to the Department with the President's approval.<sup>6</sup>

The date for issue of the statement, namely July 27, 1943, (postponed until July 28 and subsequently again postponed) having been agreed upon, the Secretary thought it desirable to postpone action pending further discussion with competent officials of the War Department with a view to obtaining from that Department, preferably in writing, an expression of full concurrence of that Department<sup>7</sup> as to the necessity of issuing the joint American-British statement on Palestine. The Secretary took the view that since the purpose in issuing such a statement was based wholly on military considerations the War Department, in advance of the issue of any statement on this subject, should furnish the State Department in writing with its own estimate of the military requirements in the area of the Middle East upon which the joint statement of the two governments was based.

On July 26, 1943 the proposed statement was shown to Acting Secretary of War Patterson by General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, with a suggestion that the Acting Secretary might hold a press conference in the War Department explaining the War Department's interest in the statement.

Judge Patterson informed General Strong that while he was not in a habit of holding press conferences he was in full accord with the contemplated statement and would be willing to sign any letter addressed on this subject to the Secretary of State which would receive the prior approval of the Chief of Staff.<sup>8</sup> Judge Patterson accordingly directed General Strong to draft the necessary letter.

The draft of the letter prepared by General Strong under instructions from Judge Patterson is attached.<sup>9</sup> This draft letter, which appeared to cover the situation fully both in this country and in the Middle East was, so we are informed, approved by the Chief of Staff for signing by the Acting Secretary of War. A draft of the letter was

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<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 798-800.

<sup>7</sup> When this paper was returned to Hull on August 17, this passage, in its typed form, had been changed to read: "an expression of the views of that Department". On the source text the additional word "full" has been inserted by hand before the word "expression".

<sup>8</sup> General George C. Marshall.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

sent informally to the Secretary of State and seemed to him adequate for the needs of the situation.

On July 27, 1943, the Acting Secretary of War signed and sent to the Secretary of State a letter regarding the military situation in Palestine and the Middle East, which is attached.<sup>10</sup> In this letter Judge Patterson eliminated all references made by General Strong in his draft letter to the dangerous repercussions in the Middle East caused by irresponsible agitation in this country on the subject of Palestine.

The Secretary of State was not satisfied that Judge Patterson's letter would justify any inclusion in the proposed statement of policy of a reference to the dangers that might be incurred by the military forces in the Middle East as a result of continued irresponsible agitation in this country. The Secretary of State accordingly communicated by telephone with Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of War, who had meanwhile returned to Washington and taken charge of the War Department and asked him to discuss the situation with Judge Patterson with a view to having the Judge's letter revised along lines of the original draft prepared by General Strong. Mr. Stimson stated that he was lunching with Judge Patterson and would discuss the matter with him at that time.

On July 28, 1943, inquiries began to reach the Department from Zionist quarters regarding the proposed statement. On that day Mr. Welles, who was then at Bar Harbor, telephoned the Secretary of State to say that he had been approached by Zionist leaders in the matter and that he had informed them that he knew nothing about the matter.

Meanwhile, on July 29, 1943, Congressman Sol Bloom, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, called upon the Secretary of State and reported that Zionist leaders had gotten in touch with him and were apprehensive lest any proposed statement might be harmful to their cause. At the Secretary's suggestion, Mr. Bloom conferred with officials of the Near Eastern Division and was furnished with a brief background of the situation at that time and permitted to see the proposed statement as well as certain important reports available both to the War Department and to this Department regarding the serious military situation in the Middle East.

Congressman Bloom was in full accord with the proposed statement and even suggested that it should be strengthened. He at the same time felt that it would be desirable for a person like Judge Rosenman to meet, preferably in New York, with outstanding Jewish leaders in order to explain to them in advance the military necessity for the proposed statement.

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

In a memorandum to the President drafted by the Secretary of State on July 29, 1943,<sup>11</sup> the Secretary supported the suggestion that Judge Rosenman could be helpful in handling this matter. As the President was about to depart for Hyde Park word was received from the White House that the President would take all the papers along with him for discussion with Judge Rosenman.

Judge Rosenman called on the Secretary of State on August 3, 1943, and later at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs where he was fully acquainted with all the papers of the case and given a full background of the situation. The Judge stated that he had already discussed the matter fully with General Strong and that General Strong had furnished him with certain data on the military situation in the Middle East and had promised to furnish him with fuller reports. Judge Rosenman stated that he intended to go to New York over the weekend where he would discuss the matter in detail with competent Jewish leaders.

On August 5, 1943, the Secretary of War called the Secretary of State by telephone to say that he had examined the military situation in the Near East, that he considered General Strong an "alarmist" in the matter and in effect "withdrew" Judge Patterson's letter supporting the need for a joint American-British statement on Palestine at this time. The Secretary of State prepared a memorandum<sup>12</sup> of his above-mentioned telephone conversation dated August 6, 1943, with the Secretary of War, a copy of which is being sent to the Secretary of War for his information.

As a result of Mr. Stimson's action in this matter, the Department in a telegram dated August 7, 1943, informed the British Government that for reasons stated in the telegram, a copy of which is attached,<sup>13</sup> this Government would not contemplate making any statement on Palestine for the time being.

For the completion of the file, there is attached a copy of a telegram from Mr. Kirk, our Minister at Cairo, dated July 28, 1943,<sup>11</sup> expressing apprehension over the delay in the issue of the statement and impressing upon the Department the urgent need of such action. It may be explained in this connection that Mr. Kirk had been furnished with the text of the contemplated statement and had been advised that it would be issued shortly. He was to have repeated the text to various American diplomatic missions in the Near East where it was believed a statement would have had a very salutary effect in quieting the agitated sentiments of the native populations.

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<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. iv, pp. 802-803.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed here. For text, see *ibid.*, p. 803.

There is also attached a copy of a telegram dated August 10, 1943, from the Embassy at London<sup>14</sup> expressing the disappointment of Mr. Eden and Colonel Stanley at this Government's decision not to issue the proposed statement.

<sup>14</sup> Not printed here. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 804.

## M. POSTWAR CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

800.796/410½

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

### QUEBEC TRIP: AVIATION

S—MR. SECRETARY: The British will bring up the possibility of entering negotiations looking towards an agreement upon post-war commercial aviation and air rights.

It is suggested that you take the position that the United States is not at present ready to enter these discussions but to indicate that this Government realizes the great importance of the question, and the great public interest therein; and that it considers that the problem must be made the subject of discussion at an opportune time. It might be left open for decision whether such discussions should be in the nature of discussions between the United States and Great Britain; or the United States and the British Empire; or between a group representing all the United Nations. Meanwhile, you might wish to say that pending the time when such discussions can be had, we should be glad to exchange general ideas and information.

You might wish to refer to the fact that in June [May] of 1942, in response to a protest of the British Foreign Office against an attempt of an American air company to secure the exclusive rights in Egypt, we suggested that neither country attempt to make arrangements exclusive of or discriminatory against the other pending an opportune time for an amicable discussion in a cooperative spirit.<sup>1</sup> We consider this as a continuing understanding, which implies that neither country will conduct or assent to a policy of "grab" while the war is going on. It is neither to the British interest nor our own to open the situation to a policy of competitive "grab".

NOTE: For your confidential information, it is the general estimate that the policy of "grab" would suit British interests far better than ours, since they are probably in a position to obtain exclusive rights

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. iv, pp. 21-23.

throughout practically all of Africa (other than the Portuguese possessions); throughout the British Commonwealth nations and India, and very likely throughout France through General de Gaulle and very possibly a fair proportion of the European continent. Since the important traffic routes lie across Canada, Britain and the West European countries, this might seriously handicap attempts of American aviation to expand beyond the Western Hemisphere. It might be pointed out to the British that discussions ought to await our sounding out of Congressional opinion; and that, indeed, the issues presented to American public opinion are very much the same as those which are being presented to British public opinion by different groups in the British Government and British commercial world.

The question may be brought up as to our attitude towards a possible cartel agreement between Pan American Airways and British Overseas Airways Corporation. (Rumors of such a cartel agreement have reached us; though they are not solidly substantiated it is plain that some steps toward that end have been taken without direct knowledge of any Government agency.) You might take the position that air rights are so intimately connected with problems of international security that no agreement by purely private parties could be accepted as binding on American policy.

The question may be brought up as to whether the United States would pursue a policy of free sale of commercial transport planes to Britain; and it would be buttressed by the argument that we had encouraged the British to manufacture fighter planes, and had undertaken ourselves to manufacture the long-range heavy planes which could be flown across the Atlantic thereby saving some tonnage. The British would argue that having abandoned to some extent their manufacture of commercial transport planes, we should freely sell to them.

You might wish to say that we should, of course, consider the question on a fair and equitable basis but we might observe that under the allocations of the Munitions Assignment[s] Board some four hundred transport planes have been allocated to Britain for war purposes which the British have found it possible to use quite easily for civil transport work. They are not, therefore, particularly short-hauled since a proportion of these will be available to take care of their regular air route necessities during the period prior to general discussion.

Detailed questions may be raised with regard to the degree to which the American army transport services are used in commercial work. This is a bone of contention between our army and the British. Our army contends that they have rigidly excluded the army transport services from any commercial work. The British, however, have con-

ducted their army transport services through the medium of B.O.A.C. and the army contends that B.O.A.C. actually engages in commercial work. The reports on these various claims are too conflicting at this time to make it possible to settle the matter—which, indeed, may not be brought up at all because there is reason to believe that the British position is somewhat weak.

The only other major aviation problem properly falls in the field of security namely, whether we should go in for a program of joint air bases. This, I presume, will already have been considered in your talks with Norman Davis. It would seem premature to try to evolve a plan at this time, though the subject might be listed as one for continuing discussion on a technical level between the two Governments.

A[DOLF] A B[ERLE, JR.]

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## N. POSTWAR WORLD ORGANIZATION

Lot 60 D 224

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant  
(Pasvolsky)*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON, August 10, 1943.]

Hull, Welles, Bowman, Pasvolsky and Davis to see President. President said memo. prepared by Bowman (and staff) on Libya<sup>2</sup> was good and he would talk about it with Churchill that week-end. President then said he had a long telegram from Churchill,<sup>3</sup> and the following papers (from State): colonial declaration,<sup>4</sup> Constitution of International Organization,<sup>5</sup> Four Power Pact,<sup>6</sup> UN Protocol.<sup>7</sup> He directed Pasvolsky to bring him up to date.

Hull read the British *aide-mémoire*,<sup>8</sup> beginning with points 9 and 10 (Council of Europe proposal). President said he had told Churchill on last visit we were opposed. Hull said Department's answer was proposed Four Power Pact. The President then suggested that they go into that, and he took exception to the article dealing with the technical commission to advise on forces which each power should keep ready for emergency enforcement purposes. He altered that to read: "available". Also, he took exception to the article dealing with disarmament. The President wondered whether this would have to be ratified

<sup>1</sup> Entry for August 10, 1943, in a chronology entitled "Indications of Contact With President on Post-War Matters".

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 338.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 702.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 717.

<sup>5</sup> See Notter, pp. 472-483. Welles had given Roosevelt a copy of this paper on or shortly before June 19, 1943.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 682.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 693.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 700.

by the Senate. Hull said he didn't think so and that we should talk about that. He said it could be issued in the form of a declaration. The President at once took that up favorably, and suggested that in the Four Power Pact, the word "article" be struck out wherever it appeared as too indicative of a treaty.

Pasvolsky then suggested that our thought was that the declaration should be issued in connection with an agreement to set up machinery. Welles said that that was the next step we had in mind. The President approved the idea.

He then turned to the United Nations Protocol, which the President started to read and then stopped reading to scan and get clear to the end and said: "This has thirteen articles. That's a bad number." He then suggested that it be reduced to a statement of the principles rather than designed to be a formal agreement. He said that that was the next stage for us to consider anyway. The President then asked Pasvolsky to draft up the protocol in the form of principles and bring them up to date. He suggested that we get such a paper by tomorrow evening at 10 o'clock, so that he would be able to get it before he left for Hyde Park where he was going to talk with Churchill about it. If not, he would be back one day next week and could then get it.<sup>9</sup>

They then talked about steps to be taken. The President indicated that Churchill was going to be joined by Eden later in the conversations and would be available to talk this thing over first before raising it with the other powers. The President would bring Eden back with him later on and we could all talk together down here.

The President then said that after we had reached agreement with the British we would have to raise the matter in Moscow.

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<sup>9</sup> For the text of "Tentative Draft of Propositions for a United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Periods", dated August 14, 1943, see *post*, p. 706.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Draft Protocol Prepared in the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

PROTOCOL OF A PROPOSED FOUR-POWER SECURITY AGREEMENT PENDING  
PERMANENT PEACE<sup>2</sup>

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations,

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<sup>1</sup> The source text seems to have been before Roosevelt during his meeting of August 10, 1943, with officers of the Department of State, reported *supra*. Welles had given Roosevelt a copy of this paper on or shortly before June 19, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> The last three words of this heading are a manuscript addition by Roosevelt.

to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such states have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to liberate themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to an organized peace; and

determined to establish and to maintain peace and to preserve international security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

have agreed as follows:

1.<sup>3</sup> The signatory states agree that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy states, shall be continued for the organization and maintenance of the peace.

2. Those of the signatory states which are at war with a common enemy agree to act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy, and to the occupation of enemy territory and territory of other states held by the enemy.

3. The signatory states agree to take all measures which they deem necessary to provide against any violation of the terms of disarmament by their present enemies.

4. The signatory states agree to the necessity of establishing a permanent international organization, based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, for the maintenance of international peace and security, and for such other purposes as may be agreed upon.

5. Pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a permanent international organization, the signatory states agree to consult and to act jointly in behalf of the community of nations in maintaining international peace and security. They further agree to establish a technical commission composed of representatives of their military, naval and air forces in order to advise them as to the strength and composition of the contingents of their forces which each shall hold available for use at any time in order to preserve the peace.

6. The signatory states undertake to negotiate a joint agreement fixing maximum and minimum limitations for their respective armaments and forces, and for their future reduction, such agreement to become operative when peace is established and general security is assured.

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<sup>3</sup> As typed, each of the six numbered paragraphs was preceded by a centered heading, "Article I", "Article II", etc. These headings have been crossed out on the source text, and handwritten arabic numbers for the paragraphs have been inserted. (See Roosevelt's instructions in the document *supra*.)

Roosevelt Papers

*Mr. Myron C. Taylor to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

NEW YORK, [August 10, 1943.]

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I dictated the attached brief summary of the activities of our committee work at the Department of State to use as a summing up at our last meeting before adjournment. As the Congressional members were "occupied" on the days set for the final meeting the meeting was postponed until September—thus I made no use of it. I am sending a copy to Secretary Hull.

Will you do me the honor to read it before your meeting with the Prime Minister.

I regret exceedingly that I did not receive word of the meeting with you today<sup>2</sup> until too late to reach Washington in time. I am available at any time if wanted.

With kind regards,  
Sincerely,

MYRON TAYLOR

[Attachment]

*Memorandum by Mr. Myron C. Taylor*

JULY 8, 1943.

The discussions in the several committees under the leadership of the Department of State during the past sixteen months have developed much thought and information relating to the world problems growing out of the present war. These problems have been subject to continuous study and exchange of ideas among an aggregate committee membership of one hundred thirty-five and a research staff of sixty, generously assisted by other members of the Department of State and representatives from other departments of government. Each problem has been considered separately and in relation to other problems. The ideal approaches to the betterment of mankind throughout the world have been stated, discussed, and re-stated.

There has gradually emerged out of this intensive consideration a set of principles which are directed toward ideal solutions, but which are necessarily influenced by immediate practical considerations. The first of these considerations—without minimizing the importance of

<sup>1</sup> This handwritten letter and its attachment were presumably written in Taylor's capacity as a member of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. See Notter, pp. 73 ff. They were sent by Taylor to the President's secretary (Tully) under cover of the following letter: "I am very desirous that the President should read the enclosed before the visit of the Prime Minister. Will you be good enough to put it in his hands at an appropriate moment." (Roosevelt Papers)

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 681.

others—is world security. In approaching the problem of general security, we must again keep in mind an ideal universal solution, but we must give first thought to the security of the United States and the other American republics, and to the welfare of the peoples of this hemisphere.

#### PROBLEMS REQUIRING INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

In the course of our long discussions we have exposed many important problems that will require post-war collaboration.

##### *Security*

For the promotion of security, we have considered what powers the international organization should have to settle disputes and to enforce its decisions. We have discussed possible means for the enforcement of peace and have considered in that connection the establishment of international air fields in the islands of the Pacific and elsewhere.

We have discussed the terms of surrender and the plans of occupation for conquered enemy countries, and have considered how these countries are to be treated in order to assure security. In particular we have weighed the treatment to be accorded Germany in order to weaken its capacity to make another war and to curb the war-like character of the German people. We have explored the possible advantages and disadvantages to durable security of partitioning the German state, in comparison with the gains or risks of leaving Germany unified. And we have considered the possibility of segregating the industrial regions of the Rhineland, the Ruhr, the Saar and Silesia, or of placing these areas under some form of international control in order to prevent the rebuilding of Germany's military might.

##### *Disarmament*

We have assessed the cost of armaments during normal periods and during war and have visualized how great a benefit would flow to mankind from an agreed world reduction of armaments accomplished within the needs of world security and the obligations of enforcing peace when necessary.

##### *Restoration of Conquered Countries*

We have considered plans for the orderly transition to independence of countries released from Nazi domination. We have explored possible forms of government for such countries and appraised the possibilities of trustworthy and capable leadership within them. We have examined the agrarian and industrial capacity of each country, and have sought to appraise its potential development.

*Territorial Adjustments*

We have also discussed the many territorial and boundary adjustments that may be required in the post-war world, among them the most practicable disposition of East Prussia and the frontiers of states bordering Russia.

*Trusteeship*

We have considered the carrying out of international responsibilities in the mandated areas resulting from the last war and in such trust areas as will be created after the present war. We have contemplated, as a substitute for the theories and practices of mandates, a new and not yet defined type of trusteeship. We have considered the administration of certain trustee areas by local groups of states rather than by a single mandatory state, as was the former practice.

*Economic Problems*

We have under consideration the full gamut of economic questions—finance (including the problem of a possible world bank), stabilization funds, long and short term credits, power problems, transportation, shipping, commissions, food problems, raw materials, heavy industries, cartels, freight agreements, trade barriers, et cetera.

These highly important economic problems, world-wide in their scope, extend to the vitals of individual and community well-being everywhere. As we have discovered through examination of the economic relationships within our own Union, these world economic activities are intimately related to whatever political structure or arrangements we may create. As the economic relations are weakened or destroyed, the political structure is weakened or destroyed. Similarly, any deterioration of political security immediately undermines economic relations and stability.

*Refugee Problems*

We have discussed the problem of refugee peoples and have sought a solution for the sad plight of those thousands who have not been executed, but who have been torn from their homes and introduced into virtual slavery because of their political, racial or religious affiliations.

*Economic and Social Improvement*

We have considered the need of bringing to the people of the earth a better standard of living, better educational facilities and protection of life and property, freedom of speech and religion.

## MEANING OF THESE PROBLEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

And so, Mr. Secretary, we have discovered that many serious problems are involved in international collaboration after this war. In our

efforts to learn how that collaboration can be achieved we have traveled over a long and difficult course; we have been beset with uncertainties and have realized the resentments, the suspicions and the doubts of every country toward the motives of the others. We have tried to understand what problems of race, religion, economic circumstances, tradition, resentment, suspicion, doubt, and hatred have through the long course of history frustrated the will of nations to collaborate—nations which are courageous enough to try once more to build out of such chaos something that will endure and benefit the world.

In our quest, we as Americans have not overlooked the ideal or the practical. Neither can we overlook the distinction between idealism and ideology. The one embodies the very spirit of man; the other has only fleeting value as the ideas of an individual who abandons the practical in the pursuit of an illusion. Such pursuit, as we have seen in the present exploitation of so-called ideologies, has brought the world near disaster. We have tried, and must continue to try, to keep free from any illusion.

Thus, as I stated at the outset, driven by the due sense of the gigantic stakes of peace, proceeding by reason and full discussion, and supported by the highest ethical motives, we undertake now to cope with the great problems emerging from the war through some form of international organization in which America can and will take a responsible part. We seek an agency with sufficient scope and power to prevent the disruption of human affairs and the destruction of human lives through the terrifying agencies of modern war, since we know that only the exercise of kindly observation, timely council and forceful action if necessary can make such conflicts impossible.

#### NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

What then is this agency that will insure the best future of the world? It can be none other than a world organization of nations—large enough, broad enough, powerful enough, alert enough and energetic enough to see and to act.

It has been our thought that such an organization should have the primary purpose of maintaining security but that it might also carry on other vital functions. To this end, we have envisaged a larger, more complete, better organized, and more effective instrumentality than the League of Nations, with power to adopt rules of right conduct among nations, to settle political disputes, to resolve legal questions by means of a world tribunal, and to prevent aggression by force if necessary. We have therefore considered the possible reorganization of the existing League of Nations, with a restatement of its principles and a redefinition of its functions; and we have considered whether a new

organization should be created out of United Nations relationships or other current experience.

### *Possible Regional Groups*

We have explored the possibility of setting up groups of states or regional councils, such as those described by Prime Minister Churchill in his address of March this year.<sup>3</sup> With respect to the proposed Council of Europe, we have questioned whether the United States should join Great Britain and Russia in guaranteeing the security of that group of states. We have examined this problem in the light of Western Hemisphere relationships under the Monroe Doctrine and in terms of the more recent Good Neighbor policies.

As an alternative to Mr. Churchill's proposal, we have discussed a union of all European states, excluding Great Britain and Russia, which would be placed under the protection of a world organization that would include Britain and Russia.

We have considered a loosely organized union of states in Eastern Europe under the protection of a world organization. We have also considered a possible Asiatic Council for security purposes as was proposed by Prime Minister Churchill.

We have questioned how long such regional groups might escape the greed, rivalries, and ambitions of their component parts, or their utilization for selfish purposes by more powerful members; and we have queried whether those dangers could be avoided only through a strong world order. We have reached a consensus that the universal organization must not be founded upon regional structures and that such regional relationships or organizations should be primarily concerned with local problems, though they could perform some functions by delegation from the general international organization.

#### THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY

The creation of such an organization gives rise to the objection that it would mean a surrender of sovereignty. What is the real basis of this claim?

Certainly no surrender of sovereignty over domestic affairs is involved, since no peace plan will be concerned with the internal affairs of nations.

Neither can the judicial process for the settlement of disputes be objected to as violating national interests, since that process is simply a means whereby a nation can safeguard its peace and security through the pacific settlement of international differences.

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<sup>3</sup> For the text of Churchill's broadcast of March 21, 1943, in which he made the suggestion referred to, see *New York Times*, March 22, 1943, p. 4; Churchill, *War Speeches*, vol. II, pp. 425-437.

Civilized nations have always claimed to be governed by international law as established by treaties, custom and usage. The promulgation of such rules of right conduct will involve no impairment of national sovereignty unless the disregard of such rules be deemed a privilege of sovereignty.

The treaty making power will not be impaired. Indeed, the field of international cooperation through general international and regional conferences and agreements can profitably be expanded. Many of the problems now under consideration may well be left to that field, outside of the immediate control of any central authority.

An international arrangement to control by force the means of aggression and to prevent acts of aggression may indeed impinge on the alleged rights of would-be aggressors. However, there will be no surrender of sovereignty by nations contributing forces to the maintenance of peace. If, however, individual nations press their claims of sovereignty to the point of judging, each for itself, what force to supply if need arises, the international organization might then be rendered impotent and the likelihood of having to employ force would be increased. Arrangements for the use of force must be set in advance and must be certain.

There can be no permanent peace unless nations are prepared to accept the decisions of the international organization on matters entrusted to it, in full faith that the enlightened opinion and moral judgment of the world will prevail in that organization. To that extent only must member states give up the right of individual decision and action. However, any conception of sovereignty that precludes united or co-operative action is an anachronism in the modern world.

There is in fact no real surrender of sovereignty in cooperated or united action; and there is nothing but an act of sovereignty itself in the negotiation of a treaty to enter into organized cooperation. If by the transfer of certain powers to an authority outside the state we obtain the support of other nations in guaranteeing our own security and that of our neighbors and allies, have we diminished our sovereignty? Or have we in fact enlarged it? What is involved is not so much a diminution of sovereignty as a re-distribution of the peoples' authority in order to make it effective over a wider area.

#### ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Following the practical sense of our exploration, what are the steps most likely to bring about ultimate world organization? It seems to me that the natural approach would be through the present association of the United States with three other great powers in a collective effort to crush the common enemy. Their responsibility for securing victory

is acknowledged. The four-power relationship has been born in this war and exists in fact. It is not something that has to be created; it is something that has to be extended and expanded. The continuing adherence of those four great nations is essential to the fulfillment of any plan for world peace that is workable and effective. Without any one of them the project becomes dubious.

Certainly European security cannot rest on a foundation that does not bring Russia into agreement with the other powers. Anglo-American understanding is basic and inherent in any plan that can work and endure. Yet certainly the American public would seriously question the encouragement of a project to insure the security of Europe if Great Britain were its only other partner, and would object upon grounds that are too familiar to be recited in this well-informed body.

In my judgment, the approach to the world organization should have as its first step a four-power pact between the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. It should be a simple document but comprehensive enough to give expression to the public will of this country, which seeks organized protective measures on a world basis. There should then be an effort to promote at the earliest moment a world organization upon lines not inconsistent with the proposed pact.

I am not one of those who believes that a mere declaration of American sentiment would be adequate. I should prefer a fundamental approach to the question of firm agreement among these four nations, urgently presented to the Senate for ratification, with the hope that it may be removed from political controversy in the year to come. The weakness in our position before the world today lies in the fact that other nations do not know whether we will make such an agreement or participate in a world organization. Our failure to enter the League leaves a reasonable doubt as to our sincerity now. To promote the world organization, therefore, some positive step must be taken now to assure the world of our adherence.

We have often referred to the greater prospects of gaining American adherence while the war is in progress, rather than to postpone all definitive action until the war is over. Of this there can be no doubt.

Concluding then, it would seem to me undesirable for this country to associate itself in a local organization that has as its objective the maintenance of peace in a particular zone; that its objective should be to promote, either through reorganization of the League of Nations or through other means, a strong universal organization through which the eligible states could effectively maintain peace; and that the approach to such a world organization should be through a four-power

pact, entered into promptly and openly, and having behind it the constitutional authority of our Government.

MYRON TAYLOR

Roosevelt Papers

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith the papers which you requested at the meeting in your office yesterday.<sup>2</sup>

These papers comprise the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol and the original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol. The abbreviated and revised draft of the latter protocol which you requested is not yet completed and I am consequently sending you the original version. During the next few days the shortened and revised form which you desire will be sent to you at Hyde Park.<sup>3</sup>

There are also attached a memorandum prepared for you which gives you the history of the recent British proposal and our analysis of it; the telegram which contains the text of the British proposal, and also the drafts sent to you by Mr. Churchill which you gave us yesterday for our information.

Owing to Secretary Hull's absence today, the redraft of the Four-Power Protocol has not been submitted to him but I understand from

<sup>1</sup> A chronology by Pasvolsky entitled "Indications of Contact With President on Post-War Matters" contains the following information under the date of August 11 concerning Welles' memorandum of that date to the President:

"We worked intensively today to complete, a few minutes after five o'clock, the preparation of the papers which the President will use in the top-flight discussions with Winston Churchill this weekend. It came out in the course of the drafting that the President dislikes the concept of maximum and minimum levels of armament to be maintained. The Four Power Declaration was discussed in the Security Committee, with Davis insisting that it should take the form of an agreement, but on this he was overridden.

"Welles similarly prefers agreement as the form the document should take, and his suggestion was the impossible one of calling it an agreement and having it take the form of a declaration.

"Welles is Acting Secretary, from eleven o'clock today, and is taking the position that he and not Pasvolsky will transmit the memorandum to the President. And furthermore, he opposes the statements in the memorandum [see enclosure 3, below] which object to regional structure and organization, and consequently he is insisting and is carrying through the sending to the President of the full draft as worked out by him and his committee of the United Nations protocol which embodies the whole regional principle. Since he could not override the memorandum, he chose to write a letter to the President in transmitting the memorandum, in which he himself upholds the regional principle.

"Welles delivered the material to the President that evening and promised him that the UN Protocol would be reduced to propositions and submitted to him." (Lot 60 D 224)

Concerning the committees referred to, see Notter, pp. 108-114, 124-131.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 681.

<sup>3</sup> See *post*, p. 706. Welles had already given Roosevelt a copy of the "original form of the suggested United Nations Protocol" (enclosure 2, below) on or shortly before June 19, 1943.

Dr. Pasvolsky that the present draft is in accordance with the Secretary's ideas.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure 1]

*Draft Declaration*<sup>4</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

TENTATIVE DRAFT OF A JOINT FOUR-POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy, and to any occupation of enemy territory and of territory of other states held by that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their present enemies.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations, and open to membership by all nations, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 522-523.

6. That, in connection with the foregoing purpose, they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

7. That they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

8. That they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

[Enclosure 2]

*Draft Protocol*

SECRET

UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL FOR THE WAR AND TRANSITION PERIOD

THE UNITED NATIONS:

dedicated to the advancement of the general welfare of mankind;  
desiring to give immediate and practical effect to the principles proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter;

seeking to obtain the continuing benefits of economic and social cooperation;

determined to ensure their common security, and to attain the progressive lightening of the burden of armament; and

resolved to achieve these purposes through a development of the international organizations of a universal and regional character required for their fulfillment;

have agreed as follows:

*Article 1*

The signatory states agree that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war until the unconditional surrender of the enemy states, shall be continued for the organization and maintenance of the peace.

*Article 2*

The United Nations and the nations presently associated with them agree that a permanent international organization shall be established for the maintenance of peace and the advancement of human welfare. They agree to expedite the creation of this organization. Pending its inauguration, they hereby establish a Provisional United Nations Council to be representative of all states parties to the Declaration by the United Nations, at Washington, January 1, 1942, and of the nations presently associated with them. The member states agree

to cooperate in carrying out the measures determined upon by the Council until permanent world peace is established.<sup>5</sup>

*Article 3*

The Provisional United Nations Council shall be composed of eleven members, including one designated by the United States of America, one by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, one by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by China, two by the group of European states, two by the group of American states, one by the group of Far Eastern states, one by the group of states of the Near and Middle East and of Africa, and one by the British Dominions, as these groups are defined in the first Annex to this Protocol.

*Article 4*

The members representing each group of states as represented in the Council shall be elected for one year by the group, in conference, from a panel consisting of nominees designated by the states comprising the group. Each state may designate three nominees who may be chosen from among nationals of any of the states of the group of which it is a part.

*Article 5*

Members of the Provisional United Nations Council shall represent the general interest of the region from which they are designated rather than the particular interests of the states of which they are nationals. They shall in all circumstances take into account the general interest of the whole community of states. In thus discharging their duties, they shall remain in close consultation with the governments of the several states in the regions from which they are designated, and they shall faithfully present to the Council the views of those governments.

*Article 6*

The Provisional United Nations Council shall formulate and recommend to the United Nations the plan for the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. Pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, and effective as to any particular region from the date upon which the military authorities therein determine, the Provisional Council shall assume in that region responsibility for the maintenance of international security and shall provide procedures for the pacific settlement of any disputes threatening the peace.

*Article 7*

The Provisional United Nations Council shall establish a Security and Armaments Commission and an Armaments Inspection Commis-

<sup>5</sup> The last six words are a manuscript addition by Roosevelt.

sion whose composition, powers, and functions shall be as stated in the second Annex to this Protocol.

*Article 8*

An effective procedure for the general limitation of armaments shall be instituted by the Council, assisted by the Security and Armaments Commission, as soon as practicable, in order to determine the maximum and minimum levels of armaments to be maintained by all states for the preservation of internal order and the discharge of their respective responsibilities for general security.

*Article 9*

The Provisional United Nations Council may utilize and establish such technical committees, services, and secretariats as may be required for carrying out the purposes of this Protocol. The Council shall appoint an individual of recognized standing to act as Chairman, without voting power, and to serve as Executive Director of such provisional international administrative organization as may be established. The Chairman of the Council may appoint, subject to confirmation by the Council, such administrative and other officers as may be required.

*Article 10*

The expenses of the Provisional United Nations Council and of any administrative or secretarial staffs which it may create shall be shared by the members in proportions to be determined by the Council.

*Article 11*

The Provisional United Nations Council shall meet in ordinary session at such times and places as it may determine. It may be convened in special session upon the call of the Chairman or of any member of the Council, or upon the initiative of any state party to this Protocol. The Council shall establish its own rules of procedure. Decisions shall be by two-thirds vote of the members present, including all of the members designated by individual states, except in instances when any one of these members, in advance of the voting, declares an intention to abstain from voting.

*Article 12*

This Protocol shall remain in force until superseded by the inauguration of the permanent international organization envisaged in Article 2. It may be amended by a decision of the Council proposing to the signatory states such amendments as it may consider desirable, which shall become effective when the ratifications of two-thirds of the signatory states have been received.

*Article 13*

This Protocol shall come into effect when it shall have been ratified by 20 states members of the United Nations, including the United

States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China. It shall remain open for adherence by other sovereign and independent states, not original signatories, subject to approval by the Council.

[Annex 1 to Enclosure 2]

REPRESENTATION ON THE PROVISIONAL UNITED NATIONS COUNCIL

Representatives on the Provisional United Nations Council shall be designated by the following states and groups of states:

United States of America, 1 representative  
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1 representative  
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1 representative  
 China, 1 representative

*European States*

2 representatives  
 Belgium  
 Czechoslovakia  
 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
 Greece  
 \*Iceland  
 Luxembourg  
 Netherlands  
 Norway  
 Poland  
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
 Yugoslavia

*Far Eastern States*

1 representative  
 China  
 Philippines

*Near and Middle Eastern States and African States*

1 representative  
 \*Egypt  
 Ethiopia  
 \*Iran  
 Iraq  
 \*Liberia

*American States*

2 representatives  
 United States of America  
 Bolivia  
 Brazil  
 \*Chile  
 \*Colombia  
 Costa Rica  
 Cuba  
 Dominican Republic  
 \*Ecuador  
 El Salvador  
 Guatemala  
 Haiti  
 Honduras  
 Mexico  
 Nicaragua  
 Panama  
 \*Paraguay  
 \*Peru  
 \*Uruguay  
 \*Venezuela

*British Dominions*

1 representative  
 Australia  
 Canada  
 [India] <sup>6</sup>  
 New Zealand  
 Union of South Africa

\*States marked with an asterisk are associated nations. [Footnote in the source text.]

<sup>6</sup> Brackets in the source text.

[Annex 2 to Enclosure 2]

## TECHNICAL SECURITY AND ARMAMENTS COMMISSIONS

*Article 1*

The Security and Armaments Commission, to be established by the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and groups of states represented on the Council. Additional representatives may be designated by the Council. Each member of the Commission may be accompanied by alternates and experts. The Commission may set up a panel of special experts, and may appoint committees whose number, composition, and functions shall be subject to approval by the Council.

*Article 2*

The Security and Armaments Commission shall be charged with the following duties: (a) to recommend to the Council plans and procedures for the general limitation of armaments as provided in Article 8 of the present Protocol; (b) to supervise the execution of all armaments stipulations, including control over manufacture and trade in arms, which may be adopted in pursuance of the present Protocol, or required of the enemy states by the terms of surrender, and report regularly to the Council; (c) to propose to the Council any modifications and amendments it may deem desirable or necessary to make in armaments limitation agreements, or in armaments terms imposed upon the enemy states; (d) to advise and assist the Council in any emergency in the application of security measures; and (e) to discharge such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Council.

*Article 3*

The Armaments Inspection Commission, to be established by the Provisional United Nations Council in accordance with Article 7 of the present Protocol, shall be composed of military, naval, aviation, and other technical experts, a majority of the total number of whom shall be nationals of states other than those possessing individual representation on the Council. The Members of the Commission shall be chosen by the Council upon nomination by the Security and Armaments Commission.

*Article 4*

The Armaments Inspection Commission shall act under the direct authority of the Security and Armaments Commission. It shall regularly report to the Security and Armaments Commission on the armaments and armaments potential of all states, and shall be charged with the duty of inspecting the armaments and armaments potential of

the former enemy states, and of other states in accordance with the agreements envisaged in Article 8 of the present Protocol.

[Enclosure 3]

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant  
(Pasvolsky)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. On July 16, 1943, Mr. Eden communicated to our Ambassador in London,<sup>7</sup> for transmission to the Secretary of State, an *Aide-Mémoire*, the text of which is attached, on "Suggested Principles which Would Govern the Conclusion of Hostilities with the European Members of the Axis." The British proposal envisages the creation of an Inter-Allied Armistice Commission or an Inter-Allied Control Commission for each enemy country. It further envisages (paragraph 9) the creation of a supervisory body called "United Nations Commission for Europe", to be situated at some point of [on?] the Continent, and to be composed of "high ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, U.S.S.R., France and other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe."

This Commission would be the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe. It would "direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief, and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established." It would also "deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order." It would have a "Steering Committee", composed of representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of France, "if she should recover her greatness." The Steering Committee would be the directing body of the Commission, and would operate under the unanimity rule.

In paragraph 10 of the British *Aide-Mémoire* it is further proposed that various civilian authorities, whether set up on a world or on a European basis, should, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, and should be responsible to the Commission. The activities indicated include relief and rehabilitation, refugees, shipping, inland transportation, telecommunications, propaganda, reparation, restitution, and other economic problems.

<sup>7</sup> John G. Winant.

2. The British proposal has been studied in the Department of State and by the Subcommittee on Security of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. The general comment of the Subcommittee on Security is as follows:

The Subcommittee agrees fully with the view expressed in the *Aide-Mémoire* to the effect that inter-allied agencies must be set up to supervise the execution of surrender terms by the defeated states, and to deal with problems relating to the rehabilitation of enemy and enemy-occupied territories during the first after-war period. Nonetheless, the Subcommittee questions the desirability of attempting to combine these agencies and functions with those which are general, i.e., world-wide or European in scope, and long-term in character. It is the feeling of the Subcommittee that the decision to create an agency, which would be essentially a kind of super-government for Europe, should be made exclusively on its own merits, and should not be confused with the making of necessary arrangements with respect to the enemy states. It is felt that the political reaction in this country would be unfavorable if the United States were to take such a major step involving general and long-run commitments, under the guise of making a settlement with the enemy. These policy issues should be determined separately.

3. The British *Aide-Mémoire* raises again the whole issue of regionalism in connection with international organization. That question has been raised several times by Mr. Churchill. His ideas are clearly expressed in the two documents addressed to the President, which are attached to this memorandum.<sup>8</sup> The general thought seems to be that international relations should be basically organized on a regional basis, in the form of three regional Councils—for Europe, for the Western Hemisphere, and for the Far East. There would also be a World Council as a superstructure.

This question has been the subject of much study and discussion in the Department and in its various committees. The committee discussions have so far pointed to the following conclusions: (1) that the basis of international organization should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that there are grave dangers involved in having the world organization rest upon the foundation of previously created, full-fledged regional organizations; and (3) that while there may be advantages in setting up regional arrangements for some purposes, such arrangements should be subsidiary to the world organization and should flow from it.

This points to the desirability of creating a general United Nations agency, operating on functional basis, and—when advisable—having

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<sup>8</sup> For the first document referred to, see subenclosure 2, below, and the annex thereto. The second document (not printed here) was a letter of May 28, 1943, from Halifax to Roosevelt, enclosing a memorandum of Churchill's discussion of May 22, 1943, with Vice President Henry A. Wallace and others. For the text of this memorandum, see *ante*, p. 167.

some subsidiary regional structures. Such an agency could well be set up on a provisional basis during the war to perform concrete tasks involved in the transition from war to peace and to prepare the way for the establishment of a permanent world organization.

4. It is our thought that the first procedural step should be by way of securing agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China on the issuance by them of a joint declaration or parallel identic declarations containing their basic intentions and constituting a pledge on their part to act jointly for certain specified purposes. Such a declaration or declarations should be in the nature of an extension of the pledges undertaken by the four major powers in the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942. There is attached hereto a tentative draft of a joint declaration.<sup>9</sup>

5. It is our further thought that the four-power declaration should be followed, as rapidly as possible, by the negotiation of a United Nations protocol and the setting up, under it, of the necessary provisional machinery for the performance of various tasks as they present themselves in point of time. A statement of the possible provisions of such a protocol will be ready in a few days.<sup>10</sup>

[Subenclosure 1—Telegram]

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 16, 1943.

4626. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

When Mr. Eden gave me the following *Aide-Mémoire* he explained to me that although it had been considered by the War Cabinet, it was not intended to represent a fixed program but rather a document for consideration. It is the result of study and a realization that there is danger of over-simplification of the problems involved. They would much appreciate our comments and reactions.

“AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Suggested Principles Which Would Govern The Conclusion Of Hostilities With the European Members Of The Axis

1. The terms to be imposed on any European member of the Axis should be presented as one comprehensive document covering all the United Nations at war with that member, and embodying the principle of unconditional surrender.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 692.

<sup>10</sup> This memorandum was transmitted to Roosevelt unsigned. See *ante*, p. 691, fn. 1.

2. If there exists a central enemy Government with which we are prepared to treat, a fully accredited representative of that Government should be associated with its Commander-in-Chief for purposes of signature; or alternatively the Armistice should not come into force until confirmed by that Government.

3. If there is no such Government the Armistice should be signed by the enemy Commander-in-Chief only. In that case provisions which the enemy Commander-in-Chief lacks authority to execute would have to be omitted from the Armistice, which would thus be primarily a military document. Non-military provisions should so far as necessary be embodied in a Declaration or Proclamation issued by the United Nations.

4. If there is neither an enemy Government nor Commander-in-Chief with whom we can or are prepared to treat, military resistance would presumably be brought to an end by a series of local capitulations. It would, however, probably be desirable that the United Nations should issue a declaration stating their intentions in respect of the defeated power. This would be followed by a series of proclamations issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief containing instructions to the local authorities and population.

5. The administration of any armistice should be placed in the hands of an inter-Allied Armistice Commission, the President to be alternately a representative of the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. The Commission would establish its headquarters in the Axis country concerned, and would be responsible for controlling the execution of the Armistice terms; in the first place, the disarmament and demobilization of enemy armed forces, the collection and disposal of surrendered war material and other mobile property and the handing over of fortifications and other fixed property. Representatives of the Armistice Commission would be dispatched to liberated Allied territory to perform a similar task in respect of the enemy troops there located and to regulate their evacuation or internment.

6. In the absence of an Armistice (see Paragraph 4) a Control Commission should administer the appropriate portions of the Declaration.

7. Any Armistice or Declaration would presumably provide for occupation, whether total or partial, of the countries concerned. In the case of Germany the exact method of organizing such an occupation should be the subject of technical discussions between the military advisers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. in the first instance.

8. The United Nations Commander-in-Chief in any occupied country should have complete responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

9. There should be established a supervisory body entitled 'United Nations Commission for Europe,' composed of high ranking *political* representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., of France and the other minor European Allies, and, if so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the policing of Europe. The Commission should be situated at some convenient point on the Continent.

The Commission would act as the Supreme United Nations authority in Europe to direct and coordinate the activities of the several Armistice Commissions, the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and any United Nations civilian authorities that may be established; and to deal with current problems, military, political and economic, connected with the maintenance of order.

A 'Steering Committee', consisting of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the U.S.S.R., and of France, if she recovers her greatness, should be established as the directing body of the Commission. In the 'Steering Committee' the unanimity rule should apply.

10. It is likely that a number of civilian authorities will be set up by agreement between the United Nations, some on a world and others on a European basis. Apart from the United Nations relief and rehabilitation administration and the Inter-Governmental Committee which may emerge from the Bermuda Conference,<sup>11</sup> the establishment of a United Nations Shipping Authority and a United Nations Inland Transport Authority for Europe have been suggested. Analogous bodies may well be required to control telecommunications and propaganda, and to handle reparation and restitution and other economic problems. These authorities might, in respect of their European activities, establish their headquarters in the same city as the United Nations Commission for Europe, to whom they would be responsible and provide the necessary technical advice.

Foreign Office. 14th July 1943."

WINANT

[Subenclosure 2]

*The British Ambassador (Halifax) to President Roosevelt*

MOST SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 2nd, 1943.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I enclose the further message from the Prime Minister<sup>12</sup> which I mentioned in my earlier letter today.

I also enclose a copy of a personal message to you from Mr. Eden, which has just come in.<sup>13</sup>

Believe me [etc.]

HALIFAX

[Annex to Subenclosure 2]

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*

MOST SECRET

MORNING THOUGHTS

NOTE ON POST-WAR SECURITY

When United Nations led by three Great Powers, Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. have received unconditional surrender of

<sup>11</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 134 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Concerning the origin of this message, see *ibid.*, p. 1051.

<sup>13</sup> Halifax's "earlier letter" and Eden's message were not included in the file of papers enclosed with Welles' memorandum to Roosevelt of August 11, 1943.

Germany and Italy, Great Britain and United States will turn their full force against Japan in order to punish effectively that greedy and ambitious nation for its treacherous assaults and outrages and to procure likewise from Japan unconditional surrender.

2. In this, although no treaty arrangement has been made, it seems probable that Great Britain and United States will be joined by Russia.

3. The peace conference of the victorious powers will probably assemble in Europe while final stages of war against Japan are still in progress. At this conference the defeated aggressor countries will receive directions of victors. Object of these directions will be to prevent as effectively as possible renewal of acts of aggression of the kinds which have caused these two terrible wars in Europe in one generation. For this purpose and so far as possible total disarmament of guilty nations will be enforced. On the other hand no attempt will be made to destroy their peoples or to prevent them gaining their living and leading a decent life in spite of all the crimes they have committed.

4. It is recognized that it is not possible to make the vanquished pay for war as was tried last time, and consequently task of rebuilding ruined and starving Europe will demand from conquerors a period of exertion scarcely less severe than that of the war. Russia particularly which has suffered such a horrible devastation will be aided in every possible way in her work of restoring the economic life of her people. It seems probable that economic reconstruction and rehabilitation will occupy full energies of all countries for a good many years in view of their previous experiences and lessons they have learned.

5. Russia has signed a treaty with Great Britain<sup>14</sup> on basis of Atlantic Charter<sup>15</sup> binding both nations mutually to aid each other. The duration of this treaty is twenty years. By it and by Atlantic Charter the two nations renounce all idea of territorial gains. Russians no doubt interpret this as giving them right to claim, subject to their agreement with Poland, their frontier of June 1941 before they were attacked by Germany.

6. It is the intention of chiefs of the United Nations to create a world organisation for the preservation of peace based upon the conceptions of freedom and justice and the revival of prosperity. As a part of this organisation an instrument of European Government will be established which will embody the spirit but not be subject to the weakness of former League of Nations. The units forming this body

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<sup>14</sup> For the text of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance signed at London, May 26, 1942, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 1038.

<sup>15</sup> Released by Roosevelt and Churchill, August 14, 1941. For text see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 236; 55 Stat. (2) 1603; *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 368-369.

will not only be the great nations of Europe and Asia Minor only. Need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a Balkan bloc appear to be obvious. A similar instrument will be formed in the Far East with different membership and the whole will be held together by the fact that victorious powers as yet continue fully armed, especially in the air, while imposing complete disarmament upon the guilty. None can predict with certainty that the victors will never quarrel amongst themselves, or that the United States may not once again retire from Europe, but after the experiences which all have gone through, and their sufferings and the certainty that a third struggle will destroy all that is left of culture, wealth and civilization of mankind and reduce us to the level almost of wild beasts, the most intense effort will be made by the leading Powers to prolong their honourable association and by sacrifice and self-restraint to win for themselves a glorious name in human annals. Great Britain will certainly do her utmost to organize a coalition of resistance to any act of aggression committed by any power; it is believed that the United States will cooperate with her and even possibly take the lead of the world, on account of her numbers and strength, in the good work of preventing such tendencies to aggression before they break into open war.

7. The highest security for Turkey in post-war world will be found by her taking her place as a victorious belligerent and ally at the side of Great Britain, the United States and Russia. In this way a start will be made in all friendliness and confidence, and a new instrument will grow around the goodwill and comradeship of those who have been in the field together, with powerful armies.

8. Turkey may be drawn into war either by being attacked in the despairing convulsions of a still very powerful Nazi power, or because her interests require her to intervene to help prevent total anarchy in the Balkans, and also because the sentiments of modern Turkey are in harmony with the large and generous conceptions embodied in the Atlantic Charter, which are going to be fought for and defended by new generations of men.

9. We must therefore consider the case of Turkey becoming a belligerent. The military and technical side is under examination by Marshal Chakmak, Generals Brooke, Alexander, Wilson and other high technical authorities. The political aspect is no less important. It would be wrong for Turkey to enter the war unless herself attacked, if that only led her to a disaster, and her ally Britain has never asked and will never ask her to do so under such conditions. On the other hand if the general offensive strength of Turkey is raised by the measures now being taken, and also by the increasing weakness of Nazi Germany, or by their withdrawal to a greater distance, or by the great divisions

taking place in Bulgaria, or by the bitter quarrel between the Rumanians and the Hungarians over Transylvania, or through the internal resistance to German and Italian tyranny shewn by Yugoslavia and Greece: for any or all of these reasons and causes, Turkey should play a part and win her place in the council of victors.

10. In the first instance it is possible that the military situation might be such that Turkey would feel justified in taking the same extended view of neutrality or non-belligerency as characterized the attitude of the United States of America towards Great Britain before the United States of America was drawn into the war. In this connexion the destruction of Rumanian oilfields by air attacks by British and American aircraft operating from Turkish airfields, or re-fuelling there, would have far-reaching consequences and might in view of the oil scarcity in Germany appreciably shorten the struggle. In the same way also the availability of air bases or refuelling points in Turkey would be of great assistance to Great Britain in her necessary attack on the Dodecanese, and later upon Crete, for which in any case, whether we get help or not, General Wilson has been directed to prepare during the present year. There is also the immensely important question of opening the Straits to Allied and then closing [them] to Axis traffic. The case contemplated in this paragraph is one in which Turkey would have departed from strictly impartial neutrality and definitely have taken sides with the United Nations without however engaging her armies offensively against Germany or Bulgaria; and those nations would put up with this action on the part of Turkey because they would not wish to excite her to more active hostility.

11. However, we cannot survey this field without facing the possibility of Turkey becoming a full belligerent and of her armies advancing into the Balkans side by side with the Russians on the one hand in the north and the British to the southward. In the event of Turkey becoming thus directly involved either offensively or through being attacked in consequence of her attitude, she would receive the utmost aid from all her allies and in addition it would be right for her before incurring additional risks to seek precise guarantees as to her territorial rights after the war. Great Britain would be willing to give these guarantees in a treaty at any time quite independently of any other power. She is also willing to join with Russia in giving such guarantees and it is believed that Russia would be willing to make a treaty to cover the case of Turkey becoming a full belligerent either independently or in conjunction with Great Britain. It seems certain to Mr. Churchill that President Roosevelt would gladly associate himself with such treaties and that the whole weight of the United States would be used in peace settlement to that end. At the same time one

must not ignore the difficulties which United States Constitution interposes against prolonged European commitments. These treaties and assurances would naturally fall within the ambit of the world-instrument to protect all countries from wrong-doing which it is our main intention and inflexible resolve to create, should God give us the power and lay this high duty upon us.

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*The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pasvolksy) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: International Organization

Attached to this memorandum are additional copies of each of the following papers on the subject of international organization, the first three of which have been sent to the President :

1. Memorandum for the President, dated August 11,<sup>1</sup> which I prepared as a result of the meeting at the White House on August 10.
2. Document, dated August 11, entitled, "Tentative Draft of a Four-Power Declaration."<sup>2</sup>
3. Document, dated August 14, entitled, "Tentative Draft of Propositions for a United Nations Protocol for the War and Transition Periods."
4. My memorandum to you, dated August 9, entitled, "International Activities in which the United States Must Participate to Re-establish and Maintain Peace and to Promote General Welfare."

L[EO] P[ASVOLSKY]

[Enclosure 3]

*Draft Heads for a United Nations Protocol*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1943.

TENTATIVE DRAFT OF PROPOSITIONS FOR A UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL  
FOR THE WAR AND TRANSITION PERIODS

The purpose of the proposed protocol is to establish in the immediate future a Provisional Organization of the United Nations for functions other than those appertaining to the military conduct of the war which need to be performed during the war and the transition periods.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 698.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 692.

A. These functions would be:

1. To formulate requirements to be imposed in connection with surrender and to provide for United Nations representation in their administration.

2. To provide for United Nations representation in activities connected with occupation of enemy territories and assistance in administration of liberated areas.

3. To provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in any area in which the United Nations military authorities consider military control no longer necessary.

4. To coordinate the activities of existing *ad hoc* international agencies and such further agencies as the United Nations may decide to place within the field of competence of the provisional organization.

5. To formulate and recommend to the United Nations a plan for a permanent international organization for the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of general welfare.

6. To institute procedures to assure as soon as practicable a general system of regulation of armaments.

B. The necessary general authority for the Provisional Organization would be vested in the organization by the ratification of the protocol by the specified number of signatories. It should expressly be provided that:

1. Signatory states would cooperate in carrying out the measures determined upon by the Organization.

2. Certain decisions (including amendments to the protocol) should be subject to approval by the signatories.

3. Adherence to the protocol by states not original signatories should be made possible.

C. Instrumentalities which the Provisional Organization would appear to require initially would include:

1. A Provisional Council of the United Nations, representative of all states parties to the Declaration by United Nations at Washington, January 1, 1942, and of the nations associated with them.

2. A Commission to coordinate the execution of surrender requirements imposed on enemy states in Europe.

3. A Commission to coordinate the execution of surrender requirements imposed on the enemy states in the Far East.

4. A Security and Armaments Commission, composed of military, naval, aviation, and civil representatives of the states represented on the Council, and of other states designated by the Council, to be charged (a) with advising and assisting the Council in regard to security measures; (b) with proposing any modifications and amendments in the terms imposed upon enemy states; (c) with supervising

the execution of armament stipulations required of the enemy states or adopted by the Council; (*d*) with making recommendations for the general regulation of armaments; and (*e*) with carrying out armament inspections and such other responsibilities as may be required by the Council and any agreements concluded in the future under the provisions of the protocol.

5. Such coordinative and administrative machinery as the Council may deem necessary.

D. The Provisional Council should be composed of members designated one each by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China, together with not less than three nor more than seven members chosen by other states among the United Nations.

The selection of members of the Provisional Council other than those designated by the four major powers might be on the basis of one of the following two principles:

*a.* Each of several regional groups of countries might be asked to select one or two outstanding individuals, without regard to nationality, to be the spokesmen for their respective groups of countries. For example, the countries of Europe and the American Republics might, as groups, have two representatives each, while the countries of the Far East, of Near and Middle East and Africa, and the British Dominions might, again as groups, have one representative each.

*b.* By a process of negotiation among the United Nations, three to seven countries might be selected with due regard to their geographic distribution for individual representation on the Provisional Council for the duration of the war, with the understanding that, in connection with the permanent organization or even during the transitional period, there will be worked out by the Council, for submission to all signatories of the protocol, a regular procedure for the selection of representatives on the Council of other than the four major countries.

Decisions of the Provisional Council should be by a two-thirds majority vote of the members present, with the majority including the votes of the representatives of all of the four major countries, unless one of these, in advance of voting, declares its intention to abstain from voting.

E. The four major countries should take joint initiative in inviting the other United Nations to sign the protocol, which would become effective upon ratification by a specified number of countries. A general conference of the United Nations for formal signature of the protocol might be desirable. The convocation of further general conferences might be left to decision by the Provisional Council.

[Enclosure 4]

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State's Special Assistant  
(Pasvolsky)*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 9, 1943.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES MUST PARTICIPATE TO RE-ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN PEACE AND TO PROMOTE GENERAL WELFARE

This memorandum deals with the following subjects:

- A. Problems of machinery and procedure in connection with international activities involved in transition from war to peace.
- B. Problems of machinery and procedure in connection with international activities involved in future maintenance of peace and promotion of general welfare.
- C. Relation between short-run and long-run activities.
- D. Some crucial problems of organization and negotiation.

A. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN TRANSITION FROM WAR TO PEACE

Apart from the conduct of the war, there are the following international activities in which the United States must, of necessity, participate with some or all of the United Nations during and immediately after the war by way of preparation and action:

I. Determination of requirements to be imposed on the enemy nations in connection with their unconditional surrender.

II. Occupation of enemy countries pending the establishment there of stable governments; including supervision over the carrying out of surrender and other requirements, aid in the re-establishment of economic life, and the creation of new governments based on the expression of popular will.

III. Punishment of war criminals.

IV. Determination of territorial adjustments with respect to enemy nations.

V. Formulation of restitution, reparation, and property rights demands to be made on the enemy nations.

VI. Operations in liberated areas pending re-establishment there of stable governments; including aid in the re-establishment of economic life and the creation of conditions for the expression of popular will as to the system and composition of government.

VII. Provision of relief.

## VIII. Handling of displaced populations.

Depending on circumstances, some of which cannot now be foreseen, the United States may or may not wish to participate directly in, but cannot remain disinterested with respect to,

IX. Determination of frontier adjustments between some of the United Nations themselves, and

X. Formation of regional or other groupings among some United Nations, with or without the inclusion in some cases of neutrals and of enemy countries.

The carrying on of each of the activities above enumerated is clearly a function that must be performed under some form of international arrangement. Appropriate machinery will be needed for each, and most of this machinery must be created during the war.

Specifically, agreement as to both policy and action is necessary as quickly as possible with respect to surrender requirements; punishment of war criminals; occupation of enemy countries; operations in liberated areas; relief; handling of refugees and other displaced populations; and, if possible, restitution, reparation and property rights demands. It will unquestionably be desirable also to secure early agreement with regard to enemy territorial adjustments, in order that provisions with respect to them may, if possible, be included in the surrender terms or in early declarations of occupying authorities. At the same time, there has been already demand, which may grow in insistence, for early agreement as regards frontier adjustments between Soviet Russia and her western neighbors, and as regards certain regional and other groupings.

So far, steps have been taken toward seeking agreement with respect to determination of policy and creation of machinery only as regards punishment of war criminals, relief, and the handling of refugees and other displaced populations. Recently, the British Government has placed before us a set of proposals for the creation of machinery to deal with the formulation of surrender requirements, for supervision over the carrying out of such requirements, and for arrangements for the occupation of enemy countries.<sup>3</sup> A significant feature of the British plan is that the proposed machinery would be operative in Europe only. An even more significant feature of the plan is that the arrangement would also embrace, within the framework of the same machinery, a number of other functions, of both short-term and long-term character, with respect to Europe as a whole—for example, relief, refugees, inland transportation, power, etc.

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 700.

The British proposal brings to a head the need for the following basic decisions:

1. Should we insist on the continuation of the present procedure of creating, as we go along, *ad hoc* machinery for each particular short-run function and of leaving for the future the question of whether or not the separate pieces of machinery should be coordinated? Or should we press now toward the creation of some over-all United Nations agency to deal, through appropriate component pieces of machinery, with all or most of the various functions involved?

2. Whichever course we select, should we agree that there should be a separate agency, or set of agencies, for Europe and presumably another for the Far East? Or should we insist that European operations and Far Eastern operations should be component parts of one general United Nations arrangement?

#### B. INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES INVOLVED IN FUTURE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND PROMOTION OF GENERAL WELFARE

Beyond these fields of immediate or transitional action, there are international activities involved in the maintenance of peace and the promotion of general welfare on a more permanent basis, in which the United States would have to participate if we decide to become a full-fledged partner in a system of organized and institutionalized arrangements for these purposes. They are as follows:

I. Creation and maintenance of machinery for political settlement of international disputes and for promotion of good understanding between nations.

II. Creation and maintenance of machinery for judicial settlement of international disputes.

III. Creation and maintenance of machinery for enforcement of international decisions and for repression of threats to, or violations of, peace.

IV. Creation and maintenance of machinery for the regulation of armaments.

V. Creation and maintenance of machinery for administration of, or supervision over, certain dependent areas and, possibly, security points.

VI. Creation and maintenance of machinery for promotion by international action of economic and social welfare.

VII. Creation and maintenance of machinery for promotion of observance of certain basic human rights.

It is assumed that mutual financial obligations and other questions between the United States and individual United Nations, arising out of the war, will be settled by direct negotiations.

The carrying on of each of the international activities above enumerated is also clearly a function that must be performed under some form of international arrangement—in this case, on a more permanent basis. In connection with some of these long-range activities—particularly in the economic and financial fields and in the treatment of dependent areas—at least partial machinery will need to become operative as soon as possible after the termination of hostilities. In connection with others, at least general agreements and preparatory arrangements will be highly desirable before the end of the war—partly in order that adequate guidance be provided for political and economic transitional activities, especially under military government.

In this regard, our procedure so far has also been on an *ad hoc* basis. Steps have so far been taken only with respect to two aspects of the machinery for promotion by international action of economic and social welfare—namely, food and agriculture, and monetary stabilization. There is pressing need for action with respect to numerous other problems, each of which is going to raise, more and more insistently, the question already raised in connection with the first two steps—namely, whether the agencies thus separately created will operate as independent entities or whether they will become component parts of a comprehensive international organization.

Here again, therefore, there is rapidly being brought to a head the need for the following decision:

Should the initial steps toward creating machinery for long-range international activities continue to be taken on an *ad hoc* basis? Or should there be created now a coordinated basis for activities in this direction?

### C. RELATION BETWEEN SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN ACTIVITIES

It is clear that there is bound to be much parallel development, as well as much overlapping, as between short-run and long-run activities, which may tend to become crystallized in two types of machinery, whether on an *ad hoc* or a coordinated basis. Hence, there is pressing need for the following fundamental decision:

Should consultations and negotiations among the United Nations with respect to long-range post-war policies, whether they are carried on on an *ad hoc* or on a coordinated basis, be divorced from whatever arrangements may be created for immediate and transitional action? Or should there be created now an even more comprehensive United Nations agency than the one referred to above—an agency which would be sufficiently flexible to carry out the special functions of bringing about a transition from war to peace, and, at the same time, to build up gradually effective machinery for a permanent international organization?

Discussion so far has pointed emphatically to the desirability of a vigorous attempt to create a comprehensive and flexible agency of the type referred to immediately above. As the war draws to a close, there will be increasing danger that the ties of association among the United Nations will loosen. It would seem to be of the utmost importance, if possible, to keep the United Nations working together on a broad basis of dealing jointly and cooperatively with post-war tasks as they present themselves in point of time. There are indications that this danger is not likely to be dispelled by the method of dealing with individual functions separately. There is accumulating evidence of a feeling of uneasiness on the part of both large and small nations over the manner in which the relief, food, and monetary problems have been handled—especially on the score of our single-handed initiative and dominant position. While the *ad hoc* approach on a single-nation initiative has many advantages, we now know that the three other large countries and at least some of the smaller ones, including some of the Latin American countries, feel that they should participate effectively in decisions leading up to the launching of any particular set of negotiations or conferences. Even if we were to agree to such procedural consultations on separate problems, the process is likely to become increasingly difficult and cumbersome as the number of problems taken up multiplies. On the other hand, a continuation by us of single-handed initiative may well lead to a competition in initiative on the part of Britain and possibly other countries.

This line of reasoning is strengthened greatly by what appears to be the emerging attitude of Soviet Russia. It may well be that, in the end, Moscow may decide in favor of very limited participation in world affairs and of correspondingly limited commitments. The sooner and the more fully we test out Moscow's intentions, the clearer will be our own tasks, as well as the possibilities open to us. Affording Moscow an opportunity to participate fully at all stages of preparation and action will provide an excellent test of this sort. This may well be an important element in inducing Moscow to accept extended participation. On the other hand, if it should happen that Moscow will be reluctant to participate in a comprehensive procedure, the need for creating a closely knit agency of cooperation among the other United Nations will become even more emphatic.

The procedure here outlined would also be, for other countries, a test of our intentions.

From the domestic point of view, the continuation of an *ad hoc* procedure has already led to some confusion as to our ultimate objectives. It may increasingly do so. The adoption of a coordinated pro-

cedure may serve to clarify this situation and help focus public opinion on the central issue of our participation in an effective international organization. The securing of widespread public support for the creation now of a comprehensive international agency will, of course, present many domestic difficulties. However, from this point of view, the difficulties may be greatly lessened if the over-all agency to be created be given initially the following functions and powers:

1. To prepare plans for dealing with enemy countries and with liberated areas, and, upon the ratification of such plans by the various governments, to put them into execution through appropriate machinery.

2. To prepare plans for the handling of the various long-range problems and to create and set into motion various pieces of necessary machinery, each step to be subject to ratification by the constituent governments.

In this manner, a system of organized international relations would become established and would have an opportunity to evolve into a fully operating, permanent international organization through a process of continuous adaptation. The development would be along functional, and in some cases regional, lines, but always within the framework of unified policy. The agency would be a central body, operating through specialized arrangements for various purposes. As time goes on, some of its early functions would disappear, while some would be merged with more permanent functions as they develop.

The key to the success of such an agency is that it be given, from the outset, concrete tasks and adequate authority to perform them, rather than a broad grant of general powers, and that means be provided for enlarging its essential powers as need for such enlargement becomes demonstrated and as the agency itself proves capable of exercising them.

#### D. SOME CRUCIAL PROBLEMS OF ORGANIZATION AND NEGOTIATION

Whatever method is finally chosen, there will inevitably be presented several crucial problems, relating both to organization and to steps to be undertaken in the process of negotiation.

The first of these is the problem of the relative positions of large and small countries. This problem has already arisen in connection with the steps toward post-war United Nations action so far taken. It is bound to arise whether we proceed to set up specific agencies independently of each other or an over-all agency with specialized component parts.

It has become axiomatic that each agency must have a relatively small executive body, and that each of the large countries must be individually represented on such a body. It seems clear that each of the large countries will wish to reserve veto power in connection with any action which touches its vital interests—although the concept of “vital interest” must be defined, not in general terms, but specifically with respect to each important function. It is equally clear that all of the other member-countries cannot be individually represented on the executive body. The problem is to find some reasonably satisfactory method in which the smaller nations can, for this purpose, be associated with the larger nations.

So far, discussion has narrowed down to a choice between three intrinsically unsatisfactory solutions, as follows:

1. The League of Nations solved the problem by having its Council composed of four types of members:

- a.* Each of the great powers had a permanent seat;
- b.* Some countries had semi-permanent seats in the sense that they were eligible for annual re-election;
- c.* Some countries, by voluntary association assured that one of them in annual rotation would always have a Council seat;
- d.* The other countries took their chances in annual elections without the right of immediate re-election.

2. There are several current proposals under which the world would be divided into regional groups, each of which would designate one or more members of the Council, to represent the group as a whole rather than any one country of the group. This method has the advantage of not making the Council vary from year to year as regards the areas represented on it. But it has, from the viewpoint of the small countries, the great disadvantage of increasing the disparity between them and the large countries and of thus tending to deprive them more and more of individual identity.

3. There is a possibility of simplifying the League formula by dropping the semi-permanent seats, by encouraging groups of countries to associate themselves voluntarily into rotation representation groups, and by letting those countries which do not so associate themselves take their chances in periodic elections.

This whole problem has a special application to the initial step in setting up any United Nations agency under present conditions. The method of creating a small executive body must be specified in whatever instrument the United Nations conclude as the basis for an international agency. Restriction of membership to the four great powers appears at this stage to be only a theoretical possibility. It should not, however, be impossible to negotiate the choice of the specific smaller

nations to be given seats on the executive body for the duration of the war with an understanding that a regular and systematic procedure for small-country representation will become operative after the war.

Another crucial problem is that of voting. The League procedure was largely based on unanimity, which afforded each member of the Council, large and small, single veto power. A possible compromise between this and a majority vote has been prepared in the form of a procedure under which decisions would be by a simple or extraordinary majority, but with the provision that the majority must include (with some possible exceptions) the votes of all of the permanent members. In this manner, each of the large countries would have single veto power, while the smaller countries would have veto power by acting together. This would require that the number of elective seats be somewhat greater than the number of permanent seats. An arrangement along these lines could be worked out for the transitional period.

Still another crucial problem is whether or not such voting arrangements, while constituting adequate protection for the large countries, especially as regards enforcement procedures for the maintenance of the peace, would provide a sufficiently speedy and effective machinery for action in this vital field. Under it, the small countries would not be able to compel any of the large countries to use its armed forces when it does not desire to do so, but the small countries could, by joining together, prevent the large countries from acting. It does not appear, however, that the risk involved on this score is likely to be serious.

Finally, there is the problem of the negotiation steps to be taken. The first necessary step is clearly to secure accord among the four great powers, as to their intentions and as to the responsibilities which they would be willing to undertake. This accord can be embodied in a formal protocol, in a joint declaration, or in parallel declarations. Whatever the form, it would appear to be very important that the document be communicated to the other United Nations only as a part of an invitation, issued jointly by the four great powers, for the negotiation of a formal United Nations protocol as the basis for the creation of the agency in view.

Draft protocols have been worked out for both purposes. They may need to be reconsidered in some aspects once the basic decisions are reached on some of the problems indicated above. Sufficient progress has been made in the study of the various phases of the international organization question to render possible fruitful negotiations with respect to it at any time.

Lot 60 D 224

*The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Trusteeship and Colonial Problems

There are attached<sup>1</sup> four copies of each of the following two documents:

1. Document, dated March 9, 1943, entitled, "Draft of a Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence."
2. Document, dated April 15, 1943, entitled, "International Trusteeship."

The proposed Declaration is intended to draw a clear line of demarcation between, on the one hand, the treatment to be accorded to dependent areas detached from the enemy countries after the last war and to such areas as may be similarly detached from our present enemies; and, on the other hand, the treatment of colonial areas proper. It is suggested that an International Trusteeship Administration be set up for the first category of dependent areas. The second category would be left undisturbed, except that the colonial powers would proclaim certain specified principles, in accordance with which they would administer their dependent areas. There would also be set up regional commissions for collaboration, with regard to some aspects of colonial administration, between the colonial powers and certain other powers having substantial interest in each of the regions.

The President has read this draft. You discussed it with Mr. Eden when he was in Washington, and he was given a copy.<sup>2</sup>

The International Trusteeship draft was prepared in the Division of Political Studies on the basis of an extended consideration of the problem by the Political Committee and by the Subcommittee on International Organization.

LEO PASVOLSKY

[Attachment 1]

*Draft Declaration*

SECRET

MARCH 9, 1943.

DECLARATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS ON NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

In the Declaration signed on January 1, 1942, the United Nations pledged themselves to a complete victory in this war for the preser-

<sup>1</sup> The attachments were not filed with the source text of Pasvolsky's memorandum. They have been supplied from other folders in Lot 60 D 224.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 31, 37, 40.

vation of liberty, independence, human rights and justice. They also proclaimed their resolve to attain, for themselves and for the human race as a whole, the objectives stated in the Joint Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill dated August 14, 1941, known—from the region in which it was formulated—as the Atlantic Charter. That Charter sets forth certain fundamental principles and purposes, applicable to all nations and to all peoples, among which are the following:

Respect for the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live;

Restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; and

Establishment of a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

By their adoption of the Atlantic Charter as an integral part of the Declaration of January 1, 1942, the 31 United Nations have thus affirmed their determination that the independence of those nations which now possess independence shall be maintained; that the independence of those nations which have been forcibly deprived of independence shall be restored; that opportunity to achieve independence for those peoples who aspire to independence shall be preserved, respected, and made more effective; and that, in general, resolute efforts will be made to create a system of world security which will provide for all nations and all peoples greater assurance of stable peace and greater facilities for material advancement.

The carrying out of these pledges imposes important responsibilities upon those peoples who possess or who are seeking to regain independence and upon all peoples who aspire to independent status. The particular pledge that peoples who aspire to independence shall be given an opportunity to acquire independent status is, therefore, in varying degrees, of concern to all of the United Nations and to all nations and peoples which now, or which may hereafter, cooperate in carrying forward and applying the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The effectuation of that pledge requires that all such nations and peoples collaborate to that end with each other to the fullest practicable extent. Accordingly, the United Nations hereby make the following  
DECLARATION :

### I

1. It is the duty and the purpose of those of the United Nations which have, owing to past events, become charged with responsibilities for the future of colonial areas to cooperate fully with the peoples

of such areas toward their becoming qualified for independent national status. While some colonial peoples are far advanced along this road, the development and resources of others are not yet such as to enable them to assume and discharge the responsibilities of government without danger to themselves and to others. It is, accordingly, the duty and the purpose of each nation having political ties with colonial peoples:

*a.* To give its colonial peoples protection, encouragement, moral support and material aid and to make continuous efforts toward their political, economic, social, and educational advancement;

*b.* To make available to qualified persons among the colonial peoples to the fullest possible extent positions in the various branches of the local governmental organization;

*c.* To grant progressively to the colonial peoples such measure of self-government as they are capable of maintaining in the light of the various stages of their development toward independence;

*d.* To fix, at the earliest practicable moment, dates upon which the colonial peoples shall be accorded the status of full independence within a system of general security; and

*e.* To pursue policies under which the natural resources of colonial territories shall be developed, organized and marketed in the interest of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole.

2. It is incumbent upon all peoples that aspire to independence to exert themselves in every feasible way to prepare and equip themselves for independence—socially, economically, and politically—to the end that they may, as soon as possible, be able to create, conduct and maintain, for, by and of themselves, efficient structures of stable self-government based on sound principles of social and political morality. In the present moment of world emergency, the capacity and desire of such peoples for the enjoyment of freedom can best be demonstrated by their contribution now toward the defeat of the Axis foes of all freedom and independence.

3. The carrying out of the policies above declared will necessarily call for much and continuous consultation and collaboration between and among the nations which are directly responsible for the future of various colonial areas and other nations which have substantial interests in the regions in which such areas are located. In order to provide an effective medium for such consultation and collaboration, there shall be created in each region, by agreement of the nations thus concerned, a commission on which each of those nations shall be represented and in the work of which the various colonial peoples concerned shall have appropriate opportunity to participate and to have or to achieve representation.

## II

1. As a result of the last war, peoples in several areas still unprepared for full independence were released from political ties with nations formerly responsible for them. Other peoples in like status may be similarly released from their former political ties as a result of this war. It is the purpose of the United Nations to assume with respect to all such peoples a special responsibility, analogous to that of a trustee or fiduciary. The United Nations hereby recognize it as their duty to give the fullest cooperation to such peoples in their efforts to prepare themselves for independence through political, economic, social, and moral advancement—and eventually to arrange for their assumption of independent status. To this end, they recognize it as their duty to observe in the case of such peoples each of the policies, obligations and methods hereinbefore set forth for observance by independent countries toward their own colonial peoples.

2. In order to carry out effectively the purposes and functions described in the preceding paragraph, the United Nations propose to establish, as soon as circumstances permit, an International Trusteeship Administration composed of representatives of the United Nations and of all other nations which now, or which may hereafter, cooperate in carrying forward and applying the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. The administration will operate through regional councils composed of representatives of the nations having major interests in the respective regions. The machinery of each council will be so designed as to give the peoples of the territories held in trust in its region full opportunity to be associated with its work.

[Attachment 2]

*Memorandum on International Trusteeship*

SECRET  
P 123-c<sup>3</sup>

APRIL 15, 1943.

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP

I. In order to promote international security and the general well-being of all peoples, the non-self-governing colonies and territories which as a consequence of the war of 1914-18, and of the war of 1939- , have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, and which are not yet ready for self-government, shall be placed under an international trusteeship.

The authority for the trusteeship shall be vested provisionally in the Executive Authority of the United Nations and finally in the Execu-

<sup>3</sup> This paper is also identified as P-I.O. 29-1 and as T 169-b.

tive Authority of the International Organization which shall delegate execution and supervision of the Trusteeship to a separate Supervisory Council for each region. These councils shall be set up provisionally by the United Nations and finally by the Executive Authority of the International Organization.

II. The objective of the international trusteeship is self-government for these dependent areas under conditions which provide guarantees of basic human rights, safeguard the economic interests of all elements of the population, and promote the security and general well-being of the international community. The objective of self-government may be deemed to be attained if a dependent area, conformable to the wishes of its people decides to stand alone as independent, or is granted autonomy and self-government possibly in association with nearby states or through voluntary federation with some independent state of its choice. The Executive Authority shall judge the fact of the establishment of such self-government to the general satisfaction of the inhabitants and the desirability of the termination of the trusteeship. The termination of the trusteeship shall involve acceptance of a bill of rights. The Executive Authority shall determine if the autonomy and self-government granted the dependent people is of such nature as to entitle it to membership in the International Organization.

III. The following purposes shall guide the international supervision and local administration :

*a.* For the dependent peoples :

1. preparation and education for self-government.
2. protection from exploitation, and promotion of economic and social justice.
3. development of the resources of the area to improve the economic well-being of the people on the highest possible self-sustaining basis.

*b.* For the general well-being of the world :

1. establishment and maintenance of non-discriminatory commercial treatment.
2. promotion of equality of economic opportunity, consistent with the safeguarding of the interests of the local inhabitants.
3. contribution to general security.

IV. The following machinery shall carry out the foregoing purposes :

#### *Executive Authority*

The appropriate Executive Authority of the International Organization shall be the final authority for the establishment and maintenance of the trusteeship. The Executive Authority shall have the

right to require any matter to be referred to it which in its judgment affects the basic principles of the trusteeship or which affects the peaceful relations between nations. It shall be within the power of the Executive Authority to adjust the areas included within the various regions and the composition and jurisdiction of the Supervisory Councils thereover, having regard to changes which experience may show to be desirable.

The Executive Authority shall maintain a permanent office with a staff of experts and shall keep itself informed of the work of the Supervisory Councils. The Executive Authority shall have the right of inspection in the dependent areas.

### *Supervisory Council*

A separate Supervisory Council shall exercise the international trusteeship over the peoples placed under its trusteeship in each area. The Supervisory Councils may be composed of representatives from states having general security interests in the region, from self-governing states in the region, as and in such number as may be determined by the Executive Authority and, in certain cases, from states to which responsibility has been delegated for exercising administrative authority over the dependent peoples.

Each Supervisory Council, acting on behalf of the Executive Authority and in consultation with each territorial Administration, shall promote the development of the territories within its area both in the interests of the inhabitants and of the rest of the world. It shall in particular (a) assure that the terms of the charter under which the territory is administered are effectively carried out, (b) examine for approval or disapproval all public or private projects involving developments of more than local character, (c) assure that the principle of non-discrimination in commercial treatment is applied, and the promotion of equality of economic opportunity is undertaken, in a manner which safeguards the long-run interests of the inhabitants, and (d) assure that emigration and immigration shall be regulated in the interest of the inhabitants of the area. Each Supervisory Council shall make an annual report together with recommendations to the Executive Authority on the various territories under its supervision. It shall also report to the Executive Authority promptly any situation which affects the peaceful relations of the territories or any failure of the Administration to carry out its obligations. The Executive Authority shall decide the time and manner of the publication of these reports.

The inhabitants shall have the right to petition directly to the Supervisory Council, subject to such regulations or conditions as the

Supervisory Council shall prescribe subject to the approval of the Executive Authority.

*Secretariat*

Each Supervisory Council shall be assisted by a Secretariat which shall include individuals trained in administration of dependent areas, and specialists in the fields of education, public works, administration of justice, health, nutrition, etc. Each Secretariat shall include a field staff.

*Administration*

Unless and until other arrangements are made by the Executive Authority, these dependent peoples shall be administered by an administrative agency which shall be appointed by the Executive Authority and shall be subject to the direction and control of the Supervisory Council.

The Administration in each territory shall exercise its authority according to a Charter which shall set forth the duties, responsibilities and powers deemed by the Executive Authority to be most suitable to the stage of development of the peoples in that territory, having regard to social and economic conditions and to factors affecting general security.

The local inhabitants shall be assimilated in the administrative and technical services to the fullest practicable extent. In territories where the Executive Authority or a Supervisory Council exercises trusteeship directly over any territory, such administrative and technical positions shall be open to qualified nationals of all states comprising the United Nations.

The Administration in each territory shall submit an annual report to the Regional Supervisory Council on the manner in which it has fulfilled its functions, attaching thereto copies of its accounts and of the measures adopted in the territory during the year. The report will be examined by the Supervisory Council in the presence of an accredited representative from the territorial government who shall be prepared to supply any supplementary information requested by the Council. The Executive Authority shall determine the time and manner of the publication of the report.

V. Operations of the trusteeship machinery.

a. For the dependent peoples

It shall be the tasks of the Administration under the direction of the Supervisory Council to provide justice in the courts, to assure civil liberties, to provide equality of economic opportunities, and to further education for self-government.

In the dependent areas which the Axis powers have temporarily occupied, the Supervisory Council and the Administration shall harmonize restoration of previous property rights of foreign nationals with greater economic opportunity for the local inhabitants.

In providing for improved labor standards, health and the general social welfare of the inhabitants, the Supervisory Council and the Administration shall have the assistance of the International Labor Organization and other technical bodies of the International Organization.

*b.* For the general well-being of the world

With due regard to the importance of furthering freedom of economic opportunity among nations, and with due regard to any general economic arrangement that may be evolved by the International Organization, the Administration in each territory shall:

1. Grant to the members of the International Organization non-discriminatory commercial treatment and equality of economic opportunity; subject to the safeguarding by the Executive Authority of the interests of the local inhabitants;
2. Avoid and prevent practices which lead to excessive prices or monopoly of raw materials;
3. Cooperate with plans for local and international development recommended by the Supervisory Council.

The dependent areas shall be administered in such a manner as to contribute to the general security of the world. No military, naval or air bases or defense forces may be established except as agreed upon by the Executive Authority as being in the interest of such general security.

#### VI. Budget.

The expenses of the various supervisory Councils and Secretariats shall be provided for in the budget of the International Organization. The Executive Authority, upon the basis of estimates submitted by the Supervisory Councils, shall fix the budgets for their work.

The administrative expenses of the territorial government shall be defrayed so far as possible from revenues of the territory under administration. In territories where the Trusteeship is directly administered by the Executive Authority or a Supervisory Council, the costs of administration, above the revenues of the territory, shall be borne in a manner to be determined by the Executive Authority.

In territories administered under trusteeship by a single state, the costs of administration above the revenues of the territory shall be borne jointly by the administering state and the International Organization in proportions to be determined by the Executive Authority. However, the administering state shall defray the salaries of its nationals on the administrative staff.

In instances where the revenues of the territory may exceed the costs of administration, the surplus shall be utilized in that territory to expedite the attainment of the purposes of trusteeship.

[Annex I to Attachment 2]

The trusteeship shall apply to the following classes of territories:

*a.* The present mandated territories which resulted from the war of 1914-18, and which have not in the meantime attained full independent status:

Type "A" Mandates:

- Palestine and Trans-Jordan (British)
- Syria and Lebanon (formerly French)

Type "B" Mandates:

- Tanganyika (British)
- Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian)
- Cameroons (French)
- Cameroons (British)
- Togo (French)
- Togo (British)

Type "C" Mandates:

- Southwest Africa (Union of South Africa)
- New Guinea (Australian)
- Western Samoa (New Zealand)
- Nauru (British Empire mandate administered by Australia)
- Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas islands in the Pacific north of the Equator (Japanese)

*b.* Territories which might be detached from Italy:

Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, Libya, Pantelleria

Territories which might be detached from Japan:

Korea, Pescadores, Formosa, and acquired or claimed, non-mandated islands (such as Marcus Island, and the Spratly Islands).

[Annex II to Attachment 2]

Various areas, such as islands in the Pacific and certain strategic points in other parts of the world should be treated primarily from the standpoint of their importance in an international security system and as commercial airports for the inter-continental air transportation service of the future. Some of these areas may best be administered by particular powers; others by direct administration of the international organization; others by inclusion under the trusteeship for a regional area. The Authority of the United Nations provisionally and

the Executive Authority of the International Organization finally shall determine the disposition of such areas.

[Annex III to Attachment 2]

## SUPERVISORY COUNCILS AND TERRITORIAL DISPOSITIONS

### NORTH PACIFIC REGION

*Regional Supervisory Council.*—Members: China, Russia and the United States.

#### *Territorial Dispositions*

Korea: To be temporarily administered by the Council, anticipating independence probably with close economic ties with China.

Pescadores: Conditional upon security arrangements to be administered by the Council.

Formosa: Conditional upon security arrangements to be administered by China.

South Sakhalin: Status and disposition uncertain, pending consideration. If security so requires, the disposition of the Luchu Islands in that regard remains for consideration.

### SOUTH PACIFIC REGION

*Regional Supervisory Council.*—Members: Australia, New Zealand, China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the United States, probably seated at Manila. France might later be represented on the Council if French administration over Indo-China is restored.

#### *Territorial Dispositions*

New Guinea (now under Australian Mandate):

Western Samoa (now under New Zealand Mandate):

Nauru (now under British Empire Mandate):

These to be administered under the trusteeship by present controlling authorities.

Pacific Islands formerly under Japanese Mandate: Status to depend upon security arrangements.

#### NOTE: *Further Pacific Dispositions*

Marcus Island: Status and disposition uncertain, pending consideration. If security so requires the disposition of the Bonin Islands and the Vulcan Islands in that regard remains for consideration.

### NORTH AND EAST AFRICA REGION

*Regional Supervisory Council.*—Members: Great Britain, France, Egypt, and subject to reservation, Ethiopia, and possibly Turkey and Greece. Italy's future participation is tentatively not precluded. The seat might be at Cairo or Alexandria.

*Territorial Dispositions*

Libya: To be placed under direct administration by the Council.

Eritrea:

Italian Somaliland:

Recommendations as to their administrative status remain under consideration.

Pantelleria: Status and disposition uncertain, pending further consideration.

## WEST AFRICA REGION

*Regional Supervisory Council.*—Members: Great Britain, France, Liberia, Belgium and (possibly) Portugal and Spain. The seat might be at Buea or Douala.

*Territorial Dispositions*

Togoland (now under British Mandate):

Togoland (now under French Mandate):

Cameroons (now under British Mandate):

Cameroons (now under French Mandate):

To be administered directly by the Council.

## SOUTH AFRICA REGION

*Regional Supervisory Council.*—Members: Union of South Africa, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Portugal, with seat at Johannesburg or Pretoria.

*Territorial Dispositions*

Tanganyika (now under British Mandate):

Ruanda-Urundi (now under Belgian Mandate):

To be placed under direct administration by the Council.

Southwest Africa (now under Union of South Africa Mandate): To be assimilated into the Union of South Africa with encouragement of a federal relationship if upon further study this appears feasible because of close political and economic ties.

## MIDDLE AND NEAR EAST REGION

No regional supervisory council is contemplated.

*Territorial Dispositions*

Palestine: to be placed temporarily under a special international trusteeship, possibly composed of Great Britain, United States, Turkey, and perhaps others. The United Nations are to be considered bound by internationally accepted principles and commitments emerging out of the present situation rather than by former mandate provisions, or by prior national promises.

Syria and Lebanon to be independent (as one state or two): they may temporarily require a special trusteeship.

Trans-Jordan: Status yet to be determined.

It is accepted that the United Nations are to be regarded as inheritors of all mandates, and it is assumed that the present mandates will terminate with the adoption of this plan.

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Lot 60 D 224

*The Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 19, 1943.

COMMENT ON DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED JOINT FOUR-POWER  
DECLARATION

THE SECRETARY: 1. Paragraph numbered 1 of the proposed Declaration<sup>1</sup> states that their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war, will be continued for the "organization and maintenance of peace and security."

This merely states the purpose to continue by united action cooperation of the Four Powers for the organization and maintenance of peace and security. There is no question but that the President has authority to make this pledge in so far as concerns the war period. While the pledge carries over into the post-war period, it is probably unobjectionable for the reason that it contains no definite commitment regarding any particular course of action. It is tantamount to a statement of foreign policy.

2. Paragraph numbered 2, declaring that the Four Powers will act together in matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of the enemy and to any occupation of enemy territory and the territory held by the enemy, would seem to be well within the prerogatives of the President.

3. Paragraph numbered 3 states that the Four Powers will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the requirements imposed upon their present enemies.

This paragraph does not contain a time limitation and might well carry over into the post-war period. The "measures deemed by them to be necessary" might consist of the use of force, and if such use of force were deemed to be necessary after the establishment of peace, there would be presented the question whether the President acting alone could execute the measures and hence whether he should have now, or wait until later, the approval of the Senate or Congress.

4. Paragraph numbered 4 states that they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 692.

This paragraph does not present a definite commitment and hence it presents no constitutional difficulty.

5. Paragraph numbered 5 states that for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security "pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a general system of security, they will consult and act jointly in behalf of the community of nations."

The only definite commitment here made relates to joint action. While such joint action is to be for the purpose of maintaining peace and security for an indefinite period of time and hence carries over into the post-war era, there is no definite commitment as to the form of action to be taken. It is to be presumed, however, that in "maintaining international peace and security" the use of force may become necessary. The Senate or the Congress may conceivably contend that they have a right to be consulted with respect to any such pledge. The President would answer that he, of course, would expect to consult the Congress before employing armed force and that forms of action may be available to him short of force which would be sufficient.

6. Paragraph numbered 6 states that in connection with the "fore-going purpose" they will establish a technical commission to advise them on the military problems involved, including the composition and strength of the forces available in an emergency arising from a threat to the peace.

This provision would seem clearly to indicate that the possibility of the use of force is in mind; that the employment of force may well take place after peace has been established. No reason, however, is perceived why the President may not receive advice through a commission or otherwise as to the status of available armed forces and that is all the paragraph purports to accomplish. He could answer critics of the Declaration along the lines of the answer suggested for paragraph 5.

7. Paragraph numbered 7 states that they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other States except for the purposes envisaged in the Declaration and after joint consultation and agreement.

This is a self-denying undertaking. It is intended to afford some degree of assurance to disarmed and weak States. The purposes "envisaged in this declaration" for which they may employ their military forces in the territories of other countries are, so far as post-war pledges are concerned, (a) those relating to violation of requirements imposed upon their enemies, and (b) the maintenance of peace and security pending the inauguration of a general system of security.

8. Paragraph numbered 8 states that they will confer and cooperate to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

The President has complete authority to make such a commitment.

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It is to be noted that the first clause of the Preamble to the Declaration takes the form of a Declaration by the Governments of the respective countries. It might disarm certain critics if the Declaration were by the heads of the Governments instead of by the Governments.

GREEN H. HACKWORTH

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## O. GERMAN TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

Lot 60 D 224

*The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Boundary Problems of Germany

The attached memoranda deal with alternative solutions for the following boundary problems of Germany:

1. German-Polish (including East Prussia, Danzig, and Silesia).
2. German-Czechoslovak (on the assumption that the Sudetenland will be returned to Czechoslovakia).
3. Minor frontier adjustments.

The memoranda are accompanied by appropriate maps.<sup>2</sup> They are based, in large measure, on discussions in various committees.<sup>3</sup>

These frontier adjustments are considered separately from the problem of whether or not the remainder of Germany should remain united or be partitioned. The problem of unity or partition is analyzed in another set of documents.<sup>4</sup>

L[EO] P[ASVOLSKY]

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<sup>1</sup> Although this memorandum was presented to Hull in anticipation of the First Quebec Conference, no detailed discussion of German boundary problems took place at that conference.

<sup>2</sup> The maps and cartograms accompanying this memorandum are not reproduced.

<sup>3</sup> Specifically the Subcommittee on Political Problems and the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. See Noffer, pp. 96-108, 117-123.

<sup>4</sup> See *post*, p. 761. Following this covering memorandum in the file is a table of contents (not printed) to the enclosed "German Boundary Documents" and the accompanying maps.

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Political Studies (Mosely)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

H-27

POLAND—GERMANY  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER  
FROM SILESIA TO THE BALTIC SEA

## I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the determination of the boundary between Poland and Germany from the northern boundary of Silesia to the Baltic Sea.

It arises from Polish claims for a revision of the pre-1939 Polish-German frontier and from Germany's dissatisfaction with its eastern frontier as established in 1919-1920. The problem has been rendered more acute by intimations from the Soviet Government that, in return for acquiescence in the loss of all or most of the Polish territories annexed by Russia in 1939, Poland should receive compensation along its western frontier at the expense of Germany. The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have urged that the settlement of boundary disputes be postponed until the end of the war, but there are indications that British leaders believe a territorial settlement with Russia, and hence with Poland, must be reached as part of a general political settlement with Russia, during the war.

The western boundary of Poland was drawn in 1919 mainly on the basis of linguistic data provided by the pre-1914 Prussian censuses. The boundary of 1919 was challenged by all post-war German régimes. German resentment was particularly strong against the "Corridor", which cut off East Prussia from the Reich proper; German nationalists even denied Poland's right to exist as a state. Between 1919 and 1939 the Polish already strong historic and ethnic claims to Poznań and Pomerania were strengthened by the more rapid growth of the Polish element and by the decline of the German minority, a decline accelerated by the emigration of considerable numbers of Germans, particularly of the official and professional class.

In order to provide Poland with an outlet to the Baltic Sea the Free City of Danzig was established under a complicated arrangement by which the local population, Poland and the League of Nations shared responsibility. Although Danzig's prosperity depended upon the furtherance of trade with its Polish hinterland, political agitation for the return of Danzig to the Reich was incessant and reached

its culmination in 1939, when alleged Polish oppression of Danzig served as a pretext for an all-out attack upon Poland.

Although East Prussia was claimed by Poland in 1919 on historic and strategic grounds, the victorious states held, on ethnic grounds, that it should remain a part of Germany. Plebiscites, held in the ethnically mixed Marienwerder and Allenstein districts under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, turned out to be unexpectedly favorable to Germany, and in the final settlement, of August 16, 1920, Poland received only a small riparian belt along the east bank of the Vistula. Long an economic liability to Germany, East Prussia, as the original home of the Prussian tradition, holds in German emotions a position out of all proportion to its area and population. To Poland, East Prussia has represented a permanent military threat, which the campaign of 1939 demonstrated. The demand for a wider and more secure outlet to the Baltic Sea has repeatedly been advanced by Polish nationalists, especially in 1919 and since 1939.

The area of East Prussia within the boundaries of 1920 was 14,283 square miles. According to the census of May 1939 it had a population of 2,496,017 persons. According to the census of 1925—the latest moderately reliable index of linguistic distribution—the Polish-speaking population totalled 40,502. According to the censuses of 1933 and 1939 the number of Poles was 4,522 and 3,718, respectively. The district of Allenstein also contains a substantial number—62,596 in 1925—of “Masurians”. While the Masurians speak a Slavic dialect closely akin to Polish and are claimed as Poles by Polish writers, the Germans regard them as non-Polish. In 1920 the majority of Masurians apparently voted to remain with Germany, perhaps because their religious and cultural affinity with the Germans as Protestants outweighed the factor of community of language with the Poles.

Danzig, with an area of 731 square miles, had a population of 412,000 in 1936. According to the census of 1923, out of a total population of 366,000, some 12,000 spoke Polish or Kashub, a Slavic dialect closely related to Polish. The number of Slavic-speaking inhabitants was not reported in 1936.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Transfer of Danzig and East Prussia to Poland Without Compensation to Germany* (see Map C-1, Polish series).

This solution was generally regarded by the Political Subcommittee as the “least bad” of possible alternative solutions.

This solution would add to Poland an area of 15,014 square miles. In 1939 this area had a population of approximately 2,900,000, of whom only some 10,000 were reported by the German census as Polish-

speaking. East Prussia contains 9 percent of the cultivable land of pre-1939 Germany and produced about 7 percent of its cereals and 7 percent of its livestock. It contained no important industries or mineral resources.

The role of Danzig prior to 1939 was defined by its position near the mouth of the Vistula River. It served as a transit center for Poland, although its relative importance in this respect had declined with the rapid rise, after 1930, of its Polish competitor, the newly created port of Gdynia. Danzig's economic ties with Germany proper and with East Prussia, as distinguished from its political and cultural affinities, were slight. Never important as a manufacturing center prior to 1939, Danzig has reportedly been transformed into a center of submarine building and other war industries.

This solution would assure Poland of approximately 280 miles of Baltic coast instead of 40 miles prior to 1939. It would place under Polish control the entire valley of the Vistula. It would open the way for the construction of more direct and efficient outlets to the Baltic from central and eastern Poland. It would add considerable agricultural resources to the predominantly agricultural economy of Poland, without enlarging its industrial capacity to any marked degree. Poland would be relieved of the fear of German flank attack based on East Prussia, and would have a much shorter frontier with Germany.

In losing East Prussia Germany would lose 7.9 percent of its pre-1939 territory, an area which is associated with great historic traditions not only for Prussians, but for other Germans. Such a transfer would undoubtedly be protested by the Germans as an alleged violation of the Atlantic Charter. The question of the future of the East Prussians and the Danzigers would be an extremely difficult one. Their mass expulsion to Germany would raise difficult problems of economic adjustment within Germany; on the other hand, for almost 3,000,000 Germans settled compactly and for centuries on this land to be placed under a traditionally despised Polish rule would multiply the problems of internal reconstruction within Poland itself.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee generally felt that, while this proposal was accompanied by tremendous difficulties of adjustment, it might, in view of the Soviet attitude, prove to be the least bad of the available alternatives. It was pointed out that German aggression against Poland and the special cruelty with which Poland has been treated since 1939 deprived Germany of any moral right to protest against this solution. Some members of the subcommittee felt that Poland should make some territorial concession to Germany in Pomerania and Poznań, in order to provide space for the settlement of a part of

the population to be evacuated from East Prussia and Danzig. The majority felt, however, that it was impossible to ask Poland to concede territory both on the east to the Soviet Union and on the west to Germany, and that other means would have to be found within Germany itself for absorbing the displaced population of East Prussia and Danzig.

The subcommittee was inclined to the view that not all the Germans need be evacuated from East Prussia and Danzig, and believed that international assistance for the orderly movement and absorption of the displaced population should be provided.

B. *Transfer of Danzig and East Prussia to Poland With Compensation to Germany* (The areas proposed for cession to Germany by this solution indicated by red lines on the secret version of Map C-1 A, Polish series.)

This solution differs from that under (A) in that a strip of western Poland, amounting to 6,563 square miles, would be assigned to Germany as partial territorial compensation for the loss of Danzig and East Prussia. This strip of territory contained in 1931 an estimated total of 959,410, of whom 123,463 were Germans. This cession could not be justified on ethnic grounds, but solely, as a means of providing some territorial compensation for Germany without injuring the Polish transportation system and without depriving Poland of any historic centers such as Poznań and Gneзно. The area concerned is almost purely agricultural and to that extent would offset in part the loss of East Prussian agricultural production.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The specific solution described above was not discussed by the Political Subcommittee, but some members of the subcommittee held that a partial compensation of this nature was desirable to weaken any future claim of dismemberment, to reconcile the German people with its territorial loss in the east, and to alleviate the economic effects for Germany of the loss of East Prussia. It was generally felt, however, that the loss of East Prussia would be so bitterly resented by Germans that no partial territorial compensation would in itself serve to change that feeling.

C. *Transfer of Part of East Prussia to Poland*

This solution, which was not discussed in detail, would provide for the transfer to Poland of the sparsely inhabited eastern districts of East Prussia, while leaving Königsberg and the western districts to Germany. This solution would give Poland an additional, more easterly, outlet to the Baltic. Such an outlet would, however, be remote from the more highly developed parts of western Poland. It would not solve any of the types of problem presented by the Corridor in past years.

### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

Some members of the Political Subcommittee felt that this alternative was preferable to the total transfer of East Prussia to Poland. It was generally agreed, however, that this solution would result in creating a second corridor, which would be as bitterly resented as that of 1919, without removing the strategic threat presented by East Prussia to Poland. It was also questioned whether the Soviet Government would favor such a half-way solution of the problem of East Prussia.

### D. *Transfer to Poland of Danzig Territory West of the Vistula*

This solution was preferred by the Territorial Subcommittee at an early stage in its consideration of the problem.

This solution would transfer to Poland about 380 square miles and would assign to East Prussia (Germany) about 350 square miles. The territory east of the Vistula contained only 795 Poles or Kashubs (census of 1923) in a total population (1929) of 65,000. The transportation and drainage systems of the east Vistula area would be improved by being reintegrated with those of East Prussia, while Poland would lose no strategic advantage through the assignment of this territory to Germany.

This solution would strengthen Polish control of the Vistula to its mouth and, if the German population were removed from the Polish-annexed part of the Free City, the Polish outlet to the sea would be slightly widened as compared with the pre-1939 situation. This solution involves retention by Germany of East Prussia, to which Danzig territory east of the Vistula would be added.

### 1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

In an early stage of its discussions the Territorial Subcommittee assumed that East Prussia, even if demilitarized, should not be transferred to Poland, because of its outstandingly German population. It felt, however, that the question of Danzig was susceptible of a solution favorable to Poland on important economic and strategic grounds, which in this case should override the ethnic factor. Since all the advantages of annexing the Free City could be obtained by Poland without acquiring Danzig territory east of the Vistula, it was considered desirable to reduce the ethnic problem even by a small degree through assigning Danzig territory east of that river to East Prussia.

### E. *Transfer of Danzig to Poland*

Under this solution Poland would receive the entire area of the Free City of Danzig, amounting to 731 square miles and containing a population of 412,000 (1936). This solution was later abandoned by the Territorial Subcommittee in favor of solution (D).

F. *Transfer to Poland of Danzig and East Prussia Together With Additional German Territory West of the 1939 Boundary*

This solution, advanced by some Polish spokesmen, would involve the same terms as solution (A) together with the transfer of parts of German Pomerania, of Grenzmark and adjacent districts extending perhaps as far as the Oder River. Some Polish spokesmen have urged that the new western boundary of Poland be drawn "from Kolberg on the Baltic to the Oder River", without defining it more precisely. This solution is apparently viewed with some favor by the Soviet Government; the Soviet press has referred to the need for a post-war "peace patrol on the Oder" to be exercised jointly by the Soviet Union and a Poland friendly to it.

The subcommittees have not considered the possibility of extending Polish territory to the west of the Polish-German boundary before 1939.

G. *Restoration of Pre-1939 Territorial Status as Between Germany and Poland*

This solution was not favored by the subcommittees, although at an early stage in its discussions of the problem the Territorial Subcommittee assumed that its basic principle should be that of favoring minimum boundary change and of requiring that every change in the pre-1937 boundaries must be fully justified.

Throughout their deliberations, however, the subcommittees assumed that the "corridor" of 1919 had not worked satisfactorily for either Poland or Germany; that German aggression meant that territorial sacrifices could not justifiably be imposed on Poland; and that a solution which would strengthen Poland's position *vis-à-vis* Germany was generally to be desired.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by Messrs. William Koren, Jr., and John C. Campbell,  
of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-28

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1943.

GERMANY—POLAND  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: GERMAN UPPER SILESIA

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of the eastern portion of German Upper Silesia.

The problem arises as the result of Polish demands for that portion of German Upper Silesia which was awarded to Poland in the first draft of the Treaty of Versailles but which was assigned to Germany following the plebiscite ordered by the final treaty. Poland bases its claim upon the award of the draft treaty and upon its alleged need of the resources of the region, of a shorter frontier with Germany and a longer common boundary with Czechoslovakia, and of a strip of territory interposed between its Silesian industries and Germany.

The territory in question, covering approximately 2,950 square miles, forms the easternmost third of the German salient thrust between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Neither its boundary with Poland nor its juncture with the rest of Germany follows important physiographic features. The area was administratively divided during the present war, the major portion remaining in *Regierungsbezirk* Oppeln and the industrialized eastern section being included with territory recovered and newly acquired from Poland in *Regierungsbezirk* Kattowitz.

In 1939 the population totalled 1,354,000, of whom one-third lived in the highly industrialized eastern tip. Throughout the territory the people were overwhelmingly Catholic by religion. According to the 1925 census, 44 percent of the total population, but only 30 percent of that of the industrial district, were Polish-speaking. This Polish minority of half a million persons suffered certain disabilities in spite of the protection of the minority clauses of the Geneva Convention of 1922. Their political and cultural organizations were never strong; the former were dissolved when the Nazis came to power and the latter soon after the German conquest of Poland. These Polish-speaking citizens of the Reich are not thought to have been expelled from their homes or otherwise treated like the Poles in occupied Poland.

The wealth of this region is concentrated in the coal-mining and metallurgical district contiguous with the larger complex of heavy industries in Poland. This district contained 5 percent of the coal reserves of Germany, equal to 6.5 percent of those of Poland; it possessed reserves of lead ore equal to 71 percent and of zinc ore equal to 45 percent of those in Poland. In 1935 its production of bituminous coal was almost one-seventh of Germany's total output; it produced two-thirds of Germany's zinc ore, over a quarter of its lead ore, one-seventh of its zinc sheets and from 1 to 5 percent of its pig iron, crude steel and coke. Its somewhat higher production in 1937 equalled 72 percent of Polish coal output, 36.5 percent of Poland's crude steel output, and exceeded Poland's total production of lead and zinc.

Extraordinarily lacking in diversity, Upper Silesian industry had to send its products to other centers for finishing. German economic

policy as well as foreign restrictions on international trade resulted in the marketing of nine-tenths of Upper Silesia's products in Germany. After the partition of the mining and industrial basin in 1922, Germany consistently worked to free German Upper Silesia from dependence on its Polish counterpart, even when that meant gutting the German coal mines, pouring capital into profitless enterprises or bankrupting German-owned concerns in Poland. Upper Silesia's distance from the sea, its need to import iron ore, iron and steel scrap and steel-hardening metals, and the completion of the Middle German Canal in 1938, all placed it at such a serious disadvantage in competition with Ruhr-Rhineland heavy industry that four-fifths of its output was marketed in east Germany. Since the reconquest of the industrial area lost in 1922 and of adjacent Polish and former Czech mining areas, the Nazis have reversed the divided exploitation of the industrial basin and have introduced integrated and somewhat rationalized ownership and operation of the coal and metallurgical complex.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

(shown on Map B-4, German Series)

### A. *Transfer to Poland of the Industrial District and of Additional Territory on Both Banks of the Oder River Selected Primarily on Ethnic Grounds (Line "D")*

This solution was tentatively adopted by the Territorial Subcommittee.

The Polish-German boundary would run from a point on the northern border of the claimed area northeast of Kreuzburg southwest to meet the Oder River at a point about ten miles south of the city of Oppeln; it would then run southwards across the eastern tip of *Kreis* Neustadt and would follow the eastern boundary of *Kreis* Leobschütz to the border of Czechoslovakia.

This solution would transfer to Poland half the area and two-thirds of the population of the territory demanded by the Poles. According to the 1925 census, there were 340,000 (44 percent) Poles and 437,000 (56 percent) Germans in the territory to be transferred, and 155,000 (41 percent) Poles and 221,000 (59 percent) Germans in the territory remaining in Germany.

Poland would acquire important coal, zinc and lead reserves. In immediate productive capacity of coal, zinc, lead and crude steel the Polish gain would be far greater than the concurrent loss to Germany in terms of the respective national totals. Marketing of these products would depend largely on the expansion of demand in eastern Europe, since nine-tenths of the output was formerly sold in Germany and since Poland was already an exporter of coal, semi-finished steel and zinc

products. Transfer of the additional territory west of the industrial district would give to Poland a considerable number of small-scale chemical, optical, machinery, textile, building, and food-processing plants, as well as agricultural and forest land.

This solution would shorten Poland's frontier with Germany by 25 miles and lengthen the common Polish-Czech frontier by 28. It would give Poland territorial protection on both sides of the Oder River for its vital industrial district, control of the Oder valley rail, road and water transportation system in the region between Oppeln and the border of Czechoslovakia, and two additional rail links with Czechoslovakia. Germany would retain the important rail junction of Oppeln, which would be located very close to the Polish frontier, and the narrow, German-populated Leobschütz salient on the left bank of the Oder. The strategic advantages which the pre-war boundary gave to Germany would be reduced.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The subcommittee favored maintenance of the economic unity of the Upper Silesian industrial area. It agreed that that end could be attained through the acquisition by Poland of the industrial district of former German Upper Silesia. It favored also the cession to Poland of a part of the predominantly agricultural territory, populated in the majority by Polish-speaking persons, lying west of the industrial district. The desirability of improving the strategic position of Poland and Czechoslovakia against Germany was also stressed, although it was conceded that Poland's security in this region would depend principally on factors other than the location of the boundary.

The subcommittee considered: "That the best division of German Upper Silesia is midway between the line of Polish claims and the line which bounds the Silesian industrial area on the west; it is the sense of this subcommittee that the industrial area should be unified and that furthermore, in seeking a final line, it is desired to maintain city-country relationships . . .<sup>5</sup> It is agreed that, in locating the line exactly, it is desirable to maintain some connection with natural features, with the necessary rail connections, and with the German administrative lines." Line "D" was agreed on as the most desirable compromise boundary based on these considerations.

B. *Transfer to Poland of the Industrial District and of Additional Territory on the Right Bank of the Oder River Selected Primarily on Ethnic Grounds (Line "C")*

This boundary would coincide with line "D" from the northern border of German Upper Silesia to the Oder River; it would then

<sup>5</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

follow the Oder upstream to meet the old Polish-German border at a point immediately south of the city of Ratibor, which would be left in Germany. This solution would increase Polish territory by approximately 1,200 square miles, leaving to Germany 1,750 square miles of the territory claimed by Poland. The total population of the area transferred to Poland would be 626,000 (1925), or 363,000 (58 percent) Germans and 263,000 (42 percent) Poles. The German majority is the result of the concentration of German population in the industrial district. In the rural area lying between that district and line "C" the Poles have a strong numerical advantage, 125,000 as against 43,000.

This boundary would follow the natural line of the Oder River in its southern sector. It would leave to Poland agricultural and forest land and some light industries in addition to the heavy industries and mineral resources of the industrial district. The Polish-Czechoslovak frontier would remain unchanged and the communications between the two countries would undergo no improvement since Germany would retain the Leobschütz-Ratibor salient, through which run the main Oppeln-Ratibor-Bohumín railway and the Oder valley highway. Possession of this salient, however, would hardly give any positive strategic advantage to Germany since it would have poor communications with the rest of Germany.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

In the discussions of the Territorial Subcommittee some members preferred the line of the Oder River on the grounds that it formed a clear geographical dividing line and was as good an ethnic line as any line further west. In the end, however, these members subscribed to the subcommittee's recommendation of line "D", which runs to the west of the Oder.

*C. Transfer to Poland of the Industrial District and of Additional Territory on Both Banks of the Oder River Selected Primarily on Strategic Grounds (Line "E")*

This line would coincide with the recommended line (Line "D") in the sector between the northern boundary of the claimed area and the Oder River; from the Oder River it would run in a southwesterly direction, to meet the border of Czechoslovakia at the northernmost tip of the Krnov salient, leaving to Poland *Kreis* Leobschütz and the eastern part of *Kreis* Neustadt. By incorporating the Leobschütz salient within Poland, this solution would improve the strategic position of Poland *vis-à-vis* Germany. It would increase the length of the common boundary between Poland and Czechoslovakia by 97 miles over the pre-war boundary and would decrease the length of the Polish-German boundary in Upper Silesia by one-third.

The population of the territory which would fall to Poland is approximately 874,000 (1925), or 523,000 Germans and 351,000 Poles. In the territory remaining in Germany the population was 279,000, of whom 135,000 were Germans and 144,000 were Poles. The additional area included within Poland by line "E" but not by line "D" contains 86,000 Germans and only 11,000 Poles.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

This line was suggested by the chairman at one of the early discussions of the subcommittee and was favorably received by several other members. In later discussions it was agreed that the disadvantages of including the solidly German-populated district of Leobschütz in Poland out-weighed the advantages of securing for Poland a slightly better strategic frontier.

*D. Transfer to Poland of the Industrial District (Line "B")*

This solution would establish as the Polish-German boundary a line roughly equivalent to the dividing line which the Nazis selected after the conquest of Poland between predominantly rural *Regierungsbezirk* Oppeln and the heavily industrialized *Regierungsbezirk* Kattowitz.

This solution would transfer to Poland one-seventh of the claimed area, with 30 percent of the total population and 28 percent of all the Poles in the territory claimed. According to the 1925 census, the Polish-speaking population would be only 138,000 (30 percent of the total) while the German-speaking total would be 320,000 (70 percent). In the area remaining to Germany the Poles would number 357,000 (51 percent) and the Germans 338,000 (49 percent).

Poland would acquire the same mineral resources and plant capacity in the heavy industries as by Solution A and would be faced with the same marketing problem. It would acquire almost no light industries, agricultural hinterland or protective belt for the industrial district and would fail to improve its transport facilities or strategic position.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

Acquisition of the industrial district was considered a minimum satisfaction which should be given to Poland's territorial claims. It was thought desirable, however, that Poland should acquire additional territory west of the industrial cities.

*E. Restoration of the Pre-War Frontier*

This solution was rejected by the Territorial Subcommittee.

This solution would be in accord with the principle of minimum boundary change. Germany would retain an area having a population 56 percent German-speaking (1925). In the plebiscite of 1921, 71 percent of the population of this area, including many of the Polish-

speaking inhabitants, voted for Germany. The 1922-1939 boundary, which was based on the results of the plebiscite, probably was as fair a frontier as could be drawn at the time on the basis of the principle of national self-determination.

The establishment of this boundary in 1922 broke up the economic unity of the Upper Silesian industrial basin. Industrial plants were separated from their sources of oil and fuel, heavy industries from finishing industries, and workers' homes from their mines and factories. Unless over-all international administration or control were provided, the restoration of this boundary at the close of the present war would represent a second break-up of the unity of the area, which Germany has exploited as a whole since its conquest of Poland in 1939.

This solution would again place the Polish-German frontier within less than 30 miles of the chief rail links connecting Poland and Czechoslovakia, and Poland's great industrial district of Upper Silesia would again be adjacent to the German frontier.

#### *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

One member of the subcommittee spoke in favor of reestablishment of the pre-war frontier in combination with some degree of international administration and control to assure the unified economic exploitation of the whole Upper Silesian industrial basin. After showing some disposition to favor this solution, the subcommittee turned to the idea of the preservation of the economic unity of the area through revision of the pre-war frontier to include the industrial district of German Upper Silesia within Poland.

#### *F. Recognition of the Polish Claim (Line "F")*

This solution was rejected by the Territorial Subcommittee.

Should the full Polish claims be accepted, Poland would acquire a territory of some 2,950 square miles, with a population of 1,354,000, of whom 44 percent (in 1925) were Polish-speaking. The Polish-German boundary would run west of the Oder River from the northernmost point of the Krnov salient in Czechoslovakia northwards to a point on the Oder River below the city of Oppeln; thence along the river downstream to the boundary of the former plebiscite area and following that boundary northwards to the former Polish-German frontier. The area acquired by Poland would include a German minority of 658,000 (57 percent). This solution would shorten the Polish-German frontier in Silesia from 162 to 75 miles; it has the strength of a good strategic frontier for the Poles.

#### *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

It was conceded that the Silesian "peninsula" between Czechoslovak and Polish territory had given Germany advantages for military op-

erations against those countries. However, the subcommittee was not prepared to recommend the full extent of the Polish claims partly because of the population structure of the area and in particular because those claims would add an unnecessary number of Germans and some exclusively German territory to Poland. It was considered undesirable to include within Poland strongly German cities such as Oppeln and rural districts such as Leobschütz.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 3]

*Memorandum by Messrs. William Koren, Jr., and John C. Campbell,  
of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-29

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1943.

#### GERMANY—POLAND—CZECHOSLOVAKIA

#### TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: THE UPPER SILESIAN INDUSTRIAL BASIN

##### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition to be made of the whole industrial basin of Upper Silesia, comprising parts of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The problem arises in connection with Polish territorial demands and with any regional plans touching the area. It also arises from any plans for German disarmament.

The Upper Silesian industrial basin may be defined by circumscribing the coal, iron, zinc and lead mines of southeast Germany, southwest Poland and north central Czechoslovakia and the heavy industries based on them. Such a boundary coincides with no important topographic features. It includes the eastern tip of German Upper Silesia (*Regierungsbezirk* Oppeln), the Polish province of Silesia, part of Kielce and part of Kraków, Czech Teschen and part of Moravia. This area contains the break between the Sudeten and Carpathian mountains through which pass the Oder River and the vital railways connecting the plain of northern Europe with the valley of the Danube. The total area approximates 4712 square miles, of which, according to the 1937 boundaries, 420 lay in Germany, 3761 in Poland and 531 in Czechoslovakia. Of its total population, approximately 3,182,000, 458,000 were in the German section (1925), 2,244,000 in the Polish (1931) and 480,000 in the Czech (1930). Within each of the three national sections was a linguistic minority, amounting to 138,000 Poles in the German part of the basin, 97,000 Germans in the

Polish part, and 48,000 Germans and 86,000 Poles in the Czech industrial area.

This basin has immense coal reserves and substantial deposits of iron ore, zinc and lead. It produced in the years immediately preceding the present war approximately 22 percent of the bituminous coal mined in continental Europe outside the U.S.S.R., 8 percent of its coke, 6 percent of its pig iron, 8 percent of its crude steel, 33 percent of its zinc ore and 15 percent of its zinc. Nevertheless its serious deficiency (relative to plant capacity) in iron ore and iron and steel scrap and its total lack of steel-hardening metals, especially when taken in conjunction with its inland position and distance from steel-finishing centers and location on the border of the subsistence economy of Eastern Europe, have greatly handicapped the Upper Silesian basin in competition with the centers of heavy industry in Western Europe. It is dependent on the outside for both capital and markets; its overwhelming concentration on heavy industry makes it peculiarly vulnerable in periods of economic depression. Even the stimuli of government favors, of French occupation of the Ruhr, of the British coal strike and of the armaments race of the late 1930's did not suffice to keep much of Silesian enterprise profitable.

Until the Nazi conquest of Poland, this industrial basin had always been exploited in three relatively uncoordinated national units, before 1919 by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, and since then by Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The revision of national frontiers after the first World War and local bitterness between Poles and Czechs over Teschen and between Poles and Germans over the boundary drawn following the plebiscite of 1921 in German Upper Silesia sharply aggravated the tendency to economic nationalism. Poland tried to eliminate German ownership of its newly acquired mines and industries. In all three countries plant and railway duplication was protected and promoted by tariffs, import quotas, export bounties and differential freight rates.

The products of each part of Silesia were generally marketed within their respective countries. Although all three participated in the steel cartel, the coal companies were not organized in a cartel, and the Czechoslovak producers did not belong to the coke cartel.

The Nazis have attempted to integrate the industrial basin by consolidation of ownership in German hands, by rationalization of operation and by its political incorporation into Germany. Except for the city of Czestochowa (left in the Government-General of Poland) and the city and environs of Moravská-Ostrava in Moravia (which have been left in the Protectorate), the Germans have carefully included the coal and ore beds, the mines and industries of the entire basin

in the new *Regierungsbezirk* Kattowitz, a district of the enlarged province of Upper Silesia. At least partial maintenance of this integration would be a necessary factor favoring a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation if one should develop.

The Polish portion of the Upper Silesian basin had the most important natural resources of the three, both absolutely and in proportion to the total resources of the country. In actual output, the Polish area ranked first in coal and a poor third in iron and steel. It and the Czech portion were important to their respective countries; the German was not. Polish Silesia accounted for virtually the entire national production of coal, coke, iron ore, zinc ore and zinc, and for approximately two-thirds of that of iron and steel. The Czech portion of the basin produced almost the entire Czech output of coke and three-quarters of the country's bituminous coal, iron and steel. On the other hand, German Upper Silesia, while producing nearly one-half Germany's zinc ore, smelted none of it, accounted for only one-seventh of the country's bituminous coal output and for less than five percent of its coke, iron and steel, and produced no iron ore.

Although there has been no local sentiment for uniting the industrial basin politically, all three parts have possessed a certain amount of particularist sentiment and Polish Silesia enjoyed quasi-autonomous political institutions. The non-German-speaking inhabitants of the German Upper Silesia of 1914, part of which was transferred to Poland in 1922, spoke a Polish dialect ("wasserpolsch") rather than Polish proper. Both they and, to a less extent, the German-speaking inhabitants of the area thought of themselves until quite recent times as Silesian rather than either Polish or German.

The jurisdiction over questions of minority rights exercised by the Mixed Commission and Arbitral Tribunal, whose chairmen were appointed by the League of Nations, also marked off Polish and German Upper Silesia from the rest of the two countries. Under Austrian rule the inhabitants of the Duchy of Teschen, speaking Polish, Czech, "Slonzak" (a dialect between Polish and Czech) and German, maintained a tradition of particularism without aspiring to any real political autonomy. During the unsettled period following the last war there was some local movement for autonomy (particularly among the propertied Germans) but the majority favored incorporation into Poland or Czechoslovakia. After the division of the Duchy the Czech portion was given no special treatment; the Polish part shared in the partial autonomy of Polish Silesia.

This industrial basin includes two disputed areas: the small, central region of the former Duchy of Teschen, with a mixed Polish and Czech

population, which is claimed by both Poland and Czechoslovakia; and the greater part of German Upper Silesia, which is claimed by Poland.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Restoration of National Sovereignties and National Economic Control*

This solution has been favorably regarded by the Territorial Subcommittee.

This solution would probably accord with the desire of the majority of the inhabitants to belong to one of the three national states already constituted. It would not preclude boundary adjustments between any two of them or even the incorporation of all industrial German Upper Silesia into Poland. It would guarantee to Poland control of its pre-war heavy industries.

On the other hand, it would cause initial economic dislocation through the break-up of unified German control and would probably encourage a repetition of the extreme economic nationalism which resulted in the inefficient exploitation of the industrial basin between the wars. (This probability would be negated if industrial German Upper Silesia were transferred to Poland and the projected Polish-Czechoslovak federation became an economic reality.) Even if boundary changes were made, this solution would not solve the problem of the existence of large ethnic minorities in the respective national units.

#### *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The subcommittee felt that this solution would involve the least political difficulties. It was agreed that the unity of the greater part of the industrial basin could be assured by the cession of the industrial district of German Upper Silesia to Poland, which the subcommittee recommended, and that the inclusion of the remainder in a unified economic system would then depend on the economic relations established between Czechoslovakia and Poland. It was thought that the unification of the greater part of the area in this way would benefit all the states of Eastern Europe, especially if associated together through economic arrangements or some regional organization, since those states represent an accessible market for Silesian industrial products, particularly in view of the reported construction of the Oder-Danube Canal.

### B. *Restoration of National Sovereignties Combined with International Economic Control*

This solution would guarantee the maintenance of the industrial integration introduced by the Nazis and would thus promote the efficient exploitation of the entire basin. It would permit the area's

economy to be directed either by the participating states acting jointly or by an instrumentality of a larger European or a world organization. It would satisfy the wishes of the inhabitants to belong to one of the three states already constituted and would permit rectification of boundaries without unbalancing the economic structure of the area.

This solution would, however, make the economic and military security of Poland and, to a less degree, that of Czechoslovakia dependent on the good-will of the international agency directing the Upper Silesian economy. If that agency were to be controlled by outside states, this solution would arouse the hostility of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It would in any case encounter frictions attendant upon the unprecedented coexistence of international direction of economic life with three national political sovereignties.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

Several members of the subcommittee suggested that the disposition of the Silesian industrial basin must be considered in the light of the general economic arrangements possible for Europe, and for Eastern Europe in particular. The nature of these arrangements was not yet clear. One member expressed the opinion that, if international control in Upper Silesia were limited to economic matters, the political difficulties of internationalization would be minimized. The subcommittee considered no specific plan of "international exploitation" of Upper Silesia and made no recommendation.

*C. Creation of a New Political Unit To Coincide With the Upper Silesian Industrial Basin*

This solution was regarded unfavorably by the Territorial Subcommittee.

The unit so created might set up its own government or be administered by an instrumentality of an international organization; it might be wholly independent or a unit of an East European or other union.

This solution would preserve and probably perfect the economic integration begun by the Nazis.

On the other hand, this solution would deprive Poland of a vital industrial area on which it has depended both for military potential and for exports essential to its balance of payments. It would also constitute a far more serious economic blow to both Poland and Czechoslovakia than to Germany. It would place under a common sovereignty fractions of three peoples who have desired to be segregated from each other and to be united with their co-nationals and two of which have been grievously oppressed by the third. Furthermore, the new political unit would lie athwart the main rail and road

links between Poland and Czechoslovakia and between Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia.

Economically, such a unit would be peculiarly vulnerable to foreign pressure since it would be unable to feed itself, would require outside capital, would depend on imports of iron ore, iron and steel scrap, and steel-hardening metals, and would have to export the major portion of its output to areas most of which would possess satisfactory alternative sources of supply.

*Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The subcommittee did not consider seriously this solution because of its obvious political difficulties. Mention was made of a possible international corporation, enjoying certain political powers and privileges, which might govern the Silesian area. The general sentiment of the subcommittee was against such a solution.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 4]

*Memorandum by Mr. Harry N. Howard, of the Division of Political Affairs*

SECRET  
H-13

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1943.

GERMANY—CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: GERMAN-CZECHOSLOVAK BOUNDARIES

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the determination of the boundary between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The problem arises from the demand made by the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile for the restoration of the territory seized by Germany in 1938.

Czechoslovakia's claim for the integral restoration of its pre-Munich frontiers is supported by the Soviet Union and by the French National Committee (Fighting France). While the United States and Great Britain do not recognize the frontiers established by the Munich Agreement of 1938, neither is committed to restoration of any specific boundaries.

The Treaty of Saint-Germain of 1919 restored the historic frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia with a few minor modifications, because it was thought that only within them could the political, strategic and economic independence of Czechoslovakia be assured. As a result

of this decision, one of the largest single minority groups in Europe—3,300,000 Sudeten Germans (1930 census), the greater part of whom lived in the frontier districts contiguous to Germany and Austria—was left within Czechoslovakia, which had a total population of about 15,000,000. The Sudeten districts contained about 80 percent of the coal and lignite of Czechoslovakia, 70 percent of the metallurgical industry, 80 percent of the textiles, a considerable portion of the timber, and almost all the glass and china industry.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Return to the Pre-Munich (1937) Frontiers With Cession of Six Czechoslovak Salients to Germany* (Indicated on Maps B-4 to B-7, German Series; and Maps B-3 to B-6, Czechoslovak Series.)

This solution was favored by the Political and Territorial Subcommittees.

This solution would involve the return to the frontiers of 1937, with the exception of the salients of Aš (Asch), Rumburk-Varnsdorf-Sluknov (Rumburg-Warnsdorf-Schluckenau), Frýdlant (Friedland), Broumov (Braunau), and Frývaldov-Krnov (Freiwaldau-Jägerndorf). The total area of the salients is 792 square miles. The German population (1930) was 306,000 (96 percent) and the Czechoslovak population was 14,000 (4 percent). Agriculture and light industries, especially textiles, dominate the economic life of the salients. Cession of the salients would not injure Czechoslovakia economically or cut any major railway communications. It would leave in Czechoslovak hands the main mountain barriers which protect the Bohemian basin.

The American Delegation at the Paris Conference favored cession of Aš and Rumburk to Germany, while the Czechs were willing to cede Aš and to cut the Frýdlant and Frývaldov salients in return for compensations in the Glatz region and on the North Bohemian frontiers. The Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, although insisting on the recognition of the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia within its 1937 frontiers, has expressed a willingness to make minor rectifications through the constitutional organs of the restored Republic; rectifications thus far hinted at affect several but not all of the salients listed above. Such minor modifications, including even the six salients, would not satisfy the demands of German nationalists.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee favored the restoration of the 1937 pre-Munich frontiers, with the exception of the six salients, which,

because of their position beyond the mountain barriers and their marked German character, could be transferred to Germany without economic or strategic injury to Czechoslovakia.

2. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee generally concurred in the views of the Territorial Subcommittee.

B. *Return to the 1937 Frontiers With Cession of Six Czechoslovak Salients to Germany, and Compensations for Czechoslovakia*  
(Compensation for Czechoslovakia indicated on Map 49, German Series.)

Research on the problem of compensations for Czechoslovakia indicates the possibility of adjustments in the regions of Glatz and Leobschütz-Ratibor, involving about 770 square miles, and a population of about 125,000, of whom about 20,000 may be Czech. Such a cession would improve the strategic position of Czechoslovakia, particularly with respect to the Silesian and Moravian industrial districts. It would have the grave disadvantage, however, of adding to Czechoslovakia German-speaking regions which have never been a part of the Republic.

Official Czechoslovak circles in London have expressed no desire for such extensive compensation. They have, however, expressed a desire for slight accessions of territory in the Adlergebirge without acquiring any substantial number of Germans. The line suggested by them would run south from Broumov (Braunau), turn southeast half way between Glatz and the 1937 frontier, and continue eastward near Frývaldov (Freiwaldau).

1. *Discussion of the Subcommittees*

Both the Political and Territorial Subcommittees approved the principle of compensations for Czechoslovakia in the Glatz and Leobschütz-Ratibor areas, but neither subcommittee discussed the problem in detail.

C. *Return to the Pre-Munich Frontiers Without Modification*

This solution is desired in principle by the Czechoslovak Government-in-exile, and by former German political parties in Czechoslovakia (liberals, clericals, Social Democrats, and Communists), representing in the elections of 1935 perhaps one-third of the German population. The French National Committee and the Soviet Government favor this solution. While such a restoration of frontiers may be justified on historic, legal, economic and strategic grounds, the same ends may be achieved through the acceptance of the first alternative, which

has the additional advantage of relieving Czechoslovakia of a significant part of its German minority.

1. *Discussion of the Subcommittees*

In view of the decided preference of the Political and Territorial Subcommittees for the first alternative solution, there was no detailed discussion of this solution. One member of the Territorial Subcommittee definitely favored simple retention of the 1937 frontiers.

D. *Cession to Germany of German-Majority Districts Adjacent to the Frontier*

(Indicated on Map B-2, German Series; Map B-1, Czechoslovak Series.)

The cession of districts adjacent to the 1937 frontier containing fifty-one percent German majorities or above would affect an area of 8,730 square miles. It would restore about 2,300,000 Germans to Germany, transferring 400,000 Czechoslovaks to Germany, and leaving 1,000,000 Germans in Czechoslovakia. It would take from Czechoslovakia all strategic mountain barriers, destroy the communication system, and remove the most vital heavy industries. While such a cession would involve a somewhat smaller area and population than were transferred by the Munich settlement, its general effects on Czechoslovakia would be the same. The strategic argument against the cession of the German-inhabited areas would have little value in case an effective international security organization were established.

1. *Discussion of the Subcommittees*

The Territorial Subcommittee rejected this solution because it would deprive Czechoslovakia of vital resources and industries and would leave it without natural defenses. The Political Subcommittee concurred in the views of the Territorial Subcommittee.

E. *Retention of the Munich Frontiers*

Cession to Germany of the Munich frontiers would involve an area of about 11,700 square miles, with a population of about 3,600,000, of whom some 740,000 are Czechoslovaks. The probable effect of this solution would be to destroy the possibility of an independent Czechoslovakia, since it would remove the vital heavy industries, disrupt the system of communications, and break the mountain barriers. It would also mean rewarding the aggressor and penalizing the victim of aggression.

1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

It was agreed that return to the Munich frontiers was impossible if an independent Czechoslovakia were to be restored, since the Munich

frontiers would deprive Czechoslovakia of her industries, natural resources, and natural frontiers.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 5]

*Memorandum by Mr. David Harris, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-31

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

### GERMANY—AUSTRIA

#### TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: THE AUSTRO-GERMAN FRONTIER

##### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the delimitation of the frontier between Germany and an Austria either restored to complete independence or joined in a Danubian federation.

The boundary of 1937 extending from the crest of the Böhmerwald in the East to the Lake of Constance in the West was the product of a long historic development. Most of the 460 miles of the line were established before the disturbances of the French Revolution. In 1815 there were several small changes, but thereafter the frontier was undisturbed until the annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938.

Following the annexation an area of some 316 square kilometers, with 2,132 inhabitants, was transferred from the Austrian province of Vorarlberg to the Bavarian district of Sonthofen. The area involved is a small valley lying north of the crest of the mountains and is more accessible from Germany than from Austria.

The Archduke Otto von Hapsburg has asserted a claim for the annexation by Austria of Berchtesgaden and of the important railway bridgehead of Passau on the ground of historic and strategic considerations.<sup>6</sup>

The pre-1938 frontier followed, in general, the crest of the mountains from the Lake of Constance to the vicinity of Salzburg whence it followed rivers—the Salzach, the Inn, and the Danube—to a point near the Bohemian mountains. In the western segment there are several passes between the two countries, but only one affords an important railway connection. The only other railways and highways cross the frontier at Salzburg, Braunau-am-Inn and Passau.

On the two sides of the frontier are Catholics of German language divided in culture by their different political experiences. Those cul-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *post*, p. 1111.

tural divergences, however, have been too slight, and the boundary has been too long established, to have created a conventional frontier problem.

Economically, likewise, there has been no cause for friction. The frontier region is lacking in significant mineral resources and in industry. The extensive traffic in electric power in both directions has given rise to no political problem.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *The Present Frontier*

This solution would accept the slight modification—indicated in red on map 4 of the Austrian series—effected in favor of Germany after the annexation of Austria. This change, involving only a small number of people and a small area shut off by the mountains from easy connection with Austria, was made for administrative convenience rather than for political considerations, and there would be no reason to intervene unless subsequently the two thousand inhabitants presented convincing claims of dissatisfaction. No strategic considerations are involved.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee was not disposed to make a political issue out of the change. In the opinion of one member familiar with the area, the rectification was a useful and proper adjustment.

### B. *The Pre-1938 Frontier*

This solution would simply restore to Austria the area discussed above.

### C. *Cession of Berchtesgaden and Passau to Austria*

The solution proposed by Archduke Otto would transfer to Austria approximately 40,000 Germans in the Berchtesgaden appendix and 25,000 in Passau. The two territories belonged to ecclesiastical princes in the eighteenth century rather than to the House of Habsburg and came into Bavarian possession during the Napoleonic period. Austria has therefore no historic claims and the possible prestige accruing to Austria by the acquisition of these localities would hardly compensate for the damage done to Austro-German relations by the creation of two irredentist points. The strategic considerations hinted at by the pretender have little value, even in terms of traditional military concepts. Any relocation of the frontier at the expense of Germany would mean extending the Austrian position beyond natural lines into the plain.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 6]

*Memorandum by Miss Evelyn M. Acomb, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-30

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1943.

GERMANY—FRANCE  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: ALSACE—LORRAINE

## I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of Alsace and a part of Lorraine.

The problem arises because of the persistent conflicting French and German claims and because of certain proposals for its inclusion as a member-state in a Rhineland federation.

The United States, Great Britain and Czechoslovakia have promised to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France. The Soviet Union, while pledging itself to the restoration of independence, has made no specific reference to frontiers.

France was forced to cede most of Alsace (except Belfort and a strip surrounding it) and a part of Lorraine (the *département* of Moselle) to Germany in 1871, and recovered them in 1919. This territory has an area of 5,605 square miles and a population of close to two million. The inhabitants of Alsace are primarily German-speaking, but the large majority speak French as well; those of Lorraine are partly German-speaking, with a French-speaking majority in the West. In both the population is chiefly Catholic.

The iron ore of this region is important to both Germany and France. Under French rule it was the source of approximately two-fifths of the national production, amounting to almost one-fifth of the entire output of the continent of Europe exclusive of the Soviet Union, or to one and a half times the total production of Germany. Germany's Thomas steel furnaces in the Ruhr and the Saar, which required French iron ore, consumed close to one-fifth of total French production and possibly a higher proportion of the Moselle output. Moselle coal production was almost one-seventh of the French total, or  $\frac{1}{33}$  of that of Germany.

After 1871 the people of Alsace-Lorraine as a whole were dissatisfied under German rule and hoped for reunion with France. After 1919 their economic situation improved with the relative prosperity of France, compared with that of Germany, but they still had many grievances. Most French governments provoked unrest by policies of centralization and anti-clericalism. Many inhabitants of the provinces

desired regional autonomy, bi-lingualism in schools, courts and civil service, and maintenance of the Concordat.

Nazi Germany has, to all intents and purposes, treated this territory as annexed. Contrary to the terms of the 1940 armistice with France, it has established a German civil administration in this area. It has carried on a rigorous policy of Germanization and Nazification, and has integrated the economy of the territory with that of the Greater Reich. The Germans have reportedly settled in Alsace a considerable number of former Alsatians and other Germans and have expelled "disloyal" elements. Resistance to German rule is strong and widespread, even by admission of German newspapers.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France*

This solution was tentatively approved by the Political Subcommittee.

The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France would satisfy French national feeling and would accord with the declared policy of this country and other members of the United Nations. It would satisfy the wishes of the inhabitants, especially if the policy of France were not one of centralization and anti-clericalism. This solution would weaken Germany and strengthen France by returning to the latter the source of almost 40 percent of its iron ore and almost 14 percent of its coal. It would also reincorporate in France powerful fortifications.

This solution would, however, require the dissolution of the economic integration of this area with the rest of Germany which has taken place since 1940. It would place in different customs and currency areas the iron and steel industries of the Ruhr and Saar, which consume Moselle iron, and the iron and steel industry of Moselle, which consumes Ruhr and Saar coal.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

In the discussions approving this solution, one member stated that the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France was justified despite the large number of German-speaking inhabitants before 1940, because of German violence, destruction of property, and depopulation of France. Another declared that a strong France was necessary to the United States. Evidence of anti-German feeling in Alsace was introduced.

#### 2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee tentatively accepted the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France.

B. *Incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine in a Rhineland federation composed, in addition, of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Baden, and Germany west of the Rhine.*

Such a federation would serve as a buffer between France and Germany and between Great Britain and Germany. The Alsatians are culturally akin to the peoples of the Rhine Province. The Rhine would serve as a unifying factor in the field of transportation, and the ports of Belgium and the Netherlands would service the entire area of the federation. Germany's economic strength would be somewhat but not vitally weakened by the territorial losses involved. A Rhineland federation would be large enough to form one unit in a larger Western European Federation, if such were created.

This solution would represent a reversal of stated American and British intentions. Furthermore, because the heavy industry of the Ruhr would be left to Germany, it would not by itself impose any serious limitation on Germany's war potential. The proposed member states would probably be reluctant to join in a basically artificial creation of this type, and would be confronted with the certainty of German irredentism. Its importance as a buffer state would tend to diminish with the development of air power. Although the federation would include a part of Germany in which there has been some sentiment for autonomy, there is no evidence that it would be acceptable locally in the Rhineland, still less in the rest of Germany. The states to be united in the federation are disparate in government, historical traditions and religion. These same arguments would tend to militate against any purely economic arrangements in this area.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

It was agreed that this solution should be discussed, since the Governments of Belgium and Luxembourg were considering it without having come to a decision, and since such a federation might prove a means of controlling the armament industry in the Rhineland. It was stated that the Political Subcommittee had not consented to place Alsace-Lorraine in a West German state, and that the Netherlands government at present would disapprove of including it in such a state.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee rejected this plan. It believed that security should be achieved by controlling armaments and by supervising the uses of economic power within Germany rather than by territorial transfers. It was convinced that Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland would be unwilling to participate in a Rhineland state, because it would involve them in measures of security which might permanently antagonize Germany.

*C. Incorporation of Alsace-Lorraine into a Rhineland federation composed, in addition, of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany west of the Rhine, and the Ruhr area.*

Most of the arguments relevant to Solution B apply also to this solution. This federation, however, would not involve Switzerland, which traditionally has preferred to remain isolated from Great Power arrangements. It would weaken Germany by including the great industrial area of Western Germany. It would give maximum political recognition to the economic integration of Alsace-Lorraine and the Ruhr.

*1. Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

One member declared that such a confederation might give considerable local autonomy to its members and receive an international guarantee of its integrity. It might be a factor for peace, especially because its mixture of nationalities would deter it from war. Another member stated, however, that the international control of cartels, including armaments industries, would be an easier solution; and that the United States was solemnly committed to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France.

[Here follow sections headed "Documentation" and "Plans for Further Research".]

[Enclosure 7]

*Memorandum by Miss Madeleine Hale, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-16

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1943.

GERMANY—BELGIUM

TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: EUPEN, MALMÉDY AND MORESNET

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of the districts of Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet, i.e., the delimitation of the entire German-Belgian frontier.

The problem arises for three principal reasons: 1) the Belgian government-in-exile demands the return of these districts after Germany is defeated; 2) Germany claims a lack of popular sanction for the 1920 transfer of these territories to Belgium; and 3) the population of these districts is for the most part German-speaking.

These three districts, previously a part of Germany, were awarded to Belgium in 1920 under the Treaty of Versailles. Modifications of the

boundary were made during the following two years whereby the Eupen-Monschau-Malmédy railway was awarded to Belgium, as well as other portions of German territory including part of the *Kreis* of Monschau; small German enclaves were left between the railway and the Belgian frontier line. On May 19, 1940, by a decree of Hitler, this whole region was re-incorporated into the Reich.

The three districts have a combined area of 367 square miles and had a total population in 1930 of 67,000, more than 70 percent of whom were German-speaking. The contested territory is of very little importance to the economy of either Belgium or Germany. Whatever strategic significance they may have had in 1914 has been virtually eliminated by modern methods of warfare.

Germany after 1919 claimed these districts on the basis of historic right and ethnic composition. It insistently criticized what it claimed to be the unfair and coercive nature of the open-registers on which persons of German nationality had theoretically the right to protest a cession already made. Despite the League of Nations' acceptance of the Belgian defense of the "consultation", the German Government continued to press for a genuine plebiscite to be held under the supervision of the League of Nations.

The Belgian Government-in-exile bases its claims on the prescriptions of the Treaty of Versailles and on the confirmed legality of the consultation in 1920. It insists on the sufficiency of that procedure as an index of the desires of the population, and has pointed out that in all provincial and general elections for the past two decades a pro-Belgian majority consistently defeated pro-German elements, which in recent years were supported by the Nazis. It contends further that the economy of the whole region is integrated with that of Belgium.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Restoration of the 1939 Frontier*

(Indicated on Cartogram 1-A, Belgian Series, as Line A).

This solution has been accepted by the Political and Territorial Subcommittees.

This solution would accord with the principle of minimum boundary change. It would permit Belgium to regain the minor economic advantages of the Versailles settlement, such as the forests and small industries, the control of the headwaters of rivers important to its canals, and a frontier which possibly has some strategic value. On the other hand, the return of the districts to Belgium would provide for no expression of the desires of the inhabitants and might give Germany an excuse for future agitation and perhaps even aggression.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

In the deliberations of the Political Subcommittee it was felt that the use of the open-register voting system in 1920 had been unsatisfactory, but that, considering the adjustments which took place after 1918, no change in the pre-1940 situation should be made.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

In view of the good treatment which the German-speaking minorities had enjoyed between the wars under Belgian rule, the Territorial Subcommittee agreed that the 1939 frontier should be restored, subject to adjustments to be agreed upon between Germany and Belgium after examination *in situ* of the railway line connecting the two areas and of the German enclaves to the west of it.

B. *Division of the Region According to the Linguistic Line*

(Indicated on Cartogram 1-A, Belgian Series, as Line B).

Under this solution, only the northwestern part of Malmédy, including the town, would be restored to Belgium. By this solution 2,200 Germans and 10,000 Walloons would remain in Belgium, and 49,100 Germans and 2,100 Walloons would go to Germany. There would result, of course, a temporary dislocation of local economic life, and Belgium would lose whatever strategic advantage the 1939 frontier may have offered.

C. *Division of the Region According to the Results of a Plebiscite*

A plebiscite, if held under effective international supervision, would probably lead to a more accurate determination of the wishes of the inhabitants than the open-register system used in 1920. A line drawn on the basis of a vote, however, might easily result in a partial disregard of economic and strategic considerations.

D. *Restoration to Germany of Monschau and Segments of the Railway*

Such a solution would decrease the number of Germans under Belgian jurisdiction. On the other hand, it would deprive Belgium of the only existing direct railway link between Eupen and Malmédy, thus necessitating construction of new lines on the Belgian side of the border or reliance upon the more roundabout railway through Limburg and Stavelot.

E. *Incorporation Into Belgium of All Territory Between the Railway and the Old Boundaries of Eupen-Malmédy, Thereby Eliminating the Former German Enclaves*

While this would simplify and strengthen Belgian control of the railway, it would mean including more Germans within Belgium's frontiers.

*F. A Compromise Between the 1914 and 1922 Boundaries*  
(Indicated as Line F on Cartogram A-1, Belgian Series).

A line based partly on ethnic considerations and partly upon the watersheds of the area would give Neutral Moresnet (La Calamine) and Neu Moresnet (now included in Eupen) to Belgium, leaving the Moselle-Rhine system in Germany and the tributaries of the Meuse in Belgium. A small part of northeastern Eupen, the northeastern section of Malmédy, and most of St.-Vith would go to Germany. Belgium, on the other hand, would retain most of the strategic and all of the hydrographic advantages of solution A, while it would lose some forest land and possession of the Eupen-Monschau-Malmédy railway. St.-Vith, which is probably more closely tied with Belgian-Luxemburg culture and economy than with German, would go to Germany; and Eupen, more German in its orientation, would go to Belgium. This compromise line would give approximately 18,000 Germans and 500 Walloons to Germany, and leave 36,000 Germans and 12,000 Walloons in Belgium. An accompanying exchange of population would result in a more equal distribution of minority groups on both sides of the line.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 8]

*Memorandum by Mr. Amry Vandenbosch, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-23

[WASHINGTON,] July 16, 1943.

GERMANY—THE NETHERLANDS  
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: FRONTIER ALONG THE EMS RIVER

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the clarification of the German-Netherlands boundary at the mouth of the Ems River.

The problem arises from the lack of a specific delimitation of the frontier in the estuary and from the claims of the Dutch Government for a frontier following the main channel of the river.

The Dutch-Hanoverian treaty of 1824 which has provided the juridical basis for the frontier merely stipulated the Ems River without further specification. By a new German-Dutch treaty in 1896 the German Government agreed to establish the necessary navigational aids in the estuary, but the Netherlands shared the expense. The

German Government, despite its acceptance of Dutch aid, acted on the assumption that the frontier lay on the west side of the estuary along the Dutch shore-line. During the preceding war and from the beginning of the present conflict Germany exercised belligerent rights over the whole of the estuary. It justified its assertion of sovereignty on the ground of historic rights which the Dutch Government has consistently rejected.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This problem has not been discussed in the subcommittees.

### A. *Frontier Following the Middle of the Main Channel*

This solution would conform to the principle of international law which holds that, whenever a treaty designates a navigable river as the boundary between two states, the main or the most frequently used channel constitutes the frontier. Such a line would give equal protection to Dutch and German interests in the use of the channel, without injury to any proper German interest.

### B. *Retention of the Line Claimed by Germany*

This solution would give Germany continued control over the entrance to the Dutch port of Delfzijl and the Delfzijl-Groningen Canal and would make the Dutch dependent upon German goodwill in the maintenance of the navigational aids in these channels.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

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Lot 60 D 224

*The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Unity or Partition of Germany

There are attached two memoranda on the problem of unity or partition of what will remain of Germany if certain boundary adjustments discussed in another set of memoranda<sup>2</sup> are made. The first

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<sup>1</sup> Although this memorandum was presented to Hull in anticipation of the First Quebec Conference, the actual discussion at that conference of the possible dismemberment of Germany was in general terms and did not involve the study of specific possible lines of division. For the minutes of the Hull-Eden discussion of this subject on August 21, 1943, see *post*, p. 927.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

memorandum<sup>3</sup> is a brief version of the second, much longer and more detailed paper. Maps are attached showing tentative plans of possible partition.<sup>4</sup>

The weight of argument definitely appears to be against any attempt at a forcible division of Germany into several parts. This does not, of course, exclude encouragement of voluntary separation of the various sections of Germany.

In this connection, it would be of the utmost importance that, if Germany is to remain united, the power of Prussia within the country be greatly reduced. There are several ways of doing this, and we are now working on an analysis of these possibilities.<sup>5</sup>

L[EO] P[ASVOLSKY]

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by Mr. David Harris, of the Division of Political Studies*<sup>6</sup>

SECRET  
H-24

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1943.

## GERMANY: PARTITION

### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is an assessment of the desirability, and the determination of the possible character and the duration of a partition of Germany in the interest of post-war security.

The problem arises by virtue of proposals advanced by certain officials of the United States, British and exiled Governments.

The issue involved in the proposal is not phrased in terms of a choice between partition and no control whatever, but rather in terms of the utility of partition as a possible substitute for, or supplement to, controls in the form of occupation, disarmament and restrictions on political and economic freedom of action.

### II. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

#### A. *Partition or Unity*

##### 1. *An Introductory Statement of Basic Arguments*

*a. For Partition.*—In favor of partitioning Germany is the judgment that, whether there be an international organization or not,

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here. For the text of this summary memorandum, see Notter, pp. 554-557.

<sup>4</sup> The accompanying maps are not reproduced.

<sup>5</sup> Following this covering memorandum in the file is a table of contents (not printed) to the enclosed documents and the accompanying maps.

<sup>6</sup> The text of this document is preceded in the file by a table of contents (not printed).

military and economic disarmament either would be insufficient or would be abandoned by the victorious powers and that, accordingly, the way to insure peace is to break up this great concentration of force in the heart of Europe.

*b. For Unity.*—In favor of leaving the Reich as a unit at the end of the war are the contentions (1) that the rigorous enforcement of carefully planned military and economic controls would effectively restrain Germany, (2) that because of the prospective hostility of the mass of the German people partition would needlessly complicate the problem of control by necessitating the imposition and the maintenance of the separation by force for an indefinite period, and (3) that the nationalistic resistance evoked by partition would jeopardize eventual German reconciliation with the peace settlement and constructive German participation in the desired world order.

## *2. Implications of Partition*

Partition as a means of stripping the Germans of the ability to make war would require a genuine dispersal of the instrumentalities which have made the Reich so powerful. Foremost among these instrumentalities have been the actual war machine built of men and matériel, the nationally integrated economy, and the centralized political control.

### *a. Partition and the War Machine*

(1) *The Period of Occupation.*—The security measures desirable in the period immediately following the defeat of Germany are occupation of strategic points and areas, demobilization of the army and destruction of its equipment, and maintenance of order and other essential governmental functions. It is pertinent to ask if partition would make a useful contribution to the administration of occupation. The necessity for rapid movement of the occupying forces from one area to another and the manifest dangers to allied harmony in assigning parts of Germany to the troops of individual allies have led to the common determination that occupation of the whole of Germany should be the work of a single United Nations authority. While this single authority might subdivide its functions into regions coterminous with the hypothetical partite states without necessarily injuring its efficiency, there is no apparent ground for supposing that partition would aid in the work of occupation; in a crisis all German administrative lines would have to be ignored.

A second question relative to the occupation period would be whether partition would be an economical substitute for measures otherwise essential. It might be answered that the uncertainties prevailing in a

defeated Germany would hardly warrant relaxing any security measures before the full effects of partition could be measured, an assessment which would require at least several years. In the meanwhile, therefore, the occupying authorities would have the duty of administering the same measures required in case Germany was left united and would have in addition the task of enforcing partition.

(2) *The Period of Reconstruction.*—In the subsequent and more hazardous period of reconstruction the emphasis will be placed on maintaining disarmament and on curbing dangerous economic enterprises. Again, the necessity for a common supervision of the whole of Germany seems apparent although, as in the earlier period, there might be no necessary impairment of efficiency through administrative subdividing to conform to the partite lines.

In case of German resistance to partition, the supervising authorities could not relax any of the established controls and would, in addition, have the further burdens of coping with the increased animus of the Germans and of thwarting attempts of the partite states to work surreptitiously together. In case, however, the German people accepted partition in good faith and the several regions went separate ways, it would be possible to reward good behavior in a given state with a progressive abandonment of restrictions. Yet since the system of controls prospectively would be the same during an indeterminate time whether Germany was partitioned or united, partition would create an additional barrier to reconciliation unless German national unity broke down through inner collapse.

In either the occupation or the subsequent period, it might be concluded, partition would seem to have no prime relevance to the problem of destroying and keeping destroyed the German war machine.

#### *b. Partition and German Economy*

Germany's closely integrated economy constitutes a portentous war threat. If partition—as distinguished from other forms of control—is to be an effective means of weakening Germany, it is necessary to examine its implications for this potentially dangerous instrumentality. Should Germany remain united, its economy would be a potentially serious menace as soon as the original controls were relaxed. Should Germany, on the other hand, be partitioned, the attendant economic problems would place before the victors the dilemma—discussed at greater length below—of deciding whether to leave the economy wholly or partially intact and have it consequently maintain a strong pressure for national unity or to break up this formidable concentration of strength at the expense of the German and the European standards of living.

*c. Partition and National Unity*

The creation of partite states through the action of the victorious powers would not necessarily do more than effect a nominal rupture of Germany's political unity. A genuine break-up of the Reich would be possible only through a changed outlook of the German people or through coercion.

(1) *The Prospective German Attitude.*—German acceptance of partition would mean a reversal of a century-old trend, and would involve a shift of major loyalty from the Reich and from the nation as a whole to a geographic subdivision. Such a change would be possible if marked geographic lines of cleavage either exist at the end of the war or could be fostered.

While it is possible to assert that Bismarck created the empire through blood and iron, once it was created there was no serious movement questioning the unity of the Reich. Particularism as a doctrine of independence came to an end in 1871; after that date it merged with federalism as a program for the preservation, or restoration, of the privileges of the historic states within the imperial framework. Separatism has meant a desire for separation, not from the Reich, but from one of the constituent states such as Prussia. It has normally not implied a desire to sever connections with united Germany but simply an internal readjustment. The attempts in 1919 and 1923 to establish an independent Rhineland had little popular support despite the exceptionally trying times; French patronage of the movement robbed it of all prestige in German eyes.

Loyalty to one of the ancient princely dynasties did not in the period from 1871 to 1914 appear to the average German incompatible with allegiance to the Reich, although devotion to the old states impelled a federal constitution in 1871 and prevented the formation of a unitary state in 1919. The roots of provincial differences run deep into Germany's past, but for over a century economic, cultural and political developments have been in the direction of greater national integration.

During the Weimar period, in general terms, federalism was supported by the nationalists, conservatives and reactionaries and the centralizing, unitary movements by the liberals and radicals. The debate between the two parties, however, was not over the existence of one Germany but over the internal constitutional organization. The remarkably uniform upsurge of the National Socialist party all over Germany after 1928 suggests no material geographic variations in the strength of the national sentiment.

One of the historic lines of cleavage within Germany has been the religious, but there is little conclusive information to be drawn from

the Weimar period to support an assumption that religious affiliations might serve as a substantial basis for the hypothetical partite states. About one-half of the Catholics regularly voted for the Center Party and consequently in preponderantly Catholic areas the Marxist and Nazi vote was somewhat less than in Protestant regions, but not enough less to indicate a significantly different kind of political life. In the Nazi period the common persecution suffered by Protestants and Catholics has drawn the two groups closer together than at any time in the past.

There have been within the past year some indications of a recrudescence of centrifugal forces, yet the present evidence points to no organically sound and popular movement that would go beyond a mild form of decentralized federalism in which Prussia's special position would be reduced. The most reasonable expectation, accordingly, is that an externally imposed break-up of the Reich would evoke bitter opposition from the German people. Coercion would seem to be the only means calculable at present of instituting and maintaining a plan of partition.

(2) *Problems of Coercion.*—Coercion as the means of perpetuating the dismemberment of Germany would create several problems.

One of these problems would be the frustration of German attempts to circumvent partition. In the field of economic activity, a customs union would open the door to a wide gamut of common action; an imposed independence would probably inspire a diversity of parallel activities which would in the end be common activities. Likewise in the political field, identical political parties and identical legislation could go far toward nullifying partition. Another possible means of circumvention would be the choice by the several states of the same executive. Resentful Germans could invent countless devices not easily subject to veto.

The duration of the settlement in the face of German opposition will depend on the continued unanimity of the victorious powers. That unanimity, in turn, will depend to no little degree on how well treaties drafted at the end of the war stand the test of a peace-time sense of justice and meet the economic and political requirements of the post-war years when the dangers of Germany's militarism will not be so poignantly felt as now and when German propagandists will exploit every occasion to divide the allies over the justice of the peace settlement. It is to be anticipated that every conflict of opinion between the victors will open the door for a German *fait accompli* and that every concession will be interpreted by a large body of Germans as a victory of obstruction rather than as a reward for good conduct. It can also be envisaged that the several resentful entities might either

actively or passively invite one or more of the victor powers to stake out special claims for power and influence.

*Committee Discussions of Unity vs. Partition*

*The Political Subcommittee*

In the deliberations of the Political Subcommittee the supporters of partition took their stand on the thesis that world security demands that Germany should never again become a menace to international peace. The means to that end, they thought, was the destruction of the power concentrated in the government of the Reich and the decentralization of German energies by a divisioning that would split and cut across the political and moral forces of the land. After the world's previous experiences there was great danger, it was emphasized, that a Germany united would in years to come be working once more for a dominant position; the United Nations could not afford to run the risk again in the face of a two-hundred year old record of dynamic power.

Partition was represented as an aid for the immediate post-war period in controlling Germany's war industries and as a procedure which would permit a special military control of Prussia for the next quarter- or half-century. The advocates of partition anticipated that in the long run the act of dividing Germany would be a powerful supplement to invasion as a demonstration of the necessity for a change of heart with respect to military ambitions. It was hoped that the proposed action might not only force the Germans into law-abiding behavior but also allow them, under the leadership of anti-Prussian and other peaceful groups, to find a prosperous and happy place in the new world order.

In opposition to the proposal the contention was advanced that it would be of questionable wisdom to rely for the means of controlling Germany on such a doubtful procedure as partition. The necessary controls, it was reported from the deliberations of the Territorial Subcommittee, would not differ materially regardless of whether Germany was divided or not, and those controls, in the opinion of certain members of the Political Subcommittee would be adequate if they were strictly enforced. It was also reported that the Security Subcommittee foresaw a complication of the machinery of control and a larger army of occupation in case of partition.

In reply to these conclusions it was insisted that, since the occupying forces would operate under one United Nations authority, the boundaries of the partite states would not be a handicap to prompt action, and it was claimed that the controls necessary in both the occupation period and subsequently could be administered as efficiently over several units as over one. One opponent of the Security Subcom-

mittee's judgment maintained that there was nothing, from the viewpoint of security, which would favor the maintenance of German unity as against dividing Germany and keeping the parts separated.

A report of the views of the Economic Subcommittee emphasized the high degree of integration of German economy and held that almost any kind of division of Germany would reduce the national efficiency. While the belief was advanced that partition would be possible in a general European organization, doubt was expressed as to the desirability of a customs union as suggested in the original proposal. It was anticipated that the entailed break-up of economic unity would mean a period of disruption and that the customs union would create pressures for further collaboration which, if successful, would reduce the partite states simply to political units of little importance.

In defense of separate political administrations despite a considerable measure of economic unity, hope was voiced that the partite states would receive the support of religious and other centrifugal forces. Criticism of this hope, however, pointed out that, under such an arrangement, Germany would be the scene of a contest between a centralized economy and a decentralized political life and that in recent years economic forces, under comparable circumstances, had won out.

Counselling against fragmentation, according to repeatedly expressed opinions, was the improbability that the victorious powers would enforce the peace settlement. While one member anticipated the probable failure to control armaments and centered his hopes on partition as the best means of security, others focussed their doubts upon the enforcement of partition. It seemed highly unlikely to certain members of the subcommittee that a decade or two hence the American public would deny German claims to unity if they were made, as they probably would be, in the name of peace and democracy. It likewise appeared questionable whether the other peoples of the world and the international organization would resort to force to prevent something as natural as the reunion of the German units.

A frequently advanced conviction held that the great danger in partition was to be found in the reaction of the German people. The protagonists of division anticipated that the Germans would protest against, and try to worm out of, any kind of controls that might be set up and they admitted that the Germans would not enthusiastically accept partition; they hoped, nonetheless, that in time a decentralized life would take root.

The opponents of partition, on the other hand, foresaw that such treatment would be psychologically disastrous in that it would make German reconciliation impossible. The attempt to reverse the trend of history, it was contended, would give the Germans a political pro-

gram and a war cry that would make for lasting disturbance; only through military power could the centripetal forces at work be restrained.

A program, it was said in reply, would be ready for any German demagogue whether Germany was divided or not—the program of Pan-Germanism and of world domination. If Germany were partitioned, the achievement of this ambition would require two steps; if not, only one.

*Tentative Views of the Political Subcommittee*

In the meeting of May 2, 1942, the chairman summarized the discussion as pointing to a tentative opinion that some form of permanent or temporary division of Germany was desirable in the interest of security. As the study of the problem continued, the divergence of views led to the suggestion on July 18 that the subcommittee should offer alternative solutions, one based on unity and one on partition. No formal choice was registered by the members as between these alternatives. In the discussion of November 7, the chairman saw a definite trend toward retaining Germany as a unit.

*The Territorial Subcommittee*

The members of the Territorial Subcommittee were generally unsympathetic to partition.

The expectation was repeatedly stressed that partition would set in motion powerful centripetal forces and that the stronger were the external efforts to divide Germany, the greater would be the pressure toward unity. In view of the long trend of German history toward economic and political integration, several members reiterated the conviction expressed in the Political Subcommittee that partition would be an artificial solution which would have to be maintained by force and would not accordingly effect a lasting security.

In the discussion of the economic aspects of partition, there was some divergence of opinion as to whether partite German states would work together or go separate ways if incorporated in a European federation, but there was common disposition to believe that, without the broader organization, partition would raise up serious economic problems. One body of opinion, as in the other subcommittees, emphasized the danger that collaboration even to the extent of a customs union would defeat the purposes of partition; another opinion reaffirmed the conviction that the prosperity of Germany, which is essential for the well-being and peace of all Europe, would be injured by a disruption of the unity of German economy; and yet another opinion pointed to the difficulties of attempting to prevent the Germans from evading an order to break up their economy.

*The Economic Subcommittee*

In the deliberations of the Economic Subcommittee it was pointed out that the partition of Germany would mean the undoing of the most highly integrated state in the world.

As in the other subcommittees apprehension was voiced that fragmentation might prove a greater menace than the retention of German unity because of the strong feeling of nationality among the Germans. Certain members believed that it would be easier to make disarmament a lasting means of security.

The subcommittee held that a strict economic separation of the partite states would mean a loss of economic effectiveness and a lowered standard of living, and that a customs union would be incompatible with the objectives of partition. A broad economic federation seemed to the subcommittee to be the only way of breaking up the Reich without serious injury, but the members agreed that the basic problems of the post-war period would be increased many-fold by partition.

*The Security Subcommittee*

While one member of the Security Subcommittee favored putting Germany in a military and political straight-jacket by means of a partition which would isolate Prussia with a view to simplifying control over the western industrial areas, the majority of the subcommittee expressed opposition. The two chief criticisms levied [*leveled?*] against partition were those voiced in the other subcommittees: the disastrous psychological effects on the German people, and the meager prospect that the prolonged military control necessary for enforcement would be supported by public opinion in the United States and in the other victorious countries.

In discussing the occupation period the military membership of the subcommittee pointed out the danger of assigning parts of Germany to individual national armies and insisted on the necessity of a single occupation authority. It was conceded that, from the point of view of security during the allied occupation, once the unity of military command was secured the number of subdivisions was immaterial; at the same time, however, it was denied that partition would serve a useful purpose.

With respect to the subsequent period, the subcommittee agreed to the following judgment: "After the termination of the occupation, a partition of Germany without adequate international control to maintain the separation would not be conducive to security. If such control exists, the reason for partition as a means of security disappears".

## B. *Relations Between the Partite States in Case of Partition*

### 1. *Political Relations*

#### a. *Independence*

The best external guaranty of the breakup of German political unity would be gained by imposing complete independence on each partite state. Of the alternatives here listed, however, rigid separation would be the most offensive to German nationalism and therefore the most conducive to the perpetuation of German resistance and to the multiplication of evasive devices. On the other hand, admission of some degree of special relations between the states would legally set in motion a centripetal force hard to control in the face of German pressure and of the peace-time concerns of the allied victors.

#### b. *Special Treaty Arrangements*

The least dangerous type of formal interstate co-operation would be that permitted through authorization to make certain treaty arrangements not conceded to non-German states. The compatibility of such a mechanism with the objectives of partition, however, would require a careful limitation of the scope of the agreements and an enduring vigilance to see to it that the ostensible purposes of the treaties did not conceal ulterior motives.

#### c. *A Common Council*

A third alternative would be the concession of a common council of delegates responsible to their respective governments and restricted to the formulation of recommendations. Such a structure would be essentially a revised edition of the German Confederation (1815-1866) in which there would be no machinery either for legislation or for the enforcement of the council's conclusions. If the German states, as in the days of the Confederation, did not wish to submerge themselves in a common policy, the council could not coerce them. If, on the other hand, the Germans continued their resistance to the imposed division, the council would provide a legal mechanism for a co-ordination of policy which would go some distance toward overcoming the handicaps of partition. If genuine centrifugal tendencies asserted themselves in various parts of Germany, the council by its resemblance to the Confederation would conceivably find roots in the past. If, however, the sense of national unity remains substantially unimpaired, the council would inherit the odium heaped on the old symbol of German impotence.

#### d. *A Circumscribed Federation*

A further alternative would be a federation of German states limited to carefully enumerated powers from which military and other potentially aggressive activities would be excluded. A federation so restricted would also offer considerable protection to particularistic

tendencies, but the machinery itself would be no guaranty of a veto if the German people wished a strongly integrated state. The Bismarckian constitution on paper was a confused and cumbersome instrument; yet in 1914 it made possible an effective organization of the national energies for war. The social and economic forces of the present century have made heavy inroads on federalism wherever practised. Should the system be imposed on a recalcitrant German people, it would require a supreme court of the United Nations, or of the international organization, to weigh virtually each piece of federal legislation. Such a procedure could not fail to have a grave influence on the prospects of German reconciliation with the post-war order.

*Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

In the Political Subcommittee there was a diversity of views as to the relations between the partite states in case of division.

The original proposal submitted to the subcommittee envisaged a "form of unity", a "semblance of union but no practical opportunity to unite for offensive action". One current of thought, however, emphasized the dangers of ultimate reunion inherent in any kind of federalism and held that it would be better to divide Germany into two or three independent states and forbid any special arrangements between them. A federation, one member believed, would be tantamount to the creation of a unified state and therefore incompatible with the professed objective.

In opposition to this thesis it was said that the Germans would more readily accept a federation that meant something substantial than they would an absolute separation. Out of fear of a central organization one member wished to allow only a limited economic collaboration to be carried out by treaty arrangements. Another suggested a confederation with a unicameral diet having authority to legislate in the economic sphere to the extent of establishing a federal bank, a common monetary system, uniform income tax laws and possibly social insurance regulations. In the interest of preventing further consolidation, this proposal assigned the administration of the confederation's laws to the partite states.

In comparable vein of anxiety, it was suggested that Germany should be returned to the pre-Bismarckian confederation with a principle of majority action and that attempts should be made to reconstruct the confederation as it should have developed in the years after 1848.

Another trend of thought inclined toward recognizing the unity of the Reich but using the influence of the victors to encourage decentralization. In favor of federal arrangements it was pointed out that historical development had moved toward larger rather than smaller political units, and that, since an attempted division would provide

material for future demagogues, the form and substance of unity should be preserved through a federal assembly sitting in a capital more central than Berlin.

According to yet another point of view, if a general system of security were created, the solution of the German problem might well be found in the creation of a federal state similar to that of either the republican or the imperial period with an executive fully responsible to a national legislature. It was further suggested that, except for the reduction of the size and influence of Prussia, the definition of the component parts of the federation should be left to the Germans themselves. Similarly another member did not wish to go beyond prescribing broad principles of decentralization, leaving it to the Germans themselves to propose the number and the character of the constituent states and the forms of collaboration.

## 2. *Economic Relations*

No matter what kind of political relations might be permitted in case of partition, there remains the further question of what should be done about the high degree of economic integration which the Nazis took over and have further intensified by government-controlled trade associations and cartels and other devices.

### *a. Complete Separation*

The most effective means of weakening Germany's economic war potential would be the imposition of rigid economic division, as well as political, through a most-favored-nation stipulation. If this alternative were successfully enforced, a substantial part of the advantage of specialization and division of labor would be lost and industrial efficiency correspondingly lowered, industries would be cut off from their customary markets, numerous manufacturing processes would be split by tariff barriers, and agricultural areas would be unable to compete in the world markets and would therefore lose population. In so far as there was a general diminution of world trade barriers these effects would be reduced, but an economic partition would still mean a serious disruption. The immediate advantages to world security of crippling Germany would exact a cost in terms of a reduced German standard of living with extensive repercussions not only upon the German state of mind but also upon European and world economy.

The observance of the most-favored-nation principle under current practices of quotas, exchange controls and other types of trade barriers would be difficult at best, and the problems would be greatly increased if the stipulations had to be enforced over German opposition. Enforcement would require continuous and detailed supervision of the trade controls and other commercial practices of the partite states for several decades before new vested interests took root and it would

necessitate machinery for determining and restraining violations. Because of the many ways already perfected for circumventing tariffs and other restrictions, the effectiveness of complete separation may be subject to doubt.

*b. A Customs Union*

A customs union between the partite states would eliminate some of the worst disadvantages inherent in the preceding alternative. The question arises, however, whether that half-way degree of decentralization could be stabilized and perpetuated. The opportunities for illicit combination mentioned in connection with the first alternative would be increased and the purposes of the separation commensurately undermined.

At the same time a customs union would raise problems that could hardly be settled without the concession of additional forms of collaboration. A customs union alone would not make possible control over trade and payments between the partite states. Without a monetary union or other form of close monetary co-operation the equilibrium between the states could hardly be maintained. Likewise a substantial degree of uniformity in social and labor legislation would be essential, and provision would be necessary for free movement of persons and capital. Under the most restricted limits of co-operation a customs union would have to be given the machinery necessary for negotiating external economic arrangements. Since international trade is inextricably bound up with political activity, the customs union, rather than the individual states, would become for all practical purposes the sovereign entity in international relations. The jeopardy to the objectives of the victors would be all the greater by virtue of the fact that it would be hard to make a generally acceptable distinction between a purely economic policy and an ostensibly economic policy which concealed a dangerous combination of economic and political ends.

*c. Incorporation of the Partite States in a European Economic Union*

The proposal that the separate economies of the partite states be absorbed in a European economic federation requires first an assessment of the possibility of establishing some kind of economic federation that would mean a genuine reduction of trade barriers. While our defeated enemies could be initially coerced into such a system, there is a widespread reluctance on the part of our allies to enter or to sanction this kind of arrangement. Given the advanced development of industrialism in the Reich, there is material danger that a European economic federation would result in a German domination of the continent not totally unrelated to that aimed at in Nazi ambitions.

There is, further, no apparent ground for supposing that a political division would make the federation either more palatable to Germany's neighbors or less exposed to the menace of German control, except in the case of the Reich's falling apart through internally disruptive forces, a contingency which cannot be counted on at the present time.

Should this solution be adopted by the victor powers, it would necessitate, in order to avoid a chaotic beginning, a period of gradual transformation in which the general European system of trade restrictions was reduced to the desired level while the German interstate barriers were being raised to it.

*Committee Discussions of the Economic Relations Between the Hypothetical Partite States*

*The Economic Subcommittee*

The Economic Subcommittee, as indicated above, was of the opinion that the first of the alternatives here given would result in an undesirable loss of economic efficiency and lowered standards of living, and that the second, a customs union, would nullify the ends sought by partition. There was agreement, however, that it might be possible to make partition a feasible measure by the establishment of a larger union. It was suggested alternatively that the German units be joined with the Danubian states, with the proposed East European Union, and with all of the other European states in one economic organization. The third form, in which national boundaries would cease to be economic frontiers, seemed to the members to offer an ultimate solution of the problem of making partition possible; it was further thought that the greater the extent of the federation, the less the danger of German domination. Doubt was expressed, however, as to the acquiescence of Great Britain to a continent-wide union.

*The Political Subcommittee*

In the course of the Political Subcommittee's discussion of interstate relations the argument was advanced that the proposed customs union, together with an internationalized transportation system, would adequately meet the economic necessities of the partite units. In opposition to this view, however, were the objections previously alluded to: that a customs union, while disruptive of German economy, would in the end undermine the significance of a political division. Warnings were given on the one hand against damaging German economy and, on the other, against leaving it intact.

To preserve German viability in case of partition, there was support both for the concession of special relations through preferential treaties or common economic agencies and for the Economic Sub-

committee's proposal of a comprehensive European economic association.

The subcommittee agreed, before canvassing all the implications of a customs union and of other forms of interstate relations, to consider the most desirable number of partite states.

### C. *The Number of States in Case of Partition*

#### *The Political Subcommittee's Discussion of the Bases for Deciding*

The Political Subcommittee considered several principles on the bases [*basis*] of which the number of states might be determined.

#### *An Economic Approach*

One proposal, growing out of a belief in the prime importance of economic activity, advocated a fragmentation along economic lines in order to provide each unity [*unit*] with a considerable measure of self-sufficiency. A variant plan recommended dividing Germany into two or three large economic units and then giving the traditional small states the choice of entering such larger units or remaining separate. Doubt was expressed as to the wisdom of allowing such elasticity in the transitional period; the suggestion was defended, however, on the ground that it would offer the Germans the satisfaction of making a choice.

Several objections were offered to determining the number of proposed states on economic grounds. On the predicate of a customs union the principle of self-sufficiency for each unit was declared invalid. The further criticism was made that it would be impossible to erect self-sufficient units within Germany and that it was consequently useless to attempt to draw an economic line unless it was desired to segregate specific industrialized areas. According to another view, since there was no economic advantage in partition, the discussion and the decision should rest on political grounds; once a political decision was made, the task would be to see how the least economic harm could be done.

#### *Legitimacy*

The chief political principles invoked in the subcommittee's discussions were legitimacy and tradition. The conviction was expressed that, since the Germans of all the peoples of Europe are the most governed by the principle of legitimacy, the plan of division should abide by that principle.

#### *Religion*

It was urged that the victors should provide a chance for the powerful forces of decentralization to exert themselves in Germany, and religion was identified as one of them. To give wider scope for religious influence it was proposed that at least one state be designed to have a strong Catholic majority.

While one member anticipated that there would be a substantial revival of religion after the war, another was doubtful of the importance of the old religious lines. In explanation it was said that many of the younger generation were no longer Christian and that the Nazi persecutions had brought the active Protestants and Catholics closer together than they had ever been before. Also in opposition it was pointed out that the German Catholics, although sympathetic to moderate decentralization on religious grounds, had not been separatist in tendency.

As an argument against a religious segregation, it was suggested that, since the Social Democratic party and the Center party had been the two most stabilizing parties of the republican period, future development of the whole of Germany along peaceful and orderly lines might be impeded by drawing political lines that would prevent full collaboration between these two groups.

*Attitude Toward Numerous Small States*

While the principle of legitimacy was interpreted as pointing to the revival of numerous dynastic states, the same principle was invoked as an argument against over-fragmentation. Opposite views were likewise taken on the question whether it would be easier for several states or for a few to reconstitute the unity of the Reich. The trend of the discussion, however, went against the creation of a large number of states. It was observed that it would be hard to control them and to make them prosperous, that they would necessitate giving greater powers to a federal government, that they would be the source of wars between themselves and with would-be absorbers, and that, finally, opinion in the United Nations would be alienated by too extensive a partition. The essential problem, in the opinion of one member, was the diminution of Prussia; after reducing that trouble-making state, the next problem was to make other states strong enough to resist domination while collaborating in federal enterprises. Hence the necessity, it seemed, to have units large enough to be viable and self-respecting.

1. *A Tripartite Division: "F" Lines*<sup>7</sup>

(Indicated on maps 16, 23, 24, and 28, German Series)

The Political and Territorial Subcommittees leaned toward the adoption of these lines in case partition is decided upon.

<sup>7</sup>The "F" lines divided Germany into a northwestern, an eastern, and a southern state. The proposed boundary between the northwestern and eastern states followed the eastern and southern boundaries of Mecklenburg from the Baltic Sea to the River Elbe, and then followed the Elbe to the 1937 boundary of Czechoslovakia. The proposed boundary between the northwestern and southern states followed the eastern boundary of the Rhine Province from the border of the Netherlands southward, and then followed the southern boundary of Hesse-Nassau and the northern boundary of Bavaria to the 1937 boundary of Czechoslovakia.

The information here introduced to describe the hypothetical states set up by a tripartite division following the "F" lines is necessarily based on pre-war data which is at present out of date in several respects.

*a. Area and Population*

	<i>Percentage of total area (1937)</i>	<i>Percentage of total population (1939)</i>	<i>Population per square mile</i>
Northwest	35. 4	39. 9	430
South	30. 3	33. 9	427
East	34. 3	26. 2	291

*b. Economic Activities*

Sources of livelihood in terms of percentages of stipulated area's population gaining livelihood from indicated occupations:

	<i>Agriculture Forestry</i>	<i>Industry Handicraft</i>	<i>Commerce Transport</i>	<i>Services Income, etc.</i>
Germany	18. 0	41. 0	15. 9	25. 1
Northwest	15. 3	43. 2	16. 5	24. 9
South	19. 3	42. 9	14. 5	23. 3
East	20. 5	35. 3	16. 3	27. 9

*Industrial relations:*

	<i>Percent of total liveli- hood from industry (1939)</i>	<i>Percent of employment in major industries</i>	<i>Percent of labor union membership (1925)</i>	<i>(1930)</i>
Northwest	42. 0	44. 4	52. 5	52. 6
South	35. 5	35. 0	26. 4	25. 6
East	22. 5	20. 6	21. 1	22. 0

While Northwest was relatively strong and East relatively weak, there was a notable consistency in the figures as arranged in these categories. The industrial strength of East, however, was based on coal mining in Silesia and on finishing manufactures around Berlin. At the present time these percentages may not be valid because of the bombing of the western industrial areas and the eastward shift of factories.

In agriculture Northwest was also the richest of the three areas in production of staple commodities and in income, gaining 44 percent of the total farm income. East, with 20.9 percent of the farm income, has poor soil for the most part and has been chronically in need of subventions to prevent wholesale bankruptcy.

The total regional income and the per capita income have steadily revealed the same disproportion between Northwest and East, although Berlin, the economic capital as well as the political, represents an anomaly in the latter region.

This distribution of activity was based on the maintenance of Germany as a protected free trade area of unified legislation and administration. Any modification in that arrangement would disturb the equilibrium established through the exploitation of natural advantage and specialization within the whole of Germany.

*c. Political Activities*

An estimation of future currents of political development in the hypothetical regions presents insuperable difficulties at the present time. For a decade free political activity has been suspended and references to pre-Nazi trends may have only a limited validity in the post-Hitler period.

During the Weimar period there was a certain difference in the strength of the German political parties indicative of divergent influences and interests in these three areas. In Northwest the Social Democratic vote was distinctly and consistently heavier than that of other parties until it was eclipsed by National Socialism. In South the Catholic faith gave a leading position to the Center and Bavarian People's Parties. In East the Junker National People's Party competed with Social Democracy for first position.

Yet the differences are by no means as striking as the similarities of the three regions. Graphs representing party votes in the whole of Germany and in each of the tripartite divisions show virtually the same kind of curve for each of the major parties. In general terms the Germans of the three areas reacted in the same manner to the changing conditions of the Weimar republic.

This homogeneity of political outlook is revealed in the rise of the National Socialist Party. The following table gives the Nazi percentage of the total vote in the specified areas:

	<i>Sept.</i> <i>1930</i>	<i>July</i> <i>1932</i>	<i>Nov.</i> <i>1932</i>	<i>March</i> <i>1933</i>
Germany	18.3	37.4	33.1	43.9
Northwest	19.2	40.9	33.2	44.5
South	16.3	31.6	28.7	40.6
East	19.2	39.9	35.2	47.0

The percentage of the total Nazi vote in each region:

Northwest	45.0	46.2	45.7	42.9
South	28.4	27.2	27.2	30.1
East	26.6	26.8	27.1	27.0

It is to be recalled that the distribution of the total population in 1933 was 39.9, 33.9 and 26.2 percent respectively.

Although South was relatively less Nazi in sentiment, the three regions showed a consistency as the party grew from 800,000 supporters

to over 17,000,000. These tripartite lines, consequently, would effect no appreciable separation of Hitler's followers from their opponents.

*d. Religious Affiliation*

The distribution of the two Christian faiths would be as follows in terms of the percentages of the 1939 population:

	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>
Germany	61	33
Northwest	75	18
South	35	61
East	72	20

These figures, however, indicate nominal affiliation rather than active communication. The Catholic percentage of the vote in 1924, 1928 and 1932 remained in each of the hypothetical regions approximately one-half the Catholic percentage of the population, while the Marxist percentage of South's total vote averaged only slightly less than the Catholic vote and in 1928 exceeded it. South, therefore, although there religion tended comparatively to restrain the extremes of Marxism and National Socialism, was not predominantly Catholic in politics and not fundamentally different from the other two areas.

*e. The Question of Distinctive Regional Characteristics*

The prospect for the continued existence of three states so divided would depend on (1) continued coercion on the part of the victors, or (2) the presence, or the development, of a distinct and separate homogeneity in each of the states.

In terms of historic experience, none of these hypothetical units has a unique homogeneity. The only two historic frontiers coinciding with the proposed lines would be that along the northern frontier of Bavaria and that separating Mecklenburg and Prussia. East, composed entirely of Prussian provinces except for portions of Anhalt and the state of Saxony, would have the advantage of a long common administration with Berlin as a center, but the other regions would be made up of traditional units that possess no unique experience and organic political background. The states hypotheticated in the proposal, therefore, have no roots in the past and would be in large measure synthetic creations.

It seems plausible to suggest, therefore, that the only practical way to insure the development of sufficiently diverse ways of life in the three suggested states to have them go separate ways would be to erect high political and economic barriers between them until new vested interests and new habits of thought and conduct had emerged. The preceding discussion, however, has attempted to indicate the problems and difficulties incident to such a course.

*Committee Discussions of a Tripartite Division**The Political Subcommittee**General Considerations*

As the Political Subcommittee continued its consideration of the most desirable form of division, the merits and demerits of some form of tripartite solution received greater attention. Against this kind of division it was urged that the plan would give Prussia the predominant role in a large section of Germany and would tend to recreate the conditions by which Bismarck unified Germany under Prussian hegemony. Fear that a third state would hold and abuse the balance of power also led to opposition. There were advanced, however, several reasons why a tripartite division was to be preferred. Such a form seemed to satisfy the demand for limited fragmentation; it would set up states strong enough to feel safe and able successfully to counter-balance Prussia; it would make a hasty union more difficult, and, finally, it would commend itself to the German people more satisfactorily than would a greater number of states.

*The "F" Lines*

Several different combinations of territories were suggested for the three hypothetical states; in common between them was a reduction of Prussia substantially to the East Elbian region. In July 1942 the "F" lines, as analyzed above, were presented to the subcommittee as a tripartite plan which would make a distribution of economic resources and war potential substantially proportionate to the distribution of population, although Prussia would fare less well than the other regions.

It was pointed out, in comment on this explanation, that the distribution of industrial resources between the three states was illusory since the character of German industry varied from one of the partite regions to the other. Further dissatisfaction with the "F" lines was voiced on the ground that the western line ran through the Ruhr, that the eastern state—a reduced Prussia—would resemble post-1918 Austria in that it would consist of an enormous city and an insufficient hinterland, that the agriculture of the East was dependent on subsidies and on the protected market of the whole of Germany, and that the "F" lines cut many important railways. In reply to these and other objections on economic grounds it was stated that a practical discussion would have to be predicated on a customs union and that the German transportation system should be incorporated into a general European organization rather than broken into three parts.

While it was indicated that only one segment of the proposed boundaries was an important historic frontier (northern Bavaria), the division seemed to one supporter of partition to satisfy the demands of

legitimacy on religious grounds in that South would be Catholic and the other states Protestant.

The arguments in favor of and against a partition along the "F" lines were, aside from the foregoing points, essentially the same arguments advanced without reference to specific lines.

*The Territorial Subcommittee*

In the opinion of one member of the Territorial Subcommittee the "F" lines seemed to set up the fairest type of partition since they reduced Prussia and divided the remainder of Germany into two fairly even parts, one Protestant and one Catholic.

The trend of the discussion, however, was critical. The "F" lines were condemned because of their lack of historic justification and because of their economic complications.

The eastern state was seen as doomed to poverty, and fear was expressed that, since this region was the most warlike part of Germany, the resulting hardships would create a provocative and dangerous situation. The balance between the three areas was attacked as a book-keeping balance which would not correspond to the realities of the German economic organization. Because the "F" lines would cut the major industrial districts and disrupt numerous industrial processes, it was contended that this proposed division could not be supported from the economic point of view. There was no persistence of regional specialization, it was further claimed, which would aid in locating some other partite lines.

In the course of the discussions the dilemmas of a customs union and of separate economies, adverted to above, were presented for consideration. It was emphasized that, because more than one-half of Europe's industrial production was German, the well-being of the continent, and therefore the peace, depended on the prosperous organization of Germany.

As a means of security the tripartite division was held to be of little use; the better economic course would be to restore Germany's dependence on foreign trade and exercise direct control over the western industrial district.

*The Economic Subcommittee*

The previously cited opinions of the Economic Subcommittee as to the feasibility of a political division of Germany only within the broader framework of a European economic union were based on the subcommittee's consideration of the projected "F" lines.

*The Security Subcommittee*

In the Security Subcommittee likewise the criticisms of partition given in an earlier section of this memorandum were applied to the "F" lines. According to a military point of view, the northwestern state alone would have a chance to survive; the diminished Prussia would naturally gravitate toward it and an eventual union would

result. It was also anticipated that South would either establish ties with Northwest or with Austria; in the latter case, belief was expressed that this southern union would have to expand to the east and southeast in order to survive, thereby sowing the seeds of future wars. According to this same military opinion, partition as a means of military security could be successful only if the German units were incorporated in a larger federation of similar small states.

2. *A Four-Fold Partition*

(Indicated on Map 58, German Series)

A recently suggested plan would divide Germany into four states:

Southern, bounded by the old frontiers in the South and East, by the Rhine in the West, and the Bavarian frontier in the North;

Western, extending from Oldenburg, with the port of Emden, in the North, to include the Rhineland, Westphalia and part of Hesse-Nassau;

Central, bounded on the South and West by the above-indicated states and on the East by the Elbe River to the western frontier of Saxony; and

Eastern, made up of Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Saxony and the Prussian lands beyond the Elbe.

a. *Area and Population (1939)*

	<i>Percent of total area</i>	<i>Percent of total population</i>	<i>Number per square mile</i>
Southern	23. 2	19. 1	313. 9
Western	13. 5	24. 2	684. 8
Central	19. 5	17. 6	344. 6
Eastern	43. 8	39. 1	340. 5

b. *Relative Economic Strength*

The distribution of sources of livelihood in terms of the percentage of the German total for the listed categories would be as follows (1939):

	<i>Agriculture Forestry</i>	<i>Industry Handicraft</i>	<i>Commerce Transport</i>	<i>Services etc.</i>
Southern	26. 8	18. 0	16. 3	17. 2
Western	16. 5	28. 7	23. 9	23. 1
Central	19. 4	17. 5	16. 6	17. 0
Eastern	37. 3	35. 8	43. 2	42. 7

By such a division, therefore, the Eastern state—a revised form of Prussia—would emerge as economically the strongest unit of the four, in contrast to the results of the tripartite division.

c. *Religious Affiliation*

The distribution of membership in the two Christian religions, in terms of the percentage of the stipulated areas' total population would be:

	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>Catholic</i>
Southern	36. 9	58. 4
Western	37. 0	56. 1
Central	81. 0	11. 6
Eastern	75. 4	14. 8

#### *d. Regional Homogeneity*

While the Central and Eastern states of this plan would be nominally homogeneous in Protestant affiliation, the two Catholic regions would be distinctly less so. Political behavior in terms of party votes would show substantially the same pattern in each region as in Germany as a whole. Each hypothetical unit would represent an arbitrary combination of historic states, although by tradition the Southern state would have a higher common denominator of experience and culture than the others.

#### *3. A Bipartite Division*

If it were decided to divide Germany into two parts, traditional distinctions would suggest two forms: an East and West and a North and South.

##### *a. East and West*

The Elbe River has conventionally been accepted as a frontier between two different kinds of Germans, the eastern group of whom is commonly identified as Prussian. This easy generalization, while rooted in historic fact, does not lend itself to critical examination. The region houses not only the Junker of Pomerania and East Prussia but also the radical proletarian of Berlin and Hamburg, the small farmer of Schleswig-Holstein, the coal miner of Silesia and the textile worker of Saxony. Even though the military spirit has been notoriously cultivated in the East, it would be more cautious, and more in harmony with the last century of German history to identify Prussianism with a state of mind rather with a geographic region.

A division approximately along the Elbe would mean an East of only slightly more population and resources than the East of the "F" lines and a West combining the strength of the Northwest and the South of the tripartite plan.

##### *b. North and South*

A line which gave some heed to the traditional differences between North and South would follow the religious frontier along the northern boundary of Bavaria. If a South comprised those states which were outside the North German Confederation of 1867 it would include approximately thirteen million inhabitants, leaving all other Germans in the North. If for religious or other reasons a bipartite South were extended through the Rhineland, the result would be a state similar to the South of the tripartite division and the other two regions of that plan would form the northern state.

The misunderstanding inherent in continuing to think in terms of these two historic distinctions is to be found in the fact that the greatest concentration of people and of national economic strength was developed in the northwestern part of Germany after the East-

West and North-South polarity became rooted in popular thought. That region has no clear place under the old rubrics.

*Committee Discussions of a Bipartite Division*

*The Political Subcommittee*

In support of a bipartite division the anticipation was expressed that if there were only two states, and preferably two states completely separated, vested interests would develop and with them a sense of rivalry that would eliminate a desire for union. By an East-West division, it was asserted, Prussia would be held down and easily subjected to special controls. In opposition to such a thesis, another member foresaw that a dual partition would make future union a simple operation. A further criticism of the proposal charged that this form of division would penalize Prussia as against the rest of Germany whereas during the past fifteen years Prussia carried no more responsibility for what has happened than did southern and western Germany; hence it would be a clear injustice to punish only Prussia.

*The Security Subcommittee*

Opinion was expressed in the Security Subcommittee that a partition line following the Elbe River, with Hamburg assigned to the East, would offer a better chance of peace than a tripartite division.

4. *Multiple Division Following Historic State Lines*

a. *The Tradition in Germany*

Despite the century-old forces culminating in the rigorous centralizing policy of National Socialism, the ancient heritage of cultural particularism has remained underneath the acceptance of national unity. During the Weimar period numerous reformers, notably many practical administrators, were proposing a reconstruction of the federal system. There was a large common denominator among these plans in that the dismemberment of Prussia and the establishment of from ten to twenty federal units were frequently proposed. These new units were generally made up of combinations of historic states and provinces since virtually all Germans, except those content with Prussian hegemony, agreed that strict maintenance of the historic states was impossible.

It is possible that a reaction to the current excesses of centralization might lead the Germans to adopt a reformed federalism if they were free to make their own decision or if they were encouraged rather than compelled in that direction. One may expect, however, that coercion would place on the proposal something akin to the stigma borne by the Weimar republic.

b. *The Number of States*

If a return to historic state lines were resolved upon, the victors would be confronted with great difficulty in specifying boundaries in harmony with the principle. A literal return to the frontiers of any given date would be as undesirable for the allies as for the Germans

by virtue of the fact that it would resurrect an extensive Prussia and a congeries of petty states out of harmony with the prospective needs of the post-war world. There emerges, then, a question as to how far the traditional states could be combined into new, and therefore artificial, groupings without compromising the principle of a return to the old order and without abandoning the centrifugal force presumably to be found through a revival of the historic states.

*c. Economic Relations*

A multiple partition raises acutely the problem of the economic relations between the hypothetical states. If Germany were to be spared a chaotic regression, it would be necessary to allow a wide latitude of co-operation through common agencies charged with co-ordinating the several domestic economies and with supervising foreign trade and payments. The danger to the effectiveness of partition would tend to be proportionate to the dependence of the individual states on the central machinery.

*d. The Principle of Legitimacy*

A solution along historic lines would perhaps raise as does no other basis of partition a question as to the applicability and the utility of the principle of legitimacy. A generally acceptable definition of the concept presents a difficult problem. If, following Guglielmo Ferrero, a legitimate government be defined as one which operates on principles accepted by the people and respected by the governors,<sup>8</sup> few liberals could or would object. There would remain only the question of the propriety of using an expression which has been interpreted by over a century of liberal teaching to mean a reactionary procedure. If, on the other hand, the principle should prescribe an attempt to return to an earlier form of government, the victors would again be under the accusation from liberals and radicals of espousing an odious plan. They would also need to determine the point in history when there was a government in Germany whose legitimacy would bespeak its revival. This need would present a problem not readily subject to a logically demonstrated solution. If Hitler is charged with a revolutionary subversion of legitimate government, as the principle of legitimacy must require if it is to be invoked against him, the corollary would seem to point to a return to the Weimar republic. If, however, partition of Germany is deemed essential to security, the republic would be an undesirable halting place—as would be the Bismarckian empire. It would be necessary to demonstrate, accordingly, that neither the republic nor the empire was a legitimate state and that the principle found its proper expression in the German Confederation of 1815 or in an earlier epoch of national impotence.

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<sup>8</sup> See Guglielmo Ferrero, *The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815*, translated by Theodore R. Jaekel (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), p. 53.

*Committee Discussion of Multiple Division**The Political Subcommittee*

During the earlier considerations in the Political Subcommittee some attention was given to legitimacy as a basis for a multiple partition but no systematic definition of the principle was attempted. In one opinion legitimacy could be found by going back to pre-Bismarckian history; in another, by returning to the historic dynasties. The bases of these judgments, however, were not elaborated. A proposal to set up eight or nine states was offered, but the majority of the members was doubtful of the desirability of so extensive a breakup of Germany because of the resulting weakness of the individual states and a specific plan of division drawn from the principles was not completed.

*The Security Subcommittee*

In the Security Subcommittee a partition based on historic political divisions was interpreted as being inextricably connected with the former dynasties. Any proposal to follow such a plan was criticized on the ground that the restoration of the old ruling houses would be unacceptable to the German people.

*D. The Duration of Partition*1. *Permanent Division*2. *Temporary Division*a. *With Definite Termination*b. *With Unspecified Termination*

If the Germans remain hostile to the peace settlement, the greatest menace to world security may appear some years hence when Germany has recovered from the disasters of the present war and when the victors have lost the sharp edge of anxiety and have become immersed in more immediate problems. It is at such a time that partition, if it be judged an effective device for weakening Germany, would be of greatest utility.

It might also be contended that only when there is no prospect of a reversal of the allied position will there be a widespread German acceptance of the peace settlement.

From another point of view one might argue that partition was necessary as a temporary measure until the ultimate intentions of the Germans were known; if they proved willing to follow a peaceful course, they might with safety be allowed to reunite.

A stipulated period of division would have the advantage of clarity of obligation, yet it would focus German anticipation on the day of liberation, and agitations such as those directed toward hastening the evacuation of the Rhineland in the 'twenties would be an inevitable concomitant.

Should the duration be indefinite, there would probably be a comparable agitation and two possible dangers in case of concessions. The first would be in the prospect that the nationalistic groups would misinterpret favorable changes as victories won by their hostility and be further encouraged in their chauvinism. The second would be in mistaking a temporary lull, such as that following Locarno, as a lasting reorientation of German thought.

*Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

Several members of the Political Subcommittee thought of the proposed division of Germany as a temporary measure of the transition period because of the difficulty of foreseeing ultimate developments. It seemed desirable to one member that, at the end of approximately five years, the Germans should be allowed to come together and devise their own plans under certain reservations laid down by the victorious powers. While there was some disposition to admit the temporary character of division, exception was taken to setting a definite time limit at the outset because the announced term would invite a repetition of the propaganda and disturbances associated with plebiscites; preferably at some unspecified date the international organization might permit a union of the Germans if it decided that they could be trusted.

On the other hand, conviction was repeatedly expressed that Germany should be permanently divided. Although opponents of partition continued to emphasize the necessity for protracted coercion one proponent voiced the hope that, if the Germans could be made prosperous and content with their local governments, division would endure.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

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P. ITALIAN TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS AND THE  
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF ITALY

Lot 60 D 224

*The Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Italian Documents

The attached memoranda deal with the following questions:

1. Alternative methods of dealing with the Italo-Austrian and Italo-

<sup>1</sup> Although this memorandum was submitted to Hull in anticipation of the First Quebec Conference, the subjects covered in the enclosures to the memorandum were not discussed in detail at that conference.

Yugoslav frontiers; with Italian colonial possessions; and with the island of Pantelleria.

2. Alternative methods of dealing with the internal political situation in Italy, from the viewpoint of the problems of central and local governments during the transitional period and later.

The memoranda are accompanied by appropriate maps.<sup>2</sup> They are based, in large measure, on discussions in various committees.<sup>3</sup>

L[EO] P[ASVOLSKY]

[Enclosure 1]

*Memorandum by Mr. David Harris, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-4

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

#### ITALY—AUSTRIA

#### TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: VENEZIA TRIDENTINA (SOUTH TYROL)

##### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is whether the frontier should remain at the Brenner Pass or be moved further south to conform more nearly to ethnic distribution.

The South Tyrol was given to Italy in 1919 as a maximum satisfaction of the demand for security. The more than 200,000 Austrians placed under Italian sovereignty were subjected to ruthless Italianization. In 1939 an Italo-German treaty gave the German-speaking Tyrolese the choice of migrating to Germany or remaining in Italy. 185,000 (69 percent) voted to emigrate. Early in 1942, 66,000 were reported to have moved to Germany; more recent indications suggest that the number is now much higher. Aside from hydro-electric developments, no significant economic interests are involved.

##### II. THE SOLUTIONS

(Indicated on Map 5, Italian Series)

##### A. *The Line Demanded by Italy in May 1915*

This solution was accepted as a first choice by the Political Subcommittee.

<sup>2</sup> The accompanying maps are not reproduced.

<sup>3</sup> Specifically, the following groups subordinate to the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy: the Subcommittee on Political Problems, the Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, the Subcommittee on Security Problems, and the Security Technical Committee. See Notter, pp. 96-108, 117-133.

Following this covering memorandum in the file is a one-page table of contents (not printed) to the documents which follow.

The Italian Government in 1915 demanded of Austria-Hungary a frontier that would have incorporated approximately 60,000 Austrians, most of them in and near the strategically important town of Bolzano. While that line would have provided good defensive terrain, the valley of the Upper Adige, remaining under Austrian control, would have been dependent on Italian communications and markets.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

In the discussion of the Political Subcommittee judgments were expressed against retaining the present frontier on the grounds of the execrable conduct of Italy, of the ethnic injustice done in 1919, and of the general unwillingness to give undue importance to strategic considerations. There was also disposition to believe that the restoration of territory to a revived Austria would provide for that state an increment of prestige, material resources and population.

The subcommittee, consequently, leaned to the tentative view that the United States Government should start its negotiations on the basis of the line demanded by the Italian Government of its own free will in May 1915.

B. *The Present Boundary*

The Brenner line conforms to the principle of minimum change, affords maximum security advantages to Italy, and would leave no basis for subsequent Italian grievances. How much of an ethnic problem will remain at the end of the war is at present uncertain.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

In the Political Subcommittee's consideration of the problem concern was voiced lest any territorial gain by Austria become in the long run an advantage to Germany. Conviction was expressed that the United States has more to fear from Germany than from Italy on the Brenner Pass, and that the loss of the strategic frontier would create international instability through the fears and resentments engendered in Italy. For such reasons the subcommittee envisaged the possibility that subsequent developments might counsel the acceptance of the existing boundary.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee, taking into consideration the uncertainties as to the future of Austria and the great importance given by the Italians to the Brenner Pass, inclined to the maintenance of the present frontier. It was none the less disposed to admit a modification of views in the light of subsequent developments.

C. *The American Proposal in 1919*

American experts at the Paris Conference proposed a line designed to give adequate defense to Italy short of the Brenner Pass. That

frontier, however, would have transferred 133,000 Austrians to Italian sovereignty. This proposal in 1919 received no attention because of President Wilson's independent commitment to Italy.

#### D. *The Ethnic Line*

The ethnic line is fairly distinct and follows watersheds except for the valley at Bolzano. Such a line, the least favorable to Italy of those here noted, would deprive Italy of extensive hydro-electric developments and would give the Italians excuse for agitation on the grounds of defense.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by Messrs. David Harris and Leon W. Fuller, of the  
Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-3

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

### ITALY—YUGOSLAVIA TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS: THE ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER

#### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the rectification of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary in the interest of reducing the number of Slavs under Italian control and of providing improved access to port facilities for Yugoslavia and Central Europe.

The Yugoslav Government-in-exile has asked for the cession of the Italian province of Venezia Giulia, Zara, and the Dalmatian islands, and that part of the Udine region inhabited by Slovenes.

Venezia Giulia has an area of 5,252 square miles and a population of approximately 950,000 inhabitants. The province contains coal, bauxite and mercury deposits of considerable importance. The ports of Trieste and Fiume are potentially more useful to Central Europe than to Italy. The large Slav minority (39 percent by the Italian census of 1921 and a larger percent by Yugoslav estimates) has been subject to a rigorous policy of Italianization. The population of Zara and the Dalmatian islands in 1921 was 19,000 of whom 12,000 were Italians.

#### II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS (Indicated on Map 6, Italian Series)

A. *Line Suggested by the Territorial Subcommittee* (represented in red on Map 6)

In the north this line would follow the 1914 frontier southward from the southern boundary of the Tarvisio district. Gorizia might go

either to Italy or to Yugoslavia, but the coastal railway connecting Trieste with Italy and the city itself would remain in Italian hands. From the outskirts of Trieste the line [would] follow the watershed in a southeasterly and subsequently in a southerly direction and reach the sea immediately west of the town of Fianona, thereby leaving the neighboring coal deposits to Italy. Approximately 140,000 Yugoslavs live in that part of Venezia Giulia left to Italy while less than 20,000 Italians, aside from those in Fiume and Zara, would come under Yugoslav sovereignty.

1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee in January 1943 proposed this line on the grounds that it represented the most equitable adjustment of economic, ethnic and—to a lesser degree—strategic considerations. A principle basic to the recommendation was the desire that as few Yugoslavs as possible be kept under Italian sovereignty because of the bad record Italy has made in its treatment of minorities.

With respect to the Istrian peninsula, minority opinion opposed retention of the coal fields by Italy out of conviction that the small percent of Italy's total consumption that is mined in the province could well be bought in the world market. Likewise in opposition was the judgment that Italian population figures misrepresented the ethnic distribution and that the whole of the peninsula below Trieste should be given to Yugoslavia.

There was some disposition to make Trieste a free port because of its importance to Central Europe but the majority view leaned toward assigning Trieste to Italy and Fiume to Yugoslavia with possibly some guaranties of access from Central Europe.

2. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee concurred in the recommendation of the Territorial Subcommittee. While it was agreed that a solution of the transportation problem might be sought by international controls, strong reluctance was expressed to an international régime for the supervision of minorities because of the grave potentialities of disturbance involved.

B. *A Compromise Line* combining in the north the Italian Demand of 1915 and in the south the American Proposal of 1919.

This second solution would vary from the first by moving the frontier above Trieste a few miles to the East, thereby giving Italy the city of Gorizia and most of the valley of the Isonzo. By such a line

the railway from Klagenfurt would be cut twice and Italy would retain control of approximately 185,000 Yugoslavs.

1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

Several of the considerations advanced were as pertinent to the second solution as to the first here indicated. The Territorial Subcommittee originally was disposed to approve the compromise line but subsequently adopted the first alternative in the interest of removing more Slovenes from Italian control.

C. *The American Proposal of 1919*

Inspired by the desire to give Italy a defensible frontier west of the boundary demanded by the Italian Government, the American line followed the Istrian watersheds. It would divide the coal and bauxite but would give most of the industrial developments to Italy. Approximately 240,000 Yugoslavs would remain under Italy.

D. *The Italian Demand of 1915*

This line, demanded as the price of continued neutrality, would lie east of the Isonzo and include in Italy the cities of Gorizia and Monfalcone. The original demand specified a free city of Trieste, but made no claims to the Istrian peninsula. Such a frontier would give Italy few resources of value and would leave a large Slovene minority to Italy. It would likewise disrupt the railway systems of the area.

E. *The Ethnic Line*

Such an ethnic line as can be drawn on the basis of suspect and out-of-date census returns would leave minorities on each side and, in the north, would give to Yugoslavia territory held by Italy since 1866. This line would sever the Pola-Trieste railway and isolate Trieste from its hinterland.

1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

While the Territorial Subcommittee agreed that ethnic considerations should take precedence over economic and strategic, it was pointed out that the existence of several strong forces made it impossible rigidly to apply the ethnic principle all over Europe.

Suggestion was made that the new frontier might be moved west of the 1914 boundary in order to incorporate the Slovenes of the Udine region into Yugoslavia but this proposal was opposed in anticipation that such action would create a new *Italia irredenta*.

F. *The Yugoslav Claim*

No subcommittee favored adoption of this solution.

The Yugoslavs claim, on ethnic grounds, a frontier running north from the vicinity of Monfalcone, crossing the 1914 boundary to in-

clude in Yugoslavia a part of the Udine region, which has been Italian since 1866. The territory claimed by Yugoslavia has an approximate area of 5,400 square miles and a population of about 930,000. An Italian minority of some 435,000 would be left in Yugoslavia, including some 200,000 in the strongly Italian city of Trieste.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 3]

*Memorandum by Messrs. Leon W. Fuller and David Harris, of the  
Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-2

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

ITALY—GREECE—TURKEY  
COLONIAL PROBLEMS: THE DODECANESE ISLANDS

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition to be made of the Dodecanese Islands. The Greek Government has formally asked for the cession of these islands. The islands were seized by Italy in 1912 and formally ceded by Turkey in the treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The twelve islands have a combined area of 1,035 square miles and a total of approximately 150,000 inhabitants, more than 80 percent of whom are culturally Greek. They have little economic importance but a certain strategic significance because of their location near the southwest coast of Anatolia.

II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. *Cession to Greece*

This solution has been approved by several of the subcommittees though with the thought that some qualification might be desirable.

Cession of the islands to Greece would be most consonant with the ethnic character and wishes of the inhabitants. There is no strong evidence that Greek annexation would injure good Graeco-Turkish relations, although guaranties of demilitarization might reasonably be imposed as a contribution to continued understanding. On the other side is the prospect of creating for Greece additional economic burdens.

1. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee held that Italy, because of imperialistic aggressions and misrule of the islands, had no valid claims. It was felt that the disposition of the Dodecanese should avoid prejudicing

good relations between Greece and Turkey. In view of the Greeks' abandonment of earlier ambitions for expansion in Anatolia, the Subcommittee believed that the islands could be entrusted to Greece. It recommended, therefore, that union be supported . . .

#### 2. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee concurred in the recommendation of the Territorial Subcommittee, although some objection was voiced to the cession of Rhodes to Greece.

#### 3. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

The Security Subcommittee, likewise approving the recommendation, was of opinion that the islands had only slight strategic value and would not be a menace to Turkey if placed under the control of a weak power such as Greece.

#### 4. *Discussion of the Security Technical Committee*

In the judgment of the military and naval members of the Subcommittee the islands were of no significant value either for surface warships or for air bases if the United Nations held other ports and bases in the East Mediterranean area. It was likewise pointed out that Italy had no valid claims to the islands on grounds of national security.

### B. *Cession to Turkey*

Turkey has a potential claim rooted in four hundred years of ownership and a strategic interest in the fate of islands so close to its shores. The Turkish government, as a general policy, has disclaimed territorial aspirations, but there exists some evidence of a desire in Turkish military and diplomatic circles to annex at least some of the islands with a possible exchange of populations among the islands.

### C. *Internationalization*

An international administration might offer the best government and dispel fears that the islands would be used for aggressive purposes. The close cultural ties of the inhabitants with Greece, however, would seem to suggest the desirability of such a solution only on the ground of the military needs of the international organization for strategic centers.

### D. *Cession to Great Britain*

This proposal has received no favorable consideration.

This solution would perhaps strengthen British security arrangements in the Mediterranean but would leave unsettled the nationality problem and would engender Turkish resentment.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 4]

*Memorandum by Mr. Philip W. Ireland, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-5

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

ITALY—EGYPT  
COLONIAL PROBLEMS: LIBYA

## I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of Libya.

The occupation by Great Britain of this Italian colony and Mr. Eden's statement that the British Government was determined that the Senussi should not again fall under Italian domination<sup>4</sup> raises the question of its future.

Libya was taken by Italy in the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-1912 but not until 1932 was Italian domination established over the country by brutality and bloodshed which gained for Italy bitter hatred and an unenviable reputation. Libya has been a strategic asset to Italy. Italian colonists numbering about 20,000 have been placed on the land but on the whole the colony has been an economic liability.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. *International Trusteeship*

This solution was preferred by the Political Subcommittee.

Under the proposal put forward by a special subcommittee (September 26, 1942) Libya would form a portion of a North African Region composed of all North Africa except Algeria and Egypt. The area was to be placed under a regional council composed of Great Britain, France, Spain, United States, Egypt, Turkey and possibly Italy. Libya was to be placed under the administration of Turkey, because this country was a Moslem state, because it has reached a stage in its development entitling it to further international responsibility. This solution was incorporated with some modifications into an international trusteeship plan (December 3, 1942) subsequently narrowed in a revised plan (April 15, 1943) which places Libya under the direct administration of a North and East Africa Regional Supervisory Council composed of Great Britain, France and Egypt and, subject to reservation, Ethiopia, and possibly Turkey and Greece. Italy's future participation was tentatively not precluded.

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<sup>4</sup> For the statement referred to, made on January 8, 1942, see *Parliamentary Debates: House of Commons Official Report*, 5th series, vol. 377, col. 78.

### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

It was the consensus, in view of the disastrous effect of Italian administration on the indigenous population, that the territory should not be left in Italian hands. No better solution existed than that of international trusteeship. It was held that the administration of Libya should be placed in the hands of an international council rather than any one power such as Turkey. Opinion was against the participation of the United States in a trusteeship in this part of the world.

### 2. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

It was agreed in view of the rapid development of air-power that it was not important, from a security standpoint, who controlled Libya.

### B. *Division of Libya Between Egypt and Tunisia*

This solution, suggested in a memorandum by the Council on Foreign Relations,<sup>5</sup> involves the cession of Cyrenaica to Egypt, thereby providing the latter with a defensible western frontier, and of Tripoli to Tunis, with which it was held to be economically and geographically a unit.

### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

Opposition was expressed to the proposal on the ground that the poor administration of Egypt should not be extended and that the addition of Italians to Tunisia would further disturb the balance between French and Italians in Tunisia.

### C. *Return of Libya to Italy*

This solution was rejected by the subcommittees, although a minority in the Security Subcommittee held that Libya should be retained by a demilitarized Italy. It was also pointed out that detachment of Libya from Italy might be interpreted as "veiled annexation" of Italian metropolitan territory. It was stressed, however, that no solution which was eventually adopted for Libya should preclude Italian migration into Libya or enjoyment of equal opportunities by Italians.

### D. *Establishment of Libya as a Refuge for Jews*

This solution has not been discussed by the Subcommittees.

This solution, put forward by a recent observer, advocates the creation of a Jewish State in Cyrenaica and the settlement of Jewish refugees in the villages and farms vacated by the Italians and on additional land. Such a solution would alleviate the Jewish refugee problem somewhat and relieve pressure on Palestine. The proposal envisages negotiations with Arab leaders of the area and the Near East to permit the settlement of Jews.

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<sup>5</sup> No. T-B 49, entitled "Libya: Alternative Proposals Affecting Its Future Status"; not printed.

One obstacle in the way of this plan is that little arable land is available beyond that already taken up by Italian colonists and indigenous cultivators. Even before the war, pressure on the land had led to increasing unrest. It is also doubtful if an agreement could be reached with the Arabs of Libya, particularly with the Senussi, whose power is growing. An increase in Arab nationalism in Libya has been reported. An attempt to foster Jewish settlement in Libya might result in extending the area of Arab-Jewish conflict without offering any substantial relief to the Jewish refugee problem.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 5]

*Memorandum by Mr. Philip W. Ireland, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-7

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1943.

#### ITALY—ETHIOPIA

#### COLONIAL PROBLEMS: ERITREA AND ITALIAN SOMALILAND

##### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition of Italian colonies in East Africa. The problem arises through the ejection of the Italians from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland by British forces. It is intimately related to the Ethiopian ambition to secure an outlet to the sea.

From these colonies, acquired by Italy in the 1880's and always economically unprofitable, Italian aggression against Ethiopia was launched. From Eritrea the Italians sought to enlarge their influence in Yemen and create a counterweight to Aden. The territories have not been popular with Italian colonists; only about 5,500 Italians lived there in 1931. Other groups in Eritrea are 255,000 Somalis, 45,000 Danakils and 375,000 Christians; most of the Christians are religiously, linguistically and ethnically part of the Amharic peoples of the Ethiopian plateau. Somaliland, with a population of one million persons, is inhabited principally by Somalis.

##### II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

###### A. *International Administration of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland*

This solution was generally favored by the Political Subcommittee.

This solution would avoid replacing Italian sovereignty by any other national sovereignty. It would furnish a better administration than that which could be provided by Ethiopia in any part of these colonies ceded to that country. The cost of international administra-

tion might not be defrayable from local revenues. This solution would not meet the Ethiopian demand for an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty, nor would it unite the related peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee felt that, since Italian colonies should not be returned to Italy, the logical conclusion seemed to be to place these colonies under trusteeship of the United Nations. In them free ports should be granted to Ethiopia. Attention was called to the fact that the singling out of these two colonies to be placed under international administration would not be well received by American public opinion.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

A majority of this subcommittee believed that, since Italy had used these colonies as bases for its attack on Ethiopia and since they had been economically unessential to Italy, there was no reason for returning them to Italy.

3. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

It was the consensus that the control of air and naval bases in these areas would not be essential to an international security organization, although the United States might wish to retain an interest in the air base at Asmara. Eritrea, therefore, might be placed under international administration or fall within the British sphere of influence. Italian Somaliland should be left under Italian control. Ethiopia should receive an outlet to the sea. It was remarked that in any event a "grab" for territory should not be permitted.

B. *International Administration of Northeastern Africa*

This solution was held to be impractical by the subcommittees.

Under this solution, proposed by a special subcommittee (Sept. 26, 1942), all colonial territories in northeastern Africa from the Sudan to Kenya would be placed under international trusteeship, to be administered by a Regional Supervisory Council composed of Egypt, Great Britain, France and Ethiopia. Italian Somaliland would be placed temporarily under British administration, and portions of Eritrea sufficient to afford an outlet to the sea would be given to Ethiopia.

This solution would have the merit of avoiding discrimination against Italy. It would break the ring of territories surrounding Ethiopia and would meet Ethiopia's desires for an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

This subcommittee believed that, if international control of colonial territories were to be established, it might well begin in this area, but

that, in view of the opposition of France and Great Britain to pooling their colonies, the plan was impractical. Several members opposed (a) the assignment to Great Britain of the temporary administration of the colonies on the ground that such administration would tend to become permanent; (b) the inclusion of Egypt on the council since it had no interest in this area; and (c) the inclusion of Ethiopia on the council on grounds of its inability to govern well.

### 2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The view was also held by this subcommittee that the interests of France and Great Britain would render international administration impracticable.

### C. *Cession of Eritrea in Whole or in Part to Ethiopia and of Italian Somaliland to Great Britain*

This solution, which found little favor with the subcommittees, was not discussed in detail.

This solution would have the merit of uniting peoples of the Ethiopian plateau having common ethnic, religious and linguistic ties. It would satisfy the major claim of Ethiopia for an outlet under its own sovereignty. It would give Italian Somaliland a higher quality of administration, comparable to that of British Somaliland. It would have the slight disadvantage of adding groups of backward Danakils and Somalis to the non-Amharic minority within the Ethiopian Empire.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee held that no part of Eritrea should be added to Ethiopia. Great Britain was referred to as being the logical power to administer Italian Somaliland, although it was pointed out that a transfer of territory from Italy to Great Britain would have to be justified in terms of principle. The advantages or disadvantages of integrating ethnic groups in the area were not fully discussed.

#### 2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The subcommittee doubted that Ethiopia could adequately govern additional territory.

### D. *Eritrea and Italian Somaliland To Be Administered by Great Britain*

This solution, suggested in the Political Subcommittee on the grounds of economy and expediency, was held to be contrary to American public opinion. It was not further discussed.

### E. *Return of Eritrea and Somaliland to Italy*

This solution found favor with a small minority of the members in the subcommittees.

This solution would presumably be connected with disarmament of Italy and pledges of non-aggression in this area. It might forestall the growth of Italian resentment at allegedly discriminatory treatment. It would, however, leave Ethiopia surrounded by territory controlled by European powers.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

A minority of this subcommittee expressed the view that the return of these colonies, which few other powers would desire, might be an inducement to Italy to cooperate with the United Nations and provide an outlet for Italian emigration. A majority held that the record of Italy indicated that it could not be entrusted with these colonies.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The view was expressed that the loss of the colonies would be regarded, wrongly or rightly, as the removal of potential outlets for Italian emigration. It was also believed that Great Britain, in view of its interests in the Red Sea areas, would oppose the return of the colonies to Italy.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 6]

*Memorandum by Mr. Grayson L. Kirk, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-3000

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1943.

ITALY  
SECURITY PROBLEMS: PANTELLERIA

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is the disposition to be made of the Italian island of Pantelleria.

This problem will require decision because of its relevance to future security arrangements in the Mediterranean. Although Pantelleria is a small island (32 sq. mi.) and lacking in good harbor facilities, its strategic location midway between Cape Bon and the Sicilian coast, and its proximity to Malta (approximately 150 miles to the eastward), give it a high strategical importance as an air base. Originally developed as a base for attacks on Tunisia, it has served during the present war as a refuelling depot for bombers en route to Libya, and its 4,000 ft. runway and underground repair shops and hangars have

provided base facilities for fighter planes which have harassed British convoys to Malta and Egypt. The disposition of Pantelleria must be considered as one part of the general problem of control over Italian armaments.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. *Continued Italian Sovereignty, With Complete Demilitarization*

This solution was tentatively accepted by the Security Subcommittee and the Security Technical Committee.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

The Security Subcommittee, while not excluding the possibility of direct administration by an international agency, felt that continued Italian sovereignty was preferable to a transfer to another power, e.g., Great Britain. Such a transfer might create lasting irredentism in Italy; it would be difficult to reconcile with the Atlantic Charter; and it would provide no security advantages which could not be assured equally well through a policy of enforced demilitarization.

#### 2. *Discussion of the Security Technical Committee*

The Security Technical Committee inclined to the view that the central goal, i.e., the assurance that Pantelleria would not again be used to help block free use of the central Mediterranean, could be achieved under Italian sovereignty, provided a system of thorough demilitarization, coupled with inspection, were instituted.

### B. *Transfer to Great Britain*

#### 1. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

The view was expressed that the transfer of Pantelleria to Great Britain might be contemplated because of its relationship to the defense of Malta, and because Great Britain would probably continue to bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security in the Mediterranean area.

#### 2. *Discussion of the Security Technical Committee*

It was suggested that transfer to Great Britain would provide full assurance that the "waist" of the Mediterranean would be kept open in the future; also that the loss of the island would be resented by Italy far less than the loss of Sicily, or even a part thereof.

### C. *Administrative Control by the International Organization*

This alternative was mentioned briefly, though not discussed, in the Political Subcommittee and the Security Subcommittee. It was mentioned in connection with the suggestion that certain areas in North Africa possessing special security significance might be placed under the permanent administration of an international security agency.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 7]

*Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-9

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION:  
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what political elements should be supported in order to assure a stable and orderly transition government in Italy, without prejudicing the ultimate right of political self-determination and the development of democratic processes.

The problem arises because of the desirability of fostering a non-Fascist Italian government upon which the United Nations can rely either (1) to hasten Italy's capitulation, or (2) in the event of invasion, to assume authority when the progress of military occupation permits. Since such a government would presumably be transitional in character, the further problem arises as to what safeguards may be necessary to assure the subsequent free choice of a permanent régime by the Italian people.

The United States and Great Britain have announced that they will not deal with any member or agent of the Fascist régime. The determination of what non-Fascist elements might be capable of forming a strong and stable transitional government is made difficult, however, by uncertainty as to political conditions at the moment of Fascist collapse and by the absence within Italy of any large or cohesive opposition group or any leader of commanding stature. Among the elements out of which a provisional government might be constructed are: (1) the House of Savoy; (2) the Army or certain of its representatives, divorced from the Fascist Régime; (3) conservative elements among the middle classes and the peasantry who may be drawn into some coalition with the monarchy and the army; (4) revolutionary elements, now scattered, that may emerge; and (5) Italian exiles, the largest organized body of whom is the Free Italy movement, headed by Count Sforza. Reliable appraisal of political groups and leaders within Italy is difficult at present because of the scant and often conflicting nature of available information.

II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. *A Government Under Auspices of the House of Savoy*

This solution was generally regarded by the Political Subcommittee and the Territorial Subcommittee as the least unsatisfactory.

The House of Savoy has been the legitimate source of political authority in Italy ever since unification was consummated in 1871. Since 1848 the powers of the king have been limited by the *Statuto Fondamentale del Regno*, which made possible a liberal constitutional monarchy. Although widely popular under earlier monarchs, the House of Savoy has never won universal confidence and loyalty among the Italians, partially because of the lack of a strong tradition of monarchy, smouldering republican aspirations, and regional resentments against the ascendancy of the Piedmontese dynasty.

The present monarch, Victor Emmanuel III, has not attained the prestige of his predecessors because his reign has lacked both luster and strength. Moreover, he is tainted in the eyes of many anti-Fascists because he called Mussolini to power in 1922 against the advice of his ministers and because he has since shown no convincing disposition to resist Fascist policies. His prestige was further undermined by an act of 1928 that placed under the custody of the Fascist Grand Council the succession to the Throne and the powers and prerogatives of the Crown.

There are conflicting reports from Italy and from neutral sources concerning the present strength and popularity of the Monarchy. On the one hand it is claimed that the House of Savoy has the confidence of conservative urban groups, of most of the peasantry (40-50% of the Italian population) and of the Vatican. Other sources suggest that the Monarchy has suffered irreparable loss of prestige and is widely unpopular, especially throughout Northern Italy. Republican-minded anti-Fascists maintain that a continuation of the monarchy would play into the hands of the allegedly reactionary and Fascist-minded upper-middle classes.

Many sources think it possible that the present King may, at the moment of political crisis, abdicate in favor of Prince Humbert,<sup>6</sup> who, although not widely popular and giving no evidence of distinguished abilities, may be more generally acceptable. There are also rumors that a regency may be formed under the Crown Princess for her son born in 1937.<sup>7</sup>

The House of Savoy might conceivably assert itself with assistance from the Army to establish an authoritarian régime. This would mean a breach of the constitution and a repudiation of the dynasty's liberal traditions. If the King were not strong enough personally to assert his authority, a struggle for dominant position might ensue among his supporters. It is more likely, however, that the ruling house by virtue of its historical position and present weaknesses, would con-

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<sup>6</sup> Crown Prince Humbert, Prince of Piedmont.

<sup>7</sup> Victor Emmanuel, Prince of Naples.

tinue as a constitutional monarchy under the *Statuto*. In this event it would remain a façade behind which a contest for power might develop among various political elements, particularly those of moderate or rightist tendency such as the Army, the Church, the financial and industrial classes, the more conservative lesser middle-classes and the peasantry. In either case, a government under the House of Savoy might afford only doubtful assurance of stability and might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a permanent government by the Italian people.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee inclined to the view that there might be advantage in dealing with the House of Savoy as the nominal "legitimate authority". Moreover, the people of Italy were thought to be devoted to the institution of the monarchy, regardless of the acknowledged weakness and disrepute of the present King. It was believed that under the House of Savoy, with its constitutional tradition and its continuity with pre-Fascist Italy, a liberal government might be developed and no better combination was thought possible for establishing strong and orderly government than one headed by the House of Savoy with the properly subordinated support of the Army. As between the present King and the Prince of Piedmont, some preference was indicated for the Prince.

The consensus was that a transitional government under the House of Savoy would be the least objectionable of the various possibilities. One view was, however, that although military requirements might make it necessary to deal with the House of Savoy, this should be a last resort because the monarchy's record under Fascism is in conflict with the aims of the United Nations. It was emphasized that any action that might appear to impose a government on the Italian people against their will should be avoided, both on the basis of United Nations principles and because it might provoke revolution. Moreover, the recognition of any provisional government should be accompanied by provisions to assure the right of the Italian people to choose their own government when they have time to think coolly and to express themselves clearly. If the people meanwhile indicate a preference for the House of Savoy and if the monarchy shows promise of enabling the development of democratic government, the United Nations could scarcely refuse to deal with it.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee discussed this alternative briefly. It was suggested that the Italian people would rally around the King (or the Prince, if the King abdicates) despite the weaknesses of the monarchy, because the House of Savoy is a symbol of continuity and

might provide a means of returning to older institutions, somewhat modified by Fascist changes. Relations between the Holy See and the House of Savoy were said to be very close, although the Vatican does not regard political adjustments as its proper field of activity.

B. *A Government Headed by the Army, Divorced From the Fascist Régime*

Opposition to the Fascist régime has grown within the Army since the attack upon Greece in 1940. It is pronounced among certain higher officers who have been made scapegoats for Italian military disasters; among them are Generals Badoglio and Caviglia, both of whom have been mentioned as possible leaders of a transitional government.

Those who advocate a provisional régime under Army leaders reason that only such a government could assure the cessation of Italian resistance or could deliver to the United Nations the support of Italian armed forces, both within Italy and throughout Southeastern Europe. These observers also believe that an Army government would best assure stability and order following the overthrow of Fascism. Opponents of this solution fear that control by the Army might lead to another dictatorship, might obstruct the free choice of a permanent government by the Italian people and might prevent the ultimate development of a liberal and democratic régime. Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Popular Party, maintains that the Italian people would have no confidence in a civilian authority under Army leadership, as evidenced by their turning out of the repressive government of General Luigi Pelloux in 1900.

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee was disposed to agree that the United Nations may have to deal with a government under the Army or some element of the Army in order to hasten the defeat of the Axis and to gain any military assistance from the Italians. The possibility of military dictatorship was thought to make this a dangerous solution, however, especially if it should interfere with the subsequent free political choice of the Italian people and the development of democratic government. Doubt was expressed as to whether an army leader could be found who would be capable of forming the government, because most of them are either too old or without popular following.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The possibility of a transitional government under the Army was given only brief consideration, in the Territorial Subcommittee. The subcommittee noted that there might be a period when questions of governmental form and civil liberty would have to be subordinated to primary questions of police order, but recognized that these temporary

necessities might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a government by the Italian people.

### C. *A Revolutionary Régime*

According to available information there are no present indications of a substantial and well-integrated revolutionary movement in Italy. Disaffection with the Fascist régime has spread in varying degrees throughout the professional and business classes, the university faculties and students, sections of the peasantry and the independent farmers, the laboring classes, and the rank and file of the Army. These diverse elements range in political complexion from moderate to communist, and have in common only their opposition to Fascism, motivated principally by its failures both in war and in domestic policy. Only the small communist group appears to be closely-knit. The possibility is not precluded, however, that a nation-wide revolutionary movement may be engendered by military events leading to the defeat of Italy.

Among the opposition groups of the center and left there is some demand for a republican form of government. This is true of those elements within Italy that are sympathetic towards the exile Free Italy movement under the leadership of Count Carlo Sforza.

#### 1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee discounted the probability of a revolutionary government because of the present lack of organization. It questioned whether a régime established by a popular uprising could take over without violence, or would have sufficient authority to govern, even during an interregnum. This would be true even though the Socialist Party and the Labor Unions might regain strength.

#### 2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee inclined to believe that considerable time would be required to build up the prestige of possible leaders in labor circles or other underground movements. The subcommittee reached no conclusion concerning the advisability of dealing with a revolutionary régime, although it emphasized that the government of Italy must ultimately be based upon the people. The subcommittee noted that a chaotic revolutionary situation, in which various leaders would contend for control and in which the Italian armed forces might be divided, would create difficulties for the United Nations.

### D. *A Government Organized by Italians in Exile*

Numerous groups seeking the overthrow of Fascism have been formed among Italian exiles in the Americas, Great Britain and the Near East. Predominant among them is the Free Italy movement led by Count Carlo Sforza, which has an extensive following among the

large Italian population in the United States and the other American republics. The Free Italy movement has declared for a democratic republic in Italy and the right of political self-determination for the Italian people. Count Sforza has further projected a plan for the reorganization of Italian government that includes administrative decentralization as an assurance for the preservation of liberties. At a conference in Montevideo during August 1942, the Free Italy movement laid plans (as yet unrealized) for a National Council headed by Count Sforza, who was authorized to approach the United Nations for recognition of Free Italy. None of the major United Nations has officially recognized the movement. Moreover, the governments of the United States and Great Britain have indicated that they will pursue a cautious policy toward "free movements".

1. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee inclined to the belief that Count Sforza has no great following in Italy and does not possess the attributes of a successful leader of a government-in-exile, despite his long record as an anti-Fascist. One member suggested that Count Sforza is not irrevocably opposed to the monarchy and might add strength to any government organized under a regency.

2. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The Territorial Subcommittee felt that it would be unwise for the United States to support an exiled Italian leader lest this nation give the impression of wishing to impose a government on the Italian people. The subcommittee noted that the United States Government had for this reason avoided political commitments to "free movements". Count Sforza, although widely respected, was thought to have no organized or politically significant following.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 8]

*Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-11

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION:  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVISIONAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine whether, in the event that the whole or part of Italy is occupied by military forces of the United Nations,

a provisional government should be established during occupation and, if so, at what stages and in what degree the provisional government should assume responsibility for civil administration.

The problem arises because some military experts believe that military exigencies may require that supreme authority remain in the hands of military officials until final peace arrangements are made; because a non-Fascist central government may be formed that will seek recognition as the ruling authority in liberated areas, or because the United Nations may find it expedient to recognize a provisional government for military and political reasons.

Normal civil functions, particularly the police powers, the dispensation of justice, and measures of health and sanitation must be carried forward, subject to military requirements, during the period of occupation. Certain civil activities, such as public finance, and monetary control will be more than local in scope and will probably require coordination throughout the occupied area. While these activities may be conducted under military auspices with the assistance of local functionaries, it is possible that they might be better administered under an Italian provisional government collaborating with the military commander. It is also reasonable to anticipate that civilian activities will gain importance as the occupation period lengthens, and that the demands for recognition of a provisional government may become more insistent.

## II. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

### A. *Control of Civil Administration by the Occupying Military Authorities Until the Establishment and Recognition of a Permanent Government*

This proposal was favored by the Security Subcommittee for enemy states in general, without specific reference to Italy.

Under this plan, supreme authority would remain throughout the occupation period with the commander of the occupying forces, who would exercise control and veto power over local civil government. Subject to these limitations, the local courts, administrative agencies, and legislative groups would continue to operate.

The principal arguments in favor of this proposal are that it will be made necessary by military requirements, that the local population will accept and respect a military authority more readily than a civilian authority during the period of occupation, and that such a policy accords with the laws of war. Opposition to the proposal is based upon the belief that the prolongation of foreign military control would provoke resentments that would obstruct the transition to a permanent

political régime, and that the recognition of an Italian provisional government during this period would offer administrative advantages and might facilitate the ultimate realization of United Nations political aims.

*B. Establishment of a Provisional Government During Occupation*

This plan contemplates the recognition during occupation of an acceptable provisional government to administer such civil responsibilities as military requirements permit. It is presumed that this government would collaborate with the military commander and would remain in power until a permanent government acceptable to the United Nations had been chosen by the Italian people. Such a plan would require decision by the political authorities of the United Nations as to what form of provisional government should be recognized and what Italian political elements should be dealt with.

The recognition of a widely-supported provisional government might hasten the overthrow of Fascism, the collapse of Italian resistance and the capitulation of Italian armies elsewhere in Europe; and might even gain Italian military assistance for the United Nations. A provisional government might also be useful for the integration of civil administration in the occupied areas and for the conclusion of peace. Its collaboration in the establishment of a permanent régime might minimize the danger that the permanent government would be weakened later by allegations that it had been created under duress. While the political experience gained under a provisional government might facilitate an orderly transition to a permanent régime, it is equally possible that a provisional government might give rise to disruptive political struggles and might prejudice the subsequent free choice of a permanent régime by the Italian people. It is possible that military security would not permit the sharing of administrative responsibility with a provisional government during occupation and that any attempt to do so might lead to embarrassing political complications to the detriment of the military effort.

*C. Recognition of a Provisional Government Prior to Occupation*

The recognition of a provisional government in advance of occupation would doubtless be governed by political considerations related to obtaining the capitulation and possible support of Italian army forces. Such an arrangement might require commitments to the provisional government with regard to the assumption of certain phases of civil administration. In other respects, this proposal would be subject to the same considerations as B (*Establishment of a Provisional Government During Occupation*).

### 1. *Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

The Security Subcommittee has discussed the possible recognition of a provisional government during the period of occupation principally in terms of "enemy states", and has given only cursory consideration to its specific application in Italy. The subcommittee was in general agreement that military authority should dominate throughout the entire period of occupation and should terminate only when a permanent government acceptable to the victor powers had come into existence.

One member stated that even during occupation the military officials will have to decide with what civil government, if any, they will deal. This political decision would be more urgent if the occupation is of skeletal character rather than in full force, and would have to be based both upon military requirements and upon an estimate of the relationship of any particular government to United States security. The prevailing view, however, was that there can be no question of recognition during the period of occupation, and that any government would necessarily have to serve as "a minion" of the military commander until such time as the United Nations political authority terminated occupation and accorded full recognition to a permanent government.

At a subsequent meeting, however, after brief discussion the subcommittee approved a set of principles relating to the military occupation of Italy which provided that: "Whether or not an Italian national government shall be recognized and, if so, the degree of authority which should at various stages of the occupation be accorded to that government will be determined by the United Nations political authorities in consultation with the military commander".

The consensus was that the occupying authority would make use of local officials under military supervision and that local courts and other civil agencies should continue to function subject to veto. The subcommittee did not consider the possible advantage of recognizing a provisional government as a means towards hastening the termination of resistance.

### 2. *Discussion of the Political Subcommittee*

The Political Subcommittee appeared to assume tacitly, when discussing what Italian individuals and groups should be dealt with, that a provisional government should be recognized during the occupation period, but did not consider that problem specifically.

### 3. *Discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee*

The discussion of the Territorial Subcommittee was similar to that of the Political Subcommittee.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 9]

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Political Studies (Rothwell)*<sup>8</sup>

SECRET  
H-25a<sup>9</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1943.

ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION:  
NATURE OF A PERMANENT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

## I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what form of permanent national government in Italy will be acceptable to the United Nations as a basis for recognition. The problem arises because the United States has assured the Italian people that when Fascism has been overthrown, they shall be free to choose whatever non-Fascist form of government they may wish to establish.

This commitment gives use [*rise*] to questions as to what definition of "non-Fascist" the United States may wish to apply, and as to whether the United Nations may wish to assure before recognition that the new government holds promise of stability, conforms to the requirements of international security, and gives expression to the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms.

## II. BASIC INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

A. *Pre-Fascist Experience*

From 1848 until the advent of Fascism in 1922 Italy was governed as a liberal constitutional monarchy under the House of Savoy and under the *Statuto Fondamentale del Regno* granted by the King. Because of serious weaknesses in the political environment, however, responsible parliamentary institutions did not function in the manner of their English counterparts; instead, the ministries centered around dominant personalities and were organized chiefly on the basis of political expedience. The liberal régime did not acquire either the roots or the strength to survive the economic and social chaos and the national resentments of the post-war period. Anti-liberal forces finally triumphed in 1922 when King Victor Emmanuel III called Mussolini to power against the advice of his ministers.

B. *Institutions of the Fascist Régime*

Under Fascism authoritarian institutions replaced liberal government. Parliament was reduced to a rubber-stamping body and finally

<sup>8</sup> Rothwell, who had earlier prepared a number of the other enclosures in this file in his capacity as a Divisional Assistant, was promoted to be Assistant Chief of the Division on August 16, 1943.

<sup>9</sup> The source copy bears the typed endorsement: "(abridgement of H-25)". For the text of H-25, see *post*, p. 815.

abandoned in 1939 in favor of an appointive Chamber of Fasci and Corporations. Mussolini, in his dual capacity of Head of the Government and leader of the Fascist party, dominated every phase of administration as well as legislation. Civil liberties were set aside and the judicial structure was subordinated to the Totalitarian state. The Fascist party not only served as an instrument for controlling the government, but also was legally integrated with the governmental structure. Mussolini's régime also undertook to regiment economic activity through the corporate system, a pyramided structure of workers and employers syndicates culminating in twenty-two corporations under Fascist control.

Throughout twenty years of Fascism the King, although actually exercising little power, remained the titular head of the Italian state. The *Statuto* nominally remained in force, but was completely perverted, its perversion having been facilitated by serious weaknesses in the document itself.

### III. PRESENT POLITICAL FORCES

Many uncertain factors, including the course chosen by the present government under Marshal Badoglio and military events leading to Italy's surrender, will undoubtedly influence the Italian people's choice of a permanent government. What that choice may be can best be approached through an estimate (necessarily based on inadequate information) of the present and potential strength of various non-Fascist groups. These would include:

A. *Supporters of the Monarchy*, who would probably include a large proportion of the numerous peasantry, together with such influential conservative groups as the prominent industrialists and large land-owners. The support of the army is also probable but dependent upon military developments, while the navy and *Carabinieri* are reported to be obediently loyal to the House of Savoy.

B. *The Catholics*, whose leaders, guided by the interests of the Church, may be expected to exert considerable influence on the new government through the numerous Catholic organizations. While the Vatican and higher officials of the Church in Italy are reported to support a continuation of the monarchy, Don Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Popular Party, believes the Vatican would bow to the wishes of the Italian people if they choose a republic, provided the new régime were not anti-clerical. A Catholic opposition party of moderate views and with wide-spread influence is reported to exist in Italy, despite the opposition of influential Catholics to a party tied to the Church. This party is said to favor the free choice of a government by the people.

C. *The Liberals*, principally members of the middle classes, the professions, and the intelligentsia, are not well integrated. At least eight distinct liberal groups, richer in leaders than followers, are said to exist. Their political objectives range from a desire to restore responsible parliamentary government under the King and the *Statuto* to a desire for a democratic republic with some degree of collectivism.

D. *Leftist Groups*. The socialist party, whose membership, like that of the communist party, is drawn chiefly from among the working classes of northern Italy, favors the establishment of a free and democratic socialism in Italy. It has recently joined other leftist groups in seeking the establishment of a republic. The communist party, although small in numbers, is reported to be the most closely organized of all left groups. The party's present policy is collaboration with all anti-Fascist groups for the overthrow of Fascism and monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

#### IV. ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

##### A. *Constitutional Monarchy Under the House of Savoy and the Statuto*

This would mean a return to the pre-Fascist forms of government. It would restore responsible parliamentary institutions on a democratic basis under the monarch as the source of authority. Civic freedoms would be restored and placed under the custody of an independent judiciary.

Such a government would be supported by conservative elements and would probably also have the backing of the Catholic groups and of many liberals. It would be opposed by liberals who favor a republic, and by all leftist groups. Question remains, however, as to whether such a government would afford assurance of future political stability, since the weaknesses of the parliamentary system and the party structure revealed by previous experience may be expected to reappear, perhaps in more intense form.

If this form of government is chosen, certain changes in the *Statuto* may be desirable in the interest of stability. Among these would be provision for a special amending process, the insertion of a bill of rights, and the establishment of some instrumentality (perhaps like the Supreme Court of the United States) to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation. Some change may also be desirable to free the executive from the incubus of parliamentary instability without at the same time making possible any abuse of executive authority.

##### B. *A Democratic Republic*

The establishment of a democratic republic would mean the triumph of liberal and leftist forces at the expense of the more conservative

groups which seek to retain the monarchy. In the absence of detailed specifications it may be assumed that the construction of a republic would follow the essentially liberal traditions of Mazzini, with a responsible, popularly elected executive and legislature and with adequate safeguards for individual liberties. A republican government might, however, reflect the desire of the socialists and other left-wing groups for some degree of collectivism.

The probable stability of such a régime is difficult to estimate at present. In its favor would be the still vital republican traditions and the wide-spread support it would probably receive from liberal and left groups, and possibly from the peasantry and the Church. On the other hand, a democratic and republican form of government would be subject to many of the weaknesses of a constitutional monarchy described above, and in addition, might be confronted for a considerable period with serious hostility from rightist groups.

### C. *A Communist Régime*

There does not appear to be serious possibility of a communist régime in Italy unless the subsequent course of the war should lead to serious social disturbances and full-blown popular revolution. The communist party, although well-integrated, remains small, even when its reputed gains among the industrial classes are taken into consideration.

#### *Discussion of the Subcommittees*

Neither the Political Subcommittee nor the Territorial Subcommittee has considered the problem of a permanent national government for Italy. In discussing what groups to deal with during the transitional period, however, both subcommittees inclined to the view that a régime under the House of Savoy would be less objectionable and more stable than a military dictatorship, and would appear to be the only logical acceptable choice available. The subcommittees were skeptical of the possibilities of a revolutionary régime and discounted the possible influence of exile groups.

[Enclosure 10]

*Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-25

[WASHINGTON,] August 4, 1943.

## ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION: NATURE OF A PERMANENT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

### I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what form of permanent national government in Italy will be acceptable to the United Nations as a basis

for recognition. The problem arises because the United States has assured the Italian people that when Fascism has been eliminated they shall be free to choose whatever non-Fascist form of government they may wish to establish.

This commitment gives rise to questions as to what definition of "non-Fascist" the United States may wish to apply, and as to whether the United Nations may wish to assure before recognition that the new government holds promise of stability, conforms to the requirements of international security, and gives expression to the liberal principles of the Atlantic Charter and of the Four Freedoms.

## II. BASIC INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS

### A. *Pre-Fascist Traditions*

From 1848 until the advent of the Fascist dictatorship in 1922 Italy was governed as a liberal constitutional monarchy under the House of Savoy. The *Statuto Fondamentale del Regno*, granted by the King, provided for a popularly-elected parliament and a responsible ministry, which Italian liberals hoped would perform the roles of their respective English counterparts. These aspirations were never fulfilled because of limitations in the Italian political environment such as a crippling heterogeneity of interests, of occupations and of living standards throughout the peninsula, the absence of any strong liberal tradition antedating the *Risorgimento*, a general lack of political experience, and low levels of literacy. The possibilities for democracy were curbed by suffrage restrictions until 1911, while the development of responsible parliamentary government was retarded by a multiplicity of relatively ineffectual parties. These conditions resulted between 1876 and 1922 in a succession of twenty-two ministries. Many of these centered around dominant personalities, were organized chiefly on the basis of political expediency, and were weakened by corruption. Despite these handicaps liberal institutions gained some strength, while the Italian nation made substantial headway toward political unity, higher levels of economic development and a significant program of social legislation.

The liberal régime nevertheless did not become sufficiently deep-rooted and vigorous to weather the severe trials of the post-war period, 1919-1922, in which nationalist resentment over the alleged defeat of Italian ambitions at the Peace Conference combined with economic readjustment and depression to arouse deep dissatisfactions and to stimulate anti-liberal tendencies. While the nation was beset by strikes and alarmed by the never very real spectre of Bolshevism, while injured national pride was finding active expression through returned soldiers and other social groups, and while violence was finding justi-

fication in the seizure of Fiume, the Italian parliament remained relatively ineffectual, and the growing Fascist movement received clandestine protection from sections of the bureaucracy. Anti-liberal forces finally triumphed in 1922, despite evidences of economic and political recovery in that year, when King Victor Emmanuel III disregarded the advice of his ministers and called Mussolini to power.

### B. *Institutions of the Fascist Régime*

Under Fascism the liberal and democratic structure was gradually supplanted after 1925 by authoritarian institutions. The Parliament was reduced to a one-party instrument with little more power than the rubber-stamping of administrative decrees. Even the pretense of popular election was abandoned in 1939, when the old Chamber of Deputies was replaced by an appointive Chamber of Fasci and Corporations. The Council of Ministers, formerly responsible to Parliament, was made solely responsible to Mussolini, who, moreover, gained control of every governmental agency directly or indirectly in his dual capacity as Head of the Government and leader of the Fascist Party.

The Party, regimented according to a strict hierarchy, not only served as an instrument for the control of political institutions, but was also legally integrated with the governmental structure. After 1928 the Fascist Grand Council was a constitutional organ of the state, with the right to review all constitutional questions, including the prerogatives of the crown and the succession to the throne, and with power to propose new legislation, to sanction international treaties and to maintain a list of successors to Mussolini as Head of the Government.

Even the judicial structure was subordinated to the totalitarian state. The courts were deprived of independence and their jurisdiction was narrowed by the transfer of a wide range of political offenses to a Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State and by the expansion of the summary administrative powers of the police and other officials.

The most sweeping Fascist change in the Italian political structure was the establishment of the corporate system. This system, designed to regiment economic relations, was based on guild-like syndicates of workers and of employers (represented separately by government-appointed spokesmen), which in 1939 had a total of more than eleven million members. These syndicates were associated within a pyramidal organization that culminated in nine great confederations representing every aspect of Italian economic life and controlled by the Ministry of Corporations. In 1934 there were superimposed on the syndical structure twenty-two corporations, which were essentially councils to

integrate the interests of labor, employers, the Fascist Party and the State.

The activities of the corporations have been correlated in part through the National Council of Corporations, but the principal centralizing agency was the Central Corporative Committee, which consisted of the principal ministers of state, other functionaries, officials of the Fascist Party, and officers of the corporations. A further integration of corporate institutions with the regular machinery of the state was effected in 1939 by the establishment of the Chamber of Fasci and Corporations, whose members were appointed from the councils of the Fascist Party and from the National Council of Corporations.

Through the corporate system, the Fascist state endeavored to abolish labor conflicts, to fix wages and working conditions and to provide means for the "unitary discipline of national economy". Even before the war, and to a greater extent since 1940, this system of economic control was utilized in the pursuit of Fascism's ultimate political ends.

### C. *Role of the Monarchy and the Statuto*

During twenty years of Fascism, the king remained the titular head of the Italian state. In practice the monarchy exercised little or no power and was in fact subjected to political control by an act of 1928 which placed under the custody of the Grand Council of Fascism the powers and prerogatives of the crown as well as the succession to the throne. The *Statuto* was circumvented rather than abolished; it remains today the legal basis for Italian government despite the complete perversion of its liberal intent under Fascism. This distortion of the fundamental law was facilitated by serious weaknesses in the document itself. The statute contains no provision for amendment, being so phrased that it could be amplified and interpreted by ordinary legislation and usage. Protection of the constitution was implicitly and explicitly the duty of the king. When his powers were curbed by parliament, and later by the Fascist dictatorship, there was no instrumentality to review the constitutionality of legislation.

### III. PRESENT POLITICAL FORCES

The Italian people's choice of a permanent post-Fascist régime will undoubtedly be influenced by the course chosen by the government of Marshal Badoglio. If the Marshal and the King choose to continue the war, it is possible that military events leading to Italy's surrender will discredit both the monarchy and the conservative elements supporting it, and that other, more revolutionary, elements will be strengthened. On the other hand, if Marshal Badoglio and the King arrange Italian capitulation, and if the present régime continues in

power as a provisional government without adequate safeguards by the occupying forces, it is possible that the prestige of the monarchy and of the elements behind Marshal Badoglio may be such as to enable them to dominate the subsequent choice of a permanent régime. These and other present uncertainties make difficult any satisfactory estimate as to what form of permanent government the Italian people may choose when they have the opportunity. That problem can be approached only through an estimate of the present and potential strength of the various non-Fascist groups that will be contending for popular support.

Since all opposition groups have been rigorously suppressed in the Fascist state, information concerning their size, strength and political objectives is scanty and often unreliable, and must be interpreted with caution. The principal sources of opposition, which may seek to influence the character of the post-Fascist government, would include :

#### A. *The Monarchists*

The participation of King Victor Emmanuel III in the ousting of Mussolini may possibly restore to the monarchy some of the prestige and respect it had lost through its compromised position under Fascism. While the House of Savoy has never gained universal support throughout Italy, there are evidences that the institution of monarchy would have the loyalty of a large proportion of the numerous peasantry. Moreover it appears to have the backing of influential conservative groups, including prominent industrialists and large land owners, who are reputed to regard the House of Savoy as a bulwark against popular revolution or a leftist régime. There are also evidences that the monarchy would be supported by the Vatican and by the Catholic Church in Italy. The extent to which the army will remain loyal to a régime under the monarchy will undoubtedly be affected by military developments, but at the present time it would appear that almost all higher officers, together with most of the rank and file, would stand behind a government under the throne. The navy, as well as the *Carabinieri*, who dominate internal policing, are reported to be obediently loyal to the Royal House. All these groups, together with many other Italians, favor the monarchy, among other reasons, because they believe it would offer continuity and stability in Italian political life.

#### B. *The Catholics*

Although the Catholic Church, the most powerful non-Fascist organization in Italy, collaborated with the Fascist régime particularly after 1928, it preserved a considerable measure of independence and its leaders have been guided principally by Catholic objectives. With the disappearance of Fascism these leaders may be counted upon

to assert the interests of the Church in the formation and conduct of any new government. In doing so, they could exert considerable influence through the numerous and strong Catholic organizations in Italy. While it is likely that differences in political preference will exist within Catholic ranks, there are indications that the Vatican and higher officials of the Church in Italy would support a continuation of the monarchy. On the other hand, Don Luigi Sturzo, former leader of the Catholic *Partito Popolare Italiano*, believes that the Vatican would not undertake to defend the monarchy if the Italian people decided in favor of a republic, provided the anti-monarchist groups were not also anti-clerical.

It has been reported to the Department that a Catholic opposition party is active in Italy, that it has widespread influence among the masses, and that its strength and influence exceed those of other opposition groups with which it maintains liaison. This party, which is said to have as its nucleus remnants of the *Partito Popolare*, is described as being more moderate than other opposition groups. Its membership is alleged to be divided between a rightist minority who believe in a semi-theocratic state and a leftist majority with more opportunistic political inclinations. While the party has been generally pro-monarchy, it is reported to have accepted the Sforza formula that the choice of a government should be left to the people. It is further reported that the strength and activity of the Catholic opposition party is being curbed by strictly Catholic circles which object to a political party specifically tied to Catholicism and which therefore oppose the reconstitution of the *Partito Popolare*.

### C. *The Liberals*

The Italian liberals, who are principally members of the middle classes, the professions, and the intelligentsia, do not constitute a homogeneous or well-integrated group. Among them are liberals of the pre-Fascist era who have managed to maintain their beliefs despite Fascist repression. There are also younger men and women whose liberalism is essentially a reaction against Fascism. The political objectives of these liberals range from a desire to restore responsible parliamentary government under the king and the *Statuto* to a desire for a democratic republic with some degree of collectivism.

At least eight distinctive liberal movements are reported to exist within Italy, some of them under leadership as distinguished as that of Benedetto Croce, and Ivanoe Bonomi. The entire liberal movement is described by observers, however, as being richer in leadership than in following. Although the various liberal and democratic forces are said by some observers to have united in a single movement for the realization of democratic principles, there is more reason to believe that the

younger liberals and those of republican views have joined forces with the socialists and other left-wing groups in opposition to Fascism and military dictatorship and in seeking the elimination of monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic. It has also been reported that a *Partito d'Azione* (Party of Action) including persons from the above groups, has pronounced for social reforms and the nationalization of heavy industry. Although certain of the liberal and democratic groups are said to view with favor Count Sforza and the Free Italy movement, there is some doubt as to the influence which the exiled movement would exert within Italy.

#### D. *Leftist Groups*

The Italian Socialist Party, one of the strongest parties of the pre-Fascist period, has maintained a clandestine existence within Italy and is likewise represented among exiled groups. Like that of the Communist Party, its membership is drawn principally from among the working classes in northern Italy. In a May Day proclamation this year the Socialist Party demanded peace, the overthrow of Fascism, the abandonment of imperialism, and the establishment of a free and democratic socialism in Italy and in Europe. More recently the socialists have joined with other leftist groups such as the Action Party, the Proletarian Union, the Communist Party and the Communist-Anarchist Federation in seeking elimination of the monarchy and establishment of a democratic republic. The Socialist Party is also reported to have formulated a "Pact of Freedom" for presentation to other anti-Fascist groups, in which the liquidation of trusts along with the monarchy is stipulated. Coördination of the various groups is to be effected through joint committees. The Communist Party, although small in members, is reported to be the most closely organized and cohesive of all left groups. Many of its leaders are imprisoned or in exile, but they appear to have maintained communication with party members throughout northern Italy. The party's present policy is one of collaboration with all anti-Fascist groups for the overthrow of Fascism and monarchy and the establishment of a democratic republic.

### IV. ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES

#### A. *Constitutional Monarchy Under the House of Savoy and the Statuto*

This would mean a return to the pre-Fascist form of government. It would restore responsible parliamentary institutions on a democratic basis, provided the legislation amplifying the *Statuto* in these respects were revived. The monarch would remain the source of authority, but government would be carried on by responsible ministers.

Civil liberties would be restored and placed in custody of an independent judiciary.

This form of government would be supported by the conservative elements favorable to the House of Savoy and would probably also have the backing of the Catholic groups and of many liberals. It would be opposed by republicans and by all leftist groups.

If freely adopted by the Italian people, this form of government would appear to meet most requirements of the United Nations. Question remains, however, as to whether it would afford assurance of future political stability. The weaknesses of the parliamentary system and the party structure, revealed by previous experience, may be expected to reappear. They may, in fact, be intensified in the earlier stages of the reconstituted régime by the readjustments necessary after twenty years of Fascism. They may be further intensified by the hostility of liberal and leftist groups to retention of monarchy, and by the desire of those groups to effect basic social and economic reforms.

Certain changes in the *Statuto* would seem desirable in the interest of stability. Among these would be provision for modification of the *Statuto* by a special amending procedure rather than through the process of ordinary legislation that has made it susceptible of political change. A further safeguard might be the establishment of some instrumentality (perhaps like the Supreme Court of the United States) to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation. Some change may also be desirable in the direction of freeing the executive from the incubus of parliamentary instability that characterized the old liberal régime, without at the same time making possible any abuse of executive authority. If the Senate is to serve as a stabilizing and conservative force in a new liberal régime, some change in the *Statuto* would seem necessary in order to limit the Senate membership and to introduce the representative principle.

All civil liberties are placed by articles 24-32 of the *Statuto* at the mercy of legislative enactment. This weakness contributed to the destruction of the bill of rights under Fascism and could be remedied only by a modification of the *Statuto* to place civil liberties under constitutional guarantee and to remove them from the sphere of ordinary legislation.

### B. *A Democratic Republic*

The establishment of a democratic republic would mean the triumph of liberal and leftist forces at the expense of the more conservative groups which seek to retain the monarchy. No detailed specifications as to the form and functions of such a republic have been set forth by its proponents, who have taken the position that the Italian people

should participate in shaping the new government after the overthrow of Fascism and the monarchy. It may be assumed, however, that the organizers of a republic would intend to follow the essentially liberal traditions of Mazzini, with a responsible, popularly elected executive and legislature and with adequate safeguards for individual liberties. This form of government is implicit in the statements attributed to liberals and socialists within Italy, and has been more explicitly outlined by Count Sforza and other spokesmen of the Free Italy movement, which has some following among the republicans at home.

It is also possible that a republican government would reflect the desire of the socialists and other left-wing groups for some degree of collectivism in industry and for a further breaking-up of the large land holdings. It might also mean the retention, on a democratic basis, of some institutions developed under the Fascist régime, such as occupational representation.

The probable stability of such a régime is difficult to estimate because of present uncertainty as to military and political developments that might bring it into being. In its favor would be the republican traditions that have never lost their vitality in parts of Italy. It would also have wide-spread support among the industrial classes, parts of the middle classes, and sections of the professional groups and intelligentsia. There is also reason to believe that it would receive some support from the peasantry, particularly if an attempt were made to redistribute the land. As suggested above, it is also possible that the Church would accept a republican régime provided it were not anti-clerical.

A democratic and republican form of government would be subject to many of the weaknesses that might contribute to instability in a constitutional monarchy as described above. In addition, it might be confronted for a considerable period with serious hostility from rightist and perhaps extreme left, groups, including such armed forces as may remain. Its stability would also be affected, as would that of any other régime, by the nature of the peace and the future international position of Italy.

### C. *A Communist Régime*

There does not appear to be serious possibility of a communist régime in Italy unless the subsequent course of the war should lead to serious social disturbances and full-blown popular revolution. The communist party, although well-integrated, remains small, even when its reputed gains among the industrial classes are taken into consideration.

At present the communists appear to be joined with other leftist and moderate groups in a front to overthrow Fascism and monarchy. What

would be the party's policy if elevated to power remains conjectural, as does the degree of support which it would then receive from groups now allied with it. For these and other reasons the probable stability of a communist régime cannot be predicted with any certainty.

*Discussion of the Subcommittees*

Neither the Political Subcommittee nor the Territorial Subcommittee has considered the problem of a permanent national government for Italy. In discussing what groups to deal with during the transitional period, however, both subcommittees inclined to the view that a régime under the House of Savoy would be less objectionable and more stable than a military dictatorship, and seemed the only logical acceptable choice available. The subcommittees were skeptical of the possibilities of a revolutionary régime and discounted the possible influence of exiled groups.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 11]

*Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-10

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION:  
RECONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what reforms in Italian local government, if any, the United Nations might desire as a condition for the recognition of a permanent régime.

The problem arises because communal and provincial government has been highly centralized by the Fascist régime at the expense of whatever representative and democratic character it had in the pre-Fascist period. With Fascist collapse it will be necessary to determine whether a decentralization of local government and a restoration of democratic processes, in addition to a purge of loyal Fascist personnel, should be insisted upon prior to recognition of a permanent régime.

The Italian Constitution (*Statuto Fondamentale del Regno*) does not prescribe the forms of local government, but provides that communal and provincial institutions shall be regulated by law. The local government of Italy was therefore based upon laws codified by a series of decrees between 1889 and 1908. These led ultimately to the creation of ninety-five provinces (excluding three in Libya) and of

more than seven hundred communes which were administered prior to the advent of Fascism in a manner similar to the French system. The communes were governed in the pre-Fascist period by elective councils having control over the budget and over many aspects of local administration. These councils chose the *sindaco* or mayor, who was none the less regarded as a functionary of the national government, removable only with the consent of the provincial prefect. Under Fascism communal government has been subjected to central control by the abolition of the communal councils (except in the largest communities where appointive bodies with purely advisory powers are tolerated) and by the concentration of communal authority in the *podestà* or magistrates appointed by and responsible to the national government.

Self-government in the provinces was restricted even prior to the Fascist régime. The prefect, appointed by and directly responsible to the Minister of the Interior, exercised broad administrative powers in the interests of the central government. There was only limited popular participation in provincial government through an elective council whose most important function was to vote the budget. Both the prefects and the councils have been retained by the Fascist régime, but the supervisory powers of the prefects over all local government have been greatly increased and the council has been reduced to an appointive and purely advisory body, supplemented by other advisory agencies, all under strict Fascist control.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This problem has not been considered in any of the subcommittees.

### A. *Return to the Pre-Fascist Status*

This solution would mean a return to the structure of local government described above. Such a solution would be legitimate and constitutional and would offer the advantage of continuity with past experience. Its effect would be to re-establish the elective principle in local government subject to the limitations of centralized control provided in the Decrees. A possible disadvantage of the solution is that developments leading to the fall of Fascism may give rise to demands for more thoroughly democratic and decentralized local government, or that a revolutionary régime may seek a new basis for local government. There is at present no substantial evidence of such demands.

### B. *Decentralization and Democratization Beyond the Pre-Fascist Status*

This solution would require legislative changes to provide greater autonomy for both provincial and communal government. In extreme form it might mean that the prefects would be elected in the provinces

instead of appointed by the central government, and that they would be responsible to elective councils with broad legislative and administrative powers. The *sindaco*, or mayor, of a commune would become a strictly local official without responsibilities to the national government.

Although there is apparently little demand so far among Italian anti-Fascists for such a decentralization of local government, it might provide freer expression for the political wishes of the Italian people in local affairs and might have the further advantage of establishing bulwarks in local government against the resurgence of authoritarian tendencies in national affairs, although this conclusion is open to question. Previous Italian experience does not justify an assumption that better or more efficient government would result from increased decentralization; neither does it offer assurance that the greater opportunities for self-government would not be seriously undermined by political corruption.

*C. Retention of Fascist Structural Changes But a Purge of Fascist Personnel*

This solution would offer the advantage of minimum change, together with the possibility that the present structure, under a liberal and competent national government, might lead to more efficient and better co-ordinated government in the communes and provinces. On the other hand, it would carry the stigma of Fascism and might be as unacceptable to the people of Italy as to the United Nations.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

[Enclosure 12]

*Memorandum by Mr. C. Easton Rothwell, of the Division of Political Studies*

SECRET  
H-12

[WASHINGTON,] June 9, 1943.

ITALY: POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION:  
METHODS FOR THE REFORM OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

I. THE PROBLEM

The problem is to determine what method should be favored for the reform of local government in Italy.

The problem arises because the United Nations may desire that local institutions be modified in the direction of greater decentralization and democratization before recognizing a permanent régime. Since certain military experts believe that the occupation should termi-

nate only when a permanent régime acceptable to the United Nations has been established and recognized, the desired reforms in local government would necessarily take place during the occupation period. During that period, the occupying military authorities will in all probability make use of local administrative agencies and will be in a position to exercise influence, if that is desired, in the direction of reforms.

The question is involved whether the military authorities should exercise such influence, or whether the Italian population, itself, should be provided opportunity to effect the necessary reorganization, and in what manner. In any case, a decision would be required by the political authorities of the United Nations, either in advance of occupation or during occupation, as to the changes in local government to be required as a basis for recognition.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

This problem has been discussed briefly and indirectly in the Security Subcommittee.

### A. *Reform by the Italian Population Within the Occupied Areas*

If the principle is adhered to that the Italian people should have opportunity freely to choose their permanent political institutions, popular assemblies or some other form of popular expression would be necessary to express the public will on the reform of local government. The conduct of elections during the occupation period would involve serious political responsibilities for the occupying authorities, and might even lead to political conflicts that could interfere with the realization of military objectives. The popular choice of local government might, however, be regarded by the Italian population both within and outside the occupied area as an earnest of United Nations intentions and might thereby encourage their good will and co-operation, or even hasten the cessation of resistance in unoccupied areas. Difficulties may be encountered, however, in attempting to bring about reforms in only the occupied areas, since the local government of Italy has always been in large measure centrally directed, and the decisions of a national assembly rather than those of local assemblies may be required to effect a nation-wide reform.

### B. *Reform by Local Officials, Subject to Later Ratification by the Italian People*

The necessary reforms in local government might be carried out by local officials, provided the functionaries were non-Fascists. The occupying military authorities could facilitate such a procedure by careful discrimination among the local officials upon whose administrative assistance they rely. This method of obtaining reforms would

offer the advantage of minimizing political disturbance during the critical phase of occupation. If the local populations were assured the right of referendum upon any changes made whenever the conditions of occupation would permit, the principle of self-determination would be preserved. This proposal, like proposal A, would be subject to the danger that a piece-meal reform of local government might prove impracticable in view of the previously centralized direction of local affairs.

*C. Reform by Local Commissions, Subject to Later Ratification by the Italian People*

A commission to recommend the reorganization of local government either in the commune or in the province, might be appointed by the military governors from among proved non-Fascists. The recommendations of the commission, after having been approved by the military authorities and by the political authorities of the United Nations, might then be put into effect during the occupation, subject to ultimate approval by the local population. This procedure would be influenced by the same considerations affecting alternatives A and B.

*D. Reform of Local Government as Part of a General Political Reorganization Leading to the Establishment of a Permanent Régime*

The reform of local government as part of a general political reorganization leading to the establishment of a permanent government might prove to be the most practicable and desirable method. In this case the reform might be effected, subject to popular ratification, by a provisional government, should such a government be recognized during the occupation period; or the reorganization might be planned by a special commission and submitted to the Italian people for approval; or it might be brought about by means of a national constituent assembly. Any one of these methods or a combination of them would have the advantage of assuring a common nation-wide plan for local institutions that would be adequately integrated with the central government, and would therefore be in harmony with previous experience. On the other hand, the general reorganization of Italian government will be possible only when Italy has completely capitulated and the Fascist régime has fallen. To await a general political reorganization, therefore, would mean to delay the reform of local government in the occupied zone.

*E. Imposition of Reforms by the Occupying Authorities*

The imposition of reforms by the military authorities of the occupants could have the advantage of assuring that local government

was reorganized in accordance with United Nations requirements during the period of occupation. Such a procedure would, however, be subject to all the hazards and criticisms of an imposed reform. It might well stultify any sincere and spontaneous movements for reform among the Italian opponents of Fascism and might lead to the weakening or repudiation of the established system of local government some time after the termination of occupation. Moreover, the imposition of reforms would violate the principle that the Italian people should have the right ultimately to set up non-Fascist political institutions of their own choice. The military exigencies of occupation may also be such that the command of the occupying forces will find it inexpedient or impossible to concern itself with political matters, and will instead utilize local administrative or judicial agencies without regard to their character purely as an adjunct to the military structure of occupational administration.

*Discussion of the Security Subcommittee*

The Security Subcommittee has referred to the problem of reorganizing local government only indirectly, and as applied to "enemy states" in general or to Germany. No specific consideration has been given the reform of local institutions in Italy. The subcommittee was in general agreement that the military authority should remain in predominant control throughout the entire period of occupation and that military rule should terminate only when a permanent government acceptable to the victor powers had come into existence. Meanwhile, administrative civilian agencies and courts would be reestablished in the occupied areas under ultimate military control, as soon as military requirements would permit. At a subsequent meeting, however, the subcommittee approved a set of principles relating to the military occupation of Italy which provided that the possible recognition of a permanent national government during occupation and the degree of authority to be accorded it at various stages of the occupation, should be determined by the United Nations political authorities in consultation with the military commander.

[Here follows a section headed "Documentation".]

## 6. PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK, AUGUST 12-14, 1943

### *Editorial Note*

Churchill arrived at Hyde Park on August 12, 1943 and left for Quebec on the night of August 14. Since Churchill was a guest in the Roosevelts' home, there took place many informal and unscheduled conversations between him and Roosevelt. It is known that the following subjects were discussed in the course of these conversations:

1. The advisability of proceeding immediately to Quebec. See Churchill's note to Roosevelt, August 13, 1943, *ante*, p. 412.

2. Anti-submarine warfare. See the joint Roosevelt-Churchill announcement on this subject, August 14, 1943, *post*, p. 833.

3. The appointment of an American officer to command OVERLORD. Since Churchill told Brooke at Quebec on August 15, 1943, before Roosevelt's arrival at the First Quebec Conference, that he had approved such an appointment, the decision must have been taken during the conversations at Hyde Park. See Alanbrooke, p. 578. Although the name of the officer to be appointed is not mentioned in Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 85, Churchill seems to have told Brooke that Marshall would be named and that Eisenhower, Alexander, and Montgomery would all be shifted. See Alanbrooke, p. 578; cf. Sherwood, pp. 758-759. Churchill's understanding of his agreement with Roosevelt on this subject is indicated in the following telegram from Churchill to Hopkins dated September 26, 1943:

"There is a lot of talk in the papers about Marshall becoming Supreme Commander in Chief over all the forces in the West. What I understood from our talks was that he would command the operation OVERLORD. He would not, however, be only a Theatre Commander. He might have the same sort of general outlook with us on the whole war against Germany, in addition to his specific command, as Dill has on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington over the whole field. We should be very glad for him to sit with our Chiefs of Staff frequently, and to have the whole scene laid before him. But I made it clear that our Chiefs of the Staff would more often have to sit together to consider our position from the British point of view, just as your Chiefs of Staff sit together in Washington. It would not fall to him to give decisions outside the sphere of OVERLORD. The control of all our combined operations and world strategy must rest with the Combined Chiefs of the Staff in Washington under the final direction of the heads of governments. Please let me know whether there is anything wrong with this message." (Hopkins Papers)

4. Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. See Pickersgill, p. 543.

5. The appointment of C. D. Howe as the Canadian representative on the proposed Combined Policy Committee to deal with atomic energy matters. See *ibid.*

6. A visit by the Churchill family to Hyde Park following the First Quebec Conference. See *ibid.*

7. Relations with Ireland. See *post*, p. 832. In light of the fact that the American Minister to Ireland (Gray) drafted a proposed message from Roosevelt to de Valera on the subject of Allied bases in Ireland (see *ante*, p. 618) following his visit to Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park, it is probable that this aspect of Allied relations with Ireland was discussed there.

8. A postwar "fraternal relationship" between the United States and the United Kingdom. See *post*, p. 832.

Although there is no firm evidence that the following subjects were discussed at Hyde Park, there is some indication that they were discussed there or that Roosevelt at least intended to discuss them with Churchill during these conversations:

1. Postwar world organization. See *ante*, p. 682.

2. Recognition of Rome as an open city. In a memorandum of August 8, 1943, the President's Naval Aide (Brown) directed the staff of the White House Map Room to assemble pertinent documentation on this subject and on recognition of the French Committee and conditions for an armistice to be demanded from Italy. Brown stated: "The President will discuss these subjects and any others that may have developed with the Prime Minister at Hyde Park on 12 August." (Roosevelt Papers)

3. Conditions for an armistice to be demanded from Italy. See under item 2, above.

4. Ethiopia. In a memorandum of August 4, 1943, addressed to Hull, Roosevelt stated that in regard to Ethiopia he would "have an opportunity to talk this over with the Prime Minister of Great Britain when I next see him" and invited Hull to let the President know before August 12 if there were anything else which Hull wished Roosevelt to take up with Churchill (851v.014/8-443). On August 10, 1943, Hull submitted to Roosevelt a memorandum commenting on questions relating to Ethiopia (*id.*; not printed). Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 97 ff.

5. Libya. See *ante*, p. 681.

6. The possibility of a meeting with Stalin in Alaska. See Pickersgill, p. 543.

It was not Roosevelt's custom to record his conversations with Churchill, and although Harry Hopkins was present at Hyde Park, nothing has been found in the Hopkins Papers concerning the substance of the discussions there. The only memorandum of conversation pertaining to these discussions which has been found is the informal memorandum by W. Averell Harriman printed *infra*. For Churchill's very brief account of his visit to Hyde Park on this occasion, see *Closing the Ring*, pp. 81-82.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 14, 1943

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mrs. Roosevelt  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Gray  
Mrs. Gray

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The only source found for this meeting (which included other guests not named in Harriman's notes) is an informal memorandum dictated by Harriman at Quebec, which contains the following information on the dinner conversation:

"Gray was telling the Prime Minister (in the presence of the President) all about Ireland and how it should be dealt with. The Prime Minister seemed unimpressed.

"At dinner the Prime Minister sat on Mrs. Roosevelt's right and I was on her left.

"The Prime Minister described the kind of 'fraternal relationship' that he would like to see accomplished between the U.S. and the British after the war. This loose concept of 'fraternal relationship' he feels is much better than any attempt at more definite association or understanding as more definite arrangements are subject to misunderstandings whereas loose concepts become realities in the public mind and, if flexible enough, can be adjusted to historic developments.

"Mrs. Roosevelt seemed fearful that this might be misunderstood by the other nations and weaken the United Nations concept, to which the Prime Minister did not agree as any hope of the United Nations would be in the leadership given by the intimacy of the United States and British in working out understandings with the Russians—and the Chinese too, he conceded, if they become a nation. . . .

"The President told me he wanted me to see that Lew Douglas was given information and fully consulted on all shipping matters as he considered that shipping was the key to strategic agreement.

“He said that he wanted to have a quiet dinner on the night of his arrival, Tuesday,<sup>1</sup> with Admiral Leahy, Harry<sup>2</sup> and myself to get a report on where the discussions stood. . . .”<sup>3</sup> (Harriman Papers)

<sup>1</sup> i.e., August 17, 1943, when Roosevelt expected to arrive at Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> Hopkins.

<sup>3</sup> Harriman noted in his memorandum that after his arrival at Quebec he discovered that the Governor General (Athlone) was giving a dinner for Roosevelt and Churchill which apparently would supersede the small dinner which Roosevelt had mentioned to him. Harriman accompanied Churchill from Hyde Park to Quebec, leaving Hyde Park by train on the night of August 14. He noted that during the trip Churchill “said he was quite happy about his talks with the President [at Hyde Park] and as always he found that he and the President could see eye to eye on major matters.”

Roosevelt Papers

*White House Press Release*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 14, 1943.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, after consultation with the British Admiralty, the United States Navy Department and the Canadian Department of National Defence for Naval Services, have issued the following monthly statement on the progress of the anti-U-Boat war:

“During the month of July very poor results were obtained by the U-Boats from their widespread effort against the shipping of the Allies. The steady flow of trans-Atlantic supplies on the greatest scale has continued unmolested, and such sinkings as have taken place in distant areas have had but an insignificant effect on the conduct of the war by the Allies. In fact, July is probably our most successful month, because the imports have been high, shipping losses moderate and U-boat sinkings heavy.

“Before the descent upon Sicily an armada of warships, troop transports, supply ships and landing craft proceeded through Atlantic and Mediterranean waters with scarcely any interference from U-boats. Large reinforcements have also been landed in that Island. Over 2,500 vessels were involved in these operations and the losses are only about 80,000 tons. On the other hand the U-boats which attempted to interfere with these operations suffered severe losses.

“Our offensive operations against Axis submarines continue to progress most favourably in all areas, and during May, June and July we have sunk at sea a total of over 90 U-boats, which represents an average loss of nearly one U-boat a day over the period.

<sup>1</sup> The text of this joint statement followed very closely a draft which Churchill had sent to Roosevelt in telegram No. 408, August 11, 1943 (not printed). See *ante*, p. 411, fn. 4. The final text was agreed upon by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park and Roosevelt sent it by telegram on August 13 to Presidential Secretary Stephen T. Early in Washington. The White House press release, dated August 14, was to be held for use in morning newspapers dated Sunday, August 15, and in radio newscasts broadcast not earlier than 9 p. m., August 14.

“The decline in the effectiveness of the U-boats is illustrated by the following figures:

“In the first six months of 1943, the number of ships sunk per U-boat operating was only half that in the last six months of 1942 and only a quarter that in the first half of 1942.

“The tonnage of shipping in the service of the United Nations continues to show a considerable net increase. During 1943 new ships completed by the Allies exceed all sinkings from all causes by upwards of three million tons.

“In spite of this very favourable progress in the battle against the U-boat, it must be remembered that the enemy still has large U-boat reserves, completed and under construction. It is necessary, therefore, to prepare for intensification of the battle both at sea and in the shipyards and to use our shipping with utmost economy to strengthen and speed the general offensive of the United Nations. But we can expect continued success only if we do not relax our efforts in any way.

“ROOSEVELT  
“CHURCHILL”

## 7. LOG OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO CANADA

### *Editorial Note*

The document referred to as the President's Log is a booklet entitled "The Log of the President's Visit to Canada, 16 August 1943 to 26 August 1943: 17-24 August—'QUADRANT' Conference at Quebec; 25 August—Visit to Ottawa" (21 regularly numbered pages of text, five pages at the front bearing Roman numerals, and 20 unnumbered pages of illustrations). This booklet, which was prepared by Chief Ship's Clerk William M. Rigdon, and approved by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, contains a list of members of the President's party,<sup>1</sup> the President's itinerary (not printed), a foreword by Lieutenant (jg) George M. Elsey, and the main body of the Log.

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Roosevelt Papers

### *The President's Log*

#### FOREWORD

When the President and the Prime Minister parted in Washington in May 1943, they agreed to meet together in the late summer to discuss again the leading military and diplomatic problems of their allied nations. They had long hoped to meet with Marshal Stalin and they wished that the next meeting might find him a partner in discussion. For some weeks this hope dominated their plans, but when it seemed more feasible for the President to meet Premier Stalin in private conference, without Mr. Churchill, plans were laid for a later assembly of the British and American Leaders and their staffs to follow the proposed Russo-American meeting.

Late in June the President recommended to the Prime Minister that this Anglo-American Conference be held in Quebec, a happier place in summer than Washington. Quebec offered the advantages of a delightful climate and appropriate and comfortable quarters at the historic Citadel and the Château Frontenac. By mid-July when it seemed likely that Marshal Stalin would be unable to leave his armies, even briefly, during their first summer offensive, the President suggested to Mr. Churchill that time would be ripe for their conference around the first of September.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed here. See William M. Rigdon, with James Derieux, *White House Sailor* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1962), pp. 278-279.

The very rapid changes on the several fronts and, in particular, the overwhelming success of the Sicilian campaign made it imperative to hold the meeting earlier. The degeneration of Italian resistance and the possibility of complete Italian collapse, greatly increased by the unexpected fall of Mussolini on July 25th, gave birth to new problems only faintly foreseen in the spring. As Mr. Churchill said, "We shall need to meet together to settle the larger issues which the brilliant victories of our forces have thrust upon us about Italy as a whole." The Prime Minister pressed for a very early date in August but the President replied that he would be unable to arrive in Quebec earlier than August 17th.

The agenda for the conference embodied world-wide strategy with a principal object of eliminating Italy quickly from the war. The scope of discussion demanded that the Staffs assemble early to begin their talks and on military grounds it was highly desirable for them to be in contact as soon as possible. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, accompanied by a large number of military and naval experts, traveled ahead of the President to meet their opposite numbers of the British Staff and meetings began in the Château Frontenac on August 11th<sup>2</sup> when the QUADRANT Conference was formally opened. "QUADRANT" was the code name chosen by Mr. Churchill late in July for security reasons in discussing the arrangements by despatch and the word was quickly adopted as a formal name for the Sixth War Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Roosevelt.<sup>3</sup>

While exploratory conversations were underway in Quebec, the Prime Minister and the President met in Hyde Park. Mr. Churchill left Quebec with his daughter and Aide, Subaltern Mary Churchill, shortly after his arrival and proceeded via Niagara Falls where he amused newspaper men by his comments that the principle of Niagara was about the same as thirty years ago. He arrived in Hyde Park on Thursday, August 12th, and returned to Quebec the following Saturday. The President then went to Washington for last minute conferences with his advisors before proceeding to Quebec.

The log of the trip follows.

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<sup>2</sup> Members of the United States Joint Staff Planners arrived at Quebec on August 11, 1943, and began consultations with their British counterparts within the Combined Staff Planners and other supporting committees of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves arrived at Quebec on August 13, 1943, and the first meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff held at Quebec took place on August 14. See *post*, p. 849. The preliminary meetings of subordinate staff are outside the scope of this volume.

<sup>3</sup> The first five "war meetings" referred to were the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 (see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. 1, pp. 341 ff.), the First Washington Conference of December 1941-January 1942, the Second Washington Conference of June 1942, and the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 (see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943), and the Third Washington Conference of May 1943 (see *ante*, pp. 24 ff.).

## THE LOG

*Monday, August 16th*

President Roosevelt and his party left Washington, by rail, at 8:20 p. m. for Quebec, P.Q., Canada, where he was scheduled to meet the Right Honorable Winston L. [S.] Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, for their Sixth War Conference. Our departure was delayed for 20 minutes because of the exceedingly full day put in by the President, extending him to the limit. The President had just returned to Washington at 7:40 a. m. from Hyde Park where he had held important preliminary discussions with the Prime Minister.

Our route to Quebec was as follows: Over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad system to Claremont, N.J.; thence via the New York Central (West Shore line) to Albany, N.Y. At Albany we were to be taken over by the Delaware and Hudson Railroad, over whose scenic route we were to travel to Montreal. From Montreal to Quebec the facilities of the Canadian Pacific Railroad were to be used.

*Tuesday, August 17th*

We crossed the International Border into Canada at Rouses Point, N.Y., at 12:30 p. m. At 1:00 p. m. we made a brief stop at Delson, Quebec, to embark the following members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who accompanied the President's party to Quebec: Assistant Commissioner Kemp, Corporal G. M. Glanville, Constables R. W. Storie, A. R. Nelson, and J. L. Raymond. Corporal Glanville and Constables Storie and Raymond were old friends to us as they had been with us during the President's fishing trip to McGregor Bay, Ontario, a few weeks previous.

Our next stop was at 1:30 p. m., when we made a brief operating stop at the Park Avenue station in Montreal. A fair sized crowd of curious people gathered outside the station to see what was happening, attracted, no doubt, by the very strict precautions imposed by the Canadian authorities to insure the President's safety, and the presence of so many of our burly (as the Canadian press described them) Secret Service operatives. However, Fala's appearance on the station platform for a limbering up seemed to dispel most of their doubts as to who Canada's distinguished visitor was.

The QUADRANT Conference had officially convened at Quebec on August 11th. Major General T. T. Handy, U.S.A., had been in attendance there since the opening and had come to Washington by air Monday, August 16th, to accompany the President to Quebec. During the day he informed the President of the progress of the conference discussions to date.

Today was Mr. Hopkins' birthday and he observed it by treating members of the party to "Old Fashion[ed]s."

After a very pleasant trip from Washington, we arrived in Quebec at 6:00 p.m., exactly on schedule. Our train was parked at the Wolfe's Cove station, on the banks of the majestic St. Lawrence about two miles by auto from the Citadel, Canada's historic fortress.

The President was met at the train by the Governor-General of Canada (The Earl of Athlone), the Prime Minister of Great Britain (The Right Honorable Winston L. [S.] Churchill), the Prime Minister of Canada (The Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King), the Canadian Minister to the United States (Honorable Leighton McCarthy); Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N. (President Roosevelt's Chief of Staff); Mr. W. Averell Harriman (Lend-Lease Coordinator in London for Combined Production and Resources Board), and Mr. Lewis W. Douglas (Deputy U.S. War Shipping Administrator).<sup>4</sup> As the President walked from his train he was greeted with enthusiastic and resounding cheers by the crowd gathered at Wolfe's Cove. He acknowledged these greetings with his characteristic smile and wave.

For the drive to the Citadel the President was accompanied by the Governor-General. The party was driven directly to the Citadel where honors were rendered by a combined honor guard composed of units of the Royal Marines (members of Mr. Churchill's guard who accompanied him from England), the Royal Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police band from Ottawa. As our national anthem was being played the Stars and Stripes was hoisted to the peak on a third flagpole alongside and to the left of the British and Canadian colors. This was the first time these three flags had ever flown together over this famous fortress.

After honors, the combined Roosevelt-Churchill-King party posed for the army of photographers who had been waiting for some hours for what had been described to them as a "very special occasion." Then the President and Prime Minister Churchill retired to the Governor-General's summer residence, within the Citadel compound, where they were to reside during their stay in Quebec by special invitation of King George VI. The Governor-General and his wife, Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, who had come from Ottawa for the day, maintained quarters in their private railroad car. Mr. Harry Hopkins, Admiral Leahy and Rear Admiral Brown occupied quarters at the Governor-General's summer residence in the Citadel. All other mem-

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<sup>4</sup> No official record has been found of the discussion which took place at Wolfe's Cove Station on Roosevelt's arrival. Pickersgill, p. 547, states that when Mackenzie King met Roosevelt he spoke at once about the latter's projected visit to Ottawa and that Roosevelt said that he would be there on August 25.

bers of our party were quartered at the Château Frontenac, Quebec's world famous hostelry, as the guests of the Canadian Government. Here also were quartered all other members of the Canadian-British-American QUADRANT Conference party. The Château, having been taken over by the Canadian Government, was closed to the general public during the conference. Here was the official conference headquarters and it was at the Château that the various Staffs met daily for their momentous conferences. Plenary reports by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were made to the President and the Prime Minister at the Citadel as occasion demanded.

Lieutenant Colonel Chester Hammond, U.S.A., assisted by Captain Ogden Kniffin, A.U.S., Lieutenant (junior grade) George M. Elsey, U.S.N.R., and Warrant Officer (junior grade) Albert M. Cornelius, U.S.A., who had come to Quebec earlier to establish a map room in the Citadel for the President, were standing by [in] the President's map room on his arrival at the Citadel to acquaint him with all the latest developments of the war. War reports had been radioed to the train during our trip up from Washington, but a more complete picture was available here for the President. The Prime Minister had his own map room in another part of the Citadel. His staff had arrived a week earlier than Lieutenant Colonel Hammond.

Major DeWitt Greer, Signal Corps, U.S.A., who had also preceded the President's party to Quebec, had the communications set-up functioning perfectly on our arrival, so that the President was never out of instantaneous communication with Washington. At the Citadel we had our own telephone exchange, called AMCO. At the Château the U.S. Army maintained a private exchange, called BOSCO. Both exchanges had direct wire service to Washington and the White House. Direct telegraph wire service was available between the Citadel and the White House.

At 6:30 p.m. the Governor-General entertained at a small reception in honor of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.<sup>5</sup>

At 8:30 p.m., the Governor-General and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice were hosts at a dinner in honor of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt. Both the reception and the dinner were held at the Governor-General's summer residence in the Citadel.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> No evidence has been found that matters of substance were discussed at this reception.

<sup>6</sup> Leahy, p. 175, notes that he, Mrs. Churchill, and Lord Moran were present at this dinner. No official record has been found of the substance of the dinner discussion. Pickersgill, p. 547, states that Roosevelt discussed with Mackenzie King the former's travel plans upon the completion of the Quebec Conference and that the President told Mackenzie King that his plan to be in Ottawa on August 25 might be announced.

After dinner the President held discussions with the Prime Minister until a late hour.<sup>7</sup>

*Wednesday, August 18th*

During the forenoon the President saw General George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A., Mr. Harry Hopkins, and Mr. Stephen T. Early, at different times, for discussions.<sup>8</sup>

The President was a guest at luncheon at the Citadel at 1:30 p. m. There were approximately 25 other guests including Prime Minister Churchill.<sup>9</sup> The Governor-General and Princess Alice were again the hosts. Their original plans to return to Ottawa yesterday evening had been altered to permit them to remain in Quebec to give this luncheon. After the luncheon, a very large group of photographers took pictures of the party, which included the Governor-General, Princess Alice, the President, Mr. Churchill, Mr. King, the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff, and various members of the Churchill and Mackenzie King families. The battlements of the ancient Citadel, the harbor, and distant views of the city of Quebec were used as background for the pictures taken.

Shortly after luncheon, Mr. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, and Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, arrived from England via clipper and were received at the Citadel.

During the afternoon the President saw Major General Handy and Mr. Harry Hopkins.<sup>10</sup> Prime Minister Churchill accompanied Wing Commander G. P. Gibson, R.A.F. (the "dam buster") and Brigadier Wingate (British Army) for separate interviews with the President.<sup>11</sup>

The President, this afternoon, sent a personally worded message of congratulations to General Eisenhower and his forces for their fine accomplishments in Sicily.

At 8:30 p. m. the President attended a dinner at the Citadel given by Mr. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada. The guests included Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill; Subaltern Mary Churchill; the Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, Sir Eugene Fiset, and Lady Fiset; Cardinal Villeneuve; the Lord Bishop of Quebec and Mrs. Carrington; the Premier of Quebec, Honorable Adélard Godbout, and Mrs. Godbout; Honorable Leighton McCarthy, the Canadian Minister

<sup>7</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 880.

<sup>8</sup> No record of these discussions has been found.

<sup>9</sup> The Leahy Diary (Leahy Papers) indicates that Leahy was among the guests. No evidence has been found that matters of substance were discussed at this luncheon.

<sup>10</sup> No record of Roosevelt's discussions with Handy and Hopkins has been found.

<sup>11</sup> See the editorial notes, *post*, pp. 887, 888.

to the United States; Mr. Ray Atherton, the United States Minister to Canada; the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, British Foreign Minister; the Right Honorable Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information; Justice Minister St. Laurent (Canada) and Mrs. St. Laurent; the Right Honorable Malcolm MacDonald, British High Commissioner to Canada; Miss Sheila MacDonald, Malcolm MacDonald's sister; Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Chairman, United Nations Munitions Assignment Board; Mr. W. Averell Harriman, of the Lend-Lease Administration; Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British Chiefs of Staff Mission in Washington; General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of the British Naval Staff; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the U.S. Naval Staff; General H. H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces; Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the British Air Staff; Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations; Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Churchill; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, Naval Aide to President Roosevelt; Lord Moran, the Prime Minister's physician; Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Norman Roberston, Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs; Mr. Stephen T. Early, President Roosevelt's Press Secretary; Mr. D. C. Coleman, president of the Canadian Pacific Railway; Mr. R. C. Vaughan, president of the Canadian National Railways, and Mrs. Vaughan; Mr. J. W. McConnell, publisher of the Montreal *Star*, and Mrs. McConnell; Brigadier Edmond Blais, District Officer Commanding Military District No. 5 (Quebec), and Mrs. Blais; Lieutenant Colonel L. Patenaude, governor of the Citadel; and Colonel Willis-O'Connor, principal aide-de-camp to the Governor-General.<sup>12</sup>

After dinner the President had discussions with Prime Minister Churchill until another late retiring.<sup>13</sup>

The President announced today that he would visit Ottawa next Wednesday after the close of the Quebec Conference.

*Thursday, August 19th*

During the forenoon the President saw General H. H. Arnold and various members of General Arnold's staff, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr.

<sup>12</sup> A seating plan preserved in the Leahy Papers indicates that Lord Leathers, British Minister of War Transport, and Mrs. D. C. Coleman were also present. There is no indication that any record of the discussions during dinner was prepared, but Pickersgill, pp. 548-550, reprints Mackenzie King's detailed diary record of the toasts offered by himself, Roosevelt, and Churchill.

<sup>13</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 888.

Stephen T. Early, and Rear Admiral Wilson Brown for discussions.<sup>14</sup>

The President attended a luncheon on the terrace of the Citadel at 1:30 p. m. Others attending were Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Averell Harriman, and Mr. Ray Atherton.<sup>15</sup>

During the afternoon the President held discussions with Prime Minister Churchill,<sup>16</sup> and, at 5:30 p. m., the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff came to the Citadel to hold a plenary session with the President and Prime Minister Churchill.<sup>17</sup> The Combined Chiefs of Staff reported the results of their conferences to date and their schedule for future meetings. The President and the Prime Minister made informal comments about some of the decisions reached and outlined various measures that they wished to have studied and made the subject of further reports. The meeting adjourned at 7:45 p. m. with the agreement that the President and the Prime Minister would be notified when the Combined Staffs are ready for further discussions with the Heads of State.

At 9:30 p. m. the President had dinner at the Citadel with the Churchill family and Mr. Harry Hopkins. After dinner he and the Prime Minister were again closeted for several hours of discussions before he retired.<sup>18</sup>

*Friday, August 20th*

Their work caught up for the moment, the President and the Prime Minister observed today as a holiday. At 10:20 a. m. a party consisting of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Commander C. R. Thompson, R.N., Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Averell Harriman, and Rear Admiral Wilson Brown left the Citadel by auto for Lac de l'Épaulé for a fishing and picnic party. Lac de l'Épaulé was selected for fishing because of its nearness to the city (Quebec) rather than for its known quality of fishing. It is a beautiful little lake, surrounded by hills, in a portion of the Quebec Park System. A very comfortable lodge is maintained. The air was cool and stimulating and the day was thoroughly enjoyed by all. The trout caught were very small but the entire party brought home 50 or more. All fishing was done with a wet fly from small rowboats. The expedition provided a very pleasant break in the routine of conferences and, at the same time, enabled the President and the Prime Minister to discuss many details during the drive to and from the fishing grounds.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>14</sup> No record of these discussions has been found.

<sup>15</sup> No record of the discussion during luncheon has been found.

<sup>16</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 894.

<sup>17</sup> For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 895.

<sup>18</sup> No record of the discussion during or after dinner has been found.

<sup>19</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 903.

The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and Mr. James Dunn, political advisor to Mr. Hull, arrived in Quebec at 1:30 p. m., from Washington.

At 9:30 p. m. the President had dinner at the Citadel. Other diners were Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. Anthony Eden, and Mr. Harry Hopkins.<sup>20</sup>

The President and the Prime Minister held their usual lengthy discussions after dinner and both retired very late.<sup>20</sup>

*Saturday, August 21st*

During the forenoon the President saw Mr. Stephen T. Early, Major General A. D. Surles, U.S.A., Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., and Captain Leland P. Lovette, U.S.N., for discussions.<sup>21</sup> He approved the joint Roosevelt-Mackenzie King press release concerning our re-occupation of Kiska in the Aleutians.<sup>22</sup> He also conferred with various members of the American delegation to the Conference during the forenoon.<sup>23</sup>

Mr. Lewis W. Douglas and Lord Leathers, British Minister of Transport, had luncheon with the combined Roosevelt-Churchill party (President Roosevelt, Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, and Subaltern Mary Churchill.)<sup>24</sup>

During the afternoon the President, accompanied by the Right Honorable Malcolm MacDonald and his sister, Miss Sheila MacDonald, visited nearby Montmorency Falls and then returned to the Citadel for tea.<sup>25</sup>

The President and the Prime Minister had a long talk before dinner.<sup>26</sup> Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, (MC), U.S.N., President Roosevelt's personal physician, who arrived from Washington this afternoon, was the only guest outside the household for dinner this evening.<sup>27</sup> After dinner Mr. Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Mackenzie King joined the President and Prime Minister Churchill and discussed affairs of state until a late hour.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>20</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 917.

<sup>21</sup> No record of these discussions has been found.

<sup>22</sup> Simultaneous announcement was made in Quebec and Washington on August 21, 1943, that United States and Canadian forces had landed on Kiska beginning August 15, and that the Japanese had evacuated the area. For the text of the announcement as issued in Washington (Navy release No. 459), see *New York Times*, August 22, 1943, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 918.

<sup>24</sup> No evidence has been found that matters of substance were discussed during luncheon.

<sup>25</sup> No evidence has been found that Roosevelt discussed matters of substance with MacDonald.

<sup>26</sup> No record of the discussion during this meeting has been found.

<sup>27</sup> No record of the discussion during dinner has been found.

<sup>28</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 928.

*Sunday, August 22nd*

During the forenoon the President and Miss Tully worked on his correspondence.

Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, and Dr. T. V. Soong, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Quebec this forenoon.<sup>29</sup>

Secretary Stimson came to lunch with the President at the Citadel. Others present for lunch were Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, and the Churchill household including Colonel [Willis-] O'Connor.<sup>30</sup>

At 2:45 p. m. the President left the Citadel by auto for a drive around the Isle d'Orléans. At the end of the drive he stopped at the residence of Mrs. Charles Porteous, whose daughter had been a former patient at Warm Springs. The President returned to the Citadel at 5:45 p. m., at which time he had a conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden until 7:30 p. m. This conference was resumed between 10:00 and 11:00 p. m.<sup>31</sup>

The President dined with the Churchill family from 8:00 to 10:00 p. m.,<sup>32</sup> and held further conferences with the Prime Minister from 11:00 to 12:00 p. m.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Stimson records in his Diary that Mackenzie King called on him during his stay at Quebec, but the date and place are not specified. The only aspect of their conversation reflected in the Diary is reminiscences of a meeting which they had had in 1940. (Stimson Papers) On his way to Quebec Stimson had called on Manuel Quezon, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, at Saranac Lake, New York. Quezon had suggested that Congress endorse Roosevelt's pledge, made in a message to the people of the Philippines on December 28, 1941 (see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. vi, January 3, 1942, p. 5), that their freedom would be "redeemed and their independence established and protected." According to an entry in the Stimson Diary, Quezon was "most anxious for the pledge of protection. He now realizes that the Filipinos cannot stand alone and he is anxious to arrange for the giving of bases to the United States in the Philippines in order for us to be able to afford them that protection." (Stimson Papers) It appears (a) that Stimson discussed with Roosevelt, at Quebec, Quezon's desire for an act of Congress which would promise that the United States would protect the independence of the Philippines after it was granted, and (b) that after the Quebec Conference Stimson conveyed to Quezon the President's approval of this idea (MacArthur Papers). Roosevelt sent a recommendation on this subject to the Congress on October 6, 1943, and a resolution providing for the retention or acquisition of bases "for the mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States" became law on June 29, 1944 (58 Stat. 625). For additional details on the introduction and passage of this legislation, see Richardson Dougall, "Philippine-American Relations Since 1939", Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. xi, August 20, 1944, pp. 189-191.

<sup>30</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 929.

<sup>31</sup> Churchill was also present at the afternoon meeting. For the minutes, which indicate that the meeting began at 5:30 p. m., see *post*, p. 930. No separate minutes of a 10 p. m. meeting have been found. See *post*, p. 930, fn. 1.

<sup>32</sup> No record of the discussion during dinner has been found.

<sup>33</sup> No record of the discussion during this meeting has been found.

*Monday, August 23rd*

During the forenoon the President received Secretary Cordell Hull, Mr. James Dunn, Mr. Norman Robertson, Mr. Stephen T. Early, and Rear Admiral Wilson Brown.<sup>34</sup>

At 1:30 p. m. the President had lunch with the Prime Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong, and Mr. Harry Hopkins.<sup>35</sup>

Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, arrived in Quebec at 1:30 p. m. Later in the afternoon he called on the President at the Citadel.<sup>36</sup>

At 5:30 p. m. the President and Prime Minister Churchill met again with the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff to receive their reports on the conference.<sup>37</sup> The meeting adjourned at 7:30 p. m. The President had a half-hour talk with Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten<sup>38</sup> before the conference with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The dinner party this evening at the Citadel included the President, Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Secretary Frank Knox, Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Stephen T. Early, and Mr. Brendan Bracken.<sup>39</sup>

Mr. Cordell Hull and Mr. James Dunn returned to the Citadel for further conferences with the President and the Prime Minister at 10:00 p. m.<sup>40</sup>

*Tuesday, August 24th*

Today marked the official close of the Quebec Conference.

During the forenoon Archdeacon ("Canon") F. G. Scott, an old friend of Mr. Churchill's, accompanied by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, called on the President for a brief talk.<sup>41</sup>

At noon a joint press conference was held by the President and Prime Minister Churchill. They were introduced to the press by Prime Minister Mackenzie King.<sup>42</sup> The President and Prime Minister Churchill issued the following joint statement to the press:

[Here follows, with minor editorial changes, the text of the Communiqué printed *post*, p. 1157.]

<sup>34</sup> No record has been found of Roosevelt's discussions with any of his morning callers.

<sup>35</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 936.

<sup>36</sup> No record of the discussion during Knox's call has been found.

<sup>37</sup> For the minutes of this meeting, see *post*, p. 942.

<sup>38</sup> No record of the discussion during Mountbatten's call has been found.

<sup>39</sup> No record of the discussion during dinner has been found.

<sup>40</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 953.

<sup>41</sup> No record has been found of the discussion during this call, which was presumably social in character.

<sup>42</sup> For Mackenzie King's introductory and closing remarks, and for the informal remarks made to the press by Churchill and Roosevelt, see Rosenman, pp. 355-365.

The luncheon party at the Citadel today included President Roosevelt, Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill, Subaltern Mary Churchill, Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. Harry Hopkins, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King.<sup>43</sup>

During the afternoon General George C. Marshall called on the President.<sup>44</sup> The President and Miss Tully spent the greater part of the afternoon and evening until dinner working on his speech to be delivered tomorrow at noon before the Houses of Parliament at Ottawa.

For dinner this evening the President and the Prime Minister had as their guests Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Averell Harriman, Admiral William D. Leahy, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, and Miss Grace Tully.<sup>45</sup>

At 10:30 p. m. the President and his party (Admiral Leahy, Rear Admiral Brown, Mr. Harry Hopkins, and Miss Grace Tully) left the Citadel to board his special train for Ottawa and home. Prime Minister Churchill accompanied the President to the train.

The President's special train departed Quebec (Wolfe's Cove) at 11:00 p. m. for Ottawa, over the facilities of the Canadian National Railways. The "QUADRANT Special", returning the American conferees and their staffs to Washington, had departed Quebec an hour earlier.

*Wednesday, August 25th*

Our train arrived in Ottawa (Deep Cut station) at 11:25 a. m., coming from Quebec via Montreal. The weather at Ottawa at the time of our arrival can best be described as perfect. It had not been so for the past few days and this had been the cause of much concern to the people of Ottawa. The President was met at the Deep Cut station and welcomed to Ottawa by the Governor-General of Canada, Mayor Stanley Lewis of Ottawa, and Mr. Ray Atherton, United States Minister to Canada. As the President walked from his train, accompanied by the Governor-General, he was acclaimed by the crowd that had gathered at Deep Cut. He entered the Governor-General's car for the drive to Parliament Hill over a route which took him via Echo Drive, Pretoria Bridges, the Federal District Parkway, the National War Memorial, and through the East Gate to Parliament Hill.

After entering the East Gate to Parliament Hill, the Governor-General's car paused while the honors were rendered for the President by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police band and a combined guard of honor (composed of units of the Canadian Army, Navy, Air Force, Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service, and Women's Cana-

<sup>43</sup> No record of the discussion during luncheon has been found.

<sup>44</sup> No record of the discussion during Marshall's call has been found.

<sup>45</sup> See the editorial note, *post*, p. 965.

dian Army Corps). It was estimated that there was a crowd of approximately 30,000 people on hand at Parliament Hill and its vicinity to welcome President Roosevelt and to hear his address. This was said to be the largest crowd ever to welcome a distinguished visitor to Ottawa, even exceeding the welcome accorded King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.

After honors, the President proceeded to the platform on the Peace Tower where he was officially received by the Prime Minister of Canada. Promptly at the stroke of 12:00 o'clock noon the carillon in the Peace Tower began tolling "God Save the King." The multitude, as one, stood silently and rigidly at attention. This concluded, the President was introduced to the people of Canada by their Prime Minister, who spoke for approximately ten minutes in praise of their distinguished guest. The President responded with the following address: [For the text of this address, omitted here, see Rosenman, pp. 365-369.]

Following the President's address, addresses of thanks to the President were made by Lieutenant Colonel the Honorable Thomas Vien, Speaker of the Senate, and the Honorable James A. Glen, Speaker of the House of Commons.

Next the carillon played the beautiful and inspiring "O Canada" to terminate the ceremonies at Parliament Hill.

The President and the official party then departed Parliament Hill via automobile and proceeded to the nearby National War Memorial. Here, while the party paused momentarily, and to the music of "Abide With Me" played by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police band, Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, President Roosevelt's Naval Aide, laid a wreath at the foot of the Memorial on behalf of President Roosevelt.

The party then moved on to Government House where they were luncheon guests of the Governor-General. The ladies of the party (Miss Grace Tully and Miss Louise Hachmeister) were luncheon guests of Mrs. Ray Atherton, wife of the United States Minister to Canada, as the luncheon at Government House was a stag affair. A very excellent buffet luncheon was served at the Château Laurier for members of the Secret Service detail and the American press.

After lunch the President had conferred on him the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of London. The Governor-General, acting in his capacity as Chancellor of the University, made the presentation. The President was formally introduced to the Governor-General by Surgeon Captain Charles H. Best, Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, a distinguished graduate of the University of London. This ceremony was held at Government House.

While at Government House the President received members of the diplomatic corps, including the chargé[s] d'affaires and the high com-

missioners to Canada. Afterwards, the President, accompanied by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, left Government House by auto for a drive about the city, passing the Canadian Government buildings, the New Supreme Court building, and thence proceeding to the Prime Minister's country home, "Kingsmere." While passing the United States Legation residence at Rockcliffe, the President paused long enough to receive the members of the Legation staff. From "Kingsmere" the party returned to the city, stopping at the Laurier House where they had tea with the Prime Minister. After tea the President and his party returned to the train, arriving at 6:55 p. m. It was raining as they returned to the train. We departed Ottawa for home at 7:00 p. m.

*Thursday, August 26th*

We crossed the International Border from Canada into the United States at Rouses Point, N.Y., at 1:30 a. m. Here we parted company with Inspector Poudrette, Corporal Glanville and Constables J. L. Raymond and D. G. Walker of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police who had accompanied us from Quebec.

We arrived at Highland, N.Y. at 8:15 a. m. The President, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Early, Lieutenant Commander Fox, and Miss Tully, as well as members of the Secret Service and communication details, left the train here and embarked in automobiles for Hyde Park. The special train, with Mr. Hopkins, Admiral Brown, Admiral McIntire, Chief Ship's Clerk Rigdon, Mr. Dan L. Moorman, and Sergeants Hoch and Combs, proceeded to Weehawken, arriving there at 10:30 a. m. This party then taxied to the Pennsylvania Station in New York City and embarked on the 11:30 a. m. Pennsylvania train for Washington, arriving in Washington at 3:30 p. m.

The President and members of the party who spent the week-end at Hyde Park returned to Washington by train at 7:45 a. m., Monday, August 30th.

## 8. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE, AUGUST 14-24, 1943

SATURDAY, AUGUST 14, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 14, 1943,  
10:30 A.M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

### PRESENT

#### UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Major General Handy  
Major General Fairchild  
Brigadier General Kuter  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

#### UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
General Riddell-Webster  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

#### *Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

#### *Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

### 1. CONDUCT OF THE CONFERENCE

With reference to the Conduct of the Conference,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

- a. That the meetings should be daily at 1430.<sup>2</sup>
- b. That there should be morning meetings when necessary.
- c. That the numbers attending should be limited to about 12 on each side. Closed sessions will be held as may be found desirable.

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 106th Meeting. The meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were numbered consecutively from the establishment of that organization, which held its first meeting in Washington on January 23, 1942. The 106th Meeting was the first held in connection with First Quebec Conference.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., 2:30 p. m.

d. That it should be understood that attendance of the Planners is not mandatory as they would often have other work demanding their attention, in which case they might be represented by one of their members.

e. That in general the procedure should follow the lines of the TRIDENT Conference, with specific reference to recording of decisions, approval of minutes, reports to the President and Prime Minister and the form of the Final Report.

f. That they would meet tomorrow.

## 2. SECTIONS I, II AND III, C.C.S. 242/6<sup>3</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

That Sections I, II and III of C.C.S. 242/6 (TRIDENT Conference Report to the President and Prime Minister) had been accepted for the QUADRANT Conference, it being understood that courses of action were not thereby excluded from consideration which might appear likely to facilitate or accelerate the attainment of the over-all objectives. The Sections to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the QUADRANT Conference.

## 3. AGENDA

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the sequence put forth in the suggested agenda presented by the British Chiefs of Staff<sup>4</sup> and directed the Secretaries to incorporate those items proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff<sup>5</sup> and to issue a revised agenda (subsequently published as C.C.S. 288/3<sup>6</sup>).

## 4. THE EUROPEAN THEATER

SIR ALAN BROOKE gave a résumé of the present situation in the European Theater. He proposed to start with the situation in Russia since it was on that front that the main land forces in Europe were concentrated. Earlier in the year German forces had massed for an attack on this front but had delayed the attack largely, he believed, due to the situation in the Mediterranean. They launched their offensive against Kursk with the object of straightening their line and possibly exploiting their success, as well as producing the required political results in Germany. The Russians had succeeded in holding them by defense in depth. Some 16 *Panzer* divisions had been used, in addition to infantry. The Russians had waited until they were sure they were holding this offensive and had then themselves attacked,

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 364.

<sup>4</sup> C.C.S. 288, *ante*, p. 400.

<sup>5</sup> C.C.S. 288/1, *ante*, p. 402.

<sup>6</sup> *Ante*, p. 412.

not only pushing back the Germans on the Kursk salient and capturing Orel, but also threatening Briansk. The attack in the neighborhood of Kharkov seemed to be succeeding and it was to be hoped that the fate of that town was now sealed. Further offensives had now started in the Smolensk area.

Though the number of German divisions remained almost constant, it was believed that their strength, both in personnel and equipment, was only some 60 percent of their authorized strength. The manpower of Germany was now stretched to its limit. The Germans had been further weakened by the withdrawal of Italians and certain other satellite forces from the Eastern Front, and this tendency for the satellites to withdraw would increase with the present situation in Italy. Further, the Italians had some 30 divisions in the Balkans and five in Southern France. Some of the former had already made overtures with a view to surrender, and Germany would be faced with the necessity for replacing all these troops.

It seemed probable that while the Italians had wished the Germans to defend Southern Italy, the latter had refused and would concentrate on the defense of the northern plains where the vital airdromes threatening Southern Germany were situated and which provided doorways to the east and west. At present Germany had approximately five divisions in Italy though there were signs that she was reinforcing in the North.

In France there were signs of German divisions being moved to the South of France to replace Italians and to the Russian Front, though it was not known if these would be replaced by training divisions from Germany.

In the British view there was at present no German threat to Spain. The necessary forces were not available, nor could they be made available unless Germany shortened her line in the East. In this connection, there were two possible lines to which the German forces might withdraw, one to the East and one to the West of the Pripet marshes. It was estimated that withdrawal to these lines might save the Germans some 30 and 70 divisions, respectively. There was a further possibility that Germany might decide to withdraw from France to the Rhine-Siegfried line. Whether Germany would decide to withdraw in the East or the West was a matter for conjecture. A withdrawal from the East would bring Eastern Germany and the Rumanian oilfields within easy bombing range and a withdrawal from the West would help us to intensify our air attacks on Germany. Since if the U-boat campaign failed completely Germany would have no further use for French bases, and since the Germans were likely to fear a Russian land advance into the country more than one carried out by Anglo-American

forces, it seemed probable that, on balance, Germany would be more likely to choose a withdrawal from the West.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he had read the U.S. Chiefs of Staff appreciation of the war in Europe <sup>7</sup> which, from the air point of view, accorded very largely with his own views.

The German air force was now completely on the defensive. Their bomber force had deteriorated greatly in the last year, largely from lack of training and a proper training organization. They had relied on a series of victorious land campaigns to be supported by the air and between which the air forces could rest and reorganize. The situation was now very different.

Their fighter forces, on the other hand, were growing fast and had achieved the remarkable increase of 22 percent during the year 1943. All this increase had been absorbed on the Western Front. In spite of this they still did not consider themselves strong enough to combat the daylight operations of the 8th Air Force and had withdrawn units both from the Russian and the Mediterranean Fronts, in spite of the defeats they were suffering in these areas.

The United Nations Air Forces, on the other hand, were everywhere on the strategic offensive. The shorter range aircraft were being used for attacks on communications, transport centers, locomotives and airfields. The night offensive was steadily increasing. Radio aids to navigation had proved immensely effective. Certain steps were now being taken to baffle the defenses which had resulted in a decrease in casualties from five to six percent to only three percent.

Finally, the daylight bombing—the most important phase of all—was being extraordinarily effective. The first object of POINTBLANK was to knock out the fighter factories and to destroy fighter planes in the air in order to achieve complete mastery in the air over Germany. The forces available to the 8th Air Force had done remarkable work but the program was behind schedule for reasons, however, which were quite understandable. The targets were being hit, the enemy aircraft were being shot down and a high percentage of the aircraft were returning safely, but it was a great battle which hung in the balance and it was vitally important to sustain and give every support to our forces in order that they could achieve superiority over the enemy.

In the Mediterranean the mixed U.S. Army Air Force and R.A.F. units were working as one team and were giving a wonderfully good account of themselves.

The key to the situation from the air point of view, would be the placing of strong offensive air forces in Northern Italy. From there all South Germany would be within comfortable range and above all two of the largest German aircraft factories which between them

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<sup>7</sup> The reference presumably is to the enclosure to C.C.S. 300/1, *ante*, p. 453.

produced nearly 60 percent of the German fighters. The bombing of Ploëști, in his opinion perhaps the most brilliant and outstanding single air operation of the war, had shown what could be achieved even at a range of 1,000 miles. This target could be attacked at much shorter range from the heel of Italy, but to get a decisive effect against the German Air Force it would be necessary to go to the North. If we could base a strong force of Heavy and Medium Bombers there in the near future, Germany would be faced with a problem that seemed insoluble. It was estimated that to protect their Southern Front against a similar scale of attack to that being made from the U.K. they would require half the fighter forces now on the Western Front. The Alps would render the German radio warning system relatively ineffective. He regarded the position of North Italy as the key to the situation.

On the Russian front some 2,000 German aircraft were opposed to 4,000 Russians. The Russian training was, however, bad, and until recently the Germans had held their own. Now, however, the tide was turning and the withdrawal of German forces to the west and particularly the withdrawal of experienced leaders was making itself felt.

SIR DUDLEY POUND briefly discussed certain aspects of the war at sea. At Casablanca it had been agreed that Russian convoys should not be run if the loss was likely to be prohibitive.<sup>8</sup> Since German forces were concentrated in the north of Norway, this route was still closed. There was no sign at present that the German surface forces intended to break out into the Atlantic, and he believed that this was now less likely, since it would probably only be considered worthwhile if by so doing the Germans could achieve the final *coup de grâce* terminating a successful U-boat campaign in the North Atlantic.

The battle of the convoys had been fought in May, and since then the U-boats had suffered heavy losses, whilst on the other hand there had been no sinkings in the North Atlantic. It was essential, however, to be ready for a return of the U-boat concentrations to that area, and our dispositions of escorting forces must be designed to meet this menace. Thus it was impossible to send additional escorts to the Azores or the Cape, though hunting groups were being used to reinforce the aerial bay offensive.<sup>9</sup> The bay offensive, with additional United States help in the air, was proving very effective. Groups of submarines were now endeavoring to fight their way in and out of the bay on the surface, and it had become a battle of the U-boat versus the aircraft. Recently, fewer German submarines had come out of the Baltic, and this was believed to be because many of them were refitting with additional radar aids and anti-aircraft guns.

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<sup>8</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 792.

<sup>9</sup> I.e., the offensive in the Bay of Biscay.

The bombing of the Biscay submarine bases had proved disappointing since the Germans had taken very adequate steps to protect their submarines in these ports. It was now felt that continuous bombing of these ports did not justify a great diversion from the essential bombing offensive against German fighter factories. German submarines were at present disposed largely in the outer seas, where they were achieving some successes, but only in the North Atlantic could they find sufficient targets to render their campaign a real success.

In the Mediterranean the Commander in Chief was anxious to retain his six battleships until after the Italian fleet had been eliminated. Our ability to reinforce the Indian Ocean was dependent therefore on the collapse of Italy. The loan of the aircraft carrier "*Ranger*" to the Home Fleet was much appreciated, and enabled sufficient aircraft carriers to be provided for Mediterranean operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked for the views of the British Chiefs of Staff with regard to the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was in agreement with the United States paper<sup>10</sup> on this point. It would not pay us to attack these islands at this stage. There were indications, as yet inconclusive, of German withdrawals from Sardinia, and he did not believe that if Italy collapsed Germany would continue to defend these islands which were largely garrisoned by Italian troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that prior to the occupation of Sicily, it had been considered inadvisable to filter agents into the island. If, however, immediate attacks on Sardinia and Corsica were unlikely, it might be advisable to send agents to those islands.

In reply to a question from General Marshall as to the value of France as an air base in the event of the Germans withdrawing, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the basing of heavy bombers in France would prove a lengthy and difficult logistic problem. He therefore considered that while the heavy bombers should continue to operate from the United Kingdom, medium and light bombers as well as fighters would use advance bases in France. They would then be within easy range of the Ruhr and the Upper Rhine towns. In addition, the fighter cover which could be provided from advance bases in France would be of immense value to the daylight bombing operations.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it was difficult to confine a discussion on the war in the air to Europe since available resources must be spread between all theaters. Early estimates, based on British experience, of the replacements of men and machines had proved too low in the case of the operations of the 8th Air Force. In addition, there was the problem of the "war-weary" crews. General Eaker at present had some

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<sup>10</sup> C.C.S. 303, paragraph 6e, *ante*, p. 477.

800 aircraft, but only 400 crews. No new units would be sent until September, but 200 aircraft would be sent in July and 239 in August. By January 1944 it was hoped to have 1,900 aircraft, with two crews for each aircraft. Finally, he questioned the possibility of obtaining the maximum use of heavy bombers in England during the winter months. In this connection North Italian bases would prove valuable.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated the difficulty which General Arnold had mentioned in foreseeing exactly replacement requirements. He agreed with General Arnold's view as to the importance of Northern Italy. Heavy bombers based in England could use Northern Italy, if the necessary ground crews and facilities were provided, as an alternative taking-off point during bad weather in the United Kingdom.

The battle against the German fighter forces was a vital battle. It must be watched, not only with hope and enthusiasm, but with the determination of providing reinforcements from wherever possible. If German fighter strength was not checked in the next three months, the battle might be lost, since it was impossible to judge the strength which the German fighter forces might attain by next spring if our attack was not pressed home.

ADMIRAL KING said that a possible German move to Spain would be aimed at cutting our vital lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar. The Germans might be held back until the United Nations were further committed in the Mediterranean and then they would flood the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar with U-boats. The value of this line of communication was second only to the North Atlantic route and its value would increase as our commitments in the Mediterranean grew.

The naval situation must be considered globally, and any forces which could be spared from the European theater were urgently required in the war against Japan.

He was surprised to learn that the bombing of U-boat bases in France had been stopped or slowed down. He was convinced that a large number of U-boats were being refitted with a view to renewing the offensive and that the U-boat campaign had not yet been won, though it was now under control, as he had predicted.

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LUNCHEON, AUGUST 14, 1943, 1:30 P. M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Mrs. Churchill  
General Brooke  
Lieutenant General Ismay

CANADA

Lieutenant General Stuart

*Editorial Note*

This luncheon, at which Mrs. Churchill was hostess and which included also one of Churchill's secretaries, is noted in Leahy's Diary (Leahy Papers). No record of the discussion during luncheon has been found.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Leahy's Diary also records a dinner on August 14 and a luncheon on August 24 attended only by military and naval personnel. No record of the discussion is included in the Diary, and as no other source refers to these meetings it is assumed that they were of a social character and they are therefore not further mentioned in this volume.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 14, 1943,  
4:30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Major General Handy  
Major General Fairchild  
Brigadier General Kuter  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
General Riddell-Webster  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge  
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ADMIRAL KING said the principal operations against Japan at present taking place were those directed on Rabaul. These were being delayed by lack of means. He had said at Casablanca,<sup>2</sup> and he must now repeat, that lack of means was in his opinion caused by failure to consider the war against all three Axis Powers as a whole. If some

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 107th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 536, 549.

15 per cent of resources of the United Nations were now deployed against Japan, then an increase of only five per cent would increase by one-third the resources available whereas a decrease of five per cent of the forces deployed against the Axis in Europe would only mean a reduction of six per cent. Air power was lacking, and at present all naval air forces not required for the U-boat campaign were being sent to the Pacific. Consequent on the TRIDENT decisions,<sup>3</sup> operations against the Mandates had been planned and would begin on 15 November against the Gilberts. This particular line of advance had certain disadvantages, but had been necessary, firstly, since it would protect Samoa, the weak spot on the line of communications to Australia; secondly, there were air facilities available in the Ellice Islands; and, thirdly, the relative proximity of this line of advance toward the operations in Rabaul would enable forces to be shifted from one to the other. The United States Chiefs of Staff memorandum<sup>4</sup> set out their proposals for the war against Japan in the relatively near future. In general, these envisaged an advance headed on Luzon by two routes, one from New Guinea, and the other through the Mandates. This plan would have the advantage of obviating the necessity for fighting for the Dutch East Indies which, if the Philippines were captured, would automatically fall to us.

In the North Pacific the attack on Kiska was planned for tomorrow. There were indications that at least a partial evacuation might already have taken place there, but the operation had been planned on the supposition that the original scale of defense still existed. There was a third possible line of approach which was through the Kuriles via Paramushiru.

It was, in his opinion, most important to plan how best the preponderance of forces now employed against the Axis in Europe could be transferred and brought to bear against Japan. It would appear that the air power which would be available could not be fully used in an advance through the Islands and therefore the use of China as a base for air action against Japan became very important.

ADMIRAL LEAHY stressed that the campaigns in Alaska, against Rabaul, in the Central Pacific, and in Burma all formed part of the complete campaign against Japan. The defeat of Japan must be accomplished at the earliest possible date by the use of the maximum possible effort. The requirements for the plan, the forces which could be made available, both immediately and on the defeat of Germany, and the method by which those forces now employed against Germany could be diverted to Japan must all be studied. Every effort was now being made with the insufficient forces available to wear down Jap-

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 369.

<sup>4</sup> C.C.S. 301, *ante*, p. 426.

anese resources, and her resistance was becoming less effective, but an immediate assessment of the availability of resources as soon as Germany had collapsed must be made.

GENERAL MARSHALL said it was important to decide on the bases required to exploit our available means. In the Pacific, adequate shipping had proved a bottleneck since heavy demands were made on account of the necessity for transferring troops to recuperate after long service in difficult and unhealthy country. Every effort was being made to render bases, particularly air bases, more healthy. The same problem of transferring troops, owing to bad climate, existed in the Aleutians.

An interesting factor in the present campaign against Japan was the heavy air losses which she was sustaining, not only in the air but in cargo and troop-carrying vessels. All operations in the Pacific were related to those in Burma. There were two matters on which differences of opinion existed—firstly, the importance of China as a base, and, secondly, the possibilities with regard to the use of Chinese manpower. General Stilwell's view, which he shared, was that properly led, the Chinese troops were an important military factor.

GENERAL MARSHALL then read out a telegram he had received from General Stilwell, giving the details of the equipment and efficiency of the Chinese troops now in Ramgarh and Yunnan and outlining possible employment for these forces. General Stilwell stressed the importance of an early campaign to reopen the Burma Road.

There was an alternative route to China via Sumatra, Singapore and Camranh Bay, though this would entail a heavy shipping commitment. There was a project, which will be further explained by General Somervell, to lay a pipeline for gasoline from Calcutta into China. There seemed to be four issues which must be decided. Firstly, what was the value of Chinese troops; secondly, could we afford to take so little action with regard to China that the present government would fall; thirdly, if we employed only air forces from China, would not the Japanese reactions be so strong as to cut the line of communication to them, and, fourthly, in an operation through China was it essential to capture a port for heavy build-up of supplies and thus link up with the naval operations across the Pacific.

He regretted immensely that there was no air communication between Australia and Ceylon. The interests of the two commands were mutual, and the psychological factor of a gap of 10,000 miles, which was not bridged, was serious. In his view it was important to find the speediest method of bringing pressure to bear on Japan itself and it might well be that operations through China would produce the result faster than fighting our way through the Islands.

It was essential to link Pacific and European strategy. Movements of ships from the Mediterranean must take place in the next few days if operations from India were not to be delayed, and a decision must be taken. It was important that no time should be lost in agreeing on a general plan for the defeat of Japan since the collapse of Germany would impose the problem of partial demobilization and a growing impatience would ensue throughout the United States for the rapid defeat of Japan.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the early days of the war with Japan a holding policy had been adopted. Now superiority was being achieved. In the air, over the last six months, the Japanese known losses had been four times the combat and operational losses of the U.S. Air Forces opposed to them.

In the Pacific, airfields would not be available in which to base the air forces which would be released after the defeat of Germany. Only China provided the necessary facilities. At present the number of units which could be deployed depended directly on the capacity of the air-route. This route had achieved 4,000 tons in July and this would, he felt sure, increase, but a 4,000 ton capacity was sufficient only to enable General Chennault's 223 aircraft to undertake 10 operations each per month. The heavy bomber group now operating in China against Hanoi, Hong Kong and Shanghai was forced to do three trips into Assam for every one operational sortie. In order to release tonnage on the air route a plan had been worked out to run a pipeline capable of taking six million gallons per month (approximately 20,000 tons) into China. Even this amount would only enable five hundred heavy bombers to undertake 10 missions per month, and an additional one thousand tons of gasoline would be required to provide for the necessary fighter protection.

The opening of the Burma Road was, from the air point of view, essential, together, if possible, with a port on the east coast of China through which the air forces could be adequately supplied.

The northern air line of approach to Japan via the Kuriles was hampered by the worst weather in the world and lack of bases. At a maximum, only one or two groups could be employed from this area. Island facilities now available could only accommodate some 20 groups, whereas if Germany were defeated some 50 groups of heavy bombers would be released from the U.K. alone, in addition to those from the Mediterranean area. The situation, however, was hopeful. Japanese aircraft production was estimated at only 600 aircraft per month. He was convinced that heavy bombing of their homeland would defeat the Japanese, "who could not take it."

At the request of General Arnold, GENERAL SOMERVELL outlined the plan for the pipeline into China. It would lead from Calcutta to Ledo and between these places would be a six inch line in order to take the load off the bad communications from Assam. From there on it would be a three inch line running through Fort Hertz to Kunming. The building of the line was not dependent on further operations in Burma though this would probably be necessary to insure its security. The line could be completed in seven months and would require only 15,000 tons of supplies. The necessary piping and installations were already available in the United States and all the necessary plans had been prepared.

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked that a paper giving a brief outline of the plan might be submitted for study by the British Chiefs of Staff.<sup>5</sup> He was in entire agreement as to the necessity for the earliest possible completion of a general plan for the war with Japan.

It was essential to decide on a policy for the employment of our forces and to allocate tasks to be undertaken either separately or jointly. The British were faced with the problem of partial demobilization after the defeat of Germany. Many of the British troops had been abroad for over seven years and a scheme was being worked out to insure that those troops who were best trained were retained, without inflicting unnecessary individual hardships. If major operations were to be undertaken from India, that country must be developed as a base. Its capabilities were at present small and its communications bad. Airfields, ports and communications must all be developed, and the extent of this development was dependent on the plan decided on.

The relative advantages of the opening of the original Burma Road or the seizure of a port in China must be examined, together with the time factor, in relation to the working of the Burma Road at its maximum capacity. Plans had been worked out for advances from Imphal, Ledo and Yunnan into Burma, together with landings on the Arakan Coast. The British Chiefs of Staff had considered proposals put forward by Brigadier Wingate for the increased employment of long range penetration groups in conjunction with the main advances. These groups relied on the Japanese out-flanking tactics but whereas the Japanese outflanking movements consisted of four or five mile sweeps, Wingate's method used 40 or 50 mile sweeps and used units of the size of a brigade group. These groups took pack transport and wireless and could, when necessary, be maintained from the air. They would reach far into the area of the Japanese lines of communication in conjunction with the main advances. A second brigade group was already being formed and it was hoped to form a third, one of which

<sup>5</sup> See C.C.S. 312, *post*, p. 973.

could operate with the Chinese forces from Yunnan by cutting Japanese communications with Mandalay. Another would operate between the Ledo and Imphal advances, and a third to the west of the Imphal Road. He felt that the United States Chiefs of Staff might wish to hear from Brigadier Wingate his views on the use of long-range penetration groups.

The British Chiefs of Staff had only recently learned, however, of the very serious results of the floods in Assam,<sup>6</sup> which would have very serious effects on future operations in Burma. These results had not yet been assessed and he suggested that a small committee consisting of General Somervell, General Riddell-Webster and an officer from the Commander in Chief's Staff in India should examine and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the effects of the floods in Assam on future operations in Burma.

In addition to the plans for Burma a study had been made of an alternative operation on the northern tip of Sumatra. This might either be an operation in itself, aimed at forming a base from which Japanese forces and lines of communication could be attacked, or it might be the first step to an attack on the Malaya Peninsula in the neighborhood of Penang with an advance on Singapore. In the former case some two to four divisions would be required, but in the latter case the forces required would render the operation impossible of achievement until after the defeat of Germany. If, however, only the tip of Sumatra was attacked, though it would result in the diversion of important Japanese forces in reaction to it, it would have the disadvantage of giving prior warning to the Japanese that an attack on Malaya was possible and they would therefore increase their defense in that area. Before, however, further examining the Sumatra plan he suggested that operations in Burma should be examined, possibly based on a later date than originally envisaged.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he strongly endorsed the view that an early decision on the plan for the defeat of Japan must be taken. Air forces would be piling up as soon as Germany was defeated. British production of heavy bombers alone would amount to some five to six hundred a month, with four hundred crews. He was interested in the statement that adequate island bases could not be found in the Pacific to deploy large air forces since in Malta, which was a very small island, some 500 aircraft had been operating. After the defeat of Germany sufficient shipping should be available to maintain these island air bases.

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<sup>6</sup> See General Auchinleck's telegram of August 13, 1943, *ante*, p. 435.

GENERAL ARNOLD explained that most of the islands in the Mandated area were atolls, with very limited land area available and complicated topographical features.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that a small committee should be formed which would include General Riddell-Webster, Major General Mallaby, General Somervell, and Admiral Badger, to examine and report on the effect of the recent floods in India on the projected Burma campaign.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> For the report of this committee to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see C.C.S. 305/1, August 18, 1943, *post*, p. 972.

## SUNDAY, AUGUST 15, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 15, 1943,  
2:30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

### PRESENT

#### UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Major General Handy  
Major General Fairchild  
Major General Barker<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Kuter  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

#### UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
General Riddell-Webster  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod  
Brigadier MacLean<sup>2</sup>

#### Secretariat

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

### *Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

### 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 106th and 107th meetings. The detailed record of the meetings was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 108th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 4 and 5 only.

<sup>3</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 106th and 107th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, pp. 849, 856.

2. ROME—AN OPEN CITY  
(C.C.S. 306<sup>4</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE referred to the FAN message<sup>5</sup> which had been sent to General Eisenhower yesterday telling him to make no further attacks on Rome nor any statements from Allied Force Headquarters pending clarification and further instructions regarding the Press reports indicating that the Italian Government had declared Rome an open city. He felt it was now necessary for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take a new decision in the matter.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that it would be impossible to reach a decision until the matter had been discussed with the President and suggested that no action should be taken until his views had been obtained.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt it the duty of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to express the military point of view to the Chiefs of Government for them to make whatever decisions might be necessary politically.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it appeared that Rome had unilaterally been declared an open city by the Italians. He felt that General Eisenhower should be allowed to retain his freedom of decision until the Combined Chiefs of Staff were restrained from this by political action. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had advised their Government that acceptance of open city status for Rome was fraught with much difficulty for the Allies in the future. It might be preferable that we had Rome in our possession to use its communications and to risk German bombing.

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that no disadvantage would be suffered by refraining from bombing.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it might be desirable from the military point of view to bomb and that a signal should be sent to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff revoking yesterday's decision and giving him a free hand.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the only reports that he had received regarding the latest bombing effort on Rome were that it had achieved success against its targets and that there had been little or no damage caused to non-military targets.

ADMIRAL KING referred to the French declaration of Paris as an open city at the time of their collapse. Then the Germans moved into Paris and used it as a base. Did this establish a precedent for the Allies in relation to Rome?

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<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 1054.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 1054, fn. 1.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the danger of political pressure later if the Allies were to agree indeed to Rome being considered an open city.

ADMIRAL KING agreed that if we were in any way a party now to its being declared an open city our hands would be tied.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he understood that the U.S. and British Governments had agreed to take no action regarding any request for Rome to be made an open city.<sup>6</sup>

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should encourage the two Governments to make no reply and that this would leave us free to bomb. He also referred to the possibility of the danger of political capital being made regarding this whole question in the future.

GENERAL MARSHALL affirmed that the political complications in the U.S. would tend to be so serious that clearance from the President must be obtained before yesterday's message was cancelled. He agreed that it should be reaffirmed that the Allies should in no way commit themselves to agreeing regarding the reported declaration of Rome as an open city and that an early recommendation to this effect should be made to the two Governments.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the President and Prime Minister should be informed at once:

a. Of yesterday's "stand still" order regarding the bombing of Rome and that they should be advised that from the military point of view the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was that the order should be revoked;

b. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered that the two Governments should in no way commit themselves on the subject of Rome being declared an open city.

### 3. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE (C.C.S. 303<sup>7</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would first like to say, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, that after reading C.C.S. 303 they believed that there was a great similarity of outlook between themselves and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe. Such divergencies as there were did not appear to be fundamental. The British Chiefs of Staff were in entire agreement that OVERLORD should constitute the major offensive for 1944 and that Italian operations should be planned with this conception as a background.

<sup>6</sup> For the Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence on this subject, see *ante*, pp. 551 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 472.

The plan for OVERLORD was based on three main conditions being created in order to give it reasonable prospect of success. Firstly, reduction in German fighter strength; secondly, German strength in France and the Low Countries and her ability to reinforce during the first two months must be kept at specified limits; and thirdly, the problem of beach maintenance must be solved. He believed that the OVERLORD plan envisaged too rapid a rate of advance and too small a margin of superiority, bearing in mind our experience in fighting German forces. It was essential, therefore, to insure that the Germans had available to them the minimum possible number of divisions in France and that their rate of reinforcement should be as slow as possible.

Operations in Italy, therefore, must have as their main object the creation of a situation favorable to a successful OVERLORD. This could be achieved by holding German reserves and by reducing German fighter strength by bombing fighter factories in Southern Germany from Italian airdromes.

He considered, therefore, that the statement (C.C.S. 303, para. 4b (3)) in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum that as between OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, when there is a shortage of resources, OVERLORD will have an overriding priority, was too binding. Sufficient forces must be used in Italy in order to make OVERLORD a possibility.

There were two further points in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff paper which he would like elucidated. How far north was it proposed our forces in Italy should go, and what strength was it estimated would be required to hold that line? He understood that the line proposed was the "Apennine" line across the neck of Italy. He believed that this should be regarded as the first stage only, and that if possible the northwestern plains should also be seized. Fighter factories in Southern Germany could be bombed from Central Italy but far greater results could be achieved by the use of those airdromes in the Milan-Turin area. Whether or not this area could be seized would depend on the amount of resistance met and could not be decided now, since the number of German divisions which would be deployed against us could not, at this stage, be assessed. Some 20 divisions might be required to hold the neck of Italy which might entail retaining three of the seven divisions earmarked for OVERLORD. If the Milan-Turin area were taken, then all seven might be required, but a decision should be deferred until it could be seen what forces were required to attain the desired result, i.e., the production of the situation requisite for a successful OVERLORD.

He agreed, however, that trained "battle experienced" troops were required for OVERLORD and therefore it would be necessary to exchange

those of the extra divisions required with others from the U.S. or the U.K.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then explained, with the aid of a map, the possible lines which might be held in Italy. He pointed out that the occupation of the northwestern part of Italy would afford a gateway into Southern France through which troops, possibly French, might attack in conjunction with the amphibious operations suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. He asked finally that certain details of the Appendices might be revised by the Combined Staff Planners.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the desired targets in Germany could be reached by heavy bombers based in the Florence area, which would lie within the line across the neck of Italy. He felt that the advantage of having these northern fields was outweighed by the disadvantage of the additional forces required to gain and hold them.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the advantages of the Turin-Milan area were considerable. There were many excellent airfields in the Turin-Milan area, capable of operating within a reasonably short period a thousand heavy and a thousand medium bombers, whereas fields in the south would have to be extended and improved and the rate of build-up would therefore be slower. Further, the Germans would make good use of the northern airfields and would not have the barrier of the Alps between them and our bases.

ADMIRAL KING said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts as to the possibility of accomplishing OVERLORD.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British view was that OVERLORD would be a success if the three conditions laid down in General Morgan's paper<sup>8</sup> were brought about, and it was essential to take the necessary steps to insure the achievement of these conditions.

ADMIRAL KING said he did not believe that the achievement of the necessary conditions was dependent solely on operations in Italy. The necessary conditions might be produced by many other factors, such as, operations in Russia, the result of those already taking place in Sicily, and the air offensive from the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it seemed to him that the essence of the problem was whether or not the required conditions for a successful OVERLORD could only be made possible by an increase in the strength in the Mediterranean. Only by giving an operation overriding priority could success be insured. TORCH was a perfect example of this concept. He agreed that if resistance was weak we should seize as much of Italy as possible. It would be better if we, and not the Germans, held the northern airfields, though almost as much could be achieved from the

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<sup>8</sup> See C.C.S. 304, paragraph 1 *a*, *ante*, p. 484.

Florence area. On the other hand, unless a decision were taken to remove the seven divisions from the Mediterranean, and unless overriding priority was given to OVERLORD, he believed that OVERLORD would become only a subsidiary operation. A delay in the decision would have serious repercussions on our ability to build up for OVERLORD and any exchange of troops, as had been suggested would absorb shipping and complicate logistic considerations of supply as far back as the Mississippi River. Recently in North Africa an additional unexpected requirement for 60,000 service troops had arisen. This requirement had been met but with very serious results for planned expansion and movement to other theatres. Not only would the OVERLORD build-up be hampered, but operations in the Pacific would also suffer.

If OVERLORD was not given overriding priority, then in his opinion the operation was doomed and our whole strategic concept would have to be recast and the United States forces in Britain might well be reduced to the reinforced army corps necessary for an opportunist cross-Channel operation.

General Barker had submitted a paper<sup>9</sup> with regard to the required conditions. This note (the main points of which General Marshall read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff) pointed out that in the view of the Combined COSSAC Staff, the required condition[s] concerning the German build-up did not imply that the operation became impracticable if the conditions were not achieved but rather that more extensive use would have to be made of available means to reduce the enemy's ability to concentrate his forces.

To sum up, he felt that unless OVERLORD were given overriding priority it would become a minor operation, in which case we should be depending for the defeat of Germany on air bombing alone. This had achieved great results, but its final result was still speculative. We must make a plan and bring our strength against Germany in such a way as to force Germany to feel it. An "opportunist" operation would be cheaper in lives but was speculative. If we relied on this we were opening a new concept which in his view weakened our chances of an early victory and rendered necessary a reexamination of our basic strategy, with a possible readjustment towards the Pacific.

In the course of discussion the following points were made:

a. In the British view, successful operations in France necessitated a preponderance of force. It was essential to achieve this preponderance in order to avoid a catastrophe, which might seriously delay our ultimate victory. Success depended not on the absolute strength of the United [*Allied?*] forces available for OVERLORD, but on the relative

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<sup>9</sup> Enclosure to J.C.S. 442/1, "Operation 'OVERLORD'", August 6, 1943; not printed.

strength of those forces vis-à-vis the Germans opposed to them. This relative strength could best be achieved by operations in Italy, aimed at containing the maximum German forces, and by air action from the best possible Italian bases to reduce the German fighter forces. By agreeing now to the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean, risks might be run in that theatre which would not only prejudice the success of OVERLORD, but might make it impossible of successful achievement.

In the British view OVERLORD was the main operation and all operations in Italy must be aimed at assisting OVERLORD.

*b.* The U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that unless overriding priority were given to OVERLORD the operation would never materialize. In every previous operation, requirements had arisen additional to those originally envisaged. These requirements might also arise in Italy and must not be met by unilateral action. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should now take a decision that Operation OVERLORD should have overriding priority and maintain this decision in order that the success of the operation could be insured. Any departure from this concept must entail a reconsideration of our basic strategy.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

*a.* Agreed to give further consideration to C.C.S. 303 at their next meeting;

*b.* Instructed the Combined Staff Planners to examine the Appendices and amend as necessary.

4. OPERATION "OVERLORD"—OUTLINE PLAN

(C.C.S. 304<sup>10</sup>)

"SYNTHETIC" HARBORS

(C.C.S. 307<sup>11</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed a note (C.C.S. 304) by the British Chiefs of Staff on the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.

In reply to a question by Admiral Leahy, LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN outlined the various methods by which the problem of beach maintenance could be overcome.

GENERAL BARKER and BRIGADIER MACLEAN of the COSSAC Staff explained the main features of the outline plan for Operation OVERLORD.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD, as set out in British Chiefs of Staff paper, C.O.S. (43) 416 (O),<sup>12</sup> and endorsed the action taken by the British Chiefs of Staff in authorizing him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 483.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 1008.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed. For a digest of this paper, see C.O.S. (43) 415 (O), *ante*, p. 488.

## 5. AIR AND NAVAL COMMAND—OPERATION “OVERLORD”

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he would like to have an opportunity to discuss with General Arnold the question of an Air Commander for OVERLORD. At present Air Marshal Leigh-Mallory was giving the necessary decisions but the Air Commander should be selected as soon as possible.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that consideration had been given to the problem of naval command for OVERLORD. The majority of the forces to be employed would be trained, organized and operate under the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth.<sup>13</sup> He had been given a special Chief of Staff to assist him in this matter. The Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, could be given control over adjacent commands as might be necessary. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should endorse the appointment of the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, as Naval Commander in Chief.

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to consider this suggestion.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

*a.* That the British Chief of the Air Staff and General Arnold would examine the question of the appointment of an Air Commander for OVERLORD and would put up their recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the end of QUADRANT.<sup>14</sup>

*b.* Of the proposals by the British Admiralty that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, should carry out the duties of Naval Commander for OVERLORD, with authority over the Naval Commanders, Plymouth and Dover, for this purpose; and deferred a decision on this matter.

<sup>13</sup> Admiral Sir Charles Little.

<sup>14</sup> See *post*, p. 905.

## MARSHALL—CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 15, 1943, EVENING

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The only record found of the discussion at this meeting is the following extract from the minutes of the 105th Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held at 10 a. m., August 16, at which Marshall gave a report concerning his conversation with Churchill:

“GENERAL MARSHALL said that last night it was evident that the Prime Minister had been informed of the results of yesterday’s C.C.S.

Meeting. Mr. Churchill did not mention the subject at first. He talked about Burma and the COSSAC command and referred to the misunderstanding with General Eisenhower about a certain dispatch. Finally, the Prime Minister got around to the subject of OVERLORD and said he had changed his mind regarding OVERLORD and that we should use every opportunity to further that operation. GENERAL MARSHALL said he told the Prime Minister that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a difficult meeting yesterday afternoon and that there had been frank differences of opinion but that he believed such a situation was excellent at the *start*. He said there was discussion regarding the 'right' and 'left' method of approach and that he informed the Prime Minister that he could not agree to the logic of supporting the main effort by withdrawing strength therefrom in order to bolster up the force in Italy. The Prime Minister finally dropped the subject, saying 'give us time.' (J.C.S. Files)

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MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 16, 1943,  
2:30 P.M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell<sup>2</sup>  
Vice Admiral Willson<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Cooke<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Badger<sup>2</sup>  
Major General Fairchild<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Kuter<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer<sup>2</sup>  
Commander Freseman<sup>2</sup>  
Commander Long<sup>2</sup>

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten<sup>2</sup>  
General Riddell-Webster<sup>2</sup>  
Admiral Noble<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Macready<sup>2</sup>  
Air Marshal Welsh<sup>2</sup>  
Captain Lambe<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier Porter<sup>2</sup>  
Air Commodore Elliot<sup>2</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE  
(C.C.S. 303<sup>3</sup>-303/1<sup>4</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 109th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 2 and 3 only.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 472.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 1023.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to give further consideration to this subject at their next meeting.

## 2. CONCLUSIONS OF 108TH MEETING

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 108th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>5</sup>

## 3. "POINTBLANK"

(C.C.S. 309<sup>6</sup> and C.C.S. 252/2<sup>7</sup>)

SIR CHARLES PORTAL gave certain figures with regard to the progress of the combined bomber offensive. Since the beginning of the war the Royal Air Force had dropped 136,000 tons of bombs on Germany, 73,000 tons of which had been dropped within the last seven months. In the first quarter of 1943 17,000 tons had been dropped by night and in the second quarter as much as 35,000 tons.

The damage caused by the air offensive was difficult to assess in precise terms, but he would like to draw attention to certain points in the report by the Joint Intelligence Committee<sup>8</sup> which had been circulated to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Only one-third of the German industry had been under heavy attack for three months. The effect of these attacks had fallen mainly on the basic industries in the Ruhr. Hence, the effect of the attack on the forces in the field was not immediate and results on these forces would increase as time went on. A further result of the attacks was the forcing on Germany of a defensive air strategy. In addition, they produced a serious drain on Germany's manpower.

With regard to the submarine war, it was estimated that no less than 30 U-boats less than the planned program had been produced between June 1942 and June 1943. As a result of damage already inflicted an additional loss in U-boat construction would result, amounting to some 12 or 13 boats over the next six months.

Morale had also been seriously affected. Casualties were heavy and great destruction of industrial homes had occurred. It was estimated that some 422,000 workers had been rendered homeless and an additional 1,800,000 had suffered damage to their homes which was irreparable, since the necessary consumer goods to replace those destroyed were not available. The report stated that the bombing had affected the outlook of the population with regard to the regime, the war effort as a whole and willingness to hold out.

<sup>5</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 108th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 862.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 1018.

<sup>7</sup> See *ante*, p. 584.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. C.C.S. 300/1, *ante*, p. 453.

Damage to Krupps Works had decreased output from 50 to 75 percent and this was in addition to damage to other similar industries. The U.S. Air Force attack on the synthetic rubber plant had reduced the total rubber supply by 15 percent. Transportation was also dislocated and Germany's plan for an expansion of locomotive production had been nullified by the destruction of locomotives and their manufacturing and repair facilities.

He had felt it right that he should put forward a memorandum on the air offensive in view of the task of coordination given him by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca.<sup>9</sup> Further, the day and night offensives were complementary and a heavy scale of daylight bombing rendered the task of the night bombers easier, since the Germans were being forced to use night fighters against daylight attacks.

The present situation had both good and bad features. On the one hand, German fighter strength was stretched almost to breaking point, and in spite of their precarious situation on the Russian and Mediterranean fronts, they had found it necessary to reinforce their fighter forces on the Western Front from these sources. On the other hand, the expansion of German fighter strength was continuing and had increased 13 percent during this year. It had been hoped that this expansion would by now have been stopped. The 8th Air Force, who were achieving a great task with their existing resources, believed that they could achieve even greater successes if their strength was increased.

He asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take action to make a victory in the battle of the air as certain as possible before the autumn. If this was not done, the Germans, by a conservation of their strength and by the development of new methods of defense, might be in an unassailable position by the spring. To achieve our object diversions from the 8th Air Force should be stopped, loans of aircraft from the 8th Air Force to other theaters must be returned, and the bomber command of the 8th Air Force must be built up and reinforced to the maximum possible. Such steps would, he was convinced, be amply justified.

With regard to the employment of the aircraft used for TIDALWAVE, he considered that whether employed from the Mediterranean or from England, they should be under the command of the 8th Air Force and devoted to attacks on fighter factories. They should, in fact, revert to a part of the POINTBLANK forces and not be left under the control of General Eisenhower, whose air forces were already considerable.

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<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943*, p. 795.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined Sir Charles Portal's paper, and that they were in full accord with the views expressed and wished to reaffirm that every resource within United States capabilities was being strained to provide the maximum reinforcement of POINTBLANK.

ADMIRAL KING referred to a directive to General Eisenhower (FAN 172<sup>10</sup>), in which he was instructed that follow-up attacks on Ploesti were to follow attacks on fighter factories. He was not clear as to how far the missions referred to in this telegram had been accomplished. It might now be necessary to modify the instructions with regard to follow-up attacks on Ploesti.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said he believed that at TRIDENT only one attack on Ploesti had been decided on.<sup>11</sup> A second attack would have serious results on POINTBLANK.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that General Eisenhower's latest signal (C.C.S. 252/2) requested the use of the B-24's against Italian targets after the completion of their attacks on the fighter factories. General Eisenhower visualized further attacks on Ploesti being carried out after the aircraft were established in Italy.

GENERAL ARNOLD outlined the losses suffered in the Ploesti raid: of the 178 aircraft dispatched, 54, including 51 crews, had been lost. The results had been excellent, with eight out of nine targets hit and five of them almost totally destroyed. The casualties had, at least in part, been caused by the loss of the leader of the formation at the outset. This had necessitated reorganization and an attack which was not completely coordinated. It might be impossible to ask crews to sustain a loss of 33 percent in more than one operation.

With regard to POINTBLANK, GENERAL ARNOLD said that in the month of July 25 attacks had been made, with a loss rate of 7.4 percent per mission, as compared with an average loss rate throughout the period of their operations of 6.7 percent. 3,400 tons of bombs had been dropped in July.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note of C.C.S. 309 and of the following comment submitted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:

"The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff are in full accord with the views of the British Chiefs of Staff that the maximum reinforcement of POINTBLANK, particularly over the period of intense combat with the Ger-

<sup>10</sup> This message, dated July 23, 1943, read as follows: "The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that the first attack on TIDALWAVE should precede attack on fighter factories and latter should take place as soon afterwards as coordinated plan with 8th Air Force can be arranged. Followup attacks on TIDALWAVE to follow attacks on fighter factories." (J.C.S. Files)

<sup>11</sup> See *ante*, pp. 39, 106-108.

man Fighter Air Force immediately ahead, is a subject of the most critical importance, and wish to reaffirm that every resource within U.S. capabilities is being strained to bring this about.”

b. Agreed to defer action on C.C.S. 252/2.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> By subsequent informal action, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that the three B-24 groups referred to in this paper (see *ante*, p. 584) should revert to the operational control of the Eighth Air Force (J.C.S. Files).

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HARRIMAN-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 16, 1943, AFTERNOON,  
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The only source found for this meeting is an informal memorandum prepared by Harriman, which contains the following information on the conversation:

“The Prime Minister seemed quite satisfied with his talk with General Marshall which had taken place at dinner the night before.<sup>1</sup> He was quite apologetic for keeping him up so late but said he thought it was fruitful.

“He talked about the Italian situation and was quite optimistic that ‘important results’ would occur.

“He was elated over the Sicilian news.

“He seemed satisfied that the differences between the Chiefs of Staff could be ironed out. He does not fully understand the suspicion that exists on the American side regarding the British determination to cross the Channel. On paper the differences don’t look very great. I believe, however, that this fear will be removed within the next day or two as I am convinced the British now see the opportunity equally favorably as do our Chiefs of Staff, which has not been the case up to now. The above would be based on acceptance of British Mediterranean proposals.

“(Admiral Leahy told me that he was much impressed by the logic of General Brooke’s presentation.<sup>2</sup>)

“I told the Prime Minister I was quite satisfied from discussions that Leathers and Douglas had had that the troop lift and cargo ships could be found to back up the strategic proposals.” (Harriman Papers)

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 869.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 850.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 17, 1943,  
2:30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell<sup>2</sup>  
Vice Admiral Willson<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Cooke<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Badger<sup>2</sup>  
Major General Fairchild<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Kuter<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer<sup>2</sup>  
Commander Freseman<sup>2</sup>  
Commander Long<sup>2</sup>

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Ismay<sup>2</sup>  
General Riddell-Webster<sup>2</sup>  
Admiral Noble<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Maccready<sup>2</sup>  
Air Marshal Welsh<sup>2</sup>  
Captain Lambe<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier Porter<sup>2</sup>  
Air Commodore Elliot<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier Macleod<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier Wingate<sup>3</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE  
(C.C.S. 303<sup>4</sup> and 303/2<sup>5</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF discussed in closed session the strategic concept for the defeat of the Axis in Europe.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Accepted the extract from C.C.S. 303 which is set forth in C.C.S. 303/2 as a brief and concise statement of their agreed strategic concept for operations in the European Theater in 1943-44.

*b.* Directed the Secretariat to put C.C.S. 303/2 in proper form with a view to its being submitted to the President and Prime Minister. (Subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 303/3.<sup>6</sup>)

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 110th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 3-5 only.

<sup>3</sup> Present for the discussion of item 5 only.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 472.

<sup>5</sup> "Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe", August 16, 1943; not printed. See fn. 2 to C.C.S. 303/3, *post*, p. 1024.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 1024.

## 2. ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a draft memorandum<sup>7</sup> for the President and Prime Minister prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Approved with certain amendments, for submission to the President and Prime Minister, a paper setting out the action suggested on the Italian peace feelers. (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 311.<sup>8</sup>)

*b.* Directed that a signal should be sent at once to General Eisenhower warning him to hold two staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon. (Message sent as FAN 195.<sup>9</sup>)

## 3. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 109th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>10</sup>

4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944  
(C.C.S. 301<sup>11</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff outlining their views on operations to be undertaken in 1943-1944 in the Pacific and Far East.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had read this memorandum with great interest. There were certain points he would like to raise. Was not the assumption that Russia would remain at peace unnecessarily pessimistic? Was an actual invasion of Japan necessarily essential; might we not obtain the collapse of Japan without invasion?

In a discussion on these two subjects it was pointed out that while Russia had everything to gain by attacking Japan, it might well be that she would wait to do so until the defeat of Japan had been almost completely accomplished.

It was also generally agreed that while blockade and air bombardment might produce the collapse of Japan without invasion, it was

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> "Italian Peace Feelers", August 17, 1943; not printed. For the final text of the directive based on this paper, as dispatched to Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill, see *post*, p. 1160.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 1055.

<sup>10</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 109th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 870.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

necessary to plan on the assumption that the country itself would have to be attacked by land forces.

In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke as to the forces required to obtain the objectives outlined in C.C.S. 301, ADMIRAL COOKE explained that an estimate of the forces required for the various operations had been prepared<sup>12</sup> and was being handed over to the British Planning Staff.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should return to a further consideration of C.C.S. 301 and to the plan for operations from India after a review of the report by the Combined Planning Staff on the strategic concept for the defeat of Japan. Each set of operations could then be considered in relation to the whole war against Japan and to the forces required.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were informed that it was hoped that the report by the Combined Staff Planners would be ready on the following day.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that it was essential for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take decisions with regard to the specific operations in 1943-1944 during the Conference.

In a further discussion of C.C.S. 301, SIR ALAN BROOKE asked whether it was considered essential, in order to retain the initiative, that both the advance into the Mandated Islands and New Guinea should be pressed forward with vigor. Might this not prove too costly, and a better course be to restrict operations in New Guinea, thus possibly releasing resources for Operation OVERLORD?

ADMIRAL KING said that he considered that if forces were so released, they should be concentrated on the Island thrust in the Pacific. However, he believed that both advances were complementary and equally essential. The western advance through Truk, could, after the capture of that base, be swung either north or continue to the westward. Thus the two thrusts would either converge on the Philippines, or one would be directed to the Marianas.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the troops to be employed in New Guinea were either already there or in transit. Thus, no saving could be made, and the only decision with regard to the troops was whether or not we could afford to take the heavy casualties which might be incurred. Supplies in the New Guinea area, owing to Japanese air action, were maintained almost entirely by 150-foot vessels, and thus no saving in cargo ships or combat loaders would be effected by

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<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

limiting these operations. Landing craft might be saved, but not tank landing craft. With regard to air, though a small saving might be achieved, all the heavy bombers required for the operations had already been deployed in the area.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it was not considered that operations in New Guinea should be discontinued, but rather that they should be limited to a holding role. The Island advance would cut across the Japanese lines of approach to the south.

ADMIRAL KING explained that the landing craft used in the Kiska operation were required for operations in the Central Pacific. For this reason it had been essential not to delay the operations in the Aleutians.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that certain landing craft were still being sent to the Southwest Pacific to meet attrition. He believed that the New Guinea operations were causing very important losses to the Japanese, particularly in aircraft.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that C.C.S. 301 should include a reference to the air route through Burma into China.

It was generally agreed that a reference to the air route should be inserted, since it was the only existing line of supply into China and must also be considered in relation to the limited capacity of the lines of communication through Assam.

With regard to the value of Chinese troops, GENERAL MARSHALL said that there were some 60 or 70 thousand at Ramgarh and about 200,000 in Yunnan. He believed that they might have great value in the land operations in China provided that they were properly trained and led. He did not visualize a vast Chinese Army being built up.

These troops would have to be led by U.S. officers even though the nominal control of the army, for "face saving" purposes, would be in Chinese hands. They must also be provided with adequate air and artillery support. He believed that if these conditions were met, and if their first operations were crowned with success, they would be of considerable value.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Directed the Secretariat to draft a subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301 on the subject of the development of the air route into China.<sup>13</sup>

b. Agreed to defer action on this paper until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

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<sup>13</sup> See C.C.S. 301/1, *post*, p. 971.

## 5. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that though the recent floods might force us to change our strategy in this area, he would suggest that the discussion should start on the basis of our present plans. The British Chiefs of Staff had been examining the possibilities of the use of long-range penetration groups which, operating well ahead of the main advances, would by long outflanking movements cut the enemy's supply lines. They themselves would be largely maintained by air. It was proposed to expand the number of these units now available to some six brigade groups. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might ask Brigadier Wingate to explain his recent operation with a long-range penetration group and to set out his views on their future employment. After this the Combined Chiefs of Staff would wish to hear the report of General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster on the repercussions on planned operations of the recent floods.

BRIGADIER WINGATE explained the tactical employment of long-range penetration groups and the reason for their introduction. He then outlined the course of the operations of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade and put forward his views with regard to the future employment of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with main advances aimed at the recapture of Northern Burma.

In summing up, BRIGADIER WINGATE pointed out that there were two main features in the employment of these groups; firstly, their whole object must be to prepare the way for the follow-up of the main advance and their employment, based on the object of dislocating enemy communications, must fit into the main plan; secondly, plans for the use of these groups must be elastic and open to alteration in the light of enemy reactions.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had decided to form six long-range brigade groups and to this end a comb-out of suitable personnel from the Indian Army would be undertaken. One of the difficulties was the lack of trained officers who had served with native troops and could speak their language. The operations outlined by Brigadier Wingate would enable us to seize sufficient of North Burma to open a road to China. These operations must continue until the break of the monsoon in order to avoid a Japanese reaction before the rains started. It was possible that in the second phase, long-range penetration groups might be used, operating from the coast through to the Mandalay-Rangoon line of communication. He suggested that on the following day General Somervell and General Riddell-Webster's report on the effect of the flood should be studied, together with operations against Akyab or Sumatra, which latter might prove necessary were it found that the floods would seriously hamper operations in Burma.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action until after consideration of the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.

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Roosevelt-Churchill Meeting, August 17, 1943, 11:30 P. M.,  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

Leahy's Diary records that the Governor General's dinner party on August 17, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 839), dispersed at 11:30 p. m., leaving Roosevelt and Churchill in conversation (Leahy Papers). According to the Log, *ante*, p. 840, Roosevelt and Churchill held discussions after dinner on August 17 "until a late hour." No record of the discussion has been found, as it was not Roosevelt's practice to record his private conversations with Churchill. For this reason it has often been impossible to determine precisely when Roosevelt and Churchill discussed particular subjects during the course of the First Quebec Conference. At some time during the conference, however, the conferees gave their attention to the following subjects in addition to those mentioned later in connection with specific meetings:

1. Approval of joint messages to Stalin and Chiang. See *post*, pp. 1059, 1062, 1063, 1091, 1095, 1159, 1160.
2. Approval of joint instructions to Eisenhower. See *post*, pp. 1060, 1161.
3. Acquisition of bases in the Azores. See *post*, p. 1091.
4. Acquisition of bases in Ireland. See *ante*, p. 618, fn. 1.
5. Terms of surrender for Italy. See *post*, p. 1161; Hull, p. 1232.
6. Iran. According to a memorandum by Dunn dated August 30, 1943, Eden spoke to Hull about Iran at Quebec and Hull said that he would be glad to have a memorandum on the subject. For Dunn's memorandum and a British memorandum headed "Situation in Persia" (dated at Quebec on August 25 but delivered in Washington on August 28), see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 381-383.
7. Civil aviation policy. According to a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., dated November 11, 1943, Roosevelt told a group of advisers on November 10 "that he had begun to discuss aviation policy with Prime Minister Churchill at Quebec". See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 177. Cf. *post*, p. 1339.
8. The possibilities of Basic English as an international language. See *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt assisted by Joseph P. Lash (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. II, p. 1514.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 18, 1943,  
3 P.M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
 General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 General Arnold  
 Lieutenant General Somervell  
 Vice Admiral Willson  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Rear Admiral Badger  
 Major General Handy  
 Major General Fairchild  
 Brigadier General Kuter  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Commander Freseman  
 Commander Long

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Field Marshal Dill  
 Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 General Riddell-Webster  
 Admiral Noble  
 Lieutenant General Maccready  
 Air Marshal Welsh  
 Captain Lambe  
 Air Commodore Elliot  
 Brigadier McNair  
 Captain Tollemache

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
 Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
 Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF PREVIOUS MEETING

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 110th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. ITALIAN PEACE FEELERS

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Representative at the Vatican<sup>3</sup> had received a signed document<sup>4</sup> from Marshal Badoglio informing him that General Castellano was authorized to speak on his behalf.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the above statement.

3. OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN FROM INDIA, 1943-1944  
(C.C.S. 305/1<sup>5</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that it appeared from the memorandum (C.C.S. 305/1) prepared by the special committee that from the

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 111th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 110th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 875.

<sup>3</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

<sup>4</sup> Not found in United States files.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 972.

figures available, the Ledo or Imphal advances might have to be abandoned as a result of the floods. A telegram<sup>6</sup> had, however, been dispatched to the Commander in Chief, India,<sup>7</sup> offering him certain assistance to improve the capacity of the line of communication. He proposed that further consideration of operations from India should be deferred pending a reply from the Commander in Chief, India.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of the interim report of the *ad hoc* committee, set out in C.C.S. 305/1.

#### 4. PRODUCTION OF LANDING CRAFT

ADMIRAL KING informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he was examining the possibility of increasing the production of landing craft by stopping production of 110 foot submarine-chasers and slowing up production of destroyer escorts. The steps he was examining might produce an increase of 25 percent in the landing craft program, but this must not, however, be taken as a firm figure.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of Admiral King's statement.

#### 5. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND (C.C.S. 308<sup>8</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF were in general agreement with the concepts laid down in Part I of C.C.S. 308.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were certain specific points which he would like to discuss with regard to Part II. It had been found difficult to cut the Southeast Asia Command from India, since the former was dependent on India as its main base. However, there were constitutional difficulties in linking the two. The logistic and administrative side of the command set up was most important and a new post of Chief Administrative Officer to the Commander in Chief, India had been set up in order that the Chief Administrative Officer of the Southeast Asia Command should have only one individual to deal with in logistic and administrative matters.

With regard to the Deputy Supreme Commander, the British Chiefs of Staff were distressed by the multitude of functions which this officer would have to carry out, necessitating his presence in many widely separated places.

In the course of discussion the following points were made:

(1) It would be difficult for one officer to combine the functions of Deputy Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and Commander of the U.S. and Chinese forces in the area.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

<sup>7</sup> General Sir Claude Auchinleck.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 968.

(2) The Deputy Commander's main task must be to insure that the Chinese forces play their part in operations into Burma. This would be no easy task and to insure it, it was essential that General Stilwell, who must control the Chinese forces, should have the standing of Deputy Commander.

(3) The command arrangements might be expected to follow the same pattern as in the North African theater, i.e., there would be ground, air and naval commanders. If General Stilwell commanded the ground forces, difficulties would arise since it was essential that control of all ground forces should be centralized in one commander. Only thus could the various operations be effectively controlled and coordinated. On the other hand, it was highly unlikely that the Chinese forces could be under the direct control of a British officer, and it was, therefore, necessary that General Stilwell should, at least nominally, control these forces and that all orders to these forces should pass through him.

(4) GENERAL MARSHALL said that he visualized this necessarily abnormal organization working on the following lines: General Stilwell's function as Deputy Supreme Commander would be limited, since his other functions would occupy the majority of his time. It must be his major task, and that not an easy one, to insure not only that the Chinese forces played their part in the operations, but also that, to the maximum extent possible, the 14th Air Force should cooperate in operations in Burma. It must be remembered that politically, all U.S. forces in China, or in the Southeast Asia Command, were regarded as being there for the sole purpose of supporting China, and therefore a system must be evolved whereby, while retaining this political principle, the maximum support could be obtained for operations into Burma.

(5) SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he appreciated that while the 10th Air Force was regarded as a source of reinforcement to the 14th Air Force, it also had possibilities for offensive action in the Burma theater. Its operations in Burma must, however, be coordinated with those of the Royal Air Force by the Air Commander, Southeast Asia Command. It was therefore essential that these two commanders should occupy the same headquarters.

(6) GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out a further complication in that the operation of the air ferry route into China was under a separate command. It was not controlled either by General Chennault, by the commander of the 10th Air Force, or by General Stilwell, though the latter decided what supplies were flown into China.

(7) It would seem to be necessary, once operations were in progress, for General Stilwell or his representative to be situated at the Army

Commander's headquarters with United States officers attached to each Chinese force through whom he could issue instructions to the Chinese forces concerned, in accordance with the policy of the army commander.

(8) Finally it was pointed out that the proposals for the employment of Chinese forces and the command arrangements would still have to be negotiated with the Generalissimo.

GENERAL ARNOLD and SIR CHARLES PORTAL then presented draft proposals covering the command arrangements on the lines discussed. Certain amendments put forward by Admiral Leahy to paragraph 8 (b) were discussed and agreed to.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Directed the Combined Staff Planners to revise paragraph 8 (a) and paragraph 8 (b) of Part II of the paper, on the basis of the suggestions put forward during the course of the meeting.<sup>9</sup>

#### 6. DECEPTION PLAN FOR THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN (C.C.S. 284/3/D<sup>10</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that C.C.S. 284/3/D set up the machinery for deception planning for the war against Japan. It remained to prepare plans. The responsibility for the formulation, for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, of overall deception plans for the war against Japan had been accepted by the United States Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Staff was now engaged on this matter. They felt, however, that plans could not be finalized until the decisions taken at the present Conference were known. It was hoped that the plan would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 15 September.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note that the U.S. Planners were engaged in preparation of an overall deception plan for the defeat of Japan but that it would have to be premised to some extent in the QUADRANT decisions and therefore would not be ready for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff prior to 15 September.

#### 7. THE U-BOAT WAR (C.C.S. 272/1<sup>11</sup>)

SIR DUDLEY POUND referred to a report by the Anti-Submarine Survey Board, putting forward certain recommendations with regard to the mobility of air units. He was in general agreement with the pro-

<sup>9</sup> The Arnold and Portal proposals and the Leahy amendments are not printed as such, but see fn. 2 to C.C.S. 308/3, *post*, p. 1001.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 415.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 509.

posals of the United States Chiefs of Staff, though he would like to examine further the detailed proposals put forward in the report itself.

ADMIRAL KING gave a brief résumé of the present position with regard to the anti-submarine war. His latest information went to show that 429 U-boats were operating, of which 166, including 23 in far northern waters, were in the Atlantic. Of the original 12 refueling U-boats, 10 had been sunk and one or two were working up in the Baltic, but there were undoubtedly others under construction. The United States was now operating five auxiliary carriers. To meet new U-boat tactics of fighting it out on the surface, aircraft were being equipped with heavier forward mountings. The United States Army Air Corps had recently made a much appreciated loan of B-25's fitted with 75-millimeter cannon. It might be found that the best weapon was the 37-millimeter cannon, which could carry more rounds. There were a very large number of anti-submarine weapons and projects in the course of experiment and development.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL mentioned the rocket weapon which could fire eight projectiles in one salvo, and which was particularly effective.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that at present U-boats were operating largely in the Central Atlantic, off the Cape, and in the Indian Ocean. It was possible to divert escort vessels from the North Atlantic only as far as the Bay of Biscay since it was essential that any craft diverted should be capable of rapidly reinforcing the North Atlantic route should the Germans decide to concentrate in that area. He believed that the U-boats now in the Baltic were refitting with new anti-aircraft weapons and radar equipment and that the Germans might, when these were ready, revert to pack attacks in the North Atlantic, having fought their way out of the Bay on the surface in groups, using their new and heavier anti-aircraft weapons.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then outlined the steps which were being taken to reinforce the escorts in the Cape of Good Hope area.

In reply to a question by Sir Dudley Pound, ADMIRAL KING said that the proposals, to which he had earlier referred, with regard to increasing the output of landing craft would not have any material effect on the production of anti-submarine craft. It was not proposed to stop the building of any anti-submarine craft except for the 110 foot submarine-chasers. Destroyer escorts already laid down would be completed and only a proportion of new construction foregone to allow for stepping up the production of landing craft. Thus no effect on important anti-submarine craft output would be felt for at least six months.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff contained in C.C.S. 272/1.

8. OPERATION "ALACRITY"  
(C.C.S. 270/5<sup>12</sup>-270/6<sup>13</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had only received the United States Chiefs of Staff's views as set out in C.C.S. 270/6 after their arrival at QUADRANT. Negotiations undertaken by the Foreign Office in consultation as necessary with the British Chiefs of Staff were then almost reaching a conclusion. The British Cabinet had given a ruling that the facilities required must, if possible, be obtained on the basis of our treaty with Portugal<sup>14</sup> (our oldest Ally) and not by force. Negotiations had been very protracted. Portugal's main fear was an attack by Spain. They asked for assistance and guarantees for their defense against such an attack and had suggested that a Portuguese Staff should proceed to London to discuss these terms. This would obviously have taken too long. The Portuguese had felt strongly that our initial entry into the Islands in too great strength would produce reactions from the Spaniards and that it must therefore be on a small scale. It had been felt possible to give the guarantee required by the Portuguese since the risk of invasion of that country appeared to be remote. The Portuguese had now agreed to the entry of a small British force into the Azores on the 8th of October.<sup>15</sup> The Prime Minister had informed him that the President had agreed to this arrangement. As soon as the British were in the Islands the policy would be to build up and arrange for the necessary facilities for United States forces.

GENERAL ARNOLD stressed the importance of the ferry route through the Azores, particularly during the coming winter months when weather conditions will greatly restrict ferrying operations over the northern route, forcing a transfer of these operations to the South Atlantic crossing—5,400 miles longer to the U.K. than the Azores route would be. It was expected that by early 1944 some 1,800 aircraft per month would be ferried across the Atlantic. During 1944 it is estimated that air transport Atlantic crossings will reach 3,500 per month. The use of the Azores for these operations would effect a monthly saving of approximately 15,000,000 gallons of gasoline, and substantially expedite the movement of aircraft and air cargo to the European-Mediterranean, Middle East and Far Eastern areas. Grave inconvenience will be caused if this ferry route is not available by the

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 610.

<sup>13</sup> "Land Airport Facilities in the Azores", August 11, 1943; not printed. See Hull's telegram No. 4856 to Winant, August 12, 1943, *ante*, p. 612.

<sup>14</sup> The Anglo-Portuguese alliance had its roots in the Treaty of London of June 16, 1373, and the Treaty of Windsor of May 9, 1386. See *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 1, pp. 462, 468.

<sup>15</sup> For the text of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of August 17, 1943, see *ibid.*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447; *Documentos relativos aos acordos entre Portugal, Inglaterra, e Estados Unidos da América para a concessão de facilidades nos Açores durante a guerra de 1939-1945*, p. 19.

winter. Negotiations by Pan-American Airways had almost achieved the desired result but had been discontinued when British negotiations got under way.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the original decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to obtain the use of the Azores had been based on their value in the anti-submarine war. The air facilities available were limited and he believed that anti-submarine requirements must take priority. He fully appreciated, however, the value of these Islands as a staging point in the air ferry route. A clause in the agreement allowed for further development and General Arnold could be assured that every effort would be made, and pressure put upon the Portuguese, to afford the use of all facilities to the United States as soon as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he felt that once an entry had been effected, the required facilities for United States aircraft might be made available without reference to the Portuguese, but it was generally felt by the British Chiefs of Staff that some reference would be necessary.

After further discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note:

*a.* That the negotiations with the Portuguese regarding the use of the Azores had been brought to a successful conclusion as regards their use by the British, with effect from October 8th.

*b.* That the President had agreed that the negotiations between the British and Portuguese Governments with regard to the use of facilities in the Azores should not be prejudiced by insisting that the facilities be made immediately available to the United States.

*c.* That the British Chiefs of Staff gave an assurance that everything would be done by the British as soon as possible after entry had been gained into the Azores, to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 18, 1943, AFTERNOON,  
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Wing Commander Gibson

*Editorial Note*

This meeting is recorded in the Log, *ante*, p. 840. While no record of the discussion has been found, the principal subject was presumably the attack led by Gibson which had destroyed the Möhne and Eder Dams. See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 68.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 18, 1943, AFTERNOON,  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill Brigadier Wingate

*Editorial Note*

This meeting is recorded in the Log, *ante*, p. 840. While no record of the discussion has been found, the principal subject was presumably the possibility of effective jungle warfare against Japan through the use of long-range penetration groups landed by air behind the enemy lines. See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 67-68.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING MEETING, AUGUST 18,  
1943, LATE EVENING, THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

Pickersgill, p. 551, states that the dinner party at the Citadel on August 18 (see *ante*, p. 840) broke up at midnight, after which Roosevelt, Churchill, and Mackenzie King "sat together for quite a little time." The Log, *ante*, p. 841, indicates that Roosevelt and Churchill held discussions after dinner "until another late retiring". No record of the discussions has been found.

## THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, AUGUST 19, 1943,  
1:30 P. M., THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins Mr. Harriman Mr. Atherton	Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

The *Log*, *ante*, p. 842, states that the persons listed above lunched together on the terrace of the Citadel. No record of the discussion has been found.

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 HOPKINS-EDEN MEETING, AUGUST 19, 1943

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Mr. Hopkins

## UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

No official record has been found of the discussion at this meeting, which is described in Eden, p. 466. Eden states that he and Hopkins discussed the proposed tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union and the subjects in which that country was most interested—the second front, the western frontiers of the Soviet Union, and the postwar treatment of Germany.

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 MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 19, 1943,  
 2:30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

General Marshall  
 Admiral King  
 General Arnold  
 Rear Admiral Cooke  
 Rear Admiral Badger  
 Brigadier General Kuter  
 Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
 Commander Long  
 Lieutenant General Somervell<sup>2</sup>  
 Vice Admiral Willson<sup>2</sup>  
 Major General Handy<sup>2</sup>  
 Major General Fairchild<sup>2</sup>

## UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
 Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
 Air Chief Marshal Portal  
 Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
 Lieutenant General Ismay  
 Brigadier Porter  
 Brigadier Macleod  
 Captain Porter  
 Air Commodore Warburton  
 Mr. Bernal<sup>3</sup>  
 Field Marshal Dill<sup>2</sup>  
 General Riddell-Webster<sup>2</sup>  
 Admiral Noble<sup>2</sup>  
 Lieutenant General Macready<sup>2</sup>  
 Air Marshal Welsh<sup>2</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
 Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
 Commander Coleridge

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 112th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 5-7 only.

<sup>3</sup> Present for part of the discussion of item 3 only.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Accepted the conclusions of the 111th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft progress report to the President and Prime Minister.<sup>5</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister.

3. "HABBAKUKS"  
(C.C.S. 315<sup>6</sup>-315/1<sup>7</sup>)

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that HABBAKUKS might be regarded as floating seadromes or giant aircraft carriers. They could be used as floating advance landing grounds and could form a staging base for air attacks. They might ultimately be used for four-engined heavy bombers. He outlined the principal characteristics of the three types. He then referred to pykrete, the material from which it was proposed to construct HABBAKUK II. This might prove a strategic material of which there was an abundant supply. It was formed of a frozen mixture of diluted pulp and water, the latest type of which contained 94 per cent water. He gave details of the characteristics and strength of this material. A thousand ton model had been built and had spent the summer in Lake Jasper, refrigeration being maintained by means of an engine of only 15 horsepower. He wished to emphasize that a HABBAKUK II, constructed of pykrete, had no limit to its size. Four-engined bombers could use them if they were built of sufficient dimensions or if adequate arrester gear and assisted take-off could be arranged.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British Chiefs of Staff regarded HABBAKUK II as essentially a Pacific project. General Arnold had mentioned the difficulty of providing adequate bases in the Islands for the deployment of air forces for the bombardment of Japan. It would be a long time before the supply route to China allowed the mainte-

<sup>4</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 111th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 881.

<sup>5</sup> Enclosure to C.C.S. 319, August 19, 1943, *post*, pp. 992, 1037.

<sup>6</sup> *Post*, p. 989.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 991.

nance of large air forces in that country and therefore the HABBAKUKS might be regarded as strategic bases or staging points for air attacks against Japan and would thus fill a gap in our facilities. They could be provided without impinging on other programs.

ADMIRAL KING said that he would agree to accept the recommendations contained in paragraph 8 *b* of C.C.S. 315.

In reply to a question by General Arnold, LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that it was proposed that experiments and construction of pykrete sections for HABBAKUK II should proceed during the coming winter. If these experiments proved successful, construction could start in the spring of 1944 and the completed HABBAKUK be ready by the spring of 1945. In the meanwhile no delay must occur in the preparation of plans and construction of sites for the building of the HABBAKUKS. He asked that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should also approve the setting up of a U.S.-British-Canadian Board to press on with the whole matter, not only with regard to the winter experiments and the preparation of sites, but also with the preparation of drawings for the completed HABBAKUK. This Board should, in order to insure results, be asked to report monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

PROFESSOR BERNAL demonstrated with the aid of samples of pykrete the various qualities of this material.<sup>8</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

*a.* Took note of paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c*, of C.C.S. 315/1.

*b.* Agreed to the construction of a section of HABBAKUK II, the continuation of design, and the study of the construction and of the facilities necessary for a full-size ship. This agreement to be incorporated as paragraph *d* in C.C.S. 315/1.

*c.* Agreed that the appropriate United States, British and Canadian authorities should be invited to set up a Board forthwith to press on with the action agreed in *b* above, and to report progress monthly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### 4. LANDING CRAFT

*a.* *Manning of Landing Craft*

(C.C.S. 286/3<sup>9</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to the modified proposal put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 286/3.

<sup>8</sup> Somewhat varied and amusing accounts of this demonstration, which included firing shots at a block of ice and at a sample of pykrete, are given in Alanbrooke, p. 584, Arnold, p. 444, King, pp. 486-487, Leahy, pp. 178-179, Leasor, pp. 136-137, and Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 1026.

*b. Allocation of Landing Craft—Operation OVERLORD—Vehicle Lift*  
(C.C.S. 314<sup>10</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed with the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 314 that the possibility of arranging an increase in the number of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from American sources should be explored.

*c. Allocation of Landing Ships and Craft—American Production*  
(C.C.S. 314/1<sup>11</sup>–314/2<sup>12</sup>)

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN explained that under the present ruling the Combined Munitions Assignments Board would feel themselves bound to allocate landing craft only to specifically projected operations. In order that the British should be able to play their part in operations in the Pacific, it was necessary for them to enter and train adequate personnel to man landing craft. If the present ruling were followed landing craft could be only allocated for specifically agreed operations which at present did not exist in the Pacific Theater. The British assault force which was in fact available and used for Operations TORCH and HUSKY had of necessity been built up before these actual operations were decided on. He felt that the allocation of landing craft should be based on agreed strategy rather than on agreed operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the present position was such that there was everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Our operations were limited in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels. In view of this overall deficiency, he felt it essential to retain the ruling that landing craft should be allocated only to specifically agreed operations.

ADMIRAL KING said he would like to know the future construction program for landing craft in the United Kingdom. He appreciated the necessity for the provision of landing craft for training purposes.

ADMIRAL KING then suggested a modification to proposal 3*b*, in C.C.S. 314/1, designed to meet Lord Louis Mountbatten's point.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved paragraph 3*b* of the enclosure to C.C.S. 314/1 modified to read as follows:

“That the British should now work out their training requirements and submit requests for a corresponding share of U.S. production in 1944–45.”

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 1027.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 989.

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, p. 991.

5. USE OF "PLOUGH" FORCE  
(C.C.S. 316<sup>13</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with the proposal that the capabilities of the PLOUGH force should be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan who should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff whether these forces could be usefully employed in their theaters. This force had already been ordered to withdraw from Kiska.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN suggested that it would assist the two commanders if a United States officer from PLOUGH force could proceed to the two theaters to give details of the capabilities of the force. He himself could also send an officer.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Took note that Admiral Nimitz and General De Witt had been directed to return the PLOUGH force to the United States on the first available transportation.

*b.* Concurred in the proposal presented in paragraph 4 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 316.

6. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS  
(C.C.S. 317<sup>14</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not yet had time to consider this paper.

GENERAL MARSHALL put forward certain amendments<sup>15</sup> to the paper, which were suggested by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Took note of certain amendments presented by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

*b.* Agreed to defer action on the paper until the next meeting.

7. SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN SARDINIA

GENERAL MARSHALL said that though he had no reports from the theater commander on the matter, General Donovan had informed him of the excellent work accomplished by O.S.S. personnel in Sicily. He had felt that even better results could have been obtained if they had been allowed to land prior to the operation, or at least in the first wave. He (General Marshall) believed that since no immediate military operations were planned against Sardinia, it would be well worthwhile to allow O.S.S. and S.O.E. to operate freely in this island. They might succeed in enabling an unopposed landing to be achieved or to seize airfields or other strategic points and hold them as centers of resist-

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 1028.

<sup>14</sup> *Post*, p. 1029.

<sup>15</sup> The amendments referred to have not been identified, although they may have been those later circulated in C.C.S. 317/1, August 21, 1943. See *post*, pp. 1031-1032, fns. 9, 11-13.

ance. He had not, of course, as yet discussed this matter with General Donovan.

GENERAL MARSHALL then presented a draft telegram to General Eisenhower suggesting that O.S.S. and S.O.E. should be given a free hand to operate in the island of Sardinia.<sup>16</sup>

SIR ALAN BROOKE asked for time to consider this proposal.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of a proposal submitted by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that General Eisenhower be requested to comment on a suggestion to gain an unopposed occupation of Sardinia by fifth column activities.

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<sup>16</sup> See C.C.S. 318, "Sardinia, Fifth Column Activities", August 19, 1943, *post*, p. 1068.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 19, 1943, AFTERNOON,  
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 842, Roosevelt and Churchill held discussions during the afternoon of August 19 before they met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. No record of the discussion has been found. At one of their meetings on August 19, however, Roosevelt and Churchill signed the "Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the Matter of TUBE ALLOYS". See *post*, p. 1117.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, AUGUST 19, 1943, 5: 30-7: 45 P. M., THE CITADEL<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane

Brigadier Jacob

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<sup>1</sup> The time of adjournment is from the Log, *ante*, p. 842.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

After welcoming the Combined Chiefs of Staff the President and Prime Minister agreed that they should read through the Report of Progress <sup>2</sup> which had been submitted to them. (*Note*: The amendments to the report that were directed by the President and Prime Minister have been included in a revised copy of the report and have been published as C.C.S. 319.<sup>3</sup>)

MR. HOPKINS raised the question as to whether POINTBLANK included air operations from Italy.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that it did not but it was anticipated that it might include such operations in the future. He said that one of the chief objectives of the POINTBLANK operation (in its first stage) was to destroy German fighter factories. Some of these can be better attacked from Italy.

GENERAL ARNOLD agreed and said it was contemplated that part of the POINTBLANK forces would eventually move so as to operate from Italian bases when they became available.

THE PRESIDENT asked if the operation included attacks on Ploesti.

GENERAL ARNOLD replied that the oil industry was one of the major objectives in the third phase of the plan and attacks on Ploesti, if not specifically mentioned in the plan, could be included in that phase provided suitable bases had become available.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that if we could reach bases as far north as Ancona in Italy they would be within striking distance of Ploesti.

It was then agreed that the plan for the combined bomber offensive should include attacks from all convenient bases.

THE PRIME MINISTER discussed the paragraph pertaining to OVERLORD. He indicated that he was in favor of the plan but that it must [be] understood that its implementation depends on certain conditions being fulfilled regarding relative strengths. One of these was that there should not be more than 12 mobile German divisions in Northern France at the time the operation was mounted and that the Germans should not be capable of a build-up of more than 15 divisions in the succeeding 2 months. If the German strength proved to be considerably greater than this, the plan should be subject to revision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

MR. HOPKINS said he did not feel that the Allies should take a rigid view of these limitations. He suggested that there might be 13 German

<sup>2</sup> The text of the progress report submitted to Roosevelt and Churchill can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 319, *post*, pp. 992, 1037, by omitting the words printed in italics in paragraphs 4, 7, 10, and 15 of the enclosure.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, pp. 992, 1037.

divisions, or even 15 German divisions at two-thirds strength. Also it would be difficult to assess what the German fighter strength would be at that time. In this regard, he felt that General Morgan's report<sup>4</sup> was inelastic.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that there should be elasticity in judgment in deciding as to whether or not the operation should be mounted. He wished to emphasize that he strongly favored OVERLORD for 1944. He was not in favor of SLEDGEHAMMER in 1942 or ROUNDUP in 1943. However, the objections which he had had to those operations have been removed. He said that every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five per cent strength to the initial assault. This would mean an increase in the landing craft necessary but there are nine months available before the target date and much can be done in that time. The beaches selected are good but it would be better if at the same time a landing were to be made on the inside beaches of the Cotentin Peninsula. The initial lodgment must be strong as it so largely affects later operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that an increase in initial assault would greatly strengthen the OVERLORD operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would like to have the time of arrival of U.S. troops in England stepped up, and GENERAL MARSHALL indicated that a study with respect to this was now being made. He wished to emphasize that the shortage of landing craft places the greatest limitation on all of our operations. He cited the case of the Mediterranean, at the present time, and indicated that we could have made an entry into Italy before this, had landing craft been available.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that Mr. Lewis Douglas, Mr. Averell Harriman, and Lord Leathers had made an intensive study<sup>5</sup> on the shipping situation which indicates that a large increase will be available as a result of our success in anti-U-boat warfare.

ADMIRAL KING said that the prospects are excellent that there will be more landing craft available than we had previously anticipated.

THE PRESIDENT said that a study is now being carried on looking toward the possibility of converting excess dry cargo ships into troop carriers. Such conversion takes about six months, but he felt that it should be carried out to the extent necessary to bring the cargo lift and troop lift into balance.

GENERAL MARSHALL reported that General Somervell is optimistic over the prospects of making up our present backlog in troop lift.

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to Italy THE PRESIDENT asked if it was contemplated sending French troops to Sardinia and

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<sup>4</sup> See annex B to C.C.S. 304, *ante*, p. 483.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

Corsica. He thought it desirable to use them in an operation against Corsica but considered it best not to use them in an operation against Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE expressed the thought that an attack against Sardinia depends entirely on what the Germans do with the forces they now have on that island. There is a possibility in the case of a collapse of Italy that the German force will be withdrawn entirely. In that case Sardinia will fall with Italy and a military operation to obtain it will not be necessary.

THE PRIME MINISTER wanted it to be definitely understood that he was not committed to an advance into Northern Italy beyond the Ancona-Pisa Line.

SIR ALAN BROOKE doubted whether we should have enough troops to go beyond this line, but it was not yet possible to say.

THE PRESIDENT asked if it was necessary to go further into Northern Italy in order to reach Germany with our aircraft.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that it was not necessary but there was a distinct disadvantage in permitting the Germans to occupy the airfields in Northern Italy south of the Alps. This had a particularly bad effect in improving the warning service for all raids into Germany. Additionally, the airfields in Northern Italy have greater capacity than those in Central Italy. These need considerable work done on them before they can accommodate our big bombers.

In discussing the paragraph pertaining to a diversion in Southern France THE PRIME MINISTER indicated that he would be hesitant in putting our good divisions into that area to meet the resistance which might be anticipated, and he doubted therefore if French divisions would be capable of an operation of the kind suggested.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that such a diversion would, of course, depend on what the German reactions had been and that troops would only be landed in Southern France if the Germans had been forced to withdraw a number of their divisions from that area. There are two routes by which it might be accomplished: from West Italy if our forces in Italy had been able to advance that far north; otherwise the landing in Southern France would have to be an amphibious operation.

MR. EDEN asked if there would be adequate air cover for an amphibious operation against Southern France.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that the air cover would not be good.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be well to consider, as an alternate plan, the possibility of flying supplies in for guerrillas who might be operating in the mountains thirty miles from the coast. This mountain area would constitute an excellent rendezvous point for Frenchmen who objected to being sent into Germany and who might

take refuge there. He described such an operation as "air-nourished guerrilla warfare."

It was agreed that the possibilities of this proposal should be explored.

With reference to the Balkans, THE PRESIDENT asked if plans were being prepared as to the action we should take in the event that the Germans withdrew from the Balkans to the line of the Danube.

SIR ALAN BROOKE replied that of course any such action would depend on the forces available. He did not think there would be any surplus from our main operation.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was most anxious to have the Balkans [*sic*] divisions which we have trained, particularly the Greeks and Yugoslavs, operate in their own countries. He thought it would be advantageous if they could follow up, maintain contact, and harass the withdrawal of the Germans if they should elect to withdraw to the Danube.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that Commando forces could also operate in support of the guerrillas on the Dalmatian coast.

THE PRESIDENT then referred to a suggestion made by the Netherlands Government that 1,500 potential officers should be trained in the U.S.A. with a view to organizing, if the Germans withdrew, formations in Holland to take part in the struggle against Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would present no difficulty.

The discussion then turned to the garrison requirements and security of lines of communication in the Mediterranean.

It was generally agreed that there would be about forty-seven divisions available for operations in that area. These include the French, Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Poles in addition to the divisions of the U.S. and U.K. Seven of the latter were due to be brought back to the U.K. for OVERLORD.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there are several British divisions that have to be reconstituted and that every effort is being made to do this as soon as possible. One expedient is the sending of nine independent battalions to North Africa to take over the guard duty now being performed by active formations.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the operations now envisaged made use of all the divisions that will be available. This, of course, is subject to fluctuation depending upon the enemy's reactions. He estimated, however, that seventeen to twenty divisions would be required in Italy, one in Corsica and Sardinia, and these, together with garrison troops in Cyprus and North Africa, would limit those available for other offensive operations. There was also a shortage of antiaircraft artillery. So long as the Germans occupy Crete and Sardinia maintenance of

antiaircraft defense will be necessary in North Africa. However, every effort was being made to remedy this deficiency.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated his desire to use the Yugoslav and Greek divisions in the Balkans if the opportunity arose.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he believed that, barring the necessity to retain the oil output in the Balkans, it would be to the Germans' advantage to withdraw from that area.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were other raw materials, particularly bauxite, which the Germans secured from the Balkans that would cause them to hesitate to withdraw.

The discussion then turned to the occupation of the Azores.<sup>6</sup>

THE PRESIDENT suggested that within a week or ten days after the British occupation of the Azores, he would send the Prime Minister a notice that a British and American convoy and some British and American air units were proceeding to the Azores and would expect to use the facilities of those islands. The British could then say to the Portuguese "that they were frightfully sorry that their cousins from overseas had descended upon them but that, having done so, there was little that they could do about it."

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed to this plan. He pointed out that the British were not at fault in failing to obtain the immediate use of these facilities for the United States. He had kept the President informed of events. He said the British have not given President Salazar any assurance as to what forces would be sent to help Portugal in case of attack. The British had only committed themselves to declare war on Spain in the event that she attacked Portugal, and to afford such help to Portugal as was in their power against an attack by the Germans. He said that, if on the 8th of October, the British have entered the islands and no attack against Portugal had resulted, President Salazar would feel much better about permitting United States use of the Azores' facilities. Immediately upon occupancy, the British will make every effort by diplomacy to obtain the permit for United States entry.

MR. EDEN said that it had always been visualized that this would be done. He suggested that the proposed American-British convoy might sail in about a fortnight after the British entry. He thought that timing was an extremely important factor but he felt confident that the situation could be handled to everyone's satisfaction.

In discussing the command situation in Southeast Asia, THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out that the setup agreed upon did not exactly co-

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<sup>6</sup> An Anglo-Portuguese agreement had been signed at Lisbon on August 17, 1943, which provided for the use of facilities in the Azores by British forces beginning October 8, 1943. See *ante*, pp. 609-616, and *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 527-543.

incide with the MacArthur model. He asked General Marshall if it might not be possible to have a British liaison officer appointed to General MacArthur's Staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that arrangements to accomplish this were under way at the present time, and, in addition, he was taking the necessary steps to see that the situation in the Southwest Pacific was adequately reported to the Prime Minister at frequent intervals.

When an examination of the final report had been concluded, THE PRIME MINISTER referred to the long term plan for the defeat of Japan, on which he understood work had been proceeding ceaselessly since the last Conference. This plan was both strategical and technical. It would deal with such things as the best method of gaining access to China, the securing of airfields from which to bomb Japan, and the provision of synthetic harbors and HABBAKUKS. There was no doubt that the combined resources of the United States and the British Empire could produce whatever special equipment might be required to permit of the concentration of the enormous air forces which would be released to attack Japan after the defeat of Germany. But apart from such considerations, there were many political factors to be taken into account. Great Britain would be faced with difficulties in moving her veterans, many of whom would have been on continuous service for several years, forward into a new campaign. It might prove somewhat easier to arrange matters in the Navy and the Air Force, and in the war against Japan it would be the air which would be of vital importance. These difficulties would, of course, be overcome. Nevertheless he hoped that the work of the Planning Staffs would only be taken as foundation data. With their comparatively circumscribed viewpoint, the Planners could not be expected to produce final solutions to the problems confronting our two nations. He hoped the Combined Chiefs of Staff would not think themselves limited by the results of the Planners' study of the war against Japan.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Chiefs of Staff never felt themselves so limited.

Continuing, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he did not view with favor the idea that a great expedition should be launched to retake Singapore in 1945. He was most anxious not to set an aim for that year which would paralyze action in 1944. The campaign of 1942-43 had been most ineffective, and he felt ashamed that results in this theater had not been better. It was now proposed in the coming winter to extend the operation of the long-range penetration groups in Northern Burma, and he thought this should be supplemented by the seizure of the tip of Sumatra. If a strong air force could be lodged there, the Japanese could be brought to action, their shipping could be bombed,

and they would be forced to gather resources to react against our initiative. Options would be kept open for subsequent action in either direction. Whatever happened, we must not let an ultimate objective paralyze intervening action, and he earnestly hoped that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would examine the possibilities in the Southeast Asian Theater, with the object of doing the utmost possible to engage all forces against the Japanese. Only in this way would our overwhelming superiority achieve rapid results against the waning strength of the enemy.

THE PRESIDENT said that he looked at the problem from a rather different angle. The position occupied by the Japanese might be compared to a slice of pie, with Japan at the apex, and with the island barrier forming the outside crust. One side of the piece of pie passed through Burma, the other led down to the Solomons. He quite saw the advantage of an attack on Sumatra, but he doubted whether there were sufficient resources to allow of both the opening of the Burma Road and the attack on Sumatra. He would rather see all resources concentrated on the Burma Road, which represented the shortest line through China to Japan. He favored attacks which would aim at hitting the edge of the pie as near to the apex as possible, rather than attacks which nibbled at the crust. Thus, provided Yunnan could be securely held, an air force could be built up through Burma in China, which would carry out damaging attacks on Japanese shipping. At the same time the attack through the Gilberts and Marshalls to Truk would strike the opposite edge of the slice of pie. If one might judge by the operations in the Solomon Islands, it would take many years to reach Japan, but the other side of the picture was the heavy attrition to which the Japanese forces were subjected in these operations.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed his agreement with the President's simile, but inquired whether the conquest of Southern Burma was really necessary. The problem in Burma was not so much the finding of forces to deploy, but rather of overcoming the difficulties of an exiguous line of communication, and of a monsoon which limited operations to six months in the year. Burma was the worst possible place in which to fight, and operations could only be carried on by a comparatively small number of high class troops. There were large forces in the Southeast Asia Command, and it was for this reason that he hoped to see an attack on the Sumatran tip. An attack on Akyab could hardly be regarded as profitable.

THE PRESIDENT said that he also had never thought much of the idea of taking Akyab or Rangoon. The Generalissimo had favored the attack on Rangoon, because he thought that it would interfere with the Japanese communications, but these probably now ran across land

from Bangkok, and the Japanese were in any event not so dependent on their line of communication as the Allied troops.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he favored the extension of Wingate's operations in Northern Burma, and the supporting advances; but he wished to emphasize his conviction that the attack on Sumatra was the great strategic blow which should be struck in 1944. CULVERIN would be the TORCH of the Indian Ocean. In his opinion, it would not be beyond the compass of our resources. We should be striking and seizing a point of our own choice, against which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to end the severe drain which would be imposed upon their shipping by the air forces from Sumatra.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that the Sumatra operation would be heading away from the main direction of our advance to Japan.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that nevertheless it would greatly facilitate the direct advances. The alternative would be to waste the entire year, with nothing to show for it but Akyab and the future right to toil through the swamps of Southern Burma. He earnestly hoped that careful and sympathetic study would be given to this, the Sumatra project, which he was convinced was strategically of the highest importance. He would compare it, in its promise of decisive consequences, with the Dardanelles operation of 1915.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read to the meeting a telegram recently received from General Auchinleck, reporting the opinion of Admiral Somerville that greater resources than had hitherto been deemed necessary would be required for the operations at Akyab.

THE PRIME MINISTER observed that Akyab, the importance of which had apparently been overlooked in the retreat from Burma, and which we had failed to take last winter, had now been turned into a kind of Plevna. It was against this that we proposed to employ the whole of our amphibious resources in the Indian Ocean in 1943-44. He could not believe that this was right.

THE PRESIDENT inquired whether the possession of Akyab was essential for an attack on Rangoon.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that it would certainly be useful in improving the scale of air attack which could be brought to bear on Rangoon, and possibly on Bangkok, but he doubted whether it was essential.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had always understood that Akyab was required in order that attacks might be made against the Japanese line of communication northward from Rangoon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the principal importance of Akyab was as a stepping-stone to the conquest of Southern Burma.

Reference was then made to the air route to China, and GENERAL ARNOLD reported that the figure of 7,000 tons was almost certain to be reached in August.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired what would be the relationship between the Generalissimo and the new Allied Commander in Chief of the Southeast Asia Command.

He was informed that their relationship would be that of two neighboring Commanders in Chief. Liaison would be insured by the fact that General Stilwell would be the Deputy Commander in Chief, Southeast Asia Command, and also Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. The arrangements made for the new command guarded against the diversion of resources destined for China, unless agreed upon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT then suggested that it would be necessary to include in the final report a carefully considered paragraph relating to our action in support of Russia.

He was informed that this was under consideration, and an appropriate paragraph would be included.

The meeting then adjourned.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 19, 1943, 9:30 P. M.,  
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Subaltern Mary Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 842, records that Roosevelt dined with the Churchill family and Hopkins, and that Roosevelt and Churchill were closeted for several hours following dinner. No record of the discussion during or after dinner has been found.

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FRIDAY, AUGUST 20, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DISCUSSIONS, AUGUST 20, 1943

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 842, records that Roosevelt and Churchill, accompanied by Hopkins, Harriman, Brown, Mrs. Churchill, and Thompson,

went on a fishing trip on the morning of August 20, and that Roosevelt and Churchill had an opportunity for discussions during the drive to and from Lac de L'Épaulé. The only information found on the discussions which Roosevelt had with Churchill on this trip is in an informal memorandum by Harriman, which states that Roosevelt and Churchill "had a discussion of the Pacific war after lunch" and contains the following details of the conversation :

"The Prime Minister was arguing for 'S[umatra]' which I gathered did not particularly appeal to the President. The Prime Minister was enthusiastic over this conception. As a matter of fact it is impossible because the shipping is not available. The President was more interested in 'B[urma]'. The President used most of the glasses and salt-cellars on the table making a 'V' shaped diagram to describe the Japanese position in the semi-circular quadrant from western China to the South Pacific, indicating the advantages of striking from either side, thereby capturing the sustaining glasses, and the disadvantage of trying to remove the outer ones one by one. It was not too serious but a pleasant relaxation." (Harriman Papers)

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 20, 1943,  
2: 30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Somervell  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Major General Handy  
Major General Fairchild  
Brigadier General Kuter  
Brigadier General Wedemeyer  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
General Riddell-Webster  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Captain Lambe  
Brigadier Porter  
Air Commodore Elliot  
Brigadier Macleod  
Captain Buzzard

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
Commander Coleridge  
Colonel Cornwall-Jones

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<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 113th Meeting.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 112th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>2</sup>

## 2. NAVAL AND AIR COMMANDERS FOR OPERATION "OVERLORD"

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to the following British suggestion for Air and Naval Commanders for OVERLORD:

Naval Commander—Commander in Chief Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Charles Little)

Air Commander—Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Fighter Command (Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)

3. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS  
(C.C.S. 317<sup>3</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he would like to have time to refer this matter to London where the officers most qualified to advise were situated. It might be necessary to handle it at a later date through the Joint Staff Mission.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

4. SARDINIA—FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES  
(C.C.S. 318/1<sup>4</sup>)

Previous Reference: C.C.S. 112th Mtg. Min., Item 7.<sup>5</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a draft telegram to General Eisenhower on the subject of the use of O.S.S. and S.O.E. organizations in Sardinia.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested certain amendments to this telegram, including a reference to operations in Corsica.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed, with certain amendments, to the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the signal contained in C.C.S. 318/1 (Subsequently dispatched as FAN 198<sup>6</sup>).

<sup>2</sup>The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 890.

<sup>3</sup>*Post*, p. 1029.

<sup>4</sup>"Sardinia, Fifth Column Activities", August 20, 1943; not printed. See fn. 1 to C.C.S. 318, *post*, p. 1069.

<sup>5</sup>*Ante*, p. 893.

<sup>6</sup>*Post*, p. 1069.

5. APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN  
(C.C.S. 313<sup>7</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had not had sufficient time to arrive at a definite conclusion with regard to the plan and would like to hear the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The early action required by U.S. forces in the Pacific appeared to be generally agreed by the Combined Staff Planners, except for differing views as to the emphasis to be laid on operations in New Guinea. It was with regard to operations of British forces that the various alternatives existed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the recommendations put forward by the U.S. Planners with certain amendments which he outlined.<sup>8</sup>

GENERAL MARSHALL said that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to undertake the recapture of the whole of Burma; only thus could the main road to China be reopened. Akyab and Ramree must be taken before the next monsoon. Operations further south, i.e., against Sumatra, would, he considered, be a diversion from the main effort which must be concentrated with a view to clearing Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then outlined the various operations which could be undertaken from India.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there seemed to be two alternatives. In both cases the first step would be the recapture of North Burma. After that, it would be possible either to press on with the reconquest of the whole of Burma and later attack Singapore or, alternatively, to recapture Singapore and afterwards clear Southern Burma. The extent of the operations this season was dependent on the reply from the Commander in Chief, India, with regard to the lines of communications through Assam. The capture of Akyab was a necessary preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, since it provided the necessary air base. The Prime Minister had suggested an alternative operation, the capture of the northern tip of Sumatra.<sup>9</sup> It was not possible to undertake in 1944 both the capture of Akyab and that of Northern Sumatra. The Akyab operation could take place in March and the Sumatra operation, which was not dependent on the monsoon, could take place in May. The North Sumatra operation was being examined and necessitated a force of some four divisions. This was only a slightly larger force than that required for Akyab.

From an examination of the courses of action put forward by the Planners, it appeared that the opening of a port in China could be

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 975.

<sup>8</sup> The amendments referred to have not been identified, although they may have been those circulated in C.C.S. 313/1, August 20, 1943. See *post*, p. 994.

<sup>9</sup> See *ante*, p. 900.

accomplished at approximately the same time, whether this was done by an overland advance through China after opening the main Burma road, or, whether it was done by sea-borne attacks from Singapore after opening the Malacca Straits.

It was, in any event, essential to develop to the maximum the air route into China. It was the only method of supplying that country. On the defeat of Germany a great number of aircraft should be available. In addition to this it was necessary to decide on the main line of advance, either overland or by sea from Singapore. In each case the Ledo road would first be opened and then either Akyab captured as a preliminary to an attack on Rangoon, or Northern Sumatra captured as a preliminary for an attack on Singapore. Whatever course of action was adopted, great developments would have to be undertaken with regard to base facilities in India.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked if an attack on the Kra Isthmus, as an alternative to the attack on Northern Sumatra, had been examined.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that though this line of advance had certain advantages, the difficulty was the lack of any ports on that coast.

ADMIRAL KING said that he had always considered Bangkok as the most valuable prize. If this town could be captured, it would be unnecessary to assault Rangoon, since all Japanese lines of communication to it could be effectively cut, and it would fall into our lap.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that on the assumption that the war against Germany was completed by the autumn of 1944, he believed that the air route to China could be vastly increased. According to the plan, no substantial amount of supplies could get into China by any road before 1946. The United Nations would have a tremendous production of heavy bombers, transports and air crews which, when the drain of active operations against Germany ceased, would rapidly build up into vast numbers. Similarly, the other requirements for the air route, such as radio aids, would be plentiful.

To achieve results, however, from these vast forces it would be necessary at once to start building up the necessary facilities and to make preparations for deploying and employing the aircraft. Numbers would be so large that, if necessary, unserviceable aircraft could be scrapped rather than large repair depots should be set up. Maximum efforts must be made, if necessary at the expense of operations to open the southern road. By 1945 it could be possible for the air supply route to reach such magnitude that delivery by the Ledo and even the main Burma roads would be insignificant in proportion. He realized that there were great difficulties in the construction of airfields particularly in China. Myitkyina, Bhamo and Lashio could be used which would

increase the load. Air forces could develop a direct air offensive on Japan and ground forces could be thrown in to stiffen the Chinese troops required to safeguard the base area. Japanese opposition everywhere would be weakened and their morale lowered. Operations on these lines would be, he felt, more profitable than tedious land operations to open the main land route. As he visualized it, it would, by the methods he had outlined, be possible to continue attacks on the periphery of the wheel to achieve attrition, to attack the heart of Japan (the center of the wheel) by air, with devastating results on her industry and morale, while at the same time the westerly drive in the Pacific would cut the spokes of the wheel. Thus he believed the earliest collapse of Japan could be achieved, but a greater effort must be made to build up the air route. A study of the logistic possibilities should be made at once, after which the route must be built up, if necessary at the expense of ground operations.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt it important that in view of the immense difficulties of ground operations in the area concerned, that the most effective application of our air superiority should be considered and that we should capitalize on the effects of this superiority.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he was very strongly in agreement with General Marshall and had himself been thinking on the same lines. He had been impressed by the small number of aircraft (22) required to maintain three of Brigadier Wingate's groups. The air could be directed by these groups onto vital enemy points. Penetration by these methods with lightly armed forces assisted and supplied by the air, could, he felt, produce quicker results than the laborious advances of land forces, accompanied by the necessary building of road communications. With regard to the seizure by air action of potential air bases, he believed that while this, in certain cases, could be achieved, it must be remembered that troops and anti-aircraft weapons were essential in the initial stages and that the bases could not be held by air action alone until the enemy had been driven back to a certain distance from them.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he considered that further use could be made of the vast number of fighters and light bombers which would later be available for direct action against the Japanese all over Burma. They could attack railroads, bridges and troops and vehicles on the march.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL agreed that this had great possibilities but pointed out the risk of delaying the air operations out of China by building up too heavy a force of lighter aircraft for operations in Burma.

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the tactical conception of operations in Burma employing air reinforcement and air support and supply to long-range penetration groups should be studied as a matter of urgency.

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that to attack Japan it would be necessary to base forces far into China. The Chinese forces required to hold the essential bases would require considerable supplies which would effect a reduction in the air effort itself. In addition to the development to the maximum of the air route, the Ledo road, with pipelines for gasoline, and then a sea route into China, must be developed. Operations to clear Lower Burma by means of long-range penetration groups in conjunction with air support or operations against either the Kra Isthmus or Singapore could be undertaken. He would be interested to know which it was believed would most assist the United States thrust in the Pacific, particularly with regard to the synchronization of these operations with corresponding operations in the Islands.

ADMIRAL KING said that in view of the nature of the country he did not believe that an attack on Rangoon would divert many Japanese forces. Operations, however, against the vital center of Bangkok or into China to develop the air offensive would, he thought, both produce strong Japanese reactions. The Japanese, however, had no shortage of troops. Their major deficiencies were in aircraft and shipping. Shipping was their main bottleneck since this was required to support all their operations throughout a wide area, including their air operations. This being the case, he believed that the initial main effort of the air forces based in China should be against shipping and port facilities.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that he agreed with Admiral King's conception of the vital importance of striking at Japanese shipping from the air.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had had a most valuable discussion. He would like to have the subject further considered on the following day. It was important to get the background as to possibilities by the various methods which had been discussed and to decide on a long-range plan and to relate immediate operations to this general policy.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

## 6. IMMEDIATE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Reference : C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132.<sup>10</sup>

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum setting out the main points in the various signals which had recently

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 1063.

been exchanged between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and General Eisenhower.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the latest information seemed to show that the Germans had some 16 divisions in Italy. The majority of these appeared to be in the north and there was a tendency to move the headquarters of units in the south into the Naples area.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 132.

#### 7. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO SPAIN (C.C.S. 321<sup>11</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there had been no time to refer the British paper with regard to policy in relation to Spain to the Foreign Office but it set out the military considerations involved.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved this paper.

#### 8. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO TURKEY (C.C.S. 322<sup>12</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL said it seemed that the present scale of equipment to Turkey was too high and might be reduced.

SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed with this view. The Turks were not absorbing all the equipment now being provided. Their training and repair facilities were inadequate. He believed that supplies should be slowed down to a "trickle" and they should not be given more than they could usefully absorb and employ.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved this paper.

#### 9. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN RELATION TO RUSSIA

SIR ALAN BROOKE outlined the present position in Russia. In general, the Russians were in a stronger position than ever before. He believed that they had reserves available for further offenses in the autumn. Hungary was understood to be seeking to negotiate a separate peace and neither Rumania nor Finland were desirous of remaining in the war. The Germans would, he thought, be forced to hold all their existing divisions on the Russian front or even to reinforce them. This would facilitate our operations in Italy and OVERLORD. He did not believe that there was any chance of the Germans achieving a

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 1099.

<sup>12</sup> "Policy Towards Turkey", August 20, 1943; not printed as such. This paper was identical with paragraph 62 of C.C.S. 319/5 (*post*, p. 1131) except that (a) it began, "The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion" and (b) it ended "as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of C in C Middle East, can absorb."

negotiated peace with the Russians who had too much to wipe off the slate.

GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the forming of a "Free Germany" movement within Russia.<sup>13</sup> From reports he had received, it appeared that Russia was turning an increasingly hostile eye on the capitalistic world, of whom they were becoming increasingly contemptuous. Their recent "Second Front" announcement, no longer born of despair, was indicative of this attitude. He would be interested to know the British Chiefs of Staff's views on the possible results of the situation in Russia with regard to the deployment of Allied forces—for example, in the event of an overwhelming Russian success, would the Germans be likely to facilitate our entry into the country to repel the Russians?

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he had in the past often considered the danger of the Russians seizing the opportunity of the war to further their ideals of international communism. They might try to profit by the chaos and misery existing at the end of hostilities. He had, however, recently raised this point with Dr. Beneš, who had forecast the Russian order to international communist organizations to damp down their activities. Dr. Beneš' view had been that since Russia would be terribly weakened after the war, she would require a period of recovery, and to speed up this recovery would require a peaceful Europe in which she could take advantage of the markets for her exports.

There would, however, SIR ALAN BROOKE considered, be Russian demands for a part of Poland, at least part of the Baltic States, and possibly concessions in the Balkans. If she obtained these territories, she would be anxious to assist us in maintaining the peace of Europe.

With regard to Russia's air power, SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that in view of her superiority on the Eastern Front, the results achieved were disappointing. This, he believed, was largely due to lack of adequate training and handling.

In discussing the possibility of the Germans releasing forces from the Eastern Front for operations elsewhere by the shortening of their line, ADMIRAL KING said that he was doubtful whether the shortening of a line would in fact allow Germany to divert divisions elsewhere. The shortening of the line would enable the Russians to intensify their dispositions on this shorter front.

#### 10. SYNTHETIC HARBORS

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN reported that certain experts with regard to synthetic harbors were now on their way to Quebec to discuss the matter with the appropriate United States officers.

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<sup>13</sup> Concerning the Free Germany Committee, founded at Moscow on July 12, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 552, 571-574.

## HULL-EDEN MEETING, AUGUST 20, 1943, AFTERNOON, THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Secretary Hull  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Atherton

## UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

740.0011 EW/8-2045

*Department of State Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

## 1. "LIFEBELT"

MR. EDEN first spoke of the operation "LIFEBELT". He said that arrangements had now been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister<sup>2</sup> for entry into the Azores by British forces, exclusively, on the understanding that within two weeks after the start of the operation efforts would be made by the British to obtain the consent of the Portuguese for American forces to join them in the islands. He further said that such assurances as the Portuguese had asked had been given by the British Government with respect to the withdrawal of British forces from Portuguese territory after the war and also with respect to the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in all her territories. MR. EDEN suggested that assurances along similar lines would be asked by the Portuguese from the United States. Such assurances might be given if we felt like doing so at the time request was made for American forces to join the operation. Comment was made that this was a reversal of the previous position taken by the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had stated their objection to confining the operations exclusively to the British and had referred to the original decision to use force, if necessary, in order to make the Islands available for Allied operations.

## 2. CONDITIONS OF SURRENDER FOR ITALY

MR. EDEN brought up the question of the discussions which had been going on between the Prime Minister and the President as to the con-

<sup>1</sup>The source text bears no indication of the authorship of these minutes. Excerpts typed later in Washington, however, ascribe the authorship jointly to Hull and Dunn. (These excerpts are located in Department of State files under the file numbers appropriate to individual paragraphs of the minutes, viz., 741.53/8-2043, 740.00119 EW/8-2043, 740.0011 EW/8-2043, 868.00/8-2043, 711.00/8-2043, and 851.01/8-2043.) The source text has been stamped "Secret" and "Secret—Security", but it is probable that these classifications were applied in the Department of State long after the Conference. The excerpts mentioned above all bear the typed notation, "Strictly Confidential".

<sup>2</sup>See *ante*, pp. 887, 899.

ditions of surrender to be given the Italians in the event of tender of unconditional surrender being received by the Allied forces or governments. He said that it was the Prime Minister's view that the long, comprehensive document<sup>3</sup> was the form to be preferred.

THE SECRETARY said that he had gone over this document, which, as far as he was concerned, appeared to be satisfactory but that he understood the President's view to be that General Eisenhower was now empowered to present the military requirements<sup>4</sup> which would be imposed in the event of an Italian surrender, and that any further political, financial and economic terms which had not yet been finally agreed upon as between the two Governments would be handed to the Italians at a later time.

Both the SECRETARY OF STATE and MR. EDEN agreed that this matter would take further discussion with the Prime Minister and President before being entirely clarified.

### 3. RUSSIA AND CHINA

THE SECRETARY then stated there had been some considerable publicity giving the impression that Stalin had not been invited to the Quebec Conference and remarked that it appeared to be rather fruitless to continue the system of inviting Stalin to the conferences, and that some attempt should be made to arrive at a basis of talks with Stalin in order to come to grips, if possible, with Soviet general policy and cooperation, if possible, in the much broader picture of the maintenance of peace and world security. THE SECRETARY pointed out that everything seemed to go back to the Russian demands for territory, which was another way of looking for security. He made the point that security was world-wide, and if we could draw the Russians into a broad discussion, then the emphasis would not remain merely on the smaller countries on Russia's western border.

MR. EDEN agreed to the necessity of making a new approach to this problem, but stated frankly he had no suggestions to make and would welcome any ideas that were put forward to accomplish this purpose. He furthermore felt that this should be done without any loss of time.

THE SECRETARY said that he had given a great deal of thought to this problem and would come back to the subject again with Mr. Eden.

(He did not touch on the four-power declaration<sup>5</sup> which he had already drafted and placed in the hands of the President as he pre-

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 538.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565.

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 692.

ferred to await the President's move on that subject first. The first mention of the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration was made by the President at the dinner that same evening attended by the Prime Minister, the Secretary, and Mr. Eden at the Citadel.)

THE SECRETARY also spoke of the necessity for keeping China not only closely informed but cooperating in the general broad over-all picture as we went forward with the war. He said he realized that the Chinese could not be brought into all of the strategic conferences naturally, but he had had visits from Chinese representatives<sup>6</sup> who indicated that the Chinese were feeling rather badly about not being included in discussions pertaining to the war against Japan in which they were important factors, and they were convinced conversations on this subject would take place in Quebec.

#### 4. ROME AN OPEN CITY

MR. EDEN brought up the question of the Italian move to have Rome declared an open city.

THE SECRETARY brought Mr. Eden up to date on the American position which was disclosed in the correspondence between the Papal Delegate in Washington and the Department.<sup>7</sup> Upon receiving word from the Papal Delegate that the Italians had decided to have Rome declared an open city and asking for the conditions under which the Allies would be prepared to accept such a declaration, the Papal Delegate was informed that the matter was under consideration and that there was no reason why the Italian authorities could not proceed in any manner they desired to fulfill the requirements of such a declaration.

THE SECRETARY went on to say, however, that the American Government had made no commitment whatever on the subject, nor was any commitment contemplated as far as we were concerned.

MR. EDEN expressed his agreement and satisfaction with the position thus far taken, which left entire freedom of action to the two governments.

#### 5. DEPENDENT PEOPLES

THE SECRETARY brought up the subject of dependent peoples, but MR. EDEN did not appear to be ready to go forward with this subject.

#### 6. GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA

MR. EDEN then spoke of the message which had been sent by the

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<sup>6</sup> See Hull's memorandum of his conversation with Soong on August 18, 1943 (*ante*, p. 440), and Soong's communication to Hull of the same date (*ante*, p. 441).

<sup>7</sup> See *ante*, pp. 528, 572.

King of Greece to both governments,<sup>8</sup> requesting advice on their part as to the position he should take in the face of demands of certain Greek elements that he renounce any intention of coming to Greece until a plebiscite on the subject of the monarchy had been taken in that country.

MR. EDEN then went on to say they were having great difficulties with the Yugoslav Government as the young king had just accepted the resignation of the Yugoslav cabinet in connection with the refusal of the Croat member of the cabinet to agree to the transfer of the Yugoslav Government from London to Cairo. It was Mr. Eden's opinion, however, that the transfer would be accomplished within two or three weeks, and that it was much better for the Yugoslav Government to carry on its operations from Cairo where it was nearer the situation.

#### 7. SENATE COOPERATION IN APPROVAL OF WARTIME INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

MR. EDEN inquired as to the recent published stories that an agreement had been arrived at between the Senate and the State Department which would provide for approval by the Senate of international agreements entered into by the United States during the wartime period.

THE SECRETARY explained that the situation was not exactly as reported. He said that for some time now he had been carrying on conversations with members of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate and other important Senators, with a view to keeping them informed of the Government's plans with regard to certain interna-

<sup>8</sup> For the text of King George II's message to Churchill, see Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 536. King George's parallel message to Roosevelt, transmitted by the Ambassador to Greece (Kirk) in a telegram of August 18, 1943, was as follows:

"1. On July 4 I declared to my people that after their liberation they will be invited to determine by means of free elections the form of their government.

"2. I am now suddenly faced by the most curious situation, of the unexpected arrival of certain individuals from Greece, who are supposed to represent various guerrilla bands. In addition a representative of certain old political parties, who wish to press me to declare that I should only return after a plebiscite which would decide on form of the future régime.

"3. This request raises a new issue on which I feel you should be consulted before any decision is made. I am adverse to taking a final decision. For in my opinion what is now proposed, although primarily a Greek matter, may have repercussions outside Greece, which might well create precedence [*precedents*] or affect political developments in other countries and specially in the Balkans. This apparently local issue may assume a wider character. In these circumstances I would much appreciate your advice as to [the] policy, which would at this time best serve the cause of Greece and the United Nations.

"4. My present personal inclination is to continue the policy agreed with Prime Minister Churchill before I left England. I feel very strongly that I should return to Greece with my troops, even if I left my country after a short period, to work [for?] its national interests among our Allies, should subsequent developments make it politic for me to do so." (868.01/374)

Concerning King George's broadcast of July 4, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 135.

tional arrangements which became necessary in the carrying out of the war effort. He cited as an example the United Nations arrangement with respect to relief and rehabilitation (U.N.R.R.A.). He told how he had shown copies of the draft arrangement on this subject to the Senators, had explained to them how the legislative function in connection with providing of funds and approval of the arrangement was provided for in the text of the draft, and had offered to meet any reasonable suggestions with respect to changes of wording in order to make the position of the legislative branch of the government clear in all respects. He said that he had met with considerable success in these conversations up to the present, and he proposed to continue along those lines in as great a detail as was necessary in order to keep the Senate informed of the plans of the Executive in all these respects.

#### 8. FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

MR. EDEN brought up the subject of relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation. There was a somewhat lengthy review of the negotiations extending over a period of two years or more, in which the Secretary made the point that at no time had the policy of the American Government not been fully agreed in, by telegrams from the Prime Minister to the President, which Mr. Eden admitted.

The discussion ran along the lines of the British taking the position that de Gaulle was their only friend in 1940, the Secretary raising as against this attitude the objectives and actions of the United States Government, including the prevention of the French Fleet and the French North African bases from falling into German hands, Admiral Leahy's work in keeping up the spirit and courage of the French population in France, the U.S. naval support long before we were in the war, and the lease-lend aid. It then became evident that neither MR. EDEN nor SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN had seen the last State Department Formula<sup>9</sup> which had been transmitted to the President within a few days after receiving the last British Formula on the subject.<sup>10</sup> Copies of the State Department draft, which was almost word for word the same as the British last suggested formula, were then produced. After examining them, MR. EDEN said he felt that the Prime Minister could not accept a formula which did not contain the word, "recognition." There was some discussion on this point in order to bring out the American view that "recognition" was only given to a

<sup>9</sup> i.e., the draft which Hull had sent to Roosevelt on August 5, 1943, *ante*, p. 666.

<sup>10</sup> i.e., the draft contained in Churchill's telegram No. 400 to Roosevelt, August 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 662.

government or some form of government, whereas in this case it was understood that both the British and the U.S. Governments had no intention whatever of considering the French Committee as a government.

MR. EDEN made the suggestion at the end of this discussion that it might be necessary for the two Governments to adopt their own formulas and make their announcements in their own separate ways.

THE SECRETARY followed this by a remark that such a procedure, even if done at identically the same moment, would mean an obvious divergence of views.

MR. EDEN said that he realized any such policy would be so considered and regretted any such possibility.

THE SECRETARY replied that he very much regretted the consideration of such a divergence of views but that if the British could stand it, we could.

THE SECRETARY then made a convincing and reasoned marshalling of the situation as it affected the long-term view of the United States toward the whole French situation and the future of France itself.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> For a further exchange between Hull and Eden concerning politicians and statesmen, which apparently took place at this meeting, see Hull, p. 1233; Eden, p. 467.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 20, 1943,  
9:30 P. M., THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary Hull  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

According to a parenthetical explanation in the minutes of the Hull-Eden meeting of August 20, *ante*, p. 914, Roosevelt spoke at this dinner meeting of "the four-power arrangement in the form of a draft declaration" (see *ante*, p. 692). This subject is mentioned also by Eden, p. 487, who indicates that the discussion also touched on the proposed tripartite meeting with the Soviet Union. Eden states that Hull left about midnight. The Log, *ante*, p. 843, lists the persons present at dinner and states that Roosevelt and Churchill "held their usual lengthy discussions after dinner and both retired very late." No further record of those discussions has been found.

SATURDAY, AUGUST 21, 1943

ROOSEVELT MEETING WITH HIS ADVISERS, AUGUST 21, 1943,  
FORENOON, THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

President Roosevelt  
Mr. HarrimanMr. Hopkins  
Mr. Douglas*Editorial Note*

The only source found for this meeting is the following informal memorandum of August 21, 1943, by Harriman:

"The shipping situation was presented simply and clearly by Lew,<sup>1</sup> both as to troopers and cargo ships. We both emphasized the fact that cargo shipping, against all statements to the contrary, was not easing up but in fact was still the tight bottleneck.

"The news about the improvement in the sinkings figures has led to relaxation of people's worries and this had led to some extent to increased demands in different directions. However, the increased military requirements for existing and future operations more than absorbed the savings." (Harriman Papers)

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<sup>1</sup> Douglas.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943,  
EARLY AFTERNOON, THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Douglas

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Subaltern Mary Churchill  
Minister of War Transport Leathers*Editorial Note*

The list of persons who lunched with Roosevelt and Churchill is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 843. No record of the discussion has been found, and there is no evidence that matters of substance were discussed.

## HULL-EDEN MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943, 1 P.M.

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

Secretary Hull  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Atherton

## UNITED KINGDOM

Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

740.0011 EW/8-2143

*Department of State Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

MR. EDEN said that he had several minor points he wished to bring up and spoke of the following:

1. *Palestine Declaration*<sup>2</sup>

MR. EDEN said that some further information had been given to him by the British military authorities with regard to this, which he handed to the Secretary in a memorandum.<sup>3</sup>

2. *Civilian Administration in Liberated Areas*

There was some discussion of this matter, and Mr. Eden asked that a draft be prepared for further study with the view to a possible statement explaining the form in which this would be taken care of in liberated areas as opposed to military government in enemy conquered areas.<sup>4</sup>

3. *Surrender Conditions for Italy*

There was some discussion on this matter also and it was decided that the present form of instructions which had been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower<sup>5</sup> were satisfactory for the moment, but that a further study would be given to the document known as "the long formula" or comprehensive formula of conditions<sup>6</sup> for possible use at some future time.

4. *Dependent Peoples*

THE SECRETARY brought this question up again, but Mr. Eden did not appear to be ready to discuss it.

5. *The French National Committee of Liberation*

MR. EDEN asked whether there had been any fresh lights on the matter of recognition of the French National Committee, and proceeded to again set forth the British position. The general conversation which followed brought no new light on the situation.

When the Secretary had given a very reasoned résumé of the American position Mr. Eden went back to the necessity as he saw it for including the word "recognition" and even if this necessitated independent action by the two governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. The source text has been stamped "Secret" and "Secret—Security", but it is probable that these classifications were applied in the Department of State long after the Conference.

<sup>2</sup> For background on the declaration referred to, see *ante*, p. 674.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 1116.

<sup>4</sup> For a United States paper on this subject dated August 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 1046.

<sup>5</sup> For the "short" or "military" terms which had been sent to Eisenhower, see *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 539.

He did, however, adopt the suggestion of Mr. [*Sir Alexander*] Cadogan that of course the final decision would have to be made for the British by the Prime Minister.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 21, 1943,  
2: 30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold

UNITED KINGDOM

General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane

Brigadier Redman

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 113th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>2</sup>

2. PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
(C.C.S. 319/1<sup>3</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved C.C.S. 319/1, as amended in the course of the discussion. (Amended version subsequently published as C.C.S. 319/2.<sup>4</sup>)

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<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 114th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 113th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 905.

<sup>3</sup> "Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister", August 21, 1943; not printed. See fn. 4, below.

<sup>4</sup> "Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister"; not printed. The text of this report (which dealt with the war against Japan), as revised in the light of decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their 115th Meeting, August 23, 1943 (see *post*, p. 937), was not circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff until August 27, 1943, after their return to Washington. The subject matter covered in C.C.S. 319/2 and annex II thereto is contained also, and in very similar language, in paragraphs 20-33, 35-40, and 42-45 of C.C.S. 319/5, *post*, p. 1125. Annex I to C.C.S. 319/2 is identical with the appendix to C.C.S. 313, *post*, p. 981.

3. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND  
(C.C.S. 308,<sup>5</sup> 308/1,<sup>6</sup> 308/2<sup>7</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

- a. Approved C.C.S. 308, excluding paragraph 8.
- b. Approved the amendments to paragraphs 8 *a* and *b* set forth in C.C.S. 308/1.
- c. Approved the amendment to paragraph 8 *c* set forth in C.C.S. 308/2. (The amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 308/3.<sup>8</sup>)

4. SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST 1943-1944  
(C.C.S. 301,<sup>9</sup> 301/1,<sup>10</sup> 301/2<sup>11</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the new subparagraph eight (*i*) "Air Route into China", set forth by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 301/2.

5. SUPPLY ROUTES IN NORTHEAST INDIA  
(C.C.S. 325<sup>12</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations contained in the paper.

6. AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN  
(C.C.S. 323<sup>13</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that this paper should be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of an appropriate report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 15 September 1943.

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<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 968.

<sup>6</sup> "Southeast Asia Command", August 21, 1943; not printed. See fn. 2 to the enclosure to C.C.S. 308/3, *post*, p. 1001.

<sup>7</sup> "Southeast Asia Command", August 21, 1943; not printed. See fn. 3 to the enclosure to C.C.S. 308/3, *post*, p. 1002.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 1000.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 971.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 993.

<sup>12</sup> *Post*, p. 1003.

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 995.

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HULL-MACKENZIE KING MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943, ABOUT 4 P. M.

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
Secretary Hull

CANADA  
Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

According to Pickersgill, pp. 551-552, Hull called on Mackenzie King at the Citadel shortly after 4 o'clock and the two went for a drive, during which they discussed the question of recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. No official record of the discussion has been found.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943,  
LATE AFTERNOON, THE CITADEL**

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 843, Roosevelt had a long talk with Churchill before dinner. No record of the discussion has been found.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943, EVENING,  
THE CITADEL**

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill
Rear Admiral McIntire	

*Editorial Note*

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 843, the "household" and McIntire dined together. The "household" presumably included Mrs. Churchill and Subaltern Mary Churchill at least, and may have included other members of the Roosevelt and Churchill parties. No record of the discussion has been found.

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**HULL-EDEN MEETING, AUGUST 21, 1943, 9 P. M., THE CITADEL**

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Secretary Hull	Foreign Secretary Eden
Mr. Dunn	Sir Alexander Cadogan
Mr. Atherton	Mr. Jebb <sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jebb was present for only the last part of the meeting.

740.0011 EW/8-2143

*Department of State Minutes*<sup>2</sup>

SECRET

## 1. POLITICAL AND CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PLANNING FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT

MR. EDEN brought up the question of organizing an exchange of views and a coming to agreement between the two governments with respect to the manner of dealing with political considerations in connection with military operations to be undertaken in Allied countries on the continent of Europe now occupied by the Axis. He said that in the first place it would seem advisable to dissipate the impression which had arisen that the Allied military government system now in effect in Sicily would be carried over and put into effect in the liberated countries. He said that while the Allied military government in Sicily, and possibly in Italy and Germany, was perfectly appropriate for use in enemy countries, there was a general objection to the thought of imposing only military government on the populations of the liberated countries where we had constituted governments which had been recognized and which felt they should bear their share of maintenance of order in the civilian administration as soon as possible and in such areas as were not actually under military operations.

THE SECRETARY agreed with this view and said that he himself had given this matter considerable thought, arriving at these same conclusions.

MR. EDEN produced a memorandum<sup>3</sup> which had been drafted in the Foreign Office on this subject and which he said had been conveyed to the AT(E) Committee (Administration of Enemy Territories, Europe), and which he understood had been transmitted to the American authorities.

THE SECRETARY stated that he had no knowledge of this memorandum and, as far as he knew, it had never been received in the State Department.

It came out further that the United States was only represented on the AT(E) by a military observer assigned for that purpose from

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<sup>2</sup> The source text bears no indication of the authorship of these minutes. Excerpts typed later in Washington, however, ascribe the authorship jointly to Hull and Dunn (740.0011 EW/8-2143, 841.24/8-2143). The source text has been stamped "Secret" and "Secret—Security", but it is probable that these classifications were applied in the Department of State long after the Conference. The excerpts mentioned above all bear the typed notation, "Strictly Confidential".

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 513.

General Devers' staff, and that the Department had no participation in its work and functions.<sup>4</sup>

There was considerable discussion then upon the best and most efficient method of thrashing out questions having to do with the civilian aspects of military operations on the Continent, resolving itself into a question of whether the best method was to have agreement between the two governments reached in the Combined Chiefs of Staff or whether some special arrangement should be made for discussions of these matters to take place in London, possibly in connection with the COSSAC organization in London.

MR. EDEN stated that in view of the fact that the British Government was so near to the Continent and that the problems of dealing with the refugee governments and the civilian populations in their countries was of such direct and close interest to the British Government, he could not conceive of dealing with these matters by the roundabout method of cabling back and forth to Washington about matters relating to countries such as France, where they had such intimate political considerations.

He pointed out how well the North African situation had worked out through Macmillan and Murphy, whereupon it was pointed out, in reply, that the President had taken a definite position he did not favor any political representative going into HUSKY, which was a clear indication of the way he was thinking at the present time.

It was decided that this was a matter which would have to be discussed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, for eventual decision by the President and Prime Minister.

There was general agreement, however, as to the necessity of setting up some definite machinery for discussing and reaching agreement on these political and civilian aspects of future military operations on the Continent.

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. the following passage from Hull's telegram No. 5927 to the American Embassy at London, September 25, 1943, as repeated to the American Legation at Cairo in Greek Series No. 33, September 28: "In an *Aide-Mémoire* handed to the Department on August 4, 1943, by the British Embassy reference was made to the American 'representative on the Allied Territories (Balkans) Committee in Cairo.' It appeared that the British Foreign Office was not aware that the only American connected with this Committee was in fact an 'observer' from General Brereton's staff whose functions were strictly restricted to military supply questions. I discussed this and related questions with Mr. Eden at Quebec and we agreed generally as to the necessity of establishing some definite machinery for discussing and reaching agreement on political and economic aspects of future military operations on the continent." (870.01 A.M.G./1b) For text of the *aide-mémoire* of August 4, 1943, referred to above, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 137-141.

## 2. FOUR POWER DECLARATION

The subject of an approach to Russia, with a view to general conversations on subjects of mutual interest to the Soviet, British and U.S. Governments, then came up.

THE SECRETARY told Mr. Eden of the plan which had been discussed by him with the President for a Four Power Declaration to be entered into by Great Britain, U.S., the Soviet Government and China, and showed Mr. Eden a draft<sup>5</sup> which he had prepared for that purpose.

MR. EDEN, after reading the draft, immediately said he liked it and asked for a copy which the Secretary gave him.

MR. EDEN said, without hesitation, that he thought this proposal offered a good basis for an approach to the Soviet Government and, without giving it studied consideration, he thought it would be a good idea for the United States to transmit a copy to the Soviet Government, saying at the same time that a copy had been given to the British Government for its consideration. He said the method of presenting it to the Soviet Government could very well be given further thought while both the U.S. and British officials were still here at Quebec.

It was agreed that this matter would be brought up at the next meeting of the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden and the Secretary.<sup>6</sup>

3. CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON ON MONETARY STABILIZATION AND RELATED SUBJECTS, AND COMMERCIAL POLICY IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE VII OF THE U.S.-U.K. LEND-LEASE AGREEMENT<sup>7</sup>

THE SECRETARY then brought up the memorandum<sup>8</sup> handed to him by Lord Halifax, suggesting that high-ranking British officials come to Washington to discuss these subjects.

MR. EDEN said he knew very little about this subject.

THE SECRETARY said he particularly did not want to have these conversations formalized, that he preferred to have the financial subjects treated as a continuation of conversations which were already in course with the U.S. Treasury and that the other subjects he wished kept in the form of exchanges of views for the purpose of drawing up an

<sup>5</sup> *Ante*, p. 692.

<sup>6</sup> No record has been found of further discussion of this subject at Quebec, but Hull, p. 1239, states that before the end of the Quebec Conference Churchill had given his concurrence to the United States draft and it had been agreed that Hull should send it to the Soviet Government. Concerning the subsequent communication of a variant text of this draft to the Soviet Government in September 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 522, fn. 25, and 528.

<sup>7</sup> Signed February 23, 1942. For text, see Department of State, Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433.

<sup>8</sup> The reference is to an *aide-memoire* which Halifax had left with Hull on August 4, 1943. For the text of this paper and for the reply of the Department of State, dated August 17, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 1106-1107.

agenda of topics to be discussed rather than the [*with a*] view to coming to any agreements on the matters themselves.

THE SECRETARY continued that he did not think it was perhaps the best idea to give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous agreement on these matters before other governments were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions.

MR. EDEN said that he would see that the matter of the representatives coming to Washington was handled in a way satisfactory to the Secretary.

#### 4. DEPENDENT PEOPLES

THE SECRETARY then raised the subject of dependent peoples for the third time in the Quebec discussions.

MR. EDEN said to be perfectly frank he had to say that he did not very much like the American draft on this subject.<sup>9</sup> He said it was the word "independent" which troubled him. He had to think of the British Empire system, which was built on the basis of Dominion and Colonial status. He said that, according to the British thought Dominion status provided for self-government and as a matter of fact through the popular institutions now in force in the Dominions it was always possible for the Dominions, if they so desired, to take the further step of declaring their own independence, although none of them had done so nor had shown any desire to do so up to the present time.

He pointed out that under the British Empire system you had varying degrees of self-government in the units, mentioning the Dominion status, the status of Ireland, which was somewhat different but still within the Empire, and, running from those degrees of self-government down through the Colonial establishments which had in some cases, like Malta, complete self-government, to other more backward areas which, he confessed, were never likely to have their own government. He said that Australia and New Zealand—Dominions themselves—had Colonial possessions which they would be unwilling to remove from their supervisory jurisdiction.

THE SECRETARY said that the thought behind his dealing with this problem had been to give encouragement to the peoples in dependent areas, not with any view to their being given, tomorrow or next week,

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<sup>9</sup> The draft referred to, dated March 9, 1943, had been handed to Eden in Washington on March 29, 1943. At some point during the Quebec Conference Roosevelt also gave a copy to Churchill, and Eden showed Hull a copy of a British *aide-mémoire* on the subject which he had given to the American Ambassador at London (Winant) on May 26, 1943. See Woodward, p. 440, fn. 2. For the text of the United States draft of March 9, see *ante*, p. 717.

complete independence as a separate entity, but to offer them, at some time when they might have proved that they were capable of independence, the possibility of so conducting their political development that they might hope for this achievement at some future time. He said that often, when you were stating a principle, it was useful to give an example which clearly represented the end in view. He cited in this respect the attitude of the United States toward the Philippines, that independence had always been held out to them as a possibility if and when they were able to carry out the responsibilities that go with such status.

Mr. Eden's position was absolutely unchanged at the end of the discussion of this subject and it was perfectly clear that it was the word "independence" which he found could never have a satisfactory meaning which would cover what various governments might have in mind by this term.

##### 5. GERMANY AND CENTRAL EUROPE

THE SECRETARY asked Mr. Eden how his thoughts were running on the question of dealing with Germany after the war, that is, whether it was to be left as an entity or an attempt was to be made to dismember it.

MR. EDEN replied that while there were some in the British Government who felt that dismemberment of Germany should be imposed on that country, he himself, and he felt that the Cabinet in general were not in favor of imposing a dismemberment on Germany largely because of the impracticability of carrying it out.

He said that he entirely agreed that it would be well, if possible, to bring about a separation of the different parts of Germany if it could be done by a voluntary act of different sections of the country, but that any decision to impose such separate divisions would result in tremendous difficulties for the Allies in its maintenance.

THE SECRETARY said that as we went forward in discussions of this matter those who were studying the question in the State Department appeared to be arriving at this same view as to the difficulties of imposing or maintaining a separation of the different sections of Germany.<sup>10</sup>

It was brought out that American thought in this connection was fearful lest an imposed dismemberment of Germany might merely create a German national slogan for union; that Germany economi-

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<sup>10</sup> For the memorandum on this subject which had been presented to Hull in preparation for the Quebec Conference, see *ante*, p. 761.

cally must exist for the support of the people of Germany and for this such national systems as canals, railroads, post and telegraph must exist as units; but it was not impossible to consider an economic break-up of Germany whereby in her own interests the decentralization of the State would unconsciously develop. Such a means might be found in providing a Mediterranean port for Southern Germany so that those regions might look south for their access to water rather than be dependent on Northern Germany. Indeed, an area including Fiume and Trieste might be the proper solution.

Cadogan, as well as Eden, gave considerable approval of this, which was an indication that it was very much along the line of some of their post-war planning to bring about, by natural forces, a separation of the German people, and specifically use those ports as southern German access to water.

MR. EDEN went on to say that he, for one, had never been in favor of detaching Bavaria from Germany and setting it up as a separate State with Austria. His view was that it would be more advisable to restore, as a matter of fact, in general lines, the separate States of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire and form them as a Danubian group. He said that these were matters on which it would be most helpful if there were exchanges of views between the British and U.S. Governments as the thinking developed.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING MEETING,  
AUGUST 21, 1943, EVENING, THE CITADEL**

**PRESENT**

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 843, records that Eden and Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt and Churchill after dinner and "discussed affairs of state until a late hour." According to Pickersgill, pp. 553-554, Mackenzie King joined Roosevelt, Churchill, and Eden at about 10:45 p. m., and the discussion, which lasted until 2 a. m. on August 22, dealt with postwar world organization, the international position of China, and recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is

possible that the joint Roosevelt–King press release of August 22 on the establishment of the Joint War Aid Committee, United States–Canada, *post*, p. 1119, was approved at this time. No official record of the discussions at this meeting has been found.

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SUNDAY, AUGUST 22, 1943

ROOSEVELT–CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, AUGUST 22, 1943,  
ABOUT 1 P. M., THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Secretary of War Stimson  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Subaltern Mary Churchill  
Minister of Information Bracken  
Colonel Willis-O'Connor

*Editorial Note*

The names of persons present at this luncheon are taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 844, and from Stimson's Diary. The time is given in Stimson's Diary. No record of the discussion has been found other than the following passage which Stimson dictated for inclusion in the Diary:

“. . . At the Citadel I was told the President wished to see me for a few minutes before we assembled at lunch and I was shown into a little room where he was waiting alone. He told me that Churchill had voluntarily come to him [at Hyde Park; see *ante*, p. 830] and offered to accept Marshall for the OVERLORD operation. This the President said relieved him of the embarrassment of being obliged to ask for it. He also discussed with me Marshall's successor, mentioning Eisenhower. I told him I already thought of that as a very possible solution.

“After this brief talk which very greatly reassured me, we went into lunch at which there were present the President, Churchill, Mrs. Churchill, Subaltern Mary Churchill, Brendan Bracken, Harry Hopkins, and aides of the two generals. I sat between Mr. and Mrs. Churchill who were very cordial and friendly. Before we went in to luncheon, Churchill took me out on the parapet ostensibly to show me the view and then he told me that he had suggested Marshall to the President. He said he had done this in spite of the fact that he had previously promised the position to Brooke and that this would embarrass him somewhat, but he showed no evidence of retreating from his suggestion to the President. I was of course greatly cheered up to find that the whole matter was going so successfully.” (Stimson Papers)

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 22, 1943, 5:30 P. M.,<sup>1</sup>  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary Hull  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Dunn  
Mr. Atherton

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

Hull Papers

*Agenda Prepared by the British Delegation*

## AGENDA

1. Proposed joint U.S.-U.K. declaration about German crimes in Poland. Polish Government has made request for this to U.S. and ourselves.
2. Civil administration of liberated friendly territory in Europe. Difference between this and A.M.G.O.T. Need to make use of exiled governments.
3. Convoys to Russia. To inform the Americans of line we have taken.
4. Joint statement on Palestine. American proposal which we approved and want, and they have now abandoned. Can it be re-examined.
5. Encouragement of fraternization with American troops in U.K. Matter was raised by Secretary of State for War. I should like authority to talk to Gen. Marshall about it.
6. Policy towards Greece. The King's appeal to President and Prime Minister.
7. Recognition of French Committee of National Liberation. Our draft amended declaration.
8. United Nations' Four-power Declaration.
9. Italian Surrender Terms.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The time of this meeting is given as 5:30 in the Department of State minutes, *post*, p. 931. The Log, however, states (*ante*, p. 844): "The President returned to the Citadel at 5:45 p. m., at which time he had a conference with Secretary Hull and Mr. Eden until 7:30 p. m. This conference was resumed between 10:00 and 11:00 p. m." No separate minutes of a 10 p. m. meeting have been found, and in view of the reference to the lateness of the hour in the final paragraph of the Department of State minutes it is possible that those minutes cover the discussion which took place between 10 and 11 p. m.

<sup>2</sup> Items 8-9 are manuscript additions on the source text.

740.0011 EW/8-2243

*Department of State Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Meeting followed an agenda previously prepared by the British.<sup>2</sup>

## 1. POLISH STATEMENT

The first subject discussed was the text<sup>3</sup> of the statement to be issued by the two Governments with respect to the atrocities against Polish citizens in the Lublin area where the population was outstandingly Polish. The discussion hinged on a text prepared by the British and which was generally agreed to as appropriate for issuance on the subject at this time even though it was not expected to have any real effect on the situation.

## 2. LIBERATED AREAS

There was discussion of the text<sup>4</sup> of a statement which had been prepared by the United States with a view to clearing up misrepresentation and apprehension as to putting military government into effect in the friendly and Allied countries which will be liberated by the military operations undertaken on the Continent against Germany.

With very minor amendments<sup>5</sup> the draft text was adopted with the decision that it would first be conveyed to the Soviet Government<sup>6</sup> and China and the refugee governments<sup>7</sup> directly concerned, with eventual view to publication.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the timing of publication would be on or about September 15, which corresponded roughly with the

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<sup>1</sup> The source text bears no indication of the authorship of these minutes. A slightly amended text typed later in Washington, however, ascribes the authorship jointly to Hull and Dunn (740.0011 EW/8-2243). The words "Strictly Confidential" are a manuscript notation on the source text. This has also been stamped "Secret" and "Secret—Security", but it is probable that these classifications were applied in the Department of State long after the Conference.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> No text originating at Quebec has been found. For the text agreed to at Quebec as telegraphed to the American Embassy at Moscow on August 27, 1943, see *post*, p. 1120. The declaration approved at Quebec was made in response to a request by the Polish Government in exile at London, *ante*, p. 506.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 1046.

<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 1047, fn. 2.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 517-518.

<sup>7</sup> Concerning further discussion at this meeting of policy toward the governments in exile and the right of the peoples of the liberated countries to choose their own governments, see Hull, p. 1240.

date fixed for the opening of Parliament. This was generally agreed to.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. CONVOYS TO RUSSIA

This discussion turned on the text of a communication to the Soviet Government<sup>9</sup> with respect to the temporary suspension of convoys to Russia in view of other military operations, the convoys to be resumed at the end of September or early in October.

### 4. STATEMENT ON PALESTINE SITUATION

The question of a statement with respect to the Palestine situation during the period of the war<sup>10</sup> was discussed and views were exchanged as to the advisability of making any statement at this time and, if so, as to its form.

Both the President and Prime Minister agreed that this question should be held in abeyance and should be discussed further between the two Governments from month to month as the war situation developed, and any decision on the matter was left to the light of these further exchanges of views on the matter.

### 5. FRATERNIZATION BETWEEN U.S. AND BRITISH SOLDIERS IN THE BRITISH ISLES

It was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that all possible steps should be taken to promote fraternization between the U.S. and British forces in the British Isles and, with a view to accomplishing this end, Mr. Eden should speak to General Marshall, to General Devers and to Norman Davis as to methods for its accomplishment.

### 6. THE KING OF GREECE

This discussion turned on the subject of the message from the King of Greece recently received by the President<sup>11</sup> and the Prime Minister,<sup>12</sup> in which the King of Greece asked advice from the President and Prime Minister as to the action the King should take, in view of the request of certain Greek elements that His Majesty should not

<sup>8</sup> Concerning the decision to postpone issuance of this statement and the later decision not to issue it at all, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 517, fn. 14, and p. 524, fn. 27. A new British draft on the subject was subsequently referred to the European Advisory Commission. See *ibid.*, pp. 651-652, 738-739, 754.

<sup>9</sup> No draft of such a communication has been found, nor has any indication been found that a communication on this subject was sent to the Soviet Government during the First Quebec Conference. For Churchill's message to Stalin on this subject dated October 1, 1943, see Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 263-266; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 166-169.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ante*, p. 919.

<sup>11</sup> *Ante*, p. 915, fn. 8.

<sup>12</sup> See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 536.

return to Greece until after a plebiscite on the subject of the Monarchy had been held.

At the request of the Prime Minister, Mr. Eden read a report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office.<sup>13</sup>

At the further request of the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander Cadogan read a communication on the subject from General Smuts, who advocated, as a matter of fair play, that the King of Greece not be precluded from entering his own country and resuming his former position, subject, perhaps, to later decision by the people of Greece as to the future form of the Greek régime.<sup>14</sup>

There was some discussion then on the general subject of the attitude of the British and U.S. Governments toward the constituted governments of the refugee countries. It was decided, in general, that the two Governments should continue to support the governments and régimes as now recognized by them generally through the period up to the defeat of the enemy.

MR. HULL pointed out that this attitude was in line with the attitude adopted in the statement with respect to administration of liberated areas, decided upon under Subject 2 of the agenda above.

With specific reference to the situation of the Greek King it was agreed between the President and Prime Minister that the British Foreign Office should reply to the King's telegram, supporting his contention that he was prepared to return to Greece as soon as possible and submit the question of the Royal House to plebiscite.<sup>15</sup>

THE PRESIDENT said the United States Government would not take any different position.<sup>16</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER further stated, on his own initiative, that the British Government would instruct the British agents who were work-

<sup>13</sup> See *post*, p. 1044.

<sup>14</sup> See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 537.

<sup>15</sup> For the text of the British reply, which had been communicated in draft to Dunn on August 21, 1943, see *post*, p. 1046. For Roosevelt's reply, sent from Washington on September 6, 1943, see *post*, p. 1046, fn. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. the following memorandum for the files, dated August 30, 1943, by Wallace Murray:

"I asked Mr. Atherton today about the apparent agreement of the President, in the discussions at Quebec on August 22, 1943 at which he had been present, to the decision taken by the British and the King of Greece that the King should return to Greece with the invading Allied Armies. I said that our consistent view had been that the return of the King with the liberating forces would introduce a dangerously controversial political element at the very moment when military considerations should be paramount, and that we had therefore been surprised on seeing the record.

"Mr. Atherton said that the minutes of the meeting at the Citadel on August 22, 1943 at 5:30 p. m. were misleadingly worded. It was his clear understanding that the President's statement that 'the United States Government would not take any different position' had referred to the general attitude of the United States and British Governments toward 'the constituted governments of the refugee countries' and not to the specific question of the return of King George II to Greece." (740.0011 European War 1939/30942½)

ing with the guerrilla elements in Greece to refrain from encouraging those elements to put forward political claims as to the future form of government of Greece at this time.

#### 7. THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

After some discussion THE PRIME MINISTER stated that all the liberal elements in the world, including the governments in exile and the Soviet Government, were demanding an immediate decision granting full recognition to the French Committee of National Liberation.

THE PRESIDENT took the view that we had to think of the future of France itself, which he felt would be in no way advanced by turning over the whole control of the French people to the present group comprising the French Committee.

After a further rather lengthy discussion, the suggestion of the President was accepted that the President himself draft the form of statement which he thought should be made.

As it was getting late and it was not possible to make further advance on this subject until the two views were further reconciled it was decided to await the President's draft to which he said he would apply himself that evening.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For a draft of a statement by the United States Government, with an indication of changes made by Roosevelt, apparently during the evening of August 22, 1943, see *post*, p. 1106. For the final text of this statement, which incorporated those changes, see *post*, p. 1169.

Harriman's informal notes on the Quebec Conference contain the following information concerning a meeting with Hull at the Château Frontenac on August 22, 1943:

"Secretary Hull described, among other things, the French situation. I protested with all the vigor at my command the idea that Britain and America should take separate action.

"Had a long talk with James Dunn and Atherton on the same and similar subjects." (Harriman Papers)

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#### HARRIMAN-BRACKEN MEETING, AUGUST 22, 1943, EARLY EVENING, CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC

##### PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Minister of Information Bracken

##### *Editorial Note*

The only source found on this meeting is the following informal memorandum by Harriman:

"Before dinner sold Bracken a bill of goods for Steve Early—that the President and Prime Minister should have a joint Press conference, which Bracken had evidently been opposing with a view to sub-

stituting a cocktail party in which newspaper men could mingle with all the Chiefs of Staff." (Harriman Papers)

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 22, 1943, 8 P. M.,  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Subaltern Mary Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 844, records that Roosevelt dined with the Churchill family from 8 to 10 p. m. No record of the discussion has been found.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 22, 1943, 11 P.M.,  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 844, records that Roosevelt and Churchill conferred from 11 p. m. until midnight. No record of the discussion has been found. With reference to the meeting at 10 p. m. which preceded this conference, in which the Log states that Roosevelt, Hull, and Eden took part, see *ante*, p. 930, fn. 1.

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MONDAY, AUGUST 23, 1943

ROOSEVELT-ROBERTSON MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943, FORENOON,  
THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

CANADA  
Mr. Robertson

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 845, states that during the morning Roosevelt received Norman Robertson, the Canadian Under Secretary for External Affairs. No record of the discussion has been found.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-SOONG LUNCHEON MEETING, AUGUST 23,  
1943, 1:30 P. M., THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CHINA
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins	Prime Minister Churchill	Foreign Minister Soong

*Editorial Note*

The Log, *ante*, p. 845, records that Roosevelt lunched with Churchill, Soong, and Hopkins. No record of the discussion has been found. According to a memorandum by Hull dated September 2, 1943, Soong (*a*) thanked Hull on that date for mentioning to Roosevelt at Quebec the problem of "the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie" (see *ante*, p. 659) and (*b*) "said that he [Soong] followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory." See *post*, p. 1240. The occasion on which Soong discussed this question with Roosevelt has not been definitely identified, but the luncheon meeting of August 23, 1943, appears to have been the most likely opportunity for such a discussion.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 23, 1943,  
2:30 P. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Admiral Leahy	General Brooke
General Marshall	Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Admiral King	Air Chief Marshal Portal
General Arnold	Field Marshal Dill
Lieutenant General Somervell	Vice Admiral Mountbatten <sup>2</sup>
Vice Admiral Willson	Lieutenant General Ismay
Rear Admiral Cooke	General Riddell-Webster
Rear Admiral Badger	Admiral Noble
Major General Handy	Lieutenant General Macready
Major General Fairchild	Air Marshal Welsh
Brigadier General Kuter	Captain Lambe
Brigadier General Wedemeyer	Brigadier Porter
Commander Freseman	Air Commodore Elliot
Commander Long	Captain Tollemache

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane	Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal	Commander Coleridge

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 115th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 1-7 only.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to the understanding that, with regard to Item 2 of these conclusions, certain amendments made to C.C.S. 319/3<sup>3</sup> would necessitate consequential amendments in C.C.S. 319/2.<sup>4</sup>

2. DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
(C.C.S. 319/3)

Certain amendments were agreed to the draft report to the President and Prime Minister contained in C.C.S. 319/3.

Later in the meeting, certain additional amendments were put forward consequent to decisions taken on Items 4 and 5 below.

In the course of discussion, GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that there might be some method whereby the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command should have at least some control over the lines of communication through Assam.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it had originally been thought that it might be possible to put the Commander in Chief India, under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area, since India formed the base for the latter's operations. There were, however, constitutional difficulties which had prevented this plan being implemented.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he fully appreciated these constitutional difficulties, but had hoped that some system similar to the French "*zones des armées*" might be instituted.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that this point had also been considered and an Eastern Command, India, had been formed comprising the whole area covering the lines of communication through Assam. This command had been placed under the Commander of the Southeast Asia area.

GENERAL ARNOLD suggested that with regard to the examination of future operations in the India-Burma-China Theater, it might be well to insert a reference to a study and report on operations against the Andaman Islands, since the possession of these islands would be of great value to operations in this Theater.

<sup>3</sup> "Draft Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", August 22, 1943; not printed. For the final text of the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Roosevelt and Churchill, see C.C.S. 319/5, *post*, p. 1121.

<sup>4</sup> "Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister"; not printed. See *ante*, p. 920, fn. 4.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt that the Planning Staff would certainly consider the Andaman Islands in connection with certain of the operations which they had been instructed to examine.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft final report to the President and Prime Minister as amended in the course of discussion (subsequently circulated as C.C.S. 319/4<sup>5</sup>), and agreed to present it at the meeting to be held that evening at the Citadel.

### 3. JAPANESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

GENERAL MARSHALL read to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum<sup>6</sup> on the treatment of U.S. and Filipino prisoners by the Japanese. This memorandum was a report from a Major in the Air Corps of the U.S. Army who had recently escaped after one year in captivity. The Japanese treatment of the prisoners had been inhuman and barbaric in the extreme.

### 4. PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA (C.C.S. 312; <sup>7</sup> 312/1<sup>8</sup>)

It was pointed out that an unqualified approval of the proposals contained in C.C.S. 312 might result in a further decrease in the scale of our military operations in Northern Burma.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that the U.S. craft sent to India for the pipeline could be used for other more urgent purposes if the Supreme Commander so desired.

After a full discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved, subject to prior requirements of military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam to facilitate air operations in China and to ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

### 5. OPERATIONS FROM INDIA (C.C.S. 327<sup>9</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE pointed out that there were three possible courses open to us in North Burma in the dry season of 1943-44, and that it seemed clear that the existing capacity of the lines of communication would not allow of the full accomplishment of more than one of these.

<sup>5</sup> "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", August 23, 1943; not printed as such. The content of this paper can be reconstructed, however, from the footnotes to C.C.S. 319/5, *post*, p. 1121.

<sup>6</sup> Not identified.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 973.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 1003.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 1005.

GENERAL SOMERVELL pointed out that operations in North Burma would not start until mid-February. He said that he believed the movement of supplies into the area should be based on the most optimistic forecast of the capacity of the lines of communication.

After a full discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

*a.* That the main effort should be put into offensive operations, with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.

*b.* That priorities cannot be rigid and that therefore the Supreme Commander should be instructed that in formulating his proposals he should regard the decision in *a* above as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication.

#### 6. MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS" (C.C.S. 246/1<sup>10</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that the "*Queens*" should revert to running on a 21 day cycle.

#### 7. AMPHIBIANS FOR "OVERLORD" (C.C.S. 326<sup>11</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 326 until after the QUADRANT conference.

#### 8. EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS (C.C.S. 317/1<sup>12</sup>–317/2<sup>13</sup>–317/3<sup>14</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed:

*a.* That the supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (Cable W7177-CM-IN-BOSCO 21, 13 August 1943<sup>15</sup> be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September–31 December 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 1041.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 1042.

<sup>12</sup> "Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals", August 21, 1943; not printed. See fns. 9 and 11–13 to C.C.S. 317, *post*, pp. 1031–1032.

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 1049.

<sup>14</sup> *Post*, p. 1053.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed, but summarized in appendix A to C.C.S. 317, *post*, p. 1032.

b. That the rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference,<sup>16</sup> i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower's radio (W7177) of 13 August 1943.

9. OPERATION "RANKIN"  
(C.C.S. 320<sup>17</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that the Allied forces employed were too large and that it was hoped that fewer forces could be used for occupation purposes. An insufficient emphasis had been laid on the value of air power to quell the population.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed with this view. They suggested that the plan should be approved in principle and kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE drew attention to the recommendation, contained in Paragraph 20*b*, that the provision in the United Kingdom of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group was of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

a. Approved in principle the digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN contained in C.C.S. 320, but directed that this plan be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises of air superiority and the number of troops necessary to insure the success of this operation.

b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff would give early consideration to the appointment of a Commanding General, Staff and Headquarters for the U.S. Army Group in the United Kingdom.

10. REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES  
(C.C.S. 324/1<sup>18</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the recommendations contained in Paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 324/1.

11. FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC  
(C.C.S. 222/2<sup>19</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to defer consideration of this paper.

<sup>16</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 823.

<sup>17</sup> *Post*, p. 1010.

<sup>18</sup> *Post*, p. 1049.

<sup>19</sup> *Post*, p. 1040.

12. MEETING WITH MAJOR GENERAL ROOKS AND MAJOR GENERAL  
WHITELEY

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to discuss operations in the Mediterranean with Major General Rooks and Major General Whiteley at their meeting the following day.

13. FUTURE MEETINGS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to meet at 1030<sup>20</sup> on Tuesday, 24 August.

<sup>20</sup> i.e., 10:30 a. m.

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ROOSEVELT-MOUNTBATTEN MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943, 5 P. M.,  
THE CITADEL

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt

UNITED KINGDOM  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten

*Editorial Note*

According to the Log, *ante*, p. 845, Roosevelt conferred with Mountbatten for half an hour beginning at 5 p. m. No record of the discussion has been found.

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MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, AUGUST 23, 1943, 5:30-7:30 P. M., THE CITADEL<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Hopkins  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Rear Admiral Brown

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill  
General Brooke  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Air Chief Marshal Portal  
Field Marshal Dill  
Vice Admiral Mountbatten  
Lieutenant General Ismay

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane

Brigadier Jacob

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<sup>1</sup> The time of adjournment is from the Log, *ante*, p. 845.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

At the request of the Prime Minister, BRIGADIER JACOB read C.C.S. 319/3 [319/4<sup>2</sup>], a draft of the Final Report from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister containing the conclusions of the QUADRANT Conferences.

There was no comment on Sections I, II, and III.

## 1. FACILITIES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS

With reference to Section IV, paragraph 1 *b*, THE PRIME MINISTER asked if any measures had been taken as yet to prepare a combined British-U.S. convoy including escorts and air support to move to the Azores about two weeks after the original British occupation on 8 October.

ADMIRAL KING said that arrangements would be made for such a convoy to leave the United States on or about 20 October.

## 2. EMERGENCY OPERATION TO ENTER THE CONTINENT

THE PRESIDENT asked if a study was being made regarding an emergency entrance of the Continent and indicated that he desired United Nations troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians.

GENERAL BROOKE replied that General Morgan's staff had prepared plans for such an entry<sup>3</sup> and that they were based on several contingencies. These include a weakening of German resistance, a withdrawal of the German forces from France, or a complete German collapse.

## 3. OPERATION "OVERLORD"

THE PRIME MINISTER stated that he wished it definitely understood that British acceptance of the planning for Operation OVERLORD included the proviso that the operation could only be carried out in the event that certain conditions regarding German strength were met. These included the number of German divisions to be in France and a definite superiority over the German fighter force at the time of the initial assault. Further, that if it developed that the German ground or air fighter strength proved to be greater than that upon which success of the plan was premised, the question as to whether or not the operations should be launched would be subject to review by the Combined

<sup>2</sup> The paper actually before Roosevelt and Churchill at this meeting was C.C.S. 319/4, "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", August 23, 1943. This paper is not printed as such, but it can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 319/5 and the footnotes thereto, *post*, p. 1121.

<sup>3</sup> See C.C.S. 320, *post*, p. 1010.

Chiefs of Staff. In this connection he suggested that the United Nations have a "second string to their bow" in the form of a prepared plan to undertake Operation JUPITER. He did not in any way wish to imply that he was not wholeheartedly in favor of OVERLORD, but, at the same time, he wished to emphasize that its launching was dependent upon certain conditions which would give it a reasonable chance for success.

It was decided that the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister should include a paragraph which would provide for continued planning for the launching of Operation JUPITER in the event that OVERLORD should have to be abandoned.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER also discussed the question of moving seven trained divisions from the Mediterranean to England. He agreed that at this time the decision to return the seven divisions to England was firm but that it was subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff if the strategic situation seemed to make such review advisable. He asked General Brooke if that was definitely understood.

GENERAL BROOKE said that at the present time it was planned that the seven trained divisions would return from the Mediterranean to England to participate in OVERLORD unless the situation forced the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reconsider this decision. This decision of course would be dependent upon the enemy situation at the time. It might be necessary to keep one or two of these trained divisions in the Mediterranean in order to create a more favorable situation for the success of OVERLORD or to avoid a setback in Italy.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if it becomes necessary to make an interchange of divisions between England and the Mediterranean, it might be done without prejudice to the move of the seven divisions by exchanging others. For example, it might be necessary to send out a second Canadian division to complete a Canadian Corps and bring home a British division in its place. Meanwhile, he stated he had heard Brigadier MacLean give a presentation of the OVERLORD plan and that it seemed sound, but should be strengthened.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed to this and pointed out that actually there would be four and one-half divisions in the initial assault rather than a force of three divisions which had been suggested at the last conference with the President and the Prime Minister.<sup>5</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if this would include an attack on the inside of the Cotentin Peninsula.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the present plans would not provide for such an operation but that if more landing craft could be made

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<sup>4</sup> See C.C.S. 319/5, paragraph 13, *post*, p. 1124.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 896.

available there was a possibility that this landing would be included in the initial assault.

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed some surprise that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth,<sup>6</sup> had been designated as Naval Commander and he indicated that he had always thought of this officer as having administrative rather than outstanding tactical ability. He agreed with the choice of Air Commander in Chief.<sup>7</sup>

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that he felt that the Commander in Chief, Portsmouth was the logical person to be given this command, particularly at this time. During the preliminary phases much of the naval planning and operations had to be accomplished between adjoining naval commands in Great Britain and he was the logical person to coordinate it. He said that if later events indicated the desirability, there would be no difficulty in designating a new commander.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had thought of giving this position to Admiral Ramsay who had been in command of the British naval operations in the attack on Sicily under the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean. He would accept the present arrangement only if it were subject to review on the appointment of the Supreme Commander.

In discussing the transport of troops across the channel, the President recalled that in 1917 two light American passenger vessels, the *Harvard* and the *Yale*, had been sent to England and had been utilized very successfully in transporting troops across the channel. He suggested that the world should be combed to see if vessels of this type could not be made available and thus increase the troop lift from England to France.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States had been pretty well explored in this connection but he would see what else could be done.<sup>8</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated the possibility of asking Canada to help out in this respect.

#### 4. OPERATIONS IN ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRANCE

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there had recently been rumors that the Germans were planning to defend the Ravenna-Genoa Line in Italy, which is about 50 or 60 miles north of the Ancona-Pisa Line. He thought that our forces should proceed as far beyond their objective as possible with the troops allocated for the purpose.

<sup>6</sup> Admiral Sir Charles Little.

<sup>7</sup> Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory.

<sup>8</sup> In C.C.S. 330, August 26, 1943, "Light Passenger Vessels for Cross-Channel Operations" (not printed), the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that this matter be referred to the Combined Military Transportation Committee for investigation.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he felt the Germans must defend on the forward or southern slope of the Apennines, in which case they would be somewhat south of the Ravenna-Genoa Line.

ADMIRAL KING agreed with this and thought that the terrain dictated a German defense on the Leghorn-Ancona position.

THE PRIME MINISTER felt that the further north in Italy the United Nations were able to progress, the easier would become the supply of guerrillas who might be assembled in the Maritime Alps. In this connection he said he was glad to see that steps had already been taken to investigate the possibility of intensifying fifth column activities in Sardinia.<sup>9</sup> He thought that organizations such as the O.S.S. and the British S.O.E. should certainly enter Sardinia at this time. However, he suggested that if Italy capitulates, Sardinia would probably come into our hands without a struggle.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that there were conflicting reports in this regard. One was that the Germans would attempt to hold Sardinia and another was that they were assembling landing craft between Sardinia and Corsica for the purpose of effecting an evacuation.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that if an advance into Southern France appeared to be likely he thought that General Giraud and General de Gaulle should be brought into consultation by General Eisenhower and that French forces should be fully utilized.

THE PRESIDENT indicated that he felt guerrilla operations could be initiated in south central France as well as in the Maritime Alps.

#### 5. THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was glad to see that the Chiefs of Staff included provision that plans should be made for the defeat of Japan within 12 months after the collapse of Germany; this at least would be a target towards which we should work and it discouraged planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.

The paragraphs concerning operations in the Central Pacific were read and THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that these should result in bringing on a naval battle with the Japanese Fleet.

ADMIRAL KING said that was one of their main purposes but he did not feel that a large battle would develop until our forces had reached the Marianas.

#### 6. OPERATIONS IN THE INDIA-BURMA-CHINA THEATER

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked for an explanation of what was meant by the directive to the Commanding General of the Southeast Asia Command that he should give priority to operations in Northern

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<sup>9</sup> See *post*, p. 1069.

Burma but at the same time keep in mind the long-term necessities for improving the lines of communication.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that priority must be set between operations and the maintenance of the lines of communications. This directive to the Commanding General, Southeast Asia Command, had been put forward to emphasize the importance of the Burma operations and, at the same time, to caution him to take a long-range view of the necessity for building up his lines of communication, without which no communications would be possible.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out to the President that in giving priority to the operations in Northern Burma, the delivery of supplies into China might be reduced. He said he did not disagree with the decision but he had been charged with the responsibility for the delivery of supplies to China and he wished to point out that giving first priority to the reconquest of Northern Burma might make it impossible for him completely to fulfill his responsibility.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this would be largely a matter of judgment for the commander on the ground. He cited the necessity of sending some 2,000 men to Yunnan as part of General Wingate's force to cover the Chinese advance from Yunnan. This would be an instance in which the delivery of supplies to China would be temporarily but justifiably interfered with.

THE PRESIDENT said that he wished to establish some proviso which would prevent commanders on the supply lines in China confiscating supplies intended for China for use in their own theaters.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought that situation had been pretty well taken care of. However, he said that it was necessary for someone on the ground to have authority to make decisions regarding priorities. He said that if, for example, it was arbitrarily decided to use the entire capacity of the air transport route to supply General Chennault with gasoline, this very decision might jeopardize the success of the Burma operations which in themselves were essential to keeping China in the war.

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to studies that were directed in the report submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He said that as far as he was concerned he had no objection to a study being made regarding the capture of Singapore but he was very much opposed to such an operation being adopted for 1945 if action in 1944 was thereby curtailed.

He would personally be quite unable to agree to an operation for the capture of Akyab and Ramree as the main amphibious operation for the Indian Ocean in 1944. At the TRIDENT Conference, the capture of Akyab had been spoken of as a preliminary to operations in Southern

Burma for the capture of Rangoon.<sup>10</sup> Rangoon had then been dropped out for 1943-44, but Akyab had been retained, mainly to please Chiang Kai-shek. Later developments showed that the capture of Akyab would be a dangerous, sterile and costly operation directed against a point where the Japanese would be expecting attack. If we undertook it, we would hamstring operations in the Indian Ocean area to little purpose. He was quite prepared for a study of the operation to be made, and it might well prove right to carry it out as a sequel to some more profitable operation elsewhere; but he would not himself be able to subscribe to it as our main amphibious operation in the coming year.

THE PRESIDENT said General Wingate had informed him that the capture of Rangoon would not cut the Japanese line of communications since they were now largely supplied overland from French Indo China and Thailand.

#### 7. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE PRESIDENT asked if Thailand was included in the Chinese Theater.

ADMIRAL LEAHY replied that both French Indo China and Thailand had been included in the Chinese Theater. At the beginning of the discussion on the Southeast Asia Command, it had been intended that French Indo China should be included in it. However, any operations in this area were so far in the future that it was not necessary to include French Indo China in the new command at this time. The situation with regard to Thailand, however, was quite different. Operations to be undertaken by the Southeast Asia Command might well envisage a conquest of Thailand. Forces of the Southeast Asia Command were in a position to carry out such an operation if it appeared to be desirable, whereas, Chinese forces could do nothing as far as this area is concerned. He therefore felt that regardless of what the commitments to the Generalissimo might have been, Thailand should definitely be included in the area of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL KING indicated that a check was to be made to see if French Indo China and Thailand had not been removed from the Chinese Theater in a more recent definition of bounds.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was anxious to make a public announcement regarding the formation of the Southeast Asia Command and also to indicate who the commander was to be. He thought that such a public announcement would indicate that much of the discussions at the QUADRANT Conferences had been concerned with the war against Japan which would set forth a sufficient reason as to why

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<sup>10</sup> See *ante*, p. 369.

Russia had not been included in the deliberations. He asked General Ismay to make up a short statement for release to the press.

THE PRESIDENT said that the statement should make it clear that the Generalissimo still retains command of the Chinese Theater.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the announcement should be written in such a way as not to mention the use of Chinese troops in the Southeast Asia Command or give any indication of General Stilwell's place in the command setup. He said that General Stilwell is still the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff and that it would be offensive to the Generalissimo if he were not to be consulted before Stilwell was assigned his additional position. Moreover, he might expect that a Chinese deputy would be appointed. Actually, General Stilwell is being made Deputy Supreme Commander for the purpose of protecting Chinese interests and also to try and insure that Chinese forces would carry out their share of the plans devised by the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the mere announcement of the formation of the Southeast Asia Command would indicate General Stilwell's status at once. He thought that any announcement should be delayed until after the Generalissimo had been informed of the decisions.

MR. HOPKINS said that Dr. Soong had said that he had just had a telegram from the Generalissimo saying that the Supreme Allied Commander should be appointed forthwith.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that any difficulty could be overcome by making the announcement to the press extremely brief. He suggested, for example, that it might be as follows:

"It has been decided to establish a combined separate Southeast Asia Command. The Supreme Commander will be (here give the officer designated by name)."

He felt that the shorter the announcement the better it would be. General agreement was expressed with this proposal.

THE PRIME MINISTER then asked General Marshall if it would not be wise to place a paragraph in the Final Report to the President and Prime Minister providing for the designation of a British liaison officer as a member of General MacArthur's staff.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he did not feel it would be necessary to include such a statement in the paper, but that he would see that the suggestion was carried out immediately.

#### 8. SPAIN

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations regarding Spain had been submitted to the Foreign Office.

GENERAL ISMAY informed him that the suggestions had been sent to the Foreign Office but no comments had as yet been received.

THE PRIME MINISTER indicated then that before committing himself on these recommendations he would like to have the advice of his government. He said that personally he did not favor putting "economic screws" on Spain at this time. The situation was still too critical. For instance, there were the negotiations with Portugal which should be settled before a new attitude regarding Spain is adopted. He said, however, that in any event even though the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff were approved, the timing as to their execution would have to be determined by the governments.

#### 9. TURKEY

THE PRIME MINISTER expressed disagreement with the proposal to have the Commander in Chief of the Middle East empowered to determine what amount of supplies Turkey could absorb. He felt that this decision should be retained by the British Government. He said that the time has now come to ask Turkey for something in return for the aid which the United Nations have been giving her. He thought the Turks would be considerably relieved if they were only asked to carry out the recommendations submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff rather than being asked to give up their neutrality and enter the war.

It was decided to delete any reference to the Commander in Chief, Middle East's being allowed to determine the amount of supplies to be given Turkey.

#### 10. MEETING OF DR. SOONG WITH THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would ask Dr. Soong to meet with them on Tuesday, 24 August.

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#### HULL-EDEN MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943

#### PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
Secretary Hull

UNITED KINGDOM  
Foreign Secretary Eden

#### *Editorial Note*

Eden, p. 468, records that he and Hull had "a brief but useful discussion about Soviet frontiers" on August 23, and that he had given Hull a note (*post*, p. 1113) about "probable Russian demands". It is possible that this meeting was also the occasion on which a British paper on recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation which

is marked "7:30 p.m. August 23" (*post*, p. 1109) was handed to Hull. No official record of the discussion has been found.

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DUNN-CADOGAN MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Dunn

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Alexander Cadogan

*Editorial Note*

The only information found on this meeting, which was concerned with terms for the surrender of Italy, is that contained in the following memorandum from Dunn to Hull on this subject dated September 1, 1943:

"Some time ago the British Chiefs of Staff brought before the Combined Chiefs of Staff a paper numbered C.C.S. 258<sup>1</sup> which was a draft of conditions for surrender of Italy. This document came to be known thereafter as the long or comprehensive document. This paper was referred to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and was found by that Committee to be out of order as the President and Prime Minister Churchill at Casablanca had declared the intention of the two Governments to pursue the war against the Axis until an unconditional surrender of the enemy. This view was concurred in by the Department of State, and when referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President was also confirmed by him. The War Department then proceeded to draw up a document containing the conditions to be imposed upon Italy in the event of an unconditional surrender by that nation.<sup>2</sup> Although some discussion with regard to this latter document was entered into with the British members of the Civil Affairs Committee and the War Department draft was referred by the British members to London, no advance was ever made with regard to establishing this latter paper as an agreed document. In the meantime, indications suddenly appeared after the fall of Mussolini that the Italians might surrender at any time. Through cable correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President, military terms to be imposed upon Italy in the event of surrender were agreed to and were transmitted to General Eisenhower through the Combined Chiefs of Staff for the General's use in the event of Italy tendering surrender.<sup>3</sup> The General was also informed that political and economic conditions would be transmitted to him

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<sup>1</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943; not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> For the "short" or "military" terms sent to Eisenhower, see *ante*, pp. 519, 522.

later and that in imposing the military terms on any Italian representatives he should mention that other conditions would be communicated at a later date.<sup>4</sup>

"The British were persistent in their efforts to have the long comprehensive document accepted and agreed to by the American Government for use as a single document comprising all conditions, military and other than military, in one paper. This matter came before you when we arrived at Quebec in the first conversation you had with Mr. Eden there.<sup>5</sup> You will recall that you immediately mentioned the matter to the President and that the President took the position that there was no reason to change the arrangement which was in effect at that time, that is, that General Eisenhower had the military terms to be imposed upon the Italians in the event of a surrender and that other conditions could be sent him for transmission to the Italians after the military terms had been imposed. You did inform Mr. Eden, and I believe also the President, that as far as the content of the long paper was concerned that was entirely agreeable to the Department as far as concerned the matters contained therein which were other than military.

"Apparently Mr. Eden and Mr. Churchill, after bringing this matter up with the President, were satisfied that agreement had been reached between the President and Mr. Churchill that the long document should be substituted for the military terms which had been sent to General Eisenhower. Mr. [*Sir Alexander*] Cadogan informed me on Monday, August 23, the day before we left Quebec, that on the strength of the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, Mr. Eden had sent a telegram<sup>6</sup> to the British Ambassador in Lisbon<sup>7</sup> to substitute the long document for the military terms in any subsequent dealings with the Italians.<sup>8</sup>

"Mr. Cadogan asked me if we would clear this matter with the President and have the Chiefs of Staff send a similar telegram to General

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 565.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 912.

<sup>6</sup> See *post*, p. 1090.

<sup>7</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>8</sup> The "long" terms were accordingly given to Giacomo Zanussi at Lisbon on August 27, 1943. See Garland and Smyth, p. 461. Zanussi was then flown to Algiers, however, before he had communicated the "long" terms to the Italian Government. See *ibid.*, pp. 462-463.

On August 25, 1943, the British Government instructed the British Ambassador at Moscow (Clark Kerr) to communicate the "long" terms to Stalin. This instruction stated that the terms had been approved by Roosevelt and Churchill. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 355. On August 26 Leahy, who was then with Roosevelt at Hyde Park, telephoned the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Deane) in Washington and informed him that Roosevelt wished Hull to send the terms to the Soviet Government. Deane transmitted this instruction to Hull first by telephone and then in writing. (740.00119 EW/8-2643) Hull's telegram to the Ambassador at Moscow (Standley) forwarding this instruction was sent the evening of August 26. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 356. Clark Kerr handed the text of the "long" terms to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) on the evening of August 26 with a covering note which he said was being communicated to the Soviet Government on behalf of Roosevelt and Churchill. Standley was present, although he had not yet received Hull's telegram. See *ibid.*, pp. 356-357.

Eisenhower. I informed Mr. Cadogan that that was a matter not within the province of the Department of State, and if he wished to have such a matter cleared through the Chiefs of Staff it should be taken up through the medium of the British Chiefs of Staff. It was not until Thursday, August 26, that you were informed by General Deane that the President had directed the Chiefs of Staff to instruct General Eisenhower to substitute the long document for the previously agreed upon military terms.<sup>9</sup>

“Apparently, from the reports coming from Lisbon and from Algiers, there has been considerable confusion introduced into the dealings with the Italians by reason of the action taken by the British Government in instructing the British Ambassador at Lisbon to introduce the longer comprehensive document into the conversations.” (Hull Papers)

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<sup>9</sup> No written communication from Deane to Hull to this effect has been found. It is probable that Roosevelt's instruction to send the “long” terms to Eisenhower was transmitted to Deane by Leahy in the telephone call mentioned in fn. 8, above.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943,  
EVENING, THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary of the Navy **Knox**  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Early  
Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Mrs. Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Minister of Information Bracken

*Editorial Note*

The list of persons present at this dinner is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 845, except for Leahy, whose presence is noted in his Diary (Leahy Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 23, 1943, 10 P. M.,  
THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary Hull  
Mr. Dunn

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the list of participants are taken from the *Log*, *ante*, p. 845. No official record of the discussion has been found. Hull, p. 1241, indicates, however, that recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was probably a major subject of discussion. The text of the Communiqué, *post*, p. 1157, was probably also discussed. For Roosevelt's remarks to the press the following afternoon concerning discussion of the Communiqué during the early hours of the morning of August 24, see Rosenman, p. 361.

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 TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1943

 ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, AUGUST 24, 1943, FORENOON,  
 THE CITADEL

## PRESENT

## UNITED STATES

 President Roosevelt  
 Secretary Hull

## UNITED KINGDOM

 Prime Minister Churchill  
 Foreign Secretary Eden
*Editorial Note*

The only material found on this meeting is that printed in Hull, p. 1241. Recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation was the principal subject of discussion, and it was presumably at this meeting that the final decision was taken that the United States and British Governments would issue separate statements on this subject. For a draft of a British statement on this subject marked "10.00 a.m. meeting August 24", see *post*, p. 1110.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In a letter to Hull dated August 26, 1943, Atherton reported as follows on a conversation which he had had with Roosevelt on August 25 at Ottawa: "Yesterday when I saw the President, he referred to the Quebec conversations and said that Eden had been the noncooperative member and, with particular reference to the French situation, the President repeated what he had already told you, that he had offered to wager Eden a dinner that before many months had run he would have quite a different view of the French Committee of Liberation, but that Eden was unwilling to take the bet. The President said that he thought that but for Eden he could have made much further headway with the Prime Minister in this matter." (Hull Papers)

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, AUGUST 24, 1943,  
10:30 A. M., ROOM 2208 CHÂTEAU FRONTENAC<sup>1</sup>

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CHINA
Admiral Leahy	General Brooke	Foreign Minister Soong <sup>2</sup>
General Marshall	Admiral of the Fleet	Major General Chu <sup>2</sup>
Admiral King	Pound	
General Arnold	Air Chief Marshal Portal	
Lieutenant General	Field Marshal Dill	
Somervell	Vice Admiral	
Vice Admiral Willson	Mountbatten	
Rear Admiral Cooke	Lieutenant General	
Rear Admiral Badger	Ismay	
Major General Handy	General Riddell-Webster	
Major General Fairchild	Admiral Noble	
Major General Rooks <sup>3</sup>	Lieutenant General	
Brigadier General Kuter	Macready	
Brigadier General	Air Marshal Welsh	
Wedemeyer	Captain Lambe	
Commander Freseman	Brigadier McNair	
Commander Long	Air Commodore Elliot	
	Brigadier Macleod	
	Major General	
	Whiteley <sup>3</sup>	
	Air Commodore Foster	
	Captain Brownrigg	

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane	Brigadier Redman
Captain Royal	Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

## 1. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the conclusions of the 115th Meeting. The detailed record of the meeting was also accepted, subject to minor amendments.<sup>4</sup>

2. FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER  
(C.C.S. 319/4<sup>5</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a draft cover note for the final report and certain amendments arising out of the

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 116th Meeting.<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of item 5 only.<sup>3</sup> Present for the discussion of item 3 only.<sup>4</sup> The amendments referred to have been incorporated in the minutes of the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as printed *ante*, p. 937.<sup>5</sup> "Final Report to the President and Prime Minister", August 23, 1943. This paper is not printed as such, but its substance can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 319/5 and the footnotes thereto, *post*, p. 1121.

the Second QUADRANT Meeting between the President and Prime Minister.<sup>6</sup>

Later in the meeting SIR ALAN BROOKE informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Prime Minister considered that the names of the naval and air commanders for OVERLORD should not be mentioned in the final report.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the cover note and certain amendments to the final report (subsequently circulated as 319/5<sup>7</sup>).

### 3. MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS

#### *a. Directive to General Eisenhower*

(C.C.S. 328<sup>8</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners covering a draft directive to General Eisenhower based on the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT. In the course of discussion, it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be sent only those parts of the final report to the Prime Minister and President (C.C.S. 319/5), and of the paper relating available resources to plans (C.C.S. 329<sup>9</sup>), that dealt with the European Theater.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed that those extracts from the Final Report of the QUADRANT Conference (C.C.S. 319/5) and from the Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings (C.C.S. 329) dealing with the European Theater should be sent to General Eisenhower with the cover note contained as an enclosure to C.C.S. 328.

#### *b. Discussion with Generals Whiteley and Rooks*

GENERAL WHITELEY outlined the position with regard to forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean. His statement follows:

1. Forthcoming operations in Italy comprise two amphibious assaults—

*a.* Across the Straits of Messina (BAYTOWN);

*b.* Into Salerno Bay (AVALANCHE). These assaults will be under the command of General Alexander, and have as their object the securing of the Rome airfields and the clearing of the enemy from Southern Italy.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 942.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 1121.

<sup>8</sup> "Directive to General Eisenhower", August 24, 1943; not printed. This memorandum reported that the Combined Staff Planners had "come to the conclusion that General Eisenhower should be given the full report which has been submitted [to] and approved by the President and the Prime Minister."

<sup>9</sup> "Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-1944", August 24, 1943. This paper is not printed as such, but its substance can be reconstructed from C.C.S. 329/2 and the footnotes thereto, *post*, p. 1132.

2. The BAYTOWN assault is being carried out by the 13th Corps, with two divisions in the assault and one in reserve. The assaulting divisions are the 5th and the Canadian. The object of the BAYTOWN assault is to contain German divisions and to open the Straits of Messina for ships carrying cargoes to Naples.

3. The AVALANCHE assault is under the command of the 5th U.S. Army. The assault will be carried out by the 10th British Corps, comprising 46th, 56th and 7th Armored Divisions. The 6th U.S. Corps is the immediate follow-up, and later follow-ups may include a French Corps and the 5th British Corps. The immediate object of AVALANCHE is to secure the port of Naples.

4. We expect to find 16 German divisions in Italy. The German intention seems to be to deny us the Po Valley by holding a position Pisa-Rimini. It looks as if they intend to withdraw their divisions from Southern Italy to the North. The four divisions in the extreme south are, we think, withdrawing, covered by two German divisions in the Naples-Salerno area. Two more German divisions are in the Rome area disciplining the Italian Government.

5. THE BAYTOWN assault will take place between September 2-4. General Eisenhower was anxious to have a ten day gap between BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE so that some of the BAYTOWN landing craft could be used for AVALANCHE. The limiting factors for the AVALANCHE assault are that it cannot be launched before September 7; that, for reasons of moon, it cannot be launched between September 11 and 21. The AVALANCHE assault will probably, therefore, take place September 9-11.

6. It looks, therefore, as if the BAYTOWN assault may not meet very strong opposition. On the other hand, the Germans had large numbers of antiaircraft dual-purpose guns on the Straits, and some of these may still be in position. Even if we do not meet with much opposition, our progress is likely to be slowed down by the physical difficulties of the country and enemy demolitions. We hope, however, to pass six divisions through Calabria by 1st December.

7. There is, of necessity, some anxiety about the AVALANCHE operation. The assault may be opposed within a few hours by comparable German forces. If and when the Germans realize that our assault is not in very great strength they may move divisions to the sound of the guns and attack us with up to six divisions some time during September. On the other hand, communications in Italy are poor and it may not be easy for the Germans to alter their withdrawal plans and concentrate divisions against our AVALANCHE assault. However, General Eisenhower must naturally be anxious to protect the AVALANCHE assault with the maximum aircraft, and to build it up just as quickly

as is humanly possible. Algiers estimates that, apart from air-borne divisions, six divisions and tactical air force will be ashore in the Naples area by 1st December.

8. The strategical air force cannot be moved in until we have secured the Rome airfields. It is not possible to estimate at this stage how many divisions will be required to do this—probably of the order of 16. The maintenance commitment of the strategical air force is the equivalent of approximately four divisions so considerable development will be necessary before it can be operating at full strength. This will probably include the provision of pipelines.

9. For any advance north of the Pisa line, we will require ports north of Naples. Civitavecchia is a good port and can be used even if the German is in occupation of Corsica and Sardinia. We must, however, deal with those two islands before we can use Leghorn and Genoa. General Eisenhower's intention prior to the receipt of any instructions resulting from this conference, was to continue to hit the Germans whenever and wherever possible.

10. As regards operations against Southern France, the main limiting factor is likely to be landing craft. If we can only assault with approximately two divisions, we want to create diversions as much as possible from other directions. Naturally, therefore, we would like to be in possession of the Italian coast right up to the French frontier. Whether or not it will be possible to do an amphibious operation in Southern France if we are not appreciably further north than the Pisa line has not yet been examined.

11. We are faced with a very difficult movement and maintenance problem in the Mediterranean. For several months we will have to be manning ports in North Africa and in Italy. Moreover, the North African ports will be working at extreme pressure. They will not only have to accept U.S. and U.K. convoys, discharge these cargoes and reload them for Italian destinations, but also they will be loading divisions for Italy at top pressure. Moreover, owing to poor communications in North Africa, we cannot always move divisions to the most desirable ports of embarkation; we have to load them where they are situated.

12. On paper, General Eisenhower has a large number of divisions available. On the other hand, it is questionable whether we will be able to provide the personnel and equipment necessary to maintain these divisions on an operational scale. There is not only the problem of shipping equipment, but of dealing with it through our bases during this period of high pressure. Moreover, many of these divisions are of foreign nationalities and this leads to less elasticity and increased maintenance commitments.

13. Plans for Operation BACKBONE have been prepared. Until the end of the year there are likely to be some British divisions in North Africa which could be made available. After the New Year we will probably have to rely on the French to provide the insurance for BACKBONE. Our first step would have to be to move air forces from Italy to the Spanish Moroccan area to operate from fields already prepared or earmarked. We would also have to forestall the Germans in the Balearics with a view to interfering with their coastal traffic from Marseilles. If we could deny them this coastal traffic, we could interfere appreciably with their rate of build-up.

14. To sum up, I think that General Eisenhower's main concerns are:

*a.* The anxious period during and immediately after the AVALANCHE assault;

*b.* Port congestion and the difficulties of movement in the Mediterranean;

*c.* Whether we will be able to maintain sufficient divisions on an operational scale.

GENERAL ROOKS explained that the AVALANCHE attack would be under command of the 5th U.S. Army and would consist of two corps, one British and one American. The possibility of a German effort to sever the lines of communication through the Straits of Gibraltar was continually kept under review. Plans had been prepared by the Fifth Army, which had now been turned over to AFHQ, who would use such forces as were available to them. At present some two to four United States and British divisions were available for this purpose, though later it might be necessary to depend to some extent on French troops.

AIR COMMODORE FOSTER said that already all the tactical fighter and most of the tactical bomber force was situated in Sicily. Air cover for the assault in the Salerno area would be provided by fighters based initially in Sicily. The single-engined fighters would operate from six to eight strips laid to the eastward of Messina and with their extra tanks could operate for between 15 and 20 minutes over the assault. The twin-engined fighters based on Catania and in Western Sicily, having a greater range, could remain longer over the area. In addition, A-26 units were also based on Catania, and the Fleet air arm would provide air cover with Seafires from four escort and one Fleet carrier. It was estimated that it would be possible to maintain 30 fighters continuously over the assault during the hours of daylight. The tactical bomber force would be used on an arc designed to stop enemy reinforcements while the strategical bomber force would concentrate on communications and airdromes. Since the enemy had good

airdromes on the eastern coast of Italy opposite the assault area, it would not be possible to harry the enemy aircraft to the same extent as had been achieved in HUSKY. It was for this reason that the Commander in Chief had asked to retain the B-24's which had been used for the Ploëști raid.<sup>10</sup>

CAPTAIN BROWNRIGG explained the naval command arrangements. The AVALANCHE assault would all be under the command of Admiral Hewitt. Under him would be Admiral Hall, commanding the combat loaders carrying the 6th Corps; Admiral Conolly commanding the United States landing craft; and Commodore Oliver, the British landing craft. Admiral Hewitt would have a force of cruisers and destroyers operating under his orders and Admiral Vian would command the carrier force. Cover to the northward would be provided by a battleship force. There would be a further covering force operating to the south of the Toe in the unlikely event of the Italian ships in Taranto endeavoring to break out. The Naval Commander in Chief was not worried on the assault phase of the operation but realized the difficulties of safeguarding the long lines of sea communication and the various routes on which convoys would have to run. It would be impossible to divert convoys to avoid submarines and air attack and they would therefore have to fight their way through. For this reason there was, of course, a large demand for escort vessels.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with interest of the above statements.

#### 4. FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC (C.C.S. 222/3<sup>11</sup>)

SIR DUDLEY POUND explained that a Combined *ad hoc* committee had put forward the proposals contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 222/3 since the present arrangement of three UGS convoys per month, with a limit of 80 ships per convoy, did not provide for all the ships presenting themselves. The suggestion that four convoys per month should be established would require further investigation since the running of additional UGS convoys would necessitate consequential adjustments to other Atlantic convoys. With regard to paragraph 5 of the memorandum, he suggested the words "unless otherwise agreed" should be added after the words "following priority" in order to give a greater degree of flexibility.

ADMIRAL KING said that he fully appreciated that the cycle could not be changed to four convoys a month except after consultation and in relation to other convoys. He suggested that it should be agreed that the United States Navy should fix the earliest practicable date for a

<sup>10</sup> See *ante*, p. 584.

<sup>11</sup> *Post*, p. 1047.

program of four UGS convoys a month, "with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic."

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed,

a. That the U.S. Navy should fix the earliest practicable date when a program of four UGS convoys per month could be established, with due regard to the general setup of convoys in the Atlantic.

b. To delegate executive authority to the Combined Military Transportation Committee to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority unless otherwise agreed:

(1) U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander in Chief in Mediterranean.

(2) U.S. and British ships destined for India.

(3) U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.

(4) U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.

(5) Ships destined for Persian Gulf.

(6) Lend-Lease to Turkey.

(7) Miscellaneous.

#### 5. MEETING WITH DR. T. V. SOONG

SIR ALAN BROOKE said he understood that Dr. T. V. Soong had been informed of the progress of discussions at Quebec by the President and Prime Minister. He felt it would be very useful to have Dr. Soong's reactions to the points made by the President and Prime Minister.

DR. SOONG said that the President and Prime Minister had given him only a general outline and had suggested that he should obtain full information about actual plans from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was most happy to know that so much consideration had been given at QUADRANT to the war with Japan. To achieve greater security he proposed to send General Chu to the Generalissimo to inform him of the decisions taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, GENERAL SOMERVELL explained the layout of the proposed pipeline to China which would carry 18,000 tons of gasoline per month. It was hoped by 1945-46 to achieve a lift of 65,000 tons of supplies by road. Some small amounts could, he hoped, be got over the road about three months after the opening.

DR. SOONG then asked for details with regard to the Chinese share of proposed operations. Was he right in assuming that the original plan was being adhered to and that Chinese forces at Ramgarh would operate from Ledo in conjunction with an advance by the forces from Yunnan?

GENERAL MARSHALL confirmed that in general this was the case.

In reply to a question by Dr. Soong, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the size of the British forces to be employed had not yet been settled, since the full effect of the floods on the lines of communication through Assam was not yet known. These lines of communication had to carry not only supplies to be flown by air into China and those required for the forces to operate from Ledo and Imphal, but also the supplies required for the expansion of the air route and the building up of the lines of communications themselves.

DR. SOONG asked to be informed of the date on which it was proposed these operations should commence.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that it was now proposed that they should start later than originally envisaged, since it was believed better that they should carry on into the early part of the monsoon, thus assisting us to consolidate our position. The actual date was, however, not settled, nor was it possible to disclose it.

Referring to amphibian operations, DR. SOONG said that the Generalissimo had always understood that they would be carried out in Burma.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was not in a position to disclose the selected area for the amphibious assault, but it was to take place from India and would have a direct bearing on operations in Burma and Western China.

DR. SOONG pointed out that the Generalissimo feared the Japanese capacity to attack since they had the advantage of superior lines of communication which would be hard to combat.

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the position was improving since the Japanese no longer had the same power as hitherto, and attrition against air and shipping was being forced upon them by the ever increasing efforts of the United Nations. In Burma it was hoped that the employment of long-range penetration groups on the principle of Brigadier Wingate's columns, would seriously interfere with Japanese lines of communications.

DR. SOONG said that he felt that it would be of no value for him, as a civilian, to express his own views on the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the success of operations in Burma was largely dependent on the confident cooperation of the Chinese forces. With this, success could be expected, but unless this collaboration was forthcoming they could not be undertaken.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out the colossal effort required to build up and maintain communications with China. The pipeline was only a small part, though that in itself necessitated the shipping of much equipment and many technicians over a vast distance. The air line

was also an immense undertaking. Last week it had achieved a rate of 7,000 tons per month. It would soon achieve 10,000 tons a month and would increase from even that figure. To make this prodigious effort worthwhile, security of the lines of communication was essential.

In the Mediterranean, by a magnificent unity of effort, a great victory had been achieved. In the Far East the position was infinitely more difficult. Unity of effort and unity of action in Burma, in India and in China *must* be achieved. A Supreme Commander<sup>12</sup> had been proposed by the British and accepted delightedly by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This Commander in Chief was faced with an extremely difficult problem and his operations could never succeed unless he was assured of complete unity of action and of cooperation by China.

(At this point General Marshall left the meeting with Dr. Soong in order to inform him of a certain decision taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>13</sup>)

On his return GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the lines of his discussion with Dr. Soong. He had once more emphasized to him that he, Dr. Soong, must ensure unity of action from China on behalf of the united effort and that this unity of action must be accompanied by no holding back or reluctance. Only thus could success be achieved and without it all our efforts would be futile.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with warm approval of the statement made by General Marshall.

## 6. RELATION OF RESOURCES TO PLANS

(C.C.S. 329; <sup>14</sup> 329/1 <sup>15</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners on the implementation of assumed basic undertakings and specific operations for the conduct of the war, 1943–44, together with certain amendments, subsequently put forward by the Combined Staff Planners. These amendments, together with certain others put forward at the meeting, were discussed in detail.

<sup>12</sup> Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.

<sup>13</sup> Probably the selection of Mountbatten as Supreme Commander, South East Asia Command. Stimson's Diary for September 6, 1943, contains the following entry, which may pertain to Marshall's discussion with Soong at Quebec: "Marshall told me of how he had spoken with great frankness and plainness to T. V. Soong on the necessity of China being willing to take the steps necessary to put fighting ground Chinese forces into the struggle instead of confining themselves to lip service and letting someone else do that fighting." (Stimson Papers)

<sup>14</sup> See *ante*, p. 955, fn. 9.

<sup>15</sup> *Post*, p. 1153.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Agreed to certain amendments to the paper including that in 329/1 (amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 329/2<sup>16</sup>).

*b.* Approved the report by the Combined Staff Planners in the enclosure to the paper.

*c.* Instructed the Secretaries to prepare a suitable paragraph on the subject for insertion in the Final Report.<sup>17</sup>

## 7. SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them the terms of an announcement to be made with regard to the appointment of Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Command.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note with approval of the proposed announcement.

8. PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE  
(C.C.S. 310<sup>18</sup>)

SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were not in a position to take action at present on this paper. He understood that it was being discussed by the British Minister of Information<sup>19</sup> on a political level. He fully appreciated the importance of resolving the problem presented and would make every effort to insure that a solution was found as rapidly as possible.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he realized that the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be charged with the implementation of the policy was questionable. He felt, however, that an early solution was important, particularly from the United States Chiefs of Staff point of view, since they had a particular responsibility in the matter.

## THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Agreed as to the necessity from the military point of view of adequate machinery for the coordination of propaganda.

*b.* Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would ascertain the result of the recent negotiations by the British authorities concerned.

*c.* Agreed that further action in this matter should be taken up by the Joint Staff Mission as early as possible.

<sup>16</sup> *Post*, p. 1132.

<sup>17</sup> See C.C.S. 319/5, paragraph 69, *post*, p. 1132.

<sup>18</sup> *Post*, p. 1097.

<sup>19</sup> Brendan Bracken.

## 9. MESSAGE TO STALIN

GENERAL MARSHALL read out a draft message to Mr. Stalin, which he suggested might be put forward to the President and Prime Minister as the basis of the communication to the Soviet Government. Certain minor amendments to this draft were suggested.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the draft message to be put forward to the President and Prime Minister.<sup>20</sup>

## 10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would like to place on record their appreciation of the work done by the Planning Staffs, by General Riddell-Webster, General Somervell and Admiral Badger, who, by their industry and long hours of toil, had contributed much to the success of the conference.

ADMIRAL KING felt that special mention of the labors of the Secretariat should also be expressed.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed, on behalf of the United States Chiefs of Staff, his appreciation for the consideration which had been shown by the British Chiefs of Staff for the United States point of view. This had contributed largely to the success of the conference and the easy reconciliation of ideas. He believed that the conference had been of great value and that further conferences should be held at short intervals.

SIR ALAN BROOKE, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, expressed his gratitude for the patience and consideration shown by the United States Chiefs of Staff to the British points of view. He believed that each meeting was a step forward to a full appreciation by each of the other's point of view, and agreements were therefore more quickly reached. Now that we held the initiative, the tempo of the war was faster and meetings should, he believed, be held more frequently than hitherto.

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<sup>20</sup> For the text of the Roosevelt-Churchill message to Stalin, see *post*, p. 1159.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL-MACKENZIE KING PRESS CONFERENCE,  
AUGUST 24, 1943, 12: 15 P. M., TERRACE OF THE CITADEL

*Editorial Note*

For the text of the Communiqué of the First Quebec Conference which Roosevelt read during this press conference, see *post*, p. 1157. For the informal remarks which Mackenzie King, Churchill, and Roosevelt made to the press, see Rosenman, pp. 355-365.

Roosevelt-Churchill-Mackenzie King Luncheon Meeting,  
August 24, 1943, Early Afternoon, The Citadel

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM	CANADA
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins	Prime Minister Churchill Mrs. Churchill Subaltern Mary Churchill Foreign Secretary Eden	Prime Minister Mackenzie King

*Editorial Note*

The list of persons present is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 846. No record of the discussion has been found.

Harriman-Eden Conversation, August 24, 1943, Afternoon

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Harriman	Foreign Secretary Eden

*Editorial Note*

The only source found for this conversation is the following informal note by Harriman:

“Had a talk with Eden about Russia and the proposed discussion, and the agenda.”<sup>1</sup> (Harriman Papers)

<sup>1</sup>The reference is apparently to the proposed tripartite meeting at the Foreign Ministers level. For further background on this conference, which was convened at Moscow in October 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

Roosevelt-Churchill Dinner Meeting, August 24, 1943,  
Evening, The Citadel

## PRESENT

UNITED STATES	UNITED KINGDOM
President Roosevelt Mr. Hopkins Mr. Harriman Admiral Leahy Rear Admiral Brown Miss Tully	Prime Minister Churchill Lieutenant General Ismay Subaltern Mary Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The list of persons present is taken from the Log, *ante*, p. 846, except for Mary Churchill, whose presence is noted in an informal

memorandum by Harriman, which also contains the following information concerning the discussion at dinner :

“The President came into the room first after some of us already had arrived, saying ‘We are both mad.’ He referred to the Prime Minister’s and his annoyance over the most recent cable from ‘Uncle Jo’.<sup>1</sup> His anger took the form of making him gayer than usual both before and after dinner. The ‘PM’, however, arrived with a scowl and never really got out of his ill humor all evening—up to three A. M. when I left.<sup>2</sup>

“I asked the President if he recalled the sentence in a cable that went to Jo from the ‘PM’ in which he said ‘I am entirely unmoved by your statement.’<sup>3</sup> I said the Prime Minister had shown me this cable and asked for comments. My only comment had been asking him whether this sentence was entirely accurate. The President roared with laughter and much to my embarrassment proceeded to tell the story to the ‘PM’ when he came in. Needless to say it not only fell flat but bounced in my direction. With a scowl he said ‘impudence.’” (Harriman Papers)

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 1086.

<sup>2</sup> According to the Log, *ante*, p. 846, Roosevelt and his party had left Quebec for Ottawa at 11 p. m., August 24, 1943 and Churchill had accompanied him to the train.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to a message from Churchill to Stalin dated June 27, 1943. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 140.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, AUGUST 24, 1943,  
EVENING, THE CITADEL**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Foreign Secretary Eden  
Sir Alexander Cadogan

*Editorial Note*

The only source found concerning the conversation following dinner on August 24 is an informal memorandum by Harriman which contains the following information on the discussion :

“Eden and Cadogan came in after dinner and got a chance to read the cable.<sup>1</sup> As it was a bit garbled and badly translated and paraphrased I could not find that it was one about which to be irritated. In recent days one has been worried about the Russians playing a lone hand. This cable rather rudely suggested that he should have greater participation in certain directions. The Prime Minister and President were particularly annoyed because they had attempted to keep him fully informed. But one can’t be annoyed with Stalin for being aloof

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<sup>1</sup> Stalin’s telegram to Roosevelt and Churchill, *post*, p. 1086.

and then be annoyed with him because he rudely joins the party. Pug Ismay and Anthony<sup>2</sup> shared this view. I didn't have a chance to talk to Harry.<sup>3</sup>

"But the Prime Minister would not have any of it. After dinner when we were alone he said he foresaw 'bloody consequences in the future' (using 'bloody' in the literal sense). 'Stalin is an unnatural man. There will be grave troubles.'

"He ticked off Anthony when Anthony suggested it was not so bad, saying 'There is no need for you to attempt to smooth it over in the Foreign Office manner' (addressing Cadogan as well)." (Harriman Papers)

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<sup>2</sup> Eden.

<sup>3</sup> Hopkins.

## 9. CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

### A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 308

[QUEBEC,] 15 August 1943.

#### SOUTH EAST ASIA COMMAND

##### PART I

1. The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been proposed that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below.

##### *Command in India*

2. The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in G.H.Q. India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

##### *Command in Southeast Asia*

3. A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:

*a.* The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

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<sup>1</sup>Approved, except for paragraph 8, at the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1943. See *ante*, p. 921.

b. The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three services and of the Allied forces.

c. The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.

4. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast Asia Command will be as follows:

a. *Eastern Boundary*

From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin, southwards along the coast of Indo China, Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.

b. *Northern Frontier*

From the point where the frontier between China and Indo China reaches the Gulf of Tonkin westwards along the Chinese frontier to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along that border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the Southeast Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.

c. *Western Boundary*

Southward along meridian 60 degrees East to Albatross Island, thence Southeastward to exclude Rodriguez Island and thence due southward.

5. The Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, should be formed in the first instance at Delhi, since it will take over elements of the present General Headquarters, India. The Supreme Allied Commander will submit his recommendations as to the ultimate location of his Headquarters as soon as he has had time to study the problem.

*Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia*

6. Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This

authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

7. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

#### PART II

8. The above arrangements have been generally agreed between the President and Prime Minister, but the following points call for further discussion:

##### *a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander*

It has been proposed that the responsibilities of General Stilwell as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander should be defined as follows:

The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, in addition to his duties as such, will command, under the Supreme Allied Commander, all ground and air forces at present under the United States Commander in the Southeast Asia Theater, and such additional United States and Chinese forces as may in the future be made available, and will continue to be responsible for the operation of the air route to China and for the defense of its India terminal. Furthermore the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander will continue to have the same direct responsibilities to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as now lie with the United States Commander.

The British Chiefs of Staff are doubtful whether the above arrangements will work satisfactorily and would welcome discussion of them. They think it would be very difficult for General Stilwell to exercise *executive* command over a part of the land forces and a part of the operational air force.

##### *b. Command Relationship*

The British Chiefs of Staff consider that the relationship of the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, should follow as closely as possible, *mutatis mutandis*, the MacArthur model. Under this arrangement, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategic policy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and over such relating factors as are necessary for implementing this policy, including the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operational strategy, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed. It is understood that the United States Chiefs of

Staff consider that the more appropriate Command relationship would be for the Supreme Commander to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff following the Eisenhower model.

*c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with Comparable British Organizations*

It is proposed that all American agencies functioning in relation to the Southeast Asia Command, notably the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.), the Office of War Information (O.W.I.), the Federal Communication Board (F.C.B.), and the Office of Economic Warfare (O.E.W.), having been placed by the United States Chiefs of Staff under the control of the Deputy Supreme Commander, these agencies should operate in conformity with the requirements of the Supreme Commander. To this end, the activities of these agencies in the Southeast Asia Command Area, whether conducted from within the India Command or from within the Southeast Asia Command Area or from other locations in Asia, should be coordinated with those of similar British agencies, such as the Far Eastern Bureau (F.E.B.), the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S.), the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.), and the Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.)

The British Chiefs of Staff consider that this coordination can best be arranged by agreement between the Supreme Commander, the Commander in Chief, India, and the Deputy Supreme Commander, in consultation with the Viceroy. These authorities should also decide the degree and method of liaison which it is expedient to establish between the American and their corresponding British Agencies.

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J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

C.C.S. 301/1

#### SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

At their 110th Meeting, 17 August 1943,<sup>1</sup> the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that a paragraph be drafted by the Secretaries for inclusion in paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301.<sup>2</sup> A suggested paragraph follows:

(i) *Air Route into China*

Present plans provide for the concentration of available resources, as first priority within the Assam-Burma Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 878.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 428.

a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to:

1. Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
2. Maintaining increased American Air Forces in China; and
3. Maintaining the flow of air-borne supplies to China.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

J.C.S. Files

*Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 305/1

INTERIM REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO EXAMINE C.C.S.  
305<sup>2</sup>

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff we have examined the telegram from the Commander in Chief India contained in paper C.C.S. 305, and submit this interim report.

2. From the information at our disposal, which is confined to the telegrams received from the Commander in Chief India, there is a short-fall of 600 tons per day foreshadowed on the Assam line of communications out of the estimated capacity of 3,400 tons per day. This short-fall is expected to continue up to 1st March 1944.

3. In respect of priority for allotment of capacity on this line of communication we consider that the air transport service to China should retain its present overriding priority.

4. We have examined the detailed allocation of tonnage as planned by the Commander in Chief India on the basis of 3,400 tons per day, and agree that this allows no margin if the operations are to take place as planned.

5. We assess that a saving of approximately 500 tons per day might be made by calling a halt to one of the offensives as planned either at Ledo or at Imphal.

6. It would therefore appear from the figures available that one of these projects should be cancelled if the other is to be carried out.

7. We have, however, addressed a cable to the Commander in Chief India offering him certain assistance which should begin to have an effect in improving capacity by late November or December 1943.<sup>3</sup> This assistance, coupled with the postponement of the date of active

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 305/1), August 18, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 435, for the enclosure to C.C.S. 305. Concerning the appointment and membership of this *ad hoc* committee, see *ante*, p. 862.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

operations till 15th February, 1944, may permit of both projects being continued though with some loss of preparedness.

8. Having regard to the above factors, we do not consider that the abandonment of either project should be definitely decided upon. The importance of continuing work on the Ledo road is manifest, and with a lower target of road construction in the Imphal area, due to the later date of operations, the continuance of the Ledo road may well be possible with little delay.

9. We make this forecast with some reserve, and we cannot definitely state what will be practicable until we receive a reply from the Commander in Chief India, to the cable which we have dispatched.

J.C.S. Files

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*Report by the United States Joint Administrative Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 312

PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

References: *a.* C.C.S. 107th Meeting<sup>2</sup>

*b.* J.C.S. Memo Directive, 14 August 1943<sup>3</sup>

THE PROBLEM

1. Prepare a study on the construction of a pipeline from India to China via Calcutta, Ledo and Fort Hertz, to Kunming.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

*2. Description of Project:*

The project is divided into two parts which can be executed simultaneously:

*a.* The construction of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Dibrugarh (Project C, attached map<sup>4</sup>) to provide gasoline (1) for U.S. air transport operations in Assam, (2) for further transportation to Kunming, and (3) to supplement the supply of the Imphal Force. The Calcutta-Dibrugarh pipeline is 900 miles long and will have a capacity of 36,000 tons per month. The line is easily accessible from rail-

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 312), August 18, 1943: "The Enclosure, a report by the U.S. Joint Administrative Committee, is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend that it be referred to the Combined Administrative Committee or to a special *ad hoc* Committee for study and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff before being placed on the C.C.S. Agenda at QUADRANT. The Committee's report should assess the effect of the troop lift involved on other troop lift commitments."

For the action taken on this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 938.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 860.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The map is not reproduced.

roads for the entire length. Time required for construction is estimated at five months.

b. The construction of a four-inch pipeline from Dibrugarh via Fort Hertz to Kunming (Project A, attached map), to provide gasoline for air operations in China. This line is 1,000 miles long and will have a capacity of 18,000 tons per month. Approximately 400 miles of this line traverses territory accessible by road, the remainder is accessible only via foot trails or air. In order to speed construction by building several sections simultaneously, materials should be flown in to airfields along the route. Time required for construction is estimated at eight months.

3. *Military Necessity:*

a. U.S. air transport operations require 15,000 tons of gasoline per month in Assam.

b. The amount of aviation fuel available in the Kunming area will be a limiting factor which will restrict the size of the air force which can be supported from Chinese bases, for attacks against Japanese shipping, shore installations, naval forces and ground forces during the year 1944.

c. There are additional military requirements, other than gasoline, for the support of ground establishments and ground forces, which are essential to the securing of the airbase area in China. The delivery of gasoline to the Kunming area by pipeline will permit the devotion to these requirements of much of the capacity of the U.S. air transport facilities previously used for gasoline.

4. *Requirements for Construction:*

The requirements for construction are as follows:

900 miles six-inch pipeline and accessories . . . .	29,000 short tons
1,000 miles four-inch pipeline and accessories . .	18,000 short tons
Signal supplies . . . . .	400 short tons
4,000 troops (15 Petr Dist Cos & misc dets <sup>5</sup> ). . . .	2,600 short tons
	50,000 short tons

5. *Capacity To Meet Requirements:*

a. Cargo shipping is available for movement of equipment and supplies.

b. Equipment and supplies are available as required to implement this project.

c. Additional shipping for the transportation of 4,000 troops must be made available or an equal number of troops destined for the same theater must be deferred.

d. Troop units are available as required.

6. *Difficulties To Be Overcome:*

a. In order to execute the project in a minimum of time, it will be

<sup>5</sup> Petroleum Distribution Companies and miscellaneous detachments.

necessary to transport, over a period of several months, 15,000 tons of pipeline material by air to points along the pipeline east of Ledo.

b. It will be necessary to transport over the line of communications from Calcutta, over a period of several months, an aggregate of:

(1) 20,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material to Assam.

(2) 30,000 tons of six-inch material along the route between Calcutta and Assam.

c. It will be necessary to provide adequate protection to prevent enemy action from interrupting the construction and operation of the pipeline.

#### CONCLUSIONS

7. a. The project is feasible from an engineering point of view.

b. The project can be initiated at once and promises considerable and early aid to China.

c. The air delivery of 15,000 tons of four-inch pipeline material invested in the Assam-Kunming pipeline project over a period of several months, will be returned in terms of tons of aviation gasoline delivered in Kunming *in the first month* of pipeline operation.

d. The distribution along the Calcutta-Assam line of communications of 30,000 tons of six-inch pipeline material over a period of several months will increase the capacity of that line of communication by 36,000 tons per month.

e. Without adequate ground protection, it is within the capabilities of the Japanese to interrupt the Assam-Kunming section of the pipeline project.

#### RECOMMENDATION

8. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposed pipeline project.

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Staff Planners to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 313

#### MEMORANDUM

Subject: Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan (C.P.S. 83).

1. In their 90th Meeting on 20 May 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff "directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 313), August 18, 1943: "The Enclosure is a covering memorandum submitted by the Combined Staff Planners in forwarding C.P.S. 83 [not printed] for consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. C.P.S. 83 has been previously circulated and file copies are available in the offices of the Secretariat."

For the discussion of this memorandum at the 113th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 20, 1943, see *ante*, p. 906.

prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.”<sup>2</sup>

2. In their 102nd Meeting on 16 July 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the Combined Staff Planners to place an appreciation and plan for the war against Japan before the Combined Chiefs of Staff during QUADRANT.

3. Combined planning teams, working in London in June and in Washington in July, completed C.P.S. 83 on 8 August with the exception of certain Tables of Forces which are under preparation and should be completed prior to the end of QUADRANT. A summary of C.P.S. 83 is attached.

4. On the basis of the premises adopted, the Combined Staff Planners consider that the measures set forth as being necessary for the defeat of Japan, namely, the retention of China as an effective ally, the destruction of Japanese sea and air forces, the blockade of Japan, and the large scale bombing of the Japanese homeland as a preliminary to the possible invasion of Japan, are sound.

5. The general lines of advance—through the Central and Southwest Pacific, and possibly in the Northwest Pacific by United States’ forces; and through the Straits of Malacca and China Sea by British forces, with the development of a line of supplies to China through Burma, are concurred in.

6. The dates on which operations are to be undertaken, with the consequent prolonged duration, envisages, as set forth by the Planning Team, the least favorable conditions to be anticipated. The Planning Teams state that conditions less unfavorable will permit the expediting of the contemplated operations.

7. Even on this conditional basis the Combined Staff Planners consider that the plan contemplates a war in the Pacific so prolonged as to be unacceptable to the United Nations. They feel that the situation existing at this time is that the Japanese have won the war and that operations which do not contemplate the complete nullification of Japanese gains before 1947 will produce the serious hazard that the war against Japan will not, in fact, be won by the United Nations.

8. The United Nations’ over-all objective, as approved in C.C.S. 242/6<sup>3</sup> during the TRIDENT Conference, states:—

“The over-all objective of the United Nations is, in conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.”

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 126.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 364.

9. The Combined Staff Planners feel that the conduct of the war to bring about the defeat of Japan must be in consonance with the over-all objective, as well as with the over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war against Japan, which reads (C.C.S. 242/6, Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3) :—

“1. In cooperation with Russia and other allies to bring about by the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

“2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

“3. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.”

10. At the present time a great preponderance of the United Nations Forces is deployed against the Axis Powers in Europe. At the time of the defeat of Germany large forces will become available for redeployment against Japan. This redeployment will require a long period of time. During this period the will to prosecute the war to the defeat of Japan will suffer from the stultifying effect caused by long delays in the increase of offensive action in the Pacific and Far East.

11. The Combined Staff Planners feel, therefore, that, if we are to comply with the approved over-all objective and strategic concept and are to ensure the complete defeat of Japan, we must contemplate the start of the reorientation of forces from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of Germany, adjusting the tempo and scale of the reorientation to the progress of the war in Europe, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

12. The U.S. Planners feel that our plans and preparations should contemplate the defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany. This timing should itself now be established as a more or less controlling objective with which our efforts, measures, and courses of action should conform. If, in the future, the measures set forth in the proposed plan do not prospectively provide for this desired rate of progress of the war, other measures should be sought— as, for instance, inducing Russia to enter the war.

The British Planners, however, while fully conscious of the need to shorten the war against Japan and to take all possible measures so to shorten it, cannot accept such a target date. In their opinion such acceptance would necessitate an entirely new concept of operations

involving an assault on the Japanese homeland without the preparatory bombing from bases in China and/or Formosa which they believe will be required. This course, though worthy of consideration nearer the time, is insufficiently certain to provide a basis for long term planning.

13. The chief value of an over-all plan of this kind is the guidance of action now and in the immediate future. Operations now underway in the North, Central, South, and Southwest Pacific, as well as those Pacific operations set forth in C.C.S. 301,<sup>4</sup>—Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943–1944—are in conformity with the plan. Operations for the seizure of Burma are in conformity with the plan, but the date that they should be undertaken is in dispute.

14. The U.S. Planners consider that the Southwest Pacific operations, through New Guinea, and to the Northwest of New Guinea, provide for a line of advance which at this time must be considered concurrent and coordinated with the advance in the Central Pacific and in this respect do not agree with the plan that these operations should be considered subsidiary in character.

The British Planners however consider that operations in New Guinea will be slow and very expensive in resources. They therefore support the view set out in the summary that when we turn to our main Pacific effort, through the Marshalls and Carolines, operations in New Guinea should become subsidiary and should only be pursued in so far as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

15. The U.S. Planners assume that the operations in North Burma, as approved at the TRIDENT Conference<sup>5</sup>—advance from Ledo and Imphal, and increase of supplies by air to China, and the Akyab and Ramree operations—will be firmly carried out in 1943–1944. Beyond these operations the plan submitted by the British Members does not contemplate offensive operations from the West (other than further operations in North Burma) until March, 1945. In other words, during the period March, 1944, to March, 1945, the efforts from the West to “maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced” would be only those possible to the forces deployed in North Burma. The U.S. Planners feel that a more extensive contribution to the war effort is necessary along this line of advance during this period. They feel that the support rendered in 1944, even though smaller than could be afforded in 1945, will give better and more needed support to the Pacific Theater.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 369.

16. The U.S. Planners consider that Course B, the capture of South Burma, beginning in November, 1944, should be carried out.<sup>6</sup> This operation is regarded as necessary not only for the improved line of supplies to China through Rangoon, but as a preliminary to the further movement of the advance from the West through the Strait of Malacca. In this they are in disagreement with the British Planners who concur with Course C, the attack against Singapore to by-pass South Burma, and to be inaugurated in March, 1945.

17. The British Planners feel that the question of whether or not China remains in the war will not be decided by the choice between Course B (the prior capture of Burma) and Course C (the prior capture of Singapore) since China's darkest hours will be in the early half of 1944, before Germany is defeated. Thereafter, the obvious weight of the United Nations offensive against Japan in general and the prospect of an early opening of the sea route in particular will do more to sustain morale than the arrival of limited additional material through Burma, always provided supply by the air route continues at the maximum.

18. The British Planners feel strongly that the recapture of Southern Burma and Rangoon would be a small strategic gain for the expenditure of great effort. At best it would:—

*a.* Produce limited pressure on Japanese land and air forces for two dry seasons with little attrition during the intervening wet seasons.

*b.* Open the Burma Road. As this cannot in any case be in full operation before some time in 1946, whether we go for Rangoon or Singapore first, the results are long term. In the unlikely event of the Japanese in the meantime occupying Kunming, all our efforts in Burma would be nullified.

19. On the other hand, the British Planners feel that the recapture of Singapore before Rangoon is a full and correct application of sea and air power. It will electrify the Eastern world and have an immense psychological effect on the Japanese. It will threaten the Japanese communications to Thailand and so to Burma, enable direct attack to be brought to bear on the Dutch oilfields, and in fact flank and undermine the whole Japanese defense structure in Southeast Asia. It provides a base for the great naval and air forces available for deployment against Japan from the West. Above all, it provides for an advance complementary to that being undertaken by the U.S.A. from the East, and converging upon the same objectives, i.e., the capture of Hong Kong or Formosa and the control of the South China Sea. It thus accelerates the opening of a sea supply route to China. Operations against Singapore will, moreover, provoke intense Jap-

<sup>6</sup> For a description of Courses B and C referred to in paragraphs 16 and 17, see *post*, p. 985.

anese reaction to preserve the material gains of the Japanese Empire in the West as opposed to its strategical position and gains in the East, thereby relieving Japanese pressure on China and stretching Japanese ability to resist the Eastern advance possibly to the limit.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:—

*Recommendations By U.S. Planners*

(a) Approve the general objectives and the general lines of advance set forth in the plan, as a basis for planning and preparation.

(b) Disapprove, as unacceptable those aspects of the plan which contemplate a prolonged war lasting into 1947 or 1948.

(c) Direct that plans and preparations for the defeat of Japan shall have as their objective the accomplishment of this defeat not later than 12 months after the defeat of Germany.

(d) Approve, in principle, the inauguration of reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East Theaters from four to six months in advance of the prospective date of the defeat of Germany, the scope and timing of reorientation to be adjusted to the requirements of the European Theater, as determined by the Combined Chiefs of Staff from time to time.

(e) Recognize that the deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept defined in C.C.S. 242/6, Sections I and II.

(f) Re-affirm the TRIDENT decision that approved operations in North Burma and against Akyab and Ramree will be executed during the coming dry season.

*Recommendations By British Planners*

(a) Agreed.

(b) Agreed.

(c) Direct that intensified study of ways and means for shortening the war should be undertaken at every stage; and that theater commanders should be so instructed.

(d) Agreed.

(e) Agreed.

(f) The British Planners consider that the form of this decision must await the outcome of discussion on C.C.S. 301.

*Recommendations By U.S.  
Planners*

(g) Re-affirm the TRIDENT decision to undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

(h) Direct the maximum possible expansion of the air supply route into China.

(i) Approve the Pacific operations as accepted in the final version of C.C.S. 301.

(j) Make a decision at this time as to operations to be undertaken in the west (South Burma or toward Singapore) in 1944.

(k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by the U.S., Australia and New Zealand; operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S.

*Recommendations By British  
Planners*

(g) Agreed.

(h) Agreed.

(i) Agreed.

(j) Approve planning and preparations for the start of operations for the capture of Singapore with a target date of 1945, followed by the recapture or re-occupation of Southern Burma during the season 1945-46. This decision to be reviewed in the spring of 1944 in the light of the then existing German situation.

(k) Agree that the forces to carry out the operations from the East, including Southwest Pacific, will be provided by U.S. [;] operations to be carried out from the west to be with forces provided by Great Britain, except that special types not available to Great Britain will be added by the U.S. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter for discussion between all the Governments concerned.

## Appendix

*Summary of Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan*

SECRET

SUMMARY OF APPRECIATION AND OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF  
JAPAN

1. The following is a summary of C.P.S. 83 (Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan). We have based the outline plan that follows on our best evaluation of what may have to be undertaken.

2. We have assumed that Japanese resistance will be continuously stubborn, and have taken no credit for a decline in the morale of the Japanese people or fighting services. Nevertheless we do not believe that it will be necessary to carry out the whole program of operations in order to defeat them. Even if Japanese morale remains high, at some point the continuous process of weakening the enemy's forces and reducing his war potential will cause a rapid decline in his ability to fight and a consequent acceleration of our advance. Since it is impossible to forecast the stage of the operations at which this critical point will be reached, we have throughout endeavored to make the plan sufficiently flexible to permit of considerable acceleration at any stage.

#### BASIC CONCLUSIONS

3. We summarize below the basic conclusions of our appreciation:

4. To achieve the ultimate defeat of Japan we must destroy her capacity to resist and this may well involve the invasion of Japan.

5. The security of the Japanese position in the Pacific depends primarily on the Japanese Fleet and Air Forces. We must therefore destroy them as soon as we can.

6. Heavy and sustained air bombardment of Japan proper should cripple the Japanese war industry and destroy her ability to continue her main war effort. It might cause the surrender we demand but we cannot rely on this. In any case, air bombardment of this nature is probably an essential prelude to bring about the defeat of Japan.

7. To bring about the sustained air offensive against Japan we shall almost certainly require the use of China and/or Formosa as the bases for our long-range bombardment. These two areas will also go a long way towards meeting our requirements for mounting invasion forces. We shall require Chinese assistance in seizing and holding the area in China required for our air bases.

8. To secure and develop airfields on the mainland of China, it will be necessary to acquire ports in China. So far as we can see, Hong Kong will be the most suitable port to open initially.

9. We therefore require a sea route to China and/or Formosa and the interruption of the enemy's lines of communication thereto. This will entail control of the South Japan and South China Seas.

The best route of advance from the East lies through the Mandated Islands, and then either through the Celebes and Sulu Seas or north of Luzon.

The best route of advance from the West lies through the Straits of Malacca.

10. In reaching these conclusions we have been guided by certain

principles, which in turn should be applied throughout the execution of the plan :

*a.* We should attack Japan along as many lines of advance as are profitable, in order to make use of our superior forces and to extend the enemy defense.

*b.* Every possible means of taking short cuts to our objectives should be adopted. The superior forces, particularly Air Forces, available to us and the opportunities for surprise should enable large and bold steps to be taken without unacceptable risk.

*c.* Shortage of bases will initially restrict our possible lines of advance. We should therefore take the first opportunity of securing additional bases from which to deploy our superior strength.

*d.* Our strength, particularly in the air, should be concentrated against Japan's weaknesses, which lie in her shortage of aircraft, war-ships, shipping and oil.

Conversely extensive campaigns against Japanese land forces in difficult country, where we cannot use our own forces to the best advantage, should be avoided until they have been weakened by lack of supplies and support from the Japanese navy and air forces.

Whenever possible, we should, in fact, aim at leaving Japanese land forces in possession of outlying territory, in order that they may continue to be a liability to Japanese shipping, air and naval forces.

*e.* Wherever practicable, direct attacks on our objectives should be aided, and if possible preceded, by attack against Japanese communications leading to them. The extremely extended nature of their communications, together with the notorious inability of the Japanese to deal with the unexpected, are likely to render such methods very profitable.

*f.* Since shipping is unlikely to be a limiting factor after the defeat of Germany, our lines of advance need not necessarily be selected so as to take the shortest route from the U.S. or U.K. to our ultimate objective, but rather the one most easily established and protected.

*g.* We should devise every possible means of exploiting to the full, the vast technical and numerical air superiority which we shall enjoy over the Japanese after the defeat of Germany.

*h.* Whilst recognizing that every effort must be made to retain China in the war and to develop her bases and land forces, our plans should retain the necessary flexibility to enable our program against the Japanese to be continued if China should drop out of the war or prove less effective than we now hope.

*i.* Whilst being prepared to achieve our aims without Russian assistance, our plans should nevertheless retain the necessary flexibility to exploit the situation fully if Russia should join in the war at any stage.

*j.* We cannot forecast the date at which Germany will be defeated. To minimize the delay in turning the full weight of our offensive against Japan after the defeat of Germany, the bases from which our initial advances are to be launched should be developed as soon as possible and plans for reorganization and redeployment made without delay.

#### GENERAL CONCEPT OF THE WAR

11. Applying these principles to the basic conclusions set out above, the general concept of the war which emerges is as follows :

#### FIRST PHASE—ACTION PRIOR TO CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR FORMOSA

12. *In the East*, our main effort should be through the Mandated Islands. Until we are ready to launch this main effort, we should maintain increasing pressure on the Japanese by means of offensive operations in the Solomons–New Guinea area and in the Aleutians. When we turn to our main effort these latter operations should become subsidiary, and should only be undertaken insofar as they are necessary for the success of our main effort.

Having completed our advance through the Mandated Islands, we should then proceed either to the South Philippines or to the north of them. Our choice should be made in the light of whichever course will most quickly achieve our object of reaching the China Coast and/or capturing Formosa.

13. *In the West*, we should maintain China and build up our air forces there by stepping up the air supply route from Assam and by operations to clear Northern Burma, thus permitting the opening of a land route to China.

Meanwhile we should make preparations in India for the launching of the major campaigns to recapture the whole of Burma and to break into the Japanese perimeter from the west by the recapture of Singapore.

Once that has been accomplished we should make our way through the South China Sea towards the coast of China and Formosa.

#### COORDINATION

14. To integrate our advances from the West and the East, the timing of the various operations should, if possible, be so arranged that they afford one another the maximum amount of mutual assistance at each stage.

15. For our advance from the East, a very large fleet, but comparatively small land and shore-based air forces will be necessary, and therefore comparatively little shipping, until we have completed

our advance through the Mandates, when our ground and land-based air forces may well be of a very large order.

Our advance from the West, on the other hand, will require large land and air forces and much shipping, but probably a considerably smaller fleet than in the case of our advance from the East.

16. Our advance from the east should provide opportunities for bringing the Japanese fleet to action in favorable circumstances. It will enable us to threaten and strike at Japan herself, and, in conjunction with air forces from China, to strike at the focal point of the Japanese sea communications in the Yellow Sea-Formosa areas. This will greatly assist our advances from the west by forcing the Japanese fleet and air forces on to the defensive in their Home area and by enabling our forces in the east to strike at the Japanese communications leading to the objectives of our advance from the west.

17. In executing our advance from the west, and after completing the capture of North Burma (*Course A*), two courses of action remain open to us in the west.

*Course B*—(Recapture of South Burma followed by recapture of Singapore) probably offers the best chance of maintaining China in the war by insuring that the overland supply route is developed as early as possible and with the greatest reliability. On the other hand, the delay in the recapture of Singapore is likely to mean that our advance to open the sea route to China would have to be undertaken from the east alone, and would receive little aid from the west.

*Course C*—(Recapture of Singapore, followed by recapture of South Burma) would enable a much greater degree of coordination and mutual assistance to be achieved in the later stages of our two advances since we should expect to reach Singapore and advance therefrom a year earlier. It would stretch Japanese resources over a wide area and would enable the British Fleet to operate off the China coast. Our land and air forces could also be moved up the South China Sea along routes far removed from the main enemy naval strength in Japan.

On the other hand, we should run the risk of delaying the development of the overland routes to China, although there would be no appreciable delay *if all operations go according to plan*.

18. Irrespective of whether the advance from the east or the west approaches China first, it is unlikely that we shall be able to capture Shanghai direct. In conjunction with shore-based air support from China, and Chinese land forces, we might, however, be able to undertake a direct assault on Hong Kong, subsequently taking Formosa.

If the capture of Hong Kong is impracticable, we should endeavor to seize Formosa first, or, if this too is impracticable, Luzon.

If neither of these can be seized direct, we should assault Hainan and if possible one of the Ryukyus.

If the above are impracticable we should continue operations against the South Philippines and complete our control of the Celebes and Sulu Seas, subsequently carrying out our program to capture a port in China and/or Formosa.

SECOND PHASE—ACTION SUBSEQUENT TO THE CAPTURE OF A PORT IN CHINA AND/OR THE CAPTURE OF FORMOSA

19. This phase will involve overland and amphibious operations in China and direct air and naval action to weaken Japanese capacity to resist. It will probably culminate in the invasion of Japan.

20. If we are established in Hong Kong before Formosa has been captured, we shall be in a position to build up the necessary land forces in China, secure the air bases most accessible from Hong Kong, and start the bombing of Japan at long range.

If, on the other hand, we capture Formosa before Hong Kong, or find that the Chinese assistance on the mainland is disappointing, the bombing of Japan can start from Formosa.

21. It is possible that, with the assistance of sea-borne air forces, Japan may be sufficiently weakened to enable us to invade her when our bomber offensive has been developed from either Formosa, or the area most accessible from Hong Kong.

On the other hand, to bomb Japan effectively we may have to move further northwards from Hong Kong in order to use the area up to the line Wenchow-Nanchang-Changsha.

From the invasion point of view, we may possibly have to secure the Shanghai area, and if this is the case, we should be well placed from our positions in Hong Kong and Formosa to undertake such an advance both overland and coastwise.

22. If Chinese assistance proves to be effective, our main effort will probably be made overland. If, on the other hand, it is disappointing, our main effort would be concentrated in amphibious operations along the China coast as far northwards as necessary.

SUBSIDIARY AND ALTERNATIVE LINES OF ADVANCE

23. Meanwhile, subject to the requirements of our main advance, we should:

(i) undertake subsidiary operations along the Malay Barrier to bring increased pressure to bear on the Japanese;

(ii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of the Northern Kuriles and the reinforcement of Petropavlovsk, in order to secure a sea route to Russia in the event of her entering the war;

(iii) prepare plans and bases for the capture of Hokkaido should

the opportunity arise for assisting our bombing or undertaking our invasion of Japan from this direction, possibly in conjunction with Russian action from the Maritime Provinces, Sakhalin or Petropavlovsk.

OUTLINE PLAN

24. Based on our appreciation, we indicate below an outline plan for operations against Japan:—

*Action in the West*

*Action in the East*

*Serial 1—Up to November 1943*

Development of air routes to China.	Offensive operations against Solomons and New Guinea.
Holding operations in North Burma and China.	Offensive operations against the Aleutians.

*Serial 2—November 1943 to May 1944*

Offensive operations in Northern Burma and on Arakan coast.	Offensive operations against Gilberts and Marshalls.
Developing Northern routes leading to China.	Subsidiary operations in Solomons and New Guinea and air operations from the Aleutians.

*Serial 3—June 1944 to November 1944*

Holding operations in Burma.	Offensive operations against Carolines.
	Subsidiary operations in New Guinea area.

*Serial 4—November 1944 to May 1945*

<i>Course B</i> (Favored by U.S.)	<i>Course C</i> (Favored by British)	
Offensive operations in North Burma and capture of Rangoon.	Offensive operations in North Burma.	Offensive operations against the Pelews and possibly Marianas.
	Offensive operations against Northern Sumatra and Malaya.	Subsidiary operations in the New Guinea area.
		Commence offensive operations against South Philippines.*

\*If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass this objective.  
[Footnote in the source text.]

*Action in the West**Action in the East**Serial 5—June 1945 to November 1945*

Holding operations in Burma.	Holding operations in North Burma. Continue offensive operations in Malaya and against Japanese communications to Burma.	Continue offensive operations against the South Philippines.	—or Offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa or Ryukyus.
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*Serial 6—November 1945 to May 1946*

Complete offensive operations to clear Burma. Offensive operations against N. Sumatra and Malaya.	Offensive operations against North Burma and Rangoon, subsequently clearing the whole of Burma. Offensive operations against Camranh Bay.†	Continue offensive operations [against the] South Philippines.	—or Launch offensive operations against Hong Kong or Formosa (if not already captured).
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*Serial 7—During the remainder of 1946*

Complete capture of Malaya.	Launch offensive operations against Luzon, Formosa, Hong Kong, Hainan and/or Ryukyus from East and West.	—or Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.
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*Serial 8—From 1947 onwards*

Establish the strategic bombing force in China and/or Formosa.  
Bomb Japan.  
Invade Japan.

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†If conditions are favorable, it may prove possible to by-pass these objectives.  
[Footnote in the source text.]

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 314/1

## ALLOCATION OF LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT—AMERICAN PRODUCTION

It will be remembered that in April 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed (C.C.S. 105/4<sup>2</sup>) that future allocations of additional landing craft from U.S. production to the United Kingdom, as could be made available and as would be needed for specific employment and specifically projected operations, be accomplished by arrangement between the United States and British Naval Staffs, and formally processed through the Munitions Assignments Committee, Navy, subject to the approval of the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington.

2. No specific operations for the War against Germany, after OVERLORD, have yet been decided upon. For the War against Japan, it is hoped that decisions will shortly be taken on the scope and extent of British participation. In order to prepare the British Assault Fleet and to estimate British manning commitments for 1944/45, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to formulate their programme without waiting for specific operational decisions.

3. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree:

a. To modify the policy previously accepted.

b. That the British should now work out and submit requests for a share of U.S. production in 1944-45.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 314/1), August 18, 1943: "In order to save delay, the enclosure prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations [Vice Admiral Mountbatten], in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration."

For the discussion of this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 892.

<sup>2</sup> "Transportation of Landing Craft", April 9, 1943; not printed.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 315

## "HABBAKUKS"

1. We are impressed with the possibilities of constructing "floating

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 315), August 18, 1943: "In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations [Vice Admiral Mountbatten], in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration."

For the discussion of this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 890.

airfields" as a type of aircraft carrier, and we are of the opinion that research and design have now reached a stage when we should proceed with the production of certain types. A Technical Note is given in Annex I.<sup>2</sup>

2. Three types of vessel have been designed on paper by naval architects:

#### HABBAKUK I

3. A vessel made of wood was designed in the hope that it could be ready in 1944 and would not use much strategic material. This, we have learned is not the case, as there is a shortage of timber. Consequently in view of the limited requirement for this type, it has been decided not to proceed with it.

#### HABBAKUK II

4. This vessel could be made of steel but would require about 150,000 tons per vessel as well as a great deal of shipyard space and skilled labor. Alternatively, it could be made of pykrete (frozen pulp and water), but the feasibility of this depends on the completion of full-scale tests during the winter 1943-44. These experiments have been in progress in England and Canada since December 1942. The proposed design has a speed of about seven knots; is self-propelled; and has a length of 1,700-2,200 feet; the beam would be sufficient to operate and park medium bombers and transport aircraft and, if assisted take off could be employed, heavy bombers. If orders for the above full-scale tests are given immediately, and if these are successful, the first pykrete HABBAKUK might be operational by the middle of 1945, but there are a large number of constructional and operational problems to be overcome.

#### HABBAKUK III

5. This would be a smaller and faster type made of steel; about 70,000 tons per vessel; speed 12 knots; self-propelled; length 1,000-1,200 feet; beam sufficient to operate fighters, naval aircraft and light twin engine bombers. If a definite order is given in the near future, and if the material can be made available, the first could be operational by the spring of 1945. The construction of this type would, however, conflict with other ship construction, e.g. escort carriers.

6. Arrestor gear will be necessary on all types and the employment of assisted take-off methods would be of great value.

7. In the war against Japan, we see considerable possibilities in Types II and III, particularly the latter. They could not, of course, in any way fulfill the functions of an aircraft carrier operating with the fleet, but there are a number of other ways, details of which are described in Annex II<sup>2</sup> in which we think they would be of great value. Indeed, we feel that after a certain number of escort carriers have been constructed, it would probably be better to build a few of these HABBAKUKS rather than devote all our efforts to further escort carriers. (See paragraphs 40 and 41 of Annex II.)

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

*Recommendations*

8. We suggest that we should now take steps as follows:

- a. To construct at least two HABBAKUKS III, which is the more promising type for use both in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean;
- b. To continue experiments and construct during the coming winter sections of pykrete for HABBAKUK II's for experimental purposes. Subject to success in this, we should construct a number of HABBAKUK II's in pykrete during the following winter for use in the Pacific.

9. We cannot undertake construction in the United Kingdom because neither labor nor the material can be made available. If, therefore, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree in principle with our proposals, we suggest that they should invite the appropriate United States and Canadian authorities to set up a board forthwith to press on with this matter. We shall be glad to place British experts at the disposal of both.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

C.C.S. 314/2

## ALLOCATION OF LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT—AMERICAN PRODUCTION

The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposals presented by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 314/1.<sup>2</sup> They feel that the provision of landing craft still constitutes a bottleneck in the conduct of military operations and will continue to do so for some time. At present there is no likelihood of a reserve in landing craft being created.

The whole subject of the allocation of landing craft is being explored by the Combined Staff Planners. However, the United States Chiefs of Staff feel the landing craft must continue to be allocated as necessary to meet the needs of specific operations.

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of the subject of this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 892.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 989.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

C.C.S. 315/1

## "HABBAKUKS"

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the proposals submitted by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 315<sup>2</sup> and have reached the following conclusions:

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<sup>1</sup> Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 112th Meeting, August 19, 1943. See *ante*, p. 890.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 989.

a. By the expenditure of extraordinary effort and consequent stoppage of other essential war projects, the construction of HABBAKUK II and an erecting plant therefor is feasible and might be completed as early as the end of 1945.

b. Construction of HABBAKUK III could possibly be accomplished by the end of 1945. Claims for invulnerability of HABBAKUK III to hull damage may be somewhat justified, but they are outweighed by the operating advantages inherent in conventional carrier types by virtue of speed, maneuverability, and operating refinements.

c. Due to the relatively small value of the HABBAKUKS in increasing the effectiveness of aircraft operation, and in view of the existing aircraft carrier program, the diversion of manpower and critical materials involved in their construction is not warranted.

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 319

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

14. *Southeast Asia Command*

We have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the set-up of the Southeast Asia Command.<sup>3</sup>

On the question of Command relationship, we have agreed:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction over the strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command.

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 319), August 19, 1943: "The Enclosure is the report to the President and the Prime Minister which was made to them at the meeting at the Citadel on 19 August [see *ante*, p. 894]. It includes all of the amendments which they directed be made." The amendments referred to consisted of six small additions in paragraphs 4, 7, 10, and 15 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 319. The three additions to paragraph 15 are printed in italics below to identify the changes made by Roosevelt and Churchill in the report originally submitted to them.

<sup>2</sup> For the introductory paragraphs and the sections dealing with the war in Europe and the Mediterranean, omitted here, see *post*, p. 1037.

<sup>3</sup> C.C.S. 308, *ante*, p. 968.

We are giving further consideration to :

*c.* The precise duties of General Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander; and

*d.* Arrangements for the coordination of American agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with comparable British organizations.

15. *Operations in the Pacific and Far East*

*a.* We have given preliminary consideration to a memorandum by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff on specific operations in the Pacific and Far East 1943-44.<sup>4</sup>

*b.* We have had an account from Brigadier Wingate of the experiences of the long-range penetration groups which were employed in *Northern* Burma in the early part of this year. We think that there is much to be said for further developing this method of conducting operations *on a larger scale* against the Japanese, and are working out plans to give effect to this policy.

*c.* We have not yet considered specific operations in *Northern* Burma or the Arakan Coast for 1943-44, pending the receipt of further information about the logistic situation which has been created by the disastrous floods in India.

*d.* Meanwhile the Combined Staff Planners have completed in outline a long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.<sup>5</sup> *This has not yet been considered.* We propose to review specific operations in the Pacific and Far East for 1943-44 (See *a*, *b* and *c* above) in the light of the conclusions reached on this larger question.

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<sup>4</sup> C.C.S. 301, *ante*, p. 426.

<sup>5</sup> Summarized in the appendix to C.C.S. 313, *ante*, p. 981.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

C.C.S. 301/2

SPECIFIC OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST, 1943-44

References: *a.* C.C.S. 301<sup>1</sup>  
*b.* C.C.S. 301/1<sup>2</sup>

1. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe that the proposed subparagraph for inclusion in paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301, circulated as C.C.S. 301/1,

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 426.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 971.

does not express the importance of the maintenance and build-up of the air route into China, or the intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in regard thereto.

2. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend the inclusion of the following subparagraph in paragraph 8 of C.C.S. 301, in lieu of the subparagraph presented in C.C.S. 301/1:

(i) *Air Route into China*<sup>3</sup>

Present plans provide for first priority of resources available in the China-Burma-India Theater, on the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

1. Keeping China in the war.
2. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
3. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
4. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

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<sup>3</sup>This draft of subparagraph 8(i) was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 114th Meeting, August 21, 1943. See *ante*, p. 921.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

C.C.S. 313/1

APPRECIATION AND PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of paragraph 20 of C.C.S. 313<sup>1</sup> as amended below:

"20. To summarize, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take the following action:—

*a.* Approve the general objectives as a basis for planning and preparation.

*b.* Direct examination of lines of advance, including a study of the feasibility and desirability of operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Peninsula in the direction of Bangkok with the object of isolating Rangoon and facilitating the capture of Singapore.

[Subparagraphs *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, *h*, *i*, and *j* are identical with subparagraphs *b*, *c*, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, *h*, and *i*, respectively, as recommended by the United States Planners in C.C.S. 313, *ante*, pp. 980-981.]

*k.* Approve planning for the start of operations against Southern Burma and/or the Malaya Peninsula with a target date of 1944; these plans to be revised at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[Subparagraph *l* is identical with subparagraph *k* as recommended by the British Planners in C.C.S. 313, *ante*, p. 981.]"

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 975.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Army Air Force Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 323

## AIR PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

## THE PROBLEM

1. The provision of an appreciation producing an outline plan to direct the full aerial resources of the United Nations to bring about, in conjunction with other military and naval effort, the overwhelming defeat of Japan not later than 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.

## ASSUMPTIONS

2. It is assumed that:

a. The defeat of the Axis powers in Europe has been accomplished in the fall of 1944.

b. Russia and Japan maintain a state of neutrality.

c. China continues as an active and cooperative Ally, furnishing ground forces which, in conjunction with U.S. Tactical Air Forces, serve to secure the unoccupied portions of China.

d. The capacity of the air, road and pipeline facilities for "over the hump" transportation is to be first devoted to requirements of the 14th Air Force and the Chinese Army.

e. During the period in question, October 1944 to August 1945, inclusive, United Nations naval, air, amphibious and ground operations in the North, Central, South and Southwest Pacific, in Burma and the Bay of Bengal areas, are maintaining constant and increasing pressure against enemy forces. United Nations submarines, in increasing numbers, continue to harass and destroy enemy shipping.

f. North and North Central Burma are cleared of the enemy and occupied in 1944; and all of Burma in 1945.

## THE MISSION

3. To accomplish, by a combined aerial offensive, the destruction of the Japanese military, industrial and economic systems to such a degree that the nation's capacity for armed resistance is effectively eliminated, within 12 months after the defeat of Germany.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 323), August 20, 1943: "The Enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Army Air Force Planners, is referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the recommendation that it be referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and the submission of a report by 15 September 1943."

For the action taken on this paper at the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1943, see *ante*, p. 921.

## OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

4. *a.* To accelerate the destruction of selected systems of critical Japanese industry, the accomplishment of which will reduce the Japanese war effort to impotency.

*b.* Among the intermediate, nevertheless the most important objectives, is the neutralization of the Japanese Air Force, by combat, and through the destruction of aircraft factories, and the reduction of Japanese shipping and naval resources, to a degree which permits an occupation of Japan.

## DISCUSSION

5. To reduce Japanese capabilities of resistance to a point which, within 12 months after the defeat of Germany, will force the capitulation or permit the occupation of Japan, requires the launching of an effective bomber offensive against vital targets on the main islands not later than the fall of 1944. Only such an offensive can, at a sufficiently early date, reach and destroy the vital elements of Japan's transportation structure, and the nerve centers of her economic, military and political empire.

6. In view of the political, economic, military and transportation situation in the U.S.S.R., and more particularly the degree of industrial and economic development in Far Eastern Russia, the vulnerability of supply lines connecting it with Western Russia, and the consequent logistic difficulties which would probably be encountered in supporting air forces in substantial strength in the Maritime Provinces, it is unwise at this time to plan United Nations bomber offensive operations against Japan from bases in that area.

7. The islands of the Pacific within effective bombing range of the vital industrial areas of Japan, do not afford adequate bases for our air forces which will be available in 1944-45. Upon information now available, it appears that the only land area affording such bases with adequate capacity and dispersion, within 1,500 miles of the Japanese target area, immediately available for development, is on the Chinese mainland.

8. The beginning of the air offensive against Japan cannot await the opening of the ports of Hong Kong and Wenchow by the difficult and necessarily slow penetration of the enemy's far flung and well defended defensive positions to the south and east thereof. Naval advances from the south and east will, however, be greatly facilitated and expedited by preliminary air offensive operations against the industrial and transportation targets on the island of Honshu.

9. It is evident that if a bomber offensive is to begin in 1944 from bases in China, the movement of all troops, organizational equipment

and supplies in the base areas must initially be accomplished by air from India.

10. The transportation of such personnel, equipment and supplies may be accomplished by the employment of approximately 4,000 B-24 airplanes converted to cargo airplanes and tankers. The project will require a flow of approximately 596,000 tons per month through the port of Calcutta. (See Section 1, Enclosure "A"<sup>2</sup>). Calcutta port facilities are at present adequate to handle 960,000 tons per month. Construction of additional facilities in that port will however not be required immediately.

11. A most important factor in planning for the air attack on Japan from the west, is the necessity for providing adequate protection of the air bases against the violent Japanese reaction which is certain to follow the large-scale development of those bases, and initiation of the use thereof. The pressure being exerted by our operations against Japanese forces in outlying Pacific areas in Burma and perhaps Sumatra, will substantially contain those forces, and prevent Japan from greatly reinforcing her air forces now deployed in China. Nevertheless, Japan will not readily accept the risk of loss of her already important, and potentially rich, newly acquired empire to the south. It is believed, however, that Chinese forces, reasonably equipped and supplied, aided in leadership, supported by the U.S. 10th and 14th Air Forces, will be able to defend the air base areas. Chinese forces and U.S. Tactical Air Forces, essential to provide such defense, will be available. Logistic support for them is dealt with in a subsequent paragraph. The initiation of the bomber offensive, and even measures in preparation therefor, will tremendously stimulate Chinese morale and unify the Chinese people under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

12. A brief outline of the logistical implications of the proposed plan is contained in Enclosure "A."

13. B-29 heavy bomber aircraft possess a tactical radius of 1,500 miles with a bomb load of ten tons, and are the best suited aircraft for the bombing of Japan from available bases. B-29 tactical units shown in Section 2 of Enclosure "A" will be available for deployment in China for operations against Japan on the dates indicated.

14. Studies conducted within the U.S. Army Air Forces indicate that 28 B-29 groups, of 28 airplanes each, conducting five missions per month on a 50 percent operational basis, for a period of six months, or a total of 168 operating group months, can accomplish the degree of destruction required to accomplish the Over-all Objective, described in paragraph 4, above.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

15. Seventy-five percent of the selected strategic targets in Japan lie between Tokio and Nagasaki. Substantially, all of this objective area is within 1,500 miles of a region in unoccupied China, the center of which is Changsha, within an approximate 800 miles radius of Kunming (See Map, Appendix "A"<sup>3</sup>).

16. The area 400 miles north and south of Changsha, within this zone, is suitable for the development of VLR bomber airfields, and many old unimproved fields exist in the region. Operations of B-29 aircraft from this area would bring the majority of the selected strategic objectives within effective tactical radius.

17. From a source of supply in the Calcutta area, 200 heavy bomber aircraft of the B-24 type, stripped of armor, armament, and other equipment not essential to transport service, can support one B-29 group operating against Japan from bases in this area, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14.

18. Such B-29 type airplanes would transport gasoline, bombs and other required supplies directly from the port of Calcutta to Kunming, using the latter area as a staging center, before proceeding with a capacity load to the B-29 operating base zone.

#### 19. *Forces Required*

A minimum striking force of 100 B-29 airplanes is desirable to conduct effective strategic bombing operations against Japanese mainland objectives. The availability of ten B-29 groups in the base area will permit sustained operation by such striking forces. Ten B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by October, 1944.

20. 2,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, would be required to support such operations from Calcutta supply bases. This number of aircraft, so converted, could be made available in the Calcutta area by October, 1944.

21. Aircraft availability schedules shown in Section 2, Enclosure "A," indicate that a total of 20 B-29 groups will be available for deployment in China by May, 1945, and could be maintained at normal strength thereafter.

22. The same schedules indicate that the 4,000 B-24 type aircraft required for conversion to transport functions to maintain these 20 B-29 groups, can also be made available in the Calcutta area by May, 1945.

23. Operations by the 10-20 groups of B-29 aircraft which will be available, at the rate set forth in paragraph 14, would total 182 operating group months by 31 August 1945 at which time it is estimated that the degree of destruction of Japanese resources essential to crush

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

the enemy's capacity for effective armed resistance will have been fully accomplished.

24. Such operations, while weakening and demoralizing the enemy, will vastly encourage our long suffering Chinese allies, and inspire them to increased and united effort to eject the enemy from their homeland, and hasten complete victory.

25. During the summer months of 1945, B-29 groups based on the Aleutian Islands could effectively attack parallel strategic Japanese objectives located in the northern part of the Empire.

26. *Air Bases.* A report on air base requirements and availability is contained in Section 3, Enclosure "A." Sites, materials and labor required for construction of Chinese and Indian air bases are locally available.

27. Preparation of the necessary bases and other facilities for these operations must be initiated at least one year prior to October, 1944.

28. *Other Supply Routes Into China.* The supplies brought into China from the west by the Air Transport Command, by pipeline, or by overland transportation, would be available for equipment and support of Chinese Ground units and supporting Tactical Air Forces (the latter provided by the U.S.A.A.F., with limited augmentation by Chinese Air Units). The Tactical Air Force required to be furnished by the U.S.A.A.F., will be available. The indicated volume of such supplies during the period in question is set forth in Section 4, Enclosure "A." Such balance of supply as is available beyond the requirements of the above forces will serve to reduce the demands of the B-29 strategic Air Force upon the special type of air transport support set forth herein.

29. *Concept of the Operation* . . . . .

a. *Phase I.* October 1944–April 1945. Sustained B-29 precision bombing attacks throughout the period to accomplish the destruction of selected strategic Japanese industrial systems, including aircraft factories and ship yards.

b. *Phase II.* May 1945–August 1945. An all-out attack against the other selected strategic objectives within tactical radius, integrated with attacks upon complementary objectives in Northern Japan by two B-29 groups based in the Aleutian Islands, to accomplish the destruction of Japanese resources which are an essential preliminary to an occupation of the Japanese homeland by United Nations forces.

CONCLUSIONS

30. The destruction of Japanese resources to such a point that the enemy's capacity for effective armed resistance is substantially exhausted can be accomplished by sustained bombing operations of 10–20

B-29 groups based in an area of Unoccupied China within 1,500 miles of the center of the Japanese industrial zone.

31. Such operations can be supplied by 2,000-4,000 B-24 type aircraft, converted to transports, based at Calcutta, supplying the operational bases after staging at Kunming.

32. The required air striking and supply forces will be available.

33. Adequate air and ground defense forces and the maintenance of such units will likewise be available.

34. The planning and preparation of air bases and other facilities essential for the execution of this plan should be instituted without delay.

35. The execution of this plan promises to vastly strengthen our Chinese Allies, and to bring about a decisive defeat of Japan within 12 months after the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

36. That the line of advance proposed in the "Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan" be approved; and that this appreciation and outline plan be submitted to the Combined Staff Planners for further study and detailed development.

37. That in consonance with the United Nations Overall Objective, and Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, action be initiated without delay and prosecuted with all practicable expedition, to complete the preparatory measures required to be taken, and to provide the facilities and air bases in expanded numbers and increased proportions, essential for the timely execution of this plan.

J.C.S. Files

*Paper Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 21 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 308/3

#### SOUTHEAST ASIA COMMAND

##### PART I

[Paragraph 1 is identical with paragraph 1 of C.C.S. 308, *ante*, p. 968.]

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<sup>1</sup> For the decisions taken on the subject of this paper at the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1943, see *ante*, p. 921. This paper, reflecting those decisions, was circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 308/3), August 21, 1943: "The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with relation to the Southeast Asia Command are set forth in the Enclosure."

*Command in India*

[Paragraph 2 is identical with paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 308, *ante*, p. 968.]

*Command in Southeast Asia*

[Paragraph 3 is identical with paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 308, *ante*, pp. 968-969.]

4. The proposed boundaries of the Southeast [Asia] Command will be as follows:

*a. Eastern Boundary*

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet, southwards along the eastern boundary of Thailand and Malaya to Singapore; from Singapore south to the North Coast of Sumatra; thence round the East Coast of Sumatra (leaving the Sunda Strait to the eastward of the line) to a point on the coast of Sumatra at longitude 104 degrees East; thence South to latitude 08 degrees South; thence Southeasterly towards Onslow, Australia, and, on reaching longitude 110 degrees East, due South along that meridian.

*b. Northern Frontier*

From the point where the frontiers of Burma, Indo China and Thailand meet generally north and west along the Eastern and Northern Frontier of Burma to its junction with the Indo-Burma border; thence along the border to the sea; thence round the Coast of India and Persia (all exclusive to the South East Asia Command) to meridian 60 degrees East.

[Subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 are identical with subparagraph 4c and paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 308, *ante*, p. 969.]

*Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia*

[Paragraphs 6 and 7 are identical with paragraphs 6 and 7 of C.C.S. 308, *ante*, pp. 969-970.]

## [PART II]

*8. a. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander<sup>2</sup>*

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British

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<sup>2</sup> Subparagraphs 8 *a* and *b*, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and printed here, are identical with the revision of these subparagraphs prepared by the Combined Staff Planners and circulated in C.C.S. 308/1, August 21, 1943 (not printed).

Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief.

General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander in Chief, India.

*b. Command Relationship*

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

*c. The Coordination of American Agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with Comparable British Organizations*<sup>3</sup>

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by

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<sup>3</sup> Subparagraph 8 c, as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and printed here, is identical with the revision of this subparagraph recommended by the United States Chiefs of Staff and circulated as C.C.S. 308/2, August 21, 1943 (not printed).

U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander in Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

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J.C.S. Files

*Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 21 August 1943.

C.C.S. 312/1

### PIPELINE FROM INDIA TO CHINA

The *ad hoc* Committee appointed by the C.O.S. to examine administrative matters reviewed C.C.S. 312,<sup>2</sup> and recommended its approval.

Orders for the construction of these pipelines are included in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander Southeast Asia, submitted for approval of the C.C.S. under C.O.S. (Q) 36.<sup>3</sup> The tentative allocation of shipping has included the movement of these troops.

GENERAL SIR T. S. RIDDELL-WEBSTER

LT. GENERAL BREHON SOMERVELL

REAR ADMIRAL O. C. BADGER

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 938.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 973.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Quartermaster General (Riddell-Webster) and the Commanding General, United States Army Service Forces (Somervell)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 21 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 325

1. The opening of an overland route to China will greatly facilitate operations and may well assist in bringing hostilities to an earlier conclusion than would otherwise be possible. In addition to meeting requirements for 1943-1944 operations in Burma, and the short term projects which are necessary to make them possible, it is necessary because of the Herculean task ahead to make urgent preparations for completing the overland route and insuring an adequate supply of stores for delivery over the route when opened.

2. Preliminary studies of the possible opening date and capacity of the road from Ledo via Myitkyina-Paoshan to Kunming, together with

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 325), August 21, 1943.

The recommendations in this paper were approved at the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 21, 1943. See *ante*, p. 921.

projected pipelines, disclose certain divergence of views as between the U.S. and British Staffs. It is not possible or necessary in this paper to assess which of the views is more nearly correct, but it is agreed by all parties that the project is urgent and should be carried out at the *earliest possible date*, subject to such operations as may be agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

3. Regardless of the date of opening of the route, which depends on the course of operations and on the major constructional problems that may arise, it is necessary now to examine the target requirement of tonnage to be carried over the route and to initiate urgent action for the expansion of the Assam L of C in preparation for this tonnage and that required for the maintenance of the route if development is not to be held up for lack of prompt action.

4. The present planned capacity of the Assam L of C to be reached by 1 November 1943 is 102,000 tons per month, including petroleum products, which will suffice only for minimum operational maintenance of essential ground and air forces, for an estimated air ferry delivery to China of about 10,000 tons per month and for road construction to keep pace with operational advances.

5. When the overland route is opened it is estimated that the additional requirement will be :

- a.* Increase of air route . . . . . 10,000 tons per month
- b.* Increase for operational forces . . . . . 13,000 tons per month
- c.* Stores for delivery to China by road . . . . . 65,000 tons per month
- d.* Maintenance stores for route . . . . . 30,000 tons per month

This represents an increase of 118,000 tons per month to be carried by the Assam L of C, exclusive of petroleum products for which two six-inch pipelines from Calcutta to Ledo are essential features and whose construction must keep pace with the development of the project.

6. We, therefore, recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve in principle the project for a supply route to China through Burma and Assam and that a directive (draft attached <sup>2</sup>) be issued to the Supreme Commander to initiate immediate action to increase the capacity of the Assam L of C to the following target figures :

1st November	1943	102,000 tons per month
1st May	1944	140,000 tons per month
1st July	1944	1st six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo
1st January	1945	170,000 tons per month
1st May	1945	200,000 tons per month
1st July	1945	<i>a.</i> a second six-inch pipeline Calcutta to Ledo
		<i>b.</i> balanced increase of tankage at Calcutta
1st January	1946	220,000 tons per month

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

7. The United States Chiefs of Staff have agreed to the provision of the special personnel, equipment and stores necessary to construct and operate the route Ledo-Kunming and, having due regard to agreed operational priorities, will make available such personnel, equipment and stores as may be necessary to achieve the increased tonnage on the Assam L of C in conformity with the plan recommended by the Supreme Commander. Pending the assumption of command by the Supreme Commander, the Commander in Chief India should be charged with the primary action in regard to the above.

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Hopkins Papers

*Memorandum by the Military Assistant Secretary to the British War Cabinet (Jacob)*<sup>1</sup>

SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO MR. SOONG

1. The building up of the Air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.

2. We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bengal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be co-ordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus to pave the way for the eventual opening of the Ledo Road to China.

3. An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

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<sup>1</sup> The source text is undated but bears the following manuscript endorsement: "(Copy handed to Mr. Hopkins 22.8.43)". An accompanying minute by Churchill's Private Secretary (Martin) attributes this paper to Jacob and states: "The Prime Minister has seen this and thinks it good, subject to the views of the Staffs." Cf. *ante*, p. 960.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 327

[QUEBEC,] 23 August 1943.

OPERATIONS FROM INDIA

1. We have now received a number of telegrams from Commander in Chief in India giving his views on the possibility of operations in

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 938.

Northern Burma, in the light of the generous offer of assistance put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.<sup>2</sup>

2. These telegrams discuss the subject in great detail, and it is quite clear that they cannot be examined fully during the present Conference. We propose, therefore, to take them back to London, have them examined at once, and let the United States Chiefs of Staff know as soon as we can the extent to which we would like to take advantage of their assistance.

3. Meanwhile, it has been possible to extract from these telegrams a brief summary of the Commander in Chief's views, and we think they should be brought to the notice of the Combined Chiefs of Staff before the Conference breaks up. Briefly, on the assumption that first priority must be accorded to raising the capacity of the air route to China, the Commander in Chief estimates that:—

*a.* Even with the assistance now offered, he will be short on 1st March 1944, by a total of 102,000 tons, of the supplies and material required to enable him to fulfill the undertakings agreed at TRIDENT for Northern Burma.<sup>3</sup>

*b.* The deficiency must either fall on the Ledo operation or must be shared between the Ledo and Imphal operations. It cannot be borne exclusively by the Imphal advance as the capacity then available would not enable us to maintain the forces necessary to repel a Japanese incursion.

*c.* If a certain reduction in the capacity allotted to the Ledo operations could be accepted, the Commander in Chief estimates that it should be possible to undertake a limited advance to the areas forward of Tamu and Tiddim which we occupied prior to the monsoon this year. It is not clear whether General Stilwell can accept this reduction however without causing the Ledo operations to be abandoned. In General Auchinleck's opinion the extensive use of L.R.P.Gs in the manner proposed by Brigadier Wingate will not alleviate the position since the L.R.P.Gs must be followed up by our main forces to hold the ground gained, and the capacity of the L. of C. will not be sufficient for the purpose.

*d.* Even these limited operations will apparently absorb the whole capacity of the L. of C. for the coming winter, and will make impossible the long-term improvements of the L. of C. which are essential if we are to contemplate the longer term increase of supplies to China by land or by air.

4. We have not the figures available in Quebec to explain in detail how the Commander in Chief arrives at the above conclusions, and further investigation will be necessary in India before definite

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. paragraph 7 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 305/1, *ante*, p. 972.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 369.

decisions can be taken as to what is to be done. Before this investigation can be carried any further, however, it is clear that a policy decision is required from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

5. Broadly speaking there are three possible courses open to us in Northern Burma in the dry season 1943-44; and it seems clear that the existing capacity of the L. of C. will not allow us to do more than one of these fully:—

*First Course.* To put our main effort into the land and air operations which are necessary to establish land communications with China and to improve and secure the air route. It is believed that this can only be done at the expense of the air lift to China.

*Second Course.* To give first priority of resources to increasing air supplies to China. It is believed that if this is to be done there will not be sufficient transportation capacity to sustain offensive operations in Northern Burma. The air route will therefore remain liable to interruption.

*Third Course.* To adopt a longer term policy and put our main effort into the development of the L. of C. so that we shall be able in the 1944-45 season both to make the air route secure and to deliver a far greater tonnage to China. This could be done if we are prepared to curtail land operations and accept a smaller rate of delivery to China in the meantime.

6. We should like to discuss these three courses with the United States Chiefs of Staff so that we shall be in a position to give guidance to the Supreme Commander immediately we return to London. Our own feeling is that we should adopt the first course and put our main effort into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. We suggest that the successful conquest of Northern Burma in the coming dry season which should result in our joining hands with the Chinese, should go far to compensate the Generalissimo for a temporary reduction in the supplies he will receive by air. Priorities between the three courses will not be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander, in formulating his proposals, to regard this decision as a guide and bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the L. of C.

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*Editorial Note*

For the final reports of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference, including conclusions with respect to the war in the Pacific, see *post*, pp. 1121 ff.

## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

*Editorial Note*

General aspects of the war in Europe are included in this section. Papers, however, which deal exclusively with Italian questions (e.g., peace feelers, surrender terms, and the status of Rome as an open city) and with the question of bases in the Azores are printed in separate sections below.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*

## ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 14 August 1943.

C.C.S. 307

1. The enemy has realized that we can only maintain a large invasion force by using ports and he has, therefore, heavily defended the existing ports and their neighboring beaches from sea and land attack. He has also made arrangements to render them unserviceable if they should be captured.

2. It is, therefore, of vital importance that we should be able to improvise port facilities at an early date. Supplies could then be maintained during unfavorable weather conditions and before we have been able to capture and recondition ports. The British Chiefs of Staff have appointed a Committee to study the whole problem and to make recommendations as a matter of urgency.

3. The basic requirements for an improvised port are:

- a. Breakwaters.
- b. Unloading facilities.

4. *Breakwaters*a. *Natural Topographical Features*

The best use must be made of natural features such as promontories and shallow banks. A study of the area, however, shows that there is only one position where such natural facilities exist.

b. *Ships Sunk To Form a Breakwater*

Ships were used to make breakwaters in the last war, but only in nontidal waters. The objections to this method off the coast of France are:

- (1) The large range of tide precludes their use except in very shallow water.
- (2) The scour effect of the strong tidal stream may cause the ships to become unstable.
- (3) The large number which would be required.

*c. New Scientific Devices*<sup>1</sup>

(1) *Bubble Breakwater*. In principle this consists of a curtain of air bubbles rising from a submerged pipe. The constant upward flow of bubbles destroys the rotary movement of water particles which is associated with waves, thus damping out the waves. Air compressors are necessary to feed the pipe. This method has been used in Russia and full scale experiment is shortly to be carried out in England by the Admiralty.

(2) *Lilo Breakwater*. It has been found that a quilted canvas bag, inflated by air at a low pressure and ballasted to float so that the greater portion is below the surface, damps out waves. A model breakwater constructed on these principles has been designed and has given promising results. It is hoped to overcome the practical difficulties of mooring, and full scale trials are being progressed at high priority by the Admiralty.

*5. Unloading Facilities**a. Methods in Previous Use*

The process of beaching L.S.T. and L.C.T. and of drying out coasters and barges can be continued with additional safety within the breakwaters. To save wear and tear and to speed up discharge of cargoes, these methods must be supplemented by other facilities.

*b. Piers*

Piers and pierheads which are capable of being towed across the Channel have been designed and are being put into production. These piers are capable of being moored so that they will stand up to a strong wind, but unloading under all weather conditions will only be possible when they are placed inside breakwaters. These piers are being designed to enable L.S.T. and L.C.T. to "beach" against semi-submerged pontoons which enable them to discharge over their ramps. Simultaneously the upper deck of L.S.T. can discharge their vehicles direct on to an "upper deck" built on the pierhead.

*c. Pierships*

In the Annexure to Appendix "X" of the OVERLORD plan (C.O.S. (43) 416 (O)),<sup>2</sup> C.O.S.S.A.C. has suggested the construction of specially modified 500 feet pierships, which could be sunk in position and which could be connected to the shore by some form of pontoon equipment or two-way pier. He has also suggested the construction of some form of quay on rocks. These and other suggestions are being examined.

*d. Hards*

If beaches of slope 1 in 40 or steeper can be found within the breakwater, the construction of unloading hards similar to those used for loading in U.K. will simplify the unloading of L.S.T.

<sup>1</sup> Diagrammatic sections of bubble and Lilo breakwaters which are appended to the source text of C.O.S. 307 are not reproduced here.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. For a digest of this plan, see *ante*, p. 488.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander Designate (Morgan)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 320

## DIGEST OF OPERATION "RANKIN"

Recommendations for the Courses of Action to be followed in North-West Europe in the event of substantial weakening of German resistance, or withdrawal from Occupied Countries or unconditional surrender occurring between the 1st November, 1943, and the 1st May 1944.

## INTRODUCTION

1. The latest review (J.I.C. (43) 324 of 3 August 1943<sup>2</sup>) by the J.I.C. of the enemy's present situation and his possible plans and intentions during the remainder of 1943 shows that the recent reverses on the Russian front, the breach developing in Italy and the Balkans, the set-back suffered by the U-boat campaign and the ever-increasing Allied air offensive, all combine to create a position which (in the opinion of the J.I.C.) must appear to the German leaders as verging on the desperate. The limiting factor for the enemy being availability of forces, the gathering threat in Italy and the Balkans may well lead him to find reserves at the expense of the ground and air forces now located in Norway, Denmark, the Low Countries and France. Nor is it beyond the bounds of possibility that an imminent threat of complete disaster on the Russian front might induce him to abandon altogether his occupation of Western and probably Southern Europe, in order to concentrate all available forces against the Russian menace, postpone the hour of final defeat and insure the ultimate occupation of Germany by Anglo-American rather than by Russian forces.

## CONDITIONS OF A RETURN TO NORTH-WEST EUROPE DURING THE WINTER

1943-44

2. It follows from the above that it has become a matter of urgent necessity to prepare for a return to the Continent during the winter 1943-44. The possible alternative conditions of return are:—

*Case A.*—Such substantial weakening of the strength and morale of the German armed forces as will permit successful assault with the Anglo-American forces prior to the target date of **OVERLORD**.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 320), August 20, 1943: "The Enclosure is a digest of the plan for Operation RANKIN which has been prepared by the COSSAC Staff."

For the discussion of this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 940.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. For a summary of this paper telegraphed to Hull by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) on August 14, 1943, see *ante*, p. 512.

*Case B.*—German withdrawal from the occupied countries.

*Case C.*—German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in North-West Europe.

In *Cases A* and *B* our object is to effect a lodgment on the Continent from which we can complete the defeat of Germany; our object in *Case C* is to occupy as rapidly as possible appropriate areas from which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender laid down by the Allied Governments. Inherent in all cases will be the rehabilitation of liberated countries. The three cases are considered in succession below.

CASE A.—COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE  
EVENT OF SUBSTANTIAL WEAKENING OF GERMAN RESISTANCE IN FRANCE  
AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

3. Excluding airborne troops and tank brigades, it is calculated that the number of Allied Divisions operationally and administratively ready on the 1st November, 1943, will be eight, on the 1st January, 1944, seventeen, and on the 1st March, 1944, twenty-three. The approximate Naval Assault Forces available on these dates will be respectively one, two-three, and five. The Metropolitan Air Force will be available for cover and support and one composite group of the Tactical Air Force should be available by the end of 1943. It is considered that with these resources the following operations would be practicable. During November and December 1943 an assault could only be undertaken on a narrow front against a weakly-held sector of the coastline, provided that there are clear indications that France and the Low Countries have been almost entirely denuded of reserves, and that German resistance is on the point of collapse. During January and February 1944 an assault could be undertaken against weak opposition to secure a strictly limited objective. From March 1944 onwards an assault with a more ambitious role might be undertaken, provided the strength and morale of the German troops and, in particular, of German reserves, are markedly below the maximum acceptable strength for Operation OVERLORD. Clearly in all three cases the overriding condition of adequate reduction in the present fighting value of the G.A.F. on the Western front, and an inability of the German Command to bring up important reserves, must pertain.

4. As for the area of assault, the choice in Operation OVERLORD was narrowed down to the alternatives of the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin-Caen sectors. The Pas de Calais is the pivot of the whole German defensive system, and it may be expected that the defenses there will remain strong to the end; it is therefore concluded that the assault area in the present case should be the same as for OVERLORD,

i.e., Cotentin-Caen. As maintenance over beaches and the construction of artificial ports would prove too hazardous in winter, it will be essential to capture the port of Cherbourg and as many minor ports as possible within 48 hours. The plan for OVERLORD would therefore have to be modified to meet this special requirement. There are obvious advantages in having the same area for either operation; for in the early months of 1944 our preparations for OVERLORD will be well advanced, and it would be difficult at that stage to change the area of assault to some different part of the coast.

5. The strategic recommendations for *Case A* may accordingly be summarized as follows:—

*a.* No assault against organized resistance will be feasible before the 1st January, 1944, unless there are clear indications that German resistance in the West is on the point of collapse, and measures are taken in time to make the Naval Assault Forces available for operations by recourse to special manning expedients.

*b.* Subsequent to that date, an assault elsewhere than in the area selected for OVERLORD is unlikely to be feasible or advisable.

*c.* If a sufficiently drastic reduction in the morale and strength of the German armed forces takes place, operations against organized opposition could be undertaken in January or February 1944 to capture the Cotentin Peninsula, or in March or April 1944 to put up a modified OVERLORD plan into effect. In either case the plan must provide for the capture of the port of Cherbourg within the first 48 hours.

*d.* As in the case of OVERLORD, diversionary operations in the Pas de Calais area, and from the Mediterranean against the South of France will probably be essential.

CASE B.—COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE EVENT OF A GERMAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES

6. It is probable that if the enemy is obliged to make withdrawals from Western Europe he will first withdraw his forces from his extremities, i.e., from Norway in the North and from South-Western and Western France in the South. If this occurs, we should require, for political as well as strategic reasons, to send some forces to occupy the areas so liberated; but it would be important that we should not tie up our main forces far from the eventual center of action.

7. In Norway, establishment of certain bases for Coastal Command Aircraft and Naval Forces is likely to be most desirable. It is probable that requirements can be limited to the establishment of bases in Northern Norway for aircraft of Coastal Command for the anti-submarine protection of shipping on passage round the North Cape; the development of Stavanger and Bergen as bases for aircraft of Coastal Command and light Naval Forces to blockade the entrance to the Baltic, and for the conduct of small offensive operations; and the establishment of surface warning sets (Radar) on the South coast of

Norway. It is considered that forces of the order of one brigade group would be required for Northern Norway, and one division for Southern Norway, to secure the naval and air bases and support the Norwegian contingent in its task of rehabilitation.

8. In France, it is probable that the first point of withdrawal would be Bordeaux, followed in succession by the other ports on the Western coast; the Channel coast and in particular the Pas de Calais would remain the last areas to be uncovered. Once withdrawal begins it is likely that it will eventually continue as far as the Siegfried Line, owing to the difficulty of holding any intermediate position with an economical force.

9. The governing condition of our return is that we must have ports, since maintenance over beaches in winter is not practicable. If the enemy withdraw from South-Western and Western France, it is proposed that we should send a brigade group each, together with minimum necessary covering air forces, to occupy Bordeaux, Nantes and Brest. The purpose of occupation of Bordeaux would be the rehabilitation of South-West France; the purpose of occupation of Brest and Nantes would also be partly the rehabilitation of France, but mainly the preparation, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance of United States Forces direct from the United States. Demands to commit larger forces to these areas should be firmly resisted, and the first point of entry for our main forces should not be West of Cherbourg. The Northern extension of the German defensive position on the Siegfried Line would probably prevent our use of Antwerp, in which case the major ports available for our return would be Cherbourg, Havre and Rouen. It is impossible to forecast the turn that operations would take, since our advance would be dependent on the enemy's withdrawal policy. It must be assumed that the enemy's demolitions will be thorough, and, therefore, it cannot be expected that our rate of advance will be swift. Moreover, rapid airfield construction, as proposed in OVERLORD, is impracticable in winter, and a more permanent and lengthy type of construction will be required. The capture of existing airfields is, therefore, of increased importance. A likely course of events is that an initial landing might be made at Cherbourg, followed by later landings at Havre and Rouen, and not long afterwards by the introduction of reinforcements and stores through the Pas de Calais ports. Our general intention should be to press Eastwards as fast as possible, opening up additional ports as we go, with the further object of establishing airfields in the Pas de Calais and in Belgium, from which the Tactical Air Force can complete the destruction of the German Air Force and the strategic bomber force can intensify their attack on Germany at closer range when the advance

Eastwards has gone sufficiently far to make this profitable. Under the condition of German withdrawal, deficiencies in the strength of the Tactical Air Force can be made good at the expense of the static fighter defense system of the United Kingdom. In this way enough squadrons could be made available to take full advantage of airfields prepared by the Army on the Continent, while additional air support could still be provided from bases in the United Kingdom.

10. The strategic recommendations for *Case B* may accordingly be summarized as follows:—

*a.* That the port of Cherbourg be the first place of entry for our main forces.

*b.* That as the German withdrawal proceeds, our main forces be based on Cherbourg, Havre and Rouen, supplemented as necessary by the smaller ports further East.

*c.* That the port of Bordeaux be occupied in the first instance by a small force only for the sole purpose of rehabilitation of South-West France.

*d.* That the ports of Brest and Nantes be similarly occupied by small forces only, partly to assist in the rehabilitation of France, but mainly to prepare, as a long-term policy, for the entry and maintenance of United States Forces direct from the United States.

*e.* That as large forces as possible from the Mediterranean be dispatched to occupy the ports of Marseilles and Toulon, and subsequently to move Northwards on Lyons and Vichy, and thereafter as required.

CASE C—COURSES OF ACTION FOR A RETURN TO THE CONTINENT IN THE EVENT OF GERMAN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER AND THE CESSATION OF ORGANIZED ARMED RESISTANCE IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE

11. The object is to occupy, as rapidly as possible, appropriate areas from which we can take steps to enforce the terms of unconditional surrender imposed by the Allied Governments on Germany; and in addition to carry out the rehabilitation of the Occupied Countries.

12. A consideration of the areas of strategic importance leads to the conclusion that the best use of our limited land forces lies in the speedy occupation in adequate force of the Jutland Peninsula, the adjacent great ports of Bremen, Hamburg and Kiel, and the large towns in the valleys of the Ruhr and the Rhine. It is considered that the forces required for occupation of these areas would amount to seven divisions for Denmark and North-West Germany, six Divisions for the Ruhr, eleven Divisions for the valley of the Rhine; making a total in all of twenty-four Divisions.

13. In addition to the forces required for occupation of Germany, further forces will be required for rehabilitation of the Liberated Territories and to assist in the disarmament of Germany. It is considered that the following forces will be required in support of the contingents

of the Nations concerned, or in the case of Denmark supplementary to the field force formations given in paragraph 12 above; one division and one brigade for Norway, one brigade for Denmark, two brigades for Holland, four brigades for Belgium; and in the case of France, two field force divisions for Paris and Northern France, two field force divisions for the Mediterranean ports and South France, and six brigades for the Atlantic and Channel ports. Except where it is explicitly stated that field force divisions will be required, full use should be made of non-field force formations in the above role.

14. Both in the case of Germany and in the case of liberated territories, it will be necessary for adequate air forces to form part of the occupying force. In Germany, their role will be to take immediate action to overcome any resistance to our terms, to take punitive action against local disorder and to be a reminder to the German people of the main strategic bomber force which will remain based in the United Kingdom. Adequate air forces for occupation of areas near key points in Germany and liberated territories are available in the United Kingdom and the whole resources of the Metropolitan Air Force will be available for reinforcement.

15. The use of large forces in the dual task of rehabilitating the liberated territories and occupying strategic areas in Germany is a problem of such complexity that the greatest simplicity in plan is required if mistakes of far-reaching consequence are to be avoided. It is considered that the best plan will be to keep to the alignment proposed for OVERLORD, i.e., to dispose the American forces on the right of the front and the British forces on the left. It is thus contemplated that the American sphere of responsibility will extend from the Rhine at the Swiss Border to Düsseldorf, and will also include France and Belgium; while the British sphere of responsibility will include the Ruhr and North-West Germany, Holland, Denmark and Norway. In the liberated countries there should be representative forces of both nations.

16. It is clear that for both political and military reasons speed of entry will be of the first importance. It may be possible to use air transport to a limited extent, but the bulk of our forces will have to be carried by sea. In the case of reentry through Copenhagen, Bremen and Hamburg, minesweeping is likely to impose short delays. The most suitable port of entry for the formations to occupy the Ruhr appears to be Rotterdam, while that for the forces for the Rhine Valley will be Antwerp.

17. The comparison of requirements against availability of forces at different dates is as follows, providing the BOLERO program is maintained and the forces earmarked to return from the Mediterranean are

received. The requirement is constant at 26 divisions and the availability of divisions shown excludes airborne troops and tank brigades:—

a. March 1944.

23 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.

4 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 27 divisions.

b. January 1944.

17 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.

7 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 24 divisions.

c. November 1943.

8 divisions administratively ready for mobile operations.

8 divisions administratively incomplete.

Total 16 divisions.

In view of the non-operational and semi-mobile nature of the tasks, the total figure shown in each case may be taken as the availability. The deficits therefore are two divisions in January 1944, and ten divisions in November 1943. It is proposed that these deficits should be made good when emergency arises by the dispatch of Allied forces in the Mediterranean and of the United States divisions earmarked for Operation OVERLORD. Apart from these forces it is proposed that Allied forces in the Mediterranean should supply one United States and one British division to accompany the forces of the French Committee of National Liberation, for employment in Southern France.

18. It is emphasized that the forces given in paragraph 12 above are the minimum land forces which will be required initially to obtain control in the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr, the entrance to the Baltic and in North-Western Germany. The ultimate size of forces of occupation will depend on the requirements and terms of occupation laid down by the Allied Governments.

19. The strategic recommendations for *Case C* may accordingly be summarized as follows:—

a. That the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander include the whole of France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and such portion of enemy territory as the Allied Governments may decide. It is assumed that this will include at least the Rhine Valley, the Ruhr and North-West Germany.

b. That, as soon as the situation permits at the time of German unconditional surrender, Allied Forces based in the United Kingdom be dispatched:

(1) To occupy and control the Valley of the Rhine from the Swiss to the Dutch frontiers, together with the area of the Ruhr, and insure disarmament of German armed forces returning from occupied territory.

(2) To occupy and control Denmark, Schleswig, Holstein, the Kiel Canal, and the cities of Hamburg and Bremen, and insure disarmament of German armed forces in those areas.

(3) To open selected ports in the West coast of France and the Low Countries to establish control in the capitals of those countries, to institute measures of rehabilitation, and to assist as may be required in the disarmament of German armed forces.

(4) To establish control in Norway, to rehabilitate the country, and insure disarmament of German armed forces.

*c.* That, simultaneously, Allied contingents from the forces based in the Mediterranean be dispatched to open selected ports on the Mediterranean coast of France, to establish control at Vichy, to institute measures for the rehabilitation of Southern France, and to assist as may be required in the disarmament of German armed forces. These Allied forces to come under operational control of the Supreme Allied Commander on arrival in France.

*d.* That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, France, Belgium and the Rhine Valley from the Swiss frontier to inclusive Düsseldorf be regarded as a sphere under the control of the United States forces, with British representation in the liberated countries.

*e.* That, under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Holland, Denmark, Norway and North-West Germany from inclusive the Ruhr Valley to Lübeck be regarded as a sphere under the control of British forces, with United States representation in the liberated countries.

#### CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Certain general recommendations emerge from the above study of RANKIN:—

*a.* The forces allotted for OVERLORD should be considered as equally available for RANKIN, if the occasion should arise.

*b.* The appointment of the Allied Air Commander-In-Chief and Staff, and the provision in the United Kingdom of the Commanding General, Staff and headquarters of the United States Army Group are of urgent importance and should be undertaken forthwith.

*c.* If the strategic recommendations in this paper are accepted in principle, the British and United States Governments should be invited, as a matter of urgency, to lay down a policy to govern the conduct of the Civil Affairs Staff in the establishment of military governments in enemy territory to be occupied by our troops, and a policy to govern the establishment of indigenous administrations in the liberated Allied territories.

*d.* That no time be lost in setting up nucleus combined American/British Civil Affairs Staffs in London for Germany and for each Allied country and friendly country, and such other countries as may

be decided to lie within the sphere of the Supreme Allied Commander, to study in detail the problems involved and to make, without delay, detailed plans for the organization of civil administration therein.

*e.* That plans be made forthwith, complete in every detail, for the rapid recruitment in reserve units on a para-military basis of British civil resources in technical personnel, labor and equipment for employment on the Continent, especially for airfield construction. In order to avoid any interference with the progress of current vital work, such as the BOLERO and airfield construction programs, these plans only to be put into effect when the emergency arises.

*f.* It will be desirable to undertake a campaign of propaganda among our own people to bring to their notice the necessity for widespread participation in the campaign in prospect. Our Service resources will be stretched to the uttermost, and will need every sort of civilian administrative support if they are to develop their full force at the decisive point or points. Provision of this support may well entail sacrifices on the part of all classes of the community.

*g.* Close attention should be devoted to the question of collaboration with the U.S.S.R.

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, S.W.1, 14 August, 1943.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Chief of the British Air Staff (Portal)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 15 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 309

“POINTBLANK”

1. I annex an appreciation by Air Intelligence of the trend of development and disposition of the German Fighter Force in relation to “POINTBLANK”.

The salient points are:—

*a.* The German Fighter Force has increased by 22% since 1 January 1943.

*b.* Its strength on the Western Front has been doubled since the same date.

*c.* The increase on the Western Front has absorbed the entire expansion under *a.*

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 309), August 15, 1943: “In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of the British Air Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration.” For the discussion of this paper at the 109th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 16, 1943, see *ante*, p. 871.

*d.* Fighter units and experienced fighter pilots have nevertheless had to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts as well, in spite of the critical situation on those fronts.

*e.* In spite of the present strain on the German night fighters they are being used by day to counter the deep daylight penetration of "POINTBLANK" into Germany.

2. The build-up of the Eighth Bomber Command as required in the "POINTBLANK" plan approved by the C.C.O.S. at TRIDENT<sup>2</sup> should have been 1068 aircraft on the 15th August. The comparable figure of the actual build-up achieved on that date was 921 (including 105 detached to North Africa).

3. The present strength of the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 2260 aircraft in first line units compared with a strength of 2000 which it was hoped would not be exceeded if "POINTBLANK" could have been executed as planned. Thus the G.A.F. Fighter Force is 13% stronger than had been hoped, and this in spite of increased successes in Russia and the Mediterranean which were not taken into account in the "POINTBLANK" plan.

4. I do not set out the above information in order to make a criticism of an inability to have achieved complete fulfillment of "POINTBLANK". My object is to bring out the fact that, in spite of some shortfall in the build-up, Germany is now faced with imminent disaster if only the pressure of "POINTBLANK" can be maintained and increased *before* the increase in the G.A.F. Fighter Force has gone too far.

There is no need for us to speculate about the effect of "POINTBLANK" on Germany. The Germans themselves, when they weaken the Russian and Mediterranean fronts in the face of serious reverses there, tell us by their acts what importance to attach to it.

5. The daylight "Battle of Germany" is evidently regarded by the Germans as of critical importance and we have already made them throw into it most, if not all, of their available reserves.

If we do not now strain every nerve to bring enough force to bear to win this battle during the next two or three months but are content to see the 8th Bomber Command hampered by lack of reinforcements just as success is within its grasp, we may well miss the opportunity to win a decisive victory against the German Air Force which will have incalculable effects on all future operations and on the length of the war. And the opportunity, once lost, may not recur.

6. I, therefore, urge most strongly that we should invite the U.S.C.O.S. to take all practicable steps at the earliest possible date to

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 241.

increase the striking power of the 8th Bomber Command as much as possible during the next two months.

## Annex

*British Intelligence Appreciation*

## G.A.F. SINGLE-ENGINED FIGHTER REINFORCEMENT OF THE WESTERN FRONT, JANUARY–JULY, 1943

1. *Strength and Disposition.* The Initial Equipment (I.E.) of the G.A.F. single-engined fighter force as a whole increased by 245 aircraft from 1,095 to 1,340 between 1 January and 1 August 1943. The disposition of this force in the main operational areas on the respective dates was as follows:

	1-1-43	1-8-43 <sup>3</sup>	Difference
Western Front	305	600	+295
Mediterranean	320	295	-25
Russian Front	430	395*	-35
Refitting	40	50	+10
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	1, 095	1, 340	245

2. It will be seen that the fighter force on the Western Front has been doubled during the period under review and that this increase has in effect more than absorbed the entire expansion which has occurred; it has in addition entailed a weakening of both the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts notwithstanding the important military campaigns in those areas where the Axis forces have suffered serious reverses since the beginning of the year.

3. *Sources of Increased Strength.* The raising of S.E. fighter strength on the Western Front has been accomplished in two ways:

*a.* As a result of the defensive strategy forced on the G.A.F. since the end of 1942 in face of growing Allied air power on the Western Front, in the Mediterranean and in Russia, Germany was forced to adopt the policy of achieving the maximum possible expansion of fighter production.

The outcome of this policy is clearly seen in the formation of new fighter units and of the expansion of others; in addition there has been a noticeable tendency to maintain the actual strength of many fighter units well in excess of I.E., particularly on the Western Front.

*b.* By the withdrawal of units from the Mediterranean and Russia.

<sup>3</sup> August 1, 1943.

\*Including 30 I.E. in Rumania newly formed since 1-1-43. [Footnote in the source text.]

4. The reinforcement of the Western Front as a result of the above measures can be analyzed as follows:

Newly formed units	}	165
Expansion of existing units		
Transferred from Russia		90
Transferred from Mediterranean		60
		<hr/>
Gross Total		315
Loss [ <i>Less?</i> ]:		
Fighter units transferred to fighter-bomber category		20
		<hr/>
Net Total Increase		295 aircraft

5. *Redisposition on the Western Front.* A most striking change in the disposition of the G.A.F. fighter force on the Western Front has taken place since 1 January in order to secure the greatest possible defensive strength to cover the approaches to Germany. Prior to that date, the German fighter dispositions were mainly to cover the North coast of France, Belgium and the Low Countries against R.A.F. fighter sweeps in these areas and against such daylight bombing of occupied territory as then took place.

The comparative dispositions are shown as follows:

<i>Area</i>	<i>I.E. at 1-8-48</i>	<i>I.E. at 1-1-48</i>	<i>Differences</i>
France (West of the Seine)	95	95	0
France (East of the Seine and Belgium)	105	70	+35
Holland	150	40	+110
N.W. Germany	180	35	+145
Denmark and S. Norway	50	35	+15
Trondheim and N. Norway	20	30	-10
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	600	305	+295

The salient points which emerge are:

*a.* The greatly increased defenses of Northwest Germany have absorbed 50% of the total increased fighter strength on the Western Front.

*b.* The balance of this increase has gone mainly to the Belgium-Holland area.

A point not clearly revealed by the above figures has been the movement eastwards of French based units and the bringing of others from Norway to Northwest Germany; there has therefore been a strong tendency to concentrate the maximum possible forces into the area

between the Scheldt and the Elbe. Nevertheless it is certain that the present fighter strength defending Northwest Germany and its approaches is still inadequate for its purpose; this is supported by the increasing use of night-fighters for daylight interception especially against deep penetration into Germany where the resources of the G.A.F. are inadequate to maintain S.E. day fighter forces.

7. *Reason for Increased Defenses.* The doubling of the German S.E. fighter force on the Western Front and the allocation of virtually the whole of this increase to Belgium, Holland and Northwest Germany are attributable solely to the development of Allied day bombing of Germany. The defense of Germany against these attacks has in fact become the prime concern of the G.A.F. and is being undertaken even at the expense of air support for military operations on other fronts. There is no reason to suppose that this will not continue to constitute the main commitment of the defensive fighter forces of the G.A.F.: if anything this commitment is likely to increase and the transfer of further units to the Western Front from other operational areas cannot be excluded.

8. *Strain on Crews.* Despite their strength and flexibility the fighter defenses of Germany are liable to be subject to extreme strain over periods of sustained day and night attacks on Germany: this was particularly noticeable during the last week in July when day fighters were extensively employed as night fighters in addition to their day operations and conversely night fighters had to be employed for day interception. The effects of such continued activity on crews must inevitably have been severe and there is evidence that in the later raids during this period opposition was less determined and Allied losses noticeably reduced. There is no doubt that during this period the German fighter defenses were subjected to the most severe test they have yet experienced.

9. *Transfer of Experienced Pilots to Western Front.* The urgent necessity of the defense of Germany has not only deprived the Russian and Mediterranean Fronts of units, let alone reinforcements; it has also entailed a deterioration in quality of the fighter pilots employed in those fronts, notably Russia since there is strong evidence that the most experienced pilots are being transferred to the Western Front and replaced by others of inferior skill.

#### 10. *Conclusions*

a. There can be no doubt that Germany regards the defense of the Reich against daylight air attack as of such supreme importance that adequate support for military operations in Russia and the Mediterranean has been rendered impossible. In Russia, the fighter force actually engaged on the entire front is now little more than half that

on the Western Front; this fighter weakness has unquestionably been an important contributory factor to the German failure in Russia this year.

Similarly in the Mediterranean despite the wide areas exposed to Allied air attack from Sardinia to Crete and the need for support of Italy no reinforcement whatever has been forthcoming; consequently Allied air operations have been carried out with the maximum of success and minimum loss against negligible opposition thereby largely contributing to present conditions in Italy.

b. The Western Front with a fighter strength almost equal that of the Mediterranean and Russian Fronts combined constitutes the only source from which reinforcements needed elsewhere can be provided unless further new units are formed; this however appears unlikely in the immediate future. Consequently in the event of South Germany becoming exposed to air attack by day, it seems inevitable that such fighter defenses as may be set up must be derived almost exclusively from the West; the defense of South Germany against air attack on a scale equivalent to that now existing on the Western Front would necessitate the reduction of the fighter force in that area by up to 50% dependent on the then existing commitments of the G.A.F. in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16 August 1943.

C.C.S. 303/1

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

The discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting yesterday<sup>2</sup> made more apparent than ever the necessity for decision now as to whether our main effort in the European Theater is to be in the Mediterranean or from the United Kingdom. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that this is the critical question before the conference and that the effective conduct of the war in Europe makes this decision now a must.

We propose the following:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff reaffirm the decisions of the TRIDENT Conference<sup>3</sup> as to the execution of OVERLORD including the definite al-

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of this paper at the 109th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 16, 1943, see *ante*, p. 870.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 864.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 365.

lotment of forces thereto and assign to it an overriding priority over other operations in the European Theater.

The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that the acceptance of this decision must be without conditions and without mental reservation. They accept the fact that a grave emergency will always call for appropriate action to meet it. However, long range decision for the conduct of the war must not be dominated by possible eventualities.

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J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 17 August 1943.

C.C.S. 303/3

#### STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved<sup>1</sup> the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis power in Europe, 1943-44.<sup>2</sup>

##### 2. Operation "POINTBLANK"

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

##### 3. Operation "OVERLORD"

*a.* This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944) After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

*b.* Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the

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<sup>1</sup> At their 110th Meeting, August 17, 1943. See *ante*, p. 875.

<sup>2</sup> The paragraphs which follow are derived from C.C.S. 303, paragraph 4 (see *ante*, p. 474), as amended in accordance with the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff contained in the enclosure to C.C.S. 303/2 (not printed), circulated August 16, 1943.

United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

*c.* As between operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

#### 4. *Operations in Italy*

*a. First Phase.* The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, farther north.

*b. Second Phase.* Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

*c. Third Phase.* The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France.

#### 5. *Operations in Southern France*

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD.

#### 6. *Air Operations*

*a.* Strategic bombing operations from Italian and central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

*b.* Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

*c.* Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.

*d.* Air supply of Balkan guerrillas (see paragraph 8 below).

#### 7. *Operations at Sea*

*a.* Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the Azores.

*b.* Security of our sea communications.

*c.* Continued disruption of Axis sea communications.

*d.* Support of amphibious operations.

#### 8. *Operations in the Balkans*

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, and to the bombing of Ploesti and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

9. *Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean*

Defensive garrison commitments (Appendix "A" to C.C.S. 303<sup>3</sup>) in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

H. REDMAN  
J. R. DEANE  
*Combined Secretariat*

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<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 481.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 286/3

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

FORMATION OF U.S. ASSAULT FORCES FOR OPERATION "OVERLORD"

1. The British request that the Americans man all the craft allocated to Assault Force "O," the American Naval Assault Force for OVERLORD based in the Plymouth Command, was considered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff who declined to undertake this commitment for the reasons given in C.C.S. 286/2.<sup>2</sup>

2. There has been an opportunity during QUADRANT for this matter to be further investigated by the Combined Staffs. As a result, we now wish to put forward a modified proposal. We withdraw the request that the U.S. should man the shipborne types of landing craft, namely 16 L.C.S.(M), 15 Hedgerow fitted L.C.A. and 60 ordinary L.C.A., as these will be carried in British ships. However, in view of the fact that the remaining craft will be assigned to, and will train with, the American Naval Assault Force under a U.S. Naval Commander, we suggest that it would be reasonable that U.S. crews be provided. The craft involved are 12 L.C.T.(R), 5 L.C.G.(L), 11 L.C.F.(L), 48 L.C.P.(L) fitted for smoke-laying and not hoistable, and the personnel required amount to 135 officers and 1,511 men.

3. We ask the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to reconsider the decision conveyed in 286/2 to this extent.

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 891.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 452.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

C.C.S. 314

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT  
(OPERATION OVERLORD—VEHICLE LIFT)

1. We have been examining the landing craft position for operation OVERLORD. It appears probable that there will be a shortage of vehicle lift of 870 vehicles, or 13 per cent of the total lift, compared with the calculations made at TRIDENT.<sup>2</sup> This shortage is made up as follows:

LCT (3 or 4)	—57
LCT (5)	—15

2. The reasons for this shortage are as follows:

*a.* 164 LCG (M) which it was hoped to build in the United Kingdom, will not be ready in time. In order to compensate to some extent for this and in order to provide supporting fire for the U.S. assaults, it has been necessary to convert 43 LCT (3 and 4) to LCT (R) or LCG (L).

*b.* In the TRIDENT calculations it was assumed that the 44 LCT (4 and 5) employed in close mobile net protection duties with the Fleet at Scapa Flow, would all be available for OVERLORD. Recent developments in anti-ship weapons make it impossible to dispense with this type of protection. Every effort is being made to substitute other types of craft and 15 LCT's have been released. The Admiralty are going to try and release more, but at present they must retain 14 LCT (4) and 15 LCT (5).

3. Under the TRIDENT decisions, 18 LCT's were to be brought back from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. It will be necessary for these to sail before bad weather starts in the Bay of Biscay. Admiral Cunningham has been asked whether these craft are taking part in AVALANCHE and when they can be released. The importance of ensuring their passage home has been emphasized. Owing to the casualties in HUSKY having been less than expected, we may get more back from this source, which would help us reduce the deficit. But we cannot count on this yet.

4. We have studied various methods by which the shortage in lift for OVERLORD could be wiped out. It seems that the only practicable method would be to arrange by some means an increase in the number

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 892.

<sup>2</sup> See Coakley and Leighton, p. 72.

of LCT(6) available for OVERLORD from American sources. The British Chiefs of Staff ask that the possibility of this should be explored.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 316

THE "PLOUGH" FORCE

1. We have been considering the question of the possible employment of the PLOUGH Force, which we understand will shortly become available for operations elsewhere.

2. The essentials as we see it are that the Force should be retained intact and employed in snow conditions on the type of task for which it has been trained.

Hence, there are now two theaters in which the Force might be employed:

a. Norway, as originally planned. Here, if the maintenance commitment is not too great, it might be used for some specific operation at an appropriate moment, in conjunction perhaps with Operation OVERLORD.

b. Italy. Here it might be used in conjunction with possible operations in the Apennines, or better still in the Alps if we get as far north. Failing either of these, it might conceivably fulfill a useful role in collaboration with patriot forces in the mountains of the Dalmatian Coast.

3. The Force is at present gaining experience in the Kiska operations and we understand that it is unlikely to arrive back in the United States much before the end of November. There is time therefore for the possibilities of its further employment to be fully explored.

4. We suggest that the full details of the Force and its capabilities should be communicated to General Eisenhower and General Morgan at once, who should be asked to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by 1 October 1943:

a. Whether they consider that the Force could be usefully employed in their theater, and if so, what tasks they propose it should undertake.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 316), August 18, 1943: "In order to save delay, the enclosure, prepared by the Chief of Combined Operations [Vice Admiral Mountbatten], in consultation with the British Joint Planning Staff, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration."

For the action taken on this paper at the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1943, see *ante*, p. 893.

b. Whether any additional provision would be necessary in the form of transport aircraft or ancillary units to sustain the Force in the role proposed.

If General Eisenhower considers that the Force would best be employed on the Dalmatian Coast, we suggest that he should consult the Commanders in Chief in the Middle East and put forward his recommendations agreed with them.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff should then decide on the theater to which the Force should be allotted.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the Joint Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 317

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

References: a. C.C.S. 288; <sup>2</sup> C.C.S. 288/1; <sup>3</sup> C.C.S. 288/2.<sup>4</sup>

b. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.<sup>5</sup>

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the requirements for matériel for equipping allies, liberated forces, and friendly neutrals, and the determination of basic policies which will govern the meeting of such requirements.

DISCUSSION

2. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for equipping 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry).<sup>6</sup> By 1 September 1943, the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

3. General Eisenhower has recommended (radio BOSCO-IN-21, 13 Aug 1943) (Appendix "A") that equipment for remaining French troops be accelerated in a manner that would provide for a total of four armored and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding Gen-

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 317), August 18, 1943: "In order to avoid delay, the enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Staff Planners, is presented direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their consideration."

For the consideration of this paper at the 112th, 113th, and 115th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 20, and 23, 1943, see *ante*, pp. 893, 905, 939.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 400.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 402.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 404.

<sup>5</sup> The minutes of this meeting, which took place at Washington on July 30, 1943, are not printed.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 823.

eral of the North African Theater of Operations advises that such a program would satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference. The requisite equipment can be made available to meet such requirements without prejudice to currently directed operations, i.e., BOLERO/SICKLE, and operations in the Pacific. It should be noted, however, that approximately 60% of the equipment required must be withheld from advance shipments to the United Kingdom, to be made up prior to departure of United Kingdom units concerned. This can be done.

4. During the first four to five months following an initial assault on the continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for the buildup and maintenance of the United Nations forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months will be required between the start of reorganization and reequipment of French Army units on the continent and their initial employment. Thus it would appear that no continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the initial assault.

5. Balkan forces are capable of mounting approximately six modified divisions and supporting troops (175,000) (Appendix "B"). They should be supplied with captured German and Italian equipment, if available, inasmuch as they are familiar therewith, and their strategic position does not further substantiate commitments from other sources.

6. It is assumed that Polish forces will continue to fight with the British and they need not be considered as sacrificed by non-support of the Polish "Secret Army" as an organized unit. Moreover, the formation of Polish divisions and brigades can only be accomplished after the fall of Germany, at which time existence of a formal Polish Army for the defeat of Germany would not be necessary (Appendix "C").

7. In respect to equipping the Turkish forces, it is presumed that this program will not extend beyond that envisaged at TRIDENT.<sup>7</sup> In view of the apparent inability of the Turkish forces to properly assimilate, maintain, and train with such equipment as has been provided to them, it is questionable as to whether the political benefits that would accrue from furnishing any further equipment would outweigh the advisability of retaining such equipment for other purposes.

8. The aggregate strengths of forces which might be available to the United Nations and which are now located in Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland totals about 150,000 men (Appendix "D"). Since potential forces in none of these countries constitutes a force which of itself could carry out extensive offensive operations, it is assumed that such forces would be available only for garrison and interior guard duty.

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<sup>7</sup> See *ante*, p. 371.

9. It is the opinion of the War Shipping Administration that cargo shipping captured should be operated for rehabilitation and support of the occupied country. This policy will reduce shipping load on United Nations and will save the time and expense of repair and rehabilitation of vessels in U.S. ports. Personnel vessels should be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

10. It is recommended that :

*a.* The supplies and equipment necessary to carry out the program recommended by the Commanding General of the North African Theater of Operations (cable W7177—CM—IN—Bosco 21, 13 Aug. 1943<sup>8</sup>) be authorized for shipment during the period 1 September—31 December 1943.

*b.* Rearmament of French Army units be limited to the obligations of the Casablanca Conference, i.e., 11 divisions as modified by General Eisenhower's radio of 13 August 1943.

*c.* Equipment for any French local forces to be organized on the Continent subsequent to invasion be limited to that required for garrison or guard duties and no attempt be made to organize assault forces. Equipment to be furnished through CG, ETO, for Northern France and through CG, NATO, for Southern France. All equipment to be furnished as far as practicable from captured German and Italian items.<sup>9</sup>

*d.* In accordance with C.C.S. 303/3,<sup>10</sup> Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe (par. 6*d* and par. 8) equipment to be supplied to the Balkans will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport and for<sup>11</sup> planning purposes the forces to be so equipped will be limited to 175,000 men (six divisions and supporting troops).

*e.* No equipment be supplied the Polish forces in Poland, other than that which can be flown in to guerrilla and underground forces extant within the limits of Poland. (The limitations imposed by the requirement that all material must be flown in will limit the forces that can be equipped to an optimum figure of 50 modified infantry battalions). This is to be a British commitment.

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<sup>8</sup> Not printed. This message is summarized, however, in appendix A, below.

<sup>9</sup> In C.C.S. 317/1, "Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces and Friendly Neutrals," August 21, 1943 (not printed), the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of paragraph 10 of C.C.S. 317, amended in four respects. The first suggested amendment was the deletion of the last two sentences of subparagraph *c*. The other amendments are described in footnotes 11–13, below.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 1024.

<sup>11</sup> The addition at this point of the word "supply" was suggested in C.C.S. 317/1.

*f.* The program of aid to Turkey be reviewed in the light of experience to date and with a view to possibly curtailing the furnishing of additional equipment.

*g.*<sup>12</sup> Equipment for potential forces in Norway and the Low Countries be limited to basic individual equipment for a total force aggregating 150,000 men, together with certain categories of light infantry weapons and light motor vehicles. That measures be initiated to determine the exact forces to be equipped as soon as operations by the United Nations in Western Europe make such action practicable. Theater commanders concerned to equip liberated forces of Norway, Holland, and Belgium through CG, ETO. The Balkans to be equipped through CG, NATO.<sup>13</sup>

*h.* That in implementing the recommendations appearing in subparagraphs *c* to *g*, inclusive, maximum use be made of captured war matériel.

*i.* That implementation (after maximum utilization of captured war matériel) of equipping the forces carried in subparagraphs *a*, *b* and *d* above, be considered to be a responsibility of the United States, and for subparagraphs *c*, *e*, *f*, and *g* to be considered as a responsibility of the United Kingdom.

*j.* Captured cargo shipping be used, insofar as practicable, to carry relief and rehabilitation supplies to the country from which captured. Captured personnel vessels be operated to assist U.S. troop lift regardless of decisions as to U.S. or British control.

#### Appendix "A"

SECRET

#### REARMAMENT OF THE FRENCH

1. During the Casablanca Conference, the United States Government accepted the responsibility for the equipping of 11 French divisions (three armored and eight infantry).

2. By 1 September 1943 the equipment for two armored and four infantry divisions, with supporting troops, will have been shipped.

3. *a.* By radiogram W7177 (Bosco-IN-21, 13 August 1943), the Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, recom-

<sup>12</sup> The addition at this point of the phrase, "For supply planning purposes," was suggested in C.C.S. 317/1.

<sup>13</sup> The deletion of the last sentence of subparagraph *g* was suggested in C.C.S. 317/1.

mends that equipment for the remaining French troops be provided as follows:

- September, 1943—One infantry and one armored division  
(less certain units)
- October, 1943 —One infantry division
- November, 1943—One infantry division
- December, 1943 —One armored division

Equipment for supporting and service units to be provided on a proportionate basis for each month.

*b.* The proposal outlined in *a* above will provide for a total of four armored (on a slightly reduced scale) and seven infantry divisions. The Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations, advises that this, considering also the Koenig Division, which was equipped by the British, will satisfy the requirements of the Casablanca Conference.

4. Equipment, allowing minor substitutions, can be made available to meet the requirements outlined in paragraph 3 above, provided that priority above that for pre-shipments to the United Kingdom is granted. About 60% of the equipment for French units would necessarily be withheld from pre-shipment to the United Kingdom. These shortages can be made up in time to equip U.K. units prior to departure. Provision of this equipment will not prejudice currently directed operations in the Pacific, BOLERO, or SICKLE. Any equipment left behind by U.S. divisions transferred from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom will be credited against this requirement. Shipping can be made available as requested by General Eisenhower (180,000 ship tons in September and 150,000 ship tons per month, October, November, and December).

5. The provision of equipment and supplies referred to in paragraph 5 [*3?*] above, will satisfy the United States obligation of the Casablanca Conference. There is no further known requirement for equipment for French units from United States sources. During the first four to five months following the initial assault on the Continent, all available port and beach capacity will be required for build-up of the combat forces. It is considered that a minimum of six to eight months would be required between the start of reorganization and re-equipment of French Army units on the Continent, and their initial employment. Thus it would appear that no Continental French Army units could be employed for from ten to thirteen months after the assault.

6. Certain resistance groups in France are being equipped by air delivery with small arms. This is a British commitment. Any demands

on the United States for weapons or equipment for this purpose will be negligible.

7. It may be necessary to clothe and equip local defense units organized in France after the invasion is well under way. Arms for such units would undoubtedly be limited to small arms and light weapons. It is believed that any such equipment should be provided from and limited to that available from captured enemy (Italian) supplies, and should not be set up as an obligation of the United States Government.

#### Appendix "B"

SECRET

#### BALKANS

1. The Balkan guerrilla forces are estimated to number around 175,000; however, some estimates have placed this figure as high as 300,000. The former figure is based on recent intelligence reports and is considered to be reliable. These forces are divided into several political groups, operating independently, the strongest of which is General Mihailovitch's Chetniks. However, it is doubtful that even he can command the loyalty of more than 175,000 to 200,000 men.

2. In addition to these forces, recent radio report from the Mediterranean Theater quotes a Yugoslavian representative as being desirous of establishing a training corps, on the fall of Italy, in some Italian territory, preferably Sicily, to consist of 30,000 to 40,000 Yugoslavian prisoners of war now in Italy. The State Department is very emphatic in the opinion that a maximum of 6,500 Yugoslavian and 1,800 Greek prisoners of war will be liberated on the fall of Italy, and that any claims of the Yugoslav Government in Exile in excess of this figure would constitute an attempt to create a Free Yugoslav Army to lend national prestige in peace conference negotiations. The liberated prisoners of war available therefore appear to be relatively insignificant in comparison to the tangible guerrilla forces, and, moreover, the time that would be consumed in training such a force would render them valueless in the conquest of Germany.

3. In the past, supply of these forces has been effected by the British Middle East Command, in some 100 scattered sorties, dropping only the bare essentials of medical supplies, etc. Their principal needs are machine guns, light (horse) artillery and medical supplies.

4. The supply of equipment to the Balkans therefore devolves to a consideration of furnishing an equivalent of the requirements for a force commensurate with the 175,000 guerrillas.

5. Equipment to be supplied to the Balkans should be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport. The latter method

must supplement the former before any substantial amount of equipment can be made available to a force aggregating 175,000 men.

Appendix "C"

SECRET

POLISH FORCES

1. Polish forces in the U.K. consist of approximately 40,000 men, including one armored division, one parachute brigade, 13 air squadrons and some light naval vessels. In the Middle East, Polish forces contain about 73,000 men, including two infantry divisions, one tank brigade, and corps troops. In both of the above elements, the supply of matériel and equipment has been from British sources, including some lend-lease transactions, and the supply status of each is approximately 75% complete.

2. There is an additional Polish force of approximately 65,000 men, in the occupied territory, known as the "Secret Army." Various estimates of this force have run as high as 300,000 men, however the former figure is based on U.S. Army Intelligence information and is considered to be reliable. In addition to supplying the Polish forces in the U.K. and Middle East, the British have occasionally dropped small quantities of explosives, and communications equipment, to this "Secret Army," from the air.

3. Supply of the forces in the U.K. and Middle East having been undertaken by the British (these elements are now a part of British forces in the respective area), the equipping of Polish forces evolves to the requirements of the "Secret Army." This requirement amounts to equipment for an equivalent of fifty infantry battalions which must be flown in, and would require an estimated 500 sorties initially. The Polish General Staff estimates this force could fight in isolation for about 20 days and its continued existence would depend on a break through contact by other Allied Forces within that time.

4. The Polish plan further envisages the transporting of the U.K. and Middle East Forces into Poland by air after the break through contact with the "Secret Army" has been established. These, with other liberated Polish Forces, would be organized into 16 infantry divisions and six dismounted cavalry brigades. This latter phase is not considered as advantageous inasmuch as the effect of it can not be realized until such time as it is no longer needed.

5. It is clear that sabotage and intelligence operations are desirable and the operation of 50 rifle battalions will considerably aid in this activity, as well as occupy the attention of considerable German forces. However, current intelligence digests indicate Russia will violently

oppose any arming of the Poles in Poland due to the well-known Polish-Russian enmity.

6. To support this operation, including supply of initial equipment, would require some 2,000 sorties by heavy transport planes and this air lift can not be spared without seriously affecting other operations.

#### Appendix "D"

SECRET

#### NORWAY, LOW COUNTRIES

1. In giving consideration to the possible need for supplying equipment and matériel to the forces of free neutrals of nations at present occupied by Axis forces and which might come within the scope of possibly having to be rearmed by the United Nations, estimates have been confined to Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. The table which follows indicates (on the basis of informal estimates furnished by a representative of the Joint Intelligence Committee) the strengths of the armed forces of each nation at or about the time each became involved in the war, as well as the indicated potential strengths of that portion of the manpower of each nation which might be available for reequipment, rearming, training and service in the event of a United Nations reoccupation :

<i>Country</i>	<i>Estimated Strength at Outbreak of War</i>	<i>Possible Strength To Be Equipped</i>
Norway	17, 000	40, 000*
Denmark	11, 000	10, 000†
Belgium	650, 000	50, 000*
Holland	400, 000	50, 000*
		150, 000

2. From the above table it is apparent that the aggregate strength of the forces which might be available for rearming in all of these countries totals 150,000 troops. Since potential forces in none of these countries constitute a force which of itself could carry out extended offensive operations, it is presumed that such forces would be supplied only to the extent of basic individual equipment, together with certain categories of small arms and light motor vehicles. Considering the reequipment of all of these nations as a complete total requirement, and assuming that such reequipment would not take place until, at the earliest, some time after 1 January 1944 (the estimated date on which

\*Estimated on basis of ability to form and train units upon liberation. [Footnote in the source text.]

†For police purposes only. [Footnote in the source text.]

the rearming of the French forces as presently contemplated would be completed), it is not considered that any great problem of supply would be involved and that quantities of the requisite matériel could be made available without unduly affecting the equipment status of American forces.

3. Assuming (for conservative purposes) that the reequipment of all of these countries would be coincidental, which of course would not be the case, a total maximum shipping requirement of some six to eight ships might be required but this could be made available without any effect on the BOLERO/SICKLE operation or operations as presently contemplated and planned for the South and Southwest Pacific areas.

4. It is, of course, obvious that a determination must be made at the earliest practicable moment in the event any or all of these countries, or any contiguous countries, are to be reequipped and rearmed. Such plans must indicate the approximate date on which rearming and reequipping would be required and, in general, the type force that it would be considered advisable to rearm and reequip for each country with the forces available to it and the nature of operations in which it is contemplated such forces might become engaged, i.e., garrison and police duty, or actual components of an offensive fighting force. It is also essential that a determination be made at the earliest practicable date as to how much equipment would be supplied and the source of the equipment.

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J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 319

#### PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff submit the following report on the progress made so far in the QUADRANT Conference.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 319), August 19, 1943: "The Enclosure is the report to the President and the Prime Minister which was made to them at the meeting at the Citadel on 19 August [see *ante*, p. 894]. It includes all of the amendments which they directed be made." The amendments referred to consisted of six small additions in paragraphs 4, 7, 10, and 15 of the enclosure to C.C.S. 319. The additions to paragraphs 4, 7, and 10 are printed in italics below to identify the changes made by Roosevelt and Churchill in the report originally submitted to them.

2. We have agreed to accept tentatively Sections I, II and III of the final report made to you at the TRIDENT Conference<sup>2</sup> as a basis for use in this Conference. These sections, covering the Over-all Objective, the Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, and the Basic Undertakings in Support of the Over-all Strategic Concept, to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the present Conference.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

3. We have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, 1943-44.

4. *Operation "POINTBLANK"*

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive *from all convenient bases* is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (bar-ring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

5. *Operation "OVERLORD"*

[Subparagraphs *a*, *b*, and *c* are identical with the subparagraphs of paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 303/3, *ante*, pp. 1024-1025.]

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD<sup>3</sup> and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

6. *Operations in Italy*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 4 of C.C.S. 303/3, *ante*, p. 1025.]

7. *Operations in Southern France*

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. *Air nourished guerilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.*

8. *Air Operations*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 303/3, *ante*, p. 1025, except that the cross-reference in subparagraph *d* has been changed to read "(see paragraph 10 below)."]

9. *Operations at Sea*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 303/3, *ante*, p. 1025.]

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 365-366.

<sup>3</sup> See annex B to C.C.S. 304, *ante*, p. 486.

### 10. *Operations in the Balkans*

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerillas by air and sea transport, to *minor Commando forces*, and to the bombing of Ploëști and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

### 11. *Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean*

[This paragraph is identical with paragraph 9 of C.C.S. 303/3, *ante*, p. 1026, except that the parenthetical reference to appendix A to C.C.S. 303 is omitted.]

#### THE U-BOAT WAR

### 12. *Progress Report*

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

#### PORTUGUESE ISLANDS

### 13. *Facilities in the Azores Islands*

On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the Azores<sup>4</sup> we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the Azores has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.<sup>5</sup>

#### REMAINDER OF THE CONFERENCE

16. Before we separate, we proposed to discuss the following matters:

- a. Immediate operations in the Mediterranean;
- b. Emergency return to the Continent;
- c. Military considerations in relation to Spain;
- d. Military considerations in relation to Turkey;
- e. Military considerations in relation to Russia;
- f. Equipment of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals;
- g. A number of miscellaneous matters.

<sup>4</sup> An Anglo-Portuguese agreement had been signed at Lisbon on August 17, 1943, which provided for the use of facilities in the Azores by British forces beginning October 8, 1943. See *ante*, pp. 609-616, and *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 527-543.

<sup>5</sup> For paragraphs 14-15, relating to the war against Japan, see *ante*, p. 992.

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 222/2

1. *a.* The present limit of UGS convoys is 80 ships.
  - b.* UGS 16 sailing on August 26th has 91 firm presenters. A number of these ships have been held back from previous UGS convoys, because of the inability of North African ports to handle them. It is understood that this difficulty no longer exists.
  - c.* UGS 17 sailing September 5th already has 79 presenters with indications of more to come.
  - d.* A similar situation is foreseen for the next few UGS convoys.
2. The situation regarding UGS 16 is now urgent and there appear to be two alternatives:
    - a.* To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
    - b.* To withdraw the 11 lowest priority ships.
  3. The most satisfactory solution would be for alternative *a* to be adopted.
  4. If this is not feasible the 11 ships to be withdrawn from UGS 16 will suffer the least possible delay if they are included in the first available HX or SC convoy to U.K. to join up with a KMS convoy to the Mediterranean. This would result in a delay in arrival dates of these 11 ships at their destinations of between 16 days and 26 days, depending upon the speed of the ships selected. North Atlantic and KMS convoys are frequently overloaded but have no fixed limit, and are not so well protected as UGS convoys.
  5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are, therefore, requested to give a decision on the allocation of ships to UGS 16 as a matter of urgency. If it is decided that the limit for UGS convoys must remain at 80 ships, it is requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicate the priority in which these 80 ships should be selected. A decision is required by August 23rd in order to ensure the least delay to any ships which it may be necessary to withdraw from UGS 16.
  6. The detail of ships and destinations of the 91 presenters for UGS 16 is shown in the Annex.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 222/2), August 20, 1943: "The Enclosure, a study prepared by the Combined Military Transportation Committee on its own initiative, is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

C.C.S. 314/3

ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT  
(OPERATION OVERLORD—VEHICLE LIFT)

1. We have noted the memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 314<sup>1</sup>) concerning the shortage of vehicle lift for OVERLORD and the necessity of additional landing craft therefor; viz., 57 LCT(3 or 4)'s and 15 LCT(5)'s. Consideration has also been given to the British proposals contained in C.C.S. 286.<sup>2</sup>

2. We have examined the possibility of providing additional LCT(6)'s from U.S. sources and find that our own LCT deliveries to fulfill the TRIDENT U.S. commitment for OVERLORD<sup>3</sup> cannot be accomplished as early as desired and that it is impossible to increase the number of LCT's so committed; viz., 146, of which 41, at least, must come from the Mediterranean.

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will effect an increase in the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944.

4. In view of this, the deficiencies in OVERLORD will have to be made good from the Mediterranean and these movements will, of course, in the case of LCT's, have to be adjusted to weather conditions.

5. It is suggested that every effort be made to put all the LCT(5)'s now in the U.K. in an operating condition and employ them in OVERLORD as a means to improve the situation.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1027.

<sup>2</sup> "Formation by U.S. Assault Forces for Operation 'OVERLORD'", July 20, 1943; not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See Coakley and Leighton, p. 72.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 21 August 1943.

C.C.S. 246/1

MOVEMENT OF THE "QUEENS"<sup>2</sup>

At the 94th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the TRIDENT Conference,<sup>3</sup> approval was given to the "*Queens*" running on

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 939.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the requisitioned passenger liners *Queen Elizabeth* and *Queen Mary*.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 179.

a 28 day cycle as at that time the urgency of lifting personnel was not as great as it is now.

It is understood that a situation is developing in which it is essential to lift as many personnel as possible, and in view of the longer nights we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should now approve that the "Queens" should revert to running on a 21 day cycle.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 326

[QUEBEC,] 21 August 1943.

#### AMPHIBIANS FOR "OVERLORD"

1. In view of the proved value and necessity of the DUKW, two and one-half ton amphibious truck, it is considered essential that adequate provision of these vehicles be available for OVERLORD in order to mitigate the great problems involved in prolonged maintenance over the beaches under difficult conditions.

2. Preliminary examination of requirements resulted in demands being placed for 1,200 DUKWs, of which 700 were destined for use by U.S. Forces and 500 for use by British Forces. It is understood that this requirement was accepted on the basis of production of 400 DUKWs per month to meet present global requirements.

3. Subsequent to the above demand, additional requirements for OVERLORD, it is understood, have been stated bringing the total requirement to 2,400; covering 1,400 for U.S. Forces, and 1,000 for the British, of which the latter will probably be increased to 1,500. Preliminary inquiries in Washington lead us to suppose that these enhanced demands have not yet been presented to the Amphibian Subcommittee of the Munitions Assignment Committee, and there appears to be some doubt in Washington as to what is the full OVERLORD requirement. With a view to clarifying the position, a telegram has been sent to London.

4. It is probable that the present production of DUKWs will prove too small to compete with requirements, and it is considered that every effort should be made as a matter of urgency to increase productive capacity. It is believed that a substantial increase can be achieved with existing plant but at the expense of production of two and one-half ton trucks and by a reallocation of the requisite steel for hulls.

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 939.

5. It is further understood that the U.S. Navy has, or will shortly have, a considerable requirement for DUKWs additional to any already demanded.

6. In view of the above, agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is requested for:

*a.* Acceptance of the principle that priority of allocation of production be given to OVERLORD.

*b.* The issue of instructions for the urgent examination of possible increases in production.

*c.* Allocations to OVERLORD be concurrent for American and British needs in a ratio to be stated by Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate).

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840.48 Refugees/5137

*Memorandum by the British Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

REFUGEES

Up till now approaches to neutral countries on refugee questions have been conducted by joint efforts of Foreign Office and State Department. At Bermuda<sup>2</sup> we thought that approaches of this kind would have much more chance of success if they were made not by Foreign Office or State Department but by Intergovernmental Committee as a whole. It would seem sensible therefore to arrange that Intergovernmental Committee should from now on take over approaches of this kind. This would not cut either of us out of the picture since we are both represented on the Committee and nothing would in fact be done without our consent but if we are to use Intergovernmental Committee for this purpose it is essential that there should be quicker decisions than there have been in the past[;] otherwise the Committee will become an object of ridicule and both our Governments will be open to the most serious criticism. Any announcement of a decision to proceed on these lines should make it clear that the two Governments are not in any way disinteresting themselves from these questions, but are convinced that this procedure will make for greater efficiency and expedition.

QUEBEC, 21st August, 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> According to a paper attached to this document, this memorandum was handed to Hull at Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the Bermuda Conference to consider the refugee problem, held April 19-28, 1943, and the work of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 134 ff.

740.0011 European War 1939/30942½

*Memorandum by the British Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

## GREECE

We have long known that Guerilla bands, particularly those of the organisation known as E.A.M., which is Communist-run, and the Politicians in Athens, are predominantly Republican and opposed to the return of the King before a plebiscite has been held to decide the future form of the régime. This view has now been reiterated by Representatives of the E.A.M. and the Liberal politicians recently arrived in Cairo without knowledge of Greek Government or H.M. Ambassador,<sup>2</sup> and their arrival has led to strong pressure being put on the King in this sense. M. Tsouderos himself is in favour of the King giving such a pledge on the grounds that a refusal would result in the resignation of his colleagues and in antagonising opinion in Greece. The King is being told that if he agrees all parties would unite to form a coalition Government which would include representatives of the Guerillas and of the politicians in Athens. But such a coalition Government would not necessarily include representatives of the Royalist elements in Greece.

It has been pointed out to H.M. Ambassador to the Greek Government that a government reconstructed on the basis proposed would be almost entirely Republican and on returning to Greece would be more than human if they did not attempt to influence opinion in favour of a Republic. We should therefore be careful before advising the King to place himself at the mercy of an E.A.M. Government on the assumption that it would play straight by him when established in Greece and allow a free plebiscite to be held when the time comes. In our view if the King now undertakes not to return to Greece on liberation he would be practically signing his abdication. Nor could we guarantee to protect the King's interests during his absence, since after Greece is liberated we shall want law and order maintained and shall therefore have to work with whatever Government is in power. Meanwhile although we felt that the decision must rest with the King, it was still our policy to give him all the support we can with a view to replacing him on his throne.

M. Tsouderos now hopes that it may be possible to defer both the reconstruction of the Government and an immediate decision about

<sup>1</sup> The source text bears the following typed notation: "(This was handed to me by Sir Alexander Cadogan—J[ames] D[unn])". It is probably the "report on the present political situation of Greece prepared by the British Foreign Office" which Eden read during a Roosevelt-Churchill meeting on August 22, 1943. See *ante*, p. 933.

<sup>2</sup> Reginald Wildig Allen Leeper.

the King's position, but he may not succeed on the latter point. As a compromise he suggested some days ago that the King should agree to return after the liberation of Greece for a short visit of two or three weeks, after which he should remain outside the country until a plebiscite is held. This is what the King refers to in the last paragraph of his message to the Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup> We do not regard this proposal as satisfactory, since there may well be a period of many months between the date of the Government's return to Greece and the time when a plebiscite could be held. Apart from the short initial period of the King's visit the Provisional Government would be free during this time to undermine his position if they chose to do so.

H.M. Ambassador reports that he is doing what he can to prevent any hasty and undignified decision.

I<sup>4</sup> am not convinced that if the King stands firm he will necessarily find himself isolated particularly if we and the United States Government continue to support him and show clearly that we do so. The opinion of the British officers who have recently returned from Greece is that even the E.A.M. which is the most powerful organisation in the country and most strongly opposed to the King, now realise that only a pro-British policy can gain popular support and that they are not strong enough to stand alone. This estimate is supported by the fact that their representatives have agreed to come to Cairo.

I would therefore suggest that in reply to the King's message he should be told that in our view the policy outlined in his declaration of July 4th is that best calculated to serve the interests of Greece and that we therefore hope it may be possible for His Majesty to avoid any further statement at this stage about his own position when Greece is liberated. By sending his message the King is evidently trying to strengthen his own hand in dealing with his Government and the Emissaries from Greece. But I do not think this need deter us from giving him the above advice, while repeating to him the assurances that whatever his decision may be we shall continue to give him the maximum support in our power.

QUEBEC, 21st August, 1943.

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<sup>3</sup> See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 536. Cf. the parallel passage in King George's message to Roosevelt, *ante*, p. 915, fn. 8.

<sup>4</sup> The source text gives no indication of the authorship of this paper. The final paragraph, however, contains language so similar to that of Churchill's reply to King George as to suggest the possibility that this paper may be a copy of telegram No. CONCRETE 374 from Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office, to the British Delegation at Quebec. Cf. *post*, p. 1046. For Churchill's minute to Eden on King George's message, see Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 536-537.

[Attachment]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sargent)* <sup>5</sup>

MOST SECRET

QUADRANT, [undated.<sup>6</sup>]

IMPORTANT

For Sargent from Foreign Secretary.

Your telegram CONCRETE 374.

Prime Minister agrees to reply as suggested to message from King of Greece.

Please therefore instruct H.M. Ambassador to the Greek Government to convey the following to His Majesty :

“I have received Your Majesty’s Message.

I venture to suggest that in the view of H.M.G. the policy outlined in Your Majesty’s declaration of July 4th is that best calculated to serve the interests of Greece and they therefore hope that it may be possible for Your Majesty to avoid any further statement at this stage about your own position when Greece is liberated.

I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to assure Your Majesty that whatever your decision may be, H.M.G. will continue to give you the maximum support in their power.”

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<sup>5</sup> The source text indicates that this message was to be sent to the War Cabinet Office in London as a telegram in the WELFARE series. Roosevelt’s message to King George, sent from Washington on September 6, 1943, after the close of the First Quebec Conference, read as follows :

“I hope that in the interest of our common war effort all Greeks will accept the program announced in Your Majesty’s radio address of July 4 as a guarantee that they will have full opportunity freely to express their political will at the earliest practicable moment and that they will meanwhile subordinate other considerations to the urgent necessity of winning the war and liberating their homeland.” (868.01/374)

The Ambassador to Greece (Kirk) was instructed to inform the King orally that Roosevelt “would find it difficult to advise him as regards the reply to be made to the Greek emissaries” then in Cairo, but that Roosevelt doubted that “any further statement by the King at this time would promote the war effort.” See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 151.

<sup>6</sup> Churchill’s message to King George quoted in this telegram was received in Cairo via London on August 26, 1943. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 149.

800.0146/8-2243

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*Proposal by the United States Delegation* <sup>1</sup>

QUEBEC CONFERENCE, 22 August 1943.

STATEMENT ON LIBERATED AREAS

1. The Governments of the United States and United Kingdom, necessarily by reason of their military operations in enemy territory,

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of this paper at the Roosevelt–Churchill meeting of August 22, 1943, see *ante*, p. 931.

must assume the major responsibility for the administration of enemy territories conquered by their forces in pursuance of the war against the Axis.

2. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, while continuing to exercise supreme military authority in liberated areas pending the defeat of the enemy, will be agreeable to the policy of each government and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with its function<sup>2</sup> of maintaining law and order with such assistance by the Allied authorities as may be necessary, subject always to military requirements.

Conversations and arrangements with the governments of those countries have already been in progress for some time on these aspects of the mutual interests involved.

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<sup>2</sup> During the discussion of this paper on August 22, 1943, this passage was changed to read: "the policy of the governments and constituted authorities of the United Nations in their respective liberated countries proceeding with the function". Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 518. Concerning the decision to postpone issuance of this statement and the later decision not to issue it at all, see *ibid.*, p. 517, fn. 14, and p. 524, fn. 27. A new British draft on the subject was subsequently referred to the European Advisory Commission. See *ibid.*, pp. 651-652, 738-739, 754.

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J.C.S. Files

*Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 22 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 222/3

#### FUTURE CONVOY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE ATLANTIC

1. *a.* C.C.S. 222/2<sup>2</sup> indicates that convoy UGS 16, sailing 26 August, has 91 firm presenters as against a convoy limit of 80 ships.

*b.* The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been requested by the Combined Military Transportation Committee to give a decision on one of two alternatives:

- (1) To raise the limit of UGS convoys.
- (2) To indicate the priority which should be assigned the presenters involved so that 80 ships can be selected.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 222/3), August 22, 1943. This report was discussed at the 116th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 24, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 959), and was approved with the amendments described in footnotes 3-4, below. The report, as amended and approved and with a few minor editorial changes, was then circulated as the enclosure to a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 222/4), August 24, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1040.

2. *a.* With regard to alternative (1), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, has established the limit on the number of ships in UGS convoys at 80 for security reasons.

*b.* The immediate problem in priorities has been solved in large part by the withdrawal of 6 U.S. Army vessels and 2 B.M.W.T. vessels from the list of presenters. The convoy limitation of 80 ships now is exceeded by 3.

*c.* It is quite possible that, of the remaining 83 vessels, at least 3 may fail to meet the convoy sailing date.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

3. It is recommended that:

*a.* Three vessels be nominated for withdrawal from the convoy, if necessary, in the following priority:

First withdrawal—1 B.M.W.T. vessel

Second withdrawal—1 W.S.A. vessel

Third withdrawal—1 B.M.W.T. vessel

Vessel or vessels to be selected by the agency concerned.

*b.* All vessels should be prepared to sail.

4. In view of the fact that indications point to a recurrence of this problem in subsequent months, it is recommended that the U.S. Navy fix the earliest practical date when a program of four UGS convoys per month will be established.<sup>3</sup>

5. It is further recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff delegate to the Combined Military Transportation Committee the executive authority to act on similar problems in the future with regard to UGS convoys in accordance with the following priority:<sup>4</sup>

*a.* U.S. and British ships destined for forces commanded by the Allied Commander in Chief in Mediterranean.

*b.* U.S. and British ships destined for India.

*c.* U.S. and British ships destined for Allied forces in Middle East.

*d.* U.S. and British ships carrying civil supplies for occupied territories in Mediterranean.

*e.* Ships destined for Persian Gulf.

*f.* Lend lease to Turkey.

*g.* Miscellaneous.

<sup>3</sup>The words "with due regard to the general set-up of convoys in the Atlantic" were added to this paragraph in C.C.S. 222/4.

<sup>4</sup>The words "unless otherwise agreed" were added at the end of this paragraph in C.C.S. 222/4.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 22 August 1943.

C.C.S. 317/2

## EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

Action on C.C.S. 317<sup>1</sup> has been deferred pending further study of the subject by the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff, however, recommend that immediate decision be rendered on the recommendations contained in paragraph 10 *a* and *b* of that paper. These paragraphs pertain to the equipment of French forces in North Africa. A decision at this time is necessary because of certain administrative arrangements which should be carried out at once in the event that the recommendations are to be approved.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*


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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1029.

J.C.S. Files

*Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 22 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 324/1

## REHABILITATION OF OCCUPIED AND LIBERATED TERRITORIES

References: *a*. C.C.S. 288; <sup>2</sup> C.C.S. 288/1; <sup>3</sup> C.C.S. 288/2.<sup>4</sup>*b*. C.C.S. 104th Meeting, Item 3.<sup>5</sup>

## THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the broad basic policy and division of responsibility as between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 324/1), August 22, 1943. This report was based on a paper (not printed) which had been circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 324), August 20, 1943: "In order to avoid delay, the Enclosure, prepared by the U.S. Joint Administrative Committee, has been referred to a combined *ad hoc* committee for study and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It will be placed on the C.C.S. agenda when the report of the *ad hoc* committee is received."

For the action taken on the enclosure to C.C.S. 324/1 at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943, see *ante*, p. 940.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 400.<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 402.<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 404.<sup>5</sup> The minutes of this meeting, which took place at Washington on July 30, 1943, are not printed.

stating of requirements, procurement of supplies and shipping thereof, for supplies required in connection with the initial phases of relief and rehabilitation of reoccupied countries.

#### DISCUSSION

2. It is recognized that minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter. Procurement for such relief by the military should be limited to that essential to military occupation but as this period may vary it is desirable for the military procurement to be coordinated with that of the civil authorities for the purpose of long term production planning. As such, it should be confined to making available the minimum quantities of food, fuel, medical, sanitary, and agreed essential supplies necessary to maintain the health and working capacity of the civilian population, as well as that required to preserve public order, maintain lines of communication and, where appropriate, develop effective fighting partners or local resources to lighten the burden on the allied armies.

3. In accordance with the basic objectives outlined in paragraph 2 above, it is essential that a program of requirements be developed which will clearly indicate the quantities of supplies estimated to be required for the civilian populations of reoccupied countries in Europe according to operational estimates. Such a statement of requirements should indicate the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and what part will be supplied by the United States. Likewise, the responsibility for arranging for the shipment of these supplies should be established.

4. Stockpiles should be held to the smallest possible amount with food items limited to the basic ration in order that large frozen stocks will not accumulate and thereby impinge on other needs of equal or greater urgency. In the case of the United States, inasmuch as the War Department utilizes military priorities for the procurement of those stores it furnishes during the period of military operations for the economic relief of the populations of occupied areas, such procurement must necessarily be limited to the basic ration, soap, medical and sanitary supplies and fuel (coal and petroleum) essential to military operations as distinguished from a more generous relief standard or from rehabilitation measures. It is essential that the basic ration issued by the United States or the United Kingdom be as nearly as possible the same.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that an over-all combined program of requirements covering the minimum economic relief for the population of occupied areas that must be furnished by the military during the period of military operations and for some time thereafter, be developed in accordance with the following principles:

*a.* The quantities incorporated in the program to be confined to the provision of the basic ration, soap, medical, sanitary supplies, fuel (coal and petroleum products), and other agreed articles considered essential to military operations. The basic ration should be as nearly as possible the same whether supplied by the United States or United Kingdom.

*b.* Stockpiling should be limited to the smallest possible amount.

*c.* A statement of requirements will be prepared indicating the quantities of each category which will be supplied by the United Kingdom and the United States.

*d.* Responsibility for arranging for shipment will rest with the country procuring the supplies.

*e.* In the provision of coal and other supplies required for relief of civil populations in reoccupied countries, maximum use will be made of supplies, stockpiles and resources locally available within such reoccupied countries. Where possible and where a surplus of coal or other supplies exists within any particular reoccupied country over and above the requirements for such commodities by that country, such surpluses will be used to fill the requirements of other reoccupied countries.

*f.* The monthly requirements for the various countries which it is anticipated may be reoccupied, will be a matter for recommendation by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

*g.* It is agreed that for a period of three months subsequent to the occupation of Italy, the United Kingdom will deliver up to 100,000 tons of coal to Italy each month if the Italian stock position and the need require it. Deliveries after the first three months will be the subject of further negotiation. Subsequent to the occupation of Italy within the strategic plan, the United States will make available the equivalent of two ships each month for the purpose of supplying the Italian civilian population with the essential dry cargo imports other than coal if the need requires it. Should it be agreed that essential civilian requirements exceed the capacity set forth above additional shipping will be provided as may be agreed upon. This paragraph is subject to the provision that Italian ships are not available for the purposes herein stated.

740.00116 European War 1939/1136

*The Netherlands Ambassador (Loudon) to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 22nd, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, In the course of Her latest visit to Hyde Park the Queen discussed with you the opportunity of issuing a declaration with a view to preventing as much as possible destruction by the Germans upon their leaving the occupied countries. The Queen discussed this idea also with the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Secretary, who were in favour of it and asked for a draft declaration. Such a draft has now been prepared and approved by Her Majesty.

Acting upon instructions I have just received, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the draft which has also been handed to the British Foreign Office.

Dr. van Kleffens instructs me moreover to submit to you the request that this draft be discussed with the British Prime Minister, if this would be agreeable to you.

I beg to add that the Queen would have no objection against a shorter and more strongly worded text.

Dr. van Kleffens would highly appreciate if further consultations could take place for the final drafting of this declaration and its subsequent handling, especially with regard to the opportune moment of its publication. In this connection Dr. van Kleffens ventures the suggestion whether it would be desirable to ask the Soviet Union to participate.

With my highest esteem [etc.]

A. LOUDON

[Enclosure]

*Draft Declaration*

In the regions of Europe which Germany has occupied, the German authorities and their subordinates have shown a measure of harshness and cruelty which not only violates clear and binding rules of international law but runs counter to the most elementary feelings of common decency. Confinement in concentration camps of evil and sinister repute, seizure of hostages (a practice expressly forbidden in

<sup>1</sup> This message was delivered to the Department of State on August 22, 1943, under cover of the following note: "The Netherlands Ambassador presents his compliments to the Honorable the acting Secretary of State, and has the honor to request Mr. Sumner Welles that through his intermediary the enclosed documents, copies of which are attached, be transmitted at the earliest opportunity to the President of the United States of America." The Ambassador's message to Roosevelt and the enclosed draft of a declaration were delivered by the Department of State to the White House Map Room at 7:30 p.m. the same day, and were forwarded to Roosevelt at Quebec later the same evening in telegram No. WHITE 116.

a solemn treaty of 1907, to which Germany has expressly adhered) and large scale deportation of men and even of women, are common German practice and these are far from being the worst offences committed in the name of Germany. In many cases, especially in Eastern Europe and with regard to the Jews, German action assumed proportions of bestiality. Wholesale slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent people will be forever a blot on the German name. In the economic field the Germans have taken measures indicating that far from their showing any regard for the occupied countries and their population, they are bent upon crippling the resources of those territories. The German nation as a whole may not as yet have a full knowledge of all the savagery and brutality committed in its name. But that nation cannot be presumed to be ignorant of what has been and still is being done. Remembering further what the German authorities did towards the end of the last war in territory then under their occupation, the Governments of . . . . .<sup>2</sup> issue the following warning to the German Government, civil and military authorities and people:

When the hour of liberation strikes for the occupied regions, those Germans who are stationed there may receive orders, or feel inclined to do their utmost not to leave the territory they hold before having wrought havoc, not only by an attempt to destroy objects of value to the wellbeing of the country concerned but also by murdering or deporting a still larger part of the population. All Germans should bear in mind that those guilty of such acts will be held responsible for their misdeeds, not only the leaders and authorities who plan crimes of this kind or give orders to commit them, but also the actual perpetrators. Moreover, from now on any further action against the population of the occupied regions including that part of the population that has been deported to Germany—in complete disregard of international law—either as prisoners or as hostages, as workers in war-industries or otherwise, any act of destruction calculated to obstruct the resumption of the economic or social life of the occupied countries to impoverish them or to impede their recovery, exposes Germany and the Germans to retaliation of the severest kind.

<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S. 317/3

[QUEBEC,] 23 August 1943.

EQUIPPING ALLIES, LIBERATED FORCES AND FRIENDLY NEUTRALS

We agree with the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup> that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve at once sub-

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 1049.

paragraphs 10 *a* and *b* of C.C.S. 317,<sup>2</sup> provided that the following is inserted at the end of subparagraph *a*, "insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT".

If you agree, we suggest that the necessary action should now be taken without this matter again coming before the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1031.

<sup>3</sup> The question, however, did come up for discussion at the 115th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 23, 1943. See *ante*, p. 939.

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### *Editorial Note*

For the final reports of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference, including conclusions with respect to the war in Europe and the Mediterranean, see *post*, pp. 1121 ff.

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## C. SPECIAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO ITALY: PEACE FEELERS, SURRENDER TERMS, DECLARATION OF ROME AS AN OPEN CITY, MILITARY OPERATIONS

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 14 August 1943.

C.C.S. 306

### ROME AN OPEN CITY

Press reports have been received that Rome has been declared an open city by the Italian Government.<sup>2</sup> General Eisenhower has indicated that he may make an attack against Rome tomorrow, 15 August.

Pending clarification of the situation, it is suggested that the following FAN message might be sent to General Eisenhower:

"Press reports this date indicate Italian Government has declared Rome an open city. Pending clarification and further instructions it is

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. By informal action the message in the final paragraph was approved and sent to Eisenhower as telegram No. FAN 191, August 14, 1943. The text was also sent to the White House Map Room at Washington, which forwarded it to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. WHITE 84, August 14.

For the discussion of this paper at the 108th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1943, see *ante*, p. 863.

<sup>2</sup> For the notification of this action given by the Apostolic Delegate in Washington (Cicognani) to the Department of State on August 16, 1943, see *ante*, p. 594.

desired that you make no further attacks on Rome nor make any statements from your headquarters regarding the attitude of the United Nations with respect to the action taken by the Italian Government.”

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET  
URGENT

QUEBEC, 15 August 1943.

Standstill order issued by Combined Chiefs of Staff in their message of 14th August<sup>2</sup> regarding bombing of Rome is revoked. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 194, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You are free to carry on these operations to the extent that you consider necessary or advisable subject to previous limitations regarding safety of Vatican.

<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of the subject of this message at the 108th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 15, 1943, see *ante*, p. 863. The White House Map Room Log Notebook indicates that the concurrence of Roosevelt (who was at Hyde Park) and Churchill (who had returned to Quebec from Hyde Park on the morning of August 15) was obtained before this message was dispatched (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET  
URGENT

QUEBEC, 17 August 1943.

Reference FO telegrams from Madrid 1404 to 1407<sup>1</sup> repeated to you from London. Instructions as to how you are to deal with the Italian peace feelers are being concerted between the President and the Prime Minister. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 195, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Meanwhile you should hold 2 staff officers in readiness to proceed to Lisbon immediately on receipt of these instructions to meet General C<sup>2</sup> and should make the necessary transportation arrangements with London for their entry into Portugal. General C has to leave Lisbon on the night of the 20th at latest.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 539 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Giuseppe Castellano.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 17 August 1943.

URGENT

The following message is personal to General McNarney for Eyes Only from Eisenhower. I request that the following message be sent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the least possible delay.

"I have seen messages number CONCRETE 231, 232, 233, and 234 from the Foreign Secretary to the Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup> I have the following suggestions to offer.

"1st, If the Combined Chiefs of Staff should direct me to send a staff officer to Lisbon, I believe he should go with the following general instructions:

"(a) To collect information and check it against that already in his possession.

"(b) To inform General C that the Allied force here make no promise in advance but that if the Italian army is really anxious to speed up the date when an Allied force lands in Italy, it should proceed at once with widespread sabotaging operations, particularly directed against all communications, airfields and public utilities useful to the Germans.

"(c) That the Italian Government and army have no recourse except to depend upon the decency and sense of justice of the Allied governments when once we have arrived in Italy.

"My second suggestion is that if I am not directed to send a staff officer to Lisbon that the British Military Attaché at that place be directed to secure every possible item of information he can from General C and forward it to this headquarters by early cable.

"If I am directed to send a staff officer to Lisbon, the individual will be Brigadier Strong of the British Army, head of my Intelligence Division. He will travel in civilian clothes with passport duly issued by the local British Consulate."

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the War Department at Washington as telegram No. W-7578 and forwarded to Quebec as telegram No. Bosco 89.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 589 ff.

740.00119 EW/8-1743 : Telegram

*The British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in the United States*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 17, 1943.

Following telegram has been sent to Quebec :—

Manzini, Secretary of the Italian Legation in Lisbon, has passed the following information to us through most secret channels at the request

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington.

of d'Ajeta, new Counsellor with whom he is collaborating on peace moves.

2. Statements made by d'Ajeta to Sir R. Campbell on August 3rd<sup>2</sup> were modified by last-minute instructions from Guariglia and an essential part was completely omitted. For unknown personal reasons Guariglia is evidently favouring German game and is impeding the intentions of the Supreme Command and the King to surrender immediately. The Supreme Command desires to establish forthwith technical details of surrender and Allied occupation, without the knowledge of the Germans, in order to frustrate their reprisals. [Garble] it has full assent of the King, General Staff, the Pope and the Government except Guariglia. To achieve this end Supreme Command decided to send their fully authorized delegate, General Castellano, to Lisbon to meet a specially authorized British delegate. Castellano is pro-British and is described as the brains of the Italian General Staff and as the man who prepared the way whereby Badoglio took over the Government.

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 554.

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740.0011 European War 1939/30775 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

US URGENT

[VATICAN CITY, August 17, 1943.]

155. I have received a first person note dated August 15 from Cardinal Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup> This is Tittmann's 155, August 17. My 153 [bis], August 13.<sup>3</sup> Summary follows.<sup>4</sup>

Note begins by reciting arguments already used by Holy See against bombing of Rome and states that unfortunately they went unheeded with result that there was painful surprise when the very nations that wished to spare Athens and Cairo from bombardment undertook to bombard Rome in whose favor certainly no less pressing reasons militate than those advanced for the other two cities. The first raid, note

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 5094 of August 20, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Acting Secretary of State; received in Washington in three sections between 3:01 and 4:50 p.m., August 20 (after Hull had left for the Quebec Conference). A copy was forwarded to Hull at Quebec by pouch on August 21, and the War Department on that date sent a paraphrase by telegram to the United States Delegation at Quebec.

<sup>2</sup> Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. In this message Tittmann had reported that he understood that Maglione had received "our reply" (see Welles' note to Cicognani dated August 8, 1943, *ante*, p. 572), which had been transmitted to the Italian Government. He had also stated: "London apparently has not yet answered." (740.0011 European War 1939/30705)

<sup>4</sup> Tittmann forwarded the full text of Maglione's note to Washington as an enclosure to his despatch No. 229, August 19, 1943. For the full text, which reached Washington on September 9, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 941-943.

continues, caused very considerable damage to Basilica of San Lorenzo while second destroyed one church and damaged another; at this rate it will be difficult to avoid danger of most serious and irreparable destruction.

Note goes on to say that the newly formed Italian Government at instance of Holy See decided to declare and render Rome an open city and that to this end suitable negotiations were begun with Allied governments through agency of Holy See. Note states that although no reply yet received from British Government, American Under Secretary of State in a letter dated August 8 informed Apostolic Delegate Washington that matter was receiving most earnest consideration of the highest U.S. authorities and that in meantime he was authorized by President to make known that in conformity with the principles of international law and treaties nothing prevented Italian Government from proceeding unilaterally to declare Rome an open city. In view of the foregoing note states at this point "you are in a position to judge whether repetitions of bombings of Eternal City are opportune while these negotiations are pending."

Note continues that if attempts are made to justify future bombings on grounds of so-called military exigencies it may be said in reply that considerations of military objectives (which in Rome would not seem to be of great importance) ought not to prevail over the very serious superior reasons of religion, civilization and humanity and that repetition of deadly bombardments of Rome and of so many other Italian cities with even greater intensity is because of the exasperation it causes among the masses keeping peace away instead of shortening war and is rendering impossible understanding and collaboration among peoples which alone is the guarantee of common tranquillity.

After lamenting fact that the Pope has not been spared pain of witnessing his Diocese and his children that are nearest to him so cruelly tried the note concludes[:]

"As you well know last night the Italian Government to which I felt it my duty to communicate the reply of the Under Secretary of the United States made public the fact that it declares Rome the center of Catholicism an open city and that 'the necessary measures are being taken according to international law'. Since it appears that matters are now well advanced the Holy See would be grateful if further negotiations could take place with the greatest possible speed in order that the desired agreement on so serious a question may be reached as soon as possible. The Holy See does not doubt that in the meantime any sort of fresh bombardment of Rome will be avoided".

My British colleague<sup>5</sup> has received a similar note from Cardinal Maglione and is telegraphing a summary thereof to London.

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<sup>5</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

740.0011 European War 1939/30776: Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

U.S. URGENT

[VATICAN CITY, August 17, 1943.]

156. At one p.m., August 16, Italian Government made the following official declaration to the Holy See:

"High Command has given orders to be carried out immediately to anti-aircraft batteries Rome not to react in case of air bombardments."

This is Tittmann's 156, August 17 with reference to his 155, August 17.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 5095 of August 20, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Acting Secretary of State; received in Washington at 3:40 p. m., August 20, and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Quebec for the attention of Roosevelt and Hull in telegram No. WHITE 111, August 20 (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.<sup>2</sup>

Generals Eisenhower and Alexander have now completed the conquest of Sicily in thirty-eight days. It was defended by 315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans, total 405,000 soldiers. These were attacked by thirteen British and United States Divisions and with a loss to us of about 18,000 killed and wounded, 23,000 German and 7,000 Italian dead and wounded were collected and 130,000 prisoners. Apart from those Italians who have dispersed in the countryside in plain clothes, it can be assumed that all Italian forces in the island have been destroyed. Masses of guns and munitions are lying scattered about all over the island. Over 1,000 enemy aircraft have been taken on the airfields. We are, as you know, about soon to attack the Italian mainland in heavy strength.

CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent as telegram No. BLACK 5 to the White House Map Room at Washington and then sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. Concerning the delivery of this message to Stalin, see *post*, p. 1095, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> For the paragraphs of this message omitted here, see *post*, p. 1095.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

QUEBEC, 18 August 1943.

URGENT

1. With the approval of the President and the Prime Minister the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct that you immediately sent [*send*] 2 staff officers, 1 U.S. and 1 British, to Lisbon to report upon arrival to the British Ambassador.<sup>2</sup> For Eisenhower, FREEDOM, Algiers, [FΛ]N 196, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They should take with them the Armistice terms already agreed and previously sent to you.<sup>3</sup> The British Ambassador in Lisbon has been directed to arrange a meeting with General "C" at which your staff officers will be present.

2. At this meeting a communication to General "C" will be made on the following lines:

*a.* The unconditional surrender of Italy is accepted on the terms stated in the document to be handed to him. (He should then be given the Armistice Terms for Italy already agreed and previously sent to you. He should be told that these do not include political, economic or financial terms which will be communicated later by other means.)

*b.* These terms do not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans. The extent to which the terms will be modified in favor of Italy will depend on how far the Italian Government and people do, in fact, aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war. The United Nations, however, state without reservation that wherever Italian forces or Italians fight Germans, or destroy German property, or hamper German movement, they will be given all possible support of the forces of the United Nations. Meanwhile, provided information about the enemy is immediately and regularly supplied, allied bombing will so far as possible be directed upon targets which affect the movement and operations of German forces.

*c.* The cessation of hostilities between the United Nations and Italy will take effect from a date and hour to be notified by General Eisenhower. (*Note:* General Eisenhower should make this notification a few hours before Allied Forces land in Italy in strength.)

*d.* Italian Government must undertake to proclaim the Armistice immediately it is announced by General Eisenhower, and to order their forces and people from that hour to collaborate with the allies and to resist the Germans.

(*Note:* As will be seen from 2*c* above, the Italian Government will be given a few hours notice.)

*e.* The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order

<sup>1</sup> Paragraphs 2-4 of this message are based on the enclosure to C.C.S. 311, "Suggested Action on Italian Peace Feelers", August 17, 1943 (not printed). For the discussion of this paper, sometimes referred to as the "Quebec Memorandum", at the 110th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 17, 1943, see *ante*, p. 876.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., the "short" or "military" terms, *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565.

that all United Nations prisoners in danger of capture by the Germans shall be immediately released.

*f.* The Italian Government must, at the hour of the Armistice, order the Italian Fleet and as much of their merchant shipping as possible to put to sea for allied ports. As many military aircraft as possible shall fly to allied bases. Any ships or aircraft in danger of capture by the Germans must be destroyed.

3. General "Charlie" should be told that meanwhile there is a good deal that Badoglio can do without the Germans becoming aware of what is afoot. The precise character and extent of his action must be left to his judgment; but the following are the general lines which should be suggested to him:

*a.* General passive resistance throughout the country if this order can be conveyed to local authorities without the Germans knowing.

*b.* Minor sabotage throughout the country, particularly of communications and airfields used by the Germans.

*c.* Safeguard of allied Prisoners of War. If German pressure to hand them over becomes too great, they should be released.

*d.* No Italian Warships to be allowed to fall into German hands. Arrangements to be made to insure that all these ships can sail to ports designated by General Eisenhower immediately he gives the order. Italian submarines should not be withdrawn from patrol as this would reveal our common purpose to the enemy.

*e.* No merchant shipping to be allowed to fall into German hands. Merchant shipping in northern ports should, if possible, be sailed to ports South of the line Venice-Leghorn. In the last resort they should be scuttled. All ships must be ready to sail for ports designated by General Eisenhower.

*f.* Germans must not be allowed to take over Italian Coast Defenses.

*g.* Make arrangements to be put in force at the proper time for Italian formations in the Balkans to march to the coast, with a view to their being taken off to Italy by United Nations.

4. General Eisenhower's representatives must arrange with General "Charlie" a secure channel of communication between Italian Headquarters and General Eisenhower.

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Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[LONDON, August 19, 1943.]

PRIORITY

For General Eisenhower's Eyes Only from the Deputy Prime Minister.

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<sup>1</sup> No copy of this instruction originating at Quebec has been found, although the second paragraph was presumably telegraphed by Churchill to Attlee with Roosevelt's approval. The source text, from the files of Allied Force Headquarters, represents the message as received at that Headquarters from United States Forces Headquarters in London.

To avoid inference which might be drawn from paragraph 3 of armistice terms,<sup>2</sup> now in the hands of your staff officers travelling Lisbon, that we are "negotiating" with Badoglio Government, President and Prime Minister have agreed that after words "Commander-in-Chief" paragraph 3 should be amended to read "and none of these may now or at any time be evacuated to Germany."

His Majesty's Ambassador, Lisbon, has been informed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 519.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

QUADRANT, [August 19, 1943.]

President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most Secret and Personal.

1. On August 15th, the British Ambassador at Madrid<sup>2</sup> reported that General Castellano had arrived from Badoglio with a letter of introduction from the British Minister at the Vatican.<sup>3</sup> The General declared that he was authorized by Badoglio to say that Italy was willing to surrender unconditionally provided she could join the Allies. The British Representative at the Vatican has since been furnished by Marshal Badoglio with a written statement that he has duly authorized General Castellano. This therefore seems a firm offer. We are not prepared to enter into any bargain with the Badoglio Government to induce Italy to change sides. On the other hand, there are many advantages and [*in?*] the great speeding-up of the campaign which might follow therefrom. We shall begin our invasion of the mainland of Italy probably before the end of this month, and about a week later we shall make our full-scale thrust at AVALANCHE (see our immediately following telegram). It is very likely that the Badoglio Government will not last so long. The Germans have one or more armoured divisions outside Rome, and once they think that the Badoglio Government is playing them false they are quite capable of overthrowing it and setting up a Quisling Government of Fascist elements under for instance Farinacci. Alternatively, Badoglio may collapse and the whole of Italy pass into disorder.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the War Cabinet Office in London as Churchill's telegram No. WELFARE 217 and forwarded to the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr), who combined the message contained in this telegram and that contained in telegram No. WELFARE 218, *infra*, into a single message for Stalin. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 144-147; vol. II, pp. 79-82. Although the messages as received in Moscow contained a garble and were not entirely complete, Clark Kerr delivered the best available text on August 20, 1943, and transmitted a corrected text on August 22. See *ibid.*, vol. I, p. 388, note 44; *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 354.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

<sup>3</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

2. Such being the situation, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have prepared and the President and Prime Minister have approved, as a measure of military diplomacy, the instructions which are given in our immediately following telegram. They have been sent to General Eisenhower for action.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For the paragraphs of this message omitted here, see *post*, p. 1091.

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

QUADRANT, 19 August 1943.

President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most Secret and Personal.

Reference our immediately preceding telegram.<sup>2</sup>

1. Operation referred to in paragraph 1 is attack on West Coast of Italian mainland. Code name in paragraph 3 refers to Portuguese Atlantic islands.

2. Following instructions to General Eisenhower referred to in paragraph 2. *Begins*: (Here insert paraphrased text of FAN 196<sup>3</sup>)  
*Ends*.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the War Cabinet Office in London as Churchill's telegram No. WELFARE 218 and forwarded to the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr). Concerning the delivery of this message in Moscow, see *ante*, p. 1062, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of telegram No. FAN 196 as dispatched from Quebec on August 18, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1060. For the paraphrased text of this telegram as included in the message delivered to Stalin, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 144-146; vol. II, pp. 80-82.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

The following summary of recent correspondence with A.F.H.Q. North African Theater relating to post-HUSKY operations, has been made for the convenience of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in connection with the discussion on post-HUSKY operations tabled for the 113th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 20 August 1943.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

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<sup>1</sup> Memorandum for Information No. 132. For texts of the messages summarized in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 12 of the enclosure, see *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1224, 1261, 1296, 1305, 1327, and 1335, respectively.

[Enclosure]

*Summary of Messages Exchanged With Allied Force Headquarters*1. *NAF 250 From General Eisenhower, Dated 30 June 1943*

This message summarizes the operations following HUSKY that General Eisenhower considers to be possible assuming that seven veteran divisions will be sent to the U.K. In paragraph five he states: "In order to be in a position to take advantage of whichever line of action shows itself more likely to achieve my mission, I have arranged for planning to be undertaken for:

"a. Operation BUTTRESS and Operation GOBLET.

"b. Operation BUTTRESS followed by a rapid overland exploitation to the Heel, Naples, and Rome, and a reinforcement by sea of three divisions into Naples.

"c. Operation BRIMSTONE both on a full and modified scale, the latter being in sufficient strength to overcome German resistance if Italian Army has ceased to fight.

"d. After Operation BRIMSTONE, it may be possible to carry out Operation FIREBRAND. The French are now actively examining this problem."

2. *FAN 165 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Dated 16 July 1943*

"The strategic concept in your NAF 250 accepted for planning purposes. In addition, the Combined Chiefs of Staff wish to express their interest in the possibilities of a direct amphibious landing operation against Naples in lieu of an attack on Sardinia, if the indications regarding Italian resistance should make the risks involved worthwhile."

3. *NAF 265 From General Eisenhower, Dated 18 July 1943*

The last paragraph is as follows: "In view of these considerations and assuming that substantial German reinforcement in Southern Italy has not taken place, I recommend carrying the war to the mainland of Italy immediately Sicily has been captured, and request very early approval in order that no time be lost in making preparation."

4. *FAN 169 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower, Dated 20 July 1943*

"The recommendations contained in the last paragraph of your NAF 265 are approved, you should, however, extend your amphibious operations northward as far as shore-based fighter cover can be made effective."

5. *FAN 175 From the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Dated 26 July 1943*

"With the object of expediting the elimination of Italy from the war, the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider you should plan forthwith

AVALANCHE to be mounted at the earliest possible date, using the resources already available to you for PRICELESS . . . .”<sup>2</sup>

6. NAF 303 From General Eisenhower, Dated 28 July 1943

“The air problem facing us in AVALANCHE is one of some difficulty, first, because of the distance from possible bases to provide cover for the initial assault and second, because of the increased effort required for neutralization of hostile air and disrupting lines of communications. Another difficulty arises because of the intensive air effort we have been maintaining for some weeks and the additional necessity for continuing this effort in a rapid clean-up of the HUSKY Operation. This clean-up is an essential preliminary to the AVALANCHE Operation in order to get necessary airfields and to have a *reasonable bridgehead in the BUTTRESS area* in order that German reserves may not be, with immunity, rushed directly to the point of landing.”

7. NAF 307 From General Eisenhower, Dated 2 August 1943

This reads in part: “Yesterday I had a meeting with the three commanders in chief. Conclusions reached were in line with those reported following a similar conference of a week ago. *We are positive that a lodgment must be made in the BUTTRESS area before any bold stroke should be attempted such as AVALANCHE.* On the other hand, our hope is that this lodgment can be made without employing troops otherwise available for AVALANCHE. If *ad hoc* crossing of Straits proves too difficult, and former landing operations in close support of that effort are forced upon us, then the AVALANCHE project must be delayed materially . . . .”<sup>2</sup>

8. NAF 318 From General Eisenhower, Dated 10 August 1943

This message reads in part: “Meeting of commanders in chief was held today in Tunis. General agreement to effect that every effort must be made to mount AVALANCHE with 10th Corps so equipped with landing craft that it can be used either on that operation or on BUTTRESS *if latter proves to be necessary.* Every effort must be made to establish a bridgehead on Toe employing only troops and means now in Sicily. Agreed that we should avoid, if humanly possible, penning up sizeable forces in Toe where they could be rather easily contained, particularly since to do so would practically eliminate any chance of AVALANCHE type of operation this year. This is because of necessary use of landing craft in maintaining over beaches the troops we would have in Toe.”

From the above, it appears that General Eisenhower has been given definite authority to operate against the mainland of Italy with a

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<sup>2</sup> Ellipsis in the source text.

very distinct preference expressed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for Operation AVALANCHE. General Eisenhower, on the other hand, has indicated that to do AVALANCHE, either BUTTRESS or an *ad hoc* crossing of the Sicily troops to the Toe of Italy must be effected in order to provide shore-based air cover for AVALANCHE. This conception has at least the tacit approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

9. W6959 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 10 August 1943

This signal gave information regarding AVALANCHE. Timing of all future operations must depend primarily upon date of completion of Sicilian campaign. All commanders were agreed that the establishment of considerable forces in Calabria would almost certainly result in stalemate being reached in Calabria this year, or at best, would permit only slow, laborious advance. Number of landing craft required would prevent any further amphibious operation this year on the scale of AVALANCHE. Two months from now weather conditions would prevent use of strips in Calabria and unless we could obtain all-weather airfields such as exist in Naples area, we should be unable to apply our air strength and would be unable to count upon the degree of air supremacy enjoyed up till now.

Previous conclusions confirmed that prior to AVALANCHE it was essential to obtain small bridgehead in Calabria in order to open Straits, hold German troops in Calabria and prevent them being employed in reinforcement of AVALANCHE area. Ability to do this and at the same time to launch AVALANCHE dependent entirely on serviceability of landing craft. Assessment being made of minimum landing craft requirements to see whether BAYTOWN or AVALANCHE could be mounted at or about the same time. Risks of AVALANCHE fully appreciated, particularly in light of apparent German reinforcement of Italy. Considered, however, that prize to be gained makes considerable risk acceptable. By air action in meantime it might be possible to make Italian people force a policy of non-cooperation with Germany on present Italian Government and so make AVALANCHE easier. As circumstances at the time might prevent launching of AVALANCHE allocation of landing craft and loading of 10th Corps to proceed so that it could be employed either in BUTTRESS or AVALANCHE. Following decisions therefore made:

To proceed with AVALANCHE preparations with target date 7 September.

Flexibility of 10th Corps and allocation of landing craft to be such that either BUTTRESS or AVALANCHE could be launched.

8th Army to make every effort to seize bridgehead with resources of craft remaining after allocation to 10th Corps.

Actual dates of operations to depend upon date of completion of Sicilian Battle.

Operations BARRACUDA and GOBLET cancelled.

5th Corps to be in AFHQ reserve.

Air effort against communications in Italy to be maintained at highest possible level consistent with maintenance requirements.

10. *W7323 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 14 August 1943*

Gave provisional figures of build-up dependent on:

a. Whether BAYTOWN-AVALANCHE mounted, or BAYTOWN-BUTTRESS mounted.

b. Date of initial assault.

c. Progress made on mainland.

d. State of port of Naples when captured.

If German resistance in Calabria weakens and BAYTOWN can be exploited, intention is for 8th Army to move into Calabria and advance north and east with a view to joining up with AVALANCHE forces and occupying Heel. Maximum number of divisions which can be maintained through Calabria is 6. Forces available for further build-up, if required: one U.S. division, *ex* Sicily; two French divisions; 5 corps of two or three divisions from Middle East; First and Sixth Armored Divisions; further French divisions. Assuming target date for AVALANCHE 7th September, it appeared that the following forces could be put on the mainland through Naples by 1st December. Either 6 divisions and tactical air force, or 5 divisions plus tactical and strategic air force. In addition 3 divisions through the Toe and possibly up to 3 further divisions by ferry service into Calabria from Sicily. Estimated rate of build-up after 1st December might be one Division per month. L.S.T.'s essential for the above build-up until at least 1st December. The above based on no shipping limitations.

11. *W7445 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 15th August 1943*

Results of AVALANCHE and succeeding operations likely to depend upon build-up race between the Germans and ourselves. Once we can get a firm hold on the Naples Area we should be well placed but it is at least probable that thereafter we may have to fight our way slowly and painfully up Italy. The difficulty of amphibious and overland operations against Southern France should not be minimized. Desirable areas in Southern France for amphibious assault cannot be reached by shore-based single-engined fighters operating either from Northern Italy or Corsica. Ability to undertake amphibious operation therefore dependent on German air strength in Europe being so reduced or

otherwise committed that assault can take place under cover of carrier-borne or twin-engined fighters. Availability of land forces will depend upon defensive commitments in Northern Italy, which should not exceed a maximum of 10 divisions, and on our ability to equip and transport remainder of divisions then in Mediterranean. Estimate that 24 divisions will be available, of which perhaps not more than 16 will be fit for operations.

12. *NAF 326, 16th August, From General Eisenhower*

In spite of every effort, enemy is succeeding in evacuating much personnel and light equipment across the Straits. Crossing the Straits should be attempted by us as quickly as necessary supporting guns and supplies can be accumulated. Present indications as to date between September 1st and 4th, and for AVALANCHE target date September 9th. Since a 10 day interval between the two assaults would greatly alleviate difficulties in landing craft, we are straining every nerve to make the first assault on the earliest possible date.

13. *W7542 From General Bedell Smith to General Whiteley, Dated 17 August 1943*

AVALANCHE will be undertaken before next moonlight period and preceded at maximum interval by BAYTOWN, which hoped to launch before end of August or early September. Target date AVALANCHE may be deferred till September 11th.

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET  
C.C.S. 318

[QUEBEC,] 19 August 1943.

SARDINIA, FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES

It is the opinion of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the present conditions of unrest in Italy might offer an opportunity for favorable results from fifth column activities in Sardinia. They therefore suggest that the following message be sent to General Eisenhower:

It is understood that you have sufficient troops available to assault Sardinia at this time. However, you are unable to do so due to lack of landing craft. This fact and the promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of fifth column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of that island. The O.S.S. and S.O.E. organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore, this presents an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for

future operations of a similar character. Your comments and recommendations are requested.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This draft telegram was presented to the 112th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 19, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 894). On August 20, in C.C.S. 318/1 (not printed), the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that the message to Eisenhower be amended by deleting the first two sentences and the first three words of the third sentence. The amended draft was considered at the 113th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 20 (see *ante*, p. 905). For the text approved and sent on that date, see *infra*. For Eisenhower's reply, see *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1360-1361.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

QUEBEC, 20 August 1943.

URGENT

The promising situation existing throughout the Italian area would appear to offer an excellent opportunity by means of 5th Column activities to establish conditions in Sardinia for an unopposed occupation of that island or an unopposed landing on it with Italian help. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 198, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The OSS and SOE organizations might collaborate in accomplishing this. Furthermore this presents an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of these organizations and to provide them with experience and training for future operations of a similar character. Corsica also may be worth your attention. Your comments requested and recommendations.

740.0011 European War 1939/30810 : Telegram

*The Chargé at Vatican City (Tittmann) to the Acting Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

US URGENT

[VATICAN CITY, August 20, 1943.]

Following is from a reliable source. (This is Tittmann's 159, August 20 with reference to his 156, August 17.)<sup>2</sup>

An interministerial committee met some days ago to discuss measures to be taken in connection with declaration by Italian Government that Rome is an open city and another meeting held yesterday of same committee with Badoglio presiding. In addition to orders already given to anti-aircraft batteries Rome not to react in case of raid pend-

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the American Legation at Bern and transmitted in telegram No. 5177 of August 23, 1943, from the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Acting Secretary of State; received in Washington at 8:43 p. m., August 23. A paraphrase was telegraphed to the United States Delegation at Quebec by the War Department on August 24. A variant text of this message was sent to the American Legation at Lisbon and transmitted in telegram No. 1937 of August 31, 1943, from the Chargé in Portugal (Kennan) to the Secretary of State (740.0011 European War 1939/30932).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1059.

ing their suppression Badoglio ordered immediate removal from Rome of all possible military objectives both personnel and material. Question of military traffic through Rome still presents difficulties but every effort is being made to solve problem and it is hoped satisfactory solution will soon be found. Meanwhile, orders have been given military trains all kinds now obliged pass through Rome should do so without stopping.

Department of the Army Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 21 August 1943.

URGENT

4227. The following are the minutes of the meeting held in Lisbon on August 18 [19] (to KKAD and AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHCOS. Reference NAF 333.<sup>2</sup> This is NAF 334.) with the following present:

Sir Ronald Campbell, British Ambassador;  
Mr George F. Kennan, American Chargé d'Affaires;  
General Castellano, Italian Army;  
Mr Montanari, Interpreter;  
Major General William [Walter] B Smith, US Army;  
Brigadier Strong, British Army.

<sup>1</sup> Sent also to the War Department at Washington as telegram No. W-7935. The Chargé at Lisbon (Kennan) transmitted a copy of the minutes contained in this message to Hull by pouch on August 21, 1943. With this set of minutes (which had minor differences from the text sent telegraphically to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec, but no substantive differences) Kennan enclosed copies of the "short" terms handed to Castellano at Lisbon and of the *aide-mémoire* referred to below. In his letter of transmittal Kennan gave the following supplemental information:

"On the morning of August 19, General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Major General Walter Smith, accompanied by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Brigadier Strong (British), arrived in Lisbon by plane, traveling incognito. The purpose of their visit was to communicate to a representative of the Italian Government, General Castellano, the terms on which General Eisenhower was prepared to grant an armistice to the Italian armed forces.

"The two officers were taken direct to my home, where they were my guests during their stay. The meeting with the Italian General and his interpreter took place at the home of the British Ambassador. The conversations, at which the British Ambassador and I were present, began at 10 p. m. on the 19th, and lasted without interruption until 7:00 the following morning. I enclose a memorandum, with attachments, setting forth the gist of the main conversations relating to the armistice terms. This memorandum, most of which I drafted myself, was accepted in its final form by both parties as a fair and accurate presentation of what took place . . . .

"The two Allied officers left Lisbon about noon on August 20, in order to return to headquarters." (740.00119 EW/8-2143)

For Castellano's account of the conference, which in some respects supplements the minutes printed here, see the sources cited *ante*, p. 590, fn. 10. See also Garland and Smyth, pp. 455-460.

<sup>2</sup> This message, dated August 20, 1943, was a brief summary of the Lisbon meeting with Castellano. For text, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1349.

The following was the general discussion.

General Smith opened the discussion by stating that on the assumption that the Italian Armed Forces were ready to surrender authorization had been made to communicate the terms on which General Eisenhower was prepared to agree to a cessation of hostilities between the Allied Forces under his command and the Italian Forces. It was to be understood that these terms constituted a Military Armistice only and must be accepted unconditionally.

General Castellano explained that there had been some misinterpretation of the purpose of his visit as he had come to discuss the question of how Italy could arrange to join the United Nations in opposition to Germany with the view to expelling the Germans from Italy in collaboration with the Allies.

General Smith stated that he was prepared only to discuss the terms on which the Allied Forces would be prepared to cease hostilities against the Italian Forces. The question of the status of the Italian Army and Government's participation in the operations against the Germans was one of high governmental policy of the United Nations and would have to be decided by the Heads of the 2 Governments concerned. The Allied Forces were prepared, however, to assist and support any Italian Forces or Italians who fought against or obstructed the German military effort, as would be brought out in amplification of the armistice conditions. He then proceeded to read aloud paragraph by paragraph the armistice conditions and the various comments which he was authorized to make with regard thereto<sup>3</sup> and these documents were currently translated point by point to their representative.

The British and American representatives then left the room for a time in order to give the Emissary an opportunity to examine in detail the armistice conditions. After this examination the conference reassembled.

General Castellano stated beforehand that he had no intention of discussing the various points of the armistice conditions as he is not empowered to do so but would like to have certain explanations which he could furnish to his government.

With respect to point 3,<sup>4</sup> there might be practical limitations to what the Italians could accomplish in preventing the movement of Allied Prisoners of War to Germany. The Italians would make every effort to comply fairly with this condition.

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1060.

<sup>4</sup> The "points" mentioned in these minutes refer to the numbered paragraphs of the "short" terms which Smith was authorized to give to Castellano. See *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565, 1062; Garland and Smyth, p. 558.

The meeting was then told that the United Nations understood the possible difficulties involved but expected the Italian Army and Government to do its best to carry out this condition.

General C requested clarification of point 4 particularly with regard to the future disposition of the Italian vessels and aircraft. He was informed that this point implied the surrender of the fleet and of the planes and that their future disposition must be a matter for decision by the Allied Commander in Chief.

General C added that the warships and many of the planes might be prevented by lack of fuel from complying with this condition.

Our representative observed that this would be a matter for the Italian authorities who naturally were interested in the preservation of their ships and aircraft and who should in their own interest make every effort to see that sufficient fuel was available for the assembly of the ships and planes to points designated by the Allied Commander in Chief.

Their Emissary with respect to the free use by the Allies of all airfields and naval ports pointed out that most of the airdromes were in German hands and that those remaining to the Italians were small and scattered. With respect to point 8 he stated that it might prove almost impossible to withdraw to Italy those Italian Forces which were now stationed at inland points in the Balkans.

Our representative replied that the Italians were not expected to accomplish the impossible but that certain Italian Divisions were located sufficiently near the coast to permit their removal to Italy by Allied shipping.

Their Emissary referring to point 10 asked for explanations as to the question of retention of Sovereignty by the Italian Government.

He was informed that our representative's instructions referred only to the terms of a military armistice and that he was not empowered to discuss questions relating to the future Government of Italy. A military government under the Allied Commander in Chief would unquestionably be necessary over parts of Italian territory.

He invited the attention of their Emissary to the fact that military government in Sicily had been established and was being exercised in a fair and humane manner.

Their Emissary then mentioned the danger to the person of the King of Italy involved in the acceptance of these terms and expressed the fear that the Germans might hold the King as a hostage or that his life might be in danger. It was suggested that the King might leave Italy on an Italian Naval Vessel.

He was assured that the King would be treated with all due personal consideration.

In the general discussion which ensued their Emissary reverted again to the manner and extent of Italian military collaboration against Germany. The United Nations representatives explained carefully that the subject under discussion must be considered a military capitulation and not any arrangement for the participation of Italy in the war on our side. Our representative explained that the terms of the armistice did not visualize the active assistance of Italy in fighting the Germans.<sup>5</sup> However, he was authorized to state that the extent to which these terms of armistice would be modified in favor of Italy would depend on how far the Italian Government and people did in fact aid the United Nations against Germany during the remainder of the war but that the United Nations stated without reservation that wherever Italian Forces or Italians fight the Germans, destroy German property or hamper German movements they will be given all possible support by the Forces of the United Nations.

Their Emissary then brought up the probability of immediate German retaliation against Italy in the event that the terms of the armistice were accepted and placed in effect. The possibility of minimizing these reprisals was discussed. It was brought out that it would be folly on the part of the Germans to institute reprisals against Italian cities and population which would certainly lead to reprisals on our part. In any case the effects of a few days of vindictive action by the Germans would be much less serious for Italy than a long war of attrition.

Their Emissary after expressing his understanding of the terms of armistice and the supplemental information conveyed by the Allied representatives stated that he was not authorized to accept the armistice terms and that these must be taken back to Italy for consideration by the Italian Government. He added that it would be most useful to his government to know when and where the Allied Invasion would take place particularly as German reaction would probably make it necessary for a part of the government to remove from Rome coincidental with announcement of cessation of hostilities. He pointed out that there were several thousand members of the SS Organization in Rome in civilian clothes and a Parachute Division in the immediate vicinity. The Italians have removed most of their troops from Rome upon declaring the city open and that it would arouse German suspicion if they were returned. He was informed that as a soldier he would understand why it was impossible for us at this time to give any detailed information of the plans of the Allied Commander. Arrangements would be made for a direct channel of communication and it was

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<sup>5</sup> A garble at this point in the telegraphic text has been corrected by reference to the minutes sent by Kennan to Hull.

proposed that if Marshal Badoglio agreed to accept the terms of the armistice General Eisenhower would announce the granting of the armistice 5 or 6 hours prior to the main Allied landing in force. General Eisenhower's announcement was to be immediately followed by Marshal Badoglio's proclamation of cessation of hostilities.

Their Emissary pointed out that 5 hours was insufficient advance notice to permit the preparations which should be made in anticipation of an Allied landing and to permit effective collaboration. He felt that a much longer period, preferably 2 weeks, was highly desirable.

General Smith thought that this might be done and stated that he would consult the Commander in Chief in an effort to make the necessary arrangements.

The Italian representatives were supplied with a copy of the terms of the armistice and with an *Aide Mémoire* covering the supplemental matters contained in the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>6</sup>

The general meeting then adjourned to permit a detailed discussion of military matters by the representatives of the 2 armies and arrangements for establishing communications. *Minutes end.*

New Subject. With reference to your 5650<sup>7</sup> detailed break down of German Forces in Italy will be sent in another cable.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The *aide-mémoire* handed to Castellano contained almost verbatim the instructions contained in subparagraphs 2 *b-f* and paragraph 3 of telegram No. FAN 196, *ante*, p. 1060, except that the notes at the end of subparagraphs 2 *c* and *d* were omitted.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> See Eisenhower's telegram No. NAF 335, *infra*.

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Department of the Army Files: Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 21 August 1943.

9. General statements made as follows:<sup>2</sup>

*a.* Estimated Germany would require some 15 Divisions for occupation of Italy if Italian Troops cooperated. Possible more would be brought in. These likely be chiefly withdrawn from France. No permanent fortifications as yet on Genoa-Ravenna Line.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the War Department at Washington as telegram No. W-7938/4256, NAF 335. The number of the message as sent to Quebec is not given on the source text. The extract printed here omits an account of the German order of battle as of August 12, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> At the military discussions with Castellano held at Lisbon, referred to in Eisenhower's telegram No. NAF 334, *supra*.

b. Best tactics for Allies would be to land in Leghorn area between Grosseto and Spezia. German lines of communication into Italy particularly via Brenner [Pass] extremely vulnerable and should be attacked by Allies.

c. Germans intended defend Sardinia and Corsica. Italian Forces to be withdrawn from Corsica but not Sardinia.

d. 2 Italian Divisions recently sent North Italy to offset occupation of Brenner area by Germans. Had been no actual fighting as result of this but firm attitude of Italians had caused Germans to hesitate in number of their actions. (AGWar personal for Marshall from Eisenhower repeated Combined Chiefs of Staff (KKAD) repeated TROOPERS personal for DMI USFor pass to TROOPERS. From Strong from G-2 FREEDOM signed Eisenhower cite FHGBI).

e. Strength of German Military Personnel in Italy estimated at 400,000.

f. Genoa-Ravenna Line would be extremely difficult to penetrate owing hilly nature of country and narrow roads.

g. Conference on 14 August held at Bologna at which General Roatta, Field Marshal Rommel and General Jodl present. Plans for defence of Italy discussed. These included return of Italian troops from France, Slovenia and North Croatia. Final result discussions not known.

h. Italian Army short of gasoline and entirely dependent on Germany for this. Italy would require supplies of wheat and coal if Germany ceases to provide. Italian Army short of many types of weapons especially anti tank guns, anti tank ammunition and boots.

i. Italian Fleet had only sufficient fuel oil for one main fleet action. Mussolini was responsible for stopping Italian Fleet putting to sea on several occasions in order to have it to counter any attack on Italian Peninsula. Germans informed Italians that submarine warfare was to be put on completely new basis which they thought would have considerable success. No details disclosed.

j. Italian Air Force very short of material but fighter element considered good. All Italian airfields except a few small ones in hands of Germans.

k. German policy towards Russia was to hold back reserves and adopt defensive policy in hope Russians would wear themselves out. Germans considered this might happen by spring 1944. German Divisions totalled 260 of which 50 to 60 in reserve. Up to December 1942 estimated German permanent casualties killed or wounded three million. Russian divisions numbered 320. Ribbentrop reckoned on Allied, especially American, war weariness increasing.

l. Ribbentrop has threatened that if Italy turned against Germany gas would be used against the country and most terrible vengeance would be exacted on Italian people as an example to remainder of Satellites.<sup>3</sup> Italian people had no gas masks or protection against gas. Italian Army almost in same position. Hungary might follow Italian example but Roumania and Bulgaria less likely.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. NAF 336 of August 22, 1943, addressed to Marshall, Eisenhower reported further on this subject: "In spite of arguments to contrary he [Castellano] appeared convinced that the German threat to use gas was real and that such a danger existed." (Department of the Army Files)

*m.* Allies could not look for collapse in German morale owing to Gestapo. Number of Generals desirous of getting rid of Hitler but this unlikely at present owing considerable loyalty towards him.

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740.00119 EW/8-2143 : Telegram

*The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 21, 1943.

Signor Berio asked to see me last night to tell me he had received a short telegram from Rome informing him that the situation there remained the same as when he had left. The Germans were at Badoglio's throat and the latter could not capitulate because it would not be physically possible for him to carry out terms of Armistice.

2. Speaking then as from himself Signor Berio again pleaded that the Allies should take some action against the Germans which would relieve Badoglio of this intense German pressure. Badoglio was only too willing to make an honourable peace if he was sure of being able to keep his word and carry out the necessary conditions. The Allies were the victors but it was for them to assist Badoglio to capitulate. As the situation was at present this was impossible for immediately he were to start to implement the Armistice terms he and his Government would be overthrown by the Germans and Farinacci or some other Italian "Quisling" put in his place.

3. I said that in my opinion there was no question of choice which Badoglio should make. It ought to be perfectly clear that unless he did as we wished, i.e. submit to our unconditional surrender, Italy would continue to be attacked from end to end. Even admitting German pressure which Signor Berio had spoken of, surely it was better to risk the consequences of accepting Allied terms than to continue resistance as at present for the latter course must only end in Badoglio's ultimate downfall whereas former offered an honourable way out not only for Badoglio and his Government but also the Italian people would be spared the continued hardship of having useless war.

4. Signor Berio then turned to the question of surrender terms and asked me whether I could not at least give him some Anglo-American main lines and whether they were such as could be carried out by Badoglio under present "suffocating German pressure". Could I not also give him some notion of the support which the Allies might give to Badoglio to carry out these terms in face of 100% opposition from

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<sup>1</sup> The source text does not indicate whether the text of this message was made available to United States officials at Quebec or in Washington.

Germany which Italian forces would be incapable of dealing with as they were "tired out and had no modern weapons".

5. I replied that I could give him no information either about terms or future intentions of the Allies and I reminded him severely that there could be no sort of haggling over these questions. I had already told him by your direction that terms would provide for honourable capitulation but Allies did not intend to enter into prior negotiations or discussion regarding them.

6. Signor Berio then begged me with great emotion to endeavour to assist him in finding a way out of the present impasse. I told him that his own opinion of the way was perfectly clear: it lay in (a) capitulation and (b) carrying out of Allied terms whatever they might be. Badoglio should capitulate immediately; but if he continued to delay as at present what could he hope for but complete destruction in the long run not to mention the hardships which would accrue to his country in the process.

7. Finally Signor Berio said that although we had made no headway during our conversation and although he could see no daylight at present he hoped that our contact for which express purpose he had been sent here might be continued and he again expressed the greatest desire to be informed of main lines of the Armistice terms.

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740.00119 EW/8-2143: Telegram

*The British Consul General at Tangier (Gascoigne) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

TANGIER, August 21, 1943.

Summary of additional points which emerged in my conversation with Signor Berio were:—

(a) Berio's insistence on the good faith of Badoglio and also of Guariglia.

(b) Berio's professed hatred of Fascism and the Germans and his cynical desire (though genuinely expressed) that Italy would be able to fight Germany with the Allies.

(c) Berio's alleged terror of general European Communism. He told me that members of the local German Consulate-General with whom he said that necessarily he was passing his time were all saying that rather than surrender to the Anglo-Saxons they would throw themselves into the arms of Stalin and that Germany and Russia would

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<sup>1</sup>The source text does not indicate whether the text of this message was made available to United States officials at Quebec or in Washington.

then form a Communist bloc. The Balkans and France [garble] might also be expected to go the same way.

2. Impressions left upon me after this conversation were that Badoglio<sup>2</sup> who is of course under the direct orders of Guariglia has received instructions to pump me for information regarding (a) armistice terms and (b) Allies' plans regarding their action in Italy after capitulation. It seemed from my conversation which lasted 2½ hours that Badoglio wants peace but on his own terms.

3. If there is anything which I could say to Berio to end this impasse between us I should be grateful if I might be informed and I should also be grateful to learn whether the "negative" line I have taken with him as described in my immediately preceding telegram<sup>3</sup> is approved and whether owing to the Lisbon negotiations you wish me to continue to contact him *on his request*. He stressed that he had been sent here by the direct orders of the Marshal at the bidding of my colleague Mario Badoglio but Guariglia's unfortunate influence is presumably one which is now directly focussed on him.

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<sup>2</sup> There is a manuscript interlineation "C.G. at Tangier" at this point in the source text, indicating that the Badoglio referred to here was Mario Badoglio, son of Marshal Pietro Badoglio mentioned earlier in the message. It is also possible that "Badoglio" at this point in the message was a garble for "Berio".

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31032

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

URGENT

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received this morning the visit of the Apostolic Delegate who has given me the attached communication<sup>2</sup> which I am sending to you for your information. The Pope requested particularly that these memoranda be brought to your attention as speedily as possible.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Quebec by pouch. Roosevelt returned the enclosures to Welles from Quebec on August 23, 1943, with the query, "Does this require any reply?" The opinion of Matthews and Dunn, to whom the file was referred, was that the matter required no further action. (740.0011 European War 1939/31032)

<sup>2</sup> Cicognani called on Welles to discuss the communication of August 20, 1943, printed below, and a second communication of the same date in which he asked again for an official reply to his note of August 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 52S. Neither Welles' memorandum of conversation nor the second communication of August 20 was forwarded to Quebec. For the texts of these two papers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 946-947.

[Enclosure]

*The Apostolic Delegate (Cicognani) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 244/43

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. WELLES, Inasmuch as events of the past few weeks in Sicily and in Italy at large have given great prominence to the prospects for the immediate future, the Holy See wishes to place before the United States government certain observations which have been dictated by its direct contact with these important events.

These reflections aim to evaluate recent and present happenings in the light of the future which they are molding and of the effects which they will have on the formulation of the peace towards which the Holy See continues to bend its every effort.

Trusting that these considerations will receive every attention I avail myself [etc.]

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*  
*Apostolic Delegate*

[Subenclosure 1]

No. 244/43

## MEMORANDUM

In the light of possible imminent developments in the Italian war situation, the Holy See cannot but be preoccupied with the grave consequences of such developments on the Church at large. These pre-occupations are greatly heightened by the determination, public[ly] expressed, that through wholesale bloodshed and destruction, even if this were to lead eventually to national chaos and anarchy, Italy must be forced out of the war.

Were these sad possibilities to be realized, the restricted territorial extent of Vatican City could not possibly prevent it from feeling most acutely the grave consequences of such a military campaign. Vatican City would inevitably become involved in, and perhaps even engulfed by, any serious disorders which might arise.

The noble and spiritual ideals which have assertedly been embodied in the Allied cause would appear to dictate that every precaution should be taken and every measure employed which might safeguard spiritual values and enhance their worth in the eyes of all men. On this point the Holy See recalls with satisfaction and hope the letter of the President of the United States to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII,

on July 9, 1943.<sup>3</sup> It cannot be denied that the religious sensibilities of millions of Catholics throughout the world would be sorely wounded by injuries, although unintended, which might be inflicted on Vatican City and, consequently, on the Holy See.

Were the Vatican to be cut off or hindered in its communication with the outside world, the nations at large would thus be deprived of one of their most potent sources of inspiration and guidance. Catholics in particular would suffer greatly from lack of contact with their Spiritual Head, and this would most assuredly make itself felt in other fields of activity.

An additional important consideration is found in the fact that at the present time the Vatican City serves as headquarters for all the resident diplomatic representatives of the Allied nations accredited to the Holy See.

For these reasons, His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State has asked that every precaution be taken to avoid creating a situation of chaos in Italy, which would make it most difficult, not to say impossible, for the Holy See to continue as the center of government for the Catholic Church.

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1943.

[Subenclosure 2]

No. 244/43

#### MEMORANDUM

The Holy See respectfully offers the following considerations with reference to the avowed intention of the Allies to make Italy feel unrestrainedly the full brunt of the war in every quarter :

1) Slaughter and destruction, especially when carried out on a large scale, contribute little or nothing to the establishment of genuine peace. These elements of warfare irritate and embitter the civilian population, with the effect of inciting the populace to blind hate against those who punish it by depriving it of everything which it holds most dear.

2) The destruction and damaging of churches, charitable institutions, and artistic monuments, even when this destruction is not intended, as well as the ruining of civilian homes etc., are doing much harm to the Allied cause. They are actually diminishing the prestige of the United States, which has always been regarded by the Italian people as a nation nurturing great respect for religion, art, and culture. If, unfortunately, at the present time, the passion for war beclouds the clear vision of good judgment, it cannot be denied that,

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 926-927.

years hence, the American people itself will be the first to deplore and condemn such actions.

3) A consideration of paramount importance is to be found in the favorable reaction of such a war policy in the interests of Communism. Under the influence of the bitterness engendered by the dread results of war, the people fall an easy prey to Communism, which is ever ready to avail itself of all means afforded by any event of public importance, especially by those of a calamitous nature.

Communism is already making noteworthy progress as the result of war.

The recent demonstrations accompanying the fall of Fascism are sufficient evidence that the Communists are well organized in Italy, and that *they have at their disposal both financial means and arms.*

Information reaching the Holy See also shows that Communism is making continual progress also in Germany.

These facts are a clear warning of the grave peril that Europe will find itself overrun with Communism immediately on the cessation of hostilities.

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1943.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31032

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I enclose for your information a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I have just had with the Apostolic Delegate.

Believe me [etc.]

SUMNER WELLES

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Attitude of Italian Government toward continuation of war.

Participants: The Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni Cicognani,  
Apostolic Delegate;  
Mr. Welles, Acting Secretary.

The Apostolic Delegate called to see me this evening for the second time today. The Archbishop brought with him a copy of a telegram which he had sent to the Cardinal Secretary of State on August 19

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to Quebec by pouch. A copy of the enclosure was sent also to Hull.

and which he read to me. In this telegram the Delegate had informed the Holy See that in his judgment public opinion in the United States was exceedingly uncertain as to whether the policy of the present Italian Government of apparently continuing the war on the side of Germany was a spontaneous decision on the part of the Italian Government or whether it was a decision which was forced upon it by German power. He also said that American public opinion was equally uncertain as to whether the Italian Government sincerely desired to find the ways and means of bringing to an end Italian participation in the war against the United Nations.

The Archbishop then read to me the reply which he had just received from Cardinal Maglione. In this message the Cardinal Secretary of State stated that the Italian Government desired to find as promptly as possible the means of ending its war against the United Nations, and second, that its continued collaboration with Germany was not spontaneous but was forced upon it by the German Government.

I thanked the Delegate for bringing this information so promptly to my attention and I said I would of course immediately refer the message he had given me to the President for his knowledge.

J.C.S. Files

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*Memorandum by the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs  
Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 21, 1943.]

MINUTES OF MEETING<sup>2</sup> HELD IN ROOM 4 E 859, OFFICE OF ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF WAR, ON SATURDAY, 21 AUGUST 1943, AT 1500<sup>3</sup>

*Members Present*

Maj. Gen. J. H. Hilldring  
(Acting Chairman)  
Mr. J. Wesley Jones  
(Rept'g Mr. James C. Dunn)  
Captain H. L. Pence, USN

Col. G. A. Rickards  
Mr. R. E. Barclay  
(Rept'g Sir Ronald Campbell)

*Others Present*

Col. David Marcus  
Major C. C. Hilliard  
Mr. William H. Taylor  
Lt. (jg) F. F. Fowle, USNR

Captain C. K. Lloyd  
Lt. Col. C. A. de Linde  
Sir David Waley

*Secretariat*

Col. R. J. Laux (Acting)

Major C. W. Garnett

<sup>1</sup> Corrections circulated in a later corrigendum have been made in the memorandum as printed here.

<sup>2</sup> C.C.A.C. Special Meeting, which took the place of the 6th Meeting in the numbered sequence of meetings of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., at 3 p. m.

1. *Surrender Terms for Italy* (C.C.S. 258<sup>4</sup> and 258/1<sup>5</sup>)

GENERAL HILLDRING stated that there were the following three documents before the Committee for their consideration and approval:

a. A comprehensive document containing all the surrender terms for Italy entitled Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy,<sup>6</sup> upon which U.S. and British authorities are in general agreement.

b. A document containing the political, economic and fiscal conditions of surrender to supplement the military terms now in General Eisenhower's possession entitled Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government,<sup>7</sup> upon which U.S. and British authorities are not entirely in agreement.

c. A document to serve as a guide to General Eisenhower in effecting and implementing the terms of surrender entitled Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia,<sup>8</sup> upon which U.S. and British authorities are not in agreement.

THE COMMITTEE proceeded to take up the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy.

MR. BARCLAY suggested the following changes in this document:

a. That the words "And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender" at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble be changed to read as follows: "And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations."

b. That there be deleted from Article 22<sup>9</sup> the second sentence which reads as follows:

"The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations."

MR. TAYLOR called attention to the fact that the second sentence of Article 23, and in particular the words "free of cost"<sup>10</sup> in this sentence, where [*were*] final and unequivocal and would prohibit the possibility of negotiations between the Italian Government and the United Nations. The sentence in question reads as follows:

"The Italian Government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time limits and on such terms as the United Nations

<sup>4</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", June 16, 1943; not printed.

<sup>5</sup> "Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation", July 1, 1943; not printed.

<sup>6</sup> The draft before the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on August 21, 1943, was a revision of the paper sent to Roosevelt on August 3, printed *ante*, p. 538.

<sup>7</sup> The draft before the Combined Civil Affairs Committee on August 21, 1943, was a revision of the paper of August 19, printed *ante*, p. 602. See *ante*, pp. 601-602.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. article 23 of the draft sent to Roosevelt on August 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 543.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. article 24 of the draft sent to Roosevelt on August 3, 1943, *ante*, p. 543.

may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations.”

After discussion concerning the suggested alterations in Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy,

THE COMMITTEE :—

Agreed,

*a.* That the words “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. on the basis of unconditional surrender” at the beginning of the second paragraph of the Preamble should be amended to read: “And whereas the U.S. and U.K. Governments on behalf of the United Nations.”

*b.* That the second sentence of Article 22 be deleted.

*c.* That the second sentence of Article 23 stand in its present form.

*d.* That the document, Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, as amended in paragraphs *a*, *b*, and *c*, above, is approved.<sup>11</sup>

THE COMMITTEE then proceeded to discuss the document entitled Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government.

MR. BARCLAY stated that comments from London on this document had not been received and that therefore no final action could be taken by the British Members.

CAPTAIN LLOYD made the following suggestions with respect to this document:

*a.* That there should be a Preamble at the beginning and a place for signatures at the end of the document.

*b.* That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted.

The sentence is as follows:

“The Italian Government will take all such measures as may be necessary to prevent strikes and lockouts, incitements to strike, or participation in labor disputes in all cases where these acts would be detrimental to the interests of the United Nations.”<sup>12</sup>

*c.* That Article 21 *b* should be deleted and Article 21 *a* should become Article 21.

Article 21 *b* reads as follows:

“*b.* The Italian Government will immediately surrender all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with the plants for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in all occupied countries, and all enemy countries.”<sup>13</sup>

*d.* That there appears to be some inconsistency between Article 6, which provides for suspension of powers of the Italian Government

<sup>11</sup> For the text of this instrument as dispatched to Eisenhower on August 26, 1943, following approval by Roosevelt and Churchill, see *post*, p. 1161.

<sup>12</sup> See *ante*, p. 606.

<sup>13</sup> See *ante*, p. 607.

in all occupied areas, and Article 17, which provides that local administrative authorities and public services will continue to function.

Mr. JONES, referring to Articles 7 and 8 *a* of this document and Article 8 of the draft Directive on Military Government of Continental Italy and Sardinia, stated that it seemed inconsistent that the Directive provides for the suspension of all prerogatives of the Crown, whereas the Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government contains no such provision.

Mr. BARCLAY stated that while it would no doubt be true that the powers of the Crown would be suspended in occupied areas, he very much doubted whether London would accept any such provision with regard to unoccupied areas. He stated further that he anticipated that the British authorities in London might ask for deletion of Article 8 *a*.

CAPTAIN LLOYD made the following additional suggestions with respect to the Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government:

*a.* That Article 14 referring to Italian shipping be amended to include all Axis shipping.

*b.* That there be included in this document an Article similar to Article 1 *c* of the Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons or authorities to refrain from destruction of or damage to any property.

After discussion with respect to the suggested changes in the Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government,

THE COMMITTEE:—

Agreed,

*a.* That the document include a preamble relating it to the military terms of surrender, and a place for signatures of the signatory parties.

*b.* That the second sentence of Article 19 should be deleted.

*c.* That the Article 21. *b* should be deleted and Article 21. *a* should become Article 21.

*d.* That further consideration would be given by both British and U.S. authorities to the questions raised with respect to Articles 6, 8 *a* and 17, concerning the suspension of the powers of the Italian Government and the prerogatives of the Crown.

*e.* That Article 14 relating to Italian shipping should be amended to include all Axis shipping.

*f.* That a provision should be added similar to Article 1 *c* of Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, providing that the Italian supreme command will order all persons and authorities to refrain from the destruction of or damage to property.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Concerning the text of the "additional" or "further" terms as it stood on August 23, 1943, following the incorporation into it of these and further changes, see *ante*, p. 602.

g. That the amendments and questions referred to above would be cleared informally by the Secretaries.

GENERAL HILLDRING stated that all differences as to Additional Conditions To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government should be settled quickly and informally in order that this document, together with the Draft of Surrender of Italy, and statements as to the advantages and disadvantages of each document, may be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their decision as to which of the documents should be used.

MR. BARCLAY recommended that the views of the British and U.S. Members as to the advantages and disadvantages of the two documents be combined in a single memorandum to accompany the documents when they are forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE COMMITTEE:—

Agreed,

That a joint note should be prepared, setting forth the views of the British and American authorities with respect to the two documents, to be forwarded to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with the documents themselves.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> See *post*, p. 1089, fn. 6.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

SECRET

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to Premier Minister Winston Churchill.

1. I have received your message[s] concerning the negotiations with the Italians<sup>2</sup> and the new terms of armistice with Italy.<sup>3</sup> Thank you for the information.

Mr. Eden told Mr. Sobolev that Moscow was fully informed about the negotiations with Italy. I have, however, to say that Mr. Eden's statement does not correspond with reality, as I have received your message in which long passages are omitted and which has no con-

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, which forwarded the Russian original, together with this translation, to the White House. The White House Map Room forwarded the translation to Quebec in telegram No. WHITE 126, August 24, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See the two telegrams of August 19, 1943, *ante*, pp. 1062, 1063.

<sup>3</sup> Information on this subject had been given by Eden to the Soviet Chargé at London (Sobolev) late in July. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 341-343. Concerning the United States approach to the Soviet Government on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 344-345, 347.

cluding paragraphs.<sup>4</sup> In view of this, it is necessary to state that the Soviet Government is not informed about the negotiations of the British and the Americans with the Italians. Mr. Kerr gives assurance that within a short time he will receive the complete text of your message; although the three days have passed, and Ambassador Kerr has not yet given me the complete text of the message. I cannot understand how such delay could have occurred during the transmission of the information on such important matter.

2. I believe that the time is ripe to organize the military-political Commission of the representatives of the three countries: The United States, Great Britain and the USSR with the purpose of considering the questions concerning the negotiations with the different Governments dissociating themselves from Germany. Until now the matter stood as follows: The United States and Great Britain made agreements but the Soviet Union received information about the results of the agreements between the two countries just as a passive third observer. I have to tell you that it is impossible to tolerate such situation any longer. I propose to establish this Commission and to assign Sicily at the beginning as the place of residence of the Commission.

3. I am waiting for the complete text of your message concerning the negotiations with Italy.<sup>5</sup>

[Moscow,] August 22, 1943.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 1062, fn. 1.

<sup>5</sup> According to Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 94, Roosevelt was "very much offended at the tone of this message." Cf. *ante*, p. 966. For the response given at Roosevelt's direction to the Soviet Chargé at Washington (Gromyko) on August 25, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 21.

740.0011 EW/8-2243

*Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the  
Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 22, 1943.

PA/D—MR. DUNN The attached message was left with me yesterday by an officer of the O.S.S. It is of interest as another "feeler" and channel from the Badoglio Govt. . . . the author of the message is Dulles. I told the OSS to make no reply to the question raised by the latter.

J W[ESLEY] J[ONES]

[Attachment]

BERN, August 20, 1943.

A reliable cutout <sup>1</sup> has transmitted to me a report from . . . <sup>2</sup> which states that Italy, according to Foreign Minister Guariglia, remains

<sup>1</sup> i.e., go-between.

<sup>2</sup> An Italian consular officer in Switzerland.

prepared to cease resistance on condition that we can guarantee plane protection against the Nazis, and they are willing to open the airports, and so forth. It would seem that . . . is anxious to be in touch with me directly. It is very possible that Guariglia and Rosso are making use of him here. Until I receive instructions, I am continuing to handle . . . with care, as an intelligence source only, and by means of cutouts.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1656

*Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

MR. MATTHEWS: I attended a drafting session at the War Department this morning in connection with the terms, other than military, to be imposed upon Italy in the event of a surrender. The military terms are already in General Eisenhower's possession.<sup>1</sup> Representatives of the British Embassy military and naval missions were present. These further terms<sup>2</sup> were drawn up and agreed to by both the British and American representatives for transmission to Quebec today with the exception of four articles nos. 3, 4, 5a and 29. The British representatives were unable to accept these articles and we agreed to send them to Quebec pointing out our differences. Among the articles to which the British could not give their concurrence were:

"No. 3, the exercise of the prerogatives of the crown will be suspended in all Italian territories. The powers of the central Italian Government will be suspended in all occupied areas as are designated by the allied commander-in-chief as Military Districts."

"No. 4 . . ."<sup>3</sup>

"No. 5a. Subject to the supreme authority of the allied commander-in-chief, the Italian Government will exercise legislative, judicial and executive powers in all unoccupied areas, these functions to continue only until, the general military situation permitting, the people of Italy shall have an opportunity freely to determine the form of permanent government, based on democratic principles, to be established in their country."

The other points on which we agreed to disagree were of a military character<sup>4</sup> and of no particular concern to the Department.

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565, 1062.

<sup>2</sup> For the draft of the "further" or "additional" terms which Dunn took to the First Quebec Conference, see *ante*, p. 601.

<sup>3</sup> Ellipsis in the source text. For the text of the draft of article 4, see *ante*, p. 603.

<sup>4</sup> The two military articles in disagreement were No. 4 (see *ante*, p. 603) and No. 29 (see *ante*, p. 609).

Already approved by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee,<sup>5</sup> under General Hilldring, was the draft instrument of surrender of Italy called the "comprehensive" document because it includes military as well as other terms. This document is designed to supersede the military terms already in General Eisenhower's hands and give him one complete instrument of surrender. This plan and procedure are generally preferred by the British representatives. It has been agreed to, as stated above, by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and in our opinion is all right as far as it goes. We do not feel, however, in spite of its designation as "comprehensive" that it is sufficiently complete.

The American representatives generally favor the alternate plan and procedure which are to supplement the military terms already in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief with the additional terms necessary to define our relationship to the defeated Italian Government. These further terms, we believe, are more complete than the "comprehensive" document and do in fact contain certain political provisions not included in the "comprehensive" document.

When I left the Pentagon Building this noon, it was agreed that both plans would be sent to Quebec by plane today with the suggestion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff select the plan and procedure they prefer.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 1084.

<sup>6</sup> It appears that this proposed course of action was not followed. A brief prepared for the United States members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, dated August 26, 1943, gives the following information concerning the status of the "long" or "comprehensive" terms and of the "further" or "additional" terms as that status was understood on the morning of August 26 by the United States members of the Committee Secretariat:

"The Combined Civil Affairs Committee has approved the comprehensive document entitled Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy containing military, political, financial and economic terms of surrender. . . .

"The Members of the Committee have approved informally the Further Terms To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government, an instrument containing political, economic and financial terms to supplement the military terms now in General Eisenhower's possession, with the exception of all or parts of paragraphs 3, 4, 5*a* and 29, shown in parentheses, to which the British have objected, and which the U.S. has now agreed to delete. . . .

"The foregoing documents have not yet been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

"*Action Recommended:*

"*a.* That the portions of paragraphs 3, 4, 5*a* and 29, inclosed in parentheses, of the instrument entitled Further Terms To Be Imposed Upon the Italian Government be deleted.

"*b.* That the Committee approve both of the above documents and transmit them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as alternatives, for their approval and transmittal to the President and the Prime Minister for decision as to which of the documents shall be used." (J.C.S. Files)

By the time the Combined Civil Affairs Committee met on August 26, however, word had been received that Roosevelt had approved the "long" or "comprehensive" terms and directed their dispatch to Eisenhower. See *ante*, p. 951, fn. 8, and p. 952, fn. 9; *post*, p. 1161, fn. 2. No consideration was given thereafter to the "further" or "additional" terms.

About 2:30 p. m. Colonel Laux of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department called to say that General Hilldring felt that the British reservations on the "American document" prejudiced the entire acceptance of the American plan; that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be inclined to take the document on which agreement had been reached and wondered if the Department would not be willing to withdraw the two articles quoted above which caused our British colleagues to withhold their approval. He said that the War Department was prepared to withdraw the two articles of military character to which the British objected. I told the Colonel that the Department felt very strongly about retaining the two political articles referred to; that it was true that if the Combined Chiefs of Staff chose the "British plan" these political provisions would not appear, but that we felt they should be submitted to Quebec for consideration. I said that while I regretted to have to insist on inclusion of certain terms which might jeopardize the acceptance of the whole "American plan", I felt that we could not omit them and thus leave ourselves open to possible future charges from the military that we had failed to give them proper advice on certain political phases of the highest importance with respect to the Italian situation. He asked if the Department's position was, then, that we could not agree to have the controversial political provisions withdrawn and I answered in the affirmative.

J W[ESLEY] J[ONES]

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740.00119 EW/8-2543 : Telegram

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sargent)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

QUADRANT, [undated.]<sup>2</sup>

IMPORTANT

President and Prime Minister are now agreed on text of comprehensive instrument for text of which see my telegram No. [blank.]

Please telegraph this to H. M. Ambassador in Lisbon,<sup>3</sup> instructing him that if and when Italians return, it should be given to them with the explanation that this document embodies the points already handed

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<sup>1</sup> The source text indicates that this message was to be sent to the War Cabinet Office in London as a telegram in the WELFARE series. The text was probably made available to the United States Delegation at Quebec on about August 23, 1943. Cf. *ante*, p. 951.

<sup>2</sup> Cadogan informed Dunn on August 23, 1943, that this message had been sent. See *ante*, p. 951. The British Foreign Office forwarded Eden's instructions to the British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) on August 25, 1943 (740.00119 EW/8-2543).

<sup>3</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

to them<sup>4</sup> and also contains the additional points which they were warned to expect.<sup>5</sup>

Combined Chiefs of Staff are sending text to General Eisenhower,<sup>6</sup> with similar instructions, in case Italians get into direct touch with his Headquarters.

<sup>4</sup> i.e., the "short" or "military" armistice terms.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 566.

<sup>6</sup> The "long" or "comprehensive" terms were not sent to Eisenhower by the Combined Chiefs of Staff until August 26, 1943. See *post*, p. 1161.

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### *Editorial Note*

For the final reports of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference, including conclusions with respect to Italy, see *post*, pp. 1121 ff.

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## D. BASES IN THE AZORES

Hopkins Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

QUADRANT, [August 19, 1943.]

President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin. Most Secret and Personal.<sup>2</sup>

3. To turn to another subject, following on the decisions at TRIDENT, His Majesty's Government entered upon negotiations with the Portuguese in order to obtain naval and Air facilities in LIFE BELT (see our immediately following telegram<sup>3</sup>). Accordingly, His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon<sup>4</sup> invoked the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, which has lasted 600 years unbroken,<sup>5</sup> and invited the Portuguese to grant the said facilities. Dr. Salazar was of course oppressed by the fear of German bombing out of revenge, and of possible hostile movements by the Spaniards. We have accordingly furnished him with supplies of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter airplanes which are now in transit, and we have also informed Dr. Salazar that should Spain attack Portugal we shall immediately declare war on Spain and render

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the War Cabinet Office in London as Churchill's telegram No. WELFARE 217 and forwarded to the British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr). Concerning the delivery of this message in Moscow, see *ante*, p. 1062, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> For the paragraphs of this message omitted here, see *ante*, p. 1062.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram No. WELFARE 218 (*ante*, p. 1063) it was explained that this code name "refers to Portuguese Atlantic islands."

<sup>4</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 611, fn. 3.

such help as is in our power. We have not however made any precise military convention ear-marking particular troops as we do not think either of these contingencies probable. Dr. Salazar has now consented to the use of LIFE BELT by the British, with Portuguese collaboration, in the early part of October.<sup>6</sup> As soon as we are established there and he is relieved from his anxieties, we shall press for the extension of these facilities to the United States ships and aircraft.

4. The possession of LIFE BELT is of great importance to the sea war. The U-boats have quitted the North Atlantic, where convoys have been running without loss since the middle of May, and have concentrated more on the southern route. The use of LIFE BELT will be of the utmost service in attacking them from the Air. Besides this, there is the ferrying of United States heavy bombers to Europe and Africa, which is also most desirable.

5. All of the above is of the most especially secret operational character.

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<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 614, fn. 2.

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*Editorial Note*

For the final reports of conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference, including conclusions with respect to the Azores, see *post*, pp. 1121 ff.

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## E. SCALE OF POSSIBLE ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 16 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 127/3

### SCALE OF ATTACK ON THE EAST AND WEST COASTS OF NORTH AMERICA

#### STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to report on the probable scale of attack that might be expected on the east and west coasts of North America.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 127/3), August 16, 1943: "The attached report on C.C.S. 127/2 ["Scale of Attack on East or West Coasts of North America", August 6, 1943; not printed], prepared by the Combined Intelligence Committee, is presented for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

The report was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 118th Meeting, September 10, 1943. See *post*, p.1221.

## DISCUSSION

2. The probable scale of attack on the east coast of North America is discussed in Enclosure "A"; that on the west coast in Enclosure "B". In this paper, consideration is limited to the Atlantic Coast north of the Straits of Florida and to the Pacific Coast north of Mexico.

## CONCLUSIONS

3. *East coast of North America.* Submarine attacks on shipping and minelaying in the coastal zone are continuing possibilities. Sporadic bombardment of shore installations, or landing of commando raiders or saboteurs by submarines are also possible but only on a small scale. Similar attacks by surface raiders are possible, but highly improbable. Air attack, on a very small scale, is possible, but is even more improbable than surface attack.

4. *West coast of North America.* Our conclusions are the same as those for the East coast, with two slight shifts of emphasis:

a. The maximum possible scale of submarine attack is less.

b. The possible scale of attack by ship-borne aircraft is greater. Such an attack, however, is very unlikely.

## Enclosure "A"

## SCALE OF ATTACK ON THE EAST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA

5. *Enemy capabilities* are virtually limited to attacks by submarine or surface raider. Land-based air attack is impractical. Surface raiders might launch ship-borne aircraft. Both submarines and surface raiders might

a. Attack shipping off the coast,

b. Mine coastal waters,

c. Bombard shore installations (including attacks by ship-borne aircraft),

d. Land commandos,

e. Land trained saboteurs and materials for sabotage.

6. *Attacks by any type of aircraft* are extremely improbable. Land-based air attack is physically possible, but because of range limitations would involve the sacrifice of the aircraft used and their crews and could not be carried out on a scale which could exert any material effect on the outcome of the war. An attack by ship-based aircraft would offer less physical difficulty, but would be very limited in its maximum scale. The one German aircraft carrier, *Graf Zeppelin*, has been laid up and there is no indication that she will be available for service in the near future, if ever. Lacking an aircraft carrier, only catapulted planes or seaplanes could be used. The vessels transporting the planes

would be subjected to a serious risk of loss. The possibility that Germany would accept these risks appears to be increasingly remote.

7. *Operations by surface raiders of any type against sea communications within the coastal zone or against shore objectives* are extremely unlikely. A merchant ship raider would probably have a better chance than a warship of reaching undetected the shipping lanes in the coastal zone or a shore objective. The chances of reaching the shipping lanes in the coastal zone are better than those of penetrating within effective gun range of a shore objective. It is most unlikely that either type, if at large in the North Atlantic, would attempt operations against objectives within the North American coastal zone in preference to attack of shipping on the ocean routes. Any relaxation of patrol activities would probably be taken advantage of by submarines rather than by surface vessels.

8. *Attacks by submarines.* Some 200 German and 40 Italian submarines are believed to be operational. At present, very few are operating immediately off the coast of North America. If, however, a reduction in anti-submarine activity in the coastal zone were perceptible, an increase in submarine activity against shipping in that zone would be likely to occur. Mining, bombardment, and the landing of raiders or saboteurs from submarines are continuing capabilities, but are possible only on a small scale.

#### Enclosure "B"

#### SCALE OF ATTACK ON THE WEST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA

9. *Enemy capabilities* are limited to attacks by submarines and surface raiders, the latter ranging in scale up to hit and run operations by a carrier task force. Land-based air attack is impossible so long as Kiska remains effectively neutralized. Japan lacks both the naval strength and the shipping to conduct large scale naval or shipborne attacks against North America.

Both submarines and surface raiders might

- a. Attack shipping off the coast,
- b. Mine coastal waters,
- c. Launch aircraft,
- d. Bombard shore installations,
- e. Land commandos,
- f. Land trained saboteurs and materials for sabotage.

10. *Carrier-borne air attack.* Japan could form a suitable task force and, considering the vastness of the Pacific, could perhaps bring it undetected within effective range of a profitable target such as Los Angeles-San Diego, the Puget Sound-Vancouver area, or the San

San Francisco Bay area. The risks, however, would be enormous, and at this juncture Japan cannot afford to risk either carriers or other vessels for indecisive purposes. All such craft available to her are, moreover, required for other uses.

11. *Surface raiders.* Japan's shortage of suitable types of naval vessels makes it extremely unlikely that she would employ them as raiders. The shipping stringency would have the same effect as regards armed merchantmen.

12. *Submarines.* About 60 Japanese submarines are believed to be operational. Some of these are capable of carrying up to 200 men. Japan has tended to use submarines in direct connection with military operations and has not employed them extensively in distant operations against shipping. Submarine attacks on shipping off the west coast of North America, mining, bombardment, and the landing of raiders or saboteurs from submarines are continuing capabilities, but are possible only on a small scale. An increase in the present low scale of submarine operations is possible but improbable. Increasing pressure on Japanese naval forces in the southwest and central Pacific would tend to occupy Japanese submarines in those waters and thus to decrease the probability of their use off North America.

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## F. TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 18 August 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent as telegram No. BLACK 5 to the White House Map Room at Washington and then sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. For the messages which had passed between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin before the Quebec Conference with respect to a possible tripartite meeting, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, pp. 8-20.

The American Ambassador at Moscow (Standley) reported as follows concerning the delivery of this message in a telegram sent to Washington and forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt at Quebec as telegram No. WHITE 110, August 20, 1943: "Upon receipt of your message at 192330 Local [i.e., at 11:30 p. m., August 19, Moscow time], I made immediate inquiry and was informed that Stalin was 'out of town.' In his absence I decided to deliver message to Molotov, whom I saw at 0040 Local [i.e., at 12:40 a. m., August 20, Moscow time]. Molotov stated he would immediately transmit your message to Stalin." (Roosevelt Papers)

Stalin's reply was not received until after the close of the First Quebec Conference. See *post*, p. 1174.

We have both arrived here with our staffs and will probably remain in conference for about ten days. We fully understand the strong reasons which lead you to remain on the battlefronts, where your presence has been so fruitful of victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

Should it prove impossible to arrange the much needed meeting of the three heads of governments, we agree with you that a meeting of the foreign office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective governments.<sup>2</sup>

CHURCHILL-ROOSEVELT

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<sup>2</sup> For the final paragraph of this message, omitted here, see *ante*, p. 1059.

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### G. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY

#### *Editorial Note*

For the text of the agreement relating to atomic energy signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec on August 19, 1943, see *post*, p. 1117.

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Hopkins Papers

*The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development  
(Bush) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 23, 1943.

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

[Subject:] TUBEALLOY—Interchange with the British.

We await your instructions regarding interchange with the British on this subject as a result of correspondence with Sir John Anderson

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<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was apparently sent by courier to the President at Quebec, and there turned over to Hopkins, who gave a copy of it to Churchill during the concluding days of the Quebec Conference. See Gowing, p. 172.

recently placed in your hands through Mr. Hopkins.<sup>2</sup> A report on the present status of the whole project has just been forwarded to General Marshall.

The next steps, if you approve the correspondence regarding interchange,<sup>3</sup> are to convene a combined committee, which will lay down rules for security and arrange conferences between scientific groups as needed to expedite the program fully.

I suggest, before you leave the Prime Minister, one step to accelerate matters. It would help if a top British scientist, accepted and of sound judgment, could be sent here as chief liaison under Sir John Anderson, to help make arrangements for the committee's work. He should be of the caliber of Sir Henry Dale or Sir Henry Tizard, and not one of the group working experimentally on a single phase of the problem.

I hasten to make this suggestion for the following reason. In previous negotiations difficulty was encountered because the British representative was an industrialist, Mr. Akers of International Chemical Industries. This same man is now here, apparently to make similar arrangements. He recently, and without consulting us, brought four eminent British scientific workers here for interchange. As we cannot use them until the combined committee has laid down the rules, they are likely to think us reluctant to interchange, whereas the exact opposite is true and we are anxious to get appropriate interchange going in an orderly fashion, so that relations will not this time become tangled. Akers is a very able man, but not the one to handle this matter.

We will proceed promptly with the whole affair on receiving your instructions.

V. BUSH

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<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 645-651.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to the agreement on this subject signed at Quebec on August 19, 1943. See *post*, p. 1117.

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## H. PROPAGANDA COORDINATION

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 15 August 1943.

C.C.S. 310

### PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

Recent events have indicated the necessity for establishing some machinery whereby propaganda policies to be followed by London,

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of this paper at the 116th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, August 24, 1943, see *ante*, p. 963.

Washington, and Theater Headquarters may be coordinated, particularly in emergency cases.

The enclosure is presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a possible solution to this problem. They consider it desirable that something along these lines be accomplished during the QUADRANT Conferences.

Enclosure

[PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE]

PROBLEM

To establish a central agency with power of decision regarding propaganda lines to be followed.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

The recent removal of Mussolini disclosed the fact that in emergencies there is no United Nations agency immediately available to coordinate and determine the propaganda policy that should be followed in order to derive the maximum benefit from the situation. As a result there has been a divergence in the propaganda aims as between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Theater Commander, which will be difficult to correct.

The time involved in obtaining agreed views from the Chief Executives of the two governments, the State Department, the Foreign Office, and the military and naval leaders of the two countries is too long to permit taking full advantage of a situation which requires immediate action.

ACTION RECOMMENDED

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and the Prime Minister:

*a.* That a Propaganda Committee be set up in Washington to include one high-level representative each from the U.S. State Department, British Foreign Office, U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff.

*b.* That this Committee be authorized to make decisions and issue broad directives on propaganda policies to be followed by the propaganda agencies of the two countries. These should be such as to insure the maximum benefit in furthering the military and political aims of the two governments. It should be understood that this committee ordinarily is free to seek guidance on the highest levels, but in emergencies to have the responsibility of taking immediate action without reference to higher authority.

*c.* That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with the implementation of the above.

## I. POLICY TOWARD SPAIN

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 20 August 1943.

C.C.S. 321

## POLICY TOWARDS SPAIN

1. We have examined the suggestion put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 303 paragraph 10<sup>2</sup>) that the time is now ripe to take full advantage of our present position and adopt a stern and frankly demanding policy towards Spain.

2. We can say at once that we agree entirely with the sense of this suggestion. The only point at issue is exactly how far we should go.

3. We feel that it will be agreed that:

a. The Spaniards, with Germany on their doorstep, will not be persuaded to take any military action which appears to threaten Germany and which might bring on them German retaliation. Any action or threat on our part to coerce them in this direction would merely tend to unite them against us.

b. From our point of view, it is most undesirable that we should press the Spaniards to a point which might impose upon us any military commitment in support of diplomatic or military threats.

4. We suggest therefore that it would be unwise to go so far as to press the Spaniards to transfer the bulk of their defensive forces to the North, which they would be most unlikely to do.

5. We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:

a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements. A note on the wolfram position by the Ministry of Economic Warfare is attached.

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 113th Meeting, August 20, 1943. See *ante*, p. 910.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 480.

d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.

g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.

h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units.

i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

6. Owing to the resentment which we are likely to cause if we interfere directly in Spanish internal affairs, it would not be in our military interests openly to promote the restoration of the monarchy since such interference would be likely to cause serious disorder in Spain, of which the Germans might take advantage by infiltration.

We should, however, welcome and encourage the formation of a less anti-Allied Government.

Enclosure

*Memorandum Prepared in the British Ministry of Economic Warfare*

#### WOLFRAM FROM THE IBERIAN PENINSULA

##### 1. *Germany's Present Position*

The virtual absence of stock, Allied preemptive purchasing in the Peninsula and the success achieved against blockade runners has made Germany's wolfram position critical.

##### 2. *Stocks and Supplies*

Germany started the war with a stock of 12,000 tons of concentrates. After the outbreak of war, Germany was dependent upon what was then a small output in the Peninsula, of which Portugal provided some 2,000 to 3,000 tons and Spain only 300 tons. Until 1942 Germany used her stocks to maintain an annual consumption of about 9,000 tons. From 1942 onwards, her consumption has been at the rate of about 5,800 per year, of which about 4,300 are basic industrial consumption and the balance for A.P. projectiles. Mines in Germany and France produce about 250 tons a year. Should our preemptive purchases in Spain and Portugal continue to be successful Germany will receive only about 2,000 tons from each country in 1943 and may receive substantially less from Spain. As Germany started the year with only 500 tons of stock, a further cut in consumption will be necessary unless she succeeds in obtaining further supplies by blockade running.

##### 3. *Effects of Shortage*

Germany's main uses for tungsten (the metal derived from wolfram) are to make tungsten carbide, which is used for providing a hard tip for machine tools, and for cores for armor piercing projectiles.

Small quantities of tungsten are also used for providing filaments for electric lamps, radio valves, etc., and as a hydrogenation catalyst. A substantial reduction of supplies would therefore face Germany with the following alternatives:

*a.* A cut in the production of weapons of all types, resulting from the absence of tungsten carbide tips from cutting tools and consequent less efficient production, or

*b.* The sacrifice of armor piercing ammunition with tungsten carbide cores.

Should supplies from the Peninsula be entirely cut off, Germany would probably suffer both as it is improbable that she would obtain sufficient supplies by blockade running. Blockade running by surface ships should prove impracticable in the future and submarines could only bring the desired quantity at the expense of all other much needed commodities.

#### 4. *Speed of Effect*

The loss of supplies from the Iberian Peninsula would probably not affect military operations for six months but after that the effect would be increasingly felt.

#### 5. *Conclusions*

Failure to obtain wolfram from the Iberian Peninsula would seriously affect the rate of production throughout German industry and would render impossible the manufacture of armor piercing projectiles with tungsten carbide cores on any substantial scale. These effects would become apparent in actual operations after about six months, depending on the rate of military wastage.

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#### *Editorial Note*

For the section on "Military Considerations in Relation to Spain" included in the final conclusions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the First Quebec Conference, see *post*, p. 1130.

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## J. POSSIBLE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Hull Papers

### *Draft of Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

QUEBEC, [August 21 (?), 1943.]

The United States and United Kingdom Governments have decided to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the

<sup>1</sup> The source text is marked "Churchill draft" in Hull's handwriting. This draft and the three printed immediately below are all undated but seem to have been prepared between Hull's arrival at Quebec on August 20, 1943, and the preparation of the draft on which Roosevelt worked during the evening of August 22, *post*, p. 1106.

responsible authority representing all Frenchmen outside France who are resolutely engaged in the expulsion from French soil of all German forces and in the destruction of the Hitler régime.

The two Governments have taken this action on the basis that the French Committee of National Liberation themselves do not claim to represent the future Government of France which can only be established after the French Nation in conditions of freedom and tranquility has been able to express its wishes in a constitutional form.

During the continuance of the war military needs are paramount and all controls necessary for operational purposes are in consequence reserved to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in any theatre of war.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Draft of Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 21 (?), 1943.]

U.S. DRAFT FORMULA

The Governments of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are in accord that the following statement in no sense constitutes recognition of a Government of France or of the French Empire. It constitutes recognition of *the French Committee of National Liberation*,<sup>2</sup> for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France in a free and untrammelled manner proceed to select their own form of Government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy. The two Governments accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

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<sup>1</sup> The source text has at the end the typed drafter's initials: C[ordell] H[ull].

<sup>2</sup> The words in italics appear on the source text as an interlineation in Dunn's handwriting, replacing the words "a Committee" as originally typed.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the two Governments with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

On these understandings the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as administrating those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. The two Governments take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities and securities in the territories under its administration are required by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom for the prosecution of the war.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Draft of Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 21 (?), 1943.]

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.

From the outset military equipment and assistance has been given to the French armed forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been constantly growing since the landing of British and American forces in North Africa. In recent weeks, arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the liberation of France.

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated.

It is our firm hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will demonstrate a singleminded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the overseas French. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people as a whole are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves. Only the people of France itself can determine the form of their future government and make the choice of their future leaders. In making this decision, they must be wholly untrammelled.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of liberating France from the German and Italian yokes. We trust that it will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent, at this time, in promoting this great cause we are agreeing to the conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unity itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political problems.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Draft of Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 21 (?), 1943.]

The President and the Prime Minister ~~have felt that the time has come to~~ announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.

This constitutes in no sense recognition of that Committee in speaking for the people in France or for a future Government of France.

It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations on behalf of French territory ~~and colonies~~ outside of France.

In view of the paramount importance ~~in~~ *of* the common war effort, the relationship between our two Governments ~~with~~ *and* the French Committee continues to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

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<sup>1</sup> There is printed here a composite text of two closely related drafts found in the Roosevelt Papers. Canceled type represents words which appear in the earlier draft but not in the later draft, while italics represent additions in the later draft. Neither draft is dated, and neither bears any indication of authorship.

The simple purpose is cooperation with all patriotic Frenchmen working ~~to~~ for the liberation of the French people and territories from the oppression of the enemy.

Accordingly we welcome the establishment of the French Committee of ~~on~~<sup>2</sup> National Liberation. It is our understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members to the prosecution of the war.

Obviously, it will be for the French people themselves ~~to settle their own Constitution and~~ to establish their own Government after they have had untrammelled opportunity to express themselves with the utmost freedom.

~~In an earnest effort to promote our great cause, we are agreeing to the recognition of the Committee in the hope that it will achieve further unity within itself and continued cooperation with the United Nations.~~

*May the restoration of France come with all speed.*

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<sup>2</sup> This change in the later draft was probably a typographical error.

Roosevelt Papers

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*Draft of Statement for President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC,] August 21, 1943.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FRENCH  
NATIONAL COMMITTEE

In line with the traditional and binding friendship of the American People for the People of France, I feel that the Government of the United States should do everything within its power to restore France to its rightful position among the family of nations. Over 90 per cent of Frenchmen are today still under the domination of the enemy and unable freely to express themselves. French forces outside Axis domination have fought valiantly with the United Nations against the oppressor.

From the outset, this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French Forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French Forces have adequate modern military equipment, effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated.

This Government has cooperated and will continue to cooperate fully with French authorities who are insuring the administration of French interests until such time as the French People freely elect their own Government. The relationship of this Government with the French National Committee must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders in the prosecution of the war against the Axis.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for matters other than military is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French People and the United Nations, and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to conditional acceptance of the Committee as already stated, for a trial and any further efforts to unify itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objectives.

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Hull Papers

*Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the United States Government*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC, August 22, 1943.]

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is ~~the understanding of the Government of the United States~~ *our expectation* that the Committee ~~has been conceived and~~ will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the *active* prosecution of the war. ~~It will be for the French people themselves to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.~~

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. The text printed here in roman type reproduces the typewritten text of the source document. Canceled type represents deletions later made by hand on the source text; italics represent additions made on the source copy in Roosevelt's handwriting. The changes were apparently made by Roosevelt during the evening of August 22, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 934). Cf. the final text of the statement by the United States Government, *post*, p. 1169.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority. <sup>2</sup>This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. <sup>2</sup>It *does* constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations ~~until~~ *during the war*. *Later on* the people of France, in a free and untrammelled manner, *will proceed in due course* to select their own ~~form~~ of government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of ~~all~~ French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire ~~in respect of the different categories of such interests~~ must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until ~~the French and Allied authorities are completely liberated~~ *soil is freed from its invaders* and until victory is complete over all ~~the~~ enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

<sup>2</sup> An indication that a new paragraph is to begin here has been inserted by hand on the source text.

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Hull Papers

*Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the United States Government*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC, August 22 (?), 1943.]

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of French people and French territories from the oppression of the enemy.

The Government of the United States accordingly welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is the understanding of the United States that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war within the framework of inter-Allied cooperation.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of the Government of the United States with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

<sup>1</sup>The source text has the following endorsement in Dunn's handwriting: "British redraft".

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States. It constitutes recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation for the purpose of functioning within specific limitations until the people of France, in a free and untrammelled manner, proceed to select their own form of government and their own officials to administer it.

On these understandings, the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge the authority of the Committee.

The Government of the United States notes the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of all French interests. The question of the extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire in respect of the different categories of such interests must, however, be reserved for consideration [in] each case as it arises.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle, in cooperation with all the Allies, until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

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Hull Papers

*Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Secretary of State*

MOST SECRET

QUEBEC CITY, August 22nd, 1943.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am sending you, herewith, a copy of our draft letter to the Delegate in Canada of the French Committee of National Liberation, about which I think I spoke to you yesterday. I have given a copy to Mr. Churchill and am sending one to the President.

Yours very sincerely,

W. L. MACKENZIE KING

[Enclosure]

*Draft Note*

MOST SECRET

[OTTAWA,] August 6th, 1943.

DRAFT NOTE TO THE FRENCH DELEGATE IN OTTAWA

SIR, I have the honour to refer to your note of June 11th with which you transmitted the text of the Declaration adopted at Algiers on

June 3rd by which the French Committee of National Liberation was established.

[Here follows, with minor editorial differences and one difference in phrasing, the text of the Canadian statement on this subject released on August 26, 1943, *post*, p. 1171.]

Accept [etc.]

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Hull Papers

*Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the British Government*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 23, 1943.]

#### RECOGNITION OF FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of co-operating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

His Majesty's Government accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war, that it is the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation and that it administers those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship of His Majesty's Government with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

It is common ground between His Majesty's Government and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely. The present declaration does not therefore constitute recognition of the Committee as a Government of France or of the French Empire.

On these understandings His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognise the French Committee of National Liberation.

His Majesty's Government take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. The source text, on British Foreign Office stationery, bears the following typed notation: "7.30 p. m. August 23."

Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close co-operation with all the Allies until the French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers.

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Hull Papers

*Draft of Statement To Be Issued by the British Government*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 24, 1943.]

#### RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of co-operating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the Committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the Committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own Government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely.

On this understanding His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement :

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognise the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also recognise the Committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-allied co-operation. They take note with sympathy of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of His Majesty's Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

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<sup>1</sup> Authorship not indicated. The source text, on British Foreign Office stationery, bears the following type notation: "10.00 a. m. meeting, August 24." See *ante*, p. 953.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the Committee's determination to continue the common struggle, in close co-operation with all the Allies, until French and Allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy powers. It is understood that the Committee will afford whatever military and economic facilities in the territories under its administration are required by the Allied Governments for the prosecution of the war.

In respect of certain of these territories, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United Kingdom authorities. The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that, pending their revision, all such agreements concluded since June 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation will remain in force as between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Committee of National Liberation.

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*Editorial Note*

For the texts of the statements on this subject issued by the United States, British, and Canadian Governments at the conclusion of the First Quebec Conference, see *post*, pp. 1169 ff.

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## K. POLICY TOWARD AUSTRIA

863.01/8-2043

*Archduke Otto of Austria to the Secretary of State*

QUEBEC, August 20th, 1943.

DEAR MR. HULL, Enclosed I am sending to you two short *aide-mémoires* on questions which I believe are of a great importance for the cause of the United Nations in Central Europe.

I most sincerely hope that it will be possible for you to consider these questions at the present conference and to bring to them an adequate solution.

I am [etc.]

OTTO OF AUSTRIA

[Enclosure 1]

*Aide-Mémoire*

### THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION

The military and political events of the near past have put Austria into the forefront of the interest of the United Nations. As approximately 84,8% of the German implements of war for Italy are shipped

over the Austrian railroads, much will depend on the attitude and action of the Austrian people.

The trend of the United Nations has been to recognize the heroic fight of Austria against the Germans by considering that country as an occupied country, which shall be liberated. But as this point has not yet been made sufficiently clear, certain agencies have used this to spread false impressions.

News from Russia indicate that the Soviet Government is about to launch an Austrian Government or National Council under the presidency of Wilhelm Koplenig (36 Gorkova ulica, Moscow), former leader of the Austrian Communist Party. Such a move would very much strengthen the Austrian Communist Party—which hitherto was negligible—and would disturb the Catholic, agrarian and patriotic opposition. The fear of Communist dictatorship would gravely weaken the Austrian resistance against the Axis.

Under these circumstances and with due regard to the ever increasing strategic importance of Austria, the following program with regard to Austria is submitted:

1.) A clear declaration at the Quebec Conference, that Austria is an occupied country and will therefore be liberated, like the other occupied countries.

2.) A settlement of the question of Southern Tyrol, along the lines suggested in the annexed memorandum on that question.

3.) The recognition by the United Nations of a provisional Austrian authority. This authority should be non-partisan and represent Austria only as long as its people is silenced. It should not have authority to commit Austria on constitutional questions. In order to achieve this aim, a Committee of all former Austrian diplomats and consuls, who have kept their nationality and resisted the Nazis, could be formed, linking thus the legality of the past with the condition of non-partisan character.

Such a program would avoid the harm which might be done by a Russian unilateral step, without too much antagonizing Russia. It would strengthen Austria's resistance against the Axis and thus help the progress of the war. It is finally in line with the lofty principles announced by the leaders of the United Nations.

[Enclosure 2]

*Aide-Mémoire*

#### THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN TYROL (ALTO ADIGE)

In the coming discussions of the United Nations, the question of establishing just and reasonable borders for Italy and her neighbours will be of great importance for the foundation of a lasting peace.

In this connection the question of Southern Tyrol, called by the

Italians Alto Adige, will be of paramount importance. This land was conceded to Italy in the last peace treaty over the protest of its Austrian population and of several Allied leaders. Under Italian occupation the Southern Tyrolese population was severely persecuted, dispossessed and partly replaced by Italians. Under an agreement between Mussolini and Hitler<sup>1</sup> a notable part of the population was forcibly moved to Germany between 1939 and 1942, where they still live under very hard and inhuman conditions. Southern Tyrol has therefore suffered more than many other parts of Europe from Axis cruelty.

Southern Tyrol can be divided roughly into two parts:

a) South of the present Austrian border and North of a line Adamello Mountains-Salurn-Cortina d'Ampezzo, is a country with 85% Austrian population, deeply attached to Austria.

b) South of the above mentioned line and North of the Italian border of 1914 is a country which, contrary to Italian propaganda, has still 54% Austrian population.

It is therefore a matter of justice, well in line with the principles of the United Nations, that this territory should be returned to Austria. It would be also a matter of political wisdom. Neither the Southern Tyrolese, nor the Austrians have ever accepted the present border. If good relations ought to be established between Austria and Italy, this can only be done by solving the Southern Tyrolese question in an Austrian sense. This would furthermore strengthen Austria materially and morally against Germany.

If the necessity of a plebiscite in the Southern zone of Southern Tyrol would be felt, care should be taken that only real Southern Tyrolese could vote. The right to vote restricted to residents as of 1918 and to their descendants would be the guarantee that the voters really represent the Southern Tyrolese people.

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is to an Italo-German agreement reached at Berlin on June 23, 1939. See *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VI, pp. 778-779.

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## L. THE SOVIET-POLISH BOUNDARY

PR 10 "Foreign Relations of U.S.,"/9-1069

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 23, 1943.]

In December 1941 Stalin informed the Foreign Secretary that he regarded the question of U.S.S.R.'s western frontiers as "the main question for us in the war."

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<sup>1</sup> Not found in United States files; printed from a copy obtained by the editors from the British Foreign Office. Although the source text is undated and unsigned, this paper was identified by the Foreign Office as the note which Eden gave to Hull during their meeting at Quebec on August 23, 1943. See *ante*, p. 949.

Stalin during the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow in 1941, Molotov in London in 1942 and Maisky speaking to the Foreign Secretary in March 1943,<sup>2</sup> have all said that Curzon Line<sup>3</sup> with minor modifications would be satisfactory basis for frontier settlement.

Neither His Majesty's Government nor, so far as we are aware, United States Government, have indicated to Soviet Government what their views on this question are. We have little doubt, however, that the Soviet Government would be much easier to deal with on Polish and other matters if His Majesty's Government and United States Government could let them know that we are prepared in practice to contemplate a substantial measure of satisfaction on what we understand Soviet territorial claims to be, while not abandoning our principle of not recognising during the war any territorial changes.

His Majesty's Government consider that an equitable solution of Russian claims would be something on the following lines: (a) *Poland* to receive in the west Danzig, East Prussia and Upper Silesia, and to be content in the east with the Curzon Line adjusted to include city of Lwów in Poland. (b) *Other frontiers*.—Eventual recognition of Russia's 1941 frontiers with Finland and Roumania, and of Soviet sovereignty over the Baltic States.

If the views of the United States Government do not differ radically from the above, there might be a basis for a joint intimation of our views to Soviet Government, in the course of any discussion with them of the general post-war settlement. His Majesty's Government wish to consider advisability of such action *now* because:—

(a) Recent exchanges of personal telegrams between the Prime Minister and Stalin show that the latter desires closer consultation on future operations.<sup>4</sup> This is natural now that we are embarked on operations in Europe which are likely soon to affect south-eastern Europe more or less directly. The views of Soviet Government will have to be taken into consideration and their attitude is likely to be suspicious and uncooperative unless they get some reassurances upon this "main question" of frontiers.

(b) When some time ago His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow<sup>5</sup> broached with M. Molotov the question of the Soviet attitude to post-war questions in Germany, he received a definite indication that the Soviet Government wished to discuss such matters with His Majesty's Government and United States Government, with a view to reaching firm agreement. The matter has not been pursued pending discussion

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<sup>2</sup> For further details of Anglo-Soviet discussions of the Polish-Soviet boundary on the three occasions referred to, see Eden, pp. 335, 380–381, 429–430.

<sup>3</sup> For the origin and a description of the Curzon Line, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. XIII, pp. 793–794.

<sup>4</sup> See particularly Stalin's message to Churchill of June 24, 1943, printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 136–138.

<sup>5</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

with United States Government, but if we want to break down Soviet suspicions and get into real contact with them on major matters we think it unwise to leave discussions further in suspense. The organisation of a Free German Movement <sup>6</sup> is an added reason for resuming discussions.

We for our part would not wish to announce formally any understanding that might be reached with the Soviet on these lines, and we should also ask them to keep it to themselves until such time as it could be presented as part of a general territorial settlement.

We must face the fact that, if we do proceed thus, we cannot be certain that publicity will not be given to the facts either from the Soviet or the Polish side.

There could, of course, be no intention of giving the Soviet Government satisfaction on the point of frontiers unless they, on their side, are willing to play a useful part in post-war organisation as we conceive it. But it is so certain that the Russians will raise this point if we get into discussion that it seems essential that we should know how we propose to deal with it.

There could, of course, be no question at this stage of any agreement written or unwritten with the Soviet Government on frontier question. This would be contrary to the assurances we gave Poland in 1941 when the Soviet Polish Treaty <sup>7</sup> was signed and again in 1942 at time of the negotiations for an Anglo-Soviet treaty.<sup>8</sup> We should therefore propose to inform the Polish Government that in our view no final settlement of Polish-Soviet difficulties can be found so long as there is no agreement on the frontier question. This question will have to be solved sooner or later. It could be left until the Soviet armies re-enter Polish territory, but it is our belief that a satisfactory solution would then be all the harder to obtain. We and the United States Government would propose therefore to approach the Soviet Government in the matter and discuss it with them.

It is probable that the Soviet Government would agree to something on the lines of paragraph 3 (a) above.<sup>9</sup> We know that it is difficult, maybe impossible, for this or any Polish Government, during the course of the war, to accept any surrender of former Polish territory.

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<sup>6</sup> Concerning the Free Germany Committee, founded at Moscow on July 12, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 552, 571-574.

<sup>7</sup> Signed at London, July 30, 1941. See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 243-245.

<sup>8</sup> Signed at London, May 26, 1942. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLIV, p. 1038.

<sup>9</sup> i.e., clause a of paragraph 4 above as the paragraphing is arranged in the source text.

But it might perhaps help them if the United States and United Kingdom Governments were to recommend to them such a solution, conditional on Poland receiving the compensation indicated.

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### M. ISSUANCE OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN STATEMENT ON PALESTINE

867a.01/1950

*Memorandum by the British Delegation*<sup>1</sup>

#### PALESTINE

It is not apparent why the United States Government should think that the situation in Palestine is less inflammable.<sup>2</sup> An American-Jewish congress is to held at the end of this month which may well put forward the most uncompromising demands. Much publicity has recently been given to talks between the Prime Ministers of Iraq and Egypt on Arab federation which, though innocuous in themselves, might lead to agitation in the Arab world about Palestine. A further incident which might set a match to the flames is the recent discovery of large-scale thefts of arms by Jews in Palestine. Investigations have disclosed the existence of a highly-organised racket, and these investigations may well lead direct to the Jewish Agency. Courts-martial have been held on some British soldiers, who have been condemned to terms of penal servitude, and the trial is now proceeding of two Jews. The High Commissioner reports that if these Jews are convicted, a violent outbreak is possible. It is clear, therefore, that both in America and in the Middle East, the need for some sedative joint statement is as urgent as ever. Such a statement would not of course be directed solely against the Jews, but applies equally to agitation from Arab or any other quarter. It is not easy to understand the Zionists' opposition to it, except on the assumption that they wish to bring the Palestine question to a head at a moment inconvenient to us from the point of view of the war. If a statement is to be issued, the sooner it appears the better.

QUEBEC, 21st August, 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> Handed to Hull by Eden on August 21, 1943. See *ante*, p. 919.

<sup>2</sup> Hull had informed the American Embassy at London on August 7, 1943, that the War Department had concluded that the security situation in Palestine was not so serious as to require any action at that time, and Hull had instructed the Embassy to inform the British Foreign Office that "it has been decided not to issue the proposed joint statement regarding Palestine". See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. iv, p. 803. For background on the statement referred to, see *ante*, pp. 674 ff.

N. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST QUEBEC  
CONFERENCE

## (1) AGREEMENT RELATING TO ATOMIC ENERGY

Department of the Army Files

*Agreement Relating to Atomic Energy*

THE CITADEL, QUEBEC.

ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT GOVERNING COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE  
AUTHORITIES OF THE U.S.A. AND THE U.K. IN THE MATTER OF TUBE  
ALLOYS <sup>1</sup>

Whereas it is vital to our common safety in the present War to bring the TUBE ALLOYS project to fruition at the earliest moment; and whereas this may be more speedily achieved if all available British and American brains and resources are pooled; and whereas owing to war conditions it would be an improvident use of war resources to duplicate plants on a large scale on both sides of the Atlantic and therefore a far greater expense has fallen upon the United States;

It is agreed between us

First, that we will never use this agency against each other.

Secondly, that we will not use it against third parties without each other's consent.

Thirdly, that we will not either of us communicate any information about TUBE ALLOYS to third parties except by mutual consent.

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<sup>1</sup> These Articles of Agreement are typed on four pages of stationery on each of which appears the letterhead "The Citadel Quebec". For a photocopy of the British signed original of these Articles, see *Articles of Agreement governing collaboration between the authorities of the U.S.A. and the U.K. in the matter of Tube Alloys* (Cmd. 9123; London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1954). The text of the articles printed by the Department of State in 1954 as Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2993 was prepared from a photocopy of the British signed original. The United States signed original used as the source text for the document printed here is identical with the British signed original except that (a) the three United States members of the Combined Policy Committee appear in typed form in the United States original whereas they are in Roosevelt's handwriting in the British original; (b) the form of the date at the end of the document (in Roosevelt's handwriting on both copies) reads "August 19 1943" in the British original and "Aug. 19th 1943" in the United States original (in which also the first digit of 19th appears to have been written over a figure 2, presumably because Roosevelt began to write 20th and then corrected it to 19th); and (c) there is a period in the United States original after the surname of C. D. Howe.

The source text of the Articles of Agreement is attached to a memorandum from Churchill's Principal Private Secretary to Roosevelt's Naval Aide, dated at Quebec, August 19, 1943, which reads as follows: "ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN. I attach, for retention, one of the two copies of the Articles of Agreement relating to TUBE ALLOYS, signed by the President and Mr. Churchill today. J. M. MARTIN."

Fourthly, that in view of the heavy burden of production falling upon the United States as the result of a wise division of war effort, the British Government recognize that any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character shall be dealt with as between the United States and Great Britain on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The Prime Minister expressly disclaims any interest in these industrial and commercial aspects beyond what may be considered by the President of the United States to be fair and just and in harmony with the economic welfare of the world.

And Fifthly, that the following arrangements shall be made to ensure full and effective collaboration between the two countries in bringing the project to fruition :

(a) There shall be set up in Washington a Combined Policy Committee composed of :

The Secretary of War.	(United States)
Dr. Vannevar Bush.	(United States)
Dr. James B. Conant.	(United States)
Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	(United Kingdom)
Colonel the Right Hon. J. J. Llewellyn, C.B.E., M.C., M.P.	(United Kingdom)
The Honourable C. D. Howe.	(Canada)

The functions of this Committee, subject to the control of the respective Governments, will be :

(1) To agree from time to time upon the programme of work to be carried out in the two countries.

(2) To keep all sections of the project under constant review.

(3) To allocate materials, apparatus and plant, in limited supply, in accordance with the requirements of the programme agreed by the Committee.

(4) To settle any questions which may arise on the interpretation or application of this Agreement.

(b) There shall be complete interchange of information and ideas on all sections of the project between members of the Policy Committee and their immediate technical advisers.

(c) In the field of scientific research and development there shall be full and effective interchange of information and ideas between those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field.

(d) In the field of design, construction and operation of large-scale plants, interchange of information and ideas shall be regulated by such *ad hoc* arrangements as may, in each section of the field, appear to be necessary or desirable if the project is to be brought to

fruition at the earliest moment. Such *ad hoc* arrangements shall be subject to the approval of the Policy Committee.

AUG. 19th 1943 <sup>2</sup>

Approved <sup>2</sup>

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT  
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

<sup>2</sup> In Roosevelt's handwriting in the source text.

(2) PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING THE CREATION OF THE JOINT WAR  
AID COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES-CANADA

Roosevelt Papers

*Press Release Issued Jointly by President Roosevelt and Prime  
Minister Mackenzie King*

QUEBEC CONFERENCE, August 22, 1943.

*For release at 8.00 p. m. August 22, 1943*

The President and the Prime Minister of Canada announced today the creation of a Joint War Aid Committee, United States-Canada, to study problems that arise out of operations of the United States Lend-Lease and the Canadian Mutual Aid program, and where necessary to make recommendations concerning them to the proper authorities.

The initial membership of the Committee is as follows:

*United States members:*

Chairman—J. H. Burns, Major General,  
Executive, Munitions Assignment[s] Board, U.S.  
and Great Britain.

Vice-Chairman—William L. Batt, War Production Board.  
J. D. Hickerson, Assistant Chief, European  
Division, Department of State.  
Arthur B. Van Buskirk, Deputy Administrator  
in the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.  
Boykin C. Wright, Brigadier General, Director,  
International Aid Division, Army Service  
Forces.

*Canadian members:*

Chairman—E. P. Taylor, Deputy Member,  
Canadian Section, Combined Production and Re-  
sources Board.  
L. B. Pearson, Minister Counsellor, Canadian  
Legation.  
J. B. Carswell, Director General, Washington Office,  
Department of Munitions and Supply of Canada.  
Maurice Pope, Major General, Chairman, Canadian  
Joint Staff.

## (3) DECLARATION ON GERMAN CRIMES IN POLAND

*Declaration on German Crimes in Poland*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 22, 1943.]

Trustworthy information has reached the United States Government regarding the crimes committed by the German invaders against the population of Poland.<sup>2</sup> Since the autumn of 1942 a belt of territory extending from the province of Białystok southwards along the line of the River Bug has been systematically emptied of its inhabitants. In July 1943 these measures were extended to practically the whole of the province of Lublin, where hundreds of thousands of persons have been deported from their homes or exterminated.

These measures are being carried out with the utmost brutality. Many of the victims are killed on the spot. The rest are segregated. Men from fourteen to fifty are taken away to work for Germany. Some children are killed on the spot, others are separated from their parents and either sent to Germany to be brought up as Germans or sold to German settlers or despatched with the women and old men to concentration camps, where they are now being systematically put to death in gas chambers.<sup>3</sup>

The United States Government reaffirms its resolve to punish the instigators and actual perpetrators of these crimes. It further declares that, so long as such atrocities continue to be committed by the representatives and in the name of Germany, they must be taken into account against the time of the final settlement with Germany. Meanwhile the war against Germany will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor until the barbarous Hitlerite tyranny has been finally overthrown.

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning the discussion of this subject by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 22, 1943, see *ante*, p. 931. No copy originating at Quebec has been found of the text agreed upon. The source text used here is the text contained in Hull's telegram No. 758 of August 27, 1943, to the American Embassy at Moscow, which stated that the agreed text would be released simultaneously by the British and United States Governments on August 30 (740.00116 European War 1939/1107a). Concerning the communication of this text to the Soviet Government with the suggestion that the Soviet Union issue a similar declaration if it saw fit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 503.

<sup>3</sup> In the text released to the press by the Department of State on August 30, 1943 (see Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, September 4, 1943, p. 150), the last twelve words of this sentence were omitted on the suggestion of the British Government, which said that there was insufficient evidence to justify their inclusion. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 416-417.

## (4) REPORTS OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[QUEBEC,] 24 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 319/5

## QUADRANT: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319<sup>2</sup> and C.C.S. 319/2<sup>3</sup>) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.

## I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

## II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 319/5), August 24, 1943: "The Enclosure is the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the QUADRANT Conference. It has been approved by the President and the Prime Minister [see *ante*, pp. 942 ff.], except for paragraph 61, upon which action has been deferred pending further consideration by the U.S. and British Governments."

This text is identical to that of the report submitted to Roosevelt and Churchill (enclosure to C.C.S. 319/4, not printed) on August 23, 1943, except that the paragraphs have been renumbered, with consequent changes in the cross-references, and except for the substantive changes described in the footnotes which follow.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, pp. 992, 1037.

<sup>3</sup> See fn. 4 to the Minutes of the 114th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, *ante*, p. 920.

The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

5. Upon the defeat of the Axis in Europe, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and, if possible, with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

### III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

*a.* Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

*b.* Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.

*c.* Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.

*d.* Continue the disruption of Axis sea communications.

*e.* Intensify the air offensive against the Axis Powers in Europe.

*f.* Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the Axis citadel.

*g.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.

*h.* Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

*i.* To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of Turkey in the war on the side of the Allies (See also paragraph 62).

*j.* To prepare the French Forces in Africa to fulfill an active role in the war against the Axis Powers (See also paragraph 63).

### IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

7. The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon.

#### 8. The U-Boat War

##### *a. Progress Report*

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

*b. Facilities in the Azores Islands*

The facilities of the Azores Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.

*Note:* On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the Azores we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the Azores has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

9. The Defeat of the Axis in Europe

We have approved the following operations in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe.

10. The Bomber Offensive

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

11. Operation "OVERLORD"

*a.* This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

*b.* There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

*c.* As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the Mediterranean Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

12. We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD<sup>4</sup> and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 488.

13. Operation "JUPITER"<sup>5</sup>

In case circumstances render the execution of OVERLORD impossible, it may be necessary to consider JUPITER as an alternative. Plans for this operation, with particular reference to an entry into Southern Norway, should therefore be made and kept up to date.

## 14. Operations in Italy

*a.* First phase. The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area, and, if feasible, farther north.

*b.* Second phase. Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

*c.* Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern France.

## 15. Operations in Southern France

Offensive operations against Southern France (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgement in the Toulon-Marseilles area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerrilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

## 16. Air Operations

*a.* Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central Mediterranean bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

*b.* Development of an air ferry route through the Azores.

*c.* Air supply of Balkan and French guerrillas (see paragraph 17 below).

## 17. Operations in the Balkans

Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to supply of Balkan guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

## 18. Garrison Requirements and Security of Lines of Communication in the Mediterranean

Defensive garrison commitments in the Mediterranean area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of Gibraltar will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in

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<sup>5</sup> Paragraph 13 was new in C.C.S. 319/5. It replaced the following paragraph in C.C.S. 319/4:

"We have approved the following command appointments for Operation OVERLORD:

"Naval Commander—Commander in Chief, Portsmouth (Admiral Sir Charles Little)

"Air Commander—Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Fighter Command (Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)".

Northwest Africa, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the Iberian Peninsula.

#### 19. Emergency Return to the Continent

We have examined the plans that have been prepared by General Morgan's staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operations.

### THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

#### 20. Long-Term Strategy

We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of Japan and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:

*a.* The dependence of Japan upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

*b.* The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan's air force, naval forces and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

*c.* The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.

21. We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:

*a.* A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an "air road" to China.

*b.* The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.

*c.* The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBANKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

22. From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within 12 months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

23. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above (paragraphs 2-5).<sup>6</sup>

24. We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.

25. The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

#### 26. Specific Operations 1943-44

We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against Japan in 1943-44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.

#### 27. Operations in the Pacific 1943-44

We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Pacific in 1943-44 as follows:

#### 28. Gilberts

The seizure and consolidation of the Gilberts preparatory to a further advance into the Marshalls.

#### 29. Marshalls

The seizure of the Marshall Islands (including Wake and Kusaie) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central Pacific.

#### 30. Ponape

The capture of Ponape preparatory to operations against the Truk area.

#### 31. Carolines (Truk Area)

The seizure of the eastern Carolines as far west as Woleai and the establishment of a fleet base at Truk.

#### 32. Palau Islands

The capture of the Palaus including Yap.

#### 33. Operations Against Guam and the Japanese Marianas

The seizure of Guam and the Japanese Marianas.

#### 34. Paramushiru

Consideration of operations against Paramushiru and the Kuriles.

<sup>6</sup> The parenthetical cross-reference was new in C.C.S. 319/5.

35. Operations in the New Guinea-Bismarcks-Admiralty Islands Subsequent to Current Operations

The seizure or neutralization of eastern New Guinea as far west as Wewak and including the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. *Rabaul is to be neutralized rather than captured.*

36. Operations in New Guinea Subsequent to the Wewak-Kavieng Operation

An advance along the north coast of New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop, *by step-by-step airborne-water-borne advances.*

37. Operations in India-Burma-China Theater, 1943-44

To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

38. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

39. To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.

40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of China,<sup>7</sup> and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

- a. Keeping China in the war.
- b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in China.
- d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

41. We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication.

42. Examination of Future Operations

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

43. A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:

- a. An operation against Northern Sumatra; target date spring 1944.
- b. Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date November 1944.

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<sup>7</sup> C.C.S. 319/4 read "air supplies to China".

*c.* Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok; target date to be as early as practicable.

*d.* Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.

*e.* The capture of Akyab and Ramree to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in *a* to *d* above or the operations in Upper Burma (Paragraph 37).

44. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and China in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the autumn of 1944.

45. This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 37 and 38.

#### 46. Southeast Asia Command

##### *General*

The vigorous and effective prosecution of large-scale operations against Japan in Southeast Asia, and the rapid development of the air route through Burma to China, necessitate the reorganization of the High Command in the Indian Theater. It has, therefore, been decided that the Command in India should be divided from the operational Command in Southeast Asia as described below:

#### 47. Command in India

The administration of India as a base for the forces in Southeast Asia will remain under the control of the Commander in Chief, India. Coordination of movement and maintenance both of the operational forces based on India and of the internal garrison can best be carried out efficiently by one staff responsible in the last resort to one authority with power to decide priorities. This machinery exists today in the Government of India and in G.H.Q. India. It is the only machinery which can carry out the dual tasks of meeting the internal requirements of India as well as the requirements of operations in the Southeast Asia Theater.

#### 48. Command in Southeast Asia

A Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia should be set up as follows:

*a.* The command and staff to be a combined British and American one on the lines of the North African Command.

*b.* The Supreme Allied Commander to be British, with an American deputy. He should have under him Naval, Army and Air Commanders in Chief, and also a Principal Administrative Officer to coordinate the administrative planning of all three Services and of the Allied forces.

*c.* The Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and the Commanders of the three Services mentioned above, acting under the orders of the

Supreme Allied Commander, to control all operations and have under their command such Naval, Military and Air forces as may be assigned to the Southeast Asia Theater from time to time.<sup>8</sup>

#### 49. Area Included

The boundaries are set out in detail in C.C.S. 308/3,<sup>9</sup> but, generally, they include Burma, Ceylon, Thailand (Siam),<sup>10</sup> the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra.

#### 50. Division of Responsibility Between India and Southeast Asia

Conflicts of opinion over priorities in connection with administration must be anticipated. It will, therefore, be necessary for someone on the spot to resolve these differences day by day as they occur. This authority should be the Viceroy, not in his statutory capacity as Governor-General, but acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet.

51. The Supreme Commander will in any event have direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff on all matters, and if he is not satisfied with the ruling of the Viceroy on administrative matters, he will be able to exercise this right. The Commander in Chief, India, will continue to have the right of direct access to the British Chiefs of Staff.

#### 52. Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

General Stilwell will be Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and in that capacity will command the Chinese troops operating into Burma and all U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Southeast Asia Theater.

53. The operational control of the Chinese forces operating into Burma will be exercised, in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army Commander, by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, or by his representative, who will be located with the troops.

54. The operational control of the 10th Air Force will be vested in the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander and exercised by his air representative located at the headquarters of the Air Commander in Chief.

55. General Stilwell will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore. His dual function under the Supreme Allied Commander and under the Generalissimo is recognized.

56. The organization and command of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Transport Services in the Southeast Asia area will remain under the direct control of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces, and of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, respectively, subject to such supply and service functions as may be by them delegated to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Requests by the Supreme Allied

<sup>8</sup> Subparagraphs *b* and *c* were new in C.C.S. 319/5.

<sup>9</sup> *Ante*, p. 1000.

<sup>10</sup> "(Siam)" was added in C.C.S. 319/5.

Commander for the use of U.S. troop carrier aircraft for operational purposes will be transmitted to the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander.

57. Requests for the use of surface transportation capacity in and through India, or for development involving construction for the air route to China, will be passed through the Supreme Allied Commander in order that they may be related, as regards priority, to his requirements before being placed on the Commander in Chief, India.

#### 58. Command Relationship

The Combined Chiefs of Staff would exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater, and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command. The British Chiefs of Staff would exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and would be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

#### 59. The Coordination of American Agencies Such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., With Comparable British Organizations

In order to facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the Southeast Asia Command, a Combined Liaison Committee will be set up at New Delhi.

60. There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the Southeast Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the government of India, the Commander in Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable.

### V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

#### 61. Military Considerations in Relation to Spain

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in Spain, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:

*a.* Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to Germany. The most important material which Germany obtains from Spain is wolfram, of which commodity Spain and Portugal supply the largest proportion of German requirements.

*b.* Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.

*c.* A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in Morocco so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.

*d.* Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.

*e.* Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.

*f.* Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.

*g.* A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.

*h.* Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

## 62. Military Considerations in Relation to Turkey

We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for Turkey to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:

*a.* We should ask Turkey to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.

*b.* We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.

*c.* We should ask Turkey to continue:

(1) To improve her internal communications.

(2) To complete the airfields required for HARDIHOOD.

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F. and Sector Control facilities which we require.

(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full HARDIHOOD Plan.

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.

*d.* Our policy on equipment to Turkey should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks can absorb.<sup>11</sup>

## 63. Reequipping the French Forces

We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, North African Theater.

## 64. "PLOUGH" Force

General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of PLOUGH force and have been asked to report as to possible uses for it in their respective theaters.

## 65. Special Operations in Sardinia and Corsica

We have asked General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities in Sardinia and Corsica with a view to facilitating entry into those islands.

## 66. "HABBAKUK"

We have examined the possibilities of constructing "floating airfields" and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments.

<sup>11</sup> In C.C.S. 319/4 the end of this paragraph read: "as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of C in C Middle East, can absorb."

## 67. Pipeline, India-China

We have approved, subject to prior requirements for Military operations in Burma, the construction of a four-inch pipeline from Assam to Kunming and of a six-inch pipeline from Calcutta to Assam. These will facilitate air operations in China and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

## 68. Supply Routes in N.E. India

We have approved, subject to prior requirements of operations in Burma, intensified development of the supply routes into and in Assam and have issued directives to theater commanders concerned with a view to a target of 220,000 tons per month being reached by 31 December 1945.<sup>12</sup>

RELATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO THE OPERATIONS DECIDED UPON <sup>13</sup>

69. We have carried out an examination of the available resources of the United Nations with a view to assessing our ability to carry out the operations decided upon.<sup>14</sup> We find in general that these resources will be sufficient to meet our needs. In some cases, however, the availability of resources is dependent upon conditions which cannot be foreseen at this time. The subject therefore should be kept under constant review, and if shortages develop or conflicts of interest arise, they will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for decision.

<sup>12</sup> C.C.S. 319/4 read "1 January 1946".

<sup>13</sup> This heading and paragraph 69 were new in C.C.S. 319/5.

<sup>14</sup> See the enclosure to C.C.S. 329/2, *infra*.

J.C.S. Files

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*Report by the Combined Staff Planners* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 26 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 329/2

IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSUMED BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND SPECIFIC OPERATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, 1943-1944: AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF CRITICAL STRATEGY

1. We have examined the available means of the United Nations with the object of assessing our ability to carry out the policy agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>1</sup> As amended and approved at the 116th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held at Quebec, August 24, 1943. See *ante*, p. 963. Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 329/2), August 26, 1943. The changes in the original report by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 329, August 24, 1943) made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during their 116th Meeting are described in the footnotes, below.

2. A summary of this policy, which has been taken as a basis of our investigation, is attached as Annex I.

3. We would emphasize that the purpose of this investigation is to examine whether the operations decided on at QUADRANT are within our resources, and not to imply binding commitments or decisions on the part of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

4. The principle has been accepted that, for war against Japan, the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States, or vice versa. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all governments concerned.

5. Our conclusions are set out below.

#### GROUND FORCES (ANNEX II)

6. The necessary ground forces for operations from the United Kingdom and in the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters, can be made available. Searching investigations are proceeding to determine if the forces required for operations in Northern Burma can be found by the target date of mid-February 1944.

#### NAVAL FORCES (ANNEX III)

7. Apart from BULLFROG the naval forces necessary for approved operations will be available, subject to a revision of the support forces required in the Mediterranean, if a decision is made to execute the Southern France operation. No such revision can be made until a plan is available. For BULLFROG the requirements provisionally estimated at TRIDENT<sup>2</sup> were as follows:—

2 Fleet Carriers (CV)	6 Escort Carriers (CVE)
3 Old Battleships (BB)	40 Destroyers (DD)
4 Heavy Cruisers (CA)	32 Escorts (DE)
6 Light Cruisers (CL)	8 Minesweepers
2 A.A. Cruisers	14 Submarines

It is estimated that the British will not be able to meet these forces in full and that there will be the following deficiencies:—

1 Escort Carrier (CVE)	8 Escorts (DE)
21 Destroyers (DD)	6 Submarines, at most

*Note:* The possibility of conflict of the deployment for BULLFROG with OVERLORD and the South of France operation must be borne in mind.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> The estimates referred to were in C.C.S. 244/1, annex III, not printed.

<sup>3</sup> This note was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

No additional operational commitments for British naval personnel can be met in addition to those planned up to 1 May 1944, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

AIR FORCES (ANNEX IV)<sup>4</sup>

8. The air resources required to meet the operations specified in this paper are available subject to:—

(a) The possible deficiency of land based aircraft for operations in the Pacific (See Appendix D<sup>5</sup>) which may arise unless the war with Germany has been concluded in time to release the additional resources required.

(b) The decision that the operations in the Mediterranean Theater (See Appendix B<sup>6</sup>) shall be limited to the capabilities of the air resources specifically allocated.

9.<sup>7</sup> The extent of all operations in support of resistance groups<sup>8</sup> will be related to the advantages to be gained and will be limited by the supply of heavy bomber aircraft. Large-scale diversions of heavy bombers from the Combined Bomber Offensive are not forecast.<sup>9</sup>

10.<sup>10</sup> The major factor now restricting the support of air and ground forces in China by air transport is the deficiency of base facilities in Assam Province of India and of transportation into Assam Province from Calcutta.

ASSAULT SHIPPING AND LANDING CRAFT (ANNEX V)

11. There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic. Appendices "A" and "B"<sup>11</sup> of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

12. To provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary, probably at the expense of cargo ship and escort production and certain army items.

<sup>4</sup> In C.C.S. 329 the heading before paragraph 8 read "Operations POINTBANK and OVERLORD".

<sup>5</sup> i.e., appendix D to annex IV; not printed. See *post*, p. 1144, fn. 19.

<sup>6</sup> i.e., appendix B to annex IV; not printed. See *post*, p. 1144, fn. 17.

<sup>7</sup> In C.C.S. 329 the heading "Operations in Support of Resistance Groups" appeared before paragraph 9.

<sup>8</sup> In C.C.S. 329 this sentence began: "The extent of these operations".

<sup>9</sup> This sentence was underscored in C.C.S. 329.

<sup>10</sup> In C.C.S. 329 the heading "Air Operations in and from China" appeared before paragraph 10.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

## SUPPLY OF CRITICAL ITEMS (ANNEX VI)

13. In the absence of detailed plans of operations for each theater, it is not possible to give finalized requirements and estimated detailed shortages of critical items. A provisional estimate is, however, set out in Annex VI. Temporary shortages will exist for a few special items, (as set out in paragraph 1 b of Annex VI). It is anticipated that these deficiencies will be made up early in 1944, and they do not appear to be of great consequence.

## SHIPPING (ANNEX VII)

14. Apart from a small deficit in the Pacific, which will be met by the end of the first quarter of 1944,<sup>12</sup> there is sufficient personnel shipping capacity to meet our known requirements.

A careful operation of cargo shipping should enable us to meet all essential commitments.

The Shipping Annex (VII) takes no account of accommodation, depot and repair ships which will be required by the British Navy in the South-East Asia area for the satisfactory prosecution of the war against Japan.<sup>13</sup>

## OIL (ANNEX VIII)

15. An examination of the oil position has revealed that the critical item is 100 octane aviation gasoline, of which there will be a pronounced shortage through 1944. Steps are being taken to find a solution to this problem, not only by the substitution of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes, but also by taking steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program.

16. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where it is necessary to supply newly established beach-heads and bases. There appear to be sufficient large sea-going tankers, in existence and coming from new construction, to meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum products.

## Annex I

## BASIS OF INVESTIGATION

The following operations and undertakings have been used as a basis for this investigation. They are not arranged in order of priority.

## I—USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS

1. The British obtain the use of facilities in the Azores from 8th October 1943 for intensified sea and air operations against the U-Boat.

<sup>12</sup> C.C.S. 329 read: "will be met by the beginning of 1944".

<sup>13</sup> This paragraph was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. These facilities are extended to embrace operational and transit use by the United States.

#### II—OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

##### *General.*

3. The combined bomber offensive from all convenient bases. This operation will continue to have the highest strategic priority.

4. Support resistance groups in Europe.

##### *Operations in Northwest Europe.*

5. OVERLORD takes place on 1st May 1944 in accordance with the approved plan which allows for employment of the following:—

*Assault:* 5 divisions (simultaneously loaded in landing craft).  
 2 divisions—follow-up.  
 2 airborne divisions.

##### *Subsequent*

*build-up:* At least 20 divisions.

**Total:** At least 29 divisions of which 7 divisions will return to U.K. from the Mediterranean.

6. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of OVERLORD.

##### *Operations in the Mediterranean.*

7. Operations in the Mediterranean will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT. In addition such French forces as may be re-equipped and fit for war will be used.

8. *First Phase.* The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north.

9. *Second Phase.* Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica.

10. *Third Phase.* The maintenance of unremitting pressure on the German forces in north Italy.

11. Offensive operations against southern France to establish a lodgment in the Toulon-Marseilles area and exploit northwards in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. The target date for planning purposes—1st May 1944.

12. Minimum essential defensive garrison commitments.

#### III—OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

##### *Operations in Southeast Asia.*

13. As the main effort, carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. These operations to include the ex-

tensive use of long range penetration groups. Target date—mid-February 1944.

The extent of these operations to be dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by the recent floods.

14. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies to China, and the development of facilities, with a view to:—

- a. Keeping China in the war;
- b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese;
- c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese air forces in China;
- d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.

15. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944, of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

16. Preparation of the necessary bases for operations in the South-east Asia Command.

*Operations in China.*

17. Air operations in and from China.

*Operations in the Pacific.*

18. Operations to seize:

<i>Objective</i>	<i>Target date for planning</i>
Gilberts	15th November 1943
Marshalls	1st January 1944
Western New Guinea	1st February 1944
New Ireland	1st May 1944
Ponape	1st June 1944
Admiralty Islands	1st June 1944
Truk	1st September 1944
Palaus or Marianas—Guam }	31st December 1944

IV—OTHER UNDERTAKINGS

19. Maintain the security and war making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

20. Support and maintain the war making capacity of our forces in all areas.

21. Maintain vital overseas lines of communications, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-Boat menace.

22. Undertake such measures as may be necessary to provide China with a volume of supplies to keep China actively in the war against Japan.

23. To sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to Russia without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

24. Continue to supply such equipment to Turkey as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of the Commander in Chief, Middle East, can absorb.\*

25. To provide for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

26. To provide for the economic support of countries occupied by the United Nations.

27. To re-arm and re-equip eleven French Divisions and supporting troops in North Africa by 31st December, 1943, insofar as this does not interfere with operations scheduled previous to QUADRANT.

## Annex II

## LAND FORCES

## SECTION I—MEDITERRANEAN

1. *Resources available.*

After allowing for the return to the United Kingdom of four American and three British divisions, there will be the following forces available in the Mediterranean on 1 November 1943:

	<i>Divisions</i>			
	<i>British</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>French (Native)</i>	<i>Total</i>
	19† (including 2 Polish)	5	5‡	29

2. *Undertakings (garrison requirements).*

	<i>British</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>French (Native)</i>	<i>Total</i>
Sicily and Southern Italy	1	—	—	1
Sardinia	—	—	1	1
Corsica	—	—	1	1
N. Africa, Palestine, Syria, Cyprus	2	—	—§	2
Italy	4	—	—	4
	7	—	2	9

\*See paragraph *d*, C.C.S. 322/1. [Footnote in the source text. The paper referred to, entitled "Policy Towards Turkey", August 30 (*sic*), 1943, is not printed as such, but is identical in substance with paragraph 62 of C.C.S. 319/5, *ante*, p. 1131, except that it begins, "The British Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion".]

†Includes one airborne division. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡Includes on[e] F[ree] F[rench] division. [Footnote in the source text.]

§The garrison commitment in N. Africa will be filled by French Divisions in training. [Footnote in the source text.]

3. The balance which will, therefore, be operationally available on 1 November 1943, will be as follows:

<i>British</i>	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>French (Native)</i>	<i>Total</i>
12	5	3	20

4. After 1 November 1943, six further French (Native), divisions will become operationally available, making a total of 11 divisions in June 1944. Of these six further divisions, four will be required for garrison duties in N. Africa, leaving two extra divisions available for operations.

5. By June 1944, there will, therefore, be available in the Mediterranean theater 22 || Allied Divisions.

6. The British divisions shown as available in paragraph 1 above are exclusive of some 14 Independent Brigades which are the equivalent of four and two-thirds divisions, but have no supporting troops. These Brigades will assist in the garrison commitments shown in paragraph 2 above.

#### SECTION II—UNITED KINGDOM

##### 7. *Forces available.*

The forces available in the United Kingdom on 1 May 1944, will be as follows:

<i>British:</i>	13 divisions
	3 divisions from Mediterranean
	1 airborne division
<i>American:</i>	14 ex U.S. (includes 2 now in U.K.)
	4 divisions from Mediterranean
	1 airborne division ex U.S.
	—
	36

8. Of the above, five American divisions, which will be in the United Kingdom or enroute, will not be operationally available on 1 May 1944. These five American divisions will, however, be operationally available two months from their date of arrival and can, therefore, be used in the build-up subsequent to the initial assaults. During May, June and July 1944, assuming operations start in May, reception and dispatch facilities in the United Kingdom will limit the build-up to two, one and one division respectively, making the total number of American divisions in the United Kingdom and on the Continent approximately 23 by August 1944. Thereafter it is assumed that direct despatch from

|| Includes one airborne division. [Footnote in the source text.]

the U.S. to the lodgment area may be commenced at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

9. *Forces operationally available on 1 May 1944.*

The total forces which will therefore be operationally available on 1 May 1944, are as follows:

<i>British:</i>	16 divisions (includes Canadians)
<i>American:</i>	13 divisions
<i>Airborne:</i>	2 divisions (one British and one American)
<i>Total:</i>	31 divisions

In addition to the above, five American divisions will be available for the subsequent build-up which should continue at the rate, if practicable, of three to five divisions per month, starting about August 1944, through ports made available on the Continent.

SECTION III—INDIA AND BURMA

10. *Required for operations.*

<i>British:</i>	8½ divisions¶ (including five assault and two follow-up brigades)
	6 long range penetration groups
	1 parachute brigade
<i>Chinese:</i>	13 divisions

11. *Resources available.*

Existing formations will have to be converted to find the additional L.R.P. groups required, unless these are found from west African formations, and the necessary suitable divisions for land operations in Northern Burma.

This matter is now undergoing detailed investigation in India, and in the War Office, and the effect of the implications cannot yet be assessed. These forces are not readily available, and therefore every effort must be made without delay to provide them from resources now available in India. The British undertake to clarify data on available resources for inclusion in this paper as an addendum. Chinese forces available amount to 22 divisions (assuming 10,000 to a division). This will allow nine divisions in reserve.

SECTION IV—THE AZORES

12. No significant land forces are required, the necessary facilities in the Islands having been made available as a result of negotiations.

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¶ 2 additional divisions as reserve will be held in India. [Footnote in the source text.]

## SECTION V—THE PACIFIC

13. *Resources available.*

The following major United Nations ground forces are present in or projected for the area as of 1 January 1944:

<i>Central Pacific</i>	4 Infantry Divisions
<i>South Pacific</i>	5 Infantry Divisions
	2 Marine Divisions
	1 New Zealand Division
<i>Southwest Pacific</i>	4 Infantry Divisions
	1 Infantry Division (1st Cav. Div.)
	1 Marine Division
	11 Australian Divisions
<i>Total</i>	29

*Note:* Of the above eleven Australian divisions, three infantry divisions (6th, 7th and 9th) are available for offensive operations; the remaining six infantry divisions and two armored divisions are presently assigned for defense.

14. *Requirements for contemplated operations.*

The following additional divisions are required for operations in the Pacific and will be made available from U.S. resources:

	6 Infantry divisions (amphibious)
	1 Marine division
	1 Airborne division
	8
Total additional	8
Already allotted	29
	37
Total available and to be made available	37

This estimate is based on reorganizing divisions after combat and recommitting them to subsequent operations. Interchange of divisions between theaters is also contemplated. As a result, the above estimate of requirements should be considered a minimum for planning purposes.

## Annex III

## PROVISION OF NAVAL FORCES

## SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

*Cross-channel operations (OVERLORD).*

1. Sufficient British light forces will be made available to counter a probable German threat within the Channel, while the British Home

Fleet will be of sufficient strength to counter any move by German heavy units. The remaining naval forces required have not yet been assessed, but it is the intention that these shall be found by the British, with some augmentation from the U.S.

*U.S.-U.K. movement.*

2. Two U.S. escort groups previously assigned to the UGF convoys (which are being discontinued) will be available for other employment commencing in September, 1943.

*Operations in the Mediterranean.*

3. On the assumption that British and U.S. combatant forces at present allocated to the Mediterranean are not reduced, sufficient forces will be available to support approved post-HUSKY operations, but not specifically for the southern France operation for which planning is not yet complete. If decision is made to execute that operation, a revision of support forces in the Mediterranean will be required, especially in view of the carrier borne air support considered necessary. It is the intention that the British will provide these support forces.

4. There is a requirement of 135 escorts in the Mediterranean for operational and through Mediterranean convoys. This requirement is at present being met by 116 British escort vessels with some assistance from British and United States destroyers. Certain of the British escorts have been loaned from the Eastern Fleet and from U.K. coastal convoys, leaving deficiencies therein.

*Pacific operations.*

5. U.S. ships now available and becoming available in 1943 and 1944 are adequate for the operation now approved for the Pacific areas.

*Amphibious operations from India.*<sup>14</sup>

6. The British can provide forces as follows:

<i>Assault Forces</i>	<i>Covering Forces</i>
4 cruisers (CL)	2 fleet carriers (CV)
5 escort carriers (CVE)	3 battleships (OBB)
2 AA cruisers	4 heavy cruisers (CA)
5 destroyers (DD)	2 light cruisers (CL)
24 escorts (DE)	14 destroyers (DD)
8 minesweepers	
8 submarines at least	

*Note:* The possibility of conflict of the above deployment with OVERLORD and the South of France Operation must be borne in mind.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> In C.C.S. 329 this heading read "The Capture of Akyab-Ramree".

<sup>15</sup> This note was added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

7. At TRIDENT it was estimated there would be needed from the United States for the Akyab-Ramree operation, set for December 1, 1943, the following naval forces:

<i>Assault Forces</i>	<i>Covering Forces</i>
5 escort carriers (CVE)	Two fleet carriers (CV)
21 destroyers (DD)	Should Italy be out of the war, the British will be able to provide one of these.
6 submarines (SS)	<i>Victorious</i> is counted as a United States unit.
<i>Tanker Force</i>	
8 escorts (DE)	

Since then four additional escort carriers have been transferred to Great Britain. Further, major operations in the Central Pacific involving extensive use of naval forces will probably prevent these forces from becoming available for Burma operations in February, 1944.

*Escorts.*

8. General requirements for the escorts for the specific strategic operations projected in this paper can be met from our combined resources without unduly weakening the convoy escorts and support groups required for the existing convoy system, except as noted in paragraph 4. Additional escorts required for the north Russian convoys, should they be resumed, and for any necessary adjustments in existing convoy cycles can, however, only be met from new construction and a reduction in the number of support groups employed.

*Naval personnel—General.*

9. The accepted general policy is that landing craft will be manned and maintained by personnel from the nation supplying the forces engaged in the operation unless specifically arranged otherwise.

*Naval personnel—British.*

10. On the assumption that the manpower proposals now before the War Cabinet are approved, the British naval personnel for the approved operations will be found, although, in order to meet the OVERLORD requirements, it will be necessary temporarily to close certain schools and establishments. Personnel due to be returned from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD, or to proceed to India, must do so and cannot be held for the offensive operations against Southern France, which requirement must be met from those remaining on the station.

11. No additional operational requirements for British naval personnel, over and above that at present planned up to 1 May 1944, can be met, except at the expense of some other operation or undertaking.

*Naval personnel—American.*

12. Personnel for approved operations and maintenance of craft therefor can be provided. This involves a commitment over and above

those agreed to at TRIDENT, to provide for OVERLORD 135 officers and 1511 men to man certain support craft involved in the U.S. part of the operation.

## Annex IV

## PROVISION OF AIR FORCES

1. The following appendices show the resources available to us for the various operations:

- Appendix "A"—Combined Bomber Offensive from U.K. and Cross-Channel Operation OVERLORD.<sup>16</sup>
- Appendix "B"—Operations from the Mediterranean.<sup>17</sup>
- Appendix "C"—Operations in Southeast Asia.<sup>18</sup>
- Appendix "D"—Operations in the Pacific.<sup>19</sup>
- Appendix "E"—Support of Resistance Groups in Europe and Balkans.
- Appendix "F"—Air Operations in and from China.

2. The group or squadron strength as measured in terms of unit equipment (U.E.) does not provide an exact measure of air force strength. Ability to endure prolonged periods of heavy combat activity is measured by the adequacy of reserves of airplanes and crews. The reserve airplanes are not included in the strength data as the percentage held in reserve varies with intensity of activity and with other factors.

3. The tactical role formerly assigned to dive bombers has been largely taken over by the fighter-bomber in the land-based air forces.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed. Paragraph 5 of appendix A contained the following "Conclusion on Availability of Forces":

"There will be sufficient forces available for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and for OVERLORD, with the exception of 270 transport aircraft.

"Consideration is being given to the transfer of four additional troop carrier groups (208 airplanes U.E.) from the Mediterranean to United Kingdom for Operation OVERLORD. If accomplished, this action will leave a deficit of 62 troop carrier transport aircraft against the requirement for 1,004 transports."

<sup>17</sup> Not printed. This appendix indicated that aircraft in excess of the TRIDENT plans would be available in the Mediterranean area as of October 1, 1943.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed. This appendix indicated that 23 squadrons in excess of the TRIDENT plans would be available for Southeast Asia operations as of February 1944.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed. This appendix indicated that (1) aircraft allocated as of January 1, 1944, would be sufficient to carry out the planned operation in the New Guinea-Bismarck-Admiralty Islands area subsequent to CARTWHEEL in the period to September 1, 1944; (2) a deficiency was anticipated for operations in New Guinea subsequent to the Wewak-Kavieng operation unless Germany were defeated in time to permit the deployment of some of the heavier types of aircraft; (3) the addition of one heavy bomber group and one medium bomber group would be necessary to carry out planned operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands; (4) sufficient aircraft would be available for the Ponape operation, assuming that the additions referred to under 3 above could be found; (5) additional forces might be required for the Caroline Islands (Truk) operation; and (6) requirements for the Palau Islands operation could not yet be determined.

Since the fighter is readily transposable to the fighter-bomber, it has been necessary to combine day fighter and fighter-bomber strengths.

Appendix E to Annex IV

SUPPORT OF RESISTANCE GROUPS IN EUROPE AND BALKANS

1. The following British aircraft are allocated to the support of resistance groups in Europe and the Balkans:

	<i>Heavy Bombers</i>	<i>Misc. Aircraft</i>
U.K. Bases	22	14
Med. Bases	36	—

2. No further heavy bomber aircraft can be allocated for this purpose without retarding the rate of build-up of heavy bomber squadrons in British Bomber Command.

3. Priority for aircraft has recently been given to the support of resistance groups in Greece and the Balkans.

4. Further assistance can therefore only be given to resistance groups in Europe at the expense of the Bomber Offensive, or the support of guerrilla forces in Greece and the Balkans.

5. Due to their special role in the Combined Bomber Offensive the heavily armed high altitude day bomber types used by the U.S. Army Air Force are not suitable or available for night operations in support of guerrilla forces.

Appendix F to Annex IV

AIR OPERATIONS IN AND FROM CHINA

1. The 14th Air Force in China has a strength, as of 23 August 1943, of one (1) heavy bomber group (35 U.E.), one (1) medium bomber squadron (13 U.E.) and five (5) fighter squadron[s] (125 U.E.). If logistical considerations permit, the U.S. fighter force in China will be expanded to thirteen squadron[s] (325 U.E.) by March, 1944. The medium bomber strength will be augmented to one group (57 U.E.) by 1 January 1944.

2. The Chinese Air Force will have, by 1 January 1944, four medium bomber squadrons (40 U.E.) and 10 fighter squadrons (100 U.E.). The fighter force will be expanded in 1944 to 20 squadrons (200 U.E.).

3. The Air Transport Command has, as of 23 August 1943, available in India sufficient aircraft to lift tonnage to China at the rate of 7,000 tons per month.

4. The provision of base facilities and refueling facilities in Assam Province are at present the major factors restricting the flow of ma-

terial to China. It is anticipated that the monthly lift to China will be increased to 10,000 tons per month by November, 1943. Further expansion of the Air Transport facilities into China is under consideration.

#### Annex V

### ASSAULT SHIPPING AND CRAFT

#### GENERAL SITUATION

1. See Appendix "A"<sup>20</sup> for the allocations and estimated availability of British landing ships and craft to 1 January 1945, and Appendix "B" giving the same information for U.S. landing ships and craft. The quantity and rate of new production are shown in the Appendices. Appendix "C" contains the casualty rates and serviceability factors used for planning purposes.

2. The present position in landing ships and craft is such that there is everywhere a deficit of landing craft. Operations are limited in many cases solely by the lack of these vessels.

3. Studies are under way which it is hoped will increase the rate of U.S. landing craft production. However, the result of these studies at the present time indicates that such an acceleration cannot be felt before April 1944. Similar efforts should be made in the U.K. to improve the situation for OVERLORD, the Mediterranean and later to prosecute the war in the Far East. The British have indicated that there may be difficulty in manning amphibious craft in additional numbers.

#### FUTURE OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN CONNECTION WITH OVERLORD

4. The assault ships and craft now in the Mediterranean are all that can be provided for immediate post-HUSKY operations in that theater.

5. In accordance with the guiding principle that, "as between operation OVERLORD and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD," future operations in the Mediterranean should not be allowed to encroach upon the assault craft planned at TRIDENT to be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD. Production both in the U.S. and U.K. together with the necessities in other theaters will permit OVERLORD to be satisfactorily mounted by 1 May 1944 only if these Mediterranean ships and craft are used. The Tables of Appendices

<sup>20</sup> The appendices to annex v are not printed. See Coakley and Leighton, pp. 212-214.

“A” and “B” indicate the numbers and types of the U.S. and British ships and craft so involved as well as the scheduling of their delivery to U.K. The numbers are substantially the same as at TRIDENT. It may be necessary to move 15 additional LCT(5), or their equivalent LCT lift, from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD.

6. Bad weather likely to be encountered off the Bay of Biscay after November, together with the need for the early formation and training of the assault forces for OVERLORD makes it requisite that landing craft sent from the Mediterranean for OVERLORD be sent as soon as practicable and, in the case of British LCT types, not later than early November.

7. The combat loaders should be released as follows:

U.S. APA's and AKA's and AGC—as soon after immediate post-HUSKY operations as possible, and after a refit in U.S., to be utilized for training and participation in OVERLORD.

British LSI(L)'s—as soon after immediate post-HUSKY as possible for normal troop movements, principally to increase the BOLERO lift.

British LSH—as soon after immediate post-HUSKY operations as possible, for OVERLORD.

8. *a.* The nature of the assault on southern France in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD is not known, as no definite plan has been formulated. The losses of landing ships and craft in HUSKY were much smaller than estimated at TRIDENT. Excluding planned withdrawals from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD and BULLFROG, it is estimated that there should be left available in the Mediterranean by 1 May 1944 sufficient assault ships and craft to mount approximately 27,000 troops and 1,500 vehicles. The ships and craft shown do not provide a balanced assault lift (See Appendices “A” and “B”) and the lift is not great. However, any operations that may be planned are to be planned with the resources shown as available herein. Augmentation is not considered practicable without drawing from OVERLORD. The British LSI(L)'s available for operations against southern France should be on station by 1 March 1944.

*b.* In order to provide for carrying the small ship-borne landing craft which will be used in the Mediterranean the U.S. LST's to remain there should be the ones having davits.

#### OVERLORD

9. The assault shipping and craft indicated as available for OVERLORD in Appendices “A” and “B” are the same as at TRIDENT with very minor exceptions. Landing craft destined for OVERLORD will arrive in time for the operation, though the complete allotment of some types

from the United States will not arrive as early as desired by COSSAC. This, however, cannot be improved.

#### *BULLFROG*

10. *a.* Three LSI(L) with their landing craft and one LSC have already been ordered to sail from the Mediterranean for India. One LSH, one LSI(H) and the remaining six LSI(L) with their landing craft, should be sailed so as to arrive in India by 15 November 1943. The ten U.S. and eight British LST for the operation are now on passage from the U.S. to India.

*b.* All the landing ships and craft requested by General Auchinleck for this operation will be available with the exception of 12 LCG(L) and 9 LCT(5).

*c.* The provision of LSP is dealt with in Annex VII.

*d.* The LSI(L) should be released immediately after the operation so as to be employed for trooping movements if not required for further operations.

#### *Pacific Operations*

11. Broad estimates of over-all requirements of assault shipping and landing craft for the campaign against Japan indicate deficiencies in certain types, particularly APA's, LST's, and LSD's.

12. The small U.S. APA's and AKA's now authorized and building by the Maritime Commission will be required in the early future and their completion is a matter of urgency. The Maritime Commission has been advised in this matter. In addition, others will be required to insure the speed of the advance across the Pacific toward Japan.

13. It is anticipated that the major British and U.S. landing ships and craft surviving **OVERLORD** can be made available to leave the European Theater in September 1944 for use in the Pacific and southeast Asia.

#### CONCLUSIONS

14. *a.* There will be sufficient landing ships and craft for approved operations in 1943 and until the summer of 1944. Landing ships and craft will, however, be the bottleneck limiting the full scope of assault in the approved operations, both in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Appendices "A" and "B" of Annex V are made out on the assumption that landing craft will be sent from the Mediterranean to **OVERLORD** so as to arrive by 15 December 1943, and assault ships by 1 March 1944.

*b.* In order to provide sufficient landing craft after the summer of 1944, an acceleration and increase in the present British and U.S. assault shipping and landing craft programs is necessary.

## Annex VI

## AVAILABILITY OF CRITICAL SUPPLY AND CONSTRUCTION ITEMS

## GENERAL

In general, the United Nations will be able to provide the critical supply and construction items for the specific operations projected except as indicated hereafter. In the absence of detailed plans of operations and specific lists of equipment and supply requirements, a more definite statement is not justified.

*a.* Overall shortages of radar and radio equipment are rapidly being eliminated. Adequate distribution of these items to U.S. Army Air Forces will be made by the end of September, 1943. All requirements will be met by June, 1944.

*b.* Certain items of equipment, notably special Air Forces vehicles, heavy trucks, two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs), landing vehicle tracked (L.V.T. II and L.V.T. (A) II), portable gas-line-driven generators, and cargo-handling equipment, are now short and must be expected to continue short for several months. Demands for these items are increasingly heavy and production is not yet sufficient to meet all requirements. The United States production of N.L. pontoon equipment may fall short of additional requirements and is, in any case, uneconomical of shipping. Urgent steps must therefore be taken to start production outside the United States.

## I—USE OF THE AZORES ISLANDS

1. Requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in general paragraphs above.

## II—OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

*Operation "POINTBLANK" and other air operations in Europe*

1. Requirements are being met, subject to limitations indicated in the general paragraphs above.

*Support of resistance groups in Europe*

2. Requirements can be met.

*Operation "OVERLORD"*

3. Requirements can be met. However, the low rate of troop movements to the U.K. during the spring and summer of 1943 has forced a high rate of movement during the fall and winter of 1943-1944. Limitations of cargo shipping and U.K. port capacity have necessitated preshipment of equipment for units scheduled to move from August 1943 to May 1944. A balance will be reached only about 1 May 1944. Preshipment has been accomplished by reducing certain equipment of units in training in the United States and depot stocks of

these items to dangerously low levels. Should it become necessary to divert to some other theater U.S. air and ground units now destined for OVERLORD, part of the equipment for such units could only be made available by withdrawal from the United Kingdom.

4. Amphibious training facilities as required by the over-all plan are being provided to meet the arrival of landing craft.

5. The plans for establishment of the artificial harbors required by OVERLORD operations are being made the matter of thorough investigation and it is anticipated that means can be provided to meet the requirements. Consideration and all possible action is necessary to move pontoon drydocks and equipment in amounts comparable to landing craft transferred from the Mediterranean to OVERLORD.

#### *Operations in the Mediterranean*

6. Since these operations are to be executed with the means now available in the Mediterranean, the only supply requirement (other than the completion of the equipment of the French forces) will be maintenance. Naval logistic requirements are either in the area or have been provided for.

### III—OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST THEATER

#### *Operations in India-Burma-China*

1. Requirements insofar as they are known, can be met. Additional requirements are expected and it is probable that they can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

#### *Operations in the Pacific*

2. Requirements are being met.

### IV—OTHER UNDERTAKINGS

#### *General*

1. Insofar as they are known, requirements can be met, subject to the limitations indicated in the general paragraphs, above.

#### *Rearming and reequipping of French forces in North Africa*

2. Equipment for 11 French divisions and the supporting troops in North Africa can be provided by 31 December 1943.

### V—PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The range and speed of contemplated amphibious operations indicate heavy future requirements for amphibious vehicles and auxiliary servicing ships of all types. The provision of these vehicles and ships together with the development of new types requires urgent consideration. Such action has already been initiated as regards U.S. development and production of two and one-half ton amphibious trucks (DUKWs).

## Annex VII

## SHIPPING

PART I [—] BRITISH DRY CARGO SHIPPING REQUIREMENTS <sup>21</sup>

1. British Military Cargo Shipping Requirements for the last four months of 1943 and the first half of 1944 have been reexamined in the light of the revised strategy, agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

These requirements are now as follows:

[Paragraph 2 contains two tables summarizing required monthly sailings in 1943 and 1944 for the maintenance and build-up of British forces overseas.]

3. In addition shipping will be required for allied operational purposes as follows:

(a) PRICELESS. The shipping required for AVALANCHE now amounts to 126 vessels. It is probable that these will be required to be retained until December, a smaller number, say 100, until February–March and thereafter about 50 for operations in the South of France and other Mediterranean movement. In addition, the Coaster Fleet in the Mediterranean will need to be retained indefinitely for internal maintenance.

(b) OVERLORD. Requirements in the initial stages will be 100 ocean-going ships and approximately 200 Coasters for the carriage of M.T. vehicles and a further 200 Coasters for the carriage of stores.

Subsequently the majority of the Coasters will be progressively released but the stores lift will require tonnage of small ocean-going and large Coaster type up to a maximum of the order of 500,000 tons deadweight.

In addition, there may be a requirement for block ships for the construction of “Synthetic Ports” and it is possible that up to 50 vessels of some 450 feet length by 45 feet height keel to deck might be involved.

(c) BULLFROG. According to the present plan 21 M.T. ships will be required from January to April inclusive and thereafter approximately five ships monthly will require to be loaded within the Indian Ocean area on account of maintenance.

(d) ALACRITY and OATMEAL. Operation ALACRITY will require three ships to sail towards the end of September but thereafter maintenance requirements will be extremely small. OATMEAL will require the sailing of 17 vessels for one voyage in September–October.

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<sup>21</sup> In C.C.S. 329 this heading read “Dry Cargo Shipping Requirements in British Strategic Areas”.

PART II[—]AVAILABILITY OF BRITISH CONTROLLED DRY CARGO TONNAGE  
(1600 G.R.T. & OVER)

[Paragraph 5 forecasts a deficit of 3.1 million deadweight tons for the second half of 1943 and a deficit of 3.2 million deadweight tons for the first half of 1944.]

6. After allowing for imports in certain bare boat chartered ships and for 1,500 tons average in each scheduled *BOLERO* sailing, the deficits in tonnage shown above are equivalent to:

384 sailings in the last 4 months of 1943,  
488 sailings in the first half of 1944.

These are allowed for in the U.S. statement in Part III.

7. No provision has been made for:

*a.* Shipment of coal to Italy. It is anticipated, however, that Italian shipping will contribute substantially towards this commitment.

*b.* Additional civil commitments to Portugal.

*c.* Possible provision of "blockships" for *OVERLORD*. This commitment is indefinite but is already the subject of urgent investigation under the direction of C.O.S.S.A.C.

PART III[—]U.S. CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

The requirements listed in the following summary include those expressed in paragraph 6 of Part II of this Annex, and in addition incorporate 50 ships for operation *PRICELESS* and 80 MT ships for operation *OVERLORD*, being the balance required after those to be provided from British controlled tonnage.

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. CARGO SHIPPING IN TERMS OF SAILINGS

<i>Requirement</i>	1943		1944	
	<i>Sept.</i>	<i>4th Qtr.</i>	<i>1st Qtr.</i>	<i>2d Qtr.</i>
(15) Total requirements	541	1,768	1,684	1,606
(16) Total available	549	1,731	1,905	1,982
(17) Balance	+8	-37	+221	+376

*Note: a.* The foregoing is based on the assumption that each *BOLERO* cargo ship will lift approximately 1,500 tons of British import cargo and on the other hand the equivalent of 12 shiploads of measurement cargo on *BOLERO* account will be lifted monthly in U.K. import vessels.

*b.* See comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers below.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> This paragraph and the following Douglas-Leathers memorandum were added to C.C.S. 329 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Douglas-Leathers memorandum had been circulated separately as C.C.S. 329/1, "Comments on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position (Annex VII, Part 3, C.C.S. 329)", August 24, 1943. Cf. Coakley and Leighton, p. 216.

## COMMENTS BY MR. L. W. DOUGLAS AND LORD LEATHERS ON THE DRY CARGO SHIPPING POSITION

(Circulated as C.C.S. 329/1)

In May we pointed out that the deficiencies in shipping resources available to meet the estimated requirements during the last half of 1943 were susceptible of being satisfactorily managed. This appears to have been the case, though the last four months of this year indicate a tight position.

Now we believe that the suggested surpluses in the first half of 1944 do not reflect the real situation, first, because planned operations may impose heavier burdens on our resources than are now contemplated and, secondly, because the war requirements have not been fully submitted. This is emphasized by the fact that the estimated number of sailings required during each of the first and second quarters of 1944 is substantially less than during the last quarter of 1943.

We feel it necessary to add this comment lest the figures give rise to misleading interpretations.

L. W. DOUGLAS

LEATHERS

## PART IV [—] PERSONNEL SHIPPING POSITION

*British*

1. In examining the British personnel shipping resources and determining their optimum deployment, the following assumptions have been made:—

*a.* That known operational requirements will be as in *a* of Table I attached<sup>23</sup> and, for purposes of calculating the British aid to U.S. troop movements have been counted against British resources.

*b.* That British personnel will be required to carry out troop movements, other than operational, as scheduled in *b* of Table I attached.

*c.* That losses of escorted class of troopships during the period under consideration (September 1943–June 1944) will offset additions to the escorted troopship fleet, and that about seven percent of the escorted troopship fleet is permanently immobilized for repairs and refits. Losses of unescorted troopships cannot be made good by new construction, and the calculations have been made on a basis of no losses in this class.

*d.* That personnel movement to Mediterranean and Indian Ocean destinations and to South and East Africa is carried out through the Mediterranean on a monthly convoy cycle and that this and other troop convoy cycles remain as at present.

<sup>23</sup> Concerning table III to part IV of annex VII, see Coakley and Leighton, p. 220. The other tables referred to in this part are not printed.

*e.* That the available British controlled personnel shipping in the Indian Ocean is capable of meeting local requirements (except for certain operational requirements) in that theater.

*f.* That troopships fitted for assault loading (LSI(L) and LSP) will be released to troop movement on conclusion of operations to which they are now assigned.

*g.* That the C.I.B. cargo ships which are being converted to LSI(L) in the U.S.A. will only be available for troop movement during their delivery voyage to the U.K. and thereafter will be used entirely on operations.

*h.* That the number of troopships in escorted BOLERO-SICKLE convoys may be increased to 30 ships if circumstances permit.

2. The BOLERO-SICKLE movement program during the period September 1943 to April 1944 makes demands on the fast unescorted class which are so exacting that there is no margin for contingencies.

3. Table II attached shows the extent of the assistance which it is estimated that British personnel shipping can provide towards the movement of U.S. troops on the following routes:—

U.S.A.	to United Kingdom (BOLERO-SICKLE movement)
Iceland	to United Kingdom (one division)
North Africa	to United Kingdom (equivalent of one division)
U.S.A.	to North Africa
U.S.A.	to India (transshipping in North Africa)
U.S.A.	to South or Southwest Pacific

Ship operating requirements may cause fluctuations in the movements scheduled for each month.

#### *United States*

4. The deployment of U.S. personnel shipping, and of British personnel shipping which is estimated to be available for the movement of U.S. troops, is shown in Table III. It should be noted that Table III indicates capabilities under the distribution of troop lift assumed in this paper. A comparison of capabilities with forecast requirements shows the following general position:

##### *a. Joint Army and Navy Requirements in Pacific.*

Troop lift available in September will not eliminate the large backlog presently existing, but beginning in October, transport capacity will be available to meet monthly requirements and substantially to reduce this backlog. The tabulation below summarizes this situation.

	<i>Central, South and Southwest Pacific</i>			
	<i>September</i>	<i>4th Quarter</i>	<i>1st Quarter</i>	<i>2nd Quarter</i>
	<i>1943</i>			<i>1944</i>
Cumulative Deficit	56, 500	24, 900	14, 400	700

*b. Build-up of U.S. Forces in U.K.*

(1) The requirement for a balanced force of approximately 1,416,000 U.S. Troops, including 19 divisions, in the U.K. by May 1944 can be met if the expectations over the period are realized. It is estimated that 14 U.S. divisions will be operationally available on 1 May 1944.

(2) The build-up of U.S. forces includes the transfer of 4 divisions from the Mediterranean area in November 1943, and of 1 division from Iceland in August 1943.

(3) The limitations on cargo reception in the U.K. during May, June and July 1944 will restrict build-up to two, one, and one divisions in the respective months. There is an indicated surplus of troop shipping in the Atlantic during the period between mounting date of OVERLORD and the date on which movements can be made direct into continental ports.

*c. Mediterranean Requirements.*

(1) Troop capacity to this area after August 1943 is based on replacement requirements.

(2) U.S. personnel shipping (2 XAP's) now in the Mediterranean is scheduled to augment the U.K. build-up program beginning in January 1944.

*d. China-Burma-India.*

The requirements for this area can be met.

*e. Alaska.*

The requirements for this area can be met.

*f. Other Areas*—Including Newfoundland, Greenland, Bermuda, Iceland, West and Central Africa, Caribbean and South Atlantic, Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Troop movements to these areas represent a very small proportion of the total and consist almost wholly of replacements. Total strengths show a gradual reduction.

*General*

5. Active examination is being made of measures to provide some margin for contingencies in this very tight program of United Nations troopship operation which the basic strategy during the period September 1943-June 1944 demands.

6. It is pointed out that the early arrival of certain Port, Depot and Engineer units is essential if the maximum quantity of BOLERO-SICKLE cargo is to be handled, and high priority must be given to the dispatch of these troops in the BOLERO-SICKLE convoys.

PART V [—] CONCLUSIONS

The presently estimated required troop lift in the Atlantic and India areas will be met within the prescribed period of time, but in

the Pacific there is a deficiency which will be substantially reduced at the end of this year.

To achieve this result and to have a reserve against contingencies will impose a heavy strain on troop transports. After 1 May 1944 there appears to be, according to present calculations, an easing of this strain.

The combined cargo shipping position indicates a deficit of 29 sailings during the last four months of this year, and a surplus during the first half of 1944.

This deficit, if handled with full cooperation among the various demanders, can be covered, but even so, it indicates a tight position throughout the period.

#### Annex VIII

#### PETROLEUM

##### *Requirements*

1. Estimates have been made of service demands of petroleum products to implement the specifically agreed QUADRANT decisions. While there has been no opportunity to make a combined final and detailed survey of refinery capacities and crude oil availability it is our judgment that adequate facilities exist, or are in process, or can be made ready in time to meet QUADRANT decisions requirements, with the exception of high grade aviation gasoline (100 octane or higher).

These estimates include essential civilian requirements.

##### *100 octane aviation gasoline*

2. The critical petroleum item is 100 octane aviation gasoline. The total production of this grade of fuel is now being consumed and requests for allocations are far greater than can be met from production at the present time. Anticipated increase in production is offset by correspondingly increased requirements in the various theaters.

3. Based on current estimates there will be a daily world-wide shortage of 68,000 barrels during September 1943. This shortage decreases progressively until the first quarter 1944 when it is estimated that shortage will average 6,492 barrels per day. Requirements then increase over production until the end of 1944 when production fails to meet requirements by a total of 53,586 barrels per day.

4. The only apparent solution to this problem is priority of allocation to the theaters prescribed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the substitution to the fullest degree of lower grades of aviation gasoline for training and other purposes until the new manufacturing program is more nearly in balance with requirements.

5. The Army and Navy Petroleum Board, acting through a staff of officers assigned to it by the U.S. Army and Navy, have taken steps to expedite to the maximum extent possible the completion of the aviation gasoline manufacturing program. The responsibility for this program rests with the Petroleum Administration for War and the joint service activities above mentioned are carried out in cooperation with that organization.

#### *Tankers*

6. Existing large seagoing tankers plus conservative estimate of deliveries from new construction over the next several months will meet requirements for bulk movements of petroleum to areas of consumption.

7. In all theaters there is a very real need for smaller tankers, particularly where necessary to supply newly established beachheads and bases, as for operations in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, OVERLORD and the Mediterranean. They are particularly important for operations in the Pacific, and in addition are being requested in increasing numbers in the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. Steps are now being taken to determine requirements. Such as cannot be supplied from present building programs will be requested in new construction.

#### *Pipeline in Southeast Asia*

8. The construction of the pipeline through Burma, and later into China, will greatly facilitate the delivery of petroleum products to allied forces in those areas. The ocean terminus of the pipeline will be served by an adequate battery of tanks to be erected, and these in turn will receive their deliveries from tankers, the supply for which is being planned.

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### (5) COMMUNIQUÉ

Roosevelt Papers

#### *Communiqué*<sup>1</sup>

[QUEBEC, August 24, 1943.]

The Anglo-American War Conference which opened at Quebec on the 11th of August, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work.

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<sup>1</sup> Read by Roosevelt in the course of a press conference held jointly with Churchill and Mackenzie King at 12:15 p. m., August 24, 1943, on the terrace at the Citadel. For informal remarks on this occasion, see Rosenman, pp. 355-365. The text of the Communiqué was printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, August 28, 1943, p. 121.

The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the Fleets, Armies and Air Forces of the two nations. Considering that these forces are intermingled<sup>2</sup> in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction.

Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may however be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T. V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political data<sup>3</sup> underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another Conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions<sup>4</sup> so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

[Consideration has been given during the conference to the question of relations with the French Committee of Liberation, and it is understood that an announcement by a number of governments will be made in the latter part of the week.<sup>5</sup>]

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<sup>2</sup> An earlier text of the Communiqué in the Roosevelt Papers, marked "1st draft" in Roosevelt's handwriting, reads "are most closely intermingled".

<sup>3</sup> The text in the Log reads "political issues".

<sup>4</sup> The text referred to in fn. 1, above, has the additional word "taken" at this point.

<sup>5</sup> This final paragraph, which does not appear in the source text but which was included in the text released to the press on August 24, 1943, is supplied from the text of the Communiqué included in the Log.

## (6) REPORTS ON THE CONFERENCE TO STALIN AND CHIANG

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

QUEBEC, August 24, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.<sup>2</sup>

In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.

The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increased scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross channel invasion.

A large-scale buildup of American forces in the United Kingdom is now under way. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross channel operations. A bridgehead in the continent once secured will be reenforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions per month. This operation will be the primary British and American ground and air effort against the Axis.

The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington as telegram No. BLACK 9, and forwarded on August 25, 1943, to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. It was preceded by the following telegraphic instruction from Roosevelt's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Naval Attaché:

"My immediately following message is most secret.

"It should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery." (J.C.S. Files)

A message drafted from a paraphrase of the telegram here printed was delivered jointly by the British and American Ambassadors at Moscow to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) on August 26, 1943, for transmittal to Stalin (Embassy Moscow Files). For the text of the message as delivered to Molotov, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 150-151, vol. II, p. 86.

<sup>2</sup> As received in Washington from Quebec, this passage read "from the President and the Prime Minister". On telephonic instructions from the Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond), the White House Map Room changed the message before dispatch to Moscow to read "from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." (Roosevelt Papers)

alliance, and the occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany.

Our operations in the Balkans will be limited to the supply of Balkan Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Comandos, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Generalissimo Chiang*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

QUEBEC, August 24, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.

In order to vitalize operations in Burma, a command, separate from India, has been set up under Vice Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten to operate directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, we think, will be an improvement in organization and further the concept of aggressive operations. Thus, we hope to obtain unity in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma operations. Unity must be achieved if success is to be attained.

At the conclusion of the conference in Quebec, I hasten to bring to you certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations in your theaters and areas contiguous thereto.

First, to accelerate the buildup of the air freight route into China to provide greatly increased support for your air and ground forces.

Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications from Calcutta to Assam requires immediate increase in their capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river craft and rail transportation facilities which should result in an eventual lift of two hundred thousand tons a month into Assam.

Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry season for the capture of upper Burma with a view to increasing the capacity

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington as telegram No. BLACK 11 and forwarded on August 25, 1943, to the United States Naval Attaché, Chungking, via Navy channels. It was preceded by the following telegraphic instruction from Leahy to the Naval Attaché:

"My immediately following message is most secret and should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery." (Roosevelt Papers)

of the air route, and to making possible the reopening of an overland route to China. The security of these land and air routes is considered of vital importance to the build up of an air offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the form of an attack from Assam into Burma via Imphal and Ledo, coordinated with an advance at the same time from Yunnan. These converging attacks are to be facilitated by the employment of long range penetration groups in front of each column similar to those employed by Brigadier Wingate last spring. These columns are to be organized by Wingate. They will include British, American, and Indian contingents, all to be supported and supplied by air.

Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed to contribute to the success of the North Burma campaign. At the same time steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure our naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean Area and to interdict the enemy's sea communications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibian attacks is still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground.

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(7) DIRECTIVE TO EISENHOWER TRANSMITTING SURRENDER TERMS FOR ITALY

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1943.

Following is text of comprehensive surrender instrument terms with Italy which has been approved by the Prime Minister and President.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This message was also sent as No. R-2302 to the Commanding General, United States Forces, London, for the British Chiefs of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> Approval was apparently agreed upon at one of the private Roosevelt-Churchill meetings at the Quebec Conference for which no minutes are available. See *ante*, pp. 880, 951. The Department of State learned on August 26, 1943, that Roosevelt had directed that Eisenhower be instructed to substitute this document for the "short terms" (see *ante*, p. 952). On the same day the British Chargé at Washington (Campbell) and the Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) reported to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee "that the President and the Prime Minister had taken the following action:

"a. Agreed upon the comprehensive document Draft Instrument of Surrender of Italy, which contains all the terms of surrender, and that it should supersede the Military Terms now in General Eisenhower's possession.

"b. Agreed upon the procedure to be followed in communicating the provisions of the comprehensive document to General Eisenhower.

"c. Instructed the Combined Chiefs of Staff accordingly." (J.C.S. Files)

The Department of Defense has supplied the information that the minutes of the August 26 meeting of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee quoted above constitute "the only record that has been found of a directive from the President and the Prime Minister to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to transmit the approved terms to General Eisenhower." Cf. *ante*, p. 952, fn. 9.

For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 203, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In any future negotiations this document should be given to Italian representative[s] with the explanation that it embodies the points already handed to them and also contains the additional points which they were warned to expect. A copy of these has been telegraphed to British Ambassador Lisbon.<sup>3</sup>

Text begins with heading "Instrument of Surrender of Italy".

"Whereas the Italian government and the Italian Supreme Command acknowledge that the Italian forces have been totally defeated and that Italy can no longer carry on the war against the United Nations and have accordingly unconditionally requested a suspension of hostilities.

And whereas the United States and United Kingdom governments acting on behalf of the United Nations are willing to lay down the terms on which they are prepared to suspend hostilities against Italy so long as their military operations against Germany and her allies are not obstructed, and that Italy does not assist these powers in any way and complies with requirements of these governments.<sup>4</sup>

The following terms have been presented by . . . duly authorized to that effect, and have been accepted by . . . representing the Supreme Command of the Italian land, sea and air forces, and duly authorized to that effect by the Italian government.<sup>5</sup>

[1.] A. The Italian land, sea, and air forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.

B. Italian participation in the war in all theatres will cease immediately. There will be no opposition to landings, movements or other operations of the land, sea and air forces of the United Nations. Accordingly, the Italian Supreme Command will order the immediate cessation of hostilities of any kind against the forces of the United Nations and will direct the Italian naval, military and air force authorities in all theatres to issue forthwith the appropriate instructions to those under their command.

C. The Italian Supreme Command will further order all Italian naval, military and air forces or authorities and personnel to refrain immediately from destruction of or damage to any real or personal property, whether public or private.

2. The Italian Supreme Command will give full information concerning the disposition and condition of all Italian land, sea and air forces, wherever they are situated and of all such forces of Italy's allies as are situated in Italian or Italian-occupied territory.

3. The Italian Supreme Command will take the necessary measures to secure airfields, port facilities and all other installations against seizure or attack by any of Italy's allies. The Italian Supreme Com-

<sup>3</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell. See *ante*, p. 1090.

<sup>4</sup> A new preamble was substituted for the preceding two paragraphs when these terms of surrender were signed at Malta on September 29, 1943. See Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604*; 61 Stat. (3) 2742.

<sup>5</sup> The ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text. For the revision of this paragraph contained in the terms of surrender signed at Malta on September 29, 1943, see *ibid.*

mand will take the necessary measures to insure law and order, and to use its available armed forces to insure prompt and exact compliance with all the provisions of the present instrument. Subject to such use of Italian troops for the above purposes, as may be sanctioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief, all other Italian land, sea and air forces will proceed to and remain in their barracks, camps or ships pending directions from the United Nations as to their future status and disposal. Exceptionally such naval personnel shall proceed to shore establishments as the United Nations may direct.

4. Italian land, sea and air forces will within the periods to be laid down by the United Nations withdraw from all areas outside Italian territory notified to the Italian government by the United Nations and proceed to areas to be specified by the United Nations. Such movement of Italian land, sea and air forces will be carried out in conditions to be laid down by the United Nations and in accordance with the orders to be issued by them. All Italian officials will similarly leave the areas notified except any who may be permitted to remain by the United Nations. Those permitted to remain will comply with the instructions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

5. No requisitioning, seizures or other coercive measures shall be effected by Italian land, sea and air forces or officials in regard to persons or property in the areas notified under Article 4.

6. The demobilization of Italian land, sea and air forces in excess of such establishments as shall be notified will take place as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

7. Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries and transports will be assembled as directed in ports to be specified by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. (*Note: If at the date of the Armistice the whole of the Italian fleet has been assembled in Allied ports, this Article would run—"Italian warships of all descriptions, auxiliaries, and transports will remain until further notice in the ports where they are at present assembled, and will be dealt with as prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief."*)

8. Italian aircraft of all kinds will not leave the ground or water or ships, except as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

9. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 14, 15, and 28 (A) and (D) below, all merchant ships, fishing or other craft of whatever flag, all aircraft and inland transport of whatever nationality in Italian or Italian-occupied territory or waters will, pending verification of their identity and status, be prevented from leaving.

10. The Italian Supreme Command will make available all information about naval, military and air devices, installations, and defences, about all transport and intercommunication systems established by Italy or her allies on Italian territory or in the approaches thereto, about minefields or other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air and such other particulars as the United Nations may require in connection with the use of Italian bases, or with the operations, security, or welfare of the United Nations land, sea or air forces. Italian forces and equipment will be made available as required by the United Nations for the removal of the above mentioned obstacles.

11. The Italian government will furnish forthwith lists of quantities of all war material showing the location of the same. Subject to such use as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may make of it, the war material will be placed in store under such control as he may direct. The ultimate disposal of war material will be prescribed by the United Nations.

12. There will be no destruction of nor damage to nor except as authorized or directed by the United Nations any removal of war material, wireless, radiolocation or meteorological stations, rail road, port or other installations or in general, public or private utilities or property of any kind, wherever situated, and the necessary maintenance and repair will be the responsibility of the Italian authorities.

13. The manufacture, production and construction of war material and its import, export and transit is prohibited, except as directed by the United Nations. The Italian government will comply with any directions given by the United Nations for the manufacture, production or construction and the import, export or transit of war material.

14. A. All Italian merchant shipping and fishing and other craft, wherever they may be, and any constructed or completed during the period of the present instrument will be made available in good repair and in seaworthy condition by the competent Italian authorities at such places and for such purposes and periods as the United Nations may prescribe. Transfer to enemy or neutral flags is prohibited. Crews will remain on board pending further instructions regarding their continued employment or dispersal. Any existing options to repurchase or re-acquire or to resume control of Italian or former Italian vessels sold or otherwise transferred or chartered during the war will forthwith be exercised and the above provisions will apply to all such vessels and their crews.

B. All Italian inland transport and all port equipment will be held at the disposal of the United Nations for such purposes as they may direct.

15. United Nations merchant ships, fishing and other craft in Italian hands wherever they may be (including for this purpose those of any country which has broken off diplomatic relations with Italy) whether or not the title has been transferred as the result of prize court proceedings or otherwise, will be surrendered to the United Nations and will be assembled in ports to be specified by the United Nations for disposal as directed by them. The Italian government will take all such steps as may be required to secure any necessary transfers of title. Any neutral merchant ship, fishing or other craft under Italian operation or control will be assembled in the same manner pending arrangements for their ultimate disposal. Any necessary repairs to any of the above mentioned vessels will be effected by the Italian government, if required, and at their expense. The Italian government will take the necessary measures to insure that the vessels and their cargo are not damaged.

16. No radio or telecommunication installations or other forms of intercommunication, ashore or afloat, under Italian control whether belonging to Italy or any nation other than the United Nations will transmit until directions for the control of these installation[s] have been prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian au-

thorities will conform to such measures for control and censorship of press and of other publications, of theatrical and cinematograph performances, of broadcasting, and also of all forms of intercommunication as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may direct. The Allied Commander-in-Chief may, at his discretion, take over radio, cable and other communication stations.

17. The warships, auxiliaries, transports and merchant and other vessels and aircraft in the service of the United Nations will have the right freely to use the territorial waters around and the air over Italian territory.

18. The forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain parts of Italian territory. The territories or areas concerned will from time to time be notified by the United Nations and all Italian land, sea and air forces will thereupon withdraw from such territories or areas in accordance with the instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The provisions of this Article are without prejudice to those of Article 4 above. The Italian Supreme Command will guarantee immediate use and access to the Allies of all airfields and naval ports in Italy under their control.

19. In the territories or areas referred to in Article 18 all naval, military and air installations, power stations, oil refineries, public utility services, all ports and harbors, all transport and all intercommunication installations, facilities and equipment and such other installations or facilities and all such stocks as may be required by the United Nations will be made available in good condition by the competent Italian authorities with the personnel required for working them. The Italian government will make available such other local resources or services as the United Nations may require.

20. Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying power throughout the territories or areas referred to in Article 18, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian administrative, judicial and public services will carry out their functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief unless otherwise directed.

21. In addition to the rights in respect of occupied Italian territories described in Articles 18 to 20,

(A) Members of the land, sea or air forces and officials of the United Nations will have the right of passage in or over non-occupied Italian territory and will be afforded all the necessary facilities and assistance in performing their functions.

(B) The Italian authorities will make available in non-occupied Italian territory all transport facilities required by the United Nations including free transit for their war material and supplies, and will comply with instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief regarding the use and control of airfields, ports, shipping, inland transport systems and vehicles, intercommunication systems, power-stations and public utility services, oil refineries, stocks and such other fuel and power supplies and means of producing same, as United Nations may specify, together with connected repair and construction facilities.

22. The Italian government and people will abstain from all action detrimental to the interests of the United Nations and will carry out promptly and efficiently all orders given by the United Nations.

23. The Italian government will make available such Italian currency as the United Nations may require. The Italian government will withdraw and redeem in Italian currency within such time-limits and on such terms as the United Nations may specify all holdings in Italian territory of currencies issued by the United Nations during military operations or occupation and will hand over the currencies so withdrawn free of cost to the United Nations. The Italian government will take such measures as may be required by the United Nations for the control of banks and businesses in Italian territory, for the control of foreign exchange and foreign commercial and financial transactions and for the regulation of trade and production and will comply with any instructions issued by the United Nations regarding these and similar matters.

24. There shall be no financial, commercial or other intercourse with or dealings with or for the benefit of countries at war with any of the United Nations or territories occupied by such countries or any other foreign country except under authorization of the Allied Commander-in-Chief or designated officials.

25. (A) Relations with countries at war with any of the United Nations, or occupied by any such country, will be broken off. Italian diplomatic, consular and other officials and members of the Italian land, sea and air forces accredited to or serving on missions with any such country or in any other territory specified by the United Nations will be recalled. Diplomatic and consular officials of such countries will be dealt with as the United Nations may prescribe.

(B) The United Nations reserve the right to require the withdrawal of neutral diplomatic and consular officers from occupied Italian territory and to prescribe and lay down regulations governing the procedure for and methods of communication between the Italian government and its representatives in neutral countries and regarding communications emanating from or destined for the representatives of neutral countries in Italian territory.

26. Italian subjects will pending further instructions be prevented from leaving Italian territory except as authorized by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and will not in any event take service with any of the countries or in any of the territories referred to in Article 25 (A), nor will they proceed to any place for the purpose of undertaking work for any such country. Those at present so serving or working will be recalled as directed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

27. The military, naval and air personnel and material and the merchant shipping, fishing and other craft and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of any country against which any of the United Nations is carrying on hostilities or which is occupied by any such country, remain liable to attack or seizure wherever found in or over Italian territory or waters.

28. (A) The warships, auxiliaries and transports of any such country or occupied country referred to in Article 27 in Italian or Italian occupied ports and waters and the aircraft, vehicles and other transport equipment of such countries in or over Italian or Italian occupied ter-

itory will, pending further instructions, be prevented from leaving.

(B) The military, naval and air personnel and the civilian nationals of any such country or occupied country in Italian or Italian occupied territory will be prevented from leaving and will be interned pending further instructions.

(C) All property in Italian territory belonging to any such country or occupied country or its nationals will be impounded and kept in custody pending further instructions.

(D) The Italian government will comply with any instructions given by the Allied Commander-in-Chief concerning the internment, custody or subsequent disposal, utilization or employment of any of the above mentioned persons, vessels, aircraft, material or property.

29. Benito Mussolini, his chief Fascist associates and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes or analogous offences whose names appear on lists to be communicated by the United Nations will forthwith be apprehended and surrendered into the hands of the United Nations. Any instructions given by the United Nations for this purpose will be complied with.

30. All Fascist organizations, including all branches of the Fascist militia (MVSN), the secret police (OVRA) and Fascist youth organizations will insofar as this is not already accomplished be disbanded in accordance with the directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. The Italian government will comply with all such further directions as the United Nations may give for abolition of Fascist institutions, the dismissal and internment of Fascist personnel, the control of Fascist funds, the suppression of Fascist ideology and teaching.

31. All Italian laws involving discrimination on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinions will insofar as this is not already accomplished be rescinded, and persons detained on such grounds will, as directed by the United Nations, be released and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected. The Italian government will comply with all such further directions as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may give for repeal of Fascist legislation and removal of any disabilities or prohibitions resulting therefrom.

32. (A) Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of or specified by the United Nations and any nationals of the United Nations, including Abyssinian subjects, confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint in Italian or Italian-occupied territory will not be removed and will forthwith be handed over to representatives of the United Nations or otherwise dealt with as the United Nations may direct. Any removal during the period between the presentation and the signature of the present instrument will be regarded as a breach of its terms.

(B) Persons of whatever nationality who have been placed under restriction, detention or sentence (including sentences in Absentia) on account of their dealings or sympathies with the United Nations will be released under the direction of the United Nations and relieved from all legal disabilities to which they have been subjected.

(C) The Italian government will take such steps as the United Nations may direct to safeguard the persons of foreign nationals and property of foreign nationals and property of foreign states and nationals.

33. (A) The Italian government will comply with such directions as the United Nations may prescribe regarding restitution deliveries services or payments by way of reparation and payment of the costs of occupation during the period of the present instrument.

(B) The Italian government will give to the Allied Commander-in-Chief such information as may be prescribed regarding the assets whether inside or outside Italian territory of the Italian state, the bank of Italy, any Italian state or semi-state institutions or Fascist organizations or residents in Italian territory and will not dispose or allow the disposal, outside Italian territory of any such assets except with the permission of the United Nations.

34. The Italian government will carry out during the period of the present instrument such measures of disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization as may be prescribed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

35. The Italian government will supply all information and provide all documents required by the United Nations. There shall be no destruction or concealment of archives, records, plans or any other documents or information.

36. The Italian government will take and enforce such legislative and other measures as may be necessary for the execution of the present instrument. Italian military and civil authorities will comply with any instructions issued by the Allied Commander-in-Chief for the same purpose.

37. There will be appointed a control commission representative of the United Nations charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

38. (A) The term "United Nations" in the present instrument includes the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the Control Commission and any other authority which the United Nations may designate.

(B) The term "Allied Commander-in-Chief" in the present instrument includes the Control Commission and such other officers and representatives as the Commander-in-Chief may designate.

39. Reference to Italian land, sea and air forces in the present instrument shall be deemed to include Fascist militia and all such other military or para-military units, formation[s] or bodies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.

40. The term "war material" in the present instrument denotes all material specified in such list[s] or definitions as may from time to time be issued by the Control Commission.

41. The term "Italian territory" includes all Italian colonies and dependencies and shall for the purposes of the present instrument (but without prejudice to the question of sovereignty) be deemed to include Albania. Provided however that except in such cases and to such extent as the United Nations may direct the provisions of the present instrument shall not apply in or affect the administration of any Italian colony or dependency already occupied by the United Nations or the rights or powers therein possessed or exercised by them.

42. The Italian government will send a delegation to the headquarters of the Control Commission to represent Italian interests and

to transmit the orders of the Control Commission to the competent Italian authorities.

43. The present instruction shall enter into force blank <sup>6</sup> hours after its signature. It will remain in operation until superseded by any other arrangements or until the coming into force of the peace treaty with Italy.

44. The present instrument may be denounced by the United Nations with immediate effect if Italian obligations thereunder are not fulfilled or, as an alternative, the United Nations may penalize contravention of it by measures appropriate to the circumstances such as the extension of the area of military occupation or air or other punitive action.

The present instrument is drawn up in English and Italian, the English text being authentic, and in case of any dispute regarding its interpretation, the decision of the Control Commission will prevail. Signed on the blank [(date)] at blank (hour) blank (time) at blank (place). (Signatures)."

<sup>6</sup>The word "blank" as printed in paragraphs 43-44 appears in the source text.

#### (8) STATEMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Hull Papers

##### *Statement by the United States Government*

[QUEBEC,] August 22, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the United States desires again to make clear its purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen, looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy.

The Government of the United States, accordingly, welcomes the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is our expectation that the Committee will function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war.

<sup>1</sup>The source text has the following manuscript notations in the upper margin in addition to the date, which is in Dunn's handwriting: (1) "Final", in Dunn's handwriting; (2) "Latest OK", in an unidentified handwriting; and (3) Hull's initials. Although the text had reached its final form by August 22, this statement was not released until the morning of August 27, 1943, after further discussion at Quebec had failed to reconcile the British and United States positions with respect to recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation. See *ante*, pp. 949, 953. The text was telegraphed to Robert D. Murphy in Algiers on August 24 for communication to the appropriate French authorities there on August 26, 1943. See *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. II, pp. 184-185. On instructions received from Hull at Quebec, the Department of State also acted on August 24 to communicate the text to the Governments of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Peru, Venezuela, China, and the Soviet Union (851.01/2779a, 2794a, 2811a, 2815a, 2815b). The text was published in Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, August 28, 1943, pp. 125-126.

In view of the paramount importance of the common war effort, the relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation must continue to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied Commanders.

The Government of the United States takes note, with sympathy, of the desire of the Committee to be regarded as the body qualified to insure the administration and defense of French interests. The extent to which it may be possible to give effect to this desire must however be reserved for consideration in each case as it arises.

On these understandings the Government of the United States recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.

This statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States.

It does constitute recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation as functioning within specific limitations during the war. Later on the people of France, in a free and untrammelled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own officials to administer it.

The Government of the United States welcomes the Committee's expressed determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until French soil is freed from its invaders and until victory is complete over all enemy powers.

May the restoration of France come with the utmost speed.

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*Statement by the British Government*<sup>1</sup>

[LONDON, August 26, 1943.]

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom desire again to make clear their purpose of cooperating with all patriotic Frenchmen looking to the liberation of the French people and French territories from the oppressions of the enemy. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom accordingly welcome the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It is their understanding that the committee has been conceived and will function on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war.

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<sup>1</sup>The source text is that printed in the *London Times*, August 27, 1943, p. 3. The final statement issued by the British Government contained a few changes from the text considered at Quebec on August 24 (see *ante*, p. 1110). No indication has been found that these changes were communicated in advance to the United States Government.

It is also, they are assured, common ground between themselves and the committee that it will be for the French people themselves to settle their own constitution and to establish their own government after they have had an opportunity to express themselves freely. On this understanding his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom wish to make the following statement :—

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognize forthwith the French Committee of National Liberation as administering those French oversea territories which acknowledge its authority and as having assumed the functions of the former French National Committee in respect of territories in the Levant. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also recognize the committee as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-allied cooperation.

They take note with sympathy of the desire of the committee to be regarded as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of his Majesty's Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom welcome the committee's determination to continue the common struggle in close cooperation with all the allies until French and allied territories are completely liberated and until victory is complete over all the enemy Powers. During the war military needs are paramount and all controls necessary for operational purposes are in consequence reserved to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Armies in any theatre of operations. In respect of certain of the territories under the administration of the committee, agreements already exist between the French authorities and the United Kingdom authorities.

The creation of the French Committee of National Liberation may make it necessary to revise these agreements, and his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom assume that pending their revision all such agreements concluded since June, 1940, except in so far as these have been automatically made inapplicable by the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, will remain in force as between his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Committee of National Liberation.

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PR 10 "Foreign Relations of U.S.,"/1-3-68

*Statement by the Canadian Government*<sup>1</sup>

The Prime Minister announced today that a note in the following terms had been addressed to the French Committee of National Liberation in Algiers:

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<sup>1</sup> This statement, a copy of which was obtained by the editors from the Canadian Department of External Affairs, was released to the press for use after midnight, August 26, 1943. Copies of a draft of this statement had been sent to Roosevelt and Hull at Quebec on August 22, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1108.

The Government of Canada has welcomed the establishment of the French Committee of National Liberation. It has been and remains the intention of the Government of Canada to co-operate with all patriotic Frenchmen in freeing France and the French people from the oppression of the enemy. This Government is deeply interested in the early return of France to her high place among the nations and regards the institution of the Committee as an important contribution to that end. Early in July the Committee was informed that Canada was prepared to consider promptly and sympathetically any requests which the Committee might care to present for assistance in the equipment and training of the French forces under its control. It is understood that the Committee will operate on the principle of the collective responsibility of all its members for the prosecution of the war. It is also understood that the Committee is in accord with the view of the Canadian Government that the French people themselves, as soon as they have an opportunity of freely expressing their wishes, should establish in France the Government of their choice.

On this basis the Government of Canada recognizes the French Committee of National Liberation as administering the French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority, and as the body qualified to ensure the conduct of the French effort in the war within the framework of inter-Allied co-operation. It notes with sympathy the desire of the Committee to be recognized as the body qualified to ensure the administration and defence of all French interests. It is the intention of the Canadian Government to give effect to this request as far as possible while reserving the right to consider in consultation with the Committee the practical application of this principle in particular cases as they arise.

The Government of Canada warmly welcomes the Committee's determination to carry on the common struggle in close co-operation with all the Allies until French and Allied territories are entirely liberated and complete victory over all enemy powers has been achieved. It is understood that the Committee will afford in territories under its administration whatever military and economic facilities are required by the Governments of the United Nations for the prosecution of the war.

## 10. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SITUATION

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Clark Kerr) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[Moscow, August 24, 1943.]

I asked Molotov last night what he thought of the latest Italian peace feelers and the way they were being handled.

2. He said that Stalin was preparing an answer to the message from the Prime Minister and the President.<sup>2</sup> It would be to the effect that the Soviet Government "considered it necessary" to set up an Anglo-Soviet-American politico-military commission to examine the terms of surrender of Italy and of all the other countries likely to fall away from their allegiance to Germany. The commission should be established in Sicily and should get to work at once. The Soviet Government were making this suggestion because they were conscious of their aloofness from such questions and felt that they should properly take a part in them. They recognized that they had been kept fully informed of decisions taken, but they thought the time had come for them to play a part in the taking of them. I asked if he had any criticisms to make of terms of surrender. He said no.

3. Some such suggestion as this was bound to come sooner or later. Here we had some sense of its likelihood. It has probably now been brought to a head by Quebec meeting and by discussion in Anglo-American press of the absence of a Soviet representative. An article entitled "Quebec and the Soviet Union" in the current number of *War and the Working Classes*, which you will doubtless have seen, (Reuters' correspondent covered it fully) shows which way the wind is blowing and that it is blowing briskly.

4. I expect that at first sight Soviet Government proposal when made will be unwelcome to you, because at this stage presence in our councils of a Soviet representative (suspicious and probably inarticu-

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message was made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington, and was forwarded to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 137, August 27, 1943, from the White House Map Room.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, pp. 1059, 1095. Stalin's message to which Molotov referred is printed *infra*.

late until prompted from Moscow) will be a nuisance. But for myself I feel strongly that we should face this nuisance and accept the proposal without demur, because it seems to me that immediate and full Soviet participation in our debates about Italy would go a long way not only towards stilling grievances but, more important, towards laying the foundations of real cooperation in the settlement of Europe. Admission of the Soviet Government to our present councils would open the door to ourselves and Americans when the time came to provide for the future of Finland and Eastern Europe.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

PERSONAL AND SECRET

From Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Mr. W. Churchill and President Mr. F. D. Roosevelt.

I have received your joint message of August 19th.<sup>2</sup>

I entirely share your opinion and that of Roosevelt about the importance of a meeting between the three of us. In this connexion I beg you most earnestly to understand my position at this moment, when our armies are carrying on the struggle against the main forces of Hitler with the utmost strain and when Hitler not only does not withdraw a single division from our front but on the contrary has already succeeded in transporting, and continues to transport fresh divisions to Soviet-German front. At such a moment, in the opinion of all my colleagues, I cannot without detriment to our military operations leave the front for so distant a point as Fairbanks although if the situation on our front were different Fairbanks undoubtedly would be very convenient as a place for our meeting as I said before.

As regards a meeting of representatives of our states and in particular of representatives in charge of Foreign Affairs, I share your opinion about the expediency of such a meeting in the near future. This meeting however ought not to have a purely exploratory character but

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<sup>1</sup> As printed in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 149-150, and vol. II, pp. 85-86, this document is dated August 24, 1943, which was the final day of the First Quebec Conference; but it is placed here because it did not reach Roosevelt and Churchill until after the close of the Conference. The source text is headed: "The following message for the Prime Minister and the President was handed to the Foreign Office by the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires on the night of August 26th, 1943." The channel through which the message was forwarded to Washington is not indicated. The Department of State delivered the text to the White House between 6 and 7 p. m. on August 26, and the White House Map Room forwarded it immediately to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. WHITE 132.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the message dispatched from Quebec on August 18, 1943, *ante*, pp. 1059, 1095.

a practicable and preparatory character in order that after that meeting has taken place our Governments are able to take definite decisions and thus that delay in the taking of decisions on urgent questions can be avoided. Therefore I consider it indispensable to revert to my proposal that it is necessary in advance to define the scope of questions for discussion by representatives of the Three Powers and to draft the proposals which ought to be discussed by them and presented to our Governments for final decision.

Yesterday I received from Sir A. Clark Kerr additions and corrections to your and Mr. Roosevelt's message,<sup>3</sup> in which you informed me about instructions sent to General Eisenhower in connexion with conditions of surrender worked out for Italy in negotiations with General Castellano. I and my colleagues think the instructions given General Eisenhower correspond entirely to the aim of unconditional surrender of Italy and therefore cannot lead to any objections on our part.

But I think the information so far received is quite insufficient in order to be able to judge what measures are necessary on the part of the Allies during negotiations with Italy. This circumstance confirms the necessity for participation of a Soviet Representative in taking decisions in the course of negotiations. Therefore I think that the time has fully come for establishment of a military-political commission of representatives of the three countries which I mentioned to you in my message of August 22nd.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, pp. 1062 (see especially fn. 1) and 1091.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 1086. For Ambassador Standley's recommendations to Hull and Roosevelt concerning the proposals contained in Stalin's messages of August 22 and 24, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 567-568.

740.0011 European War 1939/31665

*The Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State*

No 492/42

MEMORANDUM

The Apostolic Delegate<sup>1</sup> has been informed by the Cardinal Secretary of State<sup>2</sup> that the Italian government has taken the following steps to make effective its declaration of August 14, 1943, on the status of Rome as an open city:<sup>3</sup>

1) The defense installations of the city of Rome have been dismantled.

<sup>1</sup> A. G. Cicognani.

<sup>2</sup> Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 594.

2) Orders have been issued that anti-aircraft batteries are not to operate, nor are fighter planes to go into action over the city of Rome.

3) The Italian and German High Commands are leaving the city, and their complete removal will be effected within a short time.

4) Active troops are being withdrawn and there will remain in the city only a garrison of Italian troops charged with the maintenance of public order. This garrison of troops will be equipped with arms adequate for the purpose of their presence.

5) The railway system of Rome will in the future not be used for purposes of military transportation, for the marshaling of trains, or for loading or unloading troops etc. The railway system of Rome will be reduced to a mere transit line, and its facilities will not be employed for the making up or breaking up of military trains. The railroad yards of Rome will not be made a depot for military trains. For all purposes of military transportation, the railway system in and around the zone affected by the declaration of Rome as an open city will be put into the status of a simple line of passage.

6) All necessary steps are being taken to effect the transfer beyond the city limits of all military establishments, and of all factories used for the production of arms and munitions.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1943.

865.00/2172

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 25, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Italian Situation

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Minister of Portugal, Dr. João Antonio de Bianchi

The Minister of Portugal called and made an oral statement to me touching upon certain phases of the Italian situation, as seen through the eyes of Prime Minister Salazar. I [*He?*] requested that it be not made of record. I accordingly took his memorandum for examination over night, with the understanding that I would return it in the morning.<sup>1</sup>

I said that I would be only too glad to communicate this information to the President. The Minister emphasized that it had been given to the British not long ago,<sup>2</sup> but so far they had heard nothing from them.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

<sup>1</sup> Since no Portuguese memorandum on this subject has been found in Department of State files, it is presumed that Hull did in fact return it to Bianchi.

<sup>2</sup> From Jones' comments, *infra*, on Bianchi's memorandum, it appears that it was similar in substance to the approach which Salazar had made to the British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) on July 22, 1943. See *ante*, p. 534.

865.00/8-2643

*Mr. J. Wesley Jones, of the Division of European Affairs, to the  
Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY: In discussing the attached Portuguese memorandum<sup>1</sup> with the President this morning you may wish to consider the following:

Eu is inclined to agree with the reported British reaction to the Portuguese overtures that events have overtaken the original suggestions of Dr. Salazar.<sup>2</sup> The Portuguese, of course, do not know of the various direct approaches of the Badoglio Government to the British through Lisbon, Tangier and Madrid, and to us through the Vatican. From these various channels it is apparent that "unconditional surrender" and the future of Italy are not the principal preoccupations of Marshal Badoglio's Government. The immediate threat of German military forces in Italy proper appears to be the deterring factor in any surrender he might be willing to make to the Allies. What the Marshal appears most anxious to hear from us are assurances that we will (1) divert the Germans by landing in France or the Balkans, or (2) land in force somewhere above Rome in order to support his government and army against the Germans. That, of course, is a military decision.

With reference to any assurances of a political nature beyond the demand for unconditional surrender, you will recall that the British, in replying to the Italian Government through Tangier, stated that "honorable capitulation" would be provided for in the terms.<sup>3</sup> The British Consul General was also authorized<sup>4</sup> to remind the Italian envoy<sup>5</sup> that as the President and Prime Minister had stated we desired that Italy in due course should occupy a respected place in Europe and of General Eisenhower's offer regarding the release of Italian prisoners. To this might be added a reminder that we are not waging a war of conquest and assurances that we have no intention of depriving the Italian people of that territory which is essentially Italian.

Should it be determined to transmit additional assurances of this nature to Marshal Badoglio, it is suggested that existing channels,

<sup>1</sup> See fn. 1 to Hull's memorandum of August 25, 1943, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 534.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 578.

<sup>4</sup> The authorization had been sent to the Acting Consul General at Tangier, Arnold Edwards Watkinson. See *ante*, p. 578 and p. 579, fn. 2.

<sup>5</sup> Alberto Berio.

through Tangier, Madrid or the Vatican, be used rather than making use of a new intermediary, namely the Portuguese Government.

J W[ESLEY] J[ONES]

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*

MOST SECRET

LONDON,<sup>1</sup> 26 August 1943.

414. Colonel Warden to President Roosevelt personal and most secret most immediate.

Should like to arrive Washington Wednesday 1st in time for dinner instead of Monday 30th. Hope this will not be inconvenient to you. I feel I require a little more rest. Will this be all right.

<sup>1</sup>The message originated in Canada but was transmitted to Washington via London. It was forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 130, August 26, 1943.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] 26 August 1943.

From the President to Colonel Warden, Personal and Secret.

Number 346. Your number 414.<sup>2</sup> Wednesday, the First, is all right in every way. If the Subaltern wants to go to Oglethorpe<sup>3</sup> it would give her more time in Washington if she were to come down a day or two ahead.

I hope Lady Warden<sup>4</sup> is getting a real rest and that you are too. Also I hope that you have gone to one of the lakes. Be sure to have the big one weighed and verified by Mackenzie.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room in Washington as telegram No. BLACK 14. Delivered to the British Embassy at Washington for transmission to Churchill in Canada.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Churchill's daughter Mary visited the Women's Army Corps at Oglethorpe, Georgia, August 31–September 2, 1943.

<sup>4</sup> Mrs. Churchill.

<sup>5</sup> Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] August 26, 1943.

From the President to Colonel Warden, Personal and Secret. Number 347. I hope you have seen Uncle Joe's new message<sup>2</sup> which is

<sup>1</sup> Sent via the White House Map Room and the British Admiralty Delegation at Washington. Churchill was in Canada at this time.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., Stalin's message of August 24, 1943, which had just reached Roosevelt at Hyde Park. See *ante*, p. 1174.

greatly improved in its tone. As you and he know, I am lost until Monday and I would let a few days go by till we answer him.

However, my first feeling is that he has come around to our secondary meeting and that it should be held very soon.

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740.00119 EW/8-2643 : Telegram

*The British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

General Carton de Wiart has turned up in company with another Italian General. They left Rome by air yesterday morning and arrived at Lisbon this morning.

2. General C. de Wiart was released a few days ago from his prisoner camp, taken to Rome, fitted out with civilian clothes and Italian name and diplomatic passport and told that he was to accompany to Lisbon and if possible to London an Italian General who was empowered to parley armistice terms.

3. Italian General whose name is Zanussi is principal assistant to General Roatta who is Chief of the General Staff in Chief to General Ambennio [*Ambrosio*] who is Chief of Army Staff.<sup>2</sup> General Zanussi knows all about General C.<sup>3</sup> and General C. de Wiart was told that the dove had been sent out (General C.) but as it had not returned another was being despatched (General Z.) In point of fact General C. must have arrived (barring accidents) a few hours after the departure of General Z.

4. I have told General C. de Wiart in broad terms of the result of General C.'s visit and that unless instructed by you to do so I see no point in receiving General Z. as this might introduce unnecessary complications. General C. de Wiart will so inform General Z. at late meeting arranged for tonight in the flat of a member of my staff. General Z. will be told to remain here until it is certain that there is no message for him.

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<sup>1</sup> Received by the Foreign Office on August 26, 1943. Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> The references are to Mario Roatta, Chief of the Army General Staff, and Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.

<sup>3</sup> Giuseppe Castellano. Concerning Castellano's mission to Lisbon, see *ante*, pp. 1070 ff.

740.00119 EW/8-2643 : Telegram

*The British Ambassador to Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LISBON, August 26, 1943.

If revised terms<sup>2</sup> are to be handed to the Italians, there are thus two available methods (1) at contemplated Palermo meeting, (2) through General Zanussi either here or in London.

2. First method may not be entirely reliable, being dependent as it is on communication being established (according to plan agreed with General C.) between the Italian General Staff and Algiers and on General C. being able to leave and arrive safely.

3. On the other hand you may agree that this method is the more appropriate. It has moreover the additional advantage (if successfully accomplished) of establishing direct contact between General Eisenhower and the Italian General Staff.

4. A third method of communication always available is through the Italian Minister<sup>3</sup> who was finally taken by General C. into his confidence.

5. I shall do nothing pending your further instructions.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender, *ante*, p. 1161.

<sup>3</sup> Renato Prunas.

740.00119 EW/8-2643 : Telegram

*The British Foreign Office to the British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 26, 1943.

You should communicate comprehensive text to General Z. with the explanation that it embodies both the short terms given General C. and political and economic terms which General C. was warned to expect<sup>2</sup> (see Article 12 of short terms). You should tell him that these are the terms which General Eisenhower will present to any Italian emissary who presents himself in the event of the Italian Government deciding to surrender. It should be pointed out to him that it would obviously be more convenient that surrender should take the form of signature straight away of this comprehensive document rather than signature at different times of the two documents, i.e., the short

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 566.

terms communicated to General C. and at a later date the comprehensive document.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In accordance with these instructions, Campbell gave Zanussi the text of the "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender on the morning of August 27, 1943. See Garland and Smyth, p. 461.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

AUGUST 27, 1943.

MOST IMMEDIATE

Following for immediate delivery to the President.

*Begins.* Colonel Warden to President Roosevelt. Personal and Most Secret.<sup>2</sup>

Your No. 346.<sup>3</sup> Thank you so much. Starting from Ottawa Tuesday 31st. Will reach you for dinner Wednesday. Subaltern and I have caught a few, and the change and air are doing us all good. Portal and Brooke have won great victories on the same front. Cabinet have cabled expressing pleasure at the satisfactory result of our conference and urging me to take a holiday as all is quiet in England.

2. U.J.'s last two telegrams<sup>4</sup> have been distinctly more civil. I think we should agree both to the secondary meeting and to the setting up of the Commission, though not in Sicily. This is certainly the view of my Cabinet subject to settlement of details. Anthony<sup>5</sup> is coming here to-night, and I shall be ready to settle the whole thing with you in detail when we meet.

3. If you think an interim message is required I suggest something on these lines:—

*Begins.* We are considering your proposals and have little doubt that plans satisfactory to all of us can be made both for the meeting on the Foreign Office level and for the Tripartite Commission. Prime Minister and I will be meeting again early next week and will telegraph you further. *Ends.*

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the British Embassy, Washington, and forwarded to the White House on the evening of August 27; reforwarded to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, by the White House Map Room as telegram No. WHITE 138. The British Chargé (Campbell) transmitted a copy of this message to Hull on August 28 (S11.001 Roosevelt, F.D./9357).

<sup>2</sup> This preliminary language is omitted in telegram No. WHITE 138, and in its place is the following: "Former Naval Person from British Embassy to the President".

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 1178.

<sup>4</sup> The reference is presumably to Stalin's message of August 24, 1943 (*ante*, p. 1174), which may have reached Churchill in two parts. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 149-150.

<sup>5</sup> Eden.

It may well be however that you will think no interim reply need be made.

4. Mountbatten's appointment seems to have gone well.

5. Many congratulations on your splendid speech at Ottawa <sup>6</sup> which delighted the whole Dominion. I have put off my broadcast till Tuesday. *Ends.*

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<sup>6</sup> See Rosenman, pp. 365-369; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. ix, August 28, 1943, pp. 122-124.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] August 28, 1943.

From the President to Colonel Warden. Personal and secret Number 348.

It is a coincidence that I was on the point of sending you a suggestion for an interim message to Uncle Joe when yours <sup>2</sup> came this morning. Therefore, I am sending the one you suggest via the Russian Embassy in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

I am delighted, as Quebec papers say, you are teasing the trout, but I do not believe New York newspaper accounts that you have landed a five pounder. I shall require sworn verification.

We are looking forward to your arrival Wednesday evening.

Am checking with Dr. Conant in regard to degree <sup>4</sup> and will let you know.

We will be listening to you on the air on Tuesday.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent as telegram No. BLACK 16 to the White House Map Room with instructions to forward the message to Churchill via the British Embassy in Washington.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>3</sup> The text suggested by Churchill was forwarded to Stalin by the White House Map Room on August 28, 1943, via the Soviet Embassy in Washington. It was received in Moscow on August 29. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 151; vol. II, p. 87.

<sup>4</sup> The honorary degree to be conferred on Churchill by Harvard University.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 28 August 1943.

PRIORITY

W-8525/7196. This acknowledges FAN 203 <sup>2</sup> with text of comprehensive surrender instrument. To AGWar for Combined Chiefs of

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<sup>1</sup> The text of this message was forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 145, August 29, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1161.

Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHCOS. This is NAF 342. Developments since original Lisbon conference<sup>3</sup> are as follows.

Upon receipt of message 6056, FAN 202,<sup>4</sup> informing us that comprehensive terms were about to be transmitted to us, the British Minister<sup>5</sup> who had received a similar message communicated with London informing the government that there was no certainty of General C<sup>6</sup> return[ing] here and that the original terms<sup>7</sup> as submitted to him at Lisbon might be accepted without his returning. The British Minister also stated that since General C had been provided with a draft for military capitulation, the military situation might be compromised by the introduction of the more complete instrument in the short time remaining before the launching of AVALANCHE. This is particularly true since shortness of time, great difficulty in communications and the necessity for secrecy all preclude carrying on of any except the briefest and simplest kind of negotiations. We hope to be able to establish communication with the Badoglio Government beginning today, August 28, and may, within the next 48 hours, receive an indication of their acceptance of the terms of the short instrument.

In reply to the British Minister's communication, he was informed by his government that, while every effort should be made to obtain signatures to the comprehensive instrument, if military exigency required it and if the effort to obtain an agreement on the comprehensive instrument could not be accomplished because of lack of time, we might proceed to conclude a military armistice based on the initial terms of surrender on the clear understanding that these terms would be replaced later by the more comprehensive document.

We have now received information that another Italian emissary, General Zanussi, accompanied by a British General<sup>8</sup> who has been released from captivity in Italy and provided with civilian clothes and an Italian diplomatic passport, arrived in Lisbon to discuss terms of an armistice.<sup>9</sup> General Z presumably represents General Roatta, Chief of the Army Staff. On instructions from the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador at Lisbon<sup>10</sup> has presented General Z with the

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1070.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> Harold Macmillan.

<sup>6</sup> Giuseppe Castellano.

<sup>7</sup> i.e., the "short" or "military" terms. See *ante*, pp. 519, 522, 565, 1062.

<sup>8</sup> Major General Adrian Carton de Wiart.

<sup>9</sup> For the telegrams concerning the Zanussi mission which had been made available by the British Embassy at Washington to the Department of State, see *ante*, pp. 1179-1181.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

terms of the comprehensive surrender instrument,<sup>11</sup> and presumably General Z has communicated with his government through the Italian Minister at Lisbon<sup>12</sup> and General Roatta now knows of General C's previous visit and some details regarding the negotiations with staff officers of Allied Force Headquarters.<sup>13</sup>

These facts cause us grave apprehension. General Roatta is known to have strong pro-German tendencies and General C informed Smith and Strong at Lisbon that Roatta had not been taken into the confidence of the Badoglio Government because of these tendencies although, in the event of an Italian change of front, it was presumed that he would, as a soldier, follow loyally the instructions of his government. Moreover, while there is a signed paper from Baker [*Badoglio*] providing General C's credentials, there are no such credentials existing for General Z.

Accordingly, it seems to us that there is a strong possibility that Roatta, having gotten wind of the visit of General C to Lisbon, has sent this second emissary to ascertain the actual facts. If this is so, the secrecy of the whole affair and its ultimately successful result may be seriously compromised. There are also a number of suspicious facts in connection with General Z and his visit which I hope to clear up when he comes to Algiers, as for instance his desire to retard program arranged with General C and to delay while Italian Government considers complete armistice terms, which delay would be to the decided advantage of the Germans.

On the other hand, there is a possibility that the Z mission is bona fide and that the two Italian staffs, Joint and Army, are working semi-independently to the same end.

In any event, we are making arrangements to have General Z brought to Algiers en route to Sicily where he has made arrangements to be met by an Italian plane on Sunday. After he has been interviewed here it is hoped that a more detailed report of his intentions and the authority under which he is operating can be submitted. In the meantime we are proceeding along the lines of our previous arrangement as already communicated to you and the supplementary instructions which have been received since the Lisbon conference. However I wish to emphasize again that acceptance of the military capitulation is possible with-

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<sup>11</sup> See *ante*, p. 1181, fn. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Renato Prunas.

<sup>13</sup> The text of the "long" or "comprehensive" terms was apparently recovered from Zanussi before he had communicated it to Rome. See Garland and Smyth, pp. 462-463. For accounts of the Zanussi mission by Zanussi himself and by Carton de Wiart, see Giacomo Zanussi, *Guerra e catastrofe d'Italia, giugno 1943-maggio 1945* (Rome: Libreria Corso, 1946), pt. II; *Happy Odyssey: The Memoirs of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart* (London: Cape Publishers, 1950).

in the next day or two and, failing that, General C may arrive on the 31st with a signed acceptance of the original short-term military instrument accomplished in good faith. In this event, I strongly urge that the matter be closed on the spot and that C then be handed the long document with the information that these are the complete surrender terms which will be imposed by the United Nations.

The risks attendant on *AVALANCHE* which have been pointed out to you and which we are perfectly prepared to accent [*accept*] will be minimized to a large extent if we are able to secure Italian assistance just prior to and during the critical period of the actual landing. Even passive assistance will greatly increase our chances of success and there is even some possibility of the Italians being willing to immobilize certain German divisions. It is these factors which make me so very anxious to get something done now.

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740.00119 European War 1939/1620 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Standley) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

Moscow, August 28, 1943.

U.S. URGENT

1216. Personal and secret for the Secretary.

Your 749, August 26, 7 p. m., my 1201, August 27, 5 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

The British Ambassador<sup>3</sup> has received a note from Molotov dated August 27 which reads in paraphrased translation as follows:

"The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the Italian surrender terms<sup>4</sup> which have been approved by the American and British Governments as transmitted by Ambassador Kerr and Ambassador Standley on August 26.

The Soviet Government approves the terms in question. It empowers General Eisenhower to sign the terms in the negotiations with Castellano on behalf of the Soviet Government.

In the present instance it is the opinion of the Soviet Government that a special representative of the Soviet Union is not required when the Italian terms of surrender are signed by General Eisenhower."

STANDLEY

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<sup>1</sup> At Hull's request the body of this message, beginning "The British Ambassador", was sent by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 148, August 29, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed herein. For texts, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 356-357.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

<sup>4</sup> i.e., the "long" or "comprehensive" terms. See *ante*, p. 1161.

Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

LA CABANE DE MONTMORENCY, [August 28, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT: I enclosed [*enclose*] unparaphrased version of my telegram and the reply about the dates and scales of BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE respectively. The position is still far from satisfactory.

As these telegrams are unparaphrased will you please burn them after you have read them.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]  
28. 8. 43

[Enclosure 1—Telegram]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the Deputy Commander in Chief,  
Allied Force Headquarters (Alexander)*<sup>2</sup>

SECRET, PRIVATE  
AND CONFIDENTIAL

QUADRANT, August 25, 1943.

1. General Whiteley, who has been here, has told us the dates and scales of BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE respectively. He has made the statement that it is expected "that six Divisions will be through Calabria by December 1st" and "that six other Divisions will be ashore at AVALANCHE by December 1st". This has filled me with the greatest concern and I hope you will be able to reassure me. Assuming that our landings are successful and that we are not defeated in the subsequent battles I cannot understand why 2½ months or more will be required "to get ashore", or why it would be necessary, once we have obtained an effective port and bridgehead at AVALANCHE to march all the BAYTOWN Divisions through Calabria instead of sending some at least of them round by sea.

2. Moreover the rate of build-up to 12 Divisions on the mainland by December 1st seems to me to open dangers of the gravest kind. First, no effective help can come to enable the Italians in Rome to turn against the Germans, and the dangers of a German Quisling Government being installed or alternatively sheer anarchy supervening will be aggravated and prolonged. Secondly, if your rate of build-up is no more than 12 Divisions by December 1st, and these only in Naples area, what is to prevent the Germans in the same time from bringing far

<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the White House by special messenger. Texts of this message (omitting the final paragraph) and of the two enclosures were forwarded by the White House Map Room to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, in telegram No. WHITE 143, August 29, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Sent as telegram No. WELFARE 423 to the War Cabinet Office at London for transmission to Alexander.

larger forces against them? They are at present said to have 16 Divisions in the Italian Peninsula. I am not myself convinced that these are in fact complete divisions. On the contrary it would seem likely that they are the leading elements and headquarters in several cases. But if the liberation of Rome and the gaining of the important political and military advantages following therefrom is to be delayed for more than three months from now no one can measure the consequences.

3. I am most anxious to hear from you before I leave America as the President was also much distressed by the day mentioned, and if it is really the kind of time-table that is being worked to it would be better for us to face the worst in consultation. I hope however that you will chase these clouds away.

[Enclosure 2—Telegram]

*The Head of the Planning Staff, Fifteenth Army Group (Richardson)  
to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Brooke)*<sup>3</sup>

MOST SECRET

26 AUGUST 1943.

Cgs 53 26 August. BIGOT. Personal for C.I.G.S. from Richardson. Ref. 62930 (C.I.G.S.) dated 26 (WELFARE 423).

1. General Alexander is visiting formations of 5th U.S.A. Army. The slow rate of build up due to length of turn round and limited resources in craft caused some re-examination here. The following steps to speed build up were decided upon at a meeting in Algiers on 23rd August.

a. The withdrawal of the craft from BAYTOWN after (? initial<sup>4</sup>) assault, thus giving fullest priority AVALANCHE.

b. The allocation of 45 U.S.A. Division in Sicily to 5th U.S.A. Army, so shortening the turn round from Naples.

c. The examination of use of 2 U.S.A. Armoured Divisions from Sicily with a view to shortening turn round.

2. There is no intention to march all BAYTOWN Divisions through Calabria if situation permits them to be sent by sea and the resources in shipping and (? destroyers<sup>4</sup>) make a sea move more profitable.

3. I cannot give you now the exact rate of build up we are hoping to achieve but it is considerably greater than that stated by General Whiteley. The Air Force commitment is very large and this has to be set against any requirements in allocating the total lift available.

<sup>3</sup> Sent to London; forwarded by the Air Ministry to Brooke in Canada in telegram No. CONCRETE 597, August 27, 1943.

<sup>4</sup> This parenthetical queried clarification of a garble in the message appears in the source text.

4. I will send estimated rate of build up as soon as this has been finally worked out. The build up figure has to be obtained from A.F.H.Q. as so much depends upon loading facilities.

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740.00119 EW/9-143 : Telegram

*The British Ambassador in Spain (Hoare) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

MADRID, August 28, 1943.

I gathered from Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>2</sup> in San Sebastián yesterday that the Spanish Ambassador in Rome<sup>3</sup> who is in San Sebastián thinks that the Badoglio Government cannot last more than two or three days. The Ministry are most perturbed as they fear outbreaks of communism which may have serious repercussions in Spain will inevitably result from General Badoglio's fall. The Brazilian Ambassador<sup>4</sup> tells me that the Spanish Ambassador in Rome informed him yesterday that there had been two attempts at a coup in Italy, one Fascist and the other military and that the military won. When Mussolini left the meeting and called his car an Italian colonel stepped up and said he had orders to take Mussolini with him. Mussolini was now detained on the island of Maddalena north of Sardinia.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State on September 1, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> General Francisco Gómez Jordana.

<sup>3</sup> Raimundo Fernández Cuesta.

<sup>4</sup> Abelardo Rogas.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 29, 1943.

6398. Your NAF 342<sup>1</sup> has been seen by the President (book message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Eisenhower and USFor for information of British Chiefs of Staff). He authorizes you to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then transmit the comprehensive document to the Italian Representatives. The Prime Minister has been informed of this authorization.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1182.

<sup>2</sup> See *infra*.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[HYDE PARK,] August 29, 1943.

To the Prime Minister, QUADRANT, Number 349.

In response to Eisenhower's NAF 342<sup>2</sup> (Copy of which has been sent to you by the British Staff Mission) I have sent him a message<sup>3</sup> authorizing him to proceed with military terms, obtain signature, and then give Italian representative the comprehensive terms. I have taken this action because time is of the essence.<sup>4</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington. Channel of transmission from Washington to Churchill, who was still in Canada, not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1182.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>4</sup> Concerning British approval of Eisenhower's use of the "short" or "military" terms, see Macmillan, p. 316.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

AUGUST 30, 1943.

Message from Colonel Warden to the President.

Clemmie<sup>2</sup> has benefited by her rest up here and would very much like to come with us to Washington if you still have room. She would not be able to undertake any public engagements.

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<sup>1</sup> The message originated in Canada. Channel of transmission not indicated.

<sup>2</sup> Mrs. Churchill.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943.

From the President to Col. Warden. Number 350.

Perfectly delighted that Lady Warden can come too. We will have a quiet family party. Elliot and Ruth<sup>2</sup> will be here and Margaret Suckley<sup>3</sup> and no one else. The marvelous big fish dropped out of the clouds and we had two for supper.

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<sup>1</sup> Delivered to the British Embassy at Washington for transmission to Churchill in Canada.

<sup>2</sup> The Roosevelts' son and daughter-in-law.

<sup>3</sup> A cousin of Roosevelt.

740.0011 EW/8-3143 : Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1943.

Our Governments are informed by Moscow<sup>1</sup> that the Soviet Government empowers you to sign on its behalf the terms of surrender by Italy and you are hereby authorized to do so. For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 206, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This may be taken to apply to the Military or the comprehensive terms.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Government do not consider that the presence of a special representative of the Soviet Union will be required at the time of signature.

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 1185.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *post*, p. 1193.

Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think you should talk this over with General Marshall.<sup>1</sup> Does it need a reply? My first reaction is that it is not satisfactory in that it allows a "mere transit line" to go through Rome—and it is of the highest military importance that this transit line be eliminated.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OSEVELT]

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<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt was referring to the memorandum of August 25, 1943, from the Apostolic Delegation to the Department of State printed *ante*, p. 1175.

740.00119 EW/9-143 : Telegram

*The British Ambassador in Portugal (Campbell) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

LISBON, August 30, 1943.

Same source in Italian Legation<sup>2</sup> has now reported that news has been received that General C.<sup>3</sup> duly arrived at his destination.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State on September 1, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> Not identified in the source text. Earlier information with reference to the Italian peace feelers had been passed to the British Embassy at Lisbon by Raimondo Manzini, Secretary of the Italian Legation there. See *ante*, p. 1056.

<sup>3</sup> Giuseppe Castellano.

(a) If there has still been no contact with Algiers by W/T, this may be due either to

- (1) Signor M.<sup>4</sup> having forgotten his instructions.
- (2) To his having been caught by Germans en route, if it was he who was going to take charge of the Instrument [of Surrender?], or
- (3) To Italian Legation having telegraphed to Rome at General Z.'s instance to suggest withholding of reply until receipt of long terms.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Franco Montanari.

<sup>5</sup> The "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender had been given to General Giacomo Zanussi at Lisbon on August 27, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1181, fn. 3, and p. 1184, fn. 13.

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740.00119 EW/9-143: Telegram

*The British Foreign Office to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters (Macmillan)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 30, 1943.

Greek Government have empowered General Eisenhower to sign surrender articles on their behalf. They would like a representative to be present at the time of signature. State Department informed us recently that they attached<sup>2</sup> importance to presence at signature of representatives of countries who have been victims of Italian aggression, in particular Greece and France.

Please inform General Eisenhower and ask him how necessary arrangements can most conveniently be made. Greek Government will presumably wish to nominate somebody who is already in the Middle East and I should be grateful therefore if you would telegraph your suggestions direct to Mr. Leeper repeating to me.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State on September 1, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

<sup>2</sup> On the source text the typed word "attached" has been crossed out and "appreciated" has been substituted in unidentified handwriting.

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740.00119 EW/9-143: Telegram

*The British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters (Macmillan) to the British Foreign Office*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

ALGIERS, August 31, 1943.

I have informed General Eisenhower.

2. It is impossible to foretell the circumstances in which signature if any is likely to take place and no arrangements can yet be made. I

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<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy made available to the Department of State on September 1, 1943, by the British Embassy at Washington.

therefore trust that the Greek Government will not send an officer from the Middle East or anyone else for the present.

3. In case of need I will telegraph direct to Leeper as you suggest.

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740.00119 EW/8-3143

*The First Secretary of the British Embassy (Hayter) to the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)*

MOST SECRET  
AND PERSONAL

WASHINGTON, August 31st, 1943.

DEAR MR. MATTHEWS, On returning to the Embassy after our conversation this morning,<sup>1</sup> I sent off a telegram<sup>2</sup> on the lines suggested. I will let you know as soon as we get a reply.

After the telegram had gone off, we received a message from the Foreign Office<sup>3</sup> repeating one from the Resident Minister at Algiers which gave the substance of the letter which is being taken to General Ambrosio and states that it was decided not to give the messenger<sup>4</sup> the full surrender terms. I enclose for your information a copy of the telegram which Mr. Eden sent to Algiers in reply.

Yours sincerely,

W G HAYTER

[Enclosure—Telegram]

*The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters (Macmillan)*

MOST SECRET

LONDON, August 31, 1943.

We assume that General Castellano will be asked to sign comprehensive instrument if he proves willing to do so.

2. In any case it should be impressed upon him that [garble] will be expected to sign comprehensive document as soon as possible.

3. I must therefore ask that on arrival General Castellano should be invited to sign comprehensive document. If—as I recognise is now possible—he is not authorised to do so, the armistice will of course come into effect as soon as he has signed the short terms. But he should in that case be told to take comprehensive document back to Rome and get authority to return as soon as possible for the express purpose of signing it as it stands.

4. You will appreciate that although in theory the Badoglio Government, by accepting short terms, will have bound themselves under final article to accept some further document, in practice we may find

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<sup>1</sup> No record has been found of a Matthews-Hayter conversation on August 31, 1943, concerning Italy.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in United States files.

<sup>3</sup> Not found in United States files. For Eisenhower's telegram No. W 8726 of August 30, 1943, on the same subject, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1369.

<sup>4</sup> Galvano Lanza. See Garland and Smyth, pp. 464-465, 467.

difficulty in getting them to accept comprehensive document without haggling unless at the outset you make it clear that it is an essential part of the armistice.

5. FAN 206 for Eisenhower from Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>4</sup> states that Soviet's consent to General Eisenhower signing on their behalf the terms of surrender may be taken to apply to military as well as on the question of comprehensive terms. This is incorrect. The Soviet Government have only agreed to signature on their behalf of comprehensive terms.<sup>5</sup> The same applies to other allies.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 1190.

<sup>5</sup> See *ante* p. 1185.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) and the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*

SECRET

ALGIERS, 31 August, 1943.

PRIORITY

W 8750. General Z<sup>1</sup> in his conversations (From Murphy and Eisenhower for Hull and Marshall Eyes Only) with us has mentioned the following political points in regard to the Italian situation. The Italian government's position not only started by being weak at home but it was faced with a desperate military and political situation abroad [abroad?]. One of its difficulties is that it is dominated by used men the King Badoglio etc who have for many years submitted at least in part to the domination of the Fascists. It is too much now to expect spectacular initiative on their part. General Z made the analogy with Marshal Pétain. Although in his opinion the authority of the government was not seriously questioned in Italy now by the Italians even those of the extreme left and it had been able completely to set aside Fascism nevertheless the slowness with which these measures had proceeded has meant that the Germans have had sufficient time to make dispositions to take over and that they may very well do so before the Italian Government completed arrangements with the Allies. He emphasized that no one could tell how long the Germans would leave the Italian Government any freedom of action whatsoever. It might be a question of days or even hours before complete German control would be assumed through the use of military forces if necessary. This might take the form of a Quisling Government under some former well known Fascist such as Farinacci who is now

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<sup>1</sup> Giacomo Zanussi.

in Germany or of the appointment of a German *Gauleiter*. Whereas the bulk of all Italian elements are convinced that Fascism is a dead letter in Italy their primary concern today aside from the fundamental desire to rid the country of German military forces is the fear that the German General Staff may decide to throw Germany into the arms of the Soviet Union since there was no doubt in the minds of most intelligent Germans that they could not win the war. General Z said that in Rome there had been a number of indications that conversations had taken place between the Russians and the Germans prior to the Orel offensive. In Italian opinion the German General Staff and party leaders calculate that *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union may offer the guarantee of preserving Germany intact as a nation even though it may be welded into a Soviet bloc. The Germans are confident that their industrial population would eventually achieve a dominant situation in such a Teuton-Slav combination. The appointment of Himmler as Minister of the Interior controlling 3,000,000 SS the Italians regard as the first step in this direction. On the other hand they have nothing to hope for [from] the Anglo-American nations but disintegration and ruin. Italy according to General Z is badgered by this fear that once in the camp of the Americans and British it would later be faced with a Russo-German combination at its front door with Britain and America far away. He points out that one of Germany's difficult problems lies in working out a procedure whereby the power may be transferred if the German General Staff for example should effect the elimination of Reich Chancellor Hitler. That is a much more difficult process than is the case in Italy where the Royal House provides a medium by which legally the transmission of power can be effected in the traditional manner. In Germany a violent break undoubtedly would be required. General Z gave an interesting account of Mussolini's downfall which had followed a meeting of Fascist Grand Council the vote of which had been 17 to 7 against him. His only supporters being such extreme Fascists as Farinacci and Scorza. After the meeting Mussolini was summoned to the Royal Palace where the King brushed aside Mussolini's pretensions to continue on a modified basis and flatly informed him that his resignation had been accepted. On leaving the Palace Mussolini was ushered into an automobile in the guard of *Carabinieri* and was first taken to Lipari. His present whereabouts are not definitely known to the General but he is thought to be in the North Tyrrhenian Sea. It should not be forgotten in the opinion of General Z that the House of Savoy has acted as a stabilizing influence in Italy for the past 6 centuries. He believes this peg on which a transition régime may be attached is essential if chaos in Italy is to be avoided. The present Italian régime is managing to keep com-

parative order and tranquility in the country which according to the General should work to the benefit of the Allies. The disposition of Italian forces in the Rome area is stated by the Italians to the Germans as designed for the purpose of protecting the area against an Allied landing but actually it is intended to defend the city and the airfields against the Germans. According to General Z many airfields in Italy are still controlled by Italian forces who after an arrangement will receive and aid the Allies. In his opinion every top Italian officer is opposed to the Germans and ready under an appropriate arrangement to join with the Allies. General Z declared that he was not informed of the nature of the last conversation between Mussolini and Hitler, said that the recent meeting between the Italian General Staff and Field Marshals Rommel and Jodl was limited to technical army matters. Virginio Gayda General Z informed me has been interned outside of Rome. I took the liberty to suggest to General Z who agreed that he [we?] would appreciate the internment of Pound, the traitor American, who has been broadcasting from Rome during these past months and that he be held for delivery to us at the earliest possible moment.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) and the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall)*

SECRET  
URGENT

ALGIERS, 31 August 1943.

W 8751. In further conversation with General Z late today (from Murphy and Eisenhower for Marshall and Hull Eyes Only) he re-emphasized that in Italy today we are dealing with used men laboring under the handicap of 20 years of Fascism and the embarrassment of past actions. Yet the only man he said who now could possibly replace Badoglio who is generally regarded as an honest patriot would be General Ambrosio. The latter he declared does not enjoy the prestige which Badoglio unquestionably possesses, which is essential for the transition period incident to the advent of the Allies if chaos and confusion embarrassing to the Allies are to be avoided and effective cooperation with the Allies by the Italian army is to be extended.

Should the Germans learn of our present conversations in General Z's opinion their plans are perfected to seize all top Italian authorities and possibly the Pope and establish their Quisling in Italy. General Z and his friends who he said for months have given much study and thought to these eventualities have considered the means necessary

to effect the escape from German control of the Government and King. The latter while well disposed are conservative and rather helpless in their expectance that the Allies will deliver them. Initiative must come from the more energetic younger army officers working with the Allies.

General Z discussed at length the possibility of effecting their escape by Italian Naval vessel out of Spezia with air coverage provided by the Allies to Sardinia. There he said the four Italian Divisions could easily overcome the one German Division present, especially if the Allies could provide a little support. This of course would only be necessary if an Allied landing on the mainland did not provide in cooperation with the Italian army which General Z assumes will work with us the necessary protection for the present government. Naturally if the mainland operations are not adequate for these purposes the advantages of the acquisition of Sardinia (which almost automatically would entail that of Corsica) are considerable.

The long conversations with General Z demonstrate that the Italian General Staff have pondered over every possible "combination" leading out of the morass in which Italy flounders.

## 11. PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVERSATIONS AT WASHINGTON, SEPTEMBER 1-11, 1943

### *Editorial Note*

As Churchill occupied guest quarters in the White House during his stay in Washington in September 1943, he had many unscheduled and informal discussions with Roosevelt, none of which were made a matter of record by the President. These discussions, however, are known to have touched on the following subjects in addition to the subjects treated in the minutes and notes printed in this section :

1. Approval of two joint messages to Stalin. See *post*, pp. 1262, 1283.
2. The drafting of Roosevelt's message to Stalin of September 4, 1943. See *post*, pp. 1303 ff.
3. The approval of several joint messages to Eisenhower. See *post*, pp. 1261, 1268, 1275.
4. Churchill's idea (which he had explored privately in correspondence with Stalin following the First Quebec Conference) that the French be added to the politico-military commission which Stalin had proposed. See *post*, p. 1306.
5. Approval of a declaration on gas warfare. See *post*, p. 1254.
6. Anglo-American interchange of atomic energy information. See *post*, pp. 1210, 1310.
7. Release of information on anti-submarine warfare in August. See *post*, pp. 1300 ff.
8. Publication of minutes of the Council of Four during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. See *post*, p. 1334.
9. India. See Pawle, pp. 246-247.

Roosevelt also indicated to Hull on September 7, 1943, that he wished to talk over with Churchill a letter of September 1 to the Editor of the *New York Times* signed by Gerard Swope which proposed the dismemberment of Germany, disruption of the Prussian military caste, United Nations control of German heavy industry, and use of compulsory labor from the demobilized German army to rebuild homes and factories in countries which had suffered from German aggression. Roosevelt asked for Hull's comments (740.00119 Control (Germany)/-9-743). These comments were not forwarded to Roosevelt until after Churchill's departure from the United States, and no indication has been found in Department of State files that the Swope letter was in fact discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill.

Churchill was absent from Washington for several days to receive an honorary degree from Harvard University on September 6. Roosevelt left Washington for Hyde Park on September 9, but minutes and notes are included in this section of Churchill's meetings and discussions with other United States officials on September 9, 10, and 11.

For Churchill's discussions with Roosevelt at Hyde Park on September 12, see *post*, pp. 1336 ff.

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 1, 1943,  
11:30 P. M., MAP ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
General Marshall<sup>1</sup>

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Sir Alexander Cadogan  
Commander Thompson

Roosevelt Papers

*Entry in the White House Map Room Log Notebook*

. . . Then the fireworks started at 2330.<sup>2</sup> The President, the P.M., Comdr Thompson, Gen Ismay, and a member of the P.M.'s staff (Sir Alexander Cadogan) all in. Discussion re NAF's 346,<sup>3</sup> 347<sup>4</sup> & 348<sup>5</sup> commenced. President called for General Marshall at 2400. The General arrived at 0030, the 2nd of Sept. Conference broke up at 0105. Outgoing to General Eisenhower from President & P.M.<sup>5</sup> out at 0110.

F. H. GRAHAM

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<sup>1</sup> Marshall arrived at 12:30 a. m.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. 11:30 p. m. All times in this entry are expressed in the military 24-hour system.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 1257.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 1259.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 1261.

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 2, 1943, 11:25 A. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the participants are noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 2, 1943, NOON,  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the participants are noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

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**LEAHY-CADOGAN MEETING, SEPTEMBER 2, 1943, BRITISH EMBASSY**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy

UNITED KINGDOM

Sir Alexander Cadogan

*Editorial Note*

No official record of this meeting has been found. In his Diary for September 2, 1943, Leahy gives the following account of the discussion:

"By direction of the President conferred with Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the British Embassy in connection with a proposal that General Eisenhower be authorized to sign for the Soviet [Union] his short terms for the surrender of Italy.

"Cadogan informed me that on August 31st London had telegraphed to Moscow a request for authority to sign the short terms of surrender, that no reply has yet been received from Moscow, and that it does not appear practicable to take any further steps until a reply is received." (Leahy Papers)

For a joint Roosevelt-Churchill message to Stalin sent later on September 2 in which Roosevelt and Churchill said that they were assuming that Stalin would expect Eisenhower to sign the short terms on his behalf if that were necessary, see *post*, p. 1262. Soviet concurrence

in this procedure was communicated to the British Ambassador at Moscow on September 2, before this message had been delivered, and Stalin confirmed this concurrence in a message to Roosevelt and Churchill dated September 7, 1943. See *post*, p. 1267. The short terms were signed at Fairfield Camp, Sicily, on September 3, 1943. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 2, 1943,  
11:30 P. M., MAP ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt

Roosevelt Papers

*Entry in the White House Map Room Log Notebook*

. . . President and P.M. in at 2330. Discussed coming meeting of US.-British & Russia as to place for it to be held. Talked generally and left at 2350.

F. H. GRAHAM

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**FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1943**

**MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 3, 1943,  
2:30 P. M., ROOM 100A COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING<sup>1</sup>**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

General Marshall  
Vice Admiral Horne  
(representing Admiral King)  
Major General Giles  
(representing General Arnold)  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Rear Admiral Cooke  
Brigadier General Hull  
Brigadier General Wood  
Captain Lowe  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Todd  
Colonel Smart  
Colonel Bathurst  
Colonel Taylor  
Colonel Hammond  
Colonel Stratton<sup>2</sup>  
Commander Freseman  
Commander McClusky  
Major Chapman

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Dill  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Commodore McCall  
(representing Admiral Noble)  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Brigadier McNair  
Air Commodore Warburton  
Captain Tollemache  
Commander Gill  
Brigadier Wernher<sup>2</sup>  
Brigadier White<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 117th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 1-2 only.

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
 Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman  
 Commander Coleridge

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 1 and 2 are contained in Supplementary Minutes,<sup>3</sup> issued with limited distribution.

3. DATA AS BASIS FOR ALLOCATION OF LANDING CRAFT  
 (C.C.S. 333<sup>4</sup>)

ADMIRAL HORNE suggested that since the 1st of the month was already passed, the instructions should be altered so that reports are rendered immediately and subsequently on the 1st of every month.

SIR JOHN DILL agreed with this suggestion. He considered that the best method of collecting the reports would be for the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff to collect initially reports from those theaters and areas for which they were respectively responsible, including the U.S. and the U.K., while the report from the North African Theater would be rendered directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. All these reports would then be collated in Washington and would be available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that the actual form of these reports might well be worked out by the Navy Department and Admiralty in consultation.

GENERAL MARSHALL drew attention to the importance of clearly understood reports which should be rendered in exactly similar forms. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the difficulties which had been experienced in evaluating reports on availability of aircraft.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a detailed report covering the status of all types of landing ships and craft should be submitted by the commanders concerned immediately and on the 1st of each month hereafter.

b. Agreed that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff should be responsible for collecting the data regarding the theaters and areas for

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 1205.

<sup>4</sup> "Data as Basis for Allocation of Landing Craft", August 31, 1943; not printed. In this paper the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct all theater commanders to submit on the first of each month, effective at once, status reports covering all types of landing craft under their control, showing "for each type the total number of craft assigned, gains, losses, numbers out of commission, expected time for repairs, and number available for immediate operations." (J.C.S. Files) The quoted passage is the portion of paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 333 referred to in subparagraph c of the minutes, below.

which they were responsible and should forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, data from a combined theater such as North Africa to be submitted direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. Directed the Secretaries to work out in direct touch with the naval staffs the form that the reports should take covering in general the items listed in paragraph 5 of C.C.S. 333.

#### 4. HOSPITAL SHIPS (C.C.S. 228/6<sup>5</sup>)

##### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Agreed to the suggestion of the Canadian Government that the words "attached to the armed forces" should be inserted after the words "combatant, and noncombatant personnel" in paragraph 2e(2) of C.C.S. 228/3.<sup>6</sup> (Subsequently published as C.C.S. 228/7.<sup>7</sup>)

b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had no objection to paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 228/3 being promulgated in a Confidential Book by the British Admiralty.

#### 5. PROPAGANDA

##### a. Propaganda Plans (C.C.S. 332<sup>8</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL said that he agreed with the proposals put forth in this paper. This method had been tried in connection with the present operations against Italy and had produced quick and successful results.

##### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendation of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the directive in the Enclosure to C.C.S. 332 should be sent to all theater commanders.

##### b. Propaganda Committee (C.C.S. 310/1<sup>9</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL put forward certain amendments to the proposed recommendation to the President and Prime Minister contained in C.C.S. 310/1.

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned the importance of coordination between the propaganda decisions given in India to cover the Southeast

<sup>5</sup> "Hospital Ships", August 31, 1943; not printed. In this paper the United States Chiefs of Staff expressed themselves along the lines of the action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff recorded here.

<sup>6</sup> "Hospital Ships", July 9, 1943. This paper is not printed as such, but its text, as amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 3, was circulated as the enclosure to C.C.S. 228/7, September 4, 1943, *post*, p. 1318.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 1318.

<sup>8</sup> *Post*, p. 1313.

<sup>9</sup> "Propaganda Committee", September 2, 1943; not printed. For the text of the amended paper approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 1315.

Asia Command, and those in Washington to cover the Pacific. In this connection he considered that the U.S. representatives in India should be charged with the responsibility for keeping in close touch with the propaganda for the Pacific decided on in Washington. Mr. Elmer Davis was satisfied with the proposals put forward in C.C.S. 310/1 though he would have preferred either that the entire direction should be centered in Washington, or that at least an additional committee should have been set up in Algiers to deal with the Mediterranean.

SIR JOHN DILL said that he believed that the propaganda with regard to Europe must be dealt with as a whole and not split as between London and Algiers. He referred to the difference of organization for propaganda in London and Washington. In the British view the civilian representatives should be from the State Department and Foreign Office and these representatives should preside. It was also felt that P.W.E. and O.W.I. should be represented on the committees.

#### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the submission to the President and Prime Minister of the recommendations contained in C.C.S. 310/1 as amended. (The amended paper subsequently published as C.C.S. 310/2.<sup>10</sup>)

### 6. BRITISH AND U.S. SECRECY DEFINITIONS (C.C.S. 210/2<sup>11</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL said he was glad to accept the proposals put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with regard to secrecy definitions. He felt it only right to say, however, that while he would communicate the United States' suggestion that the British "Most Secret" should be dropped, this was so firmly established that he had serious doubts as to whether it could be eliminated.

#### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of this paper.

### 7. INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA (C.C.S. 196/2<sup>12</sup>-196/3<sup>13</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL said that he accepted the U.S. Chiefs of Staff views on the two British reservations. He felt sure that satisfactory integra-

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 1315.

<sup>11</sup> "British and U.S. Secrecy Definitions", August 31, 1943; not printed. The principal proposal advanced in it by the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the British Chiefs of Staff "be invited to consider the desirability of combining their two classifications 'MOST SECRET' and 'SECRET' to a single classification 'SECRET'".

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 424.

<sup>13</sup> *Post*, p. 1237.

tion would be achieved in the Southeast Asia Command. He hoped, however, that the U.S. memorandum did not mean that the existing arrangements whereby certain U.S. officers worked with British intelligence organizations, and vice versa, would be affected.

GENERAL MARSHALL assured him that this was not the intention.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the proposal made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, as outlined in C.C.S. 196/2 with the first reservation to that proposal suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of the same paper. (The detailed proposal with the accepted amendments included and the accepted reservation incorporated will be subsequently published as C.C.S. 196/4.<sup>14</sup>)

#### 8. PLANNING FOR THE HANDLING OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN ENEMY OCCUPIED AREAS WHICH MAY BECOME THEATERS OF OPERATIONS (C.C.S. 190/7<sup>15</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the word "military" should be inserted before the word "directive" in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee contained in C.C.S. 190/7. He explained that this word was in order to insure that directives to theater commanders on these matters should be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels.

SIR JOHN DILL said that the new paragraph 6 as amended could be accepted, but that the Dominion approval had not yet been obtained.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Approved the revised wording of paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 190/6/D,<sup>16</sup> as set out in C.C.S. 190/7, subject to inserting the word "military" before the word "directive" in the first sentence. It is understood that the concurrence of the Dominions has yet to be received.

#### 9. NETHERLANDS MARINE LANDING FORCE (C.C.S. 331<sup>17</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the Dutch approach might have been prompted by a feeling that more equipment could be obtained from the United States than had been possible from the United Kingdom. He suggested that the word "appreciation" might be substituted for the word "interest" in the suggested reply to the Netherlands Mission.

<sup>14</sup> *Post*, p. 1240.

<sup>15</sup> *Post*, p. 1237.

<sup>16</sup> "Charter, Civil Affairs Committee", July 3, 1943; not printed.

<sup>17</sup> *Post*, p. 1238.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 10, 11, 12 and 13 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

1. OPERATION "BAYTOWN"

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a signal he had just received from General Eisenhower with regard to the progress of operation BAYTOWN.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note, with interest, of this statement.

2. ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS  
(C.C.S. 307/2<sup>2</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested an amendment to the recommendation contained in paragraph 3 *e* of C.C.S. 307/2, since he understood that the 25 tugs referred to were not immediately available.

It was pointed out that the tugs would be required in the United Kingdom by the 1st March and that in view of North Atlantic weather conditions, those coming from the United States should cross before November.

ADMIRAL HORNE said that this point was fully appreciated and every effort would be made to get all available tugs over as soon as possible.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the recommendations of the Combined Administrative Committee contained in paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 307/2, subject to amending the first sentence of paragraph 3 *e* to read as follows:

"That twenty-five tugs and suitable towing vessels be made available as expeditiously as practicable from the . . ."

10. SLOWNESS OF BUILDUP FOR "AVALANCHE"  
(C.C.S. 334<sup>3</sup>)

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which he had sent to General Eisenhower

<sup>1</sup>The supplementary minutes were given limited distribution under a cover sheet bearing the following note: "It is requested that special precautions be taken to insure the secrecy of these Supplementary Minutes."

<sup>2</sup>Post, p. 1243.

<sup>3</sup>Post, p. 1263.

asking if, by the holding of any vessels in the Mediterranean, the buildup for *AVALANCHE* could be increased.<sup>4</sup> He also informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the reply which had been received from Major General Whiteley, in the absence of General Eisenhower, explaining that the rate of buildup was limited not by lack of shipping but by the capacity of the ports.

GENERAL HULL said that an examination had been made to see if any assistance could be rendered to General Eisenhower by permitting him to hold any landing craft which were passing through his command. This examination had shown that the only vessels available were 8 British L.S.T.'s en route to India and due in the Mediterranean on the 4th of September, and 10 U.S. L.S.T.'s which had been in the Mediterranean and were now on the way out, also en route to India.

It was pointed out that these L.S.T.'s were already fully loaded for India.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Took note of this paper.

#### 11. LIBERATED YUGOSLAV PRISONERS (C.C.S. 294/1<sup>5</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a report by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain recommendations. A revised Appendix "B" containing a draft telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower was also presented.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the dispatch of the draft reply to General Eisenhower contained in Appendix "B" to C.C.S. 294/1, as amended,<sup>6</sup> and agreed to defer action on the remainder of the paper.

#### 12. OPERATIONS OF RED AIR FORCE SUBSEQUENT TO "TIDALWAVE" (C.C.S. 255/1<sup>7</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer action on this paper.

#### 13. POSSIBLE GERMAN USE OF GAS

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to recommend to the President and Prime Minister that a special warning should be issued to Germany as to the retaliation they might expect should they now resort to the use of gas.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1377, fn. 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 1246.

<sup>6</sup> For the amendments made in the draft message to Eisenhower, see *post*, p. 1249, fn. 6, and p. 1250, fn. 7.

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 1245.

<sup>8</sup> See *post*, p. 1250.

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 3, 1943, 4:40 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT<sup>2</sup>

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Admiral King  
Rear Admiral McCain  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Rear Admiral Moreell  
Rear Admiral Brown  
Rear Admiral Land

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Brigadier White  
Mr. Bernal  
Lieutenant Commander Grant  
Minister of Information Bracken

J.C.S. Files

*Minutes*<sup>3</sup>

MOST SECRET

ADMIRAL KING said that three ways of providing Floating Airfields had already been examined, namely—

(a) *The Armstrong Seadrome*. This would be deep in draft, massive in construction, and take a long time to build. This ruled it out for any operation in the near future.

(b) *The use of Naval Pontoons*. This would give a very low freeboard, and could not therefore be used in any sea chop.

(c) *The use of dry dock sections*. An airfield so constructed would have much greater molded depth and could be sunk so as to give stability and yet retain considerable freeboard. The connections between the units would require considerable further experiment.

Admiral King explained that the production of any special form of Floating Airfield would naturally impinge upon the output of other equipment. He mentioned, by way of example, that it had been decided to step up the output of landing craft by 25 to 35 per cent, and that this involved a reduction of 35 to 48 in the libertyship programme.

In conclusion, Admiral King suggested that an *Ad Hoc* Committee consisting of Admirals McCain, Moreell and Badger should at once study the question from every aspect, and submit a report to the President and Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER explained the great operational advantages which we would derive from the possession of airfields of this char-

<sup>1</sup>The time of this meeting is noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>2</sup>The presence of Roosevelt, King, McCain, Badger, Moreell, Brown, Churchill, Ismay, White, and Bernal is noted in the Minutes, below. The presence of Roosevelt, King, McCain, Badger, Moreell, Brown, Land, Churchill, Ismay, Bernal, Grant, and Bracken is noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>3</sup>Authorship not indicated. On the basis of internal evidence, it seems probable that these minutes were prepared by one of the British participants and that a copy was then made available to the United States participants.

acter. He said that he wanted at least three of them to be delivered in the Indian Ocean within the next nine months. His idea was that the airfields would be attended by special ships carrying the aeroplanes and the necessary fuel.

It was suggested that escort carriers were now coming out in very large numbers, and that their use would satisfy the operational requirements prescribed by the Prime Minister.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed, but was doubtful whether they could be provided in adequate numbers. In any case it would seem advisable to have two or three airfields in addition to any escort carriers that could be provided.

There was some discussion about the number of machines that could operate from a floating field of the size contemplated.

ADMIRAL McCAIN put the figure at about 40, whereas PROFESSOR BERNAL said that the British Fleet Air Arm experts in England estimated that, by a slight increase in the width, it would be possible to operate 150.

A general discussion followed on the production aspect and the quantity of steel that would be required.

In conclusion, THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER agreed that a Sub-Committee should be set up on the lines proposed by Admiral King, and instructed to report as soon as possible.<sup>4</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER asked, and ADMIRAL KING agreed, that Professor Bernal should be summoned by the Committee whenever his technical advice was desired.

WASHINGTON, 5th September, 1943.

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<sup>4</sup> For the subcommittee report, see *post*, p. 1242.

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**ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 3, 1943, 5:50 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
President Roosevelt  
Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the participants are noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 7, 1943, 10:50 A. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Mr. Davis

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Minister of Information Bracken

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the participants are noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1943

ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 8, 1943, 10:55 A. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill

*Editorial Note*

The time of this meeting and the participants are noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers). No record of the discussion has been found.

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL LUNCHEON MEETING, SEPTEMBER 8, 1943,  
1 P. M., THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary of War Stimson  
Mr. Baruch  
Mr. Hopkins

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Colonel Llewellyn

*Editorial Note*

The only record of this meeting which has been found is the following passage in Stimson's Diary :

"At one o'clock I went over to the White House to lunch where there was a very cheerful party—the President, Churchill, Barney Baruch,

Harry Hopkins, Colonel Llewellyn, British Resident Minister for Supply, and myself, with the naval aide of the Prime Minister and another younger Englishman who I think was in his party. Of course the surrender [of Italy] was talked over every which way, and the probable effects.

“Then we got on to post-war talk and there was a great deal of back and forth talk by the Prime Minister and myself on that subject. He had just made a speech up at Cambridge when he received a degree which took very much the position that I have been taking in regard to carrying on the association of Great Britain and the United States in the war into the immediate post-war period and doing it as informally as possible and without an attempt to build up by treaty a big organization like the League of Nations. I also broached to them the suggestion I had made at the meeting [with Hull and Secretary of the Navy Knox] in Hull’s office on Monday, namely that when we come to creating an association of all the allied powers it should start with an economic association to repair the ravages of war and to keep them from starvation and to do this by establishing stable money systems and preventing the rise of tariffs between the needy nations. The Prime Minister at first started to criticize the idea that we should become almoners of the other nations, but I made it clear to him that that was not my idea, but on the contrary that we should as far as possible confine ourselves to doing what was left undone among the several small successor states after the Great War in Central Europe and what was successfully accomplished by our thirteen post-Revolutionary states in 1787.” (Stimson Papers)

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ROOSEVELT-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 8, 1943, EARLY  
AFTERNOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Secretary of War Stimson

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The only record of this meeting which has been found is the following passage in Stimson’s Diary :

“Just before I started to come over to the White House, we had received from the President the S-1 agreement signed by him and Churchill [*ante*, page 1117]. It was in the form in which we had drafted it in company with Sir John Anderson some time ago. But it inserted me as chairman of the Policy Committee. As worded, that would have imposed upon me a great deal of routine work which I could not possibly do in addition to my present labors. So immediately after luncheon I got the President and Churchill aside and talked it over with them.

Both of them wanted me to remain as chairman but consented that I should have General Styer, who is now doing all the routine work, as my deputy to take care of the routine work." (Stimson Papers)

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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1943

MARSHALL-CHURCHILL MEETING, SEPTEMBER 9, 1943, 12:30 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES  
General Marshall

UNITED KINGDOM  
Prime Minister Churchill

*Editorial Note*

The only record found of the discussion at this meeting is the following extract from the minutes of a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held at 4:15 p. m., September 9, at which Marshall gave a report concerning his conversation with Churchill:

"GENERAL MARSHALL said he had been sent for by the Prime Minister, whom he saw at the White House about 12:30 today. The Prime Minister said he intended to present to the President the memorandum<sup>1</sup> which he let General Marshall read. Mr. Churchill said he also intended to advise the President that there should be a special meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 5 o'clock this afternoon, and that the idea was that there should be discussions of the points covered in this memorandum but no decisions were to be expected. GENERAL MARSHALL said that the memorandum was evidently prepared primarily with a view to possible German action, such as some underground plot like Caporetto<sup>2</sup> in order that we should be prepared for some military coup. He said that with regard to naval consideration, that is, the shifting of vessels to the British Fleet, the Prime Minister's idea was evidently to buck up their own people, such as the Australians and New Zealanders. Mr. Churchill evidently felt that this would have a good propaganda effect in the Dominions.

GENERAL MARSHALL said before leaving Mr. Churchill, he asked for a copy of the memorandum, and after luncheon he received the memorandum marked 'Eyes Only' . . ." (J.C.S. Files)

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 1287.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is probably to the decision by the German High Command, during the Battle of Caporetto in the autumn of 1917, to move six German divisions to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian troops fighting against Italy. The Germans moved these divisions with the greatest secrecy, achieved complete surprise, broke the Italian front, and almost succeeded in knocking Italy out of World War I.

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH ROOSEVELT  
AND CHURCHILL, SEPTEMBER 9, 1943, 5 P. M.,<sup>1</sup> THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT<sup>2</sup>

## UNITED STATES

President Roosevelt  
Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Rear Admiral Land  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Rear Admiral McCain  
Rear Admiral Brown

## UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Admiral of the Fleet Pound  
Field Marshal Dill  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Mr. Bernal  
Lieutenant Commander Grant  
Minister of Information Bracken

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane

Brigadier Redman

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*<sup>3</sup>

## SECRET

THE PRESIDENT and PRIME MINISTER considered first certain telegrams<sup>4</sup> which had been received which seemed to indicate that there were considerable odds in favor of the acquisition of the Italian Fleet.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped that the Italian Fleet would be treated with respect by the Allies wherever it might arrive; this was very important for the future.

THE PRESIDENT suggested that a new slogan should be adopted: "Save the Pope."

THE PRIME MINISTER then proceeded to read out a minute<sup>5</sup> (attached as an annex to the minutes), which he had submitted that day to the President containing certain proposals regarding the action which should be taken on the assumption that the present battle for Naples and Rome would be successful and that the Germans would retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po.

<sup>1</sup> The time of this meeting is given as 5 p. m. in the Minutes, below, but is entered as 5:20 p. m. on Roosevelt's appointment calendar (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>2</sup> The presence of Land, Badger, McCain, Brown, Bernal, Grant, and Bracken is not mentioned in the Minutes, but is noted on Roosevelt's appointment calendar.

<sup>3</sup> Corrections noted in an accompanying corrigendum have been made in the Minutes as printed here.

<sup>4</sup> The telegrams referred to have not been identified. One of them, however, was presumably Eisenhower's telegram No. NAF 367 of September 9 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in which he reported: ". . . certain major portions of the Italian Fleet have at least left their harbors and appear to be moving toward destinations prescribed by the CinC Med. Movement from Spezia was prompt and heavy, from Taranto it was slightly delayed but has now taken place." (*Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1405)

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 1287.

When the PRIME MINISTER came to that part of paragraph 6 of his minute, which referred to the possible opening of ports on the Dalmatian Coast, he paused to consider briefly forces that might be available. He mentioned the Polish Army, a fine army, now well equipped, consisting of 75,000 to 80,000 men, burning to engage the enemy. Then there was the New Zealand Division, really a corps. In North Africa there were other divisions some of which would need reequipping as they had been robbed of equipment to make complete other divisions taking part in the present operations.

The time would soon come, he said, when we would want only garrison forces with a few of our mobile columns. We would be settling down to action in a friendly area. He thought that we probably had adequate forces available for all that we might need to do in the Mediterranean.

When he had read out that part of the minute dealing with the efforts to organize the attack upon the Germans throughout the Balkan Peninsula, THE PRIME MINISTER summed up as regards the operations necessary in Italy, that what was wanted was to establish a fortified line to seal off the north of Italy; a line prepared in depth which Italian divisions should help us to man and so strong that it would make it very costly for the Germans to do anything effective against us.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded reading the minute which he had prepared and THE PRESIDENT stated that he wished to emphasize one or two points: With regard to the use of the British Navy THE PRESIDENT wished the Chiefs of Staff to consider very carefully the important political implications of having British vessels in the Pacific. He said that in effect this tells Japan, "This is what is going to happen to you each time we can release additional means from the European Theater." He suggested with the help of British naval vessels it might be possible to use all four routes to Japan: that from the Kuriles, the middle route by Hawaii, a third route by the Marshall Islands, and a fourth route northward from the Solomons. He appreciated, however, that logistical considerations might prevent full utilization of such vessels as the British Navy could make available.

ADMIRAL KING said that weather, as well as port facilities were limiting factors when adding to the naval strength in the Pacific. An additional complication was the lack of an adequate destroyer complement to give full protection to all the capital ships that would be involved. However, he said, the United States Navy was fully aware of the political value of having British vessels operating in the Pacific. In this connection he thought it was entirely feasible for that part of the British Navy released from the Mediterranean to proceed to its station in the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought that it would be possible to send out two 16 inch ships and three modernized *Queen Elizabeth* type, all fast vessels. With them, a destroyer escort could be sent, but not full complement required.

THE PRESIDENT said with regard to the utilization of Italian naval vessels he was not convinced that would be wise. He thought it would be better if they were manned by either the U.S. or the U.K.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the difficulty in this regard was the fact that Italian naval vessels were all made on the metric system. However, he indicated that this would not be an unsurmountable difficulty, and paid tribute to the excellent quality of the *Littorio* battleships.

THE PRESIDENT expressed a hope that ample quantities of ammunition would be available in Taranto and other Italian ports.

THE PRIME MINISTER mentioned the difficulty of shortness of range regarding the employment of these Italian vessels in the Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING said that an additional threat to the Mediterranean was the possible use that the Germans might make of the French vessels now in Toulon. This danger would be decreased considerably when air bases became available in Italy from which Toulon might be bombed. He suggested that British submarines now in the Mediterranean could be profitably used in the Java Sea.

THE PRESIDENT agreed and said that this would be helpful because British submarines could be based at Colombo and Ceylon and thus cover areas beyond the reach of United States submarines based on Australia.

ADMIRAL KING added that an additional advantage of utilizing British submarines in the East Indies area was because of their small size.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that all the questions raised this far be studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In reply ADMIRAL KING said that he had already sent word to all his Naval Commanders in the Pacific with regard to possible use that might be made of the British naval vessels in the Eastern Mediterranean. He expected their replies in the near future.

THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that we had come into a fortune and must use it to the best of our ability.

THE PRESIDENT added that really we had come into two fortunes in a single day.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked if there was any practical possibility of Italian capital ships lightly armed, perhaps with only anti-aircraft protection, being used as transports in the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL KING said that there were great possibilities in this suggestion and indicated that the Japanese are already using naval ships as troop transports to some extent.

GENERAL MARSHALL said his thought was that the ships could be completely denuded of their combat complements, thus making transport space available.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that two to three thousand men could be transported on each ship without difficulty.

THE PRESIDENT'S second comment on the Prime Minister's minute was with regard to land operations in Italy.

He thought that we should proceed as far north as possible and then dig in in depth, using whatever Italians might be available for defensive operations.

He said that operations in the Balkans would be largely a matter of opportunity. However, he thought we should be prepared to take advantage of any opportunity that presented itself.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that initially it might be possible to furnish supplies to Balkan guerillas across the Adriatic. He pointed out how much they had been able to accomplish with the small amount of supplies that we had been able to drop by air in the past. He said that clearly we would not have the shipping for a large expedition but we might be able to get a couple of ports in the Adriatic.

THE PRIME MINISTER then said that these propositions should be examined by the Combined Staffs the next day, who should submit their conclusions to him in the form of a codicil. This he could take to the President at Hyde Park on Saturday.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff might prepare an outline as a basis for detailed study to be made by the Combined Planners.

THE PRIME MINISTER concluded with the remark that we must be worthy of good luck as we have been of bad in the past.

THE PRIME MINISTER then turned the discussion to the subject of HABBAKUKS and asked what new developments had taken place since his last meeting with the Naval Staffs.<sup>6</sup>

ADMIRAL KING said that it appeared to him at the present time that the most feasible plan was to use at least 8 or 10 escort carriers for air support in the initial stages of assault landings.

THE PRIME MINISTER thought if carriers were available floating airfields might not be needed. However, he was anxious to construct at least one and suggested that the subject be further discussed by the Naval Staffs the following day.

ADMIRAL KING said that by May the United States will have 50 escort carriers and Great Britain 30.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 1207.

THE PRESIDENT said that he would like to carry out at least two experiments in the construction of floating airfields with particular emphasis on their possible use in OVERLORD. He asked if the possibilities of using tank landing craft as a base for a floating airfield had been considered.

ADMIRAL KING said that there are actually 2 possibilities under consideration at the present time: one the construction of a floating air base on naval pontoons and the second the construction of an air base on floating drydocks. The President's thought of utilizing landing craft as a base for an airfield would be considered as a third possibility. He suggested that the Prime Minister meet with the *ad hoc* committee who is studying this subject, on Friday afternoon.<sup>7</sup>

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed to this suggestion.

THE PRESIDENT said that in cross-channel operations it was particularly important that aircraft have some place where they might land on the return journey in case of fuel shortage or accident.

ADMIRAL KING said that he understood that the purpose of exploring the possibilities of developing floating airfields was to provide air bases in the initial stages of assault landings before landing strips could be built on shore.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the Air Corps is somewhat worried over the distances involved in providing fighter support for the OVERLORD operation. Some types of aircraft cannot be used at all and others can only be used by adding belly tanks or by being staged to a landing area such as a floating airfield.

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<sup>7</sup> See *post*, p. 1226.

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**HARRIMAN-CHURCHILL CONVERSATION, SEPTEMBER 9, 1943, 11 P. M.,  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Mr. Harriman

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Minister of Information Bracken

*Editorial Note*

Harriman recorded the conversation at this meeting as follows in an informal memorandum:

"Played Bezique and talked with the Prime Minister, beginning around eleven PM and lasting till after two in the morning. Part of the time Brendan Bracken was present.

"The Prime Minister was much elated by the Italian developments, saying that he had been convinced for some time that a situation could

be developed in which the Italians would fight on our side (I know this to be true.)

"The drama of the Italian fleet leaving Spezia to join us moved him deeply and he called in his secretary and dispatched a cable to Cunningham to consult with Eisenhower and give the ships a friendly and dignified reception.<sup>1</sup>

"He discussed plans for disposition of the British ships freed by the Italian developments and has a program worked out for the number that might be dispatched to the Pacific to help us against the Japs. He is keen about this not only because of the war but as an indication to the American people of Britain's good intent against Japan. He has prepared a memorandum to submit to our Chiefs of Staff on the details of this subject.<sup>2</sup> This is an indication of the speed with which he always acts in taking advantage of changes in the war picture.

"We talked a lot about Russia and the impending conference. He showed me his interchange of cables with Stalin<sup>3</sup> and discussed them.

"I have not seen him in so enthusiastic a mood for a long time. (On account of Italy.) He expressed the view that Badoglio had lived up in letter and spirit to the armistice and that, although we could never allow the Italians to be full allies, we ought to give them opportunity to redress themselves and if they behaved properly they should be rewarded for it. He said it would be very important to the President with 9,000,000 Italians.

"He started framing a speech which he would make on this subject to the House when the time came for applauding the Italians, the gist of it being to describe them as a people who had thrown off the oppressor's yoke and freed themselves from the exploitation of the Nazis. He described in vivid detail how they had betrayed the Italians at every turn.

He was upset when later on a dispatch came in stating that one of the Italian battleships en route to our controlled ports had been bombed.

"He thoroughly enjoyed Bezique as he evidently had been working under great pressure with the President (The President had left for Hyde Park just before I joined him.), and he enjoyed the relaxation although we talked about the war all through the game.

"He expressed in detail and with great enthusiasm his opinion of General Marshall; that he and General Marshall saw things alike. General Marshall's mind moved quickly and forcefully under changing conditions.<sup>4</sup> He didn't feel he understood King.

"I had an opportunity to suggest to the Prime Minister that General Marshall be used in rather [a] broader way than was now being contemplated in London. He jumped at this idea and pressed me to give him something more in detail. I told him that this was entirely a matter for the President to develop if he wanted to.

<sup>1</sup> See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, p. 1287.

<sup>3</sup> See Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 280-281; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 155-158.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Harriman's account of this remark by Churchill in an address delivered at Lexington, Virginia, October 24, 1967, *Congressional Record*, vol. 113, pt. 25, p. 33926.

"As typical of the speed with which the Prime Minister acts, I mentioned to him the importance of getting the four Italian liners that were now engaged in repatriating Italian citizens under a previous agreement with us, ships like the *Saturnia* and *Vulcania*. I explained how important they were for troop lift. He immediately said he wanted to have a memorandum on this. I ran into Admiral King at the White House at noon the next day and found that the Prime Minister had talked to him about it, urging that everything be done to find out where they were and to have them available as quickly as possible, and had sent a memorandum to General Ismay about it. At every favorable turn he attempt[s] to take advantage of it by expanding his strategic plans.

"Brendan left us and went to bed rather early." (Harriman Papers)

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FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, SEPTEMBER 10, 1943,  
11 A. M., ROOM 240 COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF BUILDING<sup>1</sup>

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King<sup>2</sup>  
General Arnold  
Lieutenant General Embick  
Lieutenant General McNarney  
Vice Admiral Horne  
Vice Admiral Willson  
Vice Admiral McCain<sup>2</sup>  
Rear Admiral Cooke<sup>3</sup>  
Rear Admiral Badger<sup>3</sup>  
Major General Fairchild  
Brigadier General Kuter  
Brigadier General Hull  
Brigadier General Tansey  
Brigadier General Heileman<sup>4</sup>  
Colonel Taylor  
Colonel Peck  
Colonel Roberts  
Colonel Todd  
Colonel O'Donnell  
Colonel Bathurst  
Colonel Williamson  
Colonel Betts  
Commander Freseman  
Commander Long  
Commander McClusky  
Major Chapman

UNITED KINGDOM

Field Marshal Dill  
Admiral Noble<sup>2</sup>  
Lieutenant General Macready  
Air Marshal Welsh  
Lieutenant General Ismay<sup>4</sup>  
Commodore McCall  
Brigadier McNair<sup>4</sup>  
Air Commodore Warburton<sup>4</sup>  
Commander Gill<sup>4</sup>

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane  
Captain Royal

Brigadier Redman<sup>4</sup>  
Commander Coleridge

<sup>1</sup> C.C.S. 118th Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Present for the discussion of items 1-8 only.

<sup>3</sup> Present for the discussion of items 1 and 10-12 only.

<sup>4</sup> Present for the discussion of item 1 only.

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

Report of discussion and conclusion reached on Item 1 is contained in Supplementary Minutes,<sup>5</sup> issued with limited distribution.

## 2. ALLOCATION OF ESCORT VESSELS TO THE FRENCH NAVY (C.C.S. 336<sup>6</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should take note of this paper.

SIR JOHN DILL accepted this suggestion, and pointed out that it appeared to be a *fait accompli*.

ADMIRAL NOBLE said that he would like official confirmation at the same time of the loan of four British frigates to the French, a matter he had already discussed verbally with Admiral King. There were in addition certain amendments required to the various Combined Chiefs of Staff documents dealing with the allocation of warships to the French and he would propose to put forward a memorandum dealing with these.

### THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

a. Took note that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet had, with the approval of the President, requested the Munitions Assignments Board to assign to the French Navy certain escort vessels, the details of which were set out in C.C.S. 336.

b. Took note that Admiral Sir Percy Noble would submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a memorandum dealing with the loan to the French of four British Frigates and with certain corrections required to existing Combined Chiefs of Staff documents dealing with the allocation of naval vessels to the French.

## 3. LOGISTIC ORGANIZATION TO IMPROVE MOBILITY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE SQUADRONS (C.C.S. 272/2<sup>7</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested acceptance of the recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of the report.

<sup>5</sup> *Post*, p. 1222.

<sup>6</sup> "Allocations of Escort Vessels to the French Navy", September 5, 1943; not printed. This paper reported that Admiral King, with Roosevelt's approval, had requested the Munitions Assignments Board to assign to the French Navy twelve escort vessels scheduled for completion in the period December 1943–May 1944. (J.C.S. Files)

<sup>7</sup> Not printed as a whole. Paragraph 14 of this paper, the recommendations in which were approved at this meeting, and paragraph 5, which is referred to in the recommendations, are printed *post*, pp. 1294–1295.

SIR JOHN DILL agreed that these recommendations should be accepted. He suggested, however, that they did not, perhaps, go far enough and that a strategic survey should be prepared so that the logistic details necessary to improve the mobility of the anti-submarine squadrons could be worked out. This report could bring out the most likely movements which might be required. The best way might be for the two naval staffs to prepare a guide for the Combined Staff Planners on which the strategical survey could be based. It was obviously undesirable, unless absolutely necessary, to mix forces.

ADMIRAL KING said he considered that the implementation of the recommendations contained in C.C.S. 272/2 should be left to the two operating authorities concerned. Close touch between the naval staffs was, of course, inherent in the consideration of this problem.

AIR MARSHAL WELSH pointed out the difficulty which a group commander would have in preparing plans until he knew where he was most likely to go. Difficulties arose, not only at the reception end, but also at the despatching end.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that in the movement of U.S. air squadrons to the Bay offensive it had been found that the reception end was not fully ready to receive them. He believed it impossible to foretell with any degree of accuracy the future trend of enemy submarine warfare, and therefore of the air requirements to meet it.

AIR MARSHAL WELSH said that he felt that some advance could be made in the preparation of reinforcing plans based on the probability of future events. In any event, he felt that a report of progress on the recommendations of the Anti-Submarine Survey Board was desirable.

ADMIRAL NOBLE suggested that there should be close cooperation between the authorities concerned in implementing the recommendations.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Accepted the recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of the report by the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board contained in C.C.S. 272/2 and took note that these recommendations would be implemented in close cooperation between the U.S. and British authorities concerned.

4. EMPLOYMENT OF CVE'S IN OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST U-BOATS  
(C.C.S. 335<sup>a</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said the U.S. Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of the recommendations contained in paragraph 16 of the report, with the exception of that contained in paragraph 16*e*. In this connection

<sup>a</sup> *Post*, p. 1296.

the U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt that further efforts should be made to advance the dates of operational availability of British CVE's.

SIR JOHN DILL said that these recommendations had been referred to the British Admiralty.

ADMIRAL NOBLE said that he felt sure that all possible steps would be taken to obviate the present delays in making British CVE's operationally available.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Agreed that the recommendations contained in paragraph 16 *a* to *d* should be implemented as and when possible.

*b.* Agreed that all possible steps should be taken to obviate the present delay in making British manned CVE's operational.

*c.* Took note that these recommendations had been referred to the British Admiralty.

#### 5. NETHERLANDS MARINE LANDING FORCE (C.C.S. 331<sup>9</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY suggested that the draft reply to the Netherlands Staff Mission contained in C.C.S. 331 should now be sent, with the substitution of the word "appreciation" for "interest."

SIR JOHN DILL said that he agreed with this suggestion. There was close touch in the United Kingdom with the Dutch Government regarding their armed forces and it would be desirable, when this new plan went forward, for this close touch to be maintained. Possibly assistance could be provided in the way of instructors from Dutchmen already serving in Great Britain.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Instructed the Secretaries to reply to the Netherlands Staff Mission on the behalf of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the lines set out in C.C.S. 331, as amended in the course of discussion.

Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 6 and 7 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.

#### 8. SCALE OF ATTACK ON EAST AND WEST COASTS OF NORTH AMERICA (C.C.S. 127/3<sup>10</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Approved the report by the Combined Intelligence Committee contained in C.C.S. 127/3 and instructed the Secretaries to forward this report to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission.

Report of discussion and conclusions reached on Item 9 is contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 1238.

<sup>10</sup> *Ante*, p. 1092.

10. SELECTION OF CODE DESIGNATORS  
(C.C.S. 338<sup>11</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL said that he agreed with the proposals contained in the U.S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum that the question of code designators should be put on a proper basis.

After a brief discussion,

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

*a.* Agreed that with regard to operations coming under the cognizance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the code names tentatively selected for projected operations should be referred to the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for final approval.

*b.* Agreed that the U.S. Joint Security Control and the British Inter-Service Security Board, in cooperation, should prepare a new or revised code index containing groups of words particularly suitable for assignment as code names for projected operations.

Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 11 and 12 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.

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<sup>11</sup> "Selection of Code Designators", September 7, 1943; not printed. In this paper the United States Chiefs of Staff, noting that some code designators selected in the past appeared to be "unnecessarily inept", reported that United States agencies had been directed to submit tentatively selected code names to the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for formal approval; recommended "that the same procedure be undertaken with regard to operations coming under the cognizance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff"; and suggested "that a new or revised code word index be prepared containing groups of words particularly suitable for assignment as code names for projected operations." (J.C.S. Files) Cf. Churchill's minute to Ismay of August 8, 1943, printed in Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 662.

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J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

1. REVIEW OF STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LIGHT OF ITALIAN COLLAPSE  
(C.C.S. 341<sup>2</sup>-341/1<sup>3</sup>)

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister and [*to the*] President,<sup>4</sup> together with a draft of the conclusions regarding the action which should be taken on the

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<sup>1</sup> The supplementary minutes were given limited distribution under a cover sheet bearing the following note: "It is requested that special precautions be taken to insure the secrecy of these Supplementary Minutes."

<sup>2</sup> *Post*, p. 1290.

<sup>3</sup> "Review of Strategic Situation in the Light of the Italian Collapse", September 10, 1943; not printed. For the text of the report to Roosevelt and Churchill approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 1290.

<sup>4</sup> *Post*, p. 1287.

proposals contained in C.C.S. 341/1 prepared by the Combined Staff Planners.

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the paper presented by the Combined Staff Planners was perhaps too long and not in the form required for submission to the Prime Minister. He thought that it should be used as a basis for discussion but that a codicil was what the Prime Minister had asked for, based on the events which had taken place since QUADRANT. He thought that the codicil should indicate what action would have to be taken. Thus it would be necessary to examine the project for the despatch of a balanced British naval force to the Pacific, and the logistic problems involved; the Combined Intelligence Committee might be called upon to report on the German build-up possible in Northern Italy, a subject on which there was apparently some disagreement at present; then again, it would be necessary to examine the whole question of support to the guerillas in the Balkans; this, it would seem, should be proceeded with on the lines envisaged at QUADRANT as it was to be hoped that it would be possible for us to use Dalmatian Coast ports without the necessity of seizing them by amphibious operations.

Before leaving the subject of the support of guerilla activities in the Balkans SIR JOHN DILL said that in view of contacts already established it would seem best that the Commander in Chief, Middle East, should continue to be responsible but that the closest of cooperation would be necessary with General Eisenhower in this connection.

As regards the Italian forces, SIR JOHN DILL thought that perhaps in the codicil the opinion should be expressed that Italian forces could not be expected to be of much fighting value in view of their demoralized condition but that they might be of value on the lines of communication.

ADMIRAL LEAHY and GENERAL MARSHALL said that they agreed, in general, with Sir John Dill's comments.

After a brief discussion, THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF invited General Ismay to prepare a draft memorandum for submission to the Prime Minister and President.

After an interval in which other subjects were discussed, GENERAL ISMAY presented a draft memorandum, prepared in the light of the above discussion. This memorandum was then examined and certain minor amendments were agreed to.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Instructed the Secretaries to forward the memorandum, as amended in the course of discussion,\* to the President and Prime Minister,

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\*Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 341/2. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 1290.]

after obtaining Admiral King's concurrence to the terms of this document.

6. "HABBAKUKS"  
(C.C.S. 315/3<sup>5</sup>-315/4<sup>6</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL suggested that the two memoranda were largely in agreement and that the necessary details regarding the composition of the HABBAKUK board and its draft directive should be worked out between the two naval staffs.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that the two drafts should be referred to the Combined Administrative Committee for report.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Instructed the Combined Administrative Committee to examine C.C.S. 315/3 and 315/4 and to put forward to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a draft composition and terms of reference for the combined HABBAKUK board.

7. OPERATIONS OF RED AIR FORCE SUBSEQUENT TO "TIDALWAVE"  
(C.C.S. 255/1<sup>7</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that in his personal view it might be inadvisable at this time to ask the Russian Government to undertake this additional task when, in their opinion, they were already achieving so much. This might have an adverse effect on our relations with the Soviet Government.

SIR JOHN DILL pointed out that Great Britain and America also considered that their own armed forces were taking all possible action. The Russians were frequently asking us to undertake certain tasks and he could see no reason why some demands should not be made of them. He realized that long range strategic bombing was not generally undertaken by the Red Air Force, but he considered that on military grounds there could be no objection to the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggesting to the President and Prime Minister that an approach be made to the Russian Government. The political aspect of the matter would be

<sup>5</sup> Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff, "HABBAKUKS". September 8, 1943; not printed. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that Admiral King be directed to establish a United States-British-Canadian board to be responsible for (a) construction of a section of HABBAKUK II; (b) continuing the design of a full-size HABBAKUK II; (c) study of the construction and facilities necessary for a full-size HABBAKUK II; and (d) submitting progress reports to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (J.C.S. Files)

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, "HABBAKUKS", September 8, 1943; not printed. The British memorandum on composition of the proposed tripartite board was more elaborate than the United States proposal. The British paper summarized the functions of the board as follows: "will undertake all necessary research and experiments, will finalise such designs as are found to be practical, and will prepare drawings, plans and specifications for the construction of HABBAKUK II." (J.C.S. Files)

<sup>7</sup> *Post*, p. 1245.

taken into consideration by the President and Prime Minister in making their decision.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the distance over which the Russian Air Force would have to operate was not as great as that undertaken by the U.S. Air Force in their raid on Ploëști. The Russians possessed long range bombers but we had no knowledge of how many of them existed. A request to undertake this raid might elucidate the strength of the Russian long range bomber force.

GENERAL ARNOLD then presented a draft memorandum to the President and Prime Minister<sup>8</sup> containing the text of a suggested telegram to be sent to Marshal Stalin.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

Agreed to put forward to the President and Prime Minister the draft memorandum, as amended in the course of discussion.†

#### 9. PLANS FOR THE USE OF THE AZORES (C.C.S. 270/7<sup>9</sup>)

SIR JOHN DILL said that the memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff but that no answer had yet been received.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF :—

a. Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 270/7.

b. Took note that this paper had been referred to the British Chiefs of Staff.

#### 11. DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONTROL COMMISSION AND AMG IN ITALY (C.C.S. 339<sup>10</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that it would appear from paragraph 4 a of the memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that it was proposed that General Eisenhower should designate a U.S. Officer who would serve not only as Deputy President of the Control Commission but also as Military Governor of Unoccupied Italy. It might be considered that this officer would be in a position to remove the Italian King and Government. Such action might obviously be highly undesirable.

GENERAL MACREADY pointed out that this was certainly not the intention. The Military Governor referred to would be Military Governor only of Occupied Italy. The Combined Civil Affairs Committee were

<sup>8</sup> Not printed. For the text of the memorandum as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see *post*, p. 1256.

† Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 255/2. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 1256.]

<sup>9</sup> *Post*, p. 1293.

<sup>10</sup> *Post*, p. 1269.

still studying this problem and certain views had that morning been received from the Foreign Secretary in a telegram to the Prime Minister. London considered that the Deputy to General Eisenhower on the Control Commission should be a civilian rather than a soldier.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Agreed to defer consideration of C.C.S. 339.

12. PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE  
(C.C.S. 310/3<sup>11</sup>)

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the President had obviously not appreciated that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had already arranged for representatives of O.W.I. and P.W.E. to sit on the proposed committees.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that the machinery proposed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was badly needed. A line of news or propaganda once started was difficult to stop or alter. He instanced various occasions where very rapid decisions on this subject had been required.

SIR JOHN DILL presented a draft memorandum from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister and President, expressing the view that machinery on the lines suggested was militarily very necessary.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:—

Instructed the Secretaries to submit to the Prime Minister and President the draft memorandum‡ referred to above.

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<sup>11</sup> Not printed as such. For the text of Roosevelt's memorandum of September 7, 1943, to Leahy, which was circulated in C.C.S. 310/3, see *post*, p. 1316.

‡Subsequently circulated as [the enclosure to] C.C.S. 310/4. [Footnote in the source text. See *post*, p. 1317.]

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MEETING OF CHURCHILL WITH AN AD HOC COMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER  
10, 1943, NOON, THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral King  
Vice Admiral McCain  
Rear Admiral Badger  
Rear Admiral Moreell

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Admiral Noble  
Mr. Bernal

*Secretariat*

Lieutenant Colonel Pegram

Lieutenant Commander Grant

J.C.S. Files

*Secretariat Minutes*

SECRET

## "HABBAKUKS"

(C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 137<sup>1</sup>)

THE PRIME MINISTER said that this meeting had been called as a result of the discussion on HABBAKUKS which took place in the meeting between the President, himself and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 3 September 1943.<sup>2</sup> He observed that upon reading C.C.S. Memo for Information No. 137, it appeared that the *Ad Hoc* Committee is of the opinion that in view of the improved prospects for the aircraft carrier program other floating artificial landing fields were unnecessary.

ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. was committed to make experimental investigations concerning the use of L.S.T.'s as suggested by the President, and also the use of naval pontoons; although these may or may not be ready in time, the movement of the date for their use from 1 February to 1 May 1944 was a favorable factor.

THE PRIME MINISTER commented that with operations in the Mediterranean approaching a successful conclusion as a naval affair, the outlook for aircraft carriers was somewhat brighter.

ADMIRAL KING said that there were in sight 30 British and 50 U.S. C.V.E.'s for the operations in question and that priority was to be given the completion of 8 of the former; in the meantime experiments were to be conducted on the floating artificial landing fields.

In response to questions from the Prime Minister, ADMIRAL MOREELL gave detailed descriptions of the proposed naval pontoon HABBAKUK and the proposed concrete HABBAKUKS. To provide a landing strip 1,800 feet by 222 feet using naval pontoons will require 15,000 tons of steel and, with overriding priority, it is estimated that one can be built in 45 days.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that with the additional time now available, it should be possible to complete the work without interfering greatly with other commitments. He was surprised to hear that only a relatively small number of aircraft can be operated from so great an expanse, having in view the numbers operated from carriers.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out the advantage the carriers have by virtue of the wind speed which they themselves create.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he was not now particularly impressed with the possibilities of concrete, having in mind that at the

<sup>1</sup> See *post*, p. 1242, fn. 1.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1207.

beginning of the war the British constructed concrete ships and that although barges were satisfactory, ships were disappointing. He further commented that if the construction of concrete floating artificial landing fields was to be carried forward in India, it must be borne in mind that labor there is frail and slow as a productive force.

In response to inquiries from the Prime Minister, ADMIRAL MOREELL stated that the problem of transporting the naval pontoon units was being explored. He foresaw that 8 Liberty ships would be required to take the units directly to the scene of operations where it was calculated that they could be unloaded in 12 hours and the landing strips assembled in another 15 hours.

ADMIRAL KING stated that such figures should be taken with reservation, inasmuch as enemy opposition was to be expected and that this would cause delay and necessitate provision for additional protection and spare materials.

THE PRIME MINISTER pointed out the value of the surprise element.

ADMIRAL McCAIN commented that the Japanese could detect the movement three days out and the slow moving HABBAKUK convoy would be at a disadvantage.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that in any event, the Japanese would not know which part of the coast would be attacked and would be compelled to make a redistribution of their forces.

ADMIRAL BADGER invited the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that a survey of steel had just been completed and a shortage of steel plate was in existence which seriously retards the completion of 9 aircraft carriers and 13 sea plane tenders. He stated that this problem can be solved. However, the fact remains that the U.S. Navy is now 260,000 tons short of steel plate requirements exclusive of the requirements for landing craft.

THE PRIME MINISTER commented that owing to the improving shipping situation, more shipping space would be available than had been anticipated.

After a general discussion, PROFESSOR BERNAL commented that it appeared that the U.S. Navy representatives had overcome their own objections to floating artificial airfields.

ADMIRAL KING responded that such was not the case. The U.S. representatives take the position that the HABBAKUKS are still experimental; however, the U.S. representatives manifest the will to go ahead and try them.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, ADMIRAL KING said that the U.S. was to make a full scale section of a Pykrete HABBAKUK and plan ways and means for constructing a full size ship.

In summary, THE PRIME MINISTER said that it was then settled that high priority will be given to the completion of the 8 carriers, that the United States is to carry out experiments with naval pontoons and L.S.T.'s, and that the British are to undertake the expediting of experiments on concrete units.

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SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1943

MEETING OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH CHURCHILL,  
SEPTEMBER 11, 1943, 11 A. M., STATE DINING ROOM, THE WHITE  
HOUSE

PRESENT

UNITED STATES

Admiral Leahy  
General Marshall  
Admiral King  
General Arnold  
Mr. Hopkins  
Mr. Harriman  
Mr. Douglas

UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
Field Marshal Dill  
Admiral Noble  
Lieutenant General Ismay  
Lieutenant General Macreaddy  
Air Marshal Welsh

*Secretariat*

Brigadier General Deane

Brigadier Redman

J.C.S. Files

*Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes*

SECRET

1. REVIEW OF STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE  
ITALIAN COLLAPSE

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had referred the report which the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington had submitted to him on this subject<sup>1</sup> to the British Chiefs of Staff in London. They had replied that they took no exception to any of the items contained in the report. However, the Admiralty did indicate that there would be some difficulty in moving British ships from the Mediterranean because of the necessity of refitting them, providing them with additional anti-aircraft, etc. THE PRIME MINISTER remarked that this would not affect the principle involved and that the difficulties would be overcome.

2. UTILIZATION OF BALKAN FORCES

THE PRIME MINISTER read a telegram<sup>2</sup> that he had received from General Smuts which suggested the inclusion of a Greek formation

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 1290.

<sup>2</sup> Not found in United States files.

in the march to Rome and that also some consideration should be given to utilizing Yugoslav formations if such were available. General Smuts believed that this would have a beneficial effect on the morale of the people of Greece and Yugoslavia.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested to the Chiefs of Staff that they give this matter consideration with the view to suggesting action along these lines to General Eisenhower.

### 3. BOMBING OF PLOEȘTI

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had received the Chiefs of Staff memorandum regarding a suggestion to be made to the Russian Government that they undertake a follow-up attack against the Ploesti oil refineries.<sup>3</sup> He said that he was entirely agreeable to the proposal; he suggested, however, that when the message was sent from the President and Prime Minister it should be prefaced by a statement along the following lines:

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff inform us that it would be highly desirable, etc.”

In this way the military aspect of the operation would be emphasized.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had some doubt of the advisability of pressing the Russian Government to undertake this operation. The United States Air Forces had made an attack which, though highly successful, had resulted in quite serious losses. He thought that the Russians might take the attitude that we had failed to respond to many of their requests, particularly for a “Second Front,” and that now we were asking them to finish an operation that we had started. ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he accepted the proposition of requesting the Russians to undertake the operation but thought the view expressed above should be considered.

SIR JOHN DILL indicated that the question of submitting this proposal to the Russian Government had not been formally presented to the British Chiefs of Staff in London. This was so because of the imminence of the Prime Minister’s departure from Washington and the desire to place the proposition before the President and Prime Minister while they were still together.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would discuss the matter with the President over the weekend and that the point of view brought forth by Admiral Leahy would be brought to the President’s attention.

### 4. DISCUSSION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ITALY

THE PRIME MINISTER said he understood that the Chiefs of Staff were considering how to utilize the Italian shipping that had come

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<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 1256.

into our hands. He said that he had had a report on two large Italian vessels that were used in the repatriation of Italian prisoners of war and which were reported to be on their way to Taranto on 23 August. He read a list of the reported location of Italian vessels and emphasized that every effort should be made to utilize them in building up United Nations forces in Italy.

In response to a question from the Prime Minister, GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he expected the battle in the Naples area was going to be very difficult for the next few days. However, he had great confidence in the effectiveness of Allied air support. Intelligence reports on the German movements indicate that they may have a larger number of troops in the Naples area by tomorrow but their strength will not greatly exceed ours. Meanwhile, we are getting heavy and medium tanks ashore and should be able to hold a bridgehead until we can build up a preponderance of strength. Every spot in the Naples region is under air attack which will make it extremely difficult for the Germans to concentrate their forces and operate effectively.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that some fighter cover was being given with P-38's fitted with belly tanks. However, up to the present time there had not been a great necessity for fighter cover because of the lack of German resistance in the air. Our troops are now surrounding Montecorvino Air Field and as soon as that comes into our possession it will greatly facilitate our air operations.

ADMIRAL KING also noted that the "*Unicorn*" and three or four CVE's were giving carrier-based support from positions off the coast.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if all of the six divisions assigned to the AVALANCHE Operation were ashore.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that at the present time from four to four and one-half divisions had landed. All of the six divisions will probably not have landed until some time on Monday.

ADMIRAL KING then read a telegram which he had received regarding the disposition of the Italian ships.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the intelligence reports indicated that the German divisions in the Naples area had been hurriedly brought to full strength of about 10,000 men. The division in the Salerno area was about one-half strength, or 5,000 men. One of the *Panzer* divisions reported upon lacked 60 tanks. He pointed out that these hurried replacements would certainly decrease German efficiency and this, added to our air efforts to isolate the Naples area, gives the situation a favorable aspect.

Commenting on the air operations, GENERAL ARNOLD said that one report indicated that 170 vehicles had been destroyed on the road south of Naples.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked if the Germans now opposing General Montgomery in the south could get to the Naples area in less than three or four days.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that he thought they could unless they were seriously delayed on the roads. Reports indicate heavy concentration on all roads leading to the north from the toe of Italy.

In reply to a question from the Prime Minister, GENERAL ARNOLD said we have now nearly 3,000 operating aircraft engaged over Italy. This is more than the whole German Air Force on all fronts.

THE PRIME MINISTER then read a telegram which he had received from General Alexander in which it was indicated that the greatest deterrent to a rapid build-up was the lack of landing craft. The message said that priority was given to AVALANCHE at the expense of the toe of Italy and the Taranto area. The Prime Minister found it difficult to understand the need for landing craft in view of the fact that we had ports in both of the latter areas.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that possibly they had hoped to make landings at points north of the ports in our possession and thus create opportunities for converging attacks.

THE PRIME MINISTER said we should do anything we possibly can to expedite the build-up in Italy and, if necessary, repay any losses incurred by BOLERO out of the windfall that has come to us in the form of additional shipping. He said General Alexander has indicated that the Indian Eighth Division, which is one-half British, will not be in Italy until the 25th of September. He thought this delay was unacceptable. In addition, the New Zealand Division, which was practically the size of a corps, and the Fifty-first Division, one of England's best, were ready for the operation if they could be landed in Italy. He suggested that it would not be necessary to leave a very large force in Sicily.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that one division would be sufficient.

THE PRIME MINISTER again asked whether the Combined Chiefs of Staff could see whether they could in any way accelerate the build-up. He was very anxious, he said, because the battle was a critical one. The Germans might decide to go back quickly or they might not. It was very important to get such divisions as the New Zealanders and the 51st Highland Division there as quickly as possible.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was sure that everyone was in complete agreement that the build-up of the force for AVALANCHE should be expedited as much as could possibly be done, using every possible means.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that sometimes a helping hand stretched out from above could make just all the difference.

MR. DOUGLAS then referred to the question of troopships in the Mediterranean. He understood that 10 personnel ships which were to have been taken out were being kept on by the British in the Mediterranean and that this could be done without interfering with the BOLERO build-up. He did not know whether the extra cargo ships needed with these personnel ships had yet been found. There had been reduced sinkings in August and there had been a saving of 15 ship sailings on those decided upon at QUADRANT. In consequence he considered that if no more than 25 to 35 cargo ships would be required it could probably be managed.

GENERAL MARSHALL mentioned a signal<sup>4</sup> that he had sent privately to General Eisenhower from the War Department suggesting that perhaps ships from two convoys then unloading in or about to arrive in the Mediterranean might possibly be made available should they be required. To this General Whiteley, in the absence of General Eisenhower, had replied that the bottleneck in the Mediterranean was in port capacity and not in troop lift. As a result the Combined Chiefs of Staff had signalled to General Eisenhower asking whether any help could be given as regards loading gear and port facilities but as far as he knew no reply had been received to this offer. As regards ships, one immediate possibility might be to use Italian vessels that come into our hands, with their existing crews. He expressed thorough agreement with what Admiral Leahy had said regarding the importance of doing everything possible to assist the AVALANCHE build-up.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that sometimes things could be done which did not occur to those on the spot.

GENERAL MARSHALL was of the opinion that there were plenty of troops available.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he had been horrified to see the figure of a build-up of only 12 divisions by 1st December. He then referred to the possibilities of impeding the enemy by air attack from coming into the Naples battle area.

Regarding this, GENERAL ARNOLD said that it ought to be a field day for the combined air force if the Germans used the roads.

GENERAL MARSHALL ended this part of the discussion on an optimistic note and said that he thought the German situation must be a very difficult one.

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave information regarding the favourable situation that was developing on the Russian Front. The Russians, he said, were penetrating deep into the Ukraine country and were nearly up to the Pripet Marshes. The rains were beginning. The Germans were still holding tenaciously in certain sectors but the Russian for-

<sup>4</sup> Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1377, fn. 2.

ward movement had been rapid in the center and the south, particularly during the last 24 hours. It looked as though Maripol was being evacuated now and it appeared that the Germans were withdrawing to the Dnieper Line. He did not think that this was a much shorter line. Soon the River would freeze over and be no obstacle. He contrasted this situation on the Russian Front with that which previous summer battles in Russia might have led us to expect.

#### 5. AMGOT GOVERNMENT

The PRIME MINISTER asked General Marshall how he felt the AMGOT Government was progressing. He noted that it was the subject of attack in many of our newspapers and that the Russians had recently put forth some propaganda that was unfavorable to AMGOT.<sup>5</sup> He said that the choice of the name AMGOT was unfortunate but that he intended vigorously to defend it on the floor of Parliament about ten days hence.

GENERAL MARSHALL informed the Prime Minister that recently some detailed reports<sup>6</sup> had been received as to the AMGOT operations and assured the Prime Minister that he would make them available to him that afternoon.

#### 6. COMMENT ON HITLER'S 10 SEPTEMBER SPEECH

THE PRIME MINISTER then referred to Hitler's recent speech<sup>7</sup> and said that it had seemed to him very subdued.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that Hitler's speech showed him to be in desperate plight. It also, taking his own words, showed that he could do nothing about what went on overhead.

THE PRIME MINISTER referred to Hitler's remarks suggesting that he had something up his sleeve.

GENERAL ARNOLD thought that Hitler must have been thinking of rockets and bombs, of which we had heard already.

GENERAL ARNOLD then referred to two items of information which he had picked up on his recent visit to England. One was that an order from General Goering had been intercepted ordering German fighter pilots to attack main bodies and not stragglers. Pilots who failed to do this were to be sent to fight with the ground forces on the Russian Front. The other concerned submarine crews. Indications had been received that there was a general lowering of morale and that the Ger-

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<sup>5</sup> See *post*, p. 1264.

<sup>6</sup> Not identified. Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1157, 1266, 1367.

<sup>7</sup> For an English translation of the speech given by Hitler at Berlin on September 10, 1943, see *Hitler's Words*, edited by Gordon W. Prange (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944), pp. 381-386.

mans were having great difficulty in building up the morale of their submarine crews.

#### 7. SITUATION IN PACIFIC

GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the South Pacific and particularly to the recent successful landing by air in the Markham Valley. As a result of this operation the garrison of 8 to 10,000 Japanese had been virtually isolated. No definite information had been received of any attempt at evacuation. Our troops were pounding Salamaua and were close to Lae. Valuable airfields should soon be in our possession from which the airfields at Cape Gloucester could be made untenable. This in turn would change the whole sea situation. With our preponderance in the air the Japanese air situation in New Britain should soon be desperate.

There were signs of evacuation from the Solomons. Soon Bougainville would be under attack and Rabaul isolated.

GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the force which was being got together for jungle fighting, under Lord Louis Mountbatten, in Southeast Asia Command. Volunteers had been called for and the full complement of 3,000 made up, 2,000 from jungle trained troops in the Caribbean, 1,000 from the United States. These were now on their way to their jumping off places. He had sent a personal message<sup>8</sup> to General MacArthur regarding 250 battle experienced men whom he was providing from the fighting area.

#### 8. USE OF PLOUGH FORCE

GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to PLOUGH force, in view of the Prime Minister's particular interest in it. He said that General Eisenhower and General Devers had been asked for their suggestions as to its future employment. Burma and the Southwest Pacific had not been asked but he understood that there was a request for this force to be made available for employment in the Southeast Asia Command. General Eisenhower had suggested its use in the Apennines and a plan regarding this would be brought up before the British Chiefs of Staff and later would come to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRIME MINISTER had thought this force might be usefully employed in the Balkans to help out the patriot forces—alternatively, in the Apennines, as suggested by General Eisenhower.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt that perhaps General Eisenhower's proposition seemed the best one. The force was trained to snow conditions; it had unfortunately seen no fighting at Kiska which had been, however, a very good battle exercise and excellent training. The

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

force was now back in the United States and he thought that its early move to the Mediterranean would raise its morale higher even still.

THE PRIME MINISTER agreed and said that he certainly would not like to see this excellent and specially trained force used in the steaming jungle.

#### 9. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, THE PRIME MINISTER referred once more to the vital importance of doing all that was possible to assist the build-up in Italy. Even the acceleration of one division by a fortnight might make a big difference.

GENERAL MARSHALL assured him that everything possible would be done.

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### HULL-CHURCHILL DINNER MEETING, SEPTEMBER 11, 1943, 8 P. M., BRITISH EMBASSY

#### PRESENT

##### UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Hull  
 Secretary of the Interior Ickes  
 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau  
 Speaker Rayburn  
 Admiral Leahy  
 Mr. Douglas  
 Mr. Harriman

##### UNITED KINGDOM

Prime Minister Churchill  
 Lieutenant General Ismay

#### *Editorial Note*

The list of persons present is taken from Leahy's Diary, which notes that the party of fourteen included also a group of British officials not identified by name. The time is from Hull's engagement calendar. The only record found of the subject of discussion is the following note in Leahy's Diary: "The general conversation at dinner was about the war and post-war prospects." (Leahy Papers)

## 12. WASHINGTON DOCUMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTARY PAPERS

### A. THE WAR IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 28, 1943.

C.C.S. 190/7

#### PLANNING FOR THE HANDLING OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN ENEMY OCCUPIED AREAS WHICH MAY BECOME THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

The Combined Civil Affairs Committee has approved a proposed revised wording of paragraph 6 of C.C.S. 190/6/D<sup>2</sup> as set forth below, and submits it herewith to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval:

"6. When an enemy occupied territory of the United States, the United Kingdom or one of the Dominions is to be recovered as the result of an operation combined or otherwise, the directive to be given the Force Commander concerned will include the policies to be followed in the handling of civil affairs as formulated by the government which exercised authority over the territory before enemy occupation. If paramount military requirements as determined by Force Commander necessitate a departure from those policies he will take action and report through the Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

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<sup>1</sup>For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1204.

<sup>2</sup>"Charter, Combined Civil Affairs Committee", July 3, 1943; not printed.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 31 August 1943.

C.C.S. 196/3

#### INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have given careful consideration to the proposals submitted by the British Chiefs of Staff in

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<sup>1</sup>For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1204.

C.C.S. 196/2.<sup>2</sup> They accept the first reservation which the British Chiefs of Staff have made to full acceptance of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff's proposal set forth in C.C.S. 196/1.<sup>3</sup>

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff do not accept the second reservation proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. In this regard they do approve a free interchange of intelligence on a cooperative basis but not the intermixture of British and American intelligence staff officers, except those operating on a combined staff under a supreme commander.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 424.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed, but the United States proposals referred to are summarized in C.C.S. 196/2, printed *ante*, p. 424.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 1 September 1943.

C.C.S. 331

NETHERLANDS MARINE LANDING FORCE

The enclosure received from the Netherlands Staff Mission is referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

It is suggested that the Secretaries be directed to draft a reply along the following lines:

"The Combined Chiefs of Staff have noted with interest that the Netherlands Military and Naval authorities are working on plans for raising an Army to participate in the war against Japan following the liberation of Holland. They will be pleased to review these plans upon their completion and give them such support as is justified in the prosecution of the war."

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

Enclosure

*The Netherlands Representatives (Stoeve and Dijxhoorn) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 30 August 1943.

No. 917-5/8

1. Emanating from an earnest desire to contribute in the largest possible degree to the war effort, the Netherlands Government has

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 117th and 118th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3 and 10, 1943, see *ante*, pp. 1205, 1221.

instructed its Naval and Military authorities to work out a plan for the speedy raising of an Army to participate in the war against Japan immediately after the liberation of Holland, as the first step in the re-mobilization of Dutch manpower. As soon as this plan will have been completed and approved by the Netherlands Government, it will be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

2. Since they will most likely fight under American operational command, it is highly desirable that their training, indoctrination and armament be similar to that of the United States Forces. Consequently, the assistance of the United States will be essential in the execution of this plan with regard to the training and the supply of equipment and weapons.

3. As a first step towards the execution of this plan, the Netherlands Government has decided to form, soonest after the liberation of Holland, a Marine Landing Force of 5,000 men.

4. On behalf of the Netherlands Government the cooperation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff is requested in order to secure, even now, the most necessary assistance from the United States authorities for building up this Force.

G. W. STOEVE

*Rear Admiral, R.N.N.*

A. Q. H. DIJXHOORN

*Major General, R.N.A.*

740.0011 Pacific War/3439

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Fuller Chinese Participation in Allied War Plans

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Foreign Minister of China, Dr. T. V. Soong

The Chinese Foreign Minister called at his request. I proceeded first to felicitate him on the splendid situation which developed at Quebec in relation to more recognition and more attention to the Far East in the war, including a plan to reopen the Burma Road. I said my felicitations go to him, the Generalissimo and Madam Chiang Kai-shek, who have labored so valiantly. Dr. Soong said that he planned to return home about the 20th of this month and that he would be pleased if I would bring him up to date on all matters relating to the war situation of interest to China and also any documents relating to the post-war situation. I replied that I would be only too glad to do so.

I then proceeded to give Dr. Soong the substance of our draft of a proposed Four Power interim or transition agreement.<sup>1</sup> I need not repeat this analysis here. I said that very soon when some of its details were perfected and the matter was passed on by the President I would undertake to get a very confidential copy to him. I emphasized the supreme need for secrecy. He expressed his special gratification. He was also thankful to the State Department for the attention some of us have given to Chinese affairs and to the special requests of the Foreign Minister, during recent weeks in particular.

Dr. Soong then referred to his conversation with Mr. Lauchlin Currie some weeks ago about the 40,000 tons of munitions promised China by Canada and later revoked by Canada at the request of Mr. Currie. Dr. Soong thanked me for mentioning this to the President at Quebec and said that he followed this up with a talk with the President which was satisfactory.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Soong then brought up two requests of his Government heretofore made, one, for China to be represented on the Combined General Staff with her member located here in Washington, and also the standing request of China to become a member of the Munitions Commission. At his request I said I would be glad to mention them to the President and Mr. Churchill this week if I am given a chance.<sup>3</sup> He was very appreciative in each instance.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 692.

<sup>2</sup> No other record has been found of a Roosevelt-Hull or Roosevelt-Soong conversation on this subject.

<sup>3</sup> On September 28, 1943, the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) informed Soong personally, as he had informed him by telephone somewhat earlier, that he had reason to believe that Hull had spoken to Roosevelt on this subject. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, p. 133. The date of Hull's discussion with Roosevelt has not been determined, and nothing has been found to indicate that Hull ever discussed the subject with Churchill.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 September 1943.

C.C.S. 196/4

#### INTELLIGENCE AND QUASI-INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN INDIA

Reference: C.C.S. 117th Meeting, Item 7<sup>2</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the formation of a Combined Liaison Committee in India with British and American

<sup>1</sup> As printed here, this paper includes revisions in paragraphs 3 and 4 circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on October 9, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1203.

representation. In addition to intelligence representatives, both air and ground, the U.S. representatives will include a "Rear Echelon" officer conversant with the American quasi-military and civilian activities (Office of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Office of War Information, Federal Communications Commission, etc.).

The meetings of the committee will be at times and places which the committee finds requisite in order to enable information and views to be exchanged and problems referred to the committee to be discussed.

The committee will have the following purposes:

1. To facilitate combat intelligence, both air and ground, being exchanged between G.H.Q. and Rear Echelon in New Delhi.
2. To enable cooperation to be facilitated between the American Joint Intelligence Collection Agency now being organized in the theater, and the British Joint Intelligence Committee.
3. To facilitate the free exchange of information and coordination between the U.S. and British quasi-military agencies in India and the South East Asia Command.

There will be full and open discussion in the Combined Liaison Committee before any quasi-military activities involving operations in India or the South East Asia Theater are undertaken. However, before plans for such operations in these areas are put into effect by U.S. agencies, the concurrence of the Government of India, the Commander in Chief, India, or the Supreme Commander, South East Asia Theater, must be obtained as applicable. The U.S. authorities are to be kept fully informed of British plans and activities, and will be entitled to discuss them.

4. To constitute a central point through which the exchange of information from all these groups can be channelized, coordination arranged, and points of divergence ironed out.

It is also agreed that there will be a free interchange of intelligence on a cooperative basis. However, the intermixture of British and American intelligence staff officers is not agreed to, except those operating on a combined staff under a supreme commander. Arrangements regarding U.S.-British Intelligence activities will have to be coordinated with the needs of the new South East Asia Command.

H. REDMAN

J. R. DEANE

*Combined Secretariat*

J.C.S. Files

*The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 September 1943.

FF1/A1-1

Serial: 001900

Subject: Examination of Special HABBAKUKS as directed on Friday, 3 September 1943.

1. I transmit herewith—as Enclosures—the report of the *ad hoc* Committee appointed on Friday, 3 September 1943, at a meeting in the White House with the President and Mr. Churchill.<sup>2</sup>

2. A copy is enclosed for your reference to Mr. Churchill.

3. I concur in the recommendations of the Committee.

E. J. KING

[Enclosure]

*Report of an Ad Hoc Committee Concerning HABBAKUKS*

## MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

Subject: HABBAKUK—Report of *Ad Hoc* Committee.

1. The report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee appointed to investigate into the practicability and feasibility of providing floating seadromes or the equivalent thereof for certain operations in southeast Asia, is submitted herewith.<sup>3</sup>

2. Recommendations of this committee are:

*a.* That the British provide by target date, 1 February 1944, the CVE's necessary for this operation.

*b.* That, in case the British are unable to provide and man the necessary number of CVE's by the target date, 1 February 1944, an overriding priority be assigned to eight British escort carriers scheduled for completion prior to 15 December 1943, and that these be manned, and equipped with necessary air squadrons, by the United States.

*c.* That, in the latter case, and after the operation immediately contemplated, these carriers be employed, United States manned, to support operations in the Pacific scheduled for the late spring 1944, upon completion of which they would be taken over, manned, and operated by the British.

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Memorandum for Information No. 137), September 10, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1207.

<sup>3</sup> The full report of the *ad hoc* committee is not printed.

*d.* That, to determine the practicability and effectiveness of the use of HABBAKUK's, one concrete barge HABBAKUK be constructed by the British in India or elsewhere for trial.

JOHN S. MCCAIN  
BEN MOREELL  
O. C. BADGER

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## B. THE WAR IN EUROPE

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the Combined Administrative Committee*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 2 September 1943.

C.C.S. 307/2

### ARTIFICIAL HARBORS FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS

Reference: *a.* C.C.S. 307/1<sup>2</sup>

1. The Combined Administrative Committee has given careful consideration to the enclosed report<sup>3</sup> of a subcommittee appointed to study C.C.S. 307/1 and, in addition, has investigated and weighed other matters related to the general subject, particularly with respect to the feasibility of making timely preparations for the construction and placement of necessary artificial breakwaters. The Committee notes the contents of the report and is in general concurrence therewith.

2. Based on the report and on the additional study and investigation, the Committee arrives at the following conclusions:

*a.* The effectiveness of the Lilo breakwater<sup>4</sup> has not been demonstrated to the extent necessary, and requires further test.

*b.* The Lilo breakwater is sufficiently promising to warrant the assembly of material and facilities for its manufacture.

*c.* The necessary material and facilities for the manufacture of Lilo are available in the British Isles, with the exception of 750,000 square yards of canvas duck and other equipment of an incidental nature.

*d.* The use of floating ships to form breakwaters is not considered promising, but certain advantages in mobility, quickness of assembly, elimination of towing difficulty, etc., warrant further test. These tests should include the use of ships alone and in combination with Lilos, which they might tow to any desired locality.

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1205.

<sup>2</sup> "Artificial Harbors for Combined Operations", August 26, 1943; not printed. This memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff recommended that an enclosed paper prepared by the United States Joint Administrative Committee be referred informally to the Combined Administrative Committee for study and report.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Defined in the enclosure as "an air inflated compartmented canvas bag ballasted to float in such a manner as to dampen waves and breakers."

*e.* Liberty ships or others adaptable to the purpose are not readily available for OVERLORD except at the cost of other operations, although ships carrying cargo to the United Kingdom might be retained in that area for further and temporary use as breakwaters.

*f.* Such ships will require modification to the extent of providing heavy moorings forward and aft, and it is desirable that they be equipped with considerably increased anti-aircraft protection and with anti-submarine booms and nets.

*g.* The construction and use of concrete caissons for providing breakwaters in whole or in part is of promising feasibility. Observing, however, that to the Committee's knowledge a caisson of greater depth than 30 feet has not yet been used, and that the time factor is of critical importance, the nature and extent of the operation, both from a technical as well as an operating point of view, limits full assurance as to success.

*h.* The material and labor for the necessary caissons is believed to be available in large measure in the British Isles. Caisson construction will therefore require the shipment from the United States, under low priority, of only the replacement material for certain material used and the minimum number of personnel, having regard for the shortage of shipping space for personnel.

*i.* The establishment of Lilo or caisson breakwaters within the time limits allowed by the operation involves tremendous towing, traffic and mooring problems and will require the employment of approximately 90 towing vessels. In considering the urgency of this operation the Committee believes that sufficient towing vessels can be made available by special effort in the British Isles and the United States. In view of the short period of employment and in view of the difficulties of overseas movement during the winter months, British vessels should be employed wherever available rather than vessels from the United States.

*j.* The determination of requirements for artificial harbors in such areas as the Southern Coast of France, the Western Coast of Burma, the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra is dependent upon logistical, topographical and hydrographical data which can be assembled only after definite areas have been fixed and logistical plans developed. In the opinion of the Committee it should be made the subject of a separate study.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

3. *a.* The trials and development of Lilo breakwaters should be proceeded with on the highest priority as a British responsibility.

*b.* That in view of the time element, preliminary work and early manufacture of Lilo be carried out with materials now available in the

British Isles and that shipments, as recommended by the subcommittee in Tab "C";<sup>5</sup> be made from the United States as soon as possible.

c. That the trials of floating ship breakwaters with special regard to moorings be proceeded with on the highest priority as a United States responsibility and that, if successful, consideration be given to using a combination of floating ships and Lilos.

d. That, depending upon the success of above tests, ships in the minimum number required be provided from available sources, and that study and allocation of shipping along these lines be commenced at once.

e. That 25 tugs and suitable towing vessels be now made available<sup>6</sup> from the United States in addition to similar types now being built in the U.S. for the U.K. and that maximum effort be made to provide other necessary towing vessels from suitable types (YMS, ATR, AT, etc.) available in the British Isles. That any discrepancies be considered in further study as to their elimination.

f. That a suitable agency of [the] British government be immediately designated to carry out the entire program of constructing concrete caisson breakwaters for the OVERLORD operation; that this agency be ordered to proceed immediately with the designing, selection of sites, planning of construction program, assembling the construction equipment, acquiring material, and mobilizing the labor required for the complete program; that the actual work be begun as soon as possible and be carried out under the highest directive.

g. That preference be given to forming shallow water breakwaters of caissons and of such hulks as may be made locally available for the purpose.

h. That all agencies to perform work on the above lines be designated immediately and directed to proceed.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

<sup>6</sup> In approving the recommendations contained in this paper, the Combined Chiefs of Staff amended the first part of this sentence to read: "That twenty-five tugs and suitable towing vessels be made available as expeditiously as practicable". See *ante*, p. 1205.

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1943.

C.C.S. 255/1

OPERATIONS OF RED AIR FORCE SUBSEQUENT TO "TIDALWAVE"

In C.C.S. 255<sup>2</sup> the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and Prime Minister that

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 117th and 118th Meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3 and 10, 1943, see *ante*, pp. 1206, 1225.

<sup>2</sup> "Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to 'SOAPSUDS'", June 15, 1943; not printed.

at the proper time, subsequent to TIDALWAVE, they jointly request Premier Stalin to have the Russian Air Force undertake a follow-up mission against the TIDALWAVE objective.

At their 98th Meeting on the 18th of June, it was noted that the proposal contained in C.C.S. 255 had been submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff, from whom a reply had not yet been received. It was further noted that the British Chiefs of Staff would be informed that the proposal was not intended to be presented to the President and Prime Minister until after TIDALWAVE had been accomplished.

Now that TIDALWAVE has been accomplished,<sup>3</sup> the United States Chiefs of Staff wish to renew the proposal contained in C.C.S. 255 and recommend that immediate action be taken with a view to implementing this proposal.

<sup>3</sup> Concerning the air attack of August 1, 1943, against the Ploesti oil facilities, see Dugan and Stewart, *Ploesti*, chapters 6-11.

J.C.S. Files

*Report by the Combined Staff Planners*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 294/1

LIBERATED YUGOSLAV PRISONERS

References: *a.* C.C.S. 294<sup>2</sup>

*b.* C.C.S. 317<sup>3</sup>

THE PROBLEM

1. *a.* To formulate a policy with regard to the use of liberated Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other Allied Nations' prisoners of war in active operations,

*b.* To determine the machinery for arming and equipping such forces if established, and

*c.* To determine the responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory.

2. To consider in connection with the above the message from General Eisenhower contained in MAT 16.<sup>4</sup>

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. On 1 August 1943 General Eisenhower cabled the War Department stating that the Yugoslav Delegate for Near, Middle East and

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of a transmittal memorandum by the Combined Staff Planners (C.C.S. 294/1), September 3, 1943. For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1206.

<sup>2</sup> "Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners", August 2, 1943; not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 1029.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

North Africa had made representations concerning 70,000 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy of which 30,000 to 40,000 are said to be fit for military service. (Appendix "A"). In order to deal with the Yugoslav request and subsequent requests, General Eisenhower asks that policy decision be made on four specific questions. (Appendix "A"). From a memorandum by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, dated 28 July 1943 <sup>5</sup> (enclosed in memorandum for Combined Chiefs of Staff from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 27 August 1943 <sup>5</sup>), it appears that only some 6,500 of the Yugoslavs in Italy are Yugoslav army prisoners of war.

4. Assuming that Yugoslav prisoners in Italy are immediately liberated, it would not be possible to equip them for large scale operations prior to the summer of 1944 except at the expense of other forces.

5. It appears that the majority of the internees have been in concentration camps for long periods, some at least since the conquest of Yugoslavia in April-May, 1941. It is therefore unlikely that any of them will be fit to undertake military duties without first undergoing a prolonged period of rehabilitation.

6. The whole question of equipping allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals was considered at QUADRANT by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 317 Series. Except for French Forces, on which a decision was reached, the question is still under consideration on that level.

#### CONCLUSIONS

7. *a.* It is not possible to decide on the future employment of Yugoslav and other European liberated prisoners until the study initiated in C.C.S. 317 is complete.

*b.* It is unlikely that it will be possible to equip or train any large numbers in the immediate future.

*c.* In any case, liberated prisoners are unlikely to be of much value without a prolonged period of rehabilitation.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that:

*a.* For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces, be not used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.

*b.* The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals be continued (*vide* C.C.S. 317).

*c.* The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory should

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.

*d.* Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, should be despatched to the desired destination.

*e.* While any movement within his theater should be at General Eisenhower's discretion and with the shipping available to him, no movement outside his area should be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.

9. The probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war points to the undesirability of returning any of these to their homelands without the concurrence of the government concerned.

10. It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and forward to General Eisenhower the cablegram contained in Appendix "B", in reply to his cablegrams NAF 305, dated 1 August, and MAT 16, dated 24 August 1943.

#### Appendix "A"

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the War Department*

SECRET

ALGIERS, 1 August 1943.

WO-6293, NAF 305. Jovan Dnonovich, delegate Yugoslav Government for Near, Middle East and North Africa, has made representations concerning 70 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy, of which 30 to 40,000 are fit for military service. He makes the following specific proposals:

"1. To incorporate in the Italian surrender terms that the Yugoslav prisoners, internees and confinees must be left in the places where they now are.

"2. That the Allied Force Headquarters receive a Yugoslav Military mission whose duty would be to care for all the Yugoslavs found in Italy. A civil section would compose a part of this mission and it would take charge of the persons unfit for military service.

"3. To designate an Italian Island for the purpose of organizing a Yugoslav Army. In his opinion Sicily would be the most fitting.

"4. To separate and group into camps in Tunisia and Algeria the persons who are not fit for military service and those who cannot be employed in the different services.

"5. That the equipment, armament and maintenance of the Yugoslav forces, which exceed the financial possibilities of the Yugoslav Government, be accomplished by means of the Lend Lease agreement.

"6. That the Yugoslav units form a part of the National Yugoslav Army with Yugoslav cadres and under the orders of Allied Force Headquarters.

"7. That the use of the Yugoslav Forces, as soon as they have been organized and armed, will be decided by an agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain. He is of the opinion that it would be most fitting to use these forces for operations in the Balkans and especially in Yugoslavia."

This is the first of many requests of similar nature that we shall probably receive. In order to deal with it and subsequent requests the following policy decisions are needed :

1. Are we to use Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations in active operations? If so, are these forces to be employed anywhere or only in areas affecting their home countries.

2. If the answer to 1 is in the affirmative what machinery for arming and equipping these forces is to be established.

3. It is assumed that we should assume direct responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. Are we to assume continuing direct responsibility or are we to assist the Government concerned in caring for them.

4. In the light of our shipping problem it is presumed that we would agree to a minimum in transporting these persons from the areas in which they are found.

Provision for the release of interned Nationals of the Allied Nations was included in surrender terms for Sicily and will be incorporated in such instruments in the future.

#### Appendix "B"

*Draft Telegram From the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)* <sup>6</sup>

In answer to NAF 305 of 1 August requesting policy directive with regard to Yugoslavs interned in Italy the following policies have been adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff :

1. For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces are not to be used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.

2. The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals will be continued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>7</sup>

3. The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency

<sup>6</sup> As amended (see fns. 7-8, below), this message was dispatched to Eisenhower as telegram No. FAN 210, September 3, 1943.

<sup>7</sup> This paragraph was changed to read: "The extent to which it will ultimately be possible to equip Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals is now under consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff."

relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory is to continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.

4. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, are to be dispatched to the desired destination.

5. While any movement within your theater will be at your discretion and with the shipping available to you, no movement outside your area is to be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.

6. In view of the probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war, none of these is to be returned to his homeland without the concurrence of the government concerned.<sup>8</sup>

Policy set forth in paragraph 5 above answers your MAT 16 of 24 August.

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<sup>8</sup> This paragraph was deleted from the message as sent to Eisenhower.

J.C.S Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 3 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Subject: Gas Warfare

Messages from General Eisenhower<sup>1</sup> have indicated that the Italians have reason to believe that the Germans may resort to gas warfare against Italy in the event that she withdraws from the Axis.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider therefore that a special warning should be given to Germany as to the retaliatory measures that she may expect. It is clear that for security reasons such a warning should not be given until the results of the present negotiations with Italy have been announced.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend therefore that if you agree arrangements should be set in hand for the necessary warning to be issued by our two governments.

We feel that General Eisenhower should be informed of your decision.

J. G. DILL  
*Field Marshal*

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy*  
*Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief  
of the Army and Navy*

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1075. Cf. *ante*, pp. 555, 593.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy)  
to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, September 3, 1943.

1526. Secret from Murphy.

Following recognition by the Allied Governments<sup>2</sup> and the consequent clarification of the Committee's position, de Gaulle has raised the issue regarding the control by the Committee over military affairs. He has sent a highly confidential memorandum to Giraud requesting that the latter agree to a more clearly defined control of the Committee over the CinC and military activities and the limitation of military authority to operations against the enemy and organization of the armed forces. The memorandum further states that the powers exercised by the CinC in accordance with French law establishing a "state of siege" should be turned over to the responsible civil administrators and that all secret services should be amalgamated under one direction and controlled by the Committee.

The memorandum in question was reported to me in the greatest secrecy and it is requested that its existence not be divulged.

Further in this connection, the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested as well as the possibility of having only one president of the Committee which in this case would be de Gaulle. The divergence with respect to the military authority is being further emphasized by Giraud's insistence that he alone has the authority to speak for the army, and that the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him in his personal capacity.

The question of the organization and control of resistance movements and the authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated have been brought to the fore in the Committee's discussions. It seems clear that the extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have decided that the time has come to make a further effort to reduce Giraud's power as the CinC as

<sup>1</sup> Sent over the signature of the Vice Consul at Algiers (McBride). The source text bears the following typed endorsement: "(Paraphrased copy sent to the Prime Minister by direction of the President)". On September 7, 1943, Roosevelt dictated a memorandum to Churchill commenting that he felt that further equipment or munitions should not be sent to the French Army in North Africa if de Gaulle were to seize control from Giraud, but according to a memorandum of October 13, 1943, from Roosevelt to Marshall the memorandum to Churchill was not sent. For the texts of the two memoranda referred to, see *F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945*, edited by Elliott Roosevelt assisted by Joseph P. Lash (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), vol. II, p. 1453.

<sup>2</sup> For the statements on this subject issued by the United States, British, and Canadian Governments at the conclusion of the First Quebec Conference, see *ante*, pp. 1169 ff.

well as to increase de Gaulle's own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the Committee. It is understood that the discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the Committee meetings have led to no solution as yet.

The moderate element of Committee insist, however, that whatever solution is reached the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is basis of its recognition by Allied Governments.

As discussions of this nature continue the fear is beginning to be expressed that unless Committee is able to eliminate the personal differences and devote more attention to prosecution of the war the people of France when liberated will have lost respect for Committee and it will lose possibility of speaking for them when time comes. It is likely, however, that until French Army is able to participate more actively in prosecution of the war the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters.

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740.0011 European War 1939/31526¼

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Danish Request for Statement From the President

Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the Minister of Denmark,  
Mr. Henrik de Kauffmann

The Minister of Denmark called at his request. He said it meant a great deal to his people to receive encouragement just now and especially such encouragement as would be given by a brief statement that the President and Mr. Churchill might together or individually put out. He handed me a copy of a draft which he said he gave to the President yesterday (copy attached). I showed every interest in the situation and said that he had fully presented the idea to the President, that the matter is perfectly simple and calls for no conference between the President and myself, and that the President himself will decide whether or not to put it out and that if he does not do so, the

matter will have to remain in abeyance until later when it could be revived on some suitable occasion.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister was greatly appreciative of what I had said on this same subject during the past three days.<sup>2</sup>

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

[Attachment]

*Draft Statement*

The Danish people, long subjected to the Nazi yoke, have revolted against their oppressors in a way that has stirred the admiration of the Free World. The sympathy of all free men go forward to the Danish Nation and their gallant King, who, though made virtually a prisoner in his own country, continue[s] to fill the hearts of his people with his defiant spirit, which the tyrants have been unable to break.

Since the occupation of Denmark on April 9, 1940, the Danes in the Free World, through their contributions to the Allied war effort, have voiced the suppressed feelings of their countrymen at home. Greenland has taken her place as a bastion in the Atlantic battle.

In December 1941, Mr. Churchill and I invited the Danish Minister in Washington, Mr. Henrik Kauffmann, to join the United Nations declaration (of January 1, 1942). In accepting, Mr. Kauffmann referred to the fact that the Danish Government in occupied Denmark were under German duress, and thus not free to sign the Declaration by the United Nations. Mr. Kauffmann proclaimed that the Danish Nation, "though subjugated, now more than ever, believes in the principles and purposes of the Atlantic Charter. Danes in the free world feel pledged to contribute the best of their efforts in the common struggle for victory over Hitlerism, adhering to the principles of the Declaration of January 1, 1942 as if the Declaration had been signed by a free Danish Government."

<sup>1</sup> Concerning other conversations on this subject which Kauffmann had with officers of the Department of State while Churchill was in Washington, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 10-11, 13. Hull was informed on September 10, 1943, that at Roosevelt's suggestion Kauffmann had also discussed the matter of a statement with Cadogan (859.00/1068). No indication has been found that Roosevelt discussed this subject with Churchill, and Hull's recommendations were not forwarded to Roosevelt until September 15, 1943, after Churchill had left the United States. See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> The reference is to Hull's statement to a press and radio news conference on September 2, 1943, and to his letter of that date to Kauffmann, which was released to the press. See Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, September 4, 1943, pp. 152-153; *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 10.

All remnants of a Danish Government in Copenhagen have now ceased to exist. As trustees for Danish interests outside Denmark, the Danish Ministers in Washington and London and Danish official representatives elsewhere, working for the liberation of Denmark together with Free Danish organizations all over the world, may count upon our fullest support.

Our thoughts and our good wishes go to the people of Denmark in their struggle; they have clearly demonstrated to the world that they fully endorse the declaration of the Danish Minister in Washington on January 2, 1942. Every Dane, whether in his home country or abroad, who contributes to our common cause is an ally in name as well as in fact. We welcome Denmark's time-honoured flag, "Dannebrog", by the side of the banners of the United Nations.

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Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Assistant Private Secretary (Rowan) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)*

WASHINGTON, [September 7, 1943.]

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN: Tonight, September 7, the President and the Prime Minister together signed the draft declaration about the use of poison gas against the Italians and the President asked that I should send you the original of this for your records. This is attached.

T L ROWAN  
7. 9. 43.

[Attachment]

*Declaration on Gas Warfare*<sup>1</sup>

DRAFT DECLARATION

In the name of the U.S. and British Governments, I wish to make it plain that the use of poison gas against the Italians will call forth immediate retaliation upon Germany with gas, using the Allied air superiority to the full.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

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<sup>1</sup> For Churchill's message of September 8, 1943, notifying Stalin of the warning to the Germans as to retaliatory measures if Germany resorted to gas warfare against Italy, and for Stalin's response of the same date, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 158.

<sup>2</sup> On September 8, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff transmitted this text (without the signatures) to Eisenhower in telegram No. FAN 221, with the following introductory sentence: "The Combined Chiefs of Staff authorize you to make the following statement at the moment considered most appropriate by you." (J.C.S. Files) The statement, however, was never issued.

PR 10 "Foreign Relations of U.S.,"/9-1069

*The British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
(Cadogan) to Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON, September 8, 1943.<sup>2</sup>]

## INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON WEAPONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

In September, 1942, an Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed by which each Government undertook to furnish the other, spontaneously or on request, with all information on weapons or processes employed by them against the common enemy unless it was not in the common interest when reasons would be given.<sup>3</sup>

The proper implementation of our part of this agreement has been, and is, most difficult because much of the information we should disclose is partly American and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are reluctant to agree to its disclosure.

We have therefore to choose between breaking our agreement, disclosing information without U.S. approval on weapons and processes we employ, and giving the Russians (who are pressing us hard for certain information) the reasons for non-disclosure which would embarrass the U.S.

None of these choices is attractive. A tripartite agreement (U.K., U.S. and U.S.S.R.) to replace our existing agreement would solve our difficulties.

If this solution is agreeable to you and the President, the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be instructed that for political reasons it is essential to have a Tripartite agreement and be asked to consider the form it should take and to recommend how it should be implemented, i.e. outline the factors which should govern disclosure or non-disclosure of information.

It is recognised that we will not obtain much useful information from the Russians but nonetheless such an agreement should have military as well as political value to the extent that the information we give enables the Russians to kill more Germans.

<sup>1</sup> Printed from a copy obtained by the editors from the British Foreign Office. The original (which has not been found) was apparently given to Roosevelt by Churchill and was forwarded to Leahy by Roosevelt on September 15, 1943, under cover of a memorandum asking Leahy to speak to the President about "this" (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>2</sup> The source text is undated and unsigned, but a typed endorsement on Roosevelt's memorandum to Leahy mentioned in fn. 1, above, states that the paper sent to Leahy was dated September 8, 1943, and was initialed A.C. (Roosevelt Papers).

<sup>3</sup> The agreement referred to (not printed) was effected by an exchange of notes of September 29, 1942. Cf. *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 738-739.

Roosevelt Papers

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 10 September 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

Subject: Russian Attack Against Ploesti.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend that you send the following message to Marshal Stalin, suggesting to him the possibility of using Russian air forces to follow up our attack against Ploesti from Russian bases:

"Following the recent successful attack by U.S. bombers on the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti, further attacks by United Nations bombers are highly desirable to insure complete destruction and preclude repair of the damage to this vital objective. We suggest that when the situation permits you consider the possibility of sending Red air force bombers from Soviet bases to attack this objective. If you should consider this operation favorably, we shall be glad to advance detailed intelligence material relating to the targets."

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

J. G. DILL F.M.  
*Head of the British  
 Joint Staff Mission  
 in Washington*

WILLIAM D LEAHY  
*Admiral, U.S. Navy  
 Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief  
 of the Army and Navy*

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 118th Meeting, September 10, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1225. The text of this memorandum was circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the enclosure to C.C.S. 255/2, September 10, 1943. The memorandum was presumably discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill during their meeting at Hyde Park on September 12. Attached to the source text is a chit which includes the following notations in the handwriting of the President's Naval Aide: (1) "Ask Leahy if any action taken." (This notation has then been crossed out.) (2) "Disapproved. No action taken. W[ilson] B[rown]."

The following manuscript note in the Harriman Papers, endorsed "Note of Gen Arnold at White House Meeting—Churchill & Pres. Sept. 1943", pertains to the subject matter of C.C.S. 255/2, although the date of the meeting referred to has not been established:

"[WAH, i.e., Harriman] Unless bombing of Ploesti by the Russians is of pressing immediate importance, it may be well to wait for about 3 weeks before making the request on them.

"[Gen Arnold] The Ploesti Oil wells are now about 70% inactive. We may not be able to repeat for another several weeks—until we are able to get fields installed in Italy. The repeat must come— The Russians are as interested in this operation as we are. The success of the Germans against the Russians depends to a great extent upon that oil. Hence the Russians may *want* to do it." (Harriman Papers)

## C. THE SURRENDER OF ITALY AND THE ALLIED INVASION OF THE ITALIAN PENINSULA

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

ALGIERS, 1st September 1943.

URGENT

W-8854/8954. General Smith met Generals C<sup>1</sup> and Z<sup>2</sup> in Sicily on 31st August. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 346. General C had come straight from Rome and General Z accompanied General Smith to conference from Algiers. In addition to General Smith and other officers from AFHQ representatives of CinC Mediterranean, Air CinC and Deputy Commander in Chief were present at the meeting.

Immediately after assembling General C read from a document instructions which he said he had received from his government. The gist of his statement was as follows. "If the Italian Government were a free Government they would be perfectly prepared to accept and announce the armistice terms as desired by Allies. The Italian Government was, however, no longer free but was under control of the Germans. Since the Lisbon meeting<sup>3</sup> the German forces in Italy had been considerably strengthened and no part of Italy was without German troops. This being so, it was manifestly impossible for the armistice to be announced at the time desired by the Allies, i.e. before the main Allied landing in Italy. The Italians must first be quite sure that the Allied landings would be in sufficient strength to ensure success and guarantee the security of Rome where the King and the government intended to remain."

The subsequent discussion developed into a series of attempts by Generals C and Z to find out the strength of the forces the Allies intended to land and particularly if a landing in strength was to be made north of Rome.

It became clear that the Italian government wished our main landing to be made north of Rome so that they could be sure of protection against the German divisions in the vicinity of the city and that moreover they were not prepared to announce an armistice until they were quite sure that the Allied landings were to be successful and in

<sup>1</sup> Giuseppe Castellano.

<sup>2</sup> Giacomo Zanussi.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1070.

strength. General C mentioned the possibility of the Allies landing 15 Divisions in the Rome area.

General Smith made it abundantly clear that he was not prepared to continue the discussion on the basis of the armistice being announced after the main landing had taken place nor was he prepared to give any information on the strength or locations of the landings.

At this point General C said that he must follow the instructions given him and before saying anything further must return and consult his government. He then raised 3 additional points, reading from a paper. He first asked whether the Allies would accept the movement of the Italian fleet to Maddalena rather than to an Allied port as this would soften the blow of surrender to the Italian fleet and to the Italian people. He was informed that this would not be acceptable and that the Italian fleet would have to be disposed of in accordance with the armistice terms. It was pointed out to General C that in any case the Taranto portion of the fleet could not reach Maddalena whereupon General C said it would be quite agreeable that that portion of the fleet should go to Tripoli.

The second point raised by General C was steps the Allies intended to take to protect the Vatican City. On being questioned on the meaning of this he said "to protect the Vatican City against the Germans". General C was told that the protection of the Vatican City was at one with the protection of Rome.

Third and lastly General C stated that great pressure was being brought by the Germans to get possession of Allied prisoners captured by the Germans in Africa. General C was very doubtful whether the Italian Government would be able to continue to resist this pressure. This was noted.

At this point both Generals C and Z attempted to reopen discussions on the main issues and General C again asked to be given the opportunity to consult his government.

General Smith stated that the terms were final and that the time limit for acceptance of them had already expired but in view of the discussion the Allies were willing to extend the limit for acceptance until midnight 1/2 September to enable General C to consult his government again. A firm acceptance or refusal must be given by that time.

During subsequent discussion it became clear that General C was considerably more apprehensive of the German strength and threats to his country since the Lisbon meeting and that he was no longer so certain that the Allies would be able to stage an effective invasion of Italy.

General C was therefore told in unmistakable terms that whatever the German strength or Italian attitude might be it was the Allies' firm intention to carry the war onto the Italian mainland and drive

the Germans out of Italy regardless of any suffering that might be caused thereby to the Italian people. Nothing could now stop Italy becoming a battlefield and she could shorten her sufferenings only by accepting completely the Allied proposals. One rather disconcerting point was that whereas at Lisbon General C had given Brigadier Strong full information on German troop dispositions, he refused to do so at this meeting, stating that in view of the trend of the discussions this was obviously impossible.

Generals C and Z returned to Rome on evening of 31st August and General C has promised to communicate a definite acceptance or rejection of the terms by midnight 1/2 September. In event of acceptance he will return to Sicily in order to coordinate matters of detail. In any event the special means of communication between AFHQ and Rome would be kept open for the present.

As result of the above and General Smith's other conversation with the Italians it is clear that the Italian Government will not pluck up courage to sign and announce an armistice unless they are assured of Allied troops being landed in the Rome area and to give them some guarantee of protection against the Germans. If these troops are landed, General C hopes to arrange that the Italian Divisions near Rome will do all within their means actively to oppose the Germans and we also hope that the Italians will carry out widespread sabotage and similar anti-German measure[s] which may facilitate the general Allied operations. I have therefore decided in principle to land an Airborne force near Rome at the appropriate time and am informing General C accordingly repeating that the dispatch of this Airborne force is contingent on an Italian guarantee that the conditions as outlined by General Smith will be kept. The most important of these being that the armistice is signed and announced as desired by Allies; that the Italians seize and hold the necessary airfields and stop all anti-aircraft fire; that the Italian divisions in Rome area take action against the Germans.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>For a later report to Roosevelt from Ambassador Robert Murphy concerning these discussions and the subsequent developments leading to the signature of the "short" armistice terms on September 3, 1943, see *post*, p. 1275.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

ALGIERS, 1 September 1943.

URGENT

W-8846/8919. A detailed report<sup>1</sup> has just been submitted to you concerning conversations between my representatives and General C

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

and General Z (to AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff from the Commander in Chief. NAF number 347. BIGOT AVALANCHE.) The following is intended to be a presentation of principal factors as they now exist.

(a) Italy is in fact an occupied country and its government has no freedom of independent action. The most that could be expected from any governmental decision would be the influence [on] certain portions of the Italian armed forces to act in our favor and possibly to inspire something in the order of a general strike.

(b) The German occupation of Italy has become so strong as to change materially the estimates on which AVALANCHE was originally planned. While apparently the German strength south of Rome has not been greatly increased since the retirement of German forces out of HUSKY, yet, subject to limitations of transportation, the large German reserves concentrated in the north of Italy could be used aggressively at any moment that the German Commander believed such action desirable. Our own air action can do something to delay movements of such reserves, but it is not strong enough to impose the almost complete paralysis of communications that was achieved in Sicily.

(c) At this moment, the Italians are far more frightened by the German strength and reprisals within the country than they are of our threat of invasion or even of our bombing operations. They are particularly concerned about the Rome area, and it appears certain that they will make no attempt whatsoever to agree to an Armistice unless assured of some help in the Rome area to stiffen up the resistance which the Italian formations in that region might make against German occupation of the city. We believe that the employment of an Airborne Division for this purpose, under the conditions we have laid down to determine good faith on the part of the Italians, would be a good gamble, because the success of AVALANCHE may very likely turn upon obtaining a degree of Italian help that will materially delay movement of German forces.

(d) Consequently, under my instructions to support any Italian units that would actually fight the Germans, I have determined to employ an Airborne Division in the Rome area if we can be sufficiently assured of the good faith of the Italians.

(e) Our rate of build up in AVALANCHE has been previously reported and, as you know, is painfully slow. However, the decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at QUADRANT clearly visualized the vigorous prosecution of my mission of knocking Italy out of the War. Since this can be done only by seizing a substantial port, I have no thought of abandoning plans for AVALANCHE. But I do consider it absolutely necessary to get every possible atom of support I can from the Italian formations.

(f) Nothing that I am doing now or will do in the future implies any promises to any particular government or heads of government with respect to their status after occupation by Allied Forces.

(g) We attempt to keep the Combined Chiefs of Staff fully informed of every development in these tangled negotiations. The only reason that more frequent reports have not been submitted is because of the lack of decisiveness in the representations of General C and General Z and consequent lack of progress in negotiation. They are merely frightened individuals that are trying to get out of a bad mess in the best possible way and their attitude is, I believe, indicative of that of the whole country.

My own belief is that the Italians will probably allow this situation to drift and will not seek a formal armistice. They are too badly demoralized to face up to consequences and are not sufficiently assured of the safety of Rome.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET  
URGENT

ALGIERS, 1 September 1943.

W-8899/9175. Signal from General C<sup>1</sup> states that reply is in affirmative (To AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHSC. This is NAF 348) and that he will arrive at the appointed meeting place tomorrow September 2.

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<sup>1</sup> Giuseppe Castellano.

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J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander  
in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET  
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

6704. From President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister to General Eisenhower, personal and secret.

Your NAF 346,<sup>1</sup> 347,<sup>2</sup> and 348.<sup>3</sup>

We highly approve your decision to go on with AVALANCHE and to land an airborne division near Rome on the conditions indicated. We

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1257.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1259.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*.

fully recognize that military consideration[s] must be dominant at this juncture.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> A handwritten draft of this message, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, is in the Roosevelt Papers.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

President and Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin, most secret and personal.

1. We have received from General C. a statement that the Italians accept and that he is coming to sign, but we do not know for certain whether this refers to the short military terms which you have already seen, or to the more comprehensive and complete terms in regard to which your readiness to sign was specifically indicated.<sup>2</sup>

2. The military situation there is at once critical and hopeful. Our invasion of the mainland begins almost immediately, and the heavy blow called AVALANCHE will be struck in the next week or so. The difficulties of the Italian Government and people in extricating themselves from Hitler's clutches may make a still more daring enterprise necessary, for which General Eisenhower will need as much Italian help as he can get. The Italian acceptance of the terms is largely based on the fact that we shall send an airborne division to Rome to enable them to hold off the Germans, who have gathered *Panzer* strength in that vicinity and who may replace the Badoglio Government with a Quisling administration probably under Farinacci. Matters are moving so fast there that we think General Eisenhower should have discretion not to delay settlement with the Italians for the sake of the differences between the short and long terms. It is clear that the short terms are included in the long terms, that they proceed on the basis of unconditional surrender and Clause Ten in the short terms places the interpretation in the hands of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. We are therefore assuming that you expect General Eisenhower to sign the short terms in your behalf if that be necessary to avoid the further journeying of General C to Rome and consequent delay and uncertainty affecting the military operations. We are of course

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. In the Roosevelt Papers there is a draft of this message, British in origin, which is substantially identical with the final text except that it did not contain the final two sentences, which were added in Roosevelt's handwriting.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1185.

anxious that the Italian unconditional surrender be to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain and the United States. The date of the surrender announcement must of course be fitted in with the military coup.

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET  
C.C.S 334

[WASHINGTON,] 2 September 1943.

### SLOWNESS OF BUILD-UP FOR "AVALANCHE"

The following message has been received from the British Chiefs of Staff: *Begins*:

1. We have examined AVALANCHE plan in NAF 345<sup>2</sup> and it seems clear that result of operation will depend on comparative rate of build-up.

2. Our estimate of rate of German build-up is greater than that of AFHQ. For instance we estimate three *Panzer* Divisions and four and a half others by D plus 10 whereas AFHQ only estimate three *Panzers* and three others.

3. By D plus 7 we estimate German build-up equals ours and overtakes ours after that until by about D plus 17 they have margin of one and a third Divisions at least.

4. Impossible to assess exactly where German Divisions may be and how greatly concentration may be interrupted by BAYTOWN, by bombing or by action of Italians.

5. We cannot understand the limiting factors which appear to make the build-up of our own forces so painfully slow after the capture of Naples.

6. Result of our examination indicates overwhelming importance of straining every nerve to increase our own rate of build-up. *Ends*.

We agree that the build-up of our own forces after the capture of Naples does appear to be very slow indeed. It is to be hoped that in practice the figures given may well be improved upon. In any case General Eisenhower is clearly fully aware of the importance of the build-up being as rapid as possible, and no action at this end would seem to be called for.

<sup>1</sup> Noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 117th Meeting, September 3, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1206.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET  
URGENT

ALGIERS, 3 September 1943.

W-9077/47. This afternoon I was present <sup>1</sup> while my Chief of Staff <sup>2</sup> signed for me and General Castellano signed for Marshal Badoglio the short term military armistice with Italy,<sup>3</sup> (To AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHSC.) This is NAF 354. Formal signature <sup>4</sup> will take place after the announcement of the armistice which as you know is to be timed to fit our operational plans. The present document was absolutely necessary as the basis for definite military planning with the Italian representatives and will be kept secret for the time being. At the final signing to take place later we will arrange to have the highest ranking Italian officials present. I repeat that today's event must be kept secret or our plans will be ruined. This ends NAF 354.

<sup>1</sup> At Fairfield Camp, Sicily.

<sup>2</sup> General Walter B. Smith.

<sup>3</sup> For final text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1604; 61 Stat. (3) 2740.

<sup>4</sup> i.e., the "long" or "comprehensive" terms of surrender eventually signed at Malta, September 29, 1943.

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Hull Papers

*The Adviser on Political Relations (Dunn) to the Secretary of State* <sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

S—MR. SECRETARY: With reference to the attack on AMGOT contained in the recent issue of "*War and the Working Classes*" published in Moscow, the following points concerning the purpose of Allied Military Government in occupied territory may be of interest.

In the earlier drafts creating the structure for Allied Military Government and which served as a basis for the present directives to General Eisenhower the following statement appears, "Since these operations will involve military occupation of *enemy* territory, in contrast to the operations in North Africa, and will be conducted under the unconditional surrender principle, the administration should be definitely military in character as a part of progressive military operations."

<sup>1</sup> The subject of this memorandum was discussed by Churchill and Marshall during a meeting at the White House on September 11, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1234. No record has been found of any conversation on the subject in which Hull took part during Churchill's stay in Washington.

It is clear that from its inception AMGOT was designed for the administration of enemy territory. Its purpose is three fold :

- (a) To preserve order ;
- (b) To secure the safety of the Allied forces operating in the territory ; and
- (c) To make available the resources of the territory or country for the further military operations of the Allies against Germany.

To accomplish these purposes, the Allied Military Government is conceived as having supreme military authority by reason of the conquering of the territory or country by the Allied military forces. Thus, the Allied military Commander of the operations is himself the Military Governor of the territory although for certain purposes he delegates his authority to a member of his staff as Military Governor who in turn has a Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the necessary staff.

Allied Military Government as presently organized for the administration of Sicily is perfectly consistent with the policy of unconditional surrender. Indeed, unconditional surrender would be quite meaningless if our principal pre-occupation in Italy were the return of that country to the normal democratic processes of administration rather than the further prosecution of the war against Germany. Our position with respect to our European Allies would be quite indefensible if we concentrated on the restoration of enemy territory such as Italy to the normal processes of life and failed to use every available resource in the country for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of the territory of our Allies from German domination. Italy for her sins must pay the price required by the United Nations. It is inevitable that her complete liberation from foreign domination must be postponed until her European Axis partner has been defeated.

AMGOT has no political aspects. It is purely military administration of enemy territory which is being used for the further prosecution of the war by the United Nations. It is temporary in the sense that it will not outlive the military requirements of the area. It is non-political through necessity.

J[AMES] C[LEMENT] D[UNN]

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740.00119 European War 1939/1630

*The Secretary of State to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 4, 1943.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: I transmit for your consideration a copy of a note <sup>1</sup> submitted to the Department by the Greek Embassy, under

<sup>1</sup>The Embassy's note No. 1962 of August 13, 1943 (740.00119 European War 1939/1722) is not printed, but its contents are summarized in a memorandum of conversation dated August 14 by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Alling) printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 350.

date of August 13, 1943, containing the request of the Greek Government that:

- 1) Greece be represented on the Armistice Delegation to be set up in connection with the anticipated surrender of Italy; and
- 2) The Armistice terms provide "for the immediate evacuation of Italian military and civil authorities of all territories claimed by Greece and for the delivery of these territories to Greek authorities", or, in the absence of Greek authorities, that these territories be "provisionally left in care of Allied authorities". Specific mention was made, in this connection, of the Dodecanese Islands and of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania).

Some of the points raised in the Embassy's note have subsequently been disposed of by the joint communication made to the Greek Prime Minister by the British and American Ambassadors on August 29, 1943,<sup>2</sup> regarding the instrument to be signed in connection with the possible unconditional surrender of Italy. The Greek reply to this communication, a copy of which is also attached, empowers the Allied Commander-in-Chief to sign the proposed instrument on behalf of Greece and indicates that the Greek Government desires to have a representative present at the time of signature . . . .

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

<sup>2</sup> Not printed. For a parallel notification to the Yugoslav Government in exile, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 357-359. Similar communications were made to the governments of the Soviet Union, the British Dominions, China, Brazil, and Ethiopia, and to the French Committee of National Liberation. See *ibid.*, pp. 355-357, 359. These notifications related to the "long" terms of surrender sent to Eisenhower on August 26, 1943, *ante*, p. 1161.

740.00119 European War 1939/1642

*The President's Chief of Staff (Leahy) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1943.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Replying to your letter NE of September 4, 1943, transmitting copy of a note dated August 13, 1943, from the Greek Embassy, I have taken up with the President the questions presented in your note and am authorized to give you the following information.

The question of our informing General Eisenhower that the Government of Greece has authorized him to sign for the Royal Hellenic Government the proposed terms of surrender of Italy is now under discussion by the President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

SECRET

Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.

I have received your message of September 4th.<sup>2</sup> The question raised in your message as to whether the Soviet Government agrees to authorize General Eisenhower to sign the brief terms of the armistice with Italy in its behalf is answered by the letter of September 2nd<sup>3</sup> of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Mr. V. M. Molotov addressed to Mr. Kerr, British Ambassador.

This letter said that the authority given by the Soviet Government to General Eisenhower covers also the signing of the brief terms of the Armistice.

[Moscow,] September 7, 1943.

<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, which forwarded the Russian original, together with this translation, to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the message dispatched from Washington on September 2, 1943, *ante*, p. 1262.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 7 September 1943.

URGENT

W 9332. The following announcement will be made by General Eisenhower at 1830B hours<sup>2</sup> D minus 1 day. To AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 360. BIGOT AVALANCHE.

"This is General Dwight D Eisenhower, Commander in Chief Allied Forces. The Italian Government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As Allied Commander in Chief, I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of [and] the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics acting in the interests of the United Na-

<sup>1</sup> The source text is the one delivered to Roosevelt, who changed the final paragraph by hand to read: "Marshal Badoglio has undertaken simultaneously to make an announcement of the Armistice and his message to the Italian Armed Forces and people will be issued forthwith." Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1386.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., 6:30 p. m., Algiers time.

tions. The Italian Government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The Armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshal Badoglio and becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now act to help eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations."

Marshal Badoglio's announcement of the Armistice and his message to the Italian Armed Forces and people will be issued simultaneously with the above.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1943.

7133. Some of the Allied nations may object to the wording of the third sentence in your announcement which begins "As Allied Commander In Chief etc." as set forth in your NAF 360.<sup>1</sup> For Eisenhower FREEDOM Algiers, FAN 219, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire that this sentence should end with the word "Republics" and that the next sentence should read "I am thus acting in the interests of the United Nations".

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 7, 1943.<sup>1</sup>

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

7194. From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to General Eisenhower, personal and secret.

Your No. W9412 Dated September 7, 1943.<sup>2</sup>

The President and the Prime Minister approve the following for press release. This release will be made by them jointly at a press conference in Washington at 1830 B<sup>3</sup> on September 8, 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> Although so dated, this message was not actually dispatched by the White House Map Room until 1:15 a.m., September 8, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> i.e., 6:30 p.m., Algiers time. Eisenhower actually broadcast the statement contained in the first paragraph quoted below, as amended by telegram No. FAN 219, *supra*, at the time specified (see Garland and Smyth, p. 508), but the contemplated Roosevelt-Churchill joint press conference was not held.

“At this moment General Eisenhower is broadcasting the following announcement:

“The Italian Government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As allied commander-in-chief, I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations. The Italian Government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshal Badoglio, and becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now actively help to eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations.

“Marshal Badoglio has undertaken simultaneously to make an announcement of the armistice, and his message to the Italian armed forces and people will be issued forthwith.”

“The President and the Prime Minister added that the armistice is strictly a military instrument, signed by soldiers. No political, financial or economic terms are included. These will be imposed later. The granting of an armistice does not necessarily imply recognition of any Italian government, or acceptance of Italy as an ally or collaborator.”

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J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 8 September 1943.

C.C.S. 339

DIRECTIVE FOR THE CONTROL COMMISSION AND AMG IN ITALY

1. It is necessary that General Eisenhower be furnished immediately with a Directive for his use in the event that the Conditions of Surrender are accomplished. The Directive should inform him:

a. Whom he shall designate as Military Governor for occupied Italy.

b. The Basic Organization of the Control Commission and its relationship with Allied Military Government and the Italian National Government, as General Eisenhower requested in his NAF 340.<sup>2</sup>

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. a. General Eisenhower, pursuant to the Directive furnished him for HUSKY, established Allied Military Government. He designated

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 118th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1226.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see *Eisenhower Papers*, p. 1367.

General Alexander as Military Governor and empowered him to exercise the functions of Allied Military Government in Sicily. Recently General Eisenhower requested authority to extend the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government under General Alexander to areas of continental Italy captured in the near future. General Eisenhower was given such authority. General Eisenhower cabled that he did not intend that the authority given the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, would include supervision of the Italian National Government.

b. General Eisenhower, in his NAF 340, outlined his preliminary plans for handling the Control Commission, Allied Military Government in Italy, and the Italian Government. This planning has been done in the absence of any such Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A reply <sup>3</sup> to NAF 340 has been sent to General Eisenhower, which confirms his present planning program, but which does not constitute an adequate Directive. The reply states that he will receive such a Directive in the near future.

#### DISCUSSION

##### 3. a. *Control Commission*

The Control Commission referred to in this Paper is created by the authority contained in Paragraph 37 of the comprehensive surrender terms Document <sup>4</sup> in General Eisenhower's possession and is quoted herewith:

"37. There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations, charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander in Chief."

With reference to the term "United Nations" mentioned above, the Document states in the preamble that the United States and United Kingdom governments are acting on behalf of the United Nations. This explains the reason for establishing a Control Commission consisting of personnel furnished generally by the U.S. and U.K.

##### b. *Jurisdictional Authority of AMG and the Control Commission*

The jurisdictional authority of the Control Commission, the Allied Military Government in Italy (AMG), and the Italian Government can be explained as follows:

(1) The Control Commission is charged in the Instrument of Surrender with regulating and executing its provisions. Therefore, the Commission *enforces* the Surrender Conditions; *it does not govern*. The Commission operates under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander in Chief. In the performance of its duties, the

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 1168.

Commission functions through existing governmental agencies, whether it is territory being governed by the Italian Government, or by AMG.

(2) AMG is a *governing* body, and constitutes the sovereign authority in *occupied* Italy.

(3) The Italian Government constitutes the sovereign authority in *unoccupied* Italy.

(4) The Control Commission operates throughout Italy and makes use of both governments as its operators in order to assure compliance with the provisions of the Surrender Terms. The Control Commission is not an administrative governmental agency, and does not infringe upon the functions of the Italian Government or AMG.

(5) The division of Italy into *occupied* and *unoccupied* areas is based on military considerations and not on economic self-sufficiency. Hence it is of the utmost importance that there be close coordination between the policies and operations of AMG, the Italian Government, and the Control Commission.

#### CONCLUSION

4. *a.* Conflicts in the operation of AMG and the Control Commission may well ensue in actual practice unless one individual is the head of both agencies. To insure complete cooperation and coordination between AMG and the Control Commission, and to insure that the same policies prevail in both occupied and unoccupied territories, it is proposed that General Eisenhower designate an American officer of high rank to serve *both* as Military Governor of Italy and Deputy President of the Control Commission.

*b.* The Enclosure is a proposed Directive to General Eisenhower.

*c.* We are informed that the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee concur in the proposed Directive subject to comment from London.

#### RECOMMENDATION

5. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed Directive and submit it to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

#### Enclosure

#### *Draft Directive on Military Government in Italy*

**SECRET**

#### DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1. In the event that the terms of surrender are concluded, it is of the utmost importance that the Control Commission for Italy and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure in their dealings with the Italian Government and people. Their functions must be completely

coordinated under one supreme authority. To accomplish this, you will announce yourself as President of the Control Commission, and appoint a Deputy President who will also be the Military Governor of occupied Italy.

2. *Allied Military Government.* The Directives for AMG for HUSKY will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and Italian Government with the areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction.

3. *Control Commission.*

a. *Functions.* To enforce and execute the Instrument of Surrender under your orders and general directives.

b. *Organization.* The Control Commission will be divided into three sections: (1) Military, (2) Political, (3) Economic and Administrative. Each Section will be in charge of a Vice-President, and will be divided into subcommissions to conform as nearly as practicable with the Organization of Italian Ministries.

c. The Military Section will be divided into the following subcommissions: (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, and (6) Material Disposal.

d. The Economic and Administrative Section will be divided into the following subcommissions: (1) Interior, (2) Justice (Law, Order, Police, Prisons), (3) Finance, (4) Foreign Trade, (5) Industry and Commerce, (6) Public Works and Utilities, (7) Fuel, (8) Food, (9) Agriculture, (10) Public Health, (11) Labor, (12) Transportation, (13) Communications (Postal Telegraph, and Telephone, Radio).

e. The Political Section will be divided into the following subcommissions: (1) Foreign and Internal Affairs, (2) Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, (3) Information, Press, Censorship, and (4) Fine Arts and Archives.

f. Where the functions of the various Sections overlap, liaison and, if necessary, exchange of personnel, will be arranged between the subcommissions concerned.

g. A suitable Secretariat should be established.

h. You may assume that each Government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes, and that other expenses will be shared equally.

4. *Personnel.*

a. *Allocation of posts between U.S. and U.K.* The Commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in numbers of 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.

b. The allocation of the principal posts between U.S. and U.K. is as follows:

Deputy President of the Commission	U.S.
Vice-President in charge of the Military Section	U.S.
Deputy Vice-President in charge of the Military Section	U.K.
Vice-President in charge of the Political Section	U.K.
Deputy Vice-President in charge of the Political Section	U.S.
Vice-President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section	U.K.
Deputy Vice-President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section	U.S.

In the event a vacancy should occur in the posts of the Deputy President, Vice-Presidents, or Deputy Vice-Presidents, such a vacancy will be filled by a person of the same nationality.

The posts of heads of the subcommissions will, insofar as possible, be distributed equally between the U.S. and U.K., and the assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality.

5. Except in special cases, the personnel of the Military and Economic and Administrative Sections should have a military status, and the personnel of the Political Section should have a civilian status. The Deputy President of the Commission should be military.

6. The Vice-President of the Economic and Administrative Section will be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government.

7. It is contemplated that provision will be made for representation of the interested United Nations at the Headquarters of the Control Commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point.

8. The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Smith) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

AFHQ IN NORTH AFRICA, 8th September 1943.

URGENT

W-9423/1907. Following cipher message has just been received (to AGWar from [*for*] Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor from British Chiefs of Staff from Smith signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 365. Delivery times to both addresses immediately required.)

“Owing to changes in the situation which has broken down and the existence of German forces in the Rome area it is no longer possible

to accept immediate armistice since this proves [*would mean?*] that the capital would be occupied and the government taken over forcibly by the Germans. Operation GIANT 2 no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee air fields. General Taylor<sup>1</sup> ready to return to Sicily to present views of the government and awaits orders. Communicate means and location you prefer for this return. Signed Badoglio.”

CinC is now in conference with Commanders at Advanced Command Post and has this information. Decisions taken will be communicated to you at the earliest possible moment. They probably will be to call off GIANT 2 (this is inevitable) and to go ahead with all other plans. Question of whether announcement of armistice should be made as originally scheduled is most important. It might have great effect on Italian resistance and after all we have the signed document which was completed in good faith by an authorized representative of the man who now retracts. It is possible but not probable that Ambrosio will leave Rome and go ahead with the original plan from some other location. In any case we would like to have at the earliest possible moment your thought on whether or not we should proceed with the armistice announcement for the tactical and deception value it might have. Certainly the Italian government itself deserves no consideration. This is Eyes Only.

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning Taylor's mission in Rome, see Garland and Smyth, pp. 499-504.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Chief of Staff, United States Army (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1943.

Number 7196. It is the view of the President and the Prime Minister that the agreement having been signed you should make such public announcement regarding it as would facilitate your military operations. (To Eisenhower or Smith personal attention from Marshall) No consideration need be given to the embarrassment it might cause the Italian Government.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

ALGIERS, 8th September 1943.

URGENT

W-9443/1972. Supplementing NAF 365,<sup>1</sup> I have just completed a conference with the principal commanders and have determined not

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 1273. Cf. *Eisenhower Papers*, pp. 1401-1403.

to accept the Italian change of attitude. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 387. We intend to proceed in accordance with plan for the announcement of the armistice and with subsequent propaganda and other measures. Marshal Badoglio is being informed through our direct link that this instrument entered into by his accredited representative with presumed good faith on both sides is considered valid and binding and that we will not recognize any deviation from our original agreement. Acknowledge time of delivery to both addresses is desired immediately.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1943.

URGENT

From President and Prime Minister to General Eisenhower, Algiers.

We agree with line you are taking as indicated in your 387<sup>1</sup> and are withholding all announcements here and in London until we know what you have said and done.<sup>2</sup>

ROOSEVELT  
CHURCHILL

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower broadcast his announcement of the armistice (see *ante*, p. 1267) at 6:30 p. m., Algiers time, September 8, 1943. See Garland and Smyth, p. 508. A draft of this telegram, in Leahy's handwriting, signed by Roosevelt and initialed by Churchill, is in the Roosevelt Papers.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President's Personal Representative in North Africa (Murphy) to the President*

PERSONAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS, September 8, 1943.

AND SECRET

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In accordance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief I departed from Algiers on August 31st with General Walter B. Smith, the Chief of Staff, Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, and General Zanussi, the second emissary sent to Lisbon by General Ambrosio, arriving at Cassibile airport, near Syracuse (this is a landing field which our forces carved out of an almond grove and is a splendid piece of work), and stopped at Fairfield Camp nearby. We arrived simultaneously with Brigadier General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, who had gone to Palermo in advance to meet Giuseppe

Castellano, who, accompanied by Signor Montanari (of the Italian Foreign Office acting as interpreter—his mother is an American), arrived from Rome that morning. Castellano, you will recall, was the first emissary sent by Marshal Pietro Badoglio to Lisbon. Castellano and Montanari were the emissaries at Lisbon with whom General Smith and Brigadier Strong conferred two weeks ago. In the party at Fairfield were also Brigadier Sugden (G-3 at Allied Force Headquarters), Commodore Dick, Chief of Staff of Admiral Cunningham, General Joseph Cannon and General Lemnitzer, both of whom are now with the 15th Army Group.

General Zanussi and General Castellano got together for a few minutes and then entered into a military conference with General Smith and the others above-mentioned, Macmillan and I staying in another tent with General Alexander who had come over from the headquarters of the 15th Army Group.

This meeting lasted until about 2 p. m. According to General Smith, General Castellano's attitude had stiffened considerably since his meeting in Lisbon. Both General Smith and Brigadier Strong attributed this to the arrival in Italy of increased German forces which now amount to nineteen divisions. It was apparent that in the minds of the Italians the great question was not the character nor the harshness of our armistice terms (you will recall that the British Ambassador in Lisbon<sup>1</sup> had communicated to General Zanussi informally the complete armistice terms),<sup>2</sup> or even the question of unconditional surrender. The outstanding factor is that the Italians are not free agents at liberty to do as they please. It is a nice balance in their minds whether we or their German allies will work the most damage and destruction in Italy. They are literally between the hammer and the anvil.

The Italian representatives in this first conversation at Fairfield insisted that they could do but little and were not prepared to sign anything, long or short terms, unless we could guarantee an Allied landing *north of Rome*—even a little bit north of Rome. They asserted that if we only land south of Rome the Germans will take the city and everything north of it. In their minds the slaughter, pillage and destruction would be too awful to contemplate.

General Smith made no commitments but said there was a possibility of our landing—for example, a force of airborne troops north of the Eternal City. The Italians said that in such a case their forces would guarantee no opposition to the landings on the Rome airfields and would aid our forces in holding them.

There was lengthy discussion of the military situation, eventual German plans, the possibility of a German deal with Russia and also

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<sup>1</sup> Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1181, fn. 3.

the question of the Italian fleet. Commodore Dick appeared confident that the Italians are prepared to yield on the fleet and come over. There was considerable question of an operation in Taranto which was subsequently developed and now contemplates the landing of the First British Airborne Division in cooperation with the fleet and with the promised cooperation of the Italian forces.

After the military meeting, Macmillan and I had a brief conversation with Generals Castellano and Zanussi. We impressed on them the urgency of stimulating their government to take immediate steps, reminding them that this is their last chance. The Allies, we pointed out, had not bombed the city of Rome as yet, but there was no reason to defer such action. We suggested that if the Italians declined now to accept and sign, three things were indicated :

(1) The King and the present Italian Government would be all through as far as the Allies are concerned.

(2) We would be obliged to incite disorder and anarchy throughout Italy, even though it might not appear that it would be in our interest to do so and from the military point of view such a state of affairs might present certain disadvantages.

(3) We would obviously be obliged to bomb relentlessly and on a large scale until all the major Italian cities, including Rome, would be reduced to ashes and piles of rubble.

The reaction of the Italians remained the same and in a sense it was like preaching to the converted. The fact remained that the Rome Government still appears more afraid of the immediate German peril than of the Allies. Generals Castellano and Zanussi both said that it is a question of inducing the cautious and frightened men at Rome who, as much as they yearned to be rid of the Germans, lack the bold initiative to act against them, especially as they are not entirely convinced that the Allies are strong enough to take immediately a major part of Italy, even with Italian help, and protect the country against the large German forces. The latter, in their fury against the Italians, they believe, would unquestionably destroy ruthlessly.

Generals Castellano and Zanussi were permitted to depart from Sicily about 5 p. m. August 31st, returning to Rome by Italian plane via Palermo. It was understood between them and General Smith that if Allied Force Headquarters had no reply indicating Italian acceptance by midnight September 1st, the Allies would find it necessary to bomb Rome heavily.

That evening we dined with General Alexander and after dinner General Smith, Brigadier [*Major General*] Richardson, Macmillan and I went with General Alexander to his trailer for a discussion. General Alexander, as he had done in our earlier conversation that day, emphasized the weakness of the Allied position and the danger that unless the Allies are actively aided by the Italians in landing in AVA-LANCHE and elsewhere, the operations might fail or at least gain a

limited success at a very heavy cost of lives. It was obvious that in his mind, as well as that of Macmillan, a disaster at the present time would have a catastrophic effect in England even to the extent, they say, of causing the fall of the British Government and seriously compromising Britain's determination to remain in the war. They talked much of the fatigue, both of the British people as well as of the soldiers, many of whom have been away from home over three years. General Alexander pointed out that the Germans now have at least nineteen divisions in Italy which, added to the sixteen Italian divisions, makes a total of thirty-five divisions. AVALANCHE contemplates an initial landing of three to five divisions and a build-up over two weeks of a maximum of eight divisions. He also emphasized that a landing on a hostile shore is the most dangerous of military operations. General Alexander, therefore, is positive that literally everything must be done to persuade the Italians to help our forces, both during the landing as well as afterwards. Without that aid he would have no assurance of success. There would be, in his opinion, a grave risk of disaster. He urged that nothing be neglected to persuade the Italians to cooperate and said that he would be quite willing to risk his reputation and, if necessary, to retire from the army should his Government disapprove his insistence on immediate signature by the Italians of the short armistice terms, and Allied acceptance of Italian military cooperation.

On September 1st a radio message was sent from Allied Force Headquarters to Rome, in accordance with the recommendation of Generals Smith and Alexander, that Allied airborne forces should land in the Rome area incident to AVALANCHE. This was done after Brigadier Strong, Commodore Dick and Brigadier Sugden returned to Algiers and reported to General Eisenhower, who considered their recommendations, as well as that of Admiral Cunningham, who has always vigorously supported the idea of an operation in the Rome area.

We therefore waited at the Fairfield Camp, which is pleasantly situated in an olive grove, making a side trip to Palermo (one hour by air) to inspect the Allied Military Government organization there. Incidentally, we found that the Allied Military Government has performed remarkably well and we greatly admired both the efficiency as well as the fine spirit of both the American and British officers who are engaged in that task.

After dinner September 1st, we received a radio message from Rome saying that the emissaries would return on the morning of September 2nd. This was most encouraging and General Smith decided to go to the Termini airfield to meet their plane. On August 31st the Italian plane had landed at the Palermo airport by mistake and caused some-

what of a sensation. It had been expected at Termini, a more isolated airport which is a bit east of Palermo.

Early on September 2nd General Smith met the Italians at Termini and accompanied them to Fairfield—General Castellano, Signor Montanari, Major Marchesi and the Italian pilot who, incidentally, knows the Rome airports well.

General Smith ascertained from the Italians that they were not yet authorized to sign either the short or the long armistice terms, but that they were instructed to discuss the matter of military cooperation with the Allies. They suggested that the signature be postponed until after the Allied landing on the mainland. This sounded bad and General Smith indicated great dissatisfaction. The Italians had brought with them considerable military data—maps showing the disposition of the German forces, etc.

It was decided at this point that General Alexander should make an impressive entrance in full dress uniform, approach the Italians, who were in a tent which had been assigned to them at Fairfield, and indicate that he was coldly furious that they had returned unprepared to sign, thus wasting our time. He went through with this performance very well, making thereafter a stern exit, and the Italians seemed impressed. General Alexander insisted also afterwards, in discussing the matter with us, that under no circumstances were the Italians to leave Fairfield unless and until they signed. General Smith missed no opportunity to impress on the Italians the terrible destruction and chaos which their country would suffer if they failed.

Shortly thereafter the Italians requested the transmission of a radio message to Rome in which they urgently recommended that immediate authorization be given them to sign and discuss afterwards the details of military cooperation with the Allies. This was done about noon.

It was decided also that, in the interval, it would be best to let the Italian representatives “stew in their own juice” and all conversation with them was avoided.

General Alexander, in a conversation with us, reviewed again the disproportionate situation of fighting thirty-five Axis divisions with an initial five or six divisions available in the first days of AVALANCHE, and those not even landed but faced with the perilous test of getting ashore under the fire of several first class German divisions. He again and again said that our forces needed every possible aid we could induce by hook or crook the Italians to extend. He said he was ready to stake his military career in the effort to prevail upon the Italians to come over to our camp, employing any ruse or subterfuge to gain this end. Everyone agreed that the odds against the Allies without Italian aid are unreasonably great and were determined to prevail on

the Italians to sign the short terms and then work out the details of military cooperation.

In the afternoon of September 2nd we were greatly relieved to receive from the Commander-in-Chief a message saying that you and the Prime Minister were agreed that our dealings with the Italians should be governed by military considerations alone.<sup>3</sup> We had all been disturbed over the thought that it might be believed that the stage was all set for a public Allied-Italian armistice ceremony, forgetting that the Italians are living in the cage with the tiger and are not free agents. Military necessity required that the negotiations be conducted with the Italians in the greatest secrecy.

During the afternoon I participated in a conference attended by Generals Cannon, Timberlake, Lemnitzer and Taylor, who are engaged in the preliminary planning for the landing of the 82nd Airborne Division on the Rome airports. They all agreed that it is a hazardous undertaking which could only succeed if the four Italian divisions in the Rome area, or part of them, actively cooperate in resisting the German *Panzer* forces said to be six hours distant. They all thought the risk was worth taking, even if the divisions were lost.

No news was received from Rome late September 2nd because the last message from Allied Force Headquarters despatched from Castellano to General Ambrosio was only transmitted at 9 p. m. due to atmospheric difficulties. In that message General Castellano informed General Ambrosio that it was urgently necessary that he be authorized to sign immediately and that Marshal Badoglio transmit to the British Minister in the Vatican<sup>4</sup> a document confirming the authorization to accept the terms unconditionally and to sign the short armistice terms.

We received on the morning of September 3rd an encouraging message from Rome saying that the matter was under consideration. At 4:30 p. m. a radio message was received from the Badoglio Government granting General Castellano the necessary authority and stating that the deposit of the document confirming the authorization had been made. The British later received advice that the document had been deposited with the British Minister in the Vatican.

In the meantime General Eisenhower had arrived on a visit to Sicily in connection with the BAYTOWN operation and conferred with General Smith, several officers, Macmillan and myself. He approved General Smith's signing the armistice terms as his representative as a strictly military arrangement which must be regarded as highly

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1262.

<sup>4</sup> Sir D'Arcy Osborne.

secret until announcement can be made a few hours before the AVALANCHE operation.

At 5:30 p. m. on September 3rd, at Fairfield Camp, the short armistice terms with Italy were signed in behalf of Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, by Brigadier General Giuseppe Castellano, and in behalf of Lieutenant General [*General*] Dwight Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief, by Major General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff.

After congratulations and amenities, General Eisenhower informed General Castellano that the latter had acted in the best interests of his country. General Eisenhower stated that in the case of the Italian people, as had been the case of all other peoples determined to combat Nazi Germany, the Italians could count on the Allies for full cooperation to this end. General Eisenhower thereupon bade General Castellano goodbye and departed for North Africa.

Thus, precisely four years after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, the duly constituted Italian authorities acknowledged Italy's defeat, surrendered unconditionally to an American General acting as Chief of Staff to another American General, the Allied Commander-in-Chief. But the Italians went further and agreed to place the resources of their country in the fight on the side of the Allies against Germany. It is truly an historic milestone.

Incidentally, the signature occurred under an olive tree and I enclose a branch of the olive tree as a souvenir.

General Alexander arrived immediately thereafter and a discussion of Italian military cooperation with the Allies ensued between the Italians and Allied staff officers through the night.

Before the military conversations several questions were asked by General Castellano and Montanari regarding the possibilities which would face the Italian Government in the event of a German spearhead movement to seize Rome. General Castellano talked of the Italian Government and King proceeding to Corsica or Sardinia or Sicily, but expressed a preference for Albania. Macmillan and I took no position but mentioned that possibly in such an event the Palermo region of Sicily might be considered should circumstances require, in which case the Allied forces might delimit a region where Italian sovereignty would be maintained. It was pointed out, however, that the Italian mainland would be available after the future Allied military operations, the details of which, of course, had not been disclosed to the Italians, had been successfully completed.

Immediately after the military surrender terms had been signed General Smith, in accordance with your instructions,<sup>5</sup> handed General

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<sup>5</sup> See *ante*, p. 1188.

Castellano the text of the full armistice terms<sup>6</sup> with a covering letter which made it clear that these terms must be accepted. It is our thought that as soon as direct contact with the Italian Government can be established after landing, the complete armistice can be signed with appropriate ceremony on behalf of the United Nations and in the presence of their representatives.

At this point I want to speak a word of sincere praise for the superb manner in which General W. B. Smith has handled these negotiations under the intelligent supervision of General Eisenhower. It is an excellent example of what our military men are capable when put to the test.

General Castellano seemed perturbed over some of the conditions, but a detailed discussion of them was avoided.

Macmillan and I also discussed with General Smith the matter of setting up a program for the radio announcement by the King and Badoglio of the signing of an armistice. This would be made immediately prior to AVALANCHE. Macmillan made the point that the announcement should be prepared and registered on phonographic discs so that they could be given immediate and widespread publicity by radio stimulating the maximum aid for our military operations from the Italian people and armed forces. It was agreed to order General McClure to Fairfield immediately to work out the details of this program.

Among the miscellaneous items of information we gathered from the Italians was that Farinacci left Rome wearing a German uniform by the German Embassy plane, which took him to Germany. They also informed us that von Rahn, a German diplomat with the rank of Minister, arrived in Rome four days ago. We recalled his odorous reputation in French affairs. He was the agent who proceeded to Syria in 1941 and was one of the most effective German elements in France after the armistice. We believe that his arrival in Rome may portend the imminence of a German political spearhead involving an effort to capture the King and the Badoglio Government, looking to the establishment of a Farinacci Quisling régime. The Italians stated that Farinacci has absolutely no popular support.

The Italians told us also that over 600,000 additional persons, refugees from the northern bombed cities in Italy, especially Turin and Milan, are now in Rome, because they believe that Rome will be protected from Allied bombing. This is one of the weak points of the Italian position and explains the Italian reaction to our suggestion that it would probably be necessary to bomb the city if prompt and favorable action were not immediately undertaken. It would appear that not much would be necessary to create complete demoralization

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<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 1161.

of a surplus population of hundreds of thousands who have literally no other place to go.

General Castellano informed me in strictest secrecy that Mussolini is now in Maddalena (a small island off the northeast corner of Sardinia). Ciano has departed from Rome but Castellano does not know his whereabouts. Castellano also indicated that during the course of Mussolini's last meeting with Hitler at Verona,<sup>7</sup> Hitler promised numerous German divisions from the Russian front but said they could not arrive in Italy before October when the mud in Russia would reduce operations in that area.

All of the Italians said that food conditions in Italy are unsatisfactory, largely due to the prevailing lack of transportation. There are important supplies of food in the country, resulting particularly from the excellent cereal crop, but inadequate distribution reduces the supply in urban centers. There is a flourishing black market.

You may have heard the story of General Patton at Licata. The *Podestà* at that place pointed out to General Patton the ruins of a former Greek temple, saying that it had been destroyed in the last war. General Patton expressed surprise and said that he had not realized that Licata had been shelled in the 1914-18 war. The *Podestà* explained that he was not referring to the 1914-18 war, but that by the last war he meant the second Punic War.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT MURPHY

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<sup>7</sup> i.e., the conference held at Feltre on July 19, 1943. See Garland and Smyth, pp. 242-244, and the sources cited there.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

We are pleased to tell you that General Eisenhower has accepted the unconditional surrender of Italy, the terms of which were approved by the United States, the Soviet Republics and the United Kingdom.

Allied troops have landed near Naples and are now in contact with German forces.

Allied troops are also making good progress in the Southern end of the Italian peninsula.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. A draft of the message initialed by Churchill is also in the Roosevelt Papers.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

SECRET

Personal and secret message from Premier I. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to Premier Minister Churchill.

I have received your message of September 10.<sup>2</sup> I congratulate you with new successes and especially with landing at Naples. There is no doubt that the successful landing at Naples and break between Italy and Germany will deal one more blow upon Hitlerite Germany and will considerably facilitate the actions of the Soviet armies at the Soviet-German front.

For the time being the offensive of the Soviet troops is successfully developing. I think that we shall be in a position to achieve more successes within the next two-three weeks. It is possible that we shall have recaptured Novorossisk within the next few days.

[Moscow,] September 10, 1943.

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, which forwarded the Russian original, together with this translation, to the White House. The White House Map Room forwarded the translation to Roosevelt, who was then at Hyde Park, as telegram No. WHITE 18.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., the message dispatched from Washington on September 9, 1943, *supra*.

J.C.S. Files : Telegram

*The Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters (Eisenhower)  
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

ALGIERS, 10 September 1943.

W-9635. Through every possible channel we are urging Badoglio to unify the Italians against the Germans. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is NAF 395. We consider that the President and the Prime Minister could assist our operations greatly by urging the Italians to oppose with the fiercest possible resistance every German in Italy and it is requested that you recommend this if not inconsistent with the higher policy of the two Governments. The following message has just been sent to Badoglio in Taranto via Naval channels and MONKEY. "Pass the following to Marshal Badoglio by quickest means possible and report when delivered. (*Begins*) The whole future and honour of Italy depend upon the part which her Armed Forces are

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<sup>1</sup> The White House Map Room delivered a copy of this message to Churchill by usher, and forwarded the text of the message to Roosevelt at Hyde Park as telegram No. WHITE 5, September 10, 1943.

now prepared to play. The Germans have definitely and deliberately taken the field against you. They have mutilated your fleet and sunk one of your ships, they have attacked your soldiers and seized your ports. The Germans are now being attacked by land and sea and on an ever increasing scale from the air. Now is the time to strike. If Italy rises now as one man we shall seize every German by the throat. I urge you to issue immediately a clarion call to all patriotic Italians. They have done much locally already but action appears to be uncoordinated and uncertain. They require inspired leadership and, in order to fight, an appeal setting out the situation to your people as it now exists is essential. Your Excellency is the one man that can do this. You can help free your country from the horrors of the battlefield. I urge you to act now: delay will be interpreted by the common enemy as weakness and lack of resolution. Dwight D Eisenhower signed."

Roosevelt Papers

*Draft by Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, [September 10, 1943.]

The President and the Prime Minister have sent the following message to Marshal Badoglio:

"Marshal.<sup>2</sup> It has fallen to you in the hour of your country's agony to take the first decisive steps to win peace and freedom for the Italian people and to win back for Italy an honourable place<sup>3</sup> in the civilization of Europe.

You have already freed your country from Fascist servitude. There remains the even more important task of cleansing the Italian soil from the German invaders. Hitler, through his accomplice Mussolini, has brought Italy to the verge of ruin. He has driven the Italians into disastrous campaigns in the sands of Egypt and the snows of Russia. The Germans have always deserted the Italian troops on the battlefield, sacrificing them contemptuously in order to cover their own retreats. Now Hitler threatens to subject you all to the cruelties he is perpetrating in so many lands.

<sup>1</sup> This draft was forwarded by the President's Naval Aide to Roosevelt at Hyde Park in telegram No. WHITE 7, September 10, 1943, with the following introductory paragraph: "This is from Admiral Brown to the President. With reference to NAF 395 from Eisenhower [*ante*, p. 1284], the Prime Minister suggests the following from you and him to Marshal Badoglio." WHITE 7 also contained the following concluding paragraph: "Further from Admiral Brown with reference to above. Admiral Leahy suggests it well to consider whether it is wise for you to send any message to Badoglio at this time. This note for the President."

<sup>2</sup> This word was a manuscript addition on the source text. It was later crossed out, but was included in the text sent to Roosevelt in telegram No. WHITE 7 and also in the text sent to Eisenhower. See *post*, p. 1286, fn. 3.

<sup>3</sup> In the text sent to Eisenhower this passage, apparently as a result of a typographical error, read "honorable peace".

<sup>4</sup> Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow. The liberating armies of the Western World are coming to your rescue. We have very strong forces and are entering at many points. The German terror in Italy will not last long. They will be extirpated from your land and you, by helping in this great surge of liberation, will place yourselves once more among the true and long-proved friends of Italy<sup>5</sup> from whom you have been so wrongfully estranged.

Take every chance you can. Strike hard and strike home. Have faith in your future. All will come well. March forward with your American and British friends in the great world movement towards Freedom, Justice and Peace."

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL] <sup>6</sup>

10.9.43

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<sup>4</sup> In the text sent to Eisenhower, this paragraph began "People of Italy," in accordance with a suggestion by Roosevelt. See *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> In the text sent to Eisenhower this passage read "friends of your country".

<sup>6</sup> In the text sent to Eisenhower Churchill's initials and the date were replaced by the words, "Signed Franklin D Roosevelt and Winston Churchill."

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*The President to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)*

[HYDE PARK,] September 10, 1943.

BLACK 1. There are two thoughts in above.<sup>1</sup> The first is to Badoglio, the second to the Italian people. This I would make clear by adding at top page two<sup>2</sup> the words "People of Italy". Then it can be sent to Badoglio and also broadcast. If OK with the P.M. it can be sent at once.<sup>3</sup>

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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<sup>1</sup> i.e., Churchill's draft of a joint message to Badoglio, *supra*.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., before the paragraph beginning, "Now is the time for every Italian to strike his blow."

<sup>3</sup> The White House Map Room log for September 10, 1943, contains the following information about arrangements for the release of the joint Roosevelt-Churchill statement: "At 22:45 [i.e., 10:45 p. m.] receive[d] BLACK One which agreed to immediate transmission and broadcast. PM [Churchill, who was staying at the White House,] came at that time, and was shown the answer. Correction made and PM said to shoot it out. Called Steve Early & talked to him and Elmer Davis about the message. Gave it to Davis by Phone; before I finished Steve arrived (mad because he hadn't been informed earlier) and took it and me to his office where he mimeographed off copies for the press." The approved text was dispatched to Eisenhower at 12:20 a. m., September 11, as telegram No. FREEDOM 7473, with the following introductory instruction: "To Eisenhower from the President and the Prime Minister. Your NAF 395 [*ante*, p. 1284]. The following has been released to the press here. Please convey it as soon as possible to Marshal Badoglio." For the four changes made in Churchill's draft before its dispatch to Eisenhower, see *ante*, p. 1285, fn. 3, and above, fns. 4-6. Eisenhower reported to Roosevelt and Churchill in telegram No. W 9687 of September 11 that their message had "been relayed to Badoglio via Navy channels and our special link."

D. REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LIGHT  
OF THE ITALIAN SURRENDER

J.C.S. Files

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT. 1. It would surely be convenient before we separate to have a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff in order to take stock of the new world situation which will arise on the assumption that the present battle for Naples and Rome is successful and that the Germans retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po.

2. Assuming we get the Italian Fleet, we gain not only that Fleet but the British Fleet which has hitherto contained it. This very heavy addition to our naval power should be used at the earliest possible moment to intensify the war against Japan. I have asked the First Sea Lord to discuss with Admiral King the movement of a powerful British Battle Squadron, with cruisers and ancillaries, to the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific. We need a strong Eastern Fleet based on Colombo during the amphibious operations next year. I should be very glad if it were found possible for this Fleet to serve under the American Pacific Command and put in at least four months of useful fighting in the Pacific before taking up its Indian Ocean station. We cannot afford to have idle ships. I do not know, however, how the arrival of such reinforcements would enable the various tasks assigned to United States forces in the Pacific to be augmented. Apart from strategy, from the standpoint of high policy His Majesty's Government would desire to participate in the Pacific war in order to give such measure of assistance as is in their power not only to their American Allies but on account of the obligations to Australia and New Zealand. Such a movement of our ships to and through the Pacific would undoubtedly exercise a demoralizing effect upon Japan who must now be conscious of the very great addition of naval weight thrust against her, and besides this it would surely give satisfaction in the United States as being a proof positive of British resolve to take an active and vigorous part to the end in the war against Japan.

3. The public must be gradually led to realize what we and our Combined Staffs have so fully in mind, namely, the conversion of

<sup>1</sup> Churchill gave Marshall a copy of this minute on September 9 (see *ante*, p. 1211) and the text was circulated the same day by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the enclosure to C.C.S. 341 (see *post*, p. 1290). The latter text is the source text used here. Another copy was annexed to C.C.S. 341/2 (see *post*, p. 1290). Still another copy was filed as an enclosure to the minutes of the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill on September 9, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 1212).

Italy into an active agent against Germany. Although we could not recognize Italy as an Ally in the full sense, we have agreed she is to be allowed to work her passage and that useful service against the enemy will not only be aided but recompensed. Should fighting break out between Italians and Germans, the public prejudices will very rapidly depart and in a fortnight or so matters may be ripe, if we can so direct events, for an Italian declaration of war against Germany. The question of the Italian flag flying from Italian ships, and even some arrangement of Italians manning those vessels under British or American control, requires consideration. The whole problem of handling and getting the utmost use out of the Italian Navy requires review now on a high level.

4. On the over-all assumption of a decisive victory in the Naples area, we are I presume agreed to march northwards up the Italian Peninsula until we come up against the main German positions. If the Italians are everywhere favourable and their Army comes over to help, the deployment of at least a dozen Italian Divisions will be of great advantage in holding the front across Italy and in permitting relief of Allied forces. If, after the battle of Naples is over, we are not seriously resisted south of the main German line, we ought not to be long getting up against it with light forces, and I should hope that by the end of the year at latest we should be confronting it in full strength. If sooner, then better. There can be no question of whittling down *OVERLORD*. We must not forget at this juncture our agreement to begin moving the seven Divisions away in succession from the beginning of November. All the more important is it to bring Italian Divisions into the line, and our State policy should be adapted to procure this end.

5. I have been contemplating the 1944 campaign in the light of these new possibilities and I remain strongly convinced that we should be very chary of advancing Northward beyond the narrow part of the Italian Peninsula. Of course, if the Germans retreat to the Alps, another situation is presented, but failing that, it would seem beyond our strength, having regard to the requirements of *OVERLORD*, to broaden out into the Plains of Lombardy. We have also to consider that the Germans, working on interior lines, may perhaps bring a heavier force to bear upon our front in Italy than we shall have there at the end of the year. The possibility of a strong German counter-attack cannot be excluded. I should like it to be considered whether we should not, when we come up against the main German position, construct a strong fortified line of our own, properly sited in depth. Italian military labour could be used on a large scale for this purpose. Italian troops could naturally take part in defending the line. Thus,

by the Spring, we should be able in this theater either to make an offensive if the enemy were weak, and anyhow to threaten one, or on the other hand stand on the defensive, using our Air power which will in the meanwhile have been built up, from behind our fortified line and divert a portion of our troops for action elsewhere either to the West or to the East. I hope this may be studied.

6. We are both of us acutely conscious of the great importance of the Balkan situation. We should make sure that the Mediterranean High Command, absorbed in its present battle, does not overlook the needs of the patriot forces there. The problem of the Italian forces requires immediate study. The orders of the C.-in-C. Middle East, General Wilson, published today, are well conceived for the moment, but we require to see more clearly exactly what is intended. On the assumption that the Italians can be drawn into the war against Germany, far-reaching possibilities seem to be open. There is surely no need for us to work from the bottom of the Balkans upwards. If we can get an agreement between the patriots and the Italian troops, it should be possible to open quite soon one or more good ports on the Dalmatian coast, enabling munitions and supplies to be sent in by ship, and all forces that will obey our orders raised to good fighting condition. The German situation in all this theater will become most precarious, especially from the point of view of supplies. When the defensive line across Northern Italy has been completed, it may be possible to spare some of our own forces assigned to the Mediterranean theater to emphasize a movement North and North-Eastward from the Dalmatian ports. For the moment the utmost efforts should be put forth to organize the attack upon the Germans throughout the Balkan Peninsula and to supply agents, arms and good direction.

7. Lastly, the question of Islands is now ripe for consideration. Sardinia, I imagine, will come over immediately, though we may have to send some help to the Italians in procuring the disarmament of any German units there. In Corsica the Germans have perhaps already been overcome, but surely here is the place for a French expedition. Even if only one Division could be sent by the French National Committee, the Island could probably be quickly liberated and there is little doubt that its manhood would enable at least another Division or two to be raised locally. General Wilson's telegram about the operations against Rhodes and other Islands in the Dodecanese is all right so far as it goes, but I am not satisfied that sufficient use is being made under the present conditions of the forces in the Middle East. I am making an immediate enquiry into the exact location of all troops above Battalion strength, hoping that improvised expeditionary forces and garrisons may be provided for various minor ventures.

8. We must expect far-reaching reactions in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, and these again may produce a movement from the Turk without our having to make any request or incur any obligation to him. All this again requires military and political consideration on the high[est] level and I feel that we should do well to take a preliminary survey this afternoon if you are agreeable.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]  
9. 9. 43.

J.C.S. Files

*Note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 September 1943.

C.C.S. 341

REVIEW OF STRATEGIC SITUATION IN LIGHT OF ITALIAN COLLAPSE

The enclosure, a minute presented to the President by the Prime Minister,<sup>1</sup> has been referred to the Combined Staff Planners for study and for the submission of draft of conclusions which may be submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister on Friday afternoon, 10 September 1943.

H. REDMAN  
J. R. DEANE  
*Combined Secretariat*

<sup>1</sup> *Supra.*

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 September 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 341/2

REPORT BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT AND  
PRIME MINISTER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have reviewed QUADRANT decisions in the light of the situation created by the Italian collapse, and of the minute addressed to the President by the Prime Minister (Annex).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 118th Meeting, September 10, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1223. The text of this report was circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the enclosure to C.C.S. 341/2, September 10, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1287.

*Naval Questions*

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agree that it is most desirable that a powerful British battle squadron should proceed at the earliest possible date to the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific. They have directed the British Admiralty and U.S. Navy Department to examine the project with particular reference to:

- a. The balanced composition of the squadron;
- b. The date on which it should sail; and
- c. The character of its employment in Pacific waters.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have taken note that Admiral King has already asked for the proposals of Admirals Carpender, Halsey and Nimitz on this point.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed that the British Admiralty should forthwith examine the possibility of sending a certain number of the British submarines at present operating in the Mediterranean to the Far East and Pacific.

4. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have directed that the British Admiralty and the U.S. Navy Department should forthwith examine the whole future of the Italian Fleet as soon as it has passed into our hands. The points which require specific consideration are:

- a. The manning of the Fleet;
- b. Its operational use.

In this connection the possibility of using the Italian naval units for transport purposes in the Mediterranean area should be explored.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have invited the appropriate authorities to undertake a similar inquiry into the use of the Italian mercantile marine.

*Italian Armed Forces*

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff fully agree that the maximum use should be made of the Italian armed forces. They point out, however, that it would be unwise to place much reliance on their fighting value owing to:

- a. The low state of their morale.
- b. The difficulties of supply, observing that industry on which they are almost entirely dependent is in the Plains of Lombardy.

*Strategy in Italy*

7. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with the general conception of future operations in Italy and have directed the Com-

bined Intelligence Committee to report as a matter of urgency on the possible rate of the German build-up south of the Alps.

*The Balkans*

8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff attach great importance to the Balkan situation. The situation which was envisaged at QUADRANT<sup>3</sup> has now materialized. Every effort should be made to augment by sea the supplies which are being sent to the patriot armies by air.

9. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the responsibility for these operations should remain with the Commander in Chief, Middle East, working in the closest cooperation with General Eisenhower. They propose to direct General Wilson not only to increase the scale of supplies to the patriot force by all possible means, but also to assume more active direction of their operations by the supply of Officers, Agents, etc.

*Sardinia*

10. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have already directed O.S.S. and S.O.E. to undertake maximum activities in Sardinia.<sup>4</sup> The question of sending help to the Italians to procure the disarmament of German units there must await developments in the situation.

*Corsica*

11. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider it most desirable that French forces should be used for the capture of Corsica, provided the general situation allows. General Eisenhower already has plans for this operation.

*Turkey*

12. The Combined Chiefs of Staff think that Turkey's future action will be guided more by the course of events in the Russo-German Theater than by events in the Balkans and Italy. They adhere to their decision that the Commander in Chief, Middle East, should be free to draw upon supplies destined for Turkey for dispatch to the Balkans.

*Eastern Mediterranean*

13. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have taken note of the action which the Commander in Chief, Middle East, is taking in respect of Rhodes and other islands in the Dodecanese. They approve this action, and are considering what further can be done.

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<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1124.

<sup>4</sup> See *ante*, p. 1069.

## E. BASES IN THE AZORES

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 7 September 1943.

C.C.S. 270/7

## PLANS FOR THE USE OF THE AZORES

1. With reference to C.C.S. 270/4,<sup>2</sup> the U.S. Chiefs of Staff present to the British Chiefs of Staff for their information a brief outline of operations in the Azores contemplated by the U.S.:

*a.* The employment of anti-submarine aircraft initially in the coverage of all convoys on the Middle Atlantic lanes, and eventually for patrol around the Azores as necessary to obtain effective anti-submarine aircraft coverage of the Middle Atlantic.

*b.* The employment initially of not to exceed two naval support groups from the Azores bases in anti-submarine operations on Middle Atlantic convoy routes; to be subsequently expanded should adjustment of convoy routes dictate.

*c.* Operations of air transport service and ferry delivery service to the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean areas, India and China.

2. It is estimated that the above proposed operations will require the following facilities:

*a.* For U.S. Naval surface craft: San Miguel Island. One operating and supply base at Ponta Delgada.

*b.* For U.S. Naval aircraft:

(1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta, with sufficient facilities to accommodate 6 ASW seaplanes, and 6 NATS seaplanes.

(2) San Miguel Island. One landplane base with three 6,000 ft. runways, and facilities for 12 VLR landplanes and 1 group (approximately 30) of CVE aircraft, capable of expansion to provide for 4 squadrons of VLR aircraft.

*c.* For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft.

(1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for 3,500 personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landplane base with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed

<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 118th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1225.

<sup>2</sup> "Land Airport Facilities in the Azores", August 3, 1943; not printed.

on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate 3,300 personnel.

*d.* Existing cable systems and communications facilities essential to the operations of U.S. forces based on and operating through the Azores and to the operations of U.S. forces in the North African and European theaters of operations.

3. Ultimate U.S. forces for which accommodations will be required are estimated to amount to:

U.S. Army	6800
U.S. Navy	1400

4. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff plan preliminary preparations at this time in order that these facilities can be established in the Azores at the earliest practicable date.

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## F. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

J.C.S. Files

*The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board to the Commander in Chief,  
United States Fleet (King)*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 28 August 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 272/2

Serial: 0012

Subject: Logistic Organization To Improve Mobility of Anti-Submarine Squadrons

5. The logistic considerations for any proposed air base may be broken down into the following general headings:

*a.* Personnel.

- (1) Base personnel.
- (2) Ground echelon personnel.
- (3) Key specialist personnel.

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 272/2), September 3, 1943: "The enclosure, a report by the Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board with reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 of C.C.S. 272/1 [*ante*, p. 510], is submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet who states he is in accord with the recommendations in paragraph 14 of the report."

The recommendations contained in paragraph 14 of this report were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 118th Meeting, September 10, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1220.

*b.* Spares.

- (1) Engine and air frame spares.
- (2) Spares for special equipment of unit.

*c.* Ground equipment.

- (1) Fueling equipment, including trucks, bowsers, and/or boats.
- (2) Aircraft handling and servicing equipment.
- (3) Shop equipment, and special tools for aircraft type and special equipment. (Radar, etc.)
- (4) Ground transport.

*d.* Support.

- (1) Fuel storage and supply capacity.
- (2) Ordnance (bombs, depth charges, ammunition, pyrotechnics, etc.)
- (3) Housing and messing capacity.
- (4) Special conditions.

14. *Recommendations.*

The recommendations made in paragraph 22 of reference *b*<sup>2</sup> are reaffirmed with particular emphasis on the following points:

*a.* That spares be manufactured in accordance with the approved scales laid down for the various air services.

*b.* That Major Operating Area Commanders prepare and keep up to date information covering points listed in paragraph 5 above, concerning all air bases in their areas; that this information be disseminated to other area commanders and to responsible headquarters such as H.Q. Coastal Command, ComAirLant, etc.

The following additional recommendations are now made:

*c.* That when any commander requests or recommends the transfer of additional air units into his area, such request or recommendation should include a statement of the amount of logistic support (see paragraph 5 above) that he is prepared to provide.

*d.* That when the high command directs the transfer of a unit from one strategic area to another, the directive should specify the proportion of logistic support to be provided by the "base of destination."

*e.* That in view of the possibility of an increased U-Boat threat in the East Africa-Indian Ocean area an immediate and detailed survey of the facilities and base equipment at all air bases within this area be made and promulgated to all the relevant authorities.

J. M. MANSFIELD  
*Rear Admiral, R.N.*

J. L. KAUFFMAN  
*Rear Admiral, U.S.N.*

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<sup>2</sup> i.e., of the enclosure to C.C.S. 272/1, *ante*, p. 510.

J.C.S. Files

*The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King) to the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1943.

Enclosure to C.C.S. 335

CominCh File FF1/L11-7

Serial: 001863

Subject: Allocation of CVE Type Ships to England.

Reference: (a) Report of Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, serial 0011, dated 27 August, 1943.<sup>2</sup>

1. There is great need for additional CVE type ships in anti-submarine operations. I am aware of the policy of the Royal Navy that basic and extensive alterations are necessary in CVEs, built in the United States, to U.S. naval specifications, before these ships can be operated by the British.

2. With reference to paragraph 16(e) of the enclosure, it is my view that further efforts should be made to advance the date of operational readiness of these ships rather than change allocations already agreed upon.

E. J. KING

Enclosure

*The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (King)*<sup>3</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 August 1943.

Serial: 0011

Subject: Employment of CVE's in offensive action against U-Boats.

1. The Board has given consideration to the recent success in the Anti-Submarine War and the marked falling off in tonnage of shipping lost. It is felt that in certain quarters the past successful months and the present lull may tend to distract attention from the Battle of the Atlantic, as, in fact, has occurred during similar lulls in the past.

2. The number of submarines at sea today, considering the number potentially available, is very low. The cause of this temporary reduc-

<sup>1</sup> Circulated under cover of the following note by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 335), September 3, 1943: "The attached memorandum from the Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations and the enclosure thereto are submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for consideration."

<sup>2</sup> Printed below.

<sup>3</sup> For the action taken on paragraph 16 of this report at the 118th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 10, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1221.

tion in enemy effort is not entirely certain, but the Board cannot believe that this situation will continue indefinitely. It is possible that at least 150 submarines could suddenly appear in the Atlantic, which, regardless of A/S tactics which have proved so successful during the past few months, might well result in a serious increase in sinkings.

3. The Board has moreover given consideration to the change in tactics employed by U-Boats on passage to and from the Bay of Biscay ports. The recent success of the Bay air and surface offensive has caused the enemy to adopt a route close to the coast of Spain where effective air support can be afforded to his submarines and where the Bay A/S patrols are least effective. This has met with a considerable degree of success and a consequent falling off in the U-Boat sinkings. There is thus a gap in the offensive as a whole.

4. It is considered essential that this gap in the Bay offensive should be closed insofar as is possible and it would appear that with this change of the enemy tactics the only really satisfactory remedy is the immediate employment of CVE's on offensive A/S operations in the Southern approaches to the Bay. A minimum of two CVE's on station would be required for this purpose.

5. In addition to the above the Board wishes strongly to point out the other pressing A/S commitments for these valuable vessels. The proportion of independent shipping sunk during the war far exceeds that sunk while in convoy. There will never be sufficient escorts to protect all ships at sea but it is not generally appreciated that at any one time there are on the high seas a very large percentage of unescorted ships. The belief that unless the enemy returns to an offensive against the Atlantic lifeline he has lost the U-Boat war cannot be wholly subscribed to. Should the enemy be able and decide to operate a hundred submarines against independent shipping it will only be necessary for each submarine to sink *One* ship per month for our shipping losses to return to the unacceptable figure of previous months. It may well be that with defeat of "pack tactics" the enemy may resort to this dispersed form of U-Boat warfare providing he can find a means of breaking through the blockade of his bases.

6. In the opinion of the Board, apart from the Bay, the most pressing need is for a carrier in the Cape-Mozambique Channel area. A large percentage of sinkings in the past months have been in this area and in July alone 12 out of the 14 ships sunk were unescorted. The distances involved make the employment of a CVE the only *practicable* form of offensive against these U-Boats. (It is understood that the carrier (HMS *Unicorn*) originally assigned the Eastern Fleet is now employed on special operations.)

7. It is also possible that the Bay offensive may force the enemy to make greater use of the Northern approaches. It is possible to cover this area by air and, with the reinforcements recently sent to the Bay offensive, it may now be possible to detach a squadron from the Bay to strengthen an offensive against this Northern U-Boat route. Should, however, aircraft not be available for this route, it would appear that consideration must be given to the employment of a CVE when available.

8. During the visit of the Board to West Africa the Board was impressed with the lack of proper escorts in the area. Subsequently, although a comparatively large number of U-Boats operated in this area, the fact that there has been only one U-Boat sunk or even probably damaged bears out the opinion formed during the Board's visit. The desirability of having an escort carrier in this command should therefore be kept in mind when planning future requirements.

9. It is also desired to stress the importance of the time factor. The disasters which overcame the U-Boat during the months of May, June and July undoubtedly resulted in a serious weakening of morale. If the most is to be made of this weakening it is essential in no way to relax the pressure but to continue to harass and sink U-Boats so that the crews have no chance of regaining their morale. Should they do so and regain the initiative the effect on Allied grand strategy might well be serious.

10. It is apparent from operations in the past 6 months that the use of Support Groups and *particularly* Support Groups with CVE's had a very large share in the successful anti-U-Boat campaign. The CVE was originally developed for A/S operations; but it is fully appreciated that the increasingly rapid developments in Allied strategy have created urgent demands for this valuable type of craft for operations other than anti-U-Boat offensives. At the same time it appears that an unduly small proportion are now being employed on anti-submarine work.

11. CCS 203, dated 24 April, 1943 <sup>4</sup> (Annex I to App C) sets up 31 CVE's as the minimum for Atlantic A/S operations and although a large number of this type have been placed in commission, at the present moment only five (all U.S. Navy) are actually being used in the Atlantic for this purpose. Of the 13 British CVE's in commission in the Atlantic none are at this moment being used for A/S work. Of the 6 that are operational 4 are allocated to CinC Mediterranean for special operations, one is refitting and one has serious defects. Of the remaining seven two are working up, 4 are undergoing modifications and one is assigned for deck landing training.

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<sup>4</sup> "Measures for Combatting the Submarine Menace"; not printed.

12. It is understood that seven CVE's are allocated to the British for delivery in the next three months. However, extensive modifications required by the Admiralty, together with working-up time, etc., involves a delay of 24 to 30 weeks from the time of delivery to date of becoming operational. These modifications cover changes in gasoline installations, bomb stowage, and fighter direction.

13. At the present stage of the war these delays are not considered acceptable. By the employment of larger crews the U.S. Navy have proved that they can operate these ships most successfully without these very lengthy modifications. Failing some drastic cut in these delays it appears to the Board that it is worthy of consideration that as many of these next seven CVE's as they are able to man and equip with planes be reallocated to the U.S. Navy so that an adequate proportion may be employed on A/S operations immediately. It is estimated that all seven could be operational by about the end of January, 1944 which would effect an over-all saving of at least three months. A subsequent readjustment of the British allocation should be made.

14. In the opinion of the Board no considerations should be allowed to stand in the way of getting the maximum number of these highly valuable ships into service in the shortest possible time.

15. *Conclusion:*

In conclusion the Board wishes to stress that the present lull in the enemy's Atlantic offensive in no way justifies any relaxation of the Allied Anti-Submarine effort. On the contrary, it is essential to maintain the maximum pressure that operational commitments permit in order to ensure that the enemy has no time to improve his present weakened state of morale.

16. *Recommendations:*

The following recommendations are now made:

(a) That a minimum of two British CVE's on station be employed *Now* against the U-Boats passing in and out of the Southern approaches to the Bay.

(b) That one British CVE be allocated to the Cape-Mozambique Channel area for offensive A/S operations.

(c) That steps be taken to increase the offensive against the Northern passage and that failing adequate shore based aircraft consideration be given to the employment of a CVE when available.

(d) That the inadequacy of A/S offensive measures in West Africa be kept in mind with a view to allocation of a CVE to this area in due course.

(e) That failing a drastic reduction in delay in getting British CVE's into operation, consideration be given to the U.S. Navy manning some or all of the next 7 CVE's allocated to Britain with a view

to a higher proportion of these vessels being employed on A/S operations with the minimum delay.

J. M. MANSFIELD  
Rear Admiral, R.N.

J. L. KAUFFMAN  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The British First Lord of the Admiralty (Alexander) to Prime Minister Churchill and the British First Sea Lord (Pound)*<sup>1</sup>

MOST SECRET

[LONDON,] September 4, 1943.

IMMEDIATE

YOUR WELFARE 584.<sup>2</sup> (U-Boat Statement).

1. On the basis of the number of U-Boats sunk in relation to our shipping losses, August has been the best month of the war. Our shipping losses from U-Boat attack were 13 ships of 86,000 tons and we have sunk 20 German and Italian, and two Japanese U-Boats.

2. Owing to the number of supply boats sunk, the enemy have had to withdraw a large number of U-Boats which would normally have operated for considerably longer.

3. For this reason, and for others, including the rearmament of U-Boats, the enemy have not developed their full power to attack shipping routes.

4. We estimate enemy has about 140 U-Boats based on Biscay ports and a further 200 in commission in the Baltic, including school boats, a large number of which should be ready to sail for the Atlantic now. There are signs that the flow of U-Boats from the Baltic to the Atlantic is already starting.

5. Although the results for August are very good, it is recommended that your statement with the President should not give too much emphasis to this because the public do not appreciate the possibilities of the U-Boat force at the enemy's disposal. A very favourable statement this month, taken into account with your statement last month,<sup>3</sup> would be inclined to encourage a feeling that the U-Boat war is over. It is

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<sup>1</sup> The title of the First Sea Lord as an additional addressee appears in manuscript on the source text. At the end of the message is the following manuscript endorsement by Churchill: "President to see". The source text in the Roosevelt Papers is attached to the following typed chit on White House stationery: "THE PRESIDENT TO SEE. The draft of the proposed joint statement has been telegraphed to Mr. Mackenzie King for his observations."

<sup>2</sup> Not found in United States files.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 833.

proposed that your statement with the President should take the following line.

6. Heading of proposed statement. As a result of the Prime Minister's recent agreement with Mr. Mackenzie King that the Canadians were to be consulted before the issue of each monthly statement, the precise procedure to be followed is not clear to Admiralty as it is not known whether Mr. Mackenzie King himself wishes to be shown the communiqué before it is issued or whether he would be content merely that it should be passed by the Canadian Navy Board. Admiralty have therefore not taken any steps to bring the draft to the notice of either the Canadian Navy or the Canadian Prime Minister. *Begins.*

Issued by the President and Prime Minister after consultation with the British Admiralty, United States Navy Department, and Canadian Department of National Defence for Naval Services.

1. August has been another successful month in U-Boat warfare. Owing perhaps to re-armament and other causes, there appear to have been fewer U-Boats at sea than in recent months, and shipping losses have continued to decrease.

2. It is significant that the enemy made virtually no attempt to attack North Atlantic shipping, and opportunities for attacking the U-Boats have been relatively few. Nevertheless, U-Boats have been hunted relentlessly on all stations wherever they have appeared and a heavy toll has been taken of the enemy. In fact more U-Boats have been sunk than merchant ships.

3. Surface and Air forces have both contributed to this satisfactory month's work by the efficiency of their escorts, patrols and offensive operations. Shore-based aircraft have often had to face powerful enemy Air opposition, and carrier-borne aircraft have played a most important part.

4. We are ready to attack the enemy with utmost vigour should he provide the opportunity by resuming a general attack on our shipping with the very large number of U-Boats at his disposal.<sup>4</sup> *Ends.*

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<sup>4</sup> A copy of this draft statement was forwarded on September 6, 1943, by the President's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Director of the Office of War Information (Davis) and the Director of Public Relations in the Navy Department (Lovette).

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Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin) to the President's Naval Aide (Brown)*

WASHINGTON, [September 8, 1943.]

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN. In confirmation of our telephone conversation, the Prime Minister has been informed by Mr. Mackenzie

King that he has no objection to the terms of the proposed statement on U-Boat Warfare in August.

I should be grateful if you will let me know whether the draft is approved on your side, so that simultaneous publication on September 10 can be arranged.<sup>1</sup>

J[OHN] M[ILLER] MARTIN  
8. 9. 43.

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<sup>1</sup> Attached to this memorandum is a draft statement which is identical to the one suggested in Alexander's telegram of September 4, 1943 (*ante*, p. 1301), except that the heading has been changed to read: "Statement Issued by the President and the Prime Minister."

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Roosevelt Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Naval Aide (Brown)*<sup>1</sup>

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1943—11:45 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

In a telephone conversation between Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., and Captain R. W. Berry, U.S.N., Deputy Director of Public Relations, Navy Department, Captain Berry agreed to arrange with Mr. Elmer Davis, Director of Office of War Information, for the release of the joint anti-submarine statement exactly as proposed originally by the Prime Minister,<sup>2</sup> subject to the following conditions:

- (a) The statement to be issued as from the two governments rather than from the President and the Prime Minister.<sup>3</sup>
- (b) The exact text to be cabled to London.
- (c) The time of release to be arranged by Mr. Davis and London.

W. BROWN  
*Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy*  
*Naval Aide to the President*

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<sup>1</sup> A copy of this memorandum was sent to Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin).

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1301.

<sup>3</sup> Filed with this memorandum is a copy of a press release by the Office of War Information (OWI-2476) for release at 7:30 p. m., Eastern War Time, September 10, 1943, which (except for minor editorial changes) is identical with the four numbered paragraphs suggested in Alexander's telegram of September 4, 1943 (see *ante*, p. 1301). In lieu of a heading the final release has the following introductory paragraph: "The following statement is issued by the Office of War Information and the British Ministry of Information after consultation with the British Admiralty, United States Navy Department, and Canadian Department of National Defense for Naval Services:"

G. TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH THE SOVIET UNION  
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A MILITARY-POLITICAL  
COMMISSION

Roosevelt Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, [September 4, 1943.]

MR. PRESIDENT. It seemed to me that your draft message to Stalin <sup>1</sup> did not draw clear enough distinction between the Mediterranean Commission and the Three-Power Conference. I have ventured therefore to suggest some alterations which you will be able to identify on the re-typed copy annexed.<sup>2</sup>

I also annex a re-draft of my message, in which I have made some changes. In particular, you will see that I show Stalin I am aware that you propose a different procedure, and I suggest an argument in favour of adopting it.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]  
4.9.43

[Enclosure 1]

*Draft of Message From President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin* <sup>3</sup>

SEPTEMBER 4, 1943.

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting.<sup>4</sup>

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or Edinburgh,<sup>5</sup> and I would be willing to have my representatives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to

<sup>1</sup> Enclosure 1, below.

<sup>2</sup> Enclosure 2 to Churchill's memorandum; not printed. Churchill's suggestions, most of which Roosevelt accepted, are described in the footnotes to enclosure 1, below.

<sup>3</sup> This draft, which Roosevelt had given or sent to Churchill, contains some handwritten changes by Roosevelt, annotated below, which were apparently made before Churchill received the draft, and further suggested changes by Churchill which were then incorporated into a re-typed draft, not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Churchill suggested adding the words "on the Foreign Office level" at the end of this paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> Roosevelt changed this passage by hand to read "London or somewhere in England", apparently before he gave the draft to Churchill.

suggest Casablanca or Algiers or Tunis.<sup>6</sup> I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop<sup>7</sup> into a full-scale Combined Staffs' Conference.

5.<sup>8</sup> I have no objection to adding a French member to the meeting<sup>9</sup> because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with surrender terms,<sup>10</sup> I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

6. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.

7. If Mr. Molotov comes<sup>11</sup> I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harri-man would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping, lend-lease and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.

8. The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I congratulate you again.

9. While this coming Conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.

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<sup>6</sup> Churchill suggested deleting the words "or Algiers or Tunis".

<sup>7</sup> Churchill suggested inserting the words "at this stage" here.

<sup>8</sup> Churchill suggested a rearrangement of paragraphs whereby paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 as they appear in this draft became, respectively, paragraphs 9, 10, 5, 6, 7, and 8 in Churchill's proposed revision.

<sup>9</sup> Churchill suggested changing "the meeting" to "their meetings".

<sup>10</sup> Churchill suggested inserting the words "already signed" here.

<sup>11</sup> Churchill suggested changing the opening words of this paragraph to "If Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden come".

10. In regard <sup>12</sup> to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject? <sup>13</sup>

ROOSEVELT

[Enclosure 3]

*Draft of Message From Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin* <sup>14</sup>

The military commission.

I have discussed with the President your suggestion for a military-political commission representative of our three countries.<sup>15</sup> The President is sending you his views.

2. If a formal commission is to be set up I make the following suggestions as to its constitution and scope, from which I think the President would not dissent, but he is telegraphing separately.

3. As to its location I will agree to Sicily if you are set upon it, but I believe that either Tunis or Algiers, which are an established Allied headquarters, would be more convenient. There will be no harm in trying both.

4. I suggest that the members of the commission should be political representatives appointed by the three governments, each reporting to his Government direct. The commission could not, of course, supersede or override the authority of the Governments concerned. The representatives may require to be assisted by military advisers. The political representatives should be kept informed by their governments of military and political developments affecting their work, and would in their turn inform their Governments of local developments. They could make joint representations to their Governments, but would not have the power to take final decisions. They would, of course, not interfere with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

<sup>12</sup> Churchill suggested changing the first two words of this paragraph to "Turning now".

<sup>13</sup> This entire paragraph and the signature at the end of the draft message are in Roosevelt's handwriting.

<sup>14</sup> The draft of this message which Churchill sent to Roosevelt is not in the file, possibly because Roosevelt returned it to Churchill. The text here printed is that of the message as sent to Stalin on September 5, 1943, as it appears in *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 153-154. For Churchill's separate message of September 5 to Stalin concerning the proposed meeting of Foreign Ministers, in which he stated that he had proposed to Roosevelt that the meeting be held in Britain, see *ibid.*, pp. 155-156.

<sup>15</sup> See *ante*, p. 1087.

5. I was glad to find that you agreed <sup>16</sup> that a French member might be added. The President to whom I have submitted the idea also seemed inclined to accept it with certain reservations. We must remember that before long the French will presumably have ten or more fully equipped divisions which will certainly be needed in action.

6. There are others, notably the Greeks and the Yugoslavs, who are directly interested, and I suggest that we should devise a procedure for calling them in for consultation when questions of direct concern to them are under examination.

7. As I understand it the commission would, in the first instance, handle the Italian question only. When other cases arise experience should have shown whether this or some other organ would be the best medium for cooperating [*coordinating?*] our views and plans.

8. The President is making to you the different suggestion that you might think it sufficient to send an officer to General Eisenhower's headquarters. Seeing that the commission, if set up, would meet almost concurrently with the conference of Foreign Ministers, it may be that you will agree that the President's plan meets the case.

9. In the event of its being decided to establish the commission, I should be grateful to learn whether you agree with the proposals I have made above.<sup>17</sup> The commission, if it is desired, should be set going this month, but see my immediately following telegram.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Churchill had suggested French representation on the proposed military-political commission in a message to Stalin dated August 30, 1943, and Stalin had replied affirmatively on the following day. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 152.

<sup>17</sup> For Stalin's reply to Churchill, dated September 8, 1943, see *ibid.*, pp. 157-158.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed here. See *ibid.*, p. 155.

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 September 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Personal and secret from the President to Marshal Stalin.

1. The Prime Minister and I are both happy at the idea of the military, political meeting on the State Department level.

2. I think it should be held as soon as possible. What would you think of a date about September twenty-fifth?

3. In regard to location, the Prime Minister has suggested London or somewhere in England, and I would be willing to have my representa-

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. The source text bears the following manuscript endorsement: "(Delivered [to] Stalin 1930 [i.e., 6:30 p. m.] Sept 6)".

tives go to either of these if you also think it best. However, I am inclined to the thought of a more remote spot where also the membership of the meeting would be less surrounded by reporters. I would be inclined to suggest Casablanca or Tunis. I do not object to Sicily but the communications from and to there are more difficult.

4. The political representatives would, of course, report to their respective Governments because I do not think we could give plenary powers to them. They could be advised on military developments by attaching one or two military advisers to them, though I do not want to have the meeting develop at this stage into a full-scale Combined Chiefs' Conference.

5. If Mr. Molotov comes and Mr. Eden I would wish to send Mr. Hull, but I do not believe that the latter should make such a long journey and I would, therefore, send the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles. Mr. Harriman would go with Mr. Welles because he has such good knowledge of all shipping and commercial matters. For an American military adviser, I will try to send somebody from my Joint Staff who is in complete touch with the work of the Combined Staffs.

6. The tenacity and drive of your Armies is magnificent and I congratulate you again.

7. While this coming conference is a very good thing, I still hope that you and Mr. Churchill and I can meet as soon as possible. I personally could arrange to meet in a place as far as North Africa between November fifteenth and December fifteenth. I know you will understand that I cannot be away from Washington more than about twenty days because, under our Constitution, no one can sign for me when I am away.

8. Turning now to a Commission to sit in Sicily in connection with carrying out of further settlements with Italy, why not send an officer to Eisenhower's headquarters where he would join the British and Americans who are now working on this very subject?

9. I have no objection to adding a French member to their meetings because we are in the midst of equipping ten or eleven of their divisions in North Africa. However, I think it would be very unwise to have the French take part in discussions relating to the military occupation of Italy. If the Italians go through with the surrender terms already signed<sup>2</sup> I hope they will be able wholeheartedly to assist the occupation troops. On the whole, the Italians greatly dislike the French and

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<sup>2</sup>The words "already signed" were added at Churchill's suggestion. This was apparently the first notice given to Stalin of the signature of the Italian armistice on September 3. This was followed by a more detailed notification in a message from Churchill to Stalin on September 5 (see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, p. 155) and in a joint message from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin on September 9 (see *ante*, p. 1283).

if we bring the French into occupation discussions at this time the civil and military elements in Italy will greatly resent it.

10. We can discuss the problem of consulting the Greeks and Yugoslavs later on.

ROOSEVELT

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Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

[Translation]

SECRET

Personal and secret message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Your message<sup>2</sup> in which you touched upon several important questions I received on September 6th.

First. I still consider, as I did before, that the question of the creation of the Military-Political Commission of the representatives of the three countries with its residence at the beginning in Sicily or in Algiers is the most urgent one. Sending of a Soviet officer to the Staff of General Eisenhower can by no means substitute [for] the Military-Political Commission, which is necessary for directing on the spot the negotiations with Italy (as well as with other countries dissociating themselves from Germany). Much time has passed, but nothing is done.

As to the participation of the French representative in this Commission, I have already expressed my opinion on this subject. However, if you have any doubt, in this case this question can be discussed after the Commission is created.

Second. I consider that the beginning of October as the Prime Minister suggested, would be convenient time for the meeting of the three our representatives [*sic*], and I propose as the place of the meeting—Moscow. By that time the three Governments could have reached an agreement regarding the questions which have to be discussed as well as the proposals on those questions, without which (agreement) the meeting will not give the necessary results in which our Governments are interested.

Third. As to our personal meeting with participation of Mr. Churchill I am also interested to have it arranged as soon as possible. Your proposal regarding the time of the meeting seems to me acceptable. I consider that it would be expedient to choose as the place of the meeting the country where there are the representations of all

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<sup>1</sup> Channel of transmission not indicated. For Stalin's parallel message to Churchill, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 157-158; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 281.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

three countries, for instance, Iran. However, I have to say that the exact date of the meeting has to be defined later taking into consideration the situation on the Soviet-German front where more than 500 divisions are engaged in the fighting in all, and where the control on the part of the High Command of the USSR is needed almost daily.

Fourth. I thank you for congratulations on the occasion of the successes of the Soviet Armies. I take this opportunity to congratulate you and Anglo-American troops on the occasion of the new brilliant successes in Italy.

[Moscow,] September 8, 1943.

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Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 9 September 1943.

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

From the President to Marshal Stalin personal and secret.

Thank you for your message<sup>2</sup> received today.

1. I agree on the immediate setting up of the Military-Political Commission but I think Algiers better than Sicily on account of communications and, therefore, suggest that they meet in Algiers on Tuesday, September twenty-first. They will be given full information in regard to progress of current and future negotiations but, of course, should not have plenary powers. Such authority would, of course, have to be referred to their Governments before final action.

I am entirely willing to have a French representative on this Commission. It is important to all of us that the secrecy of all their deliberations be fully maintained.<sup>3</sup>

2. In regard to the meeting of our three representatives, I will cheerfully agree that the place of meeting be Moscow and the date the beginning of October—say Monday, the fourth. I will send you in two or three days a suggested informal list of subjects to be discussed, but I think the three members should feel free, after becoming acquainted with each other, to discuss any other matters which may come up.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. For Churchill's parallel message to Stalin, dated September 10, 1943, see *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 159-161; Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, pp. 281-282. Stalin's reply to these parallel messages, addressed to Roosevelt and Churchill jointly on September 12, 1943, did not reach the addressees until after the conclusion of their conversations at Hyde Park on September 12, and is therefore outside the scope of this volume. See *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. I, pp. 162-163; vol. II, pp. 93-94; *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 520, 786; *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>3</sup> For further correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 786 ff.

<sup>4</sup> For further correspondence on this subject, see *ibid.*, pp. 521 ff.

3. I am delighted with your willingness to go along with the third suggestion, and the time about the end of November is all right. I fully understand that military events might alter the situation for you or for Mr. Churchill or myself. Meanwhile, we can go ahead on that basis. Personally, my only hesitation is the place but only because it is a bit further away from Washington than I had counted on. My Congress will be in session at that time and, under our Constitution, I must act on legislation within ten days. In other words, I must receive documents and return them to the Congress within ten days and Teheran makes this rather a grave risk if the flying weather is bad. If the Azores route is not available, it means going by way of Brazil and across the South Atlantic Ocean. For these reasons I hope that you will consider some part of Egypt, which is also a neutral state and where every arrangement can be made for our convenience.<sup>5</sup>

4. I really feel that the three of us are making real headway.

ROOSEVELT

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<sup>5</sup> For further correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 25 ff.

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## H. COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN RESEARCH ON ATOMIC ENERGY

Hopkins Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill's Principal Private Secretary (Martin) to  
Prime Minister Churchill*

WASHINGTON, [September 9, 1943.]

### TUBE ALLOYS

PRIME MINISTER. 1. May I send the President the attached set of telegrams in amplification of what you told him about the visit by Sir Edward Appleton?<sup>1</sup>

2. In the Articles of Agreement signed at Quebec<sup>2</sup> it was stated that the United States members of the Combined Policy Committee should be the Secretary of War, Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant. Mr. Stimson spoke to you about this after luncheon yesterday,<sup>3</sup> but I did not

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<sup>1</sup> At the foot of this memorandum is the following manuscript notation by Martin: "Mr. Hopkins to see first." This was presumably Churchill's instruction to Martin and explains the presence of the memorandum and its attachments in the Hopkins Papers.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1117.

<sup>3</sup> See *ante*, p. 1210.

hear clearly what he said. Do you wish to make any record of his remarks or inform the Lord President?

J[OHN] M[ILLER] M[ARTIN]  
9.9.43

[Attachment 1—Paraphrase of Telegram]

*The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to Prime Minister Churchill*

[LONDON,] August 28, 1943.

TUBE ALLOYS. Reference YOUR WELFARE 450.<sup>4</sup>

I am distressed at this report on Akers, who has rendered most excellent service as our Chief Executive on TUBE ALLOYS and about whose integrity and ability I have not the slightest doubt. During negotiations in Washington<sup>5</sup> there was a suggestion that the United States authorities would not regard Akers as a suitable person to represent us on the Combined Policy Committee, an attitude which could be understood having regard to the fact that his work lies in the field of technical rather than political direction. No objection was however then raised to our using him for the sort of purpose for which he is now in the United States—namely, to co-ordinate the views and activities of the representatives of our individual scientific groups and to act as Chief Technical Assistant and Adviser to our representatives on the Policy Committee.

I should add that the four eminent British Scientific workers<sup>6</sup> were sent over on my instructions. This step was clearly necessary if time was not to be unnecessarily wasted and was in accordance with the following passage taken from the 5th paragraph of Dr. Bush's letter of the 6th August to me:—<sup>7</sup>

“As a matter of procedure the first step, after the formation of the Policy Committee, would certainly seem to be the presentation to that Committee by American and British Scientists of the overall picture of the current situation in their respective countries and the plans for the future. On the basis of the evidence thus presented the Policy Committee would agree as to the method of providing specific interchange to carry out the provisions of the agreement.”

Evidently however Akers's inclusion among our representatives on TUBE ALLOYS in Washington has caused trouble in the past and is

<sup>4</sup> Not found in United States files. Churchill's telegram No. WELFARE 450 probably reported to London the American objections to Akers reflected in Bush's memorandum to Roosevelt of August 23, 1943, *ante*, p. 1096.

<sup>5</sup> In early August 1943. See *ante*, pp. 640 ff.

<sup>6</sup> See *ante*, p. 1097.

<sup>7</sup> *Ante*, p. 649.

likely to continue to do so, and this is a fact which, in the interests of the prosecution of that project as a joint enterprise, we cannot afford to ignore. I accordingly suggest for your consideration that you should propose to the President that Sir Edward Appleton should at once go out to Washington on a short visit. The purpose of his visit would be first to help to arrange for launching of the Combined Committee, and secondly to submit to me recommendations regarding any adjustments which he may consider that the establishment of the Combined Committee makes necessary in our present arrangements for the technical direction of our work on the project.

In the latter connection an important factor to which we have every right to give full consideration is the general cohesion and contentment of our workers on the project. I doubt whether the recommendations which Appleton will have to make will affect anything more than our representation on the technical level in Washington, but even in that respect he will have to bear in mind the position of our team in Canada who have hitherto been accustomed to look to Akers for technical direction. I do not think that either Dale or Tizard would be suitable for this Mission, indeed I am convinced that Appleton is the only man for it. Besides having the scientific eminence apparently required, he is also the permanent Head of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, of which the Directorate of TUBE ALLOYS is a part. He thus has some general responsibility in the matter and also intimate knowledge of all the personalities involved on our side. I have every reason to believe that he will be acceptable to the American Scientists, with whom he has always been on the best of terms. I should be grateful if you could telegraph as soon as possible whether Appleton should go.

We cannot possibly hope to be able to conceal from Akers the fact that objection has been taken to him from the American side, though we need not, of course, make any specific mention of Bush.

[Attachment 2—Telegram]

*The British Lord President of the Council (Anderson) to Prime Minister Churchill*

MOST SECRET

[LONDON,] September 2, 1943.

There is an excellent opportunity of sending Appleton by fast boat due to reach New York towards the end of next week, but this will involve his leaving London tomorrow night September 3rd.

After careful consideration I have come to the conclusion that, even if immediate difficulties about Akers's personal position should be cleared up otherwise, it would still be very valuable for Appleton to pay a visit to Washington at this stage. Combining as he does a general knowledge of the whole field of Anglo-American co-operation on scientific matters with a particular responsibility, as head of the D.S.I.R.N. for the scientific side of TUBE ALLOYS, he is better qualified than anyone to get on to such terms with the American scientists in TUBE ALLOYS as to ensure that there shall be no further difficulties or misunderstandings. I have accordingly decided to take advantage of this special opportunity and have asked Appleton to leave tomorrow.

[Attachment 3—Telegram]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Lord President of the Council  
(Anderson)*

MOST SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

I am glad Appleton is coming.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> At the end of this file in the Hopkins Papers is a typed copy of the entry on Appleton in *Who's Who*.

## I. PROPAGANDA COORDINATION

J.C.S. Files

*Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 31 August 1943.

C.C.S. 332

### PROPAGANDA PLANS

1. Lack of clear understanding between theater commanders and the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the propaganda to be used in furtherance of agreed operations has led to discrepancies which have had embarrassing implications.

2. Effective coordination between the theaters and all propaganda agencies of the United Nations can be assured if propaganda plans are prepared and approved in advance of operations. It is therefore recommended that the attached directive to all theater commanders be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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<sup>1</sup> For the action taken on this paper at the 117th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, September 3, 1943, see *ante*, p. 1202.

Enclosure

*Draft Directive on Propaganda Plans*

SECRET

## DIRECTIVE: PROPAGANDA PLANS

1. Whenever a plan for an operation is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the commander concerned will without delay submit a propaganda plan pertaining thereto. This plan will become effective upon approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. Such plans will be in consonance with basic propaganda plans in effect in the areas involved or will indicate any changes desired therein.

3. The plans will indicate:

*a.* The propaganda aims and themes to be effective before and during the operation.

*b.* The plan for effecting changes in approved themes to meet changes in the situation.

*c.* The assistance desired from agencies under the control of, or cooperating with, the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

*d.* The system for releasing information of the initiation of major phases of the operation.

*e.* Such other features as the commander may desire to include.

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 Roosevelt Papers

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 3 September 1943.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Subject: Propaganda Committee.

Enclosed is a proposal which has been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup> and is submitted for your approval.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

J. G. DILL

*Field Marshal*

*Head of the British  
Joint Staff Mission  
in Washington*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief  
of the Army and Navy*

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<sup>1</sup> At their 117th Meeting, September 3, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1203.

[Enclosure]

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*SECRET  
C.C.S. 310/2

[WASHINGTON,] 3 September 1943.

## PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE

We have been examining the possibility of establishing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of propaganda in an emergency, and wish to make the following proposal and recommendations.

## THE PROPOSAL

To establish coordinating authorities with power of decision for Anglo-American policy in propaganda.

## BASIS OF PROPOSAL

Recent experience in the European theater demonstrated that existing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of and dissemination of instructions for propaganda operations in an emergency neither functions with sufficient speed nor avoids contradiction when operating under conditions of emergency.

The present procedure in obtaining agreed decision on propaganda policy from the responsible authorities of the two Governments is too protracted for the immediate unified action required by emergency developments.

## RECOMMENDATION

We recommend for your approval:

a. That Anglo-American Committees of equal membership be set up forthwith for the emergency coordination of Anglo-American propaganda policy in each of three theaters:

- (1) In Washington for the Pacific Theater,<sup>2</sup>
- (2) In London for the European Theater,
- (3) In New Delhi for the South East Asian Theater.

b. That these Committees be empowered, in relation to the theaters concerned, to make *ad hoc* decisions when emergency developments occur which make such decisions necessary or desirable and under such conditions to issue special directives on propaganda policies for the appropriate agencies of the two Governments and of the Theater Commanders.

c. That these decisions and directives be binding for all propaganda operations directed to the theater concerned until revised by the normal process of consultation between the two Governments.

<sup>2</sup> The words "China and Indo China" have been inserted by hand at this point on the file copy in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they do not appear on the copy in the Roosevelt Papers.

d. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with responsibility for securing the establishment of these three Committees in these three places, and that priority should be given for the immediate creation of the Committee which would be responsible for propaganda in connection with impending operations in the Mediterranean.

e. These Committees to consist of:

- One representative of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of British Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of U.S. State Department.
- One representative of British Foreign Office.
- One representative of U.S. Office of War Information.
- One representative of British Political Warfare Executive.

These committees to have power to call in further assistance as and when necessary.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a copy of this paper to Hull on September 4, 1943 (740.0011 Pacific War/3497).

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Roosevelt Papers

*The Director of the Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information (Sherwood) to the President*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

2. General Deane has shown Elmer Davis and me the new Combined Chiefs of Staff proposal No. 310/2 for propaganda committees.<sup>1</sup> We have studied this closely, and it has our agreement. We hope it will be approved and put into effect, as machinery like this for the coordination of propaganda policy is most urgently needed.

R[OBERT] E. S[HERWOOD]

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

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J.C.S. Files

*The President to the President's Chief of Staff (Leahy)* <sup>1</sup>

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

In regard to the Combined Staff proposals<sup>2</sup> concerning need of closer coordination of propaganda policy as between Washington,

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<sup>1</sup> Circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 310/3, September 8, 1943. For the consideration of this paper at the 118th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on September 10, see *ante*, p. 1226.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 1315.

London and the various theatres of war, I have talked this over with the Prime Minister.

Both of us would like to have further examination of this plan.

It creates three new authorities. It creates a central authority of only four, omitting OWI and the British PWE.

Personally, I wonder if it is necessary or whether it could be handled for awhile under less machinery, using preferably a more informal method.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

J.C.S. Files

*The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 10 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER

Subject: Propaganda Committees To Handle Emergency Situations.

Reference: C.C.S. 310/2<sup>2</sup> (copy attached).

We have made a further examination of the question raised by us with you in our memorandum of 8 [3] September 1943, and would like to make clear two points in connection with it.

In the first place, our proposal was in no way intended to cover the arrangements that will be necessary for the general direction of propaganda. This must, of course, be a matter for the two Governments. We were merely trying to set up a machinery for giving decisions in emergency, machinery which recent experience has shown to be most necessary.

Secondly, the inclusion of representatives of O.W.I. and the British P.W.E. has already been arranged.

We would be grateful, therefore, if approval could be given for this emergency procedure to be set up, at least provisionally. It would meet a real military need.

For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

J. G. DILL

*Field Marshal*

*Head of the British*

*Joint Staff Mission*

*in Washington*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief*

*of the Army and Navy*

<sup>1</sup> Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 118th Meeting, September 10, 1943. See *ante*, p. 1226. The text of this memorandum was circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the enclosure to C.C.S. 310/4, September 11, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> See *ante*, p. 1315.

## J. HOSPITAL SHIPS

J.C.S. Files

*Paper Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff*<sup>1</sup>

SECRET

Enclosure to C.C.S. 228/7

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that under present circumstances every effort be made to maintain immunity of hospital ships from attack.

2. The following policies are approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but they shall not be communicated to the enemy except as stated in paragraph 3 below:

*a.* In order to acquire right to immunity at night, hospital ships must be illuminated continuously from sunset to sunrise.

*b.* In order to acquire right to immunity at night, the funnels and hulls of hospital ships must be illuminated from sunset to sunrise to show the red crosses, white painting and green band. Distinctive markings which must at all times be displayed on the decks for identification from the air must be similarly illuminated at night.

*c.* If markings are not illuminated at the time of an attack at night, no complaint can be entertained. It is not, however, illegal for a hospital ship to darken ship at her own risk on necessary occasions such as when lying in a port, passing through defensive minefields or in company with the fleet.

*d.* Any form of maneuvers or stratagems at sea such as practiced by naval vessels to deceive an enemy is not permitted to hospital ships, except when alteration of course is necessary in special circumstances to avoid compromising an operation.

*e.* A ship which has been designated as a hospital ship may carry the following:

(1) The regular personnel assigned to the ship.

\* (2) Combatant, and noncombatant personnel attached to the armed forces only if wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, except that strictly medical corps personnel and personnel of an officially recognized relief society traveling either as units or as casualties may be carried for passage in either direction.

(3) Supplies incident to and for use on board the ship.

\* (4) Regular medical supplies and equipment, exclusive of ambulances and all other vehicles.

(5) No other passengers, materials, mail, or stores may be carried.

<sup>1</sup> This paper was circulated by the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the enclosure to C.C.S. 228/7, September 4, 1943. Except for the addition of the words "attached to the armed forces" in paragraph 2 *e* (2) (which addition was approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at their 117th Meeting on September 3; see *ante*, p. 1202), the text is identical with that of C.C.S. 228/3, July 9, 1943.

\* These paragraphs therefore permit a medical unit with its equipment, less vehicles, to be transported to any theater of operations. [Footnote in the source text.]

*f.* A hospital ship in company with legitimate targets is not because of that fact a legitimate target for attack, but is placed in jeopardy and accepts the risk of accidental attack under such circumstances.

*g.* A hospital ship operating in the vicinity of military objectives accepts the risk of damage incidental to attacks upon the military objectives.

3. Having agreed to the above policies, either government may use the terms of that policy in independently lodging or answering protests concerning particular incidents always, however, keeping the other government fully advised of the proceedings. If a protest concerning the same incident is addressed by the enemy to both governments, consultation shall take place before a reply is made.

4. If any important change in the policies regarding hospital ships, other than those agreed upon above, is considered by either government, the proposal shall be submitted in full to the other prior to any communication with the enemy.

5. Any reprisals taken against Japan will not be extended to Germany and Italy unless the latter show solidarity with Japan, and shall in any case be the subject of prior consultation between governments before being put into effect.

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## K. POSTWAR CIVIL AVIATION POLICY

800.796/418½

### *Memorandum*<sup>1</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

#### MEMORANDUM: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

*Topics for Possible Discussion With Mr. Churchill*

1. Commercial air transport operations
  - a.* Methods of procedure for arranging air rights
  - b.* Rights to engage in air commerce
  - c.* Rights of transit and technical stop
  - d.* Prevention of cutthroat competition
2. Allocation of transport airplanes<sup>2</sup>
3. Airport problems of mutual interest

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<sup>1</sup> The authorship of this covering memorandum is not indicated, but attached to it is a sheet bearing the following typed endorsement: "Material Prepared at Mr. Berle's Request, August 31-September 2, 1943". Another set of this material is in the Hopkins Papers.

<sup>2</sup> The enclosure on this subject is not printed.

4. Technical procedures and facilities for air navigation<sup>3</sup>
5. International organization for civil aviation
  - a. Replacement of International Commission on Aerial Navigation<sup>3</sup>
  - b. Need for a United Nations Aviation Conference

Brief statements follow on each of these topics and subtopics. Additional information can also readily be supplied from the files of the Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation and the agencies represented thereon.

[Enclosure 1<sup>4</sup>]

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle) and Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

[WASHINGTON,] August 31, 1943.

#### METHODS OF PROCEDURE

The following are possible methods of procedure in arranging international civil air rights:

(1) Preliminary discussions between the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. Great Britain will be understood to represent all British territory outside of the self-governing dominions.

The United States has an understanding with Great Britain that neither country will attempt to obtain advantages discriminatory against the other during the war, but that "at an opportune time" they will discuss the matter. This does not apply to the dominions but could be easily extended to them.

The *advantage* is that an agreement here would lay a powerful foundation for all future work; in the absence of such an agreement, future arrangements must necessarily be difficult and haphazard.

This procedure also has the advantage of initiating discussions with the only countries presently in the air to any extent and at the same time possibly working towards an understanding with the group of countries whose geography best complements our own.

The *disadvantage* is that this collective group might prove harder to bargain with than if we dealt with Britain alone and then with the dominions. However, it seems likely that Britain and the dominions will insist on separate interests, in any event. A more important dis-

<sup>3</sup> The enclosures on these subjects are not printed.

<sup>4</sup> On each of the enclosures the typed heading "Memorandum: International Civil Aviation" is repeated. None of the enclosures is signed or initialed.

advantage is that an arrangement with the British Commonwealth might lead to suspicion on the part of our other Allies and the rest of the world: this will depend largely on how it is handled.

(2) Preliminary air conversations between the United States, Canada, and Britain alone.

The *advantage* of this is that discussions could be concentrated on the difficult problems of the North Atlantic area; the *disadvantage*, that it only goes part of the way, leaving the major questions of the Middle East, India, Australia and the Pacific unsolved.

(3) A United Nations conference.

The *advantage* of this is that it creates a feeling of trust and that it would facilitate general discussion and the creation on an interim basis of a new international organization for civil aviation; the *disadvantage*, that (unless there is, in substance, a prior agreement between the British nations and ourselves), the great majority of participants might advance claims, although at present they have no substantial participation in international aviation.

Commercial rights probably must continue to be negotiated bilaterally, and our problem of securing rights would not necessarily be simplified by holding a conference which would be intended mainly for other purposes.

A possible variant might be a conference with those of the United Nations who presently were active in aviation, which in practice would be the British Empire group, plus the Netherlands, the French, the Russians, the Chinese, and the Brazilians.

(4) No conference at all, but a cautious initiation of bilateral conversations, country by country, presumably beginning with Britain, Canada, Russia, and Brazil, and working out from there.

*Advantages:* Each country could be the subject of bargaining by itself, and the aggregate of these bargains might be more advantageous than any more generalized agreements.

The *disadvantage* would be that no common cooperative machinery would evolve, though it appears certainly necessary as aviation expands.

(5) No governmental conversations, leaving private companies to do what they can, securing by private concession the air rights they wish.

The *advantages* are that in certain instances, aggressive American concerns (say, Pan American Airways) will secure favorable rights and conceivably might make a favorable cartel trade with the British Overseas Airways Company.

The *disadvantages* are that the British can probably beat us at this game and establish discriminatory treatment in a great part of the

world. It also seems certain that some of the major powers will refuse to deal with the companies until there has been prior inter-governmental discussion and agreement. Delay in beginning such discussion, while commercial interests muddy the water, could be very disadvantageous.

Through these various possible courses of action, it is to be noted that we have in general two different kinds of task to accomplish: (1) to negotiate arrangements for commercial air rights, and (2) to develop international sentiment for the changes in international practice and organization which may be made necessary by the development of civil aviation.

To accomplish the first task, it would seem most desirable to begin with discussions with the British countries; and it would be wise to keep the Russians and Chinese simultaneously informed, so that they could be drawn into the discussion as need arose, to avoid suspicion. Conferences with other countries would follow, and eventually our commercial aviation arrangements would be completed for the immediate postwar period.

To accomplish the second task, the development of international sentiment along desirable lines, there is probably no substitute for an early United Nations Aviation Conference, followed by the establishment of an interim international commission looking toward an eventual permanent organization.

[Enclosure 2]

*Memorandum by Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

#### RIGHTS TO ENGAGE IN AIR COMMERCE

Rights to engage in air commerce which would be of mutual interest to the British and ourselves include (1) rights for operations between United States and British Commonwealth territory, and (2) rights for operations into the territory of third countries throughout the world.

Rights which had been negotiated prior to the war for operations on routes between United States and British territory were very limited in character. In the United Kingdom we were restricted to two landings per week. Our Canadian arrangements were satisfactory for trans-border operations, but no satisfactory permanent agreements had been reached with respect to Alaskan or trans-Atlantic operations. We had no rights in Australia, South Africa, or India. Rights for New

Zealand were obtained by Pan American Airways and were restricted to use by it.

It is obvious that new agreements are needed to govern postwar air commerce between United States and British Commonwealth territory. Arrangements for present operations are limited to the war period; all prewar restrictions will again be in effect when the war is over unless new agreements are made.

*The first major question* is whether to deal individually with the major members of the British Commonwealth, or instead to attempt to deal with them collectively and simultaneously. The latter course seems preferable; if we deal with them individually, negotiations will be delayed and we shall be in danger of being whipsawed. The geographic relationships are such that two or more units of the British Commonwealth are interested in every major route; multiple discussions are necessary in order to solve all of the equations. Possibly most important is the fact that access to the rich market of the United States is our greatest trading point; we ought not to give that access for anything less than access to all parts of the British Commonwealth.

*The second major question* is that of the kind of deal which in general we wish to make. The question is whether to continue bargaining on a highly restricted basis, perhaps trading schedule for schedule on particular routes, or instead to seek reciprocity on a broadly liberal basis which will permit the development of international air commerce in relative freedom at least throughout the English-speaking world.

For example, those favoring the liberal approach would like to obtain unlimited landing rights at suitable airports in the British Isles and might offer the United Kingdom similar unlimited landing rights for airports serving, say, Boston, New York and Washington. From Canada, they would like unlimited rights to pick-up traffic for the United Kingdom at Toronto and Montreal, and in exchange would offer Canada the right to pick-up United States traffic for the United Kingdom at, say, Chicago and Detroit.

The *advantage* of the restricted approach is that we take few risks of being out-traded and can make certain of getting full consideration for every concession; the *disadvantage* is that the whole development is throttled and postponed in an industry where it will be urgent to expand employment as soon as demobilization begins.

The *advantage* of the liberal approach is the opportunity it provides; the *disadvantage* is the risk that we may miff the opportunity and also the certainty that measures for the control of cutthroat competition will be necessary.

The American airline industry, with the exception of the Pan American interests, advocates a relatively liberal approach, favors regulated competition, and exhibits confidence in the ability of United States operators to hold their own in international competition and to take advantage of any opportunities that offer. The Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation appears to hold a similar opinion.

British commercial interests appear to have a less optimistic outlook and show more concern for the prevention of cutthroat competition. The British governmental approach to bargaining for air rights was consistently conservative before the war, and may continue so.

*The question of rights for operations into third countries* has already been the subject of preliminary discussion, at which it was agreed that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States would negotiate agreements with third countries exclusive of or discriminatory against the other, pending further discussions of this problem at "an opportune time".

It has been generally assumed in this country that our postwar objectives would include rights of commercial air entry into substantially all of the major nations of the world, and that in any event we shall wish to be able to operate at least one round-the-world commercial air transport service. Such a service would not be politically, economically, or technically feasible without commercial entry and transit rights for the countries of the Middle East. Rights in Africa are also desired. But large sections of Africa and the Middle East must be regarded as zones of British influence, in which we shall not readily obtain rights unless the British feel free to extend their operations throughout this hemisphere. What position the British will take in actual negotiations cannot readily be predicted, but in the past there has been considerable British sentiment for zoning schemes, by which we might agree to stay out of the Middle East and Africa in exchange for a British agreement to stay out of South America.

As our objective it seems clear that we should seek a permanent agreement, for the Dominions as well as the United Kingdom, that neither group will negotiate exclusive or discriminatory agreements with third countries.

This has the *advantage* of establishing a defensible policy on the basis of high principle, one much needed for the future development of the world's air commerce; it is not to our *disadvantage*, since the British are likely to outdistance us in any race for discriminatory arrangements, and are very unlikely to give up their aviation interests in this hemisphere . . . .

*Empire cabotage* is a subject to be avoided as long as possible in any discussions with the British, but one which they may nonetheless bring

up, since some Britishers apparently have strong views on the subject. Empire cabotage is an attempt to eat their cake and have it too, to treat the dominions as sovereign states and at the same time as political subdivisions. It has no *advantage* from our point of view; aside from the obvious general disadvantages, it has the specific *disadvantage* of shutting us out of the United Kingdom traffic originating in Canada, although there is no practical way by which we can exclude Canada from the United Kingdom traffic originating in the United States.

[Enclosure 3]

*Memorandum by Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

#### RIGHTS OF TRANSIT AND TECHNICAL STOP

In negotiating in regard to air transport, rights to fly over the territory of another state and to stop for refueling and other technical purposes are distinguished from the right to pick up and discharge traffic. Private aircraft are commonly accorded the right of transit ("innocent passage") and technical stop, but corresponding rights for commercial air transport operations have been closely guarded.

We have two general problems to discuss with the British with reference to rights of transit and technical stop: (1) an exchange of such rights for United States and British Commonwealth territory, and (2) the question of whether any attitude shall be jointly taken with respect to the modification of prewar international practice on general privileges of transit and technical stop. There is also the question of British influence when we seek rights from third countries, notably Portugal, Egypt, etc.

*The British need certain specific transit rights from us, and we need certain rights from them.* If the British, the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders, or some of them jointly, are to operate from England and Canada to Australia and New Zealand, they need transit and technical stop rights for Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States. If they are to operate from Canada to Siberia or over any north Pacific great circle course, they need rights for Alaska.

Conversely, we urgently need transit and technical stop rights on an unlimited basis for Newfoundland and Eire, and they would be highly desirable for Bermuda. We need them badly for Canada and Labrador, together with similar rights for Greenland and Iceland, if we are to fly the far northern great circle courses across the Atlantic. There is technical argument as to the merit of those routes, particu-

larly in winter, but their potential importance is indicated, among other things, by the expenditures we have made for airport facilities to serve them.

Unless very extensive rights can be obtained from the Soviet Union, our best route for a round-the-world air transport service will largely parallel the British Empire route between Suez and Singapore. There would be no point in trying to operate in this area unless we have satisfactory rights of commercial entry for India, but we also need rights of transit and technical stop across India, as well as for the various British-controlled political units along the Empire route. Rights for British territory in Africa, for British Guiana, and for the British West Indies will all be desired.

In view of the extent of our needs and the fact that Hawaii and Alaska are our major trading assets so far as rights of transit and technical stop are concerned, it is clear that we shall not do well if trading on this subject is handled separately from other air right negotiations. However, there is no reason to assume that the British will wish to handle it separately. For our part, it has been anticipated that any satisfactory comprehensive agreement with the British for an exchange of rights of commercial entry throughout our respective territories would also provide for a general exchange of rights of transit and technical stop, subject in each case to the exclusion of reasonable prohibited areas.

The *advantage* of such a general exchange is that it would clear up the problem completely for us on a basis which might be acceptable to the British if they are getting satisfactory commercial entry rights from us. The *disadvantage* is the fact that if the British are allowed rights for Hawaii, it will probably not be possible to treat that Territory in its entirety as a prohibited area for the airlines of other countries, although for reasons of security we might wish to do so in the case of some other country. Just what country or countries this would be is not clear if Japan is forbidden to engage in international air transport for a long period after the war.

*The question of liberalizing general international practice with reference to transit and technical stop* is of some immediate importance because of its bearing on the question of whether to hold a United Nations Aviation Conference. Presumably the future air transport operations of both the British and ourselves with reference to third countries would be greatly simplified if it is possible to negotiate a multilateral agreement by which there would be general recognition of a rule to the effect that aircraft in commercial air transport shall be permitted to fly over the territory of any nation, except over reasonable prohibited areas, and to land at appropriate airports for refuel-

ing and repairs, without the right to discharge or take on traffic. In drafting such an agreement, it would be appropriate to provide that any nation may exclude from its air space the aircraft of any nation which fails to comply with the rule of freedom of transit and technical stop for its own territory.

A United Nations conference would probably be necessary to secure the adoption of any general principle on the subject of transit and technical stop and might be successful in achieving general adoption of the principle only while the unifying influence of the war is being felt, if success is possible at all.

The Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation has recommended that international practice be modified by the negotiation of a multilateral agreement along the lines suggested above. This recommendation was questioned by the Subcommittee on Security; it is understood, however, that the representative of the Army Air Forces on the Subcommittee was not present during the discussion of the problem of air transit rights.

The only *disadvantage* of general freedom of transit which has been raised in any quarter is on the question of security, on which the experts are evidently in disagreement. The *advantage* arises out of the fact that if transit and technical stop are put on a liberal basis as a matter of principle and of general international practice, many countries will feel constrained to accept the principle, although in bilateral negotiations they might hold out a long time because they have little interest in securing transit rights elsewhere for their own nationals.

*British influence has apparently increased our difficulties in securing rights of transit and technical stop from Portugal*, and the same influence could be exerted to our disadvantage in many other quarters. Adoption of the general principle would lessen our dependence upon the British in dealing with various countries. Meanwhile, it would be desirable, if possible, to secure British agreement to cooperate with us on the problem.

[Enclosure 4]

*Memorandum by Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

#### PREVENTION OF CUTTHROAT COMPETITION

Preliminary conversations with British officials, the content of Parliamentary debates, and discussions in the British press alike indicate that it will be necessary to deal in some way satisfactory to the British with the control of competition in air transport. According

to a recent article in the London *Economist*, it appears "to be the universal assumption of the House of Commons that British civil aviation would require some form of protection if it was to exist at all."

The fact that the United States has a statutory policy of competition under which its domestic aviation has grown great is viewed in England with considerable fear, although some strong voices now advocate a similar policy for British aviation. Considerable misinformation or lack of information as to the policy of this Government with respect to subsidies is also reported by American observers, and it appears to be generally assumed in England that if several United States companies are permitted to operate internationally after the war, all will be heavily subsidized.

Various plans or proposals may be brought forward in whole or in part with the objective of limiting and controlling competition and thereby affording protection to British interests.

1. *Internationalization* of operations on principal international routes appears to be favored by some groups, including elements in the present British Government. This would mean, for example, that a public corporation might be created to operate air transport services across the North Atlantic, which corporation would be jointly owned by, say, the United Kingdom, Eire, Canada, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and possibly other countries.

This would have the *advantage*, at least from the British point of view, of avoiding competition. International friction might be reduced, with some increase in military security and international cooperation. The *disadvantages* would probably include a low rate of technical progress, relatively high operating costs, high fares, and consequent limitations on the amount of travel. A specific disadvantage from our point of view would be the fact that at best we would probably be in a minority position in the control of any such corporation.

2. *Zoning* of the world into zones of influence in which each major power would have a relatively free hand in the field of air transport is another alternative which may appeal to certain British groups. Under such a plan we would probably be kept entirely out of Africa, the Middle East, and India, while the British might agree to stay out of South America.

Zoning would seem disadvantageous from our point of view, for reasons indicated in the statement entitled "Rights To Engage in Air Commerce." Moreover, zoning plans fail to solve the competitive problems of the inter-zone routes such as those across the North Atlantic, where competition is likely to be most acute.

3. *Trading schedule for schedule*, accompanied by low limits on the total number of schedules, is the device to limit competition which resulted from our prewar negotiations over the North Atlantic route.

The *advantage* of this scheme is the restriction of the total amount of service to an amount unlikely to be much greater than that needed to serve the traffic. The *disadvantage* is the fact that this retards traffic development. Since we shall probably originate the greater part of the traffic, partly through the traffic promotional efforts of the American airline industry, the limitation of schedules is especially objectionable to the United States companies. It would seem that on thorough consideration the British would also find the plan disadvantageous, in view of their obvious need for the encouragement of American post-war tourist travel to England and other parts of the Commonwealth as a means of redressing their postwar balance of international payments.

4. *Pooling traffic* is another device to limit competition which found much favor in the prewar organization of European air transport. The *advantage* is the partial achievement of the economies and efficiencies which can sometimes attend monopoly. The *disadvantage* is the inhibiting influence common to all devices in restraint of trade.

5. *Conferences of air transport operators*, similar to the conferences which have long been a familiar feature of the shipping industry, are another related device. Traffic pools are usually operated by conferences; they may also concern themselves with the adjustment of rates and the prevention of rate-cutting, with the allocation of routes, services, and equipment, and with the prevention of new competition.

The conference system readily becomes a device in restraint of trade unless closely and effectively supervised in the public interest by public regulatory agencies. Resort to the conference system may be necessary in the absence of other effective means of preventing cutthroat competition.

6. *Cooperation among national regulatory agencies* would seem essential if competing air transport operators are allowed to restrict competition through the conference system. The *advantage* of such cooperation is that it does not necessarily require new international machinery, and it avoids any restriction of national sovereignty and authority. The *disadvantage* is that national agencies are not always able or willing to take parallel or cooperative action. They are organized on different bases and with differing powers. Many countries, including some of the major powers, have no adequately organized governmental agency for the economic supervision of civil aviation.

7. *An international regulatory agency* with powers for international air commerce similar to those vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board for the domestic air commerce of the United States would perhaps be an ideal solution if it could be created. Major questions as to feasibility are involved, as indicated in the statement entitled "Replacement of International Commission on Aerial Navigation."

In the light of these possible alternatives and the difficulties of each, it is apparent that it will probably take much time and negotiation to achieve any satisfactory solution.

For the present it would seem desirable to reassure the British as to the outlook with respect to subsidies and comparative costs. It can readily be demonstrated that the past subsidy policy of this Government in the field of air transport has been moderate, and there is no reason to assume a desire on our part to initiate a subsidy race.

So far as operating costs are concerned, the British should overcome their inferiority complex and face the future with confidence. As is pointed out in the article in the London *Economist* of June 5, 1943, previously referred to, "On labour and personnel costs, which amount to a third of the total, British lines should have a distinct advantage over the American," while there is no reason to assume that British costs will be higher for other items, particularly in view of the magnificent record of the British aircraft manufacturing industry during the war. Indeed, over the longer future, we shall eventually be the ones to face a cost disadvantage unless we can maintain our present lead in operating "know-how" and in transport airplane design.

Fortunately, the economic characteristics of aviation are sufficiently different from those of shipping to indicate that it will be a long time before we face a cost disadvantage in international air transport at all comparable in magnitude to our cost disadvantage in merchant shipping on world routes.

[Enclosure 6]

*Memorandum by Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 2, 1943.

#### AIRPORT PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL INTEREST

*The question of airport expenditures in third countries of mutual interest may bear examination with the British.* Airports in Greenland and Iceland are obviously subjects of mutual interest for military and commercial reasons. Our expenditures for these installations amount to about \$53,000,000 in Greenland and \$22,000,000 in Iceland. Presumably full control will revert at the end of the war to the government having jurisdiction unless some other arrangement is made.

Internationalization of such airports is a solution which appears to merit study and international discussion. Internationalization could be achieved by turning the airports over to an international agency with corporate powers, which would maintain and operate them for

commercial air transport use, and for such military use as might be agreed upon. The *advantage* of this plan is that the airports would probably be adequately maintained and competently operated. Moreover, through participation in the international agency, we would retain some degree of control based on international ownership, whereas we shall lose all ownership control if the airports revert to the respective national jurisdictions. The *disadvantage* is the difficulty of securing agreement in the organization of a suitable international agency, including the agreement of the governments having jurisdiction. From our point of view, it might be more satisfactory to seek arrangements by which the airports are permanently retained as military bases; but this may not be possible.

[Enclosure 9]

*Memorandum by Miss Virginia C. Little and Mr. Paul T. David, of the Bureau of the Budget*

[WASHINGTON,] September 1, 1943.

#### NEED FOR A UNITED NATIONS AVIATION CONFERENCE

Great Britain and the United States have a mutual interest in convening an United Nations Aviation Conference. The United States is interested in such a conference for several reasons: (1) because of the contribution it can make towards securing more liberal rules of transit and technical stop, and (2) because it can lay the groundwork for an international commission to replace the I.C.A.N. Great Britain would also seem anxious to relax prewar restrictions on transit over countries situated along Empire routes, and is even more anxious than we are that an international organization be set up to deal with problems such as cutthroat competition. Furthermore, because of Britain's closer ties with the smaller nations of Europe, and particularly with the governments in exile, the British are likely to insist that these countries be represented in any international discussions on postwar European aviation.

It would therefore be desirable to convene a conference, but rather than a full dress international conference, at which binding agreements are concluded, such a conference might be organized in a manner similar to the organization of the Food Conference at Hot Springs.<sup>5</sup> The chief *advantage* of such a set-up is that it would permit an extensive exchange of views, without the necessity for making commitments before the nature of the general political and security ar-

<sup>5</sup> Concerning the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18-June 3, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 820 ff.

rangements for the postwar world is clear. A possible *disadvantage* is that many countries might be stimulated to assert claims which they could not sustain and to demand that the United States and other major aviation powers pursue a course somewhat more liberal than may be feasible in the immediate postwar period. These difficulties might be avoided by a careful handling of the agenda and by making it clear that the conference must be largely confined to preparatory discussion.

Prior to the time when definitive arrangements can be made for international aviation, there is need for an immense amount of continuing preparatory work which could well be carried on by an interim international commission designated by the countries represented at the conference. Such a commission might perform the following functions:

- (1) It could prepare plans for the eventual permanent organization;
- (2) It could prepare plans for other aspects of the peace settlement affecting civil aviation;
- (3) It could carry on the informational and advisory functions of a permanent organization to the extent feasible during the war.

The establishment of a suitable interim commission would be a major objective of a United Nations Aviation Conference of the kind advocated by the Interdepartmental Committee on International Aviation. The need for early organization of an interim commission is a major reason for holding the proposed conference in the near future.

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## L. NEED FOR A CONFERENCE ON POSTWAR EMPLOYMENT POLICIES

800.504/113

*The Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Smith) to the President*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 4, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Need for a United Nations Conference on Post-War Employment Policies

The corollary to the favorable progress on the war fronts is the need for speeding up international as well as domestic post-war planning.

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<sup>1</sup> The source text is a typed copy referred by Roosevelt to Hull on September 7, 1943, under cover of a memorandum which read: "What do you think? F.D.R." No evidence has been found that the subject of Smith's memorandum was discussed by Roosevelt with Churchill during their meetings at Washington and Hyde Park in September 1943. The comments of the Department of State in response to Roosevelt's memorandum of September 7 were not forwarded to the President until November 29, 1943 (800.504/113).

I know that some progress is being made as a result of the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, by the Currency Stabilization Committee, and by committees on other specific items.

It is my feeling that greater and more coordinated progress would result from these separate activities if the central theme of Article VII of the master Lend-Lease agreements<sup>2</sup> were developed by a conference on measures to expand domestic production and employment, at least in the great industrial countries. Such assurance is indispensable in both formulating sound recommendations and securing the desired results with regard to (1) expanded world food production; (2) a high level of international trade; (3) lowering tariffs and other trade barriers; (4) exchange stabilization; (5) expanded volume of international investment; and (6) full use of the world's expanded facilities in shipping and aviation.

You may want to discuss with Mr. Churchill the advisability of arranging at an early date for a technical conference on the internal development programs of the several United Nations as provided for in Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreements.

HAROLD D. SMITH  
*Director*

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, article VII of the lend-lease agreement with the United Kingdom, signed at Washington, February 23, 1942, Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 241; 56 Stat. (2) 1433; Department of State *Bulletin*, vol. VI, February 28, 1942, p. 192.

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## M. DEPENDENT PEOPLES

Hull Papers

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] August 30, 1943.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In accordance with our conversation today, I am sending you here-with a draft of a declaration by the United Nations on dependent peoples<sup>1</sup> for use in connection with your conversations with Prime Minister Churchill.

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<sup>1</sup> No draft is attached to the source text in the Hull papers, and the original of this memorandum has not been found in the Roosevelt Papers. The attachment was probably the text of March 9, 1943, printed *ante*, p. 717.

N. PUBLICATION OF MINUTES OF MEETINGS OF THE  
COUNCIL OF FOUR DURING THE PARIS PEACE CON-  
FERENCE OF 1919

023.1/9-743

*The President to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR HON. CORDELL HULL

Please speak to me about our publishing the notes of the conversations between Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in Paris in 1919.<sup>1</sup>

I have a distinct hesitation (*a*) because Lloyd George is still alive and (*b*) because notes of these conversations ought not to have been taken down anyway.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]

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<sup>1</sup> The reference is to the proposed publication of the minutes of the meetings of the Council of Four in *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919. The British Government had been asked to clear the minutes for publication, and Roosevelt's interest in the subject presumably arose from a conversation initiated by Churchill. Concerning further discussion of the subject between Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on September 12, 1943, see *post*, p. 1338.

023.1/9-743

*The Secretary of State to the President*

[WASHINGTON,] September 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In your memorandum of September 7<sup>1</sup> you requested that I speak with you about our publishing the notes of the conversations between Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau at Paris in 1919. You stated that you had a "distinct hesitation" in that regard.

We planned the publication of the Paris Peace Conference records in 1938 only after receiving assurances from the British Foreign Office that it had no objection in principle to the project. The minutes of the Council of Four (Big Four or Big Three) were expressly mentioned at the time as being included in the plan. We announced the project to the public and requested funds of Congress. Funds have been received, two volumes are published already; more are in preparation, and those containing the Wilson-Lloyd George-Clemenceau conversa-

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<sup>1</sup> *Supra*.

tions were to have appeared this year, had the British not offered certain objections. Several influential associations, including those of the international lawyers, the political scientists, and the historians, have urged acceleration of the work in the belief that the country should know the complete story of the last great conference as soon as possible.

Mr. Lloyd George is indeed still alive but he himself published over fifty pages of extracts from the Big Four minutes back in 1938.<sup>2</sup> The Italian Aldrovandi published voluminously from those minutes<sup>3</sup> as did Baker in *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*<sup>4</sup> and Tardieu<sup>5</sup> to a lesser extent. So many have used them that nonpublication here could hardly be excused on the ground that Lloyd George is still living.

We are now so committed to the project that withdrawal would be embarrassing. Some Congressmen and other proponents of the program would ask why it had been stopped. It would not be possible long to conceal the real reason and our Anglophobes might well capitalize upon the situation. Certainly we would not wish to accept responsibility for nonpublication and risk the assumption in the public mind that we had some ulterior motive for withholding publication.

Most of the minutes of the Big Four are not verbatim but are summaries prepared in dignified and restrained language. They are not explosive. We have submitted copies to the British with an invitation that they suggest deletions where publication would obviously be unfortunate. I wish we might work out the problem on that basis.

If, unfortunately, we cannot publish these minutes, I shall appreciate your suggestions as to what explanation is to be made to Congressmen and other persons who inquire as to the reason.

<sup>2</sup> In David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (2 vols., London: V. Gollancz, 1938).

<sup>3</sup> In Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti, *Guerra diplomatica: Ricordi e frammenti di diario (1914-1919)* (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1936); *Nuovi ricordi e frammenti di diario per far seguito a Guerra diplomatica (1914-1919)* (Milan: A. Mondadori, 1938).

<sup>4</sup> Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Written From His Unpublished and Personal Material* (3 vols., Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1922).

<sup>5</sup> André Tardieu, *La paix* (Paris: Payot et Cie, 1921); *The Truth About the Treaty* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1921).

## 13. CONVERSATIONS AT HYDE PARK, SEPTEMBER 12, 1943

### *Editorial Note*

Churchill left Washington late in the evening of September 11, 1943, and stopped at Hyde Park the following day<sup>1</sup> to see Roosevelt before proceeding later on September 12 to Canada en route to London. No minutes of the Hyde Park conversations have been found, but Churchill sent to Roosevelt from Canada on September 13 a sheaf of papers, printed in this section, which reflect at least some of the subjects discussed and some of the conclusions reached. The following subjects were probably also discussed:

1. Meeting of the International Labor Organization. See Roosevelt's memorandum to the Secretary of Labor, *post*, p. 1340, sent shortly after the President's return from Hyde Park to Washington.

2. The recommendation from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (*ante*, p. 1256) that Roosevelt and Churchill send a message to Stalin suggesting a Soviet air attack against the Rumanian oil refineries at Ploesti. This recommendation was disapproved (see *ante*, p. 1256, fn. 1).

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<sup>1</sup> Churchill was accompanied by his wife, his daughter Mary, Lord Moran, John Miller Martin, Commander Thompson, and Captain Horton. Ismay came to Hyde Park from New York during the day. See William D. Hassett, *Off the Record With F.D.R., 1942-1945* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p. 201.

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Roosevelt Papers

### *Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*

ON THE TRAIN, QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I send you herewith a number of notes and telegrams which I have prepared, arising out of our talks yesterday. These include a telegram to U.J.<sup>1</sup> which, as it mentions your affairs, I

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<sup>1</sup> For the text of Churchill's draft message to Stalin, which constitutes enclosure 1 and which dealt largely with possible arrangements for a tripartite meeting of Heads of Government, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 26. Roosevelt apparently failed to give Churchill his views on this draft message, and a reminder was sent through the British Chargé at Washington (Campbell) on September 17, 1943. Roosevelt sent his comments to Churchill on October 4, 1943, but Churchill in the meantime had sent a different message to Stalin. See *ibid.*, pp. 25, 27-28; *Stalin's Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 165-166.

have asked my Government to hold till I get your okay with any alterations.

We have all greatly enjoyed this trip, and I cannot tell you what a pleasure it has been to me, to Clemmie and to Mary to receive your charming hospitality at the White House and at Hyde Park. You know how I treasure the friendship with which you have honoured me and how profoundly I feel that we might together do something really fine and lasting for our two countries and, through them, for the future of all.

Yours ever,

W[INSTON S. CHURCHILL]

[Enclosure 2]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.]

WELFARE No. —. Most Secret and Personal.

The President thinks we should be prepared to raise with Stalin, at the Foreign Secretaries Conference in the first instance, the post-war world organization. Everything should have relation to an interim or emergency period of unspecified duration, during which permanent structures could be shaped and built. In this period he contemplates three forms of United Nations collaboration:

(a) The Four Powers, who would guarantee by force the maintenance of peace and order and the enforcement of Armistice conditions.

(b) An Executive Council embracing additional members of the United Nations, making up in all and step by step a total of eleven.

(c) A general Assembly of all the United Nations in which, presumably, respectable neutrals might find their place. This would provide opportunities for the ventilation of opinion and would be able to pass resolutions but would enjoy no executive power.

I repeat that the whole of the above is for the interim Armistice period only and in no way prejudices final decisions as to world order, or of course the natural Anglo-American special relationship.

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL] <sup>2</sup>

13.9.43

<sup>2</sup> On the source texts of enclosures 2, 3, and 5, Churchill's initials are handwritten but not in his own hand. On enclosure 4 his initials are typed. There are no initials on enclosure 6.

[Enclosure 3]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Deputy Prime Minister (Attlee) and the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.]

WELFARE No. —. Most Secret and Personal.

The President agreed with my minute to him of September 10 regarding recommendation in C.C.S. 310/2<sup>3</sup> (about setting-up of Anglo-American Emergency Propaganda Committees for Pacific, European and South-East Asian theatres), as follows: (*Begins*)

As there seems to be general agreement on this proposal I think we should accept it. In spite of the increased number of Committees which it involves, it clearly would in no way affect any guidance which you or I might wish to give separately or jointly on special occasions. I am therefore recommending my Government to concur. (*Ends*)

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

13.9.43

[Enclosure 4]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.]

Most Secret and Personal.

Reference CONCRETE 679 and 797.\*

The President has vetoed the publication of the Council of Four minutes of the last war.<sup>4</sup>

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]

13.9.43

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 1315.

\*Publication of the Minutes of the Paris Peace Conference. [Footnote in the source text. The messages referred to have not been found in United States files.]

<sup>4</sup> Following his discussion of this subject with Churchill, Roosevelt sent the following memorandum to Hull on September 16, 1943:

"In regard to the publication of the meetings with the Big Four in Paris in 1919, I am still not satisfied that it is advisable at this time. Their publication now would probably result in wholly unwarranted sensational articles. Such articles would, without doubt, come from hostile sources. They would seek to draw untrue conclusions and parallels between 1919 and 1943. I am especially anxious that this wholly preventable result should not occur.

"I would suggest that if the Congress asks about the matter that they be told that the President has requested that they be not published until after the war, in order to avoid at this time the reopening of international controversy. They cannot go behind that with any success.

"Incidentally, in those meetings of the Big Four in Paris no notes should have been kept. Four people cannot be conversationally frank with each other if somebody is taking down notes for future publication.

"I feel very strongly about this and incidentally it is not going to do anybody any harm if we defer publication for a year or two." (023.1/9-1643)

For Hull's recommendation on this subject, see *ante*, p. 1334. The minutes of the Council of Four to which Roosevelt referred were eventually published by the Department of State in 1946 in *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vols. v and vi.

[Enclosure 5]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.]

WELFARE No. —. Most Secret and Personal.

Reference CONCRETE 798.†

The President is sending a message in terms suitable for publication.<sup>5</sup> His angle as Head of a Republican Government is not necessarily identical with ours but there is no difference in aim. Meanwhile I see no reason to delay indefinitely the publication of my two messages.

W[INSTON] S. C[HURCHILL]  
13.9.43

[Enclosure 6]

*Prime Minister Churchill to the British Foreign Secretary (Eden)*

MOST SECRET

[QUEBEC, September 13, 1943.]

WELFARE No. —. Most Secret and Personal.

Reference WELFARE 677.<sup>6</sup>

It is agreed that Count Sforza's visit to the Mediterranean<sup>7</sup> is put off till further notice and that we shall be consulted again.<sup>8</sup>

13.9.43

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† (Message to the King of Greece) [Manuscript footnote in the source text. Eden's telegram No. CONCRETE 798 has not been found in United States files.]

<sup>5</sup> For the text of Roosevelt's message of September 6, 1943, to King George II of the Hellenes, see *ante*, p. 1046, fn. 5. The American Ambassador to Greece (Kirk) was instructed on September 18, 1943, that publication of Roosevelt's message was authorized if and when Churchill's message was released (868.01/387).

<sup>6</sup> Not found in United States files.

<sup>7</sup> Count Carlo Sforza, an Italian anti-Fascist leader then in the United States, had been informed by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., on September 2, 1943, that "we would be glad to endeavor to arrange his passage to North Africa." See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 402.

<sup>8</sup> The British Embassy at Washington notified the Department of State on September 25, 1943, that the British Foreign Office then felt that Sforza should proceed to Europe as soon as possible.

Hull Papers

*Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

ON THE TRAIN, QUEBEC, [September 13, 1943.]

CIVIL AVIATION

MR. PRESIDENT.

1. I have told our Government that you made no objection when I said that we intended to hold a preliminary Commonwealth meeting in London or in Canada, and that this would be only to focus our

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<sup>1</sup> Roosevelt forwarded this paper to Hull on September 28, 1943.

own British Commonwealth ideas for subsequent discussion with the United States Government.

2. I said that, about the proposed International Conference, you thought it might wait till the matter had been discussed at the forthcoming tripartite Anglo-Soviet-American meetings.

3. I mentioned that your preliminary view comprised the following:

- (i) There should be private ownership.
- (ii) Key points should be available for international use on a reciprocal basis.
- (iii) Internal traffic should be reserved to internal companies.
- (iv) Government support may be required on an international basis for certain non-paying routes.<sup>2</sup>

W[INSTON] S C[HURCHILL]

13.9.43

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Roosevelt's discussion of aviation policy at his press conference, October 1, 1943, as reported in *New York Times*, October 2, 1943, reprinted in Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. vi (July 1943-June 1944) (Boston, 1945), pp. 399-401. See *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 177-179, for Roosevelt's oral directives of November 10, 1943, on aviation policy, and for his reference to a discussion of this subject with Churchill at the First Quebec Conference.

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Roosevelt Papers

*The President to the Secretary of Labor (Perkins)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF LABOR

The Prime Minister seemed wholly favorable to a calling of the meeting by the I.L.O. The place suggested was Montreal. I see no reason, therefore, why you should not go ahead with it.

F[RANKLIN] D. R[OOSEVELT]



## INDEXES

# INDEX OF SUBJECTS

(Index of persons follows this index)

- Admiralty Islands, proposed military operations in, 429
- Airfields, floating, construction of, 890-891, 900, 989-992, 1131, 1207-1208, 1215-1216, 1224, 1227-1229, 1242-1243
- Akyab, proposed military operations against, 431, 437-438, 879, 901-902, 906, 946-947, 978
- Albania: Food shipments to, 83*n*; proposed military operations in, 14, 41; sovereignty of, 547, 608, 1168
- Aleutian Islands, military situation and operations in, 31, 134-135, 146, 229, 237, 356, 369, 419, 427, 843, 878, 984, 987, 999, 1028
- Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board, 95*n*, 161-162, 179, 509-512, 884, 1039, 1294-1300
- Alsace-Lorraine, 754-757
- ANAKIM. *See* Burma.
- Andaman Islands, proposed military operations in, 118, 937-938
- Anti-submarine warfare, 25, 95, 120, 161-163, 178-179, 186, 189, 228, 230, 237, 305, 353-354, 360-361, 366, 372-373, 509-512, 853-855, 871, 884-885, 1025, 1039, 1122-1123, 1197, 1219-1221, 1294-1300; Axis submarine losses, 162-163, 192, 398, 406, 413, 460, 609, 833-834, 1300-1302
- Armaments Inspection Commission, 694, 697-698
- Assault craft. *See* Landing craft allocations.
- Atlantic Charter, 1941, 327, 523, 673, 693, 703-704, 718, 720, 733, 802, 812, 816, 1253
- Atlantic Conference, 1941, 836*n*
- Atomic energy research: Agreement on, drafts and text, 638, 647-648, 1117-1119; purchase of patents connected with, 632; U.S.-U.K. cooperation in, 1-11, 188-189, 221, 447-448, 630-653, 894, 1096-1097, 1197, 1210-1211, 1310-1313
- Australia: Aircraft reinforcements to, 138, 289; lines of communication to, protection of, 146-147, 229; representation by of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, proposal for, 324-325
- Austria: Austrian question, 1111-1112; frontier with Germany, 752-753; frontier with Italy, 789-791, 1112-1113
- AVALANCHE. *See* Italy: Peninsula, Allied invasion of.
- Aviation, civil. *See* Civil aviation policy, postwar.
- Axis powers in Europe, strategic concept for defeat of, 100-102, 112-116, 118, 154-155, 348, 354-356, 367-368, 864-868, 870-871, 875, 1023-1024
- Azores Islands: Discussions concerning, 33, 47-48, 85-86, 91-92, 98-100, 120, 152-153, 182-183, 186, 190-191, 235, 304-312, 347, 353-354, 360-361, 366, 371-373, 479, 609-610, 612-616, 880, 886-887, 912, 942, 1039, 1091-1092, 1225; U.S. interest in air base rights in, 610-612, 886-887, 899, 1123, 1135-1136, 1293-1294
- Balkan countries: Guerrillas in, supplies to and use of, 1025, 1030-1032, 1034-1035, 1145, 1229-1230; proposed military operations in, 26, 30*n*, 32-33, 41, 194, 475, 477, 479, 483, 498-499, 898-899, 1025, 1039, 1213-1215, 1289, 1292
- Baltic States, 1114
- Belgium: Arms for troops in, 1030, 1032; Brussels, declaration of as an open city, 1940, 596-597; frontier with Germany, 757-760; situation in, 461
- Belgrade, declaration of as an open city, 1941, 597-598
- Berlin, entry of troops into, 942
- Bermuda Conference on Refugees, 1943, 336, 336*n*, 343, 1043
- Bismarck Archipelago, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369, 429, 1127, 1144*n*
- BOLERO. *See* United Kingdom, buildup of forces in.
- Bomber offensive. *See* under Germany, Allied efforts against.
- Brazil, 120-121, 191, 308-309, 696, 1321
- Brussels, declaration of as an open city, 1940, 596-597

- Bulgaria (*see also* Balkan countries), 29, 454-455, 461, 518, 705, 1075, 1290
- Burma: Air bases in and air operations from, 71-72, 142, 883; aircraft allocations for, 234, 357, 370; Chinese interest in, and participation in military operations in, 89-91, 196, 385-386; Japanese forces in, 420, 427; proposed military operations in, 15-16, 18, 27-28, 31-32, 54-76, 79-80, 87, 113-114, 118-120, 126-132, 137-139, 142, 155-157, 165-166, 172-173, 196, 226-227, 229, 236-237, 240*n*, 290-291, 293-295, 298, 303-304, 349, 356, 369, 428, 430, 431, 433-439, 443, 904, 906-909, 938-939, 945-946, 978, 985, 987-988, 993-994, 1127, 1136-1137, 1160-1161; shipping shortages in, 13, 15
- Burma Road. *See* Burma, proposed military operations in.
- Canada: Air rights in, 680, 1322-1323, 1325; anti-submarine warfare announcement, approval of, 1301-1302; atomic energy matters, participation in, 641, 646, 831, 1118, 1312; French Committee of National Liberation, relations with, 664, 666-668, 1108-1109, 1171-1172; НАВВАКУК Board, membership on, 1224*n*; hospital ships, suggestion regarding, 1202; Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.-Canada, creation of, 653-660, 929, 1119; Legation in the U.S., question of Embassy rank for, 141, 335*n*; munitions, Chinese efforts to purchase from, 440-441, 659-660, 936, 1240; Quebec Conference, question of participation in, 396-400; U.S., relations with, 334-335
- Caroline Islands, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 350, 356, 369, 428-429, 978, 987, 1126, 1144*n*
- Casablanca Conference, 1943, 1*n*, 17, 25*n*, 52, 87, 88*n*, 89, 144, 223, 288, 293, 320*n*, 358, 634, 836*n*, 856, 872, 940, 1029
- Chile, diplomatic relations with Italy, 590*n*
- China: Airfields in, 290, 907, 982, 996-997, 999; American air forces in, 135-136, 142, 430, 433-434, 972, 994, 1145-1146; Burma campaign, participation in, 883, 961; consultation with on Far East questions, 288-289; estimate of situation in, 87-91, 422, 878; international position of, 928; Japanese forces in, 139-140, 419-421, 423-424, 427; Manchuria, 419-421, 423, 427, 628-629; military assistance to, 18, 27-28, 31-32, 44,
- China—Continued  
56, 62-64, 70-77, 229, 233, 237, 288, 295-298, 302, 972-973; military operations in, 70-77, 155-157, 196, 349, 356, 369; munitions, efforts to purchase from Canada, 440-441, 659-660, 936, 1240; representation at Allied conferences, interest in, 440-443, 914, 1239-1240; Soviet influence on Communists in, 628; supply routes and pipeline for gasoline to, 79, 136, 140-141, 147-148, 230, 295-298, 858-860, 878, 907-909, 938-939, 960, 971-975, 984, 987, 993-994, 999, 1003-1006, 1132, 1157; Tibet, relations with, 138, 298-300
- Civil administration of liberated territory, 513-516, 919, 930, 931-932, 1204, 1237
- Civil aviation policy, postwar, 679-681, 725, 880, 1319-1332, 1339-1340
- Code names, 144, 155, 206, 394-395, 1222
- Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Documents:  
CCS 105, Transportation of Landing Craft, 239*n*  
CCS 105/4, *same*, 989*n*  
CCS 127/2, Scale of Attack on the East and West Coasts of North America, 1092*n*  
CCS 127/3, *same*, 1092-1095, 1221  
CCS 155/1, Conduct of War in 1943, 52, 93, 145, 223-224  
CCS 166/1/D, HUSKY, 240*n*  
CCS 168, Conduct of the War in the Pacific Theater in 1943, 145  
CCS 170/2, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 88*n*, 223, 226, 293  
CCS 174, Loss Rate for 1943, 235  
CCS 185/2/D, Policy for Coming Operations Regarding Propaganda and Subversive Activities, 180, 326*n*  
CCS 185/3, *same*, 100, 125, 163-164, 180, 326*n*  
CCS 185/4, *same*, 164*n*, 180, 326*n*, 330-331  
CCS 190/6/D, Charter, Civil Affairs Committee, 1204*n*, 1237  
CCS 190/7, Planning for the Handling of Civil Affairs in Enemy-Occupied Areas Which May Become Theaters of Operations, 1204, 1237  
CCS 196/1, Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Activities in India, 1238  
CCS 196/2, *same*, 424-426, 1203-1204, 1238  
CCS 196/3, *same*, 1203-1204, 1237-1238  
CCS 196/4, *same*, 1204, 1240-1241  
CCS 203, Measures for Combating the Submarine Menace, 1298*n*

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
Documents—Continued

CCS 206, Military Supplies for Turkey, 144

CCS 210/2, British and U.S. Secrecy Definitions, 1203

CCS 215, Invasion of the European Continent From the United Kingdom in 1943-1944, 82*n*, 238-239

CCS 217, Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive From the United Kingdom, 80*n*, 104-106, 153*n*, 230*n*, 239-253, 347*n*

CCS 219, Conduct of War in 1943-1944, 54*n*, 227-229, 303

CCS 220, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 125-126, 289-293, 302, 427

CCS 222/2, Future Convoy Arrangements in the Atlantic, 940, 1040, 1047

CCS 222/3, *same*, 959-960, 1047-1048

CCS 222/4, *same*, 1047*n*, 1048*n*

CCS 223, Operations in the European Theater Between HUSKY and ROUNDUP, 54*n*, 257-261

CCS 225, Operations From India, 1943-1944, 54*n*, 293-295

CCS 226, Use of Portuguese Atlantic Islands, 48*n*, 85*n*, 91-93, 304-307

CCS 226/1, *same*, 93*n*, 98-100, 307*n*

CCS 226/2, *same*, 93*n*, 98*n*, 99*n*, 100, 307-308, 310*n*

CCS 227, Relief and Supplies for Occupied and Liberated Territories, 83*n*, 85*n*, 115*n*

CCS 228/3, Hospital Ships, 1202*n*, 1318*n*

CCS 228/6, *same*, 1202

CCS 228/7, *same*, 1318

CCS 229, Potentialities of Air Route From Assam to China, 79*n*, 132-133, 142, 230*n*

CCS 231, Operations in Burma To Open and Secure an Overland Route to China, 79*n*, 126-132, 142, 230*n*

CCS 232, Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War, 78*n*, 93-94, 97-98, 231*n*

CCS 232/1, *same*, 78*n*, 93*n*, 94, 98, 100, 111, 231-233

CCS 233, Agenda for the Remaining Conferences, 79*n*, 94-95, 229*n*

CCS 233/1, *same*, 79*n*, 94*n*, 95, 229-231

CCS 234, Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First), 84*n*, 100-102, 112-117, 176*n*, 230*n*, 261-272, 273*n*

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
Documents—Continued

CCS 235, Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe (Concentration of Largest Possible Force in U.K.), 84*n*, 112-117, 230*n*, 261*n*, 273-281

CCS 237, European Operations, 116*n*, 118, 281*n*

CCS 237/1, *same*, 116*n*, 118, 261*n*, 273*n*, 281-282

CCS 238, Operations in Burma, 1943-1944, 142

CCS 239, Operations in the Pacific and Far East in 1943-1944, 145-148

CCS 239/1, *same*, 145*n*, 230*n*, 302-304, 349*n*

CCS 240, Sonic Warfare, 164

CCS 241, Anti-U-Boat Warfare, 161-163, 178-179

CCS 241/1, *same*, 161-163, 178-179

CCS 241/3, *same*, 179

CCS 241/4, *same*, 179

CCS 242, Draft of Agreed Decisions, 149*n*, 152, 155*n*, 346-351, 359, 361-362, 364

CCS 242/1, *same*, 346*n*, 351*n*

CCS 242/2, *same*, 152, 153*n*, 155*n*, 156*n*, 184-186, 346*n*, 351-358, 359*n*, 372*n*, 373*n*

CCS 242/3, *same*, 157*n*, 186, 189-197, 199*n*, 203*n*, 347*n*, 351*n*, 359-363, 364*n*

CCS 242/4, *same*, 199-200, 203-204, 359*n*, 363, 364*n*

CCS 242/5, *same*, 199-200, 203-204, 363-364

CCS 242/6, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 183*n*, 199*n*, 203*n*, 231*n*, 238*n*, 281*n*, 303*n*, 353*n*, 359*n*, 360*n*, 363*n*, 364-373, 401-402, 427, 473*n*, 850, 857, 976-977, 980

CCS 243, Third Soviet Protocol, 183

CCS 244, Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943-1944, 180-181, 233*n*

CCS 244/1, *same*, 180*n*, 181*n*, 233-237, 313*n*, 453, 1133*n*

CCS 246, Movement of the *Queens*, 179

CCS 246/1, *same*, 939, 1041-1042

CCS 247, Directive on Organization and Operation of Military Government for HUSKY, 187

CCS 247/5/D, *same*, 187*n*

CCS 248, Provision of New L.S.I. (L)'s, 187

CCS 248/1, *same*, 187

CCS 249, Code Names for Agreed Operations, 206*n*

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
Documents—Continued

CCS 250, Implementation of Decisions Reached at the TRIDENT Conference, 200

CCS 250/1, *same*, 200*n*, 284–287, 368*n*

CCS 251, Proposals for Improving Combined Planning, 201–202

CCS 251/1, *same*, 202

CCS 252/2, TIDALWAVE Air Force, 584, 871–874

CCS 255, Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to SOAP-SUDS, 1245*n*

CCS 255/1, *same*, Subsequent to TIDALWAVE, 1206, 1224–1225, 1245–1246

CCS 255/2, *same*, 1225*n*, 1256*n*

CCS 258, Surrender Terms for Italy and Draft Declaration and Proclamation, 522*n*, 525–526, 537*n*, 560, 580, 950, 1083–1086

CCS 258/1, *same*, 560, 580, 1083–1086

CCS 270, Land Airport Facilities in the Azores, 611

CCS 270/4, *same*, 1293*n*

CCS 270/5, *same*, 610–612, 886–887

CCS 270/6, *same*, 886–887

CCS 270/7, Plans for the Use of the Azores, 1225, 1293–1294

CCS 272/1, Logistic Organization To Improve Mobility of Anti-Submarine Squadrons, 509–512, 881–885, 1294*n*, 1295*n*

CCS 272/2, *same*, 1219–1220, 1294–1295

CCS 284/3/D, Directive Covering Responsibility and Procedure for Planning, Coordination, and Execution of Deception Measures Against Japan, 415–416, 884

CCS 286, Formation by U.S. Assault Forces for Operation OVERLORD, 1041

CCS 286/1, *same*, 452

CCS 286/2, *same*, 452–453, 1026

CCS 286/3, *same*, 891, 1026

CCS 288, Proposed Agenda for QUADRANT, 400–401, 404, 850*n*, 1029, 1049

CCS 288/1, *same*, 402–404, 850*n*, 1029, 1049

CCS 288/2, *same*, 404–405, 1029, 1049

CCS 288/3, QUADRANT Conference Agenda, 412–413, 850

CCS 294, Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners, 1246*n*

CCS 294/1, *same*, 1206, 1246–1250

CCS 300, Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943–1944: Pacific-Far East Area, 417–424, 426–427

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
Documents—Continued

CCS 300/1, *same*, European Area, 453–467, 852*n*, 871*n*

CCS 301, Specific Operations in the Pacific and Far East, 1943–1944, 413, 426–432, 857*n*, 876–878, 921, 971, 981, 993

CCS 301/1, *same*, 878*n*, 921, 971–972, 978, 993–994, 1001*n*

CCS 301/2, *same*, 921, 993–994

CCS 303, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe, 412, 472–482, 854*n*, 864–868, 870, 875, 1024*n*, 1099

CCS 303/1, *same*, 870, 875, 1023–1024

CCS 303/2, *same*, 875, 1024*n*

CCS 303/3, *same*, 875, 1024–1026, 1031, 1038–1039

CCS 304, Operation OVERLORD—Outline Plan, 483–496, 866*n*, 868, 896*n*, 1038*n*

CCS 305, Effect of Indian Floods on Burma Campaign, 435*n*, 972

CCS 305/1, *same*, 862*n*, 881–882, 972–973, 1006*n*

CCS 306, Rome—An Open City, 863–864, 1054–1055

CCS 307, Artificial Harbors for Combined Operations, 868, 1008–1009

CCS 307/1, *same*, 1243*n*

CCS 307/2, *same*, 1205, 1243–1245

CCS 308, South East Asia Command, 882–884, 921, 968–971, 992*n*, 1000–1001

CCS 308/1, *same*, 921, 1001*n*

CCS 308/2, *same*, 921, 1002*n*

CCS 308/3, *same*, 884*n*, 921, 1000–1003, 1129

CCS 309, POINTBLANK, 871–874, 1018–1023

CCS 310, Propaganda Committee, 963, 1097–1098

CCS 310/1, *same*, 1202

CCS 310/2, *same*, 1203, 1315–1317, 1338

CCS 310/3, *same*, 1226, 1316*n*

CCS 310/4, *same*, 1226*n*, 1317*n*

CCS 311, Italian Peace Feelers, 876, 1060*n*

CCS 312, Pipeline From India to China, 860*n*, 938, 973–975, 1003

CCS 312/1, *same*, 938, 1003

CCS 313, Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 126*n*, 432*n*, 906–909, 920*n*, 975–988, 993*n*, 994

CCS 313/1, *same*, 906*n*, 994

CCS 314, Allocation of Landing Craft, 892, 1027–1028, 1041

CCS 314/1, *same*, 892, 989, 991

CCS 314/2, *same*, 892, 991

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
 Documents—Continued  
 CCS 314/3, *same*, 1041  
 CCS 315, HABBAKUKS, 890–891, 989–991, 1224  
 CCS 315/1, *same*, 890–891, 991–992  
 CCS 315/3, *same*, 1224n  
 CCS 315/4, *same*, 1224n  
 CCS 316, PLOUGH Force, 893, 1028–1029  
 CCS 317, Equipping Allies, Liberated Forces, and Friendly Neutrals, 893, 905, 939n, 1029–1037, 1049, 1054, 1246–1247  
 CCS 317/1, *same*, 893n, 939–940, 1031n, 1032n  
 CCS 317/2, *same*, 939–940, 1049  
 CCS 317/3, *same*, 939–940, 1053–1054  
 CCS 318, Sardinia: Fifth Column Activities, 894n, 905n, 1068–1069  
 CCS 318/1, *same*, 905n, 1069n  
 CCS 319, Progress Report to the President and Prime Minister, 890n, 895–903, 992–993, 1037–1039, 1121  
 CCS 319/1, *same*, 920  
 CCS 319/2, *same*, 920n, 937, 1121  
 CCS 319/3, Draft Report to the President and Prime Minister, 937–938  
 CCS 319/4, *same*, 938, 942–949, 954–955, 1121n, 1124n, 1127n, 1131n, 1132n  
 CCS 319/5, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 910n, 920n, 937n, 938n, 942n, 943n, 954n, 955, 963n, 1121–1132, 1138n  
 CCS 320, RANKIN, 940, 942n, 1010–1018  
 CCS 321, Policy Towards Spain, 910, 1099–1101  
 CCS 322, Policy Towards Turkey, 910  
 CCS 322/1, *same*, 1138n  
 CCS 323, Air Plan for the Defeat of Japan, 921, 995–1000  
 CCS 324, Rehabilitation of Occupied and Liberated Territories, 1049n  
 CCS 324/1, *same*, 940, 1049–1051  
 CCS 325, Supply Routes in North-east India, 921, 1003–1005  
 CCS 326, Amphibians for OVERLORD, 939, 1042–1043  
 CCS 327, Operations From India, 938–939, 1005–1007  
 CCS 328, Directive to General Eisenhower, 955  
 CCS 329, Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Con-

Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
 Documents—Continued  
 duct of the War, 1943–1944, 955, 962–963, 1132n, 1133n, 1134n, 1135n, 1142n, 1151n, 1152n  
 CCS 329/1, Comments by Mr. L. W. Douglas and Lord Leathers on the Dry Cargo Shipping Position, 962–963, 1152n, 1153  
 CCS 329/2, Implementation of Assumed Basic Undertakings and Specific Operations for the Conduct of the War, 1943–1944, 955n, 963, 1132–1157  
 CCS 330, Light Passenger Vessels for Cross-Channel Operations, 944n  
 CCS 331, Netherlands Marine Landing Force, 1204–1205, 1221, 1238–1239  
 CCS 332, Propaganda Plans, 1202, 1313–1314  
 CCS 333, Data as Basis for Allocation of Landing Craft, 1201  
 CCS 334, Slowness of Buildup for AVALANCHE, 1205–1206, 1263  
 CCS 335, Allocation of CVE-Type Ships to England, 1220–1221, 1296–1300  
 CCS 336, Allocation of Escort Vessels to the French Navy, 1219  
 CCS 338, Selection of Code Designators, 1222  
 CCS 339, Directive for the Control Commission and AMG in Italy, 1225–1226, 1269–1273  
 CCS 341, Review of Strategic Situation in Light of Italian Collapse, 1222–1224, 1287n, 1290  
 CCS 341/1, *same*, 1222–1224  
 CCS 341/2, Report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister, 1287n, 1290–1292  
 Establishment of, 34n, 849n  
 Meetings:  
 Quebec Conference, First: Aug. 14, 849–862; Aug. 15, 862–869; Aug. 16, 870–874; Aug. 17, 875–880; Aug. 18, 881–887; Aug. 19, 889–894; Aug. 20, 904–911; Aug. 21, 920–921; Aug. 23, 936–941; Aug. 24, 954–964; with Roosevelt and Churchill, Aug. 19, 894–903; Aug. 23, 941–949  
 Washington, miscellaneous: July 9, 509n; July 30, 1029n, 1049n; Sept. 3, 1200–1206; Sept. 10, 1218–1229; with Churchill, Sept. 11, 1229–1236; with Roosevelt and Churchill, Sept. 9, 1212–1216

- Combined Chiefs of Staff—Continued  
Meetings—Continued  
Washington Conference, Third:  
*May 13*, 34-48; *May 14*, 52-66;  
*May 15*, 77-86; *May 17*, 86-96;  
*May 18*, 97-108; *May 19*, 111-  
119; *May 20*, 124-133, 142; *May*  
*21*, 143-149; *May 22*, 160-165;  
*May 23*, 178-183; *May 24*, 184-  
188; *May 25*, 199-202; with  
Roosevelt and Churchill, *May*  
*12*, 24-33; *May 14*, 66-77; *May*  
*19*, 119-123; *May 21*, 152-160;  
*May 24*, 189-197; *May 25*, 203-  
207
- Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559-  
561, 580-582, 1082-1086
- Combined Food Board, representation  
on, 660-661
- Combined Munitions Assignments  
Board, 440, 680, 892, 1219n, 1240
- Combined planning, proposals for im-  
provement of, 201-202
- Commercial policy, 50, 174, 925-926,  
1333
- Commonwealth delegations, meeting of,  
*May 20, 1943*, 333
- Communism in postwar Europe, 1077-  
1078, 1081, 1112, 1188
- Congress, U.S., 728-729, 915-916
- Continental Western Europe, invasion  
of. *See under* Germany, Allied ef-  
forts against.
- Convoys: To Soviet Union, 26, 625, 627,  
853, 930, 932, 1143; trans-Atlantic,  
940, 959-960, 1040, 1047-1048, 1092,  
1142-1143
- Corsica, proposed military operations  
in, 13, 42, 46, 103, 225, 253, 258, 265-  
269, 474, 476-477, 483, 502, 854, 896-  
897, 1025, 1075, 1289, 1292
- Crete, 705, 898
- Czechoslovakia, frontier with Germany,  
743-752
- Curzon Line, 1114
- Danzig, 731-736, 1114
- Declaration of Brussels, 1874, 557
- Denmark, 461, 1030, 1036; request for  
statement by Roosevelt, 1252-1254
- Dependent areas (*see also* Trusteeship),  
717-721, 914, 919, 926-927, 1333
- Disarmament and arms limitation, 685,  
695, 697, 701, 703, 707-708, 1168
- Dodecanese Islands, proposed military  
operations in and postwar disposi-  
tion of, 13, 26, 259-260, 266-268, 705,  
794-795, 1289, 1292
- Egypt, 122, 342, 679, 696, 796-797, 799,  
802, 1116, 1325
- Employment policies, postwar, need for  
a conference on, 1332-1333, 1336,  
1340
- English, Basic, 880
- Eritrea, 798-801
- Ethiopia, 796, 798-801, 831, 1167
- Europe, Council of, 167-168, 688, 699
- Europe, United Nations Commission for,  
698, 701-702
- European Advisory Commission (*see*  
*also* Postwar world organization),  
932n, 1047n
- European Theater: Air offensive in,  
1025; Allied failures in conduct of  
war in, 467-472; military operations  
in (*see also specific areas*), 186,  
223-226, 228, 238-287, 412-413, 850-  
855
- Far Eastern Theater, proposed military  
operations in (*see also specific*  
*areas*), 66-76, 145-148, 298, 302-304
- "Festung Europa", 454
- Finland, 454, 461, 466, 910, 1114, 1174
- Formosa, proposed military operations  
in, 433, 985-986, 988
- Four-Power security declaration: Dis-  
cussion of, 681-682, 690-691, 700,  
728-730, 913-914, 917, 925, 1240;  
drafts of, 682-683, 692-693
- France (*see also* French Committee of  
National Liberation *and* Continen-  
tal Western Europe *under* Ger-  
many, Allied efforts against): Air  
bases in, 854; air rights in, 680;  
Communist Party in, 323; frontier  
with Germany, 754-757; German  
forces in, 238, 263; liberation move-  
ment in, 320-324; navy, allocation  
of escort vessels for, 1219; Paris,  
declaration of as an open city, 1940,  
597; participation in military-  
political commission by, 1306-1309;  
post-liberation administration of,  
321-323; proposed military opera-  
tions in southern part of, 269, 464,  
475, 477-479, 897-898, 945, 957, 1025,  
1038, 1067; situation in, 461; troops,  
armament and use of, 102-104, 155,  
158, 190, 229-230, 237, 350, 358, 363,  
371, 665, 898, 939-940, 1029-1034,  
1049; Vichy government, 461
- Free Germany Committee, 601, 911, 1115
- French Committee of National Libera-  
tion, 192n, 320, 323, 532-534, 1251-  
1252, 1289; Declaration by United  
Nations, possible adherence to, 670-  
671; recognition, consideration of  
and U.S., U.K., and Canadian state-  
ments on, 661-670, 831, 916-917,  
919-920, 922, 928, 930, 934, 949-950,  
953, 1101-1111, 1158, 1169-1172
- Gas warfare, possible German use of,  
and declaration on, 555, 593, 1075,  
1197, 1206, 1250, 1254

- Germany (*see also* Germany, Allied efforts against) :
- Aircraft strength and production in, 105, 241, 243-245, 250-251, 276, 852, 872, 1018-1019
  - Crimes of in Poland, declaration on, 930-931, 1120
  - East Prussia, 686, 731-736, 784, 1114
  - France, forces in, 238, 263
  - Free Germany Committee, 601, 911, 1115
  - Frontiers of, and territorial problems with: Austria, 752-753; Belgium, 757-760; Czechoslovakia, 743-752; France, 754-757; Netherlands, 760-761; Poland, 731-748
  - Ground forces, strength of, 275-276, 850-852
  - Italy, German troops in, 579, 909-910, 944-945, 1074, 1260
  - Jews, treatment of, 1053
  - Morale in, 871, 1076
  - Naval forces, 42-43, 276
  - Postwar partition vs. unity, discussions on, 685, 761-788, 927-928, 1197
  - Rhineland, 685, 738, 754, 756-757, 765, 783-784, 787, 1014-1016
  - Ruhr, 683, 738, 744, 754-757, 781, 854, 871, 1014-1017
  - Silesia, 685, 731, 736-748, 750, 778, 784, 1114
  - Situation in after Italian collapse, 512-513; *July 30*, 453-467; proposed Roosevelt-Churchill statement on, 508-509
  - Soviet Union, policy towards, 1075
  - Submarine losses, 162-163, 192, 398, 406, 413, 460, 609, 833-834, 1300-1302
  - Western Front, German forces on, 458-459
  - Wolfram supplies from the Iberian Peninsula, 1100-1101
- Germany, Allied efforts against (*see also* Anti-submarine warfare; Axis powers in Europe; Balkan countries; Corsica; European Theater; France, proposed military operations in southern part of; Italy, Peninsula, Allied invasion of; Mediterranean Theater; Sardinia; and Sicily) :
- Berlin, entry of troops into, 942
  - Bomber offensive against Germany, 25, 27, 37-38, 43, 80-82, 84, 94, 101-102, 104-106, 113, 153-154, 181-182, 192-193, 206, 224, 228, 230, 232, 236, 238-253, 275, 347-348, 354, 367, 459, 474, 479, 852-855, 871-874, 887, 895, 1018-1024, 1038, 1123
  - Collapse of prior to OVERLORD, recommended course of action in event of, 940, 942, 1010-1018, 1125
  - Germany, Allied efforts against—Con. Continental Western Europe, invasion of: Air support for, 1216; allocation of landing craft for, 453, 939, 1027-1028, 1041-1043, 1141-1142; command arrangements for, 869, 905, 944; directive regarding, 284-286; forces for, 278-281, 357, 370; French participation in, 155, 191-192, 285, 363; German defenses in, 942; planning for, 27, 43-45, 53, 78, 80-84, 101-102, 112-116, 122-123, 191-193, 222-224, 228, 236, 238-239, 261-262, 271, 275, 277, 286-287, 348, 354-355, 361, 364, 367-368, 452-453, 470-471, 474-476, 483-496, 499-502, 506-508, 863-870, 895-896, 942-944, 1009, 1024-1026, 1038, 1123; Supreme Allied Commander, selection of, 496-498, 830, 929
  - Möhne and Eder dams, bombing of, 96, 108, 887
  - Gibraltar, Straits of, security of lines of communication in, 47, 306, 480, 855, 958, 1124
  - Gilbert Islands, proposed military operations in, 428, 431, 857, 901, 987, 1126, 1137, 1144*n*
  - Graf Zeppelin*, 42, 456, 1093
  - Great Britain. *See this index, passim.*
  - Greece: EAM, 1044; food shipments to, 83*n*; Italian armistice delegation, desire to participate in, 1191-1192, 1265-1267; policy toward, 930, 932-934, 1339; political and military situation in, 462, 705, 914-915, 1044-1046; proposed military operations in, 41, 102, 259; territorial claims by, 794, 1266; troops of, use in Mediterranean Theater, 122, 898-899
  - Greenland, 1325, 1330
  - Guadalcanal, proposed military operations in, 129
  - Guam, proposed military operations against, 428-429, 1126, 1137
  - HABBAKUKS. *See* Airfields, floating.
  - Harbors, artificial, construction of, 911, 1008-1009, 1205, 1243-1245
  - Harvard*, 944
  - Hawaii, lines of communication, security of, 145, 147, 290-291
  - Hong Kong, proposed military operations against, 290, 292, 432-433, 435, 982, 985-986, 988
  - Hospital ships, 1202, 1318-1319
  - Hungary (*see also* Balkan countries), 453-455, 461, 518, 524, 705, 910, 1075, 1290
  - Hyde Park, Churchill-Roosevelt conversations at, 618*n*, 830-834, 929, 1336-1340

Iceland, 502, 1325

India: Airfields in, 230, 234, 237, 293, 295, 297, 301-302, 349, 356, 369-370, 438-439, 999; air supplies to China, 55-57, 79, 85, 87, 126*n*, 128-129, 132-133, 142, 187-188, 230, 237, 295; conditions in, 177; floods in, and effect of on Burma campaign, 436, 861-862, 879, 993; proposed military operations from, 188, 293-295, 436-439, 859, 877, 879-882; supplies to, 131; supply routes and pipeline for gasoline to China from, 79, 136, 140-141, 147-148, 230, 295-298, 858-860, 878, 907-909, 938-939, 960, 971-975, 984, 987, 993-994, 999, 1003-1006, 1132, 1157; U.S.-U.K. intelligence organizations in, coordination of, 424-426, 971, 993, 1002-1003, 1203-1204, 1237-1238, 1240-1241

Indian Ocean area: Landing craft allocations to, 234; proposed operations in, 28, 78

International Labor Organization, 724, 1340

Iran, U.S. policy toward, 672-674, 880

Iraq, 122, 342, 696, 1116

Ireland: Allied bases in, 616-624, 831, 880; Axis espionage in, 622-623; constitutional status of, 926; neutrality of, 618, 621-623; U.S. assistance to, 619-620

Irish Republican Army, 621-622

Italy (*see also* Axis powers in Europe): Airfields in, 499, 852-853, 855, 866, 895, 897

Allied Military Government and Control Commission for, 923-924

Badoglio government: Negotiations with, 521, 523; French interest in participation in, 532-534; Soviet Union, notification of, 571, 587, 1086-1087

Political and military situation of, affecting peace negotiations, 517-519, 527, 531-532, 536-537, 548, 556, 566-567, 569, 573, 582-585, 1070-1074, 1081-1082, 1188, 1193-1196

Chile, diplomatic relations with, 590*n*

Collapse of, speculation regarding, 83, 85, 115-116

Committee of Action of Free Italy, 563-564, 568

Communists in, 555, 564, 582, 1081

Elimination of from war, possibility of, 13, 25-26, 30, 41, 101-102, 112, 225, 230, 274-275, 285

Fleet, proposed disposition of, 38, 579, 944-945, 1260

Food shipments to, 83*n*

## Italy—Continued

Frontiers with and territorial problems concerning: Austria, 789-791, 1112-1113; Dodecanese Islands, 794-795; Eritrea, Italian Somaliland, and Libya, 796-801; Pantelleria, 801-802; Yugoslavia, 593, 791-794

German defense of, 579, 944-945, 1260

Peace feelers, and Allied action on, 598-601; Barcelona, 563-565, 568; Lisbon, 534-536, 554-555, 598, 876, 881, 1056-1057, 1060-1062, 1190-1191; Madrid, 588-594, 599, 1055, 1062-1063; Switzerland, 1087-1088; Tangier, 566-568, 574-576, 578-579, 585-587, 595-596, 599, 1076-1078

Peninsula, Allied invasion of, 32, 253-254, 393, 447-448, 450-451, 474, 476-477, 584, 955-958, 1025, 1062, 1064-1068, 1186-1188, 1205-1206, 1257-1263, 1277-1281, 1283-1284, 1288-1289, 1291-1292

Political reconstruction of, proposals for, 803-829

Rome: Bombing of, 528-530, 549-551, 562-563, 595, 863-864, 1054-1056, 1277; open city, declaration of as, 499, 524*n*, 528-531, 549-554, 557-559, 561-563, 565, 570, 572, 594-598, 831, 863-864, 914, 1054-1055, 1057-1059, 1069-1070, 1175-1176, 1190

Situation of, estimates, 454-456, 461, 1230-1233

Surrender of, 1257-1259, 1261; announcement and press release on, 1267-1269, 1273-1275; messages to Badoglio government on, 1284-1286; Soviet Union, correspondence with regarding Eisenhower signing instrument on behalf of, 1175, 1185, 1188, 1190, 1193, 1199-1200, 1262-1263, 1266-1267, 1307*n*

Surrender terms: "Further" or "additional" terms: Discussion of, 565-566, 580-581, 913, 1083-1086, 1088-1090; draft text of, 602-609

"Long" or "comprehensive" terms: Consultation with Soviet Union concerning, 951*n*, 1086*n*, 1185, 1190, 1193; discussion of, 522, 525-527, 537-538, 560-561, 580-582, 587*n*, 831, 880, 912-913, 919, 930, 950-952, 1083-1086, 1089-1090; draft text of, 538-547; final text of, transmitted to Eisenhower, 1161-1169; signature of, 1162*n*, 1264*n*; transmittal of, to Italian authorities, 951*n*. 1090-1091, 1180-1181, 1183-1184, 1188-1189, 1192

## Italy—Continued

- Surrender terms—Continued  
 "Short" or "military" terms:  
 Amendments to draft text of, 522, 565-566, 1062; consultation with Soviet Union concerning, 1190, 1193, 1199-1200, 1262, 1267; discussion of, 522, 527, 560, 580-582, 913, 919, 950-952, 1088; draft text of, 519-520; "Quebec Memorandum" concerning, 876, 1060-1061, 1071; signature of, 1200, 1264, 1281; transmittal of, to Italian authorities, 1060, 1071
- Japan (*see also* Japan, Allied efforts against):  
 Aircraft losses, 859  
 Air offensive against, proposals for, 87, 291, 908, 982, 988, 995-1000  
 Armed forces, estimates of, 418-420, 422  
 Deception measures against, 415-416, 884  
 Defeat of, overall strategic concept, 28-29, 53-54, 78, 93-94, 125-126, 230, 289-293, 356, 368-369, 401, 403, 413, 427, 432-434, 856-862, 876-877, 906-909, 945, 975-988, 994  
 Kuriles, fortification of, 146  
 Lines of communication in Pacific, 147-148, 155, 302-304, 861, 988  
 Merchant marine losses, 135  
 Morale in, 423  
 Netherlands, interest of in participation in war against, 1238-1239  
 Policy toward China, 89  
 Potentialities for offensive action, 147  
 Prisoners of war, treatment of, 938  
 Puppet troops, 420-421  
 Shipping, 418-419, 423  
 Situation in 1943-1944, estimates of 417-421, 426-427  
 Soviet Union: Bases in, proposals for use of against, 996; relations with, 417
- Japan, Allied efforts against. *See* Burma; China; Far Eastern Theater; India; Indian Ocean area; Japan: Defeat of; Pacific Theater; and Southwest Pacific.
- Jews. *See* Germany: Jews, treatment of; Palestine; and Refugees, emergency measures for.
- Kiska. *See* Aleutian Islands.
- Korea, 423*n*, 628-629
- Kuriles: Japanese defense of, 419, 423; proposed military operations in, 430, 857, 859, 986

- Landing craft, production and availability of, 101, 113, 115, 231, 234, 239-241, 279, 357, 370, 882, 891
- Landing craft allocation: General, 1146-1148, 1201-1202; European Theater, 453, 1219; Indian Ocean area, 234; Pacific Theater, 877-878; U.K., 989, 991
- League of Nations, 170, 687, 690, 703, 715-716, 731, 745, 758, 1210
- Liberated areas and occupied territory: Queen Wilhelmina, draft declaration on, 1052-1053; rehabilitation of, 1049-1051; statement on, proposed, 1046-1047
- Libya: Postwar disposition of, 796-798; refugee settlement in, 338-342, 681, 797-798
- Log of Roosevelt's trip to Quebec Conference, 835-848
- Long-range penetration groups, use of, 860-861, 879, 888, 893, 900, 909, 961, 993, 1006, 1028-1029, 1137, 1140, 1161, 1235-1236
- Luetzow, 456, 459
- Magnesium, supplies of, 96, 312-313
- Malacca, Straits of, proposed military operations in, 290-291, 979, 982
- Malayan Peninsula, proposed military operations in, 28, 70, 118, 987-988, 994
- Malta, 801-802, 861, 926
- Manchuria. *See under* China.
- Mandated Islands, proposed military operations in, 857, 862, 877, 984
- Marianas, proposed military operations in, 146, 428-429, 876, 987, 1126, 1137
- Marshall Islands, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 350, 356, 369, 428, 431, 901, 978, 987, 1126, 1137, 1144*n*
- Mediterranean Theater: Allied air forces in, 271-272; Allied fleet in, 854; armed forces, deployment of, 481-482, 499-501, 1138-1139, 1142; German armed forces in, 458; lines of communication, security of, 898-899, 1025-1026, 1039; military operations in, 13, 45-47, 53-54, 78, 80-84, 101-102, 113-116, 121-122, 193-195, 198, 224, 228, 236, 257-261, 264-271, 274, 348, 355, 368, 401-403, 470-471, 475, 941, 1063; strategic situation in after collapse of Italy, 1292; U.K. forces in, 1139-1140
- Military-political commission, proposals for the establishment of, 1087, 1173-1174, 1305-1309
- Monticello, 499
- Monroe Doctrine, 688

- Netherlands: Availability of and supplies for forces in, 1030, 1032, 1036-1037; frontier with Germany, 760-761; Japan, interest of in participation in war against, 1204-1205, 1221, 1238-1239
- Netherlands East Indies, proposed military operations in, 303-304, 350, 857
- New Guinea, proposed military operations in, 31, 129, 136-137, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369, 428-429, 857, 877-878, 978, 984, 987, 1127, 1137, 1144*n*
- North Africa, invasion of, progress of, 11-12, 15, 18, 29, 44, 81
- North America, scale of possible enemy attack on, 1092-1095, 1221
- Northwest Europe, recommended course of action in, in event of German collapse prior to OVERLORD, 940, 942, 1010-1018, 1125
- Norway, proposed military operations in, 160, 193, 364, 368, 459, 461, 481, 502, 943, 1030, 1032, 1036-1037
- Office of Strategic Services, 424-426, 893-894, 905, 945, 971, 993, 1002, 1068-1069, 1087, 1130, 1237-1238, 1241, 1292
- Office of War Information, 424-425, 971, 1002, 1241
- OVERLORD. *See* Continental Western Europe, invasion of *under* Germany, Allied efforts against.
- Pacific Theater: Airfields in, 859; aircraft allocations to, 859, 997-999; landing craft allocations to, 877-878; proposed military operations in, 16, 31, 44, 78, 93-94, 145-148, 157-158, 184-185, 226-227, 229-230, 233-234, 236-237, 288-304, 349-350, 356, 369, 427-434, 876-878; shipping shortages in, 93
- Pacific War Council, meeting, 134-141, 289*n*, 299*n*, 333
- Palestine: Issuance of an Anglo-American statement on, 674-679, 919, 930, 932, 1116; Jewish immigration into, 341-342
- Pantelleria, 789, 801-802
- Paris, declaration of as an open city, 1940, 597
- Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 749, 790, 816, 1114*n*, 1197; publication of minutes of Council of Four at, 1334-1335, 1338
- Patriot forces in Europe, Allied policy on, 480-481
- Petroleum, 235, 358, 362, 371, 1156-1157
- Philippines: Proposed military operations in, 146, 290, 857, 877, 987-988; U.S. protection of and U.S. bases in, 844*n*
- Pipeline for gasoline from India to China, 858-860, 909, 938, 960, 973-975, 1003, 1132, 1157
- Ploesti, bombing of, 26, 29, 38-40, 48, 106-108, 115, 158-159, 195-196, 230, 236, 259, 266, 350-351, 355-356, 362, 368, 584, 705, 853, 872-873, 895, 1206, 1224-1225, 1230, 1245-1246, 1256, 1336
- POINTBLANK. *See* Bomber offensive against Germany *under* Germany, Allied efforts against.
- Poland: Frontier with Germany, 731-748; frontier with the Soviet Union, 703, 1113-1116; German crimes in, 503-506, 930-931, 1120; question of Australian representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, 324-325; situation in, 462; Soviet Union, evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens from, 203*n*, 325; troops, use of in the Mediterranean Theater, 122, 193, 203, 898, 1030-1031, 1035-1036, 1213
- Portugal (*see also* Azores Islands), neutrality of, 463
- Postwar world organization (*see also* Four-Power security declaration): Proposals for and discussions regarding, 141, 167-172, 681-730, 831, 928, 1210, 1337; regionalism in, 167-169, 688, 691*n*, 694, 699-700, 703, 710-711; United Nations protocol for the war and transition period, draft, 693-696, 706-708
- Propaganda: Coordination of, 963, 1097-1098, 1202-1203, 1226, 1313-1317, 1338; subversive activity and, 100, 125, 163-165, 180
- QUADRANT. *See* Quebec Conference, First.
- Quebec Agreement on atomic energy, 1117-1119
- Quebec Conference, First, Aug. 14-24, 1943, 849-1172
- Agenda, 400-405, 412-413, 1039
- Airfields, floating, construction of, 890-891, 900, 989-992, 1131
- Akyab, proposed military operations against, 879, 901-902, 906, 946-947, 978
- Aleutian Islands, military operations in, 878, 984, 987, 999, 1028
- Andaman Islands, proposed military operations in, 937-938
- Anti-submarine warfare, 853-855, 871, 884-885, 1025, 1039, 1122-1123
- Arrangements for, 391-414
- Atomic energy research, U.S.-U.K. cooperation in, 894, 1096-1097; agreement on, drafts and text, 638, 647-648, 1117-1119

- Quebec Conference, First—Continued  
 Austria: Austrian question, 1111–1112; frontier with Italy, 1112–1113  
 Axis powers in Europe, strategic concept for defeat of, 864–868, 870–871, 875, 1023–1024  
 Azores Islands, 880, 886–887, 899, 912, 942, 1039, 1091–1092  
 Balkan countries: Guerrillas in, supplies to and use of, 1025, 1030–1032, 1034–1035, 1145; proposed military operations in, 898–899, 1025, 1039  
 Baltic States, 1114  
 Belgium, arms for troops in, 1030, 1032  
 Berlin, entry of troops into, 942  
 Bismarck Archipelago, proposed military operations in, 1127, 1144n  
 Bomber offensive against Germany, 852–855, 871–874, 887, 895, 1018–1024, 1038, 1123  
 Burma: Air forces in, 883; proposed military operations in, 904, 906–909, 938–939, 945–946, 978, 985, 987–988, 993–994, 1127, 1136–1137, 1160–1161  
 Canada: Atomic energy matters, participation in, 1118; French Committee of National Liberation, relations with, 1108–1109, 1171–1172; Joint War Aid Committee, U.S.–Canada, creation of, 929, 1119; munitions, Chinese efforts to purchase from, 936; Quebec Conference, question of participation in, 396–400  
 Caroline Islands, proposed military operations in, 978, 987, 1126, 1144n  
 Chiang Kai-shek, report to on Quebec Conference, 1160–1161  
 China: Airfields in, 907, 982, 996–997, 999; American air forces in, 972, 994, 1145–1146; Burma campaign, participation in, 883, 961; estimate of situation in, 878; international position of, 928; military assistance to, 972–973; munitions, efforts to purchase from Canada, 936; report to on Quebec Conference, 1160–1161; representation at Allied conferences, interest in, 914; supply routes and pipeline for gasoline to, 858–860, 878, 907–909, 938–939, 960, 971–975, 984, 987, 993–994, 999, 1003–1006, 1132, 1157  
 Churchill, arrival for, 407–410  
 Civil administration of liberated or occupied territory, 919, 930–932  
 Civil aviation policy, postwar, 880  
 Combined Chiefs of Staff. *See main entry* Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- Quebec Conference, First—Continued  
 Commercial policy, 925–926  
 Communism in postwar Europe, 1077–1078, 1081, 1112  
 Communiqué, 1157–1159  
 Continental Western Europe, invasion of: Allocation of landing craft for, 939, 1027–1028, 1041–1043, 1141–1142; command arrangements for, 869, 905, 944; German defenses in, 942; planning for, 863–870, 895–896, 942–944, 1009, 1024–1026, 1038, 1123; Supreme Allied Commander, selection of, 830, 929  
 Convoys: To Soviet Union, 853, 930, 932, 1143; trans-Atlantic, 940, 959–960, 1040, 1047–1048, 1092, 1142–1143  
 Corsica, proposed military operations in, 854, 896–897, 1025, 1075  
 Crete, 705, 898  
 Dependent areas, 914, 919, 926–927  
 English, Basic, 880  
 European Theater: Air offensive in, 1025; military operations in (*see also specific areas*), 850–855  
 Final documents, 1117–1172  
 Formosa, proposed military operations in, 985–986, 988  
 Four-Power security declaration, 913–914, 917, 925  
 France (*see also* Continental Western Europe, *supra*, and French Committee of National Liberation, *infra*): Air bases in, 854; proposed military operations in southern part of, 897–898, 945, 957, 1025, 1038, 1067; troops, armament and use of, 898, 939–940, 1029–1034, 1049  
 French Committee of National Liberation, recognition of, 916–917, 919–920, 922, 928, 930, 934, 949–950, 953, 1101–1111, 1158, 1169–1172  
 Germany (*see also* Bomber offensive and Continental Western Europe, *supra*):  
 Aircraft strength and production in, 852, 872, 1018–1019  
 Berlin, entry of troops into, 942  
 Collapse of prior to OVERLORD, recommended course of action in event of, 940, 942, 1010–1018, 1125  
 Crimes of in Poland, declaration on, 930–931, 1120  
 Free Germany Committee, 911, 1115  
 Ground forces, strength of, 850–852  
 Italy, German troops in, 909–910, 944–945, 1074  
 Jews, treatment of, 1053  
 Morale in, 871, 1076

- Quebec Conference, First—Continued
- Germany—Continued
- Postwar partition vs. unity, discussions on, 927-928, 1197
- Soviet Union, policy toward, 1075
- Wolfram supplies from the Iberian Peninsula, 1100-1101
- Gibraltar, Straits of, security of lines of communication in, 855, 958, 1124
- Gilbert Islands, proposed military operations in, 857, 901, 987, 1126, 1137, 1144*n*
- Greece: EAM, 1044; policy toward, 930, 932-934; political and military situation in, 914-915, 1044-1046; troops of, use in Mediterranean Theater, 898-899
- Guam, proposed military operations in, 1126, 1137
- Harbors, artificial, construction of, 911, 1008-1009
- Hong Kong, proposed military operations against, 982, 985-986, 988
- India: Airfields in, 999; floods in, and effect of on Burma campaign, 861-862, 879, 993; proposed military operations from, 859, 877, 879-882; supply routes and pipeline for gasoline to China from, 858-860, 878, 907-909, 938-939, 960, 971-975, 984, 987, 993-994, 999, 1003-1006, 1132, 1157; U.S.-U.K. intelligence organizations in, coordination of, 971, 993, 1002-1003
- Iran, U.S. policy toward, 880
- Ireland, Allied bases in, 880
- Italy:
- Airfields in, 852-853, 855, 866, 895, 897
- Allied Military Government and Control Commission for, 923-924
- Badoglio government, political and military situation of, affecting peace negotiations, 1070-1074, 1081-1082
- Fleet, proposed disposition of, 944-945
- German defense of, 944-945
- Peace feelers, and Allied action on: Lisbon, 876, 881, 1056-1057, 1060-1062; Madrid, 1055, 1062-1063; Switzerland, 1087-1088; Tangier, 1076-1078
- Peninsula, Allied invasion of, 955-958, 1025, 1062, 1064-1068
- Rome: Bombing of, 863-864, 1054-1056; open city, declaration of as, 863-864, 914, 1054-1055, 1057-1059, 1069-1070
- Quebec Conference, First—Continued
- Italy—Continued
- Surrender terms:
- "Further" or "additional" terms, 913, 1083-1086, 1088-1090
- "Long" or "comprehensive" terms: Consultation with Soviet Union concerning, 951*n*, 1086*n*; discussion of, 831, 880, 912-913, 919, 930, 950-952, 1083-1086, 1089-1090; final text of, transmitted to Eisenhower, 1161-1169; transmittal of, to Italian authorities, 951*n*, 1090-1091
- "Short" or "military" terms: Amendment to draft text of, 1062; discussion of, 913, 919, 950-952, 1088; "Quebec Memorandum" concerning, 876, 1060-1061, 1071; transmittal of, to Italian authorities, 1060, 1071
- Japan:
- Aircraft losses, 859
- Air offensive against, proposals for, 908, 982, 988, 995-1000
- Deception measures against, 884
- Defeat of, overall strategic concept, 856-862, 876-877, 906-909, 945, 975-988, 994
- Lines of communication in Pacific, 861, 988
- Prisoners of war, treatment of, 938
- Soviet bases, proposals for use of against, 996
- Kuriles, proposed military operations in, 857, 859, 986
- Landing craft, manning and production of, 882, 891
- Landing craft allocation: General, 1146-1148; Pacific Theater, 877-878; U.K., 989, 991
- Liberated areas and occupied territory: Queen Wilhelmina, draft declaration on, 1052-1053; rehabilitation of, 1049-1051; statement on, proposed, 1046-1047
- Log of Roosevelt's trip to, 835-848
- Long-range penetration groups, use of, 860-861, 879, 888, 893, 900, 909, 961, 993, 1006, 1028-1029, 1137, 1140, 1161
- Malacca, Straits of, proposed military operations in, 979, 982
- Malayan Peninsula, proposed military operations in, 987-988, 994
- Mandated Islands, proposed military operations in, 857, 862, 877, 984
- Marianas, proposed military operations in, 876, 987, 1126, 1137
- Marshall Islands, proposed military operations in, 901, 978, 987, 1126, 1137, 1144*n*

- Quebec Conference, First—Continued
- Mediterranean Theater: Allied fleet in, 854; armed forces, deployment of, 1138-1139, 1142; lines of communication, security of, 898-899, 1025-1026, 1039; military operations in, 941, 1063; U.K. forces in, 1139-1140
- Military-political commission, proposal for establishment of, 1087
- Netherlands, availability of and supplies for forces in, 1030, 1032, 1036-1037
- Netherlands East Indies, proposed military operations in, 857
- New Guinea, proposed military operations in, 857, 877-878, 978, 984, 987, 1127, 1137, 1144*n*
- Northwest Europe, recommended course of action in, in event of German collapse prior to OVERLORD, 940, 942, 1010-1018, 1125
- Norway, proposed military operations in, 943, 1030, 1032, 1036-1037
- Pacific Theater: Airfields in, 859; aircraft allocations to, 859, 997-999; landing craft allocations to, 877-878; military operations in, 876-878
- Palestine, issuance of an Anglo-American statement on, 919, 930, 932, 1116
- Petroleum, 1156-1157
- Philippines: Proposed military operations in, 857, 877, 987-988; U.S. protection of and U.S. bases in, 844*n*
- Pipeline for gasoline from India to China, 858-860, 909, 938, 960, 973-975, 1003, 1132, 1157
- Ploesti, bombing of, 853, 872-873, 895
- Poland: Frontier with the Soviet Union, 1113-1116; German crimes in, 930-931, 1120; troops, use of in the Mediterranean Theater, 898, 1030-1031, 1035-1036
- Portugal. *See* Azores Islands, *supra*.
- Preparatory papers, 415-829
- Propaganda, coordination of, 963, 1097-1098
- Quebec Memorandum, 876, 1060-1061, 1071
- Queen Elizabeth* and *Queen Mary*, movement of, 939, 1041-1042
- Rabaul, proposed military operations against, 856-857
- Ramree, proposed military operations against, 906, 946, 978
- Refugees, U.K. views on, 1043
- Rumanian oil fields. *See* Ploesti, *supra*.
- Sakhalin, 987
- Quebec Conference, First—Continued
- Sardinia: Fifth-column activity in, 854, 893-894, 905, 945, 1068-1069, 1131; proposed military operations in, 854, 896-897, 1025, 1075, 1124, 1136, 1160
- Shipping, allocation of in Atlantic area, 940, 1040, 1047-1048
- Sicily, military operations in, 1059
- Singapore, proposed military operations against, 900, 906, 946, 979, 981, 985, 994, 1128
- Solomon Islands, proposed military operations in, 984, 987
- South East Asia Command: Boundaries of, 947, 969, 1101, 1129; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, 882-884, 970, 993, 1001-1002, 1128-1129; discussions on, 882, 899-900, 937, 947-948, 968-971, 992, 1000-1003; relations of with Chiang Kai-shek, 903; relations of with Indian Command, 882, 937-938, 968-970; Supreme Allied Commander, appointment of, 962-963
- Southwest Pacific: Military forces for, 981; military operations in, 978
- Soviet Union: Bases in, proposals to use against Japan, 996; convoys to, 853, 930, 932, 1143; Eastern Front, situation on, 850-851, 910-911, 949; Free Germany Committee, 911, 1115; Pacific war, entry of into, 876, 977, 983, 986; Poland, frontier with, 1113-1116; Quebec Conference, nonparticipation in, 913-914; tripartite meeting with, proposals for, 889, 917
- Spain: German threat to, 851, 855; policy toward, 910, 948-949, 1099-1101, 1130-1131
- Stalin, report to on Quebec Conference, 964, 1159-1160
- Sumatra, proposed military operations against, 861, 879, 900-902, 904, 906-907, 987-988, 1127
- Tripartite meeting, proposals for, 889, 917
- Turkey: Military assistance to, 910, 949, 960, 1030, 1032, 1048, 1131, 1138; possible entry of into the war, 1122, 1131
- Yugoslavia: Liberated prisoners of war, arming of, 1034; military and political situation in, 915; troops, use of, 898-899
- Quebec Memorandum, 876, 1060-1061, 1071
- Queen Elizabeth*, 164-165, 179, 939, 1041-1042
- Queen Mary*, 164-165, 179, 939, 1041-1042

- Rabaul, proposed military operations against, 856-857
- Ramree, proposed military operations against, 431, 906, 946, 978
- Ranger*, 854
- RANKIN. *See* Collapse of prior to OVERLORD, recommended course of action in event of, *under* Germany, Allied efforts against.
- Ravenous*, 77
- Refugees, emergency measures for, 96, 173*n*. 197, 336-346, 681, 686, 698, 797-798, 1043
- Regionalism in world organization, 167-169, 688, 691*n*, 694, 699-700, 703, 710-711
- Rhineland. *See under* Germany.
- Richelieu*, 158
- Rome. *See under* Italy.
- Ruhr. *See under* Germany.
- Rumania (*see also* Balkan countries and Ploesti, bombing of), 453-455, 461, 518, 705, 910, 1075, 1114, 1290
- Saar, 685, 754-755
- Sakhalin, 417, 423*n*, 629, 987
- Sardinia: Fifth-column activity in, 854, 893-894, 905, 945, 1068-1069, 1131, 1292; proposed military operations in, 13, 26, 30*n*, 41-42, 46, 103, 193-195, 225, 253, 255-258, 265-267, 269, 474, 476-477, 483, 502, 854, 896-897, 1025, 1075, 1124, 1136, 1160, 1289
- Saturnia*, 1218
- Scharnhorst*, 42, 456, 459
- Secrecy definitions, U.S.-U.K., 1203
- Security and Armaments Commission, 694-695, 697, 707-708
- Shipping: Availability and requirements, 176-177, 180-181, 227, 231, 502-503, 918, 1151-1156; Axis destruction of, 459-461; transfer of to U.K., 319
- Shipping, allocation of: Atlantic area, 940, 1040, 1047-1048, 1298; Far East, 156; global, 240*n*; Mediterranean, 83, 225, 235, 313-314, 317-319, 357-358, 370-371, 1298; U.K., 11*n*, 187, 1296, 1299
- Sicily, invasion of: Aircraft allocation for, 118-119, 154-155; military government for, 187, 283-284; military operations in, 11-15, 36-37, 39, 43, 95-96, 107, 224, 228, 236, 240*n*, 393, 398, 1059; psychological warfare, 326-327, 329*n*
- Singapore, proposed military operations against, 433, 900, 906, 946, 979, 981, 985, 994, 1128
- Solomon Islands, proposed military operations in, 31, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369, 984, 987
- Somaliland, Italian, 798-801
- Sonic warfare, 164
- South East Asia Command: Boundaries of, 947, 969, 1001, 1129; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, function of, 882-884, 970, 993, 1001-1002, 1128-1129; discussions on, 401, 405, 882, 899-900, 937, 947-948, 968-971, 992, 1000-1003; relations of with Chiang Kai-shek, 903; relations of with Indian Command, 882, 937-938, 968-970; Supreme Allied Commander, appointment of, 962-963
- Southwest Pacific: Japanese forces in, 420, 424; military forces for, 981; military operations in, 978
- Soviet Union:
- Air force bombing of Ploesti, proposals for, 1206, 1224-1225, 1230, 1245-1246, 1256, 1336
  - Bases in, proposals for Allied use of, 40-41, 996
  - Consultation with in case of Japanese attack on, 207
  - Convoys to, 26, 625, 627, 853, 930, 932, 1143
  - Eastern Front, situation on, 457-458, 850-851, 910-911, 949, 1233-1234
  - Far East, aims of in, 627-629
  - Free Germany Committee, 601, 911, 1115
  - Italian surrender terms and arrangements, consultation with concerning, 951*n*, 1086*n*, 1175, 1185, 1188, 1190, 1193, 1199-1200, 1262-1263, 1266-1267, 1307*n*
  - Military and political situation in, 26-27, 49-50, 53, 112-113, 174, 224, 274, 624-627
  - Military assistance to, 226, 229, 233, 237
  - Pacific war, entry of into, 28-29, 32, 147, 417, 625, 629, 703, 876, 977, 983, 986
  - Poland: Frontier with, 1113-1116; relations with, 324-325, 703
  - Quebec Conference, nonparticipation in, 913-914
  - Third International, 174
  - Third Soviet Supply Protocol, 1943, 183
  - Tripartite meeting with, proposals for, 391, 889, 917, 1095-1096, 1174-1175, 1303-1310, 1336-1337
  - Weapons, exchange of information with U.K. on, 1255
- Spain: German threat to, 403, 405, 464-465, 851, 855; neutrality of, 454, 462-463; policy toward, 480, 910, 948-949, 1099-1101, 1130-1131
- Special Operations Executive, 893-894, 945, 971, 1068

- Strategic situation in view of Italian surrender, review of, 1222-1224, 1229, 1287-1292
- Sumatra, proposed military operations against, 28, 55, 70, 118, 156, 861, 879, 900-902, 904, 906-907, 987-988, 1127
- Sweden, neutrality of, 462
- Switzerland, neutrality of, 462
- Tanks, production of, 197, 314-316
- Tarvis Conference, *Aug. 6, 1943*, 582*n*
- Third International, 174
- Tibet. *See under* China.
- Tirpitz*, 42, 456, 459
- Treaties, agreements, conventions, etc. :  
 Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, *Aug. 17, 1943*, 310*n*, 614*n*, 886*n*, 899*n*, 1039*n*  
 Anglo-Soviet Agreement, *Sept. 29, 1942*, 1255  
 Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, *Jan. 29, 1942*, 673, 703*n*, 1115, 1255  
 Atlantic Charter, *1941*, 327, 523, 673, 693, 703-704, 718, 720, 733, 802, 812, 816, 1253  
 Dutch-Hanoverian Treaty, *1824*, 760  
 Franco-German Armistice, *1940*, 755  
 Geneva Convention, *1922*, 737  
 German - Italian Agreement and Treaty, *1939*, 789, 1113*n*  
 German-Netherlands Treaty, *1896*, 760  
 Hague Conventions, *1899* and *1907*, 558  
 Italy, Armistice with, *Sept. 3, 1943*, 519-520, 522, 565-566, 1062, 1200, 1264, 1281  
 Italy, Surrender of, *Sept. 29, 1943*, 1161-1169, 1264*n*  
 Lausanne, Treaty of, *1923*, 794  
 London, Treaty of, *1373*, 611*n*, 886*n*, 1091  
 Montreux Convention, *1936*, 1131  
 Munich Agreement, *1938*, 748, 751  
 Polish-Soviet Treaty, *1941*, 1115  
 Quebec Agreement, *Aug. 19, 1943*, 1117-1119  
 Saint-Germain, Treaty of, *1919*, 748  
 Third Soviet Supply Protocol, *Oct. 19, 1943*, 183*n*  
 United Nations, Declaration by, *1942*, 670-671, 682, 692-693, 700, 707, 717-718, 1253  
 U.S.-U.K. Lend-Lease Agreement, *1942*, 925, 1333*n*  
 Versailles, Treaty of, *1919*, 732, 737, 757-758  
 Windsor, Treaty of, *1386*, 611*n*, 886*n*
- TRIDENT. *See* Washington Conference, Third.
- Tripartite meeting, proposals for, 889, 917, 1303-1310, 1336-1337
- Trusteeship (*see also* Dependent areas), 686, 717, 720-728, 796-800
- Turkey: Air bases in, 26, 40, 122, 259; military assistance to, 95, 104, 144-145, 196-197, 237, 358, 363, 371, 480, 910, 949, 960, 1030, 1032, 1048, 1131, 1138, 1292; possible cession of Dodecanese to, 795; possible entry of into the war, 13, 29-30, 46, 268, 355*n*, 463, 704-705, 1122, 1131, 1290; proposed military operations in, 224-225, 230
- Tyrol, South, 789-791, 1112-1113
- Unconditional surrender, policy of (*see also* Italy: Surrender terms), 326-331
- Urnicorn*, 1231, 1297
- United Kingdom. *See this index, passim.*
- United Nations (*see also* Postwar world organization), provisional council, 693-697
- United Nations, Declaration by, *1942*, 670-671, 682, 692-693, 700, 707, 717-718, 1253
- United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, *1943*, 1331*n*
- United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 702, 916
- Vatican, 524-525, 528, 548, 571-572, 576-578, 594-595, 804, 806, 813, 819-820, 1057-1058, 1078-1081, 1258
- Venezia Giulia, 791-794, 928
- Victorious*, 1143
- Vulcania*, 1218
- Washington Conference, First, *1941-1942*, 315*n*, 836*n*
- Washington Conference, Second, *1942*, 25*n*, 836*n*
- Washington Conference, Third, *May 12-25, 1943*, 24-387
- Agenda, 77-79, 94-95, 100, 229-231
- Albania: Food shipments to, 83*n*; proposed military operations in, 14, 41
- Aleutian Islands, military situation and operations in, 31, 134-135, 146, 229, 237, 356, 369
- Andaman Islands, proposed military operations in, 118
- Anti-submarine warfare, 25, 95, 120, 161-163, 178-179, 186, 189, 192, 223, 230, 237, 305, 353-354, 360-361, 366, 372-373
- Arrangements for, 11-23
- Atomic energy research, U.S.-U.K. cooperation in, 188-189, 221
- Australia: Aircraft reinforcements to, 138, 289; lines of communication to, protection of, 146-147, 229; representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, proposal for, 324-325

- Washington Conference, Third—Con.  
 Axis powers in Europe, strategic concept for defeat of, 100-102, 112-116, 118, 154-155, 348, 354-356, 367-368
- Azores Islands, discussions concerning, 33, 47-48, 85-86, 91-92, 98-100, 120, 152-153, 182-183, 186, 190-191, 235, 304-312, 347, 353-354, 360-361, 366, 371-373
- Balkan countries, possible military operations in, 26, 30*n*, 32-33, 41, 194
- Bismarck Archipelago, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369
- Bomber offensive against Germany, plans for, 25, 27, 37-38, 43, 80-82, 84, 94, 101-102, 104-106, 113, 153-154, 181-182, 192-193, 206, 224, 228, 230, 232, 236, 238-253, 275, 347-348, 354, 367
- Brazil, 120-121, 191, 308-309
- Burma: Air bases in and air operations from, 71-72, 142; aircraft allocations for, 234, 357, 370; Chinese interests in, and participation in military operations in, 89-91, 196; proposed military operations in, 15-16, 18, 27-28, 31-32, 54-76, 79-80, 87, 113-114, 118-120, 126-132, 137-139, 142, 155-157, 165-166, 172-173, 196, 226-227, 229, 236-237, 240*n*, 290-291, 293-295, 298, 303-304, 349, 356, 369; shipping shortage in, 13, 15
- Canada: Legation in U.S., question of Embassy rank for, 141, 335*n*; U.S., relations with, 334-335
- Caroline Islands, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 350, 356, 369
- China: Airfields in, 290; American air forces in, 135-136, 142; consultation with on Far East questions, 288-289; estimate of situation in, 87-91; Japanese forces in, 139-140; military assistance to, 18, 27-28, 31-32, 44, 56, 62-64, 70-77, 229, 233, 236-237, 288, 295-298, 302; military operations in, 70-77, 155-157, 196, 349, 356, 369; reports to on Washington Conference, 201, 204, 208, 377-379, 385-386; supply routes to, 79, 136, 140-141, 147-148, 230, 295-298; Tibet, relations with, 138, 298-300
- Code names, selection of, 144, 155, 206
- Combined Chiefs of Staff. *See main entry* Combined Chiefs of Staff.
- Combined planning, proposals for improvement of, 201-202
- Washington Conference, Third—Con.  
 Communiqué, drafts of, 373-377
- Continental Western Europe, invasion of: Directive regarding, 284-286; forces for, 278-281, 357, 370; French participation in, 155, 191-192, 285, 363; planning for, 27, 43-45, 53, 78, 80-84, 101-102, 112-116, 122-123, 191-193, 222-224, 228, 236, 238-239, 261-262, 271, 275, 277, 286-287, 348, 354-355, 361, 364, 367-368
- Convoys to Soviet Union, 26
- Corsica, proposed military operations in, 13, 42, 46, 103, 225, 253, 258, 265-269
- Dodecanese Islands, proposed military operations in, 13, 26, 259-260, 266-268
- Europe, Council of, 167-168
- European Theater, proposed military operations in, 186, 223-226, 228, 238-287
- Far Eastern Theater, proposed military operations in, 66-76, 145-148, 298, 302-304
- Final documents, 364-373, 377
- France: Communist Party in, 323; German forces in, 238, 263; liberation movement in, 320-324; post-liberation administration of, 321-323; proposed military operations in southern part of, 269; troops, armament and use of, 102-104, 155, 158, 190, 229-230, 237, 350, 358, 363
- French Committee of National Liberation, 192*n*, 320, 323
- Germany: Aircraft strength and production in, 105, 241, 243-245, 250-251, 276; France, forces in, 238, 263; ground forces, strength of, 275-276; Möhne and Eder dams, bombing of, 96, 108; naval forces, 42-43, 276; proposed military operations against, 84, 230, 273, 286-287; submarine losses, 162-163, 192
- Gibraltar, Straits of, 47, 306
- Global strategy, 52-54, 78, 95, 222-237, 351-353, 359-360, 365-366; forces for, 357, 369-370
- Greece: Food shipments to, 83*n*; proposed military operations in, 41, 102, 259; troops, proposed use of, 122
- Guadaleanal, proposed military operations in, 129
- Hawaii, lines of communication, security of, 145, 147, 290-291
- Hong Kong, proposed military operations against, 290-292

- Washington Conference, Third—Con.
- India: Airfields in, 230, 234, 237, 293, 295, 297, 301-302, 349, 356, 369-370; air supplies to China, 55-57, 79, 85, 87, 126*n*, 128-129, 132-133, 142, 187-188, 230, 237, 295; conditions in, 177; proposed military operations from, 188, 293-295; supply routes to China from, 79, 136, 140-141, 147-148, 230, 295-298
- Indian Ocean area: Landing craft allocations to, 234; proposed military operations in, 28, 78
- Italy: Collapse of, speculation regarding, 83, 85, 115-116; elimination of from war, possibility of, 13, 25-26, 30, 41, 101-102, 112, 225, 230, 274-275, 285; fleet, proposed disposition of, 38; food shipments to, 83*n*; proposed military operations on mainland, 32, 253-254
- Japan: Air offensive against, proposals for, 87, 291; Kuriles, fortification of, 146; lines of communication in Pacific, 147-148, 155, 302-304; merchant marine losses, 135; overall strategic plans for defeat of, 28-29, 53-54, 78, 93-94, 125-126, 230, 289-293, 356, 368-369; policy toward China, 89; potentialities for offensive action, 147
- Jews. *See* Palestine and Refugees, *infra*.
- Landing craft, production and availability of, 101, 113, 115, 231, 234, 239-241, 279, 357, 370
- Libya, refugee settlement in, 338-342
- Malacca, Straits of, proposed military operations in, 290-291
- Malayan Peninsula, proposed military operations in, 28, 70, 118
- Magnesium, supplies of, 96, 312-313
- Marianas, proposed military operations in, 146
- Marshall Islands, proposed military operations in, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 350, 356, 369
- Mediterranean Theater: Allied Air forces in, 271-272; proposed military operations in, 13, 45-47, 53-54, 78, 80-84, 101-102, 113-116, 121-122, 193-195, 198, 224, 228, 236, 257-261, 264-271, 274, 348, 355, 368
- Netherlands East Indies, proposed military operations in, 303-304, 350
- New Guinea, proposed military operations in, 31, 129, 136-137, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369
- North Africa, invasion of, progress of, 11-12, 15, 18, 29, 44, 81
- Washington Conference, Third—Con.
- Norway, discussions regarding possible German evacuation of, and sending of Allied forces to, 160, 193, 364, 368
- Pacific Theater: Proposed military operations in, 16, 31, 44, 73, 93-94, 145-148, 157-158, 184-185, 226-227, 229-230, 233-234, 236-237, 288-304, 349-350, 356, 369; shipping shortages in, 93
- Palestine, Jewish immigration into, 341-342
- Petroleum, 235, 358, 362, 371
- Philippines, proposed recapture of, 146, 290
- Ploesti, proposed bombing of, 26, 29, 38-40, 48, 106-108, 115, 158-159, 195-196, 230, 236, 259, 266, 350-351, 355-356, 362, 368
- Poland: Question of Australian representation of Polish interests in the Soviet Union, 324-325; Soviet Union, evacuation of certain categories of Polish citizens from, 203*n*, 325; troops, use of, 122, 193, 203
- Portugal. *See* Azores Islands, *supra*.
- Postwar world organization, proposals for, 141, 167-172
- Press, statement to at end of conference, 377
- Press conferences during, 109-110, 149-150, 211-220
- Propaganda and subversive activity, 100, 125, 163-165, 180
- Queen Elizabeth and Queen Mary, movement of, 164-165, 179
- Refugees, emergency measures for, 96, 173*n*, 197, 336-346
- Rumanian oil fields. *See* Ploesti, *supra*.
- Sardinia, proposed military operations in, 13, 26, 30*n*, 41-42, 46, 103, 193-195, 225, 253, 255-258, 265-267, 269
- Shipping: Availability and requirements, 176-177, 180-181, 227, 231; Mediterranean Theater, 225, 235, 313-314, 317-319, 357-358, 370-371; transfer of to U.K., 319
- Shipping, allocation of: Far East, 156; global, 240*n*; Mediterranean Theater, 83, 225, 235, 313-314, 317-319, 357-358; U.K., 11*n*, 187
- Sicily, invasion of: Aircraft allocation for, 118-119, 154-155; military government for, 187, 283-284; proposed military operations in, 11-15, 36-37, 39, 43, 95-96, 107, 224, 228, 236, 240*n*; psychological warfare, 326-327, 329*n*
- Solomon Islands, proposed military operations in, 31, 148, 229, 237, 303-304, 349, 356, 369

- Washington Conference, Third—Con.  
 Sonic warfare, 164  
 Soviet Union : Air bases in, Allied use of, 40-41; consultation with in case of Japanese attack on, 207; military assistance to, 226, 229, 233, 237; military situation in, 26-27, 49-50, 53, 112-113, 174, 224, 274; Pacific war, entry of into, 28-29, 32, 147; Poland, relations with, 324-325; Third Soviet Supply Protocol, 1943, 183  
 Stalin, report to on Washington Conference, 379-387  
 Sumatra, proposed military operations against, 28, 55, 70, 118, 156  
 Tanks, production of, 197, 314-316  
 Turkey : Air bases in, 26, 40, 122, 259; military assistance to, 95, 104, 144-145, 196-197, 237, 358, 363, 371; possible entry of into the
- Washington Conference, Third—Con.  
 war, 13, 29-30, 46, 268, 355*n*; proposed military operations in, 224-225, 230  
 Unconditional surrender, policy of, 326-331  
 Yugoslavia : Food shipments to, 83*n*; proposed military operations in, 14, 41; troops, use of, 122  
*West Point*, 499  
 Wolfram, 1099-1101, 1130  
*Yale*, 944  
 Yugoslavia : Belgrade, declaration of as an open city, 1941, 597-598; food shipments to, 83*n*; frontier with Italy, 593, 791-794; liberated prisoners of war, arming of, 1034, 1206, 1246-1250; military and political situation in, 462, 705, 915; proposed military operations in, 14, 41; troops, use of, 122, 898-899

## INDEX OF PERSONS

(The identification of the persons in this index is limited to circumstances and positions under reference in this volume. All titles and positions are American unless there is an indication to the contrary.)

- Acheson, Dean, Assistant Secretary of State, 655
- Acomb, Evelyn M., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 754-757
- Akers, Wallace A., British adviser on atomic energy matters, 4-5, 635*n*, 637, 644, 1097, 1311-1313
- Alexander, Albert V., British First Lord of the Admiralty, 1300-1301, 1302*n*
- Alexander, Sir Harold, General, Commander in Chief, Middle East, 1942-1943; *then* Deputy Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, and Military Governor of Sicily, 68, 704, 830, 955, 1186-1187, 1270, 1277-1279, 1281
- Alling, Paul H., Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 1265*n*
- Ambrosio, Vittorio, Army General, Chief of the Italian Armed Forces General Staff, 1179, 1195, 1274-1275, 1280
- Anderson, Sir John, British Lord President of the Council; adviser to the Prime Minister on atomic energy matters, 2*n*, 4, 630*n*, 634-635, 637, 640-646, 649-652, 1311-1313
- Appleton, Sir Edward, Head, Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1310, 1312-1313
- Arnold, Henry H., General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Army Air Forces; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Correspondence with Portal, 241  
Meetings:  
  Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 854-856, 859-860, 862, 866, 870, 873, 875, 881, 883-884, 886-887, 889-891, 904, 908, 920, 936-937, 954; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894-895, 902, 941, 946
- Arnold, Henry H.—Continued  
Meetings—Continued  
  Washington meetings, *Aug.-Sept. 1943*: With Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229, 1231, 1234; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1218, 1225; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212, 1216; with Roosevelt, Stimson, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 434-435, 498-499, 503  
  Miscellaneous, 60, 154, 841, 1200, 1256*n*
- Atherton, Ray, Acting Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State; *from July 27, 1943*, Minister to Canada:  
  Correspondence with: Hickerson, 409; Hull, 953*n*; Welles, 328-329  
  Meetings at First Quebec Conference: With Hull and Eden, 912, 918, 922; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 883, 930  
  Miscellaneous, 408-409, 667-668, 841-842, 846
- Athlone, Earl of, Governor General of Canada, 414, 833*n*, 838-840, 846
- Attlee, Clement R., British Deputy Prime Minister, 121*n*, 190*n*, 309-312, 1061-1062, 1337-1338
- Auchinleck, Sir Claude, General, Commander in Chief, India, 434-439, 902, 1005-1006, 1148
- Austria, Otto, Archduke of, pretender to the Austrian throne, 752-753, 1111
- Badger, Oscar C., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Logistic Plans); member of the Joint Administrative Committee and of the Combined Administrative Committee; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 964, 1003, 1207, 1212, 1218, 1226, 1228, 1243
- Badoglio, Mario, Italian Consul General at Tangier, 566, 1078

- Badoglio, Pietro, Marshal of Italy; *from July 25, 1943*, Italian Head of Government, 461, 517, 523, 566-567, 575, 578-579, 586, 592, 806, 818-819, 881, 1057, 1062-1063, 1078, 1267*n*, 1273-1274, 1276, 1281, 1285-1286
- Bainbridge, Kenneth T., atomic physicist; Consultant, National Defense Research Council, 3
- Ballantine, Joseph W., Chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 627-629
- Barclay, Roderick Edward, First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington, 559, 580, 1082-1086
- Barker, Ray W., Major General, U.S.A., attached to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), 446, 862, 867-868
- Barnes, William L. G., Personal Assistant to the British Lord President of the Council, 644
- Baruch, Bernard M., adviser to the President, 96, 312-313, 344-345, 1209
- Bathurst, Charles R., Colonel, U.S.A., alternate member of the Joint Administrative Committee and of the Combined Administrative Committee, 1200, 1218
- Batt, William L., Vice Chairman, War Production Board; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 656, 1119
- Baudet, Philippe, Delegate ad interim of the French Committee of National Liberation in the United States, 532*n*, 666
- Beaverbrook, Lord, British Minister of Supply, 1941-1942; Minister of Production, *February 4-19, 1942*; adviser to the Prime Minister, 24, 86, 315
- Belyayev, Alexander Ivanovich, Major General, Chairman, Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States, 18
- Beneš, Eduard, President of the Czechoslovak Government in exile, established at London, 33-34, 174*n*, 911
- Benson, Reginald L., Military Attaché, British Embassy, Washington, 559, 580
- Benthall, Sir Edward, Member for War Transport, Executive Council of the Governor General of India, 436
- Berio, Alberto, Counselor, Italian Embassy, Ankara, 1938-1942; then Counselor assigned to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 566-568, 574-575, 587, 595-596, 1076-1078, 1177*n*
- Berle, Adolph A., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, 329, 655-656, 679-681, 880, 1320-1322, 1339*n*
- Bernal, John Desmond, Professor of Physics, Birkbeck College, 889, 891, 1207, 1212, 1226
- Bernardini, Filippo, Papal Nuncio to Switzerland, 571*n*, 572, 577*n*, 578
- Berry, Burton Y., Consul General at Istanbul, 524
- Berry, Robert W., Captain, U.S.N., Deputy Director of Public Relations, Navy Department, 1302
- Best, Charles H., Surgeon Captain, R.C.N.V.R., Professor of Physiology and Director of the Banting-Best Department of Medical Research, University of Toronto; co-discoverer of insulin, 847
- Béthouart, Marie Émile, Major General, Chief of the French Military Mission at Washington, 532*n*, 666
- Betts, Thomas J., Colonel, U.S.A., attached to the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, 1218
- Bianchi, João Antonio de, Portuguese Minister to the United States, 1176
- Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, Jr., Ambassador to the Polish Government in exile, established at London, 503-506
- Bishop, Max W., Foreign Service officer assigned to the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, 627-629
- Bismarck, Otto, Prince of, Chancellor of the German Empire, 1871-1890, 765, 781
- Bissell, Clayton L., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, 436
- Bissell, Richard M., Jr., Director, Division of Ship Requirements, War Shipping Administration, 175-176
- Blais, Edmond, Brigadier, Officer Commanding Military District No. 5 (Quebec), 841
- Bloom, Sol, Congressman from New York; Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 677
- Boettiger, Anna Roosevelt, President Roosevelt's daughter, 86
- Bonbright, James C. H., Foreign Service officer assigned to the Division of European Affairs, Department of State, 667*n*
- Bonomi, Ivanoe, Italian Prime Minister, 1921-1922, 563, 820
- Bowman, Isaiah, Chairman, Subcommittee on Territorial Problems, Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, 338*n*, 681
- Bracken, Brendan, British Minister of Information, 414, 840-841, 845, 929, 934, 952, 1207, 1209, 1212, 1216, 1218

- Bradley, Follett, Major General, U.S.A., head of a special air mission to the Soviet Union in 1942, 207
- Brennan, Robert, Irish Minister to the United States, 618*n*
- Brereton, Lewis H., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Army Forces in the Middle East, 924*n*
- Brook, Norman, Personal Assistant to the British Lord President of the Council, 1940-1942, 4
- Brooke, Sir Alan, General, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; member of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill, 307-308  
Meetings:  
Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849-852, 854, 856, 860-866, 870, 875-877, 879, 881-884, 886, 889, 893-894, 904-907, 909-911, 920, 936-938, 940, 954, 960-961, 963-964; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 897-898, 941-942, 945-946  
Washington Conference, Third: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34-36, 41-47, 52-56, 63-65, 77-84, 86-87, 91-95, 97-104, 111-114, 116*n*, 117-118, 124-127, 130-132, 142-144, 160, 163-164, 178, 181, 184, 186, 199-202; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 119-122, 152, 154-157, 159, 189, 193-195, 203, 206; with Smith, 110  
Miscellaneous, 15, 17*n*, 223*n*, 304-307, 704, 841, 855, 891*n*, 929
- Brown, Wilson, Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Naval Aide to the President, 16*n*, 21, 86, 134-141, 550, 831, 839-843, 845-848, 903, 941, 965, 1117*n*, 1159*n*, 1207, 1212, 1256*n*, 1285*n*, 1286, 1301-1302
- Brownrigg, Thomas Marcus, Captain, R.N., Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, 954, 959
- Bullitt, William C., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1933-1936, 508*n*
- Bundy, Harvey H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, 634-636, 643, 648
- Burns, J. H., Major General, U.S.A., Executive, The President's Soviet Protocol Committee; Executive, Munitions Assignments Board; United States Chairman, Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 624-627, 654, 656, 1119
- Bush, Vannevar, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development; Chairman, Military Policy Committee on atomic energy; member of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy, 1*n*, 4, 6-10, 209-211, 221, 631-636, 639-646, 649-653, 1096-1097, 1118, 1310-1311
- Busseti, Pierino, Italian civilian involved in a peace feeler at Barcelona, 563, 568
- Buzzard, Anthony Wass, Captain, R.N., member of the Strategic Planning Section, British Joint Planning Staff, 904
- Cabell, Charles P., Colonel, U.S.A., member of the Advisory Council, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199
- Cadogan, Sir Alexander, Permanent Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 570-571, 840-841, 912, 916, 918, 920, 922, 928, 930, 950-952, 1044*n*, 1198-1200, 1255
- Caffery, Jefferson, Ambassador to Brazil, 308-309
- Campbell, John C., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 736-748
- Campbell, Sir Ronald Hugh, British Ambassador to Portugal, 534-536, 554, 614*n*, 951*n*, 1060*n*, 1070, 1090*n*, 1162*n*, 1176*n*, 1179-1181, 1183*n*, 1190-1191
- Campbell, Sir Ronald Ian, British Minister (and at times Chargé d'Affaires ad interim) in the United States; member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 534, 536*n*, 559, 580-581, 588*n*, 595*n*, 1082, 1161*n*, 1336*n*
- Cannon, John K., Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Northwest African Tactical Air Force, 1276, 1280
- Carmona, Antonio Oscar de Fragoso, General, President of Portugal, 309*n*
- Carpender, Arthur S., Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Commander, Seventh Fleet, 1291
- Carrington, Philip, Bishop of Quebec, 840
- Carroll, Walter, attached to the Section for Ordinary Affairs, Vatican Secretariat of State, 527
- Carswell, J. B., Director General, Washington Office, Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 1119

- Carton de Wiart, Adrian, Major General, British officer released from his status as a prisoner of war in Italy to accompany General Zanussi on a peace mission, 1179, 1183*n*
- Casey, Richard G., Australian Minister to the United States, 1940-1942; member of the British War Cabinet; Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, 447
- Castellano, Giuseppe, Brigadier General, Italian officer entrusted by Marshal Badoglio with a mission to arrange (and later to sign) an armistice, 589-594, 881, 1055*n*, 1062, 1070-1074, 1075*n*, 1175, 1179-1181, 1183*n*, 1190-1191, 1257-1259, 1261, 1264, 1276-1277, 1279-1281, 1283
- Castronuovo, Manlio, Italian Consul at Tangier, 574
- Catroux, Georges, General, Commanding General, French Forces in the Levant, involved in negotiations between Generals de Gaulle and Giraud leading to the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, 321, 324
- Caviglia, Enrico, Marshal of Italy, 806
- Chakmak, Feuzi, Marshal, Chief of Staff, Turkish Army, 704
- Chandler, Albert B., Senator from Kentucky, 213
- Chapman, William W., Jr., Major, U.S.A., Assistant Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1200, 1218
- Chen Cheng, General, Commanding General, Chinese Expeditionary Force in Yunnan, 90
- Chennault, Claire L., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Fourteenth Air Force, 16, 23, 52, 66, 74, 124, 130, 859, 883, 946
- Cherwell, Lord, British Paymaster-General; adviser to the Prime Minister on atomic energy matters, 178, 182, 188, 209-211, 221, 318, 631, 634, 636, 642-643
- Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government of the Republic of China; Supreme Commander, China Theater, 22, 75, 77, 80, 87-90, 126*n*, 299, 385-386, 882, 884, 901, 903, 947-948, 961, 970, 997, 1002, 1129, 1158, 1160-1161
- Christian X, King of Denmark, 1253
- Chu Shih-ming, Major General, Military Attaché, Chinese Embassy, Washington, 86, 91, 208, 954
- Churchill, Clementine, Prime Minister Churchill's wife, 398, 403, 411*n*, 412, 445, 447, 839*n*, 842-846, 855-856, 903, 917-918, 922, 929, 935, 952, 965, 1178, 1336*n*, 1337
- Churchill, Mary, Subaltern, Prime Minister Churchill's daughter and aide, 398-399, 403, 411*n*, 840, 843, 846, 918, 922, 929, 935, 965, 1178, 1336*n*, 1337
- Churchill, Winston S., British Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, and Minister of Defence: Address to U.S. Congress, 21-22, 117, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, proposals for, 1095-1096, 1304, 1308-1310
- Communiqués and declarations, 373-376, 1157*n*, 1254
- Correspondence with: Alexander, A. V., 1300-1301 Alexander, Gen. Sir Harold, 1186-1187 Anderson, 1311-1313 Atlee, 121*n*, 190*n*, 309-312, 1337-1338 Badoglio, 1285-1286 Cadogan, 1255 Chiang, 87, 88*n*, 1160-1161 Eden, 121*n*, 190*n*, 309-312, 345-346, 589-594, 1337-1339 Eisenhower, 1261-1262, 1268-1269, 1275 Evatt, 324 George II, 915*n*, 1045*n*, 1046 Harriman, 314-318 Hopkins, 1-6, 11-17, 138, 221, 298-299, 317, 630, 830 Ismay, 342-344 King, Mackenzie, 332-333, 398-399 MacDonald, 396 Martin, 1310-1311 Roosevelt, on: Atomic energy research, 3*n*, 632-633, 636-637; Azores, 609; de Gaulle, 320-322; French Committee of National Liberation, 661-664; Husky, 11*n*; Italian peace feelers, 517-523, 525-527, 578-579, 588-589; Italian surrender, 1287-1290; miscellaneous, 318-319, 377, 382-383, 609, 830-832, 1037*n*, 1119, 1186, 1189, 1336-1337, 1339-1340; OVERLORD, Supreme Commander for, 498*n*; postwar world organization, 702-706; Quebec Conference, arrangements for, 391-400, 403-408, 410-412, 414; refugees, 338*n*, 344*n*; Rome, bombing of, 551-554; Third Washington Conference, arrangements for, 12-20; tripartite meeting, 1303, 1304*n*, 1305*n*; Washington conversations, arrangements for, 1178-1179, 1181-1182, 1189

## Churchill, Winston S.—Continued

## Correspondence with—Continued

Stalin, 379-385, 932*n*, 1059, 1062-1063, 1091-1092, 1095-1096, 1114, 1159-1160, 1174-1175, 1254*n*, 1262-1263, 1266-1267, 1283-1284, 1305-1306, 1336*n*

Stimson, 301-302, 637-638

## Meetings:

Adana meeting with İnönü, *Jan. 1943*, 29*n*

Hyde Park conversations, 2*n*, 4, 830-832, 1336

London meetings, *July 1943*: With Bush, 642-643; with Stimson, 444-449, 634-636, 643-644

Quebec Conference, First: With Harriman, 874; with Mackenzie King, 668*n*; with Marshall, 869-870; with Roosevelt, 880, 887-889, 894, 903-904, 917-918, 922, 929-935, 952-953, 965-967; with Roosevelt and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894-902, 941-949; with Roosevelt and Mackenzie King, 888, 928-929, 965; with Roosevelt and Soong, 936

Washington Conference, Third: With Chennault, 23*n*; with Congress, members of, 117, 174, 328; with Hopkins, 198; with Hull, 49-51: Pacific War Council, 134, 136-141; with Phillips, 177; with Roosevelt, 24, 48, 51, 86, 96, 151, 183, 188-189, 197-198, 220-221; with Roosevelt and Beneš, 33-34; with Roosevelt and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24-29, 32-33, 66-68, 70, 74-76, 119-123, 152-160, 189-197, 203-207; with Roosevelt and Mackenzie King, 123, 141; with Stilwell, 165-166; with Stimson, 172-173; with Wallace, Stimson, and others, 166-172

Washington meetings, *Sept. 1943*: With Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229-1236; with Harriman, 1216-1218; with Hull, 1236; with Marshall, 1211; with military advisers, 1226-1229; with Roosevelt, 1198-1200, 1208-1211; with Roosevelt and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212-1216; with Roosevelt and military advisers, 1207-1208

Message to people of Italy, *July 16, 1943*, 328*n*, 508*n*, 535*n*

Miscellaneous, 20-23, 67*n*, 109-110, 346*n*, 364*n*, 838, 840, 842-846, 951, 1197-1198

Press conferences, 21*n*, 22*n*, 211-220, 833-834, 964, 1301

Speeches, 537*n*, 688*n*

## Churchill, Winston S.—Continued

Views on: Australian aircraft allocation, 289*n*; Balkan military operations, 449; Burma, 27-28; declaration on occupied territories, 1052-1053; de Gaulle, 322*n*; four-power security declaration, 925*n*; Italian instrument of surrender, 1090; postwar world organization, 167-172, 688, 699; postwar U.S.-U.K. relations, 832; refugees, 346; Rome, bombing of, 529*n*; ROUNDHAMMER, 448-449; shipping situation, 317-318; Sicily, administration of, 283; Sumatra, invasion of, 434; unconditional surrender policy, 330*n*, 331; tank production, 316*n*; U.S. elections, 445

Ciano di Cortellazzo, Count Galeazzo, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs *until July 1943*; Mussolini's son-in-law, 556, 1283

Cicognani, Amleto Giovanni, Archbishop of Laodicea, Apostolic Delegate in the United States, 528, 572, 594-595, 914, 1054*n*, 1057*n*, 1058, 1078*n*, 1079, 1081-1082, 1175-1176

Clark Kerr. *See* Kerr.

Clark, Lewis, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Canada, 655

Clemenceau, Georges, French Premier, 1906-1909, 1917-1920, 1334

Coleman, D'Alton Corry, President, Canadian Pacific Railway, 841

Coleridge, Richard Duke, Commander, R.N., Deputy Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; British Deputy Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34, 52, 86, 97, 111, 117, 124, 143, 160, 178, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1201, 1218

Comandini, Federico, a leader of the Italian Republican Party, 563

Combs, Henry W. Sergeant, U.S.A., member of the White House Signal Corps Detachment, 848

Conant, James B., Chairman, National Defense Research Committee; Acting Chairman, Military Policy Committee on atomic energy; member of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy; President, Harvard University, 5, 8, 634, 639-640, 644-646, 648-649, 1118, 1310

Connally, Tom, Senator from Texas; Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, 166-167, 170

Connolly, Donald H., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Persian Gulf Service Command, 672*n*

- Conolly, Richard L., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Commander of Naval Task Force 86 in the invasion of Sicily, 959
- Cooke, Charles M., Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans), Office of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; Navy member, Joint Staff Planners; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199, 201, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 877, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1200, 1218
- Cornelius, Albert M., Warrant Officer (jg), U.S.A., attached to the White House Map Room, 839
- Cornwall-Jones, Arthur Thomas, Colonel, Assistant Secretary, Offices of the British War Cabinet and the Minister of Defence, 856, 904
- Coudenhove-Kalergi, Count Richard, founder and president of the Pan-European Union, 168
- Cox, G. S., Chargé d'Affairs ad interim of New Zealand in the United States, 134
- Craig, May, Washington correspondent for the Portland (Maine) *Press Herald* and other newspapers, 216
- Cripps, Sir Stafford, British Minister of Aircraft Production, 642
- Croce, Benedetto, Italian philosopher and author, 820
- Cunningham, Sir Andrew, Admiral of the Fleet, R.N., Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, 253-256, 1027, 1276, 1278
- Currie, Lauchlin, Administrative Assistant to the President, 440-441, 653-659, 936, 1240
- D'Ajeta. *See* Lanza d'Ajeta.
- Dale, Sir Henry, Director of Laboratories, Royal Institution, 1097, 1312
- Darlan, Jean François, Admiral, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Vichy France *until November 1942*, 597
- David, Paul T., member of the Economic Staff, Fiscal Division, Bureau of the Budget, 1320-1332
- Davies, Joseph E., Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1936-1938, 18n
- Davis, Elmer, Director, Office of War Information, 1203, 1209, 1302
- Davis, Norman H., Chairman, American Red Cross; Chairman, League of Red Cross Societies; member of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, 681, 691n, 932
- Deane, John R., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff: Meetings, 24, 34, 52, 66, 86, 97, 111, 117, 119, 124, 142-143, 152, 160, 178, 184, 189, 199, 203, 849, 856, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 920, 936, 941, 954, 1201, 1212, 1218, 1229
- Miscellaneous, 233, 302, 329-330, 364, 378, 379n, 413, 434, 498-503, 529n, 951n, 952n, 972, 1026, 1049, 1055, 1063, 1237-1238, 1241, 1290, 1316
- de Gaulle, Charles, Brigadier General, President, French National Committee, *until June 3, 1943*; then Co-Chairman, French Committee of National Liberation, 191-192, 320-324, 662, 665, 916, 945, 1251-1252
- de Linde, C. A., Lieutenant Colonel, attached to the British staff of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 1082
- de Valera, Eamon, Irish Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, 618-624, 831
- Devers, Jacob L., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, 447, 924, 1235
- De Witt, John L., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Fourth Army and Western Defense Command, 893
- Diamantopoulos, Cimon P., Greek Ambassador to the United States, 577-578
- Dick, Royer Mylius, Commodore, R.N., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Naval Forces in the Mediterranean, 1276, 1278
- Dijxhoorn, A. Q. H., Major General, R.N.A., Netherlands Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1238-1239
- Dill, Sir John, Field Marshal, Head, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; member of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy: Correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill, 1250, 1256, 1314, 1317
- Meetings: Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 920, 936, 954; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 941
- Washington Conference, Third: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34-35, 37, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 104, 111, 117, 124, 142-143, 145, 160, 178, 184, 199; with Roosevelt,

Dill, Sir John—Continued

Meetings—Continued

Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 33, 66, 74-75, 119, 152, 189, 203

Washington meetings, *Sept. 1943*: With Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229-1230; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1200-1204, 1218-1226; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 1209; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212

Miscellaneous, 85, 830, 841, 1118

Dnonović, Jovan, Yugoslav Delegate for the Near East and North Africa, 1248

Doenitz, Karl, Grand Admiral, Commander in Chief, German Navy, 42

Donaldson, William J., Jr., Superintendent, House of Representatives Press Gallery, 109, 212

Donovan, William J., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Director, Office of Strategic Services, 893-894

Doolittle, James H., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Northwest African Strategic Air Force, 107, 447

Douglas, Lewis W., Deputy Administrator, War Shipping Administration, 175-178, 180-182, 313-314, 832, 838, 896, 918, 1153, 1229, 1233, 1236

Douglas, Sir Sholto, Air Chief Marshal, R.A.F., Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Middle East Command, 434

Dulles, Allen W., representative of the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland, 1087

Dunn, James Clement, Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State; member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 322*n*, 534, 536*n*, 538*n*, 559-560, 580-581, 601, 667*n*, 670*n*, 843, 845, 880, 912, 918, 922, 930, 950-952, 1044*n*, 1078*n*, 1082, 1087-1088, 1161*n*, 1169*n*, 1264-1265

Durbrow, Elbridge, Foreign Service officer assigned to the Division of European Affairs, Department of State, 325

Eaker, Ira C., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, 80, 82, 104-106, 447, 451, 854

Early, Stephen T., Secretary to the President, 20-21, 183, 654, 657, 833*n*, 840-843, 845, 848, 952

Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:  
Correspondence with: Churchill, 121*n*, 190*n*, 309-312, 345-346, 589-594, 1337-1339; Halifax, 534-536, 567-568, 570-571, 574-576; Hull,

Eden, Anthony—Continued

Correspondence with—Continued

1113-1116; Knatchbull-Hugessen, 536-537; Macmillan, 1192-1193; Roosevelt, 556, 579; Sargent, 1046, 1090-1091; Watkinson, 566-567, 574-576; Winant, 610, 613

Meetings:

Quebec Conference, First: With Harriman, 965; with Hopkins, 889; with Hull, 880, 912-917, 922-928, 949-950; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 888, 917, 930, 932-933, 952-953, 965; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 899,

Washington meetings, *Mar. 1943*:  
5*n*, 10*n*, 49*n*

Miscellaneous, 50, 341, 403, 407, 414, 445, 554, 609, 679, 698, 796, 840-846, 951, 1086*n*, 1304, 1307

Eisenhower, Dwight D., General, U.S.A., Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa; Commanding General, North African Theater of Operations:

Correspondence with: Attlee, 1061-1062; Badoglio, 1284-1285; Marshall, 1193-1196; Roosevelt, 377*n*; Roosevelt and Churchill, 1261-1262, 1268-1269, 1275; Tedder, 256-257

Directives to, 163-164, 284-286, 326*n*, 330-331, 955, 1161-1169, 1188, 1248-1250, 1271-1272

Reports by and views of: 11*n*, 36, 37*n*, 68, 96, 103, 122, 125, 194, 253, 283, 326-328, 449-451, 499, 519, 522, 530, 549, 584, 830, 945, 956-958, 1029, 1031-1033, 1054-1056, 1060-1062, 1064-1066, 1068-1076, 1182-1185, 1212*n*, 1246-1247, 1248-1250, 1257-1261, 1267-1268, 1274-1275, 1280-1281, 1284-1285

Elliot, William, Air Commodore, R.A.F., Director of Plans, British Air Ministry, 52, 77, 86, 95, 111, 124, 143, 145, 148, 160, 178, 184, 199, 272, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 904, 936, 954

Elsey, George M., Lieutenant (jg), U.S.N.R., attached to the White House Map Room, 835, 839

Embick, Stanley D., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Army member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 52, 97, 160, 178, 1218

Evatt, Herbert V., Australian Minister for External Affairs, 134, 136-137, 138*n*, 139-141, 289, 324-325

Fairchild, Muir S., Major General, U.S.A., Air Force member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 86, 95, 124, 199, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1218

- Farinacci, Roberto, member of the Italian Grand Fascist Council under Mussolini, 556, 1062, 1076, 1193-1194, 1262, 1282
- Farquhar, Harold Lister, British Consul General at Barcelona, 563-565
- Fernández Cuesta, Raimundo, Spanish Ambassador to Italy, 1188*n*
- Ferris, Benjamin G., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Headquarters, Rear Echelon, China-Burma-India Theater, 436
- Fiset, Sir Eugene, Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, 840
- Foster, R. M., Air Commodore, R.A.F., attached to Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 954, 958-959
- Fowle, F. F., Jr., Lieutenant, U.S.N.R., assigned from the Naval Office for Occupied Areas to temporary duty with the Secretariat of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 580, 1082
- Fox, George A., Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., assistant to the personal physician to the President, 848
- Franco y Bahamonde, Francisco, Generalissimo, Chief of State and President of the Spanish Government, 462-463, 480
- Franconi, Francesco, Italian Minister to Portugal, 1941-1943, 535
- Freseman, William L., Commander, U.S.N., Aide to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 34, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 904, 936, 954, 1200, 1218
- Fuller, Leon W., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 791-795
- Garnett, C. W., Major, British Secretary, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559, 580, 1082
- Gascoigne, Alvary Douglas Frederick, British Consul General at Tangier, 566, 586-587, 595-596, 1076-1078
- Gayda, Virginio, former editor of the *Giornale d'Italia*, 1195
- George II, King of the Hellenes, 462, 914-915, 930, 932-934, 1044-1046
- George VI, King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 401-402
- Gibson, Guy Penrose, Wing Commander, R.A.F., Commander, 617th Squadron, 840, 887
- Giles, Barney M., Major General, U.S.A., Chief of Air Staff, Army Air Forces; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 1200
- Gill, H. B. C., Commander, R.N., attached to the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington, 1200, 1218
- Giraud, Henri Honoré, General, High Commissioner of French North and West Africa until June 3, 1943; then Co-Chairman, French Committee of National Liberation, 103-104, 191-192, 321, 323, 665, 945, 1251-1252
- Glen, James A., Speaker of the Canadian House of Commons, 847
- Godbout, Joseph Adélar, Premier of Quebec, 840
- Godefroy, René, Vice Admiral, commander of the French Fleet at Alexandria in 1942, 190
- Godfrey, William, Archbishop of Cius, Apostolic Delegate to the United Kingdom, 570*n*
- Godwin, Earl, news broadcaster for the National Broadcasting Company, 150, 215, 219
- Goering, Hermann, Reich Marshal, Minister President for Prussia; German Reich Minister for Air; Commander in Chief of the *Luftwaffe*, 1234
- Gómez Jordana, Francisco, General, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1188*n*
- Graham, Frank H., Lieutenant, U.S.A., attached to the White House Map Room, 1198, 1200
- Grant, D. A., Lieutenant Commander, R.N.V.R., attached to the British Combined Operations Staff, 1207, 1212, 1226
- Gray, Cecil W., Assistant to the Secretary of State, 408
- Gray, David, Minister to Ireland, 618*n*, 831-832
- Green, William, President, American Federation of Labor, 21, 23
- Greer, DeWitt, Major, U.S.A., attached to the White House Map Room, 839
- Gromyko, Andrey Andreyevich, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Soviet Union in the United States, 1087*n*
- Gross, Charles P., Major General, U.S.A., Chief of Transportation, War Department; member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, 175-176
- Groves, Leslie R., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief, Construction Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department, 634*n*, 635*n*, 648*n*
- Guariglia, Raffaele, Italian Ambassador to Turkey; from July 30, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 524, 531-532, 555, 582, 584-585, 1057, 1076, 1087-1088

- Hachmeister, Louise, White House telephone operator, 847
- Hackworth, Green H., Legal Adviser, Department of State, 557-559, 596-598, 670*n*, 728-730
- Halban, Hans von, atomic scientist working in England, 4
- Hale, Madeleine, Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 757-760
- Halifax, Viscount, British Ambassador to the United States, 10, 134, 173-174, 342*n*, 534-536, 567-568, 570-571, 574-576, 702, 925*n*
- Hall, John L., Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Commander, Southern Attack Force in the Mediterranean, 959
- Halsey, William F., Jr., Admiral, U.S.N., Commander, Third Fleet, 1291
- Hammond, Chester, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Assistant to the Military Aide to the President, 383*n*, 408-410, 527, 550-551, 565, 668, 839, 1159*n*
- Hammond, T. W., Jr., Colonel, U.S.A., United States Secretary, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 538*n*, 559, 1200
- Handy, Thomas T., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff, United States Army; Chief, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 482-483, 837, 840, 849, 856, 862, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954
- Harriman, W. Averell, Personal Representative of the President in charge of the Mission of Economic Affairs, American Embassy, London, with the rank of Minister; representative in London on the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board; member of the Combined Production and Resources Board in London:  
Correspondence with: Churchill, 314-318; Hopkins, 316*n*; Roosevelt, 406*n*  
Meetings:  
Hyde Park conversations, 832-833  
Quebec Conference, First: With Atherton and Dunn, 934*n*; with Bracken, 934-935; with Churchill, 874; with Eden, 965; with Hull, 934*n*; with Roosevelt and advisers, 918; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 888, 903-904, 965-967  
Washington Conference, Third: With Roosevelt and Churchill, 51, 197  
Washington meetings, *Sept. 1943*: With Churchill, 1216-1218; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229; with
- Harriman, W. Averell—Continued  
Meetings—Continued  
Churchill and Hull, 1236; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 1199, 1208, 1256*n*  
Miscellaneous, 18, 22, 426, 833*n*, 838-842, 846, 896, 1,304, 1307
- Harris, David, Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 752-753, 762-795
- Harrison, Leland, Minister to Switzerland, 524*n*, 548*n*, 569*n*, 571-572, 582-583, 1057*n*
- Harvey, Percy Norman, British Deputy Government Actuary; Joint Statistical Adviser and Director, Statistics and Intelligence Division, British Ministry of War Transport, 175
- Haskell, John H. F., Colonel, U.S.A., Deputy Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, 559, 580
- Hayter, William, First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington, 284, 534, 559, 1192
- Heileman, Frank A., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Director for Operations, Army Service Forces, 1218
- Hewitt, H. Kent, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Commander, Western Naval Task Force in the Mediterranean, 959
- Hickerson, John D., Assistant Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 332, 334-335, 408-410, 655-656, 659, 667-668, 1119
- Hilldring, John H., Major General, U.S.A., Chief, Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff; member (and at times Acting Chairman) of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559-560, 580-581, 1082-1083, 1086
- Hilliard, C. C., Major, U.S.A., attached to the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, 580, 1082
- Himmler, Heinrich, Chief of the German Police and Leader of the National Socialist Elite Guard; *from August 24*, Reich Minister of the Interior, 1194
- Hitch, Simon H., Lieutenant, U.S.N., Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air, American Embassy, Chungking, 300*n*
- Hitler, Adolf, *Führer* and Chancellor of the German Reich; Reich Minister of Defense; Commander in Chief of the German Armed Forces, 311, 508-509, 517, 556, 573, 758, 786, 1076, 1113, 1174, 1194-1195, 1234, 1262, 1283, 1285

- Ho Ying-chin, General, Chinese Minister of War; Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese National Military Council, 166
- Hoare, Sir Samuel, British Ambassador to Spain, 345*n*, 563-565, 589-594, 1062*n*, 1188
- Hoch, Nicholas, First Sergeant, U.S.A., orderly to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, 848
- Holmes, Noel Galway, Major General, Director of Movements, British War Office, 111, 124, 175, 178, 184, 199
- Hopkins, Harry L., Special Assistant to the President; Chairman, Munitions Assignments Board:  
Correspondence with: Burns, 624-627; Bush, 6-10; Cherwell, 188, 221; Churchill, 1-6, 11-17, 138, 221, 298-299, 317-318, 630, 830; Eden, 10-11; Halifax, 10; Harriman, 316*n*; Hull, 658-659; Marshall, 16, 297-298; Roosevelt, 633; Rowan, 21-23, 282-284, 324-325, 333; Soong, 126*n*, 288-289, 296-297; Stimson, 444  
Meetings:  
Hyde Park conversations, 832  
Quebec Conference, First: With Eden, 889; with Roosevelt and advisers, 918; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 888, 903, 917, 929-930, 936, 952, 965; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894-896, 941, 948  
Washington Conference, Third: With Bush and Cherwell, 209-211, 631, 642; with Churchill, 198; Pacific War Council, 134; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 24, 48, 51, 96, 141, 151, 188, 197; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 119, 121, 189, 196, 203-204  
Washington meetings, *Sept. 1943*: With Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 1209-1210  
Miscellaneous, 5*n*, 18-19, 22-23, 86, 325, 373*n*, 374*n*, 375*n*, 444*n*, 838, 840-843, 845-846, 848
- Hornbeck, Stanley K., Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State, 443, 627, 1240*n*
- Horne, Frederick J., Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199, 1200-1201, 1205, 1218
- Hoskins, Harold B., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., officer sent on two special missions to the Middle East, 1942-1943, 675
- Hovde, Frederick L., head of the London office of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 3*n*, 4
- Howard, Harry N., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 748-752
- Howe, Clarence D., Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply; member of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy, 11*n*, 659, 831, 1118
- Hoyningen genannt Huene, Oswald, Baron of, German Minister to Portugal, 535*n*
- Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State:  
Correspondence with: Atherton, 953*n*; Berle, 655-656, 679-681; Bullitt, 508*n*; Caffery, 308-309; Campbell, Sir Ronald I., 587*n*, 595*n*; Deane, 549*n*, 551*n*, 951*n*; Dunn, 1264-1265; Early, 657, 1113-1116; Hackworth, 557-559, 728-730; Halifax, 552*n*, 553*n*, 554*n*, 556*n*, 570-571, 574-576; Hammond, 550-551, 565, 668; Hickerson, 332, 334-335, 667-668; Hopkins, 658-659; Hornbeck, 627-629; Jones, 1177-1178; Kennan, 1070*n*; King, Mackenzie, 1108; Leahy, 329-330, 344*n*, 1265-1266; Marshall, 530-531; Murphy, 527, 1193-1196, 1251-1252; Murray, 674-679; Pasvolosky, 706, 717, 730, 761-762, 788-789; Roosevelt, 320*n*, 322-324, 336-338, 346, 508-509, 527, 612, 656-658, 660-661, 664-666, 668-669, 672, 831, 1190, 1333-1335; Savage, 670; Soong, 441-443, 659-660; Winant, 512-513, 609-610, 612-613, 618, 700-702, 1010*n*
- Meetings:  
Quebec Conference, First: With Eden, 880, 912-920, 922-928, 949-950; with Mackenzie King, 921-922; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 917, 930, 933, 952-953  
Washington Conference, Third: With Beneš, 34, 174*n*; with Churchill, 49-51, 173-174; with Halifax, 173-174; with Mackenzie King, 143  
Washington meetings, *Aug.-Sept. 1943*: With Bianchi, 1176; with Churchill, 1236; with Kauffmann, 1252-1253; with Roosevelt, 681-682; with Soong, 440-441, 1239-1240

- Hull, Cordell—Continued  
 Miscellaneous, 517*n*, 521*n*, 526, 561*n*,  
 563, 572*n*, 598*n*, 676-678, 691-692,  
 843-845, 924*n*, 1081*n*, 1253*n*, 1304,  
 1307
- Hull, John E., Brigadier General,  
 U.S.A., Chief, Theater (Operations)  
 Group, Operations Division,  
 War Department General Staff,  
 594*n*, 1200, 1206, 1218
- Ickes, Harold L., Secretary of the Interior;  
 Petroleum Administrator for War,  
 23, 166-167, 1236
- Inönü, Ismet, President of Turkey, 29*n*
- Ireland, Philip W., Divisional Assistant,  
 Division of Political Studies,  
 Department of State, 796-801
- Ismay, Sir Hastings, Lieutenant General,  
 Deputy Secretary (Military) to the  
 British War Cabinet; Chief of Staff to  
 the Minister of Defence; member of the  
 British Chiefs of Staff Committee:  
 Meetings, 24, 34, 47, 52, 66, 77, 85-86,  
 97, 119, 143, 145, 152, 160, 164,  
 178, 180, 184, 189, 191, 199, 203,  
 848, 856, 862, 875, 881, 889, 894,  
 904, 936, 941, 949, 954, 1200, 1207,  
 1212, 1218, 1223, 1226, 1229  
 Miscellaneous, 197, 330*n*, 342-344, 841,  
 846, 855, 948, 965, 1198, 1236,  
 1336*n*
- Jacob, Edward Ian Claude, Brigadier,  
 Assistant Secretary (Military) to the  
 British War Cabinet, 24, 66, 119,  
 152, 189, 199, 203, 941
- Jebb, Gladwyn, Acting Counselor, British  
 Foreign Office, 922
- Jodl, Alfred, Colonel General, Chief of the  
*Wehrmacht* Operations Staff, High  
 Command of the German *Wehrmacht*,  
 1075, 1195
- Johnson, Herschel V., Minister to Sweden,  
 579
- Jones, J. Wesley, Foreign Service officer  
 assigned to the Division of European  
 Affairs, Department of State, 1082,  
 1085, 1087-1090, 1177-1178
- Jones, Jesse H., Secretary of Commerce,  
 23
- Jones, Marvin, War Food Administrator,  
 660-661
- Kauffman, James L., Rear Admiral,  
 U.S.N., United States member, Allied  
 Anti-Submarine Survey Board, 95,  
 512, 1295, 1300
- Kauffmann, Henrik de, Danish Minister  
 to the United States, 1252-1253
- Kelly, Edward J., Mayor of Chicago, 23
- Kennan, George F., Chargé d'Affaires  
 ad interim in Portugal, 573*n*, 1069*n*,  
 1070
- Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, British  
 Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 325*n*,  
 951*n*, 1062*n*, 1087, 1114*n*, 1173-1174,  
 1185*n*, 1267
- King, Ernest J., Admiral, U.S.N.,  
 Commander in Chief, United States  
 Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations;  
 member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
 and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
 Meetings:  
 Quebec Conference, First: Combined  
 Chiefs of Staff, 849, 855-857,  
 862-864, 866, 869-870, 873,  
 875, 877-878, 881-882, 885, 889,  
 891-892, 904, 907, 909, 920, 936,  
 954, 959-960, 964; with Roosevelt,  
 Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of  
 Staff, 894, 900, 902, 941-942,  
 944-945, 947-948  
 Washington Conference, Third: Combined  
 Chiefs of Staff, 34, 38, 40-41,  
 43, 47, 52, 56, 63, 77-78, 83,  
 85-87, 91-93, 97, 99-100, 111,  
 116-117, 124, 133, 142-143,  
 145-148, 160-164, 178, 182, 184,  
 199-200; with Roosevelt, Churchill,  
 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24,  
 66, 75, 119, 152, 156-158,  
 189-190, 192, 194, 203, 207  
 Washington meetings, Aug.-Sept. 1943:  
 With Churchill and Combined Chiefs  
 of Staff, 1229, 1231; with Churchill  
 and other advisers, 1226-1228;  
 Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1218,  
 1220, 1224; with Roosevelt, Churchill,  
 and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212-  
 1216; with Roosevelt, Churchill,  
 and other advisers, 1207; with  
 Roosevelt, Stimson, and Joint Chiefs  
 of Staff, 434-435, 498-501, 503  
 Miscellaneous, 16-17, 67*n*, 146*n*,  
 310, 627, 841, 1200, 1296
- King, William Lyon Mackenzie,  
 Canadian Prime Minister and Secretary  
 of State for External Affairs:  
 Correspondence with: Churchill, 332-  
 333, 398-399; Hull, 1108; Roosevelt,  
 134*n*, 333-335, 400, 410, 1242  
 Meetings:  
 Quebec Conference, First: With  
 Churchill, 668*n*; with Hull, 921-  
 922; with Roosevelt and Churchill,  
 888, 928-929, 965  
 Washington Conference, Third:  
 With Hull, 143; Pacific War Council,  
 134-135; with Roosevelt, 123,  
 151; with Roosevelt and Churchill,  
 123, 141  
 Miscellaneous, 117, 394, 396-397,  
 408, 414, 655, 657, 668, 838, 840,  
 843, 845-848, 1119, 1157*n*, 1302

- Kirk, Alexander C., Minister to Egypt; Ambassador to the Greek Government in exile, established at Cairo, 678, 915*n*, 1046*n*
- Kirk, Grayson L., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 801-802
- Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe, British Ambassador to Turkey, 531*n*, 532, 536-537
- Kniffin, Ogden, Captain, U.S.A., attached to the White House Map Room, 839
- Knollys, Viscount, Governor and Commander in Chief of Bermuda, 22
- Knox, Frank, Secretary of the Navy, 23, 845, 952
- Koplenig, Wilhelm, former leader of the Austrian Communist Party, 1112
- Koren, William, Jr., Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 736-748
- Ku Chu-tung, General, Commander of Chinese forces in Chekiang, 166
- Kuter, Laurence S., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Plans), Army Air Forces; Air Force member, Joint Staff Planners; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1218
- Lambe, Charles E., Captain, R.N., Director of Plans, British Admiralty, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 145, 148, 160, 178, 184, 199, 201, 272, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 904, 936, 954
- Land, Emory S., Rear Admiral, U.S.N. (retired), Administrator, War Shipping Administration; Chairman, Maritime Commission; United States member, Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, 23, 1207, 1212
- Lanza, Galvano, Lieutenant, Italian officer assigned as interpreter for General Zanussi, 1192*n*
- Lanza d'Ajeta, Marchese Blasco, Counselor, Italian Legation, Lisbon, 554-556, 567-568, 594, 598, 1057
- Lauritsen, Charles C., Professor of Physics, California Institute of Technology, 3
- Laux, R. J., Colonel, Assistant (and at times Acting) United States Secretary, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 580, 1082, 1090
- Laval, Pierre, French Chief of Government at Vichy, 597
- Law, Richard K., Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 337
- Leahy, William D., Admiral, U.S.N., Ambassador to France, 1941-1942; then Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff;  
Correspondence with: Hull, 329-330, 344*n*, 1265-1266; Roosevelt, 1316-1317; Roosevelt and Churchill, 307-308, 1250, 1256, 1314, 1317  
Meetings:  
Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 856-858, 862-863, 870, 873, 875, 877, 881, 884, 887, 904, 906-907, 920, 936, 940, 954, 961, 964; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 952, 965; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 941, 947  
Washington Conference, Third: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34-35, 40, 43-45, 47, 52-54, 56, 61-63, 65-66, 77, 79, 82, 86-87, 90-91, 93, 97, 100, 102, 108, 111-113, 117-118, 124-126, 128-129, 131-132, 142-143, 160-161, 163, 178-179, 184, 186-187, 199-202; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 76, 119, 152, 155, 157, 189, 203, 206; with Soong, 97, 150-151  
Washington meetings, Aug.-Sept. 1943: With Cadogan, 1199-1200; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229-1230, 1232; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1218-1221, 1223-1226; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212, 1215; with Roosevelt, Stimson, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 434, 498-499  
Miscellaneous, 30*n*, 222*n*, 227*n*, 238*n*, 289*n*, 432*n*, 550, 838-841, 846, 848, 855-856, 874, 880, 916, 1160*n*, 1236
- Leathers, Lord, British Minister of War Transport, 15, 175-176, 178, 180-182, 313-314, 403, 896, 918, 1153
- Leclerc de Hauteclouque, Jacques, Brigadier General, Commander of the Fighting French "L Force" in Fezzan and Tunisia, 322
- Lee, John C. H., Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Services of Supply, European Theater of Operations, 446
- Leeper, Reginald Wildig Allen, British Ambassador to the Greek Government in exile, established at Cairo, 1044*n*, 1191-1192

- Lehman, Herbert H., Governor of New York, 1932-1942; Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 337.
- Leigh-Mallory, Sir Trafford, Air Marshal, R.A.F., Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Fighter Command, 869, 905, 1124*n*
- Lemnitzer, Lyman L., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff, Fifteenth Army Group, 1276, 1280
- Lewis, Stanley, Mayor of Ottawa, 846
- Lippmann, Walter, columnist for the New York *Herald-Tribune* and other newspapers, 23
- Little, Sir Charles, Admiral, R.N., Commander in Chief, Portsmouth, 869*n*, 905, 1124*n*
- Little, Virginia C., member of the Economic Staff, Fiscal Division, Bureau of the Budget, 1331-1332
- Llewellyn, John Jestyn, Colonel, British Minister Resident in Washington for Supply; member of the Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy, 1118, 1209
- Lloyd, C. K., Captain, R.N., attached to the British staff of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 1082, 1084-1085
- Lloyd George, David, British Prime Minister, 1916-1922, 1334-1335
- Long, Breckinridge, Assistant Secretary of State, 336*n*
- Long, Victor D., Commander, U.S.N., Aide to the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, 34, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 145, 160, 178, 184, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1218
- Lorraine, Sir Percy, Bart., British Ambassador to Turkey, 1934-1939, 567
- Loudon, Alexander, Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States, 134, 1052
- Lovette, Leland P., Captain, U.S.N., Director of Public Relations, Navy Department, 843
- Lowe, Frank L., Captain, U.S.N., member of the Joint Administrative Committee and of the Combined Administrative Committee, 1200
- Lytelton, Oliver, British Minister of Production, 316-317
- MacArthur, Douglas, General, U.S.A., Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, 900, 948, 1235
- MacDonald, Malcolm, British High Commissioner in Canada, 22, 395-396, 841, 843
- MacKenzie, C. J., member of the Canadian National Research Council, 640*n*, 645-646
- Mackenzie King. *See* King.
- Maclay, John Scott, member of the British Merchant Shipping Mission at Washington; associate member of the Combined Military Transportation Committee, 175-176
- MacLean, K. G., Brigadier, attached to the staff of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), 862, 868, 943
- Macleod, Minden W. M., Brigadier, Director of Plans, British Combined Operations Staff, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199, 849, 856, 862, 875, 889, 904, 954
- Macmillan, Harold, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 321, 519*n*, 664, 924, 1183*n*, 1191-1193, 1275, 1277-1278, 1282
- Macready, Gordon Nevil, Lieutenant General, Head of the British Army Delegation at Washington and member of the British Joint Staff Mission; British Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; member of the Munitions Assignments Board and of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 145, 160, 178, 184, 199, 559, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1200, 1212, 1218, 1225, 1229
- MacRory, Joseph Cardinal, Archbishop of Armagh, 621*n*
- Maglione, Luigi Cardinal, Vatican Secretary of State, 524*n*, 528, 593-594, 1057*n*, 1080, 1175
- Mahoney, Merchant, Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington, 400
- Maisky, Ivan Mikhailovich, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom, *until July 1943*, 153, 1114
- Mallaby, A. W. S., Major General, (British) Director of Military Operations, India, 862
- Mansfield, J. M., Rear Admiral, R.N., British member, Allied Anti-Submarine Board, 95, 512, 1295, 1300
- Manzini, Raimondo, Secretary, Italian Legation, Lisbon, 1056, 1190*n*
- Marchesi, Luigi, Major, Italian officer attached to General Castellano, 1279
- Marchetti, Spyro, Greek Minister to Switzerland, 571*n*, 572
- Marcus, David, Colonel, U.S.A., attached to the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, 580, 1082
- Marris, A. D., Counselor, British Embassy, Washington; member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559

- Marshall, George C., General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, United States Army; member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
- Correspondence with: Eisenhower, 520*n*, 522*n*, 530, 1074-1076, 1193-1196, 1274; Handy, 482-483; Hopkins, 16, 297-298; Hull, 530-531; Roosevelt, 295-296, 386, 506-508, 528-529, 537-538, 549-550, 565-566, 616-617
- Meetings:
- Quebec Conference, First: With Churchill, 869-870; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 854, 856, 858-859, 862, 864, 866-868, 870, 875, 877-878, 881, 883, 889, 892-894, 904, 906, 908-911, 920, 936-938, 954, 961-964; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 896-898, 900, 902, 941, 943-944, 946, 948; with Soong, 962
- Washington Conference, Third: With Chu, 208; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34, 36-47, 52, 65, 77, 83-86, 91-92, 97, 101-104, 111, 114-117, 124, 128-129, 131, 142-144, 160, 163-164, 178, 182, 184-187, 199-201; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 74, 76-77, 119-120, 152-155, 158-159, 189-191, 194, 196-197, 203-207
- Washington meetings. *Aug.-Sept. 1943*: With Churchill, 1211; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1229, 1231-1236, 1264*n*; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1200-1206, 1218, 1223, 1226; with Roosevelt, 482-483; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 1198, 1209; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212, 1214; with Roosevelt, Stimson, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 434-435, 498-503
- Miscellaneous, 6, 16-17, 19, 85*n*, 86, 317*n*, 330*n*, 382-385, 447-448, 528*n*, 627, 643*n*, 648*n*, 649, 651-652, 676*n*, 840-841, 846, 1217
- Supreme Allied Commander for OVERLORD, proposed appointment as, 497-498, 830, 929
- Visit to North Africa, 14-15, 198, 205-206, 220-221
- Martin, John Miller, Principal Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, 1117*n*, 1301-1302, 1310-1311, 1336*n*
- Massigli, René, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation, 671
- Matthews, H. Freeman, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the United Kingdom; *from August 19, 1943*, Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State, 12, 1078*n*, 1087-1090, 1192
- Mazzini, Giuseppe, President of the Society of "Young Italy" organized 1832, 815, 823
- McBride, Robert H., Vice Consul at Algiers, 1251*n*
- McCain, John S., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air), 1207-1208, 1212, 1218, 1226, 1228, 1243
- McCall, Henry W. U., Commodore, R.N., Chief of Staff to the Head of the British Admiralty Delegation at Washington; member of the Combined Administrative Committee, 1200, 1218
- McCarthy, Leighton, Canadian Minister to the United States, 134, 397, 838, 840
- McCloy, John J., Assistant Secretary of War; Chairman, Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 173, 559-560
- McClure, Robert A., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief, Information and Censorship Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 1282
- McClusky, C. W., Commander, U.S.N., 1200, 1218
- McConnell, J. W., Publisher, Montreal *Star*, 841
- McDaniel, E. H., Colonel, U.S.A., member of the Joint War Plans Committee, 434
- McIntire, Ross T., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy Department; Surgeon General, United States Navy; personal physician to the President, 843, 848, 922
- McIntyre, Marvin H., Secretary to the President, 653*n*, 656
- McNair, John Kirkland, Brigadier, Army Planner, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 881, 954, 1200, 1218
- McNarney, Joseph T., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, 24, 34, 37-39, 52, 66, 77, 81-84, 86, 94, 97, 99, 105-108, 110-111, 117, 119-120, 124, 129-130, 132-133, 142-143, 152-153, 158-160, 178, 182, 184, 189, 195, 199, 203, 206-207, 1056, 1064-1066, 1068, 1070-1076, 1218
- Menemencioğlu, Numan, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, 531*n*, 532, 534

- Mihailović, Draža, General, leader of Yugoslav guerrilla forces, 41, 102, 601
- Moffatt, Jay Pierrepont, Minister to Canada, 335*n*
- Molotov, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, 325, 951*n*, 1095*n*, 1114, 1159*n*, 1173, 1185, 1267, 1304, 1307
- Monnet, Jean, French financial expert serving on the British Supply Council at Washington; *from February to June 1943*, on a mission for the Munitions Assignments Board in Algiers, 321
- Montanari, Franco, Consul Third Class in the Italian Foreign Service, 589*n*, 594, 1070, 1191*n*, 1276, 1279
- Montgomery, Sir Bernard, General, Commander, British Eighth Army, 68, 830, 1232
- Moorman, Dan L., official of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in charge of arrangements for the President's special train, 848
- Moran, Lord, personal physician to the British Prime Minister, 839*n*, 841, 1336*n*
- Moreell, Ben, Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, Navy Department; Chief of Civil Engineers of the Navy, 1207, 1226-1227, 1243
- Morgan, Sir Frederick, Lieutenant General, Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), 192, 364, 367, 446, 484-496, 866, 896
- Morgan, James, Counselor, British Embassy, Ankara, 1930-1940, 567
- Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, 23, 1236
- Morrisroe, Patrick, Bishop of Achonry, 621*n*
- Mosely, Philip E., Assistant Chief, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 731-736
- Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Vice Admiral, R.N., Chief of Combined Operations; Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), South East Asia Command, 15, 841, 845, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889-894, 904, 911, 936, 941, 954, 962*n*, 963, 989*n*, 1160-1161
- Murphy, Robert D., Personal Representative of the President in North Africa; Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 527, 664-665, 924, 1169*n*, 1251-1252, 1275-1283
- Murray, Philip, President, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 23
- Murray, Wallace S., Adviser on Political Relations, Department of State, 674-679, 933*n*
- Mussolini, Benito, *Duce del Fascismo*, Italian Prime Minister, and Head of Government *until July 25, 1943*, 311, 461, 517-519, 523, 531, 535, 545, 556, 564, 607, 804, 812-813, 817, 819, 836, 950, 1075, 1098, 1113, 1167, 1188, 1194-1195, 1283, 1285
- Naples, Victor Emmanuel, Prince of, 804
- Nash, Walter, Minister of New Zealand to the United States, 134
- Neary, Elizabeth C., Personal Secretary to the Secretary of War, 301*n*
- Nelson, Donald, Chairman, War Production Board, 23
- Nimitz, Chester W., Admiral, U.S.N., Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, 146*n*, 893, 1291
- Noble, Sir Percy, Admiral, R.N., Head of the British Naval Delegation at Washington and member of the British Joint Staff Mission; British Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 160, 178, 184, 199, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1212, 1218-1221, 1226, 1229
- Norton, Clifford John, British Minister to Switzerland, 571*n*
- Notter, Harley A., Chief, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 338*n*
- Ó Ceallaigh (O'Kelly), Seán T., Irish Minister for Finance, 620*n*
- O'Donnell, Emmett, Colonel, U.S.A., member of the Advisory Council, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1218
- Oliver, G. N., Commodore, R.N., Commander, Northern Attack Force in the Mediterranean, 959
- Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, Italian Prime Minister, 1917-1919, 563
- Osborne, Sir Francis D'Arcy Godolphin, British Minister to the Holy See, 524*n*, 537, 564*n*, 589*n*, 881*n*, 1057*n*, 1062*n*, 1280*n*
- Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah, Shah-in-shah of Iran, 673
- Pangal, Jaen, Rumanian Minister to Portugal, 1939-1940, 535
- Pasvol'ky, Leo, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 681-682, 691*n*, 692, 698-700, 706, 709-717, 730, 761-762, 788-789

- Patenaude, L., Lieutenant Colonel, (Canadian) Governor of the Citadel, 841
- Patterson, Robert P., Acting Secretary of War in July 1943, 676-677
- Patton, George S., Jr., General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Seventh Army, 1283
- Pearson, Lester B., Minister Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654-655, 1119
- Peck, Clarence R., Colonel, U.S.A., Executive Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1200, 1218
- Pegram, George B., Professor of Physics, Columbia University, 4
- Pegram, R. B., Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., attached to the Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1226
- Peierls, Rudolph E., Professor of Physics, University of Birmingham, 4
- Peirse, Sir Richard, Air Chief Marshal, R.A.F., Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Air Forces in India, 15-17, 52, 56, 64, 66, 71, 124, 128, 143, 145, 148
- Pelloux, Luigi, General, Italian Prime Minister, 1898-1900, 806
- Pence, Harry L., Captain, U.S.N., member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559, 580, 1082
- Perkins, Frances, Secretary of Labor, 1340
- Pétain, Henri Philippe, Marshal of France, French Chief of State at Vichy, 1193
- Peter II, King of Yugoslavia, 915
- Philip, André, National Commissioner for Interior and Labor of the French National Committee, 321
- Phillips, Sir Frederick, British Treasury Representative in the United States; member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 559, 580
- Phillips, William, Personal Representative of the President in India, 1942-1943, 23, 177
- Piedmont, Humbert, Prince of; Crown Prince of Italy, 523, 534, 804-805
- Pius XII, Pope, 593, 1057-1058, 1078-1079, 1195, 1212
- Pope, Maurice, Major General, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 1119
- Portal, Sir Charles, Air Chief Marshal, R.A.F., Chief of the Air Staff; member of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Correspondence with Arnold, 241
- Portal, Sir Charles—Continued  
Meetings:  
Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 852-856, 861-864, 866, 868-873, 875, 878, 881, 883-885, 887, 889-890, 904, 907-909, 911, 920, 936, 954; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 897, 941  
Washington Conference, Third: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34, 37-41, 45-46, 52, 77, 79-83, 86, 96-97, 104-108, 111, 117-119, 124-125, 129-130, 133, 142-143, 160, 162, 178-179, 182, 184-188, 199-200; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 48; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 119-120, 122, 152-153, 158-159, 189, 193-194, 203  
Miscellaneous, 15, 17*n*, 304-307, 841, 1013-1020
- Porter, L. E., Captain, R.N., Navy Planner, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 889
- Porter, W., Brigadier, Director of Plans, British War Office, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 145, 148, 160, 178, 184, 199, 272, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 889, 904, 936
- Pound, Sir Dudley, Admiral of the Fleet, R.N., First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff; member of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee and of the Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Meetings:  
Quebec Conference, First: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 853-854, 856, 862, 869-870, 875, 881, 884-885, 889, 904, 920, 936, 954, 959; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894, 941, 944  
Washington Conference, Third: Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34, 38, 42-43, 47, 52, 77, 86, 91-92, 97, 111, 117, 124, 142-143, 160-164, 178, 184, 187, 199; with Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24, 66, 71, 119-120, 152, 157, 189, 203  
Washington meetings, *Sept. 1943*: With Roosevelt, Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212  
Miscellaneous, 15, 17*n*, 304-307, 310, 841, 1300-1301
- Pound, Ezra, American poet, 1195
- Prunas, Renato, Italian Minister to Portugal, 535, 1180*n*, 1184*n*

- Purnell, William R., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Navy member, Military Policy Committee on atomic energy, 652
- Queille, Henri, former French Senator, 324*n*
- Quezon, Manuel, President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 134, 139, 844*n*
- Rahn, Rudolf, German Ambassador to Italy, 1282
- Ramsay, Sir Bertram, Vice Admiral, R.N., Commander, Eastern Naval Task Force in the Mediterranean, 944
- Rayburn, Sam, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1236
- Reams, R. Borden, Foreign Service officer assigned to the Division of European Affairs, Department of State, 336*n*
- Redman, Harold, Brigadier, Secretary, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; British Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff:  
Meetings, 34, 52, 86, 97, 111, 117, 124, 142-143, 160, 178, 184, 199, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 920, 936, 954, 1201, 1212, 1218, 1229  
Miscellaneous, 233, 302, 330, 364, 378, 412, 972, 1026, 1049, 1055, 1063, 1237-1238, 1241, 1290
- Renchard, George W., Foreign Service officer assigned to the Office of the Secretary of State, 574*n*
- Ribbentrop, Joachim von, German Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, 555, 582, 584-585, 1075
- Richardson, Arthur A., Major General, (British) Head, Planning Staff, 15th Army Group, 1187-1188, 1277
- Rickards, G. A., Colonel, (British) member of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, 580, 1082
- Riddell-Webster, Sir Thomas, General, British Quartermaster General, 849, 856, 861-862, 870, 875, 879, 881, 904, 936, 954, 964, 1003-1005
- Rigdon, William M., Chief Ship's Clerk, U.S.N., attached to the White House Map Room, 835, 848
- Roatta, Mario, General of the Armored Corps, Chief of the Italian Army General Staff, 1075, 1179, 1183-1184
- Roberts, Frank N., Colonel, U.S.A., Deputy Chief (Ground), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 1218
- Robertson, Norman, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, 335, 667-668, 841, 845, 935
- Rocas, Abelardo, Brazilian Ambassador to Spain, 1188*n*
- Romer, Tadeusz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government in exile, established at London, 503-504
- Rommel, Erwin, General Field Marshal, Commander of the German Army Group Africa, 81, 1075, 1195
- Ronald, Nigel Bruce, Acting Assistant Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 331
- Rooks, Lowell W., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3), Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 253-256, 500, 941, 954, 958
- Roosevelt, Eleanor, President Roosevelt's wife, 86, 832
- Roosevelt, Elliott, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., President Roosevelt's son, 1189
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States; Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy:  
Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin meeting, proposals for, 624, 1095-1096, 1304, 1308-1310  
Communiqués and declarations, 328*n*, 377, 508*n*, 535*n*, 1157-1158, 1254, 1285-1286
- Correspondence with:  
Bullitt, 508*n*  
Bush, 221, 633, 651-653, 1096-1097  
Carmona, 309*n*  
Chiang, 87, 88*n*, 126*n*, 385-386, 1160-1161  
Churchill, on: Atomic energy research, 3*n*, 632-633, 636-637; Azores, 609; de Gaulle, 320-322; French Committee of National Liberation, 661-664; HUSKY, 11*n*; Italian peace feelers, 517-523, 525-527, 554-555, 578-579, 588-589; Italian surrender, 1287-1290; miscellaneous, 318-319, 377, 382-383, 609, 1037*n*, 1119, 1186, 1189, 1336-1337, 1339-1340; OVERLORD, Supreme Commander for, 498*n*; postwar world organization, 702-706; Quebec Conference, arrangements for, 391-400, 403-408, 410-412, 414; refugees, 338*n*, 344*n*; Rome, bombing of, 551-554; Third Washington Conference, arrangements for, 12-20; tripartite meeting, 1303, 1304*n*, 1305*n*; Washington conversations, arrangements for, 1178-1179, 1181-1182, 1189
- Currie, 653-654, 657-658  
Eden, 536, 579  
Eisenhower, 377*n*, 1261-1262, 1268-1269, 1275

- Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued  
Correspondence with—Continued  
Evatt, 138*n*  
George II (Greece), 915*n*, 1046*n*  
George VI (United Kingdom), 401–402  
Giraud, 323*n*  
Halifax, 702  
Harriman, 406*n*  
Hopkins, 633  
Hull, 320*n*, 322–324, 336–338, 346, 508–509, 527, 612, 656–658, 660–661, 664–666, 668–669, 672, 831, 1190, 1333–1335  
Inönü, 29*n*  
King, Mackenzie, 134*n*, 333–335, 400, 410, 1242  
Leahy, 307–308, 1250, 1256, 1314, 1316–1317  
Mahoney, 400  
Marshall, 295–296, 386, 506–508, 528–529, 537–538, 549–550, 565–566, 616–617  
Murphy, 1275–1283  
Pahlevi, Mohammad Reza Shah, 673  
Pius XII, 1079–1080  
Sherwood, 1316  
Stalin, 18, 123, 151, 153*n*, 379–385, 387, 1059, 1062–1063, 1086–1087, 1091–1092, 1095–1096, 1159–1160, 1174–1175, 1262–1263, 1267, 1283–1284, 1303–1310  
Stettinius, 653  
Stimson, 496–498  
Taylor, 684–691  
Welles, 691–706, 1078–1082  
Winant, 588*n*  
Log of trip to Canada, 835–848  
Meetings:  
Hyde Park conversations, 2*n*, 4, 830–833, 1336  
Quebec Conference, First: With advisers, 918; with Churchill, 880, 887–889, 894, 903–904, 917–918, 922, 929–935, 952–953, 965–966; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 894–899, 901–903, 941–942, 944–948; with Churchill and Mackenzie King, 888, 928–929, 965; with Churchill and Soong, 936; with Mountbatten, 941; with Robertson, 935  
Washington Conference, Third: With Churchill, 24, 48, 51, 86, 96, 151, 183, 188–189, 197–198, 220–221; with Churchill and Beneš, 33–34; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 24–25, 29–33, 66–68, 70–71, 73–76, 119–120, 122–123, 151–154–160, 189–197, 203–207; with Churchill and Mackenzie King,
- Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continued  
Meetings—Continued  
123, 141; with Mackenzie King, 123, 151; Pacific War Council, 134–137, 139–141; with Soong, 108–109, 208  
Washington meetings, Aug.–Sept. 1943: With Churchill, 1197–1200, 1208–1211; with Churchill and Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1212–1216; with Churchill and military advisers, 1207–1208; with Hull, 681–682; with Marshall, 482–483; with Stimson, 444*n*; with Stimson and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 434–435, 498–503  
Message to people of Italy, July 16, 1943, 328*n*, 508*n*, 535*n*  
Miscellaneous, 6, 23, 86, 124*n*, 133, 163–164, 209*n*, 288–289, 295–297, 325, 330*n*, 331, 364*n*, 379*n*, 406*n*, 409–410, 528–529, 565, 572, 588*n*, 625*n*, 657, 659, 675–676, 832, 924, 1087*n*, 1090, 1251*n*, 1286, 1338*n*, 1340*n*  
Ottawa, trip to, 400  
Press conferences and press releases, 21*n*, 22*n*, 109–110, 149–150, 211–220, 404*n*, 561*n*, 833–834, 964, 1119, 1301  
Rosenman, Samuel L. Special Counsel to the President, 677–678  
Rossi del Lion Nero, Pier Filippo de, Italian Ambassador to Chile, 590*n*  
Rosso, Augusto, Secretary General, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1088  
Rothwell, C. Easton, Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State; from August 16, 1943, Assistant Chief, Division of Political Studies, 803–829  
Rowan, Thomas Leslie, Assistant Private Secretary to the British Prime Minister, 20–21, 86, 282, 324, 333, 1254  
Royal, Forrest B., Captain, U.S.N., Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff; United States Deputy Secretary, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1201, 1218  
St. Laurent, Louis, Canadian Minister of Justice and Attorney General, 841  
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers; Minister of Foreign Affairs and of War, 190–191, 534–535, 610–611, 613, 899, 1176, 1177  
Sargent, Sir Orme, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office, 587, 1045*n*, 1046, 1090–1091

- Sauckel, Fritz, German Reich Plenipotentiary-General for Labor, 505
- Savage, Carlton, General Consultant, Office of the Secretary of State, 670
- Schneider, Franz, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Ship Control, War Shipping Administration, 176
- Scorza, Carlo, secretary of the Italian Fascist Party, 1194
- Scott, Frederick George, Archdeacon of Quebec, 1925-1933, 845
- Seymour, Sir Horace, British Ambassador to China, 300
- Sforza, Count Carlo, Italian anti-Fascist leader, 803, 807-808, 821, 823, 1339
- Sherwood, Robert E., Director, Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, 12*n*, 1316
- Sikorski, Władysław, General of the Army, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in exile, established at London; Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, 203
- Simon, Franz Eugen, Reader in Thermodynamics, Oxford University, 4
- Slocum, Harry B., Captain, U.S.N., member of the Joint War Plans Committee, 434
- Smart, Jacob E., Colonel, U.S.A., member of the Advisory Council, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 1200
- Smith, Harold D., Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1332-1333
- Smith, Walter B., Major General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa :  
Italian armistice : Meetings with Castellano concerning, at Lisbon, 1070-1076, 1184; in Sicily, 1257-1259, 1275-1279; signature of, 1264, 1280-1281  
Meetings at Washington Conference, Third : With Brooke, 110; Combined Chiefs of Staff, 97, 103-104, 111, 124; with Marshall, 158; with Portal, 118  
Miscellaneous, 86, 253-257, 284, 1066-1068, 1282
- Smuts, Jan Christian, Field Marshal, Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa; Minister of External Affairs and Defence; Officer Commanding the Union Defence Forces, 451, 933, 1229-1230
- Sobolev, Arkady Alexandrovich, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Soviet Union in the United Kingdom, 571*n*, 587*n*, 1086*n*
- Somervell, Brehon B., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Army Service Forces; member of the Joint Military Transportation Committee and of the Combined Military Transportation Committee; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 23, 52, 60, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 175-176, 178, 180-182, 184, 849, 856, 860-862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 938-939, 954, 960, 964
- Somerville, Sir James, Admiral, R.N., Commander in Chief, Eastern Fleet, 15-16, 17*n*, 52, 56, 66, 70-71, 76, 124, 143, 145, 148, 902
- Soong, Tse Vun, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs :  
Correspondence with : Chiang, 385-386; Hopkins, 126*n*, 288-289, 296-297; Hull, 441-443, 659-660; Roosevelt, 288, 296-297  
Meetings :  
Quebec Conference, First : With Combined Chiefs of Staff, 954, 960-962; with Roosevelt and Churchill, 936  
Washington Conference, Third : With Combined Chiefs of Staff, 86-91; with Leahy, 97, 150-151; with McNarney, 110; Pacific War Council, 134-136, 138-141; with Roosevelt, 108-109, 208  
Washington meetings, Aug.-Sept. 1943 : With Hull, 440-441, 1239-1240  
Miscellaneous, 80, 126, 133*n*, 844-845, 948-949, 1158
- Spatz, Carl, Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Northwest African Air Forces, 447
- Spangler, Harrison Earl, Chairman, Republican National Committee, 21, 23
- Stalin, Iosif Vissarionovich, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union :  
Correspondence with : Churchill, 932*n*, 966*n*, 1114, 1197, 1254*n*, 1305-1306, 1307*n*, 1336*n*; Roosevelt, 18, 123, 151, 153*n*, 387, 1303-1310; Roosevelt and Churchill, 379-385, 1059, 1062-1063, 1086-1087, 1091-1092, 1095-1096, 1159-1160, 1174-1175, 1262-1263, 1267, 1283-1284  
Miscellaneous, 26, 49, 123, 600, 913, 964, 966-967, 1113-1114, 1197
- Standley, William H., Admiral, U.S.N. (retired), Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 18*n*, 387, 626*n*, 951*n*, 1095, 1185
- Stanley, Oliver, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, 679

- Steinhardt, Laurence A., Ambassador to Turkey, 531-532, 569
- Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 653, 656, 658
- Stilwell, Joseph W., Lieutenant General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Army Forces, China-Burma-India Theater; Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater; Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (Designate), South East Asia Command, 16, 23, 23*n*, 52, 66, 73-76, 85, 124, 132, 165-166, 173, 858, 883, 903, 948, 970, 993, 1000, 1129
- Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War; Chairman, Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy, 6, 19, 23, 124*n*, 165-167, 170, 172-173, 198, 301-302, 434, 444-452, 496-499, 502, 634-638, 643, 648-649, 651-652, 677-678, 844, 929, 962*n*, 1119, 1209-1211, 1310
- Stoeve, G. W., Rear Admiral, R.N.N., Netherlands Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1238-1239
- Stokes, Marcus B., Jr., Colonel, U.S.A., Chief, Planning Division, Office of the Chief of Transportation, War Department, 175-176
- Stratton, James H., Colonel, U.S.A., Chief, Engineering Branch, Construction Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department, 1200
- Streett, St. Clair, Major General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Third Air Force, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199
- Strong, George V., Major General, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), United States Army, 676, 678
- Strong, Kenneth W. D., Brigadier, (British) Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2), Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 1056, 1070, 1184, 1259, 1275-1276, 1278
- Stuart, Kenneth, Lieutenant General, Chief of the Canadian General Staff, 855
- Sturzo, Luigi, former leader of the Italian Popular Party, 806, 813, 820
- Styer, Wilhelm D., Major General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff, Army Service Forces; Army member, Military Policy Committee on atomic energy; deputy to the Chairman, Combined Policy Committee on atomic energy, 652, 1211
- Sugden, Cecil S., Brigadier, (British) Acting Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3), Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 1276, 1278
- Surles, Alexander D., Major General, U.S.A., Director, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, 446, 449, 843
- Swope, Gerard, Chairman, New York City Housing Authority, 1940-1942, 1197
- Tansey, P. H., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief, Logistics Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 1218
- Taylor, E. P., Deputy Canadian member, Combined Production and Resources Board; Canadian Chairman, Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 1119
- Taylor, Maxwell D., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Commander of the artillery of the 82d Airborne Division, 1200, 1218, 1274, 1280
- Taylor, Myron C., Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, with the rank of Ambassador; member of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy, 684-691
- Taylor, V. V., Colonel, U.S.A., Assistant to the Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, 1200
- Taylor, William H., Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research, Department of the Treasury, 1082-1083
- Tedder, Sir Arthur, Air Chief Marshal, R.A.F., Air Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Air Command, 194, 256-257
- Thompson, Charles Rolfe, Commander, R.N., Personal Assistant to the British Minister of Defence, 21*n*, 842, 903, 1198, 1336*n*
- Timberlake, Patrick W., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Director of Operations and Plans, Mediterranean Air Command, 1280
- Timberman, Thomas S., Colonel, U.S.A., Chief, Asiatic Section, Theater (Operations) Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 301*n*
- Tittmann, Harold H., Jr., Foreign Service officer resident at Vatican City, with the rank of Chargé d'Affaires, 524-525, 548, 569, 573, 583-584, 1057-1059, 1069-1079
- Tizard, Sir Henry, President, Magdalen College, Oxford University; Chairman, Aeronautical Research Committee, 1097, 1312

- Tobin, Daniel J., Vice President, American Federation of Labor; General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers, 21, 23
- Todd, Walter E., Colonel, U.S.A., Deputy Chief (Air), Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 1200, 1218
- Tojo, Hideki, Japanese Prime Minister, 311
- Tollemache, Humphrey Douglas, Captain, R.N., attached to the British Combined Operations Staff, 881, 936, 1200
- Tsouderos, Emmanuel J., Greek Prime Minister, 577*n*, 1044
- Tuck, S. Pinkney, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in France in 1942, 597
- Tully, Grace G., Personal Secretary to the President, 117, 574*n*, 618*n*, 684*n*, 844, 846-848, 965
- Tweedsmuir, Lord, Governor General of Canada, 1935-1940, 402*n*
- Unaydin, Ruşen Eşref, Turkish Ambassador to Italy, 569*n*, 584-585
- Urey, Harold C., Professor of Chemistry, Columbia University, 4
- Van Buskirk, Arthur B., Deputy Administrator, Office of Lend-Lease Administration; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 656, 1119
- Vandenberg, Arthur H., Senator from Michigan, 117
- Vandenbosch, Amry, Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State, 760-761
- van Kleffens, Eelco, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands Government in exile, established at London, 1052
- Vargas, Getulio D., President of Brazil, 120, 308-309
- Vaughan, Robert Charles, President, Canadian National Railways, 841
- Vernocchi, Olindo, deputy leader of the Italian Socialist Party, 563
- Vian, Sir Philip, Rear Admiral, R.N., Commander, Naval Air Support Force in the Mediterranean, 959
- Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy, 404, 517, 523, 534, 554-555, 804-805, 812-813, 817-819, 1057, 1072, 1193-1194, 1196, 1281-1282
- Vien, Thomas, Lieutenant Colonel, Speaker of the Canadian Senate, 847
- Villeneuve, Rodrigue Cardinal, Archbishop of Quebec, 840
- Vittrup, Russell L., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., attached to the United States Secretariat, Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34, 52, 77, 86, 97, 111, 124, 143, 160, 178, 184, 199
- Vörönlé, János, Hungarian Minister to Turkey, 524
- Waley, Sir David, Under Secretary, British Treasury, 559, 580, 1082
- Walker, Frank C., Postmaster General; Chairman, Democratic National Committee, 23
- Wallace, Henry A., Vice President of the United States, 6, 166-169, 172, 188, 211, 643*n*, 649, 652, 699*n*
- Warburton, P., Air Commodore, R.A.F., Air Planner, British Joint Staff Mission at Washington; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 889, 1200, 1218
- Watkinson, Arnold Edwards, British Acting Consul General at Tangier, 566, 576, 585, 1177*n*
- Watson, Edwin M., Major General, U.S.A., Military Aide and Secretary to the President, 96, 312, 383*n*, 410*n*
- Wavell, Sir Archibald (*from July 1943*, Viscount Wavell), Field Marshal, Commander in Chief, India, 16-17, 52, 54, 56-57, 61-62, 64, 66, 68-70, 73-75, 89, 124, 127, 130-132, 143, 145, 148, 205
- Wedemeyer, Albert C., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Chief, Strategy and Policy Group, Operations Division, War Department General Staff; Army member, Joint Staff Planners; member of the Combined Staff Planners, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 160, 178, 184, 199, 840, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954
- Weeks, Sir Ronald, Lieutenant General, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, British War Office, 316
- Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary (and at times Acting Secretary) of State, 166-167, 171, 328, 336, 528, 556, 572, 576-577, 677, 681-682, 691-692, 702*n*, 1057*n*, 1058, 1078, 1081, 1304, 1307
- Welsh, Sir William, Air Marshal, R.A.F., Head of the Royal Air Force Delegation at Washington and member of the British Joint Staff Mission; British Representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff; member of the Munitions Assignments Board, 52, 77, 86, 95, 97, 111, 124, 143, 145, 160, 178, 184, 199, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1200, 1212, 1218, 1220, 1229
- Wernher, Sir Harold, Brigadier, 1200

- Wheeler, Raymond A., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Commanding General, Services of Supply, China-Burma-India Theater, 85*n*
- White, Bruce, Brigadier, Director of Ports, British War Office, 1200, 1207
- Whiteley, John F. M., Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, 941, 954-958, 1066-1068, 1186-1187, 1206, 1233
- Wickard, Claude R., Secretary of Agriculture, 661
- Wildman, Frederick S., Major, U.S.A., attached to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Army Air Forces, 160
- Wiley, John C., Consul General at Algiers, 527*n*
- Wilhelmina, Queen of the Netherlands, 1052
- Williams, Walter D. A., Brigadier, Deputy Director of Movements, British War Office, 175-176
- Williamson, Adrian, Colonel, U.S.A., alternate for Brigadier General Kuter as a member of the Joint Staff Planners and of the Combined Staff Planners, 1218
- Willis-O'Connor, Henry, Colonel, Principal Aide-de-Camp to the Governor General of Canada, 841, 844, 929
- Willson, Russell, Vice Admiral, U.S.N., Navy member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 77, 111, 184, 849, 856, 862, 870, 875, 881, 889, 904, 936, 954, 1200, 1218
- Wilson, Carroll L., Executive Assistant to the Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development, 639
- Wilson, Sir Henry Maitland, General, Commander in Chief, Middle East, 704-705, 1289, 1292
- Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States, 1913-1921, 791, 1334
- Winant, John G., Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Representative on the European Advisory Commission, 324*n*, 331, 445, 447, 512-513, 588*n*, 609-610, 612-613, 618, 698*n*, 700-702, 1010*n*
- Windsor, Duke of, Governor and Commander in Chief of the Bahama Islands, 22, 109-110, 117
- Wingate, Orde C., Brigadier, (British) Commanding Officer, 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, 840, 860-861, 875, 879, 902, 908, 946-947, 961, 993, 1006, 1161
- Wolfenbarger, W. R., Colonel, U.S.A., member of the Joint War Plans Committee, 434
- Wood, Walter A., Jr., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Director, Requirements Division, War Department General Staff, 1200
- Wright, Boykin C., Brigadier General, U.S.A., Director, International Aid Division, Army Services Forces; member of the Joint (United States-Canadian) War Aid Committee, 654, 656, 1119
- Wright, W. H. S., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.A., Aide to the Secretary of War, 301*n*
- Zanussi, Giacomo, General, Italian officer entrusted with a special mission at Lisbon, 951*n*, 1179-1180, 1183-1184, 1193-1196, 1257-1259, 1275-1277, 1295





