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United States Department of State

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Foreign  
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States



1944

Volume IV

EUROPE

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Foreign Relations  
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United States  
Diplomatic Papers  
1944

Volume IV  
Europe



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Washington : 1966

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## PREFACE

This volume was prepared under the direct supervision of E. Ralph Perkins, formerly Chief of the Foreign Relations Division now headed by S. Everett Gleason. The compilers of this volume were Rogers P. Churchill, John G. Reid, and former staff members, N. O. Sappington, Douglas W. Houston, John Rison Jones, and Warren H. Reynolds.

The Publishing and Reproduction Services Division (Jerome H. Perlmutter, Chief) was responsible for the technical editing of this volume and the preparation of the index. These functions were performed in the Historical Editing Section under the direct supervision of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief, and Ouida J. Ward, Assistant Chief.

WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN  
*Director, Historical Office,  
Bureau of Public Affairs*

MARCH 3, 1966

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### PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the current regulation is printed below:

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.



1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, shall be edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record shall be guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There shall be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers*, the Historical Office shall:

- a. Refer to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

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## EUROPE

(Continued from Volume III)

### PORTUGAL

#### **EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO OBTAIN FROM PORTUGAL CERTAIN MILITARY PRIVILEGES IN THE AZORES:<sup>1</sup> AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PORTUGAL ESTABLISHING FORM OF INDIRECT PARTICIPATION BY PORTUGAL IN OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC**

811.34553B/46b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1944—8 p. m.

79. Norweb<sup>2</sup> saw Salazar<sup>3</sup> December 31 and presented formula for Lagens which was accepted. Salazar was quite agreeable to American personnel proceeding at once to Terceira thereunder. Respecting an American survey party for Santa Maria, Salazar still hoped Horta might prove equally acceptable. He did not view with satisfaction the idea of American or British military personnel proceeding as such to the proposed survey. Norweb suggested that our Government recommend an American company able to carry out the survey, and that the Portuguese Government then invite such company to do so. He agreed to this, and remarked that he supposed the American Army or Navy now exercised some sort of control over all American companies able to carry out a survey of this kind.

Norweb expresses conviction that in view of the spirit in which Salazar accepted this compromise we may feel free to induct members of armed services into company personnel provided a civilian character is preserved.

Salazar again broached the subject of Timor liberation<sup>4</sup> and wondered when an answer would be forthcoming. He contrasted his country's position with that of other European neutrals by remarking that for them the war would end with the termination of European conflict but for Portugal only with conclusion of hostilities in Pacific.

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence regarding interest of the United States in obtaining water-port and airport facilities in the Azores, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 527 ff.

<sup>2</sup> R. Henry Norweb, American Minister in Portugal.

<sup>3</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of Portuguese Council of Ministers, Minister of War, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal.

<sup>4</sup> For previous correspondence regarding Portuguese interest in the liberation of Timor, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 568, 570, 575, and 580.

Commenting on European War he was under no illusion but that Germany would be defeated and hoped this would be speedily accomplished. The tone of his comments was well-wishing for us and entire interview was in spirit of personal and official cordiality.

HULL

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811.34553B/72

*The American Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar)*<sup>5</sup>

LISBON, January 7, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have today received a telegram<sup>6</sup> from the Secretary of State indicating that he, the Secretary of War,<sup>7</sup> and the Secretary of the Navy<sup>8</sup> concur in the suggestion that an American commercial company should conduct the survey of the Azores, which we discussed on the last day of December. They are also in agreement that Pan American Airways, Inc. is the best equipped commercial organization to undertake this task. That Company has been informally and confidentially consulted and its acceptance obtained in advance should it be selected to do this work.

I thought that it might prove a convenience to you if I sent you this information in writing. At the same time, I wish to ask for an appointment to see you at your earliest convenience.

Please accept [etc.]

R. HENRY NORWEB

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841.34553B/44

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

No. 100

LISBON, January 7, 1944.

[Received January 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith three copies of a Memorandum dated January 4, 1944,<sup>9</sup> which the British Ambassador<sup>10</sup> presented the Prime Minister of Portugal on January 6, 1944.

Sir Ronald Campbell came to see me this morning to give me a copy of this document and an account of his interview. He said that after some discussion, Dr. Salazar agreed to give sympathetic consideration to the main question at issue, namely, the extension by expropriation of the landing area and facilities of the airfield at Lagens. Dr. Salazar was obviously concerned about the amount of cultivated land and the

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<sup>5</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 154, January 26, from Lisbon; received February 3.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 43, January 6, 1944, not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Henry L. Stimson.

<sup>8</sup> Frank Knox.

<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

number of houses which would thus be destroyed and the eventual disposition of the persons thus dispossessed. The fact that the British Government undertook to aid in the solution of this problem helped considerably in rendering the proposal acceptable. In this connection, I might add that under the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement,<sup>11</sup> Portugal undertakes, as a part payment for armaments supplied, to bear such expropriation and indemnity expenses. But in the few cases of expropriation and dispossession that have already occurred, the Portuguese Government's arrangements for compensation, both monetary-wise and otherwise, have been so meager and inadequate as to cause great dissatisfaction. In one or two instances this took the form of cable cutting and other acts of sabotage.

Sir Ronald Campbell went on to say that at the same time he had expressed to Dr. Salazar the British Government's pleasure that the formula permitting American use of the British facilities in the Azores had been agreed upon to the satisfaction of all concerned. However, in this connection Dr. Salazar interposed objection on one particular point, mention of which was made in paragraph numbered 3 of the British Memorandum, namely, the inclusion of one U.S. Navy squadron for anti-submarine patrol work. Sir Ronald said that Dr. Salazar took the view that there was both a difference in practice and in principle between the air transit uses to which the United States would put the Azores facilities and such an operational use as basing an anti-submarine air squadron in the Azores. In this connection, Dr. Salazar referred to his talks with the German Minister and General Jordana<sup>12</sup> and the emphasis that he had placed therein on the prior commitments to Great Britain under the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance,<sup>13</sup> which were the sole justification for making available to a belligerent the facilities belonging to a neutral.

I told Sir Ronald Campbell that in my conversation with Dr. Salazar on New Year's Eve I had informed him of the arrival of such an American squadron and that I could not but believe that he fully understood me since he asked how many planes comprised a squadron. At that time Dr. Salazar interposed no objection to the American squadron. Mr. Kennan<sup>14</sup> had also discussed this subject with him on December 2 (Legation's 2911, December 2, 5 p. m.).<sup>15</sup> To the explanation of the plans for the participation of our forces in anti-submarine patrol work Dr. Salazar showed no surprise and expressed

<sup>11</sup> For text of Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of August 17, 1943, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447.

<sup>12</sup> Gen. Franco Gomez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>13</sup> Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373. For text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. I, p. 462.

<sup>14</sup> George F. Kennan, Counselor of Legation in Portugal, designated Counselor of European Advisory Commission, London, December 1, 1943.

<sup>15</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 573.

no objection but pointed out that it must be subject to the general rule that a formula be found to reconcile the practice with the British Agreement.

I have acquainted the Military and Naval Attachés<sup>16</sup> and Colonel Mason<sup>17</sup> and Commander Huff<sup>18</sup> with the foregoing. I also informed them that I have today sent a note to Dr. Salazar informing him of the decision regarding the use of Pan American Airways, Inc. in the matter of the survey (Department's 43, January 6, 3 p. m.)<sup>19</sup> and requesting an interview at his earliest convenience. At that time I will seek a clarification of the American squadron question. Until then, I wish to reserve my comments on this curious and untoward happening.

Respectfully yours,

R. HENRY NORWEB

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811.34553E/50 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 9, 1944—5 a. m.

[Received 7:42 a. m.]

62. Shortly after 2:00 o'clock this morning the British Ambassador was called upon by Leitao of the Foreign Office to say that Salazar had just been roused from his bed by a telegram from the Portuguese military authorities at Terceira reporting that the senior British officer had stated that "two American transports with troops would be arriving the course of the night".

Leitao said Salazar was at a complete loss as I had spoken only of technicians. Moreover Salazar alleged he had not given permission although he was on the point of doing so. He gave it now for technicians but if troops attempted to land they would be prevented by force. Salazar moreover had been amazed to realize that ships must have left actually before I had spoken to him.

Campbell said that he was equally at a loss as his American colleague had understood that permission had been given for technicians and construction personnel and on the strength of what I had told him had so informed his Government. He could not say exactly what force was composed of but he could guarantee it was not a combatant formation.

He then came to see me and I told him that I had not only explained in detail to Salazar at our interview on December 31 the

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<sup>16</sup> Col. Robert A. Solborg and Comdr. Kenneth E. Demarest, respectively.

<sup>17</sup> Col. Grant C. Mason, technical representative of U.S. Army in Portugal to assist in the negotiations regarding the Azores.

<sup>18</sup> Comdr. Gerald L. Huff, technical representative of U.S. Navy in Portugal to assist in the negotiations regarding the Azores.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

nature and purpose of the American personnel and equipment needed by the British to be sent to Terceira but that on January 5 I confirmed to Salazar in writing the fact that two Liberty ships and two landing barges with such personnel and equipment were leaving for Terceira.

I urged Campbell to telegraph along the foregoing lines to the senior British officer at Terceira and to request that he should assist in arranging for the personnel and equipment to be landed as planned.

Campbell said he had informed Leitao that he would do so and that he hoped that Dr. Salazar also would take appropriate steps to prevent any risk of hot-headed action such as would land us in an "extremely grave situation".

Campbell is also telegraphing the matter fully to London adding that he can only hope that Dr. Salazar while raising no objection during my interview nor to my letter or even to Campbell's written statement of January 4 "that certain United States personnel are already being despatched to Terceira" was under the impression that permission would not be valid until it had been confirmed in writing.

Misunderstanding as to the character of the force arose presumably from the senior British officer's use of the term "transport and troops" which Campbell explained to Dr. Leitao might well have been used by an officer accustomed to deal in such terms without realizing their significance in the present case.

I shall cable further details when Campbell receives a reply.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/57: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 13, 1944—noon.

[Received 3:29 p. m.]

116. For the Secretary and Matthews.<sup>20</sup> As I reported in my 107 of January 12,<sup>21</sup> Dr. Salazar in my interview with him last evening undertook to send instructions to the Azores which would permit of the landing of the personnel and equipment carried by the Liberty ship and two landing barges scheduled to arrive at Terceira at any moment.

Salazar received favorably the suggestion that the Pan American Airways should conduct the requisite survey and indicated that as soon as he had an opportunity to consult with his experts, an answer would be forthcoming. In response to an inquiry, I made Mr. Long's<sup>22</sup> presence in Lisbon known to him and he asked whether there was any

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<sup>20</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs.

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22</sup> Richard C. Long, Regional Director of Pan American Airways at London.



objection to his getting in touch with Mr. Long directly about this matter, to which I interposed no objection. Although he was not at all specific, I got the impression that Salazar has his eye somewhat fixed on the development of Horta. He has given orders for the extension of the new Sacarvem field outside of Lisbon with a view to its utilization by trans-Atlantic land planes.

On January 6 the British Ambassador saw Salazar and presented to him a memorandum having mainly to do with the extension of the Lagens Field. On the following day Campbell showed me this memo and gave me an account of his interview (despatch 100, January 7 with memo enclosed). In the course of this memorandum reference was made to the anti-submarine squadrons "including one U.S. Navy squadron on loan to the British Government". This phraseology caught Dr. Salazar's attention and he informed Campbell that he could not permit such an operational use as basing an American combat air squadron in the Azores. The British Ambassador stated that all his arguments were unavailing. I immediately sought an interview with Salazar to effect clarification for he had interposed no such objection during my interview with him Monday, December 31 (No. 3131 December 31)<sup>23</sup> and in Kennan's interview with him on December 2 this subject had come under specific reference and Salazar had only said that it must be subject to the general rule that formula be found to reconcile the practice with the British agreement (paragraph numbered 1, 2911 December 2<sup>24</sup>).

When I brought this matter up and referred to above interviews Salazar said that he had thought about this matter a great deal and had finally concluded that operation of American air combat unit, whose identity as a unit was American, was beyond scope of Anglo-Portuguese Agreement. He went on to point out that facilities not dissimilar from this, which are granted to other than British ships, were specifically envisaged in Anglo-Portuguese Agreement and those for airplanes were not so contemplated. All arguments I brought to bear failed to move him for, I think, reasons given in paragraph numbered 2 of 2911, December 2 and 101, January 12.<sup>25</sup> Clearly, it was the fact that identity could be unmistakably established of an American air unit which was troubling him and at one point he said that he would have no objections to one or two American pilots flying in a British squadron. I do not think Salazar can be moved from this position.

In discussing survey party I had some difficulty in persuading Salazar that a second airfield would be necessary despite extension of

<sup>23</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 580.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 573.

<sup>25</sup> Latter not printed.

Lagens. He was obviously grappling with internal problems which expropriation and dispossession will entail and had been made hesitant thereby. Here again he reverted to a more rigid attitude in matter of use by United States of the Azores but volunteered statement that if it were arranged that such a second airfield be built, its use would have to be under terms of Anglo-Portuguese Agreement. I did not take note of this statement even by a reply, but emphasized the urgent need of these additional facilities in terms of the Far Eastern war theater.

Unless the British speedily obtain authorization for the extensions of Lagens Field we may also experience difficulties regarding the landing of the forthcoming army contingents when we inform Salazar [garbled group] of which I understand is on the point of departure from the United States and the other scheduled to leave the end of January. This would arise out of the fact that in the British memorandum regarding the extensions at Lagens, reference was made to the fact that American personnel and equipment would be mainly employed and [that?] the United States authorities are prepared to dispatch the additional personnel required as soon as the Portuguese Government have notified the British Government of their agreement to the present proposals. Salazar questioned me closely about why so much equipment and personnel were needed merely to exploit the existing field (for Mason's comments please see MA1088 of January 12<sup>26</sup>).

I have informed the Military and Naval Attachés of the details of this interview and Colonel Mason and Commander Huff.

Also I shall see the British Ambassador this noon with special reference to navy and submarine personnel.

Repeated to Department, to London by air pouch.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/58: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 15, 1944—noon.

[Received 2:54 p. m.]

143. For the Secretary and Matthews. Commander Huff with my full concurrence is leaving tomorrow for the United States proceeding via Terceira on the understanding that he will be available to return on short notice. I have asked him to call at the Department upon his arrival in Washington. He is fully conversant with the whole position and will therefore be able to supply any detail background material. Huff will also discuss with the Navy Department the pro-

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<sup>26</sup> Not found in Department files.

posal which evolved out of the discussion referred to in the ultimate paragraph of my 116, January 13, which the British Embassy has submitted to London, namely that Salazar be informed that since his objections to the operation of an American Navy squadron were made at such a late date, it was not practicable at this stage to countermand the arrangements made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but that to meet his objections, this American squadron had been incorporated into the RAF,<sup>28</sup> the incorporation being a fiction, not a fact.

He will also discuss with the Navy Department whether alternatively the inclusion of an American squadron operated exclusively by American personnel is sufficiently vital to warrant the invocation of article 8 of the Anglo-Portuguese agreement.

Incidentally Huff has been most helpful.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/59b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, January 19, 1944—10 p. m.

148. It is most important that complete understanding be reached with Salazar without delay respecting the two ships, one of which is due in the Islands beginning of next week and the other of which is now loading, to avoid any incident or any further delay in construction proceeding at Lagens. Mason reportedly is informed of details concerning construction personnel and materials being carried in these ships. We anticipate no further requests of this sort and have only to expect that as construction proceeds personnel will gradually be withdrawn in large part as indicated in the Department's 143, January 18, 8 p. m.<sup>29</sup> Of course it will be necessary to maintain current supplies for personnel in the Islands in the matter of food, clothing, etc., but as supply is not an immediate problem and is not expected to commence before early February it seems preferable not to mention this at present.

In an interview the Department hopes you will arrange with minimum delay you should endeavor to secure complete clearance for these ships and you may take up again the problem discussed in the Department's 141 of January 18, 7 p. m.<sup>30</sup> bringing to bear the arguments at your disposal. The Department hopes that by furnishing Salazar completely frank assurances that as far as mass personnel goes we contemplate no further requests you will be able to dispel any doubts

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<sup>28</sup> Royal Air Force.

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

<sup>30</sup> Not printed; it pertained to discussion of operational use of Lagens by a U.S. naval air squadron (811.34553B/36).

the Prime Minister may entertain respecting our motives and the extent of our plans. Essentially we have before us the immediate and most urgent problem of placing in Lagens the full necessary complement of construction personnel and equipment essential for developing facilities speedily, the problem of securing operational facilities at Lagens for one Navy squadron, and the problems of an additional field in Santa Maria or elsewhere and the installation of navigational aids with which you are familiar. It is important that these pending matters be kept steadily before Salazar to avoid his gaining any impression that we have any thought of abandoning any portion of our program, which we have kept within minimum limits and which we propose to carry out with a loyal regard for the Prime Minister's sensibilities.

HULL

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811.34553B/72

*The American Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Salazar)*<sup>31</sup>

No. 57

LISBON, January 21, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that, according to information just received, an American ship with working parties and material is due to arrive at Terceira during the coming week-end, and that another is due during the week of February 7-13. The groups brought by these ships will be similar to those already landed, consisting of construction, maintenance, and similar personnel needed if the program of construction is to be carried out as expeditiously as possible. They will be immediately used for speedy development of facilities on terrain already allotted for use of the British Air Force.

In accordance with my agreement with Your Excellency, I am communicating this information with the request that it be brought to the attention of the authorities at Terceira, as you were good enough to do in the last instance.

As already indicated in our earlier discussions regarding the program of construction in all its phases, even when Lagens field is fully developed it will not be able to take care of anything like the full flow of aircraft to the Far East. A further factor is the need of an additional field for an alternative landing place in case of bad weather. Because of unfavorable conditions at Lagens, numerous accidents have already occurred with loss of life.

It is, therefore, the earnest hope of my Government that Your Excellency will give earliest possible consideration to the proposal for

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<sup>31</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 154, January 26, from Lisbon; received February 3.

a survey to determine the possibility of developing an alternative field, together with the sites for the additional radio navigational aids whose importance I have already indicated to you.

With the renewed assurances [etc.]

R. HENRY NORWEB

811.34553B/64 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 25, 1944.

[Received January 25—10:44 a. m.]

228. For Secretary and Matthews. I have just received a communication dated January 24 from Salazar<sup>32</sup> thanking me for my recent notes advising him of proximate arrival of personnel and material intended for construction work at Terceira and stating that military authorities had been duly informed. He expresses doubt, however, whether numbers of personnel may not be out of proportion to the work authorized.

He then thanks us for nominating Pan American Airways to study for account of Portuguese Government possibilities of constructing an airfield near Horta and on Santa Maria but states that he has not yet approached the company because "aside from other reasons which it cannot fail to consider" the Government wishes to have survey party accompanied by its own technicians and it is not yet in a position to do this.

In light of somewhat acerbic reply to British Ambassador referred to in my 222, January 24, 10 p. m.<sup>33</sup> I think we may consider foregoing as a gentle reminder that he does not propose to be hurried by us either.

I have of course explained to Salazar in some detail the urgent reasons underlying our personal needs at Terceira but he apparently remains unconvinced.

NORWEB

811.34553B/63 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1944.

210. The Department is taking up with London the question raised in paragraph 6 of Portuguese memorandum summarized your 222, January 24, 10 p. m.,<sup>34</sup> with a view to obtaining from British Govern-

<sup>32</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 154, January 26, from Lisbon; neither printed.

<sup>33</sup> Telegram not printed.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

ment clarification of postwar reversion to Portuguese Government of construction and improvements in Lagens. The Department feels this may be useful to you, especially as American aid to British will shortly make available at Lagens a very fine airport. The position with regard to projected additional field in Santa Maria has already been made entirely clear in this respect to Salazar, the Department understands. The Department understands moreover that if Salazar has a great interest in similarly developing Fayal we will be prepared to undertake a survey of possibilities there.

Of course you and Salazar understand that it is our thought that Panair will study not only the possibilities for additional airfields but make the survey for navigational aids, with which you are familiar, as well.

While Navy is not yet actually behind schedule respecting operational squadron for Lagens, the Seabees are well advanced with preparations on the spot and squadron has been specially organized and prepared and is in readiness to proceed at the end of this month.

The expense and effort already dedicated to this project were put forth on the basis of Salazar's oral favorable assurances and we earnestly hope he will revert to his former view. From the end of the month we shall be behind schedule and this matter is therefore daily more urgent. The Department fully realizes your difficulties and is ready to support you in any way possible. If you have any suggestions as to useful steps that may be taken at this end please inform the Department at once.

HULL

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753.94/31

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On December 23rd His Majesty's Embassy communicated to the State Department an *aide-mémoire*<sup>35</sup> in which it was stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considered that an invitation should be issued to the Portuguese Government to participate at an early date in staff conversations with representatives of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and in the Commonwealth of Australia and of the United States Government to draw up a plan for Portuguese co-operation in the war against Japan.

2. Lord Halifax<sup>36</sup> has received a fresh telegram from Mr. Eden<sup>37</sup> pointing out that this question was originally raised with His Maj-

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<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>37</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

esty's Government by Dr. Salazar in June 1943 and that recent public references to the Timor position in Portugal appear to offer a good psychological moment for reopening conversations with Dr. Salazar. If there is a much longer delay in replying, Dr. Salazar may lose interest or alternatively secure better treatment by the Japanese for Timor. In either event the proposed conversations might be made more difficult. His Majesty's Government also consider that an early reply to Dr. Salazar on this point should be of assistance in dealing with other existing problems, e.g. wolfram and the American Liberator Squadron which it is desired to send to the Azores.

3. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will be prepared to accept their proposal and will agree to the early despatch of the proposed invitation to the Portuguese Government.

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1944.

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811.34553B/72: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1944—9 p. m.

505. Department's 353, February 10, 7 p. m.<sup>38</sup> You are now authorized to tell Dr. Salazar that Portuguese participation in eventual Timor expedition is under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that this Government would welcome from him any information he may wish to put forward bearing on such questions as the timing, extent, and nature of Portuguese participation in such military operations.

You will determine the moment and the manner of conveying this to Salazar and the Department is confident you will be able to make good use of it in relating it to your negotiations to obtain fuller and prompter cooperation in the realization of our needs in the Azores.

STETTINIUS

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811.34553B/85: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 22, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 4:51 p. m.]

553. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Matthews. Although I regret that Colonel Payne<sup>39</sup> was called upon to return to

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

<sup>39</sup> Lt. Col. Robert G. Payne, designated to succeed Col. Grant C. Mason as technical representative of U.S. Army in Portugal to assist in the negotiations regarding the Azores.

the U.S. within a few days of his arrival in Lisbon, his visit was helpful. In particular, I shall draw upon the following information vouchsafed me by Colonel Payne when I next see Dr. Salazar.

1. That, with the extensions, Lagens will be sufficient to take care of our European operations;

2. That it would likewise be sufficient to take care of our Far Eastern operations as long as the European war has not passed its zenith;

3. That, accordingly, we are prepared to take into consideration the problem of maintenance of Portuguese neutrality by undertaking after the completion of the survey to proceed to build the base but on the understanding that not only would it not be operated until after the crisis in the European war is passed, but if necessary, to limit the stage of construction with this in view;

4. That the base must be under American command during the war since the traffic will be of American origin and that, in view of the considerations mentioned in 3 above, the objections on the score of prejudicing Portuguese neutrality are untenable;

5. That in point of practice the availability of such a base will be the most important contribution Portugal can make to the war in the Far East.

With regard to this latter point, I shall go on to express my personal opinion that the difficulties inherent in answering Dr. Salazar's question regarding the liberation of Timor, such as making known to a neutral the plans of a belligerent, have, I believe, been augmented by reason of the difficulties we have experienced in forwarding such an important project as the proposed base and navigation aids on which the liberation of Timor will be found so importantly to depend.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/93 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

LISBON, February 26, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received February 27—4:29 a. m.]

614. For Secretary and Matthews. I saw Salazar today and had a long discussion with him about Azores bases, Far Eastern matters and wolfram situation in both Spain and Portugal.<sup>40</sup>

1. We reviewed major matters in controversy re Azores and Salazar agreed to telegraph to Portuguese delegation now surveying extension at Lagens to ascertain whether it would be possible for them to complete their work and join an American party, preferably under aegis

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<sup>40</sup> For correspondence regarding wolfram situation in Portugal, see pp. 84 ff.; in Spain, see pp. 297 ff.



of Panair to conduct a survey in matter of second base and aids to navigation. I believe that importance we attach to a second airfield, based on our need for Far Eastern theater, has now been made unmistakably clear to Salazar. In course of conversation when he queried why an answer had not been forthcoming re Portugal's participation in liberation of Timor, I pointed out that such a reply was naturally not unconnected with action in matter of authorizing construction of a second airfield for American use since in our opinion this constituted greatest single contribution Portugal could make to liberation of Timor in particular and our operations in Far East in general. The end result was that Salazar said "I will try to do something positive for American Government" and he did not in this connection mention as on previous occasions the medium of Anglo-Portuguese Alliance.

2. Salazar indicated that Japanese Minister had this afternoon concluded an interview with him in which he had on behalf of Japanese Government authorized sending of a Portuguese official from Macao to Timor to investigate situation there. But Salazar added that he did not expect any constructive result to eventuate from this mission; that some 300 Portuguese had been able to make their way from Timor to Australia; and testimony of these escaped Portuguese gave irrefutable evidence of past and present conditions which prevailed in that territory.

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NORWEB

811.34553B/93 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—9 p. m.

620. Your 614, February 26, 11 p. m. Dr. Salazar's agreement to telegraph Portuguese delegation proposing it join American party to conduct survey for second base and navigational aids should be made use of to press for issuance invitation to Panair. This progress is encouraging but should be taken advantage of to fullest extent. Refer in this connection to Department's 43 of January 6, 3 p. m.<sup>41</sup>

The Department believes advantage should also be taken of Dr. Salazar's expressed disposition to do something positive for us. It is felt that this should be used in your endeavor to bring about direct negotiations between Portuguese Government and this Government.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

811.34553B/85 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—10 p. m.

621. Your 553, February 22, 1 p. m.

(1) It cannot definitely be said that Lagens, with extensions, will adequately accommodate our European operations, and the Department does not believe this thought should be communicated to Salazar. It is rather the view of War and Navy that we may be obliged to limit ourselves to this for the moment.

(2) Similarly it cannot definitely be stated that it would adequately accommodate our Far Eastern operations as long as the war in Europe has not passed its zenith.

Even supposing these assumptions to be correct, the Department feels it would be unfortunate to furnish any such thought to Salazar, whose inclination evidently is to assert that we have all we need at Lagens.

(3) War and Navy consider the conclusion in your paragraph 3 sound however, and it is felt that it should be sufficient to communicate this conclusion to Dr. Salazar without committing ourselves finally on matters referred to in your paragraphs 1 and 2.

(4) This seems likewise sound.

(5) While Dr. Salazar's reasons for wishing to participate actively in an eventual Timor expedition itself are fully understood, War and Navy are agreed that a more substantial contribution to the war in the Pacific can be furnished by Portugal in providing us a site for the proposed additional air base.

Your 613 and 614 of February 26<sup>42</sup> received after drafting of foregoing.

STETTINIUS

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811.34553B/98 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 1, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 5:19 p. m.]

646. For Under Secretary and Matthews. I feel that in connection with Department's 620, February 29, I should point out that Salazar did not "propose" that Portuguese delegation join an American party to conduct desired survey but that he merely agreed to inquire whether it would be possible for delegation to complete its work and then join the party. My 614, February 26.

<sup>42</sup> Telegram No. 613 not printed.

I only labor this fine distinction in order that the measure of the Department's encouragement at the "progress" made may be appropriately tempered. We must face the fact that while the ground work may [be] said to have been laid a great deal of hard work lies still ahead.

Department may however rest assured that I shall continue to press for issuance of invitation to Panair and also for direct negotiations between our two Governments. This I propose to do by constantly pressing Sampaio<sup>43</sup> and also through medium of written communications during this period when Salazar is making himself more than usually inaccessible, largely because of situation brought about by our wolfram negotiations here and in Spain.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/99a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1944—5 p. m.

1607. A copy of an instruction of December 10 to the British Ambassador in Lisbon was furnished Norweb some time ago. A feature of this instruction apparently called upon Campbell to inform Salazar that it is the British desire that negotiations for a second airfield in the Azores be conducted directly between the Portuguese and U.S. Governments. It appears that Campbell may not have made this point transparently clear to Salazar in his conversations on the subject, and the Department is urgently desirous of engaging in such direct negotiations at the earliest possible moment. It is thought therefore that you should discuss the matter with the British Government, urging the desirability of having Campbell proceed without further delay to clarifying this point beyond any doubt in Salazar's mind.

It would probably be useful to inquire at the same time whether Campbell will be asked to make reply to Salazar's memorandum of January 20 to Campbell.<sup>44</sup> This memorandum will be recalled as a particularly strong one in which Salazar complained rather bitterly concerning certain phases of the Azores developments. However,

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<sup>43</sup>Teixeira de Sampaio, Portuguese Secretary General for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>44</sup>Copy transmitted to Department by the Ambassador in Portugal in his despatch 154, January 26; neither printed.

what we are mainly interested in at this time is the early and clear statement to Salazar of the expressed British wish that negotiations for the second field be conducted directly between us and Salazar. The Department believes that this clarification should be effected formally and in writing.

STETTINIUS

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811.34553B/105 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1944—7 p. m.

1858. Department's 1607, March 3, 5 p. m. Following just received from Lisbon :

"Hopkinson<sup>45</sup> has just shown me the draft of his proposed reply to Salazar's memorandum of January 20 concerning the Azores bases. He informs me that this draft has been approved by London.

"In general it may be said to support the requests made independently by the United States Government and implies that such direct negotiations were expected. It answers most questions about American personnel raised in section 5 of Salazar's note of January 20 and it wisely avoids discussion of certain points.

"2. Matters of current urgency are however entirely overlooked: (a) The second airfield and (b) the Navy squadron. I have brought these important omissions to the notice of Hopkinson and have stated that, as it is not clear to me in view of the Department's 601, February 28 and my 634, February 29,<sup>46</sup> whether London had given full consideration to (a) before giving approval to the draft reply under reference, I am not in a position to make any comment upon it without further reference to Washington. Hopkinson thereupon stated that he would not present the reply today. I trust therefore that the question (a) can be taken up with London and clarified urgently.

"With regard to (b) I think that pending the arrival of Tomlinson<sup>47</sup> we should not let this matter go by default and that Hopkinson should include some reference to it in his reply in order that the door may be kept open. I shall of course discuss this point with him but I believe it would be desirable for him to receive guidance from London."

Please take this up urgently and cable results to Lisbon repeating to Department.

HULL

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<sup>45</sup> Henry Hopkinson, Counselor of British Embassy in Portugal.

<sup>46</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>47</sup> Capt. William G. Tomlinson, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Azores.

811.34553B/109: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 15, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received March 16—12:32 a. m.]

798. For the Secretary and Matthews. Department's 691, March 4.<sup>48</sup> Tomlinson has arrived and we have discussed the matter of the formula for the United States naval squadron with Hopkinson. This formula differs from that mentioned in Department's 669, March 3.<sup>48</sup> Since it was tentatively agreed upon in London following conferences at which Winant, Campbell, Stark,<sup>49</sup> Bromet<sup>50</sup> and Tomlinson were present, we are proceeding on assumption that it supersedes first mentioned formula and has Department's approval. We should like, however, to have specific instructions on this.

London formula is briefly that approach to Salazar should be along following lines:

(a) that under an Anglo-Portuguese agreement he had authorized certain operations in Azores under British Coastal Command;

(b) that the United States squadron in question will be simply a unit of British Coastal Command which directs operations both in United Kingdom and in Azores;

(c) that the United States squadrons are operating similarly as units of British Coastal Command in the United Kingdom; and

(d) that United States squadron will be transferred to Azores by British Coastal Command from European theater and not from the United States.

Above formula was adopted largely upon advice of Campbell who stated however that he wished to reserve right to reintroduce replacement formula as an alternative in event that he sensed that new approach was not being favorably received.

I am of course prepared to approach Salazar immediately along these lines without waiting for return of Campbell. I feel that I should point out however that in our opinion it would be wiser that the formula be presented to Salazar by British for obvious reasons. A careful review of history of our attempts to obtain Salazar's acquiescence to presence of this squadron in the Azores will show that chief stumbling block has been his fears concerning its identity as an American squadron, fears which would only be increased by my taking initiative in presenting the formula. Chances of having it accepted would appear to be increased if British Ambassador were to present matter as a simple request for transfer to Azores of one of the American units of British Coastal Command.

<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> Adm. Harold R. Stark, Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

<sup>50</sup> Air Vice-Marshal Geoffrey R. Bromet, senior British officer in the Azores.

Tomlinson informs me that according to his information Campbell expects to return to Lisbon this week; I am accordingly requesting Tomlinson to remain here until after Campbell's return.

NORWEB

811.34553B/110 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 16, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:13 p. m.]

811. For the Secretary and Matthews. I would comment, in connection with the last part of London's telegram No. 2058 to the Department,<sup>51</sup> that it is important that the British Ambassador be instructed to state in writing to Salazar not merely that his Government desires that negotiations for a second airfield be conducted directly between the United States and Portugal but also that they reach a speedy and successful termination without recourse to the Anglo-Portuguese agreement of August 17. It should thus be made clear that the British Government fully supports our desire to build and operate on our own behalf the second airfield.

Reference is also made to your 750, March 11, 7 p. m.<sup>51</sup>

NORWEB

753.94/40 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 18, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 5:43 p. m.]

835. For the Secretary and Matthews. I understand that the Portuguese Government has recently reopened the question of Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor through its Minister in Washington. Since Dr. Salazar's previous approaches on this subject have been directed to the British Government, this action reflects his recent realization of the controlling influence of the United States in military operations in the Pacific theater.

Since this situation is susceptible of exploitation to our advantage I venture to make a few comments for consideration in the formulation of the reply:

(1) Salazar's wishes to obtain the benefits of being an ally but without incurring any risk of bringing the war to Metropolitan Portugal.

(2) He also wants to ensure Timor's return to Portugal with Portugal having a hand in the restoration (a) for the usual reasons of personal and national prestige, and (b) because he realizes that when dis-

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

memberment of empire begins there is no knowing where it will end. Accordingly Salazar would like so to time Portugal's belligerency as to avoid not only risk of embroilment in the European War but if possible, Jap occupation of Macao. Presumably, if Macao is occupied by the Japanese it would ultimately be liberated with the help of Chinese forces who might restore it to China and not to Portugal.

With these considerations in mind you will recall that in my last interview with Dr. Salazar (Legation's 614, February 26, 11 p. m.) I answered his question regarding Portugal's participation in the liberation of Timor by indicating that a reply was naturally not unconnected with action in the matter of authorizing construction of a second airfield for American use in the Azores since such a step constituted the greatest single contribution Portugal could make to the liberation of Timor in particular and the Far Eastern War in general. I feel we should continue to pursue this line of approach and not commit ourselves to assisting Portugal's participation in the liberation of Timor until we see our way clearer to obtaining the facilities in the Azores we need. It is for this reason that I have not yet employed the information contained in the Department's 505, February 21, 9 p. m. However a joint approach with the British in the matter of preliminary staff conversations must be envisaged and can at a certain stage be used very advantageously.

It is possible that these and related matters may be discussed by the Under Secretary during his London visit in which event it might be well for me to be there for consultation though, if wolfram is also on the agenda I recommend Butterworth<sup>54</sup> who is likewise conversant with Azores question.

NORWEB

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740.0011 European War 1939/33743a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1944—8 p. m.

831. The following information has been received from Commander Naval Forces Europe March 15, 1944; subject matter approved by Navy:

In an effort to introduce a U.S. Squadron into Azores the British Ambassador will propose following formula which British have agreed upon:

(a) Reassignment of certain coastal command squadrons required for second front preparations. It is strategically urgent and necessary to substitute for one squadron at the Azores a long range squadron

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<sup>54</sup> W. Walton Butterworth, Second Secretary of Legation in Portugal.

designed for distant anti-submarine operations. As no British squadron is at hand, it is thus desired to transfer to Lagens an American squadron of 12 planes already included in the British Coastal Command and now in England.

(b) Salazar may not know that for over a year a number of American squadrons has been included in British Coastal Command, completely manned by U.S. personnel, forming an integral part of the command, and controlled by British operations.

(c) Salazar knows that a military commander must necessarily be free to dispose his forces as he sees fit. Therefore U.S. squadrons in Coastal Command may be stationed anywhere in the command. It follows that as Lagens is a Coastal Command station exchange of squadrons is simply a proposal put forward by operational necessity.

(d) Prime Minister may want to know that presence of American squadron in Azores will not mean more American nationals there since personnel employed in construction work, soon to be released, approximates that of squadron.

Last sentence of paragraph (a), suggested by Commander Naval Forces Europe, is considered by him to be strongest available argument.

HULL

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841.34553B/53 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 7, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 1:49 p. m.]

1031. Legation's 877 [977], April 1, 6 p. m.<sup>55</sup> My British colleague has just informed me that he has received from Dr. Salazar a formal reply stating that the Portuguese Government "gives immediate authorization for the extension of the Lagens airdrome and the construction of new runways".

A full translation of this reply and the enclosures thereto are going forward by airmail pouch tonight.<sup>56</sup>

NORWEB

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811.34553B/115 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:46 p. m.]

1161. During the course of an extended interview with Salazar this afternoon he at last made it clear that his experts had submitted a negative report on the question of our request for radio aids to navi-

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

<sup>56</sup> Despatch 372, April 7, not printed.



gation in the Azores. I got the distinct impression that he felt our request could not stand on its own feet but served to cloak some ulterior motive. He said, for instance, that his experts were totally unconvinced that effective use could be made of the small angle which would result from the employment of even the most widely separated islands of the group and that he therefore could not fathom the reason underlying our request.

After some discussion he did, however, agree to hear further expert discussion of the matter and he was prepared either to send one or more experts to the United States to study the plan or to have one or more American experts come to Portugal to explain it more fully to his technicians.

In order to insure some control over the length of time involved, I accordingly recommend that an American expert or experts be sent to Lisbon at the earliest possible moment. Furthermore in the hope that this might be used as an opening wedge for beginning survey operations for the second airfield, the necessity for which Salazar said he still did not recognize, I suggest that these American experts be also thoroughly prepared to discuss the technical aspects of our needs for the second field, such as the inadequacy of Lagens field and extensions to handle the expected flow of traffic, the necessity of an alternate landing field in case of unfavorable weather conditions, et cetera. All these arguments have, of course, been advanced in previous discussions with Salazar but we must continue in our efforts to wear him down.

Salazar indicated that the Delgado Mission will have completed its work within the next 2 weeks; it would therefore appear to me desirable that our people arrive here prior to that time if possible.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/119: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 28, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 5:47 p. m.]

1282. In interview with Salazar last evening Campbell brought up certain matters connected with Azores. Salazar avoided discussion on the question of the second field.

As regards the Navy squadron Salazar attempted to put Campbell off but when he inquired if he should report to London that this matter must be considered as closed despite repeated representations both by the British and American Ambassadors, Salazar replied in the negative and indicated that he might reconsider provided some formula might be reached to place British markings on the planes.

Having in mind the preliminary agreement reached at Cairo between the representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on this matter Campbell said that he would refer the proposal to London. This is being done by cable.

The Naval Attaché has cabled full details to Washington requesting that a copy be made available to Department.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/121a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1944—3 p. m.

1389. Following from War Department:

“The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not yet taken final action on the matter mentioned in War Department’s message to the Military Attaché of April 29,<sup>57</sup> and although some form of favorable action is expected we cannot further delay on this account before successfully concluding negotiations for additional airfield.

The capacity of the single crowded Lagens Airport will be exceeded by War Department’s projected tremendously increased air loads. Projected operations of ATC<sup>58</sup> alone (repeat alone) call for 1,350 landings monthly by September. This figure will have increased to more than 2,100 monthly by January, not including diversions from the southern route. Obviously such operations cannot be accommodated by the existing field. Furthermore, these figures do not include the expected substantial British operations.

A restriction on the Allied war effort would result from attempting to operate with one field only, and it is important to understand that it is extremely hazardous now and will continue to be so, to operate without a suitable weather alternate. Loss of equipment and life will be inevitable in moving tactical aircraft over that route, and this reason alone renders an additional airport absolutely essential.

Traffic already planned as above outlined plus diversions from Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Central African Wings of ATC can be adequately accommodated with the two fields. This is a further and pressing consideration. Upon completion of both airfields it will be possible to abandon these three Wings except for small housekeeping detachments enabling the War Department to reassign thousands of highly trained personnel. The abandonment of the long southern route will save millions of gallons of aviation gasoline and much critical war material, as well as thousands of pilot hours.

Should the war in Europe end by the time these fields are completed Azores operations will diminish little if any as long as the Asiatic theater continues to engage us. The shortest and fastest channel to the Far East will continue to be provided by the Central Atlantic route, and the best route westward for tactical aircraft and cargo

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<sup>57</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>58</sup> Air Transport Command.

from Europe will be provided by the same route destined for redeployment in the Pacific.

It is absolutely imperative that by June 15 the survey be in progress and actual construction should commence immediately following the survey if the new field is to be ready to handle winter traffic. By autumn there will be rough weather in the Azores and a further delay of as much as one month in approval of this program will postpone for another year the construction of the airfield.

Please seek an immediate interview with the Prime Minister on the subject of the additional airfield alone and insist upon approval, final and definite, for prompt survey of Santa Maria. Should you encounter further difficulty please advise at once and furnish your recommendations."

The Department has asked the War Department whether you should furnish the foregoing information to Dr. Salazar and it has replied that the information is furnished for that specific purpose in order to strengthen your appeal to the Prime Minister, to be used by you in full or in part as you see fit. You are authorized to make the desired approach.

HULL

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811.34553B/121c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1944—4 p. m.

1390. The Department is informed that early in April an official of the Portuguese Government approached the Lisbon representative of Panair and inquired whether that Company was still interested in its application filed a year or more ago looking to the construction of an airfield in the Azores, among other things. The Department is uncertain whether this was responsive to your talks with the Prime Minister or whether with another purpose in view. In any case the Portuguese Government was assured that Panair was still interested. Panair has received no further communications from the Portuguese Government. The Company has now been requested by the War Department to follow up the matter. In order that we shall overlook no opportunity to achieve our objective as to the additional airfield, Long will depart immediately for Lisbon.

In view of the War Department's wishes the Department has informed Panair that it is agreeable to Panair resuming direct negotiations. This information is furnished you in order that you may understand the Department's purpose. The Department assumes that Long will work in close consultation with you.

You should not delay the steps requested in the Department's 1389, of May 17, pending Long's arrival but should seek the earliest possible opportunity to carry out that instruction.

HULL

811.34553B/121 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*LISBON, May 19, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received May 19—9:13 p. m.]

1526. I have just had an exploratory conversation with Sampaio on the subject matter of the Department's 1389, May 17, 3 p. m.

He said he was aware of my request for an interview with the President of the Council which he hoped could be arranged early next week. In the meantime he gave it as his personal view that Salazar might be interested in a second airfield if the construction were to be undertaken by Portugal with American technicians assisting. I reminded him that in a general way, this is what the Panair project had in view. His attitude indicated concern for the neutral position of Portugal if the United States or one of its agencies should build the field.

Questioning him further as to how such a second field could be made available to the United States he felt that the conditions for its use would be related to the nature of the response we gave to previous inquiries concerning the part Portugal might play in the Far Eastern theater.

I stated that my Government's request in connection with the second airfield was by way of being a partial reply in that it represented an immediate and substantial contribution which Portugal might make to the American war effort in that theater. He replied, again emphasizing that he was speaking personally, that he felt that Dr. Salazar would require a somewhat fuller reply.

NORWEB

711.53/41d

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has been informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a Combined Chiefs of Staff paper indicating that the latter would welcome any voluntary step taken by Portugal to become an active Ally in the war against Japan and also in the war against the European Axis. The Embassy doubtless will have cognizance of the full text of this Combined Chiefs of Staff paper.

Very careful consideration has been given the paper of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and this Government is in complete agreement with the decision set forth therein. It believes that the British and the American Governments should direct their respective Ambassadors

in Lisbon without delay to concert their action and acquaint the Portuguese Government with this grave decision.<sup>58a</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944.

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711.53/40a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1944—3 p. m.

1443. The combined Chiefs of Staff have approved the following views on military grounds:

1. A voluntary step by Portugal to engage in the war against Japan and against the European axis, as an active ally, would be welcomed by the combined Chiefs of Staff.

2. No military objection is perceived by them to a Portuguese participation in an eventual operation to liberate Timor. A definite commitment as to this cannot be furnished however, until after discussion in detail of logistical and other problems, in military staff conferences between representatives of Great Britain, the United States and Portugal.

3. They propose holding such conferences in Lisbon under the direction of the British and American Ambassadors to ascertain Portuguese capabilities and logistical and other problems involved.

4. The combined Chiefs of Staff, in examining the proposal of the Portuguese Prime Minister, have concluded that Portugal can make its most important immediate contribution in the war against Japan and toward liberating Timor by granting forthwith the Azores facilities requested but not yet granted, and they urge expediting favorable action.

The Department has concurred in the decision of the combined Chiefs of Staff, and has signified the concurrence of this Government to the British Government through the latter's Embassy here. In communicating with the British Embassy the Department has expressed its belief that the British and American Governments should direct their Ambassadors in Lisbon to concert their action without delay and communicate to Dr. Salazar the decision reached.

[Here follow two paragraphs informing the Minister in Portugal of the substance of the *aide-mémoire* of May 20 to the British Embassy, printed on page 115.]

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<sup>58a</sup> For the Department's advice to Norweb that it was informing the British Embassy that this Government would take no action for the present on the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, see telegram 1477, May 25, to Lisbon, p. 117.

The Department has expressed its readiness to issue you appropriate instructions if the British Government will signify its concurrence in the foregoing proposals.

Repeated to London and Rio.<sup>59</sup>

HULL

811.34553B/124 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 23, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:41 p. m.]

1570. I have just returned from seeing Salazar who has consented to write me tonight a letter inviting Panair to make a survey of Santa Maria Island and who has agreed that construction on second airfield may be commenced immediately upon completion of survey. He stressed importance of maintaining with Panair and others concerned formula that this field is being built and paid for by Portuguese with view to postwar communications. The question of use of this field by Allies would be temporarily deferred in view of political considerations involved. In this connection he spoke of the war in the Far East, the impending developments in Europe, and of wolfram, all of which will be covered in a subsequent telegram reporting interview in detail. This message is being rushed in view of imminent departure of Payne and Long.

I suggest that immediate steps be taken to have small survey party under Panair guise leave without delay for Azores where they will be joined by Portuguese designated to report on expropriation of land, re housing problems, et cetera.

Repeated to London as 238.

NORWEB

711.53/42 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 24, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 6:18 p. m.]

1581. With Salazar's agreement to the survey of Santa Maria and the commencing of construction on the second airfield, we have achieved our immediate objective and can go ahead with this work despite other problems which are now pending.

<sup>59</sup> Repeated on the same date to London as No. 4042 and to Rio de Janeiro as No. 1579.

Salazar purposely left hanging the question of the eventual use of this field by the Allies obviously intending to hold it as a bargaining weapon on wolfram. However, I do not foresee any serious difficulties in obtaining the use of the field once construction has been sufficiently advanced since:

(a) Should the tempo of our campaign in the Far East accelerate Salazar would be forced to make an early decision as regards his participation in the liberation of Timor which is inexorably linked with the use of the second field. I was encouraged by his statements that he could not foresee any improvement in Portuguese-Japanese relations which to his mind were very similar to those of the United States and Great Britain with Japan prior to Pearl Harbor and that the honor and dignity of Portugal in history required her participation in the reconquest of Timor action.

(b) The fulfillment of the now impending developments in the European Theater which would relieve him of German pressure. As was reported in my 2906, December 2<sup>60</sup> he has expressed willingness to grant us facilities in the Azores should a change in the military situation decrease the danger to Portugal from Germany.

(c) His attitude would be favorably influenced as a result of the staff talks anticipated in the Department's 1443, May 21.

(d) He is at least partially committed to our use of the field thru his expressed disposition to discuss rentals et cetera.

In our conversation he stated that in the past he had tried to separate discussions of political and economic matters, although he did not have the impression that British and American thinking was along the same lines. If he found that his method did not produce satisfactory results, he might be forced to revise it in view of the best interests of Portugal. The implication of this remark was that he was prepared to use the same tactics which he accused us of using and would tie in wolfram with the question of the use of the second field.

I shall inform the British Ambassador of my conversation with Salazar but will make no mention of wolfram. I shall, however, point out that Salazar had not forgotten the expressed British desire that we be given the use of a second field in the Azores.

It was my impression that Salazar had finally come to the decision, perhaps as a result of our stand on wolfram, that he could no longer delay in making some concessions. This initial one resulted from his recognition of the urgent importance of a second field to the war in the Far East and from his special interest in that theatre. He left me with the clear impression that once the field is completed, a satisfactory agreement could be made as to its use.

Regarding the technical arrangements for the survey and the construction of the fields Salazar emphasized that he wished to preserve

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<sup>60</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. II, p. 573.

the Portuguese character of the undertaking at least at the outset and that payment for the construction of the field would be made by Portugal. He would send a Portuguese delegation to handle the problems of expropriation land, rehousing, et cetera, and would prepare a budget covering these items as well as construction costs. It would not be necessary, however, to delay work on the field pending the completion of this budget.

While certain permanent installations would be required for the post-war use of the field he realized that there would have to be a number of temporary installations which of course would be for our account. With regard to the actual survey and construction this would largely be done by Pan-American on whom he was calling for "technical assistance" the implication being that any assistance which the American Government wished to give would have to be under Panair guise. The question of contractual and financial arrangements will be left for Panair to work out with Portuguese delegation.

Sent Department; to London as 241; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/125a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1944—midnight.

1508. The Department has just received a communication from Navy Department <sup>61</sup> expressing the thought that some misunderstanding may have occurred respecting negotiations for Navy squadron, and summarizing following Navy telegrams:

(1) Your Naval Attaché reported on April 28 that Salazar would not consent to our operating squadron without British markings on planes. Navy understood that both American and British marking could be employed.

(2) Navy advised Naval Attaché on April 30 that it approved adding British markings to our own.

(3) Commander Naval Forces Europe on May 7 communicated a report from Admiralty stating that Salazar had asked whether our planes could use both markings, and Navy immediately replied quoting the above decision.

(4) Your Naval Attaché reported on May 19 that Navy's agreement to both markings had been communicated to you and by you to your British colleague. Naval Attaché expressed opinion that no further action had been taken but he understood from you that definite instructions to your British colleague were required. He thought Campbell was awaiting orders. As you had just been requested to press for Santa Maria your Naval Attaché urgently requested advice about the squadron matter.

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<sup>61</sup> Memorandum received May 24, not printed.



(5) On May 21 Commander Naval Forces Europe was instructed by Navy to start such action as he might consider necessary respecting entry into the Azores of double-marked Naval aircraft. Navy had assumed your British colleague was going ahead on the basis of Navy's concurrence in double-marking as signified to Naval Attaché on April 30.

It is understood that Naval Attaché possesses complete file of the above communications. Please report status of squadron matter.

HULL

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811.34553B/129 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 30, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 3:18 p. m.]

1653. My 1625, May 27.<sup>62</sup> The following letters dated May 30 were received from Dr. Salazar today concerning the proposed airfield survey at Santa Maria.

Translations follow:

"Unfortunately it has not yet been possible, because of unforeseen work, for me to send to the director of the Pan American Airways the letter of which I spoke to Your Excellency last Tuesday.<sup>63</sup> I now ask of Your Excellency the favor of arranging delivery to addressee of the letter which I send herewith and ask that you excuse my not having carried out my promise on the date expected."

The enclosed letter read as follows

"The Portuguese Government desiring to further the realization of the system of aerodromes included in its plan of air connections with or through the Azores Archipelago, and knowing through the intermediary of the Embassy of the United States at Lisbon that Pan American would be ready to make studies for the account of the Government regarding an aerodrome or even to concern itself with its possible construction, if charged with this, I direct myself to Your Excellency precisely with regard to this matter.

The Government would wish that Pan American should immediately undertake the studies for an aerodrome on the Island of Santa Maria, for which it should present plans and estimates, the latter based equally on the possibility that the Government may prefer to have the work done with its own resources or on the hypothesis that Pan American may be charged with its realization for the account of the Portuguese Government. A Portuguese mission would accompany the technicians during the studies to be made on the Island of Santa Maria, not only to work with the technicians sent by Pan American but also to undertake other studies and activities necessary for the possible construction of the aerodrome.

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<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

<sup>63</sup> May 23.

The Government would like to know: (a) The conditions under which Pan American can undertake the studies, plans and estimates, as stated above; (b) the date on which it is judged that they may be able to start those studies on the Island of Santa Maria.

Thanking Your Excellency for a reply as soon as possible, I am. . . .”

I have replied to Dr. Salazar that our technicians were ready to leave at once to meet with his representatives either here or in the Azores and have requested that visas be granted.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/133 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 1, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received June 1—3: 45 p. m.]

1676. Long, on behalf of Pan American, today sent following letter to Salazar in reply to his letter of May 30, text of which was given in my 1653, May 30, 3 p. m.

“In order to satisfy the request of Your Excellency for an early reply, Pan American wishes to declare that it is ready to carry out at once, through its technicians, for the account of the Portuguese Government, the studies and work necessary to the elaboration of the plans and estimates for the construction of an aerodrome on the Island of Santa Maria and its presentation to the Government. Pan American has taken note of, and appreciates the intention of Your Excellency to send a Portuguese mission to accompany its technicians during the studies and affirms its desire to establish the most strict collaboration with the members thereof.

Responding to the points appearing in the second page of the communication received we state:

(a) The company proposes to execute the studies, project and estimate at the minimum possible expense. It is having difficulty, however, in fixing the cost in view of diverse unknown elements necessary to its elaboration. Equally it does not appear to be possible for the same reason to fix a percentage of the total estimate, the practice generally followed. Under these circumstances Pan American Airways proposes to effect the referred to studies, project and estimate, for the account of the Portuguese Government for the actual amount expended in its execution.

(b) It is judged that it will be possible to initiate the work on the Island of Santa Maria before the 15th of the current month. For this purpose six technicians coming from the United States will meet at Horta with another technician who will leave Lisbon on June 9 or 10 in an airplane of this company. The Portuguese mission could, should Your Excellency so determine, depart on the same plane.”

NORWEB

711.53/49 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 7, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:06 p. m.]

1749. It is becoming increasingly evident that the most important and immediate task with which I shall be confronted in my next talk with Salazar will be to induce him to come to grips on the matter of the use of the second airfield at Santa Maria somewhat sooner than he has indicated from past conversations that he is prepared to do.

There have, of course, occurred two developments which may tend to act in our favor: The settlement of the wolfram question and the military operations on the French coast. However, in addition to the prompt conclusion of a supply purchase agreement, the strongest lever we could possibly employ to induce Salazar to settle to our advantage immediately the use of the second airfield would unquestionably be a favorable response to Portugal's inquiry as to participate in liberation of Timor as will be clear by reference to third paragraph of our 1526, May 19, in which Salazar stated as much. See also our 1581, May 24.

It is our view that the psychological moment is here when the Department might wish to release to me the appropriate instructions based upon the views of the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff as set forth in the Department's 1443, May 21.

There is some question as to whether Salazar may not feel that he almost missed the boat in his timing on wolfram matter, the announcement having been preceded by news of invasion operations by some 24 hours; while he has this object lesson before him the time would appear ripe to strike with regard to the Timor matter.

NORWEB

711.53/49 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 8, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3 p. m.]

1763. According to a cable received by the Military Attaché this morning, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision regarding Portuguese participation in Far Eastern matters is to be postponed and no action contemplated for some time.<sup>63a</sup>

If such prove to be the case, we would, of course, be deprived of the most effective instrument within our grasp as pointed out in our

<sup>63a</sup> Presumably refers to the disposition of the Department of State and the British Foreign Office to defer introducing the CCS decision into the negotiations in progress with the Government of Portugal.

1749, June 7, 6 p. m. We are now left only with the supply purchase agreement, a speedy and favorable conclusion of which becomes more important than ever.

NORWEB

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711.53/49 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944—7 p. m.

1703. Your 1749, June 7, 6 p. m. The Department understands the problem ahead respecting use of Santa Maria and this is under active discussion.

We are moving rapidly for early conclusion of supply purchase agreement but the Department is not convinced it is yet necessary to make use of any assurance respecting Timor expedition. If we can continue to attain our ends without using this it will be preferable to withhold assurance until urgent necessity may require its use. The Department would appreciate your opinion as to this, particularly in the light of final sentence of Love's<sup>64</sup> 292 of June 9 to War Department<sup>65</sup> which indicates that our use of Santa Maria may hang upon such assurance. The Military Attaché's information (your 1763, June 8, 1 p. m.) is substantially correct, but the Department understands that we are in a position to tell Salazar, should it become necessary to do so, that this Government would not object to Portuguese participation in eventual Timor expedition. The Department believes you should not divulge this at this time, especially to your British colleague.

Please furnish your opinion whether Love's anxiety is justified. We certainly expect to exercise wartime command control and operations control in Santa Maria and it is imperative to avoid permitting the British to bring the additional field within their agreement with the Portuguese in any way. Additional instructions will be furnished you as soon as possible fully outlining our wartime and postwar desires.

As to construction, it is the Department's understanding that our authorities would prefer to have Army engineers handle this without cover, but are prepared to use the Panair guise if necessary. It is considered definitely undesirable to have the Portuguese construct the field themselves.

Do you consider the Portuguese seriously intend to pay for the construction?

HULL

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<sup>64</sup> Col. Robert M. Love, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Transport Command.

<sup>65</sup> Not found in Department files.

811.34553B/143c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1944—11 a. m.

4730. A decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was communicated to you in the Department's 4042, May 21, 3 p. m.<sup>66</sup> The Department was anxious to proceed at once under that decision but the British Government considered it would be untimely to do so while the wolfram negotiations were in progress.

The British Embassy has now stated informally to the Department that its Government has instructed Campbell to recommend to it a convenient date for commencing staff conversations in Lisbon as contemplated under the decision. The Department inquired how Campbell would determine a suitable date and was informed "presumably in consultation with Norweb." Norweb has furnished no indication that he has been so consulted but in a cable just received<sup>67</sup> states that Campbell recently has spoken as though he were prepared to approach the Santa Maria matter on the basis of the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision.

The Department now wishes you to ascertain from the British Government whether in fact it is prepared without further delay to proceed under the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision. In the affirmative the Department believes that the first step should be to concert action and inform Salazar and that this step should be taken immediately.

For your background information only, we do not wish Campbell to link the Santa Maria matter with the decision but we do wish the British Government to concert action with us as soon as possible in order that our two Ambassadors in Lisbon may simultaneously communicate the Combined Chiefs' decision to Salazar.

We expect the additional field to be for the use and control of the United States until the end of the war in the Pacific and this includes command control and operations control. We feel we can best secure this by avoiding any connection between the Santa Maria negotiations and the Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement.

Sent to London, repeated to Lisbon.<sup>68</sup>

HULL

<sup>66</sup> See footnote 59, p. 27.

<sup>67</sup> Telegram 1820, June 13, 6 p. m., not printed.

<sup>68</sup> Repeated to Lisbon as No. 1728 on the same date.

711.53/56 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 19, 1944—7 p. m.  
 [Received June 19—6:35 p. m.]

1902. Department's 1728, June 15, 11 a.m.<sup>69</sup> Campbell has confirmed to us today that he considers himself free to convey the CCS <sup>70</sup> decision to Salazar at any time when we feel it desirable to do so and without further reference to London. It is not his intention to connect this in any way with the Santa Maria matter.

He did, however, observe that he found it essential to await further progress toward the settlement of the Supply Purchase agreement before approaching Salazar to propose staff talks and remarked incidentally that Salazar had shown little confidence that the agreement would be expedited by the British and ourselves despite assurances to that end. Campbell felt that much of the effect of the CCS decision would be lost if the timing were not careful. To the extent that we have made a commitment regarding early action on the Supply Purchase agreement, I agree that further delay might be misinterpreted in this respect.

In our view once we have taken action on the CCS matter, we are not only in the clear with Salazar but also with the British which will permit us to go ahead and arrange for the use of the second field without becoming involved with the Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement should that still remain a possibility.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London as No. 285.

NORWEB

811.34553B/144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 20, 1944—7 p. m.  
 [Received June 21—8:30 a. m.]

4901. Department's 4730, June 15, 11 a. m. was immediately discussed with Sir Alexander Cadogan at the Foreign Office. In further conversation today Foreign Office stated that while they were in agreement with the action proposed by the Department and the

<sup>69</sup> See footnote 68, p. 34.

<sup>70</sup> Combined Chiefs of Staff.

method of presentation, they felt that they must again consult with the British Chiefs of Staff to be sure that they were still in agreement. Foreign Office realizes the need for haste and expects a reply from the Chiefs of Staff within the next day or two whereupon the Department will be promptly informed by telegraph.

Repeated to Lisbon as Embassy's 119.

WINANT

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811.34553B/148a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)* <sup>71</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1944—4 p. m.

1795. With regard to the comment made in your 1902, June 19, 7 p. m. to the effect that Campbell now considers himself free to present to Salazar CCS decision we feel that it is very important that this step should be made jointly by you and Campbell at the same time. If this is not possible or practicable we would prefer that you take the first step.

We are of course anxious that the presentation of the CCS decision should be made as soon as possible. It is agreeable to us, however, to delay presentation pending agreement on the Supply Purchase program since it is understood that the program will be completed shortly. As soon as possible after presentation of the CCS decision you are requested to take up with Salazar the question of obtaining his agreement to the American use and control of Santa Maria. Such a commitment on Salazar's part is necessary in advance of actual construction and in time to reallocate critical material, equipment and personnel now assigned to other important military posts. Delay between completion of the detailed survey and commencement of actual construction must, if possible, be avoided. Necessary reallocation should be accomplished at approximately the same time as the detailed survey commences.

With regard to the mechanics of construction we feel that you may wish to make clear to Salazar that no private commercial company has at present facilities with which to execute so large an undertaking. In view of the importance of the time element it is most desirable to have Salazar permit construction to be carried out by U. S. Army engineers in uniform. The chief reasons for this are that (1) delay would be caused by the necessity of furnishing members of military establishments with civilian clothes and in civilianizing all equipment and materials; and (2) work would move much more rapidly under full military discipline and control than if complicated by civilian cover

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<sup>71</sup> The Legation in Portugal was raised to the status of Embassy on June 20, 1944, on which date Mr. Norweb presented his credentials as Ambassador to Portugal.

or supervision. It is therefore most desirable to obtain this concession from Salazar, but rather than risk becoming involved in the Anglo-Portuguese agreement we would prefer to accomplish construction under Panair aegis as in the initial survey. Under this arrangement Panair would supervise only nominally to the extent directed by the War Department and actual construction would be executed by Army engineers. Such civilian cover if adopted at first would be dropped as soon as practicable. Please keep the Department currently informed since it is desirable that understanding with regard to these matters be reached as early as possible. Please show this telegram to Colonel Love and keep him currently informed.

Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London.<sup>72</sup>

HULL

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811.34553B/144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1944—noon.

1816. The British Embassy here yesterday presumably under instructions from London, orally informed the Department that the reasons for further delay in presenting the CCS decision to Salazar is that it is necessary for London to consult with the Australian Government. This is of course a new and different reason from that in London's 119, June 20, to you.<sup>73</sup> In view of the importance which the military here attach to this question in relation to the Santa Maria project it is our feeling and that of the War Department that unless you find serious objection to such a move you should seek an early appointment with Salazar in order to acquaint him with the CCS decision. Once such an appointment has been obtained Campbell could be informed of your intentions and invited to join you. If Campbell declines, your presentation of the matter would presumably be limited to the American point of view. In view of the very satisfactory progress being made in connection with the Supply Purchase Agreement, and in view of the shipment early next month of the 100 jeeps it is felt here that presentation of the CCS decision should not be held up pending final agreement on the supply questions. The reason for this is that the time element in connection with the Santa Maria project is becoming increasingly pressing. We are repeating to you a telegram of today's date to London<sup>74</sup> in which the Embassy is being instructed to urge upon the British the necessity for immediate answer. We do not feel, however, that your action in seeking an appointment

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<sup>72</sup> Repeated to London on the same date as No. 4922.

<sup>73</sup> Same as telegram 4901, June 20, 7 p. m., p. 35.

<sup>74</sup> Telegram 4969, June 24, 1 p. m., *infra*.



and seeing Salazar should await receipt of an answer to the Embassy in London.

Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London as Department's 4968.

HULL

811.34553B/144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1944—1 p. m.

4969. We are unable to understand why the Foreign Office as reported in your 4901, June 20, feel that the British Chiefs of Staff must again be consulted in this matter. It is the feeling here that since the decision was reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff there is no basis for its ratification or review by the British Chiefs of Staff. So far as we are concerned the decision is final. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Embassy here has informed the Department, apparently on instructions from London, that the reason for delay in this matter is that London must now consult with the Australian Government which, it is alleged, initiated this whole question. This latter reason was not mentioned in your 4901 and it is apparently a new excuse for delay. As you know the military here consider the presentation of this CCS decision to Salazar as having important bearing on expediting the airfield at Santa Maria. In view of the fact that the Foreign Office is in agreement with the action which we propose and in view of the fact that the reason originally given by the British for delay in presentation of the decision no longer exists, it is our feeling that you might, unless you perceive serious objection, press for immediate and final answer.

Sent to London, repeated to Lisbon, as Department's 1817.

HULL

811.34553B/6-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1944—10 p. m.

1848. It is our feeling here that Department's 1832, June 26, 4 p. m., and 1839, June 26, 8 p. m.,<sup>75</sup> have advanced the situation with regard to the Supply Purchase negotiations to such a point of certainty that you should now be in a position to go forward with the CCS decision and press for final settlement on the question of Santa Maria with

<sup>75</sup> Neither printed.

regard to which, as you know, time is of the essence and work must be begun at the earliest possible moment.

Likewise Campbell should now press for a decision in the matter of the Navy squadron. An immediate reply with regard to this question is essential because if there is to be continued delay with regard to this question Navy authorities may have to reconsider this entire matter.

Repeated to London as Department's 5074.<sup>76</sup>

HULL

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811.34553B/6-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*<sup>77</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1944—11 p. m.

1849. With reference to paragraph (1) of Department's 1848, June 27, 10 p. m., we understand that Love will have preliminary plans and figures ready for presentation to Salazar upon his arrival in Lisbon. Since he plans to be there only a limited time and since you undoubtedly will desire his assistance in disposing of all outstanding issues with Salazar relating to Santa Maria, it is important that you proceed without waiting for the Supply Purchase negotiations to be concluded. We do not believe the British fully appreciate all of the details that will have to be worked out with regard to Santa Maria after the CCS decision is presented to Salazar. Inasmuch as the whole Santa Maria project is dependent upon the speed with which it is carried out, every effort must be made to avoid any further delay.

HULL

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811.34553B/6-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1944—2 p. m.

1867. Referring to last paragraph of your 1996, June 27,<sup>78</sup> Section 4 of CCS paper <sup>79</sup> reads as follows:

"In considering Dr. Salazar's proposal, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the most important immediate contribution that Portugal can make in the war against Japan and toward the liberation of Portuguese Timor is to grant, without further delay, those additional facilities requested in the Azores and they urge that favorable action in this matter be expedited."

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<sup>76</sup> Referring to Department's 5028, June 26, and 5040, June 26 to London. Neither printed.

<sup>77</sup> Repeated on the same date to London as No. 5077, referring to Department's 5074, June 27 (1848 to Lisbon, *supra*), and 5076, June 27, not printed.

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

<sup>79</sup> See telegram No. 1443, May 21, 3 p. m., to Lisbon, p. 26.

Department's previous messages insisting that Campbell refrain from linking CCS action with Santa Maria project were simply intended to forestall any discussion of this point between Campbell and Salazar, inasmuch as Santa Maria is an American project and British have asked Salazar to handle the matter directly with United States alone. It has never been intended that you yourself will not link CCS decision with Santa Maria or that you yourself will not make full use of Section 4 of CCS action in your further negotiations for American facilities at Santa Maria.

As a matter of fact Section 4 quoted above is perhaps the most important point in CCS paper as far as United States is concerned.

You will note that Section 4 urges that Portugal grant the additional facilities requested in Azores. War Department construes this to mean facilities in addition to those at Lagens. In other words the phrase "additional facilities" used in Section 4 refers primarily to Santa Maria airfield. However, phrase is considered broad enough to include facilities which Navy is seeking.

It is Department's thought that you and Campbell, acting jointly, will present CCS decision, which speaks for itself. You are requested to obtain an immediate subsequent interview at which time you alone should seek a commitment from Salazar respecting American use and control of Santa Maria airfield. At such time you are authorized very definitely to connect Section 4 of CCS decision with Santa Maria. If, as indicated in last paragraph of your 1996, Salazar should voluntarily introduce this phase when he meets with you and Campbell, it should simply be stated that Section 4 relates to Santa Maria, which calls for direct negotiations between Portugal and United States.

With reference to paragraph 3 of your 1996, CCS decision does not concern itself with facilities in India or Portuguese Africa, and such matters should be omitted from conversations concerning CCS decision.

HULL

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811.34553B/7-144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1944—6 p. m.

1888. The Department is gratified by the progress on the Santa Maria Air Base.

One matter needs to be kept in mind. In previous operations of this kind Pan Air has not infrequently endeavored to put into the

papers clauses which are for the benefit of Pan Air rather than for the general benefit of the United States. The Department's policy is that any air rights obtained by United States officials or by any company acting on behalf of the United States must be available for disposition as United States policy shall direct, so that no one company or group of interests can become the exclusive beneficiary of any residual commercial rights which may form part of the transaction or which may eventually be acquired as a result of it. For this reason I hope you will watch the situation and report fully the proposed documentation.

For your information, there is a vigorous dispute in Congress as to whether Pan Air should be permitted to have a monopoly of United States overseas aviation, and it appears probable that a majority of both Houses are against the proposal. This group would likewise criticize our being parties to any set of arrangements which in effect would accomplish this end through a system of exclusive concessions or options on future rights. One such incident is presently under investigation by the Truman Committee.<sup>80</sup>

HULL

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753.94/7-344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1944—7 p. m.

1889. The British Embassy has informed the Department that instructions have now been issued Campbell authorizing him to concert with you the joint presentation to Salazar of a statement to the effect that Portuguese participation in an eventual expedition for the liberation of Timor would be welcomed, and of a proposal to hold in Lisbon a conference under the American and British Ambassadors to determine Portuguese capabilities in connection with such an enterprise and to study logistical and other related problems. It is thus clear Campbell will not discuss Santa Maria project, but this need not restrict your action and you may go ahead in the light of instructions already furnished you and of your own best judgment.

The Department is informed that it is essential definite agreement be reached this week on construction and use of Santa Maria.

HULL

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<sup>80</sup> Special Senate Committee to investigate the National Defense Program, Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, Chairman.

811.34553B/7-644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received July 6—12 p. m.]

2092. I have just returned from an interview with Salazar who stated that he had asked Col. Serrano<sup>81</sup> to make a résumé of the Pan-Air survey report and that it was his intention to study this résumé tonight. (See Embassy's 2081, July 5, 6 p. m.<sup>82</sup>). He assured me that he was fully aware that time was of the essence and that he would give me his answer as soon as he had made up his mind.

I went over with him in detail our most immediate needs and requirements and I was gratified to observe that at no time did he indicate any surprise but nodded his head in apparent assent and showed a genuine appreciation of the character and size of the project. Among the points which I emphasized were:

1. The time element.
2. The immediate need for men to begin the construction. At this point he inquired whether some of these were available at Terceira to which I replied in the affirmative.
3. The need for an emergency landing strip which I said could be completed in about 10 days. I explained that Col. Serrano had left his men at Santa Maria and they were awaiting authorization from Lisbon to begin this work at once.
4. The need for communications to be established between Santa Maria and Terceira as soon as the emergency strip was completed.
5. An understanding as to method of construction and conditions of ultimate use. I informed Salazar that three 10,000-ton Liberty ships would be needed and that the port facilities would require improvements to which he replied that he had already gone into this question with the Ministry of Marine and that he realized the need for haste in view of weather conditions after October 1st. He appeared interested that the report showed that the problem of constructing a trans-Atlantic airfield on Santa Maria would be simpler than that at Terceira and he concluded by stating that Serrano had been impressed with the high quality of the American survey party and of their preliminary report.

It is disappointing that today's interview was not more conclusive but I am left with the impression that Dr. Salazar's thought has advanced sufficiently deeply into this project as to exclude the probability of his reconsidering any of the more important phases. I am

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<sup>81</sup> Lt. Col. Herminio José Serrano, senior member of Portuguese survey party in Azores.

<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

reasonably confident that we may expect to hear further from him on this matter within the next few days.

Campbell and I have no indication as yet as to when we shall be received on the Timor matter.

NORWEB

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753.94/7-744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 7, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

2104. Prior to our joint meeting with Salazar this afternoon, Campbell called on me and went over the ground in a brief conversation. Two points emerged from our talk both of which he said emanated from a high source in London which I take to be the Portuguese Ambassador:

First, that in approaching Far Eastern matters, it must be borne in mind that the Portuguese place great weight upon the continued retention in their hands of Macao because of a strong belief that should the Japanese be provoked into occupying the colony, the question of recovering it from the Chinese after the Japanese are expelled therefrom might present certain complications which it is desired to be avoided. Campbell indicated that the British also had a large stake in Macao because of the large number of British nationals in refuge there.

Second, that the Germans have served notice on the Portuguese Government that any action taken by the latter which might be considered by the Japanese as inimical to their interests would be similarly regarded by the German Government.

The foregoing two points are interesting in the light of my previous conversations with Campbell who it will be recalled (see our 1835 June 14, 6 p. m.<sup>83</sup>) has regarded a break with Japan as a development that might flow from the staff talks with the Portuguese. However, in our 1996, June 27, 6 p. m.,<sup>83</sup> we remarked upon the omission from London's telegram to Campbell of any reference to the possibility that the discussions might lead to a break in Portuguese-Japanese relations.

This omission assumes greater significance in reflecting upon my talk this morning with Campbell who was undoubtedly trying to convey to me a warning against looking for any immediate action by Salazar looking forward toward a rupture with Japan.

NORWEB

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<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

753.94/7-744: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 7, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:02 p. m.]

2109. Our 2098, July 7, noon.<sup>85</sup> I have just returned from the joint meeting with Salazar.

Salazar received our favorable response to Portugal's desire for voluntary participation in the eventual liberation of Timor with evident satisfaction coupled, however, with the observation that he had first broached the matter to Campbell just over a year ago.<sup>86</sup> He indicated his readiness to appoint an Army and a Navy officer to begin the staff talks at once and Campbell and I said that we would designate our respective Military and Naval Attachés for the preliminaries and that we would recommend that our respective Governments send to Lisbon at the earliest possible moment military and naval experts in Far Eastern matters. Incidentally the rank of these officers was not brought out but we shall see our way more clearly when the Portuguese representatives have been named.

Salazar said that he has endeavored to obtain the evacuation of Timor through diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese but that these have proven endless and so far fruitless. He said that the only result was the sending of a Portuguese mission to Timor which added nothing to knowledge of conditions there. Macao with its large European population was in the nature of a hostage and this fact, of course, had to be taken into consideration. He added, therefore, that for the present he would continue to pursue the question through these channels even though the staff talks which would have to be conducted in secrecy were initiated.

In discussing the matter further, Campbell pointed out that while Churchill<sup>87</sup> had publicly stated Britain's intention to direct her full efforts to the Far Eastern war as soon as the war in Europe was terminated, it must be conceded that operations in the Pacific theater were at present almost entirely in the hands of the United States. This statement should be helpful to us in our current negotiations regarding the Santa Maria airfield.

Incidentally Salazar remarked that the Japanese must have sensed that something in the nature of the CCS decision was about to be communicated to the Portuguese because about 10 days ago the Japanese Minister asked if an agreement had been made "with the Americans" for Portuguese troops to participate in an expedition to

<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

<sup>86</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 525 ff.

<sup>87</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

Timor. Salazar replied simply "not yet." This is an interesting side light on the uneasiness of the Japanese Military.

As a result of today's interview, we may look for the first meetings to be held next week and our experts should accordingly be ready to leave on short notice.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 8, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 2: 53 p. m.]

2113. Department's 1848, June 27. Campbell informed me today that Salazar yesterday had stated that he was unable to give a decision on the matter of the Navy squadron. Salazar continued to question the necessity of the squadron in view of Churchill's recent remarks regarding the easing of the submarine menace. The British Ambassador informs me that he has this morning addressed a letter to Salazar reviewing the recent efforts of the British Embassy to obtain permission for the presence in the Azores of such a squadron with combined markings.

Should a discouraging reply be forthcoming to this letter or if there should be further and obviously delaying tactics I propose (Department's 1576 June 2<sup>88</sup>) to approach Salazar myself but I prefer not to do so until the Santa Maria matter is further clarified.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1944—4 p. m.

1941. Your 2109, July 7, 7 p. m. The Department is disappointed that, prior to or following your joint meeting with Salazar, you appear to have found no opportunity to press for definite answer concerning Santa Maria. We have reached the crucial moment beyond which we can delay no further without incurring incalculable loss. The Department cannot understand hesitancy on Salazar's part in view of all the facts with which he has been confronted. We have extended to him an opportunity to serve vital Portuguese interest by facilitating the realization of this project. On February 26 Dr. Salazar stated,<sup>89</sup> in connection with Santa Maria, that he was going to do

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<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> See telegram 614, February 26, 11 p. m., from Lisbon, p. 13.



something for the United States. This he has not yet done, and he should be advised that unless his decision is made at once, the opportunity will have passed.

You are requested to ask an immediate interview with the Prime Minister on most urgent grounds and to state to him that you are acting under instructions from your Government in asking an immediate affirmative reply, and in advising him that any further postponement of his decision must be construed by this Government as a negative decision. His reply should include acquiescence in our proposals respecting construction, use, and control.

Your discussion should be limited to this one subject.

Please acknowledge this cable immediately and report currently on every development.

HULL

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811.34553B/7-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944—7 p. m.

1951. Your 2116, July 9, 7 p. m.<sup>90</sup> The failure of Dr. Salazar to satisfy our wishes after months of discussion in the course of which his attitude has generally seemed encouraging has created an impression that we have been held off with faint hopes. At present a feeling of keen disappointment and discouragement pervades every branch of this Government cognizant of our negotiations. Meanwhile we have gone ahead in complete good faith and with remarkable speed in satisfying to the best of our ability the economic requirements of Portugal.

We are prepared to continue to support Portuguese economy in so far as possible and this Government hopes to maintain the relationship of cordiality and understanding recently established with the Portuguese Government. It must be borne in mind however that in view of wartime stringencies the position of the State Department vis-à-vis the supply agencies and the Chiefs of Staff will be secure only if adequately supported by attentiveness on the part of the Portuguese Government to our requirements.

The Department is unable to understand the hesitancy of Dr. Salazar to grant in full our requirements in Santa Maria and in Lagens. To hesitate further will mean the operation of accumulative harm to vital American and United Nations interests and will risk jeopardizing Portuguese interests in the Pacific. The Department feels that Dr. Salazar should be told with complete frankness how the posi-

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<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

tion is viewed here and urged in the strongest terms to agree now to our proposals concerning construction, use, and control in Santa Maria and to our proposal to place an operating Navy squadron in Lagens.

The Department feels that Dr. Salazar should accept without question the statement of this Government which is based upon a decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff of Great Britain and the United States as to the necessity for the additional field in Santa Maria and the operating squadron in Lagens. As between the two, Santa Maria should be concluded first, but the Department perceives no reason why the Prime Minister should not forthwith grant both of these desires. On the contrary the prompt granting of these desires is obviously and strongly in the interest of Portugal. (Your 2113, July 8, 2 p. m.)

HULL

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811.34553B/7-1144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1944—5 p. m.

1958. Plans for Santa Maria have been worked out in exact detail step by step and great engineering effort and time have been poured into this project in good faith and upon the belief that Dr. Salazar would by now have approved U.S. construction, use, and control. We are now at the point where construction personnel, essential materials, and critical equipment cannot be diverted by our competent authorities until we are able to say we have the definite agreement of the Portuguese Government. Every day's delay therefore sets back the whole program, and as you know we now risk having to abandon the entire project for a full year.

Dr. Salazar's delay in the matter of Navy's operating squadron for Lagens has already been so great as to minimize the importance of that plan. It is still important but over a long period of months our purpose has been defeated to the extent that the desired additional squadron has not been operating and much material and ground personnel have been and continue to be wasted at a critical time. The Department is quite sure that a continuing delay on that matter and failure to acquiesce in the Santa Maria plan while there is still time to make it effective will bring about unfavorable reaction in Government circles here against the Portuguese Government. These are matters which Dr. Salazar should be made to understand fully without delay. It is too much for him to expect that this Government will continue its present effort to satisfy Portuguese requirements while our own desires are neglected.

HULL

811.34553B/7-1244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1944—8 p. m.

1974. With regard to the operating squadron for Lagens the Department recognizes the necessity for full British support as the entire Lagens operation is under the British-Azores agreement. Nevertheless the Department perceives no reason why you should not as well discuss this matter directly with Salazar. This would have the advantage of insuring full and accurate presentation of this Government's views thus eliminating a possibility of misunderstanding.

In this connection you are requested to communicate the following to Dr. Salazar :

"Experience has shown the inadequacy of anti-submarine air-strength now in the Islands for furnishing requisite coverage for Mediterranean convoys. This inadequacy has necessitated the employment of carrier-based aircraft which might be released for use elsewhere in prosecuting the war if our additional squadron of B-24s could operate from Lagens.

The British Admiralty desires to have our Navy squadron in the Azores as this would permit the Admiralty more effectively to operate against submarines in the North Atlantic.

The U.S. Navy squadron we propose to place in Lagens will bear British markings in addition to U.S. markings, and in reaffirming this it is pointed out that the contemplated step corresponds identically with a situation which for many months has existed in the British Isles where three of our B-24 squadrons operate under the Coastal Command."

HULL

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811.34553B/7-1344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 13, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 7:16 p. m.]

2162. We have read and digested contents of Department's 1958, July 11, which we now [*not?*] only fully appreciate but with which we are in agreement as to substance and feeling. It may have been difficult for us to convey in telegrams with what urgency and stress we are viewing developments but on other hand at no time do we feel we have given grounds for the note of discouragement such as seems to color Department's 1941, July 8 and 1951, July 10.

On contrary although we are far from satisfied and are driven almost to point of exasperation by tempo of developments they are not abnormal from Portuguese point of view. For the past weeks the movement has been definitely progressive and in the week since

survey was completed and given to Salazar we have had further indications that matter is moving forward in all its aspects. In dealing with the Prime Minister one has to learn to read the signs and interpret the language endeavoring to draw correct conclusions therefrom. At this point we do not doubt eventual attainment of our long range objectives since we are confident that he himself not only is attracted by the prospect of a first class trans-Atlantic airfield for Portugal but also has in mind a contribution which will redound to Portugal's advantage in the Far East.

He is wise and farsighted and at the same time a prudent man and there is evidence that he is considering every angle on this project including Portuguese neutrality in Europe even to the point of consulting with Spain as he did prior to the British Azores Agreement.

I saw Sampaio again yesterday who assured me that Salazar was giving his attention to our Azores [*sic*] and that as soon as his mind was made up he would receive me. I said I was sure this was the case but repeated that I was deeply disturbed at the time factor. Undoubtedly some element unknown to us is incomplete the picture as Salazar sees it and this would explain his delay in calling me. We know for instance that 2 days ago he convoked the top military officials to discuss the plan with them. Only yesterday General Lelloone of the inner circle spoke to me with evident enthusiasm of the project for fine installation at Santa Maria.

We are of course facing certain risks but these in our judgment do not include backsliding on part of Salazar. Moreover the chain of events during last fortnight strengthens this belief. Our main concern is lest he sacrifice this unique opportunity by his constitutional in Cape City [*incapacity*] to move fast.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-1244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1944—9 p. m.

1994. Your 2149, July 12, 6 p. m.<sup>91</sup> No further investigation or survey is contemplated by Panair or anyone else and it is understood this was made clear in Love's time schedule of June 30, copy of which is understood to have been handed Salazar on July 7.

Owing to Salazar's indecision execution of plan has now fallen behind Love's deadline schedule. If you are unable to see Salazar as requested in Department's 1941 of July 8 please submit to him at once the following questions in writing:

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<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

(1) Are we authorized to proceed with construction on Santa Maria?

(2) Will United States use and control be accorded after completion of construction?

Unless replies to these questions can be obtained within next 2 or 3 days entire project must be abandoned with the results we must expect and of which the Department has already given you some indication. It is no longer possible to wait for formal interchanges of documents or correspondence between Panair and Salazar as nothing further can go forward here without instant authority to proceed with construction. The Department has been forcefully given to understand by the War Department that it is literally a case of "Now or never".

In putting these questions to the Prime Minister you may acquaint him with as much of the foregoing as you think necessary.

You should make clear to Salazar that the starting of this work now is of such importance to this Government at this critical time that unless approved at once we cannot escape the impression that the Portuguese Government is initiating a period of less than the fullest cooperation between our two countries.

HULL

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753.94/7-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 15, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 3:03 p. m.]

2192. At the Foreign Office this morning, Campbell and I were handed identic memoranda by the Secretary General on the subject of my No. 2109, July 7, 7 p. m. The memorandum refers to our conversation of the 7th with Salazar and states that orders have been given to prepare for the inter-staff talks with regard to Timor. Contrary to our understanding that Salazar would give us an indication as to character of the delegations by first indicating to us the composition of the Portuguese group, the memorandum inquires about the makeup of the Anglo-American Mission or at least the category of its senior member.

I should appreciate an immediate indication in this respect together with the number we shall send and when they may be expected to arrive.

The Secretary General observed that Dr. Salazar preferred not to initiate discussions through the medium of the Attachés of our respective Embassies.

NORWEB

811.34553B/7-1844: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 18, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received July 18—5:39 p. m.]

2213. I saw Sampayo this afternoon who handed me the following communication (re Department's 1974, July 12, 8 p. m.).

"His Excellency, the Ambassador, having manifested more than once the interest of his Government in that the Portuguese Government might grant a desire of the 'British Coastal Command' relative to an American Naval Air Squadron for long-range anti-submarine combat at night, you are informed that the Government now reviewing the problem in the light of new explanations presented has resolved to grant that request.

2. In the communication made to the Embassy of his British Majesty at Lisbon, the Government noted that the matter referred to a squadron which forms an integral part of the 'British Coastal Command' and which in the terms of the understanding between the General Staffs is loaned to the British Government and operates under the command of a British officer and from a base under British control.

3. Furthermore you are informed that the planes of the said squadron should use the emblem of the RAF although they may add to this the distinctive emblem of the military aviation of the United States."

NORWEB

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*President Roosevelt to the Portuguese Prime Minister (Salazar)*<sup>92</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 18, 1944.

HIS EXCELLENCY DR. ANTONIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR, Prime Minister of Portugal. As you have been informed by Ambassador Norweb, we are desirous of constructing an airfield on the Island of Santa Maria to be used by us in connection with our operations in the Pacific Theater. You have seen the report of the survey recently completed and have been good enough to approve the report.

Owing to the weather hazard no further delay is possible and the construction must be proceeded to at once or the project will have to be abandoned.

Bearing in mind the mutual interest of your country and mine I trust that you will authorize the sending immediately to Santa Maria of all the necessary equipment and material for the construction of an airport as contemplated in the survey.

I am sending this urgent request to you by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of

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<sup>92</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. The message was drafted in the Department of State and approved by President Roosevelt.

the Department of State,<sup>93</sup> whom I recommend to you, and who will explain to you orally the anxiety in which we find ourselves to accomplish the aforesaid purpose.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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811.34553B/7-1944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 19, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received July 20—1:30 a. m.]

2236. I have just returned from a 3-hour talk with Dr. Salazar.

He said that he was very much put out at being faced with a request for replies to the two questions I posed in my letter<sup>94</sup> and that I must take into account the unalterable fact of Portugal's neutrality vis-à-vis Japan. With regard to construction he said that he was prepared to request Panair to proceed immediately but within the limits of his memorandum to Mr. Long of July 14.<sup>95</sup> The order for construction could, however, be given only after Panair had converted their estimate into a true tender stating the costs. He said that, although he realized Panair would have to obtain men and materials from the United States Government and while I might properly consider Panair as "camouflage", he must continue to deal only with Panair in order that he might justify his action to the Germans and Japanese on the grounds that he was merely entering into a commercial transaction with a private American company. He said that he had given orders to Colonel Serrano to prepare the emergency strip at Santa Maria and that this work could begin immediately without awaiting Panair's statement of costs for the construction of the main airfield.

As to the question of eventual use and control, he said that he intended that this should be the main point of discussion in the forthcoming staff conversations. Although he realized that it was asking a great deal for the United States Government to enter into commitments as to materials, men, supplies, et cetera, we would have to take our chances in this respect relying upon the many indications which he had given me in previous talks to the effect that everything was pointing toward the possibility that the eventual use and control could be worked out to our satisfaction. In this connection he pointed to the inclusion of the long runways in the memorandum as an indication of his comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project. He said

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<sup>93</sup> Delivered to Prime Minister Salazar by Mr. Culbertson on July 22, 1944.

<sup>94</sup> Dated July 17, not printed; but see telegraphic instruction 1994, July 14, 9 p. m., to Lisbon, p. 49.

<sup>95</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 749, July 18, from Lisbon, not printed.

that while he was continuing by diplomatic means to induce the Japanese to return Timor to Portugal, he could not consistently give us now the favorable decision which we desired regarding the question of the use and control.

Although we went over the entire history of our conversations on this subject and although at one point I intimated that he had given us grounds for making certain assumptions which were proving in our conversation today to be not entirely warranted at the moment, I was unable to budge him from his position as to "juridical" neutrality vis-à-vis Japan.

He emphasized again in conclusion that he wished to begin construction at the earliest possible moment, and that during the staff talks the principal objective would be to determine how and when the Santa Maria facilities could be made available to the United States Government.

I informed Dr. Salazar that I was very doubtful if my Government would be willing, even in the light of the indications he had given me today of how his mind was working for the future, to gamble on an undertaking of this magnitude which involved the allocation of an impressive amount of materials, men, and shipping from other theaters where it was greatly needed merely in hope that matters would eventually work out to our satisfaction. I added that I would of course consult with my Government and he said he would receive me as soon as I had an indication of my Government's attitude.

It is my belief that Salazar hopes that his dilemma will be solved by a defeat of Germany before question of use of field arises in which event he would then be in position, without any risk whatever, to make available to us all facilities we require.

Bearing in mind time element, we are preparing tonight a cost figure covering construction of project as outlined within limits of Salazar's memo to Long, July 14. I propose tomorrow to present this figure to Salazar and inform him that if acceptable to him I will cable my recommendation that it be agreed to by my Government and Panair accordingly authorized. At same time I will ask him whether, if this figure is agreed to by Washington, he will request Panair to begin construction at once. Should his reply be affirmative it is my feeling as result of talk today that War Department may wish to consider advantages of instructing Panair to present formal tender to Portuguese Government at once on basis of the foregoing so as to start construction forthwith and thus gain a firm foothold on the Island.

NORWEB



811.34553B/7-2044: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 20, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

2246. In further elaboration of my 2236, July 19, 9 p. m., the following observations may be of interest.

The first hour was spent in listening to Dr. Salazar read from some 30 pages of manuscript a history of the negotiations leading up to the present time. At the conclusion of this recital, I agreed that it appeared to me to be accurate as an account of facts and as to conclusions to be drawn therefrom with the exception of a single factor which was the element of time. For instance, he claimed that he had never led us to believe that he was prepared to consider anything excepting the first phase of the matter which was that of construction; that the question of use and control was always to have been considered as the second phase.

To this I replied that this would have been true had not the time element become a factor. His thesis may have held good last November, December, January, February; but that the conversations had now dragged on into the ninth month despite the fact that we had been very active in pressing the matter (to which he gave assent) and that the point had been reached where the first and the second phase could no longer be considered separately.

His rejoinder was that there were many factors involving Portugal's neutrality and other interests which had to be taken into account.

Although the interview opened in an atmosphere which can only be described as glacial, he gradually warmed to his subject and at one point the temperature was decidedly warm when we reached an exchange of views on the question of Portugal's neutrality toward Japan, an attitude which appeared to me so difficult to understand as to leave me with a feeling of discouragement. He took refuge behind the qualification that it was a matter [of] "juridical" neutrality but I could see that he recognized the weakness of his position here.

Upon leaving I referred to his complaint that our insistence upon facing him with a request for an immediate decision was the wrong way to go about attaining our objective and asked what in his opinion would be the best way. He thought a moment and replied that, first, we should ask Panair to make him a true tender; second, that we should begin construction immediately after it had been approved; and third, that we should begin the staff conversations with the object of determining the manner and time of making available to the United States the use and control of the field. He added that he wished me to understand that in the event that all else failed and the staff talks did not lead to a solution favorable to United States, the use of the field

could always as a last resort be brought under the Anglo-Portuguese agreement or for that matter this could be arranged now if desirable. I replied that [such?] a solution would not serve our purpose nor would it be given any consideration whatever.

I have just been informed that Colonel Serrano has been given orders to the Portuguese group now waiting at Santa Maria to prepare the emergency landing strip.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-1944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1944—7 p. m.

2042. Your 2236 of July 19. The Department derives satisfaction from Salazar's statement that we may properly consider Panair as camouflage and from his further statement that the inclusion of the long runways in his memorandum indicates his comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project. We take this to mean that he understands and approves the fact that the airfield will actually be built by the U.S. Government and will be used for transoceanic traffic in the prosecution of the war against Japan. If he understands these two things clearly, we consider that definite progress has been made.

With regard to that part of your message dealing with construction, we object first to his statement that construction can proceed only within the limits of his memorandum of June 14 to Mr. Long, and second to his statement that the order for construction can be given only after Panair converts its estimate into a "true tender stating the costs".

As to the first objection, the idea of an "inter-island aerodrome" expressed in his memorandum to Mr. Long is inconsistent with Salazar's stated "comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project". Such an aerodrome (inter-island) has never before been remotely suggested by Salazar or anyone else. We must insist upon compliance with the President's request that Salazar "authorize the sending immediately to Santa Maria of everything necessary for the construction of an airport as contemplated in the survey". Additional material and personnel for a later enlargement of the airfield cannot be sent at a future date as it cannot be landed.

As to the second objection, there is no time within which to convert the estimate into a "true tender", which we assume will involve the working out of a written agreement of some kind. For our present purposes Salazar may do one of two things: (1) consider the estimate contained in the survey report as a "true tender", or (2) authorize immediate construction with the understanding that any ultimate

"true tender" will be in figures that are subject to his approval. In either event, the authorization for construction must be immediate.

With reference to that part of your message which relates to use and control: We interpret Salazar's "comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project" to mean that he understands that the United States intends to use the airfield in military operations against Japan. Since his understanding is the same as ours, we do not know that it is necessary that we be furnished a written commitment or even a more clearcut oral commitment. You may or may not consider it advisable to acquaint him with the construction we place upon his stated "comprehension of the purpose of the Santa Maria project" and thus afford him an opportunity to correct us in the event we have misunderstood him. We note Salazar states that "in entering into commitments as to materials, men, and supplies we will have to take our chances". If we enter upon such commitments and construct an airfield on Santa Maria, you will appreciate, of course, that it is upon the assumption that we will use and control it. Presumably Salazar himself realizes this.

Upon the arrival in Lisbon of Mr. Culbertson and the presentation of the President's message to Dr. Salazar<sup>96</sup> we are extremely hopeful that the air will be entirely cleared, and that we will receive a message that will enable us to advise the War Department that it may proceed forthwith with the shipment of all required equipment, material, and personnel to Santa Maria.

HULL

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811.34553B/7-2244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 22, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:53 p. m.]

2271. Culbertson and I had a cordial meeting with Salazar this afternoon at which Culbertson presented President's message and in so doing brought to Salazar's attention the direct personal interest which President has in Santa Maria matter. Salazar read President's message and Secretary's letter<sup>97</sup> out loud in English. Culbertson then pointed out that we appreciated position and problems concerning Portugal as a neutral and that we hoped he would understand our problems as a belligerent; that in connection with Santa Maria project we wished to make clear to Portuguese Government ultimate use which we have in mind for Santa Maria in order that there may be no future misunderstandings which ought to have been cleared at this stage

<sup>96</sup> Dated July 18, p. 51.

<sup>97</sup> Secretary's letter not found in Department files.

in the negotiations; and that it was appreciated that Portugal requires cover of Panair construction of this airport but that it would be in fact the U.S. Government which did the work. Culbertson then called attention to urgency of matter and our desire that immediate authorization be given to undertake construction and that such authorization would permit sending to Santa Maria of all equipment needed not only for preliminary project but also all material needed for eventual full development of airport as required for purposes which we have in mind. It was pointed out that we hope to have from Washington by Monday <sup>98</sup> a definite statement which Panair can present to Salazar giving a specific figure with regard to cost of airport and that it was hoped that with this presentation authority would be given so that mechanical side of this project might be put under way at once. It was, of course, brought out that development envisaged at Santa Maria was in mutual interest of both countries.

In reply, Salazar immediately discussed points brought out in President's message. He called particular attention to necessity of maintaining Panair camouflage and he apparently felt that this was not quite clearly indicated in President's message.

He went on at considerable length re necessity of appreciating Portugal's position as a neutral and why it was necessary for Portugal to act in accordance with that position. In general, practically all of this part of Salazar's statement is to be found in my previous telegrams. He said in reference to the point in President's letter with regard to forwarding of materials necessary for project that there would be no objection to landing all material required for preliminary project as well as for the ultimate project which we have in mind. He appreciates thoroughly the time element and necessity for expediting this preliminary mechanical work in order to get it done ahead of change of weather later on. While he was emphatic in his position that question of the airport construction and its ultimate use must be kept separate, we are convinced that his mind is made up to a point where question of ultimate use may be worked out at such time as airport is in actual existence. He said he appreciated that the United States wanted an airport on Santa Maria even though it were "constructed by the devil". Nevertheless he has certain legal problems to meet here and therefore certain procedure and formalities are necessary. He clearly appreciates that military personnel will be used in construction of this airport but requires that such personnel have appearance of civilians. He added that it was easier to make civilians out of military than to make military out of civilians.

We have an appointment to see him again on Monday and we therefore urgently need clearance in order that Long may present to

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<sup>98</sup> July 24.

Salazar a letter incorporating a firm offer and including a specific figure and an indication of length of construction period and terms of payment such as currency and place. He expects this to be followed later with a detailed contract agreement. Salazar stated that if he were to receive such a letter he could then move forward in a manner which would meet all his legal difficulties. As an indication of Salazar's interest in this matter and of the fact, as we see it, that his mind is made up, he told us that he was not going back to the country for the week-end because this particular project was now his work at hand. There is every indication that, if we will continue to meet Salazar's procedure and formula, we can obtain our long-range objective and that he is prepared to give the desired immediate authorization as soon as he receives the Panair letter.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-2244: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1944—5 p. m.

2067. The Department is very gratified to note in your 2271, July 22, 8 p. m. that Dr. Salazar has no objection to our proceeding at once to land everything required for the preliminary project and the ultimate project we have in mind. This Government is proceeding on the basis of this assurance without awaiting any further interchange. You are authorized to request Mr. Long to submit the desired tender in the amount mentioned in your 2269, July 22, 2 p. m.<sup>99</sup> or any other amount you and Long may determine, using the survey report as a general basis. As you know, this Government expects to pay the whole cost. The amount inserted in the tender is therefore considered unimportant. The construction period will be approximately 9 months and it is assumed that payment will be in dollar currency in the United States.

The Department is unwilling to postpone determination of use and control of airfield and feels that Dr. Salazar should continue to be pressed for a satisfactory assurance as to these. We are doing our utmost to satisfy his requirements as to commercial guise in construction enterprise and believe he should be willing to give at least his informal assent now, thereby relieving us of the necessity of proceeding over a period of months against a fundamental doubt. All that is required of Dr. Salazar is his informal, oral recognition of our use and control of the airfield. In this connection please see War Department's message to Solborg of July 22.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Not printed; the amount recommended was \$3,260,000 (811.34553B/7-2244).

<sup>1</sup> Not found in Department files.

811.34553B/7-2444

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office  
of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 24, 1944.

The Portuguese Ambassador<sup>2</sup> called this morning at his request to discuss recent developments in connection with the desires of our Air Corps for the immediate construction and future wartime operation of an airfield on Santa Maria in the Azores. The Ambassador reviewed past developments at some length as he saw them and emphasized that he was talking to me on his own initiative and not upon instructions from his government. His principal motif was a plea that we would not insist upon a definite commitment from Salazar *at this time* that the field be turned over to us for operation. He said that it was his understanding, and likewise Salazar's and Sampaio's, all during the previous discussions that the principal point was the construction of the airfield and that we would be willing to let the question of its use ride until construction is completed, thus taking into consideration Salazar's "difficult legal problem" of neutrality. He referred to Macao and what the Japanese might do there if premature action were taken now. Salazar was accordingly much surprised and somewhat embarrassed, he said, suddenly to receive a letter from Norweb around the 13th or 14th of July<sup>3</sup> asking for a specific commitment with regard to the future use of the field, as well as for immediate authorization for construction, with an indication that a reply must be forthcoming within three or four days. Apparently this letter and the time limit, said Bianchi, somewhat offended Portuguese sensibilities. He further complained that Colonel Solborg, our Military Attaché, apparently had knowledge of the letter and was openly talking around Lisbon to the effect that we were going to insist on immediate action and that this public discussion had likewise created an unfortunate impression.

The Ambassador then referred to the President's message carried by Mr. Culbertson and said that he believed that in the light of Mr. Norweb's interview with Dr. Salazar on July 20th the situation had progressed in reality beyond that at the time the President had sent his message. He explained in some detail the Portuguese need for Pan American cover and said that all that remains to begin construction of the field is a firm offer from Pan American to undertake the construction and a definite estimate of the cost. I told the Ambassador that I felt confident the latter would be forthcoming today and that we had been in touch with Pan American in this regard.

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<sup>2</sup> João Antonio de Bianchi.

<sup>3</sup> Apparently reference is to Ambassador Norweb's letter of July 17, not printed.

In replying to Dr. de Bianchi, I told him that any correspondence with regard to Ambassador Norweb's letter to which he referred must have taken place during my recent absence on leave and that I could not discuss that aspect of the question without looking into the records. As to the question of operation of the airfield, I said that we wished to make it clear beyond all doubt that our interest in the airfield certainly did not terminate with its construction and that we would quite naturally expect to operate it in the prosecution of the war, particularly against Japan. I added that in view of the Portuguese interest in Timor and Macao I felt that his government should have an equal desire to see this war brought to an early and successful conclusion. He said that he felt we could have full confidence in Dr. Salazar's ultimate intentions and should take into consideration his present embarrassment and need to refrain from making any commitment as to the use of the airfield at this time. He then added that of course in the last analysis we could always fall back on the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the agreement made thereunder. I said with some emphasis that this would not be satisfactory; that our military authorities would insist upon operating the field directly. He hastened to say that he did not anticipate any such suggestion on Dr. Salazar's part, but merely desired to point out the ultimate safeguard which we would have. I reiterated that use of the field under the British agreement would not be satisfactory.

(I did not wish to press with greater insistence at this time the question of a commitment at this time for the operation of the airfield upon completion: To do so might merely delay the authorization for construction and in view of the time and weather features it seems preferable not to endanger that authorization by injecting the other issue. Salazar must know that in practice if we build the field, it would be very difficult to prevent our operation of it, though he may be counting on some British support in this respect.)

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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811.34553B/7-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 25, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received July 25—7: 34 p. m.]

2300. Culbertson and I called on Salazar this p. m. and discussed with him Long's letter<sup>4</sup> which had been delivered last night. He had a few questions of detail with regard to the figures and while he

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<sup>4</sup> Not printed; it stated that Pan American Airways was prepared to construct an aerodrome on Santa Maria. The letter also made a statement on the cost of construction. (811.34553B/7-2544)

said he felt it was a little expensive, nevertheless the figure was all right and he would at once send Long a letter confirming the arrangement. He authorized the movement of personnel, equipment and material at once and arrangements were made for Serrano to leave here on Monday<sup>5</sup> via Casablanca for Lagens. He thought a Portuguese boat could be made available to transport the preliminary party to Santa Maria. I again raised the question of the use and control, and in reply Salazar went into considerable detail about the manner in which he operates. He says that he makes one step at a time in his operations and once each step is taken it is final and you know exactly where you stand. We have now taken the first step on building the airfield and the other questions will follow. He brought out that the decision with regard to the Pacific was large and important for a country as small and poor as Portugal.

He considers this first step to be a big one and at the same time a courageous one considering its implications and added that he could well use that money for the construction of a hospital or the Republic [*other public?*] facilities here. I repeated as I have before our desire to have no misunderstanding with regard to what the United States wants in the way of use and control. He made it clear that there was no misunderstanding on this point but could give no promise at this time. In this connection he asked when Culbertson was returning as he wishes Culbertson to be the bearer of his reply to the President's letter.

Ostensibly as he said taking advantage of Culbertson's presence but not unconnected with his decision on Santa Maria he went into a long discussion of the Supply Purchase program and expressed his earnest hope that some decisive action would be taken at an early date. I will cover the Supply Purchase question in a subsequent telegram.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1944—6 p. m.

2091. Your 2279, July 24, 5 p. m.<sup>6</sup> The Department is unaware of any change in its view that use and control of Santa Maria should be kept separate from staff talks and therefore does not understand your reference to "recent insistence". Furthermore no inconsistency is perceived between this attitude and the language of paragraph 4 of the CCS paper referred to. If "Salazar has made it clear that he ex-

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<sup>5</sup> July 31.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.



pects use and control of Santa Maria to form a part of staff talks" it would seem the more important for us to make it clear to him that both we and the British have recognized definitely that questions relating to Santa Maria should be negotiated directly between the United States and Portugal (your 1581, May 24, 4 p. m., and London's 2058, March 14, 6 p. m.<sup>7</sup> which was repeated to you). In other words since this matter already has been cleared with the British we have no wish to reopen it with the British in staff talks or otherwise.

Salazar may have in mind postponing a final decision as long as possible while he observes unfolding international events. He may also have in mind injecting Santa Maria into staff conversations for the purpose of recording the importance of Portugal's contribution to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. If the latter is one of his preoccupations (and for your private information we are led by Bianchi to believe it may be) it would not appear necessary to point up Portuguese contribution in this way and we feel that the staff conversations should be conducted with an exclusive view to the operation contemplated, without minimizing in any way our recognition of the importance of Santa Maria. The language of paragraph 4 of the CCS paper furnishes ample acknowledgment and recognition and should be expected, the Department considers, to influence Salazar to "grant without further delay" the satisfaction we should like to have respecting use and control. This paragraph 4 presumably has been conveyed to Salazar, but if it has not been it should be communicated now. It may have been omitted from the joint presentation on July 7 (your 2109, July 7, 7 p. m.) for the reason that it had been understood with the British Embassy here that we did not wish the British to discuss Santa Maria. The Department did not intend that paragraph 4 was to be withheld from Salazar and this should now be communicated (if it has not been) by you independently. Beyond taking this action and maintaining our position, the Department considers that it might be a mistake to belabor the point of use and control unduly at this stage when we are about to proceed with despatch of equipment and personnel and with construction (Department's 2068, July 24, 11 a. m.<sup>8</sup>).

The Department has received your 2300, July 25, 8 p. m., with satisfaction and trusts you will have expressed its gratification to Salazar.

HULL

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<sup>7</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

811.34553B/7-2644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, July 26, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

2311. ReEmb's 2300, July 25. Following is translation of a letter dated July 26 received by Long of Pan-Air from President of the Council which is in reply to Long's letter of July 24.

"I acknowledge receipt of your letter of July 24, in which you communicate to me that Pan-American is disposed to carry out for account of Portuguese Government the works of construction of an airdrome on Santa Maria Island referred to in the memo of the *Presidencia do Conselho* dated 14th and cited in same letter Pan-Air submits total tender of \$3,130,000 in accordance with note attached for said works and for 'taxi ways' which were not mentioned in memo of 14th through involuntary forgetfulness, including also an amount destined for upkeep of road for heavy transit during construction.

"Since Pan-Air must submit the definitive projects for approval of the Government, it is not possible, before such submission and such act, to realize the contract with that firm. Although the intention exists to dispense with some formalities there will always be necessity to reduce to writing the essential clauses.

"However, given urgency of construction and necessity to utilize the best season for transport and unloading of construction machinery and materials and for work on the field itself, the Government authorizes Pan-Air to take necessary measures as from now which it may consider convenient for the purpose and even to commence on Santa Maria Island the works, inauguration of which is not dependent on the definitive projects.

"It should be understood that these will be presented to the Government within the maximum period of two months, prorogable for one more (month) upon request of the interested party and that the adjudicated price of the works is the above cited of [\$]3,130,000 payable in New York in this same currency. The remaining conditions of the contract will be opportunely adjusted between the Government and Panair.

"The Government intends to maintain in Santa Maria a mission with which will be treated the matters of a technical nature connected with construction. The same mission will receive instructions to cooperate with the personnel of Panair in all that may be within its powers.

"With all consideration, (Signed) Oliveira Salazar."

This is to be regarded as written confirmation of Dr. Salazar's oral assurances to me that construction may begin at once.

Long is returning with Culbertson on Monday <sup>9</sup> to the United States to consult with his principals in preparing the final contract. It will

<sup>9</sup> July 31.

be necessary for him to make a brief visit to Santa Maria on his return trip to Lisbon in order to consult concerning certain final details with people on the spot.

NORWEB

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*The Portuguese Prime Minister (Salazar) to President Roosevelt*<sup>10</sup>

[Translation]

LISBON, July 27, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have received by the hand of Mr. Paul Culbertson the message which Your Excellency directed to me, dated the 18th of the current month, relative to the construction of an airdrome on the Portuguese Island of Santa Maria.

Between the date of sending Your Excellency's message and its delivery at Lisbon, there took place conversations with Mr. Ambassador Norweb which had already furthered the course of the negotiations and clarified the points of view of the Portuguese Government, and the considerations which it could form. Your Excellency is certainly informed of those conversations as well as of those with Messrs. Norweb and Culbertson which followed. Perhaps you are aware also of the correspondence exchanged with Pan American Airways.

In responding at this time to the message of Your Excellency, it does not appear necessary, therefore, to repeat that which Your Excellency already knows through your Ambassador, merely to confirm that which will have already been told by him in regard to the care which this project has merited from the Portuguese Government.

Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.

I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine.

I take advantage [etc.]

SALAZAR

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<sup>10</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

753.94/9-1144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944—7 p. m.

2489. According to general instructions issued by the Chiefs of Staff to the British and American delegations for forthcoming staff conversations, these conversations will be concerned entirely with Portuguese participation in eventual Timor expedition. The scope of the conversations will not include other Portuguese possessions such as Macao, or Allied facilities in the Azores or other Portuguese territory.

The mission will be under the general guidance of the British and American Ambassadors, but it is understood that the delegations will be free to refer to the Chiefs of Staff at any time for guidance.

HULL

753.94/9-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, September 14, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:02 p. m.]

2870. ReEmbs 2808, September 8, 9 p. m.<sup>11</sup> At the outset of my conversation with Salazar yesterday I inquired concerning the accuracy of the report we had received that the Japanese had offered to withdraw from Timor. Salazar stated that about two weeks ago he had called the Japanese Minister in and told him that something had to be done about Timor. The matter had now been dragging on for some years and this could not be tolerated any longer. He would next be compelled to turn to the British and Americans, in order to have a Portuguese force sent to drive the Japanese out.

At this point the Japanese Minister inquired whether Salazar had yet approached the Allies. When Salazar replied in the negative the Japanese Minister said that the question was a very difficult one. Tokyo was considering it. Last week in a further interview with the Japanese Minister the latter again inquired whether Salazar had approached us on this subject. Salazar was still able to reply that he had done nothing of a concrete nature but added that with the impending collapse of Germany the entire forces of the Allies would soon be turned upon Japan and that if the Japanese wished to withdraw gracefully from Timor now was the time to do so. The Japanese Minister refused to commit himself and Salazar believes that in actual fact the Japanese will not leave Timor, if for no other reason than because of the "loss of face" they would suffer if they as a great power acceded to

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

this request under pressure from small Portugal. During these discussions Salazar also told the Japanese Minister that he wanted something done about regularizing the situation at Macao.

The Japanese Minister remarked that Tokyo had certain reservations in this entire matter since, even if they did withdraw from Timor, might not the Portuguese at some later date turn against Japan, permitting the use of Timor as a base of operations.

At this point I mentioned the Quebec Conference<sup>12</sup> which is largely concerned with Far Eastern matters and referred to the important British and American Army, Navy and Air Force officers who had left their other urgent tasks to come to Lisbon to engage in staff talks on the subject of Timor. Had his conversations with the Japanese Minister affected his wish that these talks be held and did he still want them? He replied emphatically that he did stating that the talks could begin this week.

Salazar understood the talks would be technical in character but that undoubtedly various political aspects would crop up at the same time. These could be dealt with simultaneously by him in conjunction with the British Ambassador and myself. He expressed his hope that as a result of the staff conferences he would be able to reach a decision respecting Timor and the immediate future of Portuguese interests in the Far East. I then said that this was all very well but then what would his position be vis-à-vis Japan. He would have the basis for a technical arrangement with us and his diplomatic channel with the Japanese would still be open. He admitted this but said again that he did not think the Japanese would leave Timor not denying however that he was playing both ends against the middle.

Salazar remarked that we wanted him to break with Japan. If a decision to use force in Timor were reached as a result of the staff talks a break would naturally follow. He must think however by [of] the position of the Portuguese in Macao in such case. The war in the Pacific might go on for 2 years. I replied that while we would evidently like to see him break with the Japanese the decision was his and he must make it. Meanwhile the delegation for the staff talks was here at his own request.

He then alluded to the importance we attach to Santa Maria which represented, we had said, the greatest contribution he could make to the war in the Far East. I reconfirmed this, emphasizing its importance, even though indirect so far as Portugal was concerned, in the freeing of China, the Philippines and other areas from the Japanese yoke. In this immediate connection and in reply to my query

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<sup>12</sup> Correspondence regarding the conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, with their advisers, at Quebec in September 1944, is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

about the status of Serrano's request for authority for additional land expropriation urgently needed to advance the construction, Salazar expressed recognition of the urgency of the Santa Maria question and remarked that he had never held up any request which had reached him about the project since the work started as well as that no request was now pending with the Ministry of War. He observed that a large shipment of supplies was expected to arrive within a few days and said, in passing, that the British had requested permission to maintain a patrol in the area for the next several weeks in order to safeguard arrival and unloading. I said I understood some misunderstanding had arisen over land expropriation.

Repeating that no request from Serrano for further authorization was now pending Salazar again inquired why he had not received the Pan-Air tender yet and why some of our experts had gone back to Washington from Santa Maria. I was able to reply that they had now returned to the Island and went on to say that now was the time to settle the global project and that I hoped this could be done before the Quebec talks ended, every day being of vital importance. He then admitted that he was tired of successive requests for authorization which had to be dealt with piecemeal.

Could we not try some other approach on the basis of which a more satisfactory arrangement could be worked out? After some discussion it was agreed that we should submit to him the master plan for the whole project (ReDeptel 2315 August 23, 7 p. m.<sup>13</sup>) in detail with a covering explanatory memorandum. He would study this, seeking a new approach, and then we would endeavor to reduce to writing the formula covering the conditions of use, et cetera. He mentioned the necessity for a clause providing for the return of the field to Portugal after the war.

He went on to point out that he was not necessarily interested in anything so big as we envisaged and that some provision would have to be made for adjustment after the war on buildings, et cetera, which would not then be needed. He said that he expected Lagens to be the principal field in peace time since it lay in a populated area whereas Santa Maria, even [though] the weather conditions there were better, was barren. Santa Maria field would be a necessary adjust [*adjunct?*] of Lagens as he sees it after the war, for emergency use mainly. I remarked here that the same competent American labor and first-class material was putting in a first-class airport at Santa Maria as had been the case at Lagens.

It is my belief that Salazar is now disposed to see the global Santa Maria project on an urgent basis and that his willingness to seek now a "new approach" to the problem represents a distinct step forward.

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

I feel also that my reaffirmation of Santa Maria as a bilateral question only has carried weight with Salazar. We plan to send him the detailed master plan today.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/9-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944—8 p. m.

2528. In the hope of avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding you are requested to review with Dr. Salazar the following points at the earliest opportunity, unless, of course, there have been further developments not yet reported which overcome our immediate difficulty and reflect a complete understanding on Dr. Salazar's part:

(1) From the beginning of our conversations this Government has proposed to construct a major transoceanic airfield on Santa Maria for use in the war in the Far East. This proposal has been placed before Dr. Salazar by you and by Culbertson and we believe has always been clear and unequivocal (Department's 2042, July 20, 7 p. m.).

(2) It has never proposed and does not now propose to construct an interisland airdrome as such on Santa Maria. Such an airdrome would serve no purpose as far as this Government is concerned (your 2092, July 6, 8 p. m., paragraph 5 and also your 1820, June 13, 6 p. m., paragraph 4<sup>14</sup>).

(3) The naming of an American company to furnish cover was at specific request of Salazar. This request was made at the beginning of the year when he apparently felt that to deal openly with this Government might invite an attack by Germany and possibly some character of reprisal by Japan.

(4) Panair was selected solely for the purpose of furnishing such cover. It was made clear to Dr. Salazar that Panair was not in a position to build the proposed airfield (your 2137, July 11, 6 p. m.<sup>15</sup> and 2236, July 19, 9 p. m., as well as Department's 1795, June 22, 4 p. m.).

(5) When on July 24 and July 26 letters describing an interisland airfield were exchanged by Dr. Salazar and Panair, it was clearly understood by all concerned that such interchange of letters and any definitive contract that might follow were and are essentially camouflage, used to cover the real undertaking of this Government to build a major airfield on Santa Maria for the military purposes aforesaid.

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<sup>14</sup> Letter not printed.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

(6) From your and Culbertson's conversations with Salazar in July it was understood by this Government that construction of the complete airfield desired by this Government had been cleared. Upon such understanding large quantities of critical equipment and material have been allocated to this work and a substantial portion thereof is now at sea and approaching the island.

(7) This construction work, involving the use of such equipment and materials, cannot proceed until the land required for the construction of the complete major airfield is provided. This is our immediate difficulty. The work cannot proceed upon limited parcels of land that might be required by or be sufficient for a fictitious inter-island aerodrome. If the airfield is to be completed on schedule and in time for use in the war against Japan the entire land required by the major and only project contemplated must be made available at once.

(8) Our best information (Department's 2488, September 11)<sup>16</sup> indicates that Colonel Serrano's authority to expropriate land is limited to an interisland aerodrome. It is believed that Serrano requested on August 30 or thereabout that his authority be extended to permit him to provide all land required for the complete major airfield. Whether or not this is correct the necessary authority is required at once for acquisition of all land requisite for the facilities described in detail in the Department's 2315 of August 23.<sup>16</sup> As suggested in the Department's 2476 of September 9<sup>16</sup> the complete description and plans furnished you may be placed before Dr. Salazar. By communicating this information to him all possibility of misunderstanding as to what we propose and what we need should be removed. The first boat is due in Santa Maria at about the time of delivery of this cable and every hour lost thereafter will mean that much delay in carrying out the project and in the conduct of this phase of the war against Japan.

(9) In your 2818 of September 9<sup>16</sup> you mention Dr. Salazar's request for a report of the layout decided upon. You also ask when you may expect the tender to arrive. The Panair tender or layouts attached thereto are not considered important except for purposes of cover. If drawings accurately reflecting the Panair tender are presented to Dr. Salazar they will be purely fictitious, except to the extent that the facilities represented by such drawings are incorporated as an integral part of the major airfield. This fact should be made clear to Dr. Salazar. To illustrate, the operations building to be constructed will be much larger than the operations building described in the tender; the runways, taxiways and parking apron will be much

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed.



more extensive; and of course many facilities will be built that are not included in the tender.

(10) The Panair tender was submitted at the instance of Dr. Salazar in keeping with his desire for commercial cover. If the original tender is followed by a definitive contract purporting to obligate Panair to build an interisland aerodrome the purpose of such contract will be merely to further the idea of cover. Panair cannot (and is not intended to) actually perform the contract. This Government will perform the contract only to the extent that the facilities called for in such contract are incorporated into an indivisible whole (the major airfield).

(11) If Dr. Salazar wishes to have presented to him drawings representing a layout that is not going to be built (except as an indistinguishable part of a greater whole) you should be sure that he fully understands that that is just what is being presented. The formalizing of an arrangement that is a contract in name only tends to perpetuate a structure that is essentially false and can be justified only if the exigencies of war demand that the true situation be camouflaged. The longer the camouflage is used the greater will become the complications confronting those seeking to work under its cover and the more difficult will it become to disengage ourselves from apparent commitments that were never intended as such. It was for these and other reasons that the Department requested your opinion (Department's 2488, September 11<sup>19</sup>) as to advisability of approaching Dr. Salazar with a view to dropping the commercial guise, in the interest of speed and simplicity, so that we might go forward with all possible speed under a clear and simple bilateral arrangement between the Governments of the United States and Portugal. The threat of an attack upon Portugal by Germany, the principal reason for the original adoption of a commercial cover, no longer exists. The military conversations now in progress between Portugal, Great Britain, and this country, relative to certain phases of common interest in the war against Japan, seem to negative the need for any commercial cover so far as Japan is concerned. In view of the increasing difficulties and complications involved in dealing through or with an intermediary, in the interest of the rapid pursuit and early completion of construction work and in the hope of clearing the atmosphere of all possibility of confusion or misunderstanding, it is felt strongly here that steps should be initiated now looking toward a dropping of a commercial guise, that has become unnecessary and useless, such steps to be taken at a time and in a manner that will not jeopardize or harm any party concerned.

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<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

The Department appreciates that much of this ground has already been covered but is anxious to avoid any faint possibility of misunderstanding that might interfere with progress or give rise to a thought that this Government is being less than entirely frank in its representations. Please therefore arrange an early interview with Dr. Salazar and furnish the Department your report, first upon the matter of the immediate acquisition of necessary land, second upon the matter of Dr. Salazar's complete understanding of the foregoing exposition, and third, his views concerning removal of commercial cover. While preparation of the definitive contract probably will be completed within a few days, it is considered preferable to proceed with steps to remove the cover and thereby obviate the need for doing something further that would later require undoing. At all events, the exact status of such definitive contract as outlined in the present cable, should be clearly recognized as between you and Dr. Salazar prior to its execution or delivery.

The matter of cover will be determined by Dr. Salazar of course and if he so wishes we will maintain it to the best of our ability despite its inconveniences.

HULL

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811.34553B/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, September 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:35 p. m.]

3013. A careful review of the file on the Santa Maria project has led to certain clear and well-defined conclusions as follows:

It is apparent that as soon as the CCS decision was communicated to Dr. Salazar, a connection between Portugal's desire to participate in the liberation of Timor which was to be the subject of the staff talks and the American desires in connection with the Santa Maria project was firmly established in his mind. (See Embassy's 2236, July 19, 9 p. m.). As his thoughts developed along this line, it became evident that he visualized the staff talks as a means of clarifying his mind concerning relations in general with Japan and the liberation of Timor on the one hand and the Santa Maria project on the other constituted two important phases of the main question. It is our belief that these two phases are now inextricably woven together in his thinking and that he frankly is looking to us to meet his desires in the one if he is to grant our requests in the other.

As matters now stand and in view of the somewhat restricted directives of the American (and British) mission, it would therefore ap-

pear to us that our problem is to develop some formula arising out of the staff talks which will satisfy Salazar re Portuguese participation in liberation of Timor which could then be presented to the Prime Minister on the diplomatic level prior to the departure of the mission, always provided, of course, that he would simultaneously furnish us with the desired assurances re construction, use and control of the Santa Maria airfield.

In other words if we have correctly interpreted Dr. Salazar's thinking as reflected both in my last conversation with Sampayo and in the exchanges of views occurring in the staff talks, we have reason to hope that whole difficult and trying question of Santa Maria may be favorably solved provided I can be placed in the position of being able to hand Salazar at the end of staff talks some sort of assurance that his desires re Portuguese participation in liberation of Timor will be met. I realize, of course, that formal assurances would necessarily have to receive approval of the CCS and that such approval could not be obtained in anything like the brief time left to us prior to conclusion of staff conversations. However, it may well be that Salazar would be satisfied with a written assurance from me that the American mission (as distinct from British) will recommend to Joint Chiefs of Staff the acceptance of the formula to be reached. This in effect would be tantamount, as I understand it, to eventual approval by the CCS unless the British, Portugal's Allies, wished to assume the onus of standing in Dr. Salazar's way in the Timor matter.

A review of the foregoing will reveal that the matter resolves itself largely into a question of timing. As the affair now stands it appears that the American desire is to receive from Dr. Salazar the required authorization re the Santa Maria project prior to approval of the matters resolved in the staff talks whereas Salazar wishes the two questions to be agreed to simultaneously.

If a successful effort can be made to bring this about, I am hopeful that the entire matter may be on the brink of a satisfactory solution. This may be regarded as in reply to Department's 2611, September 27.<sup>20</sup> As far as concerns implications in Colonel Solborg's 445, September 24,<sup>21</sup> the question brought up therein, of course, forms a part of the general problem which we are now engaged in attempting to solve.

NORWEB

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<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

<sup>21</sup> Not found in Department files.

811.34553B/10-244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 2, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 7:36 p. m.]

3043. Sampayo called me to the Foreign Office this p. m. and handed me the following letter from Dr. Salazar with the enclosures<sup>22</sup> mentioned.

“For the purpose of saving time but in the conviction that the question of the indirect participation of Portugal shall be placed before and accepted in principle by the meetings of the delegates of the general staffs I send to Your Excellency in order to initiate the negotiation of the political part with which we are charged in accordance with Your Excellency’s wish two documents: the first is a draft agreement relative to the Santa Maria airdrome; the second is a text of a draft note which complements the first with a few political guarantees and assurances [of] an economic nature which I believe Your Excellency will find entirely reasonable and within possibility. Obviously the latter document lacks the final editing (which in any case will require a prior exchange of impressions and a few data which I do not at the moment possess) because it was my intent merely to cause to be clearly expressed the undertakings which the Portuguese Government desires of the United States Government.

I suppose that Your Excellency is disposed to begin immediately work on this subject and that you will find no difficulties of interpretation of the attached texts. In any case Ambassador Sampayo shall be at your disposal to furnish you any necessary clarification.

I shall be grateful to Your Excellency if you were to place at our disposal the English translation which shall serve as a basis for its study. With et cetera.”

Translations of the texts of the documents referred to will be telegraphed as soon as they are completed.<sup>23</sup>

NORWEB

811.34553B/10-344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 3, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:20 p. m.]

3058. We feel now that with the presentation by Dr. Salazar of the two drafts contained in the Embtels 3044, October 2, 8 p. m., and 3045, October 2, 9 p. m.,<sup>24</sup> we have at long last reached a goal which was to extract from him a strictly bilateral global proposition covering con-

<sup>22</sup> Enclosures not printed.<sup>23</sup> Drafts transmitted in telegrams 3044, October 2, 8 p. m., and 3045, October 2, 9 p. m., neither printed.<sup>24</sup> Neither printed.

struction and use (control to be implicit in the latter) of an airfield at Santa Maria. This proposition is decidedly unbalanced but at least covers in general our requirements. At the same time Dr. Salazar has presented us with a draft of what he would like us to submit to him for simultaneous acceptance covering primarily Portuguese participation in the liberation of Timor. This is to be regarded as a tentative approach designed to feel us out. To the latter document he has, however, introduced a number of extraneous elements which are wholly unacceptable thus making his trading proposition (for that is what this is) unworkable in its present form.

If time were not an essential element, we feel that with further prolonged discussion it might not be impossible to reduce the two documents to such form as to act as a basis for some agreement. We would, of course, be inclined to remove from the Timor document elements which do not properly belong there, not necessarily, however, excluding their discussion in other channels. The commercial matters might, for instance, be diverted to the continuing supply purchase talks.

Unfortunately, however, we are apparently faced with the need for proceeding without delay and this must be measured in days not weeks in the construction of the overall project at Santa Maria as otherwise the time schedules will be so upset as to make the completion of the airfield impossible in time for its fullest use and the project therefore subject to the danger that our War Department may suggest immediate abandonment with all that that involves.

Our best efforts have not budged Dr. Salazar from his firm position that authorization for construction beyond the limit of the Panair tender will not be granted until the Timor-Santa Maria bargain is completed. We are accordingly stiff [*still*] faced with a problem of finding a means to obtain this urgently needed authorization. Two approaches suggest themselves. The first might be called the negative approach and the second affirmative. The first would be something along the following lines: To inform Dr. Salazar that his Timor proposal is of such preposterous nature that the United States Government cannot possibly enter into any further discussions on the subject of Santa Maria unless he grants immediate authorization for construction of the global project in which case the Government will be in a position to reconsider; or the second which would be to inform him that while we are disappointed in the nature of his proposals, we feel that if he will authorize immediate construction, we can undertake to attempt to work out a reciprocal agreement with him as to the Timor question on the one hand and the use and control of the Santa Maria field on the other.

Of the two, the second is the more appealing if only on the grounds that its failure would not exclude falling back on the negative ap-

proach whereas immediate recourse to the first would necessarily eliminate the second.

These decisions which, involving questions of policy as they do, must be made in Washington and I am accordingly awaiting an indication from the Department before taking any further steps here. I shall, however, seek an opportunity immediately to make known to Salazar the profound disappointment with which our mission here views Dr. Salazar's drafts.

We are preparing a further telegram analyzing the draft propositions as seen from here.

NORWEB

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811.34553B/10-444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

3068. ReEmbs 3043, October 2, 7 p. m. As arranged at our last meeting I called on Sampayo this afternoon. I informed him that the letter from Dr. Salazar with its enclosures, which he had then handed to me seemed to me, I was sorry to say, to fail to capture the whole spirit in which the prolonged negotiations in which we were engaged had been conducted. These had centered upon an endeavor to obtain a definition of Portugal's position vis-à-vis Japan, while the drafts submitted to me were largely concerned with matters of greater or lesser detail, bringing in even, in fact, aspects largely extraneous to the main issue.

I said that I was firmly convinced of the great interest of his country as well as mine in that issue and that I believed the drafts in question might form the basis of an agreement to be reached between us. It was evident, however, that considerable time would be necessary for this to be worked out—at least a month—and meanwhile, the work on the Santa Maria project could not be delayed without threatening the possibility of any such agreement being arrived at. That work, he knew, would take 3 or 4 months to complete so that ample time for the reaching of an agreement remained prior to its completion.

Sampayo at length acknowledged that he saw our point of view in this respect and stated that he would return to Salazar to see what could be done about a reconsideration of the position as regards authorizing over-all construction. He would call me at the earliest possible moment to inform me of the result.

NORWEB

811.34553B/10-444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1944—3 p. m.

2667. Reurtel 3068 of October 4. The written proposals which you have received from Salazar are in general quite unacceptable and we are surprised that Salazar would at this stage endeavor to force his negotiating position to such an extent. Time is too vital for us to even discuss the proposals made. Proposals are being presented to the President which if he approves will be immediately forwarded to you in the form of a note for delivery to the Portuguese Government. Pending the receipt of these further instructions we feel that you should suspend all discussions with Salazar or Sampayo involving the written proposals you have received. You may of course continue your discussions of Santa Maria, if you think that project can be treated separately with some chance of immediate success. Please inform General Chaney<sup>25</sup> of these instructions in order that he may consider them in connection with his own discussions.

HULL

811.34553B/10-644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1944—4 p. m.

2678. The Department desires you to convey to Dr. Salazar without delay the substance of the following message which, for your information, has been cleared with the President:

"The Portuguese Government has expressed its desire to participate in an eventual expedition for the liberation of Timor, and in order to gratify that desire this Government has engaged in certain staff conversations which are now in progress in Lisbon. This Government has pointed out, however, that the greatest contribution Portugal can make toward the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, including the liberation of Timor, is to make available to the United States the facilities it requires in the Island of Santa Maria. This view has been confirmed by the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff.

"The urgency of this Government's requirements in the Island of Santa Maria has been emphasized over and over again, and the Portuguese Government has professed to understand this urgency. On July 19 [18] the President of the United States addressed a personal message to the Prime Minister of Portugal concerning our desire for the construction of a large airfield on the Island of Santa Maria to be used by the United States in connection with operations in the Pacific theatre. This message was delivered to the Prime Minister by Mr. Paul Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Af-

<sup>25</sup> Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, member of American delegation for tripartite staff conversations held in Lisbon.

fairs of the Department of State. The Prime Minister replied in a personal message to the President dated July 27, from which the following passages are quoted:

'Your Excellency can be certain that I have never ceased to have in mind the importance which the plan possesses for the mutual interests of our two countries. Similarly I have not forgotten the interest shown by the Government of the United States in commencing the work as soon as possible.

'It appears to me that the fundamental accord with the construction company has been satisfactorily made so that the work can commence immediately and continue at the rate considered proper. Thus is realized the first and essential condition for all the future developments.

'I have exerted my best efforts in the study of the matter to the end that it should not suffer delays and that it should enjoy all possible facilities on our part, as was Your Excellency's desire and also mine.'

"In the course of the conversations which followed the delivery of the President's message, the Prime Minister stated repeatedly that there was no objection whatever to the immediate despatch of all necessary materials and personnel to Santa Maria for the projected construction. It was clearly implied that the Prime Minister was in agreement that the construction itself should go forward without delay, for otherwise there obviously could be no point to diverting personnel and critical materials to Santa Maria.

"This Government is surprised and disappointed now to learn of the hesitancy of the Portuguese Government to make available to the United States, the necessary lands and to issue the necessary authority to permit the whole construction of the major air base to go forward. Viewed in a practical light, it can only interpret this hesitancy as a lack of complete cooperation. The present attitude of the Portuguese Government clearly does not harmonize with the previously expressed desire of the Portuguese Government to be of aid in the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. It is, in fact, a very grave obstruction to the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, and constitutes an important aid to Japan. In the circumstances, unless the Portuguese Government can see its way clear immediately to authorize all necessary land expropriations and issue all necessary authority to its officials in the Island of Santa Maria to permit the United States to continue and bring rapidly to completion the proposed construction and to operate and control the proposed airbase for military transport and ferrying purposes, the United States Government would be obliged to discontinue the staff conversations at once, and to decline to engage in any negotiations with Portugal concerning economic or other matters, and to adopt measures for the immediate curtailment of the economic aid currently being furnished Portugal under existing programs."

In delivering this message you should make it clear that you are doing so under instructions from your Government. It is impossible at this distance to estimate the chances of accomplishing our purpose by an oral communication to Dr. Salazar, and the Department must leave this to your judgment. The Department inclines to the belief that a written communication may be more effective, but recognizes the fact that Dr. Salazar undoubtedly would prefer not to add such a communication to his files. This Government wishes to attain its



purpose rapidly, and the feelings of the Portuguese Government are of secondary importance so long as our end is attained. You understand, and the Prime Minister will understand, that the Portuguese attitude forces this Government to state its case so frankly. It is not possible for this Government to suspend action while entertaining new and detailed proposals of the Portuguese Government which will require careful and time-consuming study. This Government on the other hand will gladly give its sympathetic attention to any proposals the Portuguese Government may wish to put forward following the prompt settlement, once and for all, of the Santa Maria problem.

In seeking this final settlement you will bear in mind the desirability of abandoning the Panair cloak.

Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London.<sup>26</sup>

HULL

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811.34553B/10-744: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1944—7 p. m.

2690. The Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires<sup>27</sup> called yesterday afternoon by instruction from his Government and in conversation with Culbertson and George<sup>28</sup> stated that Salazar's proposals had been received pessimistically by you and that he was instructed to ascertain the atmosphere here. He said he had looked over the proposals and found them reasonable.

The Chargé d'Affaires was told that the proposals could not even be considered while the Santa Maria project remained suspended. This Government was unable to agree to any of the proposals without careful time-consuming study. Meanwhile we were asked to mark time in Santa Maria. Dr. Garin said we surely had to expect such proposals and could not expect a gratuitous use of Santa Maria. Culbertson replied that no mention had ever before been made in the long drawn out conversations of any such conditions as were now put forward. Salazar had expressed interest in the war in the Pacific and a wish to participate in some way for recovering Timor. To gratify him we had undertaken the present staff conversations. Salazar had also been interested in a new supply purchase agreement, and again to accommodate him this Government had been at great pains to secure all the necessary concurrences in supply agencies and combined boards. This had been accomplished rapidly and thoroughly

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<sup>26</sup> Repeated to London on the same date as No. 8172.

<sup>27</sup> Vasco Vieira Garin.

<sup>28</sup> W. Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

and not without sacrifice. Throughout the whole war period this Government had generously supported Portuguese economy. Dr. Salazar had been told repeatedly that Portugal's greatest possible contribution toward prosecuting the war in the Pacific and toward recovering Timor would be the granting of our desires in Santa Maria. Thus that project was one equally of interest to Portugal as to the United States. We had been allowed to land construction personnel and large quantities of critical materials and had been given at least Salazar's implied approval of the entire project, but we were now asked to suspend action while examining the long catalogue of detailed proposals never before mentioned. This was not cooperation but was obstruction, and was in fact aid to Japan. Unless Salazar should immediately reconsider and authorize the whole Santa Maria project once and for all we should have to consider abandonment of the project, in which case Culbertson said he would be wanting in frankness if he attempted to conceal that we should be headed for very stormy weather.

Dr. Garin mentioned the possibility of sending George to Lisbon in connection with the proposals, and was told that it would be useless to send anyone. Only Dr. Salazar could alter the present situation, by immediately permitting us to go rapidly ahead in Santa Maria. This Government was prepared, Mr. Culbertson said, as always heretofore, to consider sympathetically any proposals the Portuguese Government might care to advance, but was unable to commit itself offhand to a long list of miscellaneous demands in the strategic, political, and economic fields without consultation, with other agencies and, in some instances, with its Allies. The Portuguese Government must understand that any restoration of Timor to Portugal would be as direct result of American arms, and if the Portuguese Government really had an interest in recovering Timor and in playing a part therein, it should cease haggling over Santa Maria.

HULL

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811.34553B/10-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 10, 1944—noon.

[Received 12:21 p. m.]

3092. Yesterday afternoon I called on Sampayo to ask for the appointment with Salazar required by Department's telegram 2678, October 6, 4 p. m. Before making this request however I inquired of Sampayo whether he had received Salazar's reaction to the suggestion set forth in Embassy's 3068, October 4, 8 p. m. Sampayo replied that he had not and alleged some misunderstanding as he had thought

we were now awaiting Washington's response in connection with the draft proposals submitted by the Portuguese. I said that this had not been my understanding at the close of our last interview but that in any event as he had doubtless heard from the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires in Washington matters had in the past few days progressed far beyond any such intermediary stage as that discussed personally between us last week. Sampayo was somewhat vague on what he had heard from Dr. Garin and it became clear to me as the interview progressed that the latter had not yet reported fully his talk with George and Culbertson as described in Department's telegram 2690, October 7, 7 p. m.

I then informed Sampayo of the substance of statement set forth in Deptel 2678. This obviously came as a considerable shock and he remarked in effect that it was far too "hot" for him to handle. He hoped however in view of the tenseness with which the lines had been drawn, that before we reached "the end of the road" I would afford Salazar an opportunity to have his say at our next interview. I said that this was a main purpose of my wish to see Salazar now and on this repetition of my request to see Salazar without delay Sampayo said that he would arrange the interview at the earliest possible moment.

At the point described Sampayo evinced some agitation but soon recovered his equilibrium and again endeavored to take refuge behind the fiction that there must be some misunderstanding. What exactly did we want? I said the ground had been covered repeatedly and that the statement I had given him was clear enough. The time element had caught up with our discussions and my Government could wait no longer. Here I showed Sampayo a rough [draft] which had been prepared of a proposed agreement in principle between the Portuguese and the United States Governments for the construction, use and control of the Santa Maria air base. After reading this Sampayo said that he would like very much to keep it for further study to see whether it provided any "juridical" basis upon which agreement in principle might be sought. Emphasizing its draft character, I left a copy with him.

Earlier in the day I conveyed to my British colleague, whom I had already told of our problem, the information suggested in Deptel 2691, October 7.<sup>29</sup> He told me that he had received a telegram on the subject.

NORWEB

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<sup>29</sup> This telegram read: "The Department has informally communicated to the British Embassy the fact that we have been confronted with proposals which force us to consider the possibility of having to discontinue staff conversations and to reconsider our economic policy toward Portugal. If you have not already done so you should make a similar communication to your British colleague." (811.34553B/10-744)

811.34553B/10-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 11, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

3118. As the Department is now aware, Salazar has authorized the renewal of construction at Santa Maria. This measure which represents a complete change in the situation was obtained with the greatest difficulty without a prior written confirmation on behalf of the United States Government accepting the principle of Portuguese participation in the war in the Far East.

Salazar has consistently and forcefully maintained that this participation must form the condition precedent to "juridical and political basis" for the commitment which we have so earnestly sought from him. It has been on his understanding that such participation would be accepted that he has been talking about the matter all along.

I have obtained Salazar's approval to renew work at Santa Maria on my personal assurance that I would recommend favorably to my Government a note to the Portuguese Government in the following terms:

[Here follows draft text of U. S. note of acceptance of formula for Portuguese participation in the operations for liberation of Timor. It is almost identical with that in the exchange of notes which forms an integral part of the final agreement. See footnote 32, page 84.]

This text appears to fit into the framework of the policy decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Department's telegram 1443 May 21, 3:00 p. m.) and of the President's letter of November 4, 1943.<sup>30</sup> Salazar will acknowledge simultaneously by way of confirmation.

Upon responding favorably to my strong appeal and after receiving my assurance that I would recommend the document to my Government Dr. Salazar handed me a draft agreement on Santa Maria, in general terms (provision being made in it for subsequent complementary protocols as needed), which with two minor amendments suggested by Col. Payne and accepted by Dr. Salazar admirably meets our requirements. Text follows:

[Here follows draft text of the basic Santa Maria agreement, which is substantially the same as the final text. See footnote 32, page 84.]

The procedure will be: 1. Presentation of my letter; 2. Salazar's acknowledgment; 3. Joint signature of the basic Santa Maria agreement.

Analysis and comment will follow.

NORWEB

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<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 564.

811.34553B/10-1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, October 12, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:38 p. m.]

3128. ReEmbs 3118, October 11, 8 p. m., and previous. With further reference to the Santa Maria conversations, the following comment is submitted:

I have had, beginning Monday the 9th, three conversations with Sampaio and two long sessions the 10th and 11th with Salazar. The message I was authorized to deliver by the Department's 2678 of October 6, 4 p. m., was most useful in breaking the impasse; although happily it never became necessary to present the note formally. We have kept our sights on the final objective and have attained it by indirection by having the gist of the message reach Salazar informally through Sampaio.

It was Salazar's rock-ribbed thesis throughout our 4-hour Tuesday<sup>31</sup> and the better part of yesterday's meeting (as it had been he said throughout the negotiations) that it was indispensable for the two Governments to find "juridical and political basis"—in the absence of the alliance on which the Anglo-Portuguese agreement was built—for the agreements we earnestly sought and the Portuguese viewed with sympathy.

Salazar held out tenaciously for our prior confirmation in the form of a letter (3118 of October 11), as the "juridical and political basis" before him [*he*] on his part could assure commitments. He felt with all the ardor of which his legalistic mind is capable that we were asking him to sign a blank check. He appealed constantly to reason and orderliness.

It was only upon my earnest and persistent personal appeal that he said "Yes" and drafted a telegram to the Azores authorizing immediate construction on the major project, observing that my personal assurance that I would seek prompt action from Washington upon the letter would be acceptable. He took pains to emphasize, however, the difficulty of his position and that of the Portuguese Government if we should fail Portuguese offer to participate in the liberation of Portuguese territory, a participation indispensable to Portugal's prestige and honor.

For convenience, the documents are enumerated which are necessary to the contemplated arrangement:

1. Our communication confirming our acceptance of Portugal's direct and indirect participation (Embassy's 3118).
2. Salazar's simultaneous acknowledgment and acceptance.

<sup>31</sup> October 10.

3. The over-all Santa Maria agreement, also for simultaneous signature by Salazar and me. This procedure eliminates the danger of an order of precedence, for the Timor commitment on our part and the Santa Maria commitment on the Portuguese part are assumed simultaneously.

4. The complementary agreements provided for in article 4 of the over-all agreement.

5. The ultimate recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff delegations.

It is opportune to outline the advantages—greater than the British obtained via higher price—of the arrangements agreed to in principle subject to ratification of the Department.

*a.* With regard to the first document, paragraph 1 above, Salazar said that he had furnished a copy to the British Ambassador who told me he had telegraphed his Government expressing the belief that it furnished the basis for agreement.

However, Colonel Payne whose presence here has been most helpful for the presentation of the War Department's views expresses reservations in the light of his instructions and the Combined Chiefs of Staff decision (letter of May 19, 1944, from the Secretary of War to the Secretary of State enclosed with the Department's instruction 1443 of May 21, 3 p. m.).

We have studied with the greatest care the wording of both the CCS decision and the proposed letter and feel that the letter fits within the former.

*b.* We obtain from these documents, even though we have no alliance to invoke, better terms than did the British, in fact all we ask. Furthermore, we are not in exchange committed to prior political and economic guarantees.

*c.* Among the advantages are: (*a*) Pan-American Airways is not specifically mentioned; (*b*) Portugal, in Salazar's words a "poor country", the reputation of whose Prime Minister has been built not on generosity, pays its share; (*c*) the bugbear of British insinuation into control has been eliminated.

*d.* But the greatest significance of yesterday's development is the long step which Salazar's decisions represent toward leading Portugal into the war. Persuasion, reason, frank thrashing out of issues—and not the big stick which to this neutral imbued with all the juridical considerations of the traditional neutral could well place us, in his mind, in the position of using our superior power to impose our demands—have triumphed. Salazar . . . is not, I feel confident, unhappy.

In all of this, the urgency of a prompt favorable reply is patent.

NORWEB

811.34553B/11-2944

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1944.

The final agreement<sup>32</sup> for the additional air base in Santa Maria, Azores, was signed yesterday and the Portuguese Government has instructed the Azores authorities to turn the base over to the United States Army for immediate use.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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**NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO EMBARGO BY PORTUGAL ON EXPORT OF WOLFRAM IN ORDER TO CUT OFF SOURCE OF SUPPLY TO GERMANY<sup>33</sup>**

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1414: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 10, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:44 p. m.]

71. The wolfram position in Portugal as indicated in Legation's 2972, December 11<sup>34</sup> is now such as to require a new approach on the highest political plane. The urgency of a decision is explained in my 66 of January 9<sup>35</sup> and telegrams referred to therein.

In our opinion there are no reasonable economic benefits which we can offer to Salazar<sup>36</sup> which will of themselves have the effect of inducing him to prohibit or drastically curtail wolfram exports to Germany after the expiration of the old German-Portuguese agreement<sup>37</sup> on February 28. Likewise we, as well as the British, are really morally committed to meeting Portugal's minimum economic requirements. Whether the bargain was advantageous or disadvantageous the British did contract in return for the facilities in the Azores to supply such key products as additional shipping, increased coal and wheat and to use their good offices to ensure the availability of required materials from the United States. Now by seeking and obtaining a generalization of these Azores facilities<sup>38</sup> to us we have in

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<sup>32</sup> For text of exchange of notes, agreement, and supplementary exchange of notes signed at Lisbon, November 28, 1944, see Department of State, *Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2338*, or 2 UST (pt. 2) 2124.

<sup>33</sup> For previous correspondence regarding wolfram negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 497 ff.

<sup>34</sup> Not printed; it reported increased economic concessions to Germany by Portugal and German approach to Portugal regarding a new wolfram agreement (841.34553B/31).

<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>37</sup> This agreement was entered into in 1943 for one year's duration.

<sup>38</sup> See pp. 1 ff.

effect committed ourselves to continuing to make these supplies available to Portugal.

We would call attention to another relative consideration. During the past wolfram year unorthodox methods have borne the brunt of the burden of reducing wolfram exports to Germany. In the 9 months ending December 31, 1943, we have taken off the market by absorption, immobilization, and "C" traffic 1160 tons to which must be added another 400-500 tons, being the amount which moved across to Spain and was bought by us there when the Germans were out of funds last summer. We cannot hope to reproduce this extraordinary record in the next wolfram year. We shall indeed be fortunate if we can maintain it through February.

It is hard for us to see what reasons would induce Salazar to limit drastically exports of wolfram to Germany which would not also be sufficient to persuade him to stop wolfram exports altogether. Consequently if we decided to aid in the ending of the war during 1944 by drastic destruction of the Axis supply of this strategic commodity, we suggest that the time has obviously arrived to seek a complete embargo on wolfram exports to the Axis. In our opinion this could only be achieved by the invocation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance<sup>39</sup> which would bring Portugal formally into the war against Germany.

On a lesser plane, a suggestion that the alliance be invoked but with an explanation that suggestion arose because of [*the?*] importance of wolfram might be sufficient to induce Portugal to undertake an embargo while still attempting to remain neutral. We might agree that the prohibition apply to exports to Allied destinations as well. We might also agree to continue buying wolfram, if desired, as well as to resume purchases of normal Portuguese exports. We could also offer to replace certain German supplied goods.

It must be recognized that facilities Allies have obtained in Azores are more importantly directed toward winning of Far Eastern than European war. So far as Europe is concerned, Portugal's assistance to Germans particularly with respect to wolfram probably ranks in its benefits to Germany with importance of Azores to United States. Salazar has raised question of Portugal's participation in Far Eastern war<sup>40</sup> obviously desiring among other things to obtain benefits of becoming an ally and thus securing a voice in the peace without incurring any risk to metropolitan Portugal.

If we do not press the wolfram issue, we may succeed in this endeavor. In view of communication from British Joint Chiefs of

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<sup>39</sup> Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. I, p. 462.

<sup>40</sup> See *ante*, pp. 1 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 525 ff.



Staff to British Embassy in Washington on this question of Portuguese participation in Far Eastern war and of American Joint Chiefs of Staff document 586/5 of December 6 (Mason's <sup>41</sup> copy), it appears to us that in certain circumstances our respective Chiefs of Staff are prepared to take the risk of Portugal's becoming involved with Germany.

If this is so, for the first time our hands are freed and we may ask the Portuguese to take a metropolitan risk and to help us in the European war by placing a complete embargo on wolfram to the enemy. In view of Azores' agreement of August 17 <sup>42</sup> and of the stage we have now reached in the war if drastic and effective results in denial of Portuguese wolfram to Germany are worth while, we believe the risk of invoking the alliance must be taken. In any case we require an answer within the next few days.

Sent to Department. Repeated to London as 15.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1416: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:55 p. m.]

125. I also discussed wolfram with Dr. Salazar yesterday evening. In view of the situation indicated in the Legation's 2972, December 11, <sup>43</sup> the British Ambassador <sup>44</sup> and I agreed that at the same time he should represent the same considerations to the Portuguese Foreign Office as I did to the President of the Council. We both warned the Portuguese authorities of the vital interest the United States and Great Britain had at this stage of the war in denying wolfram to Germany, indicated that there were important instructions in process of being dispatched from Washington and London and requested that no commitments be undertaken with the Germans before our proposals had been given consideration.

Salazar was eloquent and not a little vehement on the subject of wolfram and in summary said:

(1) He would not undertake to refrain from entering into an agreement with the Germans before [garble and apparent omission].

(2) He had had two or three talks with the Germans about wolfram but had not yet concluded a firm commitment.

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<sup>41</sup> Col. Grant C. Mason, technical representative of U. S. Army in Portugal, assisting in negotiations regarding military facilities in the Azores.

<sup>42</sup> Anglo-Portuguese Agreement, August 17, 1943, regarding waterport and airport facilities in the Azores. For text of Agreement, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447.

<sup>43</sup> See footnote 34, p. 84.

<sup>44</sup> Sir Ronald H. Campbell.

(3) He called attention to the fact that the Anglo-American Wolfram Agreement expired on December 31, 1943, and that of Germany not until February 29, 1944; that he had warned Kennan<sup>45</sup> early in December that the time had come for action. He added that if the past was any indication of the future, before London and Washington could get together and agree on a practicable set of proposals the time would have arrived when it was necessary to make a new German agreement which could be concluded with the Germans rapidly.

(4) He was quite prepared to receive the British Ambassador and me when he had obtained our Government's proposals which he hoped would be soon and that they would contain a practicable proposition.

Salazar referred to the figures reported in my 3060, December 22<sup>46</sup> and said that the production of wolfram in German mines was declining with some rapidity and hinted that it might be possible to discourage somewhat wolfram production. He reviewed at some length the past wolfram negotiations and emphasized forcefully the uselessness and futility of Great Britain on the one hand affirming to the Portuguese Government that it desired Portugal to preserve its neutrality and then on the other hand attempting to deny Portugal the means of maintaining that neutrality by requesting such drastic curtailment of wolfram exports to Germany as would lead to retaliation.

The above of course bears out the point that was made in the Legation's 71, January 10, and at the same time emphasizes the need for prompt action.

Repeated to London as No. 23.

NORWEB

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S11.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1416: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, January 17, 1944—midnight.

132. Your No. 71 of January 10 and 125 of January 13.

1. Our military authorities have not as yet indicated that they are prepared to take the risks which would result from the invocation of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, even on the lesser plane suggested by you. Unless and until there is a change in those quarters, we must resort to other possibly less effective means of limiting wolfram exports.

2. Department has discussed with British Embassy substance of Foreign Office telegram no. 152 of January 7 to British Embassy Washington as well as British Embassy Lisbon no. 44 of January 9 to Foreign Office (your no. 66 of January 9<sup>46</sup>) as well as more recent telegrams exchanged between London and Lisbon. We have also

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<sup>45</sup> George F. Kennan, Counselor of Legation in Portugal, designated Counselor of European Advisory Commission, London, December 1, 1943.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

discussed with British Embassy the substance of this telegram, and they are telegraphing London urgently.

3. We appreciate that unless the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is invoked, Salazar may refuse to embargo shipments of wolfram to Germany alone, even though we offer him substantial economic concessions. Consequently, we should be willing to agree, if necessary, to an embargo on shipments to all destinations, even though such action would quantitatively penalize us more than it would the Germans. Salazar's objections to such a proposal will doubtless include the following:

A. Such action will bring retaliation from the Germans. This is of course possible, but it is also quite probable that the retaliatory action would not go beyond the reduction of German exports to Portugal and the possible sinking of a Portuguese ship or two. Salazar could possibly explain his action to the Germans on the ground that inflated wolfram prices are having a severely harmful effect on Portuguese economy and that he wishes to force prices down and induce labor to return to other pursuits; that experience has proved this could not be accomplished by attempting to control production and prices through the Metals Commission; and that he is consequently forced to embargo all exports, regardless of destination, pending such time as more satisfactory production and price controls can be worked out.

B. Portugal may lose needed imports from Germany. In reply to this objection, Salazar could be advised that we would be prepared to take every possible step to make available to Portugal the materials she might otherwise obtain from Germany were it not for the embargo.

C. Unemployment will be caused among those normally engaged in wolfram production. In reply Salazar could be told that the British would be willing to continue a limited production in their own mines (for stockpiling in Portugal) and that we and the British would be prepared to make and increase purchases of Portuguese traditional exports, such as naval stores, cork, textiles, et cetera.

4. In the event Salazar maintains the position that he must permit Germany to take some wolfram, you could advise him that we would approve of an arrangement which would limit exports to German Europe on the one hand and to the United Nations on the other to a maximum of 250 tons each per quarter during the 6-month period beginning March 1, the Portuguese to reserve the right to cancel the arrangement with the Germans at the end of the first 3-month period. However, we believe it would be most desirable to couple such a maximum quota arrangement with a provision that we and the Germans may export only wolfram produced in our respective presently recognized mines and concessions. We appreciate that Salazar may consider such a formula unfair to independent producers, and we would not insist on this proviso. Nevertheless, it would appear well worth trying, as there should be more chance of policing the German operations if they are legally limited to the offtake of their own mines and con-

cessions. Moreover, Salazar may be willing to consent to such a proposal in view of his previously reported desire to remove the incentive which has led agricultural and other laborers to engage in independent wolfram ventures. In the event of his acceptance of such an arrangement, it would doubtless have to be coupled with some indication on our part of willingness to supply him with materials he might otherwise obtain from the Germans and to increase purchases of traditional exports.

5. You will of course appreciate that no specific commitments can be given concerning the supply of materials to take the place of imports from Germany, for we do not know precisely what these are. The most we can undertake in that connection is to take every possible step to meet the Portuguese requirements and to give prompt consideration to the matter as soon as specifications and quantities are submitted by the Portuguese. If the matter of shipping tonnage is raised, we would also undertake to give it our sympathetic consideration. Similarly, we cannot give specific commitments concerning purchases of traditional Portuguese exports, but as soon as lists are put forward by the Portuguese prompt and sympathetic consideration will be given them. You can assure Salazar, however, that there is no real doubt that satisfactory arrangements can be made if we substantially cut down German takings of wolfram.

6. The manner in which this matter is presented to Salazar will doubtless have great bearing on his reaction. In the light of past experience and of your no. 71 and of British telegrams, we believe that Salazar should not be given the impression that we are laying down an ultimatum concerning the complete embargo. It would appear preferable that we take the line that we want to explore with him practicable means of accomplishing what must be a common objective, namely, the shortening of the war by depriving Germany of Portuguese wolfram, upon which material her wartime industry is so largely dependent. We understand that London has approved an approach along this line, but has suggested that in the first conversation with Salazar you should discuss only a complete embargo, leaving the putting forward of the quota formula to a subsequent meeting. We are inclined to the view that you may find it necessary or desirable to put it forward during the first conversation in the event the complete embargo is refused. You will of course be guided by your discretion.

7. It will doubtless be helpful if you point out to Salazar that as soon as means of communication between Germany and Portugal are cut, there will be no market for Portuguese wolfram on anything like the presently existing scale. Consequently, it would appear most advantageous to the Portuguese to make some arrangement at this time which would cushion the effect upon Portuguese economy of the with-

drawal of the Germans and ourselves from the market. If arrangements for stopping or reducing shipments to Germany cannot be made to our satisfaction at this time, we cannot undertake to assist the Portuguese economy when wolfram purchases are completely stopped.

8. If you approve the course of action suggested above and if your British colleague receives similar instructions, please approach Salazar as soon as possible.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1418: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 24, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received January 25—1:28 a. m.]

227. For the Secretary and Matthews.<sup>48</sup> In elaboration of that portion of my 210 January 22<sup>49</sup> which dealt with British Ambassador's conversation with Salazar on subject of wolfram I may say that Campbell opened this aspect of the discussion by a statement of the general situation with respect to the supply to enemy offer of alloys following outline furnished by Riefler<sup>50</sup> at time of his recent visit here. He then made clear emphasizing the humanitarian approach, the point of view that the war would be shortened and many lives saved if specifically Portuguese wolfram were denied the enemy. He stated that of course the only solution which would be satisfactory to us in the circumstances was a complete cessation of exports of this commodity to enemy destination. He said that he was not putting forward this idea in the form of a demand but in order that Salazar should reconsider the position in light of the growing importance attached to wolfram by both British and American Governments.

Salazar expressed skepticism as to the importance of wolfram in connection with prosecution of the war and the bringing of it to an earlier conclusion. He reemphasized the danger of his own position should he take any drastic steps such as that suggested. Even if the risk of invasion had diminished the Germans [apparent omission] of making trouble for him. Twice during the interview Salazar asked Campbell if he wished an immediate answer on the spot as regards wolfram and Campbell fearing a flat refusal and also desiring to give me an opportunity of taking the matter up myself said that he did not, simply urging that Salazar think it over and give his reply subsequently. This Salazar agreed to do.

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<sup>48</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Director, Office of European Affairs.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Winfield W. Riefler, Head of Economic Warfare Division, American Embassy in the United Kingdom.

Campbell feels that the tone of interview was in general more friendly than has previously been the case when wolfram has been discussed. The method of approach was, however, deliberately such as to preclude Salazar's becoming angry and it would be unwise to draw any positive conclusion therefrom.

Salazar is out of town today and tomorrow I have been informed. As I have reported I have asked for an appointment with him which I assume I shall obtain before end of week. It is not improbable that at that time he will give me an indication of his further thinking with respect to wolfram following up the conversation with my British colleague.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1418: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1944—5 p. m.

214. Your 227 of January 24. As Salazar has expressed skepticism as to the German need for wolfram, you may wish to have the following additional information for use in your conversation with him:

The cargo of the German blockade runner *Alsterufer* sunk in the Bay of Biscay, December 27, consisted largely of wolfram. Cargoes of other blockade runners all included wolfram. Cargoes of Italian blockade running submarines included wolfram.

Blockade running from the Far East is obviously so hazardous that space must be apportioned on the basis of urgent need. These facts emphasize the importance of the estimates that have been made by FEA<sup>51</sup> and MEW.<sup>52</sup>

Parenthetically for your information all blockade cargoes also include tin in large amounts.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1420: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, January 29, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 4:05 p. m.]

281. In Dr. Salazar's continued absence from Lisbon I saw the Secretary General<sup>53</sup> of the Foreign Office last evening and made my contribution to the representations which the British Ambassador initiated in his talk with Salazar reported in my 227, January 24.

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<sup>51</sup> Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>52</sup> British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>53</sup> Teixeira de Sampaio.

In my conversation with Sampaio it did not seem desirable or necessary to draw upon the detailed [*details?*] contained in Department's telegram 132, January 17. In the main I sought to impress strongly on Sampaio the importance we attach to German acquisitions of wolfram from Portugal and to ascertain how far Salazar had moved in his thinking on this matter.

Sampaio took much the same line that Salazar did as reported in my 125, January 13, that Portugal could not be asked to remain neutral and at the same time be denied the means of maintaining that neutrality by the imposition of a total embargo. In his view although admittedly Germany was not strong enough to invade the peninsula she would nevertheless find means of effective retaliation. He then went on to say that the wolfram problem could, however, be solved in the light of the policy of benevolent neutrality which Portugal was pursuing vis-à-vis England and the United States and the three parties concerned must get together and work out a solution. He then hinted that wolfram arrangements could be made for a shorter period than a year and referred to the figures set forth in my 3060, December 22,<sup>54</sup> asserting that the Germans were getting less and less wolfram.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1424: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 8, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received February 9—12: 21 a. m.]

388. Inability to see Dr. Salazar in regard to the wolfram matter is not due to any lack of perseverance on my part or the part of my British colleague who has been equally assiduous in endeavoring to follow up this pending problem. It appears though that the Doctor, like Br'er Rabbit, is lying low pending developments in Spain.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1428: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 12, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received February 13—6: 18 p. m.]

449. In the course of my conversation with Sampayo this afternoon I again raised the question of wolfram mentioning the temporary embargo on its export which has been applied in Spain.<sup>55</sup> He was

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55</sup> For correspondence regarding efforts of the United States to get Spain to impose an embargo on wolfram shipments to Germany, see pp. 297 ff.

naturally aware of this and hastened to point out that Salazar wished to avoid a "zigzag" course such as appeared to impend there through imposing a temporary embargo and then shifting back to "something else". He said that Salazar preferred to pursue a direct unbroken line toward whatever goal should ultimately be reached in agreement with United States. He said further that in the case of Spain the problem was different from the one in Portugal in that there we had a number of other important points of difference than wolfram. He pleaded that Portugal was more vulnerable than Spain in response to my remark that no enemy reaction had been observed to Spain's step, stating also that Spain was more self-supporting than Portugal in such items for example as iron and steel. Here I pointed out that we might be in a position to help out any such deficiency which might result from a loss of sources of supply.

I told Sampayo that we took a very serious view of the continued supplying to the enemy of this raw material which was vital to his war effort. I asked him to tell Salazar that we were expectantly waiting for him to resume with United States the conversations which would lead to the goal he had spoken of.

At the end of our talk Sampayo told me that the Germans had been exerting heavy pressure on the Portuguese during recent weeks for the conclusion of a new wolfram agreement but that they had so far "done nothing".

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1430: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 17, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 7:31 p. m.]

496. I understand that in the course of his conversation yesterday with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office the British Ambassador dealt with the four possible considerations which have no doubt caused Dr. Salazar to delay in giving a reply on the question of wolfram. These were the hope of obtaining commercial advantages from Germany, the fear of German reprisals, sensitivity on the point of Portuguese sovereignty and the desire to maintain Portuguese neutrality. Having set up these four points Campbell proceeded to "knock them over." Germany's impending defeat would wipe out any hope of deriving economic benefits from continued association with her. Germans' growing weakness had reduced the danger of German reprisals practically to the vanishing point. There was no intention of impinging on Portuguese sovereignty. The Anglo-Portuguese alliance fully covered Portugal so far as the maintenance of neutrality was concerned.



Sampayo's reactions were along the following lines: Salazar was deeply worried over the juridical aspect of the wolfram situation; had he any right to cut off from the Germans the wolfram produced by their own miners. Salazar still found it difficult to believe that denying wolfram to the enemy would really shorten the war. He was also watching closely the wolfram issue in Spain and was very anxious not to do anything at all so long as it might look like giving way under pressure. In conclusion Sampayo said that we must not think nothing was happening. In fact a great deal was happening and Salazar was resisting German pressure both as regards the conclusion of a new wolfram agreement and as regards German complaints that they had only received something like two-thirds of the wolfram promised them during the year now ending.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1432: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 22, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:42 p. m.]

522. As I previously reported Salazar's obvious reluctance to see either the British Ambassador or me regarding the Azores is no doubt due to his desire to avoid discussing wolfram until a decision has been reached with regard to the embargo in Spain. I assume that we intend to obtain such an embargo in due course. But in the meantime I wish to invite attention to the fact that the Portuguese-German wolfram agreement expires on February 29. Even though a decision in Spain has not been reached by that date I believe that the British Ambassador and I should be instructed jointly to request a temporary embargo in Portugal pending clarification of the problem as a whole.

Sent Department, repeated London 82, Madrid 55.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1434a: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1944—11 a. m.

539. Department and FEA indorse your suggestion that in company with your British colleague you now approach Salazar with a request for a temporary embargo on wolfram exports.

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1434 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, February 25, 1944—11 a. m.  
[Received February 25—10: 53 a. m.]

586. I assume that your 539 February 24, 11 a. m. implies that you are taking steps to ensure (repeat ensure) that the British Ambassador will receive instructions from London to join with me in requesting a temporary embargo on wolfram exports. I shall, of course, not act alone pending his receipt of such instructions.

Repeated to London as 89. Sent Department.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1437b : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 28, 1944—5 p. m.

1483. Notwithstanding Eden's<sup>56</sup> public statement on our desires respecting Portuguese wolfram the British Ambassador in Lisbon apparently is without instructions. We have instructed Norweb to ask embargo. This step was taken after consultation with British Embassy here which was in complete agreement. We understand that our [*German?*] current wolfram agreement with Portugal expires tomorrow.

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1437 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1944—9 p. m.

635. Following cable received from London :

"In reply to your 1483, February 18 [28] I called on Mr. Eden this afternoon. He has cabled following message to British Ambassador, Lisbon :

"You should before your departure make it clear to the Portuguese Government, and if possible personally to Dr. Salazar, that you have been summoned home for consultation on wolfram as suggested in your letter to Mr. Roberts<sup>57</sup> of February 18th, at the same time emphasizing the strong feeling here.

"Despite arguments in your telegram 112, Arfar, you should also make it clear in whatever way you think best that we rely upon the Portuguese Government to maintain in practice a temporary embargo pending the further proposals you will put to them on your return. In this connection, please see Madrid telegram 322 showing that our prospects of achieving a practical embargo in Spain for the next 6 months are promising.

"You should know that the U.S. Government are showing anxiety over the

<sup>56</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>57</sup> C. H. Roberts of the British Foreign Office.

fact that the German agreement with the Portuguese Government terminates today. U. S. Ambassador has strongly represented to me the importance of maintaining a common front between our two governments and of your supporting the representations which, according to his information, your U. S. colleague has made to Dr. Salazar for temporary embargo.'

"The words 'temporary embargo' were not in your message but this was as much as I could get. I wanted agreement on complete embargo but the idea of a 'temporary embargo' was to cover U. S. until a final settlement was made.

"It was plain to me that the civil servant in the Foreign Office in charge of Portuguese affairs had failed to carry through the plan outlined by Mr. Eden to me and reported in the last paragraph of my cable 1591 of February 27."<sup>58</sup>

Final paragraph London's 1591 reported Eden had instructed Campbell to return to London to discuss wolfram and to sell Salazar he was returning for that purpose.

STETTINIUS

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1442: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 4, 1944—noon.

[Received 7:12 p. m.]

683. The British Ambassador saw the Secretary General of Foreign Office yesterday in the matter of the temporary embargo on wolfram exports to Germany. According to Campbell while Sampaio was not of course in a position to commit the Portuguese Government to anything he was impressed though worried. Sampaio indicated that Salazar had summoned for a meeting the chief officials concerned with this question.

I shall follow up this *démarche* at the beginning of next week by which time the matter should have been given full consideration by the Portuguese Government.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1428: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1944—9 p. m.

675. Your 449, February 12, 6 p. m. In the wolfram negotiations on which you have now embarked it will be well to keep London currently informed of all developments. The Department is hopeful that these negotiations will be conducted rapidly to a successful conclusion

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<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

and it is of primary importance that the British and we maintain a completely unbroken front.

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1444 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 8, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received March 9—12:54 a. m.]

742. The British Minister and I have separately seen the Secretary General of the Foreign Office in the matter of the request that Portugal refrain from allowing shipments of wolfram to Germany pending the conclusion of an arrangement with Great Britain and the United States. Sampaio avoided giving any definite reply but in both cases attempted to maintain that there was in fact no analogy between the position in Spain and that in Portugal. Needless to say I emphasized that wolfram and the destination were the same in terms of the war situation. It was evident that in view of Campbell's departure to London for consultation regarding wolfram that the Portuguese Government feels it can delay decisions pending his return.

Sampaio furthermore made much of the fact that the Germans had not received their expected quota under the expired German-Portuguese agreement indicating that they were pressing for some consideration and hinting that some was due them. He seemed to wish to prepare us for developments in this direction.

In view of this somewhat ominous idea I think it would be helpful if you called Bianchi<sup>59</sup> to the Department and made clear to him our attitude.

Sent Department, repeated London as 103.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1450 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 17, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received 7:40 p. m.]

822. The apprehensions set forth in Legation's 742 March 8 unfortunately seem to have been fully justified.

American and British secret sources have reliable evidence to the effect that about 100 tons of wolfram have been exported to Germany from Portugal by train since February 29. Furthermore the British Minister in another interview with the Secretary General of the Foreign Office was, in a strange and halting way, given to understand that

<sup>59</sup> João Antonio de Bianchi, Portuguese Minister to the United States.

Salazar and the Germans were in controversial discussion as to how much more wolfram the Germans should get under their expired agreement. The implication was clear that the contention centered about quantity—though the Department will recall that in previous conversations Salazar made much of the decline in the amount of German wolfram acquisitions and that the German-Portuguese agreement does not guarantee the making available of any specific amount but merely the issuance of export licenses up to 2100 tons. No doubt Germans are basing their complaint on the small offtake from the neutral pool which their absorption and our absorption in mobilization and other operations have reduced to insignificant proportions.

This action by way of reply to the American and British Governments' request for cessation of exports of wolfram pending the conclusion of a negotiated agreement must be countered and I believe in accordance with the recommendations made in my 71, January 10, in the matter of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.

This telegram is being repeated to London with request it supply the Legation with details it has regarding the instructions given the British Ambassador who is scheduled to arrive in Lisbon tomorrow night.

Sent Department, repeated London as 116, Madrid as 71.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1450: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1944—9 p. m.

811. Department has received most secret cable from Amembassy London <sup>61</sup> on subject of your British colleague's instructions regarding wolfram. Foreign Secretary asks information be most rigidly guarded.

Sir R. Campbell is conveying to Salazar an authoritative statement from Prime Minister which in summary expresses anxiety at effect of continued wolfram exports upon (a) British public sentiment and therefore Anglo-Portuguese relations, (b) the Spanish on the ground that it sets them bad example. Although this approach does not formally invoke the alliance it is in fact based upon it.

We understand Sir R. Campbell will consult you and you are requested to concert your actions with respect to the wolfram problem in such form as you deem most effective. We note your 822, March 17, and are most disturbed by the information contained therein.

HULL

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<sup>61</sup> Telegram 2239, March 19, noon, not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1444: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 20, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 10:15 p. m.]

852. For Secretary and Matthews. British Ambassador has returned to Lisbon with instructions to seek a permanent embargo on exports of wolfram to Germany details regarding which London is said to have made available to the Department. However, Campbell indicated that no decision had yet been reached in London as to what further action would be taken if Salazar did not initially accede to this request.

Campbell will defer discussing controversial Azores matters until after making this *démarche*.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1457: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 25, 1944—6 a. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

896. The British saw Dr. Salazar last evening at which time he presented Prime Minister Churchill's letter. The essence of the ensuing discussion which lasted some two and a half hours is as follows:

According to Sir Ronald Campbell this *démarche* proved "a lemon". Salazar was adamant in refusing to entertain the suggestion of imposing an embargo on the exports of wolfram to Germany though he apparently realized the gravity of his decision. He indicated that he had reason to believe that Germany would regard any such action as a hostile act and he summarized his attitude by saying that he did not propose toying have Portugal drawn into the war directly or indirectly through the wolfram issue. He took up Mr. Churchill's suggestion that he give a lead to Spain through imposing an embargo in Portugal by stating that he had already exerted all efforts to effect a satisfactory settlement in Spain that because of the steps taken by the United States an embargo in Spain could not now be obtained though some compromise should be able to be effected. He also hinted that some limitation on exports to Germany from Portugal might be arranged but he gave no indication that this would be of a drastic character and British Ambassador, in order not to weaken his representations for an embargo, did not take up this line for discussion. Salazar also made much of fact that it would be morally indefensible for him at this stage of the war suddenly to deprive

Germany of wolfram and even went so far as to compare such an act to Mussolini's stab in the back to France, though maintaining at same time that wolfram was not a decisive factor in prolonging war but merely one of many important elements in war situation.

Campbell has telegraphed a full report of his conversation, which will no doubt be made available to the Department through the British Embassy in Washington. He awaits further instructions from London as well as Salazar's formal reply to Mr. Churchill.

I may add that I offered to accompany Campbell to see Salazar but he obviously preferred to act alone on Mr. Churchill's instructions. In accordance with your 811 of March 20, 9 p. m., I am, of course, ready to complement his representations but the question arises whether it would not be preferable for me to hold my fire until the next step is decided on between Washington and London. However, I shall seek occasion to reiterate with what gravity we view the situation.

As Campbell was on the point of leaving Salazar called him back to discuss Azores questions and understandably enough appeared amenable to hastening arrangements under discussion. Accordingly in order to make capital of the circumstances, the British reply to Portuguese memorandum will be submitted forthwith and Campbell will promptly seek an interview with Salazar to this end.

Pending further instructions from Washington and London, American and British negotiators will take no further steps in the matter of supply purchase conversations which in any case must await a response to Legation's 882, March 23.<sup>62</sup>

Sent Department. Repeated to London as 128 and Madrid as 75.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1460:Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, March 31, 1944—noon.

[Received 1:18 p. m.]

958. Although I have not seen a copy of the letter, I understand that Salazar's written reply to the letter from Churchill referred to in my 896, March 25, 6 p. m. [*a. m.*], has been handed to the British Ambassador. I am informed that this letter is rather lengthy and that while its tone is extremely courteous its impact may be described as one of amiable obstinacy. It reiterates the arguments with respect to continued supplies of wolfram to Germany which were set forth in my 896 and toward its close I understand that it gives an additional reason for not denying the enemy wolfram at this time: The fact that Ger-

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<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

many is also fighting against the Soviet Union, indicating in substance that Salazar is less hostile to Germany than to the Soviet Union.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1471 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, April 18, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received April 18—11:16 a. m.]

1162. In the course of my long conversation this afternoon with Dr. Salazar, he on his own initiative made mention of wolfram, terming it a cursed question which plagued him. He purported to have only just realized that the British and American Governments were expecting him to make a response other than the wholly negative one contained in his letter to Prime Minister Churchill. He maintained his realization arose out of a remark which the British Ambassador had made to a Foreign Office official this morning, Campbell having talked with me prior to his call at the Foreign Office.

Salazar said that he had not begun to negotiate with the Germans, that he had, despite their insistence, refused to do so as yet and that no "new wolfram" was now moving out of Portugal to Germany. However, he firmly maintained that a permanent embargo on wolfram exports to Germany was out of the question but that he was prepared to make a "reduction sensible" in proportion to the reductions which he claimed had occurred during the past 2 years.

Needless to say, I again reiterated the importance which we attach to this question and its relation to the duration of the war and I held out no hope whatsoever that any such proposal as he envisaged would prove acceptable.

Repeated to London as 165 and Madrid as 92.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1475a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery)*

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944—11 p. m.

1325. The British and American Governments are deeply concerned over the continued exports of wolfram from Portugal to Germany. As this mineral is vital to German tank, munitions and armament production the war is being prolonged and the lives of allied troops sacrificed by the continued shipments from the Iberian Peninsula, the bulk of which come from Portugal. The Department is informed that total German wolfram requirements for this year



are estimated at 3,000 tons and that it appears that she will obtain about 2,000 tons from Portugal and Spain.

In view of Brazil's particularly close ties with Portugal and considering Aranha's<sup>63</sup> and João Neves' <sup>64</sup> assurances of their readiness to help us in Portugal, you are requested to explore the possibilities of Brazilian assistance at Lisbon in this matter. We feel confident that Brazil will be as anxious as we are to reduce, in so far as possible, this help to our common enemy.

Ambassador Martins,<sup>65</sup> with whom this problem has been discussed, is sending a parallel message to the Itamaraty.<sup>66</sup>

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1476: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

RIO DE JANEIRO, April 26, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 4:30 p. m.]

1545. Aranha says, in reference to Department's telegram 1325 of April 25, 11 p. m., that he will send at once appropriate instructions to João Neves.

CAFFERY

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1490: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 6, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received May 7—4:17 a. m.]

1371. The Brazilian Ambassador has informed me of his conversation of yesterday evening with Dr. Salazar regarding the suspension of shipments of wolfram to Germany. The conversation was timed to coincide with the announcement of the impending departure of the first contingent of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force to the European theater of operations.

In requesting Salazar for such a suspension, he emphasized that it was the first and only request which the Brazilian Government as a belligerent had made of Portugal. During the interview Salazar displayed very strong feeling and condemned bitterly the British press and radio campaign against Portugal and in particular Vansittart<sup>67</sup> declaration that Great Britain should denounce their alliance with Portugal. He pointed out that Great Britain had consistently stated

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<sup>63</sup> Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>64</sup> Brazilian Ambassador in Portugal.

<sup>65</sup> Carlos Martins, Brazilian Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>66</sup> Seat of Brazilian Foreign Office.

<sup>67</sup> Baron Vansittart of Denham, Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the British Government, 1938-41.

that they desired Portugal to remain neutral and now were executing a *volte-face* in attempting to force Portugal into the war. The recent agreement with Spain was, in his mind, most humiliating to that country and would have an unfortunate effect on Anglo-Saxon relations for years to come. Salazar recalled that while Germany, at a time when other nations were less considerate, had supplied Portugal with her necessary requirements and had always paid for her purchases in gold bars, Great Britain had furnished a minimum of material and had only paid her adverse balances through sterling balances.

He added that the United States had been more reasonable than Great Britain and had supplied such material as it could, and had refrained from press attacks on Portugal. (The importance of this latter view should not be overemphasized as this setting off of Britain against America is one of Salazar's favorite techniques.) He also pointed out that Russian question was one that was ever-present in his mind and had to be taken into consideration when any action disadvantageous to Germany was contemplated.

It was necessary he continued to take foregoing into consideration when discussing wolfram in terms of human lives. A total embargo on wolfram to both belligerents would not be fair in his consideration, and as a neutral he could not completely cut off supplies to Germany. The best he could do would be to consider the Brazilian request which he admitted had taken him completely by surprise and keep in mind the Brazilian interest in the eventual solution. He concluded by stating that an out-and-out declaration of war against Germany would be better than being drawn into the war because of wolfram. After the interview Salazar apologized for his display of strong feelings, which the Brazilian Ambassador stated came as a revelation to him.

Ambassador's impression is that in addition to his irritation against British, Salazar is harried by internal problems, in particular the dissatisfaction and unrest of general population which has resulted from present inflation. He is, however, primarily concerned with preservation of Portuguese neutrality rather than with fear of Germany, and Brazilian Ambassador took occasion to point out to Salazar that neutrality, as he conceives it, has no place in the world today. Ambassador felt that we should maintain our present pressure on Salazar and concert our future action. He is hopeful that Salazar will show a more conciliatory attitude, but he does not believe that we can achieve a total embargo on shipments to Germany unless we are able to buy Salazar off. On this his idea is to offer him possibility of acquiring shipping tonnage after the war if not at present.

It is my impression that the *démarche* by Brazilian Ambassador has strengthened Allied position on wolfram problem. He presented his

request to Salazar in a very forceful manner and apparently hopes that he will be the friendly intermediary through whom settlement of this problem is effected.

I suggest desirability of having Aranha instruct Ambassador here energetically to follow up this initial approach.

Sent Department; London as No. 202; Algiers as No. 148 for Murphy; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1495: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 10, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received May 10—3:47 p. m.]

1407. Campbell called on Salazar yesterday at the latter's request and received the following proposals made orally regarding wolfram.

1. Neutral mines would be closed, the Germans and Allies continuing to be allowed to export the production of their respective mines. (Salazar estimated German mine production at 900 tons and thought it might go below that figure. However, if it should exceed his estimate, he would consider a total export limitation of about 900 tons. He would also consider placing exports on a monthly or quarterly basis.)

2. Neutral mines would be permitted to continue operations but their production would be turned over to the Allies for export. Both Germans and Allies would be permitted to export production of their respective mines.

3. Neutral mines would be permitted to continue operations but their production would be stored in Portugal to be purchased after the war by the United States and Great Britain. Both Germans and Allies would be permitted to export production of their respective mines.

Campbell informed Salazar that he would transmit these proposals to his Government but that he only had instructions to discuss wolfram on the basis of total embargo on exports to Germany.

I am seeing Salazar this afternoon and will report fully.

Sent Department; repeated to London as 209; Madrid as 107.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1496: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 10, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received 9:47 p. m.]

1416. In my meeting with Salazar this afternoon, he presented three proposals identical to those reported in my 1407, May 10, 4 p. m.

He favored the first proposal since it would eliminate the problem of control of neutral production. Moreover, he was prepared to tighten existing controls and would welcome suggestions from our experts to that end. Salazar's estimate of annual German mine production was 900 tons, and he expressed willingness to regard this figure as a ceiling for exports. He believed, however, that with rigid controls (presumably through reducing absorbing operations) actual production might fall short of this figure.

The burden of Salazar's argument was that relatively and in terms of percentages this represented a more advantageous proposal than the agreement we had reached in Spain.

I informed Salazar that I was not in a position to make any commitments but that in accordance with his request I would place his proposals before my Government. My impression is that he hopes for a settlement based on one of these formulas and is now waiting for a counterproposal on the basis of limitations since he will not consider an embargo. He expressed the hope that these negotiations could be brought to a speedy conclusion.

The corporations will meet with the missions tomorrow to discuss details of the three plans, and a telegram embodying their analyses will follow.

At the conclusion of the conversation, Salazar said that he [wished?] to beg off discussion of any of the Azores matters today but assured me that he was giving them his full consideration.

Sent to Department; repeated to London as number 210 and to Madrid by courier as number 108.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1498 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 12, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 2:10 p. m.]

1429. Salazar's wolfram proposals as set forth in my 1416, May 10, and 1407, May 10, represent very much what was to have been anticipated of him. Apparently he has decided that if he can maintain wolfram exports to Germany on a maximum basis of 900 tons for the current year he has little or nothing to fear from the Germans in the way of reprisals either military or economic. Salazar's proposals go of course beyond the desiderata set forth in the Department's 132, January 17, but the situation has so changed since then as to render these obsolete particularly in the light of the settlement reached in Spain.

Any consideration the proposals might receive must be conditioned on the institution of strict and adequate controls. One outstanding difficulty should negotiation on such a basis be undertaken would be the reaching of an agreement on the amount of wolfram actually produced by the German mines the figure given by Salazar containing, according to our estimates, at least 20 tons per month of absorbed mineral. Incidentally in the course of our conversation Salazar informed me that no additions have been made to the 1942 lists recognized German concessions (of which we have never received a copy) and that since March 1 the Germans have only been permitted to export their own production, a figure placed by Salazar in the neighborhood of 75 tons a month whereas statistics obtained by us from secret sources are considerably higher. A further point of interest in our conversation was that on this occasion Salazar made no attempt to link the question of our supplies to Portugal with wolfram export limitation.

Salazar referred to the figure of 300 tons of immobilized wolfram (see my 1303, April 29<sup>68</sup>) and indicated that he would be prepared to make an arrangement whereby the alleged German share of 150 tons would only be released slowly and in small amounts.

Salazar maintained that his proposals would result in the reaching of a more favorable agreement than that attained in Spain. He based this statement on a percentage calculation and not on absolute figures, obviously, and I replied that so far as concerned actual amounts the enemy would be receiving far more favorable treatment from Portugal than from Spain. Salazar declined to consider the question from this point of view and adhered to his percentage argument.

At an informal meeting yesterday afternoon between representatives of the corporations and of the two Embassies the consensus was that of the alternatives suggested by Salazar the first was the least objectionable in the event it were decided to entertain the idea of negotiating on such a basis at all. Important points would of course be the period for which the 900 ton (or less) ceiling should run and the inclusion or not of the 150 tons of immobilized minerals in that total.

Sent Department, repeated London as 211; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1502 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 13, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

3918. From Riefler for Secretary, Under Secretary Acheson, Crowley<sup>69</sup> and Stone<sup>70</sup> only. Lord Drogheda<sup>71</sup> asked me to see him this morning on Portugal. He stated his Government had agreed with our Government to demand a complete embargo on exports of wolfram from Portugal to the Axis. Since Salazar has now refused an embargo, a telegram was being prepared to be despatched to Washington at very high levels, suggesting that a compromise be accepted with Salazar similar to that arrived at in the case of Spain. I stated that should such a compromise be agreed it would mean, in essence, that we would have only a minor result for all our effort to eliminate Axis supplies of wolfram from Portugal and Spain, and that we would have failed in our main objective of achieving a result that would be decisive in its military effect. Lord Drogheda replied that there were some components of the American Government and some components of the British Government who felt very strongly on the subject of wolfram and held views similar to our own; but that other components of the British, and he imagined also of the American Government, simply did not see the matter in the same light. He went on that the soldiers particularly had failed to assess highly the importance of an embargo but had shown acute interest in the advantages we had gained in the case of the Azores. He stated that it was perfectly clear that Salazar would never give an embargo on wolfram . . . I stated there was no objective we were currently seeking in the field of economic warfare that compared with the embargo on wolfram in respect to the decisive effect it might have on the war.

This message repeated to Lisbon as Embassy's 88, May 13. [Riefler.]

BUCKNELL

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<sup>69</sup> Leo T. Crowley, Administrator of Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>70</sup> William T. Stone, Director, Special Areas Branch, Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>71</sup> Director-General of British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1476: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1944—11 p. m.

1363. Your 1416, May 10, 8 p. m. Dr. Salazar's proposal is altogether unsatisfactory and you should convey this to him as urgently as possible. In doing so you may say to the Prime Minister that what we are interested in is a complete and immediate suppression of the flow of wolfram to the enemy. We are convinced that in applying a complete embargo as a measure in the national interest of Portugal the Portuguese Government will be acting within its sovereign right and will afford no grounds for complaint from any quarter for discrimination or unneutral conduct. You may add that the Portuguese Government by adopting this measure now of its own initiative will give great satisfaction to the public mind of all the United Nations and will immeasurably improve Portugal's international position. Any hesitation will arouse public feeling and impair seriously the relations which until now have been kept upon a most cordial basis. As you will be aware from another cable being sent you, our press is following these conversations very closely and has already begun to comment with some asperity on the fact that Portugal continues to supply wolfram to Germany.

Repeated to London.<sup>72</sup>

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1498: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1944—7 p. m.

1371. After a further review of your recent wolfram cables, particularly your 1429, May 12, Department and FEA wish to comment as follows: We observe that Salazar's offer described in the first paragraph of your 1429 embraces the "current year." Does this mean that his offer of a 900-ton export limitation to Germany extends retroactively to January 1, 1944?

If such is actually the case then these comments are relevant:

According to London's 3064 of April 14,<sup>73</sup> 389 tons of wolfram were shipped from Portugal to the enemy from January 5, 1944, through March 13. Further, according to your 1251 of April 26<sup>73</sup> legitimate wolfram exports from Portugal to Germany totalled 166.8 metric tons for the month of March and 63.4 tons "crossed the frontier April 18 for Germany." It therefore appears that a total of at least 620

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<sup>72</sup> Repeated to London on the same date as No. 3S56.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

tons has been shipped from Portugal to Germany from the beginning of this year to April 18. We have no information as to whether any shipments were made subsequent to April 18. It may very well be, however, that the total 620 tons includes a repetition of some shipments in March.

Assuming the Salazar formula to extend from January 1 to December 31 and also calculating on the quarter basis as indicated by you, i.e., 225 tons per quarter for four quarters, then the Germans already have virtually received their allotment of wolfram for three quarters of this year. In other words there would be no further deliveries until September.

We also wish to comment on your 1455 of May 14<sup>74</sup> which reports that production of German-owned mines totals 600 tons per annum. It therefore appears that Salazar's estimate of German takings at 900 tons includes wolfram illegally absorbed by the enemy in their own mines.

We do not wish the foregoing to be interpreted as representing any weakening of our position. On the contrary if our assumptions are valid an agreement may not be as difficult as anticipated.

Your comments will be appreciated. You will recognize the importance of keeping the Department informed precisely as to the meaning of any proposals Salazar may make.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1505: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 16, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received May 16—2:29 p. m.]

1475. The British Embassy's instructions on the wolfram question indicates that a compromise solution would be acceptable to London. While the Ambassador has been instructed to take no action until agreement has been reached with United States and the Brazilians, the solution suggested by London is that Salazar be told we will permit shipments to the Germans of 20 tons a month during May, June, July and August and 60 tons a month during the balance of the calendar year. This roughly approximates the Spanish settlement, the reason for the lower amounts suggested for July and August being the large quantities which have gone to Germany in March and April. London has also indicated that it will not allow the 150 tons of "immobilized" mineral to go to Germany outside the limits specified.

NORWEB

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<sup>74</sup> Not printed.



711.53/41a

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The recent strong representations to the Portuguese Government at the highest political level have done something to persuade Dr. Salazar to move some way to meet us over the question of Portuguese wolfram exports to Germany, but his present offer is still far from being satisfactory. The alternatives before us are (a) to resort to drastic means of pressure, political or economic, or both, in the hope of compelling Dr. Salazar to give way, or (b) to accept a compromise settlement analogous to that recently reached with Spain.

In the view of His Majesty's Government course (a) presents long and short term disadvantages. So far as the immediate wolfram issue is concerned, we are particularly concerned with quick results. Whatever the means of pressure we may adopt, we cannot hope that they would compel Dr. Salazar to meet our requirements for several months. By that time we hope in any case to be able to stop wolfram exports to Germany by other means. Meanwhile Germany would continue to receive wolfram at the present rate of some 150 tons a month, if not at an even higher rate if she makes every effort to expand production in Portugal to compensate for her loss of Spanish wolfram. From the longer term point of view, there are obvious objections for us as well as for Dr. Salazar in a deadlock in which all our strategic requirements, and more particularly the smooth development of the Azores facilities, to which the United States Government will no doubt attach increasing importance for ferrying aircraft to the Far East, will be gravely prejudiced.

His Majesty's Government have therefore reluctantly but definitely reached the conclusion that we must adopt course (b), but they regard Dr. Salazar's present proposals as unacceptable. We cannot accept an offer based on an unpredictable production of the German mines, which once the free market was closed to Germany would undoubtedly absorb large quantities of free wolfram. We must have a basic figure as a ceiling for Portuguese wolfram exports to Germany, and His Majesty's Government would be prepared to meet Dr. Salazar by accepting as a ceiling for the wolfram year ending February 28th, 1945, the figure of 700 tons, to which he thinks production of German mines should approximate. Since at least 260 tons have already been exported since March 1st, the balance exportable on the basis of this ceiling figure would be 440 tons between now and February 28th, 1945. As we are mainly interested in the immediate future, and since Portugal has already exported to Germany much more than Spain in recent months, we should insist upon monthly installments of a maximum of

20 tons from May to August inclusive, and 60 tons a month thereafter until next February. We must also insist upon the cancellation of the export of 150 tons, which Dr. Salazar claims to be due to the Germans under the expired agreement, and also upon adequate measures being taken to permit our cooperation with the Portuguese authorities in preventing smuggling.

His Majesty's Government consider that strong pressure will have to be brought to bear on Dr. Salazar if we are to induce him to accept the above arrangement in the near future. They therefore feel that the time has come to make a frank statement to Dr. Salazar of the position regarding the continuance of supplies to Portugal, which he will be free to construe as a threat or not as he sees fit. If the Portuguese Government fail to meet us on the basis now proposed, it will be impossible for His Majesty's Government to justify to the British public the continuance of supplying economic assistance to Portugal such as that provided under the Azores Agreement. Nor could they ask the United States Government to make available essential supplies, including oil, under their control. Apart from wolfram, we have no essential purchases in Portugal, and therefore after the expiry of our Azores obligations on June 3rd, we should make no special effort to produce coal or other supplies for Portugal. If there should again be a bad harvest, we should equally be unable to release wheat or shipping as we have done this year.

His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will concur in the line of action now proposed. They think it necessary to act quickly and trust that instructions may be sent to the United States Ambassador to concert with His Majesty's Ambassador and support the latter's representations. His Majesty's Government are similarly inviting the concurrence and support of the Brazilian Government.

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1944.

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711.53/41c

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>76</sup>

#### AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has received the *Aide-Mémoire* of the British Embassy, dated May 16, and given it the most careful consideration. The proposal therein made calls, in the view of the Department, for a review of the attitude which this Government and the British Government should take in regard to neutral trade with the enemy, par-

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<sup>76</sup> The substance of this *aide-mémoire* was repeated to London in telegram 3990, May 19, 11 p. m.

ticularly in items of strategic importance, in the hope that through a frank interchange of views the attitudes of the two Governments may be concerted.

At the time of the negotiations with the Spanish Government it will be recalled this Government maintained the position that the object of our policy, for the attainment of which we should exhaust every possibility, was the complete cessation of wolfram exports from Spain to Germany. It was pointed out that any compromise of this attitude would have far-reaching effects in the negotiations which the two Governments then had under way or under contemplation with other neutrals. The British Government pressed strongly the dangers which might accrue to important British supply interests in Spain from extreme insistence upon the maintenance of the wolfram embargo. Finally, this Government at the urgent request of the British Government agreed to the compromise settlement.

As our negotiations with the neutrals have progressed, our prediction as to the unfortunate consequences which would flow from a compromise of our demands on Spain have unhappily proved to be entirely correct. In Turkey<sup>77</sup> and Switzerland,<sup>78</sup> in Sweden<sup>79</sup> and Portugal we are met by the argument that demands made upon those Governments are more stringent than the settlement which we were willing to accept with Spain. We particularly directed to the attention of the British Government the likelihood of this argument being made by Portugal, upon whose wolfram exports Germany is now almost entirely dependent. Those arguments have now been made and the *Aide-Mémoire* under consideration advocates a compromise of our demands upon that country.

In the opinion of the Department—and in this all other interested Departments and agencies of this Government fully concur—a compromise of our demands upon Portugal would be a major mistake and is not required by any exigencies of the situation. Neither the British Government nor this Government has any important supply interest in Portugal. Portugal is entirely dependent for petroleum products and other important items upon imports controlled by the two Governments. Portugal is bound by the most solemn treaty obligations to the British Government. Portugal cannot seriously believe that its security is imperilled by acquiescence in the demands now made upon her.

On the other hand, a cessation of wolfram exports from Portugal to Germany would constitute a most serious blow to German war pro-

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<sup>77</sup> See vol. v, pp. 814 ff.

<sup>78</sup> See pp. 706 ff.

<sup>79</sup> See pp. 456 ff.

duction and a contribution of great value which diplomatic effort could contribute to the prosecution of the war. Only considerations of the utmost importance would warrant any departure from the pursuit of this objective. This Government is unable to see the existence of any such considerations. The Department, therefore, believes that to weaken or compromise our demands upon Portugal would cause a loss of values of inestimable importance in the prosecution of the war, both abroad and at home, and that such action should not and could not be defended.

The Department accordingly urges that the instructions from the British Government to the British Ambassador at Lisbon make clear that only a complete cessation of wolfram shipments to Germany from Portugal will satisfy the British Government. In such a firm position this Government is willing to join wholeheartedly and will be glad appropriately to reaffirm the American Ambassador's instructions in this sense.

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1944.

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1511 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 18, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 1:50 p. m.]

1504. Assuming that the confidential figures we are currently obtaining of wolfram exports to the enemy are close to the fact, it is apparent that should these continue at the same level for 6 months from March 1 they will have approached the ceiling suggested by Salazar without taking any account of illicit shipments (reference my 1481, May 16, 6 p. m.<sup>80</sup>). Even on the basis of his own estimate of around 70 tons a month as representing these exports on the supposition that he will question our figures and that we are not in a position to prove them in view of the secret nature of our sources the total is alarming. It therefore occurs to us that, as an immediate interim step to which British and Brazilian agreement could readily be had, an urgent joint approach should be made to Salazar with a view to the provisional stoppage of such exports pending the reaching of a satisfactory settlement of the entire wolfram issue.

Repeated to London [as] No. 227. To Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1526

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1944.

Lord Halifax <sup>81</sup> called upon me this morning at 12:30 at his request. He had just returned from his two weeks' trip through the middle west where he had made twelve speeches. He was encouraged with the reception he received during this trip.

The purpose of Lord Halifax's call this morning was to take up with us the contents of the *aide-mémoire* delivered to him yesterday afternoon relative to Portuguese wolfram.<sup>82</sup> He introduced the subject by saying that he was disappointed that we should have taken such an extreme position in the matter, and was concerned over the reaction that this *aide-mémoire* caused in the Foreign Office in London.

In addition, he stated that he had received this morning a message from Anthony Eden asking that he see us promptly and express the hope that we would not force the British into an impossible position in dealing with Portugal.

Lord Halifax stated that at the time of the Spanish negotiations on wolfram, there was already a temporary embargo. Therefore, during the discussions, no wolfram was going forward, but in this case, if we insist on lengthy discussions related to complete embargo, actually 30 to 40 tons of wolfram a week would continue to flow from Portugal to Germany.

Lord Halifax stated that their compromise proposal of 20 tons a month, beginning immediately, in place of the 150 tons a month that the Germans had been receiving, he felt, was making great headway, and when one considered the fact that Germany's wolfram needs were 4,000 tons a year, and under this arrangement for the next four critical months she would only be getting a total of 80 tons, he felt was a reasonable approach.

He specifically stated that in the month of April, 140 tons of wolfram had gone to Germany, and the lengthy talks would just mean more wolfram to Germany.

Lord Halifax read to me the draft of a cable that the Prime Minister was sending to Salazar, which he stated Mr. Thorold <sup>83</sup> had shown to a member of the State Department yesterday. Lord Halifax did not remember to whom it was shown.

Lord Halifax then left with me the attached envelope <sup>84</sup> on which he had scribbled this morning the figures which Mr. Thorold of the

<sup>81</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>82</sup> *Ante*, p. 111.

<sup>83</sup> G. F. Thorold, Counselor, British Embassy in the United States.

<sup>84</sup> Not found attached to the original memorandum.

British Embassy had given him, explaining in detail how they arrived at their 20 tons a month.

Lord Halifax, while calm in presenting the matter, seemed quite agitated, and appealed to us to review the matter again today in the hope that we could find some means of relaxing our position as set forth in our *aide-mémoire* of last night.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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711.53/41e

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department refers to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated May 16, 1944, concerning the current wolfram negotiations in Lisbon, and to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of today<sup>85</sup> concerning a paper of the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicating that they would welcome a voluntary step taken by Portugal to become an active Ally in the war.

The Department considers that in bringing the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the attention of the Portuguese Government the British and the American Ambassadors in Lisbon should request that Government to establish a temporary embargo on the exportation of wolfram, to be maintained at least while discussions are in progress. This is a reasonable request and one to which Dr. Salazar should find no difficulty in acceding, in as much as it is a measure which the Spanish Government readily adopted last January. It will be recalled that the temporary embargo imposed by the Spanish Government applied to all wolfram stocks, including production of German mines and stocks in the hands of the Germans and ready for exportation, and was maintained until the end of April. In the event that the Portuguese Government should demonstrate clearly a disposition to delay action, the Department considers that the threat of sanctions contemplated in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of May 16, 1944, and in the instructions already furnished the British Ambassador for possible future execution, might then be employed to good advantage.

The Department believes that the Portuguese Government should be informed of the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and should be requested to establish at least a temporary embargo on the exportation of wolfram without delay, and that while the two actions need not necessarily be related they should be taken as nearly simultaneously as possible.

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<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 25.

If the British Government will indicate to the Department its concurrence in these proposals, the Department will issue appropriate instructions to the American Ambassador in Lisbon.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944.

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811.34553B/5-2444

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The State Department's *Aide-Mémoire* dated May 20th, containing the Department's proposals that discussions should be initiated with the Portuguese Government forthwith on the basis of the recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, has been communicated to the Foreign Office.

It is the view of His Majesty's Government that while careful consideration will be given to the recommendation submitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it would be inappropriate, at this moment, to press the Portuguese Government to take the step of becoming an active Ally in the war. His Majesty's Government consider that the proposals set out in the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* would be vigorously resisted by Dr. Salazar and that to act upon them at this moment would, at the best, mean considerable further delay over the question of Portuguese wolfram exports, and at the worst, might result in a serious deterioration in our relations with Portugal. This view is confirmed by His Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon.

There are, however, reliable indications from Lisbon that Dr. Salazar is urgently reconsidering his policy on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and His Majesty's Government have therefore instructed Sir R. Campbell at once to renew our demand for a complete embargo in the most pressing terms.

His Majesty's Government hope to be able to report further developments to the United States Government very shortly, and trust that the United States Government will agree that this matter should, for the present, continue to be handled by His Majesty's Government on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. It is in the meanwhile regarded as most important that there should be no public statements or wireless propaganda to Portugal from the United Kingdom or from the United States which might be interpreted as undue pressure. His Majesty's Government are taking all steps open to them to prevent this, and hope that the United States Government will also assist in this respect.

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1944.

711.53/40b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1944—10 a. m.

1477. The Department has received today from the British Embassy an *aide-mémoire*<sup>86</sup> in answer to the Department's communications referred to in its 1443, May 21, 3 p. m.<sup>87</sup>

[Here follows summary of the British *aide-mémoire* dated May 24, printed *supra*.]

Please endeavor to ascertain and inform the Department immediately any substantial reasons to which we may attribute this complete *volte-face* on the part of the British.

For your additional information and guidance, the Department is replying to the British Embassy<sup>88</sup> that while it is gratified to learn that the British Government is renewing its demand for a complete embargo, this Government has a direct interest in the wolfram question and considers that the effort to bring about a complete embargo should continue on a joint basis and that you are being instructed accordingly. You will therefore continue to be guided by the instructions now in your possession as to wolfram. As for the matter of the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Department is informing the British Embassy that this Government will take no action for the present on the decision, and you will be guided accordingly.

HULL

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711.53/41f

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department has received the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated May 24, 1944, in answer to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of May 20, 1944, and has given careful consideration to its contents.

The Department accepts the view of the British Government that no action should be taken at this time on the decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and has instructed Ambassador Norweb accordingly.<sup>89</sup>

With particular reference to paragraph three of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire* the Department notes with satisfaction that the British Government now believes that a complete wolfram embargo can be promptly obtained and that it has instructed its Ambassador in Lisbon to renew at once our demand for a complete embargo in the most pressing terms.

<sup>86</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>87</sup> *Ante*, p. 26.

<sup>88</sup> See *aide-mémoire* of May 25, *infra*.

<sup>89</sup> See telegram 1477, May 25, 10 a. m., *supra*.



While the Department is gratified in learning that the two Governments are again in agreement on the wolfram question, the Embassy is reminded that the two Governments have pursued a common objective throughout the whole history of the wolfram discussions and that this Government has a direct interest in the solution of this problem. This Government therefore considers that for it to withdraw from the discussions at this stage would constitute a tactical error and could weaken the joint negotiating position in Lisbon. Accordingly the Department has instructed Ambassador Norweb to continue, under instructions furnished him heretofore, to press for a complete wolfram embargo.

The Department would be grateful to the Embassy for an early clarification of the views of the British Government expressed in paragraphs two and three of the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*.

The Department has asked the Office of War Information to refrain for the present from making use of public statements or wireless propaganda to Portugal which might be interpreted as undue pressure.

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1944.

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711.53/43 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 25, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10 p. m.]

1605. Campbell undertook today to inform me concerning his interview yesterday with Salazar.

The talk lasted just over 2 hours and was described as being conducted in an atmosphere of great strain on both sides. Salazar was bitter in his denunciation of what he described as "hounding" on the part of the British and ourselves in the matter of wolfram. He defended himself at length and with no little acrimony and Campbell said that he found himself in a position of having to be on guard every moment. However, it is significant that Salazar neither said yes nor no but asked for more time to consider.

According to Campbell, Salazar referred to my visit on the subject of the Azores and the inference was drawn that he felt that he was being badgered on the one hand by the Americans and on the other by the British with difficult demands; that we should make up our minds as to who wanted what. Furthermore, that as to the use of the second field perhaps it would prove necessary an invocation of article 8 of the Azores agreement.<sup>90</sup> In all frankness I cannot help

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<sup>90</sup> Anglo-Portuguese agreement of August 17, 1943. *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. CXLVI, p. 447.

but feel that the direct independent approach on the question of the second field is not viewed with wholehearted enthusiasm by the British.

For the first time during my rather extended conversations I felt that Campbell for reasons best known to himself found it impossible to give the fullest expression to his thoughts in connection with the Salazar interview. This leaves me somewhat uneasy in my mind and if the Embassy at London is able to obtain a more complete report on the matter it would be most helpful to us.

See our 1577, May 24.<sup>91</sup>

Sent Department; repeated to London as 245; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

711.53/44: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, May 26, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 1:33 p. m.]

1609. With regard to the question raised in the fourth paragraph of the Department's 1477, May 25, 10 a. m., as to any substantial reasons to which may be attributed the British apparent *volte-face*, this telegram crossed our 1605, May 25, 7 p. m., in which we indicated that we, too, were more or less in the dark.

We have nothing substantial to add to what we said in our above telegram, but the following observations are presented for what they may be worth.

In the past when Campbell has encountered complete resistance from Salazar, he has indicated to me in his account of the conversation that "matters are hopeless" or some similar expression. It may be significant that in our talk yesterday, he made no such remark and I am, therefore, left with the feeling that delaying tactics are being interjected to the end that possibly the American Government might be, in the meanwhile, induced to accept a compromise settlement as was the case in Spain.

In addition to this we are coming to the conclusion that the British are accepting Salazar's own evaluation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance<sup>92</sup> which, as Salazar stated in his speech yesterday (see our 1606, May 25, 11 p. m.<sup>91</sup>), envisaged Portugal as an independent but not as a subservient ally; and that having "smelled victory" the British are in many cases permitting long-range postwar considera-

<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

<sup>92</sup> Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Alliance between England and Portugal, signed at London, June 16, 1373; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. I, p. 462.

tions to direct their present policy, even at the expense of certain immediate objectives. Any action on the part of the American Government seeking to satisfy urgent spot needs would, of course, tend to cut across British policy in this respect.

Sent to Department; repeated to London as 247; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

711.53/43 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—4 p. m.

4290. Lisbon's 245 to London, May 25.<sup>94</sup> As Salazar apparently has given no definite answer and as meanwhile wolfram exports presumably continue, the Department considers that concerted action might well be taken immediately toward obtaining from Salazar a temporary embargo to be maintained at least while the wolfram conversations continue. The Spanish Government found no difficulty in taking this step last January and in making its temporary embargo applicable to all wolfram stocks including production of German mines and accumulated German stocks ready for shipment.

Sent to London, repeated to Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro.<sup>95</sup>

HULL

711.53/43 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—5 p. m.

1537. Your 1605, May 25, 7 p. m. Inasmuch as Salazar apparently has left the wolfram matter open, and as meanwhile wolfram exports presumably continue, the Department considers the possibility of obtaining a temporary embargo without delay should be explored and is requesting London to take this up with the British Government.

The Department regrets the injection of the matter of Santa Maria into Campbell's conversation with Salazar as irrelevant and possibly damaging. The Department does not agree that our arrangements respecting the additional field bear any relation to the Azores agreement with the British. Our arrangements call for execution of certain works by an American commercial organization at the request of the Portuguese Government. Salazar has recently signified his readiness

<sup>94</sup> Same as telegram 1605, p. 118.

<sup>95</sup> Repeated on the same date to Lisbon as No. 1536 and to Rio de Janeiro as No. 1654.

to go ahead with this enterprise and Panair is on the point of dispatching a survey party to the Azores via Lisbon. The Department believes that this should be kept entirely separate from the Anglo-Portuguese Azores agreement from this point onward.

Inform Payne.<sup>96</sup>

HULL

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711.53/45 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

4368. Reference Department's 4290, May 30, 4 p. m. Roberts of the Foreign Office told Embassy this afternoon that as a result of Campbell's talk with Salazar on May 24 the Foreign Office is more hopeful than otherwise that Salazar will meet our demands. Salazar gave as his reasons for wanting to postpone immediate decision the meeting of the Second Congress of the National Union Party and the celebrations in honor of the eighteenth year of his administration. The urgency of the matter has been stressed by the British, according to Roberts, and another telegram was sent to Campbell this afternoon instructing him to press for an early reply. Through the Portuguese Ambassador to London, who is caught in Lisbon and is said to have been most helpful in impressing on Salazar the serious view the British take of the wolfram question, Campbell had endeavored to have complete embargo put on all exports of wolfram while consideration is being given to whole question.

Roberts feels that for British, Americans, and Brazilians again to approach Salazar formally and demand a temporary embargo before he has replied to Campbell's approach of last week would not be wise. Roberts anticipates that Salazar may make what he described as a "big gesture" in accord with the Alliance and does not wish to prejudice this action by premature pressing for temporary embargo. However, Roberts stated that should Salazar's reply be along the lines that an embargo would be declared providing Britain and United States were willing to make certain economic commitments, Foreign Office would press for complete embargo during course of discussions on possible economic concessions to Portugal.

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<sup>96</sup> Lt. Col. Robert G. Payne, technical representative of U.S. Army in Portugal to assist in the negotiations for military facilities in the Azores.

Roberts gave no indication that Foreign Office was greatly disturbed over effect of American independent approach on question of second field as suggested in Lisbon's 245 to London of May 25.<sup>97</sup>

Sent to Washington. Repeated to Lisbon.

WINANT

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1527: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 2, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received June 2—3:30 p. m.]

1688. Salazar last night gave Campbell a promise to stop all mining in Portugal of wolfram and to prohibit all exports provided

(1) A supply purchase agreement to run concurrently with the embargo should have first been signed. In this connection Salazar expects additional help by way of steel products and transportation.

(2) The 100 tons wolfram due Germany under their last year's agreement could be delivered.

Although this proposal on first impression has definite psychological appeal, the 100-ton item is galling in view of wolfram exports to Germany since March 1. I understand Campbell gave no indication that this condition might be acceptable.

Details with Embassy's recommendations follow.

Sent Department. Repeated to London as 260. To Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1528: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 2, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:22 p. m.]

1693. Salazar opened his conversation with Campbell with a long exposé on the juridical features of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and questioned the extent to which the Alliance was applicable in matters such as wolfram. However, since the British had based their appeal on the Alliance the problem had been considered on that basis. As background to the proposal given in my 1688, June 2, 4 p. m., Salazar said that the Portuguese decision had been made only after two long Cabinet sessions and that it reflected the best possible Portuguese offer today. To his mind the conditions which had been carefully thought out were fair and the only possible approach to a solution was the complete cessation of wolfram mining even though this

<sup>97</sup> Same as telegram 1605, p. 118.

entailed a heavy sacrifice both directly and indirectly to the Portuguese national economy. While he estimated it would result in the unemployment of 90,000 people other work would be provided. There was no request for us to purchase stocks on hand.

Salazar countered Campbell's insistence upon an immediate embargo by contending that it could only be imposed following the signature of a satisfactory supply purchase agreement. He went through the motions of a long legalistic argument intended to present wolfram as a problem separate from that of a satisfactory supply purchase agreement. The latter he considered as being due him anyway as a result of unfulfilled promises particularly the British economic commitments made at the time of the Azores agreement. Salazar was of the opinion that this condition need not entail any undue delay since by intensive efforts a satisfactory agreement could be negotiated within a few days.

He mentioned that in addition to the goods made available under the previous agreement he would require certain supplementary supplies notably steel in view of the possible curtailment of German shipments. He would also require assistance in transportation.

With regard to the 100 tons of wolfram he pointed out that following the Anglo-American protests the Minister of Interior had curtailed shipments to Germany and that only 50 tons of the 150 tons of past year's overlap had been shipped. He did not mention the amount shipped since March 1 (which according to our figures is 450 tons but which Salazar previously informed me were 70 tons monthly). Campbell who wished to avoid argument on this score did not get involved in a discussion on figures. He did say however that his Government would be disappointed with a conditional rather than a complete embargo and that he feared this feature would ruin the opportunity for an immediate agreement.

Campbell showed Salazar draft of a British announcement which had been prepared for release Saturday<sup>98</sup> or Monday stating that Portugal had imposed a total embargo on wolfram. This, Campbell said, could not now be published since there was no immediate prohibition. (This was first I had heard of such an announcement and in reply to my inquiry Campbell said that he presumed it had been worked out after consultation with Washington.)

Campbell stated that he had made no recommendations to London but had merely reported his conversation with Salazar. He understands that details of ELW report will be sent to British Embassy Washington.

From the psychological point of view Salazar's proposal has a certain appeal since it is, with exception of 100 tons, a total prohibition

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<sup>98</sup> June 3.

and not an embargo. Campbell feels that from Parliament's point of view it is better than the Spanish agreement since it would eliminate argument that Germany is getting better treatment from Portugal than from Spain. We both feel that Salazar can be persuaded to change his attitude on export prohibitions prior to signing of a supply purchase agreement and working out other economic arrangements. It is my impression that Salazar wants a definite agreement but would accept a commitment in writing along general lines with details to be worked out later (British Embassy here feels such an agreement should be for period January 1 to December 31. In Salazar's interest it would be an admission on our part that we are and have been committed to an agreement but at same time would actually limit our commitments to a 6 months period).

Salazar had requested German Minister to call today and intended to inform him of the agreement. However, he now plans to postpone this until he makes his protest on the *Serpa Pinto* incident<sup>99</sup> which he construes as a warning to Portugal. When asked why Germans should choose this time to make such a warning Salazar admitted that about 2 weeks ago he had told Eisenlohr, the German negotiator, that he was about to make an agreement regarding wolfram and that Eisenlohr had left for Germany the next day. Salazar does not feel that metropolitan Portugal is in danger from Germany but the British are egging him on to make a strong protest feeling that this will put him in a better position to take a firmer line on wolfram.

Sent Washington, repeated to London, Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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711.53/48a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1944—midnight.

1587. Department's 1477, May 25, 10 a. m. Unless you have some strong reasons for not doing so at this time, you are requested to seek an interview with Salazar and renew the request for complete embargo of wolfram, preferably permanent but at least a temporary embargo for the duration of discussions on this subject. You will bear in mind that the Department is still in the dark as to the reasons occasioning the British change of position on this question.

The British Embassy still seems expectant of favorable developments in Lisbon although these have not been forthcoming.

HULL

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<sup>99</sup> The Portuguese ship, *Serpa Pinto*, had been stopped by Germans who forced her crew to abandon ship in mid-Atlantic.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1532 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 3, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 2:55 p. m.]

1701. In order to avoid repetition it is suggested the Department request British Embassy to show it Lisbon's telegrams to Washington numbers PUSSY 79, 80 and 81 and which Embassy here has already indicated Department may wish to see. We are in general agreement with the views set forth in those telegrams and in particular believe that the proposal to resume negotiations for a calendar year supply purchase agreement is a good one. In addition to the arguments presented in the British Embassy's PUSSY 79 to Washington an agreement on this basis would enable the Portuguese to obtain June 30th carry-overs which would otherwise be lost to them.

I understand that the British Ambassador has suggested to London that he be authorized to inform Salazar that the latter's proposals are unsatisfactory with respect to the 100 tons of wolfram due Germany under last year's agreement and also that the application of the wolfram export embargo should be made immediately without waiting for the conclusion of a new supply purchase agreement. If Salazar accepts Campbell has suggested that he should be informed we will submit supply purchase proposals within a week which will be at least no less favorable as regards the items as yet not submitted to the Portuguese than those which prevailed under the old agreement and also that we would provide additional transportation assistance. I believe that in the ensuing negotiations good use might be made of the aluminum and the locomotives which the Department has indicated might be available to the Portuguese. It should also be borne in mind that we may probably require some additional leeway to meet Portuguese demands for the replacement of German supplies.

Sent Department, repeated to London as 264, to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1529 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 3, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 3—5 p. m.]

4468. Roberts of Foreign Office this morning gave Embassy details of Campbell's talk with Salazar on night of June 1 and British answer to Salazar's proposals which Campbell has been instructed to give (reference Lisbon 1688, June 2, 4 p. m. to Department). Ac-



cordance to Roberts, British Embassy in Washington has been informed and instructed to pass on information to Department.

The impression was received from Roberts that the Supply Purchase Agreement mentioned by Lisbon had been agreed to in connection with the Azores Agreement but had not yet been fully implemented and that it was the complete implementation of this previous agreement that Salazar desired. He also, according to Roberts, demanded that the list of commodities to be supplied under the Azores Agreement, and not yet communicated, be forthcoming and that definite arrangements be made for adequate shipping to carry the commodities in question.

British reply briefly summarized by Roberts as follows:

(1) British deeply appreciate Salazar's offer of complete shutdown of wolfram mines

(2) while sympathetic to Portuguese desire for full implementation of previous economic agreements, this is a matter which is up to the Combined Boards and is thus an American as well as a British responsibility

(3) in view of fact that Germany has already received from Portugal since March 1 approximately 400 tons of wolfram and because of pressure from Parliament and public opinion, British Government would find it extremely difficult to justify delivery to Germany of the 100 tons under last year's agreement

(4) if all mines are closed down and the 100 tons is not delivered, British will do all in their power to expedite implementation of economic arrangements desired and believe that United States Government would do likewise

(5) in view of meeting of Parliament next week and fact that some statement will have to be made, Salazar is urged to give immediate consideration to problem of meeting British desires and if he feels he cannot do it may be necessary to make a statement of a serious nature in Parliament when it reconvenes.

Roberts has requested the Embassy to stress to the Department the importance of doing everything possible to expedite action of Combined Boards on Portugal's economic demands should Salazar meet our wishes. The British hope to have some definite news by Monday<sup>1</sup> or Tuesday and have promised to keep Embassy informed.

Sent to Department, repeated to Lisbon as 110, June 3, 7 p. m.

WINANT

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1528: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1944—midnight.

1603. Your 1688, June 2, 4 p. m., and 1693, June 2, 7 p. m. Please confirm directly Salazar's proposal to Campbell and report imme-

<sup>1</sup> June 5.

diately. The Department assumes an interim embargo will be made immediately effective which upon completion of supply purchase negotiations will become permanent, and is encouraged in this assumption by your observations in paragraph seven of the latter cable. Department and FEA would be disposed to consider such terms sympathetically and believe negotiations should be terminated with as little delay as possible. You may communicate these views to Campbell but not to the Portuguese until the British and American Governments are in agreement.

The Department has no knowledge of any press release or of any consultation with this Government on the subject.

Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London.<sup>2</sup>

STETTINIUS

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1534 : Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 6, 1944—noon.

[Received June 6—10:27 a. m.]

1725. The British Ambassador saw Salazar last evening and conveyed to him the British reply summarized in London's 4468, June 3, 7 p. m. Salazar agreed unconditionally to the imposition of an immediate embargo on wolfram exports and a complete stoppage of wolfram operations to the extent that the Portuguese Government will buy up all existing stocks.

Salazar indicated that his decision was activated by information which he had just received to the effect that German acquisitions since March 1 had far exceeded his own estimate of their exports based on the supposed production of the German controlled mines. This caused him to discontinue his insistence on the delivery of an additional 100 tons. Salazar indicated his willingness that a joint press announcement on the subject should be issued on June 7 presumably in time to appear in the afternoon papers.

Please reaffirm urgently authority to conclude supply purchase negotiations immediately on basis set forth in paragraph 5 of Department's 132, January 17, midnight, and Embassy's 1701, June 3, 1 p. m.

This capitulation on Salazar's part represents in our opinion a fundamental alteration in his views and it is to be hoped that the effects will continue to be far-reaching and cumulative.

Sent Department, repeated London as 268. To Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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<sup>2</sup> Repeated to London as No. 4428.

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1540: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 6, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 7:52 p. m.]

1734. I have just been called to the Foreign Office by the Secretary General who told me that Dr. Salazar wished to convey the following message:

That on the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance an announcement would be made in London tomorrow of a complete embargo on all wolfram shipments; that he was very happy that at the same time the American interests would also be satisfied in this respect. He added that so far as the production of wolfram was concerned there would be a progressive and orderly cessation thereof until the process was completed. The Portuguese announcement will be made on the following day.

Sent Department. Repeated to London as No. 271 and Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1534: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1944—4 p. m.

1645. This is an interim reply to your 1725, June 6. IPOC<sup>3</sup> is meeting immediately to expedite supply purchase arrangements. Pending detailed examination of data, general understanding of Department and FEA is that approach will be liberal one as outlined in paragraph 5, our 132, January 17. We agree to extend period of program and to arrange for supply of additional items such as locomotives, if possible on supply grounds. Shipping question may pose serious difficulties if it should come to fore, but we will press strongly should action be necessary. Incidentally, 100 jeeps will be aboard next Portuguese ship. Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London.<sup>4</sup>

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1537: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 7, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received June 7—4:20 p. m.]

1755. In light of wolfram settlement and as it appears improbable that we shall be able to present supply purchase proposals im-

<sup>3</sup> Iberian Peninsular Operating Committee.<sup>4</sup> Repeated to London as No. 4512.

mediately, I believe it of considerable importance that we provide Portuguese authorities within next few days with some tangible evidence of our intention to give Portugal economic benefits in return for step which has been taken. It is highly desirable also that a favorable atmosphere should prevail during time when Portuguese will be formulating their wolfram control regulations. Accordingly, I should like to inform them that we propose to cancel all surcharges after June 30, if Department approves.

Urgent reply to this cable is requested.

British Embassy is sending a parallel cable to London.

Sent Department; to London as 273; to Madrid by courier.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1541: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 7, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

4569. For Department and FEA. As part of Portuguese wolfram settlement, British agreed to commence supply purchase negotiations within a week. (Reference Lisbon's 1701, June 3, and Pussx 79, 80 and 81.) Representatives of MEW, British Supply agencies and Embassy yesterday considered draft supply purchase program for calendar year 1944. It is proposed to supply balances remaining, after deducting authorizations since January 1, 1944, from quantities authorized for year ending June 1944, with adjustments necessitated by current supply situation. MEW is cabling British Embassy Washington proposed supply items with details of authorizations since January 1 and balances to be supplied, for your concurrence and approval of Combined Boards. MEW has analyzed 1943 authorizations to insure that there are none outstanding for which Portuguese could request automatic renewal in 1944. Problem of 1943 carry-overs should therefore not arise. Since Combined Boards have already approved tentative allocations for first half 1944, British hope approval of whole program can be obtained without delay.

Question of surcharges has not been finally determined, but British are sympathetic to removing all surcharges from items in Portuguese program. Any Spanish charges of discrimination could be refuted by reference to Spaniards limitation on wolfram exports compared to Portugal's complete prohibition. We should appreciate your views. Petroleum program and additional shipping assistance remain to be considered. Do you wish us to discuss with British supply of locomo-

tives to Portugal? (Reference Department's 2418, March 29 and Embassy's 2740, April 4<sup>5</sup>).

Following are comments of [on] important items:

Iron and steel products and chemicals and pharmaceuticals. It is hoped quantities can be increased to replace supplies from Germany. Ammonium sulphate and/or nitrate. British supply authorities understand there is no allocation for Peninsula, and that supplies will have to be diverted from United States and United Kingdom allocations. United Kingdom may be able to supply some nitrate.

Coal, coke and pitch. Doubtful whether United Kingdom will be able to supply more than 15,000 tons monthly of 360,000 tons scheduled. Endeavoring to obtain Sardinian coal at rate of 15,000 tons a month to make up United Kingdom deficit. Payment for Sardinian coal raise difficulties. Payment in escudos to be used by Italian Legation in Lisbon satisfactory to British Treasury for experimental shipments, but if regular monthly shipments forthcoming payment will have to be in dollars or sterling. Can you expedite Treasury decision on this point?

Cotton. 500 tons long staple Egyptian firm but Misup can give no assurances regarding short and medium types now in tighter supply.

See my immediately following telegram<sup>6</sup> regarding proposed purchases in Portugal.

WINANT

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1545: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 8, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:15 p. m.]

1765. Reference is made to the Legation's telegram No. 1734 of June 6. Lisbon evening papers of June 7 published the following without comment:

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having invoked the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance to the end that exportation of wolfram should cease as a means of contributing to the shortening of the war, the Government has resolved to accede to that request and has decided to terminate immediately the exportation of that product.

In taking such a grave decision the Portuguese Government desired once again to prove its fidelity to the traditional alliance between the two nations and rejoices at the appreciation with which the British Government greeted its decision and at the recognition of the importance for the future of strong bonds between the peoples and Governments of Portugal and the British Commonwealth both of which were so amicably affirmed in the communication made by the Secretary of State of His Britannic Majesty to the House of Commons.

<sup>5</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>6</sup> Telegram 4570, June 7, 7 p. m., not printed.

The newspapers also published Eden's statement to the House of Commons of June 7.

On June 8 semi-official *Diario da Manhã* carried an editorial emphasizing that Portugal had consistently been loyal to the Alliance during the war the present action not representing a change of policy and stated the British request had been satisfied 2 days before the opening of the second front. Other editors made similar points noting the sacrifice which Portugal was making.

Notices of the Stettinius statement<sup>7</sup> were published but without mention that the United States had been active in the negotiations although it was mentioned in a Reuter despatch that the United States had been consulted and that Brazil had aided in the solution reached.

Public opinion generally holds that the Portuguese Government had lost face by delaying too long.

NORWEB

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1549: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1944—8 p. m.

1654. The Acting Secretary of State made the following announcement to the press June 6:

"The Portuguese Government undertook on June 5 to impose a total prohibition upon the export of wolfram and to bring about an immediate cessation of wolfram production in Portugal.

The action of the Portuguese Government should prove a factor in shortening the war, inasmuch as it will deprive the enemy in Europe of important quantities of a vital war material.

The United States Government has been active in the negotiations which have led up to this satisfactory conclusion in close consultation with the British and Brazilian Governments."

STETTINIUS

811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1548: Telegram

*The Minister in Portugal (Norweb) to the Secretary of State*

LISBON, June 9, 1944—noon.

[Received June 9—10:30 a. m.]

1775. In reviewing the course of the wolfram negotiations which have fortunately come to a satisfactory conclusion, it appears to be undeniable that it was the invocation of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance which finally carried the day.

I believe, however, that analysis will reveal that the action of Brazil in joining the United States and Great Britain proved to be very

<sup>7</sup> See telegram 1654, June 8, 8 p. m., to Lisbon, *infra*.

helpful. The Brazilian Ambassador's approach, it will be recalled from telegram sent at the time,<sup>8</sup> took Salazar completely by surprise and the injection by the Brazilians of the thought that Portuguese blood was being shed because of wolfram together with the psychological effect of being appealed to by the daughter nation—a member of the family—at the very moment it was preparing an expeditionary force proved to be extraordinarily effective.

NORWEB

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811.20 Defense (M) Portugal/1537: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Portugal (Norweb)*

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1944—7 p. m.

1680. Reference your 1755, June 7, and London's 4569, June 7. Department and FEA entirely agree with proposal to cancel surcharges. Sent to Lisbon, repeated to London.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>8</sup> Telegram 1371, May 6, 7 p. m., p. 102.

## RUMANIA

### NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO SIGNING OF ARMISTICE WITH RUMANIA AT MOSCOW, 5 A. M., SEPTEMBER 13 (AS OF SEPTEMBER 12), 1944

740.00119 European War 1939/2057: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 8, 1944—10 p. m.

207. Your 172, January 7, midnight, and 174, January 8, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> In view of paragraph 3 of annex 2 of the Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference establishing the European Advisory Commission,<sup>2</sup> the Department concurs in your opinion that the question of surrender terms for Rumania comes within the competence of the EAC. The Department hopes to send you, as soon as the necessary clearances can be obtained, the American views on surrender terms for Rumania.<sup>3</sup>

The background information on the forthcoming talk set forth below may be useful to you:

The American position with regard to Rumania was set forth in the Department's telegram to Stockholm of November 16 repeated to you as the Department's 7259.<sup>4</sup>

Department was informed by British Embassy on November 21<sup>5</sup> that a message had been received from Maniu indicating his desire to send a special delegate or delegates out of Rumania for the purpose of discussing arrangements for a political changeover in that country. The British Government proposed to reply to Maniu's message by

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<sup>1</sup> Neither telegram printed. They conveyed information regarding reports that a representative of Iuliu Maniu, exiled head of the National Peasant Party of Rumania, was expected shortly in Cairo to discuss surrender terms with the American, British, and Soviet representatives. In telegram 172, Ambassador Winant stated: "The information in my opinion would justify a review of armistice terms for Rumania and since the European Advisory Commission is charged with the obligation to make recommendations in this field I would appreciate being informed of the views of the Department provided that I am able to confirm the information I am sending you tonight." (740.00119 European War 1939/2056, 2057)

<sup>2</sup> The cited passage reads in part as follows: "As one of the Commission's first tasks the three Governments desire that it shall as soon as possible make detailed recommendations to them upon the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European states with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms." (*Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 757.)

<sup>3</sup> Letter of February 2 to London, p. 136.

<sup>4</sup> See telegram 2465, November 18, 1943, to Madrid, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 505.

<sup>5</sup> Communication not printed.



saying that his emissary would be received on the understanding that his sole function would be to discuss "operational details" looking to the overthrow of the present regime in Rumania and its replacement by a Government prepared to offer unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies. It was stated that the Soviet Government had approved this proposed reply, at the same time indicating its expectation that Soviet representatives would participate in any negotiations that might be carried on with Maniu's representative. Department gave its agreement to the proposed British reply as already approved by the Soviet Government.<sup>6</sup>

Ambassador MacVeagh<sup>7</sup> has been authorized to attend any conferences which may be held in Cairo with Maniu's representative provided his Russian colleague<sup>8</sup> as well as the British Ambassador<sup>9</sup> likewise attends. Should either his British or Soviet colleague designate subordinate officials to represent them in the discussion, MacVeagh is authorized likewise to designate a member of his staff for this purpose.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2069 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 11, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received January 12—1:20 p. m.]

84. I have been requested to communicate to my Government the contents of a Foreign Office note dated January 10, which is marked "absolutely secret". The Embassy's translation follows:

"The British Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Mr. Kerr,<sup>10</sup> informed the Soviet Government on November 15, 1943, that the British Government had received a message from Mr. Maniu stating that he desired to send a special delegate to discuss measures for effecting a change in the political regime in Rumania.

In the letter it was noted that this message of Mr. Maniu was received before he had been informed that the British Government would now [*not*] consider any approaches from the Rumanian side unless they were also addressed to the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union and unless they were made in the form of a proposal for the signature of an unconditional surrender before the three principal Allies.

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<sup>6</sup> Memorandum dated November 27, 1943, to the British Embassy; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, p. 507.

<sup>7</sup> Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile in Egypt.

<sup>8</sup> Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile in Egypt.

<sup>9</sup> R. C. Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile in Egypt.

<sup>10</sup> Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

On November 18, 1943, the People's Commissar<sup>11</sup> informed Mr. Kerr that the Soviet Government agreed with the point of view of the British Government concerning the contents of the reply which should be sent to Maniu. In the letter it was also stated that 'the Soviet Government, inasmuch as it is a question of Rumania, considers absolutely necessary the participation of a Soviet representative in direct conversations with the delegate from Maniu'.

Supplementary to this, the Soviet Government of [on] January 10, 1944 informed the British Embassy that 'the Soviet Government has authorized the Soviet Ambassador to the Yugoslav and Greek Governments in Cairo, N. V. Novikov, to conduct conversations jointly with the representatives of the Government of Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and with the Emissary from Maniu on the other'.

At the same time the Soviet Ambassador, N. V. Novikov, has been instructed 'to communicate this decision of the Soviet Government also to Mr. Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government who visited him recently and who, after stating that the arrival in Cairo of an emissary from Maniu was expected in the near future, requested that the Soviet representative arrive there in time for the meeting'.["]

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EW 1939/2057

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has received and read with interest the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of January 17, 1944<sup>12</sup> relative to the desire of Mr. Maniu to send a delegate out of Rumania for the purpose of discussing arrangements for political changes in that country. The information on these developments and on the possible sequence of events is appreciated.

The Department of State concurs in the opinion that if these discussions take place it will be necessary to inform the emissary of the agreed views of the British, Soviet, and American Governments as soon as possible. From this, it follows that the American Government likewise is of the opinion that the time has arrived for the three Governments to discuss the terms of surrender to be imposed upon Rumania at the appropriate time.

The Department of State has accordingly instructed its representative on the European Advisory Commission that, in the opinion of this Government, the question of surrender terms to be imposed upon Rumania falls within the competence of the European Advisory Com-

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<sup>11</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

mission.<sup>13</sup> The American representative on the Commission will, therefore, be prepared to discuss draft surrender terms for Rumania when this question is raised in the Commission's deliberations.

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1944.

740.00119 EAC/68

*The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) to the  
Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

[Extract]<sup>14</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

I am also enclosing herewith a copy of WS-16a entitled "Provisions for Imposition upon Rumania at Time of Surrender" and WS-17 entitled "Aspects of Rumanian Surrender Requiring Agreement between the British, Soviet, and American Governments". These documents have been passed by the Working Security Committee, and have also been cleared through the State Department. Clearance, however, has not yet been received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, accordingly, the two documents cannot be regarded at this juncture as formally approved. As soon as the clearance is obtained from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a telegram will be sent informing you thereof.<sup>15</sup>

Sincerely yours,

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

[Enclosure 1]

WS 16a

January 13, 1944

PROVISIONS FOR IMPOSITION UPON RUMANIA AT TIME OF SURRENDER<sup>16</sup>

The provisions outlined below, which are deemed essential to the assurance of security and to the further prosecution of the war against Germany and which have important political implications, are here recommended for imposition upon Rumania at the time of her surrender. They are intended to be imposed at the will of the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., acting in the interests of the United Nations, Rumania having no free choice of assenting or dissenting. As used in this document, the word

<sup>13</sup> See telegram 207, January 8, 10 p. m., to London, p. 133.

<sup>14</sup> The omitted portion of this letter is printed in vol. I, p. 165.

<sup>15</sup> Notice of clearance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was transmitted in telegram 853 (Eacom 3), February 3, 1944, midnight, to London; not printed.

<sup>16</sup> There is no record that the American delegation ever circulated in the European Advisory Commission a document on surrender terms for Rumania.

“Rumania” means, wherever applicable, whatever central government is in existence, as well as all provincial, local and lesser governmental organs, agencies and officials.

1. *The Signatories.* The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, by the Chief of the High Command of the Rumanian Armed Forces or his representative, and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Rumanian Government.

2. *Unconditional Surrender.* The Rumanian Government and the Rumanian High Command should be required to acknowledge the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Rumania’s armed forces and to agree to submit to such terms and faithfully to execute such duties as may be imposed upon them by the occupation authorities.

3. *Additional Provisions to be Imposed upon Rumania.* The occupation authorities should be authorized to impose, in addition to the terms stipulated at the time of surrender, such further terms as they may from time to time deem necessary or appropriate.

4. *Occupation Organs.* Rumania should be obligated to cooperate with and submit to the regulations and orders of such enforcement agencies as the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces may establish for the military government of occupied Rumania and for the execution of the surrender terms.

5. *Evacuation of Occupied Territories.* Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Rumanian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Rumania on June 21, 1941, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Rumanian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn. Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war.

6. *Demobilization and Disarmament.* Rumanian land, sea and air forces, including armed quasi-police forces, but excluding such civil police as may be approved by the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces, should be completely demobilized. Demobilization should be carried out under the direction of the occupation authorities with as much consideration for internal order and social stability as is consistent with military security. All Rumanian forces, including para-military forces equipped with weapons, should be disarmed immediately under the direction of the occupation authorities. The movement and location of Rumanian troops within Rumania, pending demobilization, should be subject to the direction of the occupation authorities. A permanent audit and in-

spection system should be established and maintained, and there should be continuous and unhampered inspection by the occupation authorities of all areas and installations which are or might be used for the production of war materials, for the conduct of military staff work, or for military training.

7. *Surrender of Materials of War.* The further production of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited, except as it may be deemed desirable by the occupation authorities that it be continued. All arms, ammunition and implements of war should be delivered, and all installations, facilities and services necessary or desirable for the full utilization thereof should be made available to the occupation authorities for such disposition as they may wish to make of them, except that Rumania should be permitted to retain such limited quantities of arms and ammunition as may be designated for internal police purposes by the occupation authorities. Lists of such materials and their locations, as well as of fortifications, mine fields, war production plants, etc. should be turned over to the occupation authorities. The Rumanian authorities should be required to prevent the destruction of such materials and installations until ordered to deliver, destroy or otherwise dispose of them.

8. *Occupation.* The United States, United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations, should have the right to occupy with any forces at their disposal and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Rumanian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Rumanian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout such territory the legal rights of an occupying power as well as the other rights arising under the instrument of surrender. For political purposes Bucharest and other principal cities to be designated should be occupied, at least temporarily. No time limit for the period of general occupation should be stated.

9. *Archives.* Rumania should be required to preserve and make available to the occupation authorities all public and private archives, archival staffs, records, files, documents and information as those authorities may require.

10. *Communications, Transport and Power.* Rumania should be required to place at the disposal of the occupation authorities, for such aid and disposition as they may determine, all facilities for communication and transportation, and for the generation, transmission and distribution of power, including establishments for the manufacture and repair of such facilities. It should be required to protect and maintain as efficiently as possible all such facilities and to inform the occupation authorities concerning them.

10a. *Control of Press, Radio, and Mail.* The utilization of press, radio, mail, and similar instruments of dissemination of information should be made subject to such controls and supervision as may be imposed by occupation forces in the interests of military security and peace and order.

10b. *Merchant Shipping.* All merchant tonnage, including yachts and miscellaneous craft, wherever located, of Rumanian ownership or operated under or subject to Rumanian control (including ships which may be under foreign control but subject to recall by right of option, in which case such option shall be promptly exercised and the return of the vessels facilitated by the Rumanian Government), shall be immediately turned over to the occupation authorities acting in the interests of the United Nations, this action to be taken without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of such vessels.

10c. *Prize Courts and Vessels.* Neither Rumania nor her nationals should be permitted to file or maintain any claim of any description against the United Nations or any national thereof in respect of the seizure, condemnation, appropriation, detention, employment, loss or damage, limited or otherwise, of any Rumanian ships or boats, whether arising under Prize Court proceedings or otherwise. Also, all pending Rumanian Prize Court proceedings should be suspended and terminated immediately, and neither Rumania nor her nationals should be permitted to file or maintain any claim of any description for loss of or for damage to vessels or cargoes sunk by or in consequence of naval action and subsequently salvaged, in which any of the United Nations or their nationals may have had any interest either as owners, charterers, insurers or otherwise, notwithstanding any decree of condemnation which may have been made by a Prize Court of Rumania or of any of the Axis powers. Nothing contained in this paragraph should be construed to imply the admissibility of any other types of claim on the part of Rumania or of Rumanian nationals.

11. *United Nations Nationals and Other Nationals in Custody.* Rumania should be required to safeguard and care for all nationals and members of the armed forces of the United Nations held as prisoners of war or in other custody and to deliver or liberate them as directed by the occupation authorities. Comparable provisions should be made for the safeguarding and care of the nationals and members of armed forces of states other than the United Nations held as prisoners of war or in other custody by Rumania.

12. *The Protection of Foreigners.* Rumania should be required to assume special responsibility for the care of foreign nationals and their property within Rumania.

13. *War Criminals.* Rumania should be obligated to hold in custody and to deliver to the occupation authorities all persons of Rumanian nationality and other persons within Rumania or subject to Rumanian jurisdiction charged with having committed war crimes. Such persons should be delivered whether they are specified by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held in the Rumanian armed forces, the Rumanian Government, or other Rumanian organi-

zations or agencies, at the time of the alleged crime. Rumania should be required to cooperate in the trial and punishment of the persons delivered under this obligation and of any persons of like category held by the United Nations as prisoners of war at the time of the surrender of Rumania through the production of records, the collection of evidence, the enactment of legislation, and any other steps necessary to facilitate such trial and punishment.

14. *Control of the Movement of Persons.* No person should be permitted to leave or enter Rumania without authorization of the occupation authorities. Rumania should be obligated to deliver upon demand persons who are nationals of any state at war with any of the United Nations or the nationals of countries occupied by such belligerent states.

15. *Commercial and Financial Transactions.* Rumania should be obligated to take such measures as the occupation authorities may require to control both foreign and domestic commerce, exchange, finance and all other types of economic activity carried on in Rumania or by Rumanian nationals.

16. *Information and Possible Action Regarding Property.* Rumania, pending further directions from the occupation authorities, should be required to take all necessary measures to safeguard, maintain and prevent the dissipation of all property removed from territory which has been under Rumanian occupation or control; and all property in Rumania belonging to, or seized, confiscated, or transferred under duress from, the governments or nationals of the United Nations, or the governments or nationals of other states whose territories have been occupied by Rumania; and such other property as the occupation authorities may specify. Rumania should be required not to dispose or allow the disposal of property outside its territory, whether of the Rumanian State, of political subdivisions thereof, of Rumanian public or private institutions or organizations, or of persons resident in Rumania, except with the permission of the occupation authorities.

Rumania should be required to take any measures concerning the disposition of all such property that the occupation authorities may require.

Rumania should be required to furnish such information concerning property rights and interests, and transactions or agreements with regard thereto, as the occupation authorities may require.

17. *Reparation.* Rumania should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require and to comply with such directions as may from time to time be prescribed by the occupation authorities acting in the interests of the United Nations.

18. *Undesirable Rumanian Organizations.* All Rumanian organi-

zations which may be regarded as a threat to the security of the occupation forces or to international peace, should be disbanded. Such parts of these organizations as it may seem desirable may be retained or converted for the purpose of performing necessary economic or social functions. The formation of new organizations, designed to replace any which may be disbanded for the reasons stated above, or whose existence may be regarded as a threat to the security of the occupation forces or to international peace, should be prohibited.

19. *Discriminatory Laws.* All Rumanian laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be suspended or repealed as directed by the occupation authorities.

20. *Review of Cases of Persons Detained.* All cases of persons held in custody or restrained or restricted under any Rumanian law, administrative order, or otherwise, should be subject to review in accordance with principles and procedures laid down by the occupation authorities, in order that those unjustly or illegally held may be released and relieved of any legal disability arising from their detention.

21. *Maintenance of Law and Order.* Subject to the paramount rights and power of the occupation authorities, the Rumanian Government should be obligated to maintain law and order in Rumania. Rumanian governmental agencies should be required to keep their services intact and to perform their functions, subject to the control of the occupation authorities and to the rights of these authorities to abolish or reform such agencies.

22. *Rumanian Diplomatic Relations.* Until otherwise determined the conduct of the diplomatic relations of Rumania should be subject to the direction and control of the occupation authorities.

23. *Cultural Agencies.* The conduct of educational and other cultural agencies should be subject to the general supervision of the occupation authorities.

24. *Economic Reconstruction.* Rumania should be required to assist and cooperate with the United Nations in such measures for relief, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction as the United Nations may decide to undertake.

25. *Cooperation in Peace Measures.* Rumania should be required to render such assistance, other than the provision of armed forces, as the United Nations may require for the furtherance of the measures for the maintenance of international peace and security taken by the United Nations.

26. *Costs of Occupation.* Rumania should be obligated to bear the costs of occupation.

27. *Duration and Enforcement of Instrument of Surrender.* The instrument of surrender should continue in force until its termination



by agreement among the United Nations. The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations, should reserve full freedom of action in case Rumania's obligations under the terms of surrender are not fulfilled.

[Enclosure 2]

WS 17

(S 98a)

January 14, 1944

ASPECTS OF RUMANIAN SURRENDER REQUIRING AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE BRITISH, SOVIET, AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS

(See Document WS 16a)

The following factors should be taken into account in considering the terms recommended in the accompanying document, WS 16a, for imposition upon Rumania at the time of her surrender.

*Comment on Nature of Surrender Document*

It is believed that the capitulation of Rumania should be recorded in a single document of unconditional surrender. The statement of principles embodied in WS 16a would, it is felt, provide an adequate legal basis for the principal security, political and economic controls which the United Nations will need to impose on Rumania at the time of surrender and thereafter. The principles listed therein should not, however, be considered as exclusive of such additional conditions which it may be found advisable or necessary to impose. Nor should it be considered that all such terms must necessarily be included in the instrument of surrender so long as the instrument includes the complete and unconditional surrender of Rumania and such other broad and general terms as the three Governments may agree should be included therein in order to safeguard their rights and powers. In general, it is believed that the document of unconditional surrender should be a relatively brief instrument, with full power reserved to implement it by such proclamations, orders and ordinances as the occupation authorities and the Governments which they represent may deem advisable or necessary.

*United Nations Concerned with the Terms of Rumanian Surrender*

The following United Nations are at war with Rumania: the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Haiti, India, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Union of South Africa. The imposition of provisions of surrender upon Rumania should rest with the Soviet, British, and American Govern-

ments, acting in the interest of the United Nations, without prejudice to the participation by other United Nations which are at war with Rumania in subsequent peace negotiations with Rumania.

*Signatory or Signatories to the Surrender Instrument (Article 1)*

The Soviet, British, and American Governments may appoint their several plenipotentiaries, civilian or military or both, to examine jointly the credentials of the Rumanian plenipotentiary or plenipotentiaries and to present for his or their signature, without discussion or negotiation, the instrument of surrender. On the other hand, having agreed together on the provisions of that instrument, the three governments may appoint a single plenipotentiary to act in the name of all three. In this latter case, the Soviet Government, on the ground that its forces have borne the brunt of the fighting against Rumania, will probably insist that the joint representative be a Soviet official or officer, perhaps the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Ukrainian Army. To support this position it might cite the granting by it to General Eisenhower of full powers to act on its behalf in presenting the terms of surrender to the Italian Government. If the offer of surrender should be made in the field, the presentation of the surrender instrument might be made by the Soviet commander. If the offer should be made elsewhere, for example in a neutral country, the presentation of the surrender instrument might be made by representatives of the three Governments.

*Provisional Status of Evacuated Territories and of Certain Occupied Territory (Articles 5 and 8)*

Article 5 of WS 16a provides for the evacuation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Rumanian armed forces "without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims". However, if these disputed areas were at once thereafter reabsorbed into the Soviet administrative system, the ultimate territorial settlement, which the American Government believes should form part of the final settlement, would in effect be prejudged. If geographical and military considerations should make it inevitable for these disputed areas to be placed under Soviet occupation until the conclusion of the final settlement, it should be stipulated between the three principal Allies that these areas are to be occupied in the interest of the United Nations, and are not to be assimilated to the status of national territory until their final disposition has been agreed upon as part of the general peace settlement.

If the above-mentioned arrangement should prove impossible in the face of Soviet insistence upon the immediate reincorporation of Bessarabia into the U.S.S.R., the position might be taken that Northern Bukovina should receive a treatment different from that of Bessarabia

and should be administered under United Nations military government in the interest of the United Nations, pending the general peace settlement. Rumania's possession of Bessarabia from 1918 to 1940 was never given *de jure* recognition by the Soviet Union, nor, in any formal instrument, by the United States. Northern Bukovina, on the other hand, was never a part of Russia until 1940, and the Soviet claim to it has never been recognized by any of the United Nations. The disposition of Northern Bukovina is closely connected with that of Eastern Poland and both problems should be considered together as part of the general peace settlement.

The three principal United Nations should agree, according to the circumstances existing at the time of surrender and occupation, whether the territory acquired by Hungary from Rumania since the outbreak of the war should be placed, in whole or in part, under the military government for Hungary or of that for Rumania. Similarly, the three principal United Nations should agree, according to the circumstances existing at the time of surrender and occupation, whether the territory acquired by Bulgaria from Rumania since the outbreak of the war should be placed, in whole or in part, under the military government for Bulgaria or of that for Rumania. These decisions should be without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of the territories concerned.

*From what Rumanian Regime should surrender be accepted?*

Assuming a Rumanian offer of surrender prior to the capitulation of Germany, the answer to this question would depend in part on the degree to which a Rumanian Government desirous of capitulating might be able to escape from German domination. Of particular importance would be the question of whether any Rumanian Government would be in a position to offer more than a token surrender, leaving the territory itself still to be conquered, as in the case of Italy. If there is agreement among the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. that the Rumanians are in a position to offer unconditional surrender, then those governments should agree without delay as to the Rumanian regime from which they are willing to accept such surrender. If they desire to saddle the Antonescu regime<sup>17</sup> with responsibility for Rumanian participation in the war, it would be important to secure the submission of the present Rumanian leaders, and thus to forestall the danger that later generations of Rumanian nationalists would blame the defeat and the surrender on the moderate and pro-Ally groups.

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<sup>17</sup> Marshal Ion Antonescu was Head of the Rumanian Government and Premier, called Dictator or *Conducator*; Mihai Antonescu was Vice Premier.

On the other hand, by accepting surrender from Antonescu, an impression might be created that his government would be expected to carry out the execution of the terms of surrender. Public opinion in countries of the United Nations, as well as in Rumania, might thereby be confused. For this reason, and also in view of the possible desirability of using Rumanian forces and Rumanian personnel in the subsequent prosecution of the war against Germany, it might be desired, either prior to or subsequent to the surrender, to replace the Antonescu regime by a Maniu-Bratianu government,<sup>18</sup> or by some other group more representative than is the present regime of the popular will and better able to rally the Rumanian people to cooperation with the United Nations in the war against Germany.

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740.00119 EAC/88 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 15, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received February 16—6:08 a. m.]

1268. Comea 28. Department's 853, February 3, midnight (Eacom 3).<sup>19</sup> I have inquired in writing of my British and Russian colleagues in the Commission whether they would be prepared to undertake at an early meeting of the Commission a discussion of proposals for terms of surrender to be imposed upon Rumania. Neither has yet replied formally. However, I recently had a personal conversation with Gousev<sup>20</sup> in which he told me that he had received instructions about German surrender terms and will be able to join in the discussion of this question at our meeting on Friday next. He also said that he would probably be able to consider Rumanian terms.

The British reply on the subject will also probably be affirmative. I am told informally, however, that the British are definitely opposed to any proviso that withdrawal of Rumanian forces from certain areas be without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims. At a time when they are pressing for an immediate direct settlement of Polish boundary questions, they do not wish to imply that such settlements must await a general peace settlement; and they would ask that this subject not be raised in any way in connection with Rumanian surrender terms.

WINANT

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<sup>18</sup> Iuliu Maniu, Rumanian National Peasant Party leader; Constantin I. C. Bratianu, Rumanian National Liberal Party leader.

<sup>19</sup> See footnote 15, p. 136.

<sup>20</sup> Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom and representative on the European Advisory Commission.

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs*<sup>22</sup>

[WASHINGTON, March 1944.]

Rumania is an enemy country and a member of the Axis. When Germany attacked Russia in June 1941, the Antonescu regime in Rumania joined forces with the Nazis in order to regain Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, seized by the Russians in June 1940.<sup>23</sup> Antonescu believed that the Germans would defeat Russia in a few weeks and, believing that a brief, successful war against the Russians would be popular at home, acted accordingly. Rumania also followed the Axis in declaring war on the United States on December 12, 1941.

The Rumanian people, despite their generally pro-western democracy sentiments, responded favorably as long as they were recovering territory, but were quickly disheartened as the war went on into Russia and their casualties mounted toward the half-million mark. Now they realize that Germany is losing the war and that the territory which they "recovered" at such great sacrifices will probably be lost again. They want above all else to withdraw from the war and to make their way into the Allied camp, but so far both the Antonescu regime and the democratic opposition under Maniu have manifested no disposition (a) to turn actively against the Germans or (b) to submit without resistance to the Russians. Their highest hope is that something will happen to enable them to surrender to the Anglo-Saxons.

Whereas the Antonescu regime has had the character of an Axis dictatorship and must accept full responsibility for Rumania's participation in the war alongside Nazi Germany, there is no hesitation in accepting as genuine the professions of Maniu and other elements of the democratic opposition that the sentiments of the Rumanian people as a whole are, and have been throughout, favorable to the western democracies.

The British and ourselves have, in consultation with Moscow, followed fairly parallel lines in our policies and attitudes vis-à-vis Rumania and the other Axis satellites and persisted coldly in our demands for unconditional surrender to the three principal Allies. The two particular problems at present are (a) to find expeditious means to facilitate Rumania's withdrawal from the war and (b) to determine the extent of American and British responsibilities in Rumanian affairs.

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<sup>22</sup> Prepared for Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in connection with his departure for London for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7-29, 1944. For report by Mr. Stettinius to the Secretary of State regarding this mission, see vol. III, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 479 ff.

It is the American view that these two problems are closely linked together and that the resolution of the second will largely determine the means available for the first. With this in mind, the British and American Governments might consider the desirability of reaffirming their expectation that Rumania and the other Axis satellites shall exist in future as independent states within reasonable frontiers. For the purpose of facilitating Rumanian withdrawal from the war, it would then be possible to give that country certain basic assurances regarding its future national existence, at the same time intimating that the more immediate treatment to be accorded that country as regards military occupation and the specific provisions of the surrender terms will be dependent upon such contribution as Rumania may yet be able to make to the Allied prosecution of the war against Germany.

The British have been more ready than ourselves to suggest that Rumanian affairs lie naturally and necessarily in Russian hands. While we recognize the Soviet Union's primary interest in Rumania, both as regards the immediate military phase and the long-range political aspect and acknowledge that distance and lack of important material considerations detach us somewhat from Rumanian affairs, we think that both the United States and Great Britain should maintain their interest in that country and should apply to Rumania the general principles underlying our conduct of the war, assuring as far as possible Rumania's continued existence as a state with such territories as would enable it to make its way as an independent country.

The confused juridical case on the status of Bessarabia might make it possible for us to contemplate the separation of that region from Rumania. The Soviet claim to Northern Bucovina is justified only on Soviet strategical grounds, supported by some general ethnical arguments, but there is no indication that Moscow would let this question be opened. It would be difficult for us to acquiesce in any further extension of Russian claims to Rumanian territory, even if Moscow were to offer to compensate the Rumanians by supporting their demands for the return of Transylvania. The British views on the important Transylvanian problem are not known nor have our own been finally determined, but our several comprehensive studies of this complicated question tend to lead in the direction of whatever form of Transylvanian autonomy would be best adapted to serve the interests of international security and to fit into the general pattern finally determined for the Danubian area.

740.00119 European War 1939/2230 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 3, 1944—10 a. m.  
[Received March 5—8:10 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 54. I am informed that the Rumanian emissary (see the Department's No. 21, January 5, 9 p. m., to the Legation in Cairo<sup>25</sup> and previous related messages) has arrived in Ankara. He is Prince Stirbei<sup>26</sup> and is now staying with his nephew the Rumanian Ambassador<sup>27</sup> until such time as he may be brought to Cairo secretly, possibly under cover of an alleged illness which would confine him ostensibly to his room.

According to a British secret document, to which I have had access and a copy of which is being forwarded by airgram, Stirbei is a relative of Cretzeanu who has been representing Maniu in conversations with British agents and is father-in-law to a British officer Major Boxhall. He is not an emissary of the Government but Marshal Antonescu is said to be privy to his mission. Ionel Bratianu<sup>28</sup> is his brother-in-law. He is 71 years of age and while Cretzeanu believes him likely to be well briefed as an emissary he thinks him unlikely to know much about Rumanian troop dispositions. The Department is doubtless familiar with his private status and past public career.

Incidentally it would appear from the document referred to that the group behind Stirbei does not yet realize the full seriousness of Rumania's position. When Cretzeanu was informed that the sending of an emissary would be useless unless he were prepared to accept unconditional surrender or at least to discuss the details of accession to power of a government so prepared he replied (1) that the Rumanians believe that Bulgaria may soon break with Germany and thus give the British the possibility of entering Bulgaria; (2) that under such conditions Rumania could surrender unconditionally to the British; and (3) that Rumania would rather perish fighting than that "history should show that her present rulers surrendered unconditionally to Russia". Yet it had been previously pointed out to him that there is no hope of British troops arriving in the vicinity of Rumania and that it would be better for the latter if the Russians should arrive at her borders and find her with arms turned against the Germans than that they should find her still fighting on Germany's side.

MACVEAGH

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Prince Barbu Stirbey.

<sup>27</sup> Alexandre Cretzianu, Rumanian Minister in Turkey.

<sup>28</sup> Son of the late Ion Bratianu, Rumanian Premier during World War I and leader of the National Liberal Party.

740.00119 EAC/111 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, March 9, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received March 9—8: 48 p. m.]

1939. Comea 37. My 1268, February 15, 6 p. m., Comea 28. With respect to the written inquiry which I addressed to my colleagues on February 11 asking whether they would be prepared to undertake at an early meeting of the Commission a discussion of proposals for terms of surrender to be imposed on Rumania, Strang<sup>29</sup> replied affirmatively on February 16. No reply has been received from Gousev. Since Gousev's position is that he can discuss no other matters until the question of the form of surrender document for Germany is decided, I have not pressed him for a reply on this point.

Meanwhile my military advisors have been shown a 27-article surrender instrument which the British post-hostilities committee has drafted for possible application to Rumania. I understand however that there is no immediate intention of presenting this to the Commission. The Foreign Office is reluctant to initiate discussion in the Commission on this subject, and would prefer that the initiative should come from the Russians. With this in mind, I am told, they have now instructed their mission at Moscow to take up informally with the Soviet Foreign Office the question of terms for Rumania (see my Comea 36<sup>29a</sup>) and to say that while the British Government feels that this is a matter for the Advisory Commission, they would welcome it if the Soviet Government would itself make the initial proposal as to what the terms of surrender for Rumania should be.

WINANT

740.00119 European War 1939/2294 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, March 17, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received 6 p. m.]

Yugos 61. See my Yugos 60 of March 16, 6 p. m.<sup>30</sup> Conversations with Stirbei began this morning, there being present Lord Moyne,<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Sir William Strang, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and United Kingdom Representative on the European Advisory Commission.

<sup>29a</sup> Not printed.

<sup>30</sup> Not printed; it reported Prince Stirbey's arrival (740.00119 European War-1939/2458).

<sup>31</sup> Walter E. Guinness, 1st Baron Moyne, British Deputy Minister of State, Cairo; Minister Resident in the Middle East.



Novikov and myself together with Steel <sup>32</sup> of the Foreign Office, the British [*Soviet*] and American counselors <sup>33</sup> and a secretary. The official minutes will be telegraphed <sup>34</sup> as soon as typed and approved. Meanwhile, the following is from my notes.

Stirbei stated that he represents Maniu and not Marshal Antonescu, though he "knows" what the latter thinks and that the Marshal has been in touch with the Allies both in Madrid and Stockholm. He said that the Government and the King as well as the opposition are desirous of making a change of front and that the Government is in a better position to do this than the opposition because it disposes of greater effectives and enjoying the confidence of the Germans could manage more adequate secret preparations. He said he thinks Antonescu would be willing to lead such a movement since "he knows that the war is lost and like every Quisling all he wants to do is save his skin". On the other hand, should the Allies desire immediate action, the Maniu interests are willing to stage a *coup d'état* but before undertaking this would like assurance from the Allies on the following points: (1). That Rumania's independence would be maintained. (2). That her territorial rights would be respected. (3). That she would be granted a cobelligerent status and (4). That if attacked by Bulgaria or Hungary she would be helped by the Allies in such ways as might be possible to them, such as air bombardment, sabotage and so forth. When asked about "territorial rights" he said this covered Transylvania and that the [future of] Bessarabia [should] eventually [be decided] by a plebiscite but that Rumania had no pretensions to the part of the Dobrudja ceded to Bulgaria in 1940.

Further as regards the *coup d'état* he said that plans are prepared and that these include participation by the King and officers of all ranks and added that even if not wholly successful it would have a useful effect in disorganizing the German rear. On the other hand, the alternative of a strictly governmental coup under the Marshal would permit the full use of 10 or 15 divisions. He said the Germans have now only 40,000 men in Rumania but that these control all the key points including the air fields and the railways on the Bessarabian side. Immediate help from the Allies would be expected consisting of air support and debarkation at Constanza. When asked who would undertake this last operation he said that obviously only the Russians are in a position to do so.

In conclusion he was informed that what he had said would be reported to our respective Governments. He said he cannot return to

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<sup>32</sup> Christopher Eden Steel, British Acting Counselor, Cairo.

<sup>33</sup> Daniel Semenovich Solod, Counselor of the Embassy of the Soviet Union, and Harold Shantz, Counselor of the American Embassy near the Greek and Yugoslav Governments in Exile in Egypt.

<sup>34</sup> Transmitted to the Department in despatch 22, March 23; not printed.

Rumania "except with the Allied forces" but that he can communicate with his principals through the Rumanian Ambassador to Ankara.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2234: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 18, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 21—11:24 p. m.]

Yugos 65. See the Department's Greek No. 45 of March 17, 6 p. m.<sup>35</sup> My Russian colleague feels that Stirbei's mission lacks practicality. He points out in the first place that Stirbei brought with him no credentials of any kind which would qualify him as a negotiator even for Maniu while his connection with Antonescu is even more tenuous. In the second place he lays emphasis on the fact that Stirbei stated that a *coup d'état* by the opposition would be quickly quelled by the Germans and that action by Government itself would be the only really hopeful procedure. This he thinks would make it appear that there must be an approach by Antonescu himself if real results are to be obtained. In addition Mr. Novikov points out that a landing at Constanza would present great difficulties while the Russian naval bases are still as far away as the Caucasus. He says that the above represents his comments to his Government.

On the other hand Lord Moyne is more optimistic. He finds nothing out of the way or suspicious in Stirbei's status and has told me that he believes he might be told that if Rumania will "work her way home" her independence at least will be saved though boundary questions cannot be gone into at this time. He says he thinks that such an answer might lead to Antonescu's "saving his skin" by flight after turning over the Government to Maniu for the *volte-face* suggested. However, he has made no comments to London, preferring to await conversations with General Wilson<sup>36</sup> and Mr. Macmillan<sup>37</sup> who are expected here today.

I am inclined to agree with Lord Moyne that a definite channel exists here through which an attempt at least could be made to galvanize the defeatism in Rumania which must be very strong to have brought together such strange bedfellows as Maniu, Stirbei and Antonescu. In any case the conversations would appear already to have revealed, if we accept Stirbei's honesty which neither Lord

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<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (SACMED).

<sup>37</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in Northwest Africa.

Moyne nor I have felt moved to doubt, that (1) recognition of Rumania's desperate position is common to all parties; and (2) no movement short of a thorough reversal on the Government's part is likely to achieve real results. To this extent our talks so far may have had some value even if it is decided not to give them any sequel.

MACVEAGH

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740.0011 EW 1939/3-2144

*Memorandum by Mr. Cloyce Kenneth Huston of the Division of Southern European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 21, 1944.

The Rumanian proposals presented by Prince Stirbey in Cairo, as summarized in Ambassador MacVeagh's Yugos-61, are more encouraging than we expected and need not be dismissed as a possible basis of discussion. Their acceptability depends largely on the Russians, who can scarcely consider them unreasonable as a first bid.

The telegram contains two surprises: (a) The suggestion that Marshal Antonescu, "who like all Quislings wants only to save his skin," would be willing to lead a movement to change fronts and (b) the indication that the Rumanians desire a debarkation on the Black Sea coast even though recognizing that the Russians are the only ones now in a position to effect such a landing. The detailed minutes of the talks may throw some light on these two points.<sup>38</sup> We have never quite looked upon Marshal Antonescu as a Quisling and there is enough of the martyr in him to make us doubt his readiness to turn actively on the Germans to save his own skin. (This sounds more like Vice Premier Mihai Antonescu). The Marshal might step down, turn the reins over to Maniu or allow himself to be overthrown, but we still entertain doubt as to his being willing actually to turn actively against the Germans. With regard to a Soviet debarkation, it is enough to recall that Rumania's greatest dread has been the prospect of having Russian forces of occupation.

The American view would seem to be that we do wish immediate action and our position with regard to the four points on which assurances are specifically requested may be stated as follows:

1. Rumanian independence should be maintained;
2. Rumanian territorial rights will, in principle, be respected; the proposal for a plebiscite in Bessarabia (and Northern Bucovina) is reasonable, but the problem of Transylvania is so complicated and serious as to require a general postwar examination;
3. Co-belligerent status could be granted to Rumania only on Rumanian soil and for the purpose of ejecting the Germans from

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<sup>38</sup>The minutes did not use the word "Quisling" but stated that Prince Stirbey "considered that he [Antonescu] would be prepared to execute a *volte-face* for the purpose of saving his skin". (740.00119 European War 1939/2400)

Rumania; it could in no case be allowed to operate beyond the Rumanian frontiers; and

4. If Rumania were to surrender and take an active pro-Allied position, the Allies would provide such assistance as might be possible in the event of an unprovoked attack of either Hungary or Bulgaria; the launching of a Rumanian attack against either of these countries would, however, not be tolerated; should one or both of these countries likewise join the Allied camp, their military operations should not be allowed to extend into Rumanian territory nor should Rumanian military operations be allowed to extend into their territory.

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740.00119 European War 1939/2294 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1944—5 p. m.

2146. In consideration of a request from the British Foreign Office communicated through its Embassy here for an expression of the views of this Government on the Rumanian proposals presented to the Allied representatives by Prince Stirbey in Cairo on March 17 (see Department's immediately following telegram<sup>39</sup>), the Department is formulating a statement of such views in consultation with the Joint Chiefs and will forward them to the British as soon as may be possible.

Meanwhile, in as much as related events are moving rapidly and valuable time may elapse before Prince Stirbey can be given a reply representing the concerted view of the three Allied Governments, it is believed that he should be advised accordingly and that he should be afforded whatever facilities he may require in order to communicate to his principals, should he so desire, the fact that whereas such necessary delay may be expected the Rumanians must realize that they alone will have to bear the responsibility if they postpone action until too late.

Please communicate the foregoing to the Foreign Office.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2351 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, March 23, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 24—11:50 a. m.]

1003. The British Ambassador has given me a letter dated March 22 which he has received from Molotov in reply to his own letter of

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<sup>39</sup> No. 2147, March 22, 5 p. m., not printed; it repeated telegrams of March 17 and 18 from Cairo, pp. 149 and 151, respectively.

March 20 regarding the talks between Allied representatives and Prince Stirbey in Cairo.

Molotov explained that from the preliminary reports received by the Soviet Government regarding these talks, Prince Stirbey does not appear to represent Maniu and has no authority from him to carry on conversations with the Allies; that it is now clear Maniu is not one of those leaders who might oppose Antonescu and that it is more probable that his actions are taken with Antonescu's permission, Maniu thus being a tool in his hands. Molotov adds that it is not at present clear either from Stirbey's statements or from other information that Antonescu shows interest in or a desire for negotiations with the Allies leading to Rumania's withdrawal from the war and her taking the side of the Allies against Germany.

In view of the above, Molotov concludes that, based on available information, "there are no grounds for attaching importance to Stirbey's statements" and Molotov expresses doubt "as to whether the negotiations which have been in progress with Prince Stirbey during the past few days in Cairo can lead to positive results".

The British Ambassador is giving me his reports of the conversation and has read me a cable just received describing the communication received by the British Embassy in Turkey from the Rumanian Minister there regarding Antonescu's invitation to meet Hitler and the prompt reply dispatched by the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean theatre.

It would be helpful if I could be informed of our views regarding the developments in Rumania in the event that Molotov raises the question with me.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/2353 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 24, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received March 24—3:34 p. m.]

Yugos 68. Under stress of developing circumstances Stirbei expressed the desire to talk specially and separately with the Soviet Ambassador here and my British colleague has inquired of London whether this can be permitted, in the belief that Stirbei would certainly be willing to report anything which might be said. Meanwhile on March 22 Stirbei received from the Rumanian Ambassador in Ankara through the British the following message which the Department will note reveals the actually close connection between the Rumanian Government and the emissary.

[“]I have received a telegram from Mihai Antonescu telling me that Marshal Antonescu was invited to Hitler’s headquarters and that he (Mihai) will probably accompany him. Mihai sends me the following:

‘I must know at once what is the impression made by recent events in Hungary,<sup>40</sup> the effect they may have on eventual territorial problems with which Rumania may be faced. In view of rapid turn of events from the Hungarian standpoint it is necessary that we should know upon what eventual political and military help we can count. I wish to draw your attention to vital character of present statement and necessity of obtaining clear understanding by Wednesday March 22nd at latest.’

I consider that Germans now having control of Hungary will repeat their demands to Rumania to send entire army to assist Germans upon whatever final defense line they may decide. Previous pretext of a defense against possible Hungarian attack no longer exists. Therefore Rumania is faced with either still closer collaboration with Germany or resistance to Germany without knowing upon what immediate assistance she can count and what she may expect in the future from political standpoint.”

In reply to the above General Wilson in his quality of Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean sent on the same date the following to Marshal Antonescu.

“You should on no account visit Hitler. If you do, this will be taken as final evidence of Roumanian intention to collaborate to the end with Germany and your country will have to take the full consequences.

You should at once surrender to the Three Great Powers and order Roumanian troops to oppose no resistance to the Russians. The Germans are in a hopeless position in South Russia and you have now your last and best chance to contribute to their total defeat. We shall judge by results and nature of peace terms ultimately imposed on Roumania will be largely determined by the extent to which she contributes towards the defeat of Germany. The more you do to embarrass the Germans the swifter will be their defeat and the better the prospect of saving Roumania from becoming a battleground during the coming weeks.

Acknowledge receipt at once.”

I have advised my British colleague of the contents of the Department’s telegram No. 2146 of March 22, 5 p. m., to London but no word has yet been received from there in this connection and meanwhile the Department may consider that General Wilson’s reply gives the Allied position as of the present moment.

MACVEAGH

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<sup>40</sup> German military occupation of Hungary had led to the flight of Prime Minister Kallay.

740.00119 European War 1939/2352 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received March 24—5:02 p. m.]

2407. The Department's views were communicated to the Foreign Office in accordance with its No. 2146, March 22, 5 p. m. Foreign Office expressed themselves in general agreement with the views set forth by the Department. They tell us that a message along these lines was in fact sent to Marshal Antonescu by General Wilson on March 22.

The Foreign Office is now attempting by every means at its disposal to prevail on the Russians to indicate what line should be undertaken as regards Rumania. They feel unable to take any further action until they have received some concrete indication of Russian views and desires.

WINANT

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740.00119 European War 1939/2367 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 25, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received March 25—2:08 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 69. Prince Stirbei has received a message from Maniu despatched from Bucharest March 22 and from Ankara March 24 of which the following is a paraphrase:

“With the consent of the King, I ask you to place the following before the British and American representatives knowing there is every indication that Rumania, like Hungary, will be asked to accept German troops in the country and that Germany will strive for still closer collaboration and make every attempt to force Rumania to greater military effort against the Soviet Union.

The occupation of Rumania following that of Hungary, which certainly will be followed shortly by occupation of Bulgaria, will mean completion of Germany's preparations for defense of the Balkans.

To have some basis on which to organize a possible attempt at resisting the German occupation we must know if we can count on a minimum of help from the Anglo-Americans. We realize we can not count at once upon a large military operation but they should at least consider giving limited but immediate help from airborne troops and airforces.

The zone of attempted resistance would be at Oltenia and the Banat in order to have the possibility of eventual retreat into Yugoslavia.

It is not impossible that large scale invasion of Rumania by the Germans may be delayed a short time until the Germans are completely installed in Hungary; therefore it is not yet too late to organize Anglo-American military assistance."

Lord Moyne has informed Stirbei that this message cannot be accepted because it is addressed only to the British and Americans and not to all three negotiating powers; and that negotiations will be resumed upon receipt of a message addressed jointly to the British, Russian and American representatives.

My Soviet colleague called on me yesterday afternoon and expressed surprise, not unmingled with indignation, that General Wilson should have sent his telegram to Antonescu (see my Yugoslav Series 68, March 24, 5 p. m.) without previous consultation with him. He ascertained that I also had not been consulted but when I pointed out that the General had acted in his capacity as Allied Commander he replied that, while the General may be Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, the area concerned is in the Eastern and not the Mediterranean theatre. He admitted that the General's strong warning might have a salutary effect in stiffening Rumania's resistance to German demands but, though somewhat mollified when he left me, he appeared to be still of the opinion that there should have been a consultation before any action was taken through an emissary with whom the three powers have entered into contact jointly.

Lord Moyne has informed me that when the Foreign Office received a copy of General Wilson's message it immediately telegraphed to ask whether the Soviet Ambassador had been consulted in the matter. In his reply Lord Moyne explained all the circumstances connected with the sending of the message, on which occasion I understand he and Mr. Macmillan and their Foreign Office advisers were present with General Wilson.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2351: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1944—9 p. m.

710. Your 1003, March 23. Since the Department had not been led to believe that Prince Stirbey would be authorized to negotiate an agreement or to sign a document of surrender or armistice with the Allies, it has not felt that his lack of credentials necessary for such a purpose need be construed as indicating that he could not be considered as representing Maniu in the Cairo conversations. While it cannot be assumed, in view of recent events, that these talks will lead swiftly



to a concrete solution of the Rumanian situation, it is believed they may prove to be useful and afford a possible implement for facilitating Rumania's elimination from the war.

The Department's further views are contained in the following telegram sent to London: <sup>41</sup>

"The Department shares the satisfaction expressed by the Foreign Office regarding the unexpectedly realistic approach as indicated by the Rumanian proposals. Whereas we feel it is for the Rumanians to decide whether a Maniu coup or a government *volte-face* should be employed to bring about a change of front, it is recognized that Antonescu would if he is willing and prepared to act without delay dispose of more effective means and have the greater chance of success.

"The Department believes that the particular points raised by Stirbey would not seriously conflict with the terms the Allies may be able to work out among themselves. The American military authorities consider that the Rumanian stipulations are unobjectionable from the United States military point of view. They have also indicated their belief that Rumania's withdrawal from the war and the assumption by Rumania of a status of co-belligerency with the Allies should be of cardinal importance in the further prosecution of the war and that the earlier an agreement can be concluded for such withdrawal the greater should be the magnitude of the loss inflicted on the German armies. In dealing with the situation, of course, full account must be taken of the rapid evolution of events in Southeastern Europe.

"Please communicate the foregoing to the Foreign Office and say that a full expression of the United States view giving attention to the specific points contained in the Rumanian proposals is being formulated in consultation with the American military authorities and will be forwarded as soon as possible. The Foreign Office should not feel, however, that it need await the receipt of a more detailed statement of the American view if on the basis of the foregoing general expression it should be found possible to address a communication to Stirbey which might be useful in convincing the Rumanians that they should act now before it is too late."

HULL

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740.0011 EW (Peace)/3-2744

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1944.

MR. DUNN: Mr. Pares <sup>42</sup> of the British Embassy came to see me yesterday (Sunday) evening to read to me, from rough, untyped code-room copy, the substance of a series of telegrams, beginning with one

<sup>41</sup> No. 2221, March 23, midnight.

<sup>42</sup> Peter Pares, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

to the Foreign Office from the British Ambassador at Moscow. It was to the effect that Mr. Molotoff had sent a letter to the Ambassador, referring to the Rumanian peace proposals, and, after some abuse of the Rumanians as being the worst of the satellites, offering "at the request of the British Government" nevertheless to continue to deal with Prince Stirbey.

The Russians then made a proposal to the effect that contact should at once be established with Marshal Antonescu, supplementary to the message which General Wilson has already sent to him, covering these points:

(a) Antonescu should order Rumanian troops in contact with the Russians to surrender.

(b) If this order can be carried out as regards Rumanian formations in the Dniester and Crimea regions, such troops, after surrender, would then be sent to the Pruth areas to be returned to Marshal Antonescu for organization by the Rumanians for use against the Germans;

(c) Contact should be established between the Rumanian and Soviet commands, for handling "practical problems of mutual basic aid" against the Germans; Marshal Antonescu to name the Rumanian personality for this purpose, or to agree that it should be one of the Rumanian generals already surrendered and now in the USSR.

A second telegram gave the text of a message from London to Lord Moyne, the British Resident Minister at Cairo, instructing him to see that through General Wilson a message is sent to Antonescu along the lines indicated above. This telegram also said that since Antonescu may not be reached (he is reported to have obeyed the summons to Hitler) the same measures should be applied by Maniu or anyone else coming into effective control of the Rumanian Government. Accordingly, a similar communication should be given to Prince Stirbey, by the representatives of the three Governments (Great Britain, the USSR, and the United States) at Cairo, for transmission to Maniu.

The telegram to the Embassy at Washington reporting the above requested that the Department be informed, with the request that we send instructions to Cairo to join in the communication to Prince Stirbey as outlined above.

It is to be supposed that paraphrases of the telegrams in question will be sent by the Embassy to the Department in due course. Meanwhile, I think we can proceed on the basis of the above summary, which is based on notes taken while the telegrams were being read to me.

You will observe that the Russian proposal in its present form would leave the matter of the Rumanian surrender exclusively in Russian hands.

740.00119 European War 1939/2376 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 27, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received March 28—8:10 a. m.]

Yugos 70. See my Yugos 65 of March 18, 8 p. m. I have been informed by Lord Moyne that while Molotov's reactions to the Stirbei proposals were in line with my Soviet colleague's remarks, he received late yesterday the 26th a message from London quoting a further letter from Molotov which has brought the Soviet Government very decidedly into the picture. This letter states that while "the Soviet Government have little hope of usefulness of premature contact with Marshal Antonescu since his Government have behaved generally worse than the Finnish and Hungarian Governments by leaving their troops in the front line against Soviet troops in the Crimea", they are "willing to try to establish the status of [*contact with?*] Antonescu", and "consider that measures already taken by General Wilson should be supplemented" in the respects quoted below.

Apparently accepting this as Soviet approval of British approach to Antonescu through Maniu, Lord Moyne early this morning radioed "to Mr. Maniu from HMG" the following message containing the substance of Molotov's letter:

"HMG is informed by the Soviet Government as follows:

(1) The Soviet Government is now ready to try to establish contact with Antonescu.

(2) In addition to measures already urged by General Wilson they state the following:

(a) Antonescu should order Rumanian troops in contact with Soviet troops to lay down arms and surrender to Soviet troops. If this order is issued and carried out by Rumanian troops in the Crimea or Dniester area, Soviet Commander undertakes to send surrendered troops to one of Pruth areas to be handed over to Antonescu for organization by Rumanian Government for resistance to the German troops.

(b) Direct contact should be established between Soviet command and Rumanian supreme command for the settlement of practical problems connected with mutual military aid against the Germans. For this purpose Antonescu should appoint authorized person or give necessary authority to one of the Rumanian generals who are prisoners in Russia.

Message ends. Please pass this message to Antonescu by quickest means and advise us immediately when you have done this."

Lord Moyne has sent my Soviet colleague copy of the above message which was despatched without prior consultation with Mr. Novikov or myself on the grounds that immediate action was vital and the clandes-

tine radio channel operates only in the very early morning hours. For the same reason General Wilson was not consulted since he is no longer here.

On March 25 Maniu telegraphed that the two Antonescus had gone to Hitler and that General Wilson's message had arrived after their departure. In a further message received today, Maniu indicates that the Antonescus have returned and that he has no precise information regarding the decisions taken but that "the occupation of Rumania appears to have been avoided".

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 EW 1939/3-2844

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 28 March 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your two undated memoranda forwarding a summary of a series of telegrams from Moscow to London to Cairo, setting forth the views of the Soviet Government as to steps now to be taken if the surrender of the Rumanian army can be effected. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the Russian proposal in effect leaves the matter of Rumanian surrender exclusively in Russian hands but consider that from a military viewpoint, this is only natural and to be expected since Russian forces are the only ones prepared to implement and take advantage of the surrender terms.

From the military point of view, the present Rumanian situation is analogous to the Italian situation at the time of her surrender to the British and ourselves. Since Russian participation in Italian operations was impracticable, the western Allies handled the matter of Italian surrender to the three principal Allies and Russian participation in the Italian situation has been limited to representation on the Allied Advisory Council for Italy and the Allied Control Commission.

As indicated in previous letters on this subject, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the detachment of Rumania and the other Balkan satellites from the Axis is militarily of the highest importance and that it is especially desirable that this detachment should take the form of a maximum effort on their part in support of Allied interests. Especially in view of the current developing military situation, prompt results are of the greatest importance and urgency. In view of this, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that no restrictive political considerations should be advanced that would militate against the early surrender of the Rumanian forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that Mr. MacVeagh be instructed to join in the proposed communication from the representatives of the three Governments to Prince Stirbey.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the*

*Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

740.00119 European War 1939/2376: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—8 p. m.

17 Yugos. The Department had been informed by the British Embassy of the Russian proposal mentioned in your 70 of March 27, and had communicated it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who have now recommended that you join in approving the message to Maniu through Stirbey. There will thus be general agreement among all the representatives of the Allied Governments on the matter.

The Department feels that such a message may prove to be the more useful since we had accepted with some reservation Stirbey's apparent belief in Antonescu's willingness to turn against the Germans (see your Yugos 61 March 17).

In making this recommendation the Joint Chiefs emphasize the urgency of working for prompt results in view of the current developing military situation, and stress the military importance of detaching Rumania or other Balkan satellites from the Axis, and the desirability of effecting this detachment in such a way as to obtain maximum benefit to Allied interests.

Certain general views which the Department thinks may be useful to you for background purposes are being communicated to you in a separate telegram.

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/2398: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 30, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received March 30—5 p. m.]

Yugos 76. This morning Prince Stirbei forwarded the Soviet Government's proposals (see last paragraph of my Yugos 75, March 29,

8 [9] p. m.<sup>43</sup>) to Maniu for Antonescu via British channels but at the same hour the British received a message from Maniu relaying a complaint from Antonescu that the messages containing the Soviet proposals have not come through Cretzeanu and adding that in view of their vital importance Antonescu desires them repeated through Cretzeanu and through DC (a British parachutist with a radio set who was captured and is still held by Antonescu) in which case he will reply direct.

Accordingly the British are replying to Maniu that they are repeating the Soviet proposals through Cretzeanu and will repeat them to Maniu himself by the same channel if he so wishes. Their message adds that they urge Antonescu to establish contact with the Allies by means of the above mentioned DC set as soon as possible; and that they also urge him to establish contact with the Soviet High Command as advised in the Soviet Government's message.

Our British friends are encouraged [by] the evident desire of Antonescu to make sure the Soviet offer is authentic. They comment that Antonescu needs time to prepare a change of front and that the daily advance of the Soviet forces must make the advantages of a change constantly more obvious to him.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2398a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1944—8 p. m.

18 Yugos. The course of the conversations on the matter of the Rumanian surrender has demonstrated that the rapid march of events requires certain decisions of primary military importance which cannot be delayed for detailed consultation between the three Allied Governments. You have handled these Rumanian conversations in full accord with the Department's ideas, and the following observations are intended for your guidance as confidential background information:

The American military authorities expect that in working on political arrangements for detaching the satellites from the Axis we shall keep in mind the following military considerations:

1. Prompt results are of the greatest importance because of the rapid evolution of events; political considerations should therefore be examined with particular attention to the degree to which they might be restrictive of military effectiveness;

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<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

2. In making political arrangements, which obviously should be acceptable to the Russians, particular care should be taken to ensure that such arrangements will not in any way prejudice the present full scale Russian military effort;

3. The United States will not in the near future be in a position to furnish military assistance in that area, except by limited support of guerrilla operations by air or possibly limited bombing.

The cogency of these considerations is apparent. In the field of political arrangements there may therefore be a recurrent difficulty in adjusting, within the framework of joint agreements, the necessity of primary action by one or two of the three Allied Governments.

It may be that a solution could be found in arrangements analogous to the situation in Italy, where the Russians were consulted in advance as to the armistice, and, while not participating in the operations, are represented on the Advisory Council and the Control Commission. No specific plans applicable to the satellite states have as yet been agreed to by the three Governments. We have tried, however, to get action on this matter, and a series of documents setting forth the American views on terms of surrender of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have been for some time in the hands of the American representative on the European Advisory Commission at London.<sup>44</sup> These documents provide for the general interests of the United Nations, even though the surrender may be effected and the occupation administered by military forces of only one or more of the countries interested. It is also our view that proper consideration should be given to the particular interests of those of the smaller United Nations adjacent to or otherwise immediately concerned with the respective enemy state.

The European Advisory Commission was established in order to provide effective and regular means of consultation and joint agreement in the settlement of general questions. The proposals which we submit to the Commission demonstrate moreover that we desire, as regards each enemy state, to give practical effect to this principle before important political decisions of a unilateral nature foreclose the opportunity.

The Department hopes that with these observations in mind you will report such developments in the present conversations or other intercourse with Allied representatives as may be helpful in finding means for the practical implementation of this policy.

HULL

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<sup>44</sup> For correspondence on the European Advisory Commission, see vol. I, pp. 1 ff. For terms of surrender for Rumania, see letter of February 2 from the Director of the Office of European Affairs to London, *ante*, p. 136. For terms for Hungary, see instruction 4433 of August 15 to London and telegram 40, January 4, 1945, 6 p. m., from Moscow, vol. III, pp. 883 and 956, respectively. For terms for Bulgaria, see telegram 1666, March 4, midnight, to London, *ibid.*, p. 308.

740.00119 European War 1939/2406 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 31, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received March 31—4: 40 p. m.]

Yugos 77. See Department's Yugos 17, March 29, 8 p. m. At a meeting today in my office attended by Prince Stirbei, Ambassador Novikov and Mr. Steel representing Lord Moyne, I informed Stirbei that my Government desires me to join in approving the message to Maniu for Antonescu quoted in my Yugos 70 of March 27. Steel then made a similar statement on the part of his Government, thus establishing general agreement among the representatives of the Allied Governments on this matter. The fact of this agreement will be communicated by Stirbei to Maniu at once. I also agreed to the action already taken by the British and Russians in advising Maniu that the proposals to Antonescu can be extended to him should he find it necessary to take over the Government (see my Yugos 71 and 76 of March 28 and 30, respectively<sup>45</sup>). And this likewise was made clear to Stirbei to whom in addition is strongly stressed the urgency of working for prompt results.

MACVEAGH

861.014/286

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT<sup>46</sup>

As a result of a successful advance the Red Army has approached the Prut river which represents the state border between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. This signifies the beginning of a full reestablishment of the Soviet state border, established in 1940 by a treaty between the Soviet Union and Rumania,<sup>46a</sup> treacherously violated in 1941 by the Rumanian Government in alliance with Hitlerite Germany. At the present time the Red Army is clearing the Soviet territory from all enemy troops which still remain on it, and the time is not far off, when the entire Soviet border with Rumania will be fully reestablished.

The Soviet Government informs that the advancing units of the Red Army, pursuing the German armies and allied with them Rumanian troops has crossed at several points the Prut river and entered Rumanian territory. The Supreme Command of the Red Army ordered

<sup>45</sup> No. 71, March 28, not printed.

<sup>46</sup> Issued to the press at Moscow on April 2, 1944.

<sup>46a</sup> Treaty of June 28, 1940, text printed in Moscow *Izvestiya*, June 29, 1940; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 479-490.



the advancing Soviet units to pursue the enemy until its final defeat and capitulation.

At the same time the Soviet Government states that it is not pursuing the aims of acquirement of any part of Rumanian territory or change of the existing social regime of Rumania and that the entrance of Soviet troops into Rumania is exclusively dictated by the military necessity and the continuing resistance of the enemy troops.

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861.014/286

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] April 1, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: The attached statement<sup>47</sup> to be issued by the Soviet Government relative to the advance of the Red Army into Rumania is a reiteration of the official position announced by the Soviet Government relative to their territorial aims in eastern and southeastern Europe, i.e., that they would restore the western boundaries of the Soviet Union as they existed on June 22, 1941 when the German attack was launched. The only modification in this stand was the recent proposal to establish the frontier with Poland on the basis of the so-called Curzon Line, which in certain parts is slightly to the east of the June 1941 frontier.<sup>48</sup>

As far as Rumania is concerned this statement signifies that the Soviet Government intends to reincorporate all of Bessarabia and all of Bucovina into the USSR. Bessarabia formed part of the Czarist Empire from 1812 to the end of the first World War, and although it was under the political control of Rumania until 1940 the Soviet authorities never officially relinquished their claim to this area, which was finally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940.

The former Austrian province of Bucovina never formed part of the Czarist Empire and was only incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 at the same time as Bessarabia was taken over. The annexation of Bucovina gives the Soviet Union a common frontier with the eastern tip of Czechoslovakia.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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<sup>47</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>48</sup> For correspondence on the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile at London and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 1216 ff.

740.00119 European War 1939/2414 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 1, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received April 1—3: 56 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 78. See my Yugoslav Series 77, March 31, 6 p. m. Yesterday General Wilson sent Mr. Maniu a message urging that the Rumanians take action in line with Soviet proposals to him and Antonescu and stating, in reply to their inquiries as to what British and American help they can expect, that as an immediate measure he is prepared to make powerful air attacks on such targets as they suggest. Details concerning this message, its prior submission to the Soviet Government and the latter's reply, are given in Lord Moyne's telegram 125, March 31, to Washington.

A message dated yesterday was received from Maniu today stating that Antonescu "in principle" is won over to the Allied cause and is awaiting urgently the repetition of Soviet conditions through Cretzeanu (see my Yugoslav Series 76 of March 30, 5 p. m.).

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2418 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 3, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received April 4—5: 34 a. m.]

Yugos 80. Instead of proceeding as stated in my Yugos 79, April 3, 5 p. m.,<sup>49</sup> Lord Moyne is tonight sending the following message to Marshal Antonescu from the British Government:

"1. In your message transmitted through Theodorescu<sup>50</sup> you asked upon what assistance from the air Rumania can count if she resists the Germans. In reply we are willing to bring powerful air attack to bear on such targets as you suggest.

2. You also asked whether the Allies can make some helpful declaration of policy to assist you in producing will to fight among Rumanians. Mr. Molotov has now made a clear declaration of which you are no doubt aware.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Possibly Col. Tr. Teodorescu, Rumanian Military, Naval, and Air Attaché in Turkey.

3. You must therefore reply at once whether you accept the proposals of the Soviet Government with which the other Allies are fully associated.”

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2432 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 4, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received April 5—11:30 a. m.]

Yugos 81. My Yugos 80, April 3, 8 p. m. Yesterday Prince Stirbey sent a message to Maniu in the following sense:

The time for halfhearted measures has passed. If after the British message today and the Molotov declaration you are still unable to take the action you asked me to affirm that you would take under even less exigent circumstances, I am forced to assume that you have grave reasons for not doing so and to conclude that there is no further point in my mission here.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2468a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1944—9 p. m.

812. The Department has been informed that Clark Kerr was instructed some days ago to inform the Soviet Government that the British presume that in dealing with the Rumanians for surrender of the Rumanian Army the Russians will regard themselves as acting on behalf of the three principal Allies. He was directed also to say that the British expect that they and the Americans will be consulted in advance in case the armistice terms which the Russians may propose carry any stipulations or implications extending beyond the accomplishment of the military capitulation. The British Embassy has inquired whether similar instructions could be sent to you.

The Department is in general agreement with the British point of view, and we have no reason to believe that it is at variance with the Soviet views. You may, therefore, talk to Mr. Molotoff along these lines, having in mind the instructions to MacVeagh which were summarized in the last two paragraphs of the Department's 762 of March 31 to you.<sup>51</sup>

Mr. Molotov's statement has already provided the Rumanians certain assurances regarding the essentially military character of the

<sup>51</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 17 Yugos, March 29, 8 p. m., p. 162.

penetration of Russian forces into Rumanian territory. We believe it would also be useful in stimulating favorable action by the Rumanians to have it made clear to them that the three principal Allies are acting after mutual consultation and in common agreement, and that the future of the Rumanian nation is not to be left exclusively in the hands of the one power with which Rumania has been directly engaged in combat.<sup>52</sup>

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2448 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 6, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received April 8—9 : 30 a. m.]

Yugos 83. After receiving a delayed further inquiry from Rumania with regard to Soviet armistice conditions, Prince Stirbei yesterday interviewed Soviet Ambassador.

In reply the latter stated that an armistice is impracticable so long as German armies are fighting in Rumania intermingled with Rumanian troops; and that immediate solution is the one indicated by Allies in the message containing the Soviet proposals (as quoted in my Yugos 70, March 27, 7 p. m.). Novikov added that a week has passed without a reply or acknowledgment to the offer which establishes *de facto* co-belligerency and that the situation demands a firm and urgent reply before negotiations can be resumed.

The substance of the above was sent from Prince Stirbei to Mihai Antonescu via Ankara and to Maniu direct.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 EW 1939/2459½ : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 8, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received April 8—12 : 58 p. m.]

Yugos. 84. Department's Yugos 21 of April 6.<sup>53</sup> The Russian Ambassador called this morning and gave me the Rumanian armistice terms which the Soviet Government proposes, as below set forth in translation from the French. Mr. Novikov said that immediately on receipt of British and American assent he is authorized to transmit these terms to Antonescu and Maniu through Stirbei. Otherwise he

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<sup>52</sup> For press conference statement by the Secretary of State on April 3, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1944, p. 315.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

will relay to his Government any objections or suggestions as we may express.

I believe the military clauses are unexceptional under the instructions sent me by the Department but that the latter may wish to consider clause 4 regarding Transylvania. Lord Moyne is also telegraphing his Government with particular regard to this clause.

"1. The Rumanian troops who are fighting with the Germans against the Red Army comprise seven divisions in Crimea, three or more divisions in the region of Odessa, three or more divisions in the region of Kichinev. These Rumanian divisions must surrender to the Red Army or they must attack in the rear of the Germans and commence operations against the Germans together with the Red Army.

If this is done the Soviet Government agrees to complete the armament of all these divisions and to place them immediately at the disposition of Marshal Antonescu and Mr. Maniu.

2. The Soviet minimum conditions of armistice are the following:

(a) Rupture with the Germans and common operations of the Rumanian and Allied troops including the Red Army against the Germans for the purpose of restoring the independence and sovereignty of Rumania.

(b) Reestablishment of the Rumanian-Soviet frontier in accordance with the agreement of 1940.

(c) Indemnity for the losses caused the Soviet Union by the hostilities and occupation by Rumania of its territory.

(d) Repatriation of all the Soviet and Allied prisoners of war as well as the internees.

These minimum conditions can be changed for the worse if Rumania does not accept them soon.

3. The Soviet Government does not ask that Rumanian territory be occupied for the duration of the armistice by the Soviet troops but the Soviet troops as well as those of the Allies must have unrestricted freedom of movement throughout Rumanian territory if the military situation makes it necessary. The Rumanian Government must contribute to this to the best of its ability with all its means of communication on land, water and in the air.

4. The Soviet Government considers unjust the decisions of the Vienna Award<sup>54</sup> and it is ready to conduct operations in common with Rumania against the Hungarians and the Germans with the object of restoring to Rumania all of Transylvania or the major part thereof.

5. If Rumania wishes to have for contact with the Soviet Union besides the general representative for military questions—also a political representative for political questions—the Soviet Government has no objections."

MACVEAGH

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<sup>54</sup> For documents signed at Vienna, August 30, 1940, see Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. x (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 581-587. See also telegrams 3826, August 30, 1940, from Berlin, and 509, September 6, 1940, from Bucharest, *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 501 and 505, respectively.

740.00119 European War 1939/2457: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 10, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received April 11—11:15 a. m.]

1232. As the British had handled the matter in writing an informal note was sent to Molotov on April 8, pursuant to the Department's 812, April 5, 9 p. m.

The note was confined to the two points that (1) my Government presumed that in dealing with the Rumanians for surrender of the Rumanian army the Soviet Government would regard itself as acting on behalf of the three Allies and (2) that in case the armistice terms should carry any implications or stipulations extending beyond the accomplishment of the military capitulation my Government would of course expect that it and the British Government would be consulted in advance.

The following is a paraphrased translation of Molotov's reply dated April 8.

"I wish to inform you, with reference to your note of April 8, concerning negotiations in Cairo with representatives of Rumania, that the Soviet Government has given precise instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, Novikov, to consult with the appropriate representatives of the United States of America and Great Britain before transmitting any further declaration to the Rumanians on the part of the Soviets. Such consultations have already taken place according to information at my disposal."

The British Embassy advises that it has received a similar reply. It also advises that further Soviet terms have been furnished to our representatives at Cairo.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EW 1939/4-1044

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 10 April 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to the memorandum of Mr. James C. Dunn of April 8, 1944,<sup>55</sup> transmitting the terms proposed by the Soviet Government for a Rumanian armistice.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that our Government should give its full assent to the military provisions of the proposed terms, the acceptance of which by Rumania would result in the assumption by that nation of a co-belligerent status with the Allies.

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

Such action by Rumania would be an event of such cardinal importance in the further prosecution of the war that it is hoped that our Government may find a basis for agreement with the Soviet and British Governments on any nonmilitary provisions of the proposed terms.<sup>56</sup>

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:  
G. C. MARSHALL  
*Chief of Staff, U.S. Army*

740.0011 EW (Peace)/3-2744

*Memorandum by Mr. Cloyce Kenneth Huston of the Division of Southern European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] April 11, 1944.

We must bear in mind the following points in connection with the Russian armistice terms for Rumania:

1. Since the terms constitute a definite departure from the principle of unconditional surrender,<sup>57</sup> it will be important for the purposes of prestige and psychological warfare to protect ourselves as far as possible from charges of having deserted this loudly announced principle.

2. The terms are essentially Russian, not allied nor tri-partite; they are frankly based on the practical premise that the war with Rumania is Russia's own business. We have heretofore proceeded on the assumption that the surrender terms would be worked out jointly in the European Advisory Commission in London and the American representative of that body has been provided with an American draft of proposed terms for Rumania.

3. The Russian proposals differ drastically from those prepared in the Department, worked over in the Working Security Committee and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for submission to the European Advisory Commission.<sup>58</sup> For example: The American draft was based on the principle of unconditional surrender, envisaged military occupation and carried detailed provisions regarding occupational organs, demobilization, disarmament, communications facilities, war criminals, repeal of discriminatory legislation et cetera, et cetera.

4. The Russian terms are at variance with the American view on territorial questions:

(a) whereas the Soviet Government is acting on the assumption that Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina lie within the Soviet state frontiers, we have entertained the view that the status of

<sup>56</sup> In telegram 3469, April 29, 10 p. m., to London, the Department stated that the revised views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in Eacom 16, Department's 2815 of April 10, 6 p. m. (vol. I, p. 210), should be taken into account as applying also to surrender terms for the satellite states (740.00119 EAC/184a).

<sup>57</sup> See vol. I, pp. 484 ff.

<sup>58</sup> See extract of letter of February 2 from the Director of the Office of European Affairs to London, p. 136.

Bessarabia is at least open to question and that the basis of the Russian claim to Northern Bukovina is still more dubious.

(b) whereas the Russians are prepared to support the Rumanian claims to "the whole of Transylvania or the great part thereof", our position has been that, although there is no disposition to consider the line established by the Vienna Award of 1940<sup>59</sup> as being satisfactory or definitive, the whole complex Transylvanian problem should be left for postwar consideration.

5. Whereas we recognize the desirability of utilizing the Rumanian forces in the prosecution of the war against the Germans, as well as against the Hungarians as long as they are fighting with and for the Germans, we feel it desirable to keep in mind the disadvantages of allowing Rumanian troops to operate or to serve as occupying forces in Hungarian and disputed Transylvanian territory.

The foregoing considerations are not intended to combat our present disposition to endorse the Russian terms, but it may be well to keep them in mind.

ADDENDUM: 6. The Russian proposals place no term on the authority of the Antonescu regime, thus leaving open the question of whether we are to deal and collaborate with a government hitherto responsible for conducting war against the Allies alongside the Germans.

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740.00119 European War 1939/2471d: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1944—10 p. m.

23 Yugos. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion that this Government should give its full assent to the military provisions of the proposed terms as contained in your 84 April 8. The Department has meanwhile been apprised of Mr. Churchill's<sup>60</sup> request that article IV of the text be amended by the addition of the words "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" and of his observation concerning article V as regards British and American representatives for political questions. Your 85 April 11<sup>61</sup> reports that the Soviet Government has agreed to these changes.

You are now authorized to give the assent of this Government to the presentation to the Rumanians of the proposed terms as modified in consideration of Mr. Churchill's views.

In conveying this assent you should inform Mr. Novikov that the Department would have preferred an amendment to article IV reading "deferring the definitive disposition of this territory to the gen-

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<sup>59</sup> See footnote 54, p. 170.

<sup>60</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.



eral settlement" but since the British suggestion reflects the same general thought and has already been cleared by Moscow we do not wish to delay proceedings by prolonging discussion of the language employed. The British views with respect to article V happen to be identical with our own.

For your background information, our objection to article IV was on grounds of principle rather than an evaluation of the relative merits of the claims to Transylvania. While there would be no difficulty in disregarding the partition of this territory as imposed by the Vienna Award, we question whether any line that might be drawn while the war is in progress would afford a basis for the eventual stability of the region. It is our view that the particular problems of Transylvania could receive more thorough consideration as a part of the general European settlement.

The same considerations would apply in a measure to paragraph B of article II, and we should have preferred that a definitive settlement of the status of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina be held over for later discussion. In view, however, of the frequent public reiteration of the Russian claims to these regions, which have some substantial foundation, the fact that the Russians are already in the territories, the supposition that the Rumanians themselves are largely reconciled to their loss, and the statement of the case as amounting in effect to a confirmation of "the agreement of 1940", we must assume that the Russians would be unwilling to give any consideration whatever to a modification of this article.

This telegram is being repeated to Moscow for Mr. Harriman's guidance in informing Mr. Molotov of the instructions sent to you.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2472 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 14, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received April 14—3:30 p. m.]

Yugos 90. My Yugos 76, March 30. Yesterday the clandestine radio set of DC in Rumania operated for the first time since April 4 and transmitted an undated message from Marshal Antonescu to General Wilson apparently written 5 or 6 days ago. It was a sentimental and verbose appeal for British-American help containing neither facts nor proposals.

This morning the agreed armistice terms were transmitted to DC for Antonescu and Maniu and DC acknowledged receipt. The message sent via Ankara (my Yugos 87, April 12<sup>62</sup>) was not sent on to Rumania since previous messages by that route were not acknowledged and may have been intercepted.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2476 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 16, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received April 17—5:30 a. m.]

Yugos 92. See my Yugos 90 of April 14, 6 p. m. Lord Moyne advises me that Russian Ambassador asked to see him urgently this afternoon and informed him that 2 or 3 days ago he had transmitted to Moscow a suggestion of Stirbey that if Antonescu does not take action and if Maniu cannot overthrow him Maniu should transfer himself to Russian territory in Moldavia and establish a government in opposition to Antonescu, the same conditions being granted to Maniu in this event as those set forth in my Yugos 84 of April 8, 2 p. m. Novikov added that Moscow has now approved that this proposal be made to Maniu on condition that London and Washington also agree.

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2495 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, April 18, 1944—noon.  
[Received 5:20 p. m.]

1332. For the President and the Secretary. In my talk with Molotov last evening he told me that the Rumanian troops were still fighting the Red Army and those who surrendered had done so only after battle. In the Crimea their resistance was particularly stubborn as the Rumanian divisions there consisted of better trained troops. He stated further that the Rumanian Government had not changed in any way its policy of cooperation with Germany.

HARRIMAN

<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

740.00119 European War 1939/2537a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav  
Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1944—8 p. m.

26 Yugos. The Department has no objection to the transmission to Maniu of the proposal that if he were to transfer to Moldavia and establish a government in opposition to Antonescu he, Maniu, should be granted the same conditions as were set forth in your 84 April 8.

It is, of course, obvious that Maniu could not in such circumstances be expected to fulfill in the same degree as Antonescu the provisions of articles I and II, particularly with respect to the surrender of Rumanian forces and the repatriation of Soviet and Allied prisoners of war and internees. If, however, he should find it possible to transfer to Moldavia and establish a government there and if he were to carry out the stipulations of these articles to the full extent of his capabilities there would seem to be no reason why he should not be assured of such benefits as are contained in articles III to V.

By accepting the proposal to transfer to "Russian territory" in Moldavia Maniu would be placing himself, as well as whatever governmental and administrative organs he might set up, under the protection and auspices of the Soviet Government, at least until such time as British and American representation could be arranged. For this reason it is important that you should give Mr. Novikov clearly to understand the position of this Government as set forth in the Department's 23 April 11, namely, that in conformity with the known American policy of deferring the settlement of boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities we have been unwilling to look upon any dispositions of territory effected during the course of the war as being definitive, preferring to regard them as pending final examination and settlement at the close of hostilities.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/2519 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, April 24, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received April 24—4:12 p. m.]

Yugos 96. See my Yugos 92 of April 16. The Soviet Ambassador informed me today that, having received the consent of the three

Governments concerned, he is telling Prince Stirbey that he may communicate to Maniu his, Stirbey's, suggestion that he transfer himself to Russian-held territory in Moldavia and establish a government there in opposition to Antonescu.

In this connection, when I informed him on April 19, as instructed in the Department's Yugos 26 of April 18, he asked me whether the Department meant its remarks to apply to Bessarabia, altering its previous acceptance of the 1940 boundary (see Department's Yugos 23 of April 11). To this I replied that in my belief the Department was merely repeating its known policy of deferring boundary issues until the conclusion of hostilities with special reference to this particular proposal in regard to Moldavia [*Transylvania*], and that the question of Bessarabia already agreed to did not arise. My explanation in this matter he repeated to Moscow and has now received the following reply (translation from the French):

The Soviet Government has taken note of Mr. MacVeagh's explanation that the reservation made by the United States Government with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Government of Maniu had no bearing on Bessarabia, it being granted that the United States Government in associating itself with the Soviet armistice conditions thereby accepted.

Referring to the restoration of the Rumanian-Soviet frontier in conformity with the Rumanian-Soviet agreement of 1940.

The Soviet Government considers that anything relating to the territorial jurisdiction of Maniu must equally be based on the known declaration of Mr. V. M. Molotov concerning the preservation of the Rumanian-Soviet frontier established in 1940.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2524 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 25, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received April 26—3: 12 a. m.]

1432. In reply to my inquiry as to any developments in the Soviet-Rumanian situation Molotov informed me that Maniu's proposal made by Prince Stirbey to break away from Antonescu and to form a new government in Soviet-occupied Rumania, although acceptable to the Soviet Government, was not considered as having been made seriously. He said that there were yet no different [*definite?*] indications that Maniu would follow such a course.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War 1939/2555 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, May 1, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:30 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 104. See my Yugoslav Series 99, April 27.<sup>63</sup> The message to Maniu as amended was transmitted April 28 "From the Delegates of the Three Allied Powers in Cairo".

More than 72 hours have elapsed without a reply from Antonescu to our last message and it would appear that negotiations with him must therefore be considered ended.

Meanwhile Maniu has asked to send at once to Cairo, as his additional emissary, Mr. Visoianu<sup>64</sup> (see first paragraph under heading "Emissary" in my secret airgram A-14, March 3<sup>65</sup>). Mr. Novikov and Lord Moyne with the assent of the Foreign Office which had previously supported an idea of his that there should be no more emissaries have agreed, the Russian seeming to be particularly interested and saying that "Maniu should be allowed to send out anybody he wants". I am accordingly agreeing also and the British intend doing what they can to get Visoianu here quickly.

Repeated to AmRep Algiers for Murphy.<sup>66</sup>

MACVEAGH

740.00119 European War 1939/2631 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, May 25, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received May 26—9:05 a. m.]

Yugos 105. My Yugos 104, May 1, 1 p. m. Maniu's second emissary has now arrived and a conference was held at Prince Stirbei's apartment today, attended by all the delegates. Stirbei read a prepared memorandum and Visoianu supplied comment. According to their statements, Antonescu is, whether willingly or not, completely under German control, and there are now too many German troops in the country for a *coup d'état* by Maniu to be possible. However, Maniu, in concert with the democratic parties, is still decided to disassociate Rumania from the Axis, and being assured of the help of General

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

<sup>64</sup> Constantin Visoianu, friend of Iuliu Maniu.

<sup>65</sup> Not printed; the paragraph reported that Mr. Maniu had not been able to get a passport earlier for Mr. Visoianu (740.00119 European War 1939/2259).

<sup>66</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U. S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

Nicolescu and "several other generals" disposing of "one or two army corps", and having obtained the consent of the King, he is willing to make the attempt by staging a movement on the front itself, though not in the interior of the country. This would be difficult, as the Rumanian units are sandwiched between German formations in the line, but Maniu thinks that if the Allies should give directives as to what exactly to do, and where and when, it might be feasible and prove effective. The emissaries added that Maniu desired also to make some observations in regard to the armistice terms, but these were not listened to at this conference, the Soviet Ambassador saying, with the concurrence of the other delegates, that it is now for the Rumanians to act. He also drew the attention of the emissaries to the fact that failure to act during the time which has elapsed since the presentation of the terms has resulted in the help which Rumania can give being a great deal less than was envisaged.

After discussion, it was decided that Maniu should be advised through Cretzeanu to send an emissary through the lines to the Russians to arrange with them the time and place of Rumanian military action to be taken in accord with the Russian forces, and that this message should be drawn up by Stirbei in collaboration with Novikov, Lord Moyne telling the latter that the initiative in these negotiations is now in his hands. In this connection, Lord Moyne informed me yesterday that he had been instructed to advise Novikov in this sense, because of the annoyance caused his Government by continued Russian suspicion of British secret operations in Rumania. (See my 18, May [4,] 10 [a. m.]<sup>67</sup>.) He was also instructed not to press the matter of Maniu's transferring himself to Russian-held Rumanian territory, since the Foreign Office has never liked this plan though it was willing to accept it because the Russians were interested. This question, however, did not come up at today's conference. In passing "the initiative" to Novikov, Lord Moyne promised him willing assistance in such matters as communications, should he desire them.

Repeated to Algiers.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2639 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, June 1, 1944—11 a. m.  
[Received June 1—10:55 a. m.]

Yugos 109. Regarding the Rumanian views which were not listened to at the conference reported in my Yugos 105, May 25, the

<sup>67</sup> Airgram not printed.

Rumanian emissaries have informed my Russian colleague that Maniu desired the Allies to give the following assurances:

1. All occupied territory to be under solely Rumanian administration.
2. Parts of Rumania, not in zone of operations, e.g., Bucharest, not be occupied by Allied forces.
3. Funds of the National Bank of Rumania seized by the Germans to be returned to the new Government.
4. Rumanian Government funds sequestered in Great Britain and United States to be released.
5. All of Transylvania to be returned to Rumania.

Since sending the messages reported in my Yugos 107, May 29,<sup>68</sup> the emissaries have heard from Maniu through Cretzeanu as follows:

(a) A message apparently sent May 21, in which he says that as a result of further interspersing of German units there is no longer a purely Rumanian sector and the Rumanian commanders can no longer guarantee operations. Therefore "Anglo-American help in the interior again becomes an essential factor" of Rumanian action; and

(b) a subsequent message received by Cretzeanu May 29. This explains that "the whole of the national opposition" has accepted the Allied conditions "as a basis of discussion" and that Visoianu was sent to Cairo to clarify certain points (presumably those given in paragraph 1 above), and "include them in a text to be sent to us". It adds that "in order to assure the utmost support of public opinion to propose change, a common policy is being formed of all the anti-Fascist parties, National Liberal, Social Democrat and Communist".

My Soviet colleague informed his Government of Maniu's views as listed in paragraph 1 above and yesterday informed the emissaries that he had received the following reply:

"Soviet Government refuses to enter upon any discussions concerning these questions so long as Maniu has not stated definitely whether he accepts the armistice conditions themselves."

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 European War 1939/2640 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, June 1, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received June 2—8: 43 a. m.]

Yugos 111. My Yugos 109, June 1. Lord Moyne, Novikov and I held a conference this evening and agreed to hand the Rumanian

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<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

emissaries a final statement in the following sense, provided our three Governments approved:

"In view of the situation created by the latest telegrams of Mr. Maniu, the delegates of the three powers deem it necessary to declare to the Rumanian delegates that further negotiations would serve no purpose and the negotiations are considered ended.

"If Mr. Maniu wishes to take advantage of the armistice terms offered by the three powers he should follow the advice already given him by sending an officer to make direct contact with the Red Army on the front."

Please instruct.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 EW 1939/2665: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, June 13, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received June 13—8:50 a. m.]

Yugos 120. Yesterday the Rumanian emissaries received from Maniu through Cretzianu a message in the following sense:

"Maniu agrees to conclude an armistice upon the conditions presented by the Allies. The means of putting the armistice into application are in process of being established in agreement with those responsible and will be communicated to you in a few days.

The patriotic democratic bloc has been formed.

In view of the fact that the conditions of the armistice have been accepted, we are convinced that we shall obtain an amelioration of these conditions when they are applied as repeatedly declared by the Allies."

The Allied representatives are at a loss to understand the last sentence above, since they have promised no amelioration of the armistice terms but on the contrary have emphasized repeatedly the statement in the terms themselves that these "can be changed for the worse if Rumania does not accept them soon".

Today the British received a radio message from Rumania asking for safelanding at Aleppo of a plane bearing three more Rumanians who wish to contact Prince Stirbey. The Allied representatives have decided to permit this, as Novikov has not yet received Moscow's approval of the proposed statement in my Yugos 111, June 1 that conversations are at an end.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as number 8.

MACVEAGH



740.00119 European War 1939/2665 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—8 p. m.

Yugos 28. Your Yugos 120, June 13. In view of Maniu's agreement to conclude an armistice on basis of terms presented by the Allies, the Department favors continuance of conversations with his representative as being of possible aid in establishing agreement on means of putting armistice into effect. The Department therefore approves decision of Allied representatives to permit safelanding of additional Rumanian emissaries at Aleppo.

The Department knows of no basis in fact for statement in Maniu's message that Allies had repeatedly declared that Rumania could obtain amelioration of armistice conditions. Since Maniu accepts Allied terms as presented, however, his observation regarding their possible modification in Rumania's favor when applied would seem to be irrelevant.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/6-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, June 29, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 2 p. m.]

Yugos 130. My Yugos 123, June 16.<sup>69</sup> Being apparently still unwilling to contact the Russians directly, Maniu has sent Stirbey and Visoianu a long telegram outlining his plan "to get Rumania out of the war". This arrived from Ankara yesterday and a copy was immediately given to Mr. Novikov for transmittal to the Soviet Government, whose reactions are awaited. For the Department's information, the plan provides the conclusion of the armistice and the change of government shall take place simultaneously with a "massive Soviet offensive". It also calls for Allied air bombardment of communications in Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, and Allied provision of three airborne brigades and 2000 parachute troops inside Rumania. Whether these Allied contingents are to be Anglo-American or Russian is left to the decision of the "Supreme Allied Command". Finally it proposes that the armistice be signed in Cairo by Maniu's delegates and the Allied representatives prior to the change of government, and that it come into force at the time of the change, with a proclamation of Rumania[n] withdrawal from the German alliance.

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

In a concluding paragraph Maniu states that having accepted the armistice terms and submitted "this precise plan of action", he would like to know what "immediate improvements" the Allies are prepared to accept in the armistice conditions. He says that "definite information exists that so far as Antonescu is concerned modifications were agreed to" and that the groups favorable to the Allies cannot undertake the grave responsibility of action on any terms less favorable than those accorded to him. Needless to say there is no knowledge here of any "modifications" promised to Antonescu.

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy as number 24.

The full text of the above message is being forwarded by airgram.<sup>70</sup>

MACVEAGH

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/7-244 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters  
(Murphy), to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 2, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:40 p. m.]

2248. At the risk of possible repetition I report the following concerning negotiations now going on with Maniu. The main points of message received by AFHQ from Cairo are:

(a) As soon as the Allies confirm that they are ready to carry out their side of the plan, details of coordination of operations will be arranged. This can be done in a very short time. Maniu has concluded his arrangements and the date of their application depends on the Allies.

(b) The armistice should be signed by the diplomatic representatives of the three Allies and the Rumanian delegates at present in Cairo before the change of government. It would come into force at the moment of the change of Government.

(c) In view of the fact that the armistice conditions have been accepted by the opposition, a plan of action submitted, and that the armistice will only take effect following precise action by them, the Allies are asked what immediate improved armistice conditions they are prepared to accept. In this connection, it is asserted that better conditions were offered to Antonescu than to the opposition.

(d) The Allies are warned against the illusion that any understanding is possible with Antonescu.

The essential details of the plan are therefore still not known and it appears that Maniu does not intend to provide them until he has been assured that his plan has been accepted.

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<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

I shall be grateful if the Department will inform me whether it desires me to continue to report on these negotiations or whether it is receiving full information from our representatives in Cairo.<sup>71</sup>

[MURPHY]

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740.00119 EW 1939/6-2944: Telegram

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, 4 July, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum of 30 June enclosing paraphrased telegrams from Ambassador MacVeagh to the Department and from the British Resident Minister in Cairo to the Foreign Office<sup>72</sup> dealing with Mr. Maniu's proposals for aligning Rumania with the Allied powers against the Germans.

So far as the military aspects of Mr. Maniu's plans are concerned, they are in the main of primary concern to the Russians who must be the ones to say whether the plan is acceptable from a military standpoint and whether they are prepared to act on it. It is impracticable for American forces to provide the airborne and parachute troops envisaged as being required. It would appear practicable, however, for Allied air forces to bomb communications between Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania as indeed has already been done to a considerable extent. Should some such over-all plan be found otherwise acceptable, no reason is foreseen why the required air bombing operations could not be carried out.

It would seem from the military point of view the attitude of the United States should be to support the position taken by the British Resident Minister at Cairo as set forth in paragraph (4) of his telegram dated 28 June 1944 to the Foreign Office.<sup>73</sup>

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

*Admiral, U.S. Navy*

*Chief of Staff to the*

*Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

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<sup>71</sup> In telegram 2127, July 7, 2 p. m., the Department replied that it would like Mr. Murphy to report information he assumed had not been included in current reports from Ambassador MacVeagh (740.00119 EW/7-244).

<sup>72</sup> Memorandum of June 30 not printed. The enclosures referred to are Ambassador MacVeagh's telegram Yugos 130, June 29, 11 a. m., p. 182, and two British telegrams, not printed.

<sup>73</sup> Namely, that further discussion of armistice terms should be refused and final reply from Mr. Maniu should be required.

740.00119 European War 1939/7-2044 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, July 20, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 11:01 p. m.]

4641. Rumanian Minister Pella, recently returned from Bucharest, has delivered to 110 through 636 (OSS<sup>74</sup> can identify) message given him on or about July 4 by Mihai Antonescu for delivery to Ambassador Hayes.<sup>75</sup> 636 explained Mihai had sent verbal message by courier some time ago to the Ambassador which the courier must have delivered in garbled form judging from Ambassador's reply asking Mihai confirm his message by letter through Turkish Government then impossible due well-known sentiments Menemencioglu.<sup>76</sup> Having at the moment no courier for Spain or Lisbon, Mihai asks whether Bern channel could be used. For safety's sake, message was taken down in longhand by Pella on dictation of Mihai. Substance follows:

1. Rumania not in service of any foreign power, entered war to defend her national territory and her institutions. In violation of formal undertakings USSR invaded Bessarabia and Bukovina, latter never even temporarily under Russian sovereignty, in June 1940 after 48-hour ultimatum and before negotiations foreseen by that ultimatum could have begun.

In November 1940 Rumania assured USSR she was determined maintain good neighborly relations, that adherence to tri-partite pact was merely passive guarantee of purely defensive character in no spirit of aggression against Russia or any other power. Moscow reply was demand for Soviet-Rumanian condominium over maritime Danube, concentration of 40 divisions on Rumanian frontier, occupation of four islands in Danube and efforts to force Sulina Channel. In December 1940 Molotov asked Berlin free hand extend Soviet domination beyond Pruth and Danube to secure direct control over the narrows. Rumania only took part in military operation 1941 to recover territories taken by USSR. Rumania has not wished, and does not wish, to fight Anglo-Saxon powers. Her defensive attitude defined in note replying to British declaration war December 1941.

2. Rumania is now asked to get out of war, turn her arms against Germany and grant right of passage to Soviet troops. Behavior of Soviet troops in occupied Rumanian territories is marked by execution and deportation of Government officials of the leading classes, by confiscation of property, by turning churches into stables, by violation of women and young girls and by mass colonization of Bessarabia

<sup>74</sup> Office of Strategic Services.

<sup>75</sup> Carlton J. H. Hayes, American Ambassador in Spain.

<sup>76</sup> Numan R. Menemencioglu, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs until June 15.

and Bukovina by another race. USSR engages in propaganda against King Michael and in favor of ex-King Carol. Rumanian Government has evidence and is not only willing but urgently requests international inquiry and will grant every facility to ICRC<sup>77</sup> or any other body to investigate.

Facts show that occupation of all Rumanian territory by Soviet armies would inevitably result in disappearance of Rumanian leading class, nationalization of country and unrestrained introduction of Communism into Southeast Europe, leading to total upset of continental equilibrium. Slavization of Rumania would lead all countries which had looked towards London and Washington to seek henceforth their political inspiration exclusively from Moscow. If Rumania decided turn arms against Germany and make way for Soviet occupation, presence of several hundreds of thousands of German soldiers would expose country to two successive devastations.

3. Rumania would get out of war if she were free to declare cessation of all fighting on bases of respect for her sovereignty, of her territorial rights and of her institutions. Without acceptance these conditions she would have to continue struggle with risk of succumbing with dignity.

Anglo-Saxon powers would be a [*would bear?*] responsibility for her sacrifice and destruction of European equilibrium and war won only by Soviets.

4. Practical possibilities getting out of war increased if statement were made agreeing leave to peace conference decision regarding Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, problem of reparations (which might furnish Soviets means in direct control essential mechanism Rumanian state) and if United States, Great Britain could at right moment bring effective military help by debarkations, landing of parachutists and installation air bases. At Stockholm Soviets offered enter bilateral negotiations territorial questions claiming 1941 frontier primarily question of prestige and in nowise excluding possibility peace conference might return wholly or in part Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina.

In any case Rumania could not get out of war unless (a) major part of Rumanian territory including capital is not occupied and (b) form of Government and social structure of Government remain exclusive attribute of Rumanian sovereignty.

Rumania prepared participate new regional continental world-wide organisms especially in European or Balkan federation, reestablish collaboration United States, Great Britain in political, military and economic field; is in favor of regime of internationalization of Black

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<sup>77</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross.

Sea and mouth of Danube, latter under control of CED<sup>78</sup> or other international bodies. She aspires to maintain best relations with Soviet Union.

If these principles accepted as basis negotiations, fully empowered representatives with military experts could be sent immediately to place selected by Allies, Rumania preferring Ankara. *Pourparlers* on Soviet territory not deemed practicable. Procedure similar that followed Italian armistice cannot be considered since slightest indiscretion would cause country's downfall without in any way serving Allied cause. Effect of similar indiscretions regarding Finland well known. There is readiness on Rumanian side to give all required gages of good faith but one would wish for certain precisions from American and British Governments in form they consider appropriate. Thereupon negotiations with three Allied powers could be undertaken on basis above indicated.

Repeated to Madrid.

HARRISON

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-1044 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 10, 1944—10 p. m.

1907. The American Consul General at Istanbul has reported that Professor Giurescu and Colonel Teodorescu, who arrived in Turkey from Rumania about a week ago, have informed representatives of American agencies in that city that they are authorized by Marshal Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu to indicate the desire of the Rumanian Government to send another envoy to Cairo. It was stated that: Rumanian public opinion now favors Rumanian surrender more than ever before; there is a strong suspicion in Bucharest that Stirbey and Visoianu have failed in their mission; if a new emissary would be accepted he would be sent out with authorization to make whatever concessions the American and British Governments might wish in the oil, mining, forestry and other industries in Rumania in exchange for the taking-over by the Anglo-American authorities of the war indemnity demanded by the Soviet Union; and, if Allied aid in the form of planes and paratroops or naval and marine forces were forthcoming via the Black Sea, Rumania was prepared to oppose the German forces established in the country. It was added that the Rumanian Government has concentrated in and near Bucharest important forces which can be placed at the immediate disposition of the British and American forces.

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<sup>78</sup> European Commission of the Danube.

Colonel Teodorescu left Istanbul for Bucharest on August 6. Another Rumanian source stated Marshal Antonescu had left Rumania for Germany on August 3 in order to persuade Hitler to withdraw German troops from Rumania and that Teodorescu had been recalled to participate in staff discussions of plans for active resistance to the Germans should the Marshal fail in his mission. Teodorescu stated before his departure that Rumania desired American and British participation in any negotiations and hoped that British and American forces would share in the occupation of the country.

Please inform the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the foregoing and say that we would be glad to know the Soviet view of this approach. You may say that it is tentatively our feeling that it probably should be considered as just one more of the many probings by which the Rumanians have endeavored to ingratiate themselves with and gain the sympathies of the Allies and at the same time to learn our thinking as to their future, whereas they have disclosed no real determination to do anything for themselves. You should add, however, that we believe the Istanbul contacts might well be told that, although we are not convinced that the Rumanians are really finally determined to take definite action to extricate Rumania from the war and terminate its association with Nazi Germany, if the Rumanian Government is genuinely desirous of making peace with the Allies on a realistic basis and desires to send a fully qualified envoy to Cairo for that purpose, the Soviet, British and American representatives would be willing to receive him and hear what he has to say.

Sent also to London.

STETTINIUS

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-1744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 17, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received August 18—1:30 a. m.]

3026. ReDeptel 1907, August 10, 10 p. m. I have not thought it wise to dignify the suggestions made by Giurescu and Teodorescu by communicating them in detail to the Soviet Government, as they are ones which would be highly insulting and offensive to the Soviet mind. I also do not feel that we can properly inquire the Soviet view of any such approach. They would probably consider that their own reaction to such suggestions would be obvious to any loyal and understanding ally and that we should be able without further inquiries in Moscow to give the proper reply.

As the British have had lengthy interchange of communications with the Russians on Rumania, I have consulted with the British Ambassador. He agrees strongly with the above, as the Soviets on past occasions have shown resentment and suspicion of the British when informed in detail of other Rumanian maneuvers to curry favor with the British and ourselves as against the Soviet Union.

In view of the above, I have today written a letter to Vyshinski <sup>79</sup> the text of which in paraphrase is as follows:

“I wish to inform you, in pursuance to the standing agreement that our Governments are to inform each other fully of peace feelers made by the enemy powers, that certain Rumanian agents namely Professor Giurescu and Colonel Teodorescu, who purport to represent Marshal Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, have approached American representatives in Istanbul recently with vague and highly unrealistic peace suggestions to which the American Government is giving no consideration.

Provided the Soviet and British Governments have no objections, the American Government contemplates replying through the same channels that the Rumanian authorities, if they really desire to make peace with the Allies on a realistic basis, can send to Cairo for that purpose a fully qualified representative and the British, Soviet and American Envoys in Cairo will be prepared to receive this representative and to hear what he has to say.

We are communicating in a similar sense with the British Government.”

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 23, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received August 23—10:47 a. m.]

3114. ReEmb 3026, August 17, 2 p. m. The following is a paraphrase translation of a letter from Vyshinski, dated August 21:

“The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of August 17 advising me of the peace proposals made to American representatives in Istanbul by the Rumanian representatives Professor Giurescu and Colonel Teodorescu and also of the negative position with respect to these proposals which, in view of their unreality, the American Government has taken.

I have brought this information to the attention of the Soviet Government as well as the substance of the proposed reply of the American Government to the Rumanian authorities.”

HARRIMAN

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<sup>79</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.



740.00119 EW 1939/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, August 23, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received August 23—2: 45 p. m.]

Yugos 135. Message sent by Maniu August 20 states that "we have decided to take action" and asks if they can count on Allied bombing points to be specified and also on parachutists and air force support. British relayed message to London, Moscow and Caserta yesterday.

Telegram from Cretzeanu today states opposition in Rumania completely in the dark as to whether to take a possibly untimely action now or wait for Allied reply that may come too late. (Repeated Moscow and to Murphy as No. 14.)

All messages passed to Soviet Embassy here, but Novikov has offered no comment. He has agreed to receive Prince Stirbey tomorrow.

SHANTZ

740.00119 European War 1939/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Turkey (Kelley) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, August 23, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received August 24—3: 34 a. m.]

1549. The Prime Minister<sup>80</sup> informed me today that he had received a telegram from the Turk Chargé in Bucharest to the following effect:

I have just been with the Prime Minister. He told me that the situation was very serious. In 2 days all Bessarabia will be occupied by the Russians. We desire you to act as our intermediary in obtaining an armistice. I am speaking in full agreement with the King, the Marshal and all the leaders of the opposition. Please obtain within 24 hours the reply of the British and American Governments to the following:

The Prime Minister of Rumania would like to know which of the three following alternatives are preferred by the British and American Governments: (1) despatch of a Rumanian representative to Moscow to conclude an armistice; (2) to enter into contact simultaneously with the Americans, British and Russians to fix the conditions of an armistice; or (3) to discuss the armistice conditions in Cairo with the Allies.

The Prime Minister said he would appreciate it if I would let him know as soon as possible the views of the American Government.

KELLEY

<sup>80</sup> Sükrü Saracoglu.

740.00119 EW 1939/9-244

*Declaration of New Rumanian Government in Broadcast on  
August 23, 1944, Over Radio Romania*<sup>81</sup>

The Government which today represents the country formed by four political parties, i.e., the National-Liberal, the National-Peasant, the Communist and the Social Democrat parties, all four united in a national democrat block, has been empowered by His Majesty King Michael I to take over the conduct of the State in the most difficult and decisive circumstances, for the destiny of the Rumanian people. The dictatorial regime which up to now constantly violated the will of the country has placed in danger, by its fatal policy, the very existence of Rumania as a State.

Today, dictatorship has been replaced and the people recover their rights. The political regime which we establish will be a democratic regime wherein public freedom will be both respected and guaranteed. The first measures taken by the Government in the foreign policy field of action have been the acceptance of the armistice terms of the United Nations.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States have guaranteed Rumania's independence within the frame of respected national sovereignty, as well as the non-intervention in our life as a State.

Our exit from the war, at the side of the Tripartite Pact,<sup>82</sup> as well as the cessation of hostilities against the Soviet Union are decisions which aim at sparing our country an otherwise certain catastrophe.

Beginning today Rumania considers the United Nations as friendly nations.

The fact that the representatives of Moscow, London and Washington have recognized the injustice caused to Rumania by the Vienna Dictate creates the possibility for the Rumanian Army to free Northern Transylvania from foreign occupation.

From now on we understand to be masters of our destiny.

The decision to denounce the alliance treaties with the Axis powers and the decreeing of the end of the war with the United Nations is the expression of all the Rumanian people. This decision does not injure the right of any foreign State and does not touch the interests of other nations. The entire country desires to put an end to a terrible war, a war lost in advance; the entire country desires peace;

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<sup>81</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Istanbul in his despatch 3462 (R-3169), September 2; received September 13.

<sup>82</sup> Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940, by Germany, Italy, and Japan, *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Series D, vol. xi, p. 204. Regarding adherence of Rumania to the pact, see Editors' Note, *ibid.*, p. 208. For correspondence regarding the pact, see *Foreign Relations*, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. II, pp. 164 ff., and *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 647 ff.

but Rumania's desire for peace means neither disarmament nor fear. Any impediment for the realization of this desire for peace and for the freedom of the Rumanian people will unloosen a merciless struggle on the part of all the armed forces of the people against those who will try to maintain our country in a state of war against the United Nations, thus prolonging the useless and vain sufferings.

In addressing itself to you, citizens of this country, the Government asks you to rally around His Majesty the King Michael I in the spirit of a perfect union and national discipline, to give him all aid for the realization of the supreme call of the present moment, in order to insure peace and to install a democratic regime, right for everybody and public freedom for all the citizens of the country.

Signed *The President of the Council of Ministers*  
*Army Corps General*  
 CONSTANTIN SANATESCU

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2444: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 24, 1944—5 p. m.  
 [Received August 24—1:17 p. m.]

3135. I called on Vyshinski this afternoon at 3:30 to inquire what information the Soviet Government had on the developments in Rumania. He stated that the Soviet authorities had no information whatsoever except what had been heard over the radio and that he had no instructions from his Government to make any statements on this matter at the present time. In reply to my question he said he did not know whether the Rumanian military command had been in touch with the Red Army or whether the Rumanians had laid down their arms. Vyshinski stated that he had no reason to feel that the surrender terms as discussed in April would not still hold but that the matter would have to be studied in view of the changed conditions. He also had no present suggestions to make as to procedure to be followed in dealing with this matter between the three Governments. I explained how anxious I knew you would be to get information and he agreed to keep me informed promptly of any developments.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to London as 153, to Ankara, to AmPolAd for Murphy and to Cairo for MacVeagh. For the Ambassadors.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 European War 1939/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 25, 1944—3 a. m.

[Received 7:50 a. m.]

3147. Molotov called the British Ambassador and myself over at 2 a. m. this morning to read us a statement of the Soviet Government regarding Rumania quoted in translation in my next telegram.<sup>83</sup> This statement will be published in the Moscow morning papers and given on the radio at 3 a. m. Molotov said that the Soviet Government had waited all day but so far had received no word from Bucharest except from the public radio broadcast.<sup>84</sup> It had now decided to make this statement to forestall any German political move. One Rumanian division had, he told us, come over to the Red Army prepared to fight against the Germans in accordance with the new Government's instructions. He had not [*no*] other information. In reply to our questions he stated that the Soviet Government had come to no decision on any further steps as to surrender terms or procedure.

HARRIMAN

740.0011 EW 1939/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 25, 1944.

[Received August 25—7:05 a. m.]

3148. Statement of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

In connection with the events in Rumania the Soviet Government deems it necessary to confirm its statement made in April 1944<sup>85</sup> that the Soviet Government has no intention [to] acquire any part of Rumanian territory or to change the existing social structure in Rumania or to infringe in any way upon the independence of Rumania. On the contrary the Soviet Government considers it necessary to establish, together with the Rumanian people, the independence of Rumania by freeing Rumania from the Fascist yoke.

The Soviet High Command believes if the Rumanian armies cease military action against the Red Army and if they join arm in arm with the Red Army in carrying on the war of liberation against the Germans for the freedom of Rumania or against the Hungarians for the liberation of Transylvania the Red Army will not disarm them, will let them keep all their arms and will fully aid them in fulfilling this honorable task.

However the Red Army will be able to terminate hostilities on

<sup>83</sup> No. 3148, *infra*.

<sup>84</sup> August 23, p. 191.

<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 165.

Rumanian territory only after the German armies in Rumania are liquidated. These have been the leaders in the enslavement and oppression of the Rumanian people.

Aid of the Rumanian armies to the Red Army troops in the liquidation of the German armies is the only means of quickly ceasing hostilities on Rumanian territory and for concluding an armistice with the Allied coalition by Rumania.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/8-2444

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has examined the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of August 24<sup>86</sup> setting forth a proposed line of action by the British, Soviet and American Governments with regard to the proposal made by the Rumanian President of the Council, acting through the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Bucharest for negotiations with the Allied Governments.

According to the reports of subsequent events the Antonescu Government may no longer be in a position to carry out the terms proposed. Nevertheless it is probable that a similar procedure would be applicable for dealing with authorities who may now be in control, and the Department accordingly is agreeable to the proposal made by the British Government that a reply be sent to the Rumanian authorities through the Turkish President of the Council to the effect that the Rumanians should send a delegate to Moscow. The Department also concurs, subject to the agreement of the Soviet Government to this procedure, in the proposal that the British and American Ambassadors to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should take part in all the discussions with the Rumanian delegate in Moscow and that the Rumanian authorities should be so informed.

Appropriate instructions are being sent forward to the American Ambassador in Ankara.

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944.

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, August 25, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received August 25—10 a. m.]

Yugos 136. Message from King Michael for Stirbey received by Cretzianu 8:30 p. m. Wednesday, 23rd, shortly before proclamation

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

of break will [*with*] Axis, states that in view of decisive action which will take place in Rumania on Saturday August 26 he requests, in conformity with promise of General Wilson, a massive bombardment of numerous specified places in Rumania and Hungary.

This message, which was received here and sent to AFHQ Caserta yesterday, makes it appear that Rumanian break was planned for tomorrow and that events forced prior action.

De Chastelain<sup>87</sup> and two Rumanian staff officers reached Ankara yesterday.

Repeated to Murphy as number 15 and to Moscow.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Shantz) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, August 25, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received August 25—1:36 p. m.]

Yugos 139. Cretzeanu yesterday gave British a message he received from Niculescu-Buzesti instructing him in name of King to inform British, American and Soviet Governments that on August 23 the King dismissed the Government of Marshal Antonescu and named General Sanatescu Premier of a Government of National Union including the leaders of four parties comprising the National Democratic bloc and Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti as Foreign Minister.

Message adds that the new Government intends to sign armistice at once and asks that, since events planned for 26th took place on the 23rd, the bombing requested for tomorrow (see my Yugos 136<sup>88</sup>) be done immediately.

Repeated to Murphy as No. 18, to London as No. 7, to Moscow and to Ankara.

SHANTZ

740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt)*

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1944—9 p. m.

744. The British Government, which had received through the same channels the message from the Rumanian Government contained in your 1549 (August 23), has proposed that a reply be given to the Rumanians through the Turkish Prime Minister to the effect that Rumania should send a delegate to Moscow either by passing him through the lines or via Turkey.

<sup>87</sup> British lieutenant colonel in Rumania.

<sup>88</sup> *Supra.*

The Department has informed the British that it is agreeable to this proposal. You are accordingly instructed to associate yourself with your British colleague in giving this reply to the Turkish Prime Minister for transmission to the Rumanians.

The Department has also concurred, subject to the agreement of the Soviet Government, in the proposal made by the British that the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow should participate in all the discussions with any Rumanian delegate sent there, and that this point should be brought to the attention of the Rumanian authorities in the reply made to them through the Turks.

The British are seeking Soviet agreement to this procedure. If the Soviet Government agrees, the British will request that the Soviet Ambassador in Ankara be so instructed, in order that a tripartite approach to the Turkish Prime Minister may be made.

HULL

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-2644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 26, 1944—3 a. m.

[Received August 26—1:30 a. m.]

3159. For the President and the Secretary. Molotov called the British Ambassador and myself over at 1:30 a. m. and made the following oral statement.

“In order to support the prestige of the new Rumanian Government and in view of present developments the Soviet Government does not deem it advisable to introduce new armistice conditions. An agreement should be reached with the Rumanian Government on the signing of an armistice based upon the conditions that were proposed in April with the three additions requested by the Rumanian representatives in Cairo:

- (1) The allocating to the Rumanians of a free zone for their seat of government,
- (2) the granting of a period of 15 days for the German troops to evacuate from Rumania,
- (3) regarding the reduction in the size of the indemnity.

The new armistice conditions proposed by the British Government may be discussed in Moscow with the representatives of the three Allied Governments.

These negotiations according to the view of the Soviet Government should take place in Moscow.”

Molotov agreed to the British proposal that the British Ambassador and myself participate in all negotiations with the Rumanian delegates. He explained that he had been informed that two Rumanian

officers had been sent to Istanbul to contact representatives of the Allies and Molotov proposed that these men should come on to Moscow at once. He had informed the Soviet Ambassadors in Ankara and Cairo to this effect.

Molotov explained that the Red Army had trapped 12 German divisions in the region of Kishenev. These divisions would not be permitted to be evacuated. He was confident they would be made prisoners of war by the Red Army.

Molotov asked for the most urgent reply and Clark Kerr said he felt sure it would be forthcoming from the British Government in the morning.

Sent to Department as number 3159 (repeated for the Ambassadors to Cairo and to Ankara as secret).

HARRIMAN

740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944—6 p. m.

2043. The Department is agreeable to the proposal that discussions between the Rumanian delegates and representatives of the principal Allies be conducted in Moscow and our Embassies in Cairo and Ankara are being so informed.

The Department also agrees to the Soviet proposal that the armistice conditions should be based upon those submitted to Rumania in April with the three additional points mentioned by Molotov.

We have no knowledge of the "new armistice conditions" proposed by the British but you will receive instructions as soon as they are known.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to Ankara and Cairo.<sup>89</sup>

HULL

740.00119 European War 1939/8-2844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1944—8 p. m.

2060. The Department has received from the British Embassy here a memorandum proposing certain changes in the armistice terms submitted to Rumania last April. The Department has indicated in reply that it is agreeable to these additions, provided they are ac-

<sup>89</sup> As Nos. 746 and 72, respectively.



ceptable to the Soviet Government. Our reply does, however, recommend certain slight modifications.

The text of the British proposals and the substance of the Department's reply will be sent to you immediately by telegram.

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/8-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 28, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received 9:05 p. m.]

3203. I understand that the Rumanian representatives may arrive in Moscow tomorrow August 29. In addition to his instructions on specific points the British Ambassador has been instructed to use the Bulgarian terms as drafted by the European Advisory Commission<sup>90</sup> as a model. I request urgent instructions.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 29, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received August 29—11:20 a.m.]

3209. ReEmbs 3203, August 28, 8 p. m. The British Ambassador has now received from his Government a complete draft of armistice terms for Rumania, which he is instructed to use as a basis for his further action in this matter. This embodies the April terms with certain alterations in wording, omits points 1 and 2 of the three additional Rumanian requests mentioned in my 3159, August 26, 3 a. m., and includes clauses on control of shipping and transport and on an Allied Control Commission as well as a catch-all clause compelling compliance with any further requirements. He may on his own responsibility add a clause on currency and make other minor changes. On certain points, notably the question of an indemnity to the Soviet Union, he has already been in correspondence with the Russians during the past few days.

Thus, it is evident that further negotiations between the British and the Soviets and ourselves will be necessary before we will be prepared to face the Rumanians with an agreed set of surrender terms.

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<sup>90</sup> See telegram 6928, August 25, midnight, from London, vol. III, p. 367.

I understand that the Department is being kept fully informed of the exchanges between the British Government and the British Embassy here, and I hope that I will be currently instructed in such a manner that I can participate effectively in both the preliminary and the final negotiations of this subject.

Sent to Department as No. 3209 and repeated to London as No. 157.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-2744: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1944—9 p. m.

2073. Your 3181 (August 27).<sup>91</sup> Department's 2060 (August 28). The British have proposed the following changes in the armistice terms for Rumania agreed upon by the three principal Allies last April. The text of those terms was sent to you in the Department's telegram no. 878 (April 11).<sup>92</sup>

*Begin British proposals:* Reference point 2 (a) of April terms, Rumania should be required to break relations with every state with which any of the United Nations is at war; enemy property should be placed under control; enemy nationals should be interned.

Reference point 2 (c) of April terms, "reparation for war damage and restoration of Allied property" should be substituted for clause in its present form.

Following four additions to April terms proposed:

(a) Allies should have the right to station troops and agencies in Rumanian territory; Rumania should be required to pay the costs of occupation and also to provide such Rumanian currency as may be required by the Allies from time to time. (However, since the Soviet Government, judging from discussions of August 25 in the European Advisory Commission, apparently does not desire to claim more than the right of Allied troops to full freedom of movement across Rumanian territory as the military situation demands, the British Government does not desire to press this provision).

(b) Rumania should comply with instructions given by the Allies concerning control of transport systems and of Danube River.

(c) The armistice should provide for the appointment of an Allied Control Commission.

(d) Rumania should carry out unconditionally such further requirements as the Allies will present (however, the British Government does not insist that the word "unconditionally" be retained). *End British proposals.*

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<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

<sup>92</sup> Not printed; for terms agreed upon, see telegram Yugos 84, April 8, 2 p. m., from Cairo, p. 169, and Department's reply, 23 Yugos, April 11, 10 p. m., p. 173.

The British memorandum mentioned the British desire for political representation in Rumania, to which the Soviet Government agreed in April. It stated also that the British Ambassador in Moscow would remind the Soviet Government that the British consider the amount of Rumanian reparations to be a matter for discussion at the general peace settlement.

The Department's reply to the British memorandum agrees to the proposed changes in the April terms, provided those changes are acceptable to the Soviet Government. Only in regard to point (d) of the additional terms proposed by the British did the Department recommend a different wording, namely that the word "unconditionally" be deleted and that the phrase "may jointly present" be substituted for the phrase "will present".

With respect to article 4 of the April terms which deals with Transylvania (Department's 878, April 11), the Department's reply to the British recalled to the attention of the British Government the known American desire to postpone final decisions on territorial questions until the general peace settlement, and recommended that the phrase "deferring the definitive disposition of this territory to the general settlement" be employed in the article in question in the final terms to be signed by Rumania. During the negotiations at Cairo in April Ambassador MacVeagh mentioned to Novikov this Government's general policy with respect to territorial questions and expressed our preference for the inclusion in article 4 of the phrase quoted above although we were willing, in order not to delay the negotiations, to accept the British phrase "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" which was accepted by the Russians, and added to article 4 as it appears in Department's 878. When an appropriate occasion arises, you should recall to the attention of the Soviet Government our general policy as stated above and also make known our specific recommendation respecting Transylvania.

For your own confidential information, the Department would have preferred to see this same principle, namely the deferment of final decision on territorial disputes until after the end of the war in Europe, applied also to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. However, the Soviet Government has taken the firm position that these provinces lie within the "Soviet state frontier established in 1940 by a treaty between the Soviet Union and Rumania", and there seems to be a disposition on the part of the Rumanians to regard loss of these provinces as inevitable. Since the three Allies have already agreed to accept point 2 (b) of the April terms, the Department does not desire that you should interject this issue into the present armistice discussions.

The United States Government, like the British Government, expects to have political representation in Rumania in the period following signature of the armistice, as agreed to by Molotov last April.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London.<sup>93</sup>

HULL

740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—8 p. m.

2083. Reurtel 3203 August 28. The Department thinks that the form in which the Bulgarian armistice terms were drafted by the European Advisory Commission might serve as a model for reducing to their final form the terms which the three Allies have agreed upon for Rumania, although not all the articles of the Bulgarian terms are applicable to Rumania. Since several of the terms agreed upon for Rumania have no counterparts in the Bulgarian terms, the Rumanian armistice will in any case not parallel the Bulgarian armistice in content, although it may be made to do so in general form.

The Bulgarian terms, as drafted by the EAC and telegraphed to the Department on August 26 and 27,<sup>94</sup> are quoted below for your information:

"1. Hostilities to cease between Bulgaria and the United Nations at . . . . .

"2. Bulgaria to sever all relations with Germany and other enemy powers, to disarm and intern enemy forces and nationals and to control enemy property.

"3. Bulgarian forces, officials and nationals, to withdraw forthwith from all Allied territory at present occupied by Bulgaria.

"4. The Supreme Allied Command to have the right to move their forces freely into or across Bulgarian territory at the cost of Bulgaria if the military situation requires or if the Bulgarian Government fail in any respects to fulfill the terms of the armistice.

"5. Bulgaria to carry out such measures of disarmament and demobilization, as may be required.

"6. Bulgaria to release Allied prisoners of war and internees.

"7. Bulgaria to comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

"8. Bulgaria to release all persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation to be repealed.

<sup>93</sup> As No. 6935.

<sup>94</sup> See telegrams 6928, August 25, midnight, and 6972, August 27, 5 p.m., from London, vol. III, pp. 367 and 374, respectively.

"9. Bulgaria to cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

"10. Bulgaria to restore all United Nations property and to make reparation for war damage and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the Allies.

"11. Bulgaria to make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her.

"12. Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require, for the use of their forces or missions in Bulgaria or for the prosecution of the war.

"13. Bulgaria to comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice; to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send; and to meet Allied requirements for the re-establishment of peace and security."

By its agreement to the April terms and to the proposed amendments and additions set forth in the British memorandum of August 26 (reDeptel 2073 August 29), the Department has already accepted as suitable armistice conditions for Rumania the substance of points 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 and 10 of the above draft of terms for Bulgaria, although in view of the different circumstances it is not expected that the wording of these conditions in the Rumanian armistice will conform to that of the Bulgarian draft.

The Department sees no objection to the inclusion in the Rumanian terms of conditions similar to points 5, 9, 11 and 12 of the Bulgarian terms. Point 3 would seem to have no application.

If point 8 is applied to Rumania, the provision for the release of political prisoners should be qualified by the clause "as the Allies may specify".

The Department believes that point 13 of the Bulgarian terms is applicable to Rumania and that its wording is preferable to that contained in point (d) of the additions proposed by the British Government to the April terms with the Department's suggested amendment which was communicated to you in Department's 2073 August 29.

The foregoing is for your use in case the matter may already have been brought up in Moscow. Meanwhile, we are endeavoring to ascertain whether the Foreign Office in London, which originally proposed the use of the Bulgarian model, has prepared or is preparing a full draft of the terms as a basis for the Moscow discussions. You will in any case receive further instructions embodying the Department's views on the working out of the details of the armistice document.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.<sup>97</sup>

HULL

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<sup>97</sup> As No. 6985.

740.00119 E.W. 1939/8-2944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1944—9 p. m.

2095. Reurtel 3203 August 28, reDeptel 2083 August 30. The Department has not yet been informed whether the Soviet Government is agreeable to the British suggestion that the Bulgarian terms drafted by the EAC be used as a model for the Rumanian armistice. The Department attaches great importance to Soviet views in this matter. In the event that the formulation of the Rumanian terms should take that course, however, the Department has prepared for your convenience the following working draft which may be useful if, as now appears from your 3209,<sup>98</sup> further drafting is being conducted at Moscow. This text contains the Department's suggestions regarding suitable form and content of an armistice document designed to incorporate the April terms, those proposed Soviet additions which still seem applicable, the proposed British amendments and additions to which the Department has agreed, and clauses based on the Bulgarian draft armistice which are applicable.

*Begin draft terms:* The Rumanian Government (hereafter referred to as "Rumania") and the Governments of the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S.A. (hereafter referred to as "the three Allies") agree to the following articles:

1. All hostilities on the part of Rumanian armed forces against the United Nations shall cease.

2. Rumania shall sever all relations with every state at war with any of the United Nations.

3. Rumania shall engage in the common struggle against the Germans, in collaboration with the Red Army, with a view to ejecting German forces from Rumanian territory and restoring Rumania's independence and sovereignty.

4. Rumania shall disarm and intern all enemy nationals and shall place under control all enemy property.

5. A zone shall be allocated to Rumania for its seat of government. This zone will not be occupied by Allied troops, which shall, however, have the right of passage through it. The location and extent of the zone shall be determined by the three Allies.

6. The commanders of Soviet or other Allied military forces in Rumania shall have the right to move their forces and supplies freely across Rumanian territory in all directions as the military situation, in their judgment, requires.

7. Rumania shall carry out such measures of demobilization and disarmament as the three Allies may require.

8. Rumania shall release all United Nations' prisoners of war and internees.

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<sup>98</sup> Dated August 29, 4 p. m., p. 198.

9. Rumania shall restore all United Nations property and shall make reparation for war damage inflicted on any of the United Nations. The amount of reparations will be determined at a later date.

10. Rumania shall not dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the three Allies.

11. Rumania shall comply with Allied requirements for the use and control of transport including Danubian navigation and transport facilities.

12. Rumania shall cooperate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of war crimes.

13. Rumania shall release, as the three Allies may specify, persons detained for political reasons or as a result of discriminatory legislation. Such legislation shall be repealed.

14. Rumania shall make such contribution towards general relief and rehabilitation as may be required of her by the United Nations.

15. Rumania shall furnish such supplies as the three Allies may require for the use of their forces or missions in Rumania or for the prosecution of the war.

16. Rumania shall consent to the appointment of an Allied Control Commission.

17. Rumania may have, if it so desires, for the purpose of contact with the Soviet Union, in addition to a general officer for military questions, a political representative for political questions.

18. Rumania recognizes the Rumanian-Soviet frontier as established in 1940.

19. The three Allies do not consider that they are in any way bound by the provisions of the "Vienna Award" of August 1940, and are prepared to conduct operations jointly with Rumania against Germany and against Hungary so long as Hungary remains an ally of Germany, with a view to the restoration to Rumania of Transylvania or the greater part thereof, but the definitive disposition of this territory shall be deferred to the general peace settlement.

20. Rumania shall comply with any further Allied instructions for giving effect to the armistice, shall give all facilities to such missions as the three Allies may send, and shall meet Allied requirements for the re-establishment of peace and security. *End draft terms.*

The April terms are covered by Articles 3, 6, 8, 9, 17, 18 and 19. The proposed Soviet additions listed in your 3159 August 26 are included in Articles 5 and 9, except for the points envisaging a 15-day period for German evacuation of Rumania and a "reduction" of the indemnity, which do not now appear to be applicable. The British proposals repeated to you in Department's 2073, August 29, are covered by Articles 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 16, 17 and 20.

Articles 1, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 20 are based on similar clauses in the Bulgarian draft armistice terms sent to you in the Department's 2083 August 30. As indicated in that telegram the Department prefers the wording of Article 20 in above draft text to the wording of similar clause proposed by the British. The Department believes that the general requirement that Rumania should comply with future

Allied instructions should be specifically connected with the execution of the armistice.

In the event that the Moscow discussions proceed on the basis of a shorter armistice document including merely the April terms plus some or all of the specific additions proposed since August 23 by the Soviet and British Governments (reurtel 3209, August 29), you are authorized to agree to such an armistice provided it meets the Department's position as set forth in its telegrams 2043 (August 26), 2073 (August 29), and the last sentence of 2083 (August 30).

For your own confidential information with regard to article 19, the Department agreed to its provisions as a matter of urgency when the Soviet Government proposed Rumanian armistice terms last April, as the withdrawal of Rumania from the war was considered of great importance from the military point of view. In view of Rumania's long delay in taking action, the Soviet Government may now be less anxious to make such definite territorial commitments to Rumania. You will wish to have in mind in such an eventuality the Department's preference as set forth in its 2073 of August 29.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London.<sup>99</sup>

HULL

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740.00119 EW 1939/8-3144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 31, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received 11:22 p. m.]

3250. Molotov received the British Ambassador and myself this evening and transmitted to us the Soviet draft of the Rumanian armistice terms. He informed us that two groups of Rumanians had arrived in Moscow and that three additional persons whom he believed to be secretarial personnel were en route through Odessa. The first group which was headed by the Rumanian Minister of Justice,<sup>1</sup> arrived in Moscow on August 29. The second group consisted of Stirbey and Visoianu.

Molotov was careful to explain that the Russians had not yet met any of the Rumanian delegates but he proposed to receive them at 11:00 this evening to agree on procedure and to ascertain who is to conduct the negotiations for the Rumanians. In this connection he said that the Rumanian Minister in Ankara had informed Vinogradov<sup>2</sup> that Stirbey and Visoianu are authorized to conduct the negotiations

<sup>99</sup> As No. 7049.

<sup>1</sup> Lucretiu Patrascanu.

<sup>2</sup> Sergei Alexandrovich Vinogradov, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Turkey.



whereas Molotov had learned that the Minister of Justice considered himself as head of the delegation.

It was agreed that the British Ambassador and myself would study the Soviet draft and that we would meet with Molotov tomorrow to discuss it. For security reasons the translation of the text is being transmitted through the British Embassy in Washington.<sup>3</sup> As Molotov emphasized the need for prompt agreement with the British and ourselves, I hope that I may receive your instructions urgently.

You will note that the terms provide for the return of Allied property rights in Rumania but not reparation whereas the Soviets obtain 20% of their claims for the damage resulting from the Rumanian invasion of Soviet territory.

Sent to Department, repeated to London as 159.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-144: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 1, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 2—11:28 p. m.]

1619. The following message sent to the Department and repeated to London as No. 38 and to Moscow:

Ankara, August 29, 1944. Mr. Ambassador: I have the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to transmit to the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the following communication from the Rumanian Government, which I received yesterday, August 28:

"1. The National Democratic Bloc, which is represented by the new Rumanian Government, had intended to send General Aldea<sup>4</sup> to Moscow to sign the armistice there. This intention had moreover been communicated in good time to the Soviet Government through the intermediary of Her Excellency Madame Kollontay.<sup>5</sup>

2. In view of the decision taken by Marshal Antonescu to send to the front all the Rumanian troops still available in the interior of the country, His Majesty the King and the heads of the National Democratic Bloc found themselves obliged to proceed immediately with the action which was not to have taken place until several days later. In consequence of this fact we have been obliged to make use, without delay, of the results obtained by the contact already existing at Cairo and we have given instructions to Messrs. Stirbey and Visoianu to sign the armistice immediately. Messrs. Barbu Stirbey and Constantin Visoianu are plenipotentiaries of the Rumanian Government.<sup>6</sup>

3. Beginning from August 24, 1944 at 4 o'clock in the morning, Rumania has been in a state of war with Germany.

Consequently the Rumanian Army at the front has been ordered to collaborate with the Soviet Army in the struggle against the common enemy, and the Ru-

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<sup>3</sup> See text transmitted on September 2, p. 209.

<sup>4</sup> Gen. Aurel Aldea, Rumanian army division commander, Minister of Interior in the new government.

<sup>5</sup> Mme. Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontay, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Sweden.

<sup>6</sup> They arrived in Moscow on August 30 from Cairo.

manian troops have spontaneously begun action against the German Army in Rumania. To the extent to which the latter has not been disarmed and interned, it will be liquidated by the action of the Rumanian troops.

4. The Rumanian Government has taken cognizance, with satisfaction, of the declaration made by Mr. Molotov on August 25 last.

The condition specified by Mr. Molotov, that the Rumanian troops should not be disarmed after they had ceased their struggle against the Soviet Army, has been realized by the fact of Rumania's entry into war against Germany.

This being the case, the Rumanian Government requests that all the Rumanian troops who have been disarmed, be rearmed and placed at its disposition for action against Germany in accordance with the promise of the Soviet Government. Likewise, the Rumanian Government understands, from the declaration made by Mr. Molotov, that henceforth Rumanian units shall no longer be disarmed but shall be associated in the struggle against the common enemy. It is clearly understood that this action must be coordinated with the action of the Soviet Army and that it will take place [in] the framework of the general operations against Germany.

5. A superior officer delegated by the Rumanian Government shall leave immediately in order to enter into contact with the Soviet Military Command, for the purpose of coordinating the action against the common enemy. The Rumanian Government would like to receive, in its turn, a Soviet Military Mission. The latter may land at any time at the Popesti-Leordeni air field. This mission may, of course, arrive from any points where contact has been established between the Rumanian and the Soviet Army.

6. The Rumanian Government requests the Soviet Government to intervene vigorously at Sofia, in order that the Bulgarians may prevent the passage into Rumania of the German troops south of the Danube. According to information received by the Rumanian Government, the German units in question are concentrated at Nicopoljstov, Turtucaia and especially at Rusciuk.

7. The Rumanian Government which from now on is in the *de facto* position of cobelligerent desires the [*that*] the United Nations recognize it as an ally.

8. The Rumanian Government desires and is ready to proceed without delay to an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Government.

9. The Rumanian Government is ready to commence immediately at Moscow the discussions relative to the conditions of the application of the armistice and to sign a special agreement to this effect. These discussions should be carried on at Moscow either by the diplomatic representative of Rumania or by a special delegation.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my very high consideration.  
The Rumanian Minister: (Signed) Cretzianu."

[STEINHARDT]

740.00119 EW 1939/9-144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 1, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 3—6:30 p. m.]

1620. The following telegram is sent to Department and repeated to London as No. [39?] and Moscow:

Ankara, August 30, 1944. To His Excellency Mr. S. Vinogradov, Ambassador of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Turkey:

Mr. Ambassador: I have the honor to request Your Excellency to be good enough to inform the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics that I received yesterday a telegram from my Government expressing its regret that the Rumanian fleet at the Danube delta had been forced to capitulate as the result of an ultimatum received from a Soviet admiral.

My Government hopes that a similar occurrence will not take place in connection with the Rumanian Black Sea fleet which is at Constanza.

The Rumanian Government emphasizes as a matter of fact that it can only be a question of a local misunderstanding in view of the declaration of August 26 [25?] <sup>7</sup> in which His Excellency, Mr. Molotov, stated that the Rumanian forces would not be disarmed in the event that they would fight by the side of the Soviet Army in order to liberate Rumania. But Rumania is in a state of war with Germany since August 24, the date on which the Rumanian Government gave the order to commence hostilities against the German troops. Moreover, this has been officially proclaimed by a public declaration of the Rumanian Government under date of August 26 last.

It is thus certain that independently of the fact of the formal signature of the armistice between the two states, there exists from the present time an understanding that the Rumanian troops will not be disarmed as long as they are fighting against Germany.

The Rumanian Government has the honor to emphasize at the same time that the Rumanian Army has already by its own efforts liberated almost all Rumanian territory and that there remain only a few points of resistance which are in the process of being liquidated. The majority of the German troops are already disarmed and interned.

On the other hand, the Rumanian emissaries who were at Cairo have left by plane for Moscow in order to sign the armistice there.

In informing the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of the above, the Rumanian Government has the honor to request:

(1) That the Rumanian troops at the front should no longer be disarmed and that they may unite [with] the Soviet troops in the struggle against the common enemy. This request obviously includes also the fleet at Constanza.

The Rumanian Government hopes that the rearmament of the Rumanian troops who have already been disarmed can take place as soon as possible.

(2) That the movements of the Soviet troops in Rumanian territory will be effected only in the spirit of Mr. Molotov's declaration and keeping in mind the fact that the Rumanian Government has shown itself in a position to liquidate by its own forces the German troops inside Rumania.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurances of my very high consideration.

The Rumanian Minister: (Signed) Al. Cretzianu.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 EW 1939/9-244

*The Department of State to the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944.

The Department of State transmits herewith for the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a copy of the text, as provided by the British

<sup>7</sup> See telegram 3148, August 25, from Moscow, p. 193.

Embassy, of the terms of surrender as formulated by the Soviet Government for presentation to the Rumanian representatives now in Moscow. This text, which has been communicated to the American and British Governments for their consideration, is designed to embody in a single document the various provisions on which the three Allied Governments have agreed in principle since the negotiations began with the Rumanians last April.

The Department, which has just now received this text, will provide you with comment as soon as its examination of the proposed terms can be completed.

[Annex]

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944.]

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM SENT BY MOSCOW TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE,  
DATED AUGUST 31ST, 1944

My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text. *Begins.*

Agreement concerning an Armistice between the Governments of USSR, United Kingdom and United States of America and the Government of Roumania.

The Government and High Command of Roumania, recognizing the fact of Roumania's defeat in the war against the USSR, United Kingdom, United States and other United Nations, fully accept armistice terms presented by the Governments of a forementioned three Allied powers acting in the interests of all United Nations.

On the basis of foreign policy the representatives of the Governments of the USSR, United Kingdom and the United States on the one hand, and representatives of Government and High Command of Roumania, on the other provided with the necessary powers, have signed the following terms, the implementation of which will take place under control of Soviet High Command, hereinafter called "Allied (Soviet) High Command", acting on behalf of the Allied Powers.

1. As from . . . . 1944 Roumania has entirely discontinued military operations against the USSR on all theatres of war, has withdrawn from the war against the United Nations, has broken off relations with Germany and her satellites, has entered the war and will wage war on the side of the Allied Powers against Germany and her satellites, for which purpose she provides not less than twelve Infantry Divisions to be kept up to strength.

Military operations on the part of the Roumanian armed forces against Germany and her satellites will be conducted under the general leadership of Allied (Soviet) High Command.

2. The Government and High Command of Roumania will ensure to Soviet and other Allied forces facilities for free movement on Roumanian territory in any direction if required by military situation, the Roumanian Government and High Command of Roumania giving such movement every possible assistance with their own means of communications (and at their own expense) on land and on water and in the air.

3. The State frontier between the USSR and Roumania, established by Soviet-Roumania agreement of June 28th 1940,<sup>8</sup> is restored.

4. The Government and High Command of Roumania will immediately hand over all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war in their hands, as well as interned citizens and citizens deported to Roumania, to Allied (Soviet) High Command for return of these persons to their own country.

From the moment of signing of present terms and until repatriation Roumanian Government and High Command undertake to provide at their own expense all Soviet and Allied prisoners of war, as well as deported and interned citizens with adequate food, clothing and medical advice, in accordance with sanitary requirements, as well as with means of transport for return of all these persons to their own country.

5. The Roumanian Government will immediately set free, irrespective of citizenship [grp. undec.]<sup>9</sup> nationality, all persons held in prison on account of their activities in favour of United Nations or because of their sympathies with the cause of the United Nations, and will remove all restrictions imposed by discriminating legislation.

6. The Roumanian Government and High Command undertake to hand over as trophies into the hands of Allied (Soviet) High Command all war material of Germany and her satellites located on Roumanian territory, including the vessels of fleet of Germany and her satellites located in Roumanian waters.

7. The Roumanian Government and High Command undertake to hand over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command all vessels belonging to the United Nations which are located in Roumanian ports, no matter at whose disposal these vessels may be, for use of Allied (Soviet) High Command during period of abeyance in general interests of Allies, these vessels ultimately to be returned to their owners.

The Roumanian Government bear full material responsibility for any damage or destruction of aforementioned property until the moment of transfer of this property to Allied (Soviet) High Command.

8. The Roumanian Government will in case of need ensure the use on Roumanian territory of industrial and transportation enterprises,

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<sup>8</sup> Text printed in Moscow *Izvestiya*, June 29, 1940; see also telegram 768, June 28, 1940, 3 p. m., from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 484.

<sup>9</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

as well as means of communication, power stations, enterprises and installations of public utility, warehouses, fuel and other materials, in accordance with instructions issued time of armistice by Allied (Soviet) High Command.

9. Losses caused to Soviet Union by military operations and occupation of Roumania of Soviet territory will be indemnified by Roumania to the Soviet Union but, taking into consideration that Roumania has not merely withdrawn from the war but has declared war and in fact wages war against Germany and Hungary, the parties agree that indemnification of losses will not be made in full but only to extent of about one-fifth namely to amount of \$300 million payable over six years in commodities (oil products, grain, timber products, sea-going and river craft, sundry machinery, etc.).

10. Roumanian Government undertake within periods indicated by Allied (Soviet) High Command to return to Soviet Union in complete good order all valuables and materials removed from its territory during the war belonging to the state public or co-operative organizations, enterprises, institutions or individual citizens, such as factory and works equipment, locomotives, railway trucks, tractors, motor vehicles, historic monuments, museum valuables and any other property.

11. Roumanian Government undertake to restore pre-war legal rights of the Allies and their citizens to property located on Roumanian territory.

12. Roumania must make regular payments in Roumanian currency and deliver commodities (fuel, food products, etc.) required for maintenance and conduct of operations of the Allied (Soviet) Army operating on or from north Roumania against the Germans and Hungarians.

13. Roumanian Government and High Command undertake to collaborate with Allied (Soviet) High Command in apprehension of persons accused of war crimes and in their trial.

14. Printing importation and distribution in Roumania of periodical [ ? and ]<sup>20</sup> pictorial periodical literature, presentation of theatre performances and films, work of wireless stations, post, telegraph and telephone shall be carried out in agreement with Allied (Soviet) High Command.

15. Roumanian civil administration is restored in the whole area of Roumania separated by not less than 50 to 100 kilometres (depending on geographical conditions) from the front line, administrative bodies undertaking to carry out instructions and orders issued by Allied (Soviet) High Command for the purpose of securing the execution of these armistice terms.

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<sup>20</sup> Brackets appear in the original.

16. A record commission will be established which will undertake regulation of and control over the execution of the present terms under general directions of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

17. The Allied Governments consider decision of Vienna Award incorrect (*sic*) and agree that Transylvania (whole or greater part) should be returned to Roumania subject to reconsideration at peace settlement.

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-244

*Memorandum by the Department of State to  
Admiral William D. Leahy*

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1944.

With reference to the Department of State's memorandum dated today transmitting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Soviet draft of armistice terms for Rumania,<sup>11</sup> the Department would like to set forth, for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs, its views on some of the more important of the provisions proposed by the Soviet Government, and to invite their comments upon the military aspects of those provisions.

The following four points would seem to be of particular interest:

1. Throughout the Soviet draft, the phrase "Allied (Soviet) High Command", which is defined as meaning the Soviet High Command, is used to describe the authority which will control the execution of the armistice.

2. The Soviet draft makes no provision for an Allied Control Commission, although Article 16 provides for a "record commission" which apparently would have the functions of a control commission, but its nature has not been explained to the Department. The Department has today received from the British Embassy in Washington a memorandum stating the British Government's view that there should be constituted an "inter-Allied Control Commission" for Rumania on which the three principal Allies would be represented. The Department takes the view that this Government should have political representation in Rumania, and it also sees certain political advantages in having American military personnel participate in such a mission. Whether this personnel may later be designated to serve on a Control Commission is a matter upon which the Department's policy has not yet been determined.

3. The provision in Article 1 of the Soviet draft to the effect that the Rumanian Army, with a minimum of twelve infantry divisions, should join the fight against "Germany and her satellites" raises both military and political questions as regards the "satellites", particularly since no limitation is placed on the use of Rumanian troops in Hungary or elsewhere outside Rumania. The Department has reservations concerning the advisability, from a political point of view, of the use of Rumanian troops in Hungary proper.

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<sup>11</sup> *Supra*.

4. The Soviet draft includes no provision concerning the demobilization or disarmament of the Rumanian armed forces upon the conclusion of hostilities against Germany.

With reference to Article 9 of the Soviet draft, the Department of State believes that it would be undesirable to include in the surrender instrument any specific sum to be paid by Rumania as reparation for war damages, the general Allied policy concerning reparations, as regards all enemy states, being still undetermined.

The British Government has recently proposed that the surrender instrument include provision for the internment of enemy nationals and the control of enemy property, and for the prohibition of the disposition of assets by Rumania without the consent of the Allies. The Department has indicated its agreement that such provisions should be included in the armistice. They do not, however, appear in the Soviet draft.

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-344: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 3, 1944—10 a. m.  
[Received September 3—8:25 a. m.]

3280. ReEmbs 3250, August 31, 11 p. m. Rumanian armistice terms proposed by Soviet Government cover break on part of Rumania with Germany and her satellites. No reference is made to Japan. Has the Department reached a decision on whether we wish to raise the issue with Rumania regarding break of diplomatic relations with Japan or are we willing to allow Japanese to maintain diplomatic mission in Rumania? If the Department desires Rumania's diplomatic break with Japan, are we prepared to deal with this point in a separate document without Soviet participation if the Soviet Government does not wish to be involved?

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-344: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 3, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received September 3—8:50 p. m.]

3281. Patrascanu and Prince Stirbey called on me today at their request. They expressed great disappointment at the delay in concluding the armistice. Stirbey said the Russians were continuing to disarm their troops and seize their supply depots. They had asked



that their troops be allowed to retain their arms in order to fight the Germans and Hungarians in accordance with the Russian terms but had been told that nothing could be done until the armistice was signed.

Stirbey said that he had been authorized to sign an armistice in Cairo but that as Patrascanu and another member of the new Government had arrived in Moscow, he assumed they would sign. Patrascanu said that he had thought when he left Bucharest that the armistice had already been signed and had authority only to implement it but that full powers to sign could be obtained from Bucharest with little delay.

Three secretaries have arrived from Bucharest bringing codes but so far the members of the delegation have had no communication with the Rumanian Government except through the Russians.

Patrascanu said that Molotov had received him but had not discussed the terms of the armistice. He told me that he was a Communist and that although the party had few members, because it had been illegal, it has considerable influence. He said that the King had played a considerable role in the *coup d'état* and that this had gained him respect with the people. Both he and Stirbey said that the King had the support of the new Government, that Carol<sup>12</sup> had no following whatever and that the only opposition to the new government was the Iron Guard which had few adherents left in Rumania.

Repeated to Cairo from [*for*] MacVeagh.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-344: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 3, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 5—3:45 a. m.]

1639. A translation of the Rumanian note reads as follows:

Mr. Ambassador: Following the conversation which I had with Your Excellency this morning, I have the honor to enclose the following texts:

1. Copy of a telegram No. 44 of August 31 signed by the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs pursuant to which I am instructed to see Your Excellency and to point out to you the serious difficulties being occasioned by the delay in signing the armistice as well as the uneasiness caused by the situation thus created.

2. Copy of a telegram No. 55 of September 1 signed by the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs pursuant to which I am instructed to emphasize to Your Excellency that the Soviet troops are giving

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<sup>12</sup> Carol II, who was succeeded by his son, Michael I, on September 6, 1940.

the impression that they consider Rumania to be an occupied country, and setting forth the acts committed by Soviet troops which appear to be contrary to the declaration made by Mr. Molotov on August 25, 1944.

3. Copy of note No. 1385 of September 2, 1944 which I have addressed to His Excellency, the Soviet Ambassador, requesting him to intervene with his Government on the subject of the matters referred to in telegrams Nos. 44 and 55 referred to above.

4. Copy of a note No. 1383 of September 2, 1944 which I am sending to His Excellency, the Soviet Ambassador to protest against the action of Soviet General Tevcenkov in having taken into his custody certain detained Rumanian politicians (Marshal Antonescu and several other members of his Government) who are now under guard by Soviet troops.

5. Copy of note No. 1384 of September 2, 1944 which I am sending to His Excellency, Mr. Vinogradov, to bring to his attention that the Commander of the Soviet Navy has blockaded the Rumanian oil depots and has insisted that there should be delivered to him immediately the German depots captured by Rumanian troops.

I should be most appreciative if you would bring to the attention of the Government of the United States of America the contents of telegrams Nos. 44 and 55 (enclosures 1 and 2) as well as note No. 1383 (relative to seizure by Soviet troops of detained Rumanian politicians).

In thanking in advance, please accept, et cetera, (Signed Cretzianu).

A translation of the telegram No. 44 referred to above reads as follows:

To Cretzianu: I beg of you to see the Ambassador of the United States and the Ambassador of Great Britain and to point out to them the inextricable situation which has been created in Rumania by the delay in signing the armistice. The Rumanian Government finds itself in the greatest perplexity by reason of the fact that the armistice has not yet been signed, although it has been informed by you and directly by its emissaries in Cairo that complete agreement had been reached on the subject of its contents.

The Soviet Army in Rumania continues its advance with the probable intention of occupying the greatest part, if not all of our territory, under the pretext that the armistice has not yet been signed. However, this advance of the Soviet troops in Rumania is not justified in view of fact that the Rumanian Government had already liquidated entirely through its own means all centers of German resistance.

Public opinion in Rumania is seriously uneasy as a result of this situation. The impression is beginning to spread that the delay in the signature of the armistice is being caused by the desire to occupy all Rumanian territory by Soviet troops.

It is unnecessary to emphasize the consequences which this regrettable state of affairs could have on the development of Rumanian-Soviet relations—relations to which the Rumanian people would like to give a character of sincere friendship.

I recall that among the conditions of the armistice in respect of which the Soviet Government declared itself to be in accord, there is the stipulation that there shall be created a zone in which Soviet troops may not enter. If the present condition continues it is obvious that

this clause will become a dead letter which could not fail to cast a shadow on our relations with the Soviet Union. Please make a similar *démarche*—in appropriate terms—to the Soviet Ambassador in Turkey.

At the same time you will request him to intervene insistently with Moscow to the effect that the Soviet Government will authorize coded telegraphic communications between the Rumanian Government and the Rumanian Delegation in Moscow. The management of the Rumanian postal telegraphic service is in a position to immediately reestablish such if the Soviet Government gives its consent. (Signed) Niculesco-Buzesti.

A translation of the telegram No. 55 referred to above reads as follows:

To Cretzianu: With further reference to my telegram No. 44, I inform you that the Soviet troops [are] under the impression that they consider Rumania as an occupied country.

Certain generals with whom furthermore it has been very difficult to make contact directly (with certain of them the Rumanian Government has been unable to make contact although they are in Bucharest), state that they have received no instructions of any kind from Moscow.

Although the disarmament of Rumanian troops is no longer taking place en masse it continues nevertheless in certain cases. The Soviet troops have demanded today that an ordinance should be proclaimed similar to that proclaimed in the occupied regions of Moldavia. The Soviet military authorities are directly requisitioning vehicles, automobiles and other things. The Soviet commanders give the impression that the war material taken from German troops captured or disarmed by us belong[s] to them. Certain communications by railroad have been interrupted by the Soviet Army which prevents the concentration of Rumanian troops which the Rumanian general staff desires to send to Transylvania to engage in the battle with the German and Hungarian troops which are there.

I beg of you to bring the foregoing to the attention of the Soviet, American and British Ambassadors and express to them at the same time the astonishment of the Rumanian Government that the armistice has not yet been signed although its terms have already been definitely established and our opinion that these events are contrary to the declaration of Mr. Molotov of August 25.

In conformity with that declaration the Soviet Union has no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Rumania and will respect its sovereignty and independence and will permit Rumanian troops to fight for the liberation of Transylvania.

This declaration constitutes an engagement irrespective of whether the armistice has or has not been signed. The condition pronounced by Mr. Molotov that this engagement should become effective was to know that the Rumanian troops have begun the fight against the Germans and was realized the moment Rumania was officially in a state of war with Germany which has been since the 24th of August.

The Rumanian Government is convinced that the facts set forth above are the result of delaying the receipt of message by the Soviet troops in Rumania from Moscow.

The Rumanian Government does not doubt that the Soviet engagements will be carried out. It requests however that message should be given urgently [so that?] Rumania shall not be treated like an enemy country but like a friendly country fighting alongside of the Red Army against the common enemy.

Postscript: At the moment of sending this telegram the Soviet generals in Bucharest have made an official declaration to us according to which they are not authorized to deal with the Rumanian Government. Negotiations can only be carried on directly by the Rumanian Government and the Soviet Government through the intervention of the Rumanian delegation now in Moscow. (Signed) Niculesco-Buzesti.

A translation of the note No. 1383 referred to above reads as follows :

To Vinogradov : I have the honor to bring to your attention pursuant to instructions contained in a telegram which I have received from my Government that the Soviet General Tevcenkov has requested in a most exigent manner that he visit the detained politicians who are in the hands of the Rumanian Government in order to assure himself in carrying out the mission with which he is charged by the Soviet Government that they are well guarded and that there is no danger of their escape.

The Rumanian Government having complied with this request, General Tevcenkov went to visit the detained politicians accompanied by the Minister of Internal Affairs.<sup>13</sup> But on arriving at their destination the Soviet General took the detained politicians into custody and removed them to a locality near Bucharest giving as his reason that they should be better guarded.

In consequence the detained politicians who are Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, (?) Pantazi<sup>14</sup> and Vasiliu<sup>15</sup> and Colonel Elefterescu are now guarded by Soviet troops to which there have been added some Rumanian elements.

General Tevcenkov has stated that he holds these detained individuals at the disposition of the Rumanian Government.

However, the Rumanian Government has the honor to invite the attention of the Soviet Government to the foregoing in protesting against the procedure of General Tevcenkov which constitutes an obvious interference with Rumanian Sovereignty.

The Rumanian Government has the honor to request the Soviet Government that the detained politicians in question be returned to be guarded exclusively by the Rumanian authorities.

Please accept et cetera. Signed: Cretzianu.

A translation of the note No. 1384 referred to above reads as follows :

To Vinogradov : I have the honor to request you to transmit to the Rumanian Delegation which is now in Moscow the following communication which I have received today September 2 from the Rumanian Government.

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<sup>13</sup> Gen. Aurel Aldea.

<sup>14</sup> Gen. C. Pantazi, former Minister of National Defense.

<sup>15</sup> Gen. C. Vasiliu, former Minister of Interior.

1. The oil depots of the Rumanian Navy belonging to both the Rumanian State and private companies have been sequestrated by the Commander of the Soviet Navy. The Rumanian Navy is obliged to request oil fuel of the Soviet Commander.

2. The Commander of the Soviet Navy has demanded that there shall be delivered to him immediately without any formality the German depots captured by Rumanian troops.

Please accept, et cetera. Signed: Cretzianu.

Note No. 1385 addressed to Vinogradov and signed by Cretzianu is substantially similar to the note addressed to me set forth above but merely couched in different language.

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-444: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:40 p. m.]

3294. At a meeting with the Russians today, Clark Kerr presented his Government's comments on the Soviet draft of armistice terms for Rumania.<sup>16</sup> I understand you have received these comments from the British Embassy.<sup>17</sup> I explained that I had not yet received comment from my Government on the Soviet draft and that such comments as I made would be based on previous instructions. I reserved the right to reopen any question after receipt of further instructions from my Government.

Molotov agreed to the British proposal that a Soviet general be authorized to sign for the three principal Allies acting on behalf of the United Nations.

Molotov proposed an alteration in the Soviet text substituting "Hungary" for "her satellites" in article I and where "her satellites" appears in other articles, Molotov desires to define "satellites" to mean countries with which all of the three Allies [are] at war.

Molotov accepted the additional provision proposed by the British in article I.

In article IV, the Soviets contended that the British proposed changes in "A" were not necessary and that the language as now drawn would, of course, be interpreted in the manner the British Government indicated.

The Soviets accepted the British amendment "B" to article IV.

The British amendment to article V was accepted.

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<sup>16</sup> See annex to memorandum of September 2, p. 209.

<sup>17</sup> Communication from British Embassy not printed.

Molotov contended that the British amendments to article VI were not needed as the Soviet draft clearly referred only to war material and not to another enemy property.

Molotov agreed to give consideration to British proposed amendment "A" to article VII and to reply later. He accepted proposal "B" to article VII.

Molotov stated that the Control Commission had authority to deal with the British comment on article VIII.

As to article IX, Molotov insisted that the amount of reparation the Soviets were asking was extremely modest and that it was necessary in order to satisfy Russian opinion that the armistice terms fix the amount to be paid the Soviet Union for war damage. He agreed, however, to an additional provision to the effect that Rumania should undertake to indemnify other United Nations for war damage to their property in Rumania, this amount to be determined at a later date. As Molotov stated, the Soviet Government considered fixing a definite sum to be paid the Soviet Union as one of the most important provisions of the armistice; it is clear that the Soviets will not change their position. Since they have now agreed to provision for reparations to other United Nations, I recommend that we concur.

Molotov told the British Ambassador that article X referred only to identifiable objects.

The British redraft of article XI was accepted by the Soviets with the addition of the words "legal pre-war" before the word "rights".

Molotov declined to agree to the British suggested changes in article XII, contending that the Soviet text gave the Allies ample power and that he believed the British language would unnecessarily alarm the Rumanians. If detailed arrangements were necessary, they could be dealt with in a protocol.

Molotov declined to accept the British proposed amendments to article XV as he considered them unnecessary and that reference to missions other than the Control Commission was confusing, and that during the period of military operations, other missions were undesirable. He said, however, that if the British and we insisted, he would agree against his better judgment to the inclusion of reference to "the reestablishment of peace and security."

Molotov declined to accept the British addition to article XVI contending that there was ample power in other provisions to cover this point and believing that it was unwise to refer constantly to expenses to be borne by Rumania.

On the British point "B" to article XVI, Molotov agreed that the powers of the Allied (Soviet) High Command would be exercised through the Allied Control Commission.

Molotov agreed subject to confirmation by his Government to the substitution for article XVII of a separate declaration in accordance

with the British text. I explained that my Government would prefer to substitute for the phrase "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" the phrase "but the definite disposition of this territory shall be deferred to the general peace settlement["]].

Molotov said that these words had been proposed by Churchill and that if Churchill agreed to the substitution he saw no objection as he considered it was a question of drafting and not of substance. Clark Kerr said he would take this matter up with his Government. The Department may wish urgently to press the British Government to agree.

As to article XVIII, Molotov agreed that changes should be made to conform to the new preamble and that unless the Rumanians objected, the Russian and English texts should be the only authentic ones.

As to the additional British comments, Molotov agreed to "A" by inserting in article I the words "for the purpose of reestablishing the independence and sovereignty of Rumania" before the words "for which purpose she provides". Molotov contended that comments "B" and "E" were clearly covered by other articles and the comments "C" and "D" were not necessary.

As to "F", Molotov stated that the Soviet Government preferred not to become involved in reference to Japan but had no objection to the British Ambassador and myself reaching an understanding with the Rumanian delegates that Rumania should sever relations with Japan.

Molotov pressed for a final meeting with us on Tuesday night or Wednesday morning and presentation of the terms to the Rumanians Wednesday evening.

In view of the need for prompt action and the difficulty of triangular clearance, I hope that when I receive instructions as to any further amendments it will be made clear which ones I should insist upon and which are left to my discretion.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 EW 1939/9-544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 5, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received September 5—7:08 a. m.]

3299. ReEmbs 3294, September 4, 8 p. m. All of us here, including General Deane,<sup>18</sup> have been analyzing proposed armistice terms for Rumania as now amended as a result of the conference yesterday.

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<sup>18</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

We feel that the draft now includes substantially all the points covered in the Department's instructions received to date and that through establishment of the control commission paralleling the Italian procedure points on which we may not be fully satisfied or new subjects can be dealt with.

Molotov is extremely anxious to have these armistice terms signed tomorrow, Wednesday night. I believe it is greatly to the interest of the Allies to have the situation in Rumania clarified which can be accomplished only through conclusion of an armistice. In the circumstances we recommend that I be instructed immediately to authorize the Soviet General to sign on our behalf.

I recommend that I be given discretion in connection with any further modifications the Department may desire, if I find that insistence on the inclusion of these points would delay the conclusion of the armistice.

HARRIMAN

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740.0011 E.W. 1939/9-344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944—9 p. m.

2138. Reurtel 3280 September 3. The Department believes that Rumania should be required to break diplomatic relations with Japan and understands the desire of the Soviet Government not to become involved in this matter. You are accordingly authorized to arrange, together with your British colleague, for the Rumanian commitment in this regard to be made the subject of a separate document without Soviet participation.<sup>19</sup>

HULL

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944—10 p. m.

2139. The Joint Chiefs have just informed the Department that they give their assent, from the point of view of the military considerations involved, to the Rumanian terms of surrender as submitted to them September 2. Accordingly you are authorized to sign the armistice on behalf of this Government, or to agree to its signature by a Soviet general.

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<sup>19</sup> See Ambassador Harriman's letter to the Rumanian armistice delegation, quoted in telegram 3492, September 14, 7 p. m., p. 233.



The following observations represent the Department's views on several points, but the manner of their presentation is left to your judgment, since in no instance would we insist on their adoption.

The Department agrees in general with the Soviet position as set forth by Molotov in the discussion of September 4 (reported in your 3294, September 4, 8 p. m.) in which he accepted some of the British proposals *in toto*, accepted some with amendments and rejected others. However, the following British proposals, not accepted by Molotov, are considered by the Department as worthy of inclusion in the armistice:

1. In Article VII of the Soviet draft the text should stop at "may be".
2. The Department supports the British position on the control of the Rumanian Navy and merchant fleet as given in additional comment "b".
3. The Department prefers that the armistice should include a provision for Rumanian contribution to general relief as proposed in additional comment "d".

As set forth in the working draft sent to you in Department's 2095 August 31 (Articles 4 and 10), the Department would have liked to see the armistice terms include provision for the control of enemy property and of the transfer of Rumanian assets.

We do not wish to press for the adoption of the British proposed additions to Article 15.

With reference to Articles XV and XVI of the Soviet text, we would expect to have political representation in Rumania but we would not wish to insist on stipulations in the armistice for Allied missions beyond the provision already made in the Russian text.

With respect to Article XVII of the Soviet text, the Department believes it inadvisable to highlight the Transylvania question by making it the subject of a separate declaration. We prefer either the phrase which the Department had recommended or the language of the Russian text.

The British Embassy here cannot give us the text of the new preamble or of the new Article 18 on which you make certain observations. We are assuming that these additions concern technical formalities regarding signature and official language, with respect to which the Department would not wish to advance any particular views.

On the matter of reparations or indemnity, the Department had hoped to avoid the stipulation of any specific sum to be paid by Rumania, the general Allied policy concerning reparations, as regards all enemy states, being still undetermined. The Department would like you to make our position clear, as a matter of principle, to the Soviet Government, even though in view of the firm Soviet insistence

on this point, it may not be possible to obtain a modification of this article.

HULL

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 6, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 8:07 p. m.]

3343. ReDepts 2139, September 5, 10 p. m. After a long discussion with the Russians and the British Ambassador this afternoon we came to an agreement on virtually all points except the question of reparation to the Soviet Union. Molotov repeating his arguments of yesterday stated categorically that the Soviet Government would insist upon the inclusion of the fixed sum of reparations to be paid to the Soviet Union. As the British Ambassador's instructions were not sufficiently flexible to concur, he is cabling tonight for further instructions. The meeting with the Rumanians is therefore postponed until tomorrow.

Molotov agreed to dealing with Transylvania either in the armistice or in a separate declaration. This issue thus becomes one between us and the British. The British Ambassador has agreed to cable London presenting our viewpoint.

I explained to Molotov that we would expect to have a political representative in Rumania. Molotov seemed surprised and inquired whether it was proposed that this representative be accredited to the Rumanian Government or to the Control Commission. He indicated that it was not intended to establish diplomatic relations with Rumania at this time and implied that any political relations with the Rumanian Government should be through the machinery of the Control Commission. Molotov said that he wanted it understood that the Control Commission in Rumania would operate in the same way as the Control Commission in Italy.

It seems clear that the Soviet Government intends to keep a tight rein on Rumanian affairs during the period of military operations. I feel it highly important that I state to the Soviet Government prior to the signing of the armistice more precisely what position and activities we expect our political representatives to have. It would be helpful, therefore, if I might have tonight clarification and guidance on this point.

In this connection Clark Kerr raised the question of other Governments of the United Nations not on the Control Commission having political representatives in Rumania. Molotov indicated that he

would not object to consular representation but would oppose at this time their sending political representatives to Rumania.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1944—7 p. m.

2152. The Department has just this afternoon received the full text of the separate declaration regarding Transylvania proposed by the British in lieu of Article XVII of the Russian draft of the armistice. Examination of this text confirms the view expressed in our 2139 September 5 namely that we believe treatment of the Transylvanian question in a separate document would serve only to give undue prominence to a matter which we have consistently preferred to hold over for the general settlement. Should your British colleague be instructed to insist on the proposal for a separate declaration, you should say that your Government is unwilling to be a signatory thereto. The Department is still willing, of course, to have included in the armistice the clause on Transylvania as it appears in the Soviet draft or with any other wording which meets the Department's position as set forth in your previous instructions.

With regard to the third paragraph of your telegram, the Department had not yet determined at the time of its earlier reference to political representation whether this Government would be prepared fully to participate in an Allied Control Commission. You may now inform Mr. Molotov that it is intended that the American representatives sent to Rumania should constitute the American representation on the Allied Control Commission, now that it has been agreed that such a commission should be created, and say that the Department hopes the Soviet Government will indicate its concurrence to the despatch of such an American mission at an early date. The names, ranks and titles of the members of the mission will be communicated to the Soviet Government as soon as they are known.

For your own information, the Department's plans contemplate that a part of the personnel of its mission to Rumania will probably be used on the staff of our diplomatic mission to that country when direct relations with the Rumanian Government are resumed.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London.<sup>20</sup>

HULL

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<sup>20</sup> As No. 7257.

740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-844: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 8, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received September 8—2: 50 p. m.]

3382. After a further discussion between Molotov, the British Ambassador and myself on the Rumanian armistice terms, Molotov presented a protocol which I quote below in translation. Molotov stated that this protocol should be signed at the same time as the signing of the armistice. Vyshinski suggested that provision No. 6 of this protocol might more properly be included in the armistice itself. I can give no explanation why this document was presented at this late date as none of the matters covered had been a subject of previous discussion in our lengthy conferences. I ask urgent instructions on the Department's attitude toward this document and its provisions:

“Upon the signing of the agreement between the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of Rumania on the other concerning an armistice, the contracting parties have agreed on the following:

1. The Allied Control Commission established in accordance with article 18 of the agreement covering an armistice shall be charged with the control of the faithful execution of the terms of the armistice.

The Rumanian Government and its bodies shall be obliged to carry out all directions of the Allied Control Commission arising from the armistice agreement.

The Allied Control Commission shall set up specific organs or sections charged with the execution of the various functions. Furthermore, the Control Commission may have its offices in various localities of Rumania.

The Allied Control Commission shall have its real seat in Bucharest.

2. By the cooperation of the Rumanian Government and High Command of Rumania mentioned in article 3 of the agreement, there is envisaged the making available to the Allied (Soviet) High Command for use at its discretion during the period of the armistice all Rumanian military, air and naval installations and structures, ports, warehouses, barracks, airports, airdromes, means of communications and meteorological stations which may be required for military purposes in good order and with the requisite personnel necessary for servicing them.

3. The Rumanian High Command will immediately turn over to the Allied (Soviet) High Command full information concerning the disposition, composition and equipment of all land, air and sea armed forces of Rumania wherever they may be as well as such armed forces of her former Allies which may be on Rumanian territory.

4. As a basis for the calculation of the payment of indemnity envisaged in article 2 of the present agreement, there shall be taken the American dollar with its gold parity as of the day of the signature of the agreement that is \$35 for one ounce of gold.

5. The Rumanian Government agrees that radio communications, telegraph and postal correspondence and courier communications as well as the telephone communications with foreign countries of Embassies and Legations, Missions and Consulates in Rumania shall be effected in the manner laid down by the Allied (Soviet) High Command.

Arrangements for signature to follow those of main agreement.

6. The Rumanian Government agrees to dissolve at once all pro-Hitlerite (of a Fascist type) political, military, [para-] military and also other organizations on Rumanian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations and particularly to the Soviet Union and not to permit from now on the existence of this sort of organization.[""]

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 8, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 8:22 p. m.]

3383. ReEmbs 3343, September 6, 4 p. m. In the conferences on the Rumanian armistice terms, full agreement has been reached on the wording of all of IDS [*its*] terms with the exception of the indemnity to be paid by Rumania to the Soviet Union. (The new protocol has not been discussed, reEmbs 3382, September 8, 4 p. m.) The changes in the language are in the nature of clarification and practically all of the Department's suggestions have in substance been excluded [*included*] with the exception of the paragraph on contribution to general relief. Molotov objected to the inclusion of this provision in the armistice but agreed that if occasion arose when it was desired to have Rumania make a contribution to relief of other countries, the subject could be a matter of consideration at that time, bearing in mind Rumania's capabilities in the light of the other obligations she assumes under the armistice.

The British Ambassador today proposed a redraft of the article on reparation to the Soviet Union which excluded reference to the percentage which the \$300,000,000 bore to the total damage caused by Rumanian occupation of Soviet territory and inserted the word "provisionally" in the clause that fixed the sum. Molotov agreed to the first of these proposals but insisted on the elimination of the word "provisionally". The British Ambassador agreed to drop the word

“provisionally” provided a separate protocol were concluded between the three Allied Governments which would cover (1) a clause to the effect that the inclusion of the fixed sum of \$300,000,000 had been agreed to without prejudice to a revision if it developed that this amount was beyond Rumania’s capacity to fulfill and (2) a provision that while the British Government did not object to deliveries to the Soviet Union alone within the amount of \$300,000,000, it should be borne in mind that other claimant countries should receive in the final settlement an equitable proportion of the total reparations received from all enemy countries.

The British Ambassador had been instructed to inform the Soviet Government that it was the British opinion that \$300,000,000 considering Rumania’s other obligations would probably be beyond her capacity to pay. Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Government would not agree to sign a separate protocol of this character. Thus the British and Soviet Governments are again at an impasse and the British Ambassador is cabling for further instructions.

Sent to Department as 3383, September 8, 5 p. m. Repeated to London as 165, September 8, 5 p. m.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, September 8, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 10—1 p. m.]

1691. After calling to see me, the Rumanian Minister sent me a note dated September 7 which reads as follows in translation:

Mr. Ambassador: Since the conversation which I had the honor to have with you this morning I have received from my Government two telegrams as to the contents of which I desire to inform you.

1. My Government informs me on the basis of a communication received from our delegation in Moscow that the delay in the signature of the armistice is not being caused by the Soviet Government but by the British Government which states that it is under the obligation to consult the Dominions.

I have addressed a note on this subject to the British Ambassador to emphasize the serious inconveniences and the numerous dangers which result to Rumania by reason of this delay which is particularly unexpected as Great Britain had declared itself in accord with the armistice conditions formulated by the Soviet Government and previously accepted by Rumania.

2. My Government has advised me that the situation of the Rumanian fleet is very serious. The entire fleet has been disarmed. The same fate has already overtaken or will probably soon overtake the

river fleet of Soulina with which the Rumanian military authorities have had no contact since the 2nd of September.

Please accept et cetera.

Repeated to Moscow.

STEINHARDT

740.00119 European War 1939/9-844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944—midnight.

2176. ReEmbs 3383 September 8. With regard to the article on reparation the Department finds itself in almost complete agreement with the British position. It is felt that while Rumania should be obligated to pay reparation, the details of the settlement and especially the amount should be left as open as possible.

Our reasons for this position, which you may explain to the Russians, are that because of the interest which all the Allies have in the reparation recoverable from each enemy country and because of the economic interrelationships of the reparation paying and receiving countries, the reparation settlements with all enemy countries should be decided jointly after discussion and deliberation by the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union rather than unilaterally and should be treated as related parts of one broad problem.

If it is impossible to obtain any concession from the Soviet Government you may agree to the reparation article in its present form. In the latter event you should make it clear that this Government does not consider its action in agreeing to the Russian reparation demands on Rumania as setting a precedent in any way for the reparation settlements with Germany or other satellite countries.

HULL

740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944—midnight.

2177. While the Department does not consider it essential that the protocol quoted in your 3382 September 8 be signed at the same time as the armistice, it has no objections to the content of the proposed text. Pending the approval of the Joint Chiefs which it may not be possible to obtain before Tuesday,<sup>21</sup> the Department cannot yet au-

<sup>21</sup> September 12.

thorize you to agree to signature of the protocol on behalf of this Government.

The Department agrees that Article VI might more properly be included in the armistice itself, but would not be inclined to favor its inclusion in that document unless that could be accomplished without causing further delay in the conclusion of the armistice. Please say, without pressing the point, that we believe it would be preferable to omit the words "and particularly to the Soviet Union" from the last sentence of this article. You may mention in this connection that we are anxious not to raise any questions or make suggestions that might further delay the actual signing of the armistice, as we feel that prompt signature is of cardinal importance in enabling the Soviet authorities to stabilize the situation in Rumania and to dispel the confusion that is bound to exist until Rumania's status is officially clarified.

HULL

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740.00119 EW 1939/9-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 10, 1944—midnight.  
[Received September 10—7:17 p. m.]

3417. At a conference this afternoon between Molotov, the British Ambassador and myself, the final draft of armistice terms for Rumania was agreed to. The British Ambassador and I both stated our respective Governments' positions regarding the naming of a fixed amount of reparation to be paid the Soviet Union. Molotov however unequivocally insisted on the inclusion of the fixed amount and the reparation article was thereupon agreed to in its latest form.

It was agreed that article VI of the protocol should be included in the armistice.

In spite of my strong presentation that "and particularly to the Soviet Union" be omitted, Molotov insisted on its inclusion on the grounds that the Soviet Union was specially concerned as a neighboring country.

The protocol has been left for consideration after I have received my instructions. Molotov expressed the belief that the protocol should be presented to the Rumanians before signing the armistice. I hope my instructions will arrive before tomorrow, Monday evening, Moscow time. The British have agreed to the protocol.

We met with the Rumanian Delegation this evening and formally presented to them the agreed proposals for the armistice. The Rumanians asked for 24 hours to give consideration to the terms and



a meeting is arranged for tomorrow, Monday evening. The Rumanians were informed that there would be a protocol which would be submitted later.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 11, 1944—1 a. m. [*p. m.*]

3422. ReEmbs 3417, September 10, midnight. I find that the British have not yet agreed to the terms of the Rumanian armistice protocol as the British Ambassador had reserved his position in a letter to Molotov in which he inquired what the functions of the three components of the Control Commission would be. Molotov has replied to this letter stating that the executive functions of the Control Commission will belong to the Soviet representatives who have the required executive machinery. He stated that the task of the other representatives on the Control Commission would be analogous to the position of the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission for Italy and would consist in maintaining liaison between the respective Governments and the Allied Control Commission. Molotov pointed out that they would thus be able to obtain all required information for their Governments. The British also have just received instructions to obtain clarification on our freedom of communication.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 11, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received September 11—8:35 a. m.]

3423. The British Ambassador has submitted two draft protocols to the Rumanian armistice which are as follows in paraphrase:

(1) "On signing the armistice agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the one hand and the Rumanian Government on the other hand, the parties have agreed as follows:

In the armistice terms, paragraph 1 of article 5 defines the obligations which the Rumanian Government has undertaken in regard to the surrender to the Allied authorities of Allied citizens interned in or

deported to Rumania and Allied prisoners of war. It will be for each Allied Government to decide which of its nationals shall be repatriated and which shall not."

(2) "On signing the armistice agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Rumanian Government on the other hand, the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed as follows:

The duration and terms of the use which the Allied (Soviet) High Command will make of the vessels which under article 9 of the armistice are handed over to it will be a matter for discussion between the Allied Governments concerned and the Soviet Government."

Since these protocols are obviously to our benefit, I shall agree to them unless instructed to the contrary.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1944—8 p. m.

2185. Reurtel 3417 September 10. The Department has just now received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearance on the protocol to accompany the Rumanian armistice. Accordingly you are authorized to sign the protocol, on behalf of this Government, or to agree to its signature by a Soviet general.

HULL

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, September 12, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received September 12—3:10 p. m.]

3443. Under Molotov's chairmanship, we all met for 5 hours during the past night with the Rumanian delegation. The latter asked for explanations or redrafts of almost every article of the armistice agreement, and also proposed certain additions.

Of all their suggestions for redrafts Molotov accepted only two definitely and agreed to give consideration to one other. The first acceptance related to the amendment of the article requiring Rumania to intern Hungarian and German citizens residing in Rumania. The

Rumanians asked that an exception be made in favor of Jewish refugees from Hungary. Molotov said that he saw no objection to this. The second related to the addition of language to the effect that the Control Commission would end its activities on the conclusion of peace with Rumania.

Molotov agreed to consider a redraft of the article dealing with the Vienna Award and Transylvania. The Rumanians claimed that the present proposed wording of this article (I assume that the final draft of the agreement has been made available to the Department by the British Embassy) is not in accord with that which was promised to them in the past and on the basis of which they ceased hostilities. Their objection to the present wording appeared to be that it did not contain a specific undertaking on the part of the Allies to aid them in the liberation of Transylvania. Molotov requested them to try their hand at redraft of the article, and to show it to us at the next meeting, which is to take place at 10 o'clock this evening. I reserved judgment.

We were not able, in view of the late hour, to give consideration to all of the Rumanian requests for additional provisions. The most important of those which still remain for consideration relate to the placing of a time limit on the military occupation and on the operation of the pertinent articles of the armistice agreement, as well as to the specific recognition of Allied or co-belligerency status for Rumania.

The Rumanians protested strongly about the reparations clause, asking that it be made more flexible to meet an eventual inability to pay.

They also sought for a greater recognition of the part of Rumanian administration in carrying out internal police and administrative measures called for by the agreement. Molotov showed no willingness to retract in any way on the reparations question nor to assent to anything which would limit Russian military or police power in Rumania during the military period.

HARRIMAN

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[The armistice agreement with Rumania was signed at Moscow, September 13, at 5 a. m., although dated September 12, and the accompanying protocol was signed at the same time. Texts were released the same day and printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, September 17, 1944, pages 289-292; printed also as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712.]

POST-ARMISTICE PROBLEMS OF OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF  
RUMANIA;<sup>22</sup> SETTING UP OF ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

740.00119 Control (Rumanian)/9-1344

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The *aide-mémoire* addressed to the Department of State by the British Embassy on September 2, 1944,<sup>23</sup> asked for an expression of the views of this Government regarding the machinery for the control of Rumania, and expressed the hope that steps will be taken to form an American Mission to be sent to that country.

The United States Government has informed the Soviet Government of its expectation to have political representation in Rumania,<sup>24</sup> as agreed by Mr. Molotov<sup>25</sup> last April. The Department is accordingly assembling the personnel for a political mission to go into Rumania and has asked the Soviet Government to give its concurrence to the despatch of such a mission at an early date. It is expected that this mission will constitute the American representation on the Allied Control Commission for which provision is made in the Rumanian armistice terms. The ranks and titles of the members of the American mission have not yet been finally determined.

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1944.

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740.0011 EW 1939/9-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 14, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 15—4:25 a. m.]

3492. ReDeptel 2138, September 5, 9 p. m.<sup>26</sup> On September 13 I handed to Mr. Patrascanu<sup>27</sup> a letter, addressed to the Rumanian Armistice Delegation, [of] which the following is a paraphrase:

“I desire to inform you that my Government expects the Government of Rumania immediately to take steps for breaking all relations

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<sup>22</sup> For correspondence regarding negotiations leading to the signing of the armistice with Rumania, see pp. 133 ff. For text of armistice agreement signed at 5 a. m., September 13 (as of September 12), 1944, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490, or 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1712.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

<sup>24</sup> See telegram 2152, September 7, 7 p. m., to Moscow, p. 224.

<sup>25</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>26</sup> *Ante*, p. 221.

<sup>27</sup> Lucretiu Patrascanu, Rumanian Minister of State and Minister of Justice, headed the Rumanian armistice delegation to Moscow.

with Japan and to cause all representatives of Japan as well as private Japanese nationals without delay to leave Rumanian territory. The presence in Rumania of any Japanese representatives or private Japanese nationals beyond the reasonable minimum time necessary to bring about their departure from Rumania will be considered by my Government as incompatible with the state of suspension of hostilities between Rumania and the United States."

The British Ambassador<sup>28</sup> sent a similar letter.

The British Ambassador and I had previously informed the Rumanian delegation of the position of our Governments in this matter. Prince Stirbey<sup>29</sup> informed me orally that both the delegation and the Government in Bucharest were somewhat concerned that the Russians might be annoyed at their breaking relations with Japan. I accordingly handed the letter quoted above to Mr. Patrascanu in the presence of Mr. Molotov in order to show him that Mr. Molotov was informed of its contents and did not disapprove.

I have now received a letter dated September 14 from Mr. Patrascanu of which the following is a paraphrase translation:

"I have received the letter which Your Excellency addressed to me on September 13, 1944 with regard to the desire of the United States Government to see Rumania break diplomatic relations with Japan. I hasten to inform you that I did not fail to transmit your letter to Bucharest and that if before my departure I do not receive a reply, I will intervene personally with my Government upon my arrival."<sup>30</sup>

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 15, 1944—midnight.

[Received September 15—11:09 p. m.]

3522. I wish to make the following observations concerning the Rumanian armistice negotiations which have just been concluded:

1. It was evident that the Russians entered upon these negotiations with the determination that the field should largely be theirs and that we should give them pretty much of a free hand in arranging the armistice terms and the subsequent treatment of the Rumanians. This attitude doubtless is based on the fact that Rumania is a neighbor and it is justified by them by the fact that they had suffered most

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<sup>28</sup> Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr.

<sup>29</sup> Prince Barbu Stirbey was a member of the Rumanian armistice delegation at Moscow.

<sup>30</sup> Rupture of diplomatic relations between Rumania and Japan took place as of October 31 and was announced in the Bucharest press of November 2 (740.0011-PW1939/11-2544).

from Rumanian hostilities and had done the most to knock Rumania out of the war on the German side.

2. The United States attitude throughout the negotiations tended to bear them out in the feeling described above and was appreciated by them accordingly. They believe, I think, that we lived up to a tacit understanding that Rumania was an area of predominant Soviet interest in which we should not interfere.

3. The tendency of the British to come forward in the course of the preliminary negotiations with a large variety of suggestions, questions and ideas, appeared to cause bewilderment and some annoyance to the Soviet negotiators. The Russians readily accepted the British proposals which strengthened Allied (Soviet) control over Rumania as well as drafting changes but in general refused to make any concessions of substance.

The repeated arguments brought forward by the British with respect to the fixed sum of reparations to the Soviet Union, while doubtless well founded in the basic conception of tripartite collaboration, were received by the Russian mind as expressing a reluctance to recognize the extent their country had suffered at the hands of the Rumanians and a desire to deprive them of their just compensation. The British suggestions would undoubtedly have been reasonable enough in any negotiations between western Allies. In the case of the Russians, they did not meet with understanding.

4. Although the combined Soviet-English-American Delegations met for a total period of over 7 hours with the Rumanians, there was little serious discussion with them of any point of the armistice terms. Molotov, who acted as Chairman for the Allied Delegations, did not enter into any detailed consideration of the arguments and propositions advanced by the Rumanians. Although he allowed them to talk at great length he did not fairly face or discuss the points they raised and rode over them brusquely whenever he felt that enough time had been spent on a given point. He repeatedly reminded them that they had gone as far as Stalingrad with the Germans, and that their action in leaving the German camp had come only at a time when it had been dictated by overwhelming and unanswerable military considerations. This procedure, however justifiable it may have been in the circumstances, left a certain amount of bitterness with the Rumanians, since they did not feel that they had been able to establish any real basis for an exchange of ideas with the Russians. Molotov did, however, agree to make a few changes in the terms as originally presented.

On the other hand, the Rumanian delegates told me after the conclusion of the armistice that its terms were as favorable as they had a right to expect but were greatly concerned about how they

would be interpreted and enforced by the Soviet Command. During the negotiations their objections were directed chiefly against the economic provisions and the extent to which the Allied (Soviet) High Command was given control of the economic life and the governmental machinery of Rumania. With respect to the economic measures they were concerned over their capacity to pay, in addition to the fixed indemnity, the cost to Rumania of maintaining Soviet troops and indemnity for damage to the refineries. Several of the delegates stated privately that the cost of rebuilding these refineries would amount to as much as the indemnity to the Soviet Union and that in any event Rumania did not have the facilities for such reconstructions.

In addition the Rumanians endeavored to obtain the insertion in the armistice of a specific undertaking providing for the departure of Allied troops at the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Molotov refused to consider such a proposal on the ground that it was premature; and the Rumanians had to be content with his statement that the departure of Allied troops as soon as the military situation permitted was inherent in the agreement.

The Rumanian Delegation appeared to have achieved unity among themselves and expressed the opinion that the Rumanian Government would endeavor loyally to carry out the terms of the armistice. Several members of the delegation expressed the hope that the Allied Control Commission would speedily be set up as they were counting upon the presence of American and British representatives to act as a restraining influence on the Soviets in their application of the armistice terms.

5. The character of the negotiations and the attitude of the Soviet Delegation, as expressed in our numerous conferences among ourselves and with the Rumanians, has given some light on the possible future state of affairs in Rumania.

Although Rumanian armed forces will presumably fight side by side with the Red Army as envisaged in the armistice agreement, they will have to submit to the Red Army domination and probably to the education of their troops in the Soviet methods to no less degree than the Polish and Czech forces operating with the Red Army.

The terms of the armistice give the Soviet Command unlimited control of Rumania's economic life; and the reduction of the Rumanian standard of living more to that of the Soviet Union may be expected gradually to take place.

Politically, the clauses about organizations hostile to the Soviet Union and about control of activities influencing public opinion can be depended upon to assure the Soviet High Command due police

power for the period of the armistice. No chief of police or interior authority will be tolerated who does not make himself amenable to Russian policies. In addition to this, Russian authorities will take a direct hand in the administration of police measures considered necessary for the full protection of Soviet interests. There need be no fear that Axis influence will not be eliminated from Rumanian political life. But the extent to which other political groupings are able to make their influence felt will depend, to quote a common Moscow phrase, on the understanding which they show for Russia's position. This morning's Moscow press already tells of the emergence of a new political grouping, the policies of which are apparently acceptable to Moscow in the same way as those of the Polish Committee of Liberation and the new regime in Bulgaria.

It is still difficult to predict the part our own representatives will be able to play in Rumania during the armistice period. The original Russian conception seems to have been that the functions of our representatives on the Control Commission would be limited strictly to those of liaison between our Government and the Soviet command. In this case, information concerning the control activities of the Soviet command would be released to our representatives if and when such release had been considered and approved by competent Soviet authorities, and it is not to be taken for granted that our representatives would be able to deal directly with Rumanian Government officials. The British are now challenging this conception energetically and are demanding that their representatives on the control commission should have direct contact with the Rumanian Government. Otherwise they ask to be further represented by a political mission, as had been agreed with Molotov at the time when the April terms were under discussion.

However this question is decided, much of the efficacy of our officials in Rumania will depend on the extent to which they are permitted by Rumanian and Russian police authorities to associate privately with Rumanian officials and Rumanian citizens, and to participate generally in the life of the community.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 16, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received September 16—11: 26 a. m.]

3533. ReDeptel 2206, September 14, 9 p. m.<sup>31</sup> Vyshinski,<sup>32</sup> the British Ambassador and I yesterday signed on behalf of our respective

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

<sup>32</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.



Governments the protocol to the Rumanian Armistice proposed by the British. In addition to the two points reported in my 3423 of September 11, 2 p. m.,<sup>32a</sup> it contains a definition of war material, reading, paraphrased, as follows:

"In Article VII the term 'material' shall be deemed to include all equipment or material belonging to, used by, or intended for use by, enemy military or para-military formations or members thereof."

The protocol is in the alternate form and is dated September 12 to coincide with the date of the armistice. It will not be published.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 16, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:45 p. m.]

3536. Re Department's 2207, September 15, 1 p. m.,<sup>33</sup> Department's telegram regarding message from Bratianu to the President,<sup>34</sup> did not reach me until after the Rumanian delegation had left Moscow.

From Department's cable, it is not clear to me what intervention on our part Bratianu refers to whether the war in general or in connection with the armistice. I was extremely careful to give the Rumanians the impression that the armistice terms were the proposals of the three Governments and that we were acting in full agreement. It is true that with the knowledge of Molotov, I received Patrascanu and Prince Stirbey on several occasions and listened to their statements without making any comment. I also received the whole delegation at the Embassy the afternoon after the armistice was signed. At that time, all of them expressed their appreciation for the friendliness of the Americans and the hope that we would interest ourselves in Rumanian affairs.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/9-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1944—8 p. m.

2232. The Department has received from the British Embassy in Washington a memorandum<sup>35</sup> stating the British Government's view

<sup>32a</sup> *Ante*, p. 230.

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

<sup>34</sup> Constantin I. C. Bratianu, Rumanian Minister of State, in a telegram of September 2 to President Roosevelt expressed admiration for the intervention of the United States in the interests of liberty and justice.

<sup>35</sup> Not found in Department files.

that in connection with the signing of armistice terms by the Axis satellites the responsibility of the latter for the protection, within their jurisdiction, of refugees and displaced persons against violence and against removal by retreating enemy forces should be clearly fixed.

Specifically, the British memorandum suggests separate public declarations on the part of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, which in the case of the two latter states could be signed simultaneously with the armistice and in the case of Rumania "in accordance with the armistice". According to the text suggested by the British, the signatory government would undertake "to take all measures within its power to ensure that all displaced persons or refugees within its territory, including Jews and stateless persons, are accorded at least the same measure of protection and security as its own nationals."

The Department is in full agreement with the purpose of the British proposal and has no objection to the suggested text of declaration. You are accordingly instructed to indicate this Government's agreement if the question of such a public declaration by Rumania is raised by the British in Moscow.

Repeated to London.

HULL

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740.00119 Control (Rumania) /9-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 23, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received 9:56 p. m.]

3643. The British Ambassador has sent a note to the Soviet Government saying that his Government cannot agree to the limitation of British representation on the Rumanian Control Commission to 5 members and pointing out that there was no limitation on Soviet representation on the Italian Commission understood to consist of about 11 persons and shortly to be augmented by 6.

Note states that Air Vice Marshal Stevenson will be head of British representation on Rumanian CC, accompanied by Le Rougetel, a Counselor in British Foreign Service, and small party of officers and other ranks.

Stevenson and party are expected to arrive in Bucharest tomorrow, September 24.

The Soviets are further advised that the British Government had originally expected to include in British representation to the CC a political representative but that since British Section of Control Commission is not to have direct communication with Rumanian

authorities, it is now proposed that a separate British diplomatic representative shall be appointed with a suitable staff. The latter's position is to be similar to that of Soviet diplomatic representative in Italy and he is to be independent of British representation of the CC. The British point out that the above is in accordance with Molotov's agreement with Churchill of last April. British further note that the right of the diplomatic representative to establish direct relations with the Rumanian Government cannot be made subject to the sanction of the local CinC. In this they base themselves on the precedent established by the position of the Soviet diplomatic representative in Italy.

Finally the Soviet Government is put on notice that the British contemplate similar arrangements in the case of Finland if British representation on the CC there is subject to the same restrictions as in Rumania.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/9-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 23, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received September 24—8 a. m.]

3651. I have received a note from the Foreign Office dated September 20 informing me that in conformity with Article 18 of the armistice agreement with Rumania the Soviet Government has appointed as Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Rumania Marshal R. Y. Malinovski, Vice-Chairman of the Commission, Lieutenant General V. P. Vinogradov and Assistants to the Chairman of the Commission Rear Admiral P. L. Bogdanko and Colonel I. S. Sidorov. The note states that Major General V. V. Vasiliev has been named Chief of Staff of the Commission.

A set of statutes regarding the Allied Control Commission in Rumania which the note states has been approved by the Allied (Soviet) High Command was enclosed. The British Embassy has telegraphed the texts of this document to London and Washington and for security reasons I am therefore not telegraphing it. Our translation of point 6 (G) of this document differs from the British translation and reads as follows:

“(G) to have a staff of collaborators (*Sotrudnikov*) in the number of five persons each”.

In view of the fact that the statutes specifically provide that the American and British representatives are to be representatives of the

“Allied Command” and in view of the restriction imposed upon them I presume that the Department will wish to concert with the British in arranging for American and British political representation in Rumania apart from our representatives on the Control Commission or alternatively to press for direct contact between our representatives on the Control Commission and the Rumanian Government, in accordance with Molotov’s assurance last April that the British and ourselves could have political representation in Rumania in the same way as the Russians have political representation in Italy.

Lacking detailed information of the facilities accorded or restrictions played [*placed*] upon Soviet representation in Italy I am unable to determine the extent to which these statutes reciprocate or fail to reciprocate the Italian arrangements.

I suggest that in acknowledging this communication I be authorized to state that we interpret point 6 (G) quoted above to give us the right to have five officers in the Control Commission apart from the necessary clerical staff such as radio operators, code clerks, et cetera.

Sent to Department as 3651, repeated to London as 185.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/9-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1944—8 p. m.

2319. Reurtels 3643 and 3651 September 23. The British Embassy here has provided the Department with a copy of Clark-Kerr’s telegram of September 21 to Mr. Eden<sup>36</sup> transmitting the text of the statutes prepared by the Soviet Government to govern the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. The Department desires to make the following proposals in this connection :

1. The Department would like to see a modification of point 6 (G), which restricts to five each the number of persons which may compose the American and British staffs of collaborators (your translation) or establishments (British version) on the Commission. Although we interpret this provision to mean that the head of the American delegation would be entitled to have on his staff up to five officers, apart from the necessary clerical and operating staff, we believe this would be inadequate to meet our requirements and should in any case prefer not to be limited in this regard in order that adequate staffs may be provided to meet the needs of whatever functions the Commission may be called upon to perform. The staff of the Soviet rep-

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<sup>36</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

representative on the Allied Commission for Italy is understood to include a deputy representative, an assistant representative, an aide and four additional officers and it has been indicated that he expects four additional officers to arrive as his personal assistants. The Soviet Government has also, of course, been from the beginning actively represented with numerous personnel on the Advisory Council for Italy.

2. Although the question of formal diplomatic relations with the Rumanian Government does not arise, the Department desires to have during the armistice period full liberty of informal contact with the Rumanian Government, as well as the means of ensuring the protection of American interests. For this reason, we expect to have political representation in Rumania as agreed to by Mr. Molotov last April. We should like the American representation to function as a unit, and for the reasons set forth below, we attach considerable importance to the civilian part of the delegation. While the statutes set up for the Control Commission seem to envisage largely military functions, we would prefer, so far as this Government is concerned, not to have to set up a separate establishment for political representation, at least at this stage.

3. The Department desires that the American political representatives on the Commission should initially consist of a senior political representative and two Foreign Service Officers as his assistants, plus two code clerks and two stenographers. (For your information, Burton Y. Berry, now Consul General at Istanbul, will be designated as the senior political representative and he will be assisted by Foreign Service Officers Roy M. Melbourne, now at Caserta, and Charles E. Hulick, now at Cairo.)

4. Our military authorities have now indicated their view that the American military representation on the Commission should initially consist of three Army officers in the grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel (one Air Corps), and one Naval officer in the grade of captain or commander, plus the necessary clerical, enlisted and other administrative personnel. These officers and men have not yet been designated.

5. Inasmuch as Rumania does not have primary military interest for the United States, while on the other hand the Department attaches considerable importance to the "protection" aspects of our work, involving citizenship, welfare, property interests, etc. which would come under the political section, we should like to designate our political representative as head of the American delegation with the personal rank of Minister.

Please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the foregoing and say that the Department would appreciate being apprised

as soon as may be possible whether these proposals regarding the American representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania are acceptable to the Soviet Government.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London, AmPolAd (Caserta), and Ankara (for Istanbul).

HULL

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740.00119 European War 1939/9-3044: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1944—8 p. m.

2331. The Department is repeating for your information the following report from American military sources. It is interesting as reflecting the immediate impact of the Rumanian negotiations, though the reporting officer may not have had access to a sufficient variety of sources to make a general survey of the situation.

“Government officials and business men in Rumania feel that Britain and the United States have broken their promises and have abandoned Rumania to Russia. Returning members of Rumanian Armistice Delegation spread story that negotiations in Moscow were dominated by Russians, the British and American representatives refusing to discuss the terms without conferring first with Russian representatives. According to a Rumanian industrialist, the position of the Rumanian Government is difficult because the Government is ignored by the Russians. Probably it will fall. In addition, the Russians apparently intend to undermine the position of King Mihai. The King’s representatives were ignored for 48 hours by Burenin, Soviet commanding general in Bucharest. The Rumanian people, who believed country would not be occupied by Russians, feel their government has misled them. Maniu<sup>37</sup> is reported disappointed in Great Britain, having expected more consideration and easier armistice terms. Russian authorities have confiscated all radios, inferior ones being destroyed and good ones sent to Russia. Russian troops are said to have entered and ransacked German Legation in Bucharest on September 11 on grounds Germans had previously stolen furnishings from Soviet Legation. Members of the International and Rumanian Red Cross complain that Russians have confiscated supplies, equipment, medicines and Red Cross ambulances.”

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London and Ankara.<sup>38</sup>

HULL

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<sup>37</sup> Iuliu Maniu, Rumanian Minister of State and leader of the National Peasant Party.

<sup>38</sup> As Nos. 8012 and 846, respectively.

740.00119 Control (Rumania) / 10-144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 1, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received October 1—7:40 p. m.]

3751. The British Ambassador has received a reply to his note to the Soviet Government reported in my 3642 [3643], September 23, 1 p. m., concerning British representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania. It reads in paraphrase as follows:

“In reply to your letter of September 23 concerning British representation in the Allied Control Commission in Rumania I desire to inform you:

1. In determining the number of British representatives, the requirements concerning the Allied Control Commission for Rumania were based on the experience of the Allied Control Commission for Italy upon which the number of Soviet representatives has until recently not exceeded 5 persons. You doubtless have in mind, in mentioning a Soviet representation of 11 members, the displaced persons subcommission. The latter is a separate question and the discussion of it should be kept separate. There is, in any event, no objection on the part of the Soviet Government to some increase in the number of members of the British representation in the Allied Control Commission for Rumania which must be determined in agreement with the president of that commission.

2. The Soviet Government has no objection to the appointment of a political representative in Rumania of the British Government, as agreed between the British and Soviet Governments in April. The Soviet Government considers that in this case also the analogy with Italy where the Soviet Government has its own political representative corresponding to the wish expressed in your letter is correct.

3. The above applies equally to the appointment in Finland of a British political representative.”

In view of the above I am not delivering the message referred to in the Department's 2319, September 29, 8 p. m., as I assume the Department will wish to reconsider its proposals. It can now be assumed, in view of the Soviet position in reply to the British alternative proposals, that the Soviet Government would not agree to our political representative also serving on the Control Commission. I therefore recommend that unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary we conform to the formula which the Soviets have now agreed to with the British which fulfills the promise made by Molotov in April. In such event, I recommend that the military officer, who would be the American representative on the Control Commission, be of the rank of general officer.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-344

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy has the honour to inform the United States Government that an advance party of the British Mission which is to constitute the British section of the Inter-Allied Control Commission for Roumania arrived at Bucharest on September 26th. The advance party consisted of Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, head of British Mission, Mr. LeRougetel, Foreign Office representative and small number of assistants. The Soviet Government were informed in advance of the departure of this party. A further small party of members of the British section was to be sent to Bucharest on September 29th.

As the Department of State are aware, the Soviet Government's proposals regarding Inter-Allied Control Commission for Roumania restrict the size of the British and American sections and would debar them from having any direct contact with the Roumanian Government. On the assumption therefore that the Soviet authorities will not allow members of the Commission other than the President to have direct communication with the Roumanian Government the Foreign Office are detaching Mr. LeRougetel from the Commission and appointing him "British Diplomatic Representative" in Roumania on the analogy of Soviet representative in Italy, with instructions to gain contact with the Roumanian Government forthwith.

The Foreign Office also propose to send an advance party into Bulgaria within the next few days. Although the situation is not analogous to that in Roumania since no armistice has been signed with Bulgaria, the Foreign Office feel that it is very important to have the British representatives on the spot as soon as possible in order, among other things, to prevent further unfortunate incidents such as the recent expulsion of British officials and to supervise the withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Greece and Yugoslavia, if such evacuation is made a pre-condition of the presentation of armistice terms to Bulgaria. The Soviet Government, as in the case of the Mission for Roumania, will be advised before the advance party leaves.

WASHINGTON, October 3, 1944.



740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-444: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>39</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 4, 1944—9 p. m.

Department's circular of September 2, 1944.<sup>40</sup> If the initiative should come from the Rumanian diplomatic representatives, the Department has no objection to informal relations between you and your staff and such representatives. You may accept informally any documents which the Rumanian representative may wish to deliver to you for transmission to your Government. We are interested in being fully informed.

Under the provisions of the armistice signed by Rumania on September 12 an Allied Control Commission is being established in Rumania. It is expected that the only official relations between the Rumanian and United States Governments will be conducted through that channel until such time as diplomatic relations are resumed.

HULL

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1944—8 p. m.

2365. ReEmbs 3751, October 1. In its consideration of the question of the American representation in Rumania the Department has been guided by the following basic factors: (1) the relatively greater importance of our political interest in Rumania as compared with our military interest; (2) the need for providing adequate protection for American interests there; (3) the importance of securing information on developments in Rumania reported directly by our own representatives; (4) the expectation that the United States Government would participate in the control of the execution of the armistice to which it is a party.

The proposals regarding American representation which the Department made in its 2319 September 29 were based on these considerations. Partly because Molotov had indicated that his Government did not favor the establishment of Allied missions or other representation in addition to the Control Commission (ReEmbs 3343 September 6<sup>41</sup>), the Department purposely proposed combined political-military American representation on the Control Commission, with emphasis on the civilian side. We desired to make it clear to the Soviet Gov-

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<sup>39</sup> At Ankara (for repetition to Istanbul), Bern, Lisbon, Rome, and Stockholm, and as No. 2708 to Madrid.

<sup>40</sup> Vol. I, p. 613.

<sup>41</sup> *Ante*, p. 223.

ernment that we agreed with their view that our military representatives on the Commission should have a role similar to that of the Soviet representatives on the ACC in Italy, namely the role of observers and liaison officers, and that our chief concern was in securing the presence in Rumania of a civilian representative with at least a small staff. The idea of political representation was of course agreed to last April.

We do not see how the Soviet Government, which repeatedly falls back on the pattern of the establishments in Italy, where it has representation on the CC, on the subcommission for displaced persons, and on the Advisory Council, as well as direct representatives to the Italian Government, could possibly raise serious objection to the size of our delegation which, moreover, we particularly designed for functioning as a small and integrated group.

The proposals made in our 2319 September 29 would have given to the Soviet Government a full view of our expectations concerning American representation in Rumania, independent of the British plans or the Soviet reaction thereto as described in your 3751 October 1. The new Soviet formula probably can be adjusted to meet the Department's basic aims. In setting forth our position we should like you to make clear that we wish to provide for adequate civilian representation, with access to the Rumanian Government and public, and with some liberty of movement for the protection of American interests. We therefore believe it may now be desirable to set Berry up independently as the American Political Representative. The American delegation formally assigned to the Control Commission would then be composed only of military and naval officers, plus perhaps one civilian adviser who would also be a member of Berry's staff.

With the foregoing in mind, please inform the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Department's desire for modification of Point 6 (G) of the Statutes Governing the Control Commission, as set forth in numbered paragraph 1 of its 2319, and indicate the proposed political and military components of the American representation as given in numbered paragraphs 3 and 4, explaining in particular our interest in the civilian representation. You should then inquire whether in the view of the Soviet Government our political representation should be designated, as a matter of formality, as a component of the American delegation on the Commission, or, in order to perform the functions we have in mind, be set up as a separate and independent establishment.

For your own information, the Department had expected that if its senior political representative were formally assigned to the Commission he would be designated as the head of the American component.

In case he should be set up independently, the Department will inquire, in accordance with your recommendation, whether our military authorities may desire to name a general officer to head the American group on the Commission.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London, AmPolAd (Caserta), and Ankara (for Istanbul).<sup>42</sup>

HULL

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 6, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 7—7:37 a. m.]

3822. I have given careful consideration to the Department's 2365, October 5, 8 p. m., and I am writing today to the Foreign Office to set forth our desire for modification of point 6 (G) although I am quite sure that the Soviet position set forth to the British as described in my 3751, October 1, 8 p. m., would apply equally to ourselves.

I see nothing to be gained however by asking the Soviet Government whether our political representation should be included in the Control Commission or should be a separate and independent establishment. The statement made by Molotov to which the Department refers was a general comment made in the course of preliminary discussions. Upon being subsequently pressed by the British the Soviets have firmly stated that they will not consent to the British representative on the CC or his deputy having the right to direct communication with Rumanian authorities but that they do not object to the appointment of a separate British political representative. They could not now agree to any other arrangement for us without reversing the whole position they have taken after protracted negotiations with respect to the British and without revising the statutes they have drawn up for the CC. I see no reason to think that they would consent to do this.

Although I recognize that our interest in Rumania from a military standpoint may no longer be great, I feel that the prestige of the United States is involved in the early appearance of American representatives in Bucharest. Even though the main military action against Rumania came from the Soviet side, the Rumanians surrendered to the three principal Allies and the representatives of the new government made it clear to me during the armistice negotiations that they were counting on reasonable interest on the part of the United

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<sup>42</sup> As Nos. 8150, 211, and 859, respectively.

States in the future of Rumania. If we now address the Soviet Government posing questions on which they have already taken a firm and definite stand we merely cause further and I am certain unproductive delay.

I earnestly hope that the Department will now agree to accept the formula worked out between the Soviets and the British under which it would appear that the four basic factors listed in the Department's telegram can best be realized. Our political representative will have freedom of contact with the Rumanian Government adequately to protect American interests and obtain information on developments in Rumania. At best as a member of the CC he would not have anything like as much freedom. If the Department agrees, all that would then be required would be to inform the Soviet Government at once of the names of our representatives on the CC and of the appointment of Berry as American Political Representative. Meanwhile Berry should be given orders to proceed at once to Bucharest. The Russians will not be interested in whether or not we consider Berry to be the ranking official of our representation there as long as he is not formally assigned to the CC.

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 8, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:25 p. m.]

3847. ReEmbs 3822, October 6, midnight. I have received a reply from Molotov to my letter setting forth our desire for a revision of point 6 (G) of the statutes of the Control Commission for Rumania. He states that in fixing the number of members of the American representation on the Commission they had proceeded from the experience of the Italian Commission where the Soviet representation had, until recently, not exceeded five persons, aside from the Commission for Displaced Persons which was a special question and subject to separate consideration. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government had no objections to a certain increase in the number of members of the American representation in the case of Rumania, such increase to be determined in agreement with the Chairman of the Commission.

HARRIMAN

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 9, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 9—3:55 p. m.]

8500. Foreign Office has manifested concern over the very large requisitions being made by the Russians in Rumania. These, according to the Foreign Office, include 800,000 tons of wheat and a great quantity of corn and cattle. The Foreign Office stated that the Rumanian Foreign Minister<sup>43</sup> had said that if these requisitions were to be considered as part of the reparations due Russia by Rumania, they could probably manage somehow but that if such requisitions were not included in the reparations, it would result in the economic depletion of Rumania.

The Foreign Office expressed interest in learning when the American representatives on the Allied Control Commission in Rumania could be expected to arrive in Bucharest.<sup>44</sup>

WINANT

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1944—midnight.

2418. Reurtel 3822 October 6. The Department has from the beginning felt that its requirements with respect to political representation in Rumania would be best met were its political representative and staff to be set up independently of the Control Commission. Following the receipt of your 3751 of October 1, we have assumed that this would be possible since, as you suggest, the Soviet Government would clearly desire to have the same arrangement with regard to our political representation as in the case of the British. We agree that the Soviet position set forth to the British would be equally applicable to us. There is no intention to seek any reversal of the Soviet position.

The Department would therefore like you to present this matter to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in order that we may have from the Soviet Government definite approval of the plan for American representation in Rumania. The reply given to the British in

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<sup>43</sup> Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti.

<sup>44</sup> The Department replied in telegram 8474, October 13, midnight, that "we are endeavoring with all urgency to get the American representatives into Rumania at the earliest possible moment." (740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-944)

this regard cannot be taken as constituting a reply to us. The Department desires that you should have full flexibility as to the form in which this matter is presented, but hopes that it can be done without delay. Arrangements for the American representation cannot go forward effectively here in Washington, particularly as regards the military contingent, until we know definitely what type of organization would have the approval of the Soviet Government.

You should inform the Soviet Government of our wish to have in Rumania, in addition to our military delegation on the Control Commission, political representation for the purpose of ensuring the protection of American interests, with freedom of movement and access to the local authorities and code privileges for reporting direct to this Government. You may state that Berry is being designated as our principal political representative in Rumania and that his staff will include the other officers and clerks mentioned in numbered paragraph 3 of Department's 2319 September 29. You may also mention that we contemplate an initial military representation on the Control Commission as set forth in numbered paragraph 4 of the same telegram, adding that a general officer may be named to head the delegation.

This latter question is now before the Joint Chiefs for final decision, which may, however, be delayed until the Soviet Government has given a clear indication of its agreement to American representation as set forth above.

HULL

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/10-1444

*The United States Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters  
(Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

No. 829

[CASERTA,] October 14, 1944.

[Received October 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a brief survey<sup>45</sup> made by the Combined Economic Warfare Agencies attached to the Allied Force Headquarters at Caserta, which discusses the economic potentialities of Rumania in the future and the ability of the country to pay the reparations specified in the armistice between Rumania and the Allies. The estimate is optimistic in tone and claims that Rumania by devoting about half of its export surpluses over the next six years can meet the reparations requirements. The study thus agrees with preliminary estimates in the Department at the time of signing the armistice,

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

that 300,000,000 United States dollars as a reparations figure was not too excessive.

Respectfully yours,

For the United States Political Adviser:

C. OFFIE

*Foreign Service Officer*

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-2844 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 28, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received October 28—1:22 p. m.]

4133. Department's 2418, October 12, midnight. On October 25 I received a telegram from Caserta stating that our military authorities were prepared to transport Melbourne and Hulick to Bucharest on October 26. I immediately communicated this information, as well as the other considerations set forth in the Department's 2496 of October 21,<sup>46</sup> in writing to the Foreign Office and informed Caserta accordingly. I have now received a note from Vyshinski in reply to Mr. Harriman's note of October 13 concerning American representation on the Control Commission and my letter of October 25. The pertinent sections of this note state in paraphrase translation as follows:

The Soviet Government does not object to the appointment in Rumania of a political representative of the United States Government. It should be noted, however, that in the present case the Soviet Government has in view the parallel with Italy where there is also a Soviet political representative. With respect to the number of members of the American representation on the Control Commission if [*in*] Rumania, as stated in Mr. Molotov's letter of October 7 (reEmbs 3847 October 8, 1 p. m.) this question should be determined in agreement with the chairman of the Control Commission.

With respect to the travel to Bucharest of Melbourne and Hulick, this matter has been brought to the attention of the Soviet military authorities in Bucharest.

KENNAN

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871.6363/11-244 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 2, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:10 p. m.]

9501. A Foreign Office official reiterated the British desire for American representatives to enter Rumania as soon as possible. The

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

British Embassy at Washington has been informed of the following situation :

The Russians have been working with all possible speed, even at night, to remove the oil well equipment of Astra Romana, Stela Romana and another oil company in which both British and American companies are interested. This equipment is being taken to Russia. The British are extremely perturbed at this Soviet activity because it will mean the entire stopping of oil extraction from the wells. They would like to see the British position on the Allied Control Commission reinforced by American participation so that such activities on the part of the Russians can be stopped.

The official expressed the same views about the urgency of sending American representatives to Bulgaria.<sup>47</sup> British and Russian representatives, in four parties, [are] en route to Thrace to see that the Bulgarians in their evacuation from Greece have not taken with them various equipment, cattle and other movable goods; likewise these parties will see exactly what looted movable goods have been returned to Greece by Bulgaria under the terms of the armistice.<sup>48</sup>

GALLMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/11-344 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 3, 1944—9 p. m.

2602. American and British sources in Rumania have reported increasing evidence of Soviet intervention in internal Rumanian affairs. They cite particularly the action of Soviet military authorities in suppressing *Universul*, largest and most influential newspaper in the country, and in refusing to allow a rally sponsored by the National Peasant Party. Reliable neutral observers believe latter action was intended to force the resignations from the Government of the Liberal and National Peasant leaders, Bratianu and Maniu, and to destroy their political position, leaving the field open to the Communists. The British Military Mission in Bucharest has also reported being informed by Rumanian sources that the entire Rumanian navy (including river craft and training ships as well as destroyers, submarines, etc.) has been manned by Russian crews and removed to Sevastopol or Odessa in apparent violation of Article One of the armistice. Soviet naval representative on the Control Commission has confirmed the fact of the fleet's removal with Russian crews but holds it is justified under the armistice. Le Rougetel, chief of the British political mis-

<sup>47</sup> Cf. circular telegram of November 8, 2 p. m., vol. III, p. 483.

<sup>48</sup> For American report, see telegram 1442, November 22, 10 a. m., from Caserta, *ibid.*, p. 489.



sion to Rumania, regards the political situation as serious in the light of the apparent tendency of the Soviet authorities to disregard the limitations of the armistice and the non-intervention pledge made by Molotov on April 2 of this year.<sup>49</sup>

The Department would appreciate receiving any information you may have been able to obtain since Ambassador Harriman's departure regarding British-Russian exchanges of views on Rumania or regarding the Soviet attitude on recent political developments in that country. You should not at this time, however, make any formal inquiry of the Soviet Government on these matters. The armistice gives wide powers to the Soviet High Command in Rumania, and we do not desire to question its use of them before the American delegation on the Control Commission and our political representatives arrive in Bucharest and are able to report developments there at first hand. Sent to Moscow; repeated to AmPolAd (Caserta)<sup>50</sup> for Berry.<sup>51</sup>

STETTINIUS

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871.6363/11-344 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 3, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received November 4—2 a. m.]

4221. Upon receiving Kirk's 1106, November 2, midnight to Department<sup>52</sup> concerning removal for shipment to the Soviet Union by Russian military authorities in Rumania of refinery equipment and accessories of the Romano-Americana and other oil companies, I got in touch at once with the British Ambassador. He had several telegrams on this subject including one instructing him to take it up with the Soviet authorities. I told him that although I had no instructions I wished to take the matter up on my own initiative without further delay and we agreed to go to the Foreign Office together for this purpose.

Molotov was unable to see us and we were not able to see Vyshinski until this evening. The British Ambassador first read to Vyshinski a memorandum the main points of which were as follows: The British Government considered this action on the part of the Soviet authorities harmful to Allied interests and in conflict with the policy of Allied cooperation and requested that instructions be sent immediately to cease the removal of equipment and accessories of British owned com-

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<sup>49</sup> See statement of the Soviet Government transmitted to the Department on April 1 by the Embassy of the Soviet Union, p. 165.

<sup>50</sup> As No. 336.

<sup>51</sup> Burton Y. Berry, formerly Consul General at Istanbul, en route to Bucharest as American Representative in Rumania.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

panies from the oil fields pending discussions with the British representatives on the Control Commission. It was possible that such equipment might be made available for use in the Soviet Union but only after joint agreement between the three delegations and the Control Commission. The British Government asked that all machinery, except such as might be removed by agreement, be returned. Finally concern was expressed at the harm which might be caused generally to Rumanian economy by lack of discrimination in the policy pursued by the Allied Control Commission. The British Government hoped that efforts might be made to avert a serious deterioration of Rumanian economy which would be a bad advertisement for Allied rule in Rumania.

When the British Ambassador had finished his statement I said that while I had no official information on the subject I had received detailed reports from reliable sources which led me to believe that property of the Romano-Americana Company was being removed by Soviet military authorities for shipment to the Soviet Union. Assuming that these reports were correct, I wished to make certain following remarks:

I then said that I had not yet received instructions from my Government on this subject and that I might have to raise the matter again in a broader way when instructions were received. In particular I thought it possible that my Government might also have observations to make concerning the effects of this action on the economic situation in Rumania and on the prosecution of the war against Germany. For the moment, however, I had come only to express my own surprise and concern over the action the Soviet military authorities had taken. I drew Vyshinski's attention to the Embassy's memorandum of October 10 concerning property of the Romano-Americana Company in which the People's Commissariat was informed of the interest of our Government in the protection of this property and to the People's Commissariat's reply of October 12 stating that this information had been transmitted to the Soviet military authorities in Rumania. I said I was unable to understand how the Soviet authorities, acting unilaterally and without our agreement, could have insisted on removing property of this company the status of which had been specifically made known to them. I said I expected that this property would be returned and restored to its former condition at once and that the Soviet military authorities in Rumania would be instructed to take no further unilateral action affecting property in which American nationals or companies were interested. In conclusion I told him that I thought this was a serious matter and was sure that a similar view would be taken in Washington. I expressed the earnest personal hope in the interests not only of our property owners but also of American-Russian collaboration in general with respect

to former satellite countries, that the People's Commissariat would give immediate and favorable attention to the matter and that the Soviet Government would take steps to remedy matters without waiting for any further communication from our Government.

Vyshinski, in replying to these representations, took the position that according to his information the items removed by the Soviet military authorities were entirely German property, tubes to be exact, which had been brought there at one time in transit, destined for use in the Caucasus. (This assertion, incidentally, is flatly contradicted in the reports which the British Ambassador has received from the British representative in the Control Commission in Rumania.) Vyshinski admitted that English and American properties were of course inviolable. He undertook to make further investigations into the character and ownership of the property which was being removed.

I said that if none of the items removed were ones in which there was an American interest my foregoing remark of course did not apply; but that I could not in any event concede the right of the Russian military authorities to remove any property whatsoever from the premises of American-owned companies in Rumania without prior consultation with those companies or with our authorities, and I wished to warn him in all friendliness that unilateral actions of this sort would unfailingly lead to trouble. To my surprise he agreed that what had been done in this instance should not have been done without consultation.

The conversation was conducted throughout in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, and I feel that it was definitely beneficial. Regardless of the facts with respect to the ownership of the property, I think we will find that it has not been wasted effort to exhibit from the start a lively and serious interest in the protection of our property rights in Russian-controlled areas.

Sent to Department as 4221, November 3, 11 p. m.; repeated to AmPolAd, Caserta, as 19 and to London as 248.

KENNAN

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871.6363/11-344 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1944—10 p. m.

2629. Reurtel 4221 of November 3. Department approves initial step which you took upon receipt of Caserta 1106 of November 2<sup>53</sup> and desires to commend you for your action.

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<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

Department's position regarding action taken by Soviet Government in removing critical oil field equipment from Rumania is that this is a matter which should have been reviewed and decided upon jointly by the three Allied Governments, presumably through the Allied Control Commission, and not acted upon unilaterally by the Soviet Government alone. The question of petroleum supplies for the benefit of the Allied nations during the war as well as for the post-war period following the collapse of Germany is directly involved.

It has been Department's view that the quickest possible rehabilitation of Rumanian production would be of distinct value in easing the European supply situation, both as regards production and saving tanker tonnage, and as question of supply for adjoining Balkan countries during the War and after the German collapse. Department appreciates that the Soviet High Command may be in a position to gauge the merit and immediate military advantage of the action they are taking. Nevertheless, Department considers that the immediate reestablishment of the Rumanian oil industry is so important that measures such as these which might seriously retard this rehabilitation should have been referred to all three Allied governments.

Department therefore instructs you to take this matter up with appropriate Soviet officials along these lines.<sup>54</sup> You should indicate Department's direct interest in a reexamination of the whole question, particularly the supply and transportation problems involved, in the light of Soviet Government's explanation of its action.

Department takes serious view of the apparent violation of the property rights of American nationals in this case, particularly since the Armistice terms with Rumania provide under Clause 13 for restoration of their property "in complete good order".

Department is therefore in full accord with the position you have taken vis-à-vis Soviet Government.

STETTINIUS

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740.00119 European War 1939/11-1944: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 9, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

4289. The morning press contains a Tass item from Bucharest to the effect that Vyshinski arrived Taure [*there*] on the 8th to check up on Rumania's execution of the armistice terms.

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<sup>54</sup> In telegram 4319, November 11, 10 a. m., the Chargé in the Soviet Union reported his letter of November 10 to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) in which was stated the U.S. Government's regret that unilateral Soviet action had been taken and request for reexamination of the question (871.6363/11-1144).

Neither the British Ambassador nor I had any advance warning of this visit, nor any knowledge of his departure prior to the appearance of this press item.

Considering especially the fact that we were technically in communication with him on matters connected with execution of the armistice terms in Rumania, we were a little taken aback by this news.

KENNAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/11-1144 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 11, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received November 12—4:10 p. m.]

4323. ReDeptel 2602, November 3, 9 p. m. 1. As far as this Embassy is aware, the only British-Russian exchanges of views on Rumania since Ambassador Harriman's departure resulted from two notes of the British Ambassador to Molotov dated October 26. The first note, expressing concern lest political differences in Rumania might degenerate into civil turmoil accompanied by armed clashes, was reported in my 4118, October 27, 7 p. m.<sup>55</sup> Particular concern was expressed over failure to disarm "Communist guards". The second note, regarding concern of British Government over failure of Rumanian Government to break off relations with Japan,<sup>56</sup> was reported in my 4119, October 27, 8 p. m.<sup>55</sup> In reply to the first note Vyshinski stated in letter dated November 2 that situation in Rumania to which British Ambassador's note drew attention was connected primarily with tendency of certain political groups in Rumania to evade or delay fulfillment of Armistice terms and not with behavior of any particular detachments. The note [added that the] necessary steps are being taken by the Soviet High Command, which is directing the activities of the ACC in Rumania, for the disarmament by the Rumanian authorities of all non-governmental groups and organizations in Rumania. Soviet reply to the second note was reported separately in my telegram 4920, November 9, 6 p. m.<sup>55</sup> In addition to this the British Ambassador, in the memorandum which he left with Vyshinski on November 3 in connection with removal by Russians of oil company equipment, referred to the general harm being caused to Rumanian economy by Soviet lack of discrimination. He mentioned particularly that due to policies of Control Commission only a small part of Autumn grain crop had been sown.

2. The factors which have determined the Soviet attitude toward Rumania are, in my opinion, the following :

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

<sup>56</sup> See footnote 30, p. 234.

(a) Soviet resentment at participation of Rumanian troops in the invasion of the Ukraine and particularly at Rumanian aspirations to Transnistria and its administration by Rumanian officials while under enemy occupation;

(b) Non-Slavic racial origin and Latin Catholic cultural traditions which automatically exclude Rumania from the bond of the all Slav brotherhood;

(c) Russian contempt of the Rumanian upper class as unprincipled, pleasure-loving and corrupt;

(d) Failure of Rumanians to acclaim Red Army with any marked show of affection;

(e) Resentment and jealousy of the relative prosperity which Rumania was found by Russians to have been enjoying under Nazi occupation, a prosperity offensive to Russians as contradictory to their propaganda regarding misery of peoples of occupied Europe, and challenging to their conception that the standard of living in defeated countries should not be higher than in the Soviet Union itself;

(f) A determination that wherever this is not inhibited by political considerations, the maximum in goods and services shall be exacted from ex-enemy territories by way of restitution for the miseries inflicted on the occupied areas of the Soviet Union.

Given this background, Russian action in Rumania has been dominated by the determination to make the country pay through the nose for its past transgressions and by a pronounced distrust and lack of sympathy for practically all of its political leaders and groupings. Unfortunately this does not seem to have been balanced off by any adequate sense of responsibility on the part of Soviet military authorities in Rumania for political stability in that country or for economic stability in central Europe.

The results of this in the economic sphere are well known to the Department. In the political sphere, the Russians have concentrated on trying to undermine the authority of the Liberal and Peasant Party leaders<sup>57</sup> who command the support of the bulk of anti-fascist forces in Rumania. They have set out to accomplish this by criticizing the attitude of those leaders toward fulfillment of the armistice terms, by accusing them of failing to purge fascist elements, by failing to give them support in their efforts to consolidate political life, and by urging immediate adoption of extreme measures of social and agrarian reform which have strong popular appeal but for the immediate promulgation of which at this moment no serious statesman could take responsibility. While the Rumanian Communists are made the spokesmen for these demands, there are indications that Moscow has no great confidence in their influence or ability. It expects and requires their obedience but does not feel itself obliged to grant them full support. It is probably contemptuous of them for their weakness,

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<sup>57</sup> Messrs. Bratianu and Maniu were not included in a Cabinet reorganization on November 4.

and reluctant to encourage them to take on too much responsibility at this time. The result of all this has been that Moscow's influence on Rumanian political life has been consistently negative and has evidently operated to paralyze Rumanian efforts to cope with the situation created by Russian requisitioning and mismanagement in the economic field.

I have a feeling that the Soviet authorities in Moscow have recently become conscious of the fact that this situation in Rumania may have repercussions unfavorable to the Soviet Union. In particular, I suspect they are worried lest tales of hardship and chaos attendant upon Soviet occupation of Rumania should operate further to stiffen the backs of the Hungarians, whose evident terror of the Red Army and continued military resistance is causing concern in Moscow. It is possible, though not certain, that representations of British representatives in Rumania and of the British Ambassador and myself here have also played a part in shaking Soviet complacency. Vyshinski's present visit, in my opinion, should be interpreted in this light rather than exclusively in connection with alleged Rumanian failure to live up to armistice terms, and I think there is reason to hope that it will result in more reasonable and more cooperative policies on the part of the Soviet military authorities.

Sent to Department as 4323; repeated to Caserta for Berry as No. 26.

KENNAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/11-1444: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 12, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received November 14—2:17 p. m.]

3. Late last evening I called on Foreign Minister Visoianu<sup>59</sup> and informed him of my status. He said that he warmly welcomed the arrival in Bucharest of a representative of the American Government. Then he kept me for an hour describing Rumania's present administrative and economic difficulties particularly with reference to application of the terms of the armistice. Throughout his talk he spoke without bitterness and even with considerable tolerance of the untraditional approach of the Soviet Command to local problems and the spontaneous actions of subordinate officers. Again and again he said that his Government sincerely desired to fulfill the obligations

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<sup>59</sup> Constantin Visoianu, a friend of Iuliu Maniu, became Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs on November 4.

they had assumed under the armistice but that this might prove impossible if it were denied the means of fulfilling them.

The Minister said that his Government had agreed to ensure free movement as required by military authorities but it was incapable of this as in fact the control of all communications was in Soviet hands. It had agreed to compensate for losses caused the Soviet Union to the amount of 50 million dollars yearly for 6 years payable in oil products, grain and other commodities. However, the means of producing oil products were being seized [and] transported from Rumania and grain next year would be lacking as only 15% of the land normally planted with wheat had been sown this autumn. This was due in part to the fact that fuel for tractors was not transported and distributed on Soviet-controlled Rumanian railways and in part to a fear born of experience among the peasants that their animals and tractors would be requisitioned by the Soviets if exposed.

Visoianu confirmed the report that Christu<sup>60</sup> had withdrawn as chairman and member of the Rumanian delegation to the Armistice Control Commission because of the resentment of General Vinogradov to the Rumanian reply to the Soviet note of November 2. (General Constantine Niculescu is slated to replace Christu<sup>61</sup> but Christu because of his experience and personality will be recalled unofficially as advisor to the delegation.) The Minister added that Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinski had come to Rumania, carrying a long verbal message for the King, for purpose of arranging for the better execution of the terms of the armistice.

On the way to the door the Minister stopped and once again emphasized the desire of the Rumanian Government to fulfill conscientiously the terms of the armistice, stressing the fact that the Government found no fault with the terms but did object to the way in which they had been executed until the present time. It was also unable to understand some requests made by the Soviets in the name of the Armistice Commission which he said would be humorous if the situation were not so tragic. To illustrate his point, the Minister drew from his pocket a request just received from the Soviets which according to him called for the immediate delivery of large quantities of silk of the finest quality, of underwear for soldiers, cocoa and other articles not produced in the country or available in reserve stocks.

BERRY

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<sup>60</sup> Ion Serban Christu.

<sup>61</sup> General Niculescu, however, was appointed head of the King's military household, and Savel Radulescu, a member of the Rumanian delegation, was promoted on November 17 to head the delegation.



871.6363/11-1744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944—5 p. m.

392. In view of the fact that Vyshinski has come to Rumania and that the question of petroleum equipment will be discussed, for your guidance in these discussions we are sending you instructions previously sent to Moscow as Department's 2629 of November 8.

The Department's position in the matter is indicated by the following telegram as well as by Moscow's 4221 of November 3 repeated to AmPolAd as No. 19.

[Here follows text the same as telegram 2629, November 8, 10 p. m., to Moscow, printed on page 256.]

STETTINIUS

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740.00119 European War 1939/11-2344 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944—6 p. m.

2727. British Embassy have informed Department that according to reports of their representatives in Helsinki and Bucharest the Soviets have told the Finnish and Rumanian Governments that their reparation deliveries would be valued at 1938 and 1939 prices respectively.

The British are instructing Clark-Kerr to make representations to the Soviet Government on this matter and to hand them a note, the text of which we have seen, in which they argue strongly for valuation on the basis of current world prices. They have asked that you be authorized to support Clark-Kerr in this representation.

The Department is in general agreement with the position of the British on this subject and with the economic arguments adduced by them in support thereof. If you have independent knowledge that the Soviet Government is actually proposing to value Rumanian reparation deliveries at 1939 prices or similar arbitrary figure, you may associate yourself with Clark-Kerr's representation with respect to Rumania, pointing out the following:

1. It has always been the understanding and belief of this Government that the basis on which the reparation deliveries would be valued would be current prices in dollars. The expression of the obligation

in terms of current gold dollars lends itself to no other reasonable interpretation.

2. This Government from the beginning opposed fixing the reparation obligation in terms of a specific amount of money. When we did give our assent to a figure which we already considered high in relation to Rumania's capacity to pay, it did not occur to us that there might be applied an arbitrary basis of valuation the effect of which would be to increase greatly the actual amount of the obligation.

3. While this Government has always fully acknowledged the claim of the Soviet Government for reparation from Rumania, it has on previous occasions also manifested the great direct interest which the United States has in European recovery and the early return of European economic stability. This Government does not oppose severe reparation terms but believes that reparation obligations which clearly exceed capacity to pay may retard recovery and react harmfully on American interests.

In your discretion you may present an *aide-mémoire* to the Russians incorporating the foregoing points, or if you consider it more appropriate in the circumstances you may confine yourself to an oral expression of these views.

STETTINIUS

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871.6363/11-2344 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the  
Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 23, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received November 24—11 : 36 a. m.]

22. Yesterday afternoon I informed Mr. Vyshinsky of Department's point of view (No. 392, November 17, 5 p. m. to AmPolAd) on problem created by reaction by Soviet authorities in removing some 23,000 tons of tubes, parts and other equipment from warehouses of various oil companies in Rumania.

After listening intently to my statement Vyshinsky replied he agreed the quick rehabilitation of Rumanian oil industry was important. He said Soviet Command had removed only equipment that was in excess to needs of the Rumanian industry and so removals would not retard rehabilitation of the industry. He added Baku and Maikop fields were in great need of equipment and shipments here of Rumanian equipment would serve our common effort.

Vyshinsky argued equipment sent to Russia was not purchased by the oil companies prior to the war. It was all German equipment sent to Rumania during the war not as payment for Rumanian oil but for reshipment to Soviet fields as soon as they were captured by

the Germans. Under such circumstances Soviet Command regarded the equipment as war booty.

I said I understood Tzbesano [*sic*] equipment in warehouses of Romano-Americana represented partial payment for oil delivered at a time when the company was working under duress for the Germans.

Vyshinsky answered that there might be room for discussion on question of title if one took the formal point of view. But he preferred a broader point of view. He suggested the amount of equipment was so small it might be written off as a minor Lend-Lease shipment.

To this I said point at issue was not the value of equipment taken away but the designation of property of an American company as war booty and removal of such property without prior consent of American Government.

In concluding the discussion of the topic, Vyshinsky said he could not agree as Soviet authorities held the equipment to be war booty but he was in agreement Rumanian oil industry should be quickly rehabilitated and he could assure me necessary parts were in stock for at least a year. He said finally he would inform Moscow immediately of State Department's interest in reviewing the whole question.

BERRY

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/11-2344: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania (Berry)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944—7 p. m.

9. A paraphrase of your telegram no. 6 November 12<sup>62</sup> has been transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their information and comments. The Department's accompanying memorandum sets forth our view, which coincides with your recommendation, that the American representation on the Control Commission should be kept small, and that it would be unwise for this Government to propose any such changes in the size and functions of the American delegation as are envisaged in Stevenson's plan.<sup>63</sup>

However, the Department would like to see the statutes of the ACC, as proposed by the Soviet Government, revised so as to remove some of the restrictions placed on the powers and prerogatives of the American

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<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

<sup>63</sup> Air Vice Marshal Donald F. Stevenson, Chief of the British delegation to the Allied Control Commission, outlined a plan of organization for the Commission giving positions to be held by Soviet, British, and American officers.

representatives. The Joint Chiefs have already requested that the Department seek to obtain such a revision of the statutes. Department's reply indicated that should the Joint Chiefs desire, either now or after the American delegation on the ACC had assumed its functions in Rumania and been able to assess the situation at first hand, to make specific recommendations for the amendment of the statutes, the Department would be glad to take up the question with the Soviet Government. Any specific recommendations you may desire to make on this matter, after consultation with General Schuyler,<sup>64</sup> would be appreciated.

The comments of the Joint Chiefs on the Stevenson proposals will be conveyed to you as soon as they are received in the Department.

STETTINIUS

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771.00/11-2444 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received November 26—12:07 p. m.]

24. Foreign Minister told me yesterday that political representatives from America, England, France, Belgium and Holland had either reached Bucharest or were on their way here. He said he would like very much to send representatives to Washington and London. If they would be received, he would give each the same title as that borne by the representative of Washington and London here. He would choose his representatives from among Rumanians who have been in Rumania throughout the war and are thus better informed concerning present conditions than those who have resided abroad the past few years.

My British colleague said the Foreign Minister yesterday made a similar statement to him which he is telegraphing to London today.

In considering this request Department will wish to bear in mind that the Rumanians will likely follow this soon with a request for the privilege of transmitting instructions to their representatives by our pouch and codes. At the present time, of course, the Rumanian Government is able to telegraph abroad only in clear. It has no pouch

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<sup>64</sup> Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler reached Bucharest on November 25 as Chief of the U.S. military representation on the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

service. If we were to grant such facilities, I believe we would encounter an immediate and strong Soviet reaction as they suspect the Rumanians of trying to stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Western Allies.

BERRY

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871.6363/11-2744 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 27, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:35 p. m.]

33. The manager of Romano-Americana reported yesterday noon that the Soviets that morning had recommended loading tubes from the company's warehouse at Baicoi field.

General Schuyler immediately sent an officer to Ploesti to investigate. Late last night he reported that the loading had started as we were informed and was continuing. General and I agreed to protest to Soviet authorities. Vyshinsky according to the Soviet Legation was out of town for several days, but an appointment previously made for Schuyler to make his initial call on Vinogradov gave the needed opportunity.

After the usual exchange of pleasantries Schuyler presented the American point of view following closely my statement to Vyshinsky as reported in telegram 22 of November 23, 5 [6] p. m. He asked that the loading be stopped and the material that had been loaded be returned.

Vinogradov replied to Schuyler with much the same arguments as Vyshinsky had replied to me. He insisted there was enough equipment on hand for operation for one year. He said he did not have the authority to stop the loading. Schuyler then requested him to halt the equipment at some central point and hold it until the matter was cleared with Moscow, but this Vinogradov declined to do. He agreed only to inform Moscow of the conversation.

Schuyler will telegraph a full report to Washington and Moscow of his interview.

BERRY

740.00119 European War 1939/11-2844 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 28, 1944—9 a.m.  
[Received November 29—12:20 a. m.]

4531. I appreciate receiving the information set forth in the Department's 2727, November 23, 6 p. m. concerning the prices at which reparation deliveries by the Finns and Rumanians are to be evaluated.

I have no independent knowledge of Soviet practice in this respect nor do I expect that any such information will be made available to me here by Soviet sources unless an official request is made along these lines. For this reason I am not undertaking at this time to associate myself with Clark Kerr's representations or to bring the Department's views to the attention of the Soviet Government.

KENNAN

871.6363/11-2844

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 28, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received November 29—midnight.]

4552. ReEmbs 4319, November 11, 10 a. m.<sup>65</sup> General Deane<sup>66</sup> has received telegram from General Schuyler along the following lines:

General Schuyler arrived Bucharest November 25. The following day his office learned that Soviets had begun to remove property from Romano-Americana Oil Company. This report was verified by personal observations of OSS<sup>67</sup> officers. On November 26 general manager of company reported 980 tons of such property had been taken away November 25 and removal of equipment was continued that day. General Schuyler had entered a strong protest to Vinogradov<sup>68</sup> against removal of this property without prior notification to our representatives in Bucharest. He had asked specifically that such removal be stopped immediately and that property already removed be returned and held under joint observation pending further instructions from Moscow and Washington. This request had been categorically refused. It was General Schuyler's opinion, in which Berry concurred, that nothing further could be accomplished in Bucharest and that the matter would have to be referred to Moscow.

<sup>65</sup> See footnote 54, p. 257.

<sup>66</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>67</sup> Office of Strategic Services.

<sup>68</sup> Lt. Gen. V. P. Vinogradov, President of the Allied Control Commission for Rumania.

I am addressing a letter to Molotov inviting his attention once again to the main points contained in my letter of November 10, and communicating to him the gist of the information received from General Schuyler. I am saying in conclusion that until my Government has had a chance to study General Schuyler's report and to determine the position it wishes to take, I have no further comment to make, but that in view of the bearing of the report on the statements made in my letter of November 10, I have thought it proper that the information received from General Schuyler should be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government without delay.

I have taken this step on the assumption that this latest action of the Soviet authorities in Rumania, which seems to indicate complete disrespect for the views our Government has expressed with regard to the treatment of these properties, will have to be the subject of further exchanges with the Soviet Government. Once these facts have been formally brought to Molotov's attention at this time it will not be possible for him to avoid discussion or responsibility on plea of ignorance if and when the subject is raised at a later date.

Ambassador Harriman is expected to return to Moscow very shortly, and further representations on this matter would obviously come with much greater logic and force if they were to be made by him and not by myself. Meanwhile, I hope that the Department will be able to let me have its views on the present phase of this matter, so that they may be available for the guidance of the Ambassador when he arrives.

There is nothing in General Schuyler's telegram to indicate that he is aware that this question is not a new one and that representations have already been made in Moscow. I hope that both he and Berry are completely informed on this point.

Sent to Department as 4552; repeated to AmPolAd Caserta as No. 39.

KENNAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/11-2944: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 29, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received December 18—5:40 p. m.]

36. See my telegram No. 35 of November 28, 6 p. m.<sup>69</sup> The difficulties encountered in negotiations between Vishinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and the representatives of

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

the Rumanian Government have added materially in keeping the Rumanian political pot boiling. Briefly summarized the negotiations developed in the following manner. Vishinsky in his first interview with the new head of the Rumanian Commission for application of the Armistice, Savel Radulescu, amid an atmosphere that Radulescu termed "threatening", demanded that within 2 days Rumania accept 1938 as base year for determining reparations prices. Vishinsky presented a delivery schedule covering 6 years for commodities, livestock and machinery. Radulescu stated the Rumanian view that the indemnity timed by the Armistice meant payments at current world prices. He and other Rumanian officials claimed acceptance of Russian proposal meant increasing indemnity three-fold and that many requested quantity deliveries notably livestock were impossible to fulfill. Vishinsky's reply was to refuse to discuss any pending questions until 1938 price principle was accepted.

The evening of November 24 Vishinsky was verbally informed of Rumanian acceptance of 1938 as price basis but of Rumanian reservations to sign a reparations schedule embodying quantity deliveries [considered?] impossible. A formal note was delivered on November 27.

Translations of Rumanian reparations price position, schedule of Soviet requested deliveries and the formal Rumanian reply follow by pouch.<sup>70</sup>

The Vishinsky talks are considered significant locally for (1) they by-passed the Allied Control Commission replacing it by direct Soviet-Rumanian negotiations and (2) they deepened Rumanian gloom and increased apprehension for the future because of the "method of negotiation[?]" which Foreign Minister Visoianu described to me as ["negotiation by ultimatum"].

BERRY

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/11-2944 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 29, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received November 30—2:25 p. m.]

37. Re my telegram No. 35 of November 28.<sup>71</sup> For a fortnight the Rumanian public has been uneasy over reports of the withdrawal of Rumanian civil administration from northern Transylvania. The Government has permitted no documents to be published but there is a growing feeling among the people that the Soviets are preventing

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<sup>70</sup> Despatch No. 19, December 1, not printed.

<sup>71</sup> Not printed.



the reparation of the injustice done Rumania by the Vienna Award.<sup>72</sup>

According to the documents confidentially given me in the Foreign Office, General Vinogradov on November 12 acting in the name of the Allied Control Commission addressed a letter to Prime Minister Sanatescu. After reviewing in his letter the activities of a Rumanian volunteer regiment of gendarmes operating in Transylvania the General in substance stated: (1) the installation of Rumanian administrative officials in Transylvania is forbidden; (2) the volunteer regiment of gendarmes operating in Transylvania must be disbanded, the men removed from Transylvania and the commander court-martialed, charged with instigation against the Red Army; (3) if the request is not fully satisfied by November 17 the Red Army will undertake the disbanding of the regiment.

The Rumanian reply to the above note was delivered November 19 and stated to General Vinogradov (1) all Rumanian authorities had been withdrawn from northern Transylvania and (2) the volunteer regiment was disbanded, the men removed from Transylvania and the commander who was not affiliated with the Rumanian military or civil authorities would be tried by the military. The remainder of the reply was a legal argument on Rumania's right to administrate northern Transylvania until the formal peace and emphasized Rumanian administration had been established openly and in cooperation with the Soviet military. It closed asking for an indication when this administration could be restored.

Copies of document will be forwarded by pouch.<sup>73</sup>

BERRY

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871.01/11-3044: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 30, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 4:40 p. m.]

40. The Marshal of the Court<sup>74</sup> called on me late last night to say that the King had decided upon a new government and that it would likely be formed within the next 24 hours. Government would be a government of technicians. It would be formed to (1) maintain order, (2) discharge the obligations assumed by the country under the terms of the armistice and (3) carry on the fight against the Hungarians and Nazis.

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<sup>72</sup> Signed August 30, 1940; for documents, see Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. x, pp. 581-587.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

<sup>74</sup> Dimitrie Negel, Marshal of the Palace.

The Marshal said it was likely the local Communists would react violently to the formation of a government of technicians. They might even attempt a *coup d'état*. If they had the cooperation of the Soviet authorities, a *coup d'état* would succeed. In such a case, he asked, what would happen to the King? Would the Americans offer him hospitality? I turned off the question by saying that I felt the Marshal was thinking in a much too pessimistic vein and that tomorrow morning, after a good night's sleep, he would likely laugh at his own question. I would appreciate, however, instructions<sup>75</sup> upon the point he raised as the question may be asked again under more urgent circumstances when I could not turn it off without a definite reply.

BERRY

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/11-3044 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, November 30, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

41. General Vinogradov in conversation with Air Vice Marshal Stevenson yesterday afternoon hinted that Marshal Malinovsky who personally commands the second Ukrainian army before Budapest and is at the same time President of the Allied Control Commission is now here secretly, probably for consultation with Vishinsky.

As the ACC has never formally been constituted, I have suggested to General Schuyler this might be the time to press for its formal constitution.

At present the Soviet Command issues instructions to the Rumanian authorities in the name of the ACC. Thus we share in the responsibility for these instructions but we have not shared in the drafting of them.

BERRY

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871.6363/11-3044 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 30, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:51 p. m.]

1559. Reference Bucharest 22 of November 23, 6 p. m. General Schuyler has informed Joint Chiefs of Staff that General Manager of Romano-Americana Oil Co. has reported that on November 26

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<sup>75</sup> No record of reply found in Department files.

Russians began to remove quantities of tubing and casting from the premises of the Romano-Americana Oil Co. This was verified by an investigation and the General Manager estimates that 980,000 kilograms were removed yesterday and is continuing today for shipment by rail.

Schuyler consulted with Berry and at their first meeting yesterday protested strongly to General Vinogradov. Vinogradov was reminded of previous protests by United States Government against removal of American-owned property and was specifically requested to have (1) Russians return everything which has been removed from American premises, for holding until agreement is reached by Washington and Moscow and (2) that further actions by Russians cease immediately.

Vinogradov stated the position of Russians in almost same manner as was done previously by Vishinsky to Berry. He especially emphasized that the equipment removed had German markings and was obtained during the war in Germany and stored temporarily in Rumania with the intention of using it in Russian oil fields when they were captured. He stated that it was considered as legal war booty by Moscow.

Schuyler told Vinogradov he intended to report this to the officials in Washington and Moscow and said he hoped he could report Vinogradov's agreement to suspend further action and hold equipment where it is under joint observation until instructions were received from their respective Governments. Vinogradov replied that he would report to Moscow and inform Schuyler of his answer, but was emphatic that no moves to halt the procedure were now possible. He made the statement that only surplus materials beyond the need for next year's operations were removed. Schuyler questioned this but remarked that main concern was removal of American property from United States-owned company without the United States Government being informed. Berry has been trying to see Vishinsky but has been informed that this is impossible for some time.

Schuyler stated that he believes neither he nor Berry can make any progress with Russians in Bucharest and that only results can be obtained by reference directly to Moscow.

Sent Department, repeated to Moscow as 152.

KIRK

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871.6363/12-144 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 1, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

4590. ReEmbs 4552, November 28, 6 p. m. Whether because it was finally realized here that a record was being built up which would

eventually be awkward to explain or whether for other reasons my letter to Molotov of November 28 on the subject of American oil company equipment in Rumania drew forth an answer in the record time of 2 days. The reply dated November 30 and signed by Dekanosov<sup>76</sup> is going forward in my next following message.<sup>77</sup> The Department will note that the reply refers not only to my letter of November 28 but also to the letter of November 10 (see my 4319, November 11, 10 p. m. [*a. m.*]<sup>78</sup> and to the *aide-mémoire* which I left with Vyshinski on November 3, thus covering all our representations to date.

I am acknowledging Dekanosov's communication and informing him that its contents have been communicated to my Government.

With respect to the contents of the reply I should like to invite the Department's attention to the following:

1. The reply makes no reference to the unilateral quality of Soviet action, the impossibility of which has been stressed in every one of our representations and ignores our expressed desire for a re-examination of the whole matter in common. It implies that the head of the ACC is implied [*empowered?*] to decide unilaterally what constitutes a military trophy even when Allied property rights are in question. It further implied his right to decide unilaterally without consultation of the views of the other members of the Commission what is of benefit and what is not of benefit to the rehabilitation of Rumanian economy.

2. If the principles of the Soviet reply be accepted, it means that equipment and supplies removed from the premises during the long period of enemy operation are the company's loss but equipment and supplies brought on to the premises during that period and found there now are the Soviet Union's gain.

3. Dekanosov implies (the obscure wording of the Russian text makes it impossible to say that he states) that all equipment now being removed is of German origin. Kirk's 1139, November 13 [*β*], midnight, to Department<sup>79</sup> cited British officials in Rumania as having categorically denied this. In Kirk's 1225, November 18, 5 p. m.<sup>79</sup> it was stated that equipment removed from American holdings was of mixed German and Rumanian origin. An infotel received here indicated that Berry when he first spoke with Vyshinski on this matter disputed the latter's assertion that the equipment removed could properly be considered as war booty.

4. Dekanosov claims that sufficient equipment is being left to assure maintenance of productions. This is likewise denied in British reports. I find no record of any opinion on this point from American sources.

Sent Department; repeated to Caserta for transmission to Berry as 2.

KENNAN

<sup>76</sup> Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>77</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>78</sup> See footnote 54, p. 257.

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

871.6363/12-144 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 1, 1944—noon.

[Received December 2—8:25 p. m.]

4591. The following is the text of a letter dated November 30 which I have received from Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanosov:

[“]In reply to your letters of November 10th and November 28 addressed to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and also in connection with your *aide-mémoire* of November 3, I wish to state that the competent Soviet authorities have again carefully examined all the data relating to the oil pipes which were removed by the Soviet authorities from Rumania. As a result of this examination the following has been established.

The American administration of the oil firms in Rumania, in which American capital participates, was dismissed from the management of these firms in the summer and fall of 1940 and replaced chiefly by Germans. From that time on the working properties of these firms became in fact German and up to August 23, 1944 the firms were used by the Germans for supplying petroleum products to the German Army. With a view to increasing the output of petroleum products vitally necessary to them, the Germans (in the person of the firm Mannesmann-Roehsen-Verband and others) during 1941–44 intensively brought to Rumania oil pipes and equipment (electric motors, et cetera) which same are being removed at the present time by the Soviet authorities.

Thus, as the Assistant People’s Commissar Vyshinski stated in his conversation with you on November 3rd, the pipes and equipment removed from Rumania constitute German military property brought to Rumania for military purposes, namely to procure petroleum products for the German Army. As a result of this, the Soviet Government considers that the pipes and equipment under discussion are military trophies and come fully under the operation of article [7] of the armistice agreement with Rumania of September 12, 1944.

Under such circumstances, the reference in your letter of November 10th to the violation of the property rights of American citizens cannot be considered well founded.

With respect to the fear of the Government of the United States of America that the exportation undertaken by the Soviet authorities of pipes from Rumania is a measure which might retard the rehabilitation of Rumanian industry, these fears are unfounded. Proceeding on the basis of the data provided by the firms themselves concerning the actual borings carried out in the Rumanian oil fields for the period 1938–43 and concerning the technical survey of the fields with boring rigs, the amount of borings which would guarantee a maintenance of production on a level of 5 million tons may be determined at 308,000 meters for 1945 for the entire Rumanian oil industry. 27,000 tons of pipe are needed for this work. According to the data of the firms themselves, there are 88,500 tons on hand of which only about 30,000 tons have been removed. There is similar data with

respect to the firms in which American capital participates: The demand for pipes of the firm 'Romano-Americana', if the maximum volume of annual borings for the last years be taken as 60-70,000 meters, consists of 5 to 6,000 tons. This firm's stocks of pipes on hand amounted to almost 13,000 tons of which it is proposed to remove 6,000 tons.

It should be noted in this connection that although the pipes and other petroleum industry equipment brought by the Germans into the oil premises during the war are trophy-property of the Red Army, nevertheless the Soviet Government, considering the needs for petroleum products in the conduct of the war against Germany, has decided to leave to the firms, including the American firm, a sufficient amount of pipes in order to guarantee the uninterrupted work of the oil industries in the future for a protracted period.

Thus the fear expressed in your letter in question that the export of pipes from Rumania may reflect on any rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry is not justified by the actual circumstances.

Please accept, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, the assurances of my very sincere respect.["]

KENNAN

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/12-444

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

No. 21

BUCHAREST, December 4, 1944.

[Received December 20.]

SIR: I have the honor to report upon the attitude of the Soviet authorities, both military and civil, towards the Allied Control Commission. Briefly, the Soviet Command appears to consider the Allied Control Commission as an instrument for carrying into effect the will of the Soviet authorities in Rumania, and as such, little regard has been given in the past to the American and British representation on that Commission.

The impression that the Soviet authorities consider the Allied Control Commission their own agency and their own responsibility was not as aggressively marked a month ago as it is today. At that time the attention of the Soviet members of the Commission was taken by pressing military matters. They were primarily concerned with securing adequate supplies for the Second Ukrainian Army fighting in Hungary. Thus, they did not seek to implement several terms of the armistice, among them Article 11 dealing with reparations. A month ago it was also impossible formally to constitute the Commission as all the delegations had not arrived in Rumania. Consequently, no operational organization then was involved.

The British Commissioner, Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, when he came to Rumania, felt handicapped in attempting to discuss problems

or to introduce organizational proposals since the Russians preferred to hold matters in abeyance, saying that the American member of the Commission had not arrived. Therefore, meetings between the Air Vice Marshal and General Vinogradov, the Deputy for the President, Marshal Malinovsky, who was at the Hungarian front, were all in the nature of private conversations. When a slightly more official cast was desired, General Vasiliev, Chief of Staff to General Vinogradov, was also present. Thus, with the Soviet authorities devoting their attention to the military aspects of the Armistice, which of course concerned primarily the Soviet and Rumanian authorities, other questions did not arise as direct issues until towards the end of October, when the Soviet military authorities began seizing the reserve equipment of oil companies, American and British as well as Rumanian, operating in the Ploesti area.

On November 2 a Note was delivered to the Rumanian Government in the name of the Allied Control Commission wherein the Soviet authorities criticized the execution of the Armistice terms. Then, with the seizure of the oil equipment reserves, we began to have a clearer indication of the Soviet attitude of the role of the Allied Control Commission. In these instances the British Commissioner was not informed of the decisions taken by the Commission.

With the arrival of the Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, about November 8, General Vinogradov seems for all practical purposes to have been superseded as head of the Soviet official mission in Rumania inasmuch as Mr. Vishinsky undertook, and has carried on, the negotiations with the Rumanian Government for the payment of reparations under Article 11 of the Armistice.

American news correspondents now in Bucharest have told me that references to the work of the Allied Control Commission are deleted from their despatches, even to the point where, in one instance, a quotation of the text of Article 18 of the Armistice and its Annex, describing the duty of the Commission, was deleted. The censorship is Soviet, attached to and acting in the name of the Allied Control Commission. Then when General Schuyler, the American representative upon the Commission, arrived in Bucharest a few days ago, the local newspapers were permitted to print only a statement of his arrival and that was very inconspicuously placed.

In short, conversations held during November by members of the staff of this Mission and other Americans, with members of the Soviet staff attached to the Armistice Commission left no doubt in our minds that the Soviet authorities consider that the full executive authority of the Commission rests in their hands, the other members being little

more than observers of the action taken by the President or Vice President in the name of the Commission.

Respectfully yours,

BURTON Y. BERRY

871.01/12-744 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the  
Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 7, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 8—6:20 a. m.]

49. The new Rumanian Government has formally been announced today and is constituted with General Radescu<sup>80</sup> as both Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior. General Negulescu<sup>81</sup> is War Minister and General Stanescu<sup>82</sup> is Under Secretary of Interior for National Security. Portfolio of General Damaceanu<sup>83</sup> for liaison with the Allies and application of the armistice has been dropped. To give National Peasant Party vote lost by relinquishing Interior Ministry post, it is planned to add an additional ministry without portfolio. Otherwise the cabinet of the second Sanatescu government remains intact.

A government program was announced to which all participants subscribed at the first cabinet meeting. It includes reestablishing order, maintaining production and factory discipline, observance of the armistice agreement, disarming members of all party organizations (the Communists alone had not disarmed), weeding out state administrative personnel of Fascist elements, abrogating all racial laws and prosecution of war criminals.

BERRY

740.00119 Control (Rumania)/10-2844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1944—8 p. m.

2801. Reurtel 4584 November 30, 9 p. m.<sup>84</sup> You should address a communication to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs referring to Ambassador Harriman's letter of October 13 to Vyshinsky. The Embassy's 4584 November 30 says that no reply to Ambassador Harriman's letter of October 13, which presumably stated the points set

<sup>80</sup> Gen. Nicolae Radescu, formerly Rumanian Chief of Staff.

<sup>81</sup> Gen. Ion Negulescu.

<sup>82</sup> Brig. Gen. Virgil Stanescu.

<sup>83</sup> Brig. Gen. I. Dimitru Damaceanu, a signer of the Rumanian armistice.

<sup>84</sup> Not printed.



forth in Department's 2418 October 12, has been received. Your 4133 October 28, however, indicated a reply had been received indicating Soviet agreement to the appointment of an American political representative, stating that the Soviet Government had in view the parallel with Italy. Kostylev, Soviet representative in Italy, and Bogomolov, Soviet member of the Advisory Council for Italy, have the privilege of direct communication in code with the Soviet Government. It has been the Department's understanding that the Soviet Government had agreed, either orally or in writing, to Berry's having freedom of communication in code. (See in this connection Molotov's statement to the Rumanian delegation on September 12 reported in your despatch no. 1066 of October 7, enclosure no. 5h.<sup>85</sup>) Please inform the Soviet Government of the Department's position on this matter and request that communication in code be immediately permitted between the American Embassy in Moscow and the American mission in Bucharest.

The Department has not yet received from Caserta or from Bucharest any information in reply to the inquiries contained in your 42 to AmPolAd Caserta repeated to the Department as 4584 November 30.

STETTINIUS

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871.01/12-744 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 7, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received December 8—2:50 p. m.]

50. Steps involved in forming the new government will be reported by despatch.<sup>86</sup> However, it is considered locally that the Radescu Cabinet, together with the agreed program, constitute a victory, at least temporarily, over the National Democratic Front composed of the Leftist parties. Responsible sources claim that Soviet pressure caused the Left suddenly to enter Radescu Government after first refusing to participate. On this point it is of interest that one report states that at a large official reception Tuesday evening at the Soviet Legation Deputy Commissar Vishinsky, in the course of an agreeable conversation with General Radescu, complimented him on virtually solving the political crisis by forming a government of all political parties.

BERRY

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<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

<sup>86</sup> No. 24, December 8, not printed.

S71.01/12-944 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 9, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9 : 45 p. m.]

52. A few days ago Maniu told Le Rougetel, my British colleague, that if the British Government wished that Rumania cast her lot with the Soviets rather than with the Anglo-Saxon powers, in case a decision become[s] necessary, he would quite understand the position but he would be grateful to receive an indication to that effect. In transmitting this statement to British Foreign Office, Le Rougetel said he was convinced Maniu was genuinely seeking guidance and suggested this inquiry could be used as [a peg?] upon which to convey a message to Maniu.

Last evening with me Maniu developed more fully the same thought. He said if he had known the Soviets were to be given a free hand in application of armistice terms he would not have advised the King to sign the armistice. He argued that his pressure and the Rumanian action which resulted from it had actually advanced the Foscani-Galatz line, which might have been held a long time, to the very gates of Budapest.

He told of an approach made to him by Molotov a year ago regarding future relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union and explained that because of his loyalty to the democratic powers he had not accepted his approach. He was convinced at that time that the democratic powers would preserve an independent and sovereign Rumania. Everything today however indicated that this was not the intention of those powers. On the contrary it appeared that Soviet Russia was deliberately planning to communize Rumania while the democratic powers silently watched. To support his point he cited such examples as the installing of Hungarian Communists in administrative positions in northern Transylvania; the steadily advancing Soviet colonizing of Constantza; and the recent request of Malinovsky that the whole of the four Rumanian countries [*counties*] in Transylvania which were divided between Rumania and Hungary by the Vienna dictate be turned over to Soviet and Hungarian administration.

With considerable emotion Maniu asked if America and Great Britain wished Rumania to become a part of the Soviet Union. "If so, please advise me accordingly for this can be easily arranged and even today late as it is I can arrange it to the better advantage to Rumania than can the Rumanian Communists." Then he repeated that if it were our intention to abandon Rumania we owed him

the obligation of telling him so and he owed the Rumanian people the obligation of securing the best possible terms for them.

I told Maniu that as far as I knew the statement made by Molotov last spring and the articles of the armistice indicated that the three principal Allies expected Rumania to be an independent and sovereign state.

The Department well knows that Maniu has stood out boldly as a champion of pro-Allied action and sentiment in Rumania even during the dark days of the Antonescu dictatorship. He has an enormous political following in the country and I believe the respect in which all Rumanians hold him eclipses that held for any other Rumanian. Because of what he has been and what he is it seems important that he be preserved from slipping into sharing the general conviction that the dissolution of the Rumanian state is now in progress. Reference my No. 42, November 30, 6 p. m.<sup>87</sup> In view of the foregoing I suggest that any message from which Maniu could take heart would be timely.

BERRY

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740.00119 European War 1939/12-1244 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 12, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received December 14—9: 15 a. m.]

54. After luncheon Sunday I had an hour's talk with the King. He was pleased that Vyshinsky had left in a favorable frame of mind and was relieved the government crisis had passed without popular disturbance.

King said when Vyshinsky made his farewell visit he had said that when he came to Rumania a month ago he was dissatisfied with Rumanian efforts to fulfill the terms of the armistice; that during his stay here he had been able to correct many impressions; and now at the time of his departure he was pleased with the Rumanian action in fulfilling the armistice terms.

Vyshinsky said the Soviet Government supported King Michael. It had no desire to see Rumania become a Communistic state, but it did desire a neighbor which was friendly. Finally Vyshinsky said his Government was very satisfied with the new Rumanian Government and a government of technicians would have been "impossible".

King told me the tone of his interview was on a much more pleasant plane than the first which was accompanied with scowls and thinly-

<sup>87</sup> Not printed.

veiled menaces. He said Vyshinsky congratulated him upon his handling of the government crisis and he had high hopes that affairs would now settle down as he understood Vyshinsky had talked to some of the more viperous Communists and had advised them against stirring up trouble.

King was optimistic upon chances of new government's maintaining order. He said the Prime Minister had shown himself firm and in two instances (those mentioned by Maniu and reported in my 52, December 9, 7 p. m.) he had taken immediate action to rectify a situation that might have grown troublesome. He said local Communists have taken quite a different attitude in the last few days and that he felt that their bluff had been called since they had learned from conversations with Vyshinsky that they could not have the support of the Red Army and since they had seen from the firm action of the Prime Minister that he was ready for a showdown.

Repeated to Moscow.

BERRY

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/12-1244: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 12, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received December 13—7:12 p. m.]

56. Reference Kennan's telegram December 1 to Department<sup>88</sup> and particularly numbered paragraph 1. Soviet authorities' understanding of their position on the ACC was set forth in a letter dated December 3 from General Vinogradov, deputy chairman, addressed to Air Vice Marshal Stevenson, British member.

The General stated that it was the intention that the ACC in Rumania should be planned on the same pattern as the ACC in Italy. In Italy the executive role belongs to the Anglo-American Command. Soviet representatives do not take part in the administration of the Departments with the exception of the Department dealing with tracing Allied citizens. Soviet representative has the right to be informed of the work of the ACC and hands his suggestions to the deputy chairman.

According to section 18 of the Rumanian armistice, the executive work of the ACC belongs to the Soviet Command. The British representative will enjoy those rights which are enjoyed by Soviet representative in Italy, that is, right to receive information and right to hand in suggestions. In addition a special British representative

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<sup>88</sup> No. 4590, December 1, 11 a. m., p. 272.

may be attached to the administrative department of the Commission which is tracing British citizens in Rumania.

BERRY

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871.01/12-1244: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 12, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received December 14—12:10 a. m.]

58. Air Vice Marshal Stevenson and Le Rougetel have changed their point of view from that reported in my telegram 42, November 30, 6 p. m.<sup>89</sup> They feel that the formation of the new Rumanian Government was a triumph for the conservative forces of the country, therefore that the danger of the Soviets communizing Rumania is now past.

The AVM is still convinced that Vishinsky came here to do the same type job that he did in the Baltic States. But when Vishinsky discovered that conditions were different the AVM believed that Moscow ordered what he described as "a Russian back-down".

It seems to me the British here were unduly pessimistic a fortnight ago about the situation in Rumania. When the full measure of their pessimism was found unjustified they swung equally violently to optimism. Extreme pessimism is ruled out by the lack of substantial evidence that the Soviets are planning a change in the Rumanian state. Extreme optimism is unwarranted as all of the basic elements for a clash of interests which were present at the beginning of the month are equally present today.

Accordingly I have not changed my basic opinion as reported in my telegram 42 but I believe that the surface tension has been eased by the departure of Vishinsky and the formation of a new political government.

Repeated to Moscow.

BERRY

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871.002/12-1844: Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 18, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received 10:56 p. m.]

66. Radescu Government in Cabinet session has decided to order arrest of all ministers and undersecretaries that served as Cabinet members between December 1937 and August 23, 1944.

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<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

Those to be arrested are placed in two categories :

1. Those that served between 1937 until the Gigurtu Government in June 1940 will be tried as persons responsible for preparing Rumania for war at the side of Germany. There are 32 former ministers and 28 former undersecretaries in this group.

2. Those that served from June 1940 until the coup de war are designated as war criminals and will be charged according to international law as later determined. In this group are 41 former ministers and 25 former undersecretaries.

Additionally included are 5 royal counselors under the Carol regime who participated without portfolio in the Christea Cabinet that annulled the democratic constitution and introduced the King's dictatorship.<sup>90</sup> The decision previews 131 arrests excepting 7 former ministers and undersecretaries who are refugees in Germany. The Council of Ministers has also ordered the arrest of 154 Nalists who urged war at the side of Germany and closely collaborated with the above Governments.

Present politicals affected by this law include former premier Gheorghe Tatarescu and Misrjalea<sup>91</sup> who recently merged his party with the Plowman's Front of Vice President of the Council Groza.<sup>92</sup> The full list will be forwarded by pouch.

The above step of the Radescu Government is considered significant of its intention to execute as far as possible the terms of the armistice. Repeated to Moscow.

BERRY

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871.6363/11-344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1944—8 p. m.

2848. ReEmbs 4590 and 4591 December 1. The reply of the Soviet Government to the Embassy's letters of November 10 and 28 covering the removal of petroleum equipment from Rumania does not, in the Department's opinion, answer satisfactorily the points set forth in the Department's 2629 November 8 which were transmitted to the Soviet Foreign Office in your letters. While we welcome the Soviet Government's concurrence, which is implied though not stated clearly, in the proposition that the rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry

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<sup>90</sup> Following suspension of the constitution, the King dismissed Octavian Goga as Premier and appointed Miron Christea, Patriarch of the Rumanian Orthodox Church, to head a Government of National Union on February 10, 1938; political parties had been suppressed.

<sup>91</sup> Mihail Ralea, of former dissident Socialist Peasant Party.

<sup>92</sup> Petru Groza.

is of overriding importance, the Department cannot agree that the disposition and allocation of the existing machinery and equipment necessary to carry out such rehabilitation and the decision on what equipment should be removed from the country are matters for the unilateral decision of the Soviet authorities.

The Department has received from Berry a summary account of General Schuyler's interview with Vinogradov on November 26 (reEmbs 4552, November 28). Berry, who had received from the Department the same instructions as were given to you in Department's 2629 November 8, had previously stated to Vyshinsky this Government's position on the matter of the removal of oil-field and refinery equipment from Rumania. Both Schuyler and Berry are completely informed but neither they nor the British representatives have been able to make any headway with the Soviet authorities in Rumania. Latter have declined to stop the loading and removal of equipment. Vinogradov stated he did not have authority to stop it. Vyshinsky has maintained that the equipment is war booty, a view which has been emphatically rejected by the American and British representatives. Vyshinsky has stated his agreement, however, to the principle that the Rumanian oil industry should be quickly rehabilitated.

This Government cannot accept the view expressed by Soviet officials that the equipment of American or other oil companies in Rumania may be considered as war booty under the armistice. The protocol to the Rumanian armistice, signed by Ambassador Harri-man, Clark-Kerr and Vyshinsky, specifically states in its clause no. 2 that the term "war material" used in Article 7 "shall be deemed to include all material or equipment belonging to, used by or intended for use by enemy military or para-military formations or members thereof". The purpose of this provision was to guard against any interpretation of the term "war material" as including other types of enemy property such as factories, industrial equipment and the like. The Department regards as even more unwarranted any interpretation of Article 7 which includes the property of American subsidiaries, especially fixed and essential refinery machinery, under the term "war material of Germany and her satellites".

While it may be that certain stocks of tubing brought to Rumania by the Germans are not needed for current and future operations, the information which has reached the Department from British sources and from officials of Romano-Americana indicates that the Soviets took entire stock of many important items, loss of which would have disastrous effect on Rumanian oil production. Romano-Americana officials reported that Russians had taken line pipe, well casings, tubing, drill pipe, sucker rods for pumping wells and tool joints

for drilling well, but that no inventory equipment or refinery replacement parts had been taken in the period before November 2, when loading at Romano-Americana stopped temporarily. Caserta's 1559 November 30 repeated to you as 152 indicates loading of tubing and casting was resumed on November 26.

All conversations held with Soviet officials up to the present have revealed wide disagreement as to the facts. In the Department's opinion we can hardly reach a satisfactory solution of the matter with the Soviet Government until there is available factual information compiled and agreed to by representatives of the three Allied Governments after study of the situation on the ground. The Department is arranging to send to Rumania as soon as possible a petroleum expert to serve on Berry's staff, and the War Department is assigning to General Schuyler's staff a colonel who has been associated with the petroleum industry.<sup>93</sup> They should be of service in any such investigation.

In view of the great importance of this matter, the Department desires you to take it up personally with the Soviet Government, in the manner you consider most effective. You should state this Government's firm position on the two major questions of principle involved; namely (1) the importance to the Allied war effort of the early rehabilitation of the Rumanian oil industry, using arguments set forth in Department's 2629 November 8 and (2) the obligation of the Soviet Government to respect American property interests in Rumania. Pending the examination of factual and technical findings, it would be better not to discuss the type and ownership of the goods actually taken, but if the matter is raised you should point out that reports reaching your Government indicate that essential equipment has been taken from the properties of American-owned companies. As a practical way out of the present impasse you should request that all loading and removal of equipment be stopped immediately and that the Soviet Government agree to the appointment of a tripartite commission of oil experts to survey the entire position of the Rumanian oil industry, particularly from the standpoint of production, and to state what measures are necessary for its rapid rehabilitation. Such a survey should show what materials already removed should be returned and whether there are any materials which are not needed for present operations or as replacements.

The British Embassy has made available to the Department a copy of the Foreign Office instructions on this matter to Clark-Kerr, summarized in your 4798 December 12,<sup>94</sup> and has asked whether the De-

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<sup>93</sup> Lt. Col. Henry Case Willcox.

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.



partment was sending similar instructions to you. The British argument lays considerable stress on the point that the property taken is not German but that of Rumanian companies in which British capital is heavily involved, and that the Russians have no right to confiscate such property irrespective of any question of its control by Germany during the war. The Department prefers for the present to avoid discussion of the legal question of title to the property taken and to concentrate on the question of the maintenance of production and the principle of joint rather than unilateral decisions on a matter which is of such importance to the common war effort, particularly when it involves property in which there is an American interest. Your approach to the Soviet Government should therefore be independent of the British approach.

STETTINIUS

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871.00/12-2144 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 21, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 8:15 p. m.]

69. Re my telegram 66, December 18, 3 p. m. Further details regarding Government's plan to try war criminals and those considered responsible for Rumania's entry into the war on the side of Germany have been given me by the confidential aide of General Radescu.

He stated the legal basis for these trials will be derived from the old constitution which was suspended in February 1938 and restored on August 23, 1944.

The trials will be premised upon the fact that all acts of the Government between the aforementioned dates are illegal.

Government plan is to organize a state tribunal from the members of the Court of Cassation which generally did not pass on decrees during the period of suspension of the constitution.

In preparing its list of Rumanian war criminals, Government has inquired informally whether there are Rumanians now within the country the American Government may consider as active agents of the Axis war collaborators for the purpose of adding the names of such persons to the Rumanian list. If Department has names of such persons and cares to present them an early reply would be appreciated.<sup>95</sup>

BERRY

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<sup>95</sup> In telegram 49, February 2, 1945, 4 p. m., the Department replied that it did not then have any names for submission to the Rumanian Government.

740.00119 European War 1939/12-1344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1944—9 p. m.

2875. Deptel 2727, November 23, 6 p. m., urtel 4800, December 13, noon.<sup>96</sup> We agree, of course, with the British position that since the Rumanian armistice was a tripartite agreement on the Allied side the question of valuation of reparation deliveries should be settled on a tripartite basis.

However, in view of Rumanian agreement to the use of 1938 prices as the basis of valuation, Department would not be inclined to make an issue of this point with the Soviet Government unless the agreed prices diverge greatly from currently prevailing prices.

Information so far available to Department is insufficient to permit us to form an accurate judgment as to possible consequences of the Soviet valuation formula. We are today wiring Berry at Bucharest<sup>97</sup> (repeated to you as No. 2874) to find out exactly what is meant by the term "1938 prices".

Meanwhile you are requested to withhold any representations on this question pending further instructions.

STETTINIUS

740.00119 European War 1939/12-2344 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary  
of State*

BUCHAREST, December 23, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received December 24—7:05 a. m.]

72. Remytel 22, November 23, 5 [6] p. m., third paragraph. The Director of Romano-Americana has provided me with detailed statements showing materials requisitioned by Red Army from the Baicoi and Teleajen warehouses.

Attached to the statements are a number of invoices showing the origin of the goods and the date of purchase. The director tells me that he is unable to furnish copies of all invoices as the company's papers were disbursed and partly destroyed by air raids. Nevertheless, he has provided a sufficient quantity to show clearly that the material taken was not, as claimed by Vyshinsky, German equipment sent to Rumania for reshipment to Soviet oil fields.

Inasmuch as it is unlikely that question of title to the equipment removed will be thrashed out in Bucharest, I shall appreciate instruc-

<sup>96</sup> Latter not printed; it quoted a letter of December 10 from the British Chargé in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Minister (740.00119 EW 1939/12-1344).

<sup>97</sup> Telegram 33, December 22, not printed.

tions as to whether to send to Washington or to Moscow the statements which I have received from Romano-Americana.

BERRY

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740.00119 Control (Rumania)/12-2344 : Telegram

*The American Representative in Rumania (Berry) to the Secretary of State*

BUCHAREST, December 23, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received December 24—10:35 a. m.]

73. The Soviet High Command has presented an order to the Rumanian Government in the name of the ACC which requests that it be reimbursed in goods from Rumania for the Pengo war currency printed and disbursed by the Red Army to the Rumanian troops fighting with them on Hungarian soil.

The Rumanian Government states that although the country does not have cobelligerent status with the United Nations, the number of Rumanian troops and their sacrifices beside the Red Army entitle them to equal treatment with the Soviet troops for their legitimate war expenses. It also argues that such a demand cannot be based upon the armistice since the expenses are being incurred upon foreign territory and Rumania should not be penalized because its troops are fighting beside the Soviet Army in Hungary.

Further details follow by pouch.<sup>98</sup>

BERRY

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871.6363/12-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received December 24—4:11 p. m.]

4979. In order to avoid losing time I have addressed a letter to Vyshinski in accordance with the Department's 2848, December 18, 9 [8] p. m., setting forth our Government's position on the questions involved in the Soviet removal of equipment from the premises of American oil companies in Rumania as outlined in the Department's telegram, and proposing the appointment of a tripartite commission to survey the Rumanian oil industry. Vyshinski has been ill but I will discuss this and other Rumanian matters with him as soon as he is available.

Repeated to Caserta for Berry as 64.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>98</sup> Not printed.

740.00119 European War 1939/12-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative in Rumania*  
(Berry)

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1944—8 p. m.

41. Reurtel 72 December 23, 6 p. m. Please send to Embassy in Moscow where negotiations on the subject are taking place, statements you have received from Director of Romano-Americana showing materials taken by Russians from that company's warehouses. The Department has instructed Ambassador Harriman to seek the Soviet Government's agreement to an investigation of the situation of the Rumanian petroleum industry by a Soviet-British-American Commission of experts. You may therefore wish to retain for possible use at Bucharest copies of the statements which you send to Moscow.

STETTINIUS

## SAN MARINO

### REPRESENTATIONS BY SAN MARINO REGARDING BOMBING OF ITS TERRITORY BY ALLIED PLANES; INSTRUCTIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECOGNIZING NEUTRALITY OF SAN MARINO

860A.01/7-144 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 1, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 11:05 p. m.]

2223. From Murphy.<sup>1</sup> Consul General San Marino at Rome has made representations through British Legation Holy See regarding alleged recent bombing of San Marino territory and claiming that hitherto the strictly neutral attitude of the Republic in the present conflict has been universally recognized. I would be grateful for advice as to the position of San Marino, whether or not we are at war and whether I am correct in assuming that we should not entertain representations of this nature directly from the Consul General on the grounds that the Italian Foreign Office is the proper channel of communication for matters concerning the Republic. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

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740.0011 EW 1939/6-2944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)*

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1944.

305. For Kirk.<sup>2</sup> The following telegram from Bern<sup>3</sup> is repeated for your information.

“Milan *Corriere* 28th attributes following appeal dated June 27 to San Marino Foreign Ministry.

“This morning at 11 a. m. and 1 p. m. Anglo-American aircraft in four waves bombed capital and surroundings of our small unarmed Republic which lives in peace and harmony. This sudden inexplicable bombardment, completely unjustified since our small state has maintained strictest and proven neutrality, has caused so far 35 dead many wounded and considerable property damage.

Supported by 16 centuries of glorious history of free and independent existence by moral recognition from all nations and international law which guarantees

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<sup>1</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>2</sup> Alexander C. Kirk, American representative, with rank of Ambassador, on the Advisory Council for Italy.

<sup>3</sup> Telegram 4139, June 29.

our peaceful existence and neutrality we protest against this violent act and damages sustained therefrom. Simultaneously we solemnly declare no military installations arms or ammunition depots are on our territory, no belligerent troops are stationed therein, or pass in transit, and we appeal either directly or through our Legations and Consulates by this proclamation to other neutral nations, requesting them in a spirit of mutual protection and defense, to intervene with Allied Commands toward discontinuing offensive action against Republic of San Marino'.

"Neo-Fascist editorial comment states this sharp protest proves no Axis military installations or troops are present in Republic and as usual alleged attack thereon by Allied aircraft 'arose from cold-blooded desire to bomb and destroy without considering most elementary rules of international rights'".

HULL

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860A.01/7-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1944—2 p. m.

324. For Kirk. Murphy has reported that the Consul General of San Marino at Rome has made representations through the British Legation to the Holy See regarding the alleged recent bombing of San Marino. He inquired concerning the position of San Marino and whether we should entertain representations of this nature directly from the Consul General or through the Italian Foreign Office.

The Department repeated to him its recent telegram to you <sup>4</sup> concerning the relations of San Marino with the United States and United Kingdom. He was further informed that prior to the outbreak of war the American Consul at Florence has traditionally been the United States representative to the Republic of San Marino. Since the Republic of San Marino has been generally recognized by this Government as an independent state (see extradition treaty between U.S. and San Marino, proclaimed June 12, 1908 <sup>5</sup>) the Department knows of no reason why we should not entertain representations directly from the accredited representative of the Republic.

HULL

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860A.01/7-144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1944—3 p. m.

2128. For Murphy. Your 2223 July 1, 3 p. m. In reply to a question of ACC <sup>6</sup> concerning the relations of the Republic of San Marino

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<sup>4</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>5</sup> Signed January 10, 1906; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1908, p. 710.

<sup>6</sup> Allied Control Commission for Italy.

with the US and UK Governments the Department sent the following telegram <sup>7</sup> to Kirk:

*Paraphrase:* In connection with the repatriation of consular personnel in this country, the Government of San Marino on January 29, 1942 informed the Swiss Government that it was not "in a state of war with U.S. America" and that for this reason it could not assume the expense of repatriation. A telegram of February 6, 1942 <sup>8</sup> from the Legation at Bern conveyed this information to the Department. The Department has held that a state of war does not exist between Republic San Marino and the U.S. on the basis of this official notification and lack of other information to the contrary. Concerning the United Kingdom, the Government of San Marino transmitted a message to the British Government through US facilities, during the time the United States was protecting British interests in Italy, to the effect that the Republic of San Marino had not declared war on the United Kingdom. The British Foreign Office can undoubtedly confirm the receipt of this communication. *End of paraphrase.*

Prior to the outbreak of war the American Consul at Florence has traditionally been the United States representative to the Republic of San Marino. Since the Republic of San Marino has been generally recognized by this Government as an independent state (see extradition treaty between U.S. and San Marino, proclaimed June 12, 1908), the Department knows of no reason why we should not entertain representations directly from the accredited representative of the Republic.

Please inform Tittmann <sup>9</sup> of the above and report details surrounding alleged bombing of the City of San Marino.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/7-744 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Lawton) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 7, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received 6:03 p. m.]

2307. From Murphy. The CinC <sup>10</sup> has requested advice at the instance of General Eaker <sup>11</sup> regarding the status of the Republics of San Marino and Andorra and the Principalities of Monaco and Liechtenstein. General Eaker is particularly desirous of knowing

<sup>7</sup> Telegram 306, July 4.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram 426, not printed.

<sup>9</sup> Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

<sup>10</sup> Commander in Chief, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower.

<sup>11</sup> Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, U.S. Army, Air Commander in Chief of Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

whether German troops and matériel passing through those states could be attacked from the air. Admiral Cunningham<sup>12</sup> also points out that Monaco is of capital importance because in addition to the port it is on the main road and railroad from Italy to France. Department's guidance is requested. [Murphy.]

LAWTON

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860A.01/7-944 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Lawton) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 9, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received July 10—1:30 p. m.]

2345. From Murphy. I have informed SAC<sup>13</sup> and MAAF<sup>14</sup> of substance your 2128 July 7, 3 p. m. I should appreciate your confirmation whether Department concurs in view of British Foreign Office stated in a telegram just received by British Resident Minister<sup>15</sup> that if territory of San Marino is being used by enemy there is no reason to abstain from military action against it.

The Foreign Office cable further states that as regards action to be taken when Allied armies arrive on frontier of San Marino and when it becomes included in area of liberated Italy the British Government consider that Allied Military Government should only be set up if local government has ceased to exist or is clearly a puppet of the enemy and if a neutral government cannot be got to function.

Sent to Department, repeated as 39 to Naples. [Murphy.]

LAWTON

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860A.01/7-1044 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, July 10, 1944—11 a. m.  
[Received 3:01 p. m.]

374. From Kirk. British High Commissioner for Italy<sup>16</sup> has now informed ACC (Department's 306, July 4<sup>17</sup>) that Great Britain has never declared war on San Marino but has not formally recognized its neutrality. Foreign Office, therefore, considers that treatment of San Marino should depend on whether it is still independent and neutral or has puppet government set up by Germans or Fascist

<sup>12</sup> Adm. John Henry Dacres Cunningham, British Allied Naval Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>13</sup> Supreme Allied Commander.

<sup>14</sup> Mediterranean Allied Air Force.

<sup>15</sup> Harold Macmillan.

<sup>16</sup> Sir Noel Charles.

<sup>17</sup> See telegram 2128, July 7, 3 p. m., to Algiers, and footnote 7, pp. 291 and 292, respectively.



Italians and whether its territory is being used by them for military purposes. Foreign Office also considers that AMG<sup>18</sup> should be set up in San Marino only if local government has ceased to exist or is clearly enemy puppet and if neutral government cannot be got to function.

In reply to inquiry from Acting Chief Commissioner ACC<sup>19</sup> as to attitude of American Government in premises, I have informed him of statement contained in Department's 306, July 4 to effect that Department has considered that a state of war does not exist between the United States and San Marino and in Department's 324, July 7 that the United States has generally recognized San Marino as an independent state, and added that I was not in a position to state my Government's views on additional points raised in foregoing communication of British High Commissioner.

As this entire question has been handled in Rome I have been transmitting paraphrases of Department's messages referred to above and copy of Department's 305, July 4, to Tittmann and Reber<sup>20</sup> in Rome.

Repeated to Algiers. [Kirk.]

BRANDT

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740.0011 EW 1939/7-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Lawton)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944—9 p. m.

2162. The following refers to Murphy's 2307, July 7, and is being repeated to Kirk.

The status of San Marino was described in the Department's 2128, July 7. Neither the Republic of Andorra nor Principality of Liechtenstein has been occupied or used by the enemy as far as is known. Therefore, they have the same neutral status as Spain and Switzerland which they respectively border. If the neutrality of any of these states is violated by the enemy, the military authorities must of course take whatever counter-measures are required. However, you should impress upon them the highly unfortunate repercussions of any unwarranted attack.

Monaco has been considered enemy-occupied territory since November 1942.

HULL

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<sup>18</sup> Allied Military Government.

<sup>19</sup> Capt. Ellery Stone, U.S.N.R.

<sup>20</sup> Samuel Reber, Vice President of Political Section, Allied Control Commission for Italy.

860A.01/7-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative to the Provisional Government of the French Republic at Algiers (Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1944—2 p. m.

2192. For Murphy. Your 2345, July 9, 9 p. m. Department agrees with Foreign Office that AMG should not be established within the Republic of San Marino unless the local Government has ceased to exist and if a neutral government cannot be made to function.

Sent to Algiers, repeated to Naples for Kirk with reference to his 374, July 10, 11 a. m.

HULL

740.0011 E.W. 1939/7-1344 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1944—3 p. m.

A-5. Department's 305, July 4, summarizing Bern's 4139, June 29. The following is Bern's 4459 of July 13:

"Communication addressed to me by San Marino Consulate General in Bern dated July 3, 1944, stated it was presenting to me personally, under instructions from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, accompanying note from its government protesting against bombardment of San Marino June 26. Approach to me I was told was due to temporary absence of representative of San Marino in the United States.

"Note which is signed by Secretary of State and dated June 26, 1944, is in translation identical with quotation in my 4139, June 29.

"Covering communication from Consulate General added that it had also been directed to bring following particulars to my attention:

"(A) Signs worded as follows: 'Neutral state of republic San Marino—German troops forbidden to transit or to stop here' have been posted at frontier by German Command at instance of this Secretariat. No German unit has ever entered Republic, no armored or military vehicle has ever passed through here and there is no installation here of military character.

"(B) In governmental organization political imprint is now that of concentration of group of good citizens carrying on work of conservation inspired by Republic's democratic traditions. German Command and Italian Government itself noting strictly neutral attitude of our small state have never requested or counseled any act or proposal incompatible therewith.

"(C) Neutrality San Marino duly notified to all belligerent nations and no exception was taken thereto. In fact some episodes may be cited in confirmation thereof: burial with solemn honor of two English aviators who perished in flying accident and fell on our territory.

"(D) Once more collectively carrying out mission in most critical period of humanity San Marino has generously opened its heart and

doors to thousands upon thousands of women and children from cities along Adriatic seaboard severely hit by war so much so that it can be considered a large community of sufferers taken into hospitals private homes and public centers.

“(E) Any repetition of bombing would cause great harm to unarmed persons who have already greatly suffered from misfortune, without any pretense of striking anything of military character.”

Inform Murphy.

HULL

## SPAIN

### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN ON CERTAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES<sup>1</sup>

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1221 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 4, 1944—noon.

[Received January 5—9 : 24 p. m.]

13. My 3637, December 10, 11 p. m.<sup>2</sup> I reminded Jordana<sup>3</sup> yesterday that no reply had been received to my memorandum proposing a wolfram embargo.<sup>4</sup> He said matter was very complicated with a number of different Government departments involved. Without undertaking to cover the whole matter he wished to call my attention to two aspects, one economic and the other political.

Many private interests involved in wolfram production were exerting utmost influence. Public Treasury likewise involved and Minister of Finance alarmed at prospect. Ministry of Industry Commerce vitally concerned. Germany was now getting only one-third wolfram production and our proposal would involve stopping practically entire production in order to deprive Germany of that one-third.

On political side he said Washington forgets that for considerable months past Spain has been actively and effectively cooperating with Allies. There had been a steady change in our direction. He referred then to declaration of neutrality, evacuation of French refugees, non-recognition of Mussolini regime and improvement in press. He said all these and other things had been accomplished in face of German protests and despite presence of large German forces still on Spain's northern border. Spain has continued to give favors to us without obtaining adequate compensation. It was too much of a one-way traffic with Spain giving all and receiving little or nothing. He said Washington forgets also that Spain is playing an important role as an impregnable barrier between Germans in Pyrenees and Gibraltar and North Africa.

<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence on matters pertaining to Spanish neutrality, negotiations regarding wolfram embargo, petroleum shipments, and internment of Italian warships, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 595 ff., pp. 632 ff., pp. 668 ff., and pp. 711 ff., respectively.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 664.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>4</sup> Apparently reference is to a memorandum presented to Jordana on November 18, 1943; see telegram 3398, November 18, 1943, from Madrid, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 656.

Our extended lines of communication could have broken and could still be broken if Spain really moved with Germany. Instead Spain has maintained neutrality and is determined to resist any German aggression. Yet we keep asking for more and more. There is too much pressure from the United States. There is always a limit. Spain has to hold some trumps in her own hand. If Spain is going to preserve real neutrality and stay out of the war, it has to consider both sides. An embargo on wolfram would mean a break with Germany because Germany would not tolerate it.

I reminded the Minister that our wolfram proposal was aimed at saving Spanish economy from the extremely grave crisis which would overtake it when we should suddenly cease our wolfram purchases. Wolfram trade was extraordinarily abnormal and not a proper base for really healthy Spanish economy. I called his attention again to points in my memorandum which I was prepared to discuss with him.

On political side I recognized fully, and I knew my Government recognized, certain things that Spain had done. However, all these things were in Spain's interest. They were not favors to the United Nations. Nor could I let pass his statement that these things had been done without compensating favors. Despite the fact that all our resources, and, in close cooperation with other American countries, all resources of America were being applied to our war effort, we and other American Republics had made real sacrifices in making petroleum available to Spain. The improvement in Spanish economy would have been impossible without this petroleum. I said further that it was only because of our military victories that Spain had been enabled to recover its independence. Otherwise Spain would be nothing more than a German province. Under the circumstances Spain was profiting greatly from United Nation's war effort both politically and economically and it was about time it did something positive to show its gratitude. The one-way traffic he had referred to was moving in the opposite direction from that he implied.

The Minister said that when reports from other agencies received he would frame a counter-proposal and submit it to me.

HAYES

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865.30/73 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 4, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received January 5—9:40 a. m.]

17. My 13, January 4 noon and 14, January 4, 1 p. m.<sup>5</sup> As reported in my 15, January 4, 2 p. m.<sup>6</sup> Jordana was greatly troubled during

<sup>5</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>6</sup> Not printed.

my conversation with him yesterday. He gave me the impression of arguing without conviction. With specific reference to Italian warships his statement that there was no clear legal basis for release does not correspond to a report received by me that Foreign Office experts have recommended in favor of release of warships, nor to statement by high Foreign Office official weeks ago that Jordana wanted to release the warships one at a time.

Beaulac<sup>7</sup> discussed with Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs<sup>8</sup> last Friday<sup>9</sup> most subjects I discussed with Jordana yesterday and Under Secretary made careful notes to furnish Jordana in as much as Jordana was going to see Franco<sup>10</sup> that afternoon. It was clear that Jordana was going to discuss these matters with Franco and this probably explains why Jordana postponed my interview with him scheduled first for last Thursday.

It seems evident to me, therefore, that Jordana yesterday was reflecting Franco's attitude rather than his own. I relate this in turn to reports reaching me recently that Franco is impressed by German resistance in Italy and by German recovery of Dodecanese Islands, that he still believes war will be a long one and that he has predicted it will end in 1946 through negotiated peace. I believe he is continuing to try to steer a middle course without unduly antagonizing either side.

So long as our economic supplies to Spain particularly of petroleum are furnished as nearly automatically as at present I fear that he will continue to believe that he can maintain his present attitude without penalty from us.

As a concrete means of making the Spanish Government more immediately conscious of its economic dependence on us and of thereby influencing its attitude toward important matters now under discussion or which may arise in the future I make the following recommendation:

That I be instructed to inform Spanish Petroleum Commissar through Mr. Walter Smith<sup>11</sup> that for reasons directly connected with our war effort February loadings of Spanish tankers have to be suspended.

Count Jordana will undoubtedly ask my assistance in arranging for loadings and I shall inform him courteously that while I shall do what I can the Spanish Government by failing to comply with pending reasonable requests has placed me in a very difficult position so far as

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<sup>7</sup> Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

<sup>8</sup> José Pan de Soraluce.

<sup>9</sup> December 31, 1943.

<sup>10</sup> Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

<sup>11</sup> Petroleum Attaché at the Embassy in Spain.

influencing my Government was concerned. I shall urge him of course to comply with those requests.

I recommend also that we give consideration to suspending later loadings if first suspensions do not produce desired results.

I consider it essential that during the period to come I maintain the most cordial personal relations with Spanish officials and that Department maintain cordial personal relations with Cárdenas.<sup>12</sup>

I have given this matter earnest thought over a long period of time and I can think of the following possible risks: (1) that the dates of loadings to be suspended might in fact coincide with some impending military operation which we would not care to reveal; (2) that the Spaniards in retaliation might give Germans increased facilities for purchasing strategic materials; (3) that Spaniards might retaliate in a military way or give special military facilities to the Germans or withdraw certain military facilities now being given to us such as prompt release of our aviators; (4) that Spaniards will withhold from the British supplies of interest to the latter.

While risk 1 will have to be estimated by our military authorities my considered opinion is that risk 3 can be largely discounted.

I believe on the other hand that the setup proposed is needed in order to impress the Council of Ministers and Franco with Spain's direct economic dependence on us and with the direct relationship between that dependence and our military effort.

I repeat that during the period to come we should maintain the most cordial relations with the Spaniards both here and in Washington.

I have not communicated this concrete proposal to British Ambassador.<sup>13</sup> However, it will be seen from my 3822, December 29,<sup>14</sup> that the British Ambassador believes that economic pressure if applied at all should be delayed in order that it may coincide with military operations to the north. I disagree in this. I believe that such pressure in order to be of greatest possible utility to us in our war effort should precede our actual invasion of Western Europe especially since the direct effects which we may bring about will not be felt for some time.

I have in mind the other possibility that our initial military effort against the Continent may not proceed as rapidly as we might wish. If our use of economic pressure coincided with instead of preceded any unexpected obstacle in the carrying out of our military plans the risks to us would be greater than they are now when by reason largely of the much greater freedom with which the Spanish press

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<sup>12</sup> Juan Francisco de Cárdenas, Spanish Ambassador.

<sup>13</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

is publishing news of Allied war activities the Spanish Government and public although perhaps not General Franco are today impressed with the vastness of our military preparations and probability that they will eventually bring us victory.

This very impression which the Spanish Government and public have will make it appear entirely natural for us to have to suspend certain loadings of Spanish tankers and it is for this reason especially that we not delay longer in carrying this plan into effect.

I request that prompt and serious consideration be given to this definite recommendation of mine and that I be informed of our Government's decision.

HAYES

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865.30/73 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 18, 1944—8 p. m.

135. 1. Department has not yet received views of Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning recommendation made in your no. 17 of January 4. We are pressing for urgent reply.<sup>15</sup>

2. Department considers it desirable and appropriate, even in the absence of the views of the military, to refuse the loading on February 11 and 12 of the *Campas*, *Campero* and *Gerona* (your 61, 102 and 135 of January 10, 13, and 16, respectively<sup>16</sup>). We do not feel that any explanation should be given to the Spaniards for this action at this time. Please have Smith advise the Spaniards that these particular loadings cannot be approved. If Smith or anyone in the Embassy is asked for reasons, they can simply say that they have received no further instructions. If Jordana asks your assistance, you should take the line suggested in your no. 17 of January 4.

3. With respect to the *Campilo* loading, nominated in your 76 of January 11,<sup>17</sup> no formal approval can as yet be given. We are awaiting approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Swiss request for laying down additional bunkers at Lisbon, which we hope to obtain momentarily.

HULL

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<sup>15</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff in a letter of January 27, 1944, to Secretary Hull, stated that they had no objections to the course of action proposed (852.6363/-1283).

<sup>16</sup> None printed.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.



711.52/313a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944—11 p. m.

204. The Spanish Ambassador is expected to call at the Department tomorrow to inquire about tanker suspensions. He will be told that our whole economic policy toward his country is under reconsideration in the light of recent tendencies; while this country has supported and is prepared to continue to support Spanish economy, it is in the expectation of a cooperative response on Spain's part. We have been able to develop an effective economic program which latterly has operated almost automatically. Against this an evident reluctance has been noticeable lately on Spain's part to satisfy requests we deem both reasonable and important. The new financial arrangement with Germany<sup>18</sup> threatens our economic warfare program, and we have had no satisfaction concerning our request for a wolfram embargo. We are discouraged with these developments and wonder whether for the sake of Spain's economy we are justified in continuing our sacrifices while Spain continues to immobilize Italian ships, while German agents remain active throughout Spanish territory, while a belligerent attitude continues to be evidenced by the presence of some portion of a Blue Division on the Eastern Front,<sup>19</sup> and while Spain furnishes Germany a right to expect a revival of imports from Spain. We feel that the Spanish Government should give to our problems and to that of Spain's international position its most urgent and most earnest consideration while we examine the overall relations between Spain and the United States. We feel that it definitely is in Spain's interest to render the fullest possible cooperation to the United Nations. The wolfram embargo, for instance, need not raise a question involving Spain's neutrality if applied impartially. Moreover the Spanish Government cannot say that such an embargo would harm Spanish economy. This is no normal trade or industrial activity and the wolfram market will collapse the moment we withdraw. Wolfram activity has been created by our active competitive buying. The interest of Spain should be to prick this bubble at once and attend to the traditional trade of Spain with the United States, having in view a sound economy and postwar trade. Later on such an embargo will have no interest for us, and we require it now. The net result of further delay on Spain's part will be damage to the normal trade and other prospects of Spain. As the Spanish Government has sometimes stated, there are involved political considerations of extreme importance, but

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<sup>18</sup> Spain had extended Germany liberal credit facilities.

<sup>19</sup> For correspondence relating to concern of the United States over Spain's maintaining the Blue Division on the Eastern Front, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 613-627, *passim*.

the Spanish Government seems to have in mind a problem of deterring Germany from aggression against Spain, while we look toward the long range interests of that country after Germany's defeat.

You should watch the internal situation with unusual attention at this time and report currently any important developments.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1230 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944—midnight.

205. The Department and FEA<sup>20</sup> have considered Embassy's no. 155 of January 18 and 198 of January 21 and also British Arfar no. 64 of January 18.<sup>21</sup> We have not cleared the following views with the British Embassy here, but we attach such importance to limiting the movement of wolfram to the enemy that we do not wish to withhold instructions to you while attempting to clear the matter with the British in Washington. However, the British Embassy here has been advised of the contents of this telegram and will wire London urgently.

The following are the views of the Department and FEA as to the course of action to be pursued:

1. It is, of course, impossible at this time to foresee precisely what action the Spanish authorities will eventually take upon our demand for a wolfram embargo. It is consequently felt that we must proceed, for the time being at least, upon the assumption that there will be no embargo and that all-out preemption is our only course.

2. Accordingly, it is considered by the Department and FEA to be extremely important that every endeavor be made by the USCC<sup>22</sup> and UKCC<sup>23</sup> staffs to purchase or otherwise tie up all available wolfram at least during the course of the next 2 or 3 months, utilizing all available resources immediately for this purpose and increasing prices to such extent as you consider necessary.

3. We do not feel in a position to give you instructions as to the precise methods to be pursued and prefer to leave the tactics to your discretion. In order to extend your limited peseta availments to the maximum, we suggest that you utilize to the fullest extent blocked sterling and dollars and also where necessary the special commodity.

4. You may also in your discretion use the threat of blacklisting against Fierro and such other producers as you desire. Please telegraph your recommendations on this point.

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<sup>20</sup> Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>21</sup> None printed.

<sup>22</sup> United States Commercial Company.

<sup>23</sup> United Kingdom Commercial Corporation.

5. It would appear highly desirable to have arrangements made to move the wolfram to shipping points as quickly as possible.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1237: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 26, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received January 27—2:22 a. m.]

241. Last evening the British Ambassador addressed a note to Foreign Minister, the substance of which is that in recent conversation regarding wolfram the latter had stated no decision had been reached by Spanish Government as to the allocation of the pesetas to be placed at disposal of the German Government and that wolfram would be one of the principal questions which the British Ambassador would discuss with General Franco during the expected interview on Friday next.<sup>24</sup> While awaiting an answer to the British and American notes, the Ambassador learned to his consternation that a contract was to be signed today for the sale of the total of this year's output of the Santa Comba mine, about 120 tons monthly, to the German Government. The Ambassador stated he felt certain that the Minister would agree that if such a contract were to be signed, any attempt the Ambassador might make to avoid a most serious crisis between Spain and Great Britain would be doomed to failure. See my 236, January 26, 1 p. m.<sup>25</sup>

The British Ambassador is to see the Foreign Minister this evening. I am seeing the Minister tomorrow.

HAYES

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852.6363/1262: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 27, 1944—7 p. m.

219. Your 235, January 26 and your 195, January 21.<sup>26</sup> You are authorized to notify Spaniards that February 21 and 22 loadings have been suspended.

HULL

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<sup>24</sup> January 28.

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Neither printed

711.52/316 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 27, 1944—8 p. m.  
 [Received January 28—2:41 a. m.]

257. Jordana today denied that the Spanish Government had made any decision concerning the manner in which the Germans may spend the pesetas made available to them for the debt settlement.

He said that he was preparing a counter-proposal to our request for a wolfram embargo. He trusted that a prompt solution of the wolfram problem could be found, especially if we were willing to supply Spain with armaments.

I asked him to arrange for the Germans to be denied export permits for wolfram pending the conclusion of our negotiations. He said he would do what he could along these lines. He said he hoped rapid progress could be made also toward the solution of other pending problems.

I made clear that if our problems were not solved our whole economic policy toward Spain would have to be reconsidered. He did not mention petroleum to me but complained that radio and press attacks, especially from Great Britain, were making it particularly difficult for him to obtain much-needed collaboration from his colleagues. See my 256, January 27, 7 p. m.<sup>27</sup>

HAYES

711.52/317 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 28, 1944—5 p. m.  
 [Received January 29—12:07 p. m.]

272. My 256, January 27, 7 p. m.<sup>27</sup> The BBC<sup>28</sup> is increasing the violence of its attacks on Spain in broadcasts in several languages. I am informed also that the American radio has now announced the suspension of petroleum shipments to Spain.

I should like to remind the Department that the Embassy's plan for obtaining a modification in the attitude of the Spanish Government toward several matters we have placed before it did not include public pressure on Spain, and was predicated on the maintenance of friendly relations with the Spanish authorities.

By far our strongest weapon is the economic weapon. Whether or not we continue our public attacks on Spain, it will be the economic

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.<sup>28</sup> British Broadcasting Corporation.

question which will bring about a modification of the Spanish Government's attitude, if such modification is possible.

Public attacks on Spain, if continued, may provoke resistance to our requests on the part of the Spanish Government, and retard the attainment of our objectives, and if continued long enough may lead to the overthrow of this regime.

It is at least possible that an attempt to overthrow the regime, even if successful, might be followed by civil war, and that that, in turn, might create a military diversion which would not fit in with our other military plans in Europe.

I have several times informed the Department that the Germans are endeavoring through such incidents as those in Valencia and Zaragoza <sup>30</sup> to bring about a crisis in Spain's relations with the United Nations. The Germans doubtless consider that such a crisis would improve their position in Spain.

To the extent that this may be true, we would seem to be playing into German hands by ourselves taking the initiative in giving wide publicity to the crisis which actually exists, but which we believe can be overcome to our advantage if the plan submitted in my 17, January 4, 4 p. m. is strictly adhered to.

I continue to believe, in present circumstances, that our relations with Spain should be discussed through diplomatic channels and not over the radio.

If, of course, the United Nations wish to overthrow the present regime in Spain and are prepared to take advantage of conditions which may develop as a result of such overthrow, then the present public campaign combined with our economic pressure may be the best means to attain that end.

However, this is a military question of prime importance, and I hope we and the British will make sure that the military have very clearly in mind the possible results of the present public campaign against Spain in connection with their attitude toward that campaign.

MA <sup>31</sup> agrees. Repeated to London and Lisbon.

HAYES

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<sup>30</sup> Reference is to acts of sabotage by enemy agents operating in these two cities, such as explosions among cargoes of oranges and onions caused by time-bombs placed by these agents.

<sup>31</sup> Military Attaché.

711.52/326a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1944.

238. Following press release was issued last night :

"The loadings of Spanish tankers with petroleum products for Spain have been suspended through action of the State Department, pending a reconsideration of trade and general relations between Spain and the United States in the light of trends in Spanish policy. The Spanish Government has shown a certain reluctance to satisfy requests deemed both reasonable and important by the State Department, and concerning which representations have continuously been addressed to the Spanish Government for some time past. Certain Italian warships and merchant vessels continue interned in Spanish ports, Spain continues to permit the export to Germany of certain vital war materials such as wolfram, Axis agents are active both in continental Spain and in Spanish African territory as well as in Tangier, some portion of the Blue Division appears still involved in the war against one of our allies, and reports have been received indicating the conclusion of a financial arrangement between the Spanish Government and Germany designed to make available to Germany substantial peseta credits which Germany unquestionably expects to apply to augmenting espionage and sabotage in Spanish territory and to intensifying opposition to us in the Peninsula.

"This action has been taken after consultation and agreement with the British Government."

HULL

711.52/326b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1944—midnight.

254. Department's 204, January 25, 11 p. m. Ambassador Cárdenas called on January 26 and was received by Mr. Taft <sup>32</sup> with Labouisse <sup>33</sup> and George <sup>34</sup> present. He asked the meaning of the tanker suspensions. Mr. Taft replied that we were reconsidering our entire economic policy toward his country. We had sustained and proposed to continue to sustain Spanish economy, but we expected a cooperative attitude toward our desires in return. An effective program had been developed by us which operated more or less automatically. Cárdenas said he and Foreign Minister Jordana had worked hard for this. Mr. Labouisse recalled that whereas formerly tankers had been subjected to considerable delays, these delays had been eliminated. The Spanish Government had shown an evident reluctance, Mr. Taft said, in deal-

<sup>32</sup> Charles P. Taft, Director, Office of Wartime Economic Affairs.

<sup>33</sup> Henry R. Labouisse, Jr., Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division.

<sup>34</sup> W. Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

ing with requests we considered reasonable and important. When Cárdenas inquired what he referred to, mention was made of (a) Italian ships, (b) continuing activity of German espionage and sabotage, (c) Blue Division, of which some part seemed to remain on the eastern front, (d) request for wolfram embargo, (e) financial arrangement with Germany, (f) the prospect of revival of German imports from Spain.

The tankers have been suspended, Mr. Taft said, because of discouragement here in this Government's efforts to obtain Spanish action. He thought the most earnest consideration should be given by Spain to our problems and to Spain's international position following defeat of Germany. In reviewing its policy toward Spain this Government is convinced it is strongly in the long term interest of Spain to cooperate and that the only result of further temporization would be to harm Spain's normal trade and other prospects. Mr. Taft mentioned occasional references of the Spanish Government to political considerations involved, and said that while these might exist we had in mind rather Spain's long term interests following the defeat of Germany. Cárdenas asked what political considerations Mr. Taft referred to, and the latter said the Spanish Government apparently was apprehensive for German attacks, although these seemed to him unlikely in the present military situation. When Cárdenas referred again to the German threat, Mr. Taft inquired whether there was specific information of any prospective attacks. Cárdenas replied in the negative.

Cárdenas then said he was placed in an impossible situation by the position taken by us, and could only resign and go home. Both Mr. Taft and Mr. George said any such decision would be deeply regretted here. Cárdenas said he and Jordana had directed their entire efforts toward furthering our cause and that he was convinced everything had been done that Spain's security permitted. He was sure his Government felt as he did, and that this decision of the United States signified the complete failure of all the Foreign Minister and he had attempted, and that both would have to resign. Mr. Taft reiterated his hope that no such step would be taken.

HULL

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711.52/321a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1944—midnight.

750. Personal for the Ambassador. Your 722, January 27, 2 p. m. and 768, January 28, 2 p. m.<sup>35</sup> The Department does not understand

<sup>35</sup> Neither printed.

the suggestion that statements reporting suspension of oil shipments to Spain may run counter to united economic front theory regarding Spain. The British Government clearly has been in agreement as to this action and has in fact proposed, in its telegram of January 22 to Lord Halifax,<sup>36</sup> that additional measures be taken to create serious administrative delays in granting Spain import facilities generally except in foodstuffs, such commodities as are already subject to limitations satisfactory to us, and imports from Spanish territory outside the Peninsula.

If it is your thought that Mr. Eden<sup>37</sup> is rather disturbed from the publicity angle, you may state that we have worked as closely as possible with the British Embassy here, keeping it as promptly informed of developments as has been possible. We furnished the Embassy in advance a summary of a statement which it was proposed to make to the Spanish Ambassador here on January 26. This statement was unavoidable because of Spanish pressure in Madrid and Washington to ascertain reasons for suspensions. As soon as this necessity became apparent the British Embassy was informed of the proposed statement. The Embassy was subsequently told the statement had been made. The British Embassy inquired on Thursday night last<sup>38</sup> whether the Department contemplated issuing a release. The answer was in the negative. The following morning when it developed that the story had substantially reached our press and that it would be the part of common prudence to issue a rational statement the British Embassy was informed that the Department intended to issue a statement at the noon press conference on Friday. The release was not made until Friday night, however, but in the course of the afternoon the Embassy was handed the text of a proposed release. Immediately following the release, the Embassy was informed that the release had been made.

At the moment of making the release the Embassy expressed its wish that the British Government be associated in the release with the action taken. This wish was gladly complied with.

HULL

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711.52/321 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 30, 1944—noon.

[Received January 31—6:38 a. m.]

293. The Foreign Minister summoned me to the Foreign Office last night. He said that within the last 24 hours some very important

<sup>36</sup> British Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>37</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>38</sup> January 27.



news has been received in Spain over the radio from London and from New York about a decision taken by the United States to cancel petroleum shipments to Spain throughout February and for an indefinite term thereafter. This news has come as a terrible shock to him and to the Spanish Government. Mr. Ackerman<sup>39</sup> had recently indicated to the Foreign Office that there might be some technical difficulty about the loadings of petroleum products in the early part of the coming month. At midday today, however, the Minister had learned over the radio that the loading schedule for February 21 and 22 would be the first of a series of loadings to be suspended by the American Government. He would remind me that as recently as last Thursday<sup>40</sup> I had had a long talk with him in the course of which I had said that I feared the result on the American economic program of Spanish delays in meeting our requests, that the economic program of the United States was based on reciprocity by Spain and that we would have to reconsider our economic program if our reasonable requests were not met. At the same time I had made a personal appeal to the Minister for favorable attention to our request about wolfram. He had then given explanations to the effect that Spain was very anxious to meet our wishes in the matter and that he was preparing a memorandum which he hoped very shortly to submit to me. I had seemed satisfied with the explanation and expressed the desire to receive the memorandum in the near future. He imagined therefore that negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily to both parties concerned.

Now very suddenly my Government was adopting extreme measures. He could not hide from me the terrible disillusionment and disappointment on the part of the Spanish Government and on the part of what he was sure was Spanish public opinion. As personally responsible for Spanish foreign policy he was much upset and felt that a bitter disappointment about the kind of statements now made over the American radio. The worst part was that this kind of publicity made it harder to arrive at a mutually satisfactory conclusion of negotiations. In the first place it involved a threat against Spain's economic well-being and development, consequences of which would be felt by all classes all over the country. Secondly, in my conversation with him last Thursday I had given him no real warning of what impended in Washington. I had talked about the possibility of a reconsideration of American economic policy toward Spain. Thirdly, we were now advertising to the world a prospective action against Spain without informing the Spanish Government in advance that we contemplated any such action. Fourthly, the putting of our public

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<sup>39</sup> Ralph H. Ackerman, Commercial Attaché in Spain.

<sup>40</sup> January 27.

threat into practice would be bound to effect a profound change in the relations between the two countries. Finally he must remind me that Spain had had formal guarantee from the United States at the time of our landing in North Africa<sup>41</sup> which Spain took seriously and which the present action of the United States placed in doubt.

He begged me to think carefully and closely and thoroughly about the whole situation thus newly created and about Spanish public opinion concerning it. Within the last few months Spain has been better prepared than ever before to act in strict accordance with a real neutrality, and yet just at the moment when this is reaching fruition Spain is attacked by propaganda from America and England. I must understand that the Minister himself is in a very difficult situation. All along he has been pro-Allied and now he must bear the brunt of Allied attacks upon his policy, so that exactly the opposite result will follow from what we desire.

The Minister can think of no better German-Axis propaganda than what the American and British radios are now giving out. It is bound to create hostility to the Allies in Spain and to be exploited by Axis propaganda as positive proof to the world as to how impossible it is for a neutral country to have any fair or normal dealings with the United Nations.

Spain, the Minister knows, is ready to fulfill all the duties of strict neutrality yet it becomes very difficult for the Minister to fight and win out in the battle within Spain for strict neutrality inasmuch as certain private economic circles that are critical of him will now be able to discredit him and the policy he has been pursuing.

The Minister fears very much that everything he explains will not be properly appreciated by my Government but he feels it a duty laid upon him by his conscience to explain the situation and to give frank warning. Without his frankness and sense of loyalty and his knowledge of his country and its attitude of mind we might be unaware of the solemn fact that the mutual relations between the United States and Spain are certain to be seriously affected by the recent radio news. He would appreciate my giving him whatever information I possess concerning the truth of the radio reports and any details I may have concerning the proposals of my Government in order that if no more petroleum supplies are to be furnished to Spain the proper authorities here may issue public instructions accordingly.

I then replied to the Foreign Minister along the following lines. Firstly, I reminded him that according to existing procedure there

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<sup>41</sup> For text of President Roosevelt's message to General Franco on November 8, 1942, assuring Franco that the invasion of North Africa, beginning that day, was in no way directed against the Government of Spain, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 14, 1942, p. 906; for correspondence concerning the invasion, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. II, pp. 429 ff.

were three loadings of petroleum products in the Caribbean for Spain every month, the first on the 1st or 2nd of the month, the second on the 11th and 12th and the third on the 21st and 22nd. The first of these loadings for the coming month of February had been suspended solely for technical reasons because a preliminary notification of the nomination of tankers had not been made by the Spanish authorities and that this was the loading undoubtedly to which Mr. Ackerman had referred. Subsequently we had received word from Washington that the second loading scheduled for February 11th-12th had been suspended but we had not been informed why. When I had talked with the Foreign Minister on Thursday I did not know that the third loading scheduled for February 21st-22nd had been suspended. It was only the next day, Friday, yesterday, that I had received word to this effect and it had been immediately communicated to the proper Spanish authorities. It was true consequently that all February loadings were suspended. I was without any instructions from Washington about these being the first of any later series of suspensions and I assumed therefore that February suspensions were temporary and did not necessarily mean any permanent cancellation of our petroleum or other economic program with Spain. Further I stated that Doffing<sup>42</sup> had recently arrived in Spain to discuss with Smith petroleum program for Spain for first half 1944. Hitherto it had been customary for Smith to go to Washington to arrange each 6-month petroleum program but this year Doffing, a representative of State Department, had come to Spain to arrange it. Consequently I assumed the Department had no intention of cancelling general petroleum program for 1944 and that suspension of it in month of February was special. I supposed it might be possible if other arrangements were satisfactory to make up for losses to Spain through suspension in February of correspondingly larger shipments in March or April.

Nevertheless I must emphasize importance of these other arrangements to which I had just referred. I must remind the Minister that during past 3 months my Government had been making urgent and repeated requests of Spanish Government which were deemed thoroughly reasonable as well as important and in strict keeping with Spanish neutrality and which, however, Spanish Government had constantly delayed in granting. These requests included embargo on wolfram or submission of any counter-proposal about it; release of Italian warships; release of Italian merchant vessels; diminution of German agents in Spain especially in Tangier and curbing of their activities; clarification of status of remaining members of Blue Divi-

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<sup>42</sup> George W. Doffing was Assistant to the Special Adviser, Office of the Special Adviser on the Eastern Hemisphere, prior to being sent to Spain on a special mission.

sion on Russian front or in Germany. I reminded him further of my conversation with him on January 3<sup>43</sup> and of its unsatisfactory outcome which I had been obliged to report to Washington especially concerning wolfram embargo and Italian warships. He must be aware of close relations between Spanish delay in acting upon any of these requests and continuance of our petroleum and other economic program in Spain. I had no doubt that Department of State in Washington was exhausted by delays and nonactivity on part of Spanish Government in these important respects and that its suspension of petroleum shipments was natural warning to Spain.

I also told [garbled group] from Washington on Thursday shortly after my last conversation with him to effect that on preceding Tuesday<sup>44</sup> or Wednesday Ambassador Cárdenas was to be informed by Department of substance of statement which now Department had publicly issued.

Foreign Minister then said that news emanating on radio from London and Washington was almost literally to effect that having lost faith in Spanish promises to fulfill neutrality obligations American Government as result of suggestions made by British Government has decided to suspend petroleum loadings beginning next month. This news he had heard himself at noon today and it was being repeated hour in and hour out in Spanish, as well as in English, and was being heard all over the country. It was producing intense alarm throughout Spain and filling Petroleum Office here with consternation. The Petroleum Office was now drafting regulations for drastic restrictions of petroleum consumption which could only mean paralysis of whole life of country.

Sudden drastic action of American Government without warning is quite different thing from reconsideration of economic program and the results, the Minister is sure, will be quite opposite to what we want and expect. The American Government should know Spanish people are more easily influenced by kindness than by a whip. Tactics now being followed do not indicate easiest solution of pending problems several of which were otherwise just about ready for solution. He begged me to seek reconsideration of the matter on the part of my Government.

The Minister said he had had no report from Ambassador Cárdenas of any statement whatsoever made to him by the State Department explaining the action or warning him that it might be forthcoming.<sup>45</sup> He had reported that he had talked with the Under

<sup>43</sup> See telegram 13, January 4, noon, from Madrid, p. 297.

<sup>44</sup> January 25.

<sup>45</sup> In telegram 323, February 4, 1944, 9 p. m., the Ambassador in Spain was informed that the Department knew as a fact that on January 27 the Spanish Ambassador sent a full account to Jordana of the Department's explanation of its action in suspending the loading of tankers (711.52/321).

Secretary of State <sup>46</sup> at a dinner in Washington but that the latter offered no explanation.

The Minister said he wished to impress on me most emphatically that the tactics being pursued were everywhere wrong. They would delay greatly instead of expediting a solution of pending problems and they would cost United States vast amount of public sympathy in Spain. Spain was now placed on the defensive against United States instead of being anxious to collaborate with United States.

I said that I was glad the Minister had spoken to me so frankly and fully. I too recognized the drastic results that might ensue from the suspension of petroleum supply during February but I also recognized the extreme procrastination of the Spanish Government in ignoring our fair and legitimate requests over a long period of time. I felt certain that if only some of our requests had been favorably acted upon, my Government would have been reassured some time ago about the sincerity of Spanish claims to neutrality and the present difficult situation for Spain would not have arisen. I still felt that some prompt favorable response must be forthcoming from Spain before I had any chance of prevailing upon my Government to reconsider its economic program favorably to Spain.

The Minister then made a strong personal plea to me to present his views to my Government in as sympathetic a way as possible. He could assure me that Spain would be glad to continue negotiations with United States and seek an outcome favorable to United States if only the embarrassing publicity could be halted and the latest attacks on Spain from London and Washington would stop. Otherwise we were throwing Spain, very greatly against his wishes, into the arms of German propagandists.

I said I would frankly and sincerely present his views to Washington.

Repeated to London.

HAYES

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711.52/329 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 31, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received February 1—3:45 p. m.]

305. The Portuguese Ambassador <sup>47</sup> called on me today. He said he had been informed by Count Jordana 2 weeks ago of the importance both he and I attached to securing a favorable issue of im-

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<sup>46</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

<sup>47</sup> Pedro T. Pereira.

portant matters pending between Spain on one side and the United States and Great Britain on the other. The Foreign Minister had told him that he still encountered considerable difficulty with certain of his colleagues and suggested that the Ambassador could help him by going direct to Franco. This the Ambassador had done last Wednesday, January 26.

In the course of his 3-hour conference with Franco the Ambassador had presented his views about the need of Spain, as well as Portugal, frankly adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the United Nations and of taking early steps to satisfy their requests. He discussed at some length the wolfram embargo, the release of Italian warships and merchant vessels, the withdrawal of all Spanish volunteers from the eastern front and Germany and the curbing of German agents and their activities, particularly their sabotage. Franco had raised only minor objections and these chiefly about the Italian merchant vessels and German sabotage. The latter he declared was being greatly exaggerated by the British and Spanish countermeasures were being correspondingly minimized. About the merchant vessels he had asserted with vigor Spain's right to obtain two of them in compensation for two sunk by Italians. Nevertheless, when the Ambassador left Franco he carried away with him the distinct impression that he would support Jordana in arriving at an early settlement of all these matters satisfactory to us.

On the next day, Thursday, the Ambassador had seen Jordana who told him that this was at last cleared, he felt sure, for meeting the wishes of the Americans and the Foreign Minister seemed to be in very high spirits.

Then on Friday the Ambassador had seen Jordana again and found him very much upset by news he had just received of suspension of petroleum loadings and the publicity campaign being waged about it over the BBC. Jordana said that only the day before I had indicated to him that the United States might revise its program with the Spaniards unless a favorable response to our requests was promptly received but it was now obvious that the United States had taken most drastic action without special warning in advance and, what was worse, that we and the British were making political capital out of the situation and rendering it vastly more difficult for him to continue negotiations.

The Ambassador had seen Jordana once more this morning and the Foreign Minister begged him to intercede with me and with the British Ambassador to try to halt the publicity campaign. The Ambassador stated that he himself appreciated the exasperating delays of the Spaniards and he quite sympathized with our losing patience and temporarily withdrawing petroleum. He had acted

similarly some months ago when he had withheld timber shipments from Portugal to Spain in order to secure certain commercial concessions here which the Spaniards had procrastinated about. He had been careful at that time however not to give any publicity to withholding of timber shipments with result that he had gotten what he had wanted without making trouble for Jordana. He wished I might have pursued similar tactics.

I explained to the Ambassador something about the exceedingly long delays which we had patiently endured and about the indirect warning which I had given to Jordana as early as January 3.<sup>48</sup> I also stated that the requests we had long been making were quite within the power of Spain to grant without in any way violating her neutrality and indeed that some of them for example about the Italian warships and merchant vessels she simply had to grant us if she were to conform to requirements of a neutral.

The Ambassador pressed me to seek a curbing of the publicity. He said any assistance he could give us he was only too happy to give. I expressed my sincere thanks.

Repeated London and Lisbon.

HAYES

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711.52/325 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, January 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:52 p. m.]

306. British Ambassador is telegraphing London once more in an effort to call a halt to BBC attacks on Spain. He has told London that our Governments must decide very quickly whether we want a break in relations with Spain. He believes that a break will involve some kind of military diversion favorable to Germany. If we do not wish a break he says publicity must be curbed because otherwise it will lead to a break within a month. If we allow uninformed public opinion in our countries to have its head it will lead to economic blockade.

He has asked for immediate instructions as to what British policy is. If Britain wants to break with Spain he suggests publicity continue. If it does not he says it must stop.

He says BBC obtained its information concerning interruption of petroleum shipments from FEA in United States.

I cannot too strongly urge that publicity concerning our relations with Spain be handled by the State Department and not by other or-

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<sup>48</sup> See telegram 13, January 4, noon, from Madrid, p. 297.

ganizations which regardless of their competence in their own field are simply not in a position intelligently and wisely to comment publicly on our relations with Spain.

HAYES

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711.52/326c : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 31, 1944—midnight.

776. Personal for the Ambassador. Supplementing the Department's 750, January 29, midnight, and with further reference to your telegram no. 768, January 28, 2 p. m.,<sup>49</sup> there is quoted below excerpts from telegraphic instructions sent by Mr. Eden to the British Ambassador at Madrid on January 19 as contained in a memorandum<sup>50</sup> given the Department by the British Embassy here:

"I am also anxious that decision to suspend oil shipments to Spain shall take effect as soon as possible. When you have seen Franco and the Spanish Government have become aware that oil shipments have been suspended it will probably be necessary for me to make a further statement about our relations with Spain."

The above quotation, as you will note, is quite clear and makes your telegram concerning Mr. Eden's reaction the more difficult to understand, particularly as Mr. Eden apparently contemplated a statement of his own on the subject.

HULL

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711.52/325 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1944—6 p. m.

277. Your 306, January 31, 9 p. m. As indicated in an earlier telegram we have asked OWI<sup>51</sup> to call a halt to any broadcasting involving apparent attacks on Spain. We are so informing London and requesting that the Embassy bring this matter to the attention of the British in order that our action may support Hoare's representations to London referred to in your 306. In discussing this whole question with Jordana you can inform him that we have endeavored in this way to meet one of his outstanding complaints and that we are just as

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<sup>49</sup> Telegram 768 not printed; in it Ambassador Winant stated that Mr. Eden felt that the suspension of oil shipments was contrary to the united economic front theory hitherto followed with regard to Spain (852.6363/1267).

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Office of War Information.



anxious as he to take our existing differences out of the field of radio and press. Having taken steps to meet Jordana in the matter of publicity the atmosphere should be cleared for immediate discussions looking to some mutually acceptable understanding.

HULL

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711.52/322 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944—2 p. m.

300. Your 291, January 29, 5 p. m.,<sup>52</sup> and 293, January 30, noon. The Department assumes your references are to American short-wave broadcasts of the OWI and is recommending to that agency that the subject be dropped. The Department has not been aware of any violent public campaign directed against the Spanish Government. Publicity in general has not appeared unfair or sensational and has not been very extensive. While some publications carried the news on the front page no particular prominence was given the item and no banner headlines were observed.

Your reply to Count Jordana very accurately states the case. Our several requests have been pending with the Spanish Government for some time and the possibility of an adverse effect on our trade program has repeatedly been mentioned. As stated to Ambassador Cárdenas in his conversation with Mr. Taft, this Government has sustained and is prepared to continue to sustain Spanish economy but must expect in return a cooperative attitude toward its requests. It can scarcely be held that the Spanish Government was not informed in advance that a threat to the trade program was created by the dilatory treatment of our requests. We have no wish to threaten Spain and have amply demonstrated this in the past, but Spain's own attitude has produced a very considerable discouragement here. The suspension of these tanker loadings certainly does not place in doubt the assurances furnished Spain at the time of our North African landing.

Our primary concern is to cause a cessation of wolfram exports. In view of Germany's tight position in ferro-alloys every ton of wolfram now reaching Germany our military authorities say can be translated directly into terms of American casualties. This is therefore of extreme importance and urgency and should resolutely be pressed for. The Department would be very reluctant to entertain any proposed compromise which would permit the continued export of wolfram.

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<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

You may say to Count Jordana that his statement has been read with the most sympathetic interest and that his frank exposition of his views is deeply appreciated, but that it is the earnest wish of this Government that he will examine with care our position vis-à-vis Spain and our difficulties, to which we have frequently drawn attention, and which have brought about this most unsatisfactory situation. We have tried by every other means at our disposal to arrive at an understanding and to place our trade relations on a mutually satisfactory basis but that latterly we have sensed in the inaction of the Spanish Government a complacency toward our proposals which left this Government, we feel, no other choice than that of restricting our own response to Spanish requirements. This action was resorted to with utmost reluctance and only after we had borne with months of delay. Having taken the action it was inevitable that there should be some publicity on the subject. This publicity resulted from the freedom of our press and was not inspired by this Government and the Department's press release was only issued with the intention of rationalizing publicity and limiting the field of free conjecture.

You may add that this Government will be glad to receive from Spain a concrete assurance respecting our desires on the basis of which we may resume a normal course. We feel in this connection that the Spanish Government will wish to consider very carefully not only this immediate situation and the remedies which rest with it, but to reexamine the entire position of Spain. In order to be able to conduct satisfactorily a mutually profitable trade program it is obvious that in the political field we must be able to look forward with greater security than heretofore to the conduct of our overall relations with that country and that these should not suffer the disconcerting and unfortunately all too frequent occurrence of incidents reflecting an unfriendliness on the part of Spanish officials or party members.

HULL

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711.52/335 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 3, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received February 4—9:24 p. m.]

377. I called on the Minister of Foreign Affairs by appointment. I said I could inform him that according to my best knowledge the only statement made by the American radio concerning petroleum exports to Spain was the brief factual statement made by Secretary Hull and that the American radio had not attacked Spain or Spanish Government. Furthermore my Government had made representations to London in the sense that BBC attacks should cease and to my best

knowledge BBC had not commented on situation during last 48 hours. I and my Government wished to collaborate fully in avoiding publicity embarrassing to Spain and to confine negotiations to diplomatic channels.

With the quieting of publicity I hoped he and I, who had the same end in view, might reach some conclusions that I might in the very near future report to my Government. There are certain difficulties not numerous but important. It would be very helpful to me if he would enable me to report in near future along following lines:

1. The Spanish Government is giving serious attention to subject of wolfram and German credits. He personally approves and endorses the informal conversations now being carried on between Undersecretary of Foreign Relations and Messrs. Ackerman and Ellis Rees.<sup>53</sup> He will speed them to an early and satisfactory conclusion and meanwhile no further licenses will be granted for export of wolfram to Germany.

2. He will let me have specific information about what the Spanish Government is actually doing concerning German agents and German sabotage and concerning final withdrawal of remaining Spanish soldiers from eastern fronts of Germany.

3. Spanish Government will release Italian warships and all but two of Italian merchant vessels. On latter point I would like to develop and resume whole case.

The Minister thanked me for the statement I had made about my desire to have publicity stopped and for what had been done.

As he had told me previously and had told the British Ambassador yesterday all pending problems between Spain and United Nations were now very nearly ready for satisfactory solution. Some were already solved, so far as Spain was concerned. For example the presence of Spanish soldiers in Russia or Germany.

The great question was how to satisfy us in all these respects so long as the appearance given in Spain and to the world was that it was being done under duress. It had been made only too clear by Washington that the petroleum loadings had been suspended in order to force Spain to do certain things favorable to the Allies. This fact makes it practically impossible for Spain to yield. It creates a most difficult situation for the Government and prompts a dangerous reaction in public opinion of which Germans are sure to take full advantage.

Nevertheless despite this most serious drawback he is optimistic that the American Government can find a formula which will provide a way out. It should not be a difficult task to find a proper formula and the Spanish Government stands ready within a few days thereafter to take favorable action on our requests.

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<sup>53</sup> Hugh Ellis-Rees, Economic Adviser of the British Embassy in Spain.

He would be ready to give us his guarantee in advance. It will be very unfortunate if the crisis is unduly prolonged. The sooner it can be surmounted the better it will be for all concerned and he would repeat that it should not prove difficult to find the necessary formula.

The Minister hoped I would appreciate the importance and truth of this position. It was necessary in his opinion to impress on the world the fact that Spain was not merely yielding to pressure. The Spanish Government had the utmost good will toward the United States. It hoped the United States Government would reciprocate by showing its good will toward Spain. He was very anxious to find a way out and he thought a formula could be devised.

As he understood the situation the American Government had raised the question of the general trend in Spain. [Apparent omission] foreign policy and had merely cited specific instances of what it thought was a trend unfavorable to the United Nations. He wished to assure me most emphatically on his own part and that of the whole Government for which he was authorized to speak that the American Government was quite mistaken in imagining that the trend was unfavorable to the United Nations. The trend was steadily against the Axis and in favor of the United Nations.

He said he would now propose to me in strictest confidence, the confidence to be respected also by my Government, the main points of what he thought the suggested formula should cover. He had already yesterday suggested the same kind of formula to the British Ambassador. He did not mean to imply that there was anything sacred in the wording or that the points he mentioned necessarily were all-inclusive. It would be rather for the United States to determine the form and content of formula, but if it were to do the good he hoped it would do it should deal with the following points.

It should be in the form of a brief statement from our State Department inasmuch as the earlier publicity surrounded the previous statement made by the Department.

It might assign as its reason the cautioning against placing an exaggerated meaning on the previous statement and there should be three chief points.

1. Suspension of petroleum shipments had been only temporary for the month of February.

2. Suspension had not been a weapon of pressure or in the nature of an ultimatum.

3. Specific problems raised were now in the process of diplomatic negotiations and on the way to solution.

I told him I was glad to have his statement and that I was sure the United States did not wish to humiliate Spain. As I read the official statement of Mr. Hull I did not gather the impression that we were

issuing any ultimatum to Spain. I thought, however, that he was quite accurate in his diagnosis of the real situation. I personally, as well as my Government, had been greatly troubled for the last 3 or 4 months about the reluctance and procrastination on the part of the Spanish Government in meeting our reasonable requests.

It was quite natural, therefore, to suppose that Spain was pursuing a policy distinctly more favorable to Germany than to us and the suspension of petroleum shipments raised the question frankly and simply whether Spain wished to go on with a seemingly pro-Axis policy or wished to develop closer cooperation with us. I would transmit his suggestions to my Government.

The Minister said he was very grateful, especially that I would transmit his suggestion, and he felt sure that if I did so it would be of great help. He was sure Washington would find a satisfactory solution. He believed the statement already published by us had been given such wide publicity that an additional published explanation was now needed. It should be done speedily for otherwise the atmosphere will become steadily, and he feared rapidly, worse. I should make it as clear as possible to my Government that Spain simply cannot surrender to pressure. On the other hand there is an insistent need of the two Governments appearing to act on a friendly basis. He hoped the crisis would be solved as quickly as possible. If it were he could assure me most solemnly that we would experience no further trouble from the Spanish side. I then reiterated that I would fully inform my Government and would advise it of the form and content of the formula he proposed. At the same time, however, I felt I must give my Government some direct and specific assurances from him concerning the particular matters at issue, namely German agents and activities; Italian ships; wolfram; continuing presence Spanish military detachments in arms against Russia.

The Minister then took a thick folder labelled Tangier.

He said he could give assurance in confidence to me and my Government solemnly on his own behalf and that of Spanish Government that two of the matters were already and finally settled and would be announced by Spain as soon as the United States Government had issued some kind of statement along the lines suggested.

They were:

(1) Suppression of German Consulate at Tangier and the expulsion of German agents from Spanish zone of Morocco, as well as the sharp diminution of the number of German agents in peninsular Spain with a view to the energetic suppression of all German espionage and sabotage anywhere in Spanish territory.

(2) Total withdrawal of Spanish legion, Spanish air squadron and Spanish forces under any name or description from Russia and Germany to be carried out immediately.

I would doubtless appreciate not only the importance of these two steps from standpoint of Allied military interest but also from standpoint of Spain's position vis-à-vis Germany. He could tell me that Germany would view both these matters as unfriendly acts by Spain and would be bound to retaliate against Spain. Nevertheless the Spanish Government has fully determined to carry them into full effect in spite of what Germany might do.

On the subject of wolfram he felt sure that a solution of the problem favorable to us would be arranged. Negotiations were proceeding, he believed, very satisfactorily and there is certainly a strong will on the part of the Spanish Government that a satisfactory solution be found in the very near future. He had noted what I said about a temporary embargo on the export of wolfram pending the conclusion of these negotiations. He did not wish to commit himself on this point because if, against his own wishes, negotiations should prove protracted Spain would, in effect, have given in without negotiation. Besides he would remind me that Portugal, an ally of Great Britain, has not been asked to do nearly as much in this regard as Spain which is not an ally of Britain.

About the Italian merchant ships he felt, through conversations with the British Ambassador, that he was in a fair way to arrive at a solution satisfactory to all concerned.

Concerning Italian warships, this was a much more complicated and difficult matter. Different points of view had [been] put before him concerning the proper interpretation of international law. In view of these conflicting interpretations, he felt that the question of the release of the Italian warships was less a legal question than a political one.

If Spain accepted the American viewpoint it would thereby be making an important contribution to the American side of the war by adding considerable strength to the American Navy. In that event he felt that Spain was entitled to compensation, and in view of the fact that Germany would bitterly resent Spain's accepting the American point of view and would very likely threaten Spain in a serious way, the best compensation Spain could secure from the United States would be defensive armaments and aviation gasoline for Spanish military planes.

I told the Minister I was glad to have his assurances about Tangier and the Spanish zone of Morocco, and the suppression of German espionage and sabotage all over Spain, as well as his assurance about a final and complete withdrawal of all Spanish forces from the war against Russia.

About wolfram, I shared his hope and expectation that negotiations need not be protracted. I could not see why with good will on both

sides the matter could not be brought to a satisfactory solution within a month, and, consequently, when I had asked for a temporary embargo pending negotiations I had had in mind a month or two.

To go back to the Italian warships I should like to resume your contentions in the matter. I was sure my Government had the right to insist on the release of the Italian warships on grounds of equity. The vessels were admitted to Spanish waters, and once they were admitted fuel and provisions had to be given to them. Only the Spanish State, under Spain's present economy, could furnish the fuel, and to date it has not done so. It should do so at once and as soon as it does the vessels will depart within 24 or 48 hours thereafter.

Furthermore, there was a second argument. When the war vessels entered Spanish waters, Italy was still at peace with Germany and at war with Great Britain and the United States. Hence, if these powers and Italy both asked for their release Germany had no grievance against Spain, and Spain, instead of favoring one belligerent over another was satisfying both belligerents equally, and therefore fulfilling her neutral obligations by releasing the ships. I had made this point in a supplementary note.

However, there is still a third very strong argument, and one which for special reasons I have not put into writing for formal presentation. It is the argument of impartiality.

I was well aware as was my Government that there were cases in 1941 and 1942 when Axis warships had been permitted to repair damage to themselves in Spanish ports resulting not only from sea voyages but from acts of war, and after relatively long periods had been allowed to leave Spanish ports. If Spain had permitted damage of such importance to be repaired in its ports, then there is still greater obligation to provide the Italian warships with fuel to permit them to continue their voyage. This is strict law, because impartiality is the essence of neutrality.

I asked how in the light of such a clear case, Spain could hold these Italian warships and still be neutral. I wondered whether his expert advisers could have argued otherwise, and if so, what their arguments could have been. I did not feel this matter had to be considered as a political question. It was a question of law and of Spain's obligations as a neutral. I did not see how compensation was involved. If all the other matters were satisfactorily adjusted and Spain made perfectly clear it was cooperating fully and clearly with the United Nations, the question of arms and gasoline could be raised and settled on its own merits and not as compensation. I had no idea the United States would give compensation for this or that specific thing. It would depend on Spain's whole attitude.

The Minister said he was relieved to note that for the moment I was not insisting on a total, permanent embargo on wolfram exports.

Perhaps it could be arranged but it certainly would require more negotiation. He was willing to put into effect a temporary embargo as I had suggested, and he too hoped the wolfram negotiation would be successfully terminated in a month.

He said he did not have time to develop the Spanish legal case as he viewed it concerning the warships, but he could assure me Spain would act in strict accordance with its neutral obligations. The final decision about the warships had not been [apparent omission] and he was still anxious to find a legal way out of the difficulty.

HAYES

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711.52/329: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944—midnight.

314. Your 306, January 31, 9 p. m. The British Embassy here has been acquainted with steps the Department has taken with the OWI and has been advised of your views and those of your British colleague respecting publicity. As you know from the Department's 277, February 1, 6 p. m., steps have been taken to reduce publicity. While the Department concurs with you that this measure seems advisable, it believes that the original publicity was highly useful in impressing upon the Spanish Government and people the importance we attached to our requests. The Spanish Government had apparently not fully appreciated this during the months of conversations which finally resulted in our action.

It is difficult for the Department to suppose that the Spanish Government would consider breaking relations with this Government and thereby insuring a complete cessation of overseas supply, to say nothing of very definitely impairing Spain's future position. The Department feels that this possibility may be discarded and that you should endeavor to obtain a complete wolfram embargo and prompt action on our other requests. With regard to the wolfram embargo, it appears from correspondence of the British Embassy here, exhibited to the Department yesterday, that Sir Samuel Hoare's reports reflect a degree of pessimism and that he may be ready to accept some lesser restrictive measure. The Department's views have been expressed clearly to the British Embassy and it is believed that Sir Samuel may receive further instructions from his Government. Meanwhile you should discuss the matter with him urgently and endeavor to dispel any pessimism you may find to exist. Your 305, January 31, 8 p. m., is of great interest in this connection and indicates that Jordana and Franco in their conversations with the Portuguese Ambassador have not seemed unwilling to go the whole way. Full advantage



should be taken of Portuguese cooperation as well as of the existing situation created by the suspension of tanker loadings. Obviously, the sooner the Spanish Government acts the easier it will be, inasmuch as any delay will afford the Germans the opportunity to bring their arguments to bear against us.

HULL

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711.52/334a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1944—midnight.

315. Mr. Stettinius was called to the telephone late last night by Cárdenas who inquired whether he might see the Under Secretary in private at an early hour today. The Ambassador was given an appointment, and presented himself at the Under Secretary's office at 8:50 this morning.

Cárdenas remarked that it was strange that in 1940, when Spain was unfriendly to us, we were considerate and kind, whereas at present when Spain is endeavoring to be considerate our attitude is not sympathetic and we are exercising unreasonable pressure. We must understand, he said, that the position of his country is very awkward and it is trying to maintain a balance. Assuming it is accurate that Germany must have wolfram, it may reasonably be supposed that should exports be interrupted Germany would invade Spain to secure it.

Cárdenas expressed his conviction that we and the British were under pressure from Russia. He had been informed that the Blue Division had been liquidated but that 1500 of its members remained in Russia. He said there likewise were many Spanish communists in Russia and that he had reason to believe that in an attempt to excite sympathy among members of the Blue Division some were posing as prisoners of war. It was not within the power of the Spanish Government to recall those members of the Blue Division who had not promptly returned. This method was being employed to attack Franco indirectly by arousing Britain and America.

Cárdenas then requested the Under Secretary to state frankly as a friend why we were so upset. Mr. Stettinius replied mentioning the Italian ships, activity of enemy agents, and wolfram, and stating that for 3 months we had made representations to his Government and were discouraged. Cárdenas admitted no 3-month factor.

He said he was in a very awkward position as these negotiations were being conducted in Madrid and his Government was not keeping him informed. There was an indirect implication that he was

unfamiliar with matters in Tangier although he had heard of our concern about German agents in the Peninsula. His first news about the ships arose at the time of the message to Laurel,<sup>54</sup> but he had heard that in the past few days several vessels had been released.

The Ambassador said Spain would be our eternal friend if we could only exercise patience and allow her to remain neutral. The Under Secretary expressed his personal feeling that Spain stood to lose nothing and had everything to gain by complying with our requests, and that it would be better for Spain if, when the war ended with a complete Allied victory, as it would, Spain's position vis-à-vis the United States were on a friendly basis. Cárdenas replied that the position in which Spain found herself was very awkward and that her salvation depended on preserving a bargaining position.

Cárdenas stated that he had not called under instructions from his Government and that he regarded this as a personal and friendly conversation. He said he would make a telegraphic report of this conversation however, and the Under Secretary asked what precisely he would say. The Ambassador said he would mention the three points as summed up by the Under Secretary.

The attitude of Ambassador Cárdenas was emotional, and the Under Secretary felt that he was concerned for his personal position. The Under Secretary told him that he might call again when he had news from Madrid, as the Ambassador definitely was anxious to harmonize relations between the two countries.

When occasion presents itself you should emphasize to Jordana that this Government has been under no pressure from Russia or any other power and that the action taken in suspending tanker loadings originated solely in our discouragement with the Spanish Government's dilatory treatment of our requests. You should add that we entertain no thought of provoking a change in Spain's neutral status, and that the requests we have made and which Spain has dealt with in such a dilatory manner have no relation to the status of Spain as a neutral.

HULL

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711.52/339 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 4, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received February 5—12:17 p. m.]

389. My 377, February 3, 6 p. m. I suggest plan of Minister of Foreign Affairs, as modified below, be agreed to:

<sup>54</sup> For correspondence relating to concern of the United States over congratulatory telegram sent by the Spanish Government to José P. Laurel, head of the Japanese-controlled Philippine government, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 722 ff.

Spanish Foreign Office will agree in advance that :

1. Italian warships will be released promptly.
2. All but two Italian merchant ships will be released promptly, Spain to have the use of the remaining two under terms to be agreed upon.
3. Licenses for export of wolfram to Germany will be withheld for at least one month pending outcome of negotiations for a wolfram embargo.
4. German Consulate in Tangier will be suppressed and German espionage and sabotage agents will be expelled from Tangier and Spanish Morocco. German espionage activities in Peninsula Spain will be energetically suppressed and agents engaged in such activities will be expelled.
5. All remaining Spanish soldiers will be withdrawn from Germany and German-occupied territory. After assurances are received from Foreign Minister that foregoing will be carried out, the Secretary will make a statement such as suggested by Jordana, possibly in reply to a question at a press conference, the statement later to be issued as a press release.

Petroleum shipments to Spain will be resumed. I shall make clear to the Foreign Minister that they are likely to be suspended again if the commitments are not satisfactorily carried out or if satisfactory agreement concerning wolfram is not reached and I shall warn him that if they are again suspended the resulting situation will be more serious than the present one.

British Embassy agrees.

Urgent reply requested.

HAYES

711.52/340 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 5, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received February 6—3:10 p. m.]

402. See my 389, February 4. Under Secretary Foreign Affairs assures me instructions have been issued to Ministry Industry and Commerce and other interested agencies to immediately suspend all exports of wolfram to any destination pending preparation of counter proposals to our request for wolfram embargo. Although he stated he is not in a position to divulge nature of these counter proposals he has the impression they include an agreement on the part of the Spanish Government to limit exports to Germany to a quantity not exceeding exports during 1943.

HAYES

711.52/335 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1944—8 p. m.

331. Your 377, February 3, first paragraph. The British Embassy here has received instructions from London to inform us that while instructions have been issued to the BBC to cut down on their broadcasts to Spain they do not feel that they can entirely cut out the line which they have recently been taking. The Embassy has been informed that we have asked OWI to cut out all attacks on Spain and that we felt that we should follow recommendations in this matter as made by you and Sir Samuel Hoare. It was further stated that while the decision was naturally one for the British to make, we hoped that if BBC continues even in a modified form that they will keep in close touch with Sir Samuel Hoare on the effect of this modified program.

HULL

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1257

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Labouisse)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 5, 1944.

Participants: Mr. G. F. Thorold	}	British Embassy
Mr. Quintin Bridge		
Mr. W. Stone	}	Foreign Economic Administration
Mr. W. Riefler		
Mr. R. Dangerfield		
Mr. P. Culbertson	}	Department of State
Mr. H. K. Fleming		
Mr. H. R. Labouisse, Jr.		

The meeting was called by Mr. Labouisse to discuss a proposal put forward by the British as a possible compromise to our request for a wolfram embargo. London had suggested that we might accept the compromise whereby the Spaniards would limit exports of wolfram to Germany to 60 tons a month.

Mr. Labouisse pointed out that the estimated German acquisitions of Spanish wolfram in 1943 were in the neighborhood of 1,400 tons. As to the Spanish production, he added that estimates indicated German-owned mine production at between 40 and 60 tons per month; that the Sante Combe production was estimated at between 120 and 180 tons per month, and that we presumably had tied this production up for four months; and that the balance of Spanish

production was presumably in the neighborhood of from 200 to 250 tons per month.

Mr. Labouisse also emphasized the great importance which this Government attached to preventing wolfram from going to the enemy and said that the British suggestion of 60 tons a month was, to his mind, far from satisfactory. He stated that, in his opinion, if we could not obtain the complete embargo, the furthest we should go would be to have the Spaniards agree to limit exports to all destinations to prewar levels which he estimated at between 400 and 500 tons per annum. If the Spaniards would agree to such a restriction, at least half of the exports should be for our account, thus limiting German takings to not more than 250 tons per year.

Mr. Culbertson said that the Department placed the demand for a wolfram embargo at the top of the list of our demands against Spain.

Mr. Thorold stated that his Government attached greater importance to stopping the espionage activities in Spain and, possibly, to the recall of the Blue Division, although the British also considered it extremely important to stop the movement of wolfram to Germany. Mr. Thorold asked at what point we would be willing to compromise the wolfram question. Mr. Culbertson said that we did not wish to compromise it and intended to instruct our Ambassador to continue to press for a complete embargo. Mr. Thorold considered this reply unsatisfactory and expressed the opinion that some agreement should be reached between our two governments as to the type of compromise we would be willing to make in the event a complete embargo proves impracticable.

Mr. Riefler stated that unless a complete embargo were obtained, it would be extremely difficult to prevent wolfram from going to Germany in large quantities. Even a small quota for Germany would not prove very helpful to us, for it could be used as a cloak to move larger quantities. He therefore urged our holding out for a complete embargo.

Mr. Thorold asked if it was the opinion of the U. S. Government that we would remain adamant in this demand and refuse to compromise. Mr. Culbertson replied that the answer to that question could not be given until we had received from the Spaniards some idea of what they would do on our various demands, and that it was impossible to come to any decision as to our last line of retreat on the wolfram matter until further developments had taken place. He emphasized that, for the present, we intended to hold out for a complete embargo but that, of course, we realized that the entire situation must be kept flexible. In short, he said that he wished to force the Spaniards to act and not have our Ambassador put in the position of making some counter proposals to the Spaniards.

Mr. Labouisse suggested that Mr. Thorold might advise his Government that it was our opinion that a compromise whereby the Spaniards would be permitted to export 60 tons of wolfram a month to Germany was tantamount to our giving in completely on the wolfram embargo question for the reason that the Germans, while taking 720 tons a year legitimately, would smuggle considerable additional quantities and very likely would obtain as much as they did in 1943. Mr. Riefler agreed.

No counter proposal, setting a figure for exports to Germany, was suggested to Mr. Thorold, and the matter was left that we considered it premature to discuss a possible compromise on the wolfram matter, the Department and FEA considering it more desirable to await further offers of settlement from the Spaniards.

HENRY R. LABOUISSÉ, JR.

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711.52/347

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1944.

The Spanish Ambassador called this afternoon at his request. He commenced the conversation by saying that the Spanish people were hurt—that their national dignity had been offended as a result of our recent action. He emphasized that his government wanted to be friendly but if they agreed at once with all our requests it would make a bad impression and appear as if they were acting under pressure. He stated he had just heard from his government that finding solutions to the various problems was far advanced and almost all of our requests were being granted. However, he felt that a total embargo on wolfram was impossible.

The Ambassador said he had been advised by his government that they thought the British Ambassador and American Ambassador were favorably inclined to permit as much wolfram to be exported to Germany in 1944 as was exported in 1943. I immediately stated that I was sure there was a misunderstanding on this point and that he must understand once and for all that we would remain firm in our position that all wolfram exports would have to cease.

The Ambassador then asked that if our demands were fully met would it be possible for our government to make a statement easing their position—something along the line of stating that our February action on petroleum was temporary only and that shipments would resume in March and that the February action was not designed to force them into a position that they were not already willing to take.

At this point in the conversation I digressed and volunteered the statement that there had been no Soviet pressure brought against the United States Government in connection with Spanish relations.

The Ambassador then stated that his government was prepared to exert "maximum severity" against saboteurs and that they had proved conclusively that the action of enemy saboteurs was of communistic nature.

The Ambassador emphasized that all wolfram exports had been stopped during these negotiations and that no time limit had been set.

The Ambassador added that his government was ready to do everything to maintain its strict neutrality, but he wanted us to know that, as far as the United States was concerned, it was a friendly neutrality.

The Ambassador finally asked what formula we had in mind for them as the next step, and I replied that we felt it was up to them to work out a formula that would most satisfactorily meet the circumstances with which they were faced.

The Ambassador, on leaving, asked that when I wished to see him again he would appreciate my calling him early in the morning so he could come to my home or office, as it was embarrassing for him to see the press. This was rather strange as he had asked for the appointment this afternoon at the State Department.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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711.52/335 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)* <sup>55</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944—6 p. m.

351. Your 377, February 3, and 390, February 4.<sup>56</sup> I am afraid Jordana may have misunderstood our willingness to meet his desire that radio and press publicity with regard to the present problem be stopped. We here feel that our having brought the pending difficulties into the open and thus to the knowledge of the Spanish people has been helpful. At the same time we were willing to accede to your suggestion and Jordana's wish in order to give the Spanish Government an opportunity to arrive at a satisfactory settlement without loss of face. The fact remains, however, that had it not been for Spain's 3 months' delay and procrastination no publicity would have been necessary. We see no justification therefore for Jordana to take the position that it is up to us to find a public formula for saving the Spanish Government's face. We will of course be prepared to be as helpful as we can on this score once a

<sup>55</sup> Repeated on the same date to London as No. 956 and to Lisbon as No. 317.

<sup>56</sup> Latter not printed.

satisfactory solution to all of the various problems has been found.

The Spanish authorities seem to have read into our action ideas which are figments of their own minds. We have noted the Spanish Cabinet's statement with regard to Spanish neutrality. You will have seen the statement made by the President in a recent press conference to the effect that we desire nothing more than that Spain should maintain neutrality in the true sense of the word. Any other assumption is completely without foundation. Cárdenas, and possibly Jordana, seem to be obsessed with the thought that we have been influenced by pressure from the Soviet Government. The Russians have never in any way approached us with regard to Spain. The present policy towards Spain is purely Anglo-American. Our press release<sup>57</sup> meant just what it said, i.e., that oil shipments had been suspended in order that we could reconsider our whole position with regard to our help in maintaining economic stability in Spain. We must seriously examine whether we can continue to supply Spain with materials which are needed for our war effort and by our civilian economy. We do not feel that the sacrifice incident to thus supplying Spain is justified, so long as Spain permits the export to Germany of an item which is of vital importance to her war effort and which is directly converted from the raw material into actual American and Allied casualties.

The proposals outlined in your 389, February 4, are interesting and helpful. We appreciate that the Spaniards have come some distance in meeting most of our requests. The proposals, however, are not satisfactory with regard to the item on which you must realize we place most emphasis, namely, wolfram. We wish a complete embargo—permanent not temporary—on the exportation of wolfram to all destinations and we feel that such a step on the part of Spain falls fully within the scope of her declared position of neutrality. The proposal contained in your 409, February 5,<sup>58</sup> is, therefore, unacceptable. Anything short of complete embargo might well be meaningless because of the difficulty of policing smuggling. We realize that the British seem to look with favor on some compromise similar to that outlined in your 409. We do not agree.

In view of the foregoing we cannot authorize loadings for the 1st of March. Neither this notice nor notices given for February loadings have even the semblance of an ultimatum, even though Jordana seems to have put that idea forward in his discussions with you. It is simply a question whether we can continue to supply Spain with what she needs so long as she continues to supply the enemy with a material so

<sup>57</sup> See telegram 238, January 29, to Madrid. p. 307.

<sup>58</sup> Not printed; Ambassador Hayes proposed that he be permitted to discuss the matter of the wolfram embargo along the line of seeking a limited rather than a complete embargo (711.52/341).



vitaly needed by the enemy in order that he may continue his war against us. The Department might add, for your own information, that it appreciates that our attitude at the present time is stiffer in character than it was a year or so ago. You will, we are sure, understand, however, that our greatly improved military position fully warrants such a change on our part and permits us to advance fair and reasonable requests with an expectation that they will be met which was not possible a year ago. The Department does not share your fears that the submission of such requests can or will adversely affect the long term friendly relations between Spain and the United States to which we so hopefully look forward.

HULL

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711.52/346 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 9, 1944—12 p. m.

[Received February 10—12:55 p. m.]

453. My 421, February 7, 11 p. m.<sup>59</sup> In a conversation yesterday with Hoare along lines of Department's 314, February 3, midnight, I was unable to convince him of the possibility that we might obtain in the near future a full Spanish embargo on export of wolfram. He is disposed, and he believes his Government is disposed, to accept a compromise settlement on the basis of a limitation of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany for this year to a figure not greater and preferably less than the figure of 720 tons for last year this amount to be distributed in equal monthly or quarterly installments. He expressed conviction that such an arrangement would be helpful to British-Portuguese negotiations about wolfram and would suffice to deprive Germans of Spanish exports during the ensuing and most critical 3 months. He seemed quite adamant in this position and told me that London was urging Washington to agree.

He further stated that London shared Spanish view that our case in international law for release of Italian warships is weak and that he and his Government are reluctant to hold up agreement with Spain on other important pending matters in order to secure a pledge for the release of the warships before resuming petroleum shipments. He expressed belief that, after atmosphere is otherwise cleared, Spain can be prevailed upon to let the warships go one by one. I argued the point with him indicating I had instructions about it from the Department and emphasizing reasons for my full concurrence with those instructions. I fear, in the light of the conversation, that unless Washington and London can speedily agree upon the course to be

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<sup>59</sup> Not printed.

followed and give uniform instructions accordingly a general settlement of the points in controversy will be unduly delayed.

HAYES

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711.52/348 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 11, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received February 12—4: 27 p. m.]

473. I shall seek an interview with the Spanish Foreign Minister early next week and carry out instructions contained in your telegram 351, February 8. In the meantime, I wish to bring the following situation to your attention. The British Ambassador to whom I conveyed this morning the purport of your instructions, has informed me that his Government's attitude diverges from ours in the matter of insisting on a total permanent wolfram embargo as well as in respect to the Italian warships as explained in my telegram 389, February 4. Sir Samuel Hoare went out of his way to make it clear beyond peradventure of doubt that he was not giving me the benefit of his personal opinion but representing the views of the British Government as recently confirmed to him and particularly emphasized that he would not be in a position to maintain with Jordana any insistence on a complete wolfram embargo and in fact would eventually have to admit that the British Government was prepared to accept a drastic limitation of export.

For obvious and imperative reasons, it is essential that the British and American Governments which embarked jointly upon this course of action should maintain a united front until a solution satisfactory to both Governments is attained. Accordingly I feel it my duty to ask that most urgent action be taken to the end that both Sir Samuel Hoare and I receive similar instructions.

I feel I must also make mention again of the fact that we are embarked on a course which is not without danger and I find it disturbing that the attitude of the two Allied Governments should so diverge as to indicate that we may not be proceeding with the full approval of the combined Chiefs of Staff.

HAYES

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711.52/349 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 11, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received February 12—2: 52 p. m.]

474. Since despatch of my 473, February 11, 1 p. m., the British Ambassador has informed me of the subsequent receipt of a repeat

telegram from London to Washington suggesting that whilst not modifying its views about difficulty of obtaining a complete wolfram embargo, the British Government is prepared to support the United States Government in demanding such an embargo provided that in so doing the British Government is not debarred from considering on its merits any counterproposal of the Spanish Government.

The British Ambassador further tells me his instructions are very explicit that while temporary pressure was to be put on Spanish Government, the British Government did not and does not contemplate any radical change of policy toward Spain and that we should not burn our bridges behind us in Spain.

In these circumstances the British Ambassador is suggesting to London that interviews with the Spanish Foreign Office should be postponed until the British and American Governments have opportunity of clearing up any points of doubt or disagreement which he hopes will be accomplished in near future.

Inasmuch as I cannot see Jordana before Monday,<sup>60</sup> may I have your reaction to foregoing over weekend.

HAYES

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711.52/346 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 11, 1944—10 p. m.

386. Your 453, February 9, 12 p. m. We have been unaware (repeat unaware) of any pressure from London to agree upon a compromise. On the contrary the British Embassy here states that instructions have been given your British colleague by his Government to support the demand for full embargo of wolfram.

You are authorized to tell Count Jordana and your British colleague that this Government has no intention of resuming tanker loadings until a complete and permanent wolfram embargo will have been established. On the questions of lesser importance, it is the Department's understanding that the Foreign Minister has already agreed in principle to the total withdrawal of Spanish legion, Spanish air squadron, and Spanish forces under any name or description from Russia or Germany, and to the suppression of German Consulate at Tangier and expulsion of German agents from Spanish zone of Morocco and a sharp reduction of number of German agents in the Peninsula. There appears to be every likelihood that our desires respecting Italian merchant ships will be acceded to on a satisfactory

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<sup>60</sup> February 14.

basis and that we may hope for the release of warships as well, though if necessary we are willing to accept some compromise with regard to the latter.

STETTINIUS

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711.52/350 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>61</sup>

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1944—1 p. m.

397. The Department does not presently contemplate any radical change of policy but its position respecting wolfram has been made abundantly clear to you (see paragraph 2, first sentence, Department's 386, February 11, 10 p. m.). In his state of mind, as described by you, it probably would be disadvantageous for your British colleague to attempt a discussion with Jordana. This is not the first time your British colleague has differed from your policy, as you are well aware. The Department has received no indication as to what serious consequences the British expect if we continue within our full right to decline to resume tanker loadings until the Spanish Government can see its way clear to establishing a full embargo on wolfram. In the circumstances and in view of the urgency of this matter, you are requested to seek an early interview with Jordana and to state unequivocally the position of this Government. This is in answer to your 473 and 474 of February 11.

Your 476, February 11, 6 p. m.<sup>62</sup> The Department thinks we should not take up these matters at this stage. To do so would require a detailed study and impose new delays which it is desirable to avoid. You may tell Jordana that a full and prompt satisfaction of our desires undoubtedly will place us in a far better position with our supply authorities to take care of Spanish requirements and to support the Spanish economic structure.

STETTINIUS

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*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*<sup>63</sup>

WASHINGTON, 15 February 1944—10:50 a. m.

467. I believe that as a result of our suspension of tanker loadings the Spanish situation is developing satisfactorily and that if both our Governments hold firm we can obtain a complete and permanent

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<sup>61</sup> Repeated to London on the same date in Department's No. 1115.

<sup>62</sup> Not printed; in it the Ambassador inquired as to whether Department was willing to step up the purchase of other commodities from Spain in order to cushion the shock of cessation of wolfram purchases.

<sup>63</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

Spanish embargo on the export of wolfram to any country. Our information indicates that the Germans are very short of wolfram and that supplies obtained at this time can be directly translated into terms of British and American casualties. We have had indications of a disposition on the part of your Ambassador and ours at Madrid to accept some compromise short of a complete embargo. I do not consider this satisfactory and I see no danger that our joint insistence upon a complete embargo before resuming loading of Spanish tankers will produce any serious reaction in Spain which would adversely affect the Allied position. The establishment of a complete embargo would be entirely within Franco's announced policy of neutrality and I hope you will send instructions to Hoare to stand firm as we are doing to Hayes. We know that the Portuguese are watching the Spanish situation carefully and our insistence upon the embargo should have a helpful effect in obtaining satisfaction with regard to wolfram from Salazar.<sup>64</sup>

ROOSEVELT

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711.52/353 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 16, 1944—noon.

[Received 6:23 p. m.]

546. Alba, Spanish Ambassador to London, told me yesterday that he saw Franco Monday.<sup>65</sup> Franco talked as follows:

He is convinced the war will last 6 years and that it will end in utter exhaustion. He visualizes that Spain will be in an important strategic position and that the democracies will need Spain. Meanwhile, Spain needs a man like Franco to guide it. He is resolved that Spain will be strictly neutral and will give no favors to Germany. He is prepared to settle outstanding questions with US, such as German agents, suppression of German Consulate in Tangier, return of Blue Division, et cetera. The wolfram problem is more difficult. Alba said he did not develop this theme.

Alba feels that, while Franco's prediction of a 6-year war is ridiculous, it reflects Franco's sincere opinion and influences his thought and decisions on international matters.

Alba says he himself thinks Spain should meet our wishes. He says the British Government attach greatest importance to three matters in the following order: (1) Expulsion of German agents and suppression of Consulate in Tangier; (2) Italian merchant

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<sup>64</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>65</sup> February 14.

ships; (3) Blue Division. He says British are not especially concerned about a wolfram embargo or about the Italian warships. I assume, of course, that he has conveyed this impression to his Government.

Alba wonders if we are not making a mistake in taking such a peremptory attitude toward wolfram at this time.

With reference to the public reaction to our suspension of petroleum shipments, he thinks it possible that our attitude will solidify public opinion in Spain behind Franco. He believes it equally possible that Franco's position will be undermined and that a change in regime will result.

Repeated London.

HAYES

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711.52/354: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 16, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received February 17—11:50 a. m.]

550. I spent 5 hours with the Foreign Minister yesterday during which I presented Department's views as set forth in its recent telegrams. We went over a lot of old ground and got nowhere except that the Minister offered to submit the matter of the Italian warships to arbitration. The net result of acceptance of this offer would be to delay the release of the warships many months.

The Minister said he had expected a more understanding reaction from Washington to the friendly suggestions made by him and embodied in my 377, February 3. He recalled that he had told me that acceptance of these suggestions would facilitate the conduct of all negotiations many of which were on the way to prompt and satisfactory solution but that Washington had passed over his suggestions and was maintaining its threat by conditioning shipments of petroleum to a solution of the wolfram problem satisfactory to it.

He maintained again that Spain had done a great service to the Allies by not entering the war and thereby making possible our Mediterranean operations and said that the closer Spain came to us the greater became our demands and he speculated as to whether this was a tactic leading to requests of broader scope. He said that if we maintain our present rigid attitude he does not see how Spain can accede to our requests without openly violating its neutral obligations and without surrendering its sovereignty. He said no counter proposal could be made by Spain while we maintained the new sanction which I had announced, that is, that petroleum shipments would not be resumed until a complete wolfram embargo was established. He

reminded me that the temporary embargo on wolfram exports was circumstantial and was not in any manner definitive nor did it constitute a concession in that sense. He maintained that Spain has in principle rejected a complete wolfram embargo from the very beginning.

He asked me to transmit the following to the Department:

"Nothing is gained by coercion; on the contrary, coercion creates a hostile atmosphere in Spain, tying the Government's hands and preventing a prompt solution of pending matters on reasonable terms which would be accepted by the Spanish Government with the same good faith which it has always shown in its relations with the Allies. The responsibility for the delay in settling these problems and the consequences of the present situation which has been created will not be Spain's but will belong to those persons who, knowing Spain so little, suppose that Spain will give in to anything, reasonable or not, if coercive measures such as the present are carried out against her. The remedy for all this is in the hands of the Allied countries: Remove those sanctions and do it in a manner which spares Spain's dignity, and all these matters will find their natural and just and reasonable channels. Otherwise, the decisions of the Spanish Government favorable to the Allies and agreed to in principle will be carried out, but the mistaken procedures referred to will not have the result of gaining those concessions which, because they are not reasonable, will not be agreed to by Spain in any case."

I promised to convey the Minister's views to Washington and he said he would convey my views to the Spanish Cabinet. He pointed out that the immediate solution rested neither in his hands nor in mine and he expressed the fervent wish that we might arrive soon at a point where the frank cordiality which for some time has been diminishing can be reesta[blished] [apparent omission] pouch a memorandum of the conversation and a copy and a translation of the Foreign Minister's memorandum of the conversation with which he furnished me today. I shall await the Department's further instructions.

HAYES

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711.52/355: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 16, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received February 17—3 p. m.]

551. My 550, February 16, 10 p. m. I told British Ambassador of my conversation with Jordana yesterday in the course of which Jordana had incidentally remarked that both British Ambassador and I and our Commercial Attachés had previously expressed the opinion that our request for a wolfram embargo was not a closed

matter and that what we really wanted was to limit so far as possible exports of wolfram to Germany. I vigorously denied this for myself and Ackerman. Hoare said he would seek an early interview with Jordana in order to confirm his complete support of my position.

HAYES

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711.52/357: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received February 19—3:10 a. m.]

573. Hoare has just informed me of a lengthy conversation he had yesterday with Jordana. After making clear that Great Britain fully supported our request for a complete permanent embargo on wolfram exports, Hoare reviewed other matters at issue between Spain and the Allies and elicited from Jordana the following itemized statement:

(1) Spain is willing to accept the British proposal concerning Italian merchant vessels namely that all except two will be released as soon as they are ready to sail and that the two will be held by Spain for its use under charter pending decision as to their ownership through subsequent negotiations or arbitration. Further Spain proposes to submit question of Italian warships to arbitration, a proposal which in the British Ambassador's opinion is hardly satisfactory but which by reason of the fact that the Admiralty places little value on the warships he believes the British Government would be disposed to accept.

(2) The Spanish Ambassador to Germany has just returned to Berlin with positive instructions to direct the prompt dissolution and repatriation of all the remaining units of the Blue Division and Blue Squadron. No Spanish Legion nor any other Spanish armed force would be allowed to serve in the war and no individual Spaniard enlisting in the German Army will receive any pay or aid of any sort from Spain.

(3) Spain is ready now to suppress German Consulate in Tangier and to expel its staff including all members of German Military Mission in Morocco. Moreover, Spanish Government "mean business" about taking the most stringent measures to prevent acts of sabotage and espionage against us throughout Spain and to punish their perpetrators.

(4) Spain cannot and will not consent to an absolute permanent embargo on wolfram exports. This would violate Spanish sovereignty and Franco and the Spanish Cabinet will positively not accept it regardless of sanctions or other serious consequences. If on this matter, however, the Allies would be conciliatory and would promptly resume petroleum shipments Spain would agree to limiting wolfram exports "to an insignificant amount of no real military value to



Germany". Without such an arrangement Spain cannot proceed to give full effect to the three items enumerated above.

Hoare believes that we have in the foregoing a basis for satisfactory agreement with Spain.

The first three items, with the possible exception of the proposal about the warships, represent in fact notable victories for United States and the fourth indicates a success in substance if not completely so in form.

Since the Department has made abundantly clear its position on wolfram I am making no new recommendations but, assuming the Department is interested principally in depriving Germany of wolfram rather than in broader objectives unknown to me, I submit the following observations.

The German Ambassador will doubtless return soon from Berlin bringing offers to Spain which may sound attractive even though Germany's ability to carry them out completely may be questioned.

According to Smith's calculations Spain's present petroleum reserves can be stretched to last from 4 to 6 months if existing drastic restrictions can be maintained. If the present impasse continues, the temporary embargo on wolfram exports may be lifted and our principal objectives may be defeated whether or not we succeed later in obtaining a complete embargo. The Germans now have pending applications for 225 tons. If we persist in our present policy we can be certain of harming Spain but we are not certain of harming Germany and an ultimate victory over Spain might be devoid of practical wartime benefits.

Three hundred tons of wolfram were made available to Germany early last month. In the light of Jordana's remarks to Hoare and to me and what the Portuguese Ambassador told me yesterday, there is a good possibility that we could obtain a continuing temporary embargo for the present 6 months and plus the promise of a drastic limitation of exports for the rest of the year. We would then effectively deprive the Germans of wolfram until the end of June and meanwhile military events may reduce the limited quantities to be made available to the Germans at a later date.

The willing cooperation of the Spanish Government in any plan designed to prevent wolfram from reaching [Ger]many is essential if smuggling is to be prevented or held to a minimum. A complete embargo is not a guarantee that smuggling will not take place. Moreover, the risks would be multiplied if Spanish Government gave an unwilling consent to such an embargo bearing in mind that German-owned mines have to fight to continue operating and that wolfram is also produced by tin mines. From the viewpoint of

practical results we would probably gain more from a willing drastic limitation than from an unwilling complete embargo.

A prompt solution of our pending problems in Spain would appear to be in our interest.

HAYES

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711.52/358 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1944—11 p. m.

458. Your 550, February 16, 10 p. m. Count Jordana's attitude is not understood, especially in reiterating the assumption that Spain has done the United Nations a great service by not embarking on an aggression against the United Nations. It is not usual in the community of nations for a country to assume that it is rendering a great service to its neighbors by not attacking them. The fact is that by keeping outside the conflict Spain served her own best interests. Spain now has an opportunity to serve those interests again. In enunciating this theory Jordana implies that Spain has in the past constituted a threat to us. However true this may be, the Department is surprised that the Foreign Minister should find it so easy to confess this.

As you are aware from our previous telegrams, the Department does not accept Jordana's absurd pretention that our unwillingness to consider his "formula" of issuing some public statement prior to Spanish agreement to a complete wolfram embargo places the responsibility for the present situation upon the United States. On the contrary it was the Spanish Government's unwillingness to respond to our patient and reasonable requests left with Count Jordana 3 months ago that forced us, acting entirely within our rights, to reconsider our long-standing support of Spain's economy. (Of course, once the Spanish Government has agreed to our requests, the Department will give sympathetic consideration to the issuance, prior to any publication of the arrangements agreed upon, of some such statement as Jordana suggests.)

You may inform Count Jordana that it is with keen disappointment and regret that we have read his message transmitted by you. There is no thought of "threatening" or "coercing" Spain in this matter but quite simply a strong conviction that we cannot justify making sacrifices to support Spanish economy in the absence of a willingness on the part of the Spanish Government to reciprocate our cooperative attitude; namely, to take the step entirely compatible with Spanish neutrality of declaring a permanent embargo on the exportation of wolf-

ram to all countries. You may further say to him that there would appear to be no purpose in continuing what have so far proved fruitless discussions and that much to our regret we are compelled to postpone any consideration of the resumption of tanker loadings indefinitely unless the Spanish Government should change its views. If you so desire, you may add that there the matter rests and that for the moment no further public statement is contemplated. It would be unfair to Count Jordana, however, not to let him know that this question is one in which the American public and press is evincing considerable interest and we do not know how long their present patient attitude can be maintained. So far in answer to all inquiries, we have replied that the question is still under discussion; obviously we cannot continue to give this answer indefinitely.

STETTINIUS

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711.52/353 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1944—10 a. m.

469. Your 546, February 16, noon. While Alba's views may reflect a former British position, the Department is confident your British colleague has now received instructions to support fully our efforts to obtain a complete and permanent wolfram embargo. For your information, there has been a satisfactory exchange of telegrams between the President and Mr. Churchill on this subject, in which the latter has indicated that your colleague has been instructed to align himself with you.

Ambassador Cárdenas called on the Acting Secretary Thursday<sup>66</sup> morning on his own initiative and indicated that his Government seemed to be expecting the Department to issue some conciliatory statement before reaching a decision on the wolfram matter. The Acting Secretary replied that we did not contemplate issuing a statement until full agreement has been signified by the Spanish Government to a complete wolfram embargo. The Ambassador referred to the importance of his Government's avoiding an appearance of yielding under pressure, and Mr. Dunn<sup>67</sup> said he thought there would be no great difficulty about issuing some statement provided the complete embargo was agreed to. The Ambassador expressed the hope that such a statement might be made prior to publicity concerning agreement on the wolfram matter. Mr. Stettinius said he foresaw no difficulties in this respect.

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<sup>66</sup> February 17.

<sup>67</sup> James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

Cárdenas intimated that while unaware of the nature of your most recent conversations with Jordana he had previously understood that you and your British colleague were prepared to consider a compromise. Both the Acting Secretary and Mr. Dunn made it clear that the British and American Governments are agreed that only a complete embargo will be satisfactory.

Cárdenas then referred to certain speculation in the *London Times* concerning the importance of bringing about a change of regime in Spain before the end of the war. The Acting Secretary assured him that our action had absolutely no political significance. Mr. Matthews<sup>68</sup> stressed strong feeling here that continued exports of wolfram to Germany at this stage of the war mean American casualties. To this Cárdenas observed the Germans might feel that some Spanish supplies to the Allies could also mean German casualties, and he mentioned the importance of German supplies to Spain, specifically wheat. The Acting Secretary said that wheat could be obtained in Argentina and said we will be glad to give sympathetic consideration to the possibility of supplying materials now obtained by Spain from Germany, once the wolfram embargo is established.

Cárdenas was allowed to remain in no doubt concerning the highest importance attached to the complete embargo of wolfram or concerning identity of British and American views on this.

Sent to Madrid repeated to London.

STETTINIUS

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1261 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*

[LONDON,] February 21, 1944.

586. Your telegram No. 467 of February 15th. Sir Samuel Hoare had already been instructed to give his fullest support to your Ambassador and I have now seen reports of further representation made by our Ambassadors at Madrid.

These show a settlement which I should myself regard as eminently satisfactory can now be reached on all points if we act quickly. This settlement would include complete cessation of Spanish wolfram exports to Germany for 6 months. If all goes as we hope I do not think we need anticipate much difficulty in maintaining this position when 6 months have elapsed.

The Foreign Secretary is telegraphing in greater detail to the State Department. I hope that you will agree that we should immediately

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<sup>68</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

clinch the matter on above basis which I am sure would represent a major political victory over the enemy.

2. We have just had a stick of bombs around 10 Downing Street and there are no more windows. Clemmie and I were at Chequers and luckily all the servants were in the shelter. Four persons killed outside.

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711.52/358 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 21, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received February 23—4: 59 a. m.]

601. I told Jordana today I had communicated to my Government an account of our last conversations. The basic reaction in Washington has been one of disappointment that the Spanish Government seems willfully to misunderstand our motives and intentions. We believe we have made clear that we intend to respect Spanish neutrality and sovereignty, that we wish only friendly relations with Spain, the Spanish people, and the Spanish Government, and that we want cooperation with Spain and not hostility or unfriendliness. My Government especially regrets the allegation that we are now "threatening" or "coercing" Spain. There is no thought whatsoever on the American side of "threats" or "coercion". What is in our minds quite simply is a strong conviction that we cannot justify making sacrifices to support Spanish economy in the absence of willingness on the part of the Spanish Government or [to] reciprocate our cooperative attitude; namely by taking the step entirely compatible with Spanish neutrality of declaring a permanent embargo on exportation of wolfram to all countries. Moreover my Government had asked me to repeat with emphasis what I had said to the Minister last Tuesday<sup>69</sup>—that responsibility for the present unfortunate situation does not rest with the United States. On the contrary it was the Spanish Government's unwillingness to respond to our patient and reasonable requests made over 3 months ago which obliged the United States acting strictly within its rights to reconsider its long standing support of Spanish economy and suspend petroleum shipments.

I said there was another point in his remarks of last Tuesday to which my Government has taken exception. He had implied that Spain had done the United Nations a great service by not cooperating in an Axis attack on US at Gibraltar [and] in North Africa. We fully recognized that the Spanish Government in 1940-1942 was professedly more pro-Axis than pro-Allied and that it did not even

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<sup>69</sup> February 15; see telegram 550, February 16, 10 p. m., from Madrid, p. 339.

pretend to be really neutral. But we recognized, as we supposed he did, that by keeping out of the conflict and by not cooperating with the Axis in attacks on Gibraltar and French Africa, Spain was serving her own best interests. Spain now has an opportunity to serve those interests again by granting our request for a wolfram embargo which in no respect would violate Spanish neutrality or impair Spanish sovereignty. I wished to make that point very clear.

Once the Spanish Government has agreed to a wolfram embargo, I said, there would be no great difficulty in Washington about issuing a statement as the Minister had proposed on February 3,<sup>70</sup> and there would be no difficulty about issuing the statement prior to any publicity concerning the agreement about the wolfram embargo.

The Foreign Minister observed that he was very sorry to hear what I had just said and to appreciate that there is no way of going on with our negotiations in view of the attitude of the American Government. He would not repeat all the arguments he had used hitherto. That seemed useless. He would, however, suggest that there was one and only one way out of the impasse between our Governments. He recognized that the impasse was brought about by the wolfram question and not by the other matters which had already been pretty well cleared up in conversations between him and myself and between him and the British Ambassador. The one possible way out of the wolfram trouble was to arrive at a quick arrangement: namely, for the American Government to accept a limitation of Spanish exports to Germany at a figure to be negotiated, possibly at 10 percent of the total 1943 exports. Such a concession to us by Spain would involve Spain in a vast deal of trouble with the Germans, to say nothing of the other pending questions on which Spain was prepared to make concessions to us but which the Germans would regard as indicating hostility to them. The longer the crisis lasts, the worse it will become, and the Minister hoped that his proposal could be quickly accepted and acted upon.

I said that we, too, wanted an early conclusion of the difficulties. There was an obvious difference between our request for a complete permanent wolfram embargo and the other requests we had made in the last 3 or 4 months. The grant of the latter did not involve any concessions by Spain to the United Nations; it was simply carrying into effect the formal declaration of Spanish neutrality. Certainly Spain was obligated as a neutral to put an end to acts of sabotage and espionage against us on Spanish soil, to withdraw all Spanish troops from combat against us or our Allies, and to release the Italian ships. On the contrary, the granting of a wolfram embargo was not required by Spanish neutrality, although it was not at all in conflict with Span-

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<sup>70</sup> See telegram 377, February 3, 6 p. m., from Madrid, p. 319.

ish neutrality. It would be a concession to the United States, but a concession closely related to the concession which we had been making in supplying Spain with petroleum products. It was the one real concession we were asking for, and of basic importance. I said I would report his proposal about the limitation of exports to my Government, but I was sure it would not be acceptable. My Government asked for a complete and permanent embargo, and only for that. I expressed agreement with him that there was no use of repeating the arguments pro and con in the matter. All had been fully submitted and discussed in our previous conversations.

The Foreign Minister said that he would like to state, only as an explanation and not as an argument, that espionage and sabotage prosecution in Spain was a neutral duty for this country if the prosecution was directed impartially against both sides, but the American Government should appreciate that, despite this being Spain's neutral duty, the carrying of it into full effect would create a vast amount of resentment, and probably many reprisals, on the part of the Germans. Regarding the other matters in question between us, exclusive of wolfram, he would admit they were all within the general province of Spain's duty as a neutral, though they fell into varying classifications, and about some of them there was some question about such neutral duty. Apparently we wanted an interpretation of neutrality in Spain as benevolent neutrality towards us.

He would go along with us in this respect just as far as he possibly could.

About wolfram, the Minister recognized that Spain had the right as a neutral to accept or deny the embargo, but already Spain had an agreement with the Germans to supply them with a certain amount of wolfram, and if Spain should accept our demand for an embargo it would have to break its agreement with the Germans. Nevertheless, if the fundamental question could be resolved through negotiations drastically limiting the amount of exports to Germany, and if the Allies would agree to take the remainder of Spain's wolfram production on reasonable prices, he felt the existing agreement with the Germans could be modified accordingly. He would like to be a little more specific on this proposal. What the Spanish Government proposed was to agree with Great Britain and the United States on a limitation to, say, 10 percent of wolfram exports to Germany, the Allies agreeing to take the rest at every [*very?*] reasonable prices to be fixed by negotiations. These negotiations would be essentially commercial and would be carried on by the Foreign Office with only expert aid from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.

I asked Minister if he deemed it proper and convenient, to inform me about actual existing agreement with Germans.

Minister replied that he had no reluctance to telling me about it. There was an agreement between Spain and Germany. It did not provide for fixed amount wolfram for export to Germany but amount was linked with general German-Spanish clearing whereby Spain furnished Germany wolfram and a few other commodities in exchange for receipt from Germany of machinery, armaments and certain other commodities. During 1943, 23% of Spain's wolfram exports had gone to Germany and it could be much smaller for 1944. The agreement was periodically renewed and if Spain could get from United Nations certain necessary commodities which it was now getting from Germany there would be no reason why Spain could not very drastically reduce its exports to Germany. On other hand we should bear in mind that wolfram industry is very important to Spain not just for few individuals and corporations but for very large number of Spanish people who work in wolfram mines and in transportation. Consequently Spain would like some guarantee from [us that?] we would continue at least for a time a [at] really reasonable prices to buy wolfram so that industry would not be immediately and utterly ruined.

I told Minister that as I had pointed out to him in original memorandum of November 18,<sup>70a</sup> and as I had very recently been reformed by my Government we were prepared to give sympathetic consideration to possibility of supplying materials now obtained by Spain from Germany once wolfram embargo is established. I repeated again that I was sure my Government would be satisfied only with full embargo not with mere limitation of exports to Germany.

To this Minister made no reply. I then said I hoped while he was consulting his Government further and I mine we could both avoid any unfortunate developments in realm of public recriminations. To date I said my Government had managed to hold in check various American propaganda agencies on American radio and these had not engaged in any attacks upon Spain or Spanish Government. However, I and my Government were seriously disturbed by publicity line now being followed in Spain at obvious dictation of Government here. On one hand Spanish censorship is not permitting Spanish press or radio to give real reasons for suspension of petroleum shipments as set forth officially by American Secretary of State. On other hand Government here is inspiring and directing fabrication for home consumption trying by means of press editorials to persuade Spanish people that United Nations are threatening Spain's neutrality and sovereignty. Moreover Spanish line is being implemented by great outbursts of German propaganda and rumor campaigns. If Spanish press and radio continue to pursue this hostile line toward us mis-

<sup>70a</sup> See telegram 3398, November 18, 1943, from Madrid, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 656.



representing a clear case then American radio and propaganda cannot be expected to continue to refrain from replying and explaining real situation to Spanish people. We resent misrepresentations of real situation. This can only make situation vastly worse.

Minister replied that Spanish Government preferred precisely those tactics in press radio and propaganda which would keep from knowledge of Spanish people general course and specific details of actual negotiations on assumption negotiations would be freer and more quickly and satisfactorily concluded thereby. The unfortunate publicity he said had been begun by Allies and was now producing, pitiless and unjust campaigns against Spain and Spanish Government. It was this very publicity which had made our negotiations so extremely difficult. The Spanish Government did not publish the statement of American Secretary of State on petroleum matter because it believed such publication would irritate Spanish public opinion. As for editorials which have been appearing recently in Spanish newspapers Government regards them as kind of safety valve for exasperated public opinion.

I said that my Government has certainly not conducted or thought of conducting any pitiless or unjust campaign against Spain or Spanish Government. Quite the contrary. We had been extremely patient and our press and radio have shown very remarkable restraint and indulgence. I could see no justification whatsoever for authorizing publication of editorials in Spanish newspapers which completely misrepresented our attitude and at least implied United States was making demands on Spain in violation of Spanish neutrality and sovereignty. He must know such charges and implications were entirely baseless.

Minister said he did not think it mattered very much what appeared in Spanish newspapers. No Spaniard took them very seriously. The editorials in question were perhaps a bit misleading and if so he would try to remedy them. I must be fully aware that mass of Spanish people knew what real difficulties were between Spain and United States and were thoroughly skeptical of silly and preposterous rumors that Germans tried to spread.

He thanked me for my friendly and cordial spirit and asked me to communicate anew with my Government and see if it would not be disposed to accept this way out of existing impasse. It was only way he knew and only one he felt would be accepted by Spanish Government. I told him I would inform my Government but must warn him again that my Government had itself proposed way out which was acceptable to it and which I still believed should be acceptable to Spain in Spain's own interest.

HAYES

711.52/360 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 22, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received February 23—2: 50 a. m.]

625. My 573 February 18, 10 p. m. Hoare states he has been informed by London that the three proposals made to him by Jordana are acceptable. Hoare plans to send a note to Foreign Office accepting proposal concerning Italian merchant ships namely that all except 2 will be released as soon as they are ready to sail and that the 2 will be held by Spain for its use under charter pending decision of their ownership through subsequent negotiation or arbitration.

I myself believe that we should hold out for release of the warships. While I cannot tell Jordana so without revealing the source of my information, I am familiar with the opinion of the legal advisers of the Foreign Office in sense that the warships should be released. The only compromise would be willing to recommend would be with reference to the timing of the release which I think might well be delayed for a month or so.

British Government considers that only problem remaining to be settled is that of wolfram. London informs Hoare that Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt have been in communication with each other and that British are disposed to support our request for a total embargo. However what they really want is to stop further wolfram shipments to Germany for next 6 months regardless of whether or not stoppage is called an embargo and London tells Hoare it is making further representations to Washington in the matter.

My 601 February 21, 8 p. m. Hoare considers my conversation with Jordana yesterday marks a considerable advance in negotiations and that Jordana's suggestion may be the basis of an agreement. I assume he will so report to his Government.

HAYES

711.52/357 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 24, 1944—10 p. m.

515. Your 573, February 18, 10 p. m. On February 21 the British Embassy here submitted to the Department an *aide-mémoire*<sup>70b</sup> outlining the discussions which had taken place between Sir Samuel Hoare and Jordana. The *aide-mémoire* states that as a result of dis-

<sup>70b</sup> Not printed.

cussions at Madrid the Spanish Government has given assurances that they are prepared now (1) to expel from Tangier the German military agents and German Consulate; (2) to put a drastic stop in Spain and North Africa to the espionage activities of the Germans; (3) to dissolve and repatriate Spanish units on the Russian front and not to allow any new units or reliefs to leave Spain; (4) to settle on terms agreeable to us and the British the question of the Italian merchant ships; (5) to refer to arbitration the question of the release of the Italian warships; (6) to give every facility for assuring a drastic limitation of the exports of wolfram. The *aide-mémoire* further states that Jordana has agreed to consider the possibility in practice that exports of wolfram to Germany should be reduced to a point which would in fact result in no shipments at all being made during the next 6 months. It is our understanding that the 6 months' period would begin to run from the date of agreement with the Spanish Government and that between now and such date no wolfram will be exported. A definite undertaking on the part of the Spanish Government on the basis of the foregoing is acceptable to us, provided that practical and effective measures are in fact instituted through which we can be fully assured that no wolfram will be shipped or smuggled to Germany from Spain during the agreed-upon 6 months' period. Immediately upon receipt of the Spanish Government's assurances that all the foregoing undertakings will be carried out, authorization will be given for the resumption of tanker loadings.

The foregoing has been discussed with British Embassy officials and represents a combined and agreed position. You are requested to associate yourself with Sir Samuel Hoare in further discussions with Jordana with a view to obtaining Spanish agreement to the foregoing arrangements.

It is not our intention that agreement to these arrangements for the 6 months' period shall in any way commit us to continue tanker loadings, should subsequent discussions fail to result in satisfactory agreement covering subsequent periods. We recognize, however, that with the progress of the war, conditions in Europe may undergo considerable change in the interim. Once the arrangements set forth above, however, have been agreed to, we will be prepared to examine with the British and Spanish authorities the possibilities of strengthening our assistance to Spain's economy, particularly with reference to any supply difficulties from Axis sources which might result from Spain's action.

Since drafting the foregoing your 601, February 21, has been received. The two references to Jordana's proposal of limiting wolfram exports to Germany to a 10 percent figure are not clear. One reference refers to "10 percent of total 1943 exports", the other to "10

percent of wolfram exports to Germany". Furthermore, your telegram makes no reference to the exports licensed in January and whether the exports are included in the 10 percent figure. If the proposal relates to 10 percent of licensed exports in 1943 and not to both licensed and smuggled, and includes the January 1944 exports, we interpret the proposal to mean that in practice there would be no further wolfram exports to Germany in 1944. If this interpretation is correct you are authorized to negotiate on the basis of Jordana's proposal. We are not concerned with form as long as we get the result we want—namely complete cessation of wolfram exports to Germany. We do not insist that the Spaniards call it a "total embargo".

Sympathetic consideration will be given to Jordana's request that we purchase Spain's wolfram at reasonable commercial prices. FEA now has the proposal under study and we hope to inform you further within a few days.

Repeat to Lisbon and keep Lisbon currently and fully informed of further developments on this subject.

STETTINIUS

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711.52/368 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, February 28, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

682. Your 515, February 24, 10 p. m. In my conversation with Jordana this morning he confirmed that limitation on exports of wolfram to Germany to be based on total export licenses issued during 1943, that exports to Germany during 1944 would be drastically reduced to as low as 10% of total exports during 1943, and that within that figure there would be included the shipments made during January of this year. In view of January shipments he proposed that there be no further shipments to Germany during the first 6 months of this year and that the arrangement for the second 6 months be subject to future discussion.

I said I could not agree to the 6-month periods dating from the beginning of the year and that the minimum my Government might accept would be that it apply from the date of the agreement. Jordana stated he could not accept this revision until he received necessary authority from the Cabinet and as the Cabinet would meet tomorrow he would call me immediately upon receiving its decision.

When I informed him that information in our possession indicated total exports for 1943 were about 3100 tons Jordana remarked that he did not have before him the exact figures. He expressed the hope

that we would be prepared, as soon as the wolfram matter was arranged, to resume shipments of petroleum products on a scale which would compensate for the period of suspension and asked whether we would be prepared to continue wolfram purchases. I stated that once the general wolfram problem was solved we would be prepared to consider means of strengthening Spanish economy and to this end we would wish expeditious detailed negotiations and that we would give sympathetic consideration to his request that we continue wolfram purchases for a time at really reasonable commercial prices.

I stated that my Government considers that upon the conclusion of an understanding on wolfram all matters at issue will have been settled. I summarized the other matters as follows (1) the German Military Mission and the German Consul in Tangier will be expelled and sabotage and espionage activities of German agents in Spain and North Africa will be stopped; (2) Spanish units on the Russian front and in Germany will be immediately dissolved and repatriated and no new units or relief will be allowed to leave Spain; (3) all Italian merchant vessels will be released except two to be held by Spain on charter pending settlement of ownership by arbitration; (4) question of release of Italian warships will be submitted to arbitration as proposed by him. I pointed out that the latter agreement was a considerable concession from our standpoint in view of our conviction of our strong legal position.

Jordana gave me a résumé of the steps already taken by Spain to implement the foregoing agreements. Agreement has been reached with the Germans insofar as concerns item number 2. The Germans have already agreed to withdraw their military mission from Tangier but the question of the suppression of the German Consulate has not yet been discussed with the Germans although the Spanish Government is prepared to take immediate action in this matter. On items 3 and 4 we are in full agreement.

Jordana stated that the Spanish Government is under strong pressure from the Germans. He showed me a note from the German Embassy which he stated was based on a Reuters despatch dated February 22 from Washington reported to have originated with the *New York Times* to the effect that Jordana had submitted a proposal to limit wolfram shipments to Germany to some small token amounts which was acceptable to the British but that the Americans were intransigent in demanding a complete embargo. This and other leakages have made much more difficult the position of the Spanish Government vis-à-vis the Germans who have used them in their attempts to disturb relations between the United States and Spain.

Jordana requested in this connection that immediately after full agreement on wolfram is reached and before there is general pub-

licity concerning steps to be taken by the Spaniards, the Secretary issue a statement similar to statement made by Eden last week.<sup>71</sup> He said this would have the result of disabusing the public of the impression which the Germans are fostering that the United States is tougher than Britain. I, myself, believe that such a statement should be made immediately, particularly in view of progress made recently.

I shall report Cabinet decision on proposed 6 months' suspension of wolfram shipments to Germany as soon as I receive it. If favorable, I request authority to authorize sailings of Spanish tankers nominated in my 540 February 15, 10 p. m.<sup>72</sup> for March 21-22 loadings. I request immediate reply on this point.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

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711.52/368: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—10 p. m.

567. Your 682, February 28, 5 p. m. Your exposition of proposal re wolfram (your paragraph 1) is not clear. Department understands this to mean Germany will get no more wolfram during 6 months counting from date of agreement and thereafter in 1944 will receive no more than approximately 10 tons (300 tons already received plus 10 tons equals 10 percent of 3,100 tons).

If this understanding is correct you may authorize sailings when agreement is reached beyond possibility of equivocation. However the Department will have to consider your proposal to resume shipments on a scale to compensate for a period of suspension.

The Department is not prepared to make a public statement prior to complete agreement.

STETTINIUS

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1262: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 2, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

720. Germans are actively buying wolfram. Their prices are roughly 20 percent higher than ours and as a result our intake for past

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<sup>71</sup> Apparently reference is to the statement Mr. Eden made in a speech on February 23, 1944, in the House of Commons when he said: "In the dark days of the war . . . the attitude of the Spanish Government, in not giving our enemies passage through Spain, was extremely helpful to us. It was especially so at the time of the North African liberation." For text of speech, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 397, col. 933.

<sup>72</sup> Not printed.

few days has dropped considerably. At meeting of a committee yesterday the corporations were authorized to increase prices on selective basis up to 5 pesetas a unit not with view to acquiring more mineral but to elevate prices Germans will be obliged to pay.

On reasonable assumption that present temporary embargo will be continued until satisfactory agreement is reached for limitation on exports, we have abandoned our policy of all-out purchasing and have adopted foregoing maneuver designed to tie up as much German capital as possible in wolfram which they will be unable to export.

Repeated to Lisbon and London.

HAYES

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711.52/380 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 7, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received March 9—12:26 p. m.]

792. I called on Foreign Minister at his request this morning. He said he had submitted an account of our negotiations to the Council of Ministers which had expressed pleasure at good disposition of American and British Governments and especially that we had consented to withdraw our request for a complete and permanent wolfram embargo in favor of a limitation on exports to Germany.

He said he had been authorized to set up a special commission comprising technical experts of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Industry and Commerce and of American and British Embassies, in order to fix the exact limitation to be placed on wolfram exports. He said he would remind me in this connection that last August Spain had concluded a commercial agreement with Germany under which Germany was entitled to acquire from Spain as much wolfram as the status of the German-Spanish clearing would permit. It seemed obvious to the Council therefore that if Spain were to meet our desires it would have to violate this agreement with Germany or negotiate a new agreement. It was proposed therefore that negotiations should proceed with the Allies on one side and Germans on the other. The Government is anxious to reach an early conclusion and the Minister believed that a time limit must be set up on negotiations. Meanwhile the temporary embargo now in force will continue.

Minister then reminded me that all other pending matters had been agreed to and that further definitive action on them would be taken as soon as an agreement on wolfram was reached. He hoped therefore that American Government would not continue to embargo petroleum supplies to Spain.

I expressed great disappointment and said it appeared to me that the Council of Ministers had taken a big step backwards. I said that in our last conversation we had seemed to be in agreement that wolfram exports to Germany during 1944 should be limited to 10% of the total amount for which export licenses had been issued in 1943. I understood that he would present this proposal to the Council of Ministers and had so informed my Government which had expressed its willingness to authorize resumption of petroleum shipments if the Council of Ministers approved the proposal and if full assurance was given on other pending matters.

Now I was told that a commission was to be set up to arrange for a limitation of exports, probably at a higher figure than 10 percent and involving additional delay. It must be obvious to him that, in the absence of positive assurances concerning wolfram, petroleum shipments could not be resumed.

Jordana said that when he reported to the Council concerning the negotiations with me he had to report at the same time concerning current relations with Germany and the existing commercial agreement with that country. The Council perceived a discrepancy between our request and the 10 percent proposal on the one hand and the agreement with Germany on the other. The Council felt that a 10 percent restriction would be an embargo under a different name and therefore felt that another arrangement must be made. While the percentage could be low, it must be of such nature as to permit negotiation of a new agreement with the Germans which would not outrage them and which would not constitute a flagrant violation of the existing agreement with the Germans.

He said he wanted to make clear that the Council was quite willing to reach an agreement sufficiently favorable to us to constitute a friendly gesture by Spain toward the United Nations and a generally unfriendly gesture toward Germany, but the Council believed at the same time that new negotiations with Germany would be necessary. Jordana urged that the matter be treated by the proposed commission and expressed the opinion that there would be little discrepancy between the 10% suggested and the figure proposed by the Spaniards. He said that in any event the establishment of the Commission would be helpful to him in softening German reaction.

I again expressed disappointment and reminded Jordana that his new suggestion was quite at variance with the proposal he, himself, had made to me previously to the effect that instead of a complete embargo exports to Germany during 1944 might be reduced to as low as 10% of total 1943 exports calculated on the basis of export licenses issued. I had told him that I would submit his proposal to my Gov-



ernment although I did not believe it would prove acceptable. My Government, much to my surprise, had accepted the proposal and I had so informed him on February 28. He had expressed relief at this attitude of my Government and believed an agreement could be reached.

Jordana reiterated that the Council of Ministers was not far away from the proposal we had discussed, but that it felt that discussion with the Germans would be expedited and facilitated through the operation of the proposed commission.

I said that I would, of course, act on his suggestion and would nominate Ackerman to represent the Embassy on the Commission, and I would inform the British Ambassador of his proposal and expected the British Ambassador would likewise appoint a representative to the Commission. I could hold out no hope however that my Government would be willing to accept a "compromise" and ventured the opinion that the further delay necessarily involved would mean that Spain would have more trouble, rather than less, with Germany.

Jordana said he believed a settlement could be reached in a short time. Negotiations with the Germans were already proceeding rapidly. Meanwhile, the Spanish Government had no thought of going back on assurances already given to United States. The Commission would be headed by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and would be composed of technical experts from the Foreign Office and from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. He said the Commission would begin to work promptly.

I have informed Hoare of the foregoing and I believe he will appoint Ellis-Rees to represent the British with the Commission.

Meanwhile I left no doubt in Jordana's mind that petroleum shipments would not be resumed until a really satisfactory agreement was reached, and I gave him no reason to believe that we would accept anything less than the 10% limitation on which he had previously proposed.

Jordana showed less confidence in his own position, this morning. It is evident that he was unsuccessful in selling the 10% proposal to the Council of Ministers and it is possible that the Council considers it more prudent to delay agreement and accept the economic disadvantages of such delay pending the outcome of large scale military developments on the continent, which the Spanish public feel are imminent.

Repeated to Lisbon.

HAYES

711.52/383 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 9, 1944—noon.

[Received March 10—7:54 p. m.]

817. My 792 March 7. It is evident that we have reached another impasse in our wolfram negotiations. Jordana's proposal to limit wolfram exports to Germany to as low as 10% of total exports last year and to institute a 6 months' embargo which was acceptable to us has not been agreed to by Council of Ministers. On the other hand there is nothing in telegrams from Department to indicate we would be content on anything less than Jordana's proposal.

Ackerman and Harrington<sup>73</sup> had a long luncheon conversation Monday<sup>74</sup> with Carceller<sup>75</sup> at latter's invitation. Carceller reported as follows:

Jordana endeavored to get the Council's approval to the 6 months' embargo and 10% limitation but the Council declined to give its approval. Jordana's suggestion that the matter be handled by a special committee is merely a temporizing device. Committee will have no power. Power will continue to rest in the Council which at its last meeting took a definite stand against an "embargo" and against giving way to "coercion".

The Council approved an agreement made between Jordana and the German Ambassador for the purchase by Spain from Germany of material valued at 2 billion pesetas for the erection in Spain of a synthetic gasoline plant subject to subsequent signing of detailed contract at which time 30% of total sum involved or 600,000,000 pesetas would be made available to the Germans. When Carceller objected on grounds that the scheme was not practical Franco agreed but approved the decree with remark that it would not be necessary to follow it through to a conclusion. (Jordana has not mentioned this alleged agreement to me but the Council of Ministers recently issued a public announcement of the forthcoming production of synthetic gasoline in Spain.)

Carceller further stated that Jordana's estimate of percentage of wolfram exported to Germany in 1943 is erroneous. Instead of about 700 tons licenses were granted for between 1000 and 1100 tons. In other words Germany received about 33% of total export permits instead of 23% as Jordana claimed. Carceller questioned Jordana's figures at Council meeting saying he had true figures since he had issued licenses.

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<sup>73</sup> Julian F. Harrington, First Secretary of Embassy in Spain.

<sup>74</sup> March 6.

<sup>75</sup> Demetrio Carceller, Minister of Industry and Commerce.

Carceller indicated to Ackerman and Harrington that he could arrange the wolfram matter if we would :

1. Agree to let an additional 209 tons of wolfram go to Germany between now and end of August. He said Spanish Government was committed to supply this amount. He did not specify exact nature of commitment nor by whom it was made but he said the commitment was effective and that it could not be canceled. I suspect that Carceller himself may have made commitment and that Jordana may be ignorant of it. He said he could spread export licenses for the 209 tons out between now and end of August.

2. Purchase Spanish wolfram output at prices well below present levels. Such lower prices would cause sharp contraction in output.

3. Supply Spain with commodities received in the past plus other commodities such as motor trucks, copper, etc. which Germany cannot supply in exchange for which he would be prepared if necessary to requisition excessive German stocks.

Carceller ridiculed Jordana and discounted his ability to reach or carry out effectively a satisfactory agreement with us. His attitude confirmed reports of open conflict between Jordana and Carceller with latter still exerting strong influence in economic matters and acting with comparative independence of Foreign Office.

While Carceller was obviously trying to sell a bill of goods to Ackerman and Harrington and while there have been persistent reports that he has lost Franco's confidence and while yesterday's conversation was clearly an effort on his part to retain control of wolfram negotiations which Franco has placed in the hands of Jordana, according to latter, it is also clear that Jordana is not at present in a position to obtain Cabinet approval to either a 6 months' embargo or to a 10% limitation on exports and it is possible he may not be able to obtain such approval in the future.

Meanwhile time may not be entirely in our favor because our peseta situation is deteriorating rapidly and in presence of continuing unwillingness of our supply authorities to furnish goods to Spain, we estimate that wolfram purchases can be continued at present rate only until end of month. There is no indication that Spain is willing to accept gold from United States at this time. In fact present indications are that it will not. There is reason to fear, therefore, that by the end of month we shall have to suspend wolfram purchases and the Germans will then be in a position to buy freely at much lower prices and that they will use the large amounts of wolfram they have already acquired and will acquire to bring additional pressure on Spain to issue export licenses.

Meanwhile also Jordana has reminded me that the present temporary embargo on wolfram exports cannot be continued indefinitely in the absence of some agreement and has said that a time limit should be placed on the deliberations of wolfram committee.

In reviewing developments of recent weeks, it is apparent that Germany and we are following exactly opposite tactics in endeavoring to influence Spain at present time.

While we have cut off petroleum supplies and have been reluctant to offer satisfactory amounts of other materials of which we have an exportable surplus such as cotton and while our supplies to Spain and therefore our power to purchase in Spain have been steadily reduced, Germany, as I have several times reported, is making a prodigious effort to supply Spain at considerable sacrifice to itself. In addition to war materials Germany is supplying wheat, barley, potatoes, heavy machinery and a variety of other materials. The balance in the clearing on March 1st favorable to Germany was 65,500,000 reichsmarks.

Germany through this means is acquiring increased purchasing power and at the same time [we] are insisting that Spain refrain from exporting to Germany not only wolfram but other commodities such as olive oil, almonds, wool, et cetera. We are attempting by pressure to prevent Spain from exporting surplus Spanish products to Germany in return for products that Germany is eager to supply and which Spain badly needs while we so far have made no definite commitments to Spain that we will ourselves either continue to purchase Spain's surplus commodities or show a willingness comparable to that of Germany to supply Spain with commodities it requires.

Germany is not only supplying Spain with large quantities of needed materials but is making all kinds of promises for the future which it may not be able to fulfill but which are nonetheless impressive to the Spanish Government especially to Franco and certain Cabinet members who still have great respect for German military and economic strength.

In contrast with Germany's willingness to offer freely, this Embassy on the other hand, has been given no latitude in this direction. We cannot even discuss future economic relations with Spain until the wolfram question is settled to our satisfaction.

Moreover despite the fact that Germany during the present war has suffered a diplomatic defeat of the first magnitude in Spain, which contributed very substantially to the loss of the Mediterranean to the Axis and to the surrender of Italy, it continued, in its own interest, because it is still seeking economic advantages from Spain, to say pleasant things about Spain officially and publicly. This impresses the Spaniards favorably.

We on the other hand have made known officially and publicly our dissatisfaction with Spain and our popular press constantly reminds the present regime of its offenses, real and imagined, while little or no effort is made to present the more favorable sides of the Spanish picture which have been concealed from our public.

I hesitate to make new recommendations concerning our policy toward Spain principally because I cannot have in Madrid the over-all picture which the Department has. However, I believe the Department should have very closely in mind the following:

(1) The Spaniards are a stubborn race who are characteristically incapable of determining their long-term interests and acting in accordance with them. If they were more rational and intelligent in such matters they would not have had the disastrous history they have had during the last several centuries.

(2) Continued economic boycott may well strengthen Franco internally at least for a time and drive Spain into German arms, economically, if not politically and militarily.

(3) If agreement on wolfram is not reached shortly the temporary embargo on wolfram exports may be lifted, in which case whatever may be the subsequent arrangements if any which we make with Spain, we will have failed to attain our primary objective of depriving Germany of wolfram from Spain. If our suspension of petroleum shipments is thereafter continued and we extend our boycott against Spain, as public opinion in the United States might require us to do, Spain's trade with Germany will doubtless be intensified rather than diminished, and I for one do not know how we can prevent it except by military means.

(4) If agreement on wolfram is not reached, we cannot expect full compliance with our other pending requests, which has been promised and when carried into effect will constitute another important political defeat for Germany.

(5) If suspension of petroleum shipments is continued indefinitely we cannot expect to be permitted to retain our large staff of petroleum observers and other "Attachés" many of whom are doing work which certain agencies of our Government appear to consider very important in connection with our future military operations in France.

(6) If our trade with Spain diminishes or disappears, the trend of Spanish policy away from the Axis and toward us will have been reversed and we may expect to lose many privileges we now have, such as comparatively free communication with resistance groups in France, free evacuation of our numerous military refugees, principally aviators, et cetera, et cetera. In fact it will be difficult for us to maintain normal diplomatic relations with Spain.

I believe that, if we continue to maintain our present attitude, either Spain will eventually give in to our demands or the present regime eventually will be overthrown. Much will depend on our military progress on the continent. However, there is a chance that meanwhile Germany will have been able to get large quantities of wolfram and other strategic materials out of Spain precisely at the time its needs are most critical. As pleasing as the overthrow of this regime might be to us from the ideological viewpoint, I have distinct reservations concerning the utility to U.S. of such a development, with attendant risk of civil war, from the military point of view.

I do not prophesy with any degree of certainty that if we persist in our present attitude all, or even any, of the unfavorable developments which I have given as possibilities, will take place. The prospect of continuing to be deprived of petroleum and other products from Americas is indeed a grim one. It may be that the Spaniards will give in before we do. It may be also that considerations of overall policy justify us in taking the risks. On the other hand it would be a mistake for us to underestimate the strength of Germany's position in Spain or to ignore the very definite risks involved in continuing our present attitude.

I am unable accurately to evaluate Carceller's present strength in the Government. However, in evaluating his proposal we should bear in mind (1) that if agreed to it would mean that wolfram exports to Germany during the first 8 months of this year would be approximately half of export permits given to Germany during all of last year and, more important, that total exports to Germany during the 8 months' period of this year would be much lower than they would be if Germany were allowed freely to export the large amounts of wolfram it has already purchased this year and is in a position to purchase during coming months, and (2) that, regardless of what kind of agreement we may reach with Spain, the problem of smuggling is going to be an extremely difficult one. The Spanish coast line is long and imperfectly policed. If Germany's need of wolfram is as urgent as we claim it is, Germany will not neglect any opportunity legal or otherwise to smuggle wolfram out of Spain. We ourselves have smuggled wolfram out. Smuggling across the Portuguese border is a common occurrence. Spanish minor officials are notoriously venal and wolfram is so valuable that the Germans can afford to pay huge bribes to get it out.

Our best hope of limiting smuggling is to reach an agreement with the Spaniards which, while drastically reducing potential wolfram exports to Germany, will be attractive enough to the Spaniards to induce them to cooperate willingly in carrying it out.

Repeated to London. By pouch to Lisbon.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1269 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 10, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received March 12—4:09 p. m.]

828. One of Carceller's closest associates who was present at luncheon mentioned my 817, March 9 subsequently called at Embassy

to ascertain whether we could accept a modified formula if he could obtain assurances from Minister of Foreign Affairs of latter's presentation of such a formula to Cabinet. He stated that apart from the Cabinet's resistance to coercion a principal obstacle to a solution to the present impasse was certain definite commitments made by the Spanish Government to the Germans by which they could use any part of the considerable sums created by German exports to Spain for the purchase of wolfram. If we would agree to an arrangement whereby Spain might export to Germany 209 tons of wolfram and place Spain in position to deny German demands by purchasing the exportable wolfram surplus ostensibly as compensation for certain commodities which Germany could not supply to Spain he felt that Jordana and Carceller arguing separately could convince the Cabinet of desirability of accepting such a formula. This 209 tons could be released at the rate of 35 tons per month which roughly corresponds to production of German mines. This he pointed out would have several advantages of denying the Germans access to substantial sums accumulated for wolfram purchases, it would limit to an infinitesimal quantity having no wartime significance to us the amount of wolfram which the Germans would receive during next 6 months and it would tie in with the general scheme of Spanish Portuguese relations. He stated that Portuguese had been closely following our wolfram discussions with the Spaniards and are faced with dilemma of finding a formula which while partly meeting our demands would not deny the Germans access to wolfram produced by German mines in Portugal. If an arrangement such as proposed were consummated in Spain the Portuguese would probably follow in same path.

Needless to say he was informed of our desire for a full wolfram embargo and his interesting viewpoint concerning effect on our Portuguese negotiations was received without comment.

Repeated to Lisbon by pouch.

HAYES

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711.52/380 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—9 p. m.

730. Your 792, March 7, 10 p. m.

1. The Department sees no value in participating in the commission of technical experts whose apparent purpose is to seek a compromise solution, in which task the Embassy's representative would appear to have nothing to contribute. Please advise Jordana that we see no useful purpose to be gained by participating in such a commission.

2. In reading your 817, March 9, noon, 828, March 10, 10 a. m., and 866, March 11, 6 p. m.,<sup>76</sup> the Department concludes we have reached a situation of some gravity in which Jordana, having offered a solution to which we agreed, then found himself unable to bind his own Government, and in which Carceller has held separate discussions with members of our Embassy tending to discredit the Foreign Minister's authority and to put forward other proposals the nature of which is neither clear nor satisfactory.

3. The Department requests that you bring to Jordana's attention the unsatisfactory state of affairs in which one Minister is seeking to work out a compromise informally, Jordana himself has conveyed his Government's suggestion of a technical commission, presumably for the purpose of attempting another compromise solution, whereas we can find no compelling reason why any solution other than that already accepted by us is necessary for consideration.

4. For your information, the Department has received from London a cable dated March 10, 9 p. m.<sup>77</sup> indicating that Carceller has also been discussing wolfram with members of the British Embassy. This coincidence may suggest that Carceller is inviting an overture of some kind on the theory, which he may be trying to establish, that while the Foreign Minister is helpless to effect an agreement he, Carceller, could accomplish something. The British Government has the impression that the Spanish Government wishes to supply Germany an additional 200 tons of wolfram this year, and the British Government seems to be thinking along the line of leaving the question of this additional tonnage in the second half of 1944 for later decision while insisting that no more wolfram be furnished Germany during the first half of 1944. We are told this does not represent a decision of the British Government but is merely exploratory thought.

5. It should be forcefully called to Jordana's attention that the Spanish Government appears to be running a considerable risk in allowing German wolfram to rest at the frontier and in allowing the Germans to continue actively buying in the wolfram market so long as a solution has not been agreed upon. This constitutes a serious responsibility and appears to invite an incident capable of threatening our entire trade program. It is felt that the Spanish Government would be well advised to adopt such precautionary measures as would remove from proximity to the frontier all wolfram stocks and cause wolfram market activity to cease. You should also caution the Spanish Government against committing itself during the course of our present conversations to any other important concessions to Germany, as for example in the matter of woolen goods, olive oil, or skins.

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<sup>76</sup> Telegram 866 not printed.

<sup>77</sup> Telegram 1972, not printed.



6. As indicated by you, the wolfram situation has brought all negotiations on matters relating to our general trade program to a standstill. We think it desirable temporarily to suspend discussion on the question of fats and oils, cotton, fertilizers, and hides, as well as other Spanish requirements. We are confident that we could continue to make available to Spain the normal amount of materials she has been taking under the previous trade programs and it would be possible to increase certain of the items, such as cotton, provided, of course, that satisfactory arrangements are made to prevent reexport of such and similar products, such arrangements being considered essential by us. Moreover, it is felt that we are in a position to supply Spain with the requirements which she normally obtains from Germany, although no definite commitments can be made until we know the quantities and specifications of such requirements. If you consider it will serve a useful purpose in connection with the wolfram situation, you may advise Jordana generally along the foregoing lines pointing out, however, that no commitments will be made at this time and emphasizing that discussion of such matters must await agreement concerning wolfram.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1275: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—9 p. m.

764. Your 938, March 16.<sup>78</sup> We do not understand your statement to the effect that parts of our 515, February 24, are at variance with each other. That telegram outlined the British interpretation of Jordana's 6 months' proposal which was that beginning from the date an agreement was reached no wolfram would be exported to Germany for 6 months. Such a proposition was acceptable to us and you were so informed. However before despatching our telegram (515) Jordana's 10 percent formula proposal was received. A further paragraph was added to our telegram saying the 10 percent formula was acceptable provided it meant in practice no further exports of wolfram. The 6 months' proposal and the 10 percent formula were two separate suggestions by Jordana. Our 515 left it open to you to negotiate on the basis of either one or the other. The British here and we were and still are agreeable to either formula. We will still accept either proposal.

As indicated in our 730, March 16, we see no useful purpose in going on with the commission which the Spanish are setting up. We

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

are not prepared to recede from our proposal that there be no further wolfram exports to Germany.

Proposals with regard to our overall approach to our economic relations with Spain are now being formulated and instructions with regard to them should reach you early next week.

Sent to Madrid, repeated to London and Lisbon.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1275: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—midnight.

815. 1. Since despatch of our 764 of March 18, the British Embassy has left with the Department an *aide-mémoire*<sup>79</sup> to the following effect:

(a) The British Government has been ready to support fully our request for a total wolfram embargo so long as it did not prejudice essential British requirements in Spain and we did not run the risk of finally losing or indefinitely postponing the obtaining of satisfaction on our other demands;

(b) If the present impasse continues we may risk losing satisfaction of those demands and, in addition, the Germans may possibly obtain 700 tons of wolfram now on the frontier and British purchases of iron ore, potash, etc. may be threatened because of lack of funds which are dependent upon the goodwill of the Spanish and exports to Spain;

(c) The British Government does not believe that a prolongation of oil embargo or even the imposition of additional sanctions will gain us an effective long-term wolfram embargo, and consequently a short-term agreement should be sought, covering the next few months, after which we could review the situation in the light of the then existing political and military situations;

(d) As the cause of the impasse is the Spaniards' promise of 209 tons more of wolfram to the Germans, the basis of the agreement would be to hold up deliveries until later in the year, regarding the 300 tons already delivered as covering the first half year and we agreeing that, if the Spanish Government gives assurances that no further deliveries will be made until July or August, we will resume petroleum shipments.

2. The British proposal is of course a variation of our previous position which would have permitted a resumption of loadings in return for a minimum 6-month embargo. The proposal also envisages the possibility of agreeing to the shipment of 100 tons in the next few months and although it does not specifically say so, possibly being forced to condone shipping the balance of 209 tons later in the year.

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<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

The Department appreciates the British need for iron ore, potash, etc. and is therefore willing to consent to a variation of the original proposal, but only upon certain express conditions. Without such conditions and without making our ultimate position entirely clear, the Spaniards might be led to doubt our intention to maintain a strong line in the future. This is particularly so in light of the fact that we would seem to be giving in to Spanish counter-pressure, for the offer would be made at a time when the Spaniards have refused us export permits for cotton textiles and are apparently making it difficult for the British to obtain the necessary exchange for supply purchases.

3. The British Embassy is telegraphing our views to London. If your British colleague receives similar instructions, you are authorized to join with him in approaching the Spaniards along the lines of the following paragraphs 4 and 5.

4. Subject to supply considerations, we will authorize the resumption of petroleum shipments at the previous program rate, provided

(a) the Spanish Government assures us that it will, and in fact does, take effective steps to prevent wolfram in any form or manner, whether by smuggling or otherwise, from going to the enemy at least until after July 31;

(b) the Spanish authorities promptly and effectively meet us on our other demands, such as the withdrawal of the Blue Division and other Spanish troops opposing United Nations forces, the closing of the Tangier Consulate and the expulsion of German agents, the suppression of German espionage and sabotage, and the release of the Italian ships;

(c) the Spanish Government assures us that it will make available the necessary facilities to enable us to purchase in Spain and to export materials of the types we have been purchasing in the past;

(d) there are no further breaches of existing export restrictions or prohibitions, such as the recently reported shipment to Hungary of woolen textiles containing 12 per cent cotton;

(e) Consumption of petroleum products by the Spaniards shall be at rates comparable to imports;

(f) it is clearly understood by the Spaniards that we are making no commitment concerning petroleum shipments subsequent to July 31.

5. During the period ending July 31, we are prepared to discuss with the Spaniards an enlarged trade program which would be mutually beneficial. Pending negotiation of such a program, however, the Spaniards should be cautioned against making any commitments to the Germans as such commitments would doubtless have a most serious effect upon the results of the negotiations and our general attitude.

6. FEA places wolfram at the very top of the list of important German raw material shortages and it is our view that every effort should be continued to prevent even small quantities going to Ger-

many. For this reason and to prevent a very serious possible incident, we consider it particularly important that the German stocks be removed to safety, as pointed out in our 730 of March 16. For your information and for such use as you in your discretion care to make of it, it is the Department's intention to suspend petroleum and probably other shipments if the Spaniards permit any wolfram to go to Germany even after July 31. We can foresee no occasion for agreeing to a solution which would permit the 209 tons going to the enemy. In this connection, we can find no record of Jordana's previous advice, as reported in your 792 of March 7, that Spain had agreed last August to supply Germany with as much wolfram as the status of the Spanish-German clearing would permit, and we doubt very much that any such commitment was made. In fact Jordana's recent advice to you to the effect that the use of German funds was subject to Foreign Office consent would seem to negative any such preexisting commitment.

7. With respect to point (d) of your 938 of March 16,<sup>80</sup> we will not make up for suspended petroleum loadings. Spain's point that she should not be penalized by reduced petroleum imports when she has maintained an embargo is frankly not very impressive, particularly in face of the fact that considerable shipments of wolfram have gone to Germany since our demand last fall for a complete embargo.

8. Prior to receipt of the British *aide-mémoire*, the Department had prepared the instruction referred to in its 764 of March 18 for the purpose of suggesting a possible new approach which might break the present deadlock. The British representatives here argued against making the approach suggested in that instruction at the present time, saying they felt it in fact offered nothing sufficiently beneficial to the Spaniards to obtain their agreement and they therefore feared that the Spaniards would cease trying to reach an immediate agreement and might permit the wolfram on the frontier to go to the enemy. We do not agree with the British view, but because of their strongly expressed supply interest, we agreed to the proposal set forth in paragraph 4 of this telegram. However you may consider that this proposal will be undesirable or unacceptable and therefore we are sending for your consideration and comments by following telegram a somewhat modified form of the instruction we had originally prepared.

9. As stated in your 938, the U.S. and U.K. must act in full accord on this matter. Dependent upon your British colleague's instructions, you are authorized to approach the Spaniards either (a) in accord with the proposal set forth in this telegram, or (b) along the lines

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

of our following telegram, or (c) by combining the two approaches and pointing out that the proposal in our following telegram indicates the general framework within which we would expect ultimately to negotiate.

Repeated to London as Department's no. 2270.

HULL

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1275: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 24, 1944—midnight.

816. This is the instruction referred to in our no. 815 of March 24 and should be read in the light of that telegram.

1. Department and FEA have reviewed the situation as seen from here. We appreciate that if wolfram shipments to Germany are to be stopped over a long period of time, the Spaniards will wish to find some excuse to enable them to offset possible German retaliation and to make it appear that they have made a satisfactory deal with us. We are accordingly prepared to resume petroleum shipments and to undertake certain purchasing commitments as well as to increase certain supplies to Spain, provided effective long-term arrangements are made to prevent any further wolfram shipments to the enemy and provided the Spaniards meet us on our previously stated desiderata and on certain other economic objectives, such as the cessation of olive oil, wool, and woolen goods exports to the enemy. Our action would be predicated on the assumption that effective steps will be taken by the Spaniards to enforce strictly all export prohibitions, including the prevention of smuggling.

2. It appears to us that unless production of wolfram is drastically reduced, it will be extremely difficult to control the situation for large stocks will overhang the market and might fall into the hands of the Germans. Consequently, we should urge a drastic reduction in production as the way out. How the Spaniards bring about such a reduction is up to them, so long as it is effective. It could presumably be accomplished by severely reduced prices or by restricting mining to prewar producers, and in prewar amounts, or, preferably, by a combination of the two.

3. The British Embassy's objection to the approach suggested in this telegram is stated in our preceding telegram. They apparently feel that the Spaniards expect that, once the wolfram problem is settled, we would be willing to continue our past trade program without change. The Spaniards may expect this, but we consider that the military situation is so changed, that we can be much stiffer in our

trading position. Although we are prepared to continue and enlarge our trade program, we must emphasize that our reason for doing so would be solely for the purpose of enabling us to attain full satisfaction of our various objectives.

4. The foregoing paragraphs are for your general background. The following paragraphs set forth the suggested line of approach to the Spaniards.

5. Although you have doubtless emphasized to Jordana and he must be aware that the present Spanish wolfram production and price structure are abnormal and wholly unjustified, it should again be pointed out to him that prewar production of wolfram was insignificant to Spanish economy, being, according to our best information, between 300 and 400 tons per year. Consequently, there could be no ground for complaint from any source, other than possibly the taxing authorities and a handful of individuals now reaping exorbitant profits, if production were limited to prewar levels. As to the taxing authorities, they have already generously fed upon this wartime bubble and even if we should be willing to have conditions continue as at present (which we definitely are not), it would only be a short time before the bubble would burst completely by reason of the severance of communications with Germany and our withdrawal from the market.

6. In the light of the foregoing and in view of our willingness to make other purchases, it would be to Spain's own definite advantage not only to prohibit further shipments to Germany but to reduce drastically the production of wolfram in Spain, confining it possibly to those few producers who were traditionally so occupied before the war and only in prewar quantities. Such a decision by the Spanish authorities would have about it a finality that would indicate that Spain wished once and for all to solve the problem of a dangerously inflated industry whose end in any event cannot be far distant and whose uneasy continuance may disrupt relations with those nations upon whom Spain must rely in the future for trade relationships based upon sound economic principles.

7. If Spain will prohibit further shipments to the enemy and reduce production to prewar levels, we would be prepared in return to undertake the following specific commitments:

(a) Make a single lump sum purchase of all wolfram stocks in Spain not now owned by the United States or the United Kingdom at a price to be negotiated but considerably in excess of the commercial prices set forth under paragraph 8 following;

(b) Purchase normal prewar Spanish production, at a rate not exceeding 400 tons per annum, for the balance of 1944 at commercial prices comparable to those set forth in following paragraph 8;

(c) Make substantial purchases of other staple Spanish commodities, such as textiles and woolen goods and olive oil, at prices to be mutually agreed upon as reasonable (which in the case of textiles, would be somewhat above domestic U.S. prices but below the prices asked by Carceller), which would in fact provide real cushioning to Spanish economy against the time when wartime products will no longer be in demand;

(d) Facilitate the purchase and acquisition by Spain of goods from outside the blockade, including commodities that Spain now secures from Germany, as indicated in paragraph 6 of our 730;<sup>81</sup>

(e) Continue to permit the import into this country of the large quantities of traditional Spanish exports such as olives, wines, and brandies.

8. The commercial price for wolfram now prevailing in world markets ranges from approximately \$1,000 to \$1,500 per ton, c.i.f. American ports. The prices which we have had to pay in Spain and even the price of 70 pesetas per kilo reportedly paid by the Germans prior to our entry into the market (your 632, February 23<sup>82</sup>) are ridiculously out of line.

9. As a part of any such enlarged trade program, Spain would doubtless wish a marked increase in her raw cotton imports. This could be arranged, but we would have to receive satisfactory assurances against exports of textiles, wool and woolen goods. Similarly, if we are to permit the shipment of fats and oils through the blockade, we would insist that no olive oil go from Spain to Germany. In other words, the position which we will take with respect to all Spanish imports through the blockade can and will be much stiffer than has heretofore been the case. We do not intend to permit imports through the blockade which can be used in any way to enable Spain to export to Germany either those materials, derivatives thereof, or products in any wise similar thereto. Moreover, we would expect active Spanish cooperation in achieving our various economic warfare objectives.

10. In view of the fact that any such trade program would require real familiarity with prevailing U.S. views and conditions, it seems highly desirable for us to despatch one or two representatives to assist in the negotiations. This we are prepared to do promptly provided the Spaniards speedily give sufficient assurances that they will in fact reduce wolfram production and effectively prevent it going to Germany.

11. Please telegraph your comments on this telegram urgently in the light of our reference telegram.

Repeated to London as Department's no. 2271.

HULL

<sup>81</sup> Dated March 16, 9 p. m., p. 364.

<sup>82</sup> Not printed.

711.52/394 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 25, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received March 26—12: 58 p. m.]

1044. At the second meeting of the Spanish Committee it proposed on the authority of Jordana and Carceller and in the belief that the Cabinet would accept the following arrangement.

In consideration for the immediate lifting of the embargo on petroleum products and preliminary to discussion of the broad economic program, Spain, in addition to complying with our wishes regarding German agents, the Consulate at Tangier, Italian merchant ships, et cetera, is willing to limit exports of wolfram to Germany for the remainder of this year to 450 tons. Exports would be at the rate of 50 tons per month and after an initial shipment of 50 tons in April in consideration of the importance we attach to the next several months, the export authorities would delay for as long as possible May and June shipments. The Committee believes that German pressure can be parried throughout May and June although it could not give definite assurance that all exports could be held up during these 2 months. July shipments would of course pick up any undelivered balances and thereafter the monthly rate would be held at 50 tons. Full assurances would be given by the Spanish Government to use its best efforts to prevent smuggling. In the event of proven cases of smuggling as a minimum Government will reduce exports to Germany in proportion to quantity smuggled. It will impose such additional penalties as may be necessary to discourage further attempts. Although Government cannot [apparent omission] our right to station wolfram observers in Spain with authority to make inspections in customs railway yards or on piers it will appreciate our cooperation and will act immediately in any bona fide instances of attempted or presumed smuggling we call to its attention.

In addition to the immediate resumption of flow of goods to Spain, Spanish Government desires that we continue wolfram purchases and supply commodities which cannot be obtained from Germany. This is the basis on which the Spaniards believe they can justify reducing wolfram exports to Germany. Discussions on this subject are to be resumed at the next meeting to be held on Monday.<sup>83</sup>

In support of its proposal which it stated was the ultimate concession the Government would make, the Committee urged that the Allied Governments recognize Spanish Government's sincere intention to meet our views to the maximum possible and that because

<sup>83</sup> March 27.



of its geographical position and economic dependence Spain cannot sever its economic relations with Germany. To maintain its neutral position Spain must treat with both belligerents and in that treatment it gives access to each side to those commodities they desire and of which Spain has an excess. Wolfram holds priority in German demands just as there are certain commodities which hold high priority in British.

When the agreement of August 18 was signed with the Germans, Spain extricated itself from a position distasteful to the Spaniards and disliked by the Allies. As a result of that agreement, it had withdrawn the Blue Division from Russia; it had charged the cost of that division against the cost of the Condor Division used in Spain during the Civil War; while agreeing to pay Germany for the 100 million reichsmark unbalance still owed from the Civil War, it had insisted that Germany supply Spain with materials sufficient to pay off 110 million of the 180 million owed to the clearing. When that agreement was signed which covered the 12-month period beginning November 1, 1943, Spain had no commitments with United States or with anyone else to deny Germany access to its excess production of wolfram and, in consideration of very definite advantages, Spain agreed that Germany might use all or any part of the funds arising from that agreement, either by reason of the adjustment of the debt or the shipment of German goods to Spain for the purchase of Spain's excess commodities, among which wolfram was specifically named.

The Germans have complied with their part of the agreement by permitting the withdrawal of the Blue Division and by shipping a large quantity of goods to Spain. Actually shipments of goods from Germany reduced the clearing unbalance to below the 70 million reichsmarks agreed to. Under these circumstances the Cabinet strongly opposed entering into any agreement with United States which so impinges on the German agreement as to give grounds for Spain being charged with acting in bad faith. The [apparent omission] committee suggested represents a drastic reduction. Apart from the fact that the Germans obtained export permits for about 1050 tons of wolfram during 1943 plus 150 tons under a special arrangement with the Air Force, they have the funds to purchase much larger quantities this year in open market and other operations. Actually they have paid export taxes on 209 tons now held at Iran for shipment and have had applications pending for some time for an additional 545 tons, plus more recent acquisitions for which applications have not been submitted because of the existing temporary embargo. Under competitive conditions German shipments during 1944 would undoubtedly greatly exceed those of 1943. The Committee also stressed the fact that the voluntary temporary embargo

in effect during February and March has been definitely advantageous to the Allies. The proposal submitted, in the opinion of the Committee, will meet with violent opposition in the Cabinet but Jordana and Carceller believe by their combined efforts they can overcome such opposition.

The Committee was informed that the arrangement proposed meant that the Germans would receive during the present year approximately 750 tons wolfram which compared favorably with our estimates of what Germans had received during 1943 discounting from that quantity the tonnage obtained under the special arrangement with the Air Force. The British and American representatives insist that this showed little disposition on the part of the Spanish Government to meet the desires of the Allies for a wolfram embargo. It was not even a drastic limitation from our point of view.

Ackerman stated that he was convinced that this proposal would not be acceptable to United States Government and that he was reluctant even to transmit it to Washington. The Committee insisted, however, that it be transmitted to London and Washington and that an objective and unbiased presentation of their arguments be used to support it bearing in mind that the Committee was sincerely anxious to find an early solution.

Subsequent to the meeting when Ackerman expressed to Ellis-Rees his regret that this proposal was so far from meeting the views of Washington which had been made so clear to the Embassy, Ellis-Rees expressed the opinion that London might be disposed to accept it with only slight modifications.

Repeated to London, Lisbon by pouch.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1282 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 30, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received March 31—2: 50 p. m.]

1119. Hoare tells me that London advises him that Washington's conditions as set forth in Department's 815, March 24, midnight, are thoroughly unacceptable to British Government and that after discussion by War Cabinet Churchill had telegraphed a personal plea to the President.<sup>84</sup> Hoare understands purpose of telegram is to induce our Government to accept a realistic and reasonable compromise. He requested I send a similar telegram to the President but I declined.

Hoare insists that Britain requires a prompt settlement and he says he is not even authorized to say that the Spanish proposal to ship

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<sup>84</sup> Prime Minister's message 631, March 30, 1944, not printed.

450 additional tons wolfram during the rest of the year is unacceptable to British.

Hoare and I agreed that no further initiative should be taken by us here until London and Washington have finally agreed upon a common position.

I shall await your further instructions.

HAYES

711.52/401 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, March 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 1—9:26 p. m.]

1136. I discussed wolfram situation with Jordana today. At end of conversation he handed me personal letter which he had already drafted and signed.

In both letter and conversation he made clear that Spain rejected our request for complete wolfram embargo.

In the letter he said if we rejected Spanish counter proposal transmitted my 1044, March 25, 2 p. m. Spain would be obliged to lift embargo and carry out its commercial agreement with Germany.

In conversation he said if we made no counter proposal Spain would be obliged to lift embargo and depend economically upon Germany.

Jordana referred in both letter and conversation to adverse effect on public opinion in Spain toward Allies if prompt and satisfactory agreement is not reached.

I expressed conviction that Spanish counter proposal would be thoroughly unacceptable to my Government.

I further warned Jordana very seriously of strong reaction in public opinion toward Spain in United States should wolfram embargo be lifted and strong possibility that public pressure would then compel us to take further steps which would have the practical effect of cutting Spain off from overseas sources of supplies.

I said further that in short time Spain would doubtless be cut off by military events from Germany and total result would then be that Spain would be completely isolated. I did not know whether Spanish economy could stand that. It was up to Spain to decide.

Following my conversation with Jordana British Ambassador called and said he is remaining in Spain to await President's reply to Churchill's message (my 1119, March 10 [30], 10 p. m.). Hoare expressed belief Spanish counter proposal in my 1024, March 23, 10 p. m.,<sup>85</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Not printed; the Spanish asserted that they desired to meet America's views to maximum within their power but that commitments with Germany prevented them from agreeing to complete cessation of shipments of wolfram during life of existing agreement with Germany (711.52/393).

would be acceptable to London but suggested that if it were not acceptable to Washington latter might agree with London to submit joint counter proposal that Spain be permitted to ship wolfram to Germany during 1944 at rate of 50 tons a month, the 300 tons exported in January to constitute total exports to Germany up to June 30. He expressed opinion that an agreement in this sense, by depriving Germany of Spanish wolfram during an additional 3 crucial months would constitute a great victory for us and also permit the prompt realization of our other important objectives in Spain.

Repeated to London, by pouch to Lisbon.

HAYES

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711.52/402a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944—8 p. m.

936. In response to the Prime Minister's appeal <sup>86</sup> we are now agreed to recede from our demand for a complete embargo on wolfram exports to Germany. We have agreed with the Embassy here that the instructions to you and to Sir Samuel Hoare should be identic. The instructions given below have been submitted to London for its approval. As soon as Sir Samuel Hoare has received his instructions from London we hope that you will have early opportunity for discussions with the Spaniards and that early agreement will be possible. The agreed upon instructions are as follows:

For the purpose of reaching an early agreement with the Spanish with regard to wolfram we are willing to accept a settlement which provides for (1) the continuation of the present temporary embargo until at least the end of June but preferably a longer period if possible; (2) a maximum export for the whole of the year 1944 to a figure not to exceed 600 tons which shall be inclusive of the 300 tons exported in January. The 300 tons thus remaining to be exported shall be limited to monthly installments over the second half of the year; (3) effective and comprehensive steps to prevent smuggling. Such steps might include measures for the reduction of production and the restriction of issue of "guias". In the event of evidence that wolfram has been smuggled to the Axis such amounts thus smuggled shall be charged against legal licensed amounts.

We will undertake in return for such an agreement on the part of the Spanish to permit shipments of oil in so far as consumption is at rates comparable to imports. However, we are not prepared to enter into any commitments regarding purchases in Spain or increased supplies to Spain. Once a settlement has been reached we will

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<sup>86</sup> Message 631, March 30, 1944, not printed.

be prepared to give consideration to such proposals as the Spanish may wish to present.

If spaced evenly over the 6 months' period the proposed maximum total figure of 600 tons for 1944 less the 300 tons already exported would thus represent 50 tons per month. It is felt that the utmost pressure should be put on the Spanish to accept an agreement which will in fact continue the existing embargo at least through the month of June. Every effort to obtain Spanish agreement to a figure involving a total export for the present year substantially below 600 tons should of course be made. We attach particular importance to this point because whatever figure we accept from the Spanish will tend to become a yard stick by which the Portuguese will measure their exports to Germany.

The above paragraphs relate only to the problem of exports of wolfram. Any settlements involving resumption of oil shipments must, it will be clearly understood, include full compliance by the Spanish with our other demands and an undertaking on the part of the Spanish to make available to the United States and to the United Kingdom all necessary facilities for the purchase of Spanish materials.

In the concluding phases of these negotiations I feel that it will be helpful to you to have someone from the Department who has been actively participating in this end of the work. I am, therefore, sending W. Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, to Madrid at once. It is hoped that he can arrive by the end of the week. It will be appreciated if the Embassy can arrange appropriate hotel accommodations for Mr. George.

HULL

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711.52/404 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 7, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received April 8—6:29 a. m.]

1206. Hoare informs me London has given him instructions identical with those contained in your 936 April 4, 8 p. m. and has told him to support my proposal to Jordana.

He says London at same time expressed regret that proposal was not more elastic and stated belief Spaniards would reject it because of pressure on them to make at least token exports of wolfram to Germany between now and June 30. London said that if that should be the case it would be prepared to urge Washington to agree to a modified proposal.

I shall try to see Jordana tomorrow and carry out your instructions.

It is evident to me that there is still no real meeting of minds between London and Washington and that until there is such meeting of minds I cannot expect full and complete support from Hoare in the future any more than in the past.

Repeated to London and Lisbon.

HAYES

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711.52/404a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1944—midnight.

979. British Embassy here has shown us a copy of London's telegram of April 6 to Sir Samuel Hoare in which they outline Alba's proposal to restrict wolfram exports to Germany to a total for the year 1944 of 450 tons, which means an additional 150 tons for the remainder of this year. We are prepared to accept an agreement with the Spanish Government on the basis of this proposal. Every effort should be made to delay the first shipments until after June 30 but we are prepared only as a last resort to agree to shipments beginning now on the basis of monthly allotments not exceeding 17 tons. Any agreement on this basis must comply with the same conditions as those outlined in Department's 936, April 4, 8 p. m.

HULL

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711.52/405b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—2 p. m.

984. Our 979, April 7, midnight. The British Embassy here has now informed us that Alba apparently had no authority for putting forward the proposal outlined in our telegram under reference. If that be the case of course the proposition in our 936, April 4, 8 p. m. still holds.

HULL

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711.52/405 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 8, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 9—1:35 p. m.]

1218. Your 979, April 7. I saw Jordana this noon. He denied Alba was authorized to make any proposal. He assumed as I did that Alba was referring to the proposal of Spanish Committee that further exports during this year be limited to 450 tons.

I then reviewed our negotiations and said my Government, with British concurrence, was now prepared, as a great concession, to agree to a limitation of total exports during this year to 480 tons of which the 300 exported in January would cover the quota during first 7 months or until August 1 while remaining 180 tons might go out in equal installments during the succeeding 5 months or, if he insisted, during succeeding 3 months.

Jordana said he appreciated counter proposal but said he was not authorized to approve or propose anything except what the Committee had proposed. My proposal would serve as a basis for further discussion within the Government but he feared there were two features that would present insurmountable difficulties:

First, the reduction from 750 tons proposed by committee to 480 tons proposed by me was too drastic;

Second, he thought it would be impossible to maintain temporary embargo until end of June or July.

He then asked if my Government would agree to a limitation of 600 tons. I finally said it would provided the 300 tons shipped in January be considered the quota for first 6 months and remainder be shipped in equal monthly installments. Your 936, April 4.

Jordana said he thought this marked a notable advance toward a settlement. He wished to emphasize however the need of allowing small shipments during April, May and June.

I said I had no authority to agree to any shipment before July and reminded him my Government was most anxious to keep wolfram from Germany during coming critical months.

When I asked him what he meant by small shipments in May, June and July he suggested, in an entirely personal manner making clear he was not authorized to make the proposal officially, that shipments be 15 tons in April, 20 in May and 25 in June, a total of 60 tons up to June 30 while remaining 240 tons might go out between July 1 and end of year in 6 equal installments of 40 tons each.

I said I was not authorized to treat on exports prior to July 1 and that my Government was obviously disposed to object to any such proposal.

Minister expressed pleasure that we were at long last in sight of agreement, said he would discuss matter with Cabinet and hoped to be able to speak to me with authority Monday<sup>87</sup> or Tuesday.

I stated that when agreement reached on figures of limitation of

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<sup>87</sup> April 10.

wolfram exports there would be a resumption of petroleum shipments if I had definite assurance from the Minister that:

1. Spanish Government would interpret limitation to apply not only to Germany but to German occupied or German controlled countries;

2. It would undertake to prevent any and all smuggling of wolfram;

3. It would promptly give effect to assurances already given concerning: (a) suppression of German Consulate in Tangier and expulsion of German agents from Morocco and peninsular Spain (b) withdrawal of all Spanish armed forces from participation in the war on the side of our enemy; (c) release of all Italian merchant ships except two; (d) submission of Italian warships matter to arbitration and,

4. Spanish Government would continue to make available to United States and Britain all necessary facilities for purchase of Spanish materials.

Minister said all foregoing definitely understood. With reference to smuggling he said he was glad the Committee had gone into that pretty thoroughly and said he believed it could work out, in harmony with American and British Commercial Attachés, ways and means of effective control and prevention of smuggling.

When I told Hoare of my conversation he expressed great satisfaction and said he would telegraph London and Halifax immediately urging them to agree to Jordana's personal proposal if he obtained Cabinet support for it.

I believe we should agree to the export of 60 tons between now and June 30 but in that event I believe we should try to obtain a reduction in total exports during year from 600 tons to say 540 or 510. However whatever figure Department willing to agree to should also be accepted by London.

Repeated to Lisbon and London.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1316

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The latest information from Madrid makes it clear that the proposal put forward by the Duke of Alba for the limitation of exports of wolfram from Spain to Germany was not authorised by his government and must therefore be disregarded. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that it must now also be



accepted (a) that the Spanish Government are firmly resolved that their commitments to Germany make a total embargo up to June 30th impossible and (b) that it will not be possible to beat the Spanish Government down below 300 tons as the total figure for exports during the remainder of 1944. Since His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have reached agreement that if necessary a total export of 300 tons for the remainder of 1944 could be accepted, the question at issue turns on whether, in order to obtain a prompt settlement, we should agree to any exports during the next three months provided these can be kept to insignificant quantities.

In his message to the President of March 30th<sup>88</sup> the Prime Minister proposed that every effort should be made to obtain a settlement which would allow not more than 50 tons a month to go to Germany during the next few vital months. The latest offer of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs would mean an average of 20 tons a month for April, May and June and 40 tons a month thereafter. This is therefore a considerable improvement on the figures mentioned by the Prime Minister. His Majesty's Government are convinced that, while the two ambassadors should do everything in their power to secure a further reduction over the next three months, both their interests and those of the United States Government will be best served by a prompt acceptance of the offer of the Minister for Foreign Affairs if, as seems likely, the Spanish Government refuses to go beyond that offer. His Majesty's Government are greatly impressed by the urgent need for an immediate general settlement and they would consider one which allowed no more than 60 tons of wolfram to go to Germany during the vital period before June 30th and which included also an assurance of satisfaction from the Spanish Government on the questions of Axis Agents in Spain, the German Consulate at Tangier, etc., to which His Majesty's Government attach great importance, as highly satisfactory.

In these circumstances Sir Samuel Hoare has been authorised, if he and his United States colleague are satisfied that there is no chance of improving upon the figures now proposed for the next three months, to concert action with Mr. Hayes on the basis that His Majesty's Government for their part would accept a settlement on the lines indicated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Lord Halifax has been instructed to urge most strongly that instructions should be sent to the United States Ambassador at Madrid authorising him also to accept at once the Minister's offer.

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1944.

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<sup>88</sup> No. 631, not printed.

711.52/417

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State  
(Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 11, 1944.

Participants: Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador  
Mr. Thorold  
Mr. Acheson

Lord Halifax called at my request. I stated that the Secretary was disturbed at the course which the Spanish negotiations seemed to be taking. As a result of the Prime Minister's communication to the President, it had been agreed between the Department and the British Embassy to recede from the position of asking the Spanish for a total embargo on wolfram and to agree to the export after July 1 of 300 tons, making a total of 600 tons for the year. On the basis of this action by the Spanish and further concessions which had already been agreed upon, petroleum shipments will be resumed. Both Ambassadors had now reported that the Spanish Government would settle the matter provided that we would agree to the export of 60 tons between now and the first of July. We were informed that the Foreign Office had instructed Ambassador Hoare to agree to this upon the receipt by the American Ambassador of similar instructions.

I said that in the Secretary's opinion this concession would have the most serious repercussions. It would utterly frustrate any chance of success in our joint approach to Sweden to stop or reduce the export of ball bearings.<sup>89</sup> It would have the same effect upon our joint approach to Turkey in regard to chrome,<sup>90</sup> and it could be expected to stiffen the resistance of the Swiss and Portuguese in reaching an acceptable understanding with us. Furthermore, the Secretary on Sunday night had stated a very strong attitude in regard to trade by the neutrals with the enemy.<sup>91</sup> As the Ambassador had seen from the press the Secretary's statement had voiced the unanimous opinion of the American people. Should this Government now be required to take action inconsistent with that statement, it might well impair the excellent effect which the speech had in uniting the country upon the entire international program. Therefore, the issue was much greater than 60 tons of wolfram, even though that would be represented as the export of two and one-half million dollars of a vital war material.

I said that in my opinion the effort to secure a settlement based on a suspension of exports until July had never had a real chance, since

<sup>89</sup> See pp. 456 ff.

<sup>90</sup> See vol. v, pp. 819-834 *passim*.

<sup>91</sup> For text of Secretary Hull's radio address of April 9 on the foreign policy of the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

the Spanish had apparently perceived that our two Governments were not firmly united upon it. I urged that another and real effort to achieve such a settlement be made.

Lord Halifax asked what further arguments the Ambassadors could use. I suggested that they stress the great disservice which the Spaniards were doing themselves in insisting upon immediate export. American opinion was thoroughly aroused upon this subject. Even if the Spanish were successful in obtaining our acquiescence, it would be at such tremendous cost to themselves that they should not seek it. Once their communication with Germany was cut and the needs of the liberated areas were required to be filled, the Spaniards could not expect that we would continue to be concerned about their needs if we felt that we had been coerced into agreeing to a most abhorrent trade with the enemy.

Lord Halifax went over the familiar arguments—the experience of Sir Samuel Hoare, the fact that he on the spot had a better appraisal of the situation than those who were distant from it, the small amount of wolfram involved, the risk of a breakdown of negotiations and the export of a far larger amount to Germany. I said that I could not imagine that the Spaniards would be so foolish at this stage of the war as to permit a breakdown of negotiations by an action which would arouse intense hostility here.

Lord Halifax asked whether he could say to the British Government that we did not wish the negotiations to break down and that, if it was impossible to get Spanish agreement to the course proposed, we would agree to their proposal. I said that this was the very type of approach which seemed to me to spell defeat; that, of course, we were not proposing an ultimatum and would always consider developments as they occurred. It seemed to me that the important thing was to get real agreement between the two Governments, that a most determined effort should be made involving all the pressure that we could both bring upon the Spaniards to suspend shipments until July 1.

Lord Halifax said that he would send a telegram reporting our conversation and would get in touch with me as soon as he had a reply.

DEAN ACHESON

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711.52/406 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 11, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received April 12—1:45 p. m.]

1245. My 1218, April 8, 10 p. m. Jordana called me this afternoon to discuss wolfram. He said Spanish Government had been studying

the matters we discussed last Saturday <sup>92</sup> and was gratified at the good disposition of the American and British Governments. As he had anticipated, however, the Government perceived two principal difficulties. The first and more important was that of extending the present embargo until July. The Government could not agree to this. It was willing, however, to limit exports to Germany during the intervening period to 60 tons, that is 15 tons in April, 20 tons in May and 25 tons in June as Jordana had suggested to me.

The other difficulty was with reference to total amount which might be exported to Germany during this year. The Government felt that total should be 660 tons. Subtracting the 302 tons exported in January, the remainder to be exported during rest of the year should be 358 tons.

Spanish Government desired assistance to establish better political and economic relations with United States.

I said I regretted very much what he had said. I had hoped that my proposal of 480 tons total exports would be accepted. While I had stated my Government would as a last resort agree to more than that amount, it would have made a much better impression in Washington and the Spanish position would have been better if Spain had been willing to agree to the 480 tons. I had made clear in any event that my Government would not agree to total exports of more than 600 tons.

The situation now was that the Spanish Government was proposing not only exports of 60 tons between now and June 30 but adding those 60 tons to the total of 600 tons which was the limit to which my Government would agree for the present year.

I had to say very frankly that there was no chance whatsoever that my Government would accede. I was very dubious that it would accede to either suggestion. Both suggestions together could not possibly be agreed to.

Jordana then said that Spain was very desirous of a rapid solution and in order to arrive at it he was officially authorized to state that if a rapid agreement could be reached Spain would limit total exports during the year to 600 tons, of which 60 tons would leave during April, May and June at the rates already proposed and the remaining 240 tons to be exported during the last 6 months of the year at the rate of 40 tons a month. He said this was the last and maximum concession the Spanish Government could make.

He said he realized there were certain details to be discussed such as the prevention of smuggling and the continuation of home wolfram purchases by us for a temporary period. However these matters could be discussed with the committee of experts.

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<sup>92</sup> April 8.

Spain was prepared, if we accepted speedily, to cooperate fully in all details through the committee of experts as well as to satisfy us on the other pending matters referred to in our last conversation.

I told Jordana I would transmit his proposal to Washington immediately.

Repeated to Lisbon and London.

HAYES

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711.52/452 : Telegram

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>93</sup>

[LONDON,] 17 April, 1944.

649. When considering what turned out to be an unauthorized proposal from the Duke of Alba, you have agreed that 51 tons of wolfram might go to Germany in monthly installments of 17 tons between now and the end of June.

The only difference outstanding between our two countries and the Spaniards is that we should like to accept Jordana's final offer of 60 tons between now and the end of June in rising monthly installments of 15, 20, and 25 tons, the remaining 240 tons to be sent in monthly installments of 40 tons each between July and December.

The period between now and the end of June is the most important, and the difference between us is 9 tons on the 3 months. We ought not, for the sake of this trifle, to run the risk of the Spanish sending into Germany nearly a thousand tons of wolfram which is waiting at the frontier, as well as losing all the other points in which we are greatly interested. I trust that you will personally consider this point.

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711.52/422a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>94</sup>

WASHINGTON. April 17, 1944—midnight.

3073. For the Ambassador and the Under Secretary.<sup>95</sup> As you are probably aware, the British Ambassador called upon me last Saturday afternoon<sup>96</sup> to convey a message from the British Government giving its view that the latest proposal of the Spanish Government,

<sup>93</sup> This paraphrased copy of message was transmitted by the White House to Secretary Hull on April 18 for preparation of a reply.

<sup>94</sup> Repeated on the same date to Madrid as 1066.

<sup>95</sup> Under Secretary of State Stettinius was in London at this time for a series of conferences with the British.

<sup>96</sup> April 15.

as to the shipment of wolfram to Germany at the rate of 60 tons between now and July, and the balance of 240 tons to be shipped during the rest of this year, should be accepted, and the shipments of petroleum products to Spain be resumed forthwith. After giving careful study to this situation over the weekend and making a survey of the attitude of public opinion in the country with respect particularly to the situation of the neutral countries furnishing war supplies to the enemy, I asked the Ambassador to call upon me this morning.<sup>97</sup> I told Lord Halifax that this question of making arrangements with neutral countries under which we agree that there shall be shipped from these neutrals to our enemies war materials which have the direct result of killing our soldiers, was a matter upon which there was the strongest of public opinion especially in view of the long continued propaganda activities against this Government running back to 1937 during the Spanish Civil War. I said to Lord Halifax that in view of the fact that the British, as they say, must continue to procure a number of strategic war materials from Spain, and for other reasons to which the British seem to attach great importance, and as Great Britain therefore would seem to have a special interest in the situation which we do not have, just as in the case of Argentina the British had a special interest which we did not have, it would seem to me entirely logical and practicable for the British to sponsor the oil shipments which would be a counterpart to the arrangements they might wish to make with regard to the shipment to Germany of wolfram and other commodities which are involved in the military situation. I therefore told the Ambassador that I desired in all earnestness to urge that if the British believe these shipments to be necessary they should undertake the responsibility and sponsorship for the shipments of oil from Shell Oil or other British facilities in the Caribbean for carrying in Spanish tankers, and that this seemed to be the only logical way out of both of our difficulties in meeting the situation each from our own particular point of view.

The response from the press and the people generally throughout the country in supporting the statements I made in my speech of April 9 with regard to our attitude toward the neutrals shows how clearly and how strongly the American public feels in this matter. I regret the necessity of taking this position, but I see no other alternative in the face of the strength of public opinion here against agreements with neutrals on the basis of which they supply important war materials to the enemy.

HULL

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<sup>97</sup> Secretary Hull's memoranda of conversations of April 15 and 17, not printed.

711.52/418 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 20—3:41 a. m.]

1341. I showed Hoare your 101 [1021] April 13, 7 p. m.,<sup>98</sup> last night. He was disturbed and indignant. He said the telegram was a very bad distortion of the sense of the conversation reported. It omitted Halifax's "telling" arguments with which Halifax reported Acheson had been impressed. Hoare especially resented the implication that he had not backed me up, and maintained that he had supported my efforts all along.

He further said that the Department's telegram was now an old story since he had word from London that the Foreign Office was not at all satisfied with Acheson's arguments and had instructed Halifax to make strong representations direct to the Secretary, which he had done on April 15.

Hoare said that what he objected to most, and in this he was completely supported by the British Government, was what he termed the indefinite postponement of a greatly desired settlement merely for the sake of the insignificant amount of 60 tons of wolfram, and at the risk of grave consequences for us if a prompt settlement should not be made.

He believes Spain cannot be forced to forego the 60 tons exports between now and June 30 or that if it is eventually forced to forego them a great deal more wolfram will find its way into German hands clandestinely than if we accept Jordana's latest proposal.

He said that, moreover, it was his personal opinion that the State Department was failing to make the legitimate political capital out of the situation that it might make. The Secretary had made a very important address<sup>99</sup> which should be followed by some immediate practical success. An immediate agreement drastically limiting wolfram exports to insignificant amounts together with satisfactory conclusion of other outstanding difficulties such as closing the German Consulate in Tangier, return of Blue Division, Italian ships, etc., would constitute such a success, and the mere announcement of these developments would place us in a far better position to secure early satisfactory results from negotiations with Turkey, Sweden and Portugal.

<sup>98</sup> Not printed, but see Mr. Acheson's memorandum of April 11, p. 383, which covers subject of the telegram.

<sup>99</sup> Apparently the reference is to Mr. Hull's radio address of April 9; see footnote 91, p. 383.

He said that otherwise the Secretary's speech would be followed by a kind of anticlimax and other neutrals would pluck up courage to resist.

He said furthermore the Department overlooked British dependence on Spain for phosphates and iron ore. British were running out of pesetas and Hoare had given orders to stop British purchases of wolfram next week in order to conserve pesetas.

He said with some jest that the United States was supposed to want everything or nothing and if it persevered in that attitude he might as well go home and stay there.

I expressed the opinion to Hoare that he was discounting the pressure on Spain resulting from its increasingly urgent need of petroleum products. I said I believed we had a good chance of getting the Spaniards to give way on the 60 tons. If the amount was insignificant to us Hoare stated it must also seem insignificant to Spain in comparison with its increasingly urgent need for petroleum and other commodities. I said I also wanted a prompt settlement as did my Government but not necessarily according to Jordana's last proposal.

I expressed the opinion also that we could impress upon the Spaniards the probability that in a relatively short time they will be cut off from Germany and that the pressure to export to Germany will therefore have disappeared. I said that if the Spaniards thought they were gambling on what Germany might do in retaliation the gamble must appear very slight to them in comparison with the risk of being deprived indefinitely of petroleum.

I must say frankly that I appeared to make no impression on Hoare. His attitude toward the United States was resentful and critical during the entire conversation and he did not give way in any respect.

My own present view is as follows:

The fact that Spain has maintained a temporary embargo on wolfram exports for close to 3 months while being deprived at the same time of petroleum products indicates that the Spanish Government views very seriously the probable results on its economy and on its relations with the United Nations and possibly on its tenure in office, of further exports of wolfram to Germany without our consent.

During this period our military position has greatly improved and Spain's need for petroleum has become much more urgent while the risks involved in failure to reach a satisfactory agreement with Spain, which I pointed out months ago, still exist, it seems to me that those risks to us are smaller as time goes on. Inversely it seems to me that the risks to Spain of failure to reach agreement with us are greater as time goes on.



I favor reaching a prompt agreement with Spain but I consider that our willingness to agree to Spanish exports of wolfram in the amount of 600 tons during 1943 [1944] represents an important compromise on our part. I consider that the Department in the light of its knowledge of the overall situation should determine whether we should maintain our agreement to exports of 600 tons with no further exports between now and June 30 or whether we should agree to exports of less than 600 tons with minimum exports between now and June 30.

In my opinion Britain's action in depriving foreign governments of means of confidential communication with Britain will have a favorable effect in Spain. Spaniards resent threats and what they consider to be insults. They are, however, very much impressed with direct action even though it involves great inconvenience to them.

Furthermore, the inept "peace campaign" of the Spanish press and the serious attitude which the Embassy has taken towards it has placed the Spanish Government on the defensive and strengthened our own position.

It seems to me furthermore that the circumstance that Turkey, Portugal and Sweden are well aware that despite the fact that Spain has maintained a temporary embargo on wolfram exports for nearly 3 months [but] has, in the absence of a definitive agreement, continued to be deprived of petroleum, should impress those Governments with the seriousness with which we view the general subject of trade in strategic materials between the neutrals and Germany.

I consider from my necessarily limited viewpoint that we therefore have already established in Spain a helpful basis for exerting further pressure on the other neutral countries involved especially on Portugal which as an ally of Britain may properly be expected to go much further than Spain in declining to give economic aid to Germany at this stage of the war.

Furthermore such pressure on other neutrals would in turn be helpful to us in our continued negotiations with Spain assuming that there will be some further delay in reaching an agreement.

While I am of course not authorized or desirous of making suggestions regarding Portugal, I may say that from the point of view of our position in Spain I believe it would not be disadvantageous to us if Portugal should really fulfill its alliance with Britain by entering the war at least against Japan and thereby provide Spain through the instrumentality of the Iberian block which Spain continues to respect with additional grounds for denying economic aid to the Axis.

Repeated to London and Lisbon.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1302 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 18, 1944—midnight.  
[Received April 19—10:20 a. m.]

1347. Following from George<sup>1</sup> for the Secretary:

"I have discussed all night with Carceller wolfram problem and he assures me that temporary embargo will be continued until end of this month and that thereafter his Government will agree to limiting exports to 20 tons a month for May and June to enemy destinations, thereafter to 50 tons monthly. While this may not appear to represent a very great improvement I find his arguments logical and believe we should agree to this. I should be grateful for the Department's immediate reply as I have told Carceller I would endeavor to furnish a reply on Friday.<sup>2</sup> I told Carceller I had no authority to agree to any exports during these months but would submit his proposal. I told him that should Washington by chance agree I did not wish to be embarrassed by then being told the Spanish Government was not behind Carceller. He assured me this would not happen.

If this is acceptable to Department I would wish to communicate it simultaneously to Jordana.[?]"

HAYES

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711.52/421 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 20, 1944—9 a. m.  
[Received April 21—9:52 a. m.]

1375. Should I interpret your April 17 midnight to London repeated to us as 1066<sup>3</sup> to mean that our Government is no longer willing to agree to the proposal embodied in your 936, April 4, to which British Government also agreed in identic instructions to Hoare and which agreement I conveyed to Jordana on April 8 (my 1218 April 8) ?

Should I understand also that Department is no longer willing to agree to alleged proposal contained in its 979, April 7, which while never made by the Spanish Government involved shipments of wolfram of 17 tons per month beginning in April ?

The proposal submitted by George in my 1347, April 18, has now been modified by Carceller in the sense that 20 tons per month would be shipped in May and June and 40 tons per month during the remainder of the year. Carceller says he has obtained Franco's ap-

<sup>1</sup> W. Perry George, Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, temporarily in Spain as a special negotiator.

<sup>2</sup> April 21.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 94, p. 386.

proval to this proposal and suggests our reply be given to Jordana. Should I assume that this proposal which differs from Jordana's proposal to the extent that 20 tons less would be shipped prior to June 30 is unacceptable to our Government?

Jordana is awaiting a reply to his counter proposal contained in my 1218, April 8, 10 p. m., which probably now has been modified in fact by the Carceller proposal referred to above.

I assume the Department will instruct me when it wishes me to inform Jordana of our present position and will supply me with a statement of our present position in precise terms.

With specific reference to your 1066, April 17, midnight, and to previous conversations between officers of the Department and Halifax it is my opinion as I told Hoare recently (my 1341, April 18, 10 p. m.) that the British are necessarily underestimating the possibility that the Spaniards will give way on the matter of wolfram shipments to Germany prior to June 30 and that the British are unnecessarily discounting the great pressure on Spain resulting from its increasingly urgent need of petroleum products.

If therefore the difference between the American and British Governments has to do principally with wolfram exports up to June 30 I believe that a further effort should be made to induce the British to adopt a really firm attitude on that point and that we should endeavor once more to induce the Spaniards to forego such shipments.

If your conversation with Halifax indicates on the other hand that we are unwilling to enter into any agreement with Spain involving further shipments of wolfram to Germany at any time, then there are certain questions which immediately arise which I believe should have the Department's consideration and concerning which I should appreciate receiving the Department's judgment as soon as practicable.

If that is the interpretation to be given to your conversation it probably means that all exports from the United States to Spain will cease. If that is the case does our Government propose that Spanish funds in the United States amounting to some 20 million dollars would be blocked or will the Spaniards be permitted to utilize them for the purchase of petroleum and other products to be supplied by Britain and for direct purchases in Latin America?

If exports from the United States are to cease does our Government intend to permit imports from Spain of such commodities as wine, olives, pyrites, et cetera?

If we suspend all trade with Spain and petroleum is furnished by the British is it contemplated that we should endeavor to maintain control of imports and distribution of petroleum products in Spain or would that function be taken over by the British?

If the latter, are we content to withdraw from Spain a substantial number of intelligence agents engaged in communication with France?

Does the plan you may have in mind involve stoppage of USCC operations in Spain and withdrawal of USCC personnel?

Are we prepared to allow British to convert pounds into dollars for the purchase of supplies for Spain from dollar areas?

Are we prepared to run the risk of interference with the free evacuation from Spain of rapidly increasing number of American aviators to which probably will be added a large number of other military personnel and passage through Spain of other refugees in whose fate the War Refugee Board is particularly interested?

Whatever background you can furnish me in the foregoing and related matters will, of course, be helpful to me in my future conversations with the British Embassy as well as with the Spaniards. I shall not of course give any hint to the latter of what you may have in mind until specifically instructed to do so.

Repeated to London.

HAYES

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711.52/452

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] April 20, 1944.

As you requested, I am submitting herewith a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's message to you, No. 649, of April 17, 1944.

Our discussions with the British regarding oil shipments to Spain and Spanish shipments of wolfram to Germany have reached a most difficult point. After the last message to you from the Prime Minister we informed the British Embassy, as you directed, that we would withdraw from the position of demanding a total wolfram embargo by Spain and would agree to resume oil shipments provided the Spanish would agree to continue the suspension of wolfram shipments until July 1 and thereafter, for the second half of the year, ship only 300 tons, the same amount which they shipped in January, 1944. The Spanish continue to insist that they must have the right to ship 60 tons before the first of July. The Prime Minister wishes us to agree to this.

As I have explained at length to Lord Halifax, I believe that this concession would have the most disastrous results. Our position in insisting upon suspension of shipments until July 1 is based on the belief that in view of pending military operations we must do everything in our power to prevent shipments from neutrals to the enemy of

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<sup>4</sup> For the reply, sent April 21, see telegram 529, p. 396.

essential war materials until such time as the success of the military operations may render shipments impossible. Upon our success in maintaining this position will depend, I believe, our ability to eliminate or drastically reduce ball bearing shipments from Sweden, chrome shipments from Turkey, and also our success in negotiations with Switzerland and Portugal to reduce their contribution to the enemy.

I also pointed out that the response which has come from all quarters to the statements made in my address on April 9 on the subject of neutral trade with the enemy shows that this position represents the unanimous attitude of the American people and that to act in any way counter to it would weaken the widespread support of our foreign policy which has become increasingly manifest.

The Prime Minister stresses the danger that the Spaniards may permit wolfram to go to the enemy if our negotiations break down. My belief is that a strong and united effort to obtain a settlement with the Spanish on the basis which we have put forward has considerable chance of success and even greater chance of keeping the matter in suspension until it may be determined by the progress of events. Ambassador Hayes has just reported that he feels that the risks to us, emphasized by the British, grow smaller as time goes on and that inversely the risks to Spain of failure to reach an agreement with us are greater as time goes on.

I also said to Lord Halifax that if they believe, contrary to our view, that oil shipments should be resumed concurrently with wolfram shipments from Spain to Germany, they should undertake the responsibility and sponsorship for the oil movements. I have not yet had a reply from him on this latest discussion.

In view of the foregoing, I believe that the best course is to continue to urge our view upon the British and the reply is drafted in this sense. Would you let me know whether you approve this course.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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711.52/423 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 21, 1944—10 a. m.  
[Received April 22—10:45 a. m.]

1391. It seems to me, as it doubtless does also to the Department that a split between the United States and Britain on the subject of Spain should be avoided if there is still any possibility of agreeing with the Spaniards on a formula which would satisfy all of us.

The Spanish position in simple terms is that Spain made an agreement with Germany under which Germany has already supplied Spain with valuable materials for which Spain has not yet paid. Spain wishes for understandable reasons not to be obliged to tell the Ger-

mans that she declines to pay for materials already received under the agreement.

The British want a prompt agreement because they fear that if agreement is delayed large quantities of wolfram will go to Germany and they wish to insure for themselves continued supplies of iron ore and potash from Spain. They feel that if prompt agreement is not reached these supplies will be cut off probably through lack of funds with which to purchase them.

Our position seems to be that following your excellent address on foreign policy in which you made clear our position that neutrals should not unnecessarily prolong the war and add to Allied casualties by supplying strategic materials to Germany, you do not wish to make an agreement with Spain which will provide that Spain may ship specific quantities of wolfram to Germany.

Before final decision should be made for the United States to abandon its economic program in Spain and allow Britain to carry on trade with Spain without us, I believe that the following proposal should be given consideration in the light of the position of the three countries involved as set forth above.

On pages 1 and 2 of the minutes of the first meeting of the technical committee on wolfram transmitted with my despatch no. 2262 of March 31<sup>5</sup> there is recorded an exchange of views between Ackerman and members of the Committee regarding the possibility that petroleum shipments might be resumed during the life of the temporary wolfram embargo.

My proposal is this:

To tell the Spaniards frankly that we cannot now make any agreement with Spain involving the shipments to Germany of any amount of wolfram no matter how small.

To express understanding at the same time of Spain's reluctance to tell Germany that no further shipments of wolfram to Germany can be made.

To agree with the Spaniards to resume shipments of petroleum products and to maintain them so long as the present embargo on wolfram exports is maintained.

To make clear to the Spaniards that what we have in mind is that the temporary embargo shall be maintained pending a definitive agreement, and that should any quantities of wolfram be allowed to go to Germany prior to the conclusion of such definitive agreement, petroleum shipments would again be stopped.

To insist that our other requests with which Spain has promised to comply upon the solution of the wolfram question will be carried out promptly.

There would be a delay of some 45 days after Spanish acceptance of

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<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

such a proposal before petroleum could arrive in Spain. If Spain should accept the proposal the temporary embargo would then in fact have been extended an additional month and a half beyond date of acceptance which would carry it up to the middle of June at least. The first 6 months of 1944 which I have been given to understand are vital would therefore have substantially been covered.

It may be that the Spaniards would not accept this proposal but discussing it with them would have the advantage of further extending the temporary embargo with the probability that military operations in the meantime would make the Spaniards more anxious eventually to reach a definitive agreement on our terms.

I have not discussed foregoing proposal with British Ambassador. If it should meet your approval I suggest it be presented to London as your proposal.

I should be pleased to receive your reaction.

Repeated to London for Under Secretary and Matthews<sup>5a</sup> only.

HAYES

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*President Roosevelt to the British Prime Minister (Churchill)*<sup>6</sup>

WASHINGTON, 21 April 1944—6:30 p. m.

529. Personal from the President for the Former Naval Person.<sup>7</sup> Your 649.<sup>8</sup> As you say, the only point which divides us on Spanish policy is whether to resume oil shipments concurrently with the resumption of wolfram shipments from Spain to Germany to the extent of 60 tons over the three months of April, May and June, or whether to do all in our power by a united effort to continue the suspension of wolfram shipments until July 1 in the hope and belief that thereafter shipments in the second half of the year in the amounts agreed to will not be practicable. It seems to us that to agree to the resumption of wolfram shipments prior to July 1st would frustrate the efforts which we are jointly making in Sweden and Turkey and would impair our position in dealing with Switzerland and Portugal. To these negotiations we attach great importance, as I know you do also.

Furthermore, our public attaches the greatest importance to Spanish shipments of wolfram and is most critical of oil supplies going to that country while these shipments continue. They are most insistent upon a policy of firmness in this matter and a contrary course on the eve of military operations would, I believe, have the most serious consequences.

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<sup>5a</sup> H. Freeman Matthews was accompanying Under Secretary of State Stettinius on a special mission to London.

<sup>6</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>7</sup> Code name for Prime Minister Churchill.

<sup>8</sup> Telegram dated April 17, p. 386.

The Duke of Alba's repudiated proposal to which you refer required shipments of only half the wolfram now proposed for the rest of 1944 and even in that case we said that only as a last resort would we consent to shipments before July 1st.

We have gone a very long way to meet your difficulties as you describe them in your long cable to me. Will you not, therefore, reconsider an instruction to our two Ambassadors to join in a determined effort to settle the matter upon the basis of a suspension of shipments during the first half year. I do not believe that we have yet done all that is possible along this line.

ROOSEVELT

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711.52/423a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>9</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1944—midnight.

1131. Our position remains exactly as outlined in our 936, April 4. The so-called Alba proposal referred to in our 979, April 7, has been disavowed and is not involved in our considerations. In brief, therefore, the only proposal under consideration involves a maintenance of the embargo on wolfram until June 30 and permits shipments at the rate of 50 tons a month for the second 6 months of 1944.

Since our 1066, April 17,<sup>10</sup> the Prime Minister has again approached the President urging that we accept the latest Spanish proposal which involves shipments during April, May and June. The President last night replied to the Prime Minister and again called for British support in our effort to obtain the maintenance of the embargo through June. This morning Sir Ronald Campbell<sup>11</sup> called at his own request in order to give the British reply to the suggestions I had made to Lord Halifax as outlined in our 1066. I told Campbell that since my talk with the British Ambassador there had been certain additional developments. I told him of your reports which sum up the situation and in which you indicate that you feel that the possibility of Spain yielding to our terms has definitely improved, and I then read to him the eighth paragraph of your 1375.<sup>12</sup> In connection with my suggestion that the oil might be supplied by the British Government, I pointed out that there appear to be numerous technical difficulties involved in this matter by which the State Department and other branches of this Government would be required to issue permits for the movement of this oil. In any event there would be an attack on us for any shipments of oil to Spain; that such an attack would affect

<sup>9</sup> Repeated to London on the same date as No. 3240.

<sup>10</sup> See footnote 94, p. 386.

<sup>11</sup> British Minister.

<sup>12</sup> Telegram dated April 20, p. 391.



to a lesser extent the British than it would us, and that the two Governments would probably be charged with manipulation or some mysterious reason which no one could understand. I called his attention to the fact that word is already being circulated that the British and the Americans have split on their policy toward Spain. I told him of the President's message to the Prime Minister and stated that it was manifest to us that we and the British should make a further effort to press Spain into acceptance of our terms including continued suspension of wolfram shipments between now and July, and that the British may not have given the fullest final nudge to the Spaniards and that is what is now called for.

The Minister then gave me the British proposal in response to the suggestion contained in our 1066. This was to the effect that the British would take over the supplying of oil to Spain but that they would expect this Government to give its approval or support. I told him that I had been careful not to commit this Government to support the British in this matter but I had said that we would do what we could to express our appreciation of the special situation of the British Government which would differ from that facing us. I repeated that it was very important for the British to go in with us and make this final drive on Spain; to accomplish what we want would avoid the difficulties inherent in the handling of the oil shipments and the publicity involved in case Great Britain were to furnish the oil as suggested. Campbell reluctantly said that he would send this suggestion on and implied that he would recommend it to his Government. I said that if this suggestion failed of acceptance we would then return to the other proposition and see what could be worked out in detail in the light of circumstances as they might then be.

HULL

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711.52/424 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 25, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received April 26—2:30 a. m.]

1431. Following receipt your 1131, April 22, midnight. I called on Jordana last night and after referring to the so-called peace campaign in the Spanish press I pointed out that the longer an agreement on wolfram was delayed the greater was the opportunity for hostile elements to inflame public opinion in both countries and to multiply difficulties. I asked him therefore to seek as quickly as possible acceptance by Spanish Government of American proposal set forth in your 936, April 4, 8 p. m. I pointed out that this provided for

exports of wolfram at the rate of 50 tons a month during entire year. It represented a considerable withdrawal on our part from our original position.

Jordana recalled that he had explained to me that Spain's last offer, involving shipments of 600 tons during the year, including 60 tons between now and June 30, represented a real and important sacrifice by Spanish Government which therein had reached the limit of its concessions. At the end of last week he had received final and concrete orders to let the American Government know in writing that, [if] within a few days, the Spanish formula was not accepted, the Spanish Government would be compelled to lift the provisional embargo and permit the exportation of the amount provided for in the formula, that is, 15 tons in April and 20 tons in May. During that period Spain would continue negotiations with us for a definitive agreement but if these negotiations failed within a reasonable time Spain would have to fulfill completely her agreement with Germany. The implication was that Spain then would permit wolfram to go to Germany in unlimited quantities. He said that he had already written me a letter to the above effect and if I had not called on him yesterday he would have had to send it to me very shortly inasmuch as the Spanish Government must act within a very few days.

He said the American proposal which I had made 2 weeks ago and to which I had reverted had been definitely found unacceptable by the Spanish Government. However, he would transmit it to his Government once more although he had no hope that it would prove acceptable.

I said I sincerely regretted the attitude of his Government and that I would be remiss if I omitted to mention the very unfortunate results that would follow the exportation of even a kilo of wolfram to Germany this month or next without permitting our negotiations to go further and reach a mutually satisfactory outcome. I could not answer for the consequences of letting down the bars completely and allowing the Germans to take all the wolfram they wished from Spain. He must be well aware of what those consequences could be.

Jordana complained about our intransigence and said he feared a most unfortunate reaction of Spanish opinion as soon as it learned of our attitude which was thoroughly unfriendly towards Spain. Spain had been deprived of petroleum now for 3 months although [apparent omission] Government.

Jordana said he would resubmit our proposal and advise me of the outcome very shortly although he warned again that he had no hope it would be accepted.

I shall inform the British Ambassador of my conversation and urge him to support me. Meanwhile I shall do whatever else is

practicable to influence the Spanish Government to accept our formula. In the event Jordana informs me shortly that the Spanish Government has again rejected the formula I shall thereupon request an interview with Franco and place the matter before him.

Meanwhile, however, I believe the Department should have very much in mind the possibility that the Spanish Government will not agree completely to withhold wolfram shipments between now and June 30. I believe the Department should have in mind also that through exhaustion of peseta resources we and the British will be obliged to suspend wolfram purchases within a few days and the Germans will be free thereafter to acquire very large amounts of wolfram which together with accumulated stocks of over 1200 tons in the absence of any definite agreement with us they may be able to export to Germany. Such a development would constitute a military setback to us and the risk that Allied lives would be lost as a result of German acquisitions of Spanish wolfram would be vastly increased.

Repeated to London and Lisbon.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1305: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 25, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received April 26—6:50 a. m.]

1432. For the Secretary, Acheson and Culbertson.<sup>13</sup> My 1431 April 25, 6 p. m. Beaulac<sup>14</sup> had a long conversation this morning with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in which the following points were brought out:

It is under Franco's instructions that Jordana is insisting on token exports to Germany prior to June 30.

Franco is quite willing to go along with us in effect but he considers himself obligated under the Spanish-German agreement not to continue the total embargo. He therefore insists on purely token exports prior to June 30.

According to the Under Secretary, Franco feels that Spain has already contributed importantly to United Nations victory. Soon after the North African landing he twice rejected Germany's insistent demand for passage of troops through Spain. While he of course recognizes this was in Spain's interest he maintains that the risk to Spain was very great and above all that his refusal to give in to German demands was of great military value to the United

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<sup>13</sup> Paul T. Culbertson, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.

<sup>14</sup> Willard L. Beaulac, Counselor of Embassy in Spain.

Nations. He feels very strongly that Spain's contribution was at least as important and very probably more important than that made by Britain's ally Portugal in giving us facilities in the Azores at a much later date.

He believes he made another important contribution when he agreed early in January to place a temporary embargo on wolfram exports to Germany before any other neutral in Europe had taken comparable action. He contrasts our attitude in continuing economic sanctions against Spain despite the embargo which has been in effect nearly 3 months with our attitude toward other countries as for example Portugal which we have continued to supply with petroleum and other products in the face of continued shipments of Portuguese wolfram to Germany.

Despite Franco's position in the matter no specific amounts of wolfram have been promised to the Germans either prior to or after June 30. The Germans insist on complete freedom to export. The Spanish Government has refused this and no compromise has been discussed.

From a highly confidential and completely reliable source Beaulac learns also that German Ambassador in his interview with Franco last week insisted very strongly on freedom to resume wolfram shipments to Germany. He offered in return in addition to armaments and other German products immediate delivery of petroleum products in limited yet nevertheless interesting quantities. Franco declined the offers and declined to agree to resumption of wolfram shipments, pointing out Spain's economic dependence on the United Nations and its close relations with the Americas. The informant who had read the minutes of the conversation said that Franco used the very arguments we had used in our conversations with Spanish officials and that the German Ambassador was finally left empty-handed.

It is now evident to me that Spain continues to be willing to withstand German pressure for resumption of wolfram shipments in amounts of any importance if it can save its "honor" and if at the same time it can be freed of the economic sanctions we are now applying.

If Jordana again tells me that Spain declines to agree to proposal contained in Department's 936 April 4, I intend to request an interview with Franco during which I shall endeavor to obtain his agreement to that proposal. It is probable that he will decline. It is possible that the conversation will lead to a proposal intermediate between our proposal and Jordana's. In any event I should like authority to reach the best possible agreement within Jordana's proposal and involving if necessary token shipments prior to June 30. George fully endorses foregoing. Please instruct as soon as possible.

Repeated to London for Under Secretary and Matthews only.  
Repeated to Lisbon for Ambassador only.

HAYES

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711.52/428a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*<sup>16</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944—11 p. m.

1153. Since sending you our 1131, April 22, midnight, a further message has been received by the President from the Prime Minister again presenting strongly the British position with regard to the Spanish situation and stating that he would assume the whole responsibility for settlement himself. This would involve British sponsorship of shipments of oil to Spain. It is obvious that should this procedure eventuate it would be necessary for me to release to the press a statement which would of necessity indicate clearly a break in the Anglo-American united front which is so essential in the conduct of the general war effort. Such a result would be regrettable. I am, therefore, reluctantly prepared to authorize you to go along with the British Ambassador in reaching a settlement with the Spanish Government. It is my understanding that such a settlement will involve shipments of wolfram to Germany beginning in May and not to exceed 280 tons (paragraph 3 of your 1375, April 20) for the remaining part of the year; 20 tons a month would be exported in May and in June and the balance in 6 equal monthly installments of 40 tons beginning in July. I understand that there will be immediate fulfillment on the part of the Spanish Government of its promises in respect of all the other items on which we asked satisfaction. In addition to this the Spanish Government will enforce stringent and effective measures which will in fact prohibit the further smuggling of wolfram to Germany. If, in spite of these measures, wolfram is smuggled into Germany the quantities thus smuggled will be deducted from the agreed upon quotas. The Spanish Government should undertake to facilitate the necessary operations in Spain of the USCC and UKCC, including the continuance of making available pesetas as requested. As indicated in our telegram of April 24<sup>17</sup> American military authorities are now insistent that Spain remove all Axis agencies from Tangier. This would of course include the Japanese. It is essential, therefore, that this be made a part of the final agreement. If such an agreement is

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<sup>16</sup> Repeated to London on the same date as No. 3320.

<sup>17</sup> Telegram 1141, not printed.

arrived at, you are authorized to approve the nomination of tankers for the first loading date possible.

At the time you issue this authorization please make it clear to the Spanish that the continued flow of petroleum is dependent upon the active support and participation of the Spanish Government in enforcing the export limitations.

HULL

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711.52/426 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 27, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 2:10 p. m.]

1450. I am cabling separately details of my conversation of yesterday and this morning with Hoare. Meanwhile there is one grave aspect of the situation which I wish to call to your attention urgently.

Hoare showed me a draft statement to be made by Churchill at such time as final agreement with the Spanish is reached in which Churchill would say among other things that it had been arranged between Britain and the United States that Spanish oil requirements in the future be drawn entirely from sources under British control instead of partly from British controlled and partly from United States sources as in the past.

There is nothing in your 1153, April 25, 11 p. m., which indicates to me that you have agreed to any such arrangement. However in the draft of a proposed joint statement supplied to me by the British Ambassador as contemplated in your 1154 of April 25, midnight,<sup>18</sup> it is stated in the last paragraph that future loadings by Spanish tankers will be at Curaçao.

The British Ambassador cheerfully assumes that this means that oil will actually be supplied entirely from British sources and that oil control will pass into British hands. I, on the other hand, assume that this is certainly not the case and have so informed Hoare. Any such fateful step would cast away the physical base of our power and influence in Spain, not only with the Spanish Government but with the Spanish people.

Needless to say, if oil control should pass from American to British hands, any impulse for the British to act jointly with us would disappear and British primacy would take the place of Anglo-American joint action.

HAYES

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<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

711.52/427 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 27, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received April 28—6:45 a. m.]

1451. My 1431, April 25, 6 p. m. I informed the British Ambassador yesterday of my conversation with Jordana on Monday<sup>19</sup> and said I thought there was still a slight chance of our persuading the Spanish Government to reach a prompt agreement with us on the basis of the proposal I had then made, namely, no further export of wolfram before June 30 and thereafter export of 50 tons a month. I explained Jordana while expressing very great pessimism about the outcome had promised to re-submit the proposal to the Government and to inform me of the result as soon as possible. I also indicated that if Jordana's reply was unfavorable I would ask him to arrange for me an interview with Franco. In the meantime I felt sure that the temporary embargo could be maintained and thus carried into May.

The Ambassador said that a good deal of water had gone over the dam since my conversation with Jordana on Monday. On Tuesday he had received a number of telegrams from London and Washington explaining that our two Governments were finally agreed on accepting the original Jordana proposal. I asked him if he had definite instructions on the matter. He said he had, and outlined them as follows: We would try to reach an agreement whereby 40 tons of wolfram could be exported to Germany between now and June 30 although if the Spaniards objected to this we might increase the allowable export to 60 tons between now and June 30 and then 40 tons a month could be exported thereafter. Also he had been instructed to support me earnestly in representations hoping towards the removal of the Japanese military agency in Tangier though this was not to be made a part of the wolfram agreement. He understood moreover that I was receiving identic instructions.

I told the Ambassador instructions were just coming in to me, that I too understood agreement had been reached between London and Washington but inasmuch as all the messages had not been decoded as yet I could not tell him precisely what my instructions were. I would inform him, however, as soon as possible. He said he thought I should seek an interview with Jordana at the earliest possible moment and communicate to him the proposal on which the British and American Governments were now agreed. I said it seemed much better to await a summons from Jordana and ascertain whether he had been able to obtain from the Spanish Government authorization to conclude an agreement along the lines of my original proposal. At any rate until

<sup>19</sup> April 24.

I knew precisely what my latest instructions were, I was in no position to seek an interview with Jordana.

As I was about to leave Beaulac transmitted to me the telephone message he had just received from Dunn in Washington. I told the British Ambassador about it and said this reinforced my conviction that neither of us should talk with Jordana until the whole matter was further clarified. He seemed to agree to this and said he was going home to keep certain engagements he had made there. We separated at 7:15 p. m.

I saw Hoare again this morning. He stated that after I had talked with him yesterday afternoon he had received a message that Jordana wished to see him. He had therefore called on Jordana. He found the Minister greatly agitated at the prospect of facing the Council of Ministers at an adjourned meeting this morning and very anxious to receive some kind of assurance from the British Ambassador that a wolfram agreement would be quickly reached. The Ambassador said he told the Minister he had no communication to make but that he hoped very much the Council of Ministers would delay taking any steps which might imperil the reaching of an agreement. He counselled Jordana to take Franco aside before the meeting and point out to him the desirability of avoiding discussion in the Council of Ministers on the matter and of postponing any decision for a week. The Ambassador said he told the Minister that while he could make no communication to him he [apparent omission] on to believe that London and Washington were disposed with Spanish cooperation to reach an agreement within the next very few days. It should be easy because there was such very little difference remaining between Spain and the Allies. According to Hoare the Minister seemed to be heartened and better prepared to meet the Council of Ministers this morning.

The Minister also expressed to Hoare his hope that any statement to be issued from Washington or London would be couched in most general terms simply saying that an agreement had been reached. Hoare pointed out certain difficulties in the way of any such general statement but expressed sympathy with Jordana's subsequent proposal that the statement should not give the impression that Spain was being rubbed in the dust by the Allies but was completing and perfecting her strict neutrality. Hoare told Jordana that he would recommend to London and Washington compliance with the latter's wishes in this matter.

The Ambassador said that until he had further clarification from London he must assume that the British will take over the oil supply from the Americans. My 1450, April 27, 2 p. m. He gave me a copy of the proposed statement of Mr. Churchill and said it clearly



indicated the belief in London that Great Britain would assume responsibility for supplying and supervising the distribution of petroleum products in Spain. I explained that the telegrams I had recently received from Washington clearly implied that the Americans would continue supplying the petroleum after a mutually satisfactory agreement about wolfram and other pending matters was reached.

Repeated to London.

HAYES

811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1305: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1944—midnight.

1182. I refer to Dunn's conversation with Beaulac and to your 1432, April 25, 7 p. m. I endorse your suggestion that you carry this matter to Franco in a final effort to obtain Spanish approval of the proposal contained in our 936, April 4. I feel that you should do this at the earliest possible moment. In the event that Franco still maintains in spite of your direct approach to him that Spain will not accept the proposal outlined in our 936 you are authorized to reach an immediate settlement on the basis of our 1153, April 25, 11 p. m. Your assumptions as to oil provision in your 1450 April 27, are correct. I should not wish any publicity or public announcements regarding a settlement to be made before Wednesday<sup>20</sup> or Thursday of next week.

I wish to inform you in connection with the press release referred to in my 1154, April 25, midnight,<sup>21</sup> that because of our situation here I must include in any press release a statement to the effect that we have arrived at this settlement at the request of the British Government whose supply situation in Spain differs from ours. Exact text will be cabled later.

HULL

711.52/440a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1944—9 p. m.

1193. Department's 1153 of April 25. On assumption that agreement will be reached with Spaniards on wolfram, clarification in respect to the initial loading of petroleum products is necessary. The

<sup>20</sup> May 3.

<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

policy of the Department is to permit resumption of petroleum shipments on same basis in effect prior to suspension of petroleum shipments. However, shipments at even this rate will be reconsidered if Spain does not lift present restrictions on consumption once shipments arrive in Spain. It is not intended that inventories should be appreciably increased over present levels.

The following policy is for your guidance in releasing tankers for the initial loading date:

1. Bulk petroleum products shipments, exclusive of bulk luboils and aviation gasoline, are not to exceed 14,000 tons for any one loading date. See Department's 27, January 4.<sup>22</sup>

2. Bulk luboils can be loaded up to 4100 tons or an average loading for the *Campilo*.

3. Bulk 87 octane aviation gasoline shall not exceed 320 tons, the monthly quota allowed in the aviation gasoline agreement.

4. Only one tanker loaded crude oil or gas oil at any one loading date in 1943 for the Canary Islands. Consequently, permission to load crude oil or gas oil should be initially granted to only one of the CEPSA<sup>23</sup> tankers *Gerona*, *Gobeo*, or *Zaragoza*.

The policy in respect to packaged petroleum products will be outlined in a subsequent cable.

HULL

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711.52/430 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, April 29, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received April 20—6: 14 a. m.]

1471. I saw Jordana last night and requested an interview with Franco. Jordana expressed the hope I would not insist. He appealed to me to reach an immediate agreement. It became evident to me that Jordana's position in the Government would be irreparably weakened if I went over his head and made an agreement directly with Franco. Furthermore as the Department will not have failed to note from my 1451, April 27, 3 p. m., Hoare's last conversation with Jordana had greatly reduced if not eliminated the possibility that Franco would agree to anything less than the export of 40 tons between now and June 30 and of 40 tons monthly thereafter during the present year.

Under the circumstances I told Jordana that we would agree to this. He said that inasmuch as his present authority did not exceed his previous proposal he would have to seek authority to

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

<sup>23</sup> Compañía Española de Petróleos, Sociedad Anónima.

agree on behalf of Spain. He informed me this morning that he had obtained such authority and agreement was finally reached. Jordana assures me he has already ordered Japanese Legation to withdraw its Assistant Military Attaché from Tangier.

I am proceeding to exchange [apparent omission] these and other arrangements and undertakings. Jordana expressed his great interest in implementing agreements and to this end he has called a meeting of the committee of experts this afternoon to concert measures to prevent smuggling of wolfram.

Smith is now checking petroleum stocks preparatory to authorizing sailings of Spanish tankers for May 20 loadings.

I am informing Hoare in foregoing sense this morning. As soon as Spanish tankers have sailed I shall proceed to take up with the Spanish Government other important pending matters which have been held in abeyance during the period of suspension of petroleum shipments.

Repeated to Lisbon and London.

HAYES

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811.20 Defense (M) Spain/1312: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1944—noon.

1218. I appreciate the sincerity and force of your comments in your 1472 of April 29, 2 p. m.,<sup>24</sup> and I in no way wish to detract from the results you have obtained as a result of these very trying negotiations with the Spanish. The American public well knows that we have been holding out for total and permanent embargo. Because of our insistent position we have whittled down the Spanish in spite of an absence of wholehearted British support. Had we had full British support I am convinced we could have obtained our objective. Much of the American public may well feel the same way. While certain elements of our press are more outspoken than others Spain is not a popular subject with any of them. Knowing what our position has been the public and the press will consider any outcome less than a complete meeting of our demands to be a compromise. A compromise with Spain will not be popular. The fact that the compromise may be favorable to us will not allay all criticism. Without detracting from what you have accomplished I feel I must let our people know that it was at British insistence that we accepted a settlement on a basis less than the one we sought.

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

In view of what you report in your 1474, April 29, 4 p. m.,<sup>25</sup> I propose to release our statement at 8 p. m. tonight for the morning papers of Tuesday.<sup>26</sup> We will, in addition to the statement give the press full background information which will I am sure bring out clearly the successful elements underlying the agreement which you bring out in your 1472.

Sent to Madrid. Repeated to London.

HULL

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711.52/472

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

No. 2430

MADRID, May 4, 1944.

[Received May 12.]

SIR: Supplementing my telegram No. 1471, April 29, 1 p. m., I have the honor to enclose a copy of my personal letter of May 1, 1944, to the Foreign Minister, embodying the terms of the agreements reached with the Spanish Government as a result of which the American and British Governments authorized the resumption of petroleum shipments to Spain. I am enclosing, also, a copy and translation of the Foreign Minister's reply of May 2, 1944, expressing his agreement with the conditions as set forth, together with certain clarifications which I consider acceptable.

I am enclosing, as well, a copy and translation of a further letter, dated May 2, 1944, which the Foreign Minister addressed to me and in which he expresses the hope that our Government would at some later date be willing to discuss the possibility of the export from Spain to Germany of an additional twenty tons of wolfram beyond the 580 tons to which we agreed. In my reply to his letter, dated May 3, 1944, a copy of which is enclosed, I of course made clear that my Government had not agreed to the export of any higher quantity than 580 tons during 1944 or at any other time.

I consider that the Minister's request that we discuss at some later date the possibility of Spain's exporting an additional twenty tons of wolfram to Germany, presumably in 1945, does not in any way affect the firm agreement limiting wolfram exports to Germany during 1944 to 580 tons, and the Minister, himself, makes it clear, in his letter, that this is his own understanding.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> For text of statement released May 2, 1944, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1944, p. 412.

[Enclosure 1]

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister  
for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*

MADRID, May 1, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER AND FRIEND: I am glad to be able to confirm the agreements reached between us in our conversation on April 29. My Government's understanding of those agreements is as follows:

1. Spanish soldiers will no longer serve with the German army. It is understood that those who have served with the German army in the past have now been withdrawn to Spain.

2. Further exports of wolfram from Spain to Germany or German-occupied or German-controlled territory during 1944 will not exceed twenty tons during May, twenty tons during June, and forty tons monthly thereafter.

3. The Spanish Government will take steps to prevent smuggling of wolfram out of Spain. Should smuggling occur, appropriate penalties and deductions would be imposed, and the above figures of maximum exports, which in such case would be interpreted to include quantities smuggled, would be subject to downward revision.

4. The German Consulate General in Tangier will be closed and its personnel required to depart from Spanish or Spanish-controlled territory. All German agents in Tangier will be expelled and required to depart from Spanish or Spanish-controlled territory.

5. The Japanese Legation in Madrid will be required to withdraw its Assistant Military Attaché from Tangier.

6. Axis sabotage and espionage agents will be expelled from Spanish-controlled territory and from metropolitan Spain.<sup>27</sup>

7. All Italian merchant ships remaining in Spanish ports, except two, namely, the *Madda* and the *Trovatore*, which will be chartered to the Spanish Government and the ultimate ownership of which will be subject to arbitration following the end of the war, will be promptly released, and the Spanish Government will grant necessary facilities, including entry into Spanish territory of crews when needed, to permit their departure at early dates.

8. The question of possible release by the Spanish Government of Italian warships now in Spanish waters will be submitted to arbitration.

9. The Spanish Government will continue to make available to the United States and Great Britain all necessary facilities for the purchase and export of Spanish products.

In consideration of the agreements and undertakings above set forth, my Government, in cooperation with the British Government, has authorized the resumption of petroleum shipments to Spain, it being understood, of course, that consumption of petroleum products in

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<sup>27</sup> For correspondence regarding the implementation of points 4, 5, and 6, see vol. v, pp. 539 ff.

Spanish and Spanish-controlled territory will be at rates comparable to imports.

In addition, the Embassy is prepared immediately to enter into detailed discussions with the appropriate Spanish authorities with regard to the development of trade exchanges between Spain and the United States.

I am [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana) to the American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

MADRID, May 2, 1944.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR AND FRIEND: In acknowledging receipt of your letter of yesterday's date which refers to the agreement reached between us during our last conversation on April 29, I am pleased to confirm to you the terms of the agreement detailed in its various aspects, with only the following clarifications in form which do not in any sense alter its substance:

With reference to No. 3 it should be understood that, in cases of duly proved acts of contraband, the Spanish Administration will apply the appropriate penalties and will deduct the quantities of wolfram which may have actually left the country as a result of any such acts of contraband from the export quotas detailed in No. 2.

With reference to No. 7 it should be understood, as His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador states in his letter of the same date, that the German tanker *Corrientes*, which has been ceded to us by the Government of the Reich as compensation for Spanish tonnage losses inflicted by German naval forces, will be placed under the Spanish flag.

With reference to No. 9, the terms of which I confirm, I consider this normally tied, in due reciprocity, to the proposals set forth in the final paragraph of the same letter.

In connection with the penultimate paragraph, which is unnumbered, and which refers to the resumption of petroleum shipments to Spain and to the consumption of petroleum in quantities comparable to imports, I interpret this logically to be based on the petroleum stocks set forth in our previous agreements in the matter.

In expressing the agreement of the Spanish Government to the document referred to, I take this occasion, Mr. Ambassador, to reiterate to you my highest consideration and esteem,

F. JORDANA

[Enclosure 3—Translation]

*The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana) to the American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

MADRID, May 2, 1944.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR AND FRIEND: In connection with the agreement referred to in the letters which Your Excellency and His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador were kind enough to address to me on May 1 and to which I have replied in my letter of today, expressing the Spanish Government's confirmation of said agreement, I beg Your Excellency, without prejudice to or detraction from such agreement, please to recall the terms of our conversations, during which we had agreed to establish the figure of 600 tons as the limit of exports to Germany of Spanish wolfram during the present year, there remaining for final decision only the distribution of such shipments, that is, whether they should or should not be confined to the second six months of the year, which point has been settled in accordance with the formula set forth in the letters referred to above.

But since in those letters there is provision for the distribution of a total quantity of only 580 tons, which represents a reduction of 20 tons from the figure which, as a result of the conversations referred to I proposed to the Spanish Government, and which the latter approved, I have the honor to address the present letter to you in order to say that, while it is not for the time being advisable to delay for this reason the normalization of our economic relations and the termination of the crisis through which those relations have passed during the last three months, I hope, nevertheless, that the Government at Washington, which at one time had authorized Your Excellency to agree to the total figure of 600 tons, will facilitate at an appropriate time, and in separate conversations which in no manner would detract from the agreement which we have reached, a study of the form and timing of the export of the 20 tons referred to.

In the hope that Your Excellency will please lend to this desire of the Spanish Government the efficacious support of your personal authority, I take the occasion to reiterate to you, with assurances of my high consideration, the expression of my personal friendship,

F. JORDANA

[Enclosure 4]

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*

MADRID, May 3, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER AND FRIEND: I have received your letter of May 2nd referring to conversations between us during which

mention was made of my Government's willingness to agree to the shipment of 600 tons of wolfram from Spain to Germany during the year 1944.

Your Excellency refers, also, to the agreement finally reached between us, which was set forth in my letter of May 1, 1944, and confirmed by Your Excellency, on behalf of the Spanish Government, in your reply of May 2, 1944, and which provides that exports of wolfram to Germany and German-occupied and German-controlled territory during 1944 shall be limited to 580 tons.

Your Excellency then expresses the hope that my Government, at an appropriate time, without prejudice to or detraction from the agreement limiting wolfram exports during 1944 to 580 tons, will study the form and timing of the export of 20 tons, which represent the difference between 600 tons and 580 tons.

In reply, I beg to remind Your Excellency that I did, in fact, say at one time during our discussions that my Government was prepared to consent to the export of not more than 600 tons of wolfram to Germany during the year 1944. However, the willingness of my Government to agree to a limitation of 600 tons was specifically conditioned on the Spanish Government's agreeing, in turn, not to export further quantities of wolfram to Germany prior to July 1, 1944. After Your Excellency had expressed the Spanish Government's unwillingness to continue the then existing embargo on wolfram exports until July 1, 1944, my Government authorized me to agree to total exports of not more than 580 tons during 1944, 300 tons of which had already been exported in January, 1944, and the remainder of which might be exported in monthly quotas, beginning in May, as set forth in my letter of May 1.

In other words, my Government has agreed to further wolfram exports from Spain to Germany and German-occupied and German-controlled territory in amounts not to exceed 20 tons in May, 20 tons in June, and 40 tons during each of the succeeding months of 1944. It has not agreed to the export of additional amounts of wolfram in 1944, or thereafter, and is not in a position at this time to enter into discussion of its economic program with Spain for the period following December 31, 1944.

In again setting forth, above, the agreement concerning wolfram to which my Government has given its consent, I have endeavored, in the interest of both our Governments, to use as precise language as possible in order not to leave room for doubt concerning my Government's position in the matter.

I am [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES



[In June 1944 the United States and the United Kingdom again sought from Spain a complete embargo on wolfram. Although the Spanish Government agreed to suspend exports for June and later suspended the July and August quotas, it did not make a definite commitment with regard to a complete embargo. However, wolfram shipments to Germany were not resumed during the remainder of the war.]

**PROTESTS TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT REGARDING SPANISH  
ATTACKS BY ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES ON ALLIED AIRCRAFT  
OPERATING OFF COAST OF SPANISH AND TANGIER ZONES OF  
MOROCCO**

862.20281/150 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Legation at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary  
of State*

TANGIER, May 26, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 4: 43 p. m.]

139. As previously reported in our 36, February 18<sup>28</sup> German subs are using Atlantic coastline of Spanish Morocco and Tangier zone to elude pursuit by Allied planes and to lurk in comparative safety in quiet waters preparatory to attacks on shipping entering the Mediterranean.

It is understood that Allied authorities are considering institution of a regular air patrol of the Atlantic Spanish Morocco coast involving regular flights over Spanish Morocco territorial waters. While previously Spanish shore batteries apparently made no serious efforts to damage Allied planes approaching near the coast more recently Allied Naval authorities have been intensely annoyed by the more serious firing of such batteries against planes in active pursuit of subs.

I expect to see Orgaz<sup>29</sup> in next few days when I propose to bring this situation to his attention unless Department has some objection. At such time I would state that Spanish authorities cannot reasonably object on grounds of Spanish neutrality to pursuit by Allied planes of Axis subs when these make use improperly of Spanish Morocco territorial waters.

CHILDS

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<sup>28</sup> Not printed.

<sup>29</sup> Gen. Luis Orgaz, High Commissioner, Spanish Zone of Morocco.

740.0011 European War 1939/34391 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 27, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 11 : 50 p. m.]

1744. From Murphy.<sup>30</sup> At a meeting of the Political Committee AFHQ<sup>31</sup> May 23rd Macmillan<sup>32</sup> and I were requested to present the following situation to our Governments with a view to the issuance of instructions to the American and British Embassies in Madrid to transmit to the Spanish Government an identical and strong protest regarding attacks by Spanish anti-aircraft batteries on Allied aircraft operating off the coast of Spanish and International Morocco. These latter are reported by our naval authorities recently as increasingly frequent and now constitute serious interference with anti-submarine patrol work in that area.

[Here follows list of eleven specific cases of attacks by Spanish anti-aircraft on Allied aircraft, citing time and place.]

According to our naval authorities anti-aircraft fire on our planes from shore batteries located in Spanish Morocco and International Morocco is at most a daily occurrence when our planes are definitely outside territorial limits. Our pilots' reports indicate that the accuracy of fire is improving at the longer ranges. It is considered that effective anti-submarine patrol by aircraft of the Strait area requires close approach to the Tangier 3-mile limit since enemy submarines are repeatedly reported inside territorial waters. We believe that our planes' navigation is accurate and that the assertion that our planes are within the 3-mile limit is not valid and should not be accepted.

It is also suggested that in view of the fact that the United States has never recognized the Spanish right to fortify the International Zone and in view of the internationally accepted 3-mile territorial water limitation, the American and British Governments strongly protest and make quite clear that the Allies intend to take appropriate retaliatory action in the event of any further unprovoked and illegal action by Spanish batteries. It is considered that we should insist that the offending batteries be removed from the International Zone immediately. The Spanish Government should be asked for an official statement regarding its anti-aircraft policy in Spanish Morocco and in the International Zone.

<sup>30</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>31</sup> Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>32</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Headquarters in Northwest Africa.

General Wilson naturally feels that diplomatic action should be exhausted before retaliatory measures are taken. Admiral Hewitt<sup>33</sup> informs me that the patience of American pilots with the conduct of Spanish anti-aircraft batteries is rapidly coming to an end and that we may be faced with an incident if the situation is not improved immediately.

British Resident Minister is sending a similar telegram to the Foreign Office.

I should be grateful for Department's prompt advice.

Repeated by courier to Madrid and Tangier. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

740.0011 European War 1939/34391 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—7 p. m.

1549. Algiers 1744, May 27, 4 p. m., repeated by courier to Madrid and Tangier. Please concert action with your British colleague<sup>34</sup> and make firm representations urgently.

Sent to Madrid, repeated to Algiers and Tangier.

HULL

862.20281/150 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Legation at Tangier (Childs)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—8 p. m.

75. Reference your telegram no. 139, May 26, 4 p. m. The Department has instructed the Embassy at Madrid to make representations on this subject. It is therefore not believed that any useful purpose would be served by your discussing this matter with Orgaz.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/34440 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, June 1, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 2—3:11 p. m.]

1957. British Ambassador has not yet received instructions similar to those contained in your 1549, May 30, 7 p. m.

<sup>33</sup> Adm. Henry K. Hewitt, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Northwest African Waters.

<sup>34</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare.

However, both Embassies have received identic notes from Spanish Foreign Minister<sup>35</sup> protesting strongly in particular against recent sinking in Spanish harbor of German *Baldur*, though reference is also made of German *Hochheimer* as sunk in territorial waters and to bombing last March of Spanish *Cabo San Sebastian* in company of two German ships *Killisi* and *Stumar* off Catalan coast. In regard to the *Baldur* the note points out that "extraordinary gravity of this violation of Spanish neutrality cannot be concealed from us inasmuch as it undermines right of Embassy to make claims against other violations of neutrality much less important than present one".

Under instructions from London the British Embassy has today offered a full and unreserved apology, indemnity for the Spanish nationals killed and injured and disciplinary measures against the British submarine commander.

The British Ambassador and I both agree that the most suitable and effective means of implementing Algiers telegram No. 1744, May 24, 4 p. m., to the Department is to act on the suggestion made in Tangier's 139, May 26, 4 p. m. to the Department. He is sending a similar telegram to London recommending that Gascoigne<sup>36</sup> be instructed to concert with Childs in an attempt to arrange matters directly with Orgaz. If such a move proves unsuccessful it is still open to us to make representations to Jordana but even if the situation described in paragraph 2 had not occurred our representations to the Spanish Government could be based purely on legalistic considerations. Our base would rest in the main on the assumption that British and American airplanes always kept outside the 3-mile limit whereas I should have thought what we really wanted was for our planes not to be hit if they seemed fairly near. Furthermore the relations between Jordana and Orgaz are tenuous at best and in effecting the closing of the German Consulate General and the exodus of the staff Orgaz has received from Madrid more peremptory telegrams than no doubt was to his liking. Accordingly he might not prove very amenable at the moment to instructions in this matter from Jordana or decide to put them into practice literally. Please instruct.

Repeated to Tangier and Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

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811.2381/69a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1944—3 p. m.

1689. Department's 1549, May 30, 7 p. m. The Department has now received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy respecting unneutral

<sup>35</sup> Gen. Francisco Jordana.

<sup>36</sup> Alvary D. Gascoigne, British Consul General at Tangier.

acts of Spanish shore batteries in firing on aircraft of the United States and United Nations engaged in anti-submarine patrol. This communication summarizes following incidents:

Two American built aircraft operated under U. S. Naval Command by French squadron fired on by batteries of Santa Cruz de Tenerife April 15. One was struck by shrapnel 3½ miles offshore while the other received a shrapnel scratch from 77 millimetre gun at altitude 2,000 feet, 3 miles offshore.

U. S. Naval planes fired on by batteries of Santa Cruz April 16 and 17 while 5 miles offshore and a second attack was made on one plane at altitude 3,000 feet 3 miles offshore.

In addition United States planes were fired on by Spanish shore batteries as follows:

[Here follows list of incidents, with time and place of occurrence indicated.]

Spain evidently is unable to prevent the continuing operation of German submarines within Spanish territorial waters in violation of Spanish neutrality, and the Navy Department feels that the United Nations right should be recognized to pursue and search for enemy submarines within the 3-mile limit without bringing into question any breach of Spanish neutrality to which Germany could object.

An anti-submarine patrol with U. S. Navy blimps will be established shortly in the Mediterranean strait area, and while instructions will be given pilots to stay outside Spanish territory and territorial waters it will be difficult to control the movements of blimps because of weather. They are easily blown off course and there will be instances when pilots will be unable to carry out instructions fully.

The Navy Department desires that a strong protest be made against the unneutral acts of Spanish anti-aircraft installations in the areas of Canary Islands and Morocco in repeatedly attacking our aircraft beyond territorial waters. The Navy Department desires to have assurances that Spanish batteries will cease firing upon United States and United Nations craft offshore regardless of distance and that no attacks will be made on U. S. Navy blimps by plane, shore battery or otherwise, while operating in the areas mentioned. The Navy Department requests that the Spanish Government be asked to give special instructions to all anti-aircraft and coastal batteries and air commands in the above areas to prevent the occurrence of an unfortunate incident.

The Department has since received from the Navy Department another communication referring to the above and has also received your 1957, June 1, midnight and Tangier's 139, May 26, 4 p. m. Navy Department's latter communication refers to a report from the Naval Attaché in Tangier<sup>37</sup> quoting Orgaz as having stated on June 1 that

<sup>37</sup> Lt. Comdr. Robert W. Gilmore.

while pursuing enemy submarines into territorial waters of Spanish Morocco Allied aircraft will not be fired on, but that patrol planes passing over these waters will be warned by one shot in the air. Planes flying low over Larache will be fired upon and Naval Attaché infers this rule will apply as regards other coastal towns.

Navy Department does not understand how Spanish commanders can know whether planes are patrolling or pursuing enemy submarines, and therefore urges the practical solution of the whole problem of obtaining from the Spanish Government suitable assurances that firing upon our planes offshore in general will be stopped, and that having regard for difficulty of navigating blimps in strong winds these craft will not be fired on even when blown over land.

The Department is agreeable to the proposal that as regards areas within the jurisdiction of Orgaz, Childs be permitted to attempt a solution locally. However, Orgaz has no authority in Canary Islands and may deny authority as regards shore batteries in the Spanish presidios in North Africa. You are therefore requested to bring the above matters urgently to the attention of the Spanish Government and to indicate that as regards areas under his control General Orgaz will be approached directly by Childs. This cable is being repeated to Tangier for the guidance of the Legation.

Sent to Madrid, repeated to Tangier and London.

STETTINIUS

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811.2381/71 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Legation at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, June 13, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received 5:50 p. m.]

168. Orgaz, who leaves for Madrid tomorrow for a week, received me today when I left him a first-person note<sup>33</sup> on subject of Department's 1689 to Madrid.

As Naval Attaché had never been presented to Orgaz I thought occasion suitable one for Gilmore to accompany me.

Orgaz said he would give immediate orders that blimps should not be fired on under any circumstances and asked if I could assure him they would not drop charges in Spanish Moroccan territorial waters. I said our aircraft would have to reserve right to fire on enemy subs escaping into such waters or lurking therein and he did not press that point.

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<sup>33</sup> Copy of note was transmitted to the Department by the Counselor of Legation at Tangier in his despatch 2141, June 13; neither printed.

I then suggested desirability of his issuing orders to prevent firing on planes in sending warning shots against planes unintentionally over Spanish Moroccan territorial waters. I suggested danger of incident would be eliminated if such orders were given. I suggested that if he were willing to give such orders I could assure him there would be no intentional intrusion by our planes except in pursuit of enemy subs or instead of firing even warning shot against such planes I proposed orders be given that no shot should be fired and that he should notify Legation of violation of Spanish Moroccan territorial waters that we would communicate these to Moroccan Ocean Sea Command, that our naval authorities would take appropriate action against offending pilots. He agreed.

Orgaz suggested on his own that it would simplify matters since British as well as American planes were involved if British would give him similar assurances in which case he would agree that British planes should not be fired on. He added that British had made numerous reconnaissance flights over Spanish Moroccan territorial waters and had taken many photos. I said I could not speak for British but I would transmit his offer at once to Gascoigne.

Repeated to Madrid as our 80; repeated to London as our 8.

CHILDS

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811.2381/76: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, June 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received June 20—10:33 a. m.]

2136. Tangier's 154, June 1, 4 p. m.<sup>39</sup> and 168, June 13, 1 p. m. I represented to the Foreign Minister today the situation as described in the Department's 1689, June 10, 3 p. m., and in the course of our discussion referred to the satisfactory arrangement which had been reached by the Legation in Tangier with General Orgaz.

Jordana said that orders had been issued by him and the Minister of Air to commanders of anti-aircraft guns to exercise the greatest prudence and care and only to fire warning shots when Allied planes actually come over Spanish land or well into Spanish territorial waters. Needless to say I made the case for pursuing submarines into Spanish territorial waters and the special flight characteristics of blimps.

Jordana said that he had not previously heard about any negotiations between our Legation and Orgaz but as soon as he could obtain a report of the arrangement, which as outlined to him by me seemed quite reasonable, he would see that it was applied to Spanish territory

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<sup>39</sup> Office of Strategic Services message not found in Department files.

not under the direct control of Orgaz including the Canary Islands and Straits area. In this connection he referred to negotiations which had recently been carried on at Gibraltar between the British authorities there and the Spanish Consul, a report of which had been made to the Spanish Air Ministry from which it appeared that the recommendations arising therefrom were in line with Orgaz's attitude. He expressed the hope that in the meantime the United States Government would renew and emphasize its construction [*instruction*] to American pilots not to fly planes over Spanish land and especially Spanish cities and towns.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Tangier and to Algiers for Murphy.

HAYES

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811.2381/6-2944 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Legation at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State*

TANGIER, June 29, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received June 30—2:29 p. m.]

187. Orgaz has confirmed to Gascoigne (183, June 25<sup>40</sup>) that on June 14 following my interview with him AA<sup>41</sup> batteries in Spanish North Africa were ordered to refrain from firing on any Allied plane flying: (1) unintentionally over SNA<sup>42</sup> or Tangier territorial waters or (2) intentionally over such waters in pursuit of enemy subs.

Orgaz added unless Spanish Government so ordered he could not promise AA batteries would not fire if Allied planes dropped depth charges on subs in territorial waters. He stated this question had been submitted by him to Madrid where decision would have to be made. Gascoigne replied he must reserve British right to open fire on subs in territorial waters.

Orgaz has introduced a reservation which Gilmore and I when we saw him on June 13 both considered had been withdrawn. Spanish Consul de Castro who was present at interview and made record of conversation states Orgaz in his opinion was not definite on this particular question. My view is Orgaz may have considered after our interview he had committed himself on an important point affecting neutral rights about which Madrid was alone competent to decide. De Castro confirms Orgaz has in fact referred question to Central Government and I therefore do not believe any useful purpose would be served by my pursuing it with him. As Jordana appears to have

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<sup>40</sup> Not printed.

<sup>41</sup> Antiaircraft.

<sup>42</sup> Spanish North Africa.



found quite reasonable my understanding of the arrangement reported my 168,<sup>43</sup> Madrid's 2136, June 19 there exists a very favorable basis for discussion in Madrid.

The only question remaining unclarified therefore is whether AA batteries in SNA will hold their fire against Allied planes and blimps after depth charges have been dropped in territorial waters.

Repeated to Madrid, by courier to Algiers.

CHILDS

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811.2381/9-1844

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

No. 1154

WASHINGTON, October 10, 1944.

SIR: The Department has had under discussion with the Navy Department the question of firing on Allied aircraft by shore batteries in Spanish Morocco. Telegram no. 187 of June 29, 1944 from Tangier stated that anti-aircraft batteries in Spanish North Africa had been ordered not to fire on Allied aircraft flying (1) unintentionally over territorial waters of Tangier or Spanish North Africa, or (2) intentionally over the territorial waters of Tangier in pursuit of enemy submarines. It was indicated, however, that no assurance could be given that Allied aircraft which dropped depth charges in such territorial waters would not be fired on, and that this question had been referred to Madrid where any decision in the matter would have to be reached.

You are requested to bring this matter to the attention of the Spanish authorities and to point out the difficulty of determining in all cases whether an aircraft is over Spanish territorial waters and to request that in order to avoid any untoward incident Spanish anti-aircraft batteries be instructed to refrain from firing on American aircraft in any circumstances, leaving for discussion by the Spanish Government and this Government any cases in which the Spanish authorities may consider that the facts so warrant.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

A. A. BERLE, JR.

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811.2381/11-1144

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

No. 3406

MADRID, November 11, 1944.

[Received November 25.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's instruction No. 1154 of October 10, 1944 (File No. 811.2381/9-1844), which has ref-

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<sup>43</sup> Dated June 13, p. 419.

erence to Tangier telegram No. 187, dated June 29, 1944, regarding the achievement of the Legation in securing the agreement of the High Commissariat at Tetuán to order anti-aircraft batteries in Spanish North Africa to desist from firing upon American military aircraft in the circumstances stated.

The implementation of this agreement, as far as this Embassy is informed, has been most satisfactory. Accordingly, the opinion of the Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier was informally requested concerning the desirability of reopening the subject at Madrid. The latter's views, to which I fully subscribe, are informally expressed in the following paragraph of his personal letter in reply to that request:

"My own feeling is that this question is distinctly a dead issue and I personally can see no possible useful purpose in raising the question with the Spanish authorities. I feel convinced that our planes are not going to be fired on so that the questions raised by the Department in its instruction are now entirely academic. I had an opportunity to discuss this problem with officers of the Moroccan Sea Frontier Command a few days before leaving for Madrid and they felt as I did, that no further difficulties of any kind were to be expected by our planes flying in this area."

The situation in like regard in the Canaries also would appear to have developed reasonably. The Consul at Las Palmas,<sup>44</sup> mentioning by letter of November 4 that the fact of the Embassy's protest to the Foreign Office at Madrid had been informally brought to the attention of the local military, stated:

"He (General Jimenez) replied that orders had been received approximately a fortnight ago that 'planes over the jurisdictional waters should not be shot at, but that planes over land must be'."

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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**REPRESENTATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES TO SPAIN FOR THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN SPANISH NATIONAL TELEPHONE COMPANY**

852.75 National Telephone Co./419

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*<sup>45</sup>

No. 2001

[MADRID,] February 10, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: As Your Excellency is aware, very considerable sums of American capital have been advanced to and invested in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España by the International Tele-

<sup>44</sup> Robert F. Fernald.

<sup>45</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2362, April 21, from Madrid; received May 11.

phone and Telegraph Corporation in order that the company should have means for creating and furnishing urban, inter-urban and international telephone service. These investments were made by reason of the fact that the Government of Spain had granted a concession contract to the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España which assured to it certain rights and privileges for a minimum period of twenty years, and the right to fair and just compensation for that investment in the event that the Spanish State exercised its right to recapture the developed properties at the termination of the stipulated period. The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation is the principal shareholder in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, owning approximately eighty percent of its common shares.

Certain recent acts of the Spanish Government, and, in some instances, the failure of the State or its representatives to act, have prejudiced the American investment in the company and threaten to impair the value of such investment.

I am informed that Mr. F. T. Caldwell, Vice President of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, New York, has submitted a petition to the Presidency of the Government appealing for an early and fair solution for a number of difficulties which have arisen in relations between the Company and the State, some of which have been caused by administrative acts of the Government. I am attaching hereto a copy of that petition.<sup>46</sup>

My Government has instructed me to request Your Excellency's good offices to assure full and prompt consideration of the arguments set forth in the petition of the representative of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Co./417a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—8 p. m.

877. In view of urgency of ITT matters now pending with Spanish Government and of possibility that delaying tactics may be employed deliberately, you are requested to ask the Spanish Government to furnish you, in reply to your note supporting the ITT complaints and claims, its assurance that the complaints and claims will be examined and given prompt consideration in the light of the terms of the concession, and that pending a final decision neither the present majority stockholder position of ITT nor the present CTNE position will be affected or disturbed by any demands of the Government. It is felt

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<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

that without some such assurance the properties and interests of the ITT are not safeguarded in a manner to permit continuing negotiations in an orderly fashion.

HULL

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852.75 National Telephone Co./419

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*<sup>47</sup>

No. 2258

MADRID, April 4, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: On February 10, 1944, I had the honor to send to Your Excellency my Note No. 2001 with which I transmitted a copy of a petition submitted by Mr. F. T. Caldwell, Vice President of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, New York, addressed to the Presidency of the Government, appealing for an early and fair solution for a number of difficulties which have arisen in relations between the Company and the State and I requested Your Excellency's good offices to assure full and prompt consideration of the matters set forth in that petition.

Your Excellency was good enough to inform me in Note No. 169 [1698?] of February 16, 1944, that my Note had been transmitted to the Presidency of the Government.

Almost two months have transpired since the petition referred to was delivered to the Presidency of the Government but no word has been received, either by the Company or by me, that action has been taken on any of the matters presented in that petition.

Under the circumstances my Government has now instructed me to request Your Excellency's assurances that the complaints and claims submitted by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation nor the present Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España position will be affected or disturbed by any actions of the Spanish Government.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/421: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, May 31, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received June 2—12:47 a. m.]

1927. With despatch 2362, April 21,<sup>48</sup> there was transmitted a copy of note 2258, April 4, addressed to Minister for Foreign Affairs following instructions in 877, March 29.

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<sup>47</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2362, April 21, from Madrid; received May 11.

<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

On May 6 I sent the Minister a follow-up personal note and in my conversation of May 25 I called to his attention the fact that I had received no response.

I have been in close touch with Caldwell who believes as I do that pending outcome of his present informal discussions for the sale of the property reported in my despatches 2383 [2393], April 27, 2442, May 8 [6],<sup>49</sup> it was inadvisable for me to press the matter vigorously. Should present negotiations be successful the American interest would be safeguarded by the sales arrangements.

The status of the sales negotiations, as reported to [by?] La Puerta<sup>50</sup> to Ackerman<sup>51</sup> yesterday, is that Franco<sup>52</sup> has agreed to all of the principal ITT desiderata except one. As a prior condition, dollar exchange would be made available for arrears owing to ITT; purchase price would be paid by an initial payment of approximately 30% and the balance by 5 annual equal installments; in the interim voting control would remain with ITT. The CTNE would contract with ITT for service and operational management, including purchasing, both from abroad and from Standard Eléctrica. Franco objected to the price asked by ITT for its shares, namely, 3,000 pesetas, but informed La Puerta he would approve purchase at 2,500 pesetas per share.

When I informed Caldwell of this conversation he was greatly elated. Although he has not been authorized to accept a price as low as 2,500 pesetas he seemed to believe that the difference is not so great that it cannot be spanned.

For my part I shall save my elation until the projected arrangements take written form.

HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/7-1844

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Jordana)*<sup>53</sup>

No. 2718

MADRID, July 7, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I regret that I again find it necessary to refer to my Note No. 2001, February 10, 1944, with which I transmitted a copy of a memorandum submitted by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, New York, to the Presidency of the Government regarding complaints and claims against acts of the Spanish Govern-

<sup>49</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>50</sup> José María de La Puerta, Spanish Under Secretary of Commerce.

<sup>51</sup> Ralph Ackerman, Commercial Attaché in Spain.

<sup>52</sup> Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

<sup>53</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2751, July 18, from Madrid; received July 29.

ment and in some instances the failure of the Spanish Government or its representatives to act, thereby prejudicing the American investment in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España.

In that Note I requested Your Excellency's good offices to assure full and prompt consideration of the arguments set forth in the memorandum of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. Your Excellency informed me on February 16, 1944, that my Note had been transmitted to the Presidency of the Government. I again alluded to this matter in my Note No. 2258, April 4, 1944, and in a personal note to Your Excellency of May 6, 1944.

More than five months have passed since the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation delivered its memorandum and I am now informed by the president of that corporation, Colonel Sosthenes Behn, who is now in Madrid, that no action has been taken on any of the claims and complaints set forth nor has the company received any definite indication that the memorandum is receiving the attention of the Presidency of the Government.

As I believe it is the sincere desire of the Spanish Government to act promptly to correct a condition which has prejudiced in the past, and will continue, until remedied, to prejudice, the American interest in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, I should appreciate the intervention of Your Excellency to avoid further needless delays.

I avail myself [etc.]

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/7-2944: Telegram

*The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, July 29, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

2639. In the course of my interview with the Foreign Minister yesterday I represented the necessity of action being taken on IT and T's claims and complaints and asked Jordana to intervene personally in this matter. He at first took the position that since the CTNE was a Spanish company, as Foreign Minister he had no local standings in the matter and, by implication the United States Government as well. However, after I reviewed the genesis of the company<sup>54</sup> citing that the Spanish State had given definite guarantees as a prior condition to the investment of American capital, that certain Spanish governmental agencies were attempting to nullify the guarantees given, that the overwhelming majority of common stock was still American owned, and that it was the United States Government's right to intercede through diplomatic channels with the Foreign Minister of a

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<sup>54</sup> For correspondence on the granting of this telephone concession, see *Foreign Relations*, 1924, vol. II, pp. 692 ff.

friendly state to the end that its citizens' interest receive equitable treatment, he receded from his previous position and agreed to act.

I have so notified the IT and T.

The Embassy has never lost sight of the desirability of obtaining action on IT and T's claims and complaints referred to in the Department's 2080, July 24.<sup>55</sup> However, as the Department is aware, IT and T's own efforts to obtain consideration of its contentions as well as its desire that pressure be exerted by the Embassy on its behalf have ebbed and flowed with the time of its sale negotiations which in my opinion have been conducted thus far in a singularly opportunistic fashion.

BUTTERWORTH

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852.75 National Telephone Company/8-1844

*The American Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lequerica)*<sup>56</sup>

[No. 2914]

[MADRID, August 12, 1944.]

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to call to Your Excellency's attention the fact that during the course of the current year the Embassy has addressed to Your Excellency's esteemed predecessor, the late Count Jordana, a number of communications requesting the good offices of the Ministry in obtaining an early and equitable solution to certain difficulties which have for some time past been outstanding between the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation of New York, an American business concern and the principal stockholder of the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, and the Spanish Government.

In his Note No. 2001 of February 10, 1944 the Ambassador transmitted to the late Minister a copy of a petition submitted by Mr. Fred T. Caldwell, Vice-President of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, addressed to the Presidency of the Government appealing for a solution to these difficulties, together with a request that prompt and full consideration be accorded to the matters set forth therein. The Minister was kind enough to reply, in his Note No. 1698 of February 16, 1944, that the Ambassador's Note had been transmitted to the Presidency of the Government for study.

On April 4, 1944, no further reply having been received from the Spanish Government in this matter, the Ambassador addressed to the Minister a second Note, No. 2258, requesting once more on behalf of his Government assurances that the claims and complaints sub-

<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

<sup>56</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2926, August 18, from Madrid; received August 29.

mitted by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation would be given the prompt and careful attention to which they were entitled, and that, pending a final decision, the interests of that company in the *Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España* would be in no way disturbed by any action of the Spanish Government.

In the continued absence of a reply to his reiterated representations, the Ambassador, after having again brought this matter to the attention of the Minister in a personal letter of May 6, 1944, addressed to the latter on July 7, 1944 his Note No. 2718, in which he pointed out that no action appeared to have been taken on any of the claims and complaints of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and that the latter had received no definite indication that the petition submitted with the Ambassador's Note of February 10, 1944 was receiving the attention of the agency of the Government to which it had been addressed.

On July 28, 1944, during the course of an interview with the late Minister for Foreign Affairs, I emphasized the urgent necessity of prompt action by the Spanish Government with respect to the claims and complaints of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and in return received his oral assurances that he would endeavor to expedite such action, an undertaking which, however, he was prevented from carrying out by his sudden death six days thereafter.

In further pursuance of this question, I now have the honor to enclose two copies of the Spanish text of a second petition, dated August 8, 1944<sup>57</sup> which Mr. Caldwell has addressed to the Presidency of the Government setting forth further claims and complaints of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation against the Spanish Government with the request that Your Excellency be so kind as to ensure prompt and full consideration of the arguments set forth therein.

In view of the very considerable investment of American capital involved in the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation's majority interest in the *Compañía Telefónica de España* and in view of the guarantees which were given by the Spanish Government as a condition precedent to the investment of that capital, my Government attaches great importance to the early rectification by the Spanish Government of the claims which have been brought against it by this American company, claims which have been under consideration by the Spanish Government for many months, and it is my earnest hope that Your Excellency will intervene personally and without delay to make certain that prompt action will be taken

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<sup>57</sup> Not printed.



by the appropriate agencies of the Spanish Government in the direction of a settlement of these claims.

I would remind Your Excellency that, despite its repeated representations with respect to this important question, the Embassy has as yet received no definitive reply from the Spanish Government as to its attitude concerning the allegations of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation nor has it been given any indication that this matter has been made the subject of active consideration by the Spanish authorities concerned. I am fully certain that Your Excellency will not wish to permit the continuance of this deplorable situation and will, on the contrary, wish to make sure that the American interests involved in this case are accorded the same consideration which, I am certain, the United States Government would accord to interests of Spanish nationals under similar circumstances, and consequently I confidentially await Your Excellency's reply in order that I may assure my Government that the Spanish Government is, in fact, earnestly devoting its attention to a settlement of the claims and complaints which have been placed before it by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation.

Accept [etc.]

W. WALTON BUTTERWORTH

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852.75 National Telephone Co./8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, August 25, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received August 27—5:54 p. m.]

2921. Vice Presidency of the Spanish Government through Government delegates to the CTNE, yesterday notified the company that in accordance with provisions of article 92 of the regulations for carrying out the concession contract it must take necessary steps to assure that a majority of its voting shares are in possession of Spanish nationals (*en poder de Españoles*) by August 29. The company is now preparing an answer.

I have today submitted a note to Foreign Minister, copy of which is going forward by tomorrow's air pouch,<sup>58</sup> strongly protesting against the discourtesy shown the American Government by failure of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to answer the several communications I have addressed to it on this matter and I informed the Spanish Government that the United States Government reserves the right to take such action as may be necessary to ensure proper protection for Ameri-

<sup>58</sup> Despatch 2962, August 26, and enclosed note not printed.

can shareholders in the CTNE. I expect to discuss matter fully with the Foreign Minister at San Sebastian <sup>59</sup> on Saturday <sup>60</sup> or Monday.

HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Co./9-1944

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

No. 3102

MADRID, September 19, 1944.

[Received September 28.]

Subject: Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España

SIR: With further reference to my despatch No. 2999, September 1, 1944,<sup>61</sup> on the above subject, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum of the substance of my conversation with the Chief of the Spanish State on September 11, 1944.

The day following that conversation the Vice President of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation received notification from the Subsecretary of the Presidency of the Government to the effect that the Presidency of the Government can not entertain the claims which are presented in the name of a foreign company in view of the fact that the right of representation of the general interests of the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España before the Spanish State corresponds to that Company.

I immediately sent a personal note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs recalling assurances given to me by General Franco and expressing my belief that this notification must have been sent by inadvertence. I pointed out that the promise of fair treatment to the American interests in the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España could only be carried out by fair treatment to that company. I requested the Minister to bring this notification to the attention of General Franco. I have received no reply to this note as yet.

In acknowledging receipt of the notification, Mr. Caldwell, Vice President of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation is reminding the Presidency that the Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España is the product of the intervention of foreign capital which still holds a controlling interest, and of foreign management, and that the denial of the Presidency to admit that the American interest in the company may address an appeal to the Spanish Government for action to remedy a condition which is injurious to that interest makes it necessary for the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation to have recourse to the United States Government for protection of its interests.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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<sup>59</sup> Summer capital of the Spanish Government.

<sup>60</sup> August 26.

<sup>61</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure—Extracts]

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

In the course of my conversation with General Franco at the Prado on Monday, September 11, which covered a number of matters which are embodied in another Memorandum of Conversation, I stated that I should like to bring up two specific matters which were at issue between our Governments and which, I trusted, might speedily be settled to the satisfaction of both.

The other specific matter I wished to bring up, I said, had to do with the Telephone Company in which there was a very large and important American financial interest which my Government intended to protect. Despite the fact that I had called this to the attention of the Foreign Office in a formal Note as long ago as early February, and despite a succession of Notes ever since that time, no reply whatsoever had been forthcoming from the Spanish Government. I thought this not only discourteous but suspiciously indicative of unfair and unjust treatment of American interests. The IT&T had invested a large amount of American capital in providing Spain with a modern and efficient telephone system under a solemn contract concluded between the Company and the Spanish Government of the time of Primo de Rivera.<sup>62</sup> This contract had been scrupulously lived up to by the Company, but in the last years had been violated in a number of respects by the Government as set forth in a memorandum of last February. It seemed obvious to me that the terms of the contract should be carried out and that if any modification of the contract was desired it should be arrived at by mutual agreement and not by unilateral action on the part of the Spanish Government.

The Caudillo said he had given much attention to this matter of the Telephone Company and it was not as simple as I implied. The contract was not between the IT&T, a foreign Corporation, and the Spanish Government, but between a Spanish company and the Spanish Government with a provision in the contract to the effect that the laws of the State had precedence over the terms of the contract. It was therefore a matter of domestic policy and not a question at issue between two governments or even between the Spanish Government and a foreign corporation. Besides, the contract had been a particularly iniquitous one. It was, so far as the Spanish Government was concerned, largely a personal act of General Primo de Rivera, who had been a good general and had done much for Spain, but who had been

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<sup>62</sup> Miguel Primo de Rivera, Marques de Estella, overthrew the Spanish Ministry in 1923 and established a Military Directorate. He resigned his office in 1930.

easily duped on economic matters. There had been a terrible outcry from the Spanish public about the terms of the contract, and it was the "scandal of the Telefónica" which was the major factor in bringing about the downfall of Primo de Rivera and eventually of the Monarchy. Indeed the chief hue and cry against the contract had been raised by the Republicans and Leftist elements in general so that, under the Republic, a serious attempt had been made to nationalize the Spanish telephone system. This had been halted through a kind of informal compromise whereby the *status quo* would continue indefinitely without the State's recognizing the validity of the contract. I should bear in mind that the contract had never been passed upon, much less accepted, by the Cortes either under the Monarchy or under the Republic. All that the Spanish Government was now doing was to continue the *status quo* much as it had been under the Republic. He recognized that there was a considerable American investment in the Telefónica. He wanted it treated fairly and justly and had no idea of effecting any confiscation.

I said that the Government had recently expressed a desire to buy the holdings of IT&T in the Spanish Telephone Company but the Government spokesman seemed to wish to buy them at a figure which would entail at least partial confiscation and money losses for American investors. The Company was willing to treat of a sale if the Government would make a firm and formal written offer and then give some individual or committee full powers to carry on the subsequent negotiation. The Caudillo said the Spanish Government had no thought whatsoever of buying up the holdings of American investors. He himself was extremely glad that American capital had been invested in Spain and he hoped it would remain invested here. The Government had thought of buying up 51% of the stock in the Company but it was not by any means finally committed to that. In any event, he would be insistent that foreign capital invested in Spain was well and justly treated and that a fair return was made to the investors. He and his Government were determined on fair and honest financial dealings. He could assure me that no American investor would suffer.

I said that raised still another point which didn't have any connection at all that I could see with questions in dispute about the contract or about the possible purchase of holdings of the IT&T. It was the point that there was now a big backlog of credits and blocked balances held by the IT&T in pesetas which had not been transferred into dollars for the American investors. Hence the latter for some years had not been in receipt of any return on their investment. I said there was no dispute regarding the amount of these credits and balances between the Company and the Spanish authorities. Everybody agreed on the amount. Moreover, Spain had resources that enabled it to make the needful transfer from pesetas into dollars and I

could not see why such action should not immediately be taken regardless of the debates about other matters connected with the Telephone Company. It was only fair and just to the American capital invested in an important and essential Spanish public utility. The Caudillo said there was a great deal of doubt in his mind whether Spain in the immediate future could transfer the full amount of the credits and blocked balances. Consequently, some further negotiation would be necessary to determine the exact amount which Spain, through its resources, could actually transfer now. He intended, however, that Spain should meet its obligations.

I said there was one great difficulty about this whole telephone complex, and that was the lack of any agency authorized and empowered to deal with the Company. All sorts of delaying and frequently contradictory proposals came from this or that member of the Government; sometimes from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, sometimes from the Ministry of the Treasury, sometimes from elsewhere. It seemed to me obvious that American capital had been invested in the Company on the understanding that the original contract was a valid one, that consequently, in the interest of the American investors, the contract should be respected and observed until such time as, through appropriate negotiation, a new contract might be made. Moreover, authoritative negotiation seemed necessary for any sale of stock from American to Spanish holders and, according to what he had just said, negotiation might be necessary to determine what amount of the credits and blocked balances would be immediately transferred from pesetas to dollars. Absolutely essential, however, to all such negotiations was the designation by the Caudillo of a person or a committee with authority and full power to negotiate on behalf of the Spanish Government. The Caudillo said this last suggestion was an excellent one and he would take immediate steps to see that such a negotiating commission was set up and that it deals promptly and in a businesslike way with the Company. He would reaffirm his purpose of respecting fully American investments in Spain and the interests of the United States here.

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852.75 National Telephone Co./9-3044

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

No. 3158

MADRID, September 30, 1944.

[Received October 21.]

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department of the developments concerning the difficulties of the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation since my despatch No. 3102, September 19, 1944.

In the Official Bulletin of the State of September 24, 1944, there appeared a decree of the Minister of Labor which limits or prohibits the employment of foreigners in technical and managerial positions. Industries may be permitted, by special authorization of the Council of Ministers, to employ foreign technicians and specialized personnel for a maximum period of seven years but companies rendering public service are prohibited by Article 2 from employing foreign personnel in positions of management, submanagement, as managing directors, superintendents, inspectors, chiefs of personnel, or in positions conveying technical or administrative authority. Although the government may concede authority for the temporary employment of foreign personnel in such companies, this may be only for the time indispensable to substitute Spanish personnel. A transitory article of the decree provides that foreign personnel must be dismissed within a period of three months from the date of its publication. A translation of the decree is being transmitted herewith.<sup>63</sup>

It will be noticed that foreigners are not barred from policy making or managerial positions in industry; the descriptions applying to the posts affected in public utilities include every post now filled by Americans in the *Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España* and leads to the strong suspicion that this legislation was designed as a flank attack on that corporation.

The issuance of the decree at this time has added significance as it coincides with the apparent expiration of the contract between the ITT and the CTNE for technical and managerial services. At the meeting of the Board of Directors on August 25th, Mr. F. T. Caldwell in his capacity as Managing Director, called attention to the fact that the service contract with the ITT should be renewed on August 29th. He purposely refrained from mentioning the fact that a law of 1940 authorized the automatic extension of contracts which had been affected by the civil war for the period in which they were not fully operative. According to the ITT's interpretation of the 1940 law, the service contract therefore continues operative for approximately twenty months more. The Directorate agreed that a new service contract with the ITT should be drawn up and should be discussed and passed upon at a subsequent meeting. Apparently the decree of September 23rd was designed to prevent the employment of Americans by the CTNE under the new service contract.

I am presenting a note to the Foreign Office, a copy of which is enclosed, pointing out that as the concession contract permitted the CTNE to employ foreigners up to 20% of its personnel and as Article 26 specifically provides that the terms of the contract cannot be

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<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

modified by unilateral action on the part of the State, I assume that the decree of September 23rd does not apply to the CTNE.

On September 26th the Board of Directors held another meeting. After the usual business had been concluded the Government Delegates presented to the Directorate a note received by them from the Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Government notifying the company that it must give strict compliance to the provisions of Article 92 of the regulations and stating that noncompliance with the obligations set forth in that regulation will prevent the legal application of resolutions which may be arrived at in the ordinary and extraordinary stockholders meeting and in meetings of the Board of Directors or other organisms or of persons whose authority emanated therefrom. A copy of the notice and translation thereof are enclosed.<sup>64</sup>

These new government acts following so shortly after my conversation with General Franco on September 11th impelled me again to discuss this entire matter with the Minister for Foreign Affairs during my interview on September 27th. I informed him that in the course of my conversation with General Franco on September 11th I had understood him to indicate quite clearly (1) that he welcomed American—and indeed foreign—investments in Spain which would be amply protected and justice rendered them by the Spanish Government; (2) that he was minded to appoint a representative or a special commission to treat with the management of the Telephone Company and to reach with them an amicable and just settlement of questions in dispute. I had made a point in my conversation with the Caudillo that the contract between the Government and the Telephone Company should be respected and observed until such time as, through mutual agreement, and in accordance with the present terms of the contract, a new and altered agreement might be made. However, since that conversation with General Franco on September 11th, the most arbitrary action had been taken, quite contrary to the words of the Caudillo as I had understood them. For example, there was a decree of September 23rd, published in the Official Bulletin and signed by General Franco, prescribing that all foreign personnel occupying managerial, technical, or administrative positions in public service companies, that is, in the Telephone Company, must quit those positions within three months, that is, by December 23rd of this year. As a matter of fact, of the total number of employees of the Telephone Company, 99.94 percent were now actually Spanish, despite the fact that the contract prescribed merely that at least 80 percent had to be Spanish. This decree of September 23rd was only one of the high-handed, arbitrary acts of the Government. On September 26th had

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<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

come a communication from the Presidency of the Government demanding strict, immediate compliance with the demand made in August for transfer of 51 percent of the stock of the Company into Spanish hands, and declaring that until such compliance was forthcoming any and all action of the Company and its Board of Directors would be illegal and unlawful. The Minister had given me to understand at San Sebastian in August that the demand then made by the Presidency of the Government would be suspended pending negotiation of all the difficulties between the Government and the Telephone Company. Not only had there apparently not been a suspension of the demand, but it was now being renewed and attended with the direst penalties.

From these latest acts—the decree of September 23rd and the demand of the Presidency of September 26th—it was abundantly clear that the Spanish Government whatever might be the professions of the Caudillo, was actually doing by indirection what it had no right under the contract to do directly and legally. To all intents and purposes, it was nullifying the contract and thereby it was endangering a large and important foreign and American investment. My Government did not propose to sit idly by at such flouting of justice. It intended to protect American interests unjustly attacked or undermined. I was sure that if and when the real facts in the case became public property there would be a most violent repercussion of American public opinion. American investment had been made with the clear understanding that the Spanish Government would respect and observe the contract it had freely made with the Telephone Company. It was now violating and nullifying that contract. If the Spanish Government wished to abrogate the contract or to modify it, it could do so legally and in accordance with contractual provisions. To achieve its ends, whatever they might be, by high-handed, unilateral action was obviously unfair and unjust, and quite belied the Caudillo's assertion that he welcomed foreign investment in Spain and wished to have it protected and justly treated.

The Minister said he was gradually familiarizing himself with the whole involved subject of the Telephone Company. Unfortunately he was personally in a difficult position, in as much as he was closely identified in business matters with Urquijo, the President of the Company. He would do his utmost, however, to draw a line between his personal interests, which were really those of the Telephone Company, and his official position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was sure the Caudillo meant what he had told me on September 11th but he must confess he thought the Caudillo was considerably misinformed about the history of the Telephone Company. There were too many self-seekers with personal axes to grind in the matter who had access to



the Caudillo and prejudiced him against the company. He knew the Caudillo wanted to be perfectly honest and fair and square. However, he needed information of an accurate sort and he, the Minister, was now seeking to collect all such information and get it before the Caudillo. He had a luncheon engagement—I understood for today, though perhaps tomorrow—with Pablo Garnica,<sup>65</sup> and he expected to obtain at lunch and in conferences afterwards a great deal of essential information. He did not believe that any immediate action could be taken to reverse the decree of September 23rd or the communication from the Presidency of September 26th, but, after all, these were details. As a businessman, he himself felt that such actions were injurious to Spanish credit abroad. He thought Carceller<sup>66</sup> knew a good deal about the whole matter and he expected to talk with him at length as well as with Garnica. He would go into the matter and would discuss it, he hoped more intelligently, with me at a future date.

I said I, too, felt the Caudillo was laboring under considerable misapprehension and misinformation concerning the Telephone Company and its past. In our conversation of September 11th, I had not wished to take time to reply in detail to many of the specific allegations the Caudillo had then made, nor did I have at that time sufficient detailed and technical information to answer his allegations with precision and accuracy. Consequently, after the conversation, I had requested my Commercial Attaché to obtain from the management of the Telephone Company the necessary specific information which might serve to disabuse the Caudillo of any misinformation or misapprehensions. The results had now been embodied in a fairly elaborate memorandum which I would hand to the Minister, in both English and Spanish versions, with the request that, if he saw fit, it should be put into the personal hands of the Caudillo. The Minister said he welcomed very much just such a memorandum and he was sure the Caudillo would welcome it likewise. He would see to it that, after reading it himself, it would be transmitted promptly for the personal attention of General Franco.

In a recent conversation between the Minister of Industry and Commerce and my Commercial Attaché, the former indicated a desire to meet informally with representatives of the ITT to discuss the Telefónica problem more leisurely than would be possible at his office. Mr. Caldwell invited the Minister to lunch with him and the other representatives on Thursday, September 28th. In addition to the Minister and Mr. Caldwell there were present Judge Pitkin, one of the New York legal representatives of the ITT, Mr. Francis White, and the ITT's Spanish attorney, Sr. Don José Beltrán.

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<sup>65</sup> Pablo de Garnica y Echevarra, Spanish industrialist and banker.

<sup>66</sup> Demetrio Carceller, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce.

According to Mr. White, the luncheon lasted from 2 p. m. to 6 p. m. and characteristically Carceller did about fourth-fifths of the talking. At the suggestion of the Embassy the company officials first sought to have the Minister increase the sum of exchange which would be made available for remittance against arrears and to obtain a promise that earnings and charges would be released currently. Carceller insisted that the dollar exchange position does not admit of the release of anything above the token payment of \$5,000,000 which he had proposed to the Commercial Attaché some weeks ago nor could he give a definite commitment regarding the remittance of current earnings.

The question of the sale of American shares to Spanish nationals was only touched on obliquely, that is, the Minister deprecated the various notices which had been sent to the company by the Presidency of the Government and the notes sent by the Embassy in connection with the various complaints and claims of the company as having very little practical effect. He reiterated his previous statements to the effect that Franco is opposed to State ownership of the company for the several reasons that public administration would inevitably greatly increase personnel and operating costs, that efficiency would decline and that the detractors of the present regime would immediately allege that such transaction had been consummated for the financial benefit of Franco and his collaborators. The problems of the Telefónica have been the subject of Cabinet discussions, according to Carceller, and within a relatively few days, possibly early next week, representatives of the company would be asked to meet with a commission appointed by the Government to discuss a revision of the contract. Carceller did not refer to the possibility that these discussions might encompass proposals for the acquisition of American-owned shares but the representatives of the ITT concluded that the question of Spanish majority ownership would be one of the changes desired.

I proposed to continue pressing the Minister of Foreign Affairs on behalf of the company until a solution is found for its many problems.

Respectfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/12-544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 5, 1944—10 a. m.  
[Received December 6—11:59 a. m.]

3945. Carceller has informed Embassy verbally that he had been named by Franco to resolve the telephone problem by direct negotiation with the ITT. It was pointed out to him that Embassy

expects Spanish Government make it clear that the order of the Ministry of Labor prohibiting employment of foreigners in public utilities (Embassy's despatch 3158, September 30) would be repressed or interpreted as not applying to the CTNE; that there be rescinded or reinterpreted the edict of the Presidency of the Government denying legal validity to acts of the stockholders or directorate until such time as CTNE had placed a majority of its common shares in Spain and that ITT representatives in Spain should be given right to uncensored communication by telephone with his principals in US. Carceller agreed to discuss first point with Minister of Labor and to take under consideration second and third points.

In view of significance of telephone problem to political and economic relations between United States and Spain Carceller requested that Embassy name an observer to sit in on all conferences. He has also invited Caldwell and Ackerman for luncheon on Wednesday<sup>67</sup> for an exploratory talk. Latter invitation we have accepted on understanding it does not involve any commitment on behalf of US Government. Our feeling is that if exploratory discussion reveals a possible basis for negotiation between the parties concerned Embassy forthwith should withdraw from formal participation therein.

Your attention is directed to Embassy's 3944 even date.<sup>68</sup>

HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/9-3044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1944—10 a. m.

3192. We have presented to the Spanish Ambassador a memorandum with regard to the telephone situation. The text of the memorandum is as follows:

"The International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, an American interest having an important investment in Spain, has been seriously prejudiced over a period of years by acts of the Spanish Government. Claims and complaints of the company have met with no remedial response and the company's legal personality, recognized when the investment was being made in Spain, appears to be questioned, inasmuch as the company is denied the right to voice its grievances to the Presidency of the Spanish Government.

"The American Embassy in Madrid has protested in writing and orally to the Chief of the Spanish State and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs without effect. On September 11 the former undertook to name a commission with full powers to deal promptly with the company's representatives, but no further action has been reported. Meanwhile the situation has been aggravated by the issuance on Sep-

<sup>67</sup> December 6.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

tember 24 of a decree regarding the employment of foreigners in public utilities in Spain. This decree, if applied to the subsidiary Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España, would violate the concession contract. Moreover the decree was issued after Ambassador Hayes had been given to understand that pending negotiations no steps would be taken to alter the position either of the CTNE or of the ITT. On September 26 an order was issued by the Presidency to the effect that until the majority of the common stock of the CTNE should be placed in Spain all acts of stockholders' meetings and of the Board of Directors of the CTNE would be illegal.

"This Government is concerned both because of the particular American interest and investment involved and because the methods of the Spanish Government may reflect the development of a policy having broader implications, at variance with assurances the American Embassy has been given that the Spanish Government welcomes American investments and enterprise.

"The Department feels that the commission proposed by General Franco should be named without further delay and that equitable arrangements should be arrived at with the American company. Continuing unfavorable treatment of this matter cannot fail to be prejudicial to general relations between the two countries."

Please present a copy of this memorandum to the appropriate authorities indicating that you are doing so under direct instructions from Washington.

STETTINIUS

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852.75 National Telephone Company/12-844: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 8, 1944— 10 a. m.  
[Received December 9—10:47 a. m.]

3973. Embassy's 3945 December 5, 10 a. m. At a meeting between Carceller and Caldwell yesterday at which de la Puerta and Ackerman were present former agreed to request Franco upon latter's return to Madrid Monday to authorize lifting of censorship on all conversations between Caldwell and Behn and also to rule that labor decree of September 24 does not now apply to Telephone Company. After exhaustive exploratory discussions principally as to necessity of modifying expired concession contract so as to meet certain government objections Carceller and Caldwell agreed there appears to be a sufficient meeting of minds for negotiation and that discussions should continue. In principle it was agreed that CTNE would remain a privately owned corporation, that larger part of American owned shares would be sold and that it should continue to supply technical assistance. Price method of payment conditions of technical contract were not discussed in detail. Another meeting is to be held next week but as subjects will be primarily related to specific changes in contract

and other technical aspects Embassy does not propose to have observer present.

HAYES

852.75 National Telephone Company/12-1644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 16, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received December 19—1:01 p. m.]

4055. After Carceller had given full assurance to Caldwell and Ackerman yesterday that the Government delegates would inform CTNE at its meeting on December 19 that Labor Ministry decree of September 14 [24?] would not affect position of Americans in CTNE Caldwell made following proposals:

(1) Immediate and complete liquidation of the ITT blocked credits of approximately 350,000,000 pesetas.

(2) ITT to retain 20% interest in the CTNE common share capital or 80,000 shares of the existing 400,000.

(3) Price for the common stock to be 2500 pesetas per share equivalent to \$222.82 per share or a total of \$53,239,973 for 238,941 shares.

(4) (a) This sale price for the shares to be covered by negotiable dollar bonds maturing in 16 years with minimum annual amortization of \$1,500,000; interest on unamortized portion of bond issue at 4% per annum payable in dollars semi-annually.

(b) When in any year the equivalent of 20% of the dollar value of exports from Spain to the United States exceeds the sum of minimum annual amortization of \$1,500,000 plus the annual interest charge on the then unamortized bonds said annual amortization shall be increased by the amount of such excess.

(c) The total amortization as provided for in (b) above will be increased by 75% of the dollar value of all exports from the Spanish Standard Eléctrica factories.

(d) In addition to the above provisions for the liquidation of the sale value of the shares and interest, ITT will receive dollar transfers representing the equivalent of the dividends on its minority stock equity and for the fees agreed upon under the technical administration contract to be authorized by the Government between the ITT and the CTNE. (This contract to be at rate of 1½% of CNTE gross annual revenue.) The total volume in any one year of such dollar transfers to be not less than an amount equivalent to 5% of the dollar value of that year's Spanish exports to the United States, any amount due and not transferred in any given year being cumulative.

Carceller stated that he accepted conditions above except 3 and 4 (d) and was confident Franco would confirm. Price may not exceed 20,000 pesetas per share. He insisted this offer is final and will not be increased by so much as one peseta. He agreed to 4 (d) except as regards transfer of dividend earnings which he wishes to examine

further to ascertain the extent of commitment. He realized that recapitulation might be necessary if the price of 2,000 pesetas were established as the value of shares but he wished to scrutinize closely the plan of such revaluation before discussing the matter with Franco. Caldwell agreed to place before him a plan for recapitulation.

In a further conversation held today when Caldwell presented as formula for payment of arrears that \$5,000,000 be paid on or before December 31st, \$15,000,000 January 15 and balance [garble] \$11,000,000 January 30, Carceller stated there had been some misunderstanding as his agreement to immediate transfer had been limited to the \$15,000,000 or \$20,000,000 mentioned previously. He assured Caldwell that \$5,000,000 would be transferred to New York before year end, \$15,000,000 by end of January; he insisted the balances should form part of the dollar bonds. Caldwell would not agree and when it became evident that an impasse had been reached he suggested this point be held over. Subject to further discussion of arrears payments Caldwell accepted share price of 2,000 pesetas on condition that price is net without deductions for taxes. Carceller would not agree to freedom from taxes ordinarily applying to such transactions but agreed to examine extent of taxes before making definite commitment. This was left pending.

Caldwell again made reservation on behalf of ITT that sale of shares is contingent upon approval by appropriate agencies of United States Government.

For Department's information, Carceller seems genuinely desirous of reaching speedy agreement and has not been inclined to quibble over technicalities. By accepting the above proposals he considers Spanish Government is being very generous. Accepting with reservation Caldwell's statement that ITT invested \$45,000,000 in its properties he pointed out that under above scheme it would recover in cash about \$30,000,000, in negotiable guaranteed government bonds \$43,000,000, that it had previously transferred \$11,000,000 and still retains a share interest valued at approximately \$15,000,000. He wishes sufficient ITT control to ensure continuing efficiency of company and is willing to pay a fair sum for that service. He fears that in reorganization of capital structure either banks, ITT, or both, may seek to obtain benefits which could lead to criticism of Government and apparently intends to study carefully ITT's proposals.

Caldwell has thus far handled negotiations very ably for his principals; although there remain for settlement such questions as tariffs, government debts to CTNE, et cetera these become less important to American interests as a consequence of sale of its majority shares.

It should be noted that the Embassy has played no part in the framing of the I.T. and T. proposals nor has it assumed any responsi-

bility in that connection. It has confined its intervention to creating the atmosphere and bringing about the conditions to the end that the representative of the I.T. and T. in Spain could negotiate with an authorized representative of the Spanish Government with more than reasonable chance of success.

HAYES

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852.75 National Telephone Company/12-3044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 30, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received January 2, 1945—1:15 a. m.]

4155. In fulfillment of promise given to Embassy in September Carceller has now given instructions for the immediate transfer to New York of \$5,000,000 token payment against accumulated arrears.

HAYES

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**REPRESENTATIONS TO SPAIN FOR THE SUSPENSION OF GERMAN  
AIR SERVICE BETWEEN SPAIN AND GERMANY**

852.79662/9-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

SAN SEBASTIÁN, September 8, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received 4:48 p. m.]

SS25. My telegram SS24 September 8, noon<sup>69</sup> reports in full my conversation with Lequerica<sup>70</sup> today regarding non-asylum for Axis leaders.<sup>71</sup>

I also stressed again that my Government regarded the prompt suppression of the German air service with Spain as of utmost urgency. I characterized the line as being no more than an appendage of the German Embassy and Government serving their military and communications ends. The point that its flights over areas of Allied military operations are intolerable to us was reiterated. He said that the topic would be first in his personal conversation with Franco<sup>72</sup> (preceding my appointment) on Monday.<sup>73</sup> He hoped that Franco would order stoppage of the line.

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> José Felix Lequerica, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>71</sup> For correspondence relating to asylum for war criminals, see vol. I, pp. 1410 ff.

<sup>72</sup> Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

<sup>73</sup> September 11.

The subject of the stores sent in to Spain from southwest France during the period of German evacuation was briefly touched. I expressed pleasure at the order of the Director General of Customs requiring the latter's specific authority for the release of any such goods. This order results from American, British, French representations to the Foreign Office.

Repeated to Madrid.

HAYES

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852.79662/9-2244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, September 22, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 24—5 p. m.]

3219. In the course of my interview with the Foreign Minister today, he stated that as a result of his discussions with General Franco the Spanish Government had resolved to stop all air traffic in merchandise and financial assets between Spain and Germany and to prevent any German agents from entering Spain by air and to this end rigid instructions were being issued to the Spanish customs officials at Barcelona and Madrid.

He went on to state that on the other hand Spain did not see its way clear to stopping all air traffic to and from Germany inasmuch as this was now the only means available to Spain for contact with the Spanish Embassy and Consulates in Germany and for the repatriation from Germany of Spanish citizens, some of whom were very aged and infirm. He requested that I communicate this explanation to you and expressed the hope that you would appreciate the humanitarian aspect of it.

I countered by citing specific instances as to the nationality of the passengers now being carried by Lufthansa planes and the exaggerated number of German diplomatic pouches and requested more drastic action.

Lequerica, faced with these data of which he took written note, said that he still hoped that some more decisive action might be taken; that in any case the amount of diplomatic mail to be transmitted would be severely limited and the number of trips of the German planes similarly would be rigidly restricted. He indicated he would present the whole case anew to Franco and I requested that at the same time he represent anew to him the importance and urgency of this matter.

HAYES



852.79662/9-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1944—8 p. m.

2619. You have already made strong representations to the Spanish Government looking to suspension of enemy air services to Iberian Peninsula. You are now requested to see Lequerica and tell him you are acting under instructions from your Government in asking the immediate and permanent suspension of those services. The Allied press and public are of course aware of this connection and you should so state. Lisbon is being similarly instructed.<sup>74</sup>

HULL

852.79662/9-2644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, September 26, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received September 27—10 a. m.]

3248. It appears probable that the Department's 2619, September 23, 8 p. m., crossed my 3219, September 22, 7 p. m., reporting my last conversation with Lequerica on the suppression of the German air service with Spain. I shall of course continue to press the matter as instructed.

I may point out however that neither at San Sebastián<sup>75</sup> nor here has the British Embassy given earnest support to our formal and informal representations although it has been kept currently informed of the American position. Only last night Lord Templewood<sup>76</sup> not only stated that he still had no instructions from his Government but he also voiced the opinion that since the service now affords the only means of erecting [*effecting*] the expulsion of German agents from Spain it is useful to our ends. That the traffic was pointed out to him to be two-directional seemed not to shake the British obsession that ridding Spain of Nazi agents is the utmost consideration.

It would be helpful to me if the British Foreign Office were to be brought to our viewpoint. Consideration also might be given to encouragement of a French diplomatic protest in the sense that by offering terminal landing facilities Spain is making itself a direct party to violations of French territorial air by aircraft of an enemy of France.

HAYES

<sup>74</sup> Telegram 2591, September 23, 1944, 11 p. m., to Lisbon, not printed.<sup>75</sup> Summer capital of the Spanish Government.<sup>76</sup> Sir Samuel Hoare, British Ambassador in Spain.

852.79662/11-344

*The Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Spain*<sup>77</sup>

[Translation]

No. 784

## NOTE VERBALE

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honor to inform the latter that, in accordance with the representations made in a recent conversation by the Ambassador of the United States to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, appropriate instructions have been given to the competent authorities to the end that extreme care be taken in the examination of the baggage carried by German citizens who travel by plane from Spain to their country, which baggage will be kept down to the minimum in keeping with the regulations, and to the end that this Ministry be advised of any anomaly which may be discovered in this connection.

MADRID, September 27, 1944.

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852.79662/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, September 28, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received September 29—9:57 p. m.]

3282. Department's 2619 September 23, 8 p. m., and my 3248 September 26, 5 p. m. The case for immediate suspension of the German air service to Spain was again urgently pressed in a conversation with Lequerica this morning.

His arguments were those with which the Department is now familiar. He said in summary that, while there is no thought of permitting the line to serve German interests, such a service is essential to Spain in connection with its obligations to its diplomatic missions and to Spanish citizens and interests in Germany and Central Europe. He would prefer that the German line be suspended if a substitute were provided and he said that he could assure me that the German operation would be stopped altogether if an arrangement could be made for the establishment of an airline, whether Spanish or Swiss or both, between Spain and Switzerland.

In promising to communicate this proposal, I remarked that the chance for favorable consideration would be improved if Spain should

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<sup>77</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3353, November 3, from Madrid; received November 13.

first accede to our request for permanent and immediate suspension of the Lufthansa service.

HAYES

852.79662/10-644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>78</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1944—midnight.

8191. The Spanish and Portuguese Governments have been requested to suspend immediately and permanently the Lufthansa service between Germany and the Iberian Peninsula. It has been pointed out to these Governments that these services are even more obnoxious to us now than heretofore in view of the fact that they pass over our military lines. The Spanish Government has indicated reluctance to comply with our request, stating that the service is essential to Spain in order to maintain contact with its diplomatic missions in Germany and Central Europe. The Portuguese Government is obviously waiting to see what action Spain takes.

Please request the British Government to make similar representations to the Spanish and Portuguese Governments. Hayes reports that in his conversations with Lord Templewood the British seem to feel that the service is useful to our ends in that it provides the only means of effecting the expulsion of German agents from Spain. The British do not appear to appreciate the two-directional nature of the service both in the carriage of passengers and enemy intelligence material.

The Mission at Paris is being instructed to encourage a French diplomatic protest to Spain on the basis that Spain, by affording terminal landing facilities, is making itself a direct party to violations of French territorial air by aircraft of an enemy of France.

HULL

852.79662/10-1844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 18, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received October 18—12:50 p. m.]

8883. ReDeptel 8191, October 6, midnight. We have just been informed by the Foreign Office that instructions have been sent to the British Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon to make representa-

<sup>78</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same day, to Madrid, Lisbon, and Paris, as Nos. 2721, 2684, and 105, respectively.

tions to the Spanish and Portuguese Governments on the suspension of the Lufthansa service along the same lines as those already made by our Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon.

WINANT

852.79662/10-644: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)* <sup>79</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1944—8 p. m.

2863. Reference Department's 2721 October 6, midnight.<sup>80</sup> The Foreign Office has informed our Embassy at London that instructions have been sent to the British Ambassadors at Madrid and Lisbon to make representations supporting our stand regarding suspension of Lufthansa.

Caffery<sup>81</sup> was informed on October 14 that the French representative at Madrid would be similarly instructed.

STETTINIUS

852.79662/11-344

*The American Embassy in Spain to the Spanish Ministry for Foreign Affairs* <sup>82</sup>

No. 3298

NOTE VERBALE

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge, with appreciation, the receipt (on October 24, 1944) of the latter's Note No. 784 of September 27, 1944, stating that instructions had been given to the appropriate authorities to exercise exacting care in the examination of baggage accompanying German nationals departing from Spain for Germany by airplane and to restrict the amount of such baggage to a regulation minimum.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reminded of the repeated occasions when the Ambassador has emphasized the objections of the Government of the United States to the continued operation of the German air services between Spain, Germany and Portugal.

In setting forth the attitude of the Spanish Government toward these services, the Foreign Minister stated to the Ambassador on September 22<sup>83</sup> that it had been resolved to stop all air traffic in

<sup>79</sup> Repeated to the Minister in Portugal as No. 2794.

<sup>80</sup> See footnote 78, p. 448.

<sup>81</sup> Jefferson Caffery, appointed United States representative to the *de facto* French Authority at Paris on September 21, 1944.

<sup>82</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3353, November 3, from Madrid; received November 13.

<sup>83</sup> See telegram 3219, September 22, 7 p. m., from Madrid, p. 445.

merchandise and in financial assets between Spain and Germany, as well as to forbid the future entry into Spain of German agents arriving by air. Respecting "diplomatic mail", the Minister said that instructions were being given severely to restrict the amount of such mail. When the general subject of the German air services was next discussed between the Foreign Minister and the Ambassador on September 28,<sup>84</sup> the former again stated that neither His Excellency the Chief of State nor he himself had any thought whatsoever of permitting the Lufthansa to serve German interests. To this end, the Ambassador was assured that the Spanish Government was taking the utmost precautions to prevent the departure for Germany by air of such merchandise and baggage. The Ambassador then mentioned information in the possession of the Embassy to the effect that substantial quantities of merchandise, including food concentrates and vitamins, of character clearly serving German war interests were, in fact, actually being freely removed from Spain to Germany by Lufthansa airplanes, presumably with knowledge of the Spanish Government.

The Embassy regrets the necessity for bringing to the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, despite the mentioned reiterations of the policy of the Spanish Government to prohibit movements of merchandise to Germany by air, very substantial shipments of the character covered by the September 22 and 28 conversations were permitted to be removed from Spain by the airplane which departed from Barcelona for Germany on October 23. In addition, a preposterously large quantity of "diplomatic mail" and excessive amounts of personal baggage are reported to have been taken on the said flight.

Equally disturbing information has been received concerning the cargo of the Lufthansa airplane which left Barcelona for Germany early this morning. The report of this latest violation of the stated air-export prohibition mentions further tonnage of food products of vital service to the German war effort and again a preposterous volume of so-called "diplomatic mail".

While the principal concern of the present Note has been to protest against extension of the facilities to an enemy of the United States and of its Allies whereby that enemy is permitted to receive vital materials from Spain by airplane, the Embassy considers it to be appropriate to impress upon the Ministry in respect to the larger question of the complete and prompt suppression of the objectionable German air services that the Government of the United States continues to

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<sup>84</sup> See telegram 3282, September 28, 9 p. m., from Madrid, p. 447.

hold firmly to the position already made known to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to His Excellency the Chief of State.

MADRID, October 30, 1944.

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852.79662/11-244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, November 2, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received November 3—7: 19 a. m.]

3638. In the course of a conversation with the Foreign Minister today I both protested against the use to which the Lufthansa planes were being put and again requested the complete and permanent stoppage of this air service with Germany. Lequerica said he was still desirous as he had been for some time, of complying with our request but what stood in the way of doing so was the necessity of Spain's maintaining contact with Spanish citizens and interests in Central Europe. He indicated that, while he appreciated the point I had made that Spanish couriers with Spanish diplomatic pouches could now go overland to Switzerland, that did not satisfy the need of a means of transporting Spanish citizens to and from Central Europe. He stated that Spain would gladly institute a special Iberian service from Spain to Switzerland if the United States, Great Britain and France would agree to it, and that just as soon as he had word of favorable action on our part he would stop the German line.

Likewise the President of Iberia Airlines has inquired as to the procedure for obtaining permission for the establishment of air service between Barcelona and Zurich with control stop in France. Swiss have told him they are agreeable to its institution.

It will be recalled that last year we specifically requested Spaniards to arrange for such a service and made provision for it in aviation gasoline agreement of September 20, 1943.<sup>85</sup> British and French missions, which made representations last week to Spanish Foreign Office regarding continuation of Lufthansa service, do not, for their part, perceive any objection to a Spanish-Swiss line, but are uninstructed by their Governments in this respect.

Your instructions would be appreciated as well as details regarding procedure for obtaining permission to operate, if you likewise have no objection to the establishment of such an airline under proper security control.

HAYES

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<sup>85</sup> See note No. 562, September 20, 1943, from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Spain, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 707.

852.79662/11-344

*The American Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Lequerica)* <sup>86</sup>

MADRID, November 2, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER AND FRIEND: Upon returning to the Embassy from our meeting today, in the course of which we discussed the German air service to Barcelona and this Embassy's Note of October 30, I was shocked by the receipt of reports of the following developments:

1. On October 31 there arrived at Barcelona a Junkers-88 plane which had been introduced into the above-mentioned German air service. As Your Excellency is undoubtedly aware, this type of plane is a military plane and has never been built for commercial use. The non-commercial nature of this particular plane in the service between Germany and Spain is emphasized by the fact that, aside from its crew, the only person carried by the plane was a German Government functionary.

2. Instead of interning this plane at Barcelona, the Spanish authorities permitted it to proceed on November 1 to Reus, which has an airport that, according to the Embassy's understanding, is closed by the Spanish Government to commercial traffic. It would appear, therefore, that the authorities, having not only failed to intern this plane, extended exceptional facilities to it.

3. Furthermore, the German plane that left Barcelona on October 30 for Germany carried not only the strategically valuable cargo mentioned in my Note of that date, but also a shipment of tin, which, it need hardly be stated, is a war material of the highest importance. These exportations were made in flagrant violation of the undertaking given by Your Excellency of which my Government has taken note.

The above-outlined incidents all demonstrate that the assurances given by the Spanish Government regarding the control of German air service have not been implemented. At the same time, it is evident that the purpose of the Germans has been to use this service directly to facilitate their war effort, and that they have even dropped all pretense of camouflaging this fact. Your Excellency can not but be aware that in doing so they have openly placed Spain in the position of being a base for a service inimicable to the United States.

Furthermore, information has come to my attention indicating that the situation created by this service, serious as it has already become, will give rise to even greater complications, the avoidance

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<sup>86</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3353, November 3, from Madrid; received November 13.

of which can be achieved by the immediate prohibition of the entry and departure of German planes in Spanish territory.

As my Government will speedily become aware of the incidents which have taken place, I shall greatly appreciate Your Excellency's early advice regarding the Spanish Government's action, including the internment of the Junkers-88 plane, in order that my Government may be appropriately informed without delay.

With the highest personal regards, I am,

Faithfully yours,

CARLTON J. H. HAYES

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852.79662/11-1344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, November 13, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received November 14—10:48 p. m.]

3735. Reference my despatch 3353 November 3.<sup>87</sup> In the course of my conversation with the Foreign Minister today, I again discussed the question of the Lufthansa service between Spain and Germany although no answer has been received to my 3638 of November 2, 8 p. m., and Lequerica said that whereas he was anxious to satisfy Allied wishes about the German airline it would have to continue to operate unless some other means were found to enable Spain to have contact at least with Switzerland. But he added as a result of my representation by [*and*] those of my British and French colleagues he had given within the past few days the strictest instructions that German agents were not to be brought into Spain on the German airline, that absolutely no merchandise was to be thus carried from Spain to Germany and that the amount of diplomatic mail was to be reduced to the barest minimum.

Incidentally Lequerica went on to say that the American military authorities on Franco-Swiss border had refused to allow Spanish diplomatic couriers to leave Switzerland en route through France to Spain and he requested that I bring this matter to your attention to the end that authorization be given forthwith for the movement of Spanish diplomatic couriers by car to and from Switzerland. At same time he reiterated the proposal transmitted in my 3638 November 2, 8 p. m.

Repeated to London as 961, to Paris for SHEAF as 27 and to Bern and by courier to Lisbon and Tangier.

HAYES

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<sup>87</sup> Not printed.



852.79662/11-1344 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, November 18, 1944—8 p. m.

3057. In view of the strong nature of your demands for cessation of Lufthansa service, the Department believes these demands should be pressed vigorously, regardless of the explanation furnished you by Lequerica. The fact remains that these planes traverse our war zone and will continue to serve the enemy war effort directly as long as the service is maintained regardless of any restrictions Spain may impose along the lines of your 3735, November 13, 8 p.m. You may tell Lequerica that failure to comply with our request inevitably influences relations between Spain and the United States.

Sent to Madrid, repeated to London.

STETTINIUS

852.79662/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)*

WASHINGTON, November 23, 1944—7 p. m.

3087. For your own information and in connection with your 3806, November 21, 2 p. m.,<sup>88</sup> and previous, the Department on November 21 wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to obtain their views about the desirability of having the Deutsche Lufthansa service to Spain discontinued and a service by Iberia from Madrid to Switzerland, with control stop in France, substituted. At the same time the Department asked that approval for the allocation of a sufficient quantity of 87 octane gasoline to operate not more than two round-trip frequencies a week be given in the event that the Joint Chiefs were desirous of accepting the Spanish proposal. You will be advised promptly when a reply is received.

STETTINIUS

852.79662/12-2044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State*

MADRID, December 20, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received December 21—5:50 p. m.]

4084. I appreciate receiving the information contained in the Department's 3256, December 16, 8 p. m.<sup>88</sup> and I hope that when the replies of the theater commander are received the matter will be reviewed by the Combined Chiefs. Perhaps it would for the moment

<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

be ideally preferable to effect stoppage of the Lufthansa Line between Spain and Germany without agreeing to the initiation of an Iberia Line between Switzerland and Spain with a control stop in France. But unless the appropriate theater commander is prepared to arrange for night fighters to shoot down the Lufthansa planes and thus effectively put an end to that service, the question is not whether it is undesirable to have either line operating but whether it is not much more desirable to have a controlled Spanish line than an uncontrolled German line.

Repeated to London as 1038 and to Bern.

HAYES

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**AIR TRANSPORT SERVICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN**

[For text of agreement effected by exchange of notes signed at Madrid December 2, 1944, and related notes, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 432, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1473.]

## SWEDEN

### NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH SWEDEN FOR THE CESSATION OF SWEDISH EXPORTS TO GERMAN OCCUPIED EUROPE<sup>1</sup>

740.00112 European War 1939/9842 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1944.

66. Reference Stockholm's 4120 December 21 and 4098, December 18<sup>2</sup> which were repeated to Embassy as their 824 and 821 respectively.

Department and FEA<sup>3</sup> have considered the figures for Swedish exports of iron ore during November. Exports during the first 11 months amount to 9,648,000 tons, a figure which allows for a very small export tonnage during December if the ceiling of 9.9 million tons, in itself an extension of the ceiling established under the old Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement,<sup>4</sup> is not to be violated.

For your information, we cannot accept Hägglöf's<sup>5</sup> contention that 10 million tons should be considered as the ceiling under the normal trade formula. An argument for such a ceiling has not been made before even by the Swedes, and Boheman,<sup>6</sup> as recently as December 1st, stated that his Government had accepted the 9.9 million ceiling. (See Stockholm's 3900, December 1st<sup>7</sup> repeated to you as their 790.)

The very slight margin left to the Swedes for exports during December combined with Hägglöf's plea for an extension in the ceiling make it appear almost inevitable that at least a 10-million-ton total will be

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<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 739 ff., and pp. 815 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>3</sup> Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>4</sup> This agreement was signed on December 7, 1939, and announced on December 8; for substance, see W. N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, vol. I, in the British civil series *History of the Second World War* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), pp. 150-152.

<sup>5</sup> Gunnar Hägglöf, head of the Economic Division of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, served as Chairman of the Swedish Trade Delegation in London.

<sup>6</sup> Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>7</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 822.

reached, notwithstanding Hägglöf's estimates as reported in Stockholm's 4120, December 21. Under these circumstances and in the absence of some agreement for limiting first quarter shipments as proposed in our 7367, November 20,<sup>8</sup> our hard-won limitation on iron ore exports in 1944 is of slight value.

We therefore suggest that you take up with MEW<sup>9</sup> immediately the proposal that the British and American Legations press most urgently for a satisfactory answer to their joint memorandum of December 1st.<sup>10</sup> If the Swedes argue that the reduction in exports requested by us is so severe as to disrupt their coal and coke imports from Germany, we might remind them of the evidence contained in Stockholm's 4122 of December 21,<sup>11</sup> a paraphrase of which has been sent to you by air pouch from the Legation which indicates that there are large stocks of coal and coke on hand in Sweden.

We also propose that the Swedes be informed, provided that the Legation sees no objection at this time, that we consider it of particular importance, at this stage of the war, that Section 7, paragraph 2 of the Swedish Declaration<sup>12</sup> be applied by them in such a way that the export of no commodity or group of commodities limited under the Agreement should, in the first and second quarters, be disproportionately large relative to the exports in past years, or in relation to the amount of the ceilings for the whole year 1944. Reasonable allowances should, of course, be made for the seasonal factors and for the ordinary flow of trade. In connection with the above, the Swedes should be reminded that during the negotiations last summer<sup>13</sup> the American and British representatives repeatedly emphasized the desirability of limiting exports during the first and second quarters to amounts in reasonable proportion to the amount of the ceilings for the whole year.

Department and FEA consider it of special importance that some satisfactory arrangement be made to reduce to a minimum the export of iron ore during the first and second quarters.

HULL

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<sup>8</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 819.

<sup>9</sup> British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>10</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 7367, November 20, 1943, midnight, to London, and telegram 3900, December 1, 1943, 4 p. m., from Stockholm, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 819 and 822, respectively.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

<sup>12</sup> This declaration is included in a War Trade Agreement, initialed at London on September 23, 1943, between the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden; for text of the agreement, with declarations by the three Governments, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 806-815.

<sup>13</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 762-815.

740.00112 European War 1939/9902 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, January 5, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 6—10 a. m.]

37. *Aide-mémoire* regarding transit traffic through Bothnian ports (see Legation's 4169, December 29, 6 p. m.<sup>14</sup>) presented to Legation officer today by Swedish Foreign Office official reads in paraphrase as follows:

“American and British Legations in Stockholm have recently requested information regarding transit of concrete, coal and coke from ports on the east coast of Sweden to Norway. Legations have been informed in reply that this transit traffic is composed solely of 3 items mentioned above and is carried on from Swedish ports of Lulea, Sundsvall and Harnow and to Trondheim and Narvik, respectively. From November 1942–October 1943 about 1600 trucks a month were forwarded and assurance has been given that these figures will not in future be surpassed.

Additional information is now available as follows:

The transit of coke and coal from Sweden to Norway was small prior to war and occupation of Norway, since Norway imported the majority of her supply from England. Following completion of occupation of Norway in June 1940, it became necessary to obtain supplies of coal and coke from Continent as local stocks available had become gradually exhausted. Coke and coal transit over Bothnian ports was far below its present figure during latter half of 1940 and greater part of 1941, but since close of 1941, this transit has remained reasonably constant. Customs statistics concerning this traffic are not available but figures furnished by railway authorities indicate a total transit to Norway over Bothnian ports of 37,000 tons in 1940, 114,000 tons in 1941 and 260,000 tons (thereof 15,000 tons of concrete) in 1942. It is probable that figures for 1943 will be slightly higher. Ships that bring iron ore from Sweden normally carry coal and coke to Bothnian ports. Amounts of coal and coke transited to Norway are but fraction of amounts shipped for Swedish consumption to Bothnian ports, but they make up only minor part of Norway's total importation of coal and coke since greater part is shipped direct to Norwegian ports. German or German controlled trucks are largely used for transit through Sweden, average loading capacity for coal and coke being about 15 tons. Only concrete, coke and coal are transited by these routes. Different Norwegian firms are consignees, and, as far as is known in Sweden, coke and coal are used by Norwegian state railways, by industrial plants and for general purposes.

Transit traffic mentioned above has always differed in nature from transit to Finland and Norway over the ferry ports Trölleborg, Malmö and Hälsingborg, as envisaged by Swedish-German agreement of 1940<sup>15</sup> regarding transit of war material, personnel and other goods

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

<sup>15</sup> For text of this agreement signed on July 8, 1940, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, series D, vol. x (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 158.

for account of the occupying power. Principles of this agreement were applicable to transit to Finland as well as Norway so far as war material and other goods were concerned, but agreement had in view transit to Norway only. It is interesting to observe in this connection that goods—coal, coke and concrete—transited over Bothnian ports have not hitherto been sent over ferry ports, excluding possibility of northern traffic having been used as substitute for ferry boat transit.

It never occurred to anybody during the discussions among the Swedish, British and later U. S. authorities during 1942 and 1943 that anything other than ferry boat traffic was object of discussion, which clearly appears from wording of Mr. Boheman's memorandum of October 15, 1942. At that time this traffic was declared—certain restrictive measures having been taken—not to exceed total quantity of 200,000 tons per year in the future, this figure being an estimate of actual traffic volume at time over ferry ports. The American and British representatives proposed, in course of discussions during summer of 1943, in connection with eventual end of transit of war material, a reduction on to 120,000 tons, which reduction corresponded in their opinion to war material transited.

The American and British Governments were informed after conclusion of new transit agreement with Germany in August 1943 that transit of goods other than war material would be maintained at then existing level, Germans not being permitted to use traffic capacity left open by cessation of transit of war material for other goods.

Fact[s] mentioned above indicate situation clearly. Perhaps it might be said that special attention should have been drawn to transit over Bothnian ports. It is sincerely regretted if misunderstanding should have arisen due to this omission—as a result of the belief that this traffic was not under discussion, since it is of a completely different nature.

Special stipulation in Swedish-German agreement of 1940 referring to capacity of Swedish railroads is foundation for restrictions on ferry boat transit. Under allegation that oil must be classed as kind of war material, transit of oil has been prohibited. Goods transported by railways leading from Bothnian ports to Norway cannot be classified as war material and no question of traffic capacity as to these railways can be involved.

Nevertheless, instructions have been issued by Swedish Government as follows:

(1) In transit to Norway over Bothnian ports transport facilities will not be granted for increase over existing level.

(2) In order to prevent goods which cannot now be transited over ferry boats, as result of restrictions imposed, being sent over Bothnian ports, no goods other than those already transited will be admitted on these routes."

British Legation was given identical *aide-mémoire*. Copy of original is being sent by air mail to Department and to London Embassy.

This Legation is convinced that Swedes have acted in good faith in this matter. When Foreign Office official was asked whether something could not be done to reduce this traffic he replied that the

Foreign Office knows no grounds on which it could take any action other than that promised above.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9978 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 18, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:15 p. m.]

484. [To Stockholm:] 1. In order to allow Department to make any comment in view of slightly changed circumstances, Embassy suggests that steps outlined below not be taken by Legation until 48 hours after receipt of this message.

2. Department instructed Embassy in telegram 66 of January 4 to discuss with MEW a renewal of attempt to get undertaking from Swedish Government that during first quarter 1944 not more than 488 thousand tons of iron ore shipped to enemy Europe and that during any 1 month of that quarter not more than 200 thousand tons be shipped, as requested in joint memorandum of December 1.<sup>16</sup> This suggestion was based on apparent inevitability of iron ore exports exceeding ceiling, and fact that such an excess would undermine our hard won limitation on these exports for 1944.

Department suggested that should Swedish Government counter with argument that such a reduction during first quarter would seriously affect coal and coke imports, its attention should be drawn to large stocks reported in Legation's telegram 4122, December 21, 7 p. m. to Department.<sup>17</sup>

3. In addition Department suggested, should you perceive no objection, that attention of Swedish Government be drawn to its undertaking under section 7, paragraph 2, Swedish Declaration, and it be asked to agree to apply this section in such a way that the export during first and second quarters of 1944 of no commodity or group of commodities limited under agreement should be disproportionately large relative to exports during 1943 or relative to ceilings for 1944. Reasonable allowances would of course be made for seasonable factors and ordinary flow of trade. Department suggested that Swedes should be reminded that American and British representatives during last summer's negotiations emphasized repeatedly, desirability that exports for first and second quarter of 1944 be limited to amounts which would be reasonable in proportion to annual ceilings.

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 7367, November 20, 1943, midnight, to London, and telegram 3900, December 1, 1943, 4 p. m., from Stockholm, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol II, pp. 819 and 822, respectively.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

Embassy believes that all foregoing considerations are greatly strengthened in view of excess of 342 thousand tons in 1943 over normal trade ceiling established in 1939 agreement reported in your 26 of January 15, 3 p. m. (to Department 139).<sup>18</sup>

4. MEW is instructing British Legation, Stockholm to press for a favorable answer on iron ore export limitation for first quarter 1944. It is likewise instructing that approach be simultaneous with American. British reasoning is slightly different from foregoing, inasmuch as greater stress is laid on assurances given by Swedish Government that ceiling on iron ore exports would not be broken during 1943.

5. Embassy understands from MEW that Swedish Government has proposed that excess be charged against 1944 ceiling for iron ore exports. MEW believes it would be safer for the moment to ignore this suggestion of Swedish Government as it would in all probability lead us into a long and complicated wrangle as to exact definition of enemy Europe under 1939 War Trade Agreement. Its instructions to British Minister will suggest pressing at this time solely for first quarter specific limitation. Embassy agrees fully in this point of view.

6. In addition Ministry is instructing British Mission to join you in pressing for Swedish assurances in the sense outlined above as to specific manner in which section 7 (2) of Swedish Declaration will be applied.

This message sent to Stockholm as 22 from Embassy is repeated to Washington for Department, Stone,<sup>19</sup> FEA and Riefler.<sup>20</sup>

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10147

*The American Legation in Sweden to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*<sup>21</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the joint memorandum of December 1, 1943 wherein certain assurances relating to export of iron ore to Germany and associated countries and to countries occupied by Germany were requested of the Royal Swedish Government by the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom. The Government

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> William T. Stone, Director, Special Areas Branch of Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>20</sup> Winfield W. Riefler, Special Assistant for Economic Warfare to the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom. Mr. Riefler was in Washington temporarily on official business.

<sup>21</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2724, January 24, from Stockholm; received February 10.



of the United States now renews the request made in the joint memorandum that during the first quarter of 1944 the Royal Swedish Government will not permit iron ore exports to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories in Europe in any one month to exceed 200,000 tons, nor to exceed a total of 488,000 tons for the first quarter of the year.

The Government of the United States further desires to invite the attention of the Royal Swedish Government to its undertaking under Section VII, Paragraph 2, of the Swedish Declaration and to request that this Section be applied in such a way that the exports during the first and second quarters of 1944 of no commodity or group of commodities limited under the agreement should be disproportionately large relative to exports during 1943 or relative to the ceilings for 1944. Reasonable allowances will, of course, be made for seasonal factors and the ordinary flow of trade.

In this connection the Royal Swedish Government will recall that the representatives of the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom during the negotiations in the summer of 1943 emphasized repeatedly the desirability that exports for the first and second quarters of 1944 be limited to amounts which would be reasonable in proportion to the annual ceilings.

STOCKHOLM, January 22, 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/10148

*The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American Legation in Sweden*<sup>22</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

I. The Anglo-Swedish War Trade Agreement of 1939 does not give any specific ceiling for the iron ore exports. Consequently the iron ore exports are governed by the general rule of "normal trade" as laid down in the 1939 agreement.

Paragraph II of the Swedish Declaration of the 7th of December, 1939, states:

"In order to ascertain whether exports are to be classified as falling within the conception of normal trade, the figures of quantities contained in the Swedish trade statistics for the year 1938 will be treated as standard."

Further Section F of the Instructions to the Joint Standing Commission of the same date stipulates that:

<sup>22</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 2728, January 25, from Stockholm; received February 10. Copy of memorandum was also given to the British Legation in Sweden.

“For the purposes of these presents the term ‘Germany’ shall include—

- (a) the territory of the German Reich;
- (b) any territory for the time being under German occupation or control;
- (c) the territory of any country which may be allied to Germany or at war with the United Kingdom, including territory under that country’s occupation or control.”

The figures for the export of iron ore in 1938 to Germany as defined above are as follows:

	<i>metric tons</i>
To Norway	2, 112
Poland	126, 862
Germany	8, 945, 088
Holland	220, 939
Belgium	555, 494
France	76, 306
Czechoslovakia	798, 150
Hungary	11, 640
Other countries (Denmark, Danzig etc.)	<u>insignificant</u>
Total	10, 736, 591

On the basis of a strict interpretation of the 1939 agreement Sweden could therefore claim a “normal trade” figure for iron ore of 10.7 million tons. In 1943 the corresponding figures were:

	<i>metric tons</i>
To Norway	23, 087
Germany	10, 085, 817
Holland	18, 970
Belgium	64
Hungary	74, 841
Denmark	5, 880
Finland	33, 032
Total	<u>10, 241, 691</u>

It could therefore be claimed that the Swedish exports of iron ore in 1943 were 494,900 tons less than the normal trade ceiling.

It is only fair, however, to point out that always since the conclusion of the 1939 agreement the figure for the ceiling of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany has been spoken of as being 10 million tons. This round figure has in fact during all the war-time discussions and especially during the London negotiations of May–June 1943 been mentioned as the agreed limit of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany. The explanation of this rather arbitrary figure seems to be that at the time of the conclusion of the 1939 agreement “Germany” included Poland and Czechoslovakia i.a. and not the other countries

which have since then become occupied or allied territories. The foregoing table shows that the total of the iron ore exports in 1938 to Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia was 9.9 million tons or about 10 million tons. Therefore the round figure of 10 million tons has been adopted as a standard figure.

While the Swedish Government do not intend to urge on the strict interpretation of the agreement of 1939, which would mean a normal trade limit of 10.7 million tons, as compared with the corresponding exports of 10.2 million tons in 1943, it seems fair that the standard limit of 10 million tons should be applied in respect of the iron ore exports to Germany, including Poland and Czechoslovakia according to the statistics now established. The exports to these countries in 1943 amounted to 10,085,817 tons. There is therefore a quantity of about 86,000 tons in excess of the standard ceiling of 10 million tons.

The Swedish Government propose to carry over to 1944 the exact surplus over and above 10 million metric tons, thereby reducing the 1944 ceiling of 7.5 million tons by that same amount.

II. The most important single factor in connexion with the rising trend of the Swedish iron ore exports during 1943 has been the increased shipments via Narvik, which is outside Swedish control. In fact, the Narvik shipments have increased with about 70 percent as compared with 1942.

As to the Baltic ports the climatic conditions prevailing during the year have been remarkably favourable for the operation of the traffic. Thus, the port of Luleå was opened about one month earlier than usual. In addition thereto the shipping in the Baltic was not during the summer of 1943 hampered in the same way as during 1942 when the Swedish authorities were obliged to arrange for a convoy system.

The Swedish Government have during the last six months of 1943 followed the developments of the iron ore export situation with the closest attention. In connexion with the deliveries to Germany the following facts have been of particular interest. The transports on the Luleå-Narvik railway have been considerably reduced on account of extensive repairs which were undertaken in the course of the autumn 1943. The port of Luleå was closed on the 12th of December or about two weeks earlier than justified by prevailing climatic conditions. The capacity of the ports in the middle of Sweden in respect of iron ore shipments has been reduced owing to a limitation of the labour in the respective ports. This reduction has been particularly noticeable in respect of the port of Oxelösund.

An estimate made by the Swedish authorities on the 1st of December, 1943, showed that in view of the above-mentioned circumstances

the exports would be below the 10 million tons limit. The estimate proved good with regard to all ports except Narvik, which is outside Swedish control. In respect of Oxelösund the quantity exported has been less than was expected. On the other hand the exports via Narvik exceeded the estimate with about 90,000 tons, a large portion of which was shipped during the last days of the year owing to an unexpectedly large number of German ships having arrived there.

III. The Swedish-German Trade Agreement for 1944 stipulates a quota for the iron ore exports of 7 million metric tons with an additional margin of 100,000 tons. In addition to the exports to Germany some small exports will take place to Finland, Norway, Hungary, Belgium and Holland, the total figure being within the total ceiling indicated in the Swedish Declaration of 1943.

In addition the Swedish-German Trade Agreement for 1944 has been formulated in order to ensure the special stipulation in Section VI (a) of the Swedish Declaration of 1943.

It will be seen from the above that the Swedish Government have taken all steps necessary to implement the stipulations of the London Declarations regarding exports in 1944.

STOCKHOLM, 22 January 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/10015 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, January 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received January 25—8:21 a. m.]

252. My 244 January 22, 9 p. m., and 251 January 24, 6 p. m.<sup>23</sup>—53 and 54 to London. When I gave Boheman memorandum on January 22<sup>24</sup> covering iron ore export questions at same time receiving Foreign Office's memorandum<sup>25</sup> in reply to joint American-British memorandum of December 1, 1943, he made following comments: Circumstances controlling shipments of iron ore from Sweden to Germany in 1944 are entirely different to those which obtained in 1943. Structure of new trade agreement with Germany is on new bases. In previous trade agreements with Germany there was no limit to amount of iron ore exports except price. No one expected that limit could be attained. In new agreement<sup>26</sup> there is definite limitation in that Swedes can and will refuse licenses for any amount in excess of 7 million ton ceiling. Shipments can now be restricted through new

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<sup>23</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>24</sup> *Ante*, p. 461.

<sup>25</sup> *Supra*.

<sup>26</sup> The Swedish-German trade agreement for 1944 was concluded on January 10, 1944.

method from Narvik, a form of control at the port which Swedes did not have previously. Every ton of export is now subject to license. This applies to ball bearings and other commodities also. Boheman emphasized that terms of new German trade agreement are in every detail in accord with Anglo-American-Swedish London declarations<sup>27</sup> and that latter have been most scrupulously adhered to in formulating new German agreement.

With reference to memorandum I handed him on January 22, which was similar in substance to signed note given him at same time by British Minister (who had specific detailed instructions) he asked how we had derived figure of 200,000 tons for any month of first quarter of 1944 and figure of 488,000 tons as total for first quarter of 1944. Boheman said that his Government wanted to have this point cleared up before giving a final answer to our protests. Neither Mallet<sup>28</sup> nor I was able to give him any explanation as to derivation of these figures. Boheman gave no intimation that our proposal with respect to these figures would be agreed to.

Repeated to London as my 55.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9978 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1944—7 p. m.

618. Refer Stockholm's 37 of January 5, 88 of January 10, and 139 of January 15 to Department, Embassy's 199 of January 8<sup>29</sup>. In amplification of and in addition to the approach described in your 484 of January 18, Department and FEA believe that the time has come to call to the attention of the Swedish Government our dissatisfaction with observance by them of their obligations to us and to take positive steps to protect our interests. The violation of the iron ore ceiling and the revelation that there is a nonferry traffic via Bothnian ports which the Swedes do not apparently regard as falling within the terms of their 120,000-ton limitation are the two main causes for our disappointment. We are also greatly displeased with the apparent laxity shown by the Swedes in carrying out the terms of the new War Trade Agreement, particularly with regard to continuing exports of transport equipment, producer gas units, and exports of grains to Finland.

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<sup>27</sup> See footnote 12, p. 457.

<sup>28</sup> Sir Victor A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.

<sup>29</sup> Telegrams 88, 139, and 199 not printed.

We believe, therefore, that representations in the most emphatic terms should now be made by us on these issues and that we should take steps designed to reach immediate solutions satisfactory to us. A satisfactory settlement of the iron ore question is particularly urgent. In fact, unless the objectives set out in our joint memorandum of December 1 are promptly attained, we shall be too late to affect shipments of iron ore during the first quarter of this year, which is the most important period in which to obtain a reduction. In addition, we feel it is most important that the 7.5 million ton ceiling for 1944 be reduced by the excess of iron ore shipments to enemy Europe in 1943 over the ceiling of 9.9 million tons. This excess, according to the figures supplied in Stockholm's 139 of January 15, amounts to 341,737 tons, and we are unwilling to accept the intended Swedish proposal of a deduction of 85,817 tons, which ignores (a) the 1943 ceiling of 9.9 million tons (which incidentally was recently confirmed by Boheman), and (b) the excess shipments in 1943 to enemy Europe.

Therefore, please seek the agreement of MEW on the presentation of a note along the following lines:

"The Government of the United States and the Government of the United Kingdom are profoundly concerned over the interpretation given by the Swedish Government to its undertakings with respect to exports of iron ore to enemy territory and they cannot understand why export prohibitions which have been mutually agreed upon continue to be infringed. In this connection the attention of the Swedish Government is drawn to the Annex attached indicating some of the infractions and derogations of the agreements.

As has been indicated in their joint note of December 1 the two Governments have learned with surprise that Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany in 1943, the same year in which the new War Trade Agreements were negotiated by them with Sweden, were not only higher than in any preceding war year but in fact are so high as to constitute an infraction of the obligations undertaken by Sweden to the U.K. in 1939.<sup>30</sup> In this connection, while the two Governments are aware of certain efforts made by the Swedish Government to reduce these exports, they cannot accept the premise that Swedish adherence to the ceiling was or is in any sense dependent on any military action by the Allied Governments.

The two Governments are particularly surprised to learn only recently from the Swedish Government that there exists a very sizeable and important traffic in coal, coke and cement from Germany to Norway across northern Sweden, a traffic which the Swedish Government seeks to except from the terms of its declaration concerning transit traffic, the carrying out of which they considered as one of the basic considerations which led them to sign the War Trade Agreements.

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<sup>30</sup> See footnote 4, p. 456.

The signing by the Governments of the U.S. and U.K. was with the understanding that these declarations covered all traffic from the Continent to Norway and Finland through Sweden, whether by the ferry routes or otherwise.

The Government of the U.S. and the Government of the U.K. consider that the Bothnian traffic is of material assistance to the military effort of their enemies. It is a traffic which is not a normal peacetime route but largely began after the occupation of Norway. Moreover, it is composed of goods which are in effect war materials as virtually all coal, coke and cement transported via the Bothnian routes is utilized by the German military authorities to assist them to attack Allied shipping, to maintain their oppressive occupation of the Norwegian people and therefore must be directly contrary to the best interests of Sweden.

(On this point the Ministers should interpolate orally that the Swedish Government will have noted that the German battleship *Tirpitz* is reported to be in Norwegian waters. They will also recall that in a recent naval engagement off the north cape, the battleship *Scharnhorst* was sunk by British naval units, that Allied convoys are constantly being attacked by aircraft, submarines, and surface craft operating from Northern Norway and that therefore this is a zone of active military operations. Consequently, the two Governments, assuming that the Swedish Government would wish to avoid such aid to their enemies, will desire to discontinue the Bothnian traffic immediately.)

The practical realities of the situation and the present decisive stage of the war make the stoppage of this traffic a matter of the utmost importance.

In the light of the above circumstances, the Governments of the U.S. and the U.K. find it necessary to seek from the Swedish Government immediate assurances:

1. That in accordance with the joint memorandum of December 1, the Swedish Government will not, during the first quarter of 1944, permit exports of iron ore to enemy territory to exceed 488,000 tons nor allow any more than 200,000 tons to be shipped in any one month.

2. That the excess of iron ore shipments to enemy Europe in 1943 over the ceiling of 9.9 million tons will be subtracted from the 1944 ceiling of 7.5 million tons and that the Swedish Government will make satisfactory arrangements to effect this deduction during the first 6 months of 1944.

3. That, in addition to the 120,000 ton limitation on transit traffic, whether ferried or not, the traffic via Bothnian ports to Trondheim or Narvik or any other regions north of Trondheim in Norway or traffic via the Bothnian ports to Finland will be completely and promptly discontinued.

4. That the Swedish authorities will take the necessary steps to ensure that there shall be no further infractions of the provisions

of the War Trade Agreements and that restitution will be made for whatever infractions of the Agreement have occurred.

5. That, in accordance with Section VII of the Swedish Declaration in the recent War Trade Agreements, with respect to commodities or groups of commodities whose export in 1944 was regulated by the War Trade Agreements, arrangements will be made so that exports during the first 6 months of 1944 will not exceed the average rate of exports during the corresponding period of the 5 years from 1938 through 1942.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom emphasize the great importance which they attach to the prompt granting of the above assurances and to the reduction to an absolute minimum of the aid which Germany and its satellites receive from Sweden. The two Governments feel that they should recall to the Royal Swedish Government that they entered into their obligations under the War Trade Agreements solely on the basis of their expectation that the Swedish Government would take all measures within its power to reduce the aid which Germany and its satellites received from Sweden including complete fulfillment of Sweden's undertakings in the War Trade Agreements which constitute the minimum basis for the wartime trade relations between the three countries. They do not consider the requests for the assurances sent out above are either unreasonable or of a character with which the Swedish Government cannot comply."

We believe that the British and U.S. representatives should add orally after presenting the foregoing communication :

"We have been further instructed to state orally that our Governments wish to emphasize the urgency of obtaining the Swedish reply to the foregoing requests as soon as possible, that is within say 10 days or 2 weeks."

In the event that we fail to obtain promptly the required assurances, we are of the opinion that appropriate measures should be taken to protect our interests.

The point has been raised here as to whether it might be desirable to delay the granting of navicerts for goods to Sweden until we receive satisfactory assurances. In such event, it is not proposed that the Swedes be advised of this but that we simply employ delaying tactics in granting export licenses and navicerts. Please obtain the views of MEW on this point and cable urgently. We do not wish to delay action on the note pending determination of this question.

The Annex to the proposed note is contained in a following telegram.<sup>31</sup>

Repeated to Stockholm as our no. 126 of January 25.

HULL

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<sup>31</sup> Telegram 619, January 25, 1944, 8 p. m., to London, not printed.



740.00112 European War 1939/9978 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1944—11 p. m.

1047. Department and FEA have carefully considered Stockholm's 384 (76 to you), February 5,<sup>32</sup> and offer the following comments thereon:

1. We are unable to accept the Swedish plea that they did not have the means to control iron ore exports in 1943, whereas they do have such control for the current year. The Swedes were obliged under the 1939 Anglo-Swedish agreement to keep specified exports within certain ceilings and their failure to devise satisfactory means to carry out this obligation cannot be accepted as an excuse for not living up to this obligation.

2. We do not think it feasible to defer making our representations to the Swedes until Hägglöf arrives in London as we are too pressed for time inasmuch as unless we obtain assurances regarding Swedish exports in the first quarter and first half of 1944, the first quarter will be so nearly over that our objectives will be compromised.

We wish to emphasize again the importance which we attach to reaching a satisfactory solution at the earliest possible moment of the matters set out in our 618 and 619 of January 25<sup>33</sup> and subsequent telegrams and trust you will continue to work with MEW to that end.

STETTINIUS

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740.0011 European War 1939/33210 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, February 14, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received February 15—11: 59 p. m.]

498. I venture to invite Department's attention to existing factors tending to stiffen Swedish will to neutrality and having direct bearing on probable Swedish attitude to Anglo-American efforts to secure immediate reduction of iron ore exports as well as advantages in other directions (see Department's 227, February 11, 8 p. m.<sup>34</sup> and previous related correspondence).

(1) The war between Finland and Russia<sup>35</sup> appears to be rapidly approaching a crisis. Even most sober and realistic elements in Swedish Government are seriously concerned as to course events may take.

<sup>32</sup> Not printed.

<sup>33</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>34</sup> Telegram not printed.

<sup>35</sup> For correspondence pertaining to the war between Finland and the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 556 ff.

Possibility of Finnish efforts to obtain peace with Russia is now in balance. German reaction thereto unknown but there are 6 or 7 German divisions in Finland. Aside from situation of acute danger to Sweden which would arise in event Germany should offer military resistance to a Finnish attempt to make separate peace, it seems hardly necessary to point out that total ignorance and much distrust of Russian intentions and apprehension of Russian forces reaching borders of Sweden alone would be major factors in present Swedish state of mind. Government is prepared to face this situation including danger of fighting on Finnish soil and of influx of Finnish refugees into Sweden. I believe Sweden will fight if attacked but it will not by any act of its own invite an attack.

(2) Uncertainties of Polish situation and fear that Anglo-Saxon powers may have decided or felt compelled to give Russia a free hand in Eastern Europe is matter likewise of serious concern and intimately connected with Finnish problem. These apprehensions are pivoted around growing strength and aggressiveness of Russia and what some Swedes fear is unwillingness or inability of Anglo-Saxon powers to exercise control by influence or otherwise on Russian policy, ambitions and action. Fact that many Swedes have an exaggerated apprehension of Russian danger does not lessen reality of their fear.

Slow apparent progress of Allied military operations in Mediterranean and uncertainty as to time necessary to accomplish purposes of continental invasion.

Foregoing considerations all combined are now tending to stiffen basic Swedish will to neutrality. Sweden is between the two fires of Russia and Germany. Their natural instinct in face of these potential dangers to Sweden's neutrality is to maintain it with every means in their power. Swedish Government and Foreign Office in particular are acutely conscious of Allied pressure exerted on Turkey <sup>36</sup> and Spain <sup>37</sup> and of results to date of that pressure. They confidently expect that Sweden will be next objective and tend to regard our stiff attitude on what they choose to consider minor infractions to war trade agreement as entering wedge of that pressure. In my opinion no form of peaceful pressure exerted by us on Sweden to secure material advantages for Allied position would be considered and decided by Swedish Government on any other basis than how such action would affect essential security of Sweden. It is not a moment in my view when Swedes can be pushed or pressed to make concessions in our favor which would complicate their position any further vis-à-vis Germany which country is fully aware that Swedes desire their defeat. They will have to admit necessity of living up to contractual obligations, but they would not necessarily be disposed to accept without question our concept and interpretation of what the obligations are. Any setback in United Nations' position such

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<sup>36</sup> See vol. v, pp. 814 ff.

<sup>37</sup> See pp. 297 ff.

as slow development of military plans and pursuance by Russia of policies potentially dangerous in Swedish eyes and not always in concert with their Allies would cause cautious Swedes to take here stock of their actual position vis-à-vis both Russia and Germany and would tend to produce extreme caution in action. Our position for pressure and bargaining could undergo favorable change any day by force of military events. Moreover, liquidation of Russo-Finnish war on terms which would leave Finland an independent state in fact and not cause heavy influx of Finnish refugees into Sweden should greatly improve Allied position provided Germans do not elect to fight out issue with Russia on Finnish soil.

I venture to suggest that foregoing situation as it appears here receive consideration in connection with framing of any immediately planned protest to Sweden or pressure for advantages. My 95, February 14 repeats this to London.

These comments likewise have a direct bearing on Department's most secret telegram No. 16, January 3, 10 p. m.<sup>38</sup> to which I am not yet prepared to give an answer. This final paragraph not repeated to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10253 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 23, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received February 23—3:44 p. m.]

1480. For Department, Stone, FEA and Riefler. Reference Embassy's 1292 and 1293, February 15.<sup>39</sup> In view of apparent Swedish acceptance in principle of our demand that transit traffic from Bothnian ports be discontinued, MEW and Embassy believe that situation is materially altered and that it is no longer appropriate to present memorandum as suggested in Embassy's 1293, February 15.

2. MEW is considering at this time instructing British Minister, Stockholm to discuss with Swedish authorities the transit traffic situation along following lines:

(a) Maintain our objection in principle to this traffic as a breach of at least a moral undertaking to us;

(b) Attempt to put forward to Swedes explanations which would be considered plausible when offered to Germans as an excuse for discontinuance of this traffic; and

<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

<sup>39</sup> Neither printed; telegram 1292 indicated that the proposed memorandum quoted in telegram 1293 had been agreed upon. It was similar to the *aide-mémoire* finally presented to the Swedish Government on March 17, p. 478.

(e) Possible consideration of bargain along lines suggested by Grönwall.<sup>40</sup> Reference Stockholm's 546 and 558 to Department.<sup>41</sup>

Embassy suggests that bargaining aspect of Grönwall's suggestion be played down to as great an extent as possible in view of strong belief here that Swedes are morally bound to include traffic within 120,000 tons ceiling.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10265: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, February 24, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received February 24—8:11 p. m.]

631. Reference Department's 1272 and 1273, February 19, midnight to London.<sup>41</sup> Boheman handed me this afternoon a memorandum dated today in reply to memorandum of January 22 in which we reiterated our request to Government of Sweden to restrict its exports to Germany of iron ore to 200,000 tons in any 1 month and to 488,000 tons in first quarter 1944. This memorandum which explains in considerable detail Swedish position is in net effect a rejection of our request. It is emphasized that Swedish-German trade agreement was negotiated on basis of Swedish declaration in Anglo-American-Swedish trade agreement; Swedish declaration did not foresee any special limitation of iron ore exports except 7.5 million tons level for whole year 1944 and the fixed relation between coal or coke and iron ore, nor does Swedish German trade agreement foresee any such special limitation. Swedish Government, therefore, maintains that it would not be in conformity with this latter agreement if any such new limitations were enforced and Swedish Government [garbled group] of further limitation put forward by Allied Governments.<sup>42</sup> It is stated, however, that on other hand Swedish Government has no intention whatever to facilitate iron ore exports. In this respect it is observed that German purchases of iron ore in Sweden are restricted not only by quotas of deliveries fixed in accordance with Swedish dec-

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<sup>40</sup> Tage Grönwall, Acting Chief of Bureau in the Commercial Division of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, suggested on February 16, 1944, that Bothnian traffic cessation might be arranged in exchange for limited supply by United States of certain materials, e.g., toluol, essential to the Swedish rearmament program.

<sup>41</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>42</sup> A copy of the original text of the garbled portion of the memorandum, transmitted to the Department in despatch 2913, February 26, from Stockholm, reads as follows: "It would therefore not be in conformity with this latter Agreement if any such new limitations were enforced. In view of this fact the Swedish Government do not see their way to accept the proposals of a further limitation put forward by the Allies." (740.00112 European War 1939/10384)

laration of 1943, but also by Swedish demands for prompt repayment of all credits outstanding. It is further mentioned that Swedish exporters do not ship any iron ore until full payment is received and that this should also contribute to prevent any undue speeding up of iron ore deliveries.

With reference my 613, February 23, 7 p. m.<sup>44</sup> memorandum just received furnishes revised statistics indicating that total Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany in 1943 was 10,105,990 tons, since it has been discovered that 135,701 tons of previous total given were shipped from Narvik stocks built up out of 1942 exports.

Full summary of note will be telegraphed tomorrow<sup>45</sup> and repeated to London.

My 133 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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103.9169/2616: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 26, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received February 26—6:49 p. m.]

1585. For Department, Stone, FEA, and Riefler. Secret report from Sweden leads to conclusion that preemption of ball bearings has been ineffective in preventing exports of small sizes to enemy as had been hoped. This report caused some concern in EOU<sup>46</sup> and 8th Air Force. However, EOU and ERD<sup>47</sup> of MEW now feel as a result of past weeks' raids on Schweinfurt and other ball-bearing factories that it is no longer possible to ascribe particular importance to small types or any other specific types.

This changed situation was reviewed at a February 26 meeting of Foot,<sup>48</sup> Vickers<sup>49</sup> and representatives of Enemy Resources Department of MEW, as well as EWD,<sup>50</sup> including EOU. This meeting reached following conclusions:

We should now disregard specific types and have as our aim in Sweden prevention of any variation in German orders already placed, in view of raid disruption of German program on which they were based, and prevention of 1944 Swedish deliveries from being concentrated in earlier months of year.

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

<sup>45</sup> Telegram 634, not printed.

<sup>46</sup> United States Enemy Objective Unit located in London.

<sup>47</sup> Economic Resources Department.

<sup>48</sup> Dingle M. Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>49</sup> Charles G. Vickers of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>50</sup> Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom.

It was agreed that we should henceforth press Swedes for following objectives :

1. Deliveries in 1944 within War Trade Agreement ceilings should be spaced as evenly as possible.

2. We should request information on Swedish export licenses as and when granted, as well as on actual orders placed or to be placed with SKF<sup>51</sup> for ball and roller bearings, balls and rollers, races and ball and roller-bearing machinery and components.

3. Swedes should be pressed to prevent SKF from permitting variations in orders once placed, particularly following last Schweinfurt raids.

4. Subject to Supply Authorities Agreement, Swedes should be pressed to requisition ball and roller bearings, races, balls and rollers, during next few months even at expense of both belligerents if necessary.

5. We should ensure that provisions of Annex II of War Trade Agreement restrict export of bearing machinery and components. We should seek spacing of these also.

6. We should refuse to agree to Swedish request for amalgamating ceilings for tariff items 1527 and 1529.

Bearings should be first priority in our Swedish Economic Warfare program even if it were necessary to assure this at expense of our iron ore demands in view of time it takes to process latter and loss of Nikopol manganese for utilizing it.

It was also agreed that we should examine possibility of using Black List threats to prevent unneutral accommodation of German requirements growing directly out of air raids.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10297: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 1, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received March 1—3:17 p. m.]

697. After an unsuccessful attempt had been made in London to determine from Hägglöf indirectly whether Swedish-German Trade Agreement would prevent acceptance by Swedes of our formula for spacing iron ore exports (see Department's 319, February 29<sup>52</sup>), British Commercial Counsellor here raised with Sohlman<sup>53</sup> general question of relation between exports of iron ore to Germany and imports of coal and coke. Sohlman has now replied informing us that

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<sup>51</sup> Svenska Kullagerfabriken Aktiebolaget is a major Swedish ball and roller bearing corporation with holdings in a number of countries; its main offices are located in Göteborg, Sweden.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

<sup>53</sup> Rolf Sohlman, Acting Chief of the Commercial Division of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

agreement with Germany permits Sweden to reduce deliveries of iron ore if Germany does not fulfill her obligations to deliver specified quantities of coal and coke. On other hand agreement does not give Germany right to claim quicker deliveries of iron ore on basis of quicker deliveries of coal and coke.

Legation believes this statement prevents Sweden from arguing that our request for 6 months' ceiling runs counter to their obligations to Germany. Sweden will be further questioned by Legation as to manner in which determination is made that Germany has failed to deliver coal and coke in accordance with terms of agreement, i.e., whether the German delivery quotas are divided into quarterly or semi-annual subquotas.

My 151 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10335 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—6 p. m.

1986. For the Ambassador and Riefler.

1. The Department and FEA continue to be seriously disturbed over Swedish ball- and roller-bearing exports to enemy Europe. The attainment of the six objectives outlined in Embassy's 1585 of February 26 would prove most helpful in reducing this aid to the enemy. However, we must continue to seek additional means to eliminate such exports completely.

2. We do not have sufficient information to determine the reason for the failure of the past preemptive program as reported in your 1585. We shall appreciate a full and confidential report on this subject. We are willing to join with MEW in any program of preemption, direct or indirect, which might have a chance of success. Indirect preemption might entail the offer of an inducement to SKF, monetary or otherwise, with a view to a limitation of exports of bearings below the established ceilings or possibly a complete cessation of such exports. Please let us have your views and recommendations as to type of action which might be pursued in this connection.

3. We agree with MEW that the possibility of using blacklist threats and other possible pressure on SKF should be fully re-examined. It would be possible to refuse licenses for the transmittal of funds from the SKF subsidiary here to SKF in Sweden. These points are being reviewed here. In the meantime we shall appreciate your further comments.

4. The following comments relate to the first four objectives set forth in your 1585:

(a) As to objective numbered 1, in addition to the SKF undertaking referred to in point 4 of your 1907 of March 8,<sup>55</sup> we feel that assurances concerning the even spacing of deliveries in 1944 should be given directly to the United States and British Governments, either by SKF or preferably by the Swedish Government. Moreover, the limitation should apply to each rubric and also to ball-bearing machinery. However, in pressing the Swedes on this point, we should be careful not to give them reason to believe that we are specifically confirming the approval of shipments during 1944 of the full amounts set forth in the War Trade Agreement. For example, we must take the position that there shall be deducted from 1944 shipments amounts equivalent to the excess of 1943 over 1942 shipments, such deductions to be made during the first half year. Moreover, if we can find other means of further reducing 1944 shipments, our hands should not be tied.

(b) As to objective numbered 2, we assume that Hägglöf's statement as reported under point 1 of your 1907 of March 8 means that the full information requested will be given.

(c) As to objective numbered 3, we should prefer to obtain a definite assurance from SKF or from the Swedish Government rather than rest solely on Hägglöf's statement as reported under point 3 of your 1907. Moreover, it appears to us the reservation concerning minor changes "regarded as normal in the ball bearing trade" may leave too large a loophole.

(d) As to objective numbered 4, we do not understand on what grounds it is believed the Swedes might agree to requisition ball bearings, etc. From the point of view of the United States supply authorities we would have no objection to such action on the part of the Swedish authorities. We assume that the British supply authorities will be consulted as to United Kingdom requirements. We have no information here as to possible Russian needs. We assume that the "requisitioning" would have to be financed by the British and ourselves in some way. Please comment more fully on this point.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10378: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, March 17, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:53 p. m.]

922. Department's 426, March 15, noon.<sup>55</sup> Together with British Chargé d'Affaires<sup>56</sup> I called on Secretary General of Foreign Office

<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

<sup>56</sup> W. H. Montagu-Pollock.



this morning at 11:30 and communicated joint protest in form of *aide-mémoire*<sup>57</sup> on Swedish infractions of War Trade Agreement. Mr. Boheman read through communication rapidly, made no comment except to say that it would receive most careful study and added that he did not agree with all of our reasoning.

Mr. Pollock and I both emphasized urgency from viewpoint of our respective Governments of obtaining Swedish reply to requests contained in joint communication as soon as possible, suggested 10 days or 2 weeks. We likewise mentioned fact that inasmuch as exports of ball bearings and ball-bearing machinery are now being discussed in London matter of spacing these exports will be covered in same discussions together with "further reductions" to be made in bearings exports in 1944. Mr. Boheman indicated his assent to this comment.

My 212, March 17, 7 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10486

*The American and British Legations in Sweden to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs*<sup>58</sup>

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

1. The Government of the United States of America and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have used their best efforts to carry out their engagements under the Swedish-Anglo-American economic agreement of 1943. They expected that the Government of Sweden would strictly observe the provisions of that agreement and that there would be in consequence a marked reduction in the aid given by Sweden to their enemies. The results obtained during the last half of 1943 were not what the two Governments believe they were justified in expecting.

2. Certain grievances of which the two Governments complain and in respect of which they are asking reparation are set forth below:

(a) The export of iron ore in 1943 from Sweden to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories in excess of "normal trade" as defined in the Anglo-Swedish war trade agreement of 1939.

The two Governments, in their urgent communications of December 1 and January 22 last, asked the Government of Sweden to restrict Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories to 200,000 tons in any one month and to 488,000 tons in the first quarter of 1944. The two Governments have noted the reply to this request which was contained in the Swedish Government's memorandum of February 24, 1944.<sup>59</sup> They have also noted

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<sup>57</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>58</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3036, March 18, from Stockholm; received April 6.

<sup>59</sup> Not printed; but see telegram 631, February 24, 9 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 473.

that contrary to their expectation Swedish exports of iron ore approximated 450,000 tons in the month of January. The two Governments are deeply disturbed over this development and feel it necessary to obtain from the Government of Sweden a satisfactory agreement with respect to exports of iron ore during the immediate future.

It is pointed out in the Swedish Government's memorandum of February 24 that no special limitation, other than the 7,500,000 ton ceiling for 1944 and the fixed relation between exports of iron ore and imports of coal or coke, was foreseen in the Swedish Declaration of 1943 with reference to exports of iron ore. The two Governments nevertheless consider that they are justified in expecting from the Swedish Government a limitation of iron ore exports during the first half of 1944 to an amount which does not represent a larger percentage of the 7,500,000 ton ceiling for the whole year of 1944 than the averages of the percentages exported in the first six months of the years from 1938 through 1942 in relation to the total of iron ore exports in those five years.

The offer of the Swedish Government to reduce iron ore exports to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories in 1944 by the amount by which the 1943 exports exceeded the ceiling established in the Anglo-Swedish war trade agreement of 1939 is accepted and the two Governments expect that this reduction will be made during the first half of the current year.

The two Governments cannot agree, however, that 86,000 tons represents the amount by which in 1943 the ceiling established in the Anglo-Swedish agreement of 1939 was exceeded, since this figure resulted from what they believe to be an unpermissible method of calculating "normal trade".

The two Governments must insist that the correct figure for "normal trade", which all concerned had previously accepted, is 9,900,000 tons and that it is this figure which must be taken as the basis for the computation of the deduction.

Official Swedish statistics furnished monthly to the Allied Governments by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that a total of 10,257,073 tons of iron ore was exported to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories in 1943. On the basis of this figure it would follow that the deduction to be made is in round figures 357,000 tons.

Swedish exports of iron ore during the first six months of 1944 might be expected to approximate 2,940,750 tons, if the average of the five years from 1938 through 1942 is taken as the basis for the computation. After deducting the excess exports in 1943, the ceiling for Swedish iron ore exports during the first six months of 1944 would become 2,583,750 tons. The Swedish Government is requested to assure the Allied Governments that it will limit Swedish exports of iron ore to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories to that ceiling during the first six months of 1944.

(b) The continuing grant through a clearing deficit of a substantial credit to Denmark.

The Allied Governments ask for assurance that termination of credits of this kind covered by the War Trade Agreement will be arranged to their satisfaction.

(c) The export to areas under German control of various means of transport, such as railway rolling stock and equipment and bicycle parts in contravention of Paragraph XI (1) of the Swedish Declaration in the 1943 economic agreement.

The two Governments must ask for an assurance from the Swedish Government that these exports will immediately cease.

(d) The ineffective nature of the steps taken by the Government of Sweden in pursuance of its undertakings in the so-called two point letter embodied in the 1943 economic agreement.

The marked increases in the 1943 exports to Germany, particularly of ball bearings, balls and rollers and high speed steel, have surprised and disappointed the two Governments. They would be interested to learn what steps the Swedish Government took in this connection and why those steps failed.

Moreover, in view of the great increase in the value of Swedish exports to Germany in 1943 over those in 1942, especially in the last five months of 1943 as regards ball bearings (rubric 1527) and balls and rollers (rubric 1529), notwithstanding the undertakings of the Swedish Government in the so-called two point letter, the two Governments consider that they are justified in expecting that the Swedish Government will take still further steps to reduce exports in 1944 of all three balls and bearings rubrics.

3. The attention of the Swedish Government has already been invited to the undertaking in Paragraph 7 of the Swedish Declaration of 1943. The two Governments consider that they are justified in asking for an assurance from the Swedish Government that it will immediately arrange with respect to commodities or groups of commodities the export of which is regulated in 1944 by the economic agreement of 1943 that the export of such goods during the first half of 1944 will not exceed the average rate of the export of such goods during the corresponding period of the five years from 1938 through 1942.

The two Governments have noted the statement in the Swedish memorandum of February 24 that the Government of Sweden will, as a matter of course, see to it that the stipulations of Paragraph 2, Section 7, of the Swedish Declaration will be fully observed. What the two Governments desire is a new undertaking which might take the form of an addition to Section 7, providing that the principle above set forth would be applied to all items specifically mentioned in the economic agreement of 1943 and on which there have been fixed definite ceilings.

4. The Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government desire to emphasize the great importance which they attach to the very early receipt of the assurances for which they are herein asking. The two Governments hope they may at the same time receive from the Government of Sweden an expression of its fixed

intention scrupulously and in every particular to observe the terms of the 1943 economic agreement.

STOCKHOLM, March 17, 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/10455:Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 31, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:33 p. m.]

2617. For limited distribution Department and Stone FEA from Riefler. Reference Embassy's 2460, March 26, 4 p. m.<sup>60</sup> As part of conversations at present being conducted in London on Swedish exports of ball bearings, Hägglöf sent Foot a letter in which following pertinent passages occurred:

"What I have told you about the keen interest of the Swedish authorities to acquire aeroplanes of the type mentioned is fully confirmed by the information which I have now received from Stockholm.

As to the question of the Swedish exports of ball bearings to Germany, there can be no doubt that these exports are well within the limitations laid down in the London Declaration. A reduction of the kind mentioned during our conversation would constitute a breach of the agreement recently concluded by Sweden regarding exports to Germany. The Swedish authorities do not find it possible to justify such a breach.

By my letter of the 3rd March, you have on the other hand received an assurance that the exports will be limited per month to about one-twelfth of the yearly total."

Riefler and Foot questioned Hägglöf closely on exact implication of phrases in carefully worded letter quoted above. It was clear that though Swedish Government desired airplanes badly it considers itself pretty thoroughly committed to deliver bearings up to amounts of ceiling limitations, and that maximum additional restriction they can impose is holding to about one-twelfth of annual quota monthly.

British ball-bearing expert in Stockholm has now arrived here, and discussions regarding last year's preemptive purchases are under way.

Possibility of direct approach to SKF in regard to 1944 exports is being actively canvassed and results will be reported as soon as possible. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/10470 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 3, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received April 4—4:40 a. m.]

2713. From the Ambassador and Riefler. Reference Department's 1986, March 16 and Embassy's 2460, March 26 and 2329, March 22.<sup>61</sup>

1. Waring<sup>62</sup> has now arrived from Stockholm and we have examined the ball-bearing problem with him. We have seen Stockholm's 1054, March 28 to the Department<sup>63</sup> and have taken the contents into account. There have also been further conferences between the Ambassador and General Spaatz<sup>64</sup> and between Foot, Hägglöf and Riefler. In view of the circumstances as we now see it the ball-bearing situation appears as follows:

2. No action should be taken to deprive us of the advantages we now enjoy which limit Swedish exports of ball bearings to enemy Europe during 1944 to around 29,000,000 kronor. Every effort should be made, however, to improve on these advantages to the maximum extent possible. Such additional advantages, rated in decreasing order of importance, would consist of (a) further decreases during 1944 in aggregate deliveries of bearings to Germany below the amounts set forth in the existing Swedish-German contract (b) cessation or reduction of immediate deliveries from Sweden to Germany during the next few months and postponement of deliveries of these deferred amounts to the latter part of the year, (c) impediments to the delivery of special types of bearings, such as bearings for airframe assemblies, (d) an even spacing of deliveries throughout the year to one-twelfth of the annual quota each month, and (e) restrictions imposed by the SKF company limiting German ability to shift orders once placed to types more immediately in demand as our bomber offensive progresses.

3. We have received Swedish Government assurances with respect to (d) and (e) above. We feel we can place considerable reliance upon (d) beginning with the second quarter of 1944, but we are less certain of the practical meaning of the assurance we have received under (e). Our uncertainty arises out of the difficulty of knowing how materially this assurance may hamper the enemy. We are exploring the subject further and are requesting details of orders placed by the Germans with SKF.

<sup>61</sup> Telegrams 2460 and 2329 not printed.

<sup>62</sup> William Waring, of the British Supply Ministry.

<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

<sup>64</sup> Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in European Theater of Operations.

4. The Swedish Government has told us that they cannot go farther than this to meet our wishes, that they feel bound to live up to their agreement with the Germans which was concluded in strict accord with their prior agreement with us and that they are duty bound to try to see to it that SKF lives up to contracts made in accordance with its agreement. (Reference Embassy's airgram A-402, April 1.<sup>65</sup>) At the same time, Hägglöf has admitted that the Swedish Government has no legal means of forcing compliance upon SKF. He has also let us know that the Swedish Government is extremely anxious to receive Spitfires (although they are not prepared to break their agreement to obtain them), that SKF is anxious for further orders for ball bearings, and that a German trade delegation is due to return to Stockholm about the middle of this month. In view of the heavy pressure (including lavish offers of supplies) which the Germans have imposed in their attempts to get ball bearings during recent months, we feel that action must be initiated at once, prior to the arrival of the German delegation in Sweden, and that such action should be directed primarily at the SKF company. It should also include inducements, calculated to restrain the Swedish Government as far as possible to "formal" position in carrying out their commitments to the Germans. We propose, in consequence, the program outlined below. While it does not attempt to obtain our objective under (a) above, i.e., an absolute decrease in total bearing deliveries during 1944 below the contract limits, we think it has a chance of obtaining our objective under (b), i.e., the deferring of deliveries to latter half of 1944.

5. (a) Should the SKF company fall in with our plans, the British Government will arrange to begin to deliver Spitfires to the Swedish Government. It will be understood that these deliveries will stop should the Swedish Government adopt more than a "formal" position in carrying out its commitments, vis-à-vis, ball bearings to the Germans.

(b) As the SKF company appears to place considerable importance on its prospects of trade with Russia, both in the immediate future should Finland withdraw from the war, as well as during the post war period, the British are asking the Russian Government to indicate to the Swedish Government and to SKF in no uncertain terms that Russia's attitude with respect to future business relations with SKF will be conditioned on the extent to which SKF meets our wishes with respect to its current deliveries to Germany. We recommend that the Department act immediately on parallel lines.

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<sup>65</sup> Not printed.

(c) MEW, with our concurrence, has directed Mallet, on an informal and personal basis (keeping Johnson informed), to contact Marc Wallenberg<sup>66</sup> to sound out the SKF company as follows: (1) we may be prepared to place large orders with SKF for 1944 and 1945 delivery to us providing that SKF makes no contract with enemy Europe for 1945 and ceases current deliveries of all bearings to Germany for a period of 3 months; (2) we might be prepared to place smaller orders if SKF cannot eliminate current deliveries but is able to cut them by, say, 50%. The SKF company would not be asked to break its contract with Germany but merely to defer deliveries under that contract until late in the year. It would also be asked to indicate what could be done to impede German access to special types of bearings such as air frame bearings. (Wallenberg would be informed that we place great importance on the attitude of SKF toward these proposals, that we feel the company by increasing its capacity to manufacture small bearings has deprived us of part, at least, of the advantage that should have accrued from the preemptive orders which the British placed last year, that the United Nations will be in a position to influence a great portion of Europe's business after the war and that company may well find itself in difficulties if it does not conform to our present request.)

6. Marc Wallenberg appears the best initial contact for this move. We understand that his bank holds a considerable volume of shares of SKF, that his brother Jakob is on the SKF board, that he is personally strongly pro-United Nations, and that he enjoys intimate contacts with the Swedish Government.

7. We feel that speed is essential and desire the Department's comments, including (if it concurs) authorization to go ahead, as soon as possible. Should the informal response from Wallenberg indicate that the above approach is feasible we would like funds in hand to strike a bargain. Because of the fact that the British are providing the Spitfires and that they also provided the funds for the preemptive program last year (2,000,000 pounds in all, although some of the purchases had a supply aspect), we recommend that American funds be used for the contracts outlined above. Generals Spaatz and MacDonald<sup>67</sup> join us in recommending that at least \$20,000,000 be made available for this purpose as soon as possible. [Winant and Riefler.]

WINANT

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<sup>66</sup> Marcus Wallenberg, Vice-Managing Director of Stockholms Enskilda Bank.  
<sup>67</sup> Gen. George C. MacDonald, Director of Intelligence of United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

740.00112 European War 1939/10455 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1944—midnight.

2604. For the Ambassador and Riefler.

1. We have received and carefully considered your 2617, March 31, and are most disappointed at the position of the Swedish Government as set forth in Häggglöf's note to Foot. The situation with respect to ball-bearing and related exports is such, however, that we cannot accept Häggglöf's note as being the final decision of the Swedish Government and all interested agencies of this Government feel that we must not neglect any possibility of impressing the Swedes with the importance which we attach to obtaining our ends.

Prior to receipt of Stockholm's telegram no. 236 of March 28 to you,<sup>68</sup> we had hoped that some arrangement might be worked out with SKF whereby deliveries to Germany could be stopped. Our chances of success through a direct approach to SKF seem, however, very slim in view of the uncooperative attitude of Hamberg<sup>69</sup> as disclosed in Stockholm's telegram. We believe, therefore, that the approach should be direct to the Swedish authorities in Stockholm, inviting their intervention and assistance. This is not to say that if the Swedish Government shows a disposition to meet our desires through its own pressure on SKF we should insist on dealing only with the Swedish Government. The main point is that we now feel that initiative for stopping these exports must come from the Swedish Government.

Accordingly, we propose to instruct Minister Johnson to make a formal *démarche* to Stockholm along the lines indicated in paragraph 2 below. We hope that the Foreign Office will see its way to instructing Mallet to make a parallel *démarche* thus associating the British Government with the United States Government in this important matter. This telegram is being sent to Johnson but he is to delay making his *démarche* until instructed to do so by the Department in order that the British Foreign Office may have an opportunity to consider its position.

2. Instructions to Johnson : As soon as you are specifically instructed to do so by the Department you should call on the Foreign Minister and make written representations in the following sense :

The Government of the United States has noted with gratification the successive steps which the Swedish Government has taken since the delivery of the oral statement contained in the Department's 26, January 7, 1943,<sup>70</sup> to terminate the various humiliating measures

<sup>68</sup> Sent to the Department as No. 1054, March 28, 1944, 8 p. m., not printed.

<sup>69</sup> C. A. Harald Hamberg, Managing Director of SKF.

<sup>70</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 739.



forced upon Sweden during the flood tide of German military power and unmistakably to reassert Sweden's sovereign rights. Sweden's enforcement of German respect of Swedish rights has as anticipated in our *démarche* of a year ago led to renewed American confidence in the Swedish Government and people and concretely laid the foundation for various forms of friendly collaboration between the two Governments including the comprehensive War Trade Agreement of 1943.

A stage has now been reached in the war which the United States and its associates are waging against Germany when it becomes of paramount importance to eliminate to the greatest possible extent all benefits which Germany derives from areas not under German control and which are directly employed by German armed forces in killing American soldiers. The benefits which the American Government has in mind are not only arms and ammunition but also those strategic products and raw materials which are essential to the German war machine.

The fundamental similarity in the basic interests of the Swedish and American peoples leads the American Government to believe that the Swedish Government will wish to take adequate measures to insure that Swedish long range interests are not compromised through avoidable contributions to the strength of the German military machine, to break the strength of which American lives are being daily expended in increasing numbers.

Specifically, the American Government now desires to bring about the cessation of all exports from Sweden to Nazi controlled Europe of ball and roller bearings, and machinery and special tools and special steels for the manufacture thereof, and piston rings. The American Government appreciates that a request for the complete cessation of these exports is not provided for within the framework of the existing War Trade Agreement. These materials are, however, of such direct benefit to the German war machine, and consequently the cause of the deaths of so many American soldiers and airmen, that the American Government must use every possible means at its disposal to effect the cessation of their export. Emphasis is given to the American necessities in this respect by important military developments and the basic change in the military situation since the War Trade Agreement was worked out last summer.

The Swedish Government is aware that exploratory conversations concerning exports of ball bearings, etc. have already taken place in London between Mr. Hägglöf and representatives of the British and American Governments. The American Government now desires that these conversations be pressed forward in London as formal negotiations and emphasizes that the exigencies of the war do not permit the American Government to prolong such negotiations or to delay the immediate use of all possible measures at its disposal to bring about an immediate cessation of the exports in question. In recognition of the difficulties involved on the Swedish side in arriving at satisfactory arrangements to fulfill our wishes in this matter the American Government is prepared:

- (1) To purchase the SKF production of ball and roller bearings and components that otherwise might go to Germany and her satellites within the limits of the War Trade Agreement,

and to make suitable arrangements for purchasing piston rings and special steels;

(2) To use its best efforts to assure the return to SKF after the war of title to such SKF properties in Germany as possibly may be expropriated by the German Government in retaliation for Swedish action in stopping ball bearing exports;

(3) To do everything in its power to make up to Sweden for the loss of critical imports from Germany and to offset other possible economic losses as a result of German retaliatory action;

(4) Immediately to discuss with the Swedish Government the possibility of supplying Sweden with products which are in short supply in the United States and which are badly needed for Swedish economy and defense establishment.

On the other hand, the American Government states quite frankly that if its desires in this matter, which vitally concern the lives of countless American soldiers, are not met, serious consideration will be given to blacklisting SKF in view of the general attitude and cooperation with Germany in various ways of responsible officials of that company including Mr. Hamberg, and to such other measures as are at the disposal of the American Government.

The American Government emphasizes its hope that the Swedish Government will take the necessary steps to accomplish the desire of the United States Government for an immediate cessation of exports of the articles requested.

3. When making the written representations outlined in paragraph 2, Minister Johnson should make the two following points orally:

(a) He should impress upon the Swedes the importance to us of immediate cessation of the exports in question and that we do not wish those exports to continue while negotiations are in progress in London. In fact, we will have to insist that such exports shall cease forthwith;

(b) He should point out that the Swedes will doubtless wish to bear in mind the enduring effect upon American public opinion which would result from a knowledge that Sweden continued to permit exports to Germany of such vital war materials as those referred to above. Much publicity has been given to the air attacks on German ball bearing factories and to the loss of American lives resulting therefrom. The American people will not understand any possible justification for continued Swedish contribution of these materials to the German war machine. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly.

4. For your information this telegram has been approved by the Department and Foreign Economic Administration and represents the considered views of this Government. Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem it of utmost military importance that every possible effort be made to secure at the earliest practicable date a reduction to a minimum of Swedish exports to the enemy, particularly ball bearings, and have emphasized the importance of vigorous

and unremitting efforts to this end. The subject is of such vital concern to the prosecution of the war that, as mentioned in paragraph 1, we feel that we must make a *démarche* along the indicated lines within a week at the outside. We believe, however, that parallel action by the British would immeasurably strengthen our chances of obtaining Swedish compliance with our request and wish you therefore urgently to press the matter with the Foreign Secretary.<sup>71</sup>

Sent to London for action; repeated to Stockholm for information as Department's no. 576.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10470 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944—midnight.

2631. For the Ambassador and Riefler. The Department considers it most desirable to postpone approach to Wallenberg referred to in Embassy's 2713, April 3 as such action might prejudice approach outlined in Department's 2604 of April 3 which we wish pressed with Mr. Eden. Department and other interested United States agencies including Joint Chiefs consider it important that we attempt to achieve complete cessation of shipments rather than just postponement.

It is possible that, when the note is delivered to the Swedish Foreign Office, the matter could be discussed informally with Wallenberg in an effort to enlist his support in obtaining action by SKF. In this connection we think it particularly significant that Hägglöf has admitted that the Swedish Government has no legal means of forcing SKF to make shipments to Germany.

HULL

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103.9169 Stockholm : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1944—9 p. m.

591. Your 922 of March 17. Department and FEA note from your reference telegram that you presented the *aide-mémoire* on March 17 with the request that a reply be given within 10 days or 2 weeks. We urge that you press the Swedes for an immediate reply if one has not already been received by you. We are most anxious that the Swedes should not have another opportunity to use the delaying tactics which they so successfully employed in connection with our previous protests

<sup>71</sup> Anthony Eden.

of December 1 and January 22. This telegram is being repeated to London so that your British colleague will receive parallel instructions.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's No. 2664.  
HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10470: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1944— 11 p. m.

2665. For the Ambassador and Riefler.

1. Since despatch of Department's 2631 of April 4, Department and FEA have further considered your 2713 of April 3. We still consider that we must proceed with the *démarche* to the Swedish Government outlined in our 2604 of April 3 and we hope that the Foreign Office will associate itself with us. Please advise us urgently on this point.

2. We are concerned that the line of action proposed in your 2713 rejects the possibility of obtaining a complete cessation of exports during the year 1944 or even the decrease in total 1944 exports suggested under point (a) of your paragraph 2.

3. Following presentation of the note, an approach might be made to SKF, either through Mark Wallenberg or otherwise, offering to make large purchases this year and next provided deliveries to Germany and German-occupied Europe cease entirely and at once. Wallenberg might be advised along the lines indicated in the last sentence of your paragraph 5 and, in addition, the possibility of blacklisting SKF might be pointed out as indicated in the next to the last paragraph of the draft note contained in our 2604.

4. We are prepared to make available whatever amount is necessary to accomplish our objectives. Please advise what credits or other transfer of funds is necessary.

5. Question of approach to Soviet Government is under consideration. You will be kept advised.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10496: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received April 7—4:09 a. m.]

1177. Legation's 922, March 17 repeated to London as my 212 and despatch 3036 March 18.<sup>72</sup> Secretary General of Foreign Office Mr.

<sup>72</sup> Latter not printed.

Boheman handed British Minister and me this morning a memorandum<sup>73</sup> in reply to joint Anglo-American protest of March 17 on Swedish infractions of war trade agreements. A summary of Swedish memo which is dated today is given in immediately following telegram. (See also Department's 591, April 5, 9 p. m.)

After British Minister and I had read through memo Mr. Boheman said there were certain observations he desired to make. These were substantially as follows.

Tenor of Swedish memo which might seem strongly worded is due to fact that Anglo-American protest endeavored to construct juridical interpretations by which they attempted to show Swedes had committed breaches of agreement and accordingly asked reparations. Swedish Government contests this stand and has been obliged to frame its reply in accordance with form of protest. In spite of what has been said in reply memo, Swedish Government will endeavor to meet Allied wishes as far as possible. Swedish Government cannot and will not, however, give any assurance on matters which it does not know can be fulfilled, thus giving rise to additional recriminations. Allied Governments apparently are of opinion that Swedish exports for first half of year are only exports which matter and think that this is due to fact that in second half of year German exports will go down because of inability to deliver or disturbances in Baltic or decisive military events. Swedes are unable to pass any judgment on such a view but they must count on diminished trade with Germany as a result of factors mentioned above and also on possibility that Gothenburg traffic might be stopped for a considerable period. They must likewise count on imports from Germany stopping after a German collapse. All these factors make it of utmost importance to Sweden to secure as much as possible by way of imports before those events take place. He also pointed out that from Swedish point of view they have endless difficulties with Great Britain and United States on their side of trade agreement and that they are able to get nowhere in dealing with our Governments on these difficulties. As example, he referred to question of Swedish exports to Argentina. In spite of all this which would be motivation to Sweden to keep up imports from Germany as high as possible, Swedes are doing everything in their power to diminish imports from Germany. It might be thought that imports from Germany would go down automatically because of difficulty in effecting payment but Germans have been exporting so much that retarding effect of payment factor has not been so effective as expected. As practical means of slowing down imports from Germany all State authorities (the State is a heavy importer from Germany) have been instructed to cut their imports

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<sup>73</sup> See telegram 1178, April 6, from Stockholm, *infra*.

to a minimum. Swedish Government is likewise trying to influence private buyers wherever possible to limit their purchasers. Swedish Government is taking advantage of its wartime control of sales prices in Sweden to make imports from Germany less favorable.

In regard to iron ore Mr. Boheman stated that it was extremely difficult to find any effective measures. They are, however, trying to delay as long as possible opening of port of Lulea. This depends entirely on whether ice has increased lately and no ice breakers will move. By recent mobilization measures number of miners available for extracting ore has been reduced by as much as 30%. This is partly offset, however, by fact that there is a pool of unemployed labor which can be utilized to fill part of gap. As an example of frantic pressure which Germany is bringing to bear to obtain increase in Swedish exports of ballbearings to their account he said that Germans had recently offered Sweden 200 brand new Messerschmitts of latest type in exchange for an agreement to export ballbearings up to level of last year. This German offer has been refused.

My No. 256 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10497: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 6, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:52 p. m.]

1178. Following is summary of memorandum dated April 6 presented by Foreign Office in reply to *aide-mémoire* of March 17 (see Legation's 1177, April 6, 8 p. m.).

After stating questions raised in our *aide-mémoire* should have been treated in Joint Standing Commission,<sup>74</sup> and recapitulating events leading up to 1943 agreement, Swedish memorandum asserts that "on all essential points" Swedes observed agreement in 1943. Swedish memorandum admits that interpretation of some points in agreement may be controversial but states they have always endeavored so far as possible to meet Allied wishes and that machinery set up by agreement exists to settle whatever differences may arise.

On specific points made in our *aide-mémoire* Swedes reply as follows:

1. Deficit in Danish clearing does not constitute grant of credit.
2. Export of means of transport was covered by list of existing

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<sup>74</sup>This Commission, consisting of American, British, and Swedish representatives, was established in Stockholm to assure Allied Governments that Swedish policy was in accordance with various trade agreements including the London Declarations of September 1943.

commitments presented in London in 1943 before signature of agreement.

3. Swedes have more than complied with two point letter which bound them only to do their utmost to prevent acceptance of further orders for delivery to Germany in 1943. By exerting pressure on Swedish exporters Swedish Government succeeded in reducing deliveries of bearings during 1943 from 36 million reichsmarks contracted to 28 million reichsmarks.

4. Regarding iron ore exports Swedes state that if they had not taken special steps these exports would have reached higher figures (they reject Allied interpretation normal trade principles and attach special memorandum on this subject).

Swedes characterize new demands made in *aide-mémoire* as involving "structural revision" of 1943 agreement. Regarding our request for spacing of iron ore exports Swedes state that it is impossible for them to agree because of commitments they have already entered into.

Regarding bearings Swedish memorandum repeats contents of letter sent by Hägglöf to Foot dated March 3<sup>75</sup> in which Swedish Government referred to undertaking by SKF that deliveries in any one month will amount to about one-twelfth of total exports for year and that no changes except minor normal ones would be permitted in types ordered by Germany.

Swedish memo closes with statement that in their view no purpose is served ["in reiterating on every occasion an assurance to fulfill at the best of their ability an undertaking which they have already given"].

Attachment on normal trade doctrine presents same points as those made previously by Swedes on this subject and confirms their willingness to make reduction of only 86,000 tons from 1944 ceiling.

Copy of memo is being forwarded by airmail pouch leaving Stockholm April 11.<sup>76</sup>

My 257, April 6, 8 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10491 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 6, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 6—7:42 p. m.]

2836. For Department and Stone FEA from the Ambassador and Riefler. Foreign Office, MEW and Air Ministry have considered De-

<sup>75</sup> See telegram 2617, March 31, 8 p. m., from London, p. 481.

<sup>76</sup> Despatch 3145, April 11, from London, not printed.

partment's 2604, April 3. They are not sanguine about the tactics of a high level approach such as is envisaged but are prepared to give instructions to Mallet to join Johnson subject to clarification on the following five points:

1. They would like to move immediately to get the Russians to join in the approach.

2. They wish clarification on what moves will be made should the Swedes refuse. They will not consider possibility of risking our present restrictions on ball bearings and other advantages arising out of the 1943 War Trade Agreement and will not join if Swedish inability to meet our demands were to be followed by sanctions which risked that agreement.

3. They desire in the meantime to go ahead with the approach to SKF through Wallenberg suggested in our 2713, April 3 and already initiated informally through Mallet, and would like your concurrence.

4. In view of urgent British needs in immediate future for special SKF bearings for latest type aircraft, and also of great Swedish resentment to Blacklist, they would not want to commit themselves to listing SKF and desire that joint note be rephrased at this point to a threat more like that contained in our 2713, April 3.

5. If this approach is made, British prefer to demand an embargo for a definite period of 3 months during which your suggested London negotiations could take place.

[Winant and Riefler]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10509a: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—4 p. m.

2764. For the Ambassador and Reifler.

1. Stockholm's 1191, April 7 (repeated to London as Stockholm's 258) <sup>77</sup> supports our belief that immediate presentation of the note given in the Department's 2604, April 3 (576 to Stockholm) would produce fruitful results. Accordingly, Johnson is being instructed to make his *démarche* as soon as possible after the Easter holidays even if British concurrence cannot be obtained.

2. As we would much prefer, however, to have the British associated with our *démarche* either through presentation of a joint note or through a parallel but independent approach through Mallet, we make the following observations on the numbered points outlined in your 2836, April 6:

(1) We have no objection in principle to asking the Russians to support our approach but because of the paramount importance of the

<sup>77</sup> Not printed.



time element prefer not to delay presentation of the note until Soviet concurrence can be obtained.

(2) We entirely agree with the British as to the undesirability of risking the present restrictions on ball bearings and other advantages arising out of the 1943 War Trade Agreement and do not now contemplate any action calculated to jeopardize the Agreement.

(3) We regret that a crossing of telegrams resulted in the British going ahead with the approach through Wallenberg but now that that approach has been initiated we agree to its continuance provided the objectives sought through this channel are altered to conform to the objectives outlined in our note which will shortly be presented by Johnson to the Swedish Government. We sincerely hope, however, that the British approach to SKF through Wallenberg will be handled in such a way as not to cross wires with our formal approach to the Swedish Government.

(4) In order to meet the British point of view in so far as is possible we propose to alter unnumbered paragraph 2 of subparagraph 4 of paragraph 2 of our 2604 to read as follows:

“On the other hand, the American Government states quite frankly that if its desires in this matter, which vitally concern the lives of countless American soldiers, are not met, serious consideration will be given to the use directly against SKF of measures at the disposal of the American Government. In this connection the American Government has observed with concern the general attitude and cooperation with Germany in various ways of responsible officials of SKF, including Mr. Hamberg.”

(5) We agree to the British proposal for a demand for an embargo for a definite period of 3 months during which negotiations could take place and subparagraph *a* of Paragraph 3 of the Department's 2604 to London (576 to Stockholm) is modified accordingly.

3. Please present the foregoing to Mr. Eden and other interested British officials as soon as possible and telegraph both the Department and Stockholm the results of your conversations.

4. For Johnson: Please consider the foregoing as instructions to you as well as to London. In accordance with the recommendations contained in your 1191, April 7, 6 p. m. (258 to London) you are authorized to deliver a note modified as above to the Swedish Foreign Office as soon as possible after the Easter holidays. You should keep in close touch with Mallet in order that you and he may coordinate your actions should he receive authorizing instructions from London.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 609.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/10502 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 9, 1944—midnight.

[Received April 9—8:38 p. m.]

2902. From the Ambassador and Riefler. Reference Department's 2764, April 8.

1. British are prepared subject to one point to instruct Mallet to support Washington *démarche*.

2. They are not happy about clause threatening SKF and must clear with supply authorities before they can give a definite commitment to associate themselves with this clause.

3. British are sending instructions to Mallet to support *démarche* if this clause is omitted.

4. British suggest that note be delivered without clause immediately thereby gaining maximum effect because it will be confined to constructive inducements to the Swedes.

5. Threat to SKF could be conveyed subsequently either to Swedish Government or to SKF Company or both. It could be conveyed on an agreed basis by the British and ourselves or as a unilateral American move, if British final views should be adverse and Washington should still want to go ahead.

6. British will ask Russians to associate themselves with *démarche*.

7. British would suggest waiting until Tuesday<sup>78</sup> or Wednesday before presentation to give Russians opportunity to associate themselves with *démarche*.

8. Repeated to Stockholm as 120. [Winant and Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10510a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1944—8 p. m.

861. In association with the British we are planning to make a *démarche* in Stockholm within the next few days with a view to effecting the maximum possible reductions in Swedish exports of ball bearings to the enemy. We will offer the Swedish Government various inducements to meet our desires in this matter.

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<sup>78</sup> April 11.

The British have suggested and we concur that it would be most helpful if the Soviet Government would support our *démarche* and we understand the British are approaching the Soviet Government in this connection immediately although we are not informed as to the details of the approach. You are authorized to confer with your British colleague<sup>79</sup> and join with him in your discretion in any approach he may make to the Soviet Government in this matter.

You may if you wish inform the Soviet Government that only the urgency of the matter, which we are sure they will appreciate, prevented us from conferring with it before making the *démarche*.

Repeated to London as our 2829 for information. Repeated to Stockholm as No. 635.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10507: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 10, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 10—6:30 p. m.]

2920. From the Ambassador and Riefler. Reference Embassy's 2902 and 2903, April 9.<sup>80</sup>

1. British have consulted their supply authorities on problem of threatening SKF and subject has also been referred to Portal, Chief of Air Staff. Supply authorities strongly oppose any risk to SKF deliveries of bearings to Britain. Portal has expressed opinion that cutting off of supplies of Swedish bearings at this moment would be extremely serious.

2. British earnestly request that clause threatening SKF be dropped from note.

3. British will in any case support Johnson in his *démarche* at Stockholm but form of support will depend on whether clause threatening SKF is omitted or not. If it is omitted, Mallet is authorized to hand Swedish Foreign Office at the same time American note is delivered a written statement saying that His Majesty's Government are in complete agreement with United States and associate themselves entirely with requests contained in United States note. If clause in question is not omitted, Mallet will probably make a separate visit to Foreign Office and associate himself verbally and in general with objectives sought in note.

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<sup>79</sup> Sir Archibald J. K. Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

<sup>80</sup> Latter not printed.

4. British are pressing Moscow to join and would prefer that delivery of note be deferred until Wednesday <sup>81</sup> morning to give Moscow opportunity to associate themselves also with the *démarche*.

Repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 122 of April 10. [Winant and Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10502 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom*  
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1944—midnight.

2828. For the Ambassador and Riefler.

1. With reference to your 2902 and 2903 of April 9,<sup>82</sup> we are pleased that Foot and Warner<sup>83</sup> found it possible to act so promptly in instructing Mallet to join in Johnson's *démarche* in Stockholm. We attach the greatest importance to the immediate delivery of the note, particularly in view of policy towards neutral trade with the enemy expressed in the Secretary's speech last night.<sup>84</sup> Because of our desire to secure full British support, we agree to the omission of the clause specifically threatening SKF. The language for the paragraph containing that clause should read as follows:

"On the other hand the American Government states quite frankly that if its desires in the matter, which vitally concern the lives of countless American soldiers, are not met, serious consideration will be given to all measures at the disposal of the American Government."

We assume that this is acceptable to the British and that Mallet will be promptly instructed to support Johnson fully.

Both Department and FEA are of strong opinion that the Swedish authorities should be apprised of this Government's willingness to specifically consider black-listing SKF as among measures referred to in foregoing paragraph quoted. We must therefore reserve full freedom of action with respect to later conveyance to Swedish Government of this position if necessary. We trust that the British will urgently reexamine their ability to join in such a declaration which, while we are agreeing to delete from note, we believe should be as promptly as possible communicated orally to the Swedish authorities in Stockholm subsequent to delivery of note. While we are hope-

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<sup>81</sup> April 12.

<sup>82</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>83</sup> Christopher F. A. Warner, Counselor of the British Foreign Office.

<sup>84</sup> For text of radio address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

ful British will feel that upon basis of reexamination with their supply authorities they can join us in such later declaration, you should impress them with our intention to follow up note with oral declarations in this sense made unilaterally if British find it impossible to join.

2. Johnson is accordingly instructed to consult with Mallet and prepare a joint note including the paragraph quoted above, to be delivered not later than 12th. If the Russians agree to support the Anglo-American *démarche*, no harm would, we think, result from their representations following ours by a day or so.

3. Sent to London for information of Ambassador; repeated to Stockholm for action as Department's no. 629 of April 10.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10455 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 11, 1944—5 p. m.

637. Department's no. 576.<sup>85</sup> Your oral remarks to be made when you deliver the ball bearing note should be couched in the strongest possible language making full use of those sections of my speech of April 9 which refer to our intention to make every effort to reduce neutral aid to the enemy. Our intentions in this respect are firm, are backed by developing public opinion in the United States, and are of the utmost importance for military reasons. For your information, in addition to the written views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the substance of which was given you in paragraph 4 of the reference telegram, the Secretaries of War and Navy have today called on me and repeated their previous expressions of the importance which they attach to the elimination of Swedish ball-bearing exports to the enemy. You should inform the Swedish Foreign Minister<sup>86</sup> that this matter is receiving my personal attention.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10515 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 11, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 11—8:34 p. m.]

1234. My 1219, April 10, 5 p. m.<sup>87</sup> I gather from talk with British Minister that clause substituted in Department's 629 April 10, 10

<sup>85</sup> Same as telegram 2604, April 3, midnight, to London, p. 485.

<sup>86</sup> Christian E. Günther.

<sup>87</sup> Not printed.

p. m.<sup>88</sup> numbered paragraph 1 for clause specifically threatening SKF would be even more objectionable to British authorities than original clause because it contains a threat against the Swedish Government. Mallet is strongly of opinion that inclusion of this clause will not, at this stage, add to forcefulness of our representations. It is his feeling that this threat will be intensely resented by Swedish Government, will be considered as an attempt to intimidate them and will hinder rather than further attainment of our purposes. He bases his opinion on all past experience in dealing with Swedes where threats or implied threats have been employed. It is my own opinion that we might have better chance of constructive results if note is put in omitting this threat against the Government and stating that we confidently expect an immediate and favorable reply. If such a reply is not forthcoming we can then inform the Swedes exactly what we intend to do.

My 268 April 11, 9 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10523 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 12, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received April 12—7:44 p. m.]

2977. From the Ambassador and Riefler for Department and Stone FEA.

1. British Minister in Stockholm has just cabled MEW his strong belief that most recently amended version of clause aimed at SKF in draft ballbearing note, (see Department's 2828, April 10) hurts rather than helps a successful conclusion of our negotiations. He has also stated that initial response to his approach to SKF through Wallenberg is distinctly encouraging. He therefore feels the clause should not be included in the note.

2. Notwithstanding MEW's viewpoint reported in Embassy's 2948, April 11,<sup>89</sup> to give written support to note including clause, Foot is now unwilling to override Mallet's objections. He has, however, instructed Mallet: (a) To confer with Johnson on problem of elimination of clause to which he objects; (b) whether clause is eliminated or not, to support note; and (c) if clause is not eliminated, that he (Mallet) has leeway as to whether British support is in written or oral form.

3. Embassy has worked industriously to obtain full and wholehearted British support for a form of *démarche* to Swedes about which

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<sup>88</sup> Same as telegram 2828, April 10, midnight, to London, p. 497.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

British had serious misgivings. Their Minister in Stockholm, in contrast to ours, has again today expressed serious doubts about wisdom of formal note. We have succeeded in securing full support in London to everything except clause noted above. It has been our experience to date that our chances of success in very difficult negotiations such as these, are immeasurably increased when United States Government and His Majesty's Government are in full and hearty accord. In view of this fact and Johnson's stand (see Legation's 1219, April 10 to Department<sup>90</sup>) Embassy recommends that clause be dropped from note. [Winant and Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10515: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1944—10 p. m.

651. Your 1234, April 11. We have given full consideration to your recommendation that the threat clause be eliminated from the ball-bearing note but in view of the importance which we attach to this *démarche* and the general attitude of interested agencies here (see Department's 637, April 11) feel constrained to retain the clause in question particularly since London informs us that though the British are not happy over retention of the clause they have nevertheless instructed Mallet to associate himself fully with your *démarche* even should the Department and FEA decide to retain the threat.

Sent to Stockholm; repeated to London as Department's No. 2897.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10529: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 13, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

1265. British Minister and I called by appointment this afternoon on Foreign Minister Günther. I handed Mr. Günther a communication in form of an *aide-mémoire*<sup>91</sup> the text being substantially same as draft telegraphed by Department (Department's 576, April 3, midnight<sup>92</sup>), with modifications directed by Department's telegram 609, April 8, 4 p. m.,<sup>93</sup> numbered section 2 paragraph (5) and 629,

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<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3164, April 14, from Stockholm; neither printed.

<sup>92</sup> Same as telegram 2604 to London, p. 485.

<sup>93</sup> Same as telegram 2764 to London, p. 493.

April 10, 10 p. m. [*midnight?*],<sup>94</sup> numbered section 1. See also Department's 651, April 12, 10 p. m. Mr. Günther read *aide-mémoire* carefully and his first remark was to ask what was meant by statement in penultimate paragraph of memorandum that "if its desires were not met United States would give serious consideration to using all measures at its disposal to bring about desired result". I told Mr. Günther that I had been furnished no special interpretation of that section but that from comments I had been instructed to make orally I believed he would realize extreme seriousness with which the United States Government viewed question at issue and that paragraph which he queried might be considered in that light.

At this point British Minister handed Foreign Minister an *aide-mémoire* in which he stated that his Government was in complete agreement with views of United States Government regarding export from Sweden of ball bearings to Germany and her satellites and that his Government associated itself entirely with request contained in *aide-mémoire* which American Minister was presenting to Royal Swedish Government today.

Mr. Günther who preserved his usual calm and moderate manner throughout interview, said that we, that is United States and Great Britain, know as well as the Swedes what Sweden's position is. He gave an outline of negotiations which had taken place during past year between representatives of U.S.A., Great Britain and Sweden which resulted in a trade agreement under which both sides assumed obligations and mentioned that following conclusion of this agreement Sweden had with greatest difficulty secured an agreement with Germany which was in every respect predicated upon Sweden's obligations to U.S.A. and Great Britain under tripartite agreement. If Sweden now acquiesces in Anglo-American demands regarding ball bearings they will break a definite treaty obligation which they have with Germany, a procedure which Sweden does not wish to do. He said that Sweden in such an event must also count with the consequence. Her entire trade with Germany would cease which would be very serious; whole economic life of Sweden would be most injuriously affected. Furthermore, matter would not end with the economic consequences; Sweden would have to count not only with bad but with worst possible relations with Germany. He then paused to inquire what in face of such a situation Anglo-Saxon powers promise to Sweden.

He called attention to our promised undertaking to do everything within our power to offset Swedish economic losses, et cetera, resulting from possible German retaliation, and furnish of imports greatly

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<sup>94</sup> Same as telegram 2828 to London, p. 497.



needed by Swedish economy, et cetera even when in short supply in United States, and inquired how as a practical matter any agreement based on these promises could be attained and what we could do to implement them. Gothenburg traffic would certainly be closed by Germany and although a few commodities and products might be sent by air it is quite obvious that Allies under present conditions would not be able to send any coal to Sweden. He said that we do not take any account in our communication of the likely political consequences of Sweden's acceding to our request. I intervened at this point with Mr. Günther's permission to make the oral representations which Department had instructed in telegram 576, April 3, midnight, and implemented by Department's 637, April 11, 5 p. m. Mr. Günther said that he fully understood Allied point of view regarding ball bearings and importance which we attach to them but he reiterated that we had an agreement with Sweden which Sweden for her part had made every endeavor to fulfill and that Sweden likewise had an agreement with Germany which took fully into account Swedish obligations to the Allies. I pointed out to Mr. Günther that no attempt was made in our note to base our request for cessation of ball-bearing exports on any right derived from tripartite trade agreement but that we were making an entirely new request based upon changed conditions and urgent necessities for reasons of vital importance to Allied war effort. Mr. Günther remarked that he realized importance of matter from our point of view but said that Sweden was obliged to her trade agreement with Germany also as a matter of vital importance. He said that he did not see how it would be possible for Sweden unilaterally to violate her obligations under that agreement and put a virtual embargo on the export of ball bearings and related products mentioned in our communication "this year". Mr. Günther referred to my references to developing public opinion in United States regarding trade with Germany and said that he wondered if that public opinion would not see justice of Sweden's position if entire correspondence should be published by Sweden in which it would appear that Sweden's trade with Germany was upon a contractual basis known to Allied Governments and based upon prior agreements with those Governments. I told Mr. Günther that I could not hazard an authoritative view as to how public opinion generally might be affected by such a measure but that I felt sure a certain section of opinion would reach the conclusion that even if Sweden had not violated any legal obligation she was nevertheless completely within German orbit and unable to resist German pressures. I told him that I realized that this was not true but that there was a section of public opinion abroad which believed it and that certainly a large section of public opinion would not be inclined to look at matter from viewpoint of whether

legal obligations were being fulfilled if at same time material aid for whatever reason was going from Sweden to Germany and contributing to destruction of lives of American soldiers.

Mr. Günther said that whole matter would have to be presented to the Government and would be very carefully considered. He said that he also wanted to emphasize that he was not arguing against our request on a basis of Swedish economic interests important as those were to Sweden.

From the general tenor of his remarks and from his constant returning to the subject it is evident that existence of a formal convention or treaty undertaking with Germany for trade during 1944 is considered to be an extremely difficult and a practically insuperable obstacle by Foreign Minister. It is to be expected that Government will take substantially same view. Added to this is obvious fact that Swedes must consider that consequences of meeting our demands would have extremely serious repercussions with Germany not necessarily solely of an economic nature. Although we feel that in meeting our new demands based on new conditions the Swedes no longer have to face danger of a German attack, Mr. Günther said that Swedish Government is by no means sure of this; that while it has been stated in the Secretary's speech<sup>95</sup> that we have no intention of coercing any neutral nation to entering the war on our side, nevertheless if Sweden accedes to the present requests she will be yielding to pressure which might as result bring war to Sweden; that by granting our demands Sweden would definitely have abandoned her position of neutrality and aligned herself on Allied side. Germans even in their last period of weakness and desperation might consider that as Sweden was another enemy she would have to be treated as all of Germany's enemies and Sweden would thus be drawn into the conflict.

While I would not venture any prediction as to what Swedish reply to this *démarche* will be, I feel convinced that Swedish estimates and conceptions of their own national security will be the guiding principle in decision. That communication will make a profound impression on Government is undoubted; that it will be intensely resented in some quarters as an attempt to intimidate Sweden into assisting one belligerent side to injure the other in spite of treaty obligations freely entered into on all sides, is also apparent from remarks made by Mr. Günther. He said that Allies cannot claim of Sweden performance which would mean in effect that she would have to give up her basic policy of neutrality and face critical danger of being drawn into the war through an almost certain break with Germany.

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<sup>95</sup> Radio address of April 9, 1944, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

I should add that when Mr. Günther made a remark that he did not see how any legal means could be found for putting an embargo on exports of ball bearings and related products, British Minister inquired if SKF itself could not find some practicable means of stopping exports particularly in view of fact that we are offering to purchase their production. Mr. Günther made no direct reply to this suggestion.

British Minister took a part throughout conversation and fully supported my representations.

My 274, April 13, 9 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10533 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 13, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 14—2:31 a. m.]

1280. Pursuant to the Department's 861, April 10, 8 p. m. a note was sent to Molotov<sup>96</sup> on April 12 requesting Soviet support of the steps which we and the British were taking in Stockholm.

The British Embassy advises that in response to its request for Soviet support Mikoyan<sup>97</sup> stated that the representative in Stockholm of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade had been instructed to inform SKF that the Soviet Government was opposed to any further exports of Swedish ballbearings to Germany.

Sent to Department, repeated to London.

HARRIMAN

740.00112 European War 1939/10529 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1944—7 p. m.

666. Your 1265, April 13. We await with interest your further reports of any indications of what the Swedish reply may be.

The following thoughts are submitted for your background guidance and such use as you think fitting in the event that you should meanwhile have any conversations on the subject with Boheman or other Swedish officials:

1. We have noticed that in discussions regarding limitations on Swedish trade with the enemy Swedish officials frequently remark

<sup>96</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>97</sup> Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

that if and when the British and Americans open a safe line of communication between Sweden and the outside world through, for example, Norway, Swedish dependence on German supplies will become of little or no importance and consequently Sweden at that time would be in a position to take drastic steps with respect to reductions in Swedish exports to the enemy.

We think this very shortsighted thinking: The Swedes might well bear in mind that when this war has advanced to that stage the Allies will be able to take measures of their own to prevent German trade in the Baltic and accordingly unilateral action by Sweden to this end though possibly welcome will not be necessary. Hence such action could not be regarded as a satisfactory *quid pro quo* for concessions on our part or for concessions in connection with long-term Swedish desiderata.

2. With respect to Günther's remarks regarding the basic policy of neutrality of Sweden you may say that Sweden has already during the course of this war permitted most serious derogations of its neutrality in favor of the enemy and that these derogations are still on the books. We have in mind particularly the passage of an armed division of German troops over Swedish territory. We feel that the concessions with respect to Swedish exports which we are now asking are not comparable in so far as Swedish neutrality is concerned to such deviations in favor of our enemies.

Sent to Stockholm for action. Repeated to London for information as Department's no. 2988.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10554 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 15, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received April 15—7:22 p. m.]

3100. For Department and Stone, FEA from Riefler. Reference Embassy's 2977, April 12. Hägglöf in a call on Riefler Friday<sup>98</sup> expressed great concern that threat clause in Stockholm *démarche* signified rupture of War Trade Agreement of 1943 if Sweden could not meet our demands. He elaborated at great length thesis that small countries such as Sweden lived and maintained their independence by rigorous observance of agreements. He contended vigorously that they should not be subject to reprisals for making a commercial agreement with Germany that conformed to a War Trade Agreement previously negotiated with us.

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<sup>98</sup> April 14.

Riefler emphasized that clause in question signified importance which his Government placed on elimination of Swedish exports of ball bearings at present time and that inquiries as to its specific meaning should be addressed to American Legation in Stockholm or to Washington. He also emphasized at great length opportunity presented to Sweden to make a really vital contribution to United Nations in winning the war.

Hägglöf seemed attracted by this thesis but contended his Government would probably be forced to refuse on ground that they must maintain agreements. When Riefler pointed out that the SKF company as a private business organization had a right to accept or reject orders and to break its business contracts with Germany if it pleased, Hägglöf seemed somewhat attracted but then went back to a passionate plea that there was little basis for new negotiations if threat clause meant that we were prepared to repudiate an agreement such as the War Trade Agreement of 1943 not because it had been violated but because the situation had changed and we desired a new concession.

Repeated to Stockholm as 131. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10550 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 15, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received April 15—10:05 p. m.]

1305. My 1265, April 13, 9 p. m. and Department's 666, April 14, 7 p. m. When I saw Mr. Günther on April 13 for delivery of the *aide-mémoire* he made one comment on first paragraph of *aide-mémoire* which was inadvertently omitted from my report. He referred to our describing the humiliating measures forced on Sweden at time when German military strength was at its peak and to subsequent efforts of Sweden to reassert sovereign rights. He remarked that language employed was unusual and would cause resentment; that Sweden had never abandoned her sovereignty and that word "humiliating" tendentious. He then passed to material part of *aide-mémoire* by saying that the other matter was not of sufficient importance to discuss. There is no doubt however that he intended to convey a sense of displeasure at language used.

I saw Boheman late yesterday. He told me that our *démarche* had given Government a great shock and that the Cabinet was very "angry" and resentful.

He said all were puzzled that we had seen fit to make such a communication which he said was the worst received by Sweden from

any belligerent during entire course of war. During this short conversation I did not recede from stand which we have officially taken in *aide-mémoire* and which I had maintained during my interview with Foreign Minister. While Boheman was careful to refrain from what Swedish reply would be he made comments to effect that our requests were impossible, which led me to believe that present temper of Government is to give a negative reply. What may develop, however, during course of next few days when they have had time to reflect can hardly be predicted with any certainty. My present inclination is that I expect a negative reply, but that it will be conciliatory and possibly constructive in character with some suggestion of independent action on their part which would at least go part of the way in meeting our views. I feel confident that it is not only the Government which has been galvanized by your action but that it will also have a salutary effect on Hamberg and directors of SKF. SKF could in fact go much further in cooperation with us than it has done in past. There are means by which ball bearing production to German account can be seriously impeded such as factory strikes, machinery breakdowns, etc. and I am hopeful that our *démarche* may serve to shock them out of their complacent attitude "business as usual".

Boheman told me that before the bombing of Schweinfurt SKF had in fact been very uncooperative with the Government but that since bombing of Schweinfurt Government had found Directorate more amenable and cooperative. I have purposely not sought any opportunity to talk to Wallenberg during these negotiations as British Minister had already made approaches to him prior to delivery of our *aide-mémoire* and I have felt that no useful purpose would be served by injecting myself into that situation. Mallet tells me that he saw Wallenberg yesterday. Wallenberg's reaction to protest was that Allies had made serious mistake; that in his opinion more would have been achieved by indirect methods with SKF. Wallenberg said that we had made mistake not to preempt SKF production last December before agreement with Germany had been reached. At that time British for no apparent reason cut their order in half. Wallenberg is talking, however, as a business man and on the basis of SKF being a completely free agent. Our *démarche* may force Government to get tough with SKF. I do not feel it would be useful to go any further in detailed speculation at present time. For all the talk about contractual obligation even though sincere, the determining factor will be Swedish conception of national security.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10507 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944—midnight.

3032. In considering the possible pressures that might be effective in the event that the Swedes do not give us satisfaction in the matter of elimination of ball-bearing exports to the enemy we have reached the conclusion that the most effective measure would be the black listing of SKF. We recognize that the full effectiveness of black listing action cannot be obtained unless we are joined by the British. The British, however, apparently do not feel able at this time to commit themselves to black listing of SKF because of the strong opposition of their supply authorities and of Portal, Chief of Air Staff, (Embassy's 2920, April 10), since they feel that such action might endanger the supply of bearings needed for British aircraft. It is obvious therefore that an essential condition precedent to the British ability fully to cooperate in this matter would be the supply from the United States of the bearings the British now obtain in Sweden. For reasons unknown to the Department difficulty has been experienced in obtaining from the British the data necessary to determine whether British bearing needs can be adequately met from the United States. (See Department's 2856, April 11.<sup>99</sup>) As time may be of the essence the Department would appreciate your taking the necessary steps to put the American and British supply authorities at work on this question as soon as possible. Please bring this telegram to the attention of Freeman Matthews<sup>1</sup> as well as Riefler.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10497 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944—midnight.

674. As you, of course, realize, the formal Swedish memorandum described in your 1178 April 6 cannot be considered by Department and FEA as a satisfactory reply to the joint Anglo-American protest of March 17. We are considering the problems raised by the Swedish

<sup>99</sup> Not printed.

<sup>1</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, accompanied Under Secretary of State Stettinius on his mission to London, April 1944.

<sup>2</sup> Repeated on the same date to London as telegram 3016.

position and you will be informed as soon as we decide on the next step.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10557: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 16, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received April 16—8:45 p. m.]

3117. From Riefler for the Secretary, Acheson,<sup>3</sup> and Stone, FEA. Reference Embassy's 2713, April 3; Department's 2665, April 5. Mallet has reported on personal basis to Foot that Wallenberg has intimated SKF Company might be persuaded to cancel outstanding ball bearing contracts with Germany in return for orders from United States of 100 million kronor. I have requested Foot to have Mallet find out whether SKF Company are in fact prepared to stop immediately all deliveries of bearings to enemy Europe for the duration of the war in return for orders from United States in this amount. Please instruct urgently whether Washington will entertain a proposition to this effect, if so make appropriate authorization and funds available to Johnson.

This message repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 134, April 16, 11 p. m. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10631b: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*<sup>4</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1944—8 p. m.

3054. From Department and FEA. Department and FEA will follow, pending results of present efforts to restrict further Swedish exports of bearings to Axis, a policy of licensing to Sweden only those exports required under the strictest possible interpretation of the War Trade Agreement, allowing exceptions only for vitally essential humanitarian purposes and unimportant items in long supply.

Please seek MEW's agreement to a similar policy on all Swedish imports from the U.K. or navicert area. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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<sup>3</sup> Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State.

<sup>4</sup> Repeated on the same date to Stockholm as telegram 682.



740.00112 European War 1939/10557 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>5</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1944—midnight.

3104. From Crowley<sup>6</sup> and Stone, FEA. We would welcome proposition along lines of your 3117 of April 16 repeated to Stockholm as 134. Any such arrangement with SKF should include assurances that all deliveries of bearing machinery (including tools), special steels as well as ball and roller bearings to enemy Europe will be effectively stopped for the duration of the war. Authorization of funds has been assured by USCC<sup>7</sup> subject to above conditions and satisfactory arrangements with UK authorities for equitable division of costs. A special representative of USCC and FEA, Stanton Griffis, will leave shortly for London and Stockholm with authority to assist in negotiations and consummate deal for USCC.

Sent to London, repeated<sup>1</sup> to Stockholm. [Crowley and Stone, FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10592 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:16 p. m.]

1352. Following is paraphrase of text of proposed note on Bothnian traffic referred to in Legation's 290, April 17, 7 p. m. to London (Legation's 1320, April 17, 7 p. m. to Department<sup>8</sup>) :

United States and British Governments have considered Swedish *aide-mémoire* of January 5<sup>9</sup> referring to transport of large amounts of cement, coke and coal from Germany to Norway across Sweden through Bothnian ports. Allied Governments have noted that Swedish Government considers this transit as outside purview of the understandings arrived at last summer. This contention is inadmissible to American and British Governments.

Allied Governments have frequently stressed serious view they take of all kinds of transit through Sweden on behalf of Germany. Even though their principal concern has been movement of enemy troops and war materials across Sweden, they pointed out in course of discussions on transit traffic with what great concern they viewed transit

<sup>5</sup> Repeated on the same date to Stockholm as telegram 698.

<sup>6</sup> Leo T. Crowley, Foreign Economic Administrator.

<sup>7</sup> United States Commercial Company.

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

<sup>9</sup> See telegram 37, January 5, 7 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 458.

of other commodities for enemy account. During these discussions last year and previously both Governments, although not informed about traffic via Bothnian ports, regarded negotiations as including all kinds of traffic across Sweden. The undertaking drawn up by negotiators in London last year contains following undertaking<sup>10</sup> (article I) :

“A limitation to 120,000 tons will be imposed by Swedish Government on annual traffic of all commodities not included in attached list of war materials which pass through Sweden from enemy areas to Finland and Norway.”

Allied Governments were within their rights in making the assumption as they did that since Swedish Government never expressed any opposition to this draft undertaking it agreed to its provisions. This assumption was supported by the fact that in August 1943 the Swedish Foreign Office confirmed to the British Minister the list of war materials envisaged by the undertaking, indicating thereby that the Swedish Government was operating along the lines of the London document. In addition Kumlin of the Foreign Office told the British Minister in August 1943 that the ceiling of 120,000 tons per annum for the traffic in non-war materials would be applied.

In their *aide-mémoire* the Swedish Government maintains that this undertaking to limit the traffic in non-war materials to 120,000 tons yearly relates only to traffic via ferries since discussions last year and previously were confined to ferry traffic. Allied Governments cannot agree with this conclusion, although they accept premise on which it is based. Allied Governments did not know of existence of Bothnian traffic which has sprung up since 1939 and is a means by which the Germans maintain their occupation of Norway.

Obviously, therefore, Allied Governments meant negotiations on traffic of non-war materials to limit all such transit, irrespective of route used. Certainly Swedish negotiators would have made a specific exception of traffic via the Gulf of Bothnia if their intentions had been different.

All Governments must conclude that on both sides it was intended to have unilateral declaration made in 1943 cover all enemy traffic through Sweden with no reservations. All three Governments understood negotiations in this manner and it was only later when Swedish Government became aware [aware?] of traffic via Gulf of Bothnia that their position changed. Allied Governments are confident that this conclusion is well founded. On basis of this conclusion Swedish Government cannot expect that Allied Governments could

<sup>10</sup> See telegram 4093, June 21, 1943, 11 a. m., from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 781.

agree with contention now made on Swedish side that only matter discussed was traffic via ferries.

It is impossible to disregard another side of question. United States and British Governments should undertake only with great hesitation to supply to a neutral country commodities badly required in their war effort. Steps taken by Sweden with regard to enemy transit were greatly responsible for their willingness to make this sacrifice. For this reason United States and British Governments clearly expect as of right that no modification in the understanding reached will now be made to their injury, particularly since the two Governments cannot conceivably be regarded as responsible for whatever error in understanding may have occurred.

Consequently, Allied Governments ask that Swedish Government give assurances promptly that transit of non-war materials from enemy territory to Finland and Norway by way of Gulf of Bothnia or other ports in Sweden will be brought within annual ceiling of 120,000 tons accepted in 1943 by Sweden.

My 300, April 19, 5 p. m. repeats this message to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10585: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 19, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received April 19—7 p. m.]

1356. Reference Legation's 1305, April 15. Boheman informed me this afternoon that history of Swedish war trade relations with Allies and with Germany, associated countries and occupied territories had been presented in detail in both Houses of the Riksdag meeting in secret session this morning. Prime Minister<sup>11</sup> and Foreign Minister alternated in presenting facts and answering questions both Houses. Opinion was unanimous that Sweden must adhere to juridical basis in replying to Allies' approach regarding Swedish exports of bearings, bearing machinery and piston rings. Not a single Member of either House of the Riksdag, including Communist Members, expressed himself as being in favor of accepting Allies' note.<sup>12</sup>

However, both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister made it clear, Boheman said, that it might be possible to discuss attainment of Allies' objectives within framework of Sweden's existing agreements. Boheman added formal Swedish reply to our note might be expected by end of this week.

My 301 April 19 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

<sup>11</sup> Per Albin Hansson.

<sup>12</sup> See telegram 1265, April 13, 9 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 500.

740.00112 European War 1939/10598: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 20, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 7:16 p. m.]

1368. My 1356, April 19, 7 p. m. I called to see Boheman this morning in hope that I might elicit from him some additional information regarding Swedish intentions with respect to our ball bearing request. He reaffirmed statement made yesterday that answer might be expected this week and that it would be negative. He went on to say that the extensive publicity incident to our *démarche* following on the Secretary's speech of warning to neutrals has put Government in an exceedingly difficult position between the two belligerents as a favorable reply involving breach of agreement with Germany would be interpreted by latter as direct result of Allied pressure. Inasmuch as Boheman had stated categorically that Government's decision was to make negative reply to our *démarche*, I did not attempt to argue that point. I asked him if they intended to make any constructive suggestions. He intimated that they did not have such intention as far as written reply was concerned. I expressed the hope that they were seeking for other ways of meeting our desires and mentioned what he had said yesterday to effect that both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister thought it might be possible to discuss attainment of our objectives within framework of existing agreements of Sweden. Although I made no reference direct or indirect to talks which Mallet has had with Wallenberg (my 1344, April 18, 9 p. m.<sup>13</sup>), I said that I felt confident that SKF could find ways of cooperating toward ends desired. Boheman did not dissent from this opinion and said his Government was seeking earnestly possible ways and means; but situation has, however, been rendered more difficult by our *démarche* and attendant publicity, as any action taken by SKF which would result in reduction of contract deliveries to Germany would immediately be interpreted by Germans as directly yielding by Swedes to Allied demands. Boheman said that, along with their written reply, I would receive a memorandum of certain facts in connection with ball bearing shipments to Germany. He went on to say that prior to Allied air attacks against German ball-bearing industry, Swedish exports of ball bearings were not more than 2% of German production; while it is impossible now to make any precise estimate of present percentage which Swedish exports bear to total German production, Boheman says that his Government experts and SKF officials do not believe it is greatly in excess of 7½%. Swedes have been under constant pressure from Germans to make special types of ball bearings for airplanes and tanks.

<sup>13</sup> Not printed.

With exception of one order for a million kronor some time ago for special bearings these German requests have been all refused. Only this week he said Germans have again returned pressing for such deliveries and have offered 150 Focke-Wulfs of latest model for very early delivery, some immediately. This offer has been refused. All the bearings which are now being delivered under agreement to Germany, Boheman insists, are of standard type and are not special bearings for airplanes and tanks. He said that it is only for Great Britain that SKF is making such special bearings. He said, with apparent sincerity, that Swedes cannot understand constant accusations emanating from Allied quarters and American in particular, that Sweden is exporting special types of bearings to Germany. He said that all bearings manufactured in Germany itself, as well as elsewhere, bear the inscription "SKF" and that it seems to Swedes that Allied authorities are attributing all such bearings in use by Germany to Swedish provenance. He cannot explain persistent belief on our part that Sweden is exporting these bearings to any other cause. He said that on assumption that his knowledge of Swedish exports of bearings to Germany is correct and that no bearings are going except those of standard make and in small quantity relative to German total production, he does not see how we can sustain our claim that Swedish exports are causing the death of countless American soldiers. He said that perhaps Allies are not aware that subsequent to their concentrated bombing of Germany the German production of special ball bearings had been scattered all over Germany and in occupied territories in small plants. Statements along line of foregoing, I anticipate, will be in special memorandum Boheman spoke of above which will accompany their reply. Boheman also made it clear that the wording of the American *aide-mémoire* had been considered offensive and he went so far as to intimate that we had gone the wrong way toward obtaining our objective.

I mentioned recent German protest in training of Norwegian police in Sweden and also discovery of ordnance maps of Sweden at Hälsingborg.<sup>15</sup> Boheman said that German note on Norwegian training had been very sharp and unpleasant but that he did not connect that note nor the map incident with Allied *démarche* on ball bearings. He said that there was really no connection and that in his opinion note on Norwegian trainees and map incident are more directly connected with Hitler's anger against Sweden because of her action in Finnish-Russian peace feelers.<sup>16</sup> German reaction to Swedish efforts in this

<sup>15</sup> On April 14, 1944, Hälsingborg customs officials confiscated a large shipment of German-made military maps of Sweden.

<sup>16</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 214, 218, 220-221, 226-228, 236, 237, 284, 304, 310, and 311-313.

direction has been much sharper and more menacing than has been allowed to appear in German press. Boheman thinks real danger from Germany will be if Hitler becomes convinced that Sweden is either unwilling or unable to withstand Allied pressure and if he should suspect that there is any possibility even of Sweden allowing Allies use of air bases.<sup>17</sup> Fact that Germany is beleaguered on all sides would not in Boheman's opinion and in opinion of others here be deterrent to his ordering an attack on Sweden for purely military reasons of a preemptive nature, if he thought Sweden had aligned herself with Allies.

My 303 April 20, 3 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10603: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 20, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received 11:48 p. m.]

3268. From the Ambassador and Riefler. Reference Embassy's 3168 April 18.<sup>18</sup> British Government views on listing of SKF are given in letter quoted below from Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, to Riefler:

"I promised you that after consulting my colleagues I would let you know our views on the proposal the United States Government have made to us that if the Swedish Government refuse our request for an embargo on the export of ball bearings to the Axis we should at once threaten to put SKF on the Proclaimed and Statutory Lists.<sup>19</sup> I need hardly say that my colleagues and I have given this matter our most earnest consideration, but I am afraid that as at present advised I could not agree to the proposition in the form in which you have made it.

In our view it would be a fatal blunder to make such a threat at this moment. All those who have intimate knowledge of Sweden advise me that there would be every likelihood of the Swedes reacting most unfavourably. One must never lose sight of the fact that the smaller European nations, especially those who have so far successfully resisted Hitler's attempts to dominate them, are touchy on the point of threats to an extent that amounts almost to an inferiority complex. I would therefore ask you to use every effort to persuade the United States Government against adopting this course. I need hardly say that I have welcomed and vigorously supported the suggested offer to purchase the entire output of SKF during 1944 and

<sup>17</sup> For correspondence regarding the use of Swedish air facilities by United States military authorities, see pp. 683 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> See telegram 3032, April 15, midnight, to London, p. 508.

1945, and I think that this would be an exceedingly wise step. It is against the double-handed approach that I feel so strongly. In all things we wish to act with the United States Government, but we are bound to say quite plainly when we think a grave error is contemplated. I was considerably disturbed at the suggestion that was made that, in the event of the British Government refusing to associate itself with a black listing threat at this juncture, the United States Government would be prepared to act unilaterally. That, I am afraid, would not alter our attitude, and the result would be very unfortunate.

If, however, your Government would agree to approach the SKF purely from the business angle, without any threats, I quite agree that in the event of SKF turning the offer down we ought to consider whether it might not be right to black list the firm. I would even be prepared to agree to a time limit being placed on SKF's answer, though I would deprecate that course at the moment, and the time limit, if imposed, should be a reasonable one. If all these efforts fail, then I agree we may need to consider the question of black listing. In my opinion, however, this would be a most serious step to take.

I do not stress the question of the supplies the British Government is at present receiving from SKF, which would of course immediately terminate. Of even greater importance, in our view, is the possible effect on supplies to the enemy. Under present arrangements, as you know, such supplies are severely limited. The contracts with Germany and other Axis countries amount to just over 26 million kronor and cannot under the terms of the War Trade Agreement exceed 29 millions. The Swedes promised us—and we have no reason to think that the promise is not being kept—that no more than about one-twelfth of the annual quota will be exported in any one month of 1944. In addition a considerable amount of the SKF capacity to produce the special types of bearings needed for aircraft is engaged in fulfilling our own preemptive orders placed last year. The present position therefore is that the Germans cannot obtain from Sweden more than 2,416,000 kronors' worth of bearings a month and that under existing commitments it will not be more than 2,166,000 kronor. The possibility of concentrating on special types of bearings is limited by our own preemption and by the undertaking that the switching of orders will not be allowed except for such minor variations as are normal in the trade.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government we cannot rule out the possibility that the Swedish Government would treat the black listing of SKF as being in effect, a breach of last year's War Trade Agreement and that they would repudiate the Agreement. We do not say that this is the most probable result and no doubt the Swedes would hesitate before doing so. But as you know, the Swedes are a proud and stubborn people and they have always been more resentful of the black list than any other neutral country. In addition the Swedish Government are already feeling extremely sore over our recent note on iron ore and other matters,<sup>20</sup> and the note delivered last week<sup>21</sup> on the subject of ball-bearing exports has been very badly received. The

<sup>20</sup> Joint note delivered to the Swedish Government on March 17, 1944, p. 478.

<sup>21</sup> Text not printed, but see telegram 1265, April 13, 9 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 500.

listing of SKF would undoubtedly be regarded as an attempt at coercion and we cannot rule out the risk that Sweden would react violently. I need hardly emphasize what a disaster this might be. If the ceilings were removed and if British orders no longer needed to be fulfilled, SKF could, at a conservative estimate, deliver bearings to the Germans to an annual value of 100 million kronor. This would represent a monthly delivery to the value of at least 8 million kronor although there would be nothing to prevent a larger quantity being sent in any particular month. In addition we should lose the limitation on ball-bearing machinery, the export of which to Germany might be approximately doubled.

There is a further possibility which needs to be taken into account. Even if the Swedes do not repudiate the War Trade Agreement they might cease taking any very drastic steps to police it. The smaller types of bearings with which we are particularly concerned, are not very bulky and there is always the danger of smuggling. This would obviously be increased if deliveries to the British representatives in Sweden were discontinued. We necessarily depend upon Swedish vigilance to prevent smuggling and this in turn depends upon Swedish good will.

It is further necessary to take account of the bearings which the British supply authorities now hold at Göteborg. At the present time we have about 350 tons and by the end of May the amount will be about 700 tons. Admittedly these stores do not include the small bearings used in aircraft fuselages since these are flown across as soon as they can be obtained. Nevertheless I am sure you will agree that this very considerable quantity represents an important hostage. If Swedish property in the United States or the United Kingdom were sequestered it is not inconceivable that the Swedish Government, by way of reprisal, would lay hands on our property in Göteborg. It must also be remembered in this connection that there are some thousands of tons of bearings of all sizes loaded on the *Lionel* and *Dicto*.<sup>22</sup> It might be possible to scuttle these ships if they were in danger of being seized. But there is always a certain element of chance in operations of this kind. For all these reasons we do not think that it is worth while running the risk involved in listing SKF. Certainly we ought not to do so until we have fully explored the suggestion put forward by Wallenberg. We shall be grateful if Washington will consider the points I have raised.

I need hardly say that we wholly share your Government's views regarding the supreme importance of reducing Axis supplies of ball bearings. Indeed, as you will remember, the proposal to make ball-bearing plants one of the highest bombing objectives first came from this Ministry, and we have never ceased to urge on all those concerned that this is one of the most vulnerable points in the enemy's war machine. We therefore entirely agree with the end in view. But the fact remains that as a result of our joint efforts last year, the greater part of Swedish and Swiss production has already been denied to the enemy."

[Winant and Riefler]

WINANT

<sup>22</sup> Two Norwegian merchant ships.



740.00112 European War 1939/10615: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 21, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 21—8:40 p. m.]

1397. Department's 635, April 10, 8 p. m.<sup>23</sup> Under instructions from Soviet Government Semenov, Counselor of Soviet Legation here, yesterday called on Boheman and supported American representation regarding immediate cessation of Swedish exports of bearings, bearing machinery, et cetera, and piston rings.

In the ensuing conversation Semenov expressed opinion that Sweden has no real reason to fear Germany and that discovery of war maps (Legation's 1317, April 17<sup>24</sup>) was result of German plant which could only be described as "a cheap bluff".

My 308, April 21, 9 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10620: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 22, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 22—7:20 p. m.]

1417. Foreign Minister Günther received British Minister and me this afternoon to hand over *aide-mémoire* dated today (identic copies to Mallet and me) in reply to my *aide-mémoire* of April 13 on subject ball-bearing exports to Germany. Mr. Günther had very little to say. He reverted to remarks he had made on April 13 when our *démarche* was made and said that those remarks were still valid as expression of Swedish Government's view. Mr. Boheman was present and stated that after present interview he would have something to say to British Minister and me. See my 1368, April 20 and previous messages on this question in particular my 1265, April 13. Another telegram contains résumé of Swedish *aide-mémoire*.<sup>25</sup>

Mr. Günther stated that he was not making text of this public and inquired what was intention of our Governments. Both Mallet and I replied that we had received no information on this point but Mallet explained that there would doubtless be inquiries in Parliament regarding Swedish reply and that Foreign Minister would probably give its substance. I likewise remarked that Department of State might feel it necessary to make public nature of Swedish reply. Mr. Gün-

<sup>23</sup> Same as telegram 861, p. 495.

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> See telegram 1419, April 23, 5 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 522.

ther said that he was giving same information but not text of *aide-mémoire* to representatives of Swedish press this afternoon.

My 319 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10618: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 22, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received April 23—3:10 a. m.]

1418. Immediately after leaving Foreign Minister Günther (see my 1417 April 22, 10 p. m.) Mallet and I went with Mr. Boheman to his office to hear his oral comments, which were substantially as follows:

He first informed us that no further licenses for export of piston rings to Germany have been issued since Legation's representations (see my 1260, April 13, 4 p. m.<sup>26</sup> and related correspondence). He hoped in a few days to be able to give a definite assurance that there will be no licenses issued for exports in future.

Mr. Boheman said that as far as Foreign Office is informed SKF is exploring all possibilities to meet to some extent our wishes expressed in *aide-mémoire* of April 13. He cannot say anything further at present nor say exactly when these results will be known; he said that it is possible that he may not be able to say anything but that we can see the results in fact. He remarked that means of doing anything on part of company have been rendered more difficult by extensive publicity which ball bearing question has had. He likewise informed us that only commissions now placed with SKF for ball bearings of a special type for aircraft are two orders totaling 1,300,000 kronor given by Hungary and Rumania. These orders will not be carried out. He reiterated what he had told me previously and which I have reported, that Germans are exerting constant pressure on SKF to accept orders for special types of aircraft bearings, in fact having recently offered to give Sweden 150 latest model Focke-Wulf planes as an inducement. This offer was refused and Boheman stated categorically that no orders for similar bearings from Germany will be accepted. He said that there is a special kind of ball bearing which Swedes believe is used by Germans for tank production. An order totaling 1,300,000 kronor had been placed by Germans for this type of bearing. Most of this order has been delivered, a small residue remaining. No new orders will be accepted for this type of bearing. Boheman told me that it was not his order that he made reference

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<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

when I talked to him the other day (see my 1368, April 20, 3 p. m.) SKF will not deliver in future to Germany any ball bearings except those of standard types. I asked Mr. Boheman if some of these so-called standard bearings were not bearings which could be used in aircraft. Mr. Boheman said that he could not guarantee that some would not be but he could only say that none of these bearings now sent by SKF to Germany would be accepted by Swedish aircraft industry for their planes; that type of bearings produced for Swedish aircraft industry are of a much higher quality than those sent to Germany, with a greater "tolerance"; that none of this superior type has been exported to Germany; that the ball bearings sent to England are of a higher quality than those sent to Germany. Both British Minister and I mentioned that we had information that German aircraft which had come into our possession bore bearings which our authorities were confident they had been made in Sweden. Mr. Boheman said that SKF experts had assured him that ball bearings now made in Germany bear SKF mark only and that marks previously used on German produced ball bearings which indicated Germany as point of origin are no longer placed on those bearings. He said that these SKF experts assure him that it is impossible to tell whether ball bearings now manufactured in Germany are produced there or in Sweden. Boheman also said that SKF experts had informed him that to best of their knowledge less than 3% of total ball bearing requirements of Germany before extensive bombings came from Sweden. This figure is now between 6 to 8% which indicates that more than half of German ball-bearing industry has been put out of action. Boheman says that this information comes from SKF personnel in Germany and that company here is greatly worried lest it come to ears of Germans that this information has leaked out. They would take immediate reprisals on SKF personnel. Boheman expressed his willingness and willingness of SKF for any British or American ball-bearing expert to discuss these matters directly with SKF officials. Mallet suggested that Waring was fully competent to do so.

I think both Mr. Günther and Boheman feel that Sweden has given only reply possible from their point of view but that they have not closed door through SKF. Mallet and I expressed opinion that SKF could take action which would go far toward meeting our views and Boheman was rather reticent in his reaction. He said that Government could not take any action to stop SKF production; that such action would be impossible; and furthermore that we could not expect that SKF would stop entirely its exports to Germany under terms of Swedish-German agreement. I then inquired whether Government would interfere if we could come to some sort of understanding with SKF. He made no reply to this question and Mallet made remark

that perhaps it was unfair to expect Mr. Boheman to answer that question now. Boheman, of course, is fully informed of attempts through Wallenberg to start something with SKF. I hope it will be possible for our Government and British to move slowly in reaction to Swedish reply and allow possibilities of some more effective action directly with SKF to be tested out.

My 320, April 22, 10 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10605 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1944—11 p. m.

3224. I have read with interest your 3273<sup>27</sup> and Lord Selborne's letter repeated in your 3268.<sup>28</sup> We are all appreciative of the fine work which the Embassy and the Economic Warfare Division have done in assisting our air forces. We had already determined upon a line of approach on the ball-bearing matter somewhat similar to that proposed by Lord Selborne. As you have noted from other telegrams we are prepared in conjunction with the British to enter into an extensive pre-emptive purchasing program, details of which we intend shall be worked out in Sweden through direct and businesslike conversations with Wallenberg and other SKF representatives. To this end Mr. Stanton Griffis<sup>29</sup> is leaving this country on April 25 to fly by Lisbon to London and thence to Sweden with full authority from USCC and FEA and with the full approval of the State Department. He will carry on his discussions in Stockholm under the general supervision of Johnson and of Riefler should the latter go to Stockholm in accordance with the suggestion made in Department's 3072.<sup>27</sup>

I am, of course, agreeable to the suggestion made by you and concurred in by Mr. Stettinius that Riefler and Foot come to Washington. Since the effectiveness of Mr. Griffis' proposed conversations in Stockholm will be greatly enhanced if he can have the benefit of consultation with Riefler and Foot in London I suggest, however, that they may wish to postpone their departure for Washington until after Griffis' arrival in London. Griffis has a first hand knowledge of the views of interested agencies in Washington and consultation with him may result in agreement in London on a practicable common program.

HULL

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<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Telegram 3268, April 20, from London, p. 515.

<sup>29</sup> Special representative of the United States Commercial Company and the Foreign Economic Administration.

740.00112 European War 1939/10621 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 23, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:48 p. m.]

1419. Legation's 1417, April 22. Full text of Swedish *aide-mémoire* dated April 22 is being forwarded by airmail pouch leaving Stockholm April 25.<sup>30</sup>

After referring to careful study including consultation with both chambers of Riksdag, and Foreign Relations Committee given our representations made April 13 (Legation's 1265, April 13) Swedish *aide-mémoire* says United States Government is aware that request for compliance with demand supplies [*implies*] that Swedish Government should refuse to fulfill engagements entered into within ceilings on exports provided for by 1943 agreement. Reference is then made to fact that terms of Swedish-German 1944 agreement were made known to Allies at Stockholm JSC<sup>31</sup> meeting January 14 at which time no objection was made.

Concerning statement that war has reached decisive stage and military situation has changed since negotiations summer 1943 *aide-mémoire* expresses difficulty of Swedish Government to comprehend that changes in war situation since such negotiations and since relevant terms of Swedish-German trade agreement made known to us January 1944 were not taken into account by Allies at those times. It is then said that above changes have not altered conditions pursuant to which Sweden has since summer 1943 entered into engagements with various countries. It is emphasized in this connection that safe conduct traffic still requires consent both belligerents for its continuance.

After pointing out that United States has not attempted to deny Swedish Government's strict compliance with War Trade Agreement and rights and obligations of a neutral to permit exports in order to obtain vitally needed goods which Allies unable to supply under present conditions, *aide-mémoire* expresses astonishment and concern over threat clause our note and refusal of Swedish Government to believe that USA would contemplate action against Sweden to prevent exports which take place within framework its agreement with United States.

*Aide-mémoire* records regret that Swedish Government is unable to accede to our demands but notes fundamental idea expressed by USA Government to effect that Sweden as neutral country should refrain from assisting enemies of USA in this war. It concludes

<sup>30</sup> Despatch 3230, April 25, not printed.

<sup>31</sup> Joint Standing Commission.

that Swedish Government cannot consider that this principle is infringed by Swedish trade with belligerents to extent necessary to safeguard Sweden's vital interests and in fulfillment of "legally and politically irreproachable engagements".

See my 1418, April 22.

My 321 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10619: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 23, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:40 p. m.]

1421. In view of urgency our obtaining satisfactory arrangement on exports ballbearings and in view of fact that despite definite refusal in Swedish *aide-mémoire* (Legation's 1419 April 23, 5 p. m.) oral statements by Boheman and others indicate door still open for negotiations (Legation's 1418 April 22, 10 p. m. and 1420, April 23, 6 p. m.<sup>32</sup>) I recommend following for consideration:

1. In conjunction with my British colleagues be authorized to enter into negotiations with Swedish authorities and/or SKF for purpose of obtaining desired objective. Under present prohibitions against diplomatic travel, pouch mail and code messages Swedes cannot be expected to carry on discussions in London. Moreover by holding discussions here we make certain availability for at least informal discussions of those individuals who have expressed desire to assist us and with whom we have established close relations. Method of obtaining embargo piston-rings example of usefulness of this method. (Legation's 831, March 10, 5 p. m., 1059, March 29, 2 p. m. and 1260, April 13, 4 p. m.<sup>33</sup>) To hold negotiations elsewhere would under present circumstances delay obtaining beneficial results which delay can be to our detriment only.

2. I be authorized to enter into negotiations with Swedish Government in preference to SKF unless this proves impossible in which case I be authorized to negotiate directly with SKF.

3. If Department deems it advisable to issue public statement concerning our dissatisfaction (my 1420, April 23, 6 p. m.) such statement be issued immediately. If this is done I will use such statement as grounds for requesting negotiations on basis constructive inducements.

4. Subject to approval Department my initial objective would be elimination of exports at least until last few months this year. This will permit satisfaction our demands within frameworks of contracts and Swedish Government agreement with Germans. If this proves impossible I propose we attempt to obtain 3 months' embargo. However we may be forced to agree to token or very small shipments at

<sup>32</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>33</sup> None printed.

least until last months 1944 of specified bearings with least strategic uses which would constitute minimum compromise acceptable to United States. It is assumed that our offers to Swedes as stated in our *aide-mémoire* as compensation for cancellation of exports are still available although to be given in proportion to Swedish concessions.

5. Naturally our desire to complete negotiations in a very short time with understanding that any agreement is subject to our Government's approval would be made known to Swedes. Similarly depending on course of negotiations it is understood that any reduction in our demands from initial request would only be made with Department's approval.

My 323 April 23, 6 p. m. to London repeats this message.

JOHNSON

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103.916902/868c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1944—8 p. m.

744. Suggestion approved your 1421, April 23, 6 p. m. numbered paragraph 1.

In connection with direct negotiations with SKF at this time you may wish to go slow till Griffis' arrival. Department's telegram to you 698 of April 18.<sup>34</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10655: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 25, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 26—12:57 a. m.]

1454. During a conversation with Boheman at lunch today I said that I hoped that some progress was being made on study of ways to meet our wishes in regard to ball-bearing exports to Germany and that in my opinion SKF had a particular interest in cooperating. Boheman said that much study was being given to subject but said that we should realize that it is impossible for SKF to stop entirely all of its exports under existing contracts with Germany. He seemed reluctant to make any concrete suggestions but said that he realized importance we attach to immediate cessation of these exports. In this connection I failed to report in my 1418, April 22, 10 p. m. that Mr. Boheman had stated in commenting on suggestions made by both Mallet and me that SKF had a very vital material interest in meeting our wishes, that we were wrong to place blame on company for its actions as Swedish

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<sup>34</sup> Same as telegram 3104, April 18, midnight. to London, p. 510.

Government was really the responsible agent. I think it would be unwise for us to place too great reliance on direct negotiations with SKF as a certain way of attaining our aims. It is evident that Government is closely examining every alternative action which might be taken and that they realize they will not be able to evade responsibility by passing it on to SKF. Boheman made no reference to possibility suggested by Waring of an embargo to all belligerents (my 1453, April 25, 9 p. m.<sup>35</sup>) but it might be that they would consider that measure less objectionable than an action directed against Germany alone which would break their agreement with Germany and would obviously be result of extreme Allied pressure. I did not attempt to discuss Wallenberg's efforts with Boheman as I have no knowledge that they have received any Government sanction.

It may be that we could interest the Swedish Government in an embargo on ball-bearing exports to all belligerents if we should be able to keep the SKF plant operating at its present rate of output by paying for the production and storing the ball bearings, etc, in Sweden, provided that we, in line with the Department's telegram No. 576, April 3 midnight<sup>36</sup> should make it clear to the Swedish Government that if an embargo on ball-bearing exports should be followed by German retaliation in the form of economic sanctions such as stoppage of German buna exports to Sweden we would be prepared to supply appropriate quantities of rubber and other vitally needed materials formerly obtained from Germany.

My 33 of April 25, 9 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10621: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1944—7 p. m.

776. 1. The fact that, according to Wallenberg and Ståhle,<sup>37</sup> Swedes are considering solution to bearings problem along the lines of embargo on exports to all belligerents, is of greatest interest to Department. Please report immediately anything further along these lines.

2. Your 1419, April 23rd, 5 p. m. stated "Swedish *Aide-Mémoire* says United States Government is aware that request for compliance with demand implies that Swedish Government should refuse to fulfill engagements entered into". Department's 2764, April 8th, 4 p. m. stated "We agree to the British proposal for a demand for an embargo for a definite period of 3 months during which negotiations could

<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

<sup>36</sup> Same as telegram 2604 to London, p. 485.

<sup>37</sup> Nils Ståhle, of the Commercial Division of the Swedish Foreign Office.



take place, and sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of Department's 2604 to London <sup>38</sup> (576 to Stockholm) is modified accordingly". (Obviously, however, our ultimate objective in such negotiations will be the permanent cessation of exports of bearings, etc. to Germany.) Your 1317, April 17th,<sup>39</sup> quoted *Dagens* of the 16th "Irregularity often caused by Germans offers precedent should Sweden desire without breaching treaty to curtail ball-bearing exports indefinitely while investigating whether negotiations with both sides might reconcile conflicting trade demands".

You will recall that Hägglöf said in his letter of March 3rd to Foot that he agreed that only about one-twelfth of the ball bearings provided for in the Swedish-German agreement would be exported to Germany each month. Moreover, your 1273, April 14th, 2 p. m.<sup>39</sup> stated that statistics for January showed exports of machine tools in the 10-20 ton range were 352,115 crowns compared with the ceiling of 273,000 crowns established for the whole year 1944. It would seem then that there is no obligation on the Swedes to ship commodities under the Swedish-German agreement at a particular time, and that in some cases the Swedes have exported the entire amount of commodities under the ceiling in the first month of 1944.

In view of these facts, a request for a 3 months' cessation of the export of bearings to Germany would not appear to be a violation of the Swedish-German agreement and since the Swedes have exported in January full amount under one ceiling, they might well postpone the export of other commodities until the last of the year.

It may prove that SKF has promised specific delivery dates to the Germans, but such promises cannot be regarded as Swedish Government obligation and thus failure to meet such schedules cannot be regarded as a violation of the Swedish-German agreement.

If you have not already done so it is suggested that you might take an early opportunity to point out to the Swedes that a 3-months' cessation would not violate the Swedish-German agreement. (Your 1328 April 17.<sup>39</sup>) We consider this an important point since the assumption that we are requesting action that constitutes a violation seems to be the basis of a negative reply made by the Swedes to our *démarche*.

3. Such a discussion is left to your discretion, however, in view of developments referred to in paragraph 1 of this telegram. It is noted in this connection, however, that Boheman in his conversation with you on April 25th made no reference to possibility of an embargo. Your 1454, April 25th, 9 p. m.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London.

HULL

<sup>38</sup> Dated April 3, p. 485.

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/10674: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, April 28, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

1506. I saw Boheman this morning at my request before having received Department's 776, April 27, 7 p. m. which was being decoded. I told him that if he agreed I would like to have a frank off-the-record talk with him and to ask some specific questions to which I hoped he might feel able to give me frank off-the-record answers. I reminded him of fact that he had previously given me the impression that although his Government's reply to our ball-bearing communication was a flat negative, Swedes were exploring ways and means in which Allied aims could be met within framework of existing agreements. I also emphasized that what we want is immediate restriction on Swedish exports of ball bearings to Germany and that in our *aide-mémoire* of April 13 we had specifically mentioned an embargo for 3 months. I told him that with these factors in mind my Government had authorized me to negotiate either directly with Swedish Government or with SKF. Then I asked which procedure would suit Swedish Government—negotiations directly with Government or with SKF. Mr. Boheman said that probably SKF would be preferable. I then asked him if we negotiated with SKF and were able to reach an agreement would the Government intervene to prevent implementation of such an agreement. Boheman replied that it would be impossible for him to give such an assurance. I then asked him, having in mind previous statement that he had made to Mallet and me, reported in my 1454, April 25, 9 p. m., if Government policy and decision were not really determining factor in this situation. He reluctantly admitted that they were. He said that Government could not force SKF to production but that Government policy with respect to Sweden's international obligations was the really dynamic factor.

Boheman then launched into a somewhat lengthy dissertation on iniquity of our pressure in this matter. He said he did not see how United States of all countries, in light of high moral standard it had always taken in international relations, could press a small neutral country in such a perilous position as Sweden to compliance with demands which if granted would put Sweden on brink of ruin and in a position where United States would not be able to give any assistance military, political or economic. He said that our offers of commodity concessions were of no practical value as if our demands were granted Germans would immediately close Gothenburg traffic; that furthermore if great Allied offensive should be stalled Sweden would be at mercy of Germany and would be ruined. He rejected entirely Allied

thesis that Sweden is no longer in any danger of attack from Germany and said that he could give a score of detailed instances during course of present war in which if Sweden had followed Allied advice she would no longer exist.

He said further that spotlight of publicity which had centered on Sweden in this case together with nature and manner of Allied demands made the matter for Sweden a major political issue. At this point I suggested that a drastic diminution of deliveries to Germany by the company in immediate future could be arranged on business and operational grounds and would not be in reach of German agreements; that deliveries might be slowed down or even be eliminated by various methods. I suggested that personnel of SKF factory was very pro-Ally, and that effective strikes might be organized, that factory might even be sabotaged. Boheman replied that all of these measures had been thought of by the Swedes but he said that such procedure in Sweden was politically impossible; that furthermore because of spotlighting of this case any action of such a nature would become known to Germans together with real reasons; that it would be impossible to keep them secret; that we ourselves had raised insuperable difficulties to informal solution. Boheman having referred so often to "insuperable difficulties" of meeting our demands, I asked him if he would not consider the situation without reference to "difficulties" but with reference to "realistic possibilities" that a difficult matter was not necessarily an impossible one. He then spoke rather strongly about what he believed is our mistaken attitude as to intrinsic importance of Swedish ball-bearing exports to Germany, and said that as we attach such inordinate importance to it he felt that it had almost a sinister significance. I told him that I thought he was overstating the case and that if our responsible military authorities felt that a 7 to 12% increase in German ball-bearing supply was of vital importance then it must in fact be of vital importance. I reiterated terms of original *démarche* to effect that we were not claiming that Sweden had violated any of her engagements or that we had any right to make demand derived from our war trade agreement; that what we were asking was an entirely new thing and that we did not believe its accomplishment impossible.

Boheman persistently declined to give any assurance that we would be able to accomplish more than a partial result and said several times that it was impossible for Sweden to stop ball-bearing exports entirely during lifetime of present agreement with Germany. I then mentioned to him statement reported to have been made by Ståhle to Waring that Swedes were considering a solution of ball-bearing problem along lines of an embargo of exports to all belligerents. Boheman with apparently complete sincerity said that that was not true; that Government was not considering any such possibility. I

can only infer from this that such a possibility has been considered merely by Stähle personally and certain other lower ranking officials along the line. I do not yet rule it out as a possibility.

In view of Boheman's previous statements that ways were being explored to meet our wishes within framework of agreements, and his apparent reluctance during this conversation to hold out any promise of substantial accomplishments, I asked him if matter was out of hands of Foreign Office and was being decided at highest level of policy. He hesitated a moment and said it was true. It must therefore be in hands of Prime Minister and his principal advisers. I asked Boheman if Foreign Office views would necessarily prevail and he replied very seriously "most certainly not". I mentioned forthcoming visit of Mr. Stanton Griffis and told him that Mr. Griffis was coming here to assist me in this matter and that he was fully competent to handle business aspects of any arrangements.

Mr. Boheman was most courteous throughout our interview but very serious and genuinely depressed. He said that he would give very careful thought to what I had said. He telephoned me later this afternoon to say that it was agreeable to Government for us to go ahead in our talks with SKF with Government approval. I asked him how far we could rely on the Government to endorse and implement any agreement we might be able to reach with SKF. Mr. Boheman replied that it was impossible for him to give a commitment on this point until he knew what terms of agreement would be. I told him that I would make no personal move to contact SKF until after arrival of Mr. Griffis which I hoped would be in a day or two. Mr. Boheman who is leaving Stockholm this afternoon for a week informed me that if necessary in the interval he would return at once. During this talk with Mr. Boheman I made no reference whatever to Wallenberg's conversations with Mallet nor to Wallenberg's and Waring's conversations with SKF officials. I told him that my approach this morning had been entirely a personal one for off-the-record purposes and that I had not consulted with Mallet. He understands of course that I am reporting my conversation.

My 344, April 28 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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103.9169/3430a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 2, 1944—8 p. m.

808. From Department and FEA. Reference your 1525, April 29.<sup>41</sup> We do not feel that presentation at this time of your proposed note

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<sup>41</sup> Not printed.

on Bothnian traffic<sup>42</sup> would jeopardize the attainment of our other objectives. It might, in fact, strengthen our position by further indicating to Swedes our doubts as to the advantages of the War Trade Agreement in view of their performance under it. You are therefore requested to present the proposed note with British concurrence. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10716: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 5, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:11 p. m.]

1591. Department's 808, May 2, 8 p. m. and previous pertinent correspondence. British Minister and I handed to Mr. Söderblom, Acting Secretary General of Foreign Office, this afternoon separate *aide-mémoires* which were substantially identical on subject of Bothnian port traffic. Mr. Söderblom, after reading *aide-mémoire*, said that he could not make any definite commitment but that he could assure us that most earnest and serious efforts would be made to meet our wishes and that our communications would have careful and detailed attention of the Government.

He indicated that a reply would be given as soon as possible.

My 370, May 5, 5 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10721: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 5, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received May 5—5:25 p. m.]

3702. From Riefler. Stanton Griffis arrived evening of May 4, and will leave London en route to Stockholm evening May 6 accompanied by Poteat.<sup>43</sup> At conference at MEW today Griffis outlined plan he proposed to pursue, namely, to seek contract with SKF terminating definitely and completely all further deliveries of bearing machinery to enemy Europe. If this proved impossible, but partial suspension could be secured, he stated he must refer such moves for approval to Washington and London. Griffis stated that he was prepared to pay any reasonable amount to secure this objective but naturally did not

<sup>42</sup> See telegram 1352, April 19, 5 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 510.

<sup>43</sup> J. Douglas Poteat, Chief Administrative Officer, Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in London.

wish to pay more than was necessary. British stated their complete support of the program and agreed to share half of the costs provided that their preemptive purchases (already amounting to about 2 million pounds) were taken into consideration as part of the program.

Waring, who has obtained certain details of German orders with SKF, is in Great Britain and will arrive in London tonight. We plan to work over his material in conjunction with ours before Griffis leaves. Waring will return to Stockholm early next week to help in the negotiations.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Stockholm as 162. [Riefler.]  
WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10737: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 9, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 3:34 p. m.]

1634. For Crowley, Currie,<sup>44</sup> Scheuer<sup>45</sup> and Stone from Griffis. Mr. Douglas Poteat and I called on Mr. Marcus Wallenberg at his apartment yesterday, Monday afternoon, May 8 at 5:30 and after usual amenities immediately started a discussion of question of export of ball bearings and ball-bearing machinery to Germany. Mr. Wallenberg explained at length Swedish position in matter and enlarged upon what he claims to be additional difficulties created through publicity which have developed as result of exchange of *aide-mémoires* between the two Governments and subsequent publicity connected with dispatch to Stockholm of representatives of Foreign Economic Administration. We recalled to him that he himself had urged the usefulness of substantial pressure and publicity from America and referred to fact that this was all water over the dam, that we were here merely as two businessmen attempting to work out a commercial arrangement with businessmen which he represented. I stated that I had been correctly informed both in United States by his old friends and by both our American and British associates in Stockholm that he was entirely friendly and that we could frankly put our case in his hands. Accordingly we stated in words of one syllable that our instructions were definite to attempt to conclude the negotiations during the current week, failing in which we should leave Sweden. We stated that we desired a complete embargo of every type of ball bearing and ball-bearing machinery to be immediately placed in effect and to last for duration of the war. As a *quid pro quo* we were prepared to assume

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<sup>44</sup> Lauchlin Currie, Acting Deputy Foreign Economic Administrator.

<sup>45</sup> Sidney H. Scheuer, Executive Director for Supplies, Bureau of Supplies of the Foreign Economic Administration.

all unfilled German orders taken in accordance with the trade agreement for the year 1944 and, assuming that the arrangements for 1945 would under no conditions have been higher, we were prepared to place orders for 1945 delivery for approximately the 1944 German ceiling, or something under 30 million kronor, making a total flat figure of approximately 50 million kronor. We stated that we were prepared to hold SKF harmless against any suits or actions for damages which might arise as result of any alleged breach of the German contract.

Mr. Wallenberg stated that he feared that this was impossible and that the company would under no circumstances agree but that it was conceivable that some form of compromise might be worked if small shipments of bearings might continue to Germany.

We pointed out that this solved nothing; that any breach of the German contract would involve the enmity of Germany and that the German objections to such a course could be little increased if shipments were discontinued entirely; in other words, that nothing would be gained and the irritation in the United States would remain even as the German enmity continued.

Mr. Wallenberg spoke at great length upon an alleged agreement of the Swedish Government which assured the Government enforcement of the Swedish contract, and stated that as an inherent part of the war trade agreement with Germany, there was a clause which committed the Swedish Government not only to grant export licenses but see to it that the orders were fulfilled. He stated that the commercial negotiations in the matter were inextricable from the relations of the Swedish Government with Germany.

An opening from one of Mr. Wallenberg's remarks made it possible to state that they had no doubt considered an embargo on ball bearings and ball-bearing machinery to all belligerents for the duration of the war under the theory that this industry had become the source of irritation in their relations to all belligerents, Allied and Axis alike, and that it seemed intelligent to develop the theory that the way out on the matter was a complete embargo to all belligerent nations after making a commercial contract which would ensure the continued employment of their men and a stockpiling of Anglo-American purchases here in Sweden for the duration of the war. Despite the fact that Mr. Wallenberg continually came back to the impossibility of a complete embargo against Germany, the discussion was held definitely and to the end to the theory of an embargo against all belligerents, to which the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has, of course, consented. At the very end of the conference Mr. Wallenberg seemed convinced, and so stated, that this method was probably the

way out and gave a definite implication that the Swedes might find other much needed exports for Germany to satisfy it on this point.

Throughout the conference Mr. Wallenberg stated that both he and many members of the Swedish Government were convinced that the ballbearing question had been magnified out of all logical proportions and that they were convinced that the real motive of both the *aide-mémoire* and the present negotiations might be a sinister one with an entirely different basic purpose such as further involving the Swedes in bad relations with Germany or that the United States itself was attempting to create through many self-serving declarations a case against Sweden.

We stated categorically and with deep integrity that this was not the case; that the United States planned nothing in the present negotiations which did not appear on the surface; that the United States was deeply sympathetic with the position in which Sweden found herself, and that we believed that once the question of exports of war materials to Axis nations was settled, it seemed entirely improbable that any other matters would develop to threaten Swedish-American friendship. For tactical reasons we agreed momentarily that the ball-bearing situation had been exaggerated and was becoming a forest fire of public opinion in the United States and Great Britain. Accordingly it was obvious that it could not be of such importance to the Germans that it could not be easily solved.

Mr. Wallenberg himself brought up the question of the veiled threats of blacklisting. We stated that this was exactly what we feared as our only basis for blacklisting was trading with the enemy and as trading with the enemy was practiced by practically every important corporation and individual in Sweden, we felt that a black list having once been established against SKF it could not fail to spread to include substantially all Sweden with unbelievably disastrous consequences to the trade relations of Sweden and the Allies for many years to come. We endeavored to point out that since the matter in their minds was not of supreme importance to Germany, it might be settled by some other form of tribute; a complete embargo would be accepted by the people of the United States and Great Britain as an astounding gesture of good will towards us with immeasurable future advantage to Sweden during the war and post war trade.

Mr. Wallenberg continually referred to the sanctity of contracts and the unwillingness of either the Company or the Swedish Government to be charged with violation of the German contract. We endeavored to point out that far above the morality of contracts was the duty and responsibility of the Company and the Government towards the Swedish nation and that any move which was a defined advance



towards the safety and integrity of Sweden was in a category higher than the sanctity of a commercial contract.

Mr. Wallenberg, after a conference with Mr. Hamberg on the telephone, stated that it was impossible for Mr. Hamberg to come to Stockholm until Wednesday <sup>46</sup> due to the fact that he was preparing his annual report to stockholders. We emphasized the fact that our stay was short and that time was of the essence. Mr. Wallenberg agreed to attempt to persuade Mr. Hamberg to come and we have just received word that Mr. Hamberg is now in Stockholm and we shall see him this afternoon. [Griffis.]

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10751 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 9, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

3771. For Department and Stone, FEA. Reference Department's 3104, April 18. Memorandum set out below in paraphrase was taken to Stockholm by Griffis and Poteat as guide in their negotiations with Swedes.

1. Initial request at commencement of negotiations will be for immediate cessation of all deliveries of ball bearings, roller bearings, balls and rollers and ball-bearing machinery from SKF to any purchaser in enemy Europe. This embargo should be for negotiations for duration [*for duration of negotiations*] and without prejudice to final result. Negotiators should be informed that it is our pressing desire to see that negotiations are concluded within a week.

2. Aim of negotiations arrangement with SKF for complete cessation until end of hostilities of all shipments of ball bearings etc. and ball-bearing machinery to enemy Europe. Any contract or undertaking should be avoided by negotiators if provision regarding cessation of shipments should be definitely subject to Swedish Government's acquiescence. It is also of importance to continue employment in Sweden of highly skilled labor in ball-bearing industry so that it not attracted to employment in enemy Europe. In order to attain both these ends we are willing to place orders and to offer other concessions which are subject to negotiation.

[3.] If SKF refuses complete cessation of deliveries to enemy Europe negotiators may explore less advantageous concessions by SKF. Such concessions must be referred before acceptance to Wash-

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<sup>46</sup> May 10.

ington or London. They may be either offers to go a considerable way to meet our wishes "within the framework of existing Swedish obligations" or wishes through abrogation of existing obligation of company though less drastic than cessation of all deliveries to enemy Europe.

4. (a) Advantage of most importance which could be gained within existing agreements framework would be prolongation of temporary embargo on shipments of ball bearings, etc., and ball-bearing machinery to enemy to latest possible date in 1944. An embargo for 1 month would have relatively little significance; an embargo up until December would go a long way toward meeting our needs.

(b) Orders for ball bearings, etc., have been accepted by Swedes up to ceilings for this year. Machinery orders have not yet been placed to limits of this year's ceiling. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that an undertaking be secured from SKF as soon as possible that it will not accept additional orders for deliveries of machinery to enemy Europe during 1944 or for deliveries of bearings, etc., and machinery thereafter until end of war.

(c) An undertaking has already been given by SKF that no changes in orders already placed will be permitted. A renewal of this pledge is important as is the tying of it to undertaking mentioned in (b) above. This is important in order to prevent placing of additional orders for ball-bearing machinery or for particular bearing sets, such as those necessary to maintain German productive equipment or to rebuild plants which have been bombed out.

5. (a) Should SKF refuse to cancel in whole its outstanding German contracts for bearings, because of publicity directed against that contract, company may be willing to completely cancel existing contract for bearing machinery, as most machinery ordered for 1944 has not yet been delivered. Cancellation of these orders is extremely important in negotiations' early stages.

(b) Should SKF insist on token deliveries to enemy Europe, every attempt should be made to secure German contracts' complete cancellation, although fulfillment of contracts to supply Finland, Norway, France, Belgium, Holland, et cetera may be allowed.

(c) If SKF is willing to eliminate deliveries of certain bearings to Germany, but not cease exports wholly, the first attempt should be to eliminate all deliveries of military types (in this case non-military types are to be defined as bearings of large sizes with intention that only those sizes which are large as not to be useful in equipment which is mobile will be exported). Should this attempt fail a second approach should be made which will allow exports of very small bearings. We would allow in first instance exports of British group I A (those

bearings having up to 35 mm outer diameter). Then the next concession would be ball bearings in size group I B (bearings between 35 mm and 57 mm outer diameter). Next concession could be group I in all bearings (outer diameter 58 mm to 100 mm) excepting SKF numbers 6206 to 6211 and 6306 to 6308. (Assumption of this second line of approach is that because of widespread destruction to German aircraft industry fuselage bearings have become redundant.) Thrust bearings of any size might also be conceded.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10752: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 10, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 4:13 p. m.]

1645. For Crowley, Currie, Sheuer and Stone from Griffis. Mr. Douglas Poteat, Mr. Waring (who has been given powers of negotiation by Ministry of Economic Warfare) and I called on Mr. Hamberg, President of SKF, at the Enskilda Banken<sup>47</sup> yesterday afternoon at 3 p. m., and were joined shortly by Mr. Marcus Wallenberg. At the outset Waring stated his position to the effect that despite any suggestions looking to a compromise which might have been made in previous talks with Hamberg, his instructions from his Government now were to associate itself completely with United States in the present negotiations and his Government was equally insistent with the United States that a complete stoppage of ball-bearing exports to belligerents must now be sought. The discussion developed substantially into a reiteration of discussion with Wallenberg the previous day (see Legation's 1634, May 9, 1 p. m.; 387, May 10, noon to London), Mr. Hamberg urging a compromise position and we restating our position. However almost immediately both Hamberg and Wallenberg made the flat statement that whatever was done was now a matter for the Government; that the company could and would do only what was fully approved by the Government. Both men were familiar with fact that the Minister had already arranged for us to meet Boheman and were insistent that company could take no steps without full Government sanction. Wallenberg, however, seemed reluctant to end the meeting and asked what next step was in case negotiations failed. We stated that we were not here with threats but he was probably completely aware from his own associates in United States what next move would be. He indicated that he was thoroughly aware thereof. It was stated that we might say to the Government that we were convinced that a satisfactory

<sup>47</sup> Stockholms Enskilda Bank.

deal could be made with the company if Government concurred. Hamberg stated, of course, that any negotiations would be subject to the company's board which he would be willing to immediately call into conference. Upon his statement that our consideration of the value of their trade with belligerents must take into consideration their trade with neutrals such as Switzerland, Spain and Portugal where shipments might be stopped by the Germans, we restated our proposition that upon a theoretical calculation of their possible trade for the balance of 1944 and 1945, we would hold them harmless against losses of orders including such neutrals.

See my immediately following telegram 1646, May 10, 5 p. m.,<sup>48</sup> repeated as my 390, May 10, 5 p. m. to London.

Legation's 389, May 10, 4 p. m. repeats this to London. [Griffis.]  
JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10741 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 10, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

1651. My 1506 April 28, 8 p. m., 344 to London, and 1507 April 28, 9 p. m., 345 to London.<sup>49</sup> This morning, at Mr. Boheman's request, Mr. Griffis and I had an informal conference with him. Mr. Boheman said he wished to meet with us for a frank off-the-record talk before making his report to the Government. He desired particularly to assure himself that we had a full and complete understanding of the Swedish point of view. He reiterated his belief, which he stated was held in high and low circles in Sweden, that the ball-bearing demands were designed to cover undisclosed sinister purposes, intimating that if they were as important as we represented, the bombing campaign had proved a failure and the war would be indefinitely prolonged. He said that the Swedish Government simply did not believe the statements of the American and British Governments and that our demands and methods of presenting them were brutal and unjustified. He asked if Sweden could have the slightest assurance in case these demands were met, that with a further change in the military situation we would not return and make similar demands regarding iron ore exports, thus recreating the present dangerous situation for Sweden. Our refusal to accept anything but complete cessation of shipments to all belligerents, he said, had put the decision squarely before the Swedish Government as to whether they should accept the consequences of our displeasure or risk more than a 50% chance of being

<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> Latter not printed.

involved in the war. He admitted that Germany derived certain advantages from Sweden's neutral position but said that the moment Germany should believe that Sweden was deviating from the neutral line and passing into the other camp, the German attitude would be bound to change. It would not be a question for the Germans of how costly or even how foolish an undertaking to invade Sweden would be, but whether in the light of German defense of her northern frontier it was necessary. This defense, Boheman is convinced, would be carried out by Germany on the same general lines as govern the fortifications of her other frontiers and Sweden could not fail to be involved. He said the Swedish Government was determined to take no action which would invite an attack on Sweden; that Swedish neutrality would not be abandoned under any conditions unless Sweden were herself attacked. He emphasized the grave responsibility on the part of the Government for the protection of the independence of the country and the lives of the Swedish people; that Sweden had no intention or desire to undergo the unnameable horrors of a German occupation. It was quite apparent from Mr. Boheman's remarks that the question of the fundamental security of Sweden is the crucial issue in this situation as far as Swedish Government is concerned.

Both Mr. Griffis and I emphasized strongly to Mr. Boheman that he was mistaken in attributing either a sinister motive to these demands or that they cloaked any other intention than the plain one of stopping ball-bearing exports to Germany. Our Government, we said, wishes to reach a satisfactory solution of this ball-bearing problem with a complete lack of any intent to involve Sweden in the war. Since SKF had categorically stated that their action would depend solely on the will of the Government, any suggestion of compromise less than complete embargo must come from the Government. We reiterated our judgment that a compromise would be a grave mistake from Swedish point of view and that greatly more satisfactory results would flow from an embargo of ball-bearing exports to all belligerents; that such a measure properly framed could be completely within the boundaries of Swedish neutrality and could even enhance the neutral position of Sweden. We expressed our willingness, should the Swedish Government desire and if our Governments approve, to recommend delivery of formal protests to Sweden from the American, British and Russian Governments, these protests being designed to show that the Swedish embargo materially injured our war position regardless of the results for Germany. We had the impression that Boheman felt this suggestion merited attention and study. He did not attack it and said that he would report fully all of the comments and suggestions we

had made to his Government. (See my 1646, May 10, 5 p. m.<sup>50</sup> repeated as 390 May 10, 5 p. m. to London.)

Please inform FEA.

My 391, May 10, 6 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10758 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 11, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:50 p. m.]

1668. See my 1651, May 10, 6 p. m. (391 to London). Mr. Boheman asked me to see him this afternoon to inform me of the following:

His conversations with Mr. Griffis and me have been fully reported in detail to the Cabinet at a special meeting early this afternoon. The Government's decision is that our suggestion for a complete embargo on all exports of ball bearings from Sweden is impossible for it would involve a breach of Swedish trade agreement with Germany for the current year; no responsible Swedish Government could consider possibility of such action. A total embargo would be regarded by Germany as a deliberate act against Germany. Boheman pointed out that Russia was not receiving any ball bearings as all orders to Russian account are in storage in Sweden pending means for transportation. Much of the British buying is also pre-emptive and quantities which can be got out relatively small. Boheman said Government realizes that we consider Sweden overcautious and more frightened of Germany than present circumstances warrant. Swedish Government he said is unable to share this view. He said that the consequences of our reaction to this decision are fully realized here and were taken fully into account by Government. Those consequences in the Government's view, deplorable as they are for Sweden, are less onerous than the extreme danger from Germany if Sweden meets our views. I told Mr. Boheman that I was confident that in his report to the Government he had faithfully rendered the views which had been expressed to him on behalf of the US Government by myself and informally by Mr. Griffis, but asked him if he felt certain all members of the Government genuinely realized that our demands were presented in all seriousness and that we meant what we said? He replied that he could not, of course, give an assured answer to such a question but that he believed the members of the Government did. He said that Government had given full authori-

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

zation to SKF to explore with Mr. Griffis whatever possibilities may exist for meeting our demands within the letter of the German agreement.

I told him that I had no official instructions from my Government since I had transmitted Swedish reply <sup>51</sup> to our original ball-bearing note, but that from my knowledge of the directives which Mr. Griffis brought with him I was confident that we would not be satisfied with any compromise solution that did not meet substance of our demands almost in entirety. He said that in that case he was afraid there was nothing further that could be done. I told him that I would report what he had said to the Department and that I would consult with Mr. Griffis regarding a further talk with Mr. Hamberg. I also said that next move was entirely up to Mr. Hamberg and that he should come with definite proposals and not with the suggestion that he and Mr. Griffis sit down to "explore" possibilities. I then asked him if there would be any objection on the part of Mr. Günther or himself to my seeing the Prime Minister and taking Mr. Griffis along with me. Mr. Boheman said that there would be no objection on the part of the Foreign Office and expressed the hope that I would do so. He remarked, however, that there was not the slightest possibility of my persuading the Prime Minister to take a different view. Mr. Boheman gave the impression that the Prime Minister is already mentally prepared for the consequences resulting from our side of the Government's present decision.

In discussing the possible German reactions to an affirmative Swedish answer to our demands, Boheman made it sufficiently clear that whatever action might be taken by Germany against Sweden would not be because of the loss of a given amount of ball bearings but because such a decision by the Swedes would be regarded by the Germans as a definite pro-Allied move and the beginning of a breach of their northern counter-invasion defenses. Boheman has so emphasized this point in several meetings that it is difficult for me to avoid the suspicion that Swedes have been directly threatened by Germans against any further yielding to Allied pressure. Boheman said that his Government's judgment of this situation vis-à-vis Germany is naturally its own estimate of the situation based on a very considerable amount of information, and he again reiterated that however insane a German attack on Sweden might appear in the Allied judgment, and however insane it might be in fact, that would be no deterrent to Germany making the attack as a strategic move in total defense.

This, he said, is the considered opinion of Swedish Government Military Command and General Staff. At the end of the discussion on this point he remarked that there is absolutely no material assistance

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<sup>51</sup> Dated April 22; see telegram 1419, April 23, 5 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 522.

which the Allies can bring to Sweden in such a situation that would be of any immediate effect; that Spain, Turkey and Portugal could receive assistance from US but that Sweden would depend only on her own resources.

After discussing my talk with Mr. Boheman with Mr. Griffis, we both agreed that he should under no circumstances make any further overtures to Hamberg. I then telephoned Mr. Boheman and suggested that the next move was up to Mr. Hamberg and that I thought he ought to make it immediately and come with concrete proposals. Mr. Boheman promised to get in touch with Mr. Hamberg at once.

While I do not doubt that Swedish Government has made this decision after the most serious consideration and weighing of all the consequences, I feel certain that it was made with an eye to the present military situation and with a desire to gain time until invasion is under way. The military situation in the West as it actually stands is, in my opinion, a major factor in this decision.

It is not my intention to seek an appointment with the Prime Minister until after Mr. Griffis and Mr. Waring of the British Legation have again talked with the head of SKF.

My 398, May 11, 7 p. m. repeats this message to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/5-1244: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 12, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 12—3:37 p. m.]

1683. Following from Griffis. Waring, Poteat and I this morning in response to Boheman's request entered into negotiations with Hamberg and other officials of SKF looking towards a compromise solution of the ball bearing problem. We have made slight progress but did get an agreement from SKF that during period of these negotiations no exports of ball bearings, roller bearings, or ball-bearing machinery will be made to any belligerent country, effective at once. Cannot emphasize too strongly the absolute necessity of keeping the existence of this agreement completely secret. It should have most guarded circulation. Should this reach press it would be altogether disastrous to negotiations. The basis of our discussions of it has been a disavowal of substantial orders under Swedish law of 1937 relating to export of war materials (exact citation will follow in another telegram) but with SKF power of substitution of types, shipment of such substituted bearings not to be made until last months of year.

Please inform FEA.

My 404, May 12, 3 p. m., repeats this message to London. [Griffis.]

JOHNSON



108.9169 Stockholm : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 13, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received May 13—6:51 p. m.]

1708. From Griffis for Crowley, Currie, Scheuer and Stone. Please instruct me on following points:

1. If compromise made satisfactory to you involving postponement substantial shipments until latter months of year and company suggests possible insolvency of Germany at that time, may I be authorized guarantee payment contract against delivery goods to Allies?

2. If arrangements made along above lines, do you desire now enter any trade negotiations or complete pre-emptive purchases for 1945?

3. Swedish Government hiding behind three main points alleged opinion: first, sanctity of contracts; second, fear of German attack; third, inability Allies to aid Sweden in case of attack. Government strongly influenced by press and public opinion. Recommend nationwide publicity campaign here to educate public opinion against these contentions, handled by best Swedish publicity journalist. Could an appropriation be made for this effort? [Griffis.]

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10539 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1944—1 p. m.

915. From Department and FEA. Your 1273 of April 14,<sup>52</sup> 1178 of April 6 and Dept's 674 of April [15] repeated to London as your 278, 257 and Dept's 3016 respectively.

Section 1. Department and FEA desire that you prepare a memorandum in response to the Swedish memorandum of April 6 replying to our *aide-mémoire* of March 17. We leave the exact wording to your discretion, but suggest that the content be along the following lines:

"The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. cannot consider the Swedish memorandum of April 6 as an acceptable reply to their *aide-mémoire* of March 17 regarding the operations of the Anglo-American-Swedish Agreement of 1943. This is particularly the case in view of the fact that developments subsequent to March 17 have revealed other important additions to the grievances mentioned in the *aide-mémoire* of March 17.

The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. have made every effort to fulfill both in letter and in spirit their obligations to Sweden with re-

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<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

spect to basic rations, and have considered sympathetically Swedish requests for additional supplies outside the basic rations. The Royal Swedish Government, on the other hand, has failed in important respects to fulfill its clear obligations and has generally shown a non-cooperative spirit with respect to matters outside the strict letter of the Agreement. Its replies to our previous statements of our grievances have been extremely legalistic. The two Governments believe, therefore, that the advantages secured by them as a result of the operation of the Agreement have fallen short both of their expectation and of their supply sacrifices in making basic rations available. The Governments of the U.S. and U.K. are, therefore, suspending the basic rations for Sweden as of the date of this memorandum and until the two Governments are satisfied that Sweden will carry out the terms of the Agreement in a cooperative spirit."

Section 2. We do not wish any action apart from drafting to be taken by you with respect to the above memorandum pending the results of Griffis' negotiations. If he reaches a stalemate, however, we wish to have the text of a memorandum along the above lines agreed to in advance in London, Stockholm, and Washington so that you will be in a position to present it immediately when you receive specific instructions to do so. It would not be presented if bearing discussions result satisfactorily. MEW is being requested to instruct Mallet to collaborate with you in the actions outlined under 1 and 2 above.

The vigor of the Swedish reaction to suspension of basic rations would probably depend largely on the size of existing reserve stocks in Sweden of essential imports through the blockade which cannot be replaced from areas under enemy control. Although the post-armistice position of Sweden would also be an important consideration, it is believed that so far as the Swedes are concerned, this would be secondary to maintenance of their neutrality and to their current supply position.

Although cancellation of the War Trade Agreements by the Swedes as a retaliatory measure would in theory at least leave the way open for complete integration of Swedish industry with the German war economy, it is certain that the Swedes would oppose German domination at least as effectively as they did in 1940 and 1941 so as to maintain their technical neutrality.

The sanctions at the disposal of the U.S. and the U.K. even without the War Trade Agreements are very substantial, and the absence of a War Trade Agreement might even increase our freedom of action in using such sanctions.

Section 3. Department and FEA desire that you arrange for the U.S. representatives to take up the following grievances regarding operation of War Trade Agreement at the next JSC meeting together with any additional grievances known to you which you consider merit inclusion:

[Here follows a list of the more important Swedish commercial transactions with Germany and German-occupied Europe during the last 10 months in apparent violation of existing arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom.]

The vigor with which we would press for reparation for these violations would of course depend in very large part upon the outcome of the current bearing negotiations; if it is satisfactory we would anticipate little difficulty in reaching a mutually agreeable compromise on other relatively less important matters. We would welcome a return to mutually cooperative spirit envisaged after last summer's agreement, and would expect that to result from a satisfactory solution to bearings problem. If Swedes question our raising these additional issues during bearing negotiations they may be answered along above lines. However, we would of course want to reach an agreement as favorable to us as possible on these matters, and do not wish to give any impression that we regard the provisions of the War Trade Agreement, and Swedish violations of them, as unimportant.

Sent to Stockholm repeated to London. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10799a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden. (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1944—8 p. m.

919. From Stone for Griffis. Your 1683, May 12. Department and FEA are gratified that you have succeeded in getting an agreement from SKF that during period of these negotiations no exports of ball bearings, roller bearings, or ball-bearing machinery will be made to any belligerent country, effective at once.

FEA authorizes you to guarantee payment contract against delivery goods to Allies. Numbered paragraph 1, your 1708, May 13th, 9 p. m.

If negotiations result in acceptable compromise, we would be willing to undertake pre-emptive purchases which would replace German orders until the end of the European war. We would not favor committing ourselves beyond that time and feel that it should not be necessary since the German orders would then become inoperative in any event.

Your reference in numbered paragraph 3 to sanctity of contracts is unclear. Does this refer to SKF contracts with Germans or to alleged obligation of Swedish Government to see that these contracts are fulfilled?

We are not inclined to favor the employment of a Swedish publicity journalist but will discuss at once with OWI<sup>53</sup> what can be done along

<sup>53</sup> Office of War Information.

the lines suggested by you. In the meantime we suggest that you discuss with Minister Johnson the possibility and advisability of some action by the OWI outpost in Stockholm.

We will be inclined to defer to Griffis' and Minister's judgment as to when he should leave Sweden but wish him to telegraph us best offer made by Swedes, his proposed date of departure, and do not wish him to leave Sweden until we have approved his departure. In any case it would seem to us that if he has obtained an agreement from SKF to embargo shipment of bearings etc. to all belligerents during the period of negotiations it would be to our advantage for Griffis to remain until all chances of obtaining our full demands have disappeared.

With further reference to numbered paragraph 1 of your 1708, we believe that if compromise is necessary, it should include not only postponement of substantial shipments but the elimination of all deliveries of military types. Paragraph *c* under Section 5 of London's 3771, May 9, 8 p. m., which contained memo taken to Stockholm by Griffis and Poteat as guide in their negotiations. Please refer also to London's 3805, May 10, 8 p. m.,<sup>54</sup> repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 170, May 10, 8 p. m.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's no. 3877. [Stone.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10798b: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1944—9 p. m.

920. We suggest that you consult with Mallet with a view to calling on your Soviet colleague,<sup>55</sup> if you have not already done so, to inform her of the results of our negotiations to date with respect to ball-bearing exports to the enemy in view of her Government's support of our *démarche* to the Swedes in that connection.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to Moscow for information.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10818: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 19, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 19—4:40 p. m.]

1778. Situation increasingly tense as company worried about continuance secret embargo agreement now entering second week. Just

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

<sup>55</sup> Mme. Alexandra Kollontay, Soviet Minister in Sweden.

returned from 2 days' negotiations in country and have not receded whatever from our positions as all ball and roller bearings are war materials within the wording and meaning of Decree No. 65 of 1937 and export licenses should be denied. Have now proposed that company urge Government to shortly announce enforcement of this law and in due course appoint a commission of independent Swedish citizens to determine what bearings are war materials, the commission to take evidence for 2 months during which time all export licenses denied to any belligerent, and at end of period all bearings determined as war material to be embargoed for balance of war. We believe this will create important delay and we have insisted that if this action is taken we retain any right of action thereafter. Hamberg, President SKF, planning to put this proposition before Boheman tomorrow. We are not sanguine of success but hopeful.

Above message for FEA from Griffis and Poteat.

Repeated to London as my 436, May 19, 5 p. m.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10937b: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944—4 p. m.

1250. We have been informed by the British that a complication has arisen in our ball-bearing negotiations with Sweden in that the Russians have informed the British that they did not wish to run any risk of losing the supplies which are being manufactured for them by SKF Sweden.

Please ask the British Embassy in Moscow to give you full details on this matter. We have been fully informed through the British Embassy in Washington.

After consultation with the British Embassy we believe that it would be helpful if you would call on the appropriate Soviet official and express your Government's appreciation for the very helpful support given by the Soviet Legation in Stockholm to our *démarche* to the Swedish Government looking to the elimination of Swedish exports of ball bearings to the enemy. We assume that the Soviet Government has been kept informed by the Soviet Legation in Stockholm of the negotiations which have since developed, as we have instructed our Minister in Stockholm to keep his Soviet colleague fully informed.

The Soviet Government is of course aware of the great importance which this Government attaches to the elimination or at least greatest possible limitation on Swedish ball-bearing exports to the enemy because of their essentiality to the strength of German military and

air forces operating against Soviet as well as British and American troops. It now seems possible that the solution to this problem may be found in a Swedish embargo on ball-bearing exports, particularly bearings of military importance, to all belligerents, Axis as well as United Nations. Such embargo would place certain strain on British as well as American production facilities to the extent that British needs in particular have been met by imports from Sweden. It is our understanding that the Soviet Government has placed orders in Sweden but that deliveries under these orders have been effected only to the limited extent that shipments could be made by air from Sweden to the United Kingdom and thence to the Soviet Union; that accordingly by far the greater part of supplies manufactured in Sweden to Russian order remain in Sweden and cannot be shipped until the military situation permits. The immediate effect upon the Russian supply situation of a total embargo on Swedish bearings exports would appear therefore to be very small. For this reason and for the more important reason, namely, the importance of depriving the enemy to the greatest extent possible of this assistance derived from Sweden we hope very much that the Soviet Government will not interpose any objection to the imposition of a Swedish embargo and will forego in the same manner as the United States and the United Kingdom its supply of bearings from Sweden if necessary to keep bearings from the enemy. The American Government in conjunction with the British Government will make every effort to safeguard Russian essential supplies from our own resources (we understand that a similar assurance has already been given the Soviet Government by the British Ambassador in Moscow).

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London as Department's no. 4013 and to Stockholm as Department's no. 961 referring to London's 3998, May 17.<sup>56</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10830 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 20, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 20—2: 15 p. m.]

1797, Reference Department's 948, May 19, 5 p. m.<sup>56</sup> Shortly after arrival of Griffis and Poteat, they demanded of SKF precise information regarding the alleged obligation in Swedish-German trade agreement that Swedish Government guarantee deliveries up to the quota limit. They were later given by Marcus Wallenberg the German text

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<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

of a clause said to have been taken from the Swedish-German trade agreement and to be the stipulation on which Swedish Government claims it has guaranteed these deliveries. Following is translation from this text:

“From the Swedish side the following deliveries have been specified in connection with the goods set forth below for the year 1944:

(j) Ball and roller bearings and parts therefor.”

This information was given by Wallenberg under pledge of utmost secrecy and our possession of it must not, under any circumstances, be disclosed.

Press comment on this aspect of all ball-bearing situation has been uniformly to effect that Swedish Government is under no obligation to Germans in connection with ball-bearing deliveries except to grant export licenses. We are unable here to see how language of clause above quoted constitutes in any sense a Government guarantee of deliveries.

If Wallenberg's statement is correct that this clause is only stipulation of agreement which bears on this matter, it must be that Swedish Government chooses to or feels that it must interpret this clause as concerning such an obligation. In his talks Boheman has given no citation to back up his statement regarding Government's guarantee.

JOHNSON

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103.9169 Stockholm : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944—5 p. m.

964. Department and FEA think it highly important that Swedes should not be led to believe that we will accept settlement of bearing issue on the basis of their granting some other valuable concession to the enemy, i.e., “some other form of tribute”. (Your 1634, May 9th.)

In discussing possibility of blacklisting SKF under certain circumstances we recommend you emphasize specific accommodation to the enemy, such as having added to their plant with result that British preclusive purchases failed to cut into the amount of bearings scheduled for delivery to Germany, rather than simply their exports to the enemy within limits set by War Trade Agreement. We take this view because if at this stage we blacklist a firm merely for its exports within the ceilings, Swedes may argue that the present War Trade Agreement is of little value to them, and will be less concerned about possibility of its termination.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/10539 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1944—10 p. m.

4066. Department's 915, May 15, 1 p. m., to Stockholm repeated to London as Department's 3860. We desire urgently to be informed whether the British would agree to the withholding of basic rations in the event that the ball-bearing negotiations break down and whether in that event the British would also join us in blacklisting SKF and various other Swedish firms affiliated with SKF.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/10871 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 24, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received May 25—12:15 a. m.]

1854. Mr. Boheman sent for me yesterday afternoon and referred to suggestion which had been made by Mr. Griffis urging through his contacts that Government announce enforcement of decree No. 65 of 1937 and appoint a commission of Swedes to pass on what bearings are war materials. See my 1778, May 19, 5 p. m. (436 to London). He stated that this suggestion had been considered in highest Government quarters and that Government could not agree. I argued with Mr. Boheman along the lines set forth in Department's 969, May 20, midnight<sup>58</sup> and urged on him the vital necessity of Sweden taking some action in ball-bearing matter to meet our requests. I also asked him to explain why Government was unwilling to implement decree No. 65 by effective action. He said that Government could of course amend that decree by issuing a new one adding ball bearings to commodities of which export is prohibited, and that furthermore there was no legal impediment to Government's declaring a complete embargo on ball bearings as we had originally suggested. He said the suggestions had been exhaustively examined and that Government had simply reached the conclusion that it was not action that Sweden could take. I asked him then if the Government's action toward our ball-bearing requests resolved itself entirely to a matter of high policy. He replied that "exactly the case". He endeavored to assure me, however, that they are desperately trying to find some formula within the terms of trade agreement with Germany to meet our views as far as

<sup>58</sup> Not printed; in this telegram the Department approved the action outlined in telegram 1778, May 19, 5 p. m., p. 545.



possible. He mentioned that Mr. Hamberg was to make certain proposals to Mr. Griffis on May 25 and asked us to wait until we had these proposals "before discussing the matter further". He pointed out that there have been no exports of ball bearings to Germany whatever since May 12 which indicates that he is fully informed of undertaking Hamberg has given in this connection (see Legation's telegram 1683, May 12, 3 [5] p. m., from Griffis; 404 to London). I thereupon urged Mr. Boheman that on no account should this *de facto* embargo be lifted and asked him to examine urgently possibility of continuing it in this form at least for some months, suggesting that terms of Swedish agreement with Germany would fully cover such action. He objected that if this complete embargo is carried too long Germans will smell a rat and return with their complaints and threats to Stockholm. We then agreed to postpone any further discussion until after Mr. Griffis has received SKF proposals on May 25.

Griffis informs me that Hamberg held a meeting of directors SKF yesterday which lasted entire day. He is holding a stockholders' meeting today and another board meeting. He returns to Stockholm tomorrow and Griffis and Poteat are expecting to receive definite written proposals from the company which they will endeavor to improve and submit by telegraph. These are undoubtedly the proposals referred to by Boheman yesterday afternoon. Please inform FEA.

My 460, May 24, 10 p. m., repeats this message to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10856: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 24, 1944.

[Received May 24—3:42 p. m.]

4168. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary, Acheson, Crowley and Stone FEA only from Riefler. I received the following letter today:<sup>59</sup>

"On Saturday last you handed me a memorandum of a telegram dated 15th May from the Department of State and FEA regarding economic warfare policy in Sweden.<sup>60</sup>

As I understand it, your Government wish to proceed as follows:

All the breaches, or apparent breaches of the economic agreement of 1943 are to be raised as soon as possible in the Stockholm JSC. If thereafter the present ball-bearing negotiations reach a satisfactory conclusion, we should seek an amicable compromise on these matters.

<sup>59</sup> The Department was informed in telegram 4171, May 24, 5 p. m., from London, that the quoted letter was from the Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Dingle Foot (740.00112 European War 1939/10857).

<sup>60</sup> See telegram 915, May 15, 1 p. m., to Stockholm, p. 542.

If, on the other hand, the ball-bearing negotiations fail, we should deliver a joint note to the Swedish Government, complaining strongly of the uncooperative spirit which they have shown, and announcing that basic rations will be suspended forthwith until such time as the Swedish Government have satisfied us that they will carry out the agreement in a cooperative spirit.

This course would mean a complete change in the policy we have hitherto pursued. It may be convenient therefore if I describe at some length the attitude which MEW have hitherto adopted towards Sweden.

During the negotiations last year we came to the definite conclusion, which I believe you shared, that the Swedes were not making an agreement for the sake of basic rations. No doubt the rations are of some importance, but, broadly speaking, the trickle of supplies through Gothenburg is not essential to Swedish economy, and is certainly not an adequate return for the very substantial reductions which the Swedes undertook to make in their trade with the Axis. The agreement involved a reduction of something like a third in Swedish export trade, and a good deal of dislocation and possible unemployment in almost every Swedish industry. Although we did not get everything that we wanted, the Swedish Government went a very long way to meet us. Both you and we are familiar with the furious opposition that at once arises if any American or British Government propose even a small reduction in an existing tariff, and we know the great pressure which is immediately brought to bear. It is not difficult to imagine what your industrialists or ours would have said if you or we had agreed to sacrifice a third of American or British export trade for a period of some 18 months. There can be no doubt therefore that the Swedes were ready to make a very substantial economic sacrifice, in return for which we could give them no adequate economic recompense. What they were anxious to obtain was Allied good will. They signed the agreement for political far more than for commercial reasons.

It is true that the Swedish declaration has not been implemented in every detail, and that there have been a number of breaches, of varying importance. Some of these have already been discussed at the London JSC, and the most serious, the over-shipment of iron ore in 1943, has been the subject of several communications, culminating in the Allied *aide-mémoire* of March 17. We do not regard these matters lightly, but we cannot agree to the inference which might be drawn from the State Department's telegram that the agreement has been honoured in the breach rather than in the observance. On the contrary, nearly all of its main provisions have been implemented. In other words, we have secured the substance of what we set out to secure in the negotiations last May. This is a point of such supreme importance that it is worth while recapitulating some of the definite advantages which we then obtained and are still obtaining from the agreement:

(a) The total Swedish exports to Axis Europe were reduced by 107,000,000 kronor in 1943, and are to be reduced by 329,000,000 kronor in 1944. The 1943 reduction would have been even greater if the Germans had not unexpectedly managed to increase

their exports to Sweden. The ceilings fixed for the various Axis countries during 1943 have been observed.

(b) The Germans have been compelled in 1944 to repay credits amounting to 55,000,000 kronor, and there are to be no future Swedish credits to Germany. Credits to a further 25,000,000 kronor are in course of repayment.

(c) Iron ore exports to Germany are being reduced by over 3,000,000 tons as compared with last year.

(d) There seems no reason to doubt that after the delegation returned to Stockholm last year SKF were constrained to reduce their deliveries of ball bearings, et cetera, to Germany by 8,000,000 marks during 1943.

(e) The 1944 ceiling for ball bearings represents a reduction of over 50% compared with 1943. Had it not been for the agreement German purchases during 1944 would almost certainly have exceeded last year's figure.

In addition the Swedes have, since the signature of the agreement, given us certain further concessions without asking for any return from us. You will remember that in March, Hägglöf agreed on behalf of his Government that (a) deliveries from SKF to Germany should be spaced equally throughout the 12 months and that deliveries in any 1 month should not be more than about one-twelfth of the whole year's quota; and (b) the Germans should not be allowed to switch their orders from one type of bearings to another.

You will remember that at the end of March MEW were in favour of a secret approach to SKF through Wallenberg, with an offer of large orders in return for a stoppage or a substantial reduction in further ball bearing exports to Germany, especially during the next few months. We still feel that this method would have been more likely to produce results. We deferred, however, to Washington's view that there should be a full dress approach to the Swedish Government, although we were not sanguine about it. Our information from Stockholm shows that the unfortunate publicity given to our joint *démarche* and to the subsequent Griffis mission has greatly prejudiced the chances of a satisfactory settlement; and that the Swedes are extremely suspicious of our motives. They are inclined to think that our present demands, if accepted, will be followed by others, and that our real purpose is to embroil them with the Germans and so bring them into the war. This frame of mind is a fact which we must bear in mind in trying to gauge what Swedish reaction would be to further Allied pressure.

For the above reasons we are disposed to query the assumption in the State Department telegram that Swedish reaction to the suspension of basic rations will depend upon the size of stocks now held in Sweden. If we are right in thinking that the Swedes entered into the agreement for political and not for economic reasons, the prospect of losing the rations will not be the chief consideration which will determine their attitude. They will feel that Allied good will is a will-o'-the-wisp which can be endlessly pursued but never caught; and that although they have gone further to meet us than any other neutral country, still further concessions will not save them from being pilloried in future as in the past just as if they had be-

haved in the same way as Franco's<sup>61</sup> Spain or Salazar's<sup>62</sup> Portugal. In these circumstances I personally feel that it is more than a theoretical possibility that the Swedes might denounce the War Trade Agreement. Alternatively, they may—and this is perhaps more probable—cease to take any effective steps to police it. Their attitude may well be: 'Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive, Officiously to keep alive', and, as you know, we are completely dependent upon Swedish vigilance to enforce their undertakings, especially as regards ball and roller bearings, machinery of all kinds, and goods on List A. We cannot do so ourselves. MEW believe that the loss of the Agreement, either in form or in substance, would be a disaster for us and a triumph for the Germans, who would be able once more to draw freely on Swedish resources. Surely on this point there cannot be two opinions.

The State Department telegram refers to 'sanctions which are very substantial and which we could use even more freely in the absence of a war trade agreement', but it does not specify what these sanctions are. Apart from the suspension of basic rations, the only method of pressure of which we are aware is the Black List. We could, of course, put more Swedish firms on the lists. We feel, however, considerable doubt whether the Swedish Government would yield to this form of pressure. Many Swedish firms would dread the possible loss of facilities after the armistice, but they are not, for the most part, immediately vulnerable. Moreover, the postwar threat would not be fully effective unless the Russian Government were prepared to join in.

We therefore stand to lose a great deal by the course which Washington proposes. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what we can expect to gain. If the ball-bearings negotiations finally break down we are not likely to secure a different decision or to obtain a more advantageous war trade agreement by exerting forms of pressure which cannot be immediately effective. If the war continues into next year it may well happen, moreover, that we shall certainly have other desiderata, political, economic and operational, in Sweden. We can hardly expect to achieve them in the atmosphere that will obtain if the course now proposed be followed.

For all these reasons we do not feel that these tactics will produce any useful economic warfare result and we would deprecate them on wider grounds."

[Riefler]  
BUCKNELL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10867 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 24, 1944—midnight.

[Received May 24—9:08 p. m.]

1856. See my 1591, May 5, 5 p. m. Mr. Boheman has informed me confidentially that he believes he can give British Minister and me

<sup>61</sup> Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Spanish Chief of State.

<sup>62</sup> Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of Portuguese Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

in a few days a communication which will be satisfactory reply to our *aide-mémoire* on subject of Bothnian port traffic. He says Germans have already been informed that the coal shipments to Norway through these ports must cease. He does not know what German reaction will be nor what attitude Swedish Government may take to a violent German reaction but said that as far as he can see now he believes we will have a satisfactory reply.

My 462, May 24, midnight, repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10902: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, May 28, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 9:44 p. m.]

1909. Following from Griffis and Poteat for Department and FEA. After 3 weeks' negotiation here with which you are familiar, we were handed this week letter from SKF in which they purport to describe their position and the position which we have taken. Paraphrase of this letter given in Legation's telegram 1910, May 28, 6 p. m.<sup>63</sup> (482, May 28, 6 p. m. to London).

This letter was accompanied by a proposed contract and a proposition whereby SKF would cease shipments of all so-called aircraft ball bearings to Germany and occupied satellite countries. Note that Waring has cabled description such bearings to London repeating to Washington. Proposition included right of substitution of other bearings to equal kronor value for such aircraft bearings during balance of 1944 trade agreement. We have now retraded [*sic*] this proposition so that following agreement offered by SKF which, though it had not received formal approval by Government of Sweden, we have representation from company that such approval may be considered a certainty if United States and British Governments approve. Please note that no bearings of any kind have been shipped to enemy countries since May 12 and letter contains extension of such agreement to June 5. However, on account rumors in Göteborg where factory is located regarding piling up of stocks with no shipments being made in more than 2 weeks implying some sort of secret embargo, we shall probably have to consent to small shipments next week approved by Waring in order to complete agreement and prevent violent enemy repercussions. Suggested agreement follows:

1. Bearings: The balance of the quota for 1944 as of May 12, 1944, for shipment to Germany 15,685,000 kronor; to other Axis-controlled countries 3,582,000; total 19,267,000 kronor. The deduction of aircraft

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<sup>63</sup> Not printed.

bearings as per SKF catalogue 1940 (for detail see Waring's cable) against outstanding orders as of May 12, 1944, will amount to 5,061,000 kronor to Germany, and 1,500,000 to German-controlled countries for a total of 6,561,000. This leaves a balance in kronor of 10,624,000 to Germany, 2,082,000 to German-controlled countries or a total of 12,706,000. A division of these totals by the 7 remaining months of 1944 gives a monthly quota total of 1,518,000; 298,000 to German-controlled countries or a total of 1,816,000. The shipments to Germany for the months June, July and August under new agreement will be cut 50% or 760,000. The shipments to German-controlled territories are to be left undisturbed, Waring having examined the orders and having concluded that they are not of sufficient importance to warrant a controversy. The shipments will therefore amount to 298,000 making a total of 1,058,000. It is understood that the ration [*ratio?*] between roller bearings and ball bearings will be maintained, that is, the deductions must follow rate only on each of these two categories in accordance with the previous understanding under the trade agreement.

2. Machinery for bearings: The quota in this category for 1944 is 1,960,000. Deliveries between January 1, 1944, and May 12, 1944, amount to 95,000 kronor leaving an undelivered balance of 1,865,000 kronor (no orders are shown for German-controlled territory and none have been accepted). A division of the balance of 1,865,000 by the remaining 7 months of 1944 gives an average of 266,000 per month. Under the present proposal 50% of this monthly total may be delivered from June 1 through August 31 or a monthly total of 133,000.

3. After September 1, 1944, the remaining part of the total quotas of 1 and 2 above can be delivered plus that part of the quota represented by the deducted aircraft bearings but in substitution thereof, but only in equal monthly installments.

4. Other important deliveries of small lots of standard bearings listed in the aircraft catalogue may be made on a showing of exceptional circumstances if the approval of such shipments is previously given by Waring as arbitrator.

Note that in substance the proposed agreement will mean a reduction to approximately one-third of the quotas for the period in question, May 12 to September 1.

Both Waring and ourselves are entirely aware of the opinion in EWD London that the small type aircraft bearings may be of less importance to Germany now than the large type. However, reference to the aircraft catalogue list will indicate that a considerable number of types considered important are also included. It is our opinion that in terms of the complete embargo formula, we could not force final deal to include more than aircraft catalogue list. We anticipate the Swedish Government may formalize the SKF agreement by declaring a Government embargo on these types and accordingly we felt that the retrade proposal offers an imperative face-saver for the Swedish Government.

Substance of proposed contract is stated above but company has endeavored to stipulate that Allied Governments shall not now or in future undertake reprisals in any form whatever towards SKF or affiliated companies. We have stated plainly that we expect Governments, as military situation develops, to reserve all rights of suggestion, negotiation, threats, reprisals or otherwise. Our liability in this contract consists solely of agreement (see your 919, May 15, 8 p. m. repeated to London as Department's 3877) to take up and pay for any goods ordered by Germany or affiliates which by reason of embargo delay or otherwise attributable to this agreement fail of acceptance and payment by enemy. Under political, military and other conditions existing here we recommend the acceptance of this agreement unless our Government is willing to take immediate strong and direct action against both company and Swedish Government to enforce complete embargo. We would appreciate instructions to close this deal waiving no existing rights of later negotiation or action to improve deal if in the judgement of United States Government the changing military situation or other considerations or events makes such action desirable. We have offered to discuss purchasing possible 1945 SKF sales to enemy as outlined by you in your telegram 919, May 15, 8 p. m. repeated to London as Department's 3877, but have stated that this arrangement is not subject to negotiation except on basis of complete embargo of bearings and machinery of all types for 1945. This negotiation they are either unwilling, or are under orders of Government not at this time to discuss. Cannot emphasize too strongly necessity for complete secrecy in Washington, London, Sweden if deal approved, and company stipulates that if deal made, any public statements must be submitted to respective Governments before being published. Company asked termination [*determination?*] from Department if commitment of our Government in note of April 13<sup>64</sup> for use of best efforts of return of company's German properties in case of German reprisals holds if the proposed agreement is made. Asks also if affidavits of SKF officers as to ownership and voting power of SKF Sweden mailed by pouch to Department about 2 weeks ago have reached Washington. Please note that our secret agreement as to all exports may expire June 5. Please, therefore, expedite our further instructions in this matter. [Griffis and Poteat.]

My 481, May 28, 4 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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<sup>64</sup> See telegram 1265, April 13, 9 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 500.

740.00112 European War 1939/10905: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:26 p. m.]

1920. Pursuant to the Department's telegram No. 1250, May 20, 4 p. m., I sent a note to Molotov<sup>65</sup> on May 24 in which *inter alia* I expressed the hope of my Government that the Soviet Government would interpose no objection to a Swedish embargo on ball-bearing exports and that the Soviet Government would in the same manner as the United States and the United Kingdom forego its supplies of bearings from Sweden if necessary to keep bearings from the enemy.

In a reply dated May 28 Molotov states that on May 17 the American Minister in Sweden and Mr. Griffis informed the Soviet Minister regarding the status of this question with SKF. The note continues:

"Mr. Johnson and Mr. Griffis stated that the proposal of the Soviet Government to except Soviet ball-bearing orders from a possible general prohibition to export ball bearings from Sweden would be fully carried out and that the United States Government would assist in the delivery of these bearings from Sweden to the Soviet Union. Messrs. Johnson and Griffis furthermore requested Madame Kollontay to support before the Swedish Government the Anglo-American *démarche* for the establishment of an embargo on the export of ball bearings from Sweden to all warring countries. In connection with the receipt of this information, Madame Kollontay was instructed to inform Mr. Johnson and Mr. Griffis that note had been taken of their statement. With respect to the question of supporting the *démarche* undertaken by the United States and British Governments before the Swedish Government regarding the establishment of an embargo on the export from Sweden of ball bearings with the above-mentioned exception, Madame Kollontay was instructed to support the appropriate *démarche* of the American and British Ministers before the Swedish Government.

In connection with the aforementioned, and since Madame Kollontay has possibly already made an appropriate statement to the Swedish Government, I would be grateful if you would inform me whether the United States Government considers it necessary to maintain the proposal set forth in your letter of May 24."

Sent to the Department. Repeated to London and Stockholm.

HAMILTON

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<sup>65</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.



740.00112 European War 1939/10902: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—9 p. m.

1062. Your 1909 and 1910, May 28,<sup>66</sup> now received and under urgent study by FEA, Department and other interested agencies. Appropriate instructions will be sent as soon as possible. We hope that every effort short of jeopardizing possibility of an agreement will be made by you to prevent resumption of token shipments until final decision made here on SKF offer. Your action in reserving all rights of suggestion, negotiation and reprisal is strongly supported.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as our 4298.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/10897: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944—1 p. m.

1075. For Griffis and Poteat. Department's 1062, May 30, 9 p. m. Department has not yet received London's analysis of aircraft bearings as per SKF catalogue (numbered paragraph 1 of suggested agreement outlined in your 1908 [1909], May 28, 4 p. m.) and is therefore as yet unable to evaluate this important part of SKF offer. Moreover, delays in coding, decoding, etc. and necessity of consultation between interested agencies in Washington and London may make it impossible to come to a decision with regard to SKF offer within a day or two.

We note that no bearings of any kind have been shipped to enemy countries since May 12th and that letter outlined in your 1910, May 28, 6 p. m.<sup>67</sup> contains an extension maintaining temporary embargo "until further notice but not beyond June 5th". You are instructed to make the strongest possible representations to the SKF company to the end that the temporary embargo may be continued until we can come to a decision with regard to SKF offer.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/10919: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 1, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:06 p. m.]

1954. My 1909, May 28, 4 p. m., 481 to London; and 1910, May 28, 6 p. m., 482 to London; and Department's 1063, May 30, 11 p. m.<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> Letter not printed.<sup>67</sup> Not printed.<sup>68</sup> Telegrams 1910 and 1063 not printed.

Considering bearing question by itself and without relation to any of our other desires for Swedish performance, Legation believes there might be disadvantages to unqualified acceptance of SKF's proposal as it stands. It should not in my view, however, be summarily rejected unless our Government with the unqualified support of the British is prepared to impose drastic economic warfare sanctions to implement our threats.

Department and FEA are aware that moral pressures of black-listing, freezing of assets, tightening of blockade, seizures, and exclusion from markets and sources of supplies have been freely used in negotiations and in attendant publicity which produced SKF proposals. If through use of these weapons all we could show for our efforts were a result so far removed from complete embargo then these threats may well lose force for any future demands that may be made.

It is suggested therefore that Department and FEA may wish instead of an unqualified acceptance of SKF proposals to accept them in principle at same time pressing for a larger reduction just short of complete embargo and for a longer period, with all reservations as to future action. Thus it is suggested that we might request reduction along following lines: A reduction from German quota less aircraft bearings as defined in original proposal (1,816,000 kronor) of 80% instead 50% for period June through September 30 instead of June to September 1. A reduction of 80% would authorize shipments of kronor 366,000 monthly to Germany. Adding shipments to German-controlled territories at non-reduced level as proposed by SKF would leave total monthly shipments to Axis Europe 661,000 kronor. This is to be compared to 1,058,000 kronor monthly shipments authorized under SKF proposal. Whereas SKF proposal results in a reduction to approximately one-third of the monthly quota now permitted to Axis Europe, counter-proposal would result in reduction to approximately one-quarter to Axis Europe and reduction would be effective for additional month. Same reduction of 80% and additional month duration would also apply to bearing machinery.

This counter-proposal would not constitute a complete embargo which Swedes have constantly declared to be impossible and which in my opinion they will not give. Moreover, by making this counter-proposal we would be in position if it should appear we would lose everything by insisting on full terms of counter-proposal to give up either the extra month demand or the greater reduction demand.

We are recommending counter-proposal for following reasons:

1. Meeting our increased demand would not constitute in principle greater breach of Swedish-German trade agreement than would SKF proposal. Since the door has now been opened to reduced shipments we should try within framework proposed by SKF to open door as wide as possible.

2. For purposes of future demands that may be made our proposal safeguards value of all economic and moral threats that have been employed during course of negotiations by reason of fact that objectives gained are close to complete embargo. Thus difference on 3 months' basis only between SKF proposal and above suggested counter-proposal would be 12,000 kronor on bearings alone which is significant amount.

3. Finally since Swedes have expressed suspicion that our bearings demands are opening wedge for other demands which have ulterior purpose of embroiling them with Germans, bearings agreement accepted by us should be satisfactory enough so that we will be content not to use same type of pressure for further new concessions at least until changed military situation introduces new bargaining factor or negotiations are reopened on bearings shipments just prior to termination of embargo.

Should Department and FEA agree to making of counter-proposal it is not likely that Swedes could maintain complete embargo beyond June 5. However, we could insist that during course of negotiations shipments be maintained at rate no higher than provided for in SKF proposal on condition that adjustments would be made should counter-proposal be accepted. This would also permit us should it develop that counter-proposal cannot be accepted in whole or in part to at least retain SKF proposal if such is deemed desirable.

Immediately following telegram<sup>69</sup> submits Legation's recommendations regarding procedure to be followed in event of further demands prior to successful invasion of enemy Europe near Sweden.

My 494 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10929 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 3, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received June 3—12: 15 p. m.]

1975. From Griffis and Poteat. Following your instructions contained in Department's 1075, June 1, 11 [1] p. m., we have this morning had a meeting with SKF officials and they have agreed to continue embargo upon condition that prompt decision be made in Washington. No exact date for lifting embargo has been set but company officials have agreed to discuss any necessary or proposed shipment before action taken or embargo discontinued. We cannot too strongly urge expedition of final decision in this matter as we have good reason to believe that Swedes think that both Washington and negotiations are stalling to continue temporary embargo which was definitely put in

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<sup>69</sup> Telegram 1955, June 1, 1944, 9 p. m., not printed.

effect upon our commitment to obtain prompt decision. [Griffis and Poteat.]

My 506, June 3, 1 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10902 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1944—midnight.

1105. For the Minister and Griffis.

1. After careful analysis of the SKF offer and your comments and recommendations, FEA and the Department have reached the conclusion that we cannot accept the proposals of the Company as outlined in your 1909 of May 28. We are disappointed, as you are, with the initial offer which falls far short of our request for a total embargo. While we cannot give our acceptance to the Company's proposals, we agree with your conclusions that practical results may be achieved for the critical period of the next few months by pressing for further concessions during this period, reserving freedom of action with respect to the longer future. You are accordingly authorized to make a counter proposal to SKF designed to achieve further advantages along the lines of the Minister's recommendations of June 1 and to settle within the limits you proposed but subject to the following safeguards, assurances, and clarifications:

2. We are especially concerned about the clause in paragraph 3 of your 1909 permitting substitution of other types for deducted aircraft bearings. This would provide the first opportunity since March for Germans to place substitution orders to counteract bottlenecks resulting from Allied raids. The following three provisions are designed to safeguard us against this contingency. We would require these safeguards or others that accomplish substantially the same ends:

*a.* Total embargo on aircraft bearings or parts against the Axis to apply to all deliveries through remainder of 1944 of all bearings used by Axis in aircraft, including frames, instruments, engines, superchargers, etc.

*b.* We be given a satisfactory preclusive agreement which would effectively block German substitute orders in groups 2, 3, 4 and 5 up to and including 210 mm. outer diameter. This might take the form of an option on currently unscheduled SKF capacity for manufacture of all bearings or parts which we know are now used in Axis military equipment other than aircraft, or types that could be readily substituted therefor. For this option we suggest you offer whatever minimum sum you believe necessary.

*c.* Waring and technical associate nominated by E. W. D. (probably Pincus) will be given an opportunity to screen reduced schedules for deliveries up to October 1 to see that they are spread over the list and

are not concentrated on particular types for which the Germans have most urgent need.

3. Should safeguards such as outlined above prove to be unobtainable, we would prefer a straight postponement of deliveries of all types until after September 30, within the percentage limits, rather than give up the undertaking we have received from the Swedish Government not to permit substitutions. We would prefer deliveries to be scattered among all types now on order (including aircraft bearings) at a rate of not more than say 10 or 20 percent of the present monthly ceiling.

4. Your proposals on bearing machinery are satisfactory. You should try to make the percentage reductions as favorable to us as possible.

5. You have not yet reported on special steels used for the manufacture of bearings. We desire to stop or impede shipments by SKF or subsidiaries of such steels to the Axis as far as possible.

6. It should be understood that after June 5, up to the time when a deal is arranged, the embargo on all bearings and bearing machinery should continue to apply. If this is impossible to obtain, it is understood that Waring will screen types on such minimum deliveries as you may permit.

7. You are authorized to close with SKF in accordance with our proposals under either paragraph 2 or 3 above, if possible as they stand, or if unavoidable with relinquishment of additional month or extra percentage reduction, in whole or in part. At the same time, you should make clear to the Company that we regard this arrangement as a compromise only, and must reserve full freedom to revert to our original demands in the light of the developing military situation.

8. At their discretion Griffis and Waring may inform SKF that if it cannot provide safeguards against the effect of substitutions such as we have sought to provide in paragraphs 2 and 3 above, they will be forced to advise their Governments that in their opinion the SKF offer was not put forward in a sincere effort to go even part way to meet our objectives. In effect it would permit the Germans to cancel contracts for specific types of bearings of which they are no longer in most urgent need and to substitute therefor orders for other bearings of higher current importance. The offer therefore would have the effect of depriving us of our present advantages arising out of the undertaking given by the Government against shifts in German orders and would increase rather than decrease the current contribution of the SKF Company to the war production of our Enemies.

Please fully inform your British colleague and Waring of the contents of this telegram with which Foot <sup>70</sup> concurs. Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's 4427.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/1003b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1944—8 p. m.

1146. The Department feels that this would be a good opportunity to discuss the ball-bearing situation with Boheman or in his absence with another high official of the Swedish Foreign Office. Unless you feel strongly to the contrary, you are therefore authorized to talk to him along the following lines:

“In the month of April the British and American Ministers made certain demands on the Swedish Government with regard to the export of ball bearings to Germany which demands were categorically rejected. Subsequently, with your knowledge, Mr. Stanton Griffis, acting on behalf of an agency of the American Government, started conversations directly with SKF with a view to securing a cessation of the shipment of ball bearings to Germany and German occupied territory. Mr. Griffis recently received from the ball bearing company a proposal <sup>71</sup> which appeared at first sight to go part way to meet our needs but which really opened once more to the Germans an opportunity to switch their orders for ball bearings from types they no longer urgently need because of the effects of our bombing of aircraft assembly plants to types now in pressing demand. The fact that the SKF company under prevailing conditions would involve itself in what can be construed as a ‘trick’ offer has been the occasion of indignation in high Government circles here and has led to serious consideration of the recall of Mr. Griffis. In the hope, however, of avoiding a complete breakdown in the negotiations, Mr. Griffis has been given authority to use the proposal of the ball-bearing company as the basis for stating the maximum concessions we are prepared to make. His proposition is now being considered by the company which has been forcefully informed by Mr. Griffis of the importance which my Government attaches to a prompt acceptance of what it regards as an extraordinarily generous proposition in the light of the accelerated military actions now entered upon by our armed forces.”

Extreme care should be taken that no impression is left with the Foreign Office that we are seeking the Swedish Government's approval or intervention in connection with any agreement which may be reached privately with SKF as a result of Griffis' and Waring's

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<sup>70</sup> Mr. Foot was temporarily in Washington.

<sup>71</sup> For the SKF proposal, see telegram 1909, May 28, 4 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 554.

negotiations with the company. We wish to keep our hands completely free for any later approach to the Swedish Government irrespective of the outcome of present negotiations with SKF. Therefore we do not wish the Swedish Government to be even by implication a party to any agreement we may reach with SKF.

Please inform your British colleague of the nature of your representations pursuant to the above instructions. Foot has seen this telegram and agreed it.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as the Department's 4523.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/10963 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 8, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 1:05 p. m.]

2041. This is from Griffis and Poteat for FEA. With great assistance from your cable of instructions from Washington (see Department's 1105, June 3, midnight, 4427, June 3, midnight to London) and undoubted help from General Eisenhower,<sup>72</sup> we have substantially closed deal with SKF well within the limit of your instructions. Letters of agreement<sup>73</sup> being drawn today and will be cabled you. In summary, agreement extended from September 1 to October 12 with no substitutions of any kind permitted. Shipments to satellite countries and machinery remain unchanged as outlined our 1909 May 28, 4 p. m., (481 May 28, 4 p. m. to London). Shipments to Germany however limited without substitution to 470,000 kronor per month approximately 21% of total original quota and 31% quota ex-aviation bearings. We have reserved all rights of future action as outlined our 1909. We have agreed to enter additional purchases of approximately 10 million kronor but please note that our liability to take up and pay for goods which by reason of this agreement fail of delivery to Germany, satellites and neutrals must be approximately 6 million dollars as it must include protection against possible shipments to neutral countries notably Switzerland, Turkey, Portugal, Spain and the Argentine which might fail if Germany cut off traffic in retaliation for this agreement. Please note this offer and commitments made early in negotiations (see our 1645, May 10, 4 p. m.; 389, May 10, 4 p. m. to London). Secret embargo still in effect and company stipu-

<sup>72</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, which began cross-Channel invasion of France on June 6.

<sup>73</sup> The letters of agreement dated June 8 and 9 were transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Sweden in his despatch 3527, June 13; none printed. This understanding is often referred to as the Griffis Agreement in the negotiations that followed.

lates that signing of this agreement must be kept strictly secret and subject only to announcement approved by Governments concerned. We have not taken action on SKF exports of steel as believe that if SKF shut off we would only assume a purchase liability with no results as many other companies here able to immediately fill German requirements. Accordingly, believe this matter substantially a subject for intergovernment discussion. We expect to sign this agreement almost immediately but will appreciate expedited comments. [Griffis and Poteat.]

My 532, June 8, 1 p. m., to London repeats this message.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10970 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 9, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received 9:52 p. m.]

2067. Following is from Griffis and Poteat for Department and FEA with which I entirely concur. Griffis, Poteat and I have just had a meeting with British Minister and Waring. Two latter state that they are likewise in entire agreement and request that substance of message be given to Foot with statement that it has their approval. Reference my 2041, June 8, 1 p. m. (532, June 8, 1 p. m. to London) and 2050, June 8, 5 p. m.<sup>74</sup> (534, June 8, 5 p. m. to London) :

Late last evening SKF officials and Wallenberg coming directly from a meeting with the Government and apparently acting under Government instructions refused to incorporate in agreement paragraph 7 stating that the negotiations [*negotiators?*] reserved on behalf of their Governments complete freedom of future action. The contention is that while this has been made entirely clear the Government will not permit it to go in the record. Company insists on making proposition to us stating that they will now make a change in their export policy fully conforming to memorandum sent you.<sup>75</sup> We are to reply that in consideration of this we will give them indemnity and orders as outlined in memorandum. However, no statement of freedom of action is to be incorporated by letter or otherwise. In view of fact that this reservation has been made clear in all meetings with company officials and Wallenberg and by the Minister in meetings with the Government we feel that it does not vitally affect the situation

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<sup>74</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>75</sup> Apparently this is a reference to a letter from SKF to the American Legation in late May 1944, paraphrased copy of which was transmitted to the Department in telegram 1910, May 28, 6 p. m., from Stockholm, not printed; for substance, see telegram 1909, May 28, 4 p. m., from Stockholm, p. 554.



to keep it out of the record and will appreciate it if you can so promptly instruct us.

This telegram is being repeated to London as my 540, June 9, 6 p. m. with request that substance be given to MEW.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/10978 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 10, 1944—7 p. m.

1174. The Department and FEA have authorized approval of SKF proposal on the clear understanding that we reserve full freedom of action in the future. This reservation is essential to our acceptance of this agreement with the company and must be made absolutely clear to both SKF and the Swedish Foreign Office. Your 2067, June 9.

In order that there may be no possible cause for future misunderstanding on the point that the interim arrangement with SKF is not regarded by this Government as satisfaction of its original demands in the note of April 13 and that accordingly we may revert to those demands you are instructed to call at the Foreign Office along with your British colleague, when he receives similar instructions which are being sent to him by Foot, and to inform Boheman or other appropriate official of the Foreign Office in the sense of this telegram.

Griffis should also emphasize foregoing to the SKF company. On foregoing terms paragraph 7 may be omitted from exchange of letters.<sup>76</sup>

If arrangement is satisfactorily concluded in accordance with foregoing, Griffis and Poteat may return. Your 2079, June 10.<sup>77</sup>

STETTINIUS

740.00112 European War 1939/10936 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944—7 p. m.

1479. Reference your 1920, May 29, 5 p. m., and 2003, June 5, noon,<sup>78</sup> Department has not received any confirmation from Stockholm that Johnson and Griffis gave Madame Kollontay assurance quoted in Molotov's note of May 28.<sup>79</sup> As it appears that no general embargo will be placed on the export of ball bearings from Sweden for the time

<sup>76</sup> See footnote 73, p. 564.

<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

<sup>78</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>79</sup> See telegram 1920, May 29, 5 p. m., p. 557.

being the matter is not of immediate importance. However, the Legation at Stockholm has been requested to report regarding their conversation of May 17 with Madame Kollontay and further instructions will then be sent to the Embassy.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/11001: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 13, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 2: 45 p. m.]

2121. From Griffis and Poteat for Department and FEA. Following supplements our 2115, June 12, 7 p. m.<sup>80</sup> (562, June 12, 7 p. m. to London) and gives context of the final meetings at which letters consummating the deal were exchanged:

Paraphrase of telegram received by American and British Ministers on June 11 was shown SKF at first meeting held morning of June 12. (Message was Department's 1174, June 10, 7 p. m.)

SKF declared this was unacceptable as it meant in effect that there was no agreement. We called attention to fact that SKF had not objected June 9 to our reservation of freedom of action and that throughout negotiations, this had been quite clear. Their objection was to having such reservation in writing and they asked that it be made orally. In keeping with their request, we had asked our principals for instructions and were now able to make this verbal statement. The purpose of giving them the gist of these instructions in the form of the above paraphrase was simply to avoid any possible misunderstanding. We adjourned with no action having been taken to meet at 5 o'clock in afternoon.

At 5 p. m. meetings were resumed with Company and we were shown by SKF informal statement to effect that although our views on future policy had been heard by them, they were unable to regard these as part of the contract. Mr. Griffis stated we had time and again stressed to SKF our perfectly clear instructions and were now complying with Company's request of June 9. However, as no progress was being made, he could not continue negotiations. Mr. Waring indicated agreement.

We declared that we were under entirely unequivocal instructions to give Company perfectly clear view of position and, lacking any other choice, we must inform Company that if our viewpoint was unacceptable to it, negotiations must be broken off. The Company's present attitude was placing us in an entirely false position inasmuch as our respective Governments had been informed of the situation as it had

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

been understood by us June 9. Extracts of a telegram from Mr. Dingle Foot to British Minister on June 10 referring to need for retaining freedom of action were read by Mr. Waring, substance of which follows:

I am sorry to have to emphasize in such a manner a position (namely retaining future freedom of action) which we have already made exceedingly plain. It is impossible for me to emphasize too strongly how important it is to reach an agreement with the Company as soon as at all possible. Accordingly I hope letters can be exchanged at once in view of present feeling here. (End of substance of extracts from Dingle Foot's telegram.)

Finally we said that there either was or was not an agreement. At last Mr. Hamberg said he thought there had been enough argument and he therefore suggested that we go about exchanging letters. This was then immediately done without further ado.

We hope to leave for England tonight. Original documents are being sent by pouch on same plane. [Griffis and Poteat.]

My 568, June 13, 2 p. m. to London repeats this message.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War/10938 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1944—8 p. m.

4680. From Department and FEA. Reference your 4486 of June 3rd.<sup>81</sup> In view of interim agreement in prospect Department and FEA are rescinding policy outlined in our 3054 of April 17 (to Stockholm 682) and reverting to the policy pursued prior to bearings issue. We suggest you invite MEW to adopt similar policy. Repeating to Stockholm. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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103.9169/4120d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1944—3 p. m.

1206. Your 1856 of May 24, 1591 of May 5, and 1352 of April 19. Department and FEA are gratified that the Swedes have taken steps to end shipment of coal to Norway via Bothnian route. However, we still wish to obtain if possible the limitations requested in your *aide-mémoire* of May 5 (your 1591 and 1352). Please continue to make every effort to achieve our objective at an early date. The pro-

<sup>81</sup> Not printed.

cedure to be used is left to your discretion. This telegram is being repeated to London and the British Embassy here is telegraphing London so that your British colleague will receive parallel instructions.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/11075a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—5 p. m.

1216. From Department and FEA for the Minister, Ravndal<sup>82</sup> and Fagen.<sup>83</sup> Department and FEA wish to receive your views on the following matters which have been discussed with Foot and Riefler and are under consideration here:

1. Desirability of proposing to Swedes that in view of improved atmosphere now prevailing it may be mutually desirable to consider new over-all trade negotiations dealing with extension of present war trade agreement in amended form beyond present expiration date of December 31, 1944. It is contemplated that such negotiations would take place about September. This proposal if made to Swedes would also include request that no commitments be made to enemy for 1945 pending conclusion of negotiations with us and confirmation by Swedes of fact that they have as yet made no commitments to the enemy for 1945.

2. The probable supply and other desiderata which the Swedes might regard as constituting an acceptable *quid pro quo* for an extensively revised agreement for the period following December 31, 1944.

3. That as preliminary to over-all trade negotiations mentioned in 1 and 2 above, comprehensive discussions be undertaken with the Swedes with the object of reaching a satisfactory agreement both on violations and on necessary clarification of provisions of the present war trade agreement which in operation have revealed wide difference between our interpretation and that of the Swedes. We feel that it may be desirable to raise problem of violations and clarification in connection with proposal for comprehensive discussions, so as to focus our full bargaining power on objectives which have current value. We wish to avoid offers of reparation from Swedes for violations of such a nature that they could not logically be refused although they might represent no real economic warfare benefit to us under present conditions (for example reduction of iron ore ceiling by amount of 1943 excess export is less important now because of reduced enemy steel production due to shortage of alloy metals).

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<sup>82</sup> Christian M. Ravndal, Counselor of Legation in Sweden.

<sup>83</sup> Melvin Fagen, Foreign Economic Administration representative in the Legation in Sweden.

We are considering that comprehensive discussions of Swedish as well as our own immediate desiderata under the present agreement should take place as soon as possible, preferably not later than July 15, in London if the present ban on communication has been rescinded, otherwise in Stockholm.

4. In order to create a favorable atmosphere for such discussions we propose to grant subject to MEW concurrence in the near future certain supply requests of the Swedes. These will include 80 tons of buna for Goodyear, tire cord fabric, carbon black, reclaimed rubber asphalt and probably Chilean nitrates. We believe this will indicate to Swedes that under favorable circumstances we are not averse to granting additional supply concessions and should whet their appetite for larger quantities and other concessions in the future. Major supply concessions will, however, be reserved for the discussions planned for July and the subsequent negotiations so as to protect our bargaining power.

We would appreciate receiving your views as quickly as possible so that work can be begun on drafting a joint Anglo-American agenda for the proposed discussions in July and for later over-all negotiations.

This telegram is being repeated to London. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/11045 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, June 17, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 17—3:32 p. m.]

2185. Department's 1206, June 16, 3 p. m. Swedish Government has informed Germans that all transit shipments of goods to either Norway or Finland via Bothnian route must cease by August 1.

My 590, June 17, 7 p. m. repeats this to London with reference to my 462, May 24, midnight.<sup>84</sup>

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/6-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1944—9 p. m.

5338. Stockholm's telegram to London 628, June 27, 4 p. m., repeated by Stockholm to Department as 2331, June 27, 4 p. m.<sup>85</sup> De-

<sup>84</sup> Same as telegram 1856, p. 553.

<sup>85</sup> Not printed.

partment notes with apprehension that SKF received on or about June 15th large orders from Germans for 1945 delivery for bearings with value estimated at between 10 and 15 million kronor. Legation states that presumably SKF will accept this new German order in its entirety thereby committing themselves to 1945 deliveries of ball bearings and that Legation believes we shall have to face 1945 problem on inter-governmental level.

It is of primary importance that we secure an agreement from the Swedish Government to embargo the export of ball and roller bearings to Germany in 1945 before the Swedes make any commitments to the Germans for that period.

You are therefore requested to consult the appropriate British authorities to obtain their agreement, as well as necessary instruction to British Legation in Stockholm, to joint presentation by British and American Ministers of *Aide-Mémoire* to Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs in sense of next paragraph. When you have obtained British agreement you are instructed to notify Legation in Stockholm which is hereby authorized to take action as indicated.

“It is the understanding of the Government of the United States that the Swedish Government have made no engagements regarding exports to Germany in 1945. The Government of the United States desires therefore to effect the cessation in 1945, or during that part of 1945 in which hostilities continue between the United Nations and the Axis, of all Swedish exports to Germany, associated countries and occupied territories, of ball and roller bearings and parts thereof and of machinery and special steels and special tools for the manufacture thereof as well as of piston rings.

This Government is motivated to express the above desire at this time since it has been informed that SKF received on or about June 15th large orders from Germany for between 3 million and 3½ million bearings with total value estimated at between 10 million and 15 million kronor.

The American Government emphasizes its hope that necessary steps will be taken by the Swedish Government to meet this Government's wish that the export of these commodities would not be permitted in 1945. One of these steps would doubtless be the informing of Swedish manufacturers of the Swedish Government's decision. A reply to this *Aide-Mémoire* at the earliest convenience of the Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs would be appreciated.”

The American and British Ministers should, when they present the *Aide-Mémoire* to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, refer to their statement made to Boheman on June 12 (Legation's 2116 to Department <sup>86</sup> and 563 to London, both of June 12, 8 p. m.) in order that there may be no misunderstanding regarding our continued reservations of full freedom of action in 1944. Department desires to avoid publicity with

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<sup>86</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 1174, June 10, 7 p. m., to Stockholm, p. 566.

regard to this *démarche* and requests action taken be regarded as confidential in London and Stockholm.

It is of the greatest importance in the opinion of the Department that the British and American Legations in Stockholm should immediately present *Aide-Mémoires* along the above lines and it is hoped that you will be in a position to cable Stockholm within 24 hours.

Cable action taken.

(In the event Swedes reply that they cannot give a favorable reply to *Aide-Mémoire* until we have negotiated War Trade Agreement for 1945, Legations at Stockholm may inform the Swedes that we are proposing to begin such negotiations later in the year but that we desire an immediate assurance that they will not enter into any commitments with Germans prior to these negotiations, regarding the commodities mentioned above.)

Sent to London repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 1347.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 6, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:24 p. m.]

5339. For Secretary, Under Secretary, Crowley and Stone FEA from Riefler. Gunnar Hägglöf, Swedish Minister to Netherlands Government, who handles Swedish economic warfare matters in London, is returning to Sweden for a short visit, and probably will be back in London in first days of August. Riefler and Foot had a purely informal conversation with him and Gisle<sup>87</sup> prior to his departure. Foot and Riefler intimated that although a war trade agreement for 1945 had been mentioned earlier, recent developments were so rapid that military events might greatly restrict or sever Swedish-German trade by then. In view of this, it was suggested that it might be a wise course for the Swedes at this time and on their own initiative to end their trade with Germany.

Hägglöf made two observations that the Swedish Government might not look favorably on such an action at very last moment, and that small countries, as he had previously pointed out, had to fulfill their agreements in view of dangers involved.

Riefler pointed out that our supply authorities in view of UNRRA<sup>88</sup> and other demands would find allocation of materials more difficult in future. Foot suggested that a possible first step along road of termi-

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<sup>87</sup> Carl O. Gisle, Counselor of the Swedish Legation in the United Kingdom.

<sup>88</sup> United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

nation of all trade might be a prohibition on Swedish ships calling at Axis ports. Hägglöf pointed out again that there was problem of the existing shipping agreements, but said that he would put these ideas before his Government.

Full text of Foot's minutes by airmail. [Riefler.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/7-844: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 8, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

5397. Reference Department's 5338 July 6 to Embassy, 1347 to Stockholm. Both Embassy and MEW believe that military situation is changing so rapidly that it would be disadvantageous to us were we to make an approach to Swedish Government at this time which could be interpreted as indicating that it was our belief that trade between Sweden and enemy countries and territories could be continued in 1945 on same basis as at present. See Embassy's 5339, July 6.

2. *Aide-mémoire* suggested by Department in its 5338, July 6 was discussed with MEW immediately upon its receipt. In view of considerations mentioned in paragraph 1 above, Embassy and MEW believe most strongly that it would be inappropriate for American and British Ministers in Stockholm to present this *aide-mémoire* as drafted since it would permit the impression that we were ready to open shortly negotiations for a war trade agreement for next year on a basis somewhat similar to present one.

Embassy and MEW therefore strongly recommend that American and British Ministers in Stockholm be instructed to make a joint formal *démarche* to Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to obtain an immediate assurance from his Government that it will not enter into any commitment with the enemy regarding export of any commodities and, more especially, bearings et cetera in 1945, without previous consultation with Allied Government. Actual wording of *aide-mémoire* is to be left to our Minister in Stockholm. MEW is instructing British Minister in Stockholm to join with his American colleague in presenting an *aide-mémoire* in this sense immediately upon latter's receipt of similar instructions.

We both believe this would completely hold our position without indicating the course of action we may plan to pursue.

3. Waring is at present in London; he points out: (a) that he has no definite proof that SKF accepted orders based in [on] inquiry made



to it by Germans and reported in Stockholm's 2331, June 27, to Department<sup>89</sup> (628 to London), although such an acceptance is not impossible; (b) that no order accepted by SKF is definitive or can be fulfilled until such time as it has received the approval of Swedish Government; (c) that it is of paramount importance that secrecy of information he has received from SKF be maintained, and that under no circumstances should the fact that we are in possession of this information be divulged to Swedish Government.

Message repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 250.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-644: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944—midnight.

5420. For Riefler. The Department and FEA feel that this is not a moment for issuing invitation to Swedes to negotiate War Trade Agreement for 1945 as suggested in Stockholm's 665, July 6, 9 p. m. to London, 2498 to Department.<sup>89</sup> We believe that, in view of the rapidly changing military situation, negotiations for 1945 War Trade Agreement should be withheld until the latest practicable date.

We nevertheless believe that American and British Governments should go on record in warning Swedes against making any commitments in forthcoming discussions with Germans for 1945 exports or carry-overs for 1945. If you and Foot agree and if British Government forwards appropriate instructions to Mallet, you are authorized so to inform Johnson. He is hereby instructed in such an event jointly with his British colleague to present the following *aide-mémoire* to Boheman or other appropriate official of the Swedish Foreign Office:

"The American and British Governments request the Swedish Government to refrain from entering into any commitment for 1945 exports to the enemy or for carrying unfilled 1944 quotas over into 1945.

In view of this request and in view of the changing military situation the American and British Governments declare that during the negotiations for a war trade agreement for 1945, which they will soon propose to the Swedish Government, they will not recognize any commitments made by the Swedish Government to Axis Governments for that year as reasons for Swedish inability to agree to American and British requests for limitations on Swedish exports to Germany and German-controlled territory."

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's 1362.

HULL

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<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/7-1144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 11, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:12 p. m.]

2566. Swedes generally believe that the war will be won by Allies and be over by end this year. Generally too they are uneasy as to what will be Sweden's lot in the early postwar period. Most comfort themselves with wishful thinking that what Sweden has to offer in way of production and transportation facilities will be so important to Allies in their rehabilitation and reconstruction work that Sweden's neutral course during the war will soon be forgotten. A few Government officials and some Swedish firms engaged in international trade, however, are not too optimistic. They are beginning to fear that the Anglo-American agencies will control the distribution of the supplies of all-important raw materials, food and coal which Sweden must import to maintain its economy and that if Sweden should be cut off from its present sources of supply in enemy Europe, which may happen before end of war as a result of Allies gaining control of Baltic area, and those agencies failed to allocate to Sweden shares in the allocation Sweden would shortly have to suffer a very marked and painful deterioration in its economy which deterioration would carry over well into postwar period.

We feel here that this last point should be pressed home at once. It should be made entirely clear to Swedish Government that if Swedish postwar import needs are not now recognized by our agencies and if Sweden's actions from now until end of war do not permit us sympathetically to take into account Swedish needs when they make allocations, the Swedish Government can expect little consideration to be given in the postwar period to Sweden's vital needs of materials in short supply.

I believe it would be timely for Department to instruct me to have an informal conversation with the Foreign Minister to suggest to him that the Swedish Government would be well-advised to anticipate the foregoing developments and to assure us now that it will not permit any export of any commodity to Germany and its satellites in 1945. We also think I should suggest to the Foreign Minister that it would be advisable for the Swedish Government to give us such assurances at an early date preferably prior to July 20 when German trade delegation is scheduled to commence negotiations with Swedes, since otherwise it might be too late for Sweden to gain much consideration of its 1945 and subsequent needs for materials under allocation. In my judgment furthermore it would be good policy to tell Foreign Minister frankly that we do not propose to negotiate any "trade agreement" with Sweden for 1945, that what will happen is simply this: If the

assurance referred to is given us we will work out with Swedes what goods and in what quantities Allies will ship to Sweden in 1945 (Department's 1216 June 17, 5 p. m.). Concerning prevention of disruption of Swedish economy should its exports to Germany and occupied countries be eliminated, I assume that we can advise Foreign Office that purchases by UNRRA and other Allied agencies will be used to counterbalance stoppage of exports to enemy.

I see no objection to presenting the formal *démarche* referred to in Embassy's 5397, July 8, 5 p. m. provided the *démarche* is made within next few days, since it would not be inconsistent with the course herein suggested. But the time is ripe for a statement along the lines above set forth and I shall appreciate receiving telegraphic authorization to call on the Foreign Minister for that purpose.

My 677, July 11, 6 p. m. repeats this message to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1144: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 11, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:39 p. m.]

2568. For Department only. As stated in my 2211, June 20, 1 p. m.,<sup>91</sup> if there were free access to Swedish ports or access to Sweden across Norway or Finland we could ask Swedish Government for immediate complete stoppage of trade with enemy territory in return for support of the Swedish economy at least on restricted wartime basis. But as stated in my 2566, July 11, 6 p. m., Legation now believes in view of rapid military developments that by means of informal conversations with the Foreign Minister and his senior assistants it may be possible to obtain as a result of Swedish initiative, without making any formal request, a voluntary assurance from the Swedish Government that it will not permit any export of any commodity to Germany and its satellites in 1945. This may be hopeful thinking but it is an approach which in my view should be tried.

Legation moreover is not convinced that having the British and the Soviet Governments join us in making a formal request of the Swedes to secure elimination of Swedish aid to the enemy and maximum assistance to the United Nations (Department's 1356, July 8, 10 a. m.)<sup>91</sup> would be as effective as the informal approach suggested. The Swedes are stubborn and slow moving and get their backs up when formally subjected to pressure particularly if it is attended with publicity. Our experience has been that reasonable suggestions planted in the right quarters frequently have been productive of satisfactory results. The

<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

procedure has enabled intelligent farseeing officials to prepare the ground and to save the Government's face through getting the Government to take voluntary action apparently on its own initiative. We would be free, of course, at any time to resort to formal and all-out pressure in the event that the informal approach should prove unproductive.

However, if the making of a formal request by the three Governments is decided upon, I assume consideration would have been given to the possible conflict of interest between the British and the Russians and the fact that the latter, who wish to buy substantial quantities of merchandise on credit from Sweden and therefore may regard maintenance of Sweden's economy and good will as outweighing importance of Sweden's present trade with the enemy, might feel entitled by reason of their major interests to take the lead in formulating the approach to the Swedish Government and in the development of later policies toward Swedish trade.

At present the Russians appear amiably disposed towards the Swedes. If we should deliberately stir them up emotionally against the Swedes we might start a forest fire and the Russians might in the end go further than we would find convenient.

My 678, July 11, 8 p. m. and 4, July 11, 8 p. m. repeats this to London and Moscow respectively.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/7-844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1944—noon.

5454. Your 5397, July 8, 5 p. m. Our views are given fully in Department's 5420, July 10, midnight.

The *Aide-Mémoire* now to be presented to the Swedish Government refers to "any commitment for 1945 exports" and would therefore cover the export of ball bearings, etc. It will not then be necessary to present Swedes with *Aide-Mémoire* referred to in Department's 5338, July 6, repeated to Stockholm as 1347.

Sent to London repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—noon.

1391. At a meeting held July 12 attended by representatives of State, War, Navy and FEA, it was agreed that the developments on

both the East Front and the West Front pointed to the advisability of taking early and drastic steps to bring about elimination of Swedish trade with the enemy. Meeting agreed that cooperation of the British would be highly desirable and that not over 2 weeks' time might be allocated to an attempt to work out a common line of action directed towards the goal above stated. This will be taken up on the highest levels in Washington and London.

In the meantime we believe that pending outcome of efforts being made in London to induce the British to join with us in a more formal *démarche* as well as receipt of your views and of the London and Moscow Embassies views on Department's 1356 to you,<sup>93</sup> it might be well for you to initiate with the appropriate Foreign Office official informal conversations as suggested in your 2568, July 11 looking to a voluntary assurance from the Swedes that they will not permit any export of any commodity to Germany and its satellites. It is suggested however that during this talk you might include the considerations set forth in paragraph numbered 1 of Department's 666, April 14 (2980 to London), and thereby emphasize the desirability of stopping exports in the very near future.

In presenting the note, text of which was set forth in Department's 1362 to you,<sup>94</sup> you may in your discretion talk with the Foreign Minister along the lines which you suggested in your 2566, July 11, but you should be careful in your conversation not to make any statement regarding 1945 trade which might tie our hands with respect to an early demand for elimination of Swedish exports during the balance of 1944.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's no. 5481 and to Moscow as Department's no. 1681.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—4 p. m.

5490. Personal for the Ambassador. At the direction of the President please deliver the following message from him to the Prime Minister: <sup>95</sup>

"Swedish exports to the enemy are becoming a very pressing question here. All the circumstances of the war, particularly Soviet successes in the Baltic area, could now be favorably used by us to bring maximum pressure to bear on Sweden to eliminate exports to the

<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

<sup>94</sup> Same as telegram 5420. July 10, midnight, to London, p. 574.

<sup>95</sup> Winston S. Churchill.

enemy. I would appreciate your getting behind the matter personally as Winant is now taking this question up with your people in the Foreign Office."

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—5 p. m.

5491. This Government has arrived at a decision that military developments in Europe make it necessary to bring about elimination of all Swedish trade with the enemy using to this end all pressures at our disposal. We attach the highest importance to the attainment of this objective and would like to have the British Government associated with us in the demands which will be made upon Sweden. This is a matter of top importance and I hope that you will spare no effort to bring the Prime Minister and Eden to agreement to cooperate in carrying out this Government's decision. This Government regards the matter as so pressing that we may feel compelled to proceed alone if British concurrence cannot be obtained within the very near future.

I have recommended to the President that he send a personal message to the Prime Minister asking for his personal support.<sup>96</sup>

Please review my 5481, July 13<sup>97</sup> and the telegrams from Johnson referred to therein which were repeated to you as Stockholm's 677 and 678<sup>98</sup> and then press our views as strongly as possible with the Prime Minister and Eden. I anticipate that you will have some difficulty with the Foreign Office.

I cannot stress too strongly the importance this Government attaches to the attainment of our ends with respect to Swedish trade with the enemy.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, July 13, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received July 13—4:30 p. m.]

5529. For Department, Crowley and Stone, FEA, from Riefler. Reference Department's 5420, July 10, midnight and 5454, July 12, noon.

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<sup>96</sup> See *supra*.

<sup>97</sup> Same as telegram 1391, p. 577.

<sup>98</sup> Same as telegrams 2566 and 2568, pp. 575 and 576, respectively.

1. MEW is convinced that procedure recommended in Embassy's 5397 July 8, 5 p. m. is still correct procedure. It has already instructed its Minister in Stockholm to join Johnson as soon as he receives parallel instructions. It is now authorizing Mallet, in addition if Washington desires, to join with Johnson (*a*) to ask for an assurance that exports under unfilled 1944 quotas will not be permitted in 1945 and (*b*) to request that Swedes reply in writing. MEW feels that actual wording of *aide-mémoire* should be left jointly to Ministers in Stockholm.

2. For practical reasons MEW does not wish to include in present approach subject matter of last sentence in suggested *aide-mémoire* proposed by Department and FEA in their 5420 (1362 to Stockholm). They feel that it commits us more formally to negotiations for 1945 agreement than they care to be committed at this time and also that it may imply to Swedes that we expect a negative response to our request.

3. In view of approaching July 20 deadline Embassy urges that action be taken promptly. Tactics outlined above, to which MEW has agreed, appear to Embassy to be consistent with Stockholm's position in Stockholm's 2566 July 11 (1677 [677] to London). Embassy notes, however, that Stockholm would prefer a completely informal approach without a formal *démarche*. Embassy and MEW do not feel strongly on this matter and would go along with Stockholm's suggestion should you so desire. If, however, you still attach importance to a formal *démarche*, seeking a written reply, an *aide-mémoire* in terms suggested in paragraph 1 and 2 above is agreeable to MEW and Embassy in London.

This message was repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 258, July 13. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1944—7 p. m.

5526. Your 5529, July 13, 6 p. m. Department and FEA agree that reference to War Trade Agreement for 1945 should be omitted. We therefore agree to the omission of the following words in the second paragraph:

"During the negotiations for a war trade agreement for 1945 which they will soon propose to the Swedish Government". We feel, however, that the remaining portions of the *aide-mémoire* should remain since there is need for immediate action and time does not permit

clearing a revised draft with the other interested agencies in Washington which have already approved the essential points in draft note. In view of the fact that British proposals parallel ours in regard to this matter we hope that MEW will agree to the *aide-mémoire* quoted in Department's 5420, July 10 to London and repeated to Stockholm as Department's 1362 with the aforementioned change. The *aide-mémoire* as drafted would make the appropriate request of the Swedes and would cover our attitude should that request be refused. It is of importance to note that the American Minister at Bern<sup>99</sup> has been instructed to make a statement in the same sense to the Swiss Government (Department's telegram 2398 of July 13 to Bern,<sup>1</sup> repeated to London as Department's 5499).

You are requested to make every effort to persuade MEW to instruct the British Minister in Stockholm to the end that the *aide-mémoire* may be presented jointly by the British and American Ministers.

Since we are informed Swedish-German negotiations begin in Stockholm on July 20, it is imperative that representations be made to the Swedish Foreign Office before that date. Will you therefore cable Department at earliest possible moment whether you have been able to secure MEW's agreement.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's 1400.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1944—11 p. m.

1431. Ambassador Winant has made the point that the *aide-mémoire* quoted in Department's 1362, July 10 even as redrafted (Department's 1400, July 14)<sup>2</sup> might gratuitously provide the Swedes with an argument for resisting any new demands with respect to 1944 trade since by stressing the fact that we would not recognize new commitments for 1945 as valid reasons for failing to meet our demands we would establish by implication the validity of existing commitments as a reason for continuing Swedish exports this year.

Accordingly, you are instructed to join with Mallet, as soon as he receives amended instructions, before July 20 in making a *démarche* to the Swedish Foreign Minister to obtain an immediate assurance from his Government that it will not enter into any fresh commitments with the enemy regarding exports of any commodities without previous consultation with the Allied Governments. In view, how-

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<sup>99</sup> Leland Harrison.

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 743.

<sup>2</sup> Same as telegrams 5420 and 5526 to London, pp. 574 and 580, respectively.



ever, of the fact that we may in the near future make drastic demands upon Sweden you should eliminate the phrase "more especially bearings, et cetera" which appears in paragraph 2 of London's 5397, July 8, repeated to Stockholm as London's 250.

In the event that the Foreign Minister does not give a definite assurance forthwith, you should inform him that in general your Government reserves all of its rights with regard to the matter and in particular would be unable to recognize any fresh commitments as the basis for Swedish refusal of any future requests by your Government.

At the same time you should immediately initiate the informal approaches authorized in Department's 1391, July 13 taking care, however, to observe the injunction contained in the penultimate paragraph of that telegram.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's no. 5613.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1844: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 18, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received July 18,—9:29 p. m.]

2669. I saw Foreign Minister Günther this afternoon by appointment at my request and before receipt of Department's 1431 of July 17, 11 p. m. (5613 to London). I explained to Mr. Günther that I had requested the interview in order to express certain personal observations regarding probable development of our war trade policy towards Sweden and suggested that if he would allow me I would be very frank in this informal statement. Briefly I pointed out to the Foreign Minister that it must be obvious to all observers that the war was rapidly approaching a final conclusion and that for that reason the courses of action which hitherto could not be considered by Sweden for reasons of national security might now be contemplated without apprehension. I recognized that his country had in the recent past given some particularly important practical demonstrations of its desire to cooperate with the Allies in reducing the economic assistance to their enemies and that I thought the time had now arrived when a spontaneous demonstration on the part of Sweden that she desired still further to cooperate with us in shortening the war would be received by my Government with great appreciation and understanding. I suggested that he might consider whether the Swedish Government could not now give the Allied Governments assurances that as soon as land or sea communications with Sweden are possible for the Allies that Sweden would discontinue entirely its exports to our enemies. I said that I realized that such an action would inevitably create economic difficulties for

Sweden and that I felt confident that my Government and its Allies would make every practicable effort to alleviate these difficulties. I made no mention of the forthcoming trade negotiations with Germany to begin on July 20 nor any mention of a war trade agreement with the Anglo-Saxon Allies for 1945 but kept strictly to the subject of cessation of exports of war materials and supplies to Germany otherwise following the general line of my 2566 July 11, 6 p. m. (677 to London).

Mr. Günther remarked that he was confident I realized that such action on Sweden's part would mean a radical change in its policy towards Germany and because of existing treaty commitments would involve important political considerations. I told him that I did realize that but that I would venture to make the observation that the moment was a critical one not only for us but for all of Europe and that, while my Government had the greatest respect in principle for contractual obligations, I felt a contractual obligation was of small importance when the lives of thousands of men were on the other side of the scales. I likewise pointed out that this situation in which contractual obligations seemed of small importance was one which had been solely created by the Germans themselves who had initiated and extended this war. Mr. Günther received my remarks with courtesy and patience and when I left said that he would give the "important observation" I had made most careful study. It is my intention to have this opening approach to Mr. Günther implemented immediately by more detailed talks with officials of the Foreign Office who are concerned in the making of Swedish policy in these matters and likewise with Hägglöf who has returned from London to take part in the German negotiations.

The British Legation has not yet received instructions from London in line with Department's 1431 of July 17, 11 p. m. and the British Minister informed me yesterday that he did not feel that he could take any action without instructions as various directives received up to date have been indecisive and confusing.

My 709, July 18, 10 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-2044: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 20, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 12 p. m.]

2701. British Minister and I this afternoon met with Mr. Sohlman, head of the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office. Both of us made statements to him to following effect:

American and British Governments request Swedish Government to give them immediately an assurance that Swedish Government will not enter into any new commitment with the enemy with respect to export of any commodities without previous consultation with American and British Governments. Both of us likewise made the statement that our respective Governments of course could not accept any such new commitment as a valid reason for rendering impossible future requests for limitations of Swedish trade with Germany. We made it clear during course of discussion that "Germany" included also countries which are satellites of Germany and occupied territories, in fact all areas comprised within purview of Anglo-American-Swedish War Trade Agreement. See my 2683 of July 19, 8 p. m., (713 to London)<sup>3</sup> and Department's 1437, July 19, 1 p. m., (London No. not given).<sup>4</sup>

We likewise reiterated the attitude of our two Governments as already re-expressed through the JSC against permitting deliveries under contracts not completely fulfilled to be carried over for completion in the succeeding year.

Mr. Sohlman said that as far as he was now aware the Swedish meeting with German delegates to begin on July 25 did not contemplate any discussions for commitments in 1945. These mid-year meetings had in the past been usually concerned with the application of existing Swedish-German Trade Agreement and the Swedes almost invariably concentrated on various German failures to live up to their terms of the Agreement. German exports to Sweden under the Agreement during past 6 months have however exceeded all expectations and Sohlman was of the opinion that questions under the clearing would be at the forefront. He made the comment that there was a legal distinction between the 1944 and the 1945 situations inasmuch as there were definite ceilings for trading with Germany for 1944 agreed to by us. Mallet and I recognized that the situation for the 2 years was different in a technical sense but pointed out that existing contracts in a number of categories did not come up to the established ceilings of the Agreement and that we were asking the Swedes to make no new contracts even though they might fall within the upper limits of the ceilings, that the ceilings were maximum not minimum standards. Sohlman good-naturedly admitted this argument. He said that he would have to consult with the Government and in regard to the assurance we had requested would make every endeavor to give us a reply as soon as possible. He understands clearly

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed; it suggested that any approach to the Swedes should not reveal any differences of opinion between the United States and the United Kingdom (740.00112 European War 1939/7-1944).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

that we expect and desire this reply before negotiations with the Germans are begun.

He then referred to the Trade Agreement with Norway which expired on July 1st and has not been renewed. Some of the contractual commitments under the Agreement have not yet been fulfilled and are being carried out on a carry-over basis. Trade with Norway which he said Sweden must continue particularly for importation of nitrates is being carried on through day-to-day basis and largely as barter transactions. Hägglöff off-the-record this morning stated that the Trade Agreement with Norway will not be renewed. Sohlman in effect admitted that this decision has been made but said that as he was talking officially he could not say so. Both Mallet and I stated that our Governments expect to be informed in detail of all exports and imports to Norway and Sohlman pointed out that this is in fact being done through the arrangement for delivery of statistics to us and through the machinery of the JSC.

Same situation obtains in regard to Denmark as the Swedish-Danish Trade Agreement expired on July 1st and Sohlman pointed out that in case of both Norway and Denmark but particularly of the latter Swedish problems from political psychological point of view in dealing with these occupied countries are much more difficult than any of the material factors. In the case of Denmark it is also definitely understood that our two Governments will be kept fully informed of all transactions. Sohlman furthermore emphasized that in case of all trade with Germany and her satellites and occupied countries the ceiling limits have been strictly adhered to and will continue to be adhered to.

Sohlman's general attitude was understanding and reasonable. The attitude of Hägglöff with whom I had a long talk this morning was similar and I am confident that Hägglöf is attempting during his visit in Stockholm to influence various quarters in the Government to adopt a receptive attitude to the Allied request.

I venture most strongly to recommend that the Department permit no publicity to be given this *démarche*.

My 723, July 20, 7 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-2144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, July 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:32 p. m.]

2718. My 2701 of July 20, 7 p. m., 723 to London. This afternoon Mr. Sohlman requested British Minister and me to see him. He told

us that he had been authorized by the Swedish Government to give us the following reply to the request we had made of him yesterday.

1. In regard to trade for 1945, Mr. Sohlman stated that he could confirm what Hägglöf had told Foot in London, that the Swedish Government has not entered into any commitments for 1945 with enemy countries. The question regarding any such commitments has for the present no actuality and is not expected to arise until late this autumn. Before any consideration is given by the Swedish Government to such a question, the American and British members of the JSC in London will be informed in time to allow them to present their views.

2. In regard to trade for 1944, Mr. Sohlman said he would like to explain that the Swedish Government has for 1944 made a number of agreements regarding trade between German and Axis Europe. Of this the American and British Governments are aware. Full information in regard to these agreements has been given in the JSC. Swedish commitments in these trade agreements of course falls entirely within the framework of the Anglo-American-Swedish War Trade Agreement which however also gives latitude for further agreements. The question regarding any such further agreements is expected to arise only with respect to Swedish trade with Norway and Denmark during second half of this year. The Swedish Government does not however intend to enter into any such further agreements with these two countries. After the fulfilment of the commitments arising out of agreements governing trade for the first 6 months of this year with these two countries, trade with each will be carried on a barter basis without any further agreements.

In relation to Germany, the Swedish Government will only apply existing agreements. They will decline any proposals for additional agreements. In other words, Sweden will stick strictly to the quotas with Germany which have already been established and will not entertain any proposals for increase of those quotas within the ceiling limits.

Both British Minister and I thanked Mr. Sohlman for the promptness of this reply and said that we were confident it would be appreciated by our Governments. It seems to both Mallet and me to be a most satisfactory response to our request.

My 728, July 21, 7 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>5</sup>

LONDON, July 27, 1944—11:49 a. m.

[Received July 27—9:15 a. m.]

738. Your message of July 14.<sup>6</sup> I entirely agree on the desirability of cutting off Swedish exports to the enemy. We must, however, avoid jeopardizing:

(a) The substantial economic warfare advantages we have already obtained in Sweden:

(b) Our military requirements, especially in relation to deception plans:

(c) Our sources of intelligence in Sweden:

(d) Our bases in Sweden for underground work in Denmark and Central Europe.

The Foreign Office is communicating with Winant regarding the form and timing of our approach to the Swedish Government.<sup>7</sup>

As soon as this is agreed, it will be necessary to approach the Russian Government and seek their support.

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-2744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 27, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received July 27—1 p. m.]

5942. (*Section I*) Reurtels 5490 July 13, 4 p. m. and 5491 July 13, 5 p. m. Following has just been received from Mr. Eden together with the draft of a proposed immediate joint personal letter to M. Günther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred to therein:

“Thank you for your letter of the 14th July regarding elimination of Swedish trade with the enemy.

As the Prime Minister has already informed the President we entirely agree regarding the desirability of such elimination. Indeed as you are probably aware this matter was informally raised with M. Hägglöf on the 5th July before his return to Sweden. It was suggested that the time had come when the Swedish Government of their own accord should suspend all trade with the Axis and that as a first stage they should prohibit all Swedish vessels from sailing to Axis ports. M. Hägglöf promised to consult with his Government but unfortunately owing to weather conditions his return was delayed for a week. We may assume however that the Swedes are now aware of what is in our minds.

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<sup>5</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>6</sup> See telegram 5490, July 13, 4 p. m., to London, p. 578.

<sup>7</sup> See *infra*.

The form and timing of the proposed approach to the Swedish Government need, we think, to be carefully considered. It would in our opinion be a mistake to lead off with a formal demand that Sweden should at once cease all trade with Axis countries—even more so if the demand were made public. As we and you know well, the Swedes are an extremely stubborn people and judging from past experience anything in the nature of an ultimatum would merely evoke a refusal. We should then either have to retract, which would be distasteful, or apply some form of sanctions. The latter course would presumably involve cutting off Swedish basic rations. The Swedes would then be under no obligation to observe and police last year's War Trade Agreement with the result that the enemy might well obtain more and not less economic assistance. Moreover we might jeopardize our other objectives in Sweden. These include (a) :

(*Section II*) Certain lines in which the Combined Chiefs of Staff are interested, the collection of intelligence and underground connections with Central Europe and Denmark. I may say that, in our opinion, the intelligence which has reached us from Sweden in recent months has been of the highest value. The Chiefs of Staff are communicating with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the aspects of the matter that chiefly interest them.

On the other hand the Swedes have shown during the past year a disposition to meet our wishes provided that they do not appear to be yielding to pressure, and publicity is avoided during the discussions. For example, you may remember that last year their economic delegation which visited London entered into a draft agreement to terminate the transit of German troops and war materials on Swedish railways, to include oil in the category of war materials, and to put a ceiling on the carriage of non-war materials on German account. The Swedish Government refused to ratify the agreement but put all these measures into force as an act of unilateral sovereignty. In this case, if they were to accede to our demands they would obviously wish it to appear that they had cut off trade with the Axis of their own accord and not because a pistol had been put to their heads by the Allies.

We think that the first step might be that Mr. Hull and I should send an immediate personal letter to M. Günther, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I enclose a draft for Mr. Hull's consideration. We suggest that the Swedes should be asked simultaneously to receive in the very near future a small delegation which would visit Stockholm secretly and there discuss this matter with the Swedish Foreign Office in consultation with the British and American Ministers. If your Government agrees, this delegation might perhaps consist of Mr. Riefler and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare, since they are both (*Section III*) familiar with Swedish commercial questions and, if the news of their visit leaked out, it could be said that they had come to attend meetings of the Stockholm Joint Standing Commission. They should be accompanied by a representative or representatives of the services so that the Germans, if they hear of the visit, may be left in some doubt as to its purpose.

In our view and that of the British Chiefs of Staff, the prohibition of all Swedish vessels from sailing to Axis ports is far the most important concession which we want from the Swedes in the immediate

future and far the most urgent. The German shipping position in the Baltic and northern waters is already most precarious and is likely to become more so. At the present time there are 1,100,000 g.r.t.<sup>8</sup> of shipping operating in the Baltic on enemy account. This total includes 360,000 g.r.t. of Swedish vessels. If this Swedish tonnage were withdrawn the effect on the enemy shipping position would be disastrous, particularly if he was finding it necessary at the same time to evacuate his forces from the Baltic States by sea. If, therefore, there was a prospect of obtaining this quickly, we should not wish to lose time by pressing for the immediate cessation of all trade with the Axis.

Whatever course we may decide to adopt it will be necessary to consult the Russians and obtain their support. As you know, they have already shown considerable interest in ball-bearing supplies from Sweden and there is some reason to think that they are anxious to stimulate Russian-Swedish trade at the earliest opportunity. The opening of direct traffic between Sweden and Russia might, therefore, make the Russians less, rather than more, anxious to use violent tactics with the Swedish Government.

As on former occasions the Swedes are likely to react to a suggestion of the kind (*Section IV*) proposed by asking what supplies we are prepared to make available. We know that they are seriously alarmed about their coal imports after the European armistice. Although they have stocks for some months ahead they still feel it necessary to import from Germany in case supplies are not forthcoming after the armistice. They are afraid that at that time they may be left without any coal at all. They are also, we believe, anxious to know whether the basic rations which they now obtain under the War Trade Agreement will continue to be available after the armistice. If the Swedish Government replies to our proposal by asking what we will do to replace the loss of supplies from Germany, I think we should be ready with some kind of answer. We should be grateful if your Government would consider this.

A point of minor importance which should not be overlooked is that there are certain exports to Norway and Denmark of little importance from the point of view of economic warfare, which your Government and ours might wish to continue, e.g. I do not suppose your authorities would wish to cut off the present relief exports from Sweden to Norway. There are also the humanitarian projects which we are urging or may urge on the Swedish Government, notably the schemes for the evacuation to Sweden of a large number of Norwegian and Jewish children. Finally, it seems to us quite essential for the reasons suggested above that this matter should be handled with the greatest secrecy. If any hint of what we have in mind were to appear in the press the chances of a successful outcome would, as I am sure you will agree, be greatly diminished."

(Proposed immediate joint personal letter to M. Günther). (*Section V*)

[Here follows in substance text of message presented to the Swedish Government on August 24, printed on page 626.]

WINANT

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<sup>8</sup> Gross registered tons.



740.00112 European War 1939/7-2744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1944—2 p. m.

6018. 1. For convenience of reference in the future please telegraph Legation in Stockholm and Embassy in Moscow close paraphrase of Embassy's 5942, July 27.

2. The British agreement in principle to this Government's proposal with respect to the elimination of Swedish trade with the enemy is gratifying and the contents of Mr. Eden's letter lead us to anticipate that there should be no difficulty in working out at a very early date a joint Anglo-American *démarche* supported by the Soviet Government.

3. Following are our observations on certain of the points made in your 5942; references are to sections of that telegram:

*Section I:*

(a) We agree with the British suggestion that as a first step towards the attainment of our major objective, namely the elimination of all Swedish trade with the enemy, an attempt be made to induce the Swedish Government to withdraw Swedish tonnage from the service of the enemy.

(b) Provided the Swedish Government does not procrastinate we are willing to give them an opportunity to take on their own initiative action responsive to our desires.

(c) While we hope that our objectives can be promptly attained through the diplomatic channel and without the use of sanctions candor compels us to observe that this Government would be prepared in the final analysis to employ against Sweden any pressures or sanctions which might seem calculated to further our aims, including the cutting off of Swedish basic rations. While the consequences of cutting off Swedish basic rations are matters of opinion we are inclined to believe that in the light of the rapidly developing military situation in the Baltic, Swedish public opinion would not permit the Swedish Government to retaliate against a cutting off of basic rations by relaxing existing controls over Swedish trade with the enemy.

*Section II:*

(a) We are fully aware of the various American and British military interests in Sweden and are in constant touch with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments with regard to these matters.

(b) We agree to the dispatch to the Swedish Foreign Minister of a joint message (rather than a letter) from Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull.

(c) The steps with respect to Sweden which we are about to take are regarded by this Government as of the highest political and military importance. Accordingly, we believe that it would be preferable to use the regular diplomatic channels, namely, the American and British Ministers in Stockholm, rather than to dispatch a special delegation to Stockholm.

*Section III:*

(a) British remarks on importance to the enemy of Swedish tonnage have been commented upon above.

(b) We entirely agree that the Russians must be consulted and kept fully informed of all developments. Our proposal is that after we and the British have agreed upon all necessary steps the Soviet Government be informed through the American and British Ambassadors in Moscow of our final plans and invited to throw Russian weight behind the joint Anglo-American *démarche* in Stockholm through appropriate representations by Madame Kollontay. The opening of direct traffic between Sweden and the Soviet Union might be assumed to offer an opportunity for direct negotiation between the Swedish and Soviet Governments with respect to trade between the two countries.

*Section IV:*

(a) Undoubtedly the Swedish Government will raise the question of replacement by the American, British and Soviet Governments of supplies formerly furnished by Germany. If, however, we are to attempt to induce the Swedes to withdraw Swedish tonnage from enemy service and eliminate all Swedish trade with the enemy of their own accord and not publicly as under pressure from the Allies, we are at this time inclined to think that we should make no commitments to the Swedes with respect to future supplies except that we will do what may be possible as occasion arises in the light of our own needs. We believe that in our approach to the Swedes the emphasis should be on the necessity for the Swedes to stand up and be counted in this war rather than to permit them to bargain for our future assistance. That assistance would presumably follow should Sweden's assertion of its policy vis-à-vis Germany be sufficiently forthright and unequivocal. In this connection we believe that the Swedes might appropriately be confronted with the thoughts set forth in paragraph numbered 1 of the Department's 666, April 14, to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's 2980 [2988].

(b) We agree that it may be necessary to permit humanitarian shipments to Norway and Denmark. We believe that these are details, however, which could be handled on an *ad hoc* basis by the Joint Standing Commissions.

(c) We fully agree that secrecy is essential.

*Section V:*

(a) Although we agree to the general approach taken in the proposed joint message to Günther we would have preferred a somewhat stronger tone. However, in order to expedite action we agree to the text of the message as drafted by the Foreign Office.

(b) We believe that when Johnson and Mallet present the joint message they should orally outline to the Swedish Foreign Minister the situation, political and military, which leads the British and American Governments and presumably the Soviet Government if its agreement can be obtained, to propose that the Swedish Government seize firmly the present opportunity to bring about this radical change in Swedish policy towards Germany. These oral remarks would follow and be a development of the conversation which Johnson has already had with Günther (see Stockholm's 2669, July 18, repeated to London as Stockholm's 677 [709]). The remarks made by Johnson in the latter conversation, however, were purported to have been his own personal suggestions and the oral statements now suggested would therefore be an official confirmation of what Johnson has already intimated might be forthcoming from the American and British Governments.

4. Please present the foregoing to Mr. Eden immediately so that we may obtain British concurrence with our views and move forward with this important matter including consultation with Moscow.

Sent to London for action, repeated to Stockholm as no. 1520 and to Moscow as no. 1822 for information only.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-344: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 3, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received August 4—6: 55 a. m.]

2931. Department's 1520, July 31, 5 p. m.<sup>9</sup> During past 3 weeks I have talked with Boheman and Sohlman, and Ravndal has talked with Sohlman and Ståhle along lines of following which is substance of an informal and unofficial memorandum I left with Boheman on his return from vacation, July 24.

Rapid change in military situation has made obvious United Nations will soon win war. Thoughtful persons are speculating as to what Sweden's lot in early postwar period will be. What Sweden has to offer in way of transportation and production facilities it is hoped by some will be so much in demand that Sweden necessarily will receive treatment equal to that accorded to United Nations.

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<sup>9</sup> Same as telegram 6018 to London, p. 590.

Other persons are not so sanguine. They anticipate that agencies of Allied Governments will control distribution of all-important fuel, food and raw materials. They realize that if Sweden should be cut off from its present European sources of supply, which they perceive may occur even before end of war, and if Allied supply agencies should fail when making allocations to make provision for Swedish requirements the economy of Sweden would face a painful deterioration which conceivably might be prolonged for a considerable time after the war.

Sweden has in recent past given evidence of its wish to cooperate with Allied Governments. The assistance has been materially reduced which our enemies have been able to derive from Sweden since 1943. Nevertheless, since war is now rapidly approaching end and Sweden can without apprehension contemplate action it had previously felt it could not for reasons of national security consider and since, furthermore, any and every possible step to hasten end of war which in lives and material is costing so much would be to common interest, there is strong feeling among Allies that Sweden should now give maximum assistance to Allies and entirely eliminate aid to their enemies.

Time has come when Sweden should recognize that while for contractual obligations we have greatest respect, in principle these contractual obligations when placed in scales with war's cost in treasure and blood become of little importance to people who are responsible for war's conduct. While a spontaneous demonstration at this time on Sweden's part that it desires fully to cooperate in shortening war would be understood and greatly appreciated by Allies, it is also thought that war is developing so rapidly that positive Swedish action may soon be too late to have significance desired.

If Sweden's action now does not induce us to take important needs of Sweden sympathetically into account when allocating raw materials, food and fuel, it can hardly be expected by Swedish Government that those agencies in immediate postwar period will be inclined to give much consideration to needs of Sweden.

In allocating goods in short supply Allied agencies have had long experience and in view of many advantages from this type of control to both producers and consumers it is not likely that immediately after war this administrative machinery will be discontinued. It is anticipated, indeed, in view of desirability of obviating in so far as practicable postwar economic disturbances Allies will as they enlarge their area of control retain machinery for planned international trade. A system of priorities apparently will have to be used and it is almost inevitable that as a practical matter a country's action during the war will be taken into account when that country's claim to materials in short supply is considered.

That Swedish Government wishes to assist Allies in shortening war is considered certain. Therefore, Sweden should now in interest of humanity as well as in its own interest reorient its trade. From spontaneously stating now its willingness to make this change Sweden has much to gain.

Sacrifices and risk Sweden has entailed from practical demonstrations it heretofore has given of its desire to cooperate with Allies. Time has now come when by eliminating entirely its assistance to

our enemies Sweden can go much farther. Sacrifices can be only of short duration, and almost non-existent would be the risk. Rewards for Sweden both economically and politically would be great on other hand. *End of substance of statement.*

It has been our impression from reactions of Foreign Office officials named that they are doing all in their power to convince the Government that Sweden should now and can now entirely stop its trade with Germany and enemy-controlled Europe. They are hopeful it will be possible within very near future to persuade the Government to use arrival of Russian troops on shores of Baltic as an excuse to withdraw Swedish ships from trade with Germany without violating terms of Swedish-German Trade Agreement.

My 817 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-544: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 5, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received August 6—1:50 p. m.]

2965. For the Acting Secretary. I saw Mr. Boheman this morning at his request. He said that he wished to acquaint me with certain developments which have taken place since I left the informal memorandum regarding Swedish trade with Germany referred to in my 2931 August 3, 6 p. m. He said that the Government has during the last few days given the most intensive consideration to possibilities of diminishing and even eliminating entirely its trade with Germany. Situation, however, is a very complicated one, which he desired to go into in some detail by way of background. First he explained the factual situation regarding shipping. There are 400,000 tons of Swedish shipping composed of ships of more than 1,000 tons each engaged in direct trade between this country and Germany. In addition there are a number of small craft with a total tonnage of about 65,000 tons.

This 465,000 tons represents the carriage of approximately 65% of the Swedish-German trade. In practice about one-half of the total is at all times tied up in German ports. Congestion in German ports due to Allied bombing and other conditions has the result that loading and unloading in German harbors takes place much more slowly than the corresponding operations in Swedish ports which is the basic reason why at any given moment so many ships are tied up in German harbors. Boheman says that is while [*that if*] the Government suddenly announces that there will be no more dispatch of goods and material from Sweden to Germany, there is no question but that Ger-

man Government will seize all of the Swedish ships then in its possession. Close to 250,000 tons of shipping will thus be lost to Sweden and would represent a calamity which this country cannot face. Boheman said that it must appear obvious moreover that such a result would not be in the Allied interest nor desired by the Allies. It is therefore essential that Swedish decisions to stop the shipping be taken by degrees and appear to be motivated entirely by practical necessities which even the Germans in their present situation will have to accept.

The Government has already stopped the departure of further Swedish flag ships to Stettin and other principal German ports because of the critical danger to the traffic. An opportunity may be given at any moment to put a stoppage to all the traffic and Boheman mentioned as a personal suggestion in this connection that the conclusion of an armistice or peace between Russia and the Mannerheim<sup>10</sup> Government in Finland might offer such an opportunity. The legal basis for this action is afforded by the provision in the shipping agreement with Germany that the Swedish Assurance Association may at any time when the situation in the Baltic so warrants, refuse to give any insurance to Swedish ship owners who engage in the Baltic traffic and to withdraw any insurance already issued. Boheman says that when the Assurance Association in any given case takes such action, no Swedish ship owner will venture his ships into the traffic. Other German ports will be added to this list as rapidly as feasible so that eventually there will be no Swedish shipping to German ports thereby in practice cutting off the Swedish-German trade. He said that this decision, of course, is one taken in entire independence by the Swedish Government and has not been the result of my informal representations.

He said however that he felt that we must realize that as a result of this decision we would be getting in effect everything that we wanted and he emphasized that there should be no publicity as it would greatly complicate the situation with Germany and raise serious difficulties for the Swedish Government. Mr. Boheman also made it clear that from the political point of view it is of real importance that this decision is taken by the Swedish Government in furtherance of the interests of Sweden and that it is not the result of pressure from us. I am convinced that Boheman and the Foreign Office in general as well as certain other elements in the Government are strenuously urging that the Swedish Government should now meet our desires. The going has not been easy in the face of contrary views among reluctant and timid members of the Government. It is Boheman's opinion that we will cut the ground right from under the feet of our friends in the Government by endeavoring to achieve our ends through methods of

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<sup>10</sup> Karl Gustav, Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim, President of Finland since August 4, 1944.

pressure on Sweden at this time. I expressed to Mr. Boheman my gratification at the information he had given me and said that I thought it was a great step forwards.

Regarding the German-controlled shipping in the Swedish-German trade which represents about 35% of the total, Boheman gave me the interesting information that there are strong indications that the Germans have already withdrawn part of it and that they may be compelled to draw out even more. The Germans are suffering from an acute shortage of shipping. With the Russian advances they will be compelled to divert ships now engaged in the Swedish-Baltic traffic to provisioning and evacuation of their troops in the Baltic. Some of these ships will likewise have to be diverted to the provisioning of the German forces in northern Finland which may succeed in getting into Norway. This circumstance therefore he thinks may result in the German-carried trade between Sweden and Germany reaching the vanishing point. This serious shortage of shipping in Germany and the imperative necessity for ships to provision and evacuate the troops in Esthonia and in northern Finland would constitute, Boheman says, an additional temptation to the Germans to seize the Swedish ships in their possession if the Swedes by precipitate and ill-considered action should afford them such an excuse.

I regard the information which Boheman has given me of this decision as of very great importance and I consider that we must take the view that the Swedish Government intends to implement it to its fullest extent and as rapidly as practicable. We have powerful friends in Sweden who are working toward our ends and I think it is in our deepest interest to allow this new development to take a natural course without any action on our part which may indicate suspicion of Swedish good intentions or which would play into the hands of the stubborn group who deeply resent any form of foreign pressure.

My 839, August 5, 10 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Riefler and my 14, August 5, 10 p. m. repeats this to Moscow for the Ambassador.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 6, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received August 6—2:50 p. m.]

6311. Personal for the Acting Secretary. Following up my 6266 of August 5,<sup>11</sup> Mr. Eden's reply was delayed because he was out in the country. It has just reached me and I am cabling it on to you:

<sup>11</sup> Not printed.

"My Dear Ambassador: Many thanks for your letter of August 2 enclosing a message from the Department of State dated July 31.<sup>12</sup> It seems to me that we are now agreed in almost all particulars on the form of approach to be made to the Swedish Government. It is only necessary for me to make a very few comments.

Since my letter to you of July 27,<sup>13</sup> we have been informed that Monsieur Hägglöf is likely to leave Stockholm for London on August 5 'to discuss certain matters with Riefler and Foot'. Presumably he will be bringing some kind of reply to the suggestions made to him on July 5. You will remember that on that occasion Riefler and Foot suggested that the time had come when the Swedes should discontinue all trade with the Axis and that as a first step, they should force their ships to sail to Axis ports. It is probable therefore that we shall learn something more of the Swedish attitude within the next day or two. Meanwhile we are informing Mallet of the lines on which we are proposing to proceed. We think too that we should at once take the preliminary step of informing the Russians. I will send you shortly a copy of our instructions to our Ambassador in Moscow which will direct him to approach the Soviet Government as soon as Mr. Harriman has received similar instructions. We shall also communicate our instructions to Clark Kerr to the State Department through our Embassy in Washington.

As regards paragraph *c* in the Department's message, we should be reluctant to cut off basic rations for Sweden since as I pointed out in my last letter to you, we are concerned not only with the preservation of the War Trade Agreement but also with certain other objectives in connection with which we are extremely dependent upon Swedish cooperation. This point can, however, be left aside for the present. Let us hope that it will never become actual.

I am quite willing that the communication from Mr. Hull and myself should take the form of a joint message rather than a letter.

With reference to part II, paragraph *c*, in the Department's telegram, it did seem to us that in present circumstances, the despatch of a delegation to Stockholm might cause some perplexity to the Germans who might well suppose that the discussions were not confined merely to economic questions. If, however, your Government feels that the matter would be better handled through the regular diplomatic channels, we will not press the point.

We entirely agree that the Swedes should if possible be persuaded to withdraw their tonnage from enemy service and to discontinue their trade with the enemy of their own accord and not as part of a bargain struck with the Allies. Nevertheless, the Swedes are quite certain to raise the question of compensating supplies and if the success or failure of the negotiations were to turn upon it, it might be worth-while to give them certain assurances. This is a matter which we have under urgent consideration and I will let you know if we wish to go farther than the formula which the State Department suggests.

We are most grateful to the State Department for agreeing to the text of the proposed joint message. We on our side agree that when

<sup>12</sup> See telegram 6018, July 31, 2 p. m., to London, p. 590.

<sup>13</sup> See telegram 5942, July 27, 4 p. m., from London, p. 587.



they present the message, Mallet and Johnson should speak as proposed in the Department's paragraph *b* of part IV [V].

Yours sincerely, Anthony Eden.<sup>5</sup>

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-844 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1944—8 p. m.

6263. Personal for the Ambassador. I want you to know that we all appreciate the efforts on your part which lie behind your 6311 and 6312<sup>14</sup> regarding an Anglo-American approach to Sweden.

It might be helpful to you to have an indication at this time of our plan of action with respect to this important matter: As stated in our 5491, July 13, we are determined to make every effort to eliminate all Swedish trade with the enemy and to this end are prepared to use all measures at our disposal. We are anxious, however, to go hand in hand with the British just as long as possible and with this in mind have agreed in the main to their proposals as regards the general line of our joint official *démarche* to the Swedes. On the other hand, we propose to exploit to the fullest extent the informal and unofficial conversations already initiated by Johnson on his own initiative with the Swedish Foreign Office and which parallel the similar conversation which Foot had with Hägglöf on July 5.<sup>15</sup>

We feel that we may be able to go further in presenting our view to the Swedes through the media of Johnson's informal conversations than perhaps the British would be willing at this time to go in our joint official approach. I think it only fair to say, however, that if the Swedes do not respond quite promptly to the official Anglo-American approach, supported we hope by the Russians, and to the parallel but independent informal approaches which we and the British are making we may feel compelled to invite the British to go along with us with more drastic measures against Sweden, proceeding alone if British concurrence cannot be obtained. I sincerely hope, however, that this contingency will not arise.

With reference to your 6312 we do not at all minimize the importance of the Swedish decision to take steps to immobilize Swedish shipping in the Baltic; however, in taking this decision and in formulating their plans for putting it into full effect the Swedes show an overcautiousness which to my mind is not warranted at the present stage of the war. What this country expects and hopes to obtain

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<sup>14</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>15</sup> See telegram 5339, July 6, 10 p. m., from London, p. 572.

from Sweden is not action which follows as a consequence of war developments but action which anticipates and helps to shape such developments and shorten the war.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-844 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1944—9 p. m.

1886. British Embassy here states that instructions have been sent by Foreign Office, London to Clark Kerr to join with you in inviting the Soviet Government to go as far as it feels able in supporting the Anglo-American *démarche* in Stockholm referred to in Department's 1822, July 31.<sup>16</sup> You are authorized to join with your British colleague in making this approach to the Soviet Government as soon as possible.

Sent to Moscow, repeated to London and to Stockholm.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-544 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 8, 1944—10 p. m.

1578. 1. We approve of the informal unofficial memorandum which you left with Boheman on July 24 (your 2931, August 3) but regret that the text was not transmitted earlier as its tone and content so thoroughly accord with our thought here that it might have influenced the contents of the Department's 1520, July 31 to Stockholm.<sup>16</sup>

2. It seems apparent from your 2931, 2965 and 2966<sup>17</sup> that influential groups within the Swedish Government have, under the pressure of military and political developments in Europe, taken very much to heart the informal observations which you have made to Günther and Boheman as well as the observations made by the British to Hägglöf and are moving towards the withdrawal of all Swedish facilities from the service of the enemy which is at this time our most important policy goal with respect to Sweden. We do not of course minimize the importance of Swedish action, past and contemplated, with respect to Swedish shipping in enemy service. We are disappointed, however, to note that the Swedish Government, while seemingly disposed to undertake steps with respect to Germany which

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<sup>16</sup> Same as telegram 6018 to London, p. 590.

<sup>17</sup> Telegram 2966, August 5, 1944, 10 p. m., not printed.

although taken in the name of Swedish interests alone also would be of benefit to the Allied cause, seems to contemplate taking these steps, in a spirit of caution, subsequent to certain political and military developments and not in time enough to have a decisive effect upon those political and military developments or, ultimately, upon the outcome of the war itself. Whether this apparent timidity is the result of the strength of pro-Axis or *laissez-faire* elements in the Swedish Government or whether it is another expression of the rather cynical policy outlined by Prime Minister Hansson in his speech of July 23 or whether it is the result of fear of some form of German retaliation is beside the point. We feel, and feel strongly, that, as you have well put it in the memorandum which you left with Boheman the war is developing so rapidly that positive Swedish action may soon be too late to have the significance desired by this Government. The time is ripe, and nearly over-ripe, for Sweden to take definitive action which will have a decisive effect upon the course of the war rather than to pursue a policy which although possibly consistent with Sweden's short term interest cannot be a basis for a Swedish claim to the position to which she might otherwise be entitled after this war shall have been won through the sacrifice of Allied blood and treasure, without any significant contribution to such victory having been made by the Swedish Government.

3. We feel, therefore, that the minimum initial action which this Government can take, consistent with its responsibility to the American people for the prosecution of the war with all measures at our disposal, would be the presentation of the joint message referred to in the Department's 1520, July 31, supplemented by strong oral representations. The British Government has now indicated substantial approval of the steps outlined in the Department's 1520 but desires to await the return to London of Häggglöf and the reply he presumably is bringing to the observations made to him by Foot on July 5. (Our assumption is that his observations will in the main follow those which Boheman has already made to you.) In the meantime the British and American Governments have agreed to inform the Russians of our contemplated action and instructions to that end will be sent to British and American Embassies at Moscow.

4. We feel that your memorandum of July 24 and other informal conversations with Boheman should be implemented as soon as possible by a further informal conversation between you and either Boheman or Günther which might follow the sense of paragraph 2 above. It might be well for you to introduce into such conversation a strongly worded personal observation with regard to the importance which you know that your Government attaches to positive Swedish steps which will exert a timely and substantial influence

on the course and duration of the war. You should also mention (in such a way that you may revert to the matter more officially later should you be instructed to do so) that should the Swedish Government fail spontaneously to take such definitive action, which manifestly would in the long run redound greatly to Sweden's advantage, your Government might feel compelled to make formal demands upon Sweden, failure to satisfy which could result in the taking of measures among which might very possibly be: (1) the cutting off of basic rations (2) the extension of the blacklist to cover all Swedish firms engaged in trade with the enemy (3) the vesting by the Alien Property Custodian of Swedish commercial interests in the United States and (4) the withdrawal of the General License now pertaining to Swedish financial transactions, supplemented by other measures of a financial and commercial nature.

Sent to Stockholm for action, repeated for information only to London as Department's no. 6265 and to Moscow as Department's no. 1887.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 10, 1944—2 a. m.

[Received 4:20 a. m.]

6395. From Riefler. Following is a paraphrase of a minute prepared by Mr. Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary of MEW, of the interview we had with Mr. Hägglöf this morning immediately following his return to London from Stockholm.

I can think of only two points in the very long interview which Mr. Foot neglected to mention. One was an inquiry by Mr. Hägglöf about our negotiations with Switzerland.<sup>19</sup> He expressed great surprise that the Swiss had announced the conclusion of a new trade agreement with Germany at about the time when we were asking Sweden to make no new commitments to the Axis of any kind. We replied that the announcement of the new German-Swiss agreement, as given to the press in Bern, did not give correct impression of the actual diminution of Swiss exports to Germany, nor did it indicate the concessions that were being made to us. We told Mr. Hägglöf that we did not think that we were treating Switzerland more partially than Sweden.

When Mr. Hägglöf inquired about the possibility of securing an allocation of supplies after the close of hostilities, and we replied as

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<sup>19</sup> See pp. 706 ff.

noted in last paragraph of Mr. Foot's minute, that under the present circumstances it would be futile to transmit such a request, Mr. Hägglöf turned to me and asked me directly whether in case Sweden should state, say, that all trade with Germany would be terminated as of tomorrow, would we then be willing to put up to the Combined Boards the question of postwar supplies to Sweden. I stated that under such a circumstance I would forward such a request.

*(Begin paraphrase Foot's minute.)*

Yesterday Hägglöf returned from Sweden and this morning he came to see Mr. Riefler and me. He stated that immediately upon his return to Stockholm he had conversations with American and British Ministers in which suggestions put forward in our July 5 interview were discussed.<sup>20</sup> Subsequently a number of unofficial discussions had taken place between him and Boheman on one hand, and Mallet and Johnson on the other. Everything which he could do he had done in order to bring our requests to Swedish Government's attention. Swedish Government was unwilling to follow Turkey's example<sup>21</sup> and sever commercial relations completely at last moment when it was absolutely certain that imminent defeat faced Germany. Hägglöf had not been able to make much progress regarding proposal on shipping until he had managed to place question on technical level rather than political.

Foot and Riefler were then informed by Hägglöf of certain information they had already received; that is to say, Swedish Government intends to refuse to issue insurance for ships of Swedish registry sailing to certain ports in Germany, and to increase steadily number of ports under such prohibition. In Sweden marine insurance is in Government's control, and it is impossible for risks to be covered anywhere else by Swedish shipowners.

Presently 300 Swedish ships are engaged in trading with ports in Germany. Of these 150 are small and 150 are large. Round trip on average from a Swedish to a German port and return takes 4 weeks approximately.

Insurance has not been issued for vessels of Swedish registry sailing to Rotterdam since last year. On August 4 insurance for ships sailing to Emden and Delfzyl in Holland had been refused. Emden had always been one of principal iron ore ports. Bremen and Hamburg are next in order, and it is Hägglöf's opinion that some time this week prohibition will be applied to them. Result of foregoing would be end of all North Sea trade and in turn that amounts to greater part of trade between Sweden and Germany. Of Swedish ships engaged in iron ore traffic, 70 to 80 per cent sailed to ports in

<sup>20</sup> See telegram 5339, July 6, 10 p. m., from London, p. 572.

<sup>21</sup> See vol. v, pp. 814 ff.

North Sea. On arrival there they loaded coal or alternatively went to Danzig and there took on coal cargoes.

It is intention that later on prohibition should be applied to ports in Baltic. Naturally all such development would depend upon military events should war take a different turn and, for example, should Russians be forced to withdraw, it would be necessary to change program. However, assuming continued Russian advance and continued increase in dangers to Swedish ships, in due course, all ports in Germany would be closed to Swedish trade. However, it is important that process take place step by step. Half of Swedish ships engaged in this traffic at any given moment are at ports in Germany, and due to congestion in these ports it is not easy to have loading expedited. Should a general ban be suddenly imposed by Swedes, Swedish ships in German ports might well be seized by Germans.

Foot stated that this danger was realized by him. Foot pointed out at same time that he hoped that it would not take long to complete process of extricating Swedish vessels. He thought that as a matter of friendly advice he should tell Hägglöf that sooner all ships of Swedish registry had returned to ports in Sweden, better it would be from all viewpoints. Should there be any doubts in Hägglöf's mind about importance attached by us to this matter, Hägglöf should remember recent attack on Brunsbittel Locks and recent mining of Kiel Canal. Each of these had been difficult operations requiring long preparation and special training and equipment.

What Foot said was obviously taken most seriously by Hägglöf; however, latter asked whether Allies were correct in placing such great importance on Baltic shipping. It would be necessary for Germans to employ German vessels for supplying or evacuating troops in Finland or Baltic States. It is unlikely that they would desist from doing so, so as to make up loss of Swedish vessels engaged in traffic in iron ore. That this is probably true was admitted by Foot. But he said in addition that highest importance was attached by us to reduction in general tonnage pool available in Baltic and northern waters generally to Germans. They would be greatly embarrassed if it was necessary for them to choose between ceasing to evacuate or provision their forces or abandoning their overseas trade. It was Foot's desire to leave Hägglöf in no doubt regarding fact of our interest in this matter. Gradual attrition of enemy shipping in past had been part of our general program of economic warfare, which was designed to reduce enemy's war potential gradually. However at this time question of amount of shipping available to enemy has an operational significance which is immediate.

Hägglöf informed us during this portion of conversation that recently there had been a decrease in number of German vessels

trading with Sweden, but number of Danish vessels engaged in this trade on account of Germany increased. There was also a decrease in number of ships of Finnish registry because several of them had sought a refuge in ports in Sweden. Hägglöf had heard that total of these vessels was 35,000 tons (presumably dead weight).

Hägglöf was pressed by us to give us some idea of period which would elapse before all ports in Germany were closed to Swedish vessels. He was unable to do this, but our impression is that an answer on this might be given at a later interview by him. It was his promise that we would be informed currently as the ban was extended to each port. So far he stated Stettin was safest of all ports. To date the ban had not yet been applied to Stettin, (note: This is in conflict with the information Johnson was given by Boheman, but it is probable that version on [of] Hägglöf is correct).

According to Hägglöf at this time very few Swedish ships are calling at ports in Denmark; however, aside from ordinary shipping there are the Swedish-Danish and Swedish-German ferries. Although bulk of ferry traffic is small, value is high.

Hägglöf then stated that a number of those persons with whom these matters had been discussed by him in Stockholm were surprised that the Western Powers should have been the chief source for these approaches. These persons believed that it was likely that Russia would be the dominant power in Baltic, and it was their expectation that representations on such matters as the trade of Sweden with ports in Germany would come from Moscow, in first place. To this Foot replied that Russians agreed with us entirely. In addition particular interest had always been showing [shown] by them regarding traffic in iron ore. Naturally, however, each belligerent was inclined to have the largest interest in those particular operations in which it engaged its own forces. Attacks on enemy shipping in northern waters during last 4 years had mainly been carried out by Royal Navy, Coastal Command and Bomber Command, and this made British rather shipping conscious.

Hägglöf next raised question whether we still had an interest in discussing a war trade agreement for next year. Foot and Riefler expressed their opinion that this question was probably academic. Hägglöf agreed with them. Then Hägglöf proceeded to raise question of supplies. Sweden at present under War Trade Agreement has her basic rations. Then he asked when the war came to an end what would happen? Foot and Riefler replied that no answer to this question could be given by them. There would undoubtedly be acute shortages in period after armistice. Allocations of any supplies to neutral countries might even have to be at expense of countries which had been liberated. Should Government of Sweden be ready to stop

all trade with Germany for remainder of war a strong case to Combined Board could have been made by us; however Foot and Riefler gathered that Swedish Government was unwilling to make a decision of this order. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1944—5 p. m.

1597. There seems to be some conflict between the information given you by Boheman and that given the British by Hägglöf upon his return to London as regards the German ports to which Swedish sailings have been stopped. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this confusion is deliberate and designed to confuse the issues involved. We continue to be unimpressed by the Swedes' desire to postpone further action to terminate Swedish sailings to enemy ports until further military developments have taken place in the Baltic and are unmoved, as stated in Department's 1584, August 9,<sup>22</sup> by their concern over losing their ships which are now in enemy ports.

If the Swedes really desire to contribute to the harassment of the enemy, it seems to us that immediate cancellation of insurance of all Swedish vessels serving enemy needs in the Baltic would be fully justified by the military situation in the Baltic of which even the man in the street is cognizant. There also seems to us to be no reason why the Swedes cannot take appropriate action to withdraw Swedish tonnage now in enemy ports within say a week at the outside and to prevent further sailings to such ports either through cancellation of insurance or through administrative action.

Please bring the foregoing observation informally to the attention of Boheman as soon as possible.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as no. 6348 and to Moscow as no. 1913.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 11, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:28 p. m.]

3056. This afternoon Boheman advised me he had instructed Hägglöf yesterday to advise Foot and Riefler that Swedish Insurance

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<sup>22</sup> Not printed.



Board has decided to refuse insurance to any Swedish shipping to any North Sea German port. Boheman explained that roughly 55% of Swedish iron ore exports to Germany are carried on Swedish ships. As vast majority of this traffic must be unloaded at North Sea ports Boheman estimates action of Board will result in immediate curtailment of about 40% of total iron ore shipments to Germany. This measure of refusing insurance is in fact a Government act and Boheman informs me Board itself acting on business basis had stated that there was no necessity for the action, that existing circumstances would only require them to raise insurance rate. The measure is not applicable to ships already loaded and at sea en route to destination which cannot be recalled. It has not yet been made applicable to Baltic ports and Swedish shipping has not yet been stopped from going to Baltic ports with exception of Danzig. Boheman's statement to me the other day (see my 2965 August 5, 10 p. m.) that Stettin had been included is a mistake. As soon as Swedish Government has information that Russian submarines can operate in Baltic they will stop Swedish shipping to Baltic ports.

I thanked Boheman for the information and asked him informally if it were not true that great majority of Swedish ships in trans-Baltic traffic are coal burners and old vessels. He said it was true and explained importance to Sweden of these ships on ground that they all are ships of small tonnage suitable for rivers, taking on lumber and discharging coal cargoes. Swedish shipping authorities he said attach great importance to possession of these small vessels at war's end for transporting coal and other short-haul commodities. Having in mind Department's 1584, August 9, 6 p. m.,<sup>23</sup> I reverted to his statement to me the other day (my 2965, August 5, 10 p. m.) to the effect that Swedish Government apprehends Germany would seize such of this shipping as might be in its possession if the Swedes suddenly and openly announced cessation of trade with Germany, and asked him why, if the Germans were in such dire need of shipping, they had not lighted upon some pretext to take this shipping long ago. He answered that the Germans "dared not"; that the cargoes borne by these ships were of far more importance to Germany than possession of craft of this small individual tonnage. Now, however, if the Swedes should suddenly announce severance of all trade with Germany the Germans having nothing to lose would most certainly seize these ships which were mainly of use to the Germans in the short-haul Baltic traffic and Sweden, he said, simply cannot afford to lose them. I talked at considerable length with Mr. Boheman, as if the ideas were entirely my own, along lines indicated in Department's 1578, August 8, 10 p. m., section 2, emphasizing particularly that the Swedish action which

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<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

I thought would have the greatest effect in the opinion of my Government, would be action which might have a direct effect upon the course of the war anticipatory of military events rather than such action coming after and synchronized with Allied military successes. Boheman expressed himself as in agreement with this idea and said that he is daily urging it to his Government. He also stated that the action reported in the beginning of this telegram with regard to Swedish shipping to North Sea German ports is definitely of an "anticipatory" character. The line of argument I took, which follows the Department's thought and my own, is entirely understood by Boheman, but I do not think we should minimize the difficulties he and others of the same mind are having with certain elements in the Swedish Government, not least of whom is the Prime Minister. Boheman explained that in 1940 they had adopted a certain line and policy of neutrality under spur of the most imperative necessity in order to save Sweden from the fate of Norway and other countries occupied by Germany. This policy had been observed with more or less consistency and had resulted successfully as far as saving Sweden from a military attack by Germany. For Sweden now, when the issue of the war against Germany is an undoubted fact, to kick the prostrate animal is repugnant to Swedish thinking. He said that he personally could not help but feel ashamed if Sweden now gave a kick to the dying German machine for any motive of prospective material benefit to Sweden. He said rather strongly that the Swedish Government would never consent to making their country a second "Turkey". As to the stoppage in fact of all trade with Germany, he said that there was nothing that he more greatly desired and that he believed it would not be long until in fact all trade was stopped. As soon as Marshal Mannerheim has got Finland out of the war with Russia Boheman said that all trade with Germany on Swedish ships would cease. With reference to the German-controlled shipping in Swedish trade, Boheman said that they had intercepted a message from Germany to German Baltic shipping ordering them to accept no new charters and that all ships not in process of fulfilling a present engagement should repair at once to Lindau. These ships as Boheman has told me before are urgently needed by the Germans for provisioning and evacuation of their forces in the Baltic. Proper authorities he said are making every endeavor now to check on this intercepted message and to discover exactly what is happening (see my 3042, August 10, 9 p. m.<sup>24</sup>).

My 874, August 11, 7 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1144: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 11, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 10:25 p. m.]

2953. In accordance with the Department's instruction 1886 of August 8, I have today sent to the Soviet Foreign Office the text of the proposed joint message to the Swedish Foreign Minister and have invited the Soviet Government to associate itself with this *démarche*. The British Ambassador has done likewise.

Sent to Department and repeated to London as No. 137 and Stockholm.

HARRIMAN

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1044: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1944—11 p. m.

6368. Your 6402, August 10.<sup>25</sup> 1. We have no objection to an Anglo-American warning supported if possible by the Russians, to the Swedes that we look to them to do everything possible to see that Swedish ships in Northern waters are not seized by the Germans.<sup>26</sup>

It must be understood, however, that we do not agree to any delay in the proposed formal joint approach to the Swedes beyond that reasonably necessary to give the Russians an opportunity to support such an approach. See our telegram to Moscow, repeated to London as Department's 6264, our 6265<sup>27</sup> and our 6263.<sup>28</sup>

2. Riefler's suggestion to delay the proposed approach to the Swedes relative to their joining the postwar shipping pool is approved. Appropriate instructions will be sent to our shipping representatives in London later.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> The Minister in Sweden was instructed in telegram 1631, August 16, 1944, to join Mr. Mallet in delivering the above warning to the Swedish Government; Ambassador Harriman was instructed to request Soviet support as soon as the British Ambassador received similar instructions (740.00112 EW/8-1444).

<sup>27</sup> Same as telegrams 1886 to Moscow, and 1578 to Stockholm, p. 599.

<sup>28</sup> Dated August 8, 8 p. m., p. 598.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1944—7 p. m.

1619. Today the Swedish Minister <sup>29</sup> called on Mr. Dunn <sup>30</sup> to discuss with him the various conversations which you have recently had with Boheman and other Swedish officials, the tenor of which had been given orally to Aminoff <sup>31</sup> a few days ago by another officer of the Department. Boström said that we seemed to be making very strong demands of Sweden and called attention to the fact that Sweden had already taken some steps to withhold aid from Germany by terminating Swedish sailings to some German ports. He was told that the aid which Sweden might contribute towards shortening the war might be graded as "some, more and most"; that terminating Swedish sailings to a few German ports might be characterized as "some" help; that what this Government expected however was the "most" cooperation from Sweden. Boström observed that that could only mean terminating all Swedish trade with Germany. He was told that this was precisely what the American Government desired.

Boström then observed that Sweden had to exercise caution in taking steps which might compromise its policy of neutrality because of the possible effect of such a precedent upon Sweden's position in the next war. Mr. Dunn replied that we were bending every effort to crush such peace breakers as Germany and Japan and upon their defeat to assist in bringing about the creation of an international security organization without which there could be little hope for peace in the future; that if such an organization were not established it would be wishful thinking to suppose that the development of modern means of warfare would permit any nation in the future to remain neutral should some powerful aggressor nation arise and set out to dominate the world.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's 6444.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1944—7 p. m.

6466. You will have noted from Department's telegram to Moscow of today's date,<sup>32</sup> repeated to London for information, that if the

<sup>29</sup> Wollmar F. Boström, Swedish Minister in the United States.

<sup>30</sup> James C. Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs.

<sup>31</sup> Alexis de Aminoff, Counselor of the Swedish Legation in the United States.

<sup>32</sup> Telegram 1940, not printed.

Soviet Government is not yet prepared to reach a decision with respect to supporting the proposed Anglo-American *démarche* in Stockholm this Government desires to proceed with the delivery of the joint message leaving it to the Russians to give their support later. As we anticipate therefore that the joint message will be delivered to the Swedes within the next 2 or 3 days we believe that Johnson and Mallet should be working out the general line to be taken in the oral remarks which they are to make simultaneously with the delivery of the message.

Your 6311, August 6 indicates that the British Government has agreed to the proposals set forth in that portion of our 6018, July 31 (1520 to Stockholm and 1822 to Moscow) designated "Section V (b)". In view, however, of the events which have taken place since the dispatch of that telegram we believe that the subject matter of the remarks to be made by Johnson and Mallet should be expanded to include not only Johnson's earlier conversation with Günther but also the substance of the informal memorandum which he left with Boheman on July 24 (see Stockholm's 2931, August 3, repeated to London as 817) as well as paragraph 4 of Department's 6265, August 8,<sup>33</sup> which was repeated to Stockholm as 1578 and to Moscow as 1887.

It is our intention that Johnson's remarks while made orally will be made under instructions from his Government and not informally and on his own responsibility. We hope that Mallet will be given similar instructions.

We hope that the joint message can be delivered not later than August 18 and Johnson is so instructed provided of course that appropriate instructions are sent Mallet.

We must emphasize that although we hope that the British Government will fully associate itself with our proposals we are prepared to go alone if full British concurrence cannot be obtained. Today's landings in the south of France point to the rapidity with which the time is slipping by during which Sweden can make a tangible contribution towards the shortening of the war and the saving of Allied lives.

Sent to London and repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 1625 for appropriate action. Repeated to Moscow for information as no. 1944.

HULL

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<sup>33</sup> Same as telegram 1578 to Stockholm, p. 599.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1644: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 16, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received August 16—7:30 p. m.]

3123. Reference my 3106, August 15, 6 p. m. (895 to London).<sup>34</sup> This afternoon I talked with Mr. Assarsson, Acting Secretary General of the Foreign Office. During the course of the conversation I told him in detail of the contents of paragraph 4, Department's 1578, August 8, warning that, in my opinion, unless Sweden of her own volition took action I was confident she would be presented with formal demands and that if those demands were then rejected the reaction was certain to be sharp. Mr. Assarsson expressed himself as being personally in favor of immediate recall of all Swedish ships in German trade and stated that in a long interview he had this morning with Prime Minister Hansson he had urgently presented this view. Mr. Assarsson gave the genuine impression that he strongly favors immediate and vigorous action.

I reiterated many of the arguments which are familiar to the Department and which it is hardly necessary to repeat but emphasized again and again that I thought it was in Sweden's highest interest to act immediately to withdraw all her shipping from German trade and not to await further military developments of any nature in any area. I also drew attention to the considerations treated in the Department's 6368, August 11 to London (repeated to Stockholm as 329, August 14, 1 p. m.) and urged upon Assarsson that he make every endeavor to have ships which left Swedish waters prior to withdrawal of insurance for North German seaports ordered to return. I commented that it hardly seemed necessary to point out prime necessity for Swedish ships not being seized by Germany in an emergency which might at any moment arise and that every effort should be made to have all shipping withdrawn before such situation arose. I also asked him if Swedish shipping authorities had given appropriate instructions to captains and crews of Swedish ships for action to prevent their ships falling into German hands, suggesting that if necessary they be scuttled. Assarsson said he thought there might be practical difficulties in way of that suggested action but promised to take up again with Prime Minister at once the various points I have raised and urge immediate action.

My 900 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1744 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 17, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 18—2:30 p. m.]

3147. Legation believes it advisable to review history piston rings negotiations in view Department's 1602, August 12, noon,<sup>35</sup> as Department and FEA might wish to give consideration to various factors which Legation believes have strong bearing on settlement and final outcome on these negotiations. The seriousness of export of piston rings from Sweden to enemy Europe was first raised by Department and FEA in 366, March 7, 5 p. m.<sup>36</sup> which instructed Legation to request Swedes to place embargo on piston rings. 490, March 23, 9 p. m.<sup>36</sup> instructed Legation to pursue any course of action deemed most effective by it in obtaining complete embargo. London's 108, March 27, 9 p. m. (2493 to Department)<sup>36</sup> likewise restressed importance of obtaining prohibition of exports on basis information available in London.

Legation's 1059, March 29, 2 p. m. (238 to London)<sup>36</sup> reported that Sohlman had arranged for refusal export licenses for piston rings for second quarter and his informal request that as compensation for embargo, Allies place orders for 300,000 kronor piston rings for 1944. Department's 639, April 11, 6 p. m.<sup>36</sup> stated our Government's willingness to comply with the request and again stressed urgency for immediate action. Question of urgency was again raised Department's 826, May 4, 9 p. m.<sup>36</sup> In Department's 1220, June 19, 10 a. m.,<sup>36</sup> Department and FEA restated objective of total prohibition and confirmed offer to purchase piston rings to value 300,000 kronor. Legation's 2226, June 20, 10 p. m.<sup>36</sup> reported that while during period of negotiations no export licenses had been granted for piston rings destined for enemy Europe firm had taken position it could not cancel all outstanding orders. Department and FEA considered this disappointing. (Department's 1251, June 24, 3 p. m.<sup>36</sup>).

Difficulties in company's compliance with our requests were emphasized and elaborated upon at time of visit of Chairman of Boards of Directors of Davy Robertson (Legation's 2537, July 9, 10 a. m., not repeated to London and Legation's 2619, July 14, 8 p. m., repeated to London as my 693<sup>37</sup>).

In view of these difficulties we recommended that (1) United States supply piston rings for 200 Twin Row Wasp engines, (2) we provide

<sup>35</sup> Not printed; it stated that the present situation did not warrant any concessions to Sweden to obtain an embargo on export of piston rings to Germany (103.9169/8-1244).

<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

<sup>37</sup> Neither printed.

suitable furnace for manufacture of piston rings required by Swedish Air Forces; (3) we reimburse Davy Robertson for the 50–60,000 kronor value of piston rings they would have to scrap; (4) we place orders to compensate Davy Robertson for outstanding orders with enemy Europe which it would have to cancel. It should be noted that Davy Robertson was anxious to be permitted to export 140,000 kronor of outstanding orders but Legation took position pursuant to Department's and FEA's instructions that because of great benefit derived by enemy from export of piston rings nothing short of complete embargo would be satisfactory.

Legation naturally indicated in accordance with Department's and FEA's authorization that our Government would be willing to compensate Davy Robertson for loss incurred as direct result cancelling orders as result of compliance with our request for continuance of total embargo.

London's 266, July 20 (5757 to Department) <sup>38</sup> raised for first time possibility that the piston rings being exported from Sweden were not sufficiently important to enemy to warrant our spending any funds to prevent any exports thereof. As stated in its 2758, July 25, <sup>38</sup> Legation advised that withdrawal of our offer at this time would undermine confidence in our good faith. Department's 1511, July 29 <sup>38</sup> implied furnace could probably be delivered. Furthermore its 1590, August 10 <sup>38</sup> stated it was probable Wasp piston rings could be supplied from England and agreed that our compensation offer was still open.

The Legation believes that only bases on which we can in good faith obtain continuance of complete embargo are set forth in its 3021 August 9 (864 to London). <sup>39</sup> It would be unfair to the firm to advise them that an electric melting furnace will be furnished when we know it is extremely unlikely that this can be arranged (Department's 1590). Moreover in view of strong interest of Swedish Air Force in obtaining this furnace for manufacture piston rings for its use an unfulfilled promise for delivery of furnace may have undesirable consequences with Swedish Government at a time we are pressing for far more important concessions than those under reference.

In view long period of negotiations, which Legation, pursuant to Department's and FEA's instructions, has increasingly taken strong position that export embargo is a matter of military necessity, Legation believes that only alternatives are to withdraw our request and accept undesirable consequences or to fulfill moderate requests of

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<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

<sup>39</sup> Not printed; it suggested that the Davy Robertson Company be supplied an electrical furnace and be given fair compensation for cancelled orders and lost business in return for maintaining a complete embargo on export of piston rings to Germany (740.00112 European War 1939/8–944).



Davy Robertson and Swedish Air Force as summarized Legation's 3021, August 9.

It is to be emphasized that the Legation seems to have succeeded to date in accomplishing the specific and urgent aim set forth by FEA and Department in telegram 490, March 23, subsequent to which it appears that this aim is found to be of less value than first supposed with consequent difficulties in settling the obligations meanwhile undertaken by the Legation under instructions.

Legation should appreciate Department's and FEA's further instructions before it takes final action.

My 908, August 17, midnight repeats this message to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 18, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 6:55 p. m.]

3056. In a letter dated August 18, Vyshinski<sup>41</sup> referring to my two communications of August 11 and 16 respectively,<sup>42</sup> states that the Soviet Government supports the initiative of the American and British Governments in relation to the actions they have indicated "which have as their object impelling Sweden radically to change its policy in relation to Germany." He states that the Soviet Government "also supports the proposal of the American and British Governments in relation to the cessation of all Swedish trade with Germany and its Allies in Europe, in the North as well as in the Baltic Seas." He further stated that the Soviet Minister in Stockholm has been instructed to support the appropriate joint *démarche* of the British and American Ministers there.

My communication of August 11 related to the proposed joint message to the Swedish Government. The communication of August 16 related to the proposed warning against permitting Swedish shipping to fall into enemy hands.

Sent to the Department as 3056 and repeated to London as No. 146 and to Stockholm.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>41</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>42</sup> See telegram 2953, August 11, 10 p. m., from Moscow, and paragraph 1 of telegram 6466, August 16, 7 p. m., to London, pp. 608 and 609, respectively.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1744: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—6 p. m.

6607. On Friday, August 18, the British Embassy here showed us Foreign Office telegram (your 6635, August 17<sup>48</sup>) setting forth the latest British observations on the proposed joint approach to Sweden. In summary the British urge (1) that presentation of joint message be deferred until Soviet clearance is received; (2) that the threat of sanctions be omitted from the supplementary oral remarks to be made by Mallet and Johnson; and that (3) as a substitute for the threat of sanctions Mallet and Johnson make an oral statement to the following effect: (a) the British and American Governments are far from satisfied with Swedish action up-to-date in the matter of suspension of sailings to German ports; (b) the two Governments are not prepared, as proposed by the Swedes, to await a serious Finnish peace offer to the Soviet Union before the Lulea iron ore traffic is stopped; and (c) the two Governments must therefore ask for a definite program of the proposed Swedish steps and the dates on which such steps will be taken, and in particular must know at once by what date all Swedish sailings to German ports will have been stopped.

Our views are as follows: The Soviet Government (see Moscow's 3056, August 18, which was repeated to London and to Stockholm) has instructed the Soviet Minister in Stockholm to support the joint *démarche* of the British and American Ministers there. The Soviet Government also supports the Anglo-American initiative with a view to impelling Sweden radically to change its policy in relation to Germany and furthermore supports the Anglo-American proposals in relation to the cessation of all Swedish trade "with Germany and its Allies in Europe in the North as well as in the Baltic Seas". Accordingly we desire that the joint message as previously agreed upon be delivered to the Swedish Government on Monday, August 21.

With respect to the supplementary oral remarks we reserve the position which we have previously maintained, namely, that if necessary we are prepared to present the Swedes with formal demands coupled with a threat to take certain measures available to us if our demands are not complied with. With a view however to getting on with this matter as urgently as possible we nevertheless agree to omit the threat of sanctions from the oral explanations to be made by Johnson and Mallet on Monday and to substitute therefor the British suggestions outlined above. We must insist, however, upon the inclu-

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<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

sion in the remarks of the two Ministers, as under instructions from their respective Governments, of the other material referred to in the second paragraph of our 6466, August 16, to London. We also must insist that Johnson and Mallet make clear to the Swedish Government that we expect a very prompt and unequivocal reply to the joint message and supplementary oral statements and that the Anglo-American requirements cannot be considered as having been satisfactorily met until the Swedish Government has terminated all trade relations with the enemy and radically changed its policies with respect to Germany. Johnson is also instructed to say nothing himself and to avoid seeming to acquiesce in any statements by his British colleague that might in any way be taken by the Swedish Government to preclude subsequent formal American demands coupled with the threat of retaliatory measures in case the demands are not complied with.

We are willing to go thus far in meeting the British proposals because Johnson, as reported in his 3133 [3123], August 16, has already placed on record at the Swedish Foreign Office the possibility that unless the Swedish Government of its own volition takes prompt action to meet the American military requirements, the Swedes will be presented with formal demands.

Please bring the foregoing to the immediate attention of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. We are informing the British Embassy here.

Johnson is instructed to inform Madame Kollontay in detail of our proposed steps in order that she may synchronize with him the execution of her instructions from Moscow.

Sent to London and repeated to Stockholm as No. 1656 Aug. 19 for action and repeated to Moscow for information as No. 1977.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—10 p. m.

6614. Stockholm's 3163, August 18, 8 p. m.,<sup>45</sup> just received reports that Boheman has informed Johnson that afternoon of August 18 orders were given withdrawing insurance for all Swedish shipping including Baltic ports. Authorization for order was given by the Prime Minister and must remain technically provisional until Monday when other members of Government return to Stockholm.

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

In agreeing to London's suggested addition to oral statement (Department's No. 6607, 6 p. m. August 19,) this Government was principally motivated by a desire to get the earliest possible action and so far as possible to meet British views. It was felt, however, that there was danger by attaching so much emphasis to the shipping point that the wider objective to which this Government attaches the greatest importance might be prejudiced. In view of Johnson's information referred to above, perhaps the British would now agree to withdraw their suggested amendment to the oral message. Such withdrawal would not affect our agreement to drop the threat of sanctions from the oral statement.

Please take this up at once but emphasize that if the British do not wish to withdraw their amendment we would rather agree to its retention than to delay delivery of joint message and oral statement beyond Monday the 21st.

Please inform Stockholm directly as well as the Department of result of your talk with the British on this matter.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as No. 1659 Aug. 19 and to Moscow as No. 1979.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2044: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 20, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 20—9:06 p. m.]

6753. British have instructed Mallet to proceed with joint formal statement and accompanying oral comments in accordance with Department's 6607, August 19, 6 p. m. (1656 to Stockholm) as modified by Department's 6614, August 19, 10 p. m. (1659 to Stockholm), unless in the opinion of the British, Russian and American Ministers the making of this approach on Monday, August 21, would jeopardize Swedish Government ratification of the decision taken by Boheman on August 18 to withdraw insurance from Swedish ships sailing to Baltic ports as reported in Stockholm's 3163, August 18.<sup>46</sup>

Sent to Stockholm as 352 and repeated to Department as 6753 and Moscow as 90.

WINANT

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<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-1744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1944—7 p. m.

1669. Department and FEA have given careful consideration to Legation's 3147, August 17, midnight, repeated to London as 908. They appreciate your efforts to obtain piston ring embargo.

In view of present situation, we desire that you abstain from initiating further discussions on this point. Should Davy Robertson press for a decision, you are instructed to withdraw request for embargo originally made last March, explaining at your discretion that we are unable to make available at this time the electric furnace, Wasp piston rings, nor additional funds.

It may be pointed out that the Swedes have failed since mid-April to accept our offer of \$75,000.00 in return for a total embargo.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1944—8 p. m.

1991. We are very gratified over the wholehearted support which the Soviet Government (your 3056, August 18) has given to our initiative with respect to Sweden. We are particularly pleased to note that the Soviet Government apparently concurs in the importance which we attach to the American Government's major objectives, namely, (1) elimination of Sweden's trade with the enemy, and (2) a drastic revision of Swedish policy vis-à-vis Germany. Your efforts to bring this about are highly commended.

We are hopeful that the Anglo-American *démarche*, which as a matter of fact has now become in effect an Anglo-American-Soviet *démarche*, and which we trust will be made today or tomorrow, will result in the prompt initiative by Sweden of definitive action towards attainment of our major objectives. As you will have noted, however, from the Department's telegrams on this subject, particularly, for example, our 1938, August 15,<sup>47</sup> we feel very strongly that if the Swedish Government does not on its own initiative take prompt action which will shorten the war by anticipating and aiding in shaping military developments in Europe, we should make formal demands upon Sweden and couple those demands with a warning that if they are not

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

met we shall be compelled to take certain measures which are outlined in paragraph (4) of our 1887, August 8.<sup>48</sup> We are fully prepared to make these demands alone, if necessary, but of course would prefer to have British and Soviet support. The British have so far proved reluctant to commit themselves to go with us in formal demands coupled with a threat of retaliatory measures if those demands are not complied with. The apparent coincidence of American and Soviet views, as reflected in your 3056 leads us to hope, however, that the Soviet Government would agree with us on the necessity of making such formal demands upon Sweden should a prompt Swedish response to our current *démarche* not be forthcoming. Accordingly we feel that it might be well for you in your discretion to have a talk with the appropriate Soviet official on the basis of our 1938 and 1943, August 15,<sup>49</sup> and other telegrams in which we have expressed our views with a view to laying the groundwork for close American-Soviet cooperation with respect to Sweden. Please keep us currently informed of such conversations as you may have on this subject.

Sent to Moscow only.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2144: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 21, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 22—4:09 a. m.]

3216. My 3212, August 21, 7 p. m.<sup>50</sup> After Mr. Boheman informed me this afternoon that the Government had confirmed the action taken on August 18 to withdraw insurance from all Swedish shipping to Germany, it [I] told Mr. Boheman that this action was appreciated by us as an important step forward. I reminded him, however, of previous talks in which I had made it clear that our objective was that Sweden eliminate entirely all trade with Germany and by the manner of taking this action contribute toward a more speedy conclusion of the war. Mr. Boheman became obviously extremely angry. He said that we were insatiable, that no matter how great a step Sweden might take we always wanted more; if we demanded that the Swedish Government take an official action as sure to stop totally all trade with Germany it will be flatly refused. Boheman continued by saying that "we will not be bullied into action" and that Sweden's subsequent measures would be taken in the light of Sweden's interests and according to Sweden's own conception of her duty. He said that

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<sup>48</sup> Same as telegram 1578 to Stockholm, p. 599.

<sup>49</sup> Telegram 1943 is the same as telegram 1619 to Stockholm, p. 609.

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

we could make any threats we pleased. He then brought up the case of the *Dicto* and *Lionel* and said that both we and the British had then strenuously insisted on the right of any belligerent nation to send its own ships to a neutral nation to bring out cargoes; that we then made use of Sweden's neutral duties, but that now we are practically asking Sweden to abandon neutrality at the closing stage of the war. He concluded by saying "and how despised we will be later if we do this".

I did not feel that any useful purpose would be served by engaging in any argumentative comment on the sore marks but expressed strongly our view that Sweden should take all action within her power to contribute toward shortening the war. Boheman then remarked that Swedish trade with Germany as it stands today would have no real effect on the course of the war and that if the trade were stopped entirely it would have no material effect. I told him that in my opinion total severance of trade relations with Germany would have a valuable psychological and moral effect, and Boheman professed to believe that this is imaginary. He also expressed repugnance to the idea that Sweden should abandon her fixed policies under pressure or for hope of future gain.

Department's telegram to London (number unknown) <sup>51</sup> repeated to Legation as Department's 1656, August 19; Department's 1659, August 19,<sup>52</sup> London's 6753, August 20 to Department (325 [352] to Stockholm); and Department's 1663, August 20 <sup>53</sup> have been received. I conferred with Mallet today and we are both meeting with Madame Kollontay tonight. I saw Madame Kollontay on August 19 after receipt of Moscow's 3056, August 18 to Department, repeated to Stockholm, and brought her up-to-date. Mallet and I agreed that it would be impossible to make the *démarche* today as there was not time to coordinate the action with Madame Kollontay. We both were of the opinion furthermore that it would be unwise to do so until the final Government action had been taken on the shipping insurance question.

I will send a further telegram to the Department tonight following my meeting with Madame Kollontay and Mallet.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2144: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 21, 1944—midnight.

[Received August 22—2:58 a. m.]

3217. My 3216, August 21, midnight. Mallet and I had a conference this evening with Madame Kollontay regarding the joint ap-

<sup>51</sup> The Department's telegram to London, August 19, was No. 6607, p. 615.

<sup>52</sup> Same as telegram 6614 to London, p. 616.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

proval of [*approach to?*] the Swedes. Madame Kollontay said that the instructions she had received were to support the British Minister and myself in the joint *démarche* we were to make. She said, however, that she strongly held the view that to make this *démarche* with its pressure for political action on the part of Sweden immediately after the Swedish action in withdrawing ships from trade with Germany was badly timed from a psychological point of view and in her opinion almost certain to meet with a flat refusal. She said that in her view there was no possibility of anything but a negative reply from the Swedish Government before Swedish shipping had been repatriated from Germany (see my 3213 [3212], August 21, 7 p. m.; <sup>54</sup> 920 to London). She thought that if this *démarche* were made immediately following the repatriation of Swedish ships in the German trade in mid-September, there might be a chance that the Swedes would yield and take the action which the proposed *démarche* is designed to effect. She remarked that she had had some 14 years of close and intimate dealings with the Swedish Government on many occasions where the issue was sharply drawn; that she had the certain conviction that the Swedes could not be made to do things "all at once"; that the only hope of getting desired action from them was to make it possible for them to proceed by degrees. (This procedure has frequently been urged upon me and members of my staff by influential officials of the Government, who are the undoubted friends and advocates of our cause, as the only practicable way of getting expeditious action out of the Swedish Government). She said that she has telegraphed to her Government her view that the *démarche* comes at the wrong moment and that if now made it will be refused, expressing the opinion that it should be made at moment more propitious for success. She has not yet had a reply to this message. She said however that if the American and British Governments proceed with their present plan for an immediate *démarche* and Mallet and I act accordingly, that she will give it her full support under her present instructions.

Madame Kollontay also said that she thought it would be a serious mistake for the proposed joint message from the Secretary and Mr. Eden to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs coming immediately after the Swedish withdrawal of all Swedish shipping Germany not to take some cognizance of this fact, particularly as the message is a personal one from the two Secretaries of State to the Swedish Foreign Minister. It was suggested that in the 4th sentence from the end beginning "already because of direct military activities of the United Nations, et cetera" there be inserted immediately between the words "nations" and "Germany's" an expression to the following effect "and by the recent action of Sweden in withdrawing Swedish

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<sup>54</sup> Not printed.



shipping from the Swedish-German trade". Mallet expressed his agreement with this suggestion and is telegraphing the recommendation tonight to London that the message be so amended. I think Madame Kollontay's point is well taken and Department's urgent instructions are requested.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1944—1 p. m.

1676. Your 3217, August 21. Provided British concur we agree to Madame Kollontay's suggested amendment to joint message.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as No. 6671 of August 22, 1 p. m.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1944—6 p. m.

1680. Your 3212, 3216, 3217 and 3218<sup>55</sup> have been received and your action in insisting that *démarche* be made not later than August 23 is fully approved.

It must be reiterated that we attach the greatest importance to placing the joint message and supplementary oral remarks on the record at once. It is entirely possible that even should Sweden forthwith respond by terminating all trade with the enemy, such action will not at this late date have a determining effect upon shortening the war by depriving Germany of valuable imports. But in any case, the promptness and decisiveness of the Swedish response will make manifest to the whole world where Sweden stands with respect to the fundamental issues involved in this war—it will be that standing up to be counted in this war to which we referred in one of our earlier telegrams. Sweden has given us certain indications of her "inward and spiritual grace" but what is required at this time is "the outward and visible sign".

We feel that certain of Boheman's observations as reported in your 3216 call for comment: Far from attempting to bully Sweden into action, the purpose of our proposed formal *démarche* is to make American, British and Soviet views entirely clear to the Swedish Government in order that it may have an opportunity to take action on

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<sup>55</sup> Telegrams 3212 and 3218 not printed.

its own initiative. With respect to Boheman's statement that in the case of the *Dieto* and *Lionel* we made use of Sweden's neutral duties but are now practically asking Sweden to abandon neutrality, his attention might be drawn to the Swedish Prime Minister's speech of July 23 in which he said, in effect, that Sweden's policy had not been one of strict legal neutrality but a policy of expediency, first yielding concessions to one side and then to the other side, in order to keep Sweden out of the war. His reference to the fact that Sweden would be despised later if it should abandon neutrality at this stage of the war at once suggests that he has in mind the possible future attitude of Germany. If this assumption is correct, it would indicate short-sighted thinking on Boheman's part: (1) the United Nations would certainly not despise nor forget any Swedish action which would shorten the war and save Allied lives; and (2) after Germany's defeat all Germany's political and commercial relations will be directed in accordance with the wishes of such Allied control authority as is established in Germany.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as No. 6687 of Aug. 22 and to Moscow as No. 2005 of Aug. 22.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2344: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 24, 1944—2 a. m.

6750. 3263, August 23, 6 p. m. from Stockholm.<sup>56</sup> Johnson reports that Mallet interpreted his latest instructions to mean that he is not authorized to deliver joint message until Madame Kollontay receives further instructions from Moscow. As Kollontay already has instructions to support Anglo-American *démarche* when made we fail to understand why Mallet has not yet received instructions to join with Johnson in making the agreed-upon *démarche*. We must emphasize that any further delay may leave us no alternative but to consider proceeding alone. Please take this up immediately with MEW and Foreign Office. British Embassy here is also telegraphing London on this subject.

Sent to London as no. 6750, repeated to Stockholm as no. 1693 and to Moscow as no. 2020.

HULL

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<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 24, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 5:01 p. m.]

3269. Department's 1669, August 21, 7 p. m. repeated to London. Legation is puzzled over Department's reference to "efforts to obtain piston rings embargo" as Legation's 3147, August 17, midnight, 908 to London, and previous related correspondence reported, there has been in effect since the end of the first quarter a complete embargo on exports of piston rings to enemy-controlled Europe. This embargo was obtained by the Legation pursuant to the Department's and FEA's instructions. To maintain this embargo Legation had to keep open the American offer of \$75,000 as compensation for monetary losses suffered by firm in meeting our wishes. Department's 1590, August 10<sup>58</sup> agreed that the compensation offer was still open.

In accordance with the Department's and FEA's instructions the Legation will not initiate further discussion with Davy Robertson. However, as evident from the Legation's 3021, August 9, 9 p. m.,<sup>58</sup> Davy Robertson expects a reply to its request for compensation. Legation presumes that it is authorized to reply to Davy Robertson that while we are unable at this time to make available the electric furnace we are prepared to compensate firm for monetary losses which it has suffered to date in complying with our request for embargo but that we will not be able to make similar compensation for losses incurred hereafter and that accordingly our request for the continuance of the embargo is withdrawn.

Legation does not see how Department's and FEA's desire to withdraw from this matter now that it has been ascertained that embargo of exports of Swedish piston rings is of no value to us can be met except through the procedure indicated above and at the same time fulfill obligations we have assumed.

Authorization to carry through on this offer is urgently requested. My 940, August 24, 2 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 24, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received August 24—2:42 p. m.]

3270. Mallet and I saw Foreign Minister Günther at noon by appointment and delivered the joint message from the Secretary and

<sup>58</sup> Not printed.

Mr. Eden.<sup>59</sup> I then made oral remarks<sup>60</sup> in line with the Department's instructions and these were confirmed and fully supported by Mallet in the name of his Government. A résumé of these remarks will follow in a separate telegram.<sup>61</sup> We both made it clear that what our Governments desired was a complete cessation of all trade between Sweden and Germany and that the Swedish Government should take this action not by administrative measures but in such a way that it would declare to the world where Sweden stood and have genuine value as a moral act. Mr. Günther said that he would discuss the message and the oral observations immediately with his colleagues in the Government and would let us have a reply as soon as possible. He then inquired if a similar Anglo-American *démarche* had been made to Spain, Switzerland and other neutral countries.<sup>62</sup> Both Mallet and I replied that we did not know. Mallet took occasion to call Mr. Günther's attention to a statement made in a speech on August 2 by Prime Minister Churchill<sup>63</sup> in which he referred to the postwar position of neutrals and how they, as well as all belligerent countries, would be judged by the stand they took during the war. We both in informal remarks laid emphasis on the almost bewildering speed with which military developments are changing the entire situation. On this observation Mr. Günther agreed.

Madame Kollontay has still not received reply from Moscow to her messages of August 21 but she stated this morning that as she had not yet received a reply, she is prepared to support our *démarche* under her original instructions and it was understood by Mallet and me that she would request an appointment to see Mr. Günther today.

Toward the close of our interview, I told Mr. Günther that I had heard expressions of opinion in some Swedish quarters that Sweden would be despised if she took affirmative action to declare a stand at this late day. I pointed out that I was quite certain that Sweden would not be despised in my country by reason of any action she took which might speed up the conclusion of the war and contribute toward saving the lives of our soldiers; that on the contrary such Swedish action would be understood and held in profound appreciation in my country. Mallet said that he could say precisely the same thing in regard to reactions in Great Britain and added that in his opinion, the case of Turkey was by no means analogous to Sweden; that Turkey had a treaty with Great Britain and had moreover never

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<sup>59</sup> *Infra*.

<sup>60</sup> *Post*, p. 627.

<sup>61</sup> Telegram 3280, August 24, 6 p. m., not printed.

<sup>62</sup> For correspondence on the effect of American economic warfare policies upon relations with Spain and Switzerland, see pp. 297 ff. and pp. 706 ff., respectively.

<sup>63</sup> For text of speech, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 402, col. 1474.

been in imminent danger of overwhelming attack from Germany as Sweden had been in the past.

My 941 repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-544

*The Secretary of State and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden) to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Günther)*<sup>64</sup>

JOINT MESSAGE FOR HIS EXCELLENCY THE SWEDISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FROM HIS MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Rapid changes during recent weeks both in the military and economic conditions which up to recently have governed Sweden's relations with Germany, have now produced a new situation with respect to which the British and American Governments wish to make certain observations for the very serious consideration of the Swedish Government.

The relations which our two Governments have maintained and developed with Sweden during the course of the war, particularly in their economic aspects, have been based on the fundamental consideration that Sweden's basic interests, as a freedom loving country, lay in a victory for the United Nations, and that military and economic necessity, rather than choice, constituted the basis of the military and economic concessions which Sweden made to Germany at an earlier stage of the war. All our relations with Sweden during this period, including the agreements and understandings which have been concluded, have been based upon this overriding consideration. We have acted on this belief in our own policy toward Sweden where we have carefully refrained from asking Sweden to take actions limiting her concessions to Germany, which we have felt were beyond her powers, either military or economic, and which threatened her independent existence. We have also expressed this understanding in the material help we have furnished Sweden for the use of her armed forces, and in the economic supplies, including supplies from our very limited stocks of vital materials which we have allocated to the Swedish economy. In return, we have expected that Swedish policy with respect to Germany would show progressive development, as the balance shifted between the military strength of Sweden and the military forces which Germany might spare against her.

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<sup>64</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4034, September 5, from Stockholm; received September 13.

This balance has now definitely shifted in favor of Sweden. In present conditions, existing and prospective, Sweden can no longer have any fear of a German attack. In the economic sphere, also, the balance has shifted. It is true that Germany is still in a position, owing to the nature of her controls, to prevent for a time Swedish trade with the outside world. She is not similarly situated, however, to maintain trade with Sweden. Already, because of direct military activities of the United Nations *and because of the recent action of the Swedish Government in withdrawing Swedish shipping from Swedish-German trade*, Germany's ability to import goods from Sweden is being more and more restricted, and may soon be reduced to very small proportions. Fortunately for the Swedish economy, it is our understanding that Swedish stocks of coal already imported from Germany are sufficient for this final stage of hostilities.

We have made these observations because we feel that the time has come for a radical change in Sweden's policy towards Germany, a change that is in the interest of Sweden as well as of all other free peoples.

We are sure that your Government recognize this new situation and we shall be glad to learn what steps they intend to take in consequence.

STOCKHOLM, 24 August 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-544

*Oral Remarks by the American Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Günther)*<sup>65</sup>

We feel confident that the Swedish Government, in its own interest as well as in that of humanity, has wished to assist in ending the war. Sweden has given practical demonstrations of this desire. Since 1943 the assistance which our enemies have been able to derive from Sweden has been materially reduced. We fully recognize in this connection the importance of the action of the Swedish Government in stopping Swedish shipping engaged in trade with the enemy.

Until recently, however, it has appeared that the military situation has been such that the Swedish Government, while disposed to take steps in the name of Swedish interests with respect to Germany which would also be of benefit to the Allied cause, has taken these steps in a spirit of caution, subsequent to certain political and military developments. It has been recognized that the Swedish Government could not for reasons of national security consider going much further in making a positive contribution to shortening the war. It has now,

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<sup>65</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4034, September 5, from Stockholm; received September 13.

however, become obvious, as a result of the rapid change in the military situation, that Sweden can take steps which would have a decisive effect upon political and military developments and would hasten the termination of hostilities.

It is urged that Sweden take this action rather than pursue a policy which, although possibly consistent with Sweden's short-term interest, cannot be the basis for a Swedish claim to the position to which she might otherwise be entitled after this war shall have been won through the sacrifice of Allied blood and treasure without a substantial contribution to such victory having been made by the Swedish Government. The withdrawal of insurance coverage and consequent halting of Swedish shipping proceeding to German ports is an encouraging forecast of a possible change in Swedish policy, which we hope will be accomplished before the continuing successes of our Armed Forces have made Swedish action unnecessary. The progress of the invasions of France points to the rapidity with which the time is slipping by during which Sweden can take steps which will have a decisive effect upon political and military developments and ultimately upon the outcome of the war itself.

It has been said that Sweden has had to exercise caution in taking steps which might compromise her position of neutrality, because of the possible effect of such a precedent on Sweden's position in the next war. The Allies are bending every effort to crush such peace breakers as Germany and Japan and, upon their defeat, to assist in bringing about the creation of an international security organization without which there could be little hope for peace in the future. It would be wishful thinking to suppose that the development of modern means of warfare would permit any nation in the future to remain neutral should some powerful aggressor nation arise and set out to dominate the world.

That the war will soon be won by the United Nations has become obvious as a result of the rapid change in the military situation. Many thoughtful persons are speculating as to what will be the lot of Sweden in the early postwar period. Some hope that what Sweden has to offer in the way of transportation and production facilities will be so much in demand that Sweden will necessarily receive equal treatment in the postwar period with the several members of the United Nations. Others, however, are not so optimistic. It is anticipated by them that Allied agencies will control the distribution of all important raw materials, food and fuel. They contemplate that if Sweden should be cut off from its present European sources of supply, which they realize may happen even before the end of the

war, and the Allied supply agencies failed to make provision for Swedish requirements in the allocations, Sweden would face a painful deterioration of its economy which might carry over well into the postwar period.

It should be evident that if Sweden's action now does not induce the Allied supply agencies to take Sweden's import needs of important raw materials, food and fuel sympathetically into account when allocations of those goods are made, the Swedish Government can hardly expect those agencies will be inclined to give much consideration to Sweden's needs in the immediate postwar period.

Allied agencies have had long experience in allocating goods in short supply. It is not likely, in view of the many advantages to both producers and consumers from this type of control, that this administrative machinery will be discontinued immediately after the war. Indeed it is anticipated that as the Allies enlarge their area of control it will become increasingly advisable, in view of the desirability of obviating postwar economic disturbances in so far as practicable, to retain machinery for planned international trade. It seems apparent that a system of priorities will have to be used and as a practical matter it is almost inevitable that any country's claim to materials in short supply will be considered in the light of its action during the war.

The practical demonstrations which hitherto Sweden has given of its desire to cooperate with the Allies have entailed sacrifices and risk. It is now believed that the time has come when Sweden can, without endangering national security, go much further. Whatever the resulting sacrifices may be, they can only be of short duration, and whatever the risk, it would be so slight as to be almost non-existent. On the other hand, the rewards for Sweden, both political and economic, would be substantial.

24 AUGUST 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, August 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 8:36 p. m.]

3284. Legation's 3270, August 24, 3 p. m. Madame Kollontay has just advised me that she saw Foreign Minister Günther this afternoon and fully supported our *démarche*. She described Mr. Günther's reaction as "not unfavorable".

JOHNSON



740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—7 p. m.

1740. Department and FEA are still considering your 3269, August 24 (repeated to London as 940). It now appears impossible to make furnace available.

Report anything new which Davy Robertson may bring up, but make no commitments until you hear further from us.<sup>66</sup>

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/9-244 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 2, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 3—12: 14 p. m.]

3454. For Department only. My 3270, August 24, 3 p. m. I was informed by Mr. Boheman this afternoon that British Minister and I would receive reply on Monday<sup>67</sup> to the joint *démarche*. Mr. Boheman did not tell me exactly what it would be but he said that it would go very far in meeting our views and would leave the door open. I asked if it met the issue on the moral and political stand we were asking Sweden to take. He replied that he did not think it went as far as we wished. He then proceeded to an analysis of what he said was the opinion not only of the Government but Foreign Affairs Committee of Riksdag which was fully consulted in the matter. He added that the reply had been approved without a dissenting vote by the entire Cabinet and Foreign Affairs Committee. He said that the people concerned in the decision cannot see any median stand between entry into the war and declared policy of neutrality. He said this opinion was expressed even by peasant members of Riksdag who are on the Riksdag Committee. The difficulty in their thinking is that they have no peg on which to hang an official action which would amount to a practical break with Germany and certainly of all economic relations. It is not, he said, that anybody has any apprehension of danger to Sweden or any feeling that there is the slightest moral obligation to Nazi Germany, but that it would be a wrong thing for Sweden to do from her own point of view unless Germany gives them an overt occasion. This, Boheman says, the Germans are most

<sup>66</sup> American and British negotiations with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to arrange a cessation of piston ring exports to Germany were brought to a successful conclusion on January 11, 1945, when the Davy Robertson Company agreed to accept 150,000 crowns in full compensation.

<sup>67</sup> September 4.

sedulously refraining from doing; that their attitude now is obsequious and that although they have stated they regard stopping of shipping as a political act they have made no threat of stopping the Göteborg traffic or taking any other counter-measure. He said that no arguments at the moment could change Government and Riksdag opinion.

Boheman told me that he had personally had a terrific struggle with the Prime Minister, the Government and the Riksdag members in trying to make them understand our point of view and the necessity for Swedish action to meet it. He frankly said that he had not "been able to deliver the goods" but he thought that he had been able to get their concurrence to a reply which went much further toward meeting our full demands than the Government was at first disposed to consider.

He then, speaking personally, pleaded that we give him a little more time. He said that the moment there was the slightest incident, of a German action against Sweden, a German occupation of the Åland Islands or any form of German threat or menace, he believed he could bring the Government to take the action we are demanding. Boheman today seemed to have lost all trace of his earlier irritation and anger when I talked to him of the Anglo-American demands and spoke calmly and reasonably. He said that he understood our point of view and that if he were an American he would undoubtedly share it, but he said that while he does not for practical reasons agree with the prevailing Swedish view he says that he also understands it thoroughly and that from the viewpoint of the Swedish position in Europe, Swedish policy and ethical conceptions, the view is right even if it may be unwise.

He then said that he would like to mention one thing on a purely personal basis. If American propaganda agencies feel that public attacks on Sweden must continue, he hopes for the sake of the future that they at least can be kept to the level of facts. He mentioned in this connection the despatch of correspondent Parsons<sup>68</sup> from France which has been given wide currency here, accusing Sweden of having exported a large amount of the military equipment found in German hands in France, and taken up by the American broadcast from London in Swedish yesterday. He said that while some Americans may be indifferent to its effect in Sweden the dissemination of information of that character which is a "total lie" is doing great damage to the American position and reputation. He says every Swedish peasant knows that Sweden has exported no arms whatever since the beginning of the war and he said, again speaking personally, that he thought it was unworthy of a country with the high moral standards which

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<sup>68</sup> Geoffrey Parsons, Jr., Chief of the London Bureau of the *New York Herald Tribune*.

the United States professes and has carried out in her international relations to allow such statements to be broadcast on the radio.

With reference to Parson's despatch he said if there is one sin which Sweden has not committed since this war it is the exportation of arms or weapons of any kind to Axis Europe; that if any Bofors<sup>69</sup> guns have been found in France they must be French guns; that a considerable export of Bofors guns was made just prior to the outbreak of the war to France, Poland and Czechoslovakia particularly to France and that many of them must have fallen at some time into German hands.

Boheman concluded by saying that the "peg" on which Swedish Government could have the desired action against Germany might come on the scene at any moment, in a day, 5 days, 2 weeks.

I thanked Boheman for giving me his personal views so frankly and told him that while I understood the Swedish motivation I was convinced that they were wrong and that they would be making a capital mistake not to give an unequivocal reply to the *démarche*. He said simply that he knew that that was my view and the American view but that he could only hope we would not find the reply wholly unsatisfactory and that he had done the best that was possible at the moment.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-444: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received September 5—8:48 a. m.]

3476. When Foreign Minister Günther and Mr. Boheman had handed British Minister and me the reply to our *démarche*, paraphrase of which is sent in my immediately following telegram No. 3477, September 4, 9 p. m.,<sup>70</sup> Mr. Günther asked us to read it. Mr. Boheman then said that he would like to make the following official comments: (1) Actual Swedish trade today with Germany is very small. The withdrawal of Swedish shipping from that trade had a far more pronounced effect than its previous proportion to the total trade would indicate. German tonnage now in the trade with Sweden is very much less than it has been previously although this Boheman stated was not unexpected; they had believed that this shipping would be largely withdrawn as in fact it has been for other purposes. With today's

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<sup>69</sup> Swedish arms and munitions manufacturers.

<sup>70</sup> Not printed, but for text of Swedish reply, see *infra*.

news of cessation of hostilities between Russia and Finland<sup>71</sup> the Finnish shipping is also out of German Swedish trade. There only remain a few German ships and some others including Danish, all in greatly decreased quantity to the normal figures. For several days now there has not been a single ship at Lulea or Oxelosund to take on iron ore although the Germans have announced that 12 will be sent to Lulea and 5 to Oxelosund. These 17 ships according to Boheman would represent a tonnage of about 60,000 which is much less than the previous average and he says that they would represent all shipping for that traffic to the Baltic ports for the entire month of September. They have not yet arrived there or even been dispatched according to Swedish information. Foreign Office is of the opinion that other events may soon happen which would have such an influence on German and German controlled shipping to Sweden as to reduce it almost to a vanishing point.

(2) He says that transit of all war material which goes to German occupied Finland has now stopped. Boheman stated that the question of the cessation of the remaining traffic of the same kind to Norway is under serious consideration now by the Government. He was referring to the 120,000 tons conceded by the terms of the Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement. The inference was that the transit to Norway will likewise be completely stopped.

Boheman then went on to say that the Allies have often expressed their view that Sweden should make clear her stand in regard to Nazi Germany and that if she did so it would among other things have a strong influence in the direction of forcing Finland to get out of the war. In this connection Boheman pointed out that the Finns have often advanced as one of their main difficulties in attempting to get peace with Russia their precarious situation. Sweden recently, as we know, has informed the Finns that Sweden would supply Finnish food requirements to the necessary extent in the event that the Finns come to an understanding with Russia. This assurance from the Swedish Government Boheman stated has great influence on the Finnish decision. Boheman also drew attention to the reservation made by Sweden at the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-American-Swedish war trade agreement that if the situation should change as far as the position of the northern countries was concerned she would reserve the right to export certain necessary commodities to the northern countries. The present assurance to Finland in regard to food is in line with this Swedish reservation and the Swedes have therefore not thought it necessary to consult with us prior to the decision. Full

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<sup>71</sup> On September 4, 1944, a cease fire order was obtained, and an armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on September 19. For correspondence on American relations with Finland, see vol. III, pp. 556 ff.

details of all exportations under this obligation will however be given to us through the Joint Standing Commission.

Mr. Günther then asked me what I thought of the reply. I told him that frankly speaking I was certain that it would be a disappointment to my Government; that what we had expected from the Swedish Government in reply to the joint *démarche* was an action which would be a clear affirmation of where Sweden's sympathies lay in the present war; that the moment had come when Sweden could take such action without risk of an overwhelming attack from our enemy and that an opportunity had been afforded for Sweden to give public expression to the feeling which we knew the country had always had. Mr. Günther replied that he understood our reasoning but that it was not the viewpoint of the Swedish Government. He said that from the Swedish view it was not a question of whether there was the slightest danger from Germany nor of even seizing the occasion to proclaim to the world a fact which according to Mr. Günther should be well known—that Sweden has no sympathy and has never had any sympathy with Nazi Germany. Sweden's position is not a thing which can be lightly repudiated without an overt act having been taken against this country. Mr. Günther then argued that although he understood our point of view that the Swedish trade with Germany now remaining still contributed to the resistance of the enemy and thereby to lengthening of the war, he could not personally agree with that opinion. Both the British Minister and I replied that our highest military authorities were of a contrary opinion and that even if that trade contributed to the lengthening of the war by only one day or one hour it should be stopped. I remarked that they could not expect our military authorities to be satisfied with anything less than total cessation of all trade with Germany. Boheman then intimated that the Swedish Government would in fact eventually go much nearer to meeting our requests in entirety than we possibly even imagined. The minute anything happened in one of the northern countries (he was obviously referring to Denmark and Norway) we would find that Swedish actions would be completely inconsistent with neutrality. Mr. Boheman then made some remarks which I do not think had been contemplated but which occurred to his mind at the moment. He said he could not but believe that the technical neutrality of Sweden was something which brought substantial advantages to the Allies. Through the Swedish position as protecting power in many countries of the Soviet interests and the smaller Allies, Sweden had been in a position effectively to ameliorate the physical conditions of many Allied citizens and had in fact been able to save many lives. These were lives he observed as well as those of the soldiers whom we say are being killed because of Swedish material sent to Germany. He referred to various specific activities such

as the exchange of war prisoners,<sup>72</sup> Greek relief, et cetera, which could not have been undertaken if Sweden were not a neutral power. He then queried how the Allies would like to see Switzerland enter the war as an ally. What would become then of the vast machinery for the protection of our interests in enemy countries? The important work done by Sweden for war prisoners would also be impossible if Sweden abandoned neutrality. Boheman queried whether abandonment of Swedish neutrality which would be the result of complete compliance with the joint request would be worth the sacrifice of the many activities in which Sweden is now engaged to our benefit. Both he and Mr. Günther emphasized that the Swedish insistence on maintaining consistent declared policy of neutrality was based on their Government's conception of their duty to Sweden itself and had no relation to any form of obligation—moral or otherwise—to Nazi Germany which they frankly admitted did not exist nor to any apprehension of German counter measures.

My 1002, September 4, 8 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-544

*The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs (Günther) to the Secretary of State and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Eden)* <sup>73</sup>

In reply to the joint message, addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th of August 1944, Mr. Günther has the honour to forward the following statement to the Secretary of State of the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Sweden has never left any doubts as to her policy during the present war. On the contrary the Swedish Government have repeatedly made clear their intention to maintain consistently their policy of neutrality announced from the beginning of the hostilities. Such a policy appears to the entire Swedish people as a natural and necessary basis for the preservation of their vital interests in a time of violent disturbances. At the outbreak of war, that policy of Sweden was indeed exactly the same as that of all democratic countries in Europe with which a comparison is possible to make. Since then several of them have, entirely against their will and in spite of all efforts to preserve peace, been drawn into the war by direct attack from Germany. There is every reason to believe, however, that should this not have been the

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<sup>72</sup> For correspondence pertaining to the exchange of war prisoners, see vol. III, pp. 785 ff. *passim*.

<sup>73</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 4034, September 5, from Stockholm; received September 13.

case, these countries like Sweden would have pursued up to this very day the policy of neutrality. Sweden considers herself entirely belonging to this group of democratic countries, whether they take part in the war or not.

The Swedish Government are also anxious to point out that they regard Sweden's policy of neutrality as entirely justified also from the point of view of the general international obligations of this country. The Allied Governments doubtless have the best foundation for their statement that Sweden's basic interests as a freedom-loving country lay in a victory for the United Nations. They will, however, certainly admit, that Sweden has not through her position of neutrality caused them any disadvantage as belligerents. Is it not, on the contrary, a fact that Sweden's consistent policy of neutrality in connection with her clearly expressed intention to meet at any time, by force of arms, any attack against this neutrality, has been during the war to the advantage not only of Sweden but also of the Allies? On the other hand the Swedish Government as well as the Swedish people refuse to believe that the mere fact that Sweden has not been attacked by Germany could cause the Allied Powers to take a less confident or sympathetic attitude towards Sweden than would have otherwise been the case. In the wording of the message received there is in fact nothing to indicate the intention of the Allied Governments to induce Sweden to take part in the war. Neither has it been interpreted by the Swedish Government in that spirit but rather as the expression of the Allied Governments' desire to do everything possible in order to shorten the war. It is hardly necessary to point out that it is the ardent wish also of the Swedish people that the war will soon come to an end. If only for this reason the Swedish Government must in their decisions take this point of view into the most serious account. Could, however, the policy of a neutral Sweden be said to influence at all the development of the war, this obviously only applies to Sweden's trade with the belligerents. The following reference to this question has been made in the message that Mr. Günther had the honour to receive: "Already, because of direct military activities of the United Nations and because of the recent action of the Swedish Government in withdrawing Swedish shipping from Swedish-German trade, Germany's ability to import goods from Sweden is being more and more restricted, and may soon be reduced to very small proportions". As a matter of fact Sweden's trade with Germany has already decreased to such an extent that it cannot be said to influence the duration of the war. A continued decreasing trend may be expected. The fact that this process has taken place and still takes place parallel and in conjunction with the development of the war can evidently not diminish its importance or consequences.

A general change in Sweden's political attitude towards Germany could not be expected to give any further contribution to the shortening of the war and should not need, if only for this reason, to be contemplated.

In these circumstances the Swedish Government—which obviously must reserve their right independently to decide their policy according to Sweden's proper interests—wish in reply to the message received to refer to the statements made above. These statements should tend to show that the points raised in the Allied message are looked upon by the Swedish Government in a spirit of understanding and due consideration and that in all essentials the wishes expressed by the Allied Governments are and will be met by a continuation of Sweden's present policy.

STOCKHOLM, September 4, 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-844 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 8, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 9—7:09 a. m.]

3561. Swedish Foreign Office according to Grafström<sup>74</sup> informed Germans September 6 that effective September 9 all transit of goods through Sweden for German use will be stopped. It will be recalled that Mr. Boheman told me on September 4th (Legation's 3476, September 4, 8 p. m.; 1002 to London) that the transit of all war material which previously had come to German-occupied Finland had been stopped and that the question of the cessation of the remaining traffic of the same kind to Norway was under serious consideration by the Government.

Mr. Grafström described this stopping of all German transit traffic as another step in Sweden's rapid progress in the continuing breaking of its commercial relations with Germany. He added that for all practical purposes these relations had ceased.

He went on to say with reference to how the term "war criminals" might be interpreted by the Swedish Government that he was certain that "war criminals" would be construed as including looted property and that the Swedish Government would actively cooperate in efforts to discover and return such property (Legation's 3542, September 7, 9 p. m., 1021 to London<sup>75</sup>).

My 1028, September 8, 7 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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<sup>74</sup> Sven Grafström, Acting Director of the Department of Political Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>75</sup> Not printed.



740.00112 European War 1939/9-444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1944—10 a. m.

1824. Your 3476 and 3477 of September 4.<sup>76</sup> Should any Swedish officials inquire as to our reaction to Günther's message in reply to the Anglo-American *démarche* you should inform them that we consider it to be entirely unsatisfactory in every respect and that this Government is greatly disappointed at the failure of the Swedish Government to realize at this late stage the extremely adverse effect its attitude may have on Sweden's future position. You may add that we have no intention whatever of letting the matter drop.

For your own information, we fail to appreciate the validity of the arguments used by the Foreign Minister in defense of Sweden's so-called "neutrality policy". In our opinion Sweden's policy has been based upon a determination to keep out of the war at all costs rather than one of strict neutrality. Hence, she has granted concessions to one belligerent group and then the other in accordance with the fluctuations of the war. Now that the people of Sweden, as well as those of the United Nations, realize the defeat of Germany is a foregone conclusion, we cannot comprehend why the Swedish Government still hesitates to sever all trade with Germany.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-2244 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 22, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received September 22—4: 57 p. m.]

3824. I have just been informed by Mr. Boheman that the decision on the matter reported in my 3746, September 19, 9 p. m.<sup>77</sup> has been taken by the Government. The German Minister<sup>78</sup> will be informed tomorrow that all Swedish Baltic ports are closed to all shipping except Swedish. This decision will probably be published Sunday or Monday<sup>79</sup> and Mr. Boheman especially requested that we treat it with the utmost secrecy until it has been published here. Implementation of the decree presents certain practical difficulties and Boheman expects that it will be during the night of September 25, 26 that the measure will become fully effective. Boheman estimates that in practical effect all but 1 or 2 percent of the German trade with Sweden is

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<sup>76</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

<sup>78</sup> Hans Thomsen.

<sup>79</sup> September 24 or 25.

thus eliminated. Certain other observations made by Mr. Boheman will be reported in a separate telegram.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-2344: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 23, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 24—5:40 a. m.]

3844. For the Department only. My 3824 September 22, 7 p. m. When I saw Boheman yesterday I said that I was very glad to receive the information he had given me but that I could not refrain from expressing disappointment that the measure did not include all Swedish ports without exception. Boheman said that he had hoped that would be the case and that a number of the individuals (the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag) who had a hand in the decision had the same view. He said that it had been the original intention of the Government as soon as Finland had ceased hostilities with Russia to take drastic action cutting off Swedish trade with Germany and that it had been planned to close all Swedish ports to all trade with Germany. He then remarked, and it is fair to say without any suggestion of bitterness or truculence, that the present decision would have covered all the ports if it had not been for the Anglo-American *démarche*. He said he did not believe we realized the extent to which this pressure had been resented by the Government and in particular by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksdag, more than half of whom are members of peasant origin with a deep-rooted resentment of any foreign interference (see my 3842, September 23, 8 p. m.<sup>80</sup>). I told him that it appeared to me that events of this week in Denmark<sup>81</sup> were of such an extraordinary nature that his Government would have been justified in any action even action which would have entailed a total break of relations with Germany. I reminded him of the remark which he had made to me in a conversation of September 4 (my 3476, September 4, 8 p. m.) that when anything happened in one of the northern countries we should find that Swedish actions would be completely inconsistent with neutrality. Boheman said that he remembered making that remark perfectly and that he still stood by it. On September 4 he said the Swedish Government had secret information which led them to believe that on September 15 there would be a general insurrection in

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

<sup>81</sup> This is presumably a reference to the general strike of September 16, 1944, in Denmark, protesting the deportation of 190 Danish prisoners to Germany. The Germans declared a state of emergency in Denmark on September 19, 1944, and the strike ended on September 21, 1944.

Denmark or Allied invasion or both; that the Swedish Government was prepared in such an event immediately to ship arms and ammunition with soldiers to Denmark and that they would be fighting anyone who was fighting the Danes. That determination he said still holds good and he made a remark about the large number of young highly trained men Sweden now has under arms with the plain intimation that it would be those soldiers who would carry their arms and ammunition into Denmark. I commented that if this were realized it would mean that Sweden would be fighting Germans in Denmark with all the natural consequences. Boheman smiled and shrugged his shoulders.

While he gave me the definite impression that he personally regretted that the present decision of closing the Baltic ports did not include all ports, he said that he thought there was much to be said for the argument of those who had been opposed to complete cutting of trade at this time that an insurrection in Denmark or an Allied invasion of Denmark would be a much better peg on which to hang severance of all relations with Germany with their consequences.

A prominent Dane now on a visit to Stockholm who is a member of the underground movement called to see me today and I asked him what he thought would be immediate developments from the German actions of this week. He replied that he believed nothing serious would come of it until the underground movement received "the signal". He said that the Danes had an extraordinarily high degree of discipline and this discipline would be maintained until they received the signal for an uprising. They are hoping he said hourly for an Allied invasion. As Legation has previously reported and confirmed by this gentleman, the Germans have deported 1,700 Danish police to Germany presumably to serve as hostages. My informant today stated there are about 6,000 members of the police force still remaining in Denmark. He said that last week before the trouble started the police got their wind up and knew that something was coming. At that time the 6,000 left their posts and "went underground" where they still are.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*<sup>82</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1944—midnight.

7927. Department's 7811, September 26, 10 a. m.<sup>83</sup> After due reflection on the implications of the action of the Swedish Government

<sup>82</sup> Repeated to Stockholm as telegram 1950, September 29, 8 p. m.

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

in closing Swedish ports on the Baltic to all non-Swedish vessels, it is our opinion that although this step goes a long way toward meeting our objective respecting the total elimination of Swedish-German trade, several important "leaks" still exist. Iron ore is still being exported by rail to Narvik and German vessels may still load at Göteborg and Malmö products regularly exported through these ports such as ball bearings and special steels. In view of these circumstances, and the fact that our agreement with SKF expires October 12, the Department considers that it would be desirable for the American and British Ministers at Stockholm jointly to approach the Swedish Foreign Minister in the near future and make oral representations in the following sense.

They should inform Mr. Günther that the American and British Governments have noted with satisfaction the decision of the Swedish Government to close the Baltic ports to German shipping. The two Governments regret, however, that the ports of Malmö and Göteborg are still open to German vessels and hence products essential to the German war effort such as ball bearings and special steels may still be obtained by the Germans. In addition, they consider it most unfortunate that Germany may still secure iron ore by rail shipments to Narvik. Considering these facts, the American and British Governments strongly urge that the Swedish Government take such measures as it may deem necessary to close the ports of Göteborg and Malmö to German shipping, terminate completely ore shipments via Narvik and limit exports via the Hälsinborg-Helsingor ferry to small hand parcels. They should add that action along these lines would redound to Sweden's advantage in Allied eyes, indicating as it would the desire of Sweden to prevent by every means in its power the prolongation of the war in Europe. Furthermore, to offset the hardship occasioned to Sweden through its inability to acquire German products, the American and British Governments would, in the event of a favorable reply, give sympathetic consideration to Sweden's essential needs insofar as the supply situation permits.

Our Ministers should also impress upon Mr. Günther that, before giving a negative reply, the Swedish Government should give every consideration to the fact that for a considerable period after the collapse of Germany, Sweden will be dependent upon Allied consent for imports from sources under our control, including Germany and to the possibility that it might be necessary to take direct action against the Swedish companies engaged in exporting goods to Germany.

Please discuss the above proposal with the British at once and telegraph urgently whether they are in agreement with us. If the British agree, the Soviet Government will then be informed through the

British and American Ambassadors at Moscow and invited to lend its support to the joint Anglo-American *démarche*.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-444: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1944—7 p. m.

8146. Department notes with satisfaction that if Military do not oppose possible Swedish action closing remaining ports to Germany, the Foreign Office would not find it difficult to go along with the *démarche* proposed in the Department's 7927, September 28, midnight. However, in view of expiration of SKF Agreement on October 12, the Department believes that it is imperative to make an immediate joint *démarche* to the Swedish Foreign Minister along the lines of the following. Such action would be without prejudice to any subsequent action which might be taken as the result of the military decision, when received.

They should inform Mr. Günther that the American and British Governments have noted with satisfaction the decision of the Swedish Government to close the Baltic ports to German shipping. The two Governments regret, however, that products essential to the German war effort may still be obtained from Sweden by the Germans. The American and British Governments therefore strongly urge the Swedish Government to bring about the immediate cessation of exports to Germany of those commodities of particular value to German war effort including iron ore, rubric 405, 406, 407; charcoal pig iron, rubric 1330; special steels, rubric 1371-1372:2; bearings, rubric 1527-1529; machine tools, rubric 1695-1700; and cold rolled steel, rubric 1381-1386, 1388-1394. The Swedish Government is urged, furthermore, to make what will amount only at the most to token shipments of other exports to Germany. They should add that action along these lines would redound to Sweden's advantage in Allied eyes, indicating as it would the desire of Sweden to prevent by every means in its power, the prolongation of the war in Europe.

To offset the hardships occasioned Sweden through its inability to acquire German products, in the event of German retaliation the American and British Governments would, in the event of a favorable reply, give sympathetic consideration to Sweden's essential needs insofar as the supply situation permits. Our Minister should also impress upon Mr. Günther that, before giving a negative reply, the Swedish Government should give every consideration to the fact that for a considerable period after the collapse of Germany, Sweden will

be dependent upon Allied consent for imports from sources under our control, including Germany, and to the possibility that it might be necessary to take direct action against the Swedish companies engaged in exporting goods to Germany.

Please discuss the above proposal with the British at once and telegraph urgently whether they are in agreement with us on taking the foregoing action at once. If the British agree, the Soviet Government will, when this action is decided upon, be informed through the British and American Ambassadors at Moscow and invited to lend its support to the joint Anglo-American *démarche*. Delivery of latter, however, need not necessarily be delayed pending Soviet concurrence.

Please telegraph urgently to Washington and to Stockholm whether British agree with us.

The above telegram is sent to London for action and Stockholm for its information but not for action unless and until it is informed by Embassy, London, that appropriate instructions have been sent to British Minister at Stockholm to join in proposed *démarche*.

Since foregoing was drafted, London's 8355, October 4,<sup>84</sup> has been received. Urgent consideration is being given it, and separate reply will be made. Department is of opinion action described above is not affected and attaches greatest importance to securing promptly British concurrence.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 6, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received October 6—5:20 p. m.]

8403. The question of a further Anglo-American *démarche* to Sweden was discussed with the Foreign Office and MEW today along the lines of the Department's 8146, October 5, 7 p. m. The Foreign Office stated that its preliminary reaction to the terms of the proposed *démarche* was favorable with two possible reservations; (1) it is not certain whether it is wise at this time to make a definite commitment about giving consideration to Swedish supply needs in view of the possibility of wishing at a later date to put pressure on Sweden with respect to postwar supplies and trade, and (2) the British do not like to make the threat implied in the last sentence of the proposed *démarche* as they fear that any threats made to the Swedes would only increase the reluctance of the Swedes to meet our wishes.

<sup>84</sup> Not printed.

After stating that the matter would be urgently considered, the Foreign Office and MEW approached us later in the day to show us a telegram from British Legation in Stockholm which makes them hesitate to come to an immediate decision. According to this message, which was shown the Embassy, the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office told Mallet that he had had a long talk with Hamberg of SKF and had introduced him to the new Swedish Minister of Commerce.<sup>85</sup> The SKF board of directors was scheduled to meet probably today and it is expected that a decision with regard to ball-bearing exports after October 12 will be taken this weekend. It was made clear to Mallet that there was no question of resumption of large scale deliveries after October 12. Hamberg was advised by Boheman, and supported by the Minister of Commerce, to cease all exports of bearings to Germany and German-occupied Europe, even those bearings which have been going to Norway and Denmark. The Swedish Cabinet had later approved this advice and it is thought it will prevail. The Government has promised the company that it would back up the company if Germany should complain at cessation of bearings exports. It was also made clear to Hamberg that the company should not attempt to drive any sort of bargain but should make a clean break and cut off all deliveries. Of course, it was added, in making the announcement of this action to the U. S. and the U. K. authorities, SKF could request the U. S. to cease persecuting its subsidiaries in the U. S. and that both Governments could be requested to reiterate assurances that SKF properties which might be confiscated by Germany would be restored to the company after the war.

Before coming to a final decision with regard to the *démarche* proposed by the Department, the Foreign Office wishes further to consider the matter in the light of Mallet's information and they suggest that the Department may also wish to reconsider its proposal.

Sent to Department as 8403, repeated to Stockholm as 535.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-644 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 6, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:22 p. m.]

4066. For the Department only. Legation's 4053, October 6, 2 p. m.,<sup>86</sup> 1221 to London for the Ambassador. In presence of Larson and Winquist, two directors of SKF, Hamberg assured Waring and Ravndal, following extended but affable conversation this afternoon,

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<sup>85</sup> Bertil Ohlin.

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

that he would recommend to Board of Directors that SKF completely stop all shipments of ball and roller bearings and component parts and machinery to enemy Europe effective October 12. He was urged to obtain Board's formal approval immediately and to notify us thereof by Monday<sup>87</sup> at the latest. This he undertook to do.

Hamberg stated that the SKF would need evidence of threatened punitive action by Allied Governments for use in satisfying Germans, that complete stoppage of exports was result of "economical *force majeure*". Documents in language which company believes will best serve purpose is being drafted by company's lawyer. It is thought that company's decision will not be qualified by conditions. It will, however, be understood that we will reach an interpretation of the indemnity clause of the June Agreement and also give assurances regarding SKF properties in Germany and France.

My 1225, October 6, 9 p. m. repeats this to London, for the Ambassador only.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-644: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 6, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:24 p. m.]

4070. For Department only. My 4066, October 6, 9 p. m., 1225 to London for Ambassador only. Substance of letter which SKF and Mr. Boheman desire British Minister and me to address to company in connection with their preparations completely to stop all exports of bearings et cetera effective October 12 is as follows:

On behalf of the Governments which we represent we the undersigned inform you that we expect you within a week's time to stop all your exports to Germany and satellite countries of ball-bearing machinery, ball and roller bearings and parts thereof. If you do not stop your exports of these commodities to the countries in question you will have to bear the consequences such as the blacklisting of your firm which will mean the stoppage of your exports to other countries even after the war and also seizure of your property in countries which are under Allied control. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Swedish Foreign Office.

If British Minister concurs I propose jointly to sign with him a letter to SKF along lines indicated and to make it available to the company tomorrow unless Department instructs to contrary.

My 1226 repeats this to London for Ambassador only.

JOHNSON

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<sup>87</sup> October 9.



740.00112 European War 1939/10-944: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 9, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:23 p. m.]

4097. For Department only. When the joint Anglo-American letter threatening punitive action (Legation's 4070, October 6, 9 p. m., 1226 to London for Ambassador only) was handed to Hamberg October 7, he submitted that since SKF had voluntarily agreed completely to stop all exports to Germany and satellite countries of ball and roller bearings and parts thereof and ball-bearing machinery, it was hoped that the British and American Governments would agree (*a*) to the immediate cessation of all discriminatory action against SKF and its affiliated companies; (*b*) to use their best efforts to insure the restoration to SKF after the war of all SKF property in Germany and in countries now or previously during the war under the control of Germany; (*c*) to confirm the undertaking regarding the taking over of ball-bearing machinery, ball and roller bearings and parts thereof mentioned in the letter of Messrs. Griffis and Waring dated June 9, 1944;<sup>88</sup> (*d*) to give the necessary facilities to SKF for its exports and payment therefor during and after the present war and to this end appropriately to instruct the Combined Production and Resources Board and other authorities concerned; and (*e*) to allow SKF access to raw materials and other equipment and material needed for SKF's production.

It was made quite clear by Mr. Hamberg that SKF's action would not be conditional on the satisfaction of the above points but it was his feeling that in view of what SKF would do it might properly be expected that the British and American Governments would in return do something for SKF.

The oral reply given to Hamberg by Waring and Ravndal on October 6 and reiterated by Waring the following day was that while the two Legations could not make any commitments there was no doubt in our minds that the company's request would receive sympathetic consideration. It was evident that Hamberg had expected this reply in view of what I had previously told Mr. Boheman (Legation's 4053, October 6, 2 p. m.,<sup>89</sup> 1221 to London, for the Ambassador only).

Specifically with regard to the points made by Mr. Hamberg he was advised that it was thought by the two Legations as regards (*a*) this was a matter primarily for the decision of the United States Government; (*b*) there was no apparent reason why property clearly belonging to SKF should not be returned to it; (*c*) the question of the in-

<sup>88</sup> See footnote 73, p. 564.<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

terpretation of the Griffis-Waring letter of June 9 would be referred to Washington and London (Legation's 4066, October 6, 9 p. m., 1225 to London for the Ambassador); (*d*) once the company had ceased dealing with the enemy there would appear to be no reason for discrimination against SKF; (*e*) the needs of liberated areas would necessarily come first and it was not now known what supplies would be available after the war for neutral countries but otherwise there would appear to be no reason for discrimination against SKF.

My British colleague is telegraphing the Minister of Economic Warfare that he trusts that once the Board of Directors of SKF have formally ratified the decision completely to stop all exports to Germany and satellite countries of ball and roller bearings and parts thereof and of ball-bearing machinery, the British and American Governments will take into urgent and sympathetic consideration the matter of giving the company the desired assurances.

As I have previously reported, (my 4053) I fully agree with this position and urge, with reference to the Department's 2011 of October 7, 11 a. m.,<sup>90</sup> that the interested authorities of our Government give prompt and favorable consideration in so far as this may be practicable in light of our laws and regulations. It is my opinion (my 4053) and the British Minister fully concurs that it is of the utmost importance that our threatening letter should be kept secret and given no publicity.

My 1243, October 9, 7 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador only.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-1044 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 10, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 7:42 p. m.]

4109. For Department only. At Board of Directors meeting October 9, SKF officially decided to stop all exports to Germany and satellite countries of ball and roller bearings and parts thereof and of ball-bearing machinery as from October 12.

The company's minutes will record (*a*) that SKF is doing this in the assumption that the 5 points set forth in the memorandum which was handed Waring on October 7 (Legation's 4097, October 9, 7 p. m.) will be given sympathetic consideration by the British and American Governments; (*b*) that SKF does not request an answer now but reserves the right to receive clarification at a later date and (*c*) that it was agreed that no publicity shall take place.

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<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

My 1250, October 10, 6 p. m. repeats this to London, for the Ambassador only.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-1044: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1944—midnight.

8388. Now that the ball-bearing question seems to be satisfactorily settled, (Stockholm's 4109, October 10, 6 p. m., repeated to London as 1250) there still remains, in the opinion of the Department and FEA, the immediate necessity of doing everything possible to bring about the cessation of exports to Germany of the other rubrics mentioned in the Department's 8146, October 5, 7 p. m.

We are glad to note that the Foreign Office has stated that its preliminary reaction to the terms of the proposed *démarche* was favorable with two possible reservations (your 8403, October 6, 7 p. m.). In view of the present attitude of the Swedish Government, we are quite willing to omit any threat and are also willing to omit any supply commitment from the *démarche* should the British so desire.

We do believe, however, that a joint overall *démarche* should immediately be made to the Swedish Foreign Minister along the lines of the Department's October 5 telegram with the modifications referred to above.

Since we have accepted the British reservations, we are hopeful that the British will instruct their Minister at Stockholm to join our Minister in making the *démarche* now. Please discuss this matter with Foreign Office and MEW, and cable Department and Legation, Stockholm, urgently the decision arrived at.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-1444: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 14, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:50 p. m.]

4179. Desirability of immediately stopping all exports to Germany and satellites of iron ore, charcoal, pig iron and various steels (Department's 1999, October 5, 7 p. m.<sup>91</sup>) has with knowledge and approval of Swedish Foreign Office (Legation's 4166, October 13, 7 p. m.,<sup>92</sup>

<sup>91</sup> Same as telegram 8146 to London, p. 642.

<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

1274 to London) been discussed with Wiking Johnsson, Managing Director of Jernkontoret, Swedish Iron and Steel Association. He has undertaken to inform appropriate organization members of our wishes and to advise us on October 18 of what can be worked out secretly. He believes that most members will be disposed to collaborate without pressure and that he will have useful suggestions as to how others can be brought into line.

Sohlman is seeing managing directors of Uddeholm<sup>93</sup> and Bofors on our behalf this weekend.

It is again urged that this informal method of approach which I am gratified to note is preferred by MEW (London's 8704, October 13, 8 p. m., 566 to Legation<sup>94</sup>) be allowed opportunity to produce results. British Minister is out of town but I will inform him as soon as he returns.

My 1280, October 14, 5 p. m., repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Stone.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-1744: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1944—3 p. m.

2098. 1. Department and FEA have no objection to the inclusion of the products mentioned in Mr. Winant's 8877, October 17, 9 p. m. to the Department (London's 581, October 17 to you)<sup>94</sup> in the informal *démarche* you and Mr. Mallet are to make to Mr. Günther. You are accordingly requested to call upon the Foreign Minister as soon as an appointment can be arranged and make oral representations along the lines indicated in the Department's 1999, October 5,<sup>95</sup> as modified by its 2039 October 11,<sup>96</sup> and with mention of our gratification at the encouragement given by the Swedish Government to SKF in its decision to stop exports of bearings and bearing machinery. You should add that we naturally do not wish to indicate the measures that may be taken by Sweden in order to meet us on these points. The important thing is that the shipments to Germany of the products listed in the aforementioned telegrams cease, whether by Government decree, decision of the producers, et cetera.

2. For your confidential information, the War and Navy Departments (including the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff), the State Department and the FEA consider our ultimate aim with respect to

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<sup>93</sup> Swedish wood processing and iron and metal manufacturing firm.

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

<sup>95</sup> Same as telegram 8146 to London, p. 642.

<sup>96</sup> Same as telegram 8388 to London, p. 648.

Swedish-German trade is the total cessation of all Swedish exports to Germany. This decision has been reached after careful consideration by our highest military and naval authorities of the possible adverse effects of such action upon the military and related factors you have mentioned. However, as the British apparently do not yet see eye-to-eye with us on this matter and as we consider that a joint approach will be far more effective than a unilateral one, we are willing to limit our present *démarche* to a request for the termination of the exportation of Swedish products most important to the German war effort. This concession on our part does not, of course, preclude a further approach on the cessation of all trade, either by us alone or with British concurrence which we will continue to endeavor to obtain.

3. For your further confidential information, the Department appreciates the humanitarian desires of the Swedish Government to utilize its remaining trade as a weapon to force the Germans to terminate the deportation to Germany of Danish and Norwegian hostages (your 4213, October 16, 8 p. m.<sup>98</sup>). We are doubtful, however, that much could be accomplished at this late date to alleviate the suffering of the Danes and Norwegians by employing this threat and, in addition, feel that in the final analysis military consideration must be decisive.

4. We fully concur in your view that your hand would be greatly strengthened if more favorable treatment were extended to Swedish requests for permission to acquire products essential to Sweden's economy (your 4166, October 13, 7 p. m.<sup>98</sup>). Steps have already been taken to meet certain of the Swedish requests on asbestos packings and sheetings as well as supplies needed by SKF. Efforts are being made to settle the toluol question although the supply situation is extremely tight and the total amount involved could not be approved in full prior to the first quarter of 1945. Certain other Swedish requirements, notably buna and lead, could not in any case be granted until a satisfactory solution of the current economic warfare problems is reached. Bunker stocks at Göteborg and 100-octane gasoline will have to receive approval of our military authorities. Swedish compliance with the requests contained in the present *démarche* would naturally create a much more favorable atmosphere for such approval. In your discretion, you may so indicate to our friends in the Swedish Government.

5. Please inform us when the *démarche* has been made.

Repeated to London as Department's 8659.

HULL

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<sup>98</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/10-2444: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 24, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received 10:42 p. m.]

4331. It is thought by Stähle and Ihre (the latter is in charge of the German Section of the Commercial Department of Swedish Foreign Office) that I shall be informed by Mr. Boheman tomorrow or Thursday what the Swedish Government has decided with reference to our informal suggestions that Sweden terminate the export to Germany of products of importance to the German war effort (Department's 2122, October 21, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> and previous related correspondence). The British Minister and I have not called on the Foreign Minister since we have reason to believe from numerous conversations with Mr. Boheman and others that our objectives may be attained this week. These conversations have of necessity dealt with our desires in detail.

I gather that the Swedish Government may make a proposition looking towards the stoppage of the exports in which we are interested in exchange for the immediate shipment of a reasonable quantity of buna, Swedish necessity for which is desperate. Mr. Stähle believes in this connection that we shall be asked to give firm assurances that 1500 tons of buna plus accessories will be placed aboard a Swedish ship which is due to arrive in New Orleans towards the end of October.

According to Ihre a problem faces the Foreign Office in the matter of stopping the exports of lithium carbonate (Department's 2099, October 19, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup>) since this commodity is the basis of a barter agreement involving a nickel substance which is wanted by the Swedish Armed Forces.

As for iron ore, it is expected by Stähle that the offer will be to keep exports down to the present low level (Legation's 4227, October 17, 8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> 1302 to London) with Grängesberg cooperating. Boheman discussing same commodity with me on Saturday indicated that Government would probably propose to stop all exports of iron ore after arrival of buna safely in Sweden. Boheman seems to be of the firm opinion that the Germans attach a genuine prestige importance to the iron ore shipments out of proportion to what their present intrinsic importance can be, and that if Sweden stops all iron ore shipments the Germans will probably cut off the Göteborg traffic. It is for this reason that he said they desire that the iron ore shipments be kept to the present low level until the buna has arrived.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Possible method of procedure in effecting stoppage of trade in other products will be, according to both Ståhle and Ihre, to postpone shipments and otherwise to prevent exports under plausible excuses without immediately disclosing to Germans Swedish Government's decision—this in the hope that the Germans will not close the Göteborg safe conduct traffic before buna arrives.

A troublesome question is possibility that companies may bring claims against the Swedish State in connection with the Government's requirement that they break contracts which they were encouraged by the Government to make for the year 1944. See my No. 4260, October 19, 8 p. m.<sup>3</sup> We should resist any demands for compensation.

My 1351, October 24, 8 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Stone.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-2444 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944—7 p. m.

2151. You are requested immediately to make the *démarche* mentioned in the Department's 2098, October 19, 3 p. m., and 2122, October 21, 7 p. m.<sup>4</sup> Please report fully the conversation which you and your British colleague have with the Foreign Minister in regard thereto.

In the event that Mr. Günther replies along the lines indicated in your 4331, October 24, 8 p. m., we believe that it would be helpful for you to have our views regarding such a proposal. These are for your confidential information and not for communication to him or any other Swedish official.

(a) Although we realize that the matter of buna is connected with the termination of exports, we desire, in so far as possible, to treat the subject separately and thus avoid any idea of striking a bargain.

(b) It is our wish that Sweden will terminate immediately the exportation of all the products to be mentioned in the *démarche*. If Sweden insists on maintaining token shipments of iron ore until the safe conduct vessel about to load at New Orleans arrives at Göteborg, we will not make an issue of the matter.

(c) In view of the interest of the British in stopping exports of lithium carbonate, it is felt that it should not be omitted from the list of commodities to be included in the *démarche*. Should the Swedes meet us on all the other points, however, it is possible that the British may be willing to reach a compromise regarding this product.

(d) It is immaterial to us what methods the Swedish Government employs to stop the exports.

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<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Latter not printed.

(e) Since we are reasonably confident that the Swedish Government will meet our wishes we are already seeking to receive authority from the Combined Raw Materials Board for the release of upwards of 1,000 tons of buna and certain necessary accessories. Before the shipment could be made, however, we would require assurances from the Swedish Government that all token exports of iron ore to Germany and German-occupied countries would terminate as soon as the vessel reaches Göteborg.

(f) If such a suggestion is made, you should make it clear to Mr. Günther that we have no intention of granting compensation to any Swedish firm in return for compliance with our requests.

(g) Every effort will be made to avoid any publicity on the actions which Sweden may take in meeting our wishes.

Repeated to London as Department's 8941.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-2644 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 26, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received October 27—8:40 a. m.]

4367. As anticipated in my 4331, October 24, 8 p. m., 1351 to London Mr. Boheman informed the British Minister and me this afternoon and is similarly informing the Swedish Ministers at London and Washington that the Foreign Office has completed its conversations with the exporters of products of importance to the German war effort (Department's 2122, October 21, 7 p. m.<sup>5</sup> and previous related correspondence particularly Legation's 4166, October 13, 7 p. m.,<sup>5</sup> 1274 to London) and the following results have been achieved.

Charcoal and pig iron stopped (all stoppages effective as of this date). Machine tools stopped with the qualification that one firm, Lidkopings Mekaniska Verkstad, has some machine tools ready for shipment which cannot be used in Sweden. The value of these approximates 500,000 crowns and it is hoped that the Allied Governments will be able to help in having orders for these goods placed to the end that this firm will not suffer too great a loss from meeting our wishes. Selenium stopped. Caesium chloride stopped. Cobalt slag stopped. Electric machines and motors and parts thereof stopped. Measuring instruments stopped with the qualification, however, that one firm, Aktiebolaget C. E. Johansson, has approximately 500,000 crowns of orders in process and the firm requests that we help it to obtain new orders for these instruments so that it will not be necessary to throw skilled laborers out on the street. This might be done through its selling companies in United States (Swed-

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<sup>5</sup> Not printed.



ish Gauge Company, Detroit) and England (C. E. Johansson Ltd., Coventry).

Iron and steel: The total amount of steel of all kinds to go from Uddeholm, Hellefors, Hofors, and Bofors<sup>6</sup> totals 4,000 tons. The total of the rubrics we have asked them to stop is 400 tons. The stoppage of exports of these 400 tons is regarded as feasible though it is thought that it would lead to a very narrow escape for the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic. There would still be 3,600 tons of permissible steels to be exported during the balance of the year. The Foreign Office suggests an alternative plan which it hopes will meet with our approval. It proposes that the Swedes be permitted to export about 2,000 tons of all kinds of steels including about 175 tons of the rubrics we wish to have stopped up to the time around December 1 when the *Saturnus* will have reached Gothenburg with the buna aboard to which reference is made below. Thereafter all exports of all kinds of iron and steel would be stopped.

Iron ore is now being exported out of three ports Halmstad, Otterbacken and Narvik. The only company exporting out of Halmstad is a German-owned company which is permitted to export 15,000 tons a month which means it still may export 30,000 tons up to the end of the year. This ore is of a very low quality. The amount which still may be exported out of Otterbacken is 21,000 tons for balance of year, which is also of a low quality. As for Narvik only 17,000 tons have been taken by the Germans out of that port during the past 4 weeks. Grängesberg is actively collaborating in keeping this amount low. (Legation's 4227, October 17, 8 p. m., 1302 to London.)<sup>7</sup> Swedes propose that they be permitted to continue this low rate of shipment since it is vital to them that the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic be kept open as long as possible and they have learned that the Germans have told Hitler without indicating how insignificant the amount of the iron ore shipments is that he must not close the Gothenburg traffic, otherwise the Swedes will stop shipments of iron ore out of Narvik. All shipments would be stopped immediately if the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic were stopped by the Germans.

Lithium carbonate. As indicated in my 4331<sup>8</sup> the Swedes have a barter agreement with the Germans under which they are to provide 20 tons of lithium carbonate in exchange for 75 tons of nickel sulphate plus 12 tons of cadmium. These are goods which are greatly needed for Sweden's defense and the Swedes hope that we will permit them to continue this barter arrangement. However, if it is vital to us that the shipment of this lithium carbonate be stopped the

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<sup>6</sup> Swedish iron and steel companies.

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

<sup>8</sup> Dated October 24, 8 p. m., p. 651.

export will be stopped but they would request us to assure them that they will be supplied with approximately 6 tons of cadmium.

The total of surgical instruments for which the Swedes request exception is 17,000 crowns. Legation assumes in view of the Department's 2122 October 21, 7 p. m. (873 to London) that there will be no objection to making this exception.

It was stressed by Mr. Boheman that the Swedes have made no commitment to the Germans for trade in 1945 and unless the Allies should agree to certain exports with a view to permitting the Swedes to negotiate with the Germans for the maintenance of the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic all exports to Germany will cease January 1 (Legation's 2718, July 21, 7 p. m., 728 to London). He added that when the Swedish Government closed the east coast ports it thought it had a well-founded hope that by Christmas Sweden would be able to trade with the Allies without German permission. It now finds from reports from its representatives in Allied countries and in Germany that its views in this regard were too optimistic and that it must reckon with waiting until the spring before Sweden will be able to trade with us. This means that Sweden expects to be completely isolated from trade with all countries beginning January 1 when its trade with Germany ceases and the Gothenburg traffic almost certainly will be closed unless we have permitted Sweden to negotiate a new agreement with the Germans good enough to induce the Germans to allow the traffic to continue. For this reason the Swedes must necessarily associate with our request for the stoppage of certain additional exports of importance to the German war effort Sweden's desperate need for buna and accessories. The Swedish Government has reduced tire-borne traffic to the uttermost and yet the 35,000 buses and trucks operating in Sweden are now facing a situation wherein all tire reserves and material for their manufacture will have been exhausted in a very few months. Mr. Boheman pointed out in this regard that Sweden has to use trucks to get the firewood out of the forests and out of the way so that the timber can be floated down the rivers. He added that if Sweden cannot get the firewood out of the forests which is imperative now that the coal shipments have stopped and if Sweden cannot use trucks to transport milk and other food products from the farms to the population centers Sweden's situation will be intolerable. If on the other hand Sweden can get buna and accessories from us it could hold out completely isolated until next July. Politically the Swedish Government is no longer concerned about Germany and is perfectly willing to be "rude" to the Germans but the Swedish Government realizes that German patience has been stretched to the utmost degree and it therefore feels unable to do anything which would make it impossible for Sweden to get these vitally needed supplies of rubber.

Incidentally if Sweden does not get the rubber it will not be able to produce for us the pulp paper and timber et cetera which we will need from Sweden after the war.

Accordingly the Foreign Office feels it must ask us to give firm assurances that we will cover Sweden's minimum needs for 1945 and in this connection assure it immediately that we will load on the *Saturnus* which is due to arrive in New Orleans the end of this week a total of 3665 tons of buna and accessories subdivided as follows: buna 2105, natural rubber 345, carbon black 380, tire cord 185, and for manufacture 1000 tons Svedopren: 300 tons of carbon black, 100 tons of magnesium oxide and 250 tons of "unknown chemicals".

Total requirements for 12-month period including amounts requested for loading on *Saturnus* are buna 3700 tons, natural rubber 610 tons, tire cord 1000 tons, carbon black 1125 tons and for production of 1000 tons Svedopren same figures as desired for *Saturnus*. In addition Swedes would require other chemicals and ingredients necessary for tire manufacture from buna which are unknown here but estimated to amount to 500 tons. These figures exclude small stocks of buna, natural rubber and tire cord reserved for civilian supply but do take into consideration present stocks of buna and natural rubber for military purposes. Memorandum setting forth this information prepared by Rubber Department of Industrial Commission will be transmitted by next air pouch.<sup>9</sup>

It is believed that it would be satisfactory to Swedes if we would assure them promptly that we will load the amount specified for the *Saturnus* and undertake to cover Sweden's minimum requirements for 1945. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Sweden's need for buna is desperate and that Swedes' last opportunity to obtain enough buna to subsist at the minimum rate of consumption until next July is the *Saturnus* arriving at New Orleans at the end of this week. It is the considered judgment of the Foreign Office that if we cannot give these assurances with respect to rubber it will not be able to get the Swedish Government to support what the Foreign Office has succeeded in getting the exporters to agree to.

My 1365, October 26, 7 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Stone.

JOHNSON

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<sup>9</sup> Despatch 4400, October 30, 1944, and enclosed memoranda, not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/10-2744 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 27, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received 11:20 p. m.]

4384. As previously reported (Legation's 4331, October 24, 8 p. m., 1351 to London) the *démarche* was in effect made (Department's 2151 October 26, 7 p. m., 8941 to London).

I assume from the Department's telegram under reference that the arrangements and proposals (Legation's 4367, October 26, 7 p. m., 1365 to London) will be found satisfactory and that we have obtained the stoppage of exports of products of importance to the German war effort.

While it may seem that the Swedish request for buna and accessories is in the nature of a proposed bargain I urge that such is not the case. The stoppage of exports with the exceptions the Department has anticipated has already taken effect. I shall, however, be careful to make it clear to the Foreign Office when I am authorized to advise it regarding the approval of the request for buna and accessories that the furnishing of the supply is not to be considered as a return for anything they have done.

My 1375, October 27, 8 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and Stone.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-2344 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman)*

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1944—11 p. m.

9028. From Department, FEA and USCC. Your 9105, October 23 repeated to Stockholm as your 613, and Stockholm's 4097, October 9; 4109, October 10 and 4243, October 18 to the Department repeated to you as Stockholm's 1243, 1250 and 1312 respectively.<sup>10</sup> As result of SKF's agreement to cease exports of bearings and machinery to Germany sympathetic consideration has been given by the interested agencies here to the five requests put forward by SKF. We are somewhat uncertain as to the exact significance of some of the requests, but as we understand them the following are our present views:

(a) The United States Government cannot accept the view that discrimination has been practiced against SKF. SKF, like other companies owning property and doing business in the United States, must conform to United States regulations designed to protect our

<sup>10</sup> Telegrams 9105 and 4243 not printed.

wartime interests. Within this general principle we can assure SKF that no discrimination will be practiced against them in the future.

(b) We agree with Foot that SKF properties in Germany will be treated without discrimination in the same manner as other similar properties owned in neutral countries and having similar relationship to German war effort. All such properties would be treated in accordance with general policy decisions of interested governments.

(c) We do not believe there is any obligation, either legal or moral, to compensate SKF for losses arising from cessation of shipments after October 12th. Griffis Agreement<sup>11</sup> clearly confines our liability to losses "due solely to the operation of this agreement", which ended October 12. As to possible moral obligation, our position has consistently been that Sweden should completely stop export of bearings. Moreover, we have more recently called upon Swedish Government to cease all exports to Germany, especially products of direct benefit to German military effort. In the case of special steels, we have indicated (Department's 2151, October 26, 7 p. m., repeated to London as 8941) that no compensation could be expected for cessation of such exports, and we believe same reasoning applies in even greater measure to bearings. We fully recognize our obligation to reimburse SKF for losses during period May 12 to October 12; moreover, we have agreed to place orders for over 10 million kronor additional. We cannot agree, therefore, to compensation for any bearings except those which would, except for Griffis Agreement, have been shipped (not merely manufactured) before October 12th. In this connection, we do not understand significance of statement in Stockholm's 4243 that SKF is continuing production of bearings, and implication that Hamburg expects we will take over bearings produced for shipment after October 12th. Our position should be made clear to SKF without delay.

(d) We are not clear regarding meaning of SKF request for "facilities for exports". We presume this is with relation to division of markets for bearings and agree, if so, that answer should be in the most general terms and based upon general Allied postwar commercial policy. In this context we would be willing to assure SKF that they will not be discriminated against.

(e) We agree with Foot's suggestion regarding access to raw materials. We suggest, moreover, that SKF could be assured that sympathetic consideration is being given by us to their request for supplies rejected by us last August. (Department's 6194 of August 5th.<sup>12</sup>)

We believe American representative should accompany British experts to Sweden for settlement of financial obligations with SKF. We would like to know urgently whether Embassy has suitable person available. We are exploring possibility of sending representative from here, and hope British would be willing, if necessary, to delay departure of their experts for a few days to enable us to get a man to London.

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<sup>11</sup> See footnote 73, p. 564.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

We agree with Stockholm's 4243 that information should be sought regarding Russian orders and requirements. It may be possible also to dispose of bearing stocks to liberated areas (e.g., the Netherlands, who have indicated desire to purchase 1,400,000 kronor of Swedish bearings).

Scheuer expects to leave for London momentarily and will be prepared to discuss further questions of settlement and disposal of bearings.

Repeated to Stockholm as Department's 2169. [Department, FEA and USCC.]

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-844

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 8, 1944.

The Swedish Minister called this morning at his request.

He stated that he received a communication from his Government that they had an urgent military need for buna and that it was hoped that a shipment could be placed on board a vessel leaving the 15th although it could be held until the 20th. The Minister stated that in his opinion his Government had fulfilled all of our requests and that in return the buna seemed a very small item.

In reply I pointed out to the Minister that certain members of this Government were doubtful as to whether it was wise to resume shipments of this kind to Sweden until his Government had actually cut all economic aid to the enemy. The Minister replied that the cessation of exports to Germany would completely isolate Sweden from the rest of the world and would not permit trade with Britain, the United States, or any other country. He knew that American Army and Navy representatives had this attitude but he thought that the attitude of FEA and the Department in these matters was very constructive. He stated that he had exchanged views with his Government on the advisability of appealing to the President but he knew that the President was busy and would back up the military in any event.

I then told the Minister that he must realize it had taken his Government a long time to accomplish the reduction in exports and that while I was not sure what could be done in the case of his request for buna, I would look into the situation and review it with the proper officers in the Department.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1044: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 10, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received November 10—1:23 p. m.]

9796. For Department, Crowley and Fleming, FEA from Stone. ReDepts 9170, November 2.<sup>14</sup> MEW and Foreign Office are cabling British Embassy in Washington a new formula on the matter of buna supplies requested by Sweden for shipment on *Saturnus*. It is apparent that the British military and civil authorities are disturbed by reports they have received of terms contemplated by Washington. As a result, British plan to request opinion of Combined Chiefs of Staff on the relative military advantage of complete cessation of trade, which would sever vital communications with Denmark, as against trickle of trade through west coast ports, which is regarded as unimportant in German war economy.

In meeting with Foot today, I strongly urged him to include iron ore in point 1 of his 3 proposals; or at least to agree to inform Swedes now that iron ore shipments must cease on or before arrival of *Saturnus*. Foot was unable to accept either suggestion, but if Department insists I believe British will agree to join us immediately in demanding stoppage of iron ore on arrival of *Saturnus* if necessary to secure departure of this ship. I do not believe that British can be induced to go beyond this at present time, as they are firmly convinced that failure to secure buna for *Saturnus* would jeopardize gains already secured, and that total stoppage of all trade now would not be to our advantage.

Sent to Department as Embassy's 9796 repeated to Stockholm as 696. [Stone.]

GALLMAN

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-744: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 10, 1944—7 p. m.

2260. Your 4561, November 7.<sup>14</sup> Buna question has been taken up with War and Navy Departments which reiterate the opinion which they have consistently held that this Government should insist upon the immediate cessation of all "war aid" that Sweden is still extending to Germany (and this includes all shipments to Germany). The Department, of course, shares this view.

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

The War and Navy Departments feel that in Germany's present position any import into Germany from abroad is of direct assistance to the German economy and therefore directly or indirectly to the German war potential. Both Departments feel accordingly that Swedish delay in fully responding to our request of last August for immediate cessation of Swedish exports to Germany has enabled Germany to prolong the war.

The War Department feels that the Göteborg traffic is not now essential to Sweden and therefore do not share the Swedish concern over the possible consequences to Sweden of closure of this traffic by the Germans. Furthermore, as you have been informed in our 2098, October 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that the importance to the prosecution of the war of a stoppage of all Swedish exports to Germany outweighs the possible adverse effects upon other factors which have from time to time been mentioned by the Swedes.

The Department desires that at the earliest possible moment you seek an interview with the appropriate official and give him orally the substance of the foregoing which are the views of your Government. You should then reiterate with all the force at your command this Government's insistence that Sweden terminate, or unequivocally engage to terminate on a certain date all remaining exports to Germany. Meanwhile this Government is not prepared to ship buna and accessories to Sweden.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London for the information of the Embassy and interested British agencies as Department's no. 9462.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-1144 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 11, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received November 11—1:26 p. m.]

9835. When informed of Department's telegram to Stockholm of November 10<sup>15</sup> (repeated to London as Department's 9462), Foot expressed surprise and concern that the United States Government has found it necessary to act in this matter without prior consultation with British. He pointed out that British were not, at this moment, in a position to instruct their Minister in Stockholm to join our Minister in the demand for immediate cessation of all trade. Foot had hoped that it would be possible to achieve a common policy for stopping all vital exports at a fixed date, and he had expected that

<sup>15</sup> No. 2260, *supra*.



proposals referred to in Embassy's 9796 of November 10 would receive consideration prior to further action on our part.

Repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 699.

GALLMAN

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1044: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Gallman)*

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1944—midnight.

9501. With reference to Department's 2260, November 10, to Stockholm, repeated to London as Department's 9462, please inform the appropriate British officials that because of the military importance attached by this Government to the immediate stoppage of all Swedish exports to Germany we feel that we cannot delay further in pressing the Swedes as forcefully as possible to accomplish such stoppage. We thoroughly appreciate that there has been some difference of opinion between London and Washington as to the best methods of bringing about a termination of Swedish exports to Germany and as to the effects of such action upon the over-all ends to be sought in Sweden including various military and intelligence activities, et cetera, which need not be detailed here. Nevertheless, we are most anxious to have the British Government associate itself with us in this request of the Swedish Government and sincerely hope that they can see their way clear to taking such action.

For your information, the decisions set forth in the reference telegram were made at the direction of the President. The time element and the urgency from the standpoint of this Government of immediate action made it impossible to consult fully with the British who in any case have been kept fully informed of our developing views even though they have not always found it possible for reasons of their own to see eye-to-eye with us.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm for information as Department's No. 2272.

STETTINIUS

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1244: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, November 12, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received November 12—7 p. m.]

9881. For Department and FEA. Embassy informed Foreign Office and MEW today of action outlined in Department's 9501, No-

vember 11, midnight and strongly emphasized the military importance which our Government attaches to the immediate stoppage of all Swedish exports to Germany.

At a meeting with Foot this afternoon, Stone strongly reiterated the urgency and necessity for immediate action and emphasized the advantages to be achieved by prompt British participation in pressing the Swedes to stop all remaining exports to Germany. Foot conceded that our joint objectives in Sweden had not been fully attained and expressed desire to find a practical and satisfactory joint approach which would accomplish our purpose without delay. He believed that actual difference between our two Governments was small and could be eliminated. Foot pointed out, however, that British Embassy in Washington had by now shown Department the formula proposed in their telegram of November 10.<sup>17</sup> Foot had hoped that this proposal would prove acceptable. In the light of your telegram (9501) we indicated that this was most unlikely. After further discussion Foot agreed to extend earlier proposal as follows:

1. Swedes to be informed by the two Governments that buna and accessories will be shipped on the *Saturnus* provided that:

(a) Assurances are given that all existing restrictions on exports to all enemy territories will be maintained unconditionally by the Swedish Government;

(b) All other Swedish exports to enemy territories will cease immediately on arrival of the *Saturnus* save for such relief and other items as we may agree to exempt for the present.

2. The list of exempt items will be discussed by the two Governments and full agreement sought before arrival of the *Saturnus* in Sweden.

British are instructing Mallet to join with our Minister immediately either on basis of the above proposal or the earlier formula submitted on November 10 subject to approval of the Department.

In order to reach agreement with American Government, MEW will again ask British military authorities here to reconsider question immediate stoppage of iron ore. In any case, however, the undertaking in their proposal of November 10 still stands, namely, that they will join in seeking iron ore embargo on arrival of the *Saturnus* unless Combined Chiefs of Staff decide otherwise.

Repeated Stockholm.

GALLMAN

<sup>17</sup> See telegram 9796, November 10, 5 p. m., from London, p. 660.

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1244: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom  
(Gallman)*

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1944—midnight.

9559. The Department appreciates the promptness (Embassy's 9881, November 12) with which its 9501 was taken up with the British. We also are glad to note that Foot concedes that joint Anglo-American objectives in Sweden have not been fully attained and desires to find a practical and satisfactory joint approach which would accomplish our purpose without delay.

The British formula of November 10 (your 9796, November 10) was given us in detail by the British Embassy on the afternoon of November 11. The second proposal set forth in your 9881, November 12, coincides in all major respects with an alternative procedure which was before the President when he made the decision set forth in the Department's 9462, November 10.<sup>18</sup>

Neither the November 10 formula nor that of November 12 entirely meets our requirements in that (1) they contemplate shipment of buna and accessories to which we are not at this time able to agree and (2) they would open the way for further delays by the Swedes in agreeing to a point which this Government considers of the highest importance, namely, the immediate cessation of all Swedish exports to Germany.

It should be clear from our 9462 and 9501 that this Government is not prepared to ship buna and accessories to Sweden at this time.

This Government feels strongly regarding continued Swedish delay in fully responding to our request of last August for immediate cessation of Swedish exports to Germany, thus contributing to Germany's ability to prolong the war. We feel that the nature of the decisions set forth in our 9462, which were made at the direction of the President, and military requirements as seen by this Government, do not admit of further delay in again pressing the Swedish Government. We are anxious, however, to have the British associated with us in making this demand and hope that instructions can be sent to Mallet very shortly in this sense. Johnson can defer action on his instructions for 2 or 3 days to permit of further consideration by the British authorities.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's no. 2285.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>18</sup> Same as telegram 2260 to Stockholm, p. 660.

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1544

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

His Majesty's Government understand that instructions have been sent to the United States Minister in Stockholm to request the Swedish Government to cease forthwith, or as from a fixed date in the future, all exports to Germany, and to inform them that in the meanwhile the tyre making requirements for which they have asked cannot be released. His Majesty's Government further understand that a communication along the above lines has been made to the Swedish Legation in Washington.<sup>19</sup>

His Majesty's Government do not agree with this decision, and are disturbed to learn that they were afforded no opportunity of expressing their views before action was taken, bearing in mind that economic warfare policy with regard to Sweden has hitherto been handled on a joint basis and that the Department were aware that His Majesty's Government were in favour of the immediate release of the rubber, etc. against certain conditions to be entered into by the Swedish Government. The Embassy have accordingly been instructed to draw the attention of the Department to the following consideration:

1. As a result of restrictions on Swedish exports to the enemy already secured under the War Trade Agreement or now promised by the Swedish Government, and as a result of the cessation of all exports from the Baltic Ports, Swedish exports to the enemy are reduced to insignificant quantities of goods of little or no assistance to the enemy's war effort.

2. Some time ago the Swedish Government indicated their intention in any case to stop all exports to Germany on January 1st, 1945, and they have now announced publicly that the trade agreement with Germany will not be renewed on expiry at 31st December, 1944. The Swedish Government have explained the various considerations that have made them reluctant to precipitate a crisis prior to January 1st, by stopping immediately their remaining exports to the enemy, and His Majesty's Government are of the opinion that these considerations are valid.

3. The communication made to a representative of the Swedish Legation in Washington on November 6th<sup>19</sup> as a result of which the Swedish Legation is understood to have reported to the Swedish Government in Stockholm that the military authorities in the United States insisted on an immediate embargo on all exports, and that in the meanwhile it was most unlikely that the tyre making requirements would be released evidently came as a complete surprise to the Swedish Government, who whether rightly or wrongly had formed the impression that the substantial progress they had made in meeting our

<sup>19</sup> Not found in Department files.

economic warfare objectives was appreciated, and that their difficulties in making further immediate progress were understood. In this connection it is perhaps relevant that as recently as a few weeks ago, the Department themselves are understood to have proposed in a telegram to Stockholm that in return for embargoes on a further limited list of Swedish exports, the Swedes should be afforded sympathetic consideration of their urgent supply needs. It seems that the Swedish Government in putting forward their proposals for further embargoes at the end of October, and in asking for the release of tyre making requirements, were acting under the impression that in the light of the action they had already taken and the further steps they proposed to take to meet the wishes of the American and British Governments, their request for the release of tyre making requirements would be regarded by the American and British Governments as reasonable.

4. His Majesty's Government attach importance to securing the embargoes promised by the Swedes at the end of October, which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government comprise the remaining exports to Germany that might be of any significant assistance to the enemy's war effort. His Majesty's Government are most averse to acquiescing in a course of action that may well result in the Swedish Government refusing to implement these embargoes for a further few weeks.

5. His Majesty's Government also wish to draw to the urgent attention of the Department certain other consequences of direct importance to the United Kingdom which are likely to result if Swedish tyre making requirements are not immediately released. As the Department is aware, His Majesty's Government are extremely anxious that Swedish timber should be available for shipment to the United Kingdom as soon as transport is possible. The need for these supplies of timber is of course due to the serious housing shortage, largely resulting from the robot bomb attacks on Southern England and on London in particular. The Swedish Government in explaining their need for their tyre making requirements have pointed out that unless these are immediately forthcoming, their road transport situation will be extremely grave. Because of the shortage of coal, one of the important purposes for which trucks are used in Sweden is for the transport of wood for fuel either direct to the towns or to the rail head. If wood for fuel cannot be transported from the forests, the Swedish Government will be obliged to use as fuel construction timber which has already been cut and transported, and which would otherwise be available for export to the United Kingdom immediately shipment was possible. The same consideration applies to pit props, which are urgently required in France and Belgium. His Majesty's Government cannot ignore the fact that a decision to withhold tyre making supplies for Sweden is likely, for the above reasons, to prejudice the procurement of timber that is desperately needed in the United Kingdom, and in this connection, His Majesty's Government feel obliged to point out that in spite of our acute need for timber, negotiations with the Swedes for the purchase of this timber have been held up ever since May, in compliance with the wishes of the United States authorities, who feared that they might prejudice the attainment of our joint economic warfare aims. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government are gravely concerned at the probable effect of this decision on the negotiations with the Swedish Government for a new financial agreement between

Sweden and the United Kingdom, of which the Department is aware, and on the negotiations concerning Swedish participation in the United Maritime Authority.

In view of the foregoing considerations which compel His Majesty's Government to the conclusion that the decision of the United States Government referred to above is unlikely to result in any material advantage to the American and British Governments, and is in fact only too likely to have the opposite effect, the Embassy is instructed to urge the Department to reconsider this decision and as an alternative to request the Swedish Government to undertake immediately that all Swedish exports to the enemy will cease as soon as the Swedish vessel *Saturnus* has arrived, and to inform the Swedish Government that on receipt of this undertaking the tyre making requirements will be released at once for shipment on the *Saturnus*.<sup>21</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944.

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-1544 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944—6 p. m.

2315. Your 4678, November 15; London's 9993, November 15, repeated to you as 717.<sup>22</sup> If the Swedes take unequivocal action to terminate all remaining exports of whatever nature to Germany now, we are prepared to permit a shipment of buna and tyre accessories.

If in order to make sure that buna et cetera reaches Sweden before Gothenburg traffic is stopped, we would not object to the Swedes withholding formal announcement of action until buna arrives, provided exports are in fact completely stopped now by administrative delay or otherwise.<sup>23</sup>

Repeated to London.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-1844 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 18, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 19—11:55 a. m.]

4727. I have discussed Department's 2315, November 17, 7 p. m. with Boheman with following result.

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<sup>21</sup> In marginal note it was stated that this memorandum was answered orally.

<sup>22</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>23</sup> The file copy bears the following handwritten note: "OK FDR."

Boheman states his Government is "absolutely certain" that unless present meager exports to Germany which he says may in some instances be further reduced to token figures, are kept up, German authorities will not permit arrival of *Saturnus* to Sweden; that a "complete" stoppage now, even though taken administratively, would unquestionably produce this result. Sweden would, therefore, not only fail to get the rubber even though we grant it but would also lose extremely valuable cargo already loaded on *Saturnus*. I have no reasonable doubt in my mind that Boheman has represented genuine conviction of Swedish Government which he shares that our granting buna will be useless unless Swedes are able to keep up semblance of trade with Germany until arrival of the ship. He informed me that Minister Boström has received lengthy instructions to raise the issue again with U. S. authorities and make declaration in following sense: As soon as *Saturnus* arrives in Sweden with rubber cargo applied for, Swedish Government will stop all export to Germany of any commodity that can be considered as of importance for conduct of the war. After arrival of *Saturnus* no Swedish export to Germany will take place whatsoever except in special cases with regard to other commodities than those mentioned above and after previous consultation within framework of Joint Standing Commission.

It is my belief that Swedish Government is getting ready to stop all exports to Germany except in special cases after consultation in the JSC. (Government will not formally say "agreed upon" but will only say "after consultation" in the JSC. Boheman says, however, that there can be no reasonable doubt that the consultation will also imply consent. He admits that any Swedish exports to Germany after January 1 would have character of political act.) Swedes, therefore, are unable to see why they should sacrifice cargo of *Saturnus* with or without the rubber when there is no compensating factor but actually serious loss to them, and maintain immediate total stoppage by whatever measures will have result that *Saturnus* will not be allowed to pass German blockade. See immediately following cable.<sup>24</sup>

Repeated to London as my 1511.

JOHNSON

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-2144: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1944—8 p. m.

2347. We are prepared to permit the shipment of buna and tire accessories including crude rubber if the Swedes will agree now that

<sup>24</sup>Not printed.

immediately upon the arrival of the shipment in Sweden they will terminate all exports to Germany and pending its arrival will restrict to an absolute minimum by administrative or other measures the quantities of goods still eligible for export to Germany. The crude rubber will be furnished from U.K. stocks. Actual allocation of rubber by CRMB<sup>25</sup> is expected in day or so.<sup>26</sup>

Since U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have stressed the importance from American military standpoint of total cessation of Swedish exports to Germany even if this involves closure of all Swedish ports, we are not in a position to support British request to Swedes to keep Danish communications and Swedish west coast ports open. As British desire in this respect seems to be based on military and military intelligence considerations, it would seem appropriate for the British Chiefs of Staff to present their views in Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime, however, Department would be guided by views of our own military authorities which are as stated above. Please concert action with your British colleague. You are of course aware of the urgency which this Government attaches to securing objective.

Sent to Stockholm, repeated to London as the Department's 9804.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-2244 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 22, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

4799. This afternoon the British Minister and I saw Mr. Boheman and I communicated to him substance of the Department's 2347, November 21, 8 p. m. 9804 to London. Foreign Office had already received this information through a telegraph from the Swedish Minister at Washington. It had already been taken up with the Cabinet and Mr. Boheman informed us in the name of the Government that the Swedish Government accepted without reservation the conditions which had been set forth in detail to Mr. Boström. He will confirm this in writing tomorrow.<sup>27</sup> The British Minister joined himself entirely with my instructions and we both expressed our gratification to Mr. Boheman at the action taken by his Government.

Mr. Boheman said that the Government plans as soon as the *Saturnus* arrives to issue a simple statement to the press that all trade

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<sup>25</sup> Combined Raw Materials Board (United States and Great Britain).

<sup>26</sup> The Swedish Minister called on the Secretary of State at the latter's request on November 21, 1944, and was informed of the substance of this paragraph. He was also advised that President Roosevelt had approved of this policy.

<sup>27</sup> Copy of letter transmitted to the Department in despatch 4575, November 25, from Stockholm; neither printed.



with Germany has ceased. In the meantime they will stop exports of all items on our list (see my 4367 of October 26, 7 p. m., 1365 to London and 4441, November 1, 10 a. m.,<sup>28</sup> 1401 to London) and will reduce all others to an absolute minimum in line with the Department's stipulations to Mr. Boström.<sup>29</sup> It will not therefore be necessary to make any specific statement about the closure of the west coast ports in which the British are interested.

Mr. Boheman's statement of the action they will take on the arrival of the *Saturnus* was in reply to a remark from Sir Victor Mallet that his Government would regret seeing the west coast ports closed. Mr. Boheman was of the opinion that when the total embargo on exportation to Germany becomes effective the small craft in which the British are interested will not be in any greater jeopardy than they are at present.

My 1540, November 22, 7 p. m., repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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103.9169/12-1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 12, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received 10 p. m.]

11032. For Department, Crowley and Fleming FEA from Stone. ReDepts 10329, December 11.<sup>30</sup> On afternoon December 12 American-British negotiations were opened with Swedes by presentation of memorandum set out below. Boheman's reaction was on whole favorable and desire of Swedish Government to participate actively in rehabilitation of Europe was emphasized by him.

Following is text of memorandum:

"The United States and United Kingdom Governments agree:

(a) To maintain in force existing basic rations for the period of continued hostilities in Europe and for 90 days thereafter subject, of course, to the existing proviso that the rations may need to be modified in certain instances if this is rendered necessary by the current supply position.

(b) To adopt a liberal attitude towards Swedish requests for increased supplies in all cases where the supply position permits.

(c) In the event of the closing of the Göteborg traffic to raise no objection to Swedish stockpiling of her basic ration purchases up to

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<sup>28</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>29</sup> See paragraph 1 of telegram 2347, p. 668. In telegram 2734, November 24, 1944, 7 p. m., the Department instructed the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to inform appropriate Soviet authorities of Sweden's action (740.00112-European War 1939/11-2444).

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

one-quarter of the annual quantities involved and be ready to give favorable consideration to further stockpiling should entry to Swedish ports be closed for a period of more than 3 months. This provision as to stockpiling to be subject to Swedish Government giving full information with respect to such stockpiled purchases and being willing in the event of an exceptional shortage developing in any particular commodity to sell to the United States or United Kingdom Governments against a promise of future delivery to Sweden when traffic is reopened.

(d) In the post hostilities period to use their best endeavors up to the limits imposed by the supply position to see that goods are made available to Sweden in quantities sufficient to maintain her economy on a reasonable basis; and to proceed to examine possibilities of giving Swedish Government more precise indications of the allocations which it may be practicable to make for Sweden in respect of certain key commodities in short supply.

The Swedish Government agree:

(a) To continue in force the provisions of the 1939 war trade agreement and of the tripartite agreement of 1943 together with all the measures which the Swedish Government have subsequently taken and in particular completely to eliminate trade with Germany, occupied territories and satellite countries as from January 1, 1945 except as regards particular transactions specifically approved by the JSC in Stockholm.

(b) To make provision for full consultation and information regarding Swedish trade with Finland.

(c) To place an embargo on all trade and communications between, or via, Sweden and Japan.

(d) To give a general assurance that it is the intention of the Swedish Government in the post hostilities period to do all in its power to cooperate with the United States and United Kingdom in the general economic tasks involved in reconstruction and relief and in the orderly distribution of supplies throughout the world.

In particular the Swedish Government agree:

(1) to maintain existing wartime restrictions on purchases of a limited number of commodities which are in short supply and which must therefore remain the subject of allocation in order to ensure equitable distribution; and where requested to do so to maintain in force existing arrangements for the centralized or coordinated buying of such commodities.

(2) To arrange for the equitable distribution of Swedish products required for reconstruction in Europe and to facilitate the procurement of needed supplies from Sweden if their procurement on a commercial basis meets with difficulty.

(e) To institute such measures as may be necessary to fulfill the aims expressed in Bretton Woods resolution No. VI.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> For text, see *Proceedings and Documents of United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), vol. I, p. 939. Resolution VI pertained to enemy assets and looted property.

With regard to undertakings of American and British Governments Boheman commented on paragraph (*d*) that Swedish need was not so much for foodstuffs as for raw materials which would make exports for rehabilitation possible. In fact he suggested that after "maintain her economy on a reasonable basis" there might well be added "and to maintain Swedish exports for the rehabilitation of Europe" or words to that effect. Foot and Stone indicated general agreement with Boheman's suggestion.

With regard to the Swedish undertakings Boheman in commenting on point (*a*) said that Sweden had recently maintained a small trade with Norway and Denmark on a barter basis and desired to be able to continue this in 1945. The trade with Norway had been approved by the home front and the Government in Exile as not serving any German purpose. Trade with Denmark was mainly in wood products the distribution of which is under the supervision of Danish trade unions. Total of the trade with Denmark and Norway was approximately 50 million crowns for a 6 months' period. Foot pointed out that the Allied Governments had generally recognized the needs of the Norwegian Government and Danish authorities. It was our desire that these transactions be considered by the JSC on their merits.

With regard to point (*b*) Boheman desired to know whether consultation implied consultation before export. Foot answered in affirmative. Boheman then inquired as to the basis for this request. Foot and Stone replied that Allied Governments desire an opportunity to make representations at JSC and that clause was inserted in order to prevent exports going to Japan via Finland to make certain that Finland did not get larger share of supplies than liberated areas and that we had an opportunity of controlling Swedish re-export of supplies provided by United States.

With regard to point (*d*) (1) Foot informed Swedish delegates that we desired continuation of coordinated buying as established by 1943 agreements and might desire to add additional commodities in future. With regard to (*d*) (2) Foot pointed out that our desire was equal treatment for all countries and that we desired to take care of impoverished countries. This was really a corollary to existence of combined boards. Boheman pointed out that interest of his Government was "not to be deprived of all liberty of action."

With regard to paragraph (*e*) Boheman stated that he believed regulations recently put into effect by Swedish Government covering financial transactions and property belonging to non-resident aliens would probably meet our requirements. He promised to supply us with these regulations.

A list of commodities urgently needed in addition to basic rations was also presented at meeting. These will be despatched *en clair* in a following telegram.

Foregoing was obviously Boheman's initial reaction and he suggested that he would be ready on December 14 to make additional comment.

Sent to Department as Embassy's 11032, repeated Stockholm as 826. [Stone.]

WINANT

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103.9169/12-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 14, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:06 p. m.]

11088. For Department, Crowley and Fleming, FEA from Stone. ReEmbs 11032 December 12 and 11049 December 13.<sup>32</sup>

1. Second formal meeting was held with Swedes this afternoon, December 14. Boheman's reaction to draft agreement continued to be favorable. He offered following minor preliminary amendment to draft memorandum:

United States and United Kingdom undertaking: In point (*d*) after "on a reasonable basis" insert "and to enable her to make her contribution to post war reconstruction"; and add after "to proceed" the word "forthwith".

Swedish Government undertaking: Point (*c*) eliminate "and communications". In commenting on this alteration Boheman stated he believed that his Government would object in principle to including in this written agreement a prohibition on all private communications postal and other, with Japan. Foot suggested that it might be possible for the Swedish Government to inform us that it was not its intention to reopen facilities for private communication with Japan. This appeared to Boheman to be feasible and was likewise acceptable to Foot and Stone as achieving our aim.

Swedish Government undertaking: Point (*e*) in view of regulations recently put into effect (reported by Stockholm in its telegram 4466 November 2<sup>33</sup>) Boheman suggested an amendment to this clause. After some discussion following redraft was accepted by Swedish, American and British delegates: "to continue in force such measures as are necessary to implement Bretton Woods resolution No. VI and favorably consider such further measures as are necessary for this purpose".

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<sup>32</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

2. During this meeting Swedes presented figures showing the extent and general categories of trade they desire to carry on with Norway and Denmark.

[Here follow the aforementioned figures.]

In commenting on this proposed trade with Norway and Denmark Boheman drew the attention of the American and British representatives to the fact that the memorandum presented to the Swedes called for embargo of all exports to Germany subsequent to the arrival of the *Saturnus*. The Swedish interpretation of Germany includes all Axis Europe except Norway and Denmark.

With regard to the exports to Norway he reiterated his previous remarks about the steps taken to prevent the goods being of benefit to the Germans and promised a memorandum on controls used. He stated that no exports were used for the reconstruction and repair of premises damaged by Allied raids and stated that if any diversion of goods for this purpose occurred the Swedish Government learned of it immediately. When his attention was drawn to the fact that timber occurred as an export and import from Norway he stated that this was the normal border traffic.

The Swedes stated that the pharmaceuticals exported to Norway and Denmark were in the first place sulfa drugs and that in Norway there was close control similar to that of relief items to ensure that these goods were used in Norwegian hospitals for the benefit of Norwegians.

The timber exports to Denmark were supervised by Danish trade unions in order to make certain that the goods were not diverted to the benefit of the Germans. This supervision would continue in the future.

3. As a result of today's meeting Boheman is recommending that his Government accept the agreement. However, Boheman made it clear that final acceptance by his Government would depend upon some assurance from the United States and United Kingdom Governments with respect to trade with Norway and Denmark.

British also consider agreement acceptable but do not believe that it is to our advantage to conclude it immediately because negotiations with Swedes on shipping pool have not yet been concluded and because there may also be certain additional matters which we may desire to include. In event that Department and FEA also find agreement generally acceptable in present form Foot suggested that it might be best to inform the Swedish Government prior to Boheman's return to Sweden that we should appreciate his return to London in early part of January to complete negotiations. In the meantime all three Governments would agree to act as if the agreement were in force. This is similar to the arrangement made in June, 1943.

To make this suggestion workable it would probably be necessary to give discretion to the American and British representatives on the Stockholm JSC to approve exports to be made during January to Norway and Denmark. These instructions could allow total exports in January proportionate to the amounts reported in section 2 of this telegram which were not objectionable because of the nature of the goods themselves.

4. Embassy would greatly appreciate reactions of Department and FEA to memorandum and Swedish comment at earliest possible date. All additional information received from Swedes will be telegraphed or airmailed. Please note that Embassy's 11034, December 13,<sup>34</sup> reported list of commodities Swedes desire urgently and need in addition to existing basic rations. Swedes promised certain additional information regarding iron and steel products and machinery which they would like to export to Norway and Denmark. This will be reported in detail as soon as received.

Sent to Department as Embassy's 11088; repeated to Stockholm as 837. [Stone.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/12-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 14, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:45 p. m.]

11089. From Stone for Department and FEA. ReEmbs 11032, December 12 and 11088 December 14. During our discussions with the Swedes on the interim agreement Boheman has made it clear that Sweden expects immediate termination of the Göteborg traffic by Germany as a result of complete stoppage of trade on January 1. The Swedish Government has had evidence of German intentions in this regard but is prepared to apply the total embargo without any reservation.

Commenting informally on our desire to secure Swedish aid on rehabilitation of liberated Europe however Boheman observed that it might be to our advantage to keep the Göteborg traffic open if this could be accomplished without contributing in any way to the German war economy. He believed that this might be possible if Sweden could hold out the prospect of an insignificant trickle of trade restricted to timber products, pulp and paper through west coast ports and not including prefabricated houses, pit props or any other material of even indirect war aid to Germany. Boheman could not estimate

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<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

the minimum volume which might be required to secure continuance of the Göteborg traffic but he thought that the Germans might allow the traffic to continue on a month-to-month basis if they could secure these timber products up to 2 or 3 million kronor a month. In Boheman's opinion, the Germans are now concerned chiefly with the imminent prospect of losing further prestige, and hence will be likely to accept any trickle of trade however unimportant this may be. Consequently, he felt that it might be to our interest to permit the Swedes to sound out the Germans on this line on the understanding that no commitment of any kind would be made without the complete approval of the British and American Governments. Boheman reiterated that his suggestion was not put forward in a desire to avoid the commitment to stop all trade to Germany on January 1 already made by the Swedish Government and reaffirmed in the interim agreement.

Foot is putting this suggestion before his Government, but he gave Boheman no indication that it would be favorably considered. I told Boheman that I could not express the views of the American Government, but that I would forward his suggestion for the comment of the Department and FEA.

The Embassy would appreciate your views.

This message was repeated to Stockholm by Embassy's 838, December 14, 9 p. m. [Stone.]

WINANT

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103.9169/12-1544 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 15, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

5134. Yesterday the Germans informed the Swedish Legation at Berlin that the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic will be stopped January 1 if Swedish exports to Germany are not continued after that date.

If it should not be to the Allies' interest to have this traffic stopped (Legation's 5112, December 14, 2 p. m.<sup>35</sup> 1653 to London), Sohlman and Ståhle believe that the Swedish Government must now inform the German Government (*a*) that Swedish exports to Germany will not be stopped January 1 (*b*) that a German trade delegation is invited to come to Stockholm during the middle of January to discuss future German-Swedish trade and (*c*) that in interim pending the outcome of those negotiations direct trade between the two countries will continue. Foreign Office believes that it will be possible to put

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<sup>35</sup> Not printed.

these talks off until the middle of January since the Christmas season in Sweden extends through January 6.

Sohlman and Ståhle further believe that the minimum which the Germans would agree to as a *quid pro quo* for the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic would be some form of compensation trade along the lines of the barter deals between Sweden and Denmark and Sweden and Norway. Its scope would be the minimum which in the judgement of the Stockholm JSC would suffice for the accomplishment of its purpose.

However, unless the Swedish Government is specifically requested by the Allies in their own interest to permit exports to Germany to continue at a token rate the Swedish Government will immediately upon the arrival of the *Saturnus* issue the notice that all trade with Germany has ceased. A certain result in the opinion of the Swedish Foreign Office would be the immediate stoppage of the Gothenburg safe conduct traffic.

My 1661 December 15, 6 p. m. repeats this to London.

JOHNSON

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103.9169/12-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1944—midnight.

10495. From Department and FEA, reurtel 11088, December 14, repeated to Stockholm as 837. We agree with your suggestion, reference point (*d*).

Suggested change in point (*e*) also acceptable (reference telegram and your 11117, December 15,<sup>36</sup> repeated to Stockholm as 841). A separate letter to cover this point would be acceptable if Swedes object to putting it in agreement. London's understanding as stated in 11117 is correct.

Point (*e*). We suggest following clause: "To continue in force measures already instituted to implement Bretton Woods Resolution number VI and to institute such other measures as are necessary for this purpose." We believe "consider favorably" does not necessarily imply acceptance of principle of Resolution VI, or any obligation to undertake measures even though they may be admittedly necessary to carry out its purpose. In reference to suggestions made in Stockholm's 1652, December 13 to London (to Washington as 5105<sup>36</sup>) we believe that general statement of this nature would be satisfactory for the present, leaving way open for detailed discussion of further

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed.



measures envisaged in this clause. We would appreciate Stockholm's comments on this point.

Reference point 2. We cannot agree to en bloc approval of export program to Norway and Denmark. Any such exports should be referred to JSC on *ad hoc* basis. We will give instructions to JSC members following receipt of information regarding proposed end use for these exports. In general, assuming end uses are unobjectionable, we are prepared to view such exports sympathetically, particularly those having a humanitarian objective. Similar consideration would be given relief shipments to Poland and Netherlands. We have always assumed that Norway and Denmark were included in definition of Germany and Axis Europe. This is specifically stated in existing War Trade Agreement.

Subject to above considerations we consider the proposed agreement acceptable and see no reason why it should not be concluded now, conditioned upon satisfactory agreement on shipping pool. If there are any reasons for delaying conclusion of agreement of which we are unaware, we desire to be apprised of them promptly and in meantime we see no objection to the suggestion that each of the parties act as though the agreement were in force as suggested in reference telegram.

We assume that agreement will read as contained in your 11032<sup>38</sup> (repeated to Stockholm as 826) as modified by reference telegram and our suggested (e) above. If there are any textual changes please clear with us.

Sent to London repeated to Stockholm as Department's 2535, Dec. 16. [Department and FEA.]

STETTINIUS

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103.9169/12-1444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1944—midnight.

10496. From Department and FEA, reference your 11089, December 14, 9 p. m., repeated to Stockholm as your 838 and Stockholm's 5112, December 14, 2 p. m. repeated to London as its 1653.<sup>39</sup> Although we appreciate humanitarian interests which have lead Boheman to suggest desirability of maintaining the Göteborg traffic open, it is our desire that all exports from Sweden to Germany and German controlled territory cease immediately upon arrival of the *Saturnus*. Accordingly, it is desired that the Swedish Foreign Office be informed of our view in this matter at the earliest possible moment. Although

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<sup>38</sup> Dated December 12, 7 p. m., p. 670.

<sup>39</sup> Latter not printed.

it is our understanding that the assurance given by Sweden regarding termination of exports to Germany also include all German-occupied territory, we are prepared to consider on an *ad hoc* basis certain exports to Denmark and Norway and relief shipments to Poland and Netherlands. This subject is discussed fully in a separate telegram which we are sending you.

Sent to London, repeated to Stockholm as Department's 2536, Dec. 16. [Department and FEA.]

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/12-1844

*The Counselor of the British Embassy (Marris) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

WASHINGTON, 18 December, 1944.

DEAR MR. ACHESON: You will remember that the Swedish Government have undertaken to impose a total embargo on exports to Germany immediately the *Saturnus*, now at sea, reaches Gothenburg.

We are now informed by the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London that the Swedes have recently been inclined to believe that, in order not to have to admit a rupture of commercial relations with Sweden, the Germans would allow the Gothenburg traffic to continue so long as the Swedes continued to make token shipments to Germany. M. Boheman has now informed the Ministry that the Germans have recently intimated to the Swedish Government that there would be some hope of maintaining the Gothenburg traffic if discussions about Swedish exports could take place in the middle of January, and if there were no actual embargo on January 1st. According to the Ministry, Boheman interprets this to mean that the Gothenburg traffic will definitely be stopped unless some exports from Sweden continue after January 1st.

We are accordingly instructed to enquire urgently from the Department and F.E.A. whether the latter would agree to the Swedes discussing with the Germans the question of continuing a very small volume of trade in timber and wood products, in return for the maintenance of the Gothenburg traffic.

The Ministry instruct us to remind the Department and F.E.A. that maintenance of the Gothenburg traffic has certain definite advantages to the Allies. In the first place, American and British interests will be prejudiced if 100 octane gasoline cannot be supplied in Sweden for maintaining air communications between Sweden and the United Kingdom, and in this connection, arrangements are now being made to load 100 octane gasoline on a Swedish tanker which cannot however reach Gothenburg until shortly after January 1st. Furthermore,

relief operations in liberated Norway, and possibly even in occupied Norway, will need to be undertaken on a large scale, and will certainly be hampered if Sweden can no longer import from overseas. Finally, if Sweden is cut off from all overseas trade for a period of several months, her capacity to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe will necessarily be impaired.

The Ministry ask us to emphasize that they are not agreeing, or asking the Department and F.E.A. to agree, to any actual arrangement between the Swedes and the Germans. It will always be possible to turn down any concrete proposal if we do not like it, and to insist on a complete embargo of Swedish exports to the enemy. All that is now proposed is that we should authorise the Swedes to discover on what terms the Gothenburg traffic might be kept open.

As time is short, I would be grateful if you could let me have, at your early convenience, the views of the Department and F.E.A. to communicate to the Ministry of Economic Warfare in London.

Yours sincerely,

A. D. MARRIS

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740.00112 European War 1939/12-1844

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Counselor of the British Embassy (Marris)*

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1944.

MY DEAR MARRIS: The Department has given careful consideration to your letter of December 18th relating to the impending embargo by Sweden of exports to Germany. The Foreign Economic Administration has also been consulted and concurs in this reply.

As you are aware, the overriding objective of this Government in its economic warfare dealings with Sweden has been the complete stoppage of trade from Sweden to Germany and German occupied areas. On this objective our military authorities and the civilian agencies concerned have been in full agreement. The collateral risks and disadvantages, including those itemized in your letter, which might result from this stoppage have been given full consideration. The Department and the Foreign Economic Administration do not find any basis at this time for modifying their decision that these risks and disadvantages should be accepted in securing, as we now have, our major objective.

We would agree that it would be to our advantage to maintain the Gothenburg traffic if this could be accomplished without affecting in any way the complete embargo which the Swedes have promised to impose in the immediate future. We attach, however, great impor-

tance to the psychological aspects of a public Swedish announcement of the embargo of all trade with Germany. The Department and the Foreign Economic Administration accordingly would not be prepared to authorize the Swedes to discuss with the Germans in January the terms upon which the Germans would permit the Gothenburg traffic to continue.

In connection with the foregoing, I understand that the representatives of your Government on the Combined Liberated Areas Committee have submitted a similar statement of this proposal with the request that the Combined Liberated Areas Committee formulate its views for the consideration of the economic warfare policy authorities of both Governments. The matter is being discussed on the American side, and my understanding is that they will transmit to your representatives on the Combined Liberated Areas Committee an expression of views identical with those contained in this letter.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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103.9169/12-2244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 22, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received December 22—5:02 p. m.]

11399. For Department, Crowley and Fleming FEA from Stone. Revised draft of interim agreement, incorporating all textual changes suggested by Washington, was presented at a meeting today with Gisle<sup>40</sup> representing the Swedes in the absence of Boheman who has been detained in Paris. We proposed with the British that this agreement be considered as in force on January 1, pending formal signature upon Boheman's return in January. During the period between January 1 and the formalizing of the agreement, any changes that the Swedes or ourselves might wish to make could be considered. Swedish delegation here is cabling for approval on this basis.<sup>41</sup>

We assured the Swedes that every precaution would be taken to prevent any publicity leak which would jeopardize safe arrival of *Saturnus*.

Repeated to Stockholm as Embassy's 868. [Stone.]

WINANT

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<sup>40</sup> Carl O. Gisle, Counselor of the Swedish Legation in the United Kingdom.

<sup>41</sup> On December 30 the Swedish Legation in London informed the British Ministry of Economic Warfare that the Swedish Government agreed to consider the interim agreement in force as of January 1, 1945.

103.9169/12-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1944—3 p. m.

2575. Swedish Legation in memorandum December 18,<sup>42</sup> report to us they have been instructed by Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm to communicate following from SKF Company in Gothenburg to USCC Washington:

"We hereby beg to inform you that in pursuance with our letters exchanged in Stockholm dated June 8 and 9, 1944<sup>43</sup> we expect you to take over and pay for ball bearings, parts and machinery up to the amount mentioned in your letter of June 9, paragraph *a*. We are prepared for delivery and await your instructions to whom we have to deliver, as well as where to present documents against payment. Referring to our letter of June 8, point 5, we suggest that you and the British Ministry of Economic Warfare appoint Mr. Waring or other adjoint representative residing in Sweden for handling the details. We presume that you have been informed of certain negotiations with official representatives from the US Legation in Stockholm and officials from the British Ministry of Supply in London and Stockholm which negotiations, however, are not as yet concluded. Should you be interested in a settlement along the lines discussed with the above representatives we would suggest that you give the necessary instructions. Awaiting your reply by cable."

Please inform SKF that USCC recognizes an obligation to take over and pay for bearings, parts and machinery under the agreement of June 9, but not those produced for shipment following October 12. Also that USCC is informed of negotiations which are taking place and that a technical representative is on his way to advise the American Legation in Stockholm on the technical aspects of the settlement. Furthermore that the American Legation will have authority to negotiate such settlement<sup>44</sup> subject only to final approval USCC Washington.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>42</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>43</sup> Neither printed; see footnote 73, p. 564.

<sup>44</sup> According to a release signed by H. Hamberg, President and Managing Director for and on behalf of AB. Svenska Kullagerfabriken, Göteborg, Sweden, transmitted to the Department by the Minister in Sweden in his despatch 5890, August 6, 1945 (neither printed), on July 27, 1945, in Stockholm AB. Svenska Kullagerfabriken received a sum of 6,700,000 Swedish kronor (\$1,597,615) from the U. S. Commercial Company in full settlement and satisfaction of all claims arising out of the "Griffis-Waring Agreement" of June 8-9, 1944, released the US Commercial Company and the U. S. Government from any and all obligations, retained all bearings, machines, and materials pursuant to the US Commercial Company's liabilities under the "Griffis-Waring Agreement", and assumed all packing, storage, handling charges and all other liabilities arising from the agreement (740.00112EW/8-645 and Stockholm Legation Files).

NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING A MILITARY AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN

858.79661/10-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1944—9 p. m.

2112. In view of the multiple nature of our air problems with Sweden, the Department feels that it might be helpful to recapitulate.

Most immediate, of course, is the question of release of interned American airmen.<sup>45</sup> This is going forward with reasonable satisfaction, the Swedes having allowed for the advance release of a certain number of these airmen as a credit against expected German internees seeking to escape from Finland. In this connection, Department does not feel that there is any need for a gesture of good will and appreciation, more particularly since an offer of certain fighter aircraft has already been made to the Swedes.

With regard to Swedish permission on prisoner-of-war air mail service, this is a humanitarian gesture on Sweden's part and as such should be allowed to rest on its own merits without anyone making a return. (Reurtel 4098, Oct. 9, 8 p. m.<sup>46</sup>)

The principal reason for the existing operation of the Air Transport Service has now almost been concluded. A continuation of the Service is not desirable since it is much too restricted for the needs of the Army Air Forces. It is considered, however, that a military air service into, through and away from Sweden, to be operated by the Air Transport Command, openly and without subterfuge, is of vital importance in supporting our European occupation forces following the end of hostilities on the Continent. You are therefore instructed to approach the Swedish authorities to permit the Air Transport Command, not only to operate into, through and away from Sweden from any point, which may be militarily desirable and feasible, but also to establish such facilities in Sweden as may be necessary for the efficient and safe conduct of such operations.

In your conversations with the Swedish authorities you should make it clear that this is a purely military service, has no connection with civil aviation, and therefore no question of commercial reciprocity is involved.

It has been the Department's policy carefully to refrain from providing any definite *quid pro quo* for permission to operate air service (aside from reciprocity, which is not here involved). That does not

<sup>45</sup> See pp. 689 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

mean, however, that in return for Swedish favors this Government would not be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to certain reasonable requests of the Swedish Government.

The Department is disposed to recommend the release of certain interned Flying Fortresses to the Swedes for conversion to their civilian needs, such allocation to be made on same basis as previous. The Department is not prepared to recommend the allocation of commercial types, such as C-47's, to Sweden at this time. For the strictly confidential information of the Minister, the Department does not wish to build up the commercial air power of a neutral nation, such as Sweden, to a point where, at the close of the war, the neutral commercial airlines will have a distinct edge over the airlines of those nations who have been our active allies, unless some important advantage, should thereby accrue to U.S. interests. The allocation of military types of planes will accomplish the immediate desires of the Swedes, but will not give them any preferred advantage when it comes to post-war commercial operations, since the converted Fortresses will not be able to compete successfully with commercial types.

In reconsidering the question of the possibility of the Swedes re-establishing service to Moscow, the Department has come to the conclusion that as this cannot be prevented the question is really academic. While permission might be refused to use planes which we have made available to the Swedes, they have other planes over which we have no control.

If the Swedes grant permission to the Air Transport Command to operate into, through, and away from Sweden, then all that will be necessary for military operations to Moscow will be the Soviet permission.

HULL

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858.79661/11-744

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is in reply to your letter of October 24, 1944.<sup>47</sup>

The negotiations which are now proceeding with the Swedish Government relative to approval of the military air transport service urgently desired by the Army Air Forces and the Air Transport Command will, if concluded in accordance with the State Department instructions to the American Minister of October 20, 1944, meet military requirements.

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

Note is made of the final paragraph of your letter in which you indicate that the State Department is not disposed to recommend approval of the request for commercial type aircraft since it does not desire to build up the commercial air power of a neutral nation to the disadvantage of any nation which may have been one of our allies. Your department may be unaware of the informal conversations which have taken place between the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces<sup>48</sup> and the Commanding General, Air Transport Command,<sup>49</sup> and representatives of the Swedish airlines. In those conversations it has been intimated that at such time as definite arrangements were made for the release of American airmen interned in Sweden, favorable consideration would be given to the allocation of five C-7 type aircraft. This expression is in consonance with letter of General Arnold to Mr. Stettinius,<sup>50</sup> under date of September 27th.<sup>51</sup> In view of the conversations above referred to, your department may desire to review its position with respect to the allocation of a limited number of commercial type aircraft to Sweden.

Informal arrangements have been completed for the immediate initiation of the proposed service. The inauguration of this service is urgently required in order that air transport service to Sweden may not be interrupted and to meet military needs. May I express the sincere hope that nothing will deter the early consummation of these negotiations.

I should like to urge, however, that these negotiations should not interfere in any way with our demands on Sweden that she stop all the war aid which she is still rendering Germany.<sup>52</sup> There is no reason, in the view of the War Department, why Sweden should not meet the desires of the Army Air Forces and the Air Transport Command and at the same time stop the vital aid afforded Germany.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

858.79661/12-1744 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 17, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 5:20 p. m.]

5151. Mr. Grafstrom<sup>53</sup> last night delivered the Swedish Government's reply dated December 15 to my note of October 30<sup>51</sup> requesting

<sup>48</sup> Maj Gen. Henry H. Arnold.

<sup>49</sup> Maj. Gen. Harold L. George.

<sup>50</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State; he was appointed Secretary of State October 3, 1944, and took the oath of office on December 1, 1944.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

<sup>52</sup> For correspondence on United States efforts to reduce Sweden's trade with Germany, see pp. 456 ff.

<sup>53</sup> Sven Grafström, Acting Director of the Department of Political Affairs of the Swedish Foreign Office.



permission for ATC to operate into, through and away from Sweden (Department's 2112 October 20, 9 p. m. and related correspondence). Reply was as follows.

"The Swedish Government are well aware of the importance that the establishment of such an air service could have for the reconstruction in Europe after the war as well as for the future civil aviation between Sweden and the United States. The Swedish Government, however, having carefully considered the American request, do not find themselves in a position to concede at present the establishment of an airplane communication, implying i.e. the establishment of an important American organization of military character on Swedish soil. The Swedish Government are, however, prepared to examine a new proposal on the subject from the American authorities at a later date, when the need of a direct air service communication between Sweden and the United States, especially in connection with the work of reconstruction, will prove more imminent.

"During the informal discussions which have taken place in the matter it has been made clear that the organization in Sweden can be completed within a very short delay. The Swedish Government are nevertheless prepared already now to receive for storage, if the American authorities should deem it appropriate and desirable, material necessary to build up the ground organization."

See my immediately following telegram 5152 December 17, 10 a. m.

JOHNSON

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858.79661/12-1744 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 17, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received December 17—3:25 p. m.]

5152. After delivering the *aide-mémoire* quoted in my 5151, December 17, 9 a. m. Grafstrom stated that the Government's decision had been made on purely political grounds. He explained (*a*) that all of the interested departments and agencies had recorded their approval and that the specialists who had been called to the Government's hearing yesterday morning to analyze the project had recommended acceptance, but (*b*) the Government whose "hobby is neutrality" had been scared off by the military nature of the project. The Government, he added, had felt that Sweden's neutrality and sovereignty would be seriously compromised if the Government should permit uniformed foreign military personnel to operate a foreign military base on Swedish soil. (See my 4756, November 21, 3 p. m. and 4841, November 25, 10 p. m.)<sup>55</sup>

It is quite clear from Grafstrom's subsequent off-the-record remarks that in his considered judgment we would have received an immediate

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<sup>55</sup> Neither printed.

affirmative reply to our request had we not emphasized the military nature of the proposed enterprise. He believes that ultimately we shall receive the desired permission and as reason for this belief he pointed to the Government's authorization to us to import the ground installations for the proposed base and to store them here so as to be immediately available when it becomes possible for the Government to approve the projected operations.

Grafstrom thought we might profitably after a reasonable period resubmit our request in modified form and that in the interim we might prepare the Government by (a) requesting permission for certain technicians to enter Sweden to receive the radio equipment and other ground installations for the proposed air base and to instruct the Swedes regarding proper storage and maintenance and by (b) requesting permission for a certain number of instructors to come here to instruct the Swedes how to operate a modern transatlantic air base.

Grafstrom suggested that our project might be resubmitted in due course as a United States Government project not labelled as military with ground personnel operating in civilian clothes. He thought there would be no objection to ATC<sup>56</sup> insignia on the airplanes. He believed that it would be helpful in obtaining approval if Swedish personnel could be employed to operate the weather forecasting service. It was his impression that one of the reasons why the Government "had been scared off" was our condition that the weather service would be handled in secret cipher not available to the Swedes.

The Government, according to Grafstrom, had been disturbed at the possibility that ATC's military personnel would be in a position to receive and send military operational messages unknown to and uncensored by the Swedish authorities which would constitute a violation of Swedish sovereignty and neutrality. Weather service, incidentally, has according to Grafstrom, been prohibited by the Swedish Government since the beginning of the war. He suggested that we devise a code for weather and other operational messages which could be made available to the Swedes who would furnish the desired technical services under American instruction and Swedish supervision.

Our insistence that this should be an open military operation is, in my opinion, the major factor back of the Government's decision. See immediately following telegram.<sup>57</sup>

I have been reliably informed by another source (not Foreign Office) that General Count Ehrensvar, Chief of the United Defense Staff, recommended that the project not be approved as a military operation but on a civil basis only.

JOHNSON

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<sup>56</sup> Air Transport Command.

<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

811.79658/12-2144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, December 21, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 5:52 p. m.]

5209. My 5151, December 17, 9 a. m. and 5152, December 17, 10 a. m. Mr. Günther<sup>58</sup> brought up with me last night the subject of the Swedish Government's reply to my note of October 30 requesting permission for ATC to operate in Sweden. Mr. Günther said that he wanted to assure me that the Government had reached an adverse decision for the moment on this important project with the greatest reluctance. He said that they fully realized the importance of the undertaking and likewise the contingent benefits which would accrue to Sweden. The Government felt however that certain of the conditions under which the Air Transport authorities wished to operate this service were politically impossible and he mentioned in particular the request that the service operate its own independent radio station and use code messages. The wearing of military uniforms, while considered undesirable by the Swedish Government, was not so important an objection as the desire of the Air Transport Command to operate certain independent and secret services. He said that the Government's decision was entirely of a political character; that he and some members of the Cabinet realized that there were no secret ulterior motives behind the request but that there were members of the Cabinet who while not opposed to the project in principle had been genuinely suspicious of our motives because of the insistence on operating an independent secret communications service. The Government on balance of considerations had felt that the present was not a moment when it was politically possible for it to give a favorable reply. He suggested that within a short time, which he stated might be about 2 months, that the project be again submitted to the Swedish Government in a modified form and indicated that there was no disposition on his part or that of the Government to consider present refusal a permanent one.

I recommend to the Department and to the interested authorities of the War Department that the matter be given further consideration in the light of Mr. Günther's remarks and that the proposals be carefully scrutinized so as to eliminate features which are not strictly essential to its operation and which would obviously be objected to by the Swedish Government on grounds of national policy.

I am now endeavoring to work out with the Foreign Office some practical arrangement which will enable Colonel Balchen,<sup>59</sup> the com-

<sup>58</sup> Christian E. Günther, Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>59</sup> Since January 27, 1944, representative of the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and responsible for the establishment and operation of air service between the United Kingdom and Sweden.

manding officer of the service in Sweden, to receive more satisfactory weather and other reports. The attitude of the Foreign Office toward some such arrangement is understanding and sympathetic.

As reported in my 5189, December 19, 7 p. m.<sup>60</sup> the Foreign Office has voiced no objection to continuance until December 31, 1945 of the AAT's<sup>61</sup> service as at present operated. The assurances given by Grafstrom and reported in my 5189 were oral but will presumably be confirmed in writing in reply to a note which I sent dated December 18.

JOHNSON

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NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT FOR RELEASE  
OF UNITED STATES AIRMEN INTERNED IN SWEDEN

858.248/9-1344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 13, 1944—7 p. m.

1829. Your no. 2992, August 7, 9:00 p. m.<sup>60</sup> The War Department desires that you informally ascertain the views of the Swedish Government to a proposal that this Government make available for purchase by Sweden of from 60 to 150 P-47 aircraft and lend Sweden 4 interned B-17 aircraft for use as transports in return for the release of all American air crew personnel now or hereafter interned in Sweden and assurance that all American bombers now or hereafter force-landed in Sweden will be released. The final number of P-47 aircraft to be made available within the above limits is left to your discretion for determination during the negotiations.

For your confidential information, the War Department attaches the highest importance to the release of the air crew personnel, now interned in Sweden, at the earliest possible moment. You are therefore requested to take up this matter at once with the appropriate Swedish authorities. The Department desires to be kept currently informed by telegraph concerning the course of your negotiations.

For your further confidential information, the War Department desires, in the event of a favorable reply to the above proposal, to send a military air mission to Sweden in order to instruct the Swedish Air Force in the maintenance and operation of United States aircraft. No mention should be made at this time of the second proposal unless the Swedish authorities themselves indicate the need for instructors.

HULL

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<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

<sup>61</sup> Army Air Transport.

711.62114A/9-1444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 14, 1944—noon.

1834. Please inform Boheman<sup>63</sup> that this Government expects the immediate release from internment of one American airman for each German soldier offered the choice either of remaining in Sweden or returning to Germany (third paragraph your 3566, September 8, 10 PM<sup>64</sup>).

HULL

858.248/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 16, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 6:42 p. m.]

3700. Have discussed suitable portions Department's 1829, September 13, 7 p. m., with Boheman. He has promised to go into matter thoroughly and I am convinced fully understands implications as well as opportunity now afforded Sweden to make a welcome gesture. He made no definite commitments but I gather that release of personnel would offer less difficulties than release of force-landed bombers. If Swedish Government should agree to our request for release of all force-landed bombers now and in future Boheman said it would be practically making Sweden a base of military operations against Germany and that it would not be possible. I am seeing him again, however, early next week and in the meantime have urged on him to explore every possibility and not dismiss anything as being "impossible". I shall also discuss matter informally with General Nordenskiöld.<sup>65</sup>

A convoy of 15 Finnish ships under German charter or requisition which left Finland yesterday carrying evacuated military material and some military personnel received news while in the Baltic of German attack on Högland.

According to Swedish information, 9 of the ships immediately broke away from the convoy and made for Swedish ports. Three have already arrived. Boheman expects others to arrive today. Masters and crews of these vessels are of Finnish nationality. All German military personnel on these boats will be immediately interned and Boheman has promised that he will release one of our airmen for each one of them immediately. Boheman has also given entirely satis-

<sup>63</sup> Erik C. Boheman, Secretary General of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

<sup>65</sup> Lt. Gen. Bengt G. Nordenskiöld, Commander in Chief, Royal Swedish Air Force.

factory assurances regarding immediate release from internment of one American airman for each German soldier who may come to Sweden from Finland and who may be offered the choice of remaining in this country or returning to Germany. (Department's 1834, September 14, noon.)

JOHNSON

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740.00115A European War/9-844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1944—3 p. m.

1866. Last paragraph your 3700, September 16, 5 p. m. not clear. Do you mean (a) that Sweden will immediately release one American airman for each German arriving on a Finnish vessel even though the German will be interned for the duration or (b) that one American airman will be released for each German arriving in this manner who will be offered the choice of remaining in Sweden or returning to Germany?

HULL

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740.00115A European War/9-1944: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 19, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 19—10 a. m.]

3725. Department's 1866, September 18, 3 p. m. One Allied airman will be immediately released for each German soldier of whatever category who may be brought here aboard Finnish vessel or who may cross Swedish frontier. German will be offered choice of remaining in Sweden or returning to Germany but release of Allied airman will not be affected in the event German chooses to remain in Sweden. I regret that foregoing was not made clear in my 3708, September 18, 2 p. m.<sup>66</sup>

JOHNSON

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858.248/9-2644: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 26, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 27—7:44 a. m.]

3895. Our 3700, September 16, 5 p. m. Legation officer has informally suggested to Grafström<sup>67</sup> with reference to Mr. Boheman's

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

<sup>67</sup> Sven Grafström, Acting Director of the Department of Political Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

assurances regarding immediate release from internment of one United States airman for each German soldier who may enter Sweden from Finland the Swedish Government anticipate arrival and release of a comparable number of German soldiers and release now all Allied interned airmen. Grafström seemed to regard suggestion as useful one and said he would immediately present it to his Government.

This afternoon the idea was broached to officers of British Legation who raised question whether since German soldiers would be fleeing in face of Russians (*sic*) the Swedish Foreign Office might raise the question as to Russian agreement in the same manner as the question has been raised with reference to release of 53 German soldiers who entered Sweden from Tallinn September 22. Our 3894, September 26, 10 p. m.<sup>68</sup>

British appear to be adopting strange attitude with respect to our efforts to obtain release of interned airmen. For example, Pollock, Counselor of British Legation advised this afternoon that British Foreign Office had disapproved action of this Legation in jumping at opportunity to obtain release of 33 interned airmen against 33 German soldiers who were brought here against their will aboard Finnish vessels which broke away from German convoy (our 3708, September 18, 2 p. m.<sup>69</sup>). This Legation acted on its own responsibility in this case because obviously the German soldiers were not internable and Swedes would have released them whether or not we accepted the exchange. British Legation advises that British Foreign Office desires to be consulted in all cases involving exchanges allegedly on grounds that Foreign Office might disagree with the Legations as to merits of proposed exchange. Legation urges that reference of all cases to London and Washington would contribute to delay in getting internees out at a time when it is understood to be highly important to get them out of Sweden and back into active fighting as quickly as possible. It is suggested that Legation be authorized to use its discretion and only to refer to Washington for instructions when it appears that among the German soldiers concerned there may be a German officer of importance.

Legation also requests authority to use its discretion with reference to agreeing to release of interned airmen against release of German airplanes not regarded by United States Military Air Attaché<sup>70</sup> as being of much military significance. We have precedent for agreeing to release of German training planes against release of 10 interned airmen and have been following this precedent. There recently landed three additional German planes one of which is an old German seaplane used for communication purposes and of only slight-

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 3725, September 19, 1 p. m., *supra*.

<sup>70</sup> Col. Charles E. Rayens, Military Attaché, and Military Attaché for Air.

ly more military significance than a training plane. Legation hopes Department will approve its agreeing to release of these 3 planes against release of 35 or 40 airmen.

Our stake in this matter of exchange of airmen is immeasurably greater than the British who have only 58 internees as against our 902.

Release of our airmen is a matter of vital importance and should not be in any way hampered by British counter desire whatever may be motive and object of latter. I am genuinely apprehensive that British Legation may make difficulties for us and seriously jeopardize our efforts by interfering and consider it urgent that British Foreign Office be advised of importance which we attach to prompt release of our airmen with a view to appropriate directions being sent to their Legation here. It is most earnestly requested that contents of this paragraph be reserved for Department only and that my comments on British Legation be not communicated to London.

Telegraphic instructions will be greatly appreciated.

JOHNSON

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858.248/9-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1944—2 p. m.

1939. 1. The Department fully approves of your action in obtaining release of 33 interned airmen (your 3708, September 18, 2 p. m.<sup>71</sup>), and in instructing a member of your staff to suggest to Grafström the immediate release of all interned airmen in anticipation of the arrival and release of a comparable number of German soldiers. (Your 3895, September 26, 10 p. m.)

2. The Department authorizes you to use your discretion in referring to Washington cases involving German officers of importance.

3. We have instructed Mr. Winant<sup>72</sup> to inform the British Foreign Office of the vital importance we attach to the release as soon as possible of all American airmen interned in Sweden and, hence, of our inability to concur in the procedure suggested by Pollock of referring all cases to London and Washington. Mr. Winant will also request the Foreign Office to inform your British colleague<sup>73</sup> of our view in this matter.

4. The question of releasing 3 German planes against 35 to 40 airmen has been referred to the War Department for decision. You will be informed as soon as a reply has been received.

<sup>71</sup> Not printed.

<sup>72</sup> John G. Winant, Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>73</sup> Sir Victor A. L. Mallet, British Minister in Sweden.



5. The possibility of Soviet objection to the release of 53 airmen against the Germans who arrived from Tallinn appears to be a question which the Swedish Foreign Office itself should decide (your 3894, September 26, 10 p. m.<sup>74</sup>); however, we have requested Mr. Harriman's views<sup>75</sup> as to the advisability of our approaching the Soviet authorities regarding the matter.

6. Please report urgently progress of your conversations regarding an exchange of our airmen against the sale of P-47 aircraft. Despite the possibility that these men may eventually be released against German soldiers crossing the Swedish border, the need for them is so great that every method for obtaining release as quickly as possible must be fully explored. (Your 3700, September 16, 5 p. m.)

HULL

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711.58114A/9-2844: Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, September 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:04 p. m.]

3939. I have just been informed by Boheman that the Government following our various representations has decided to release to us at once without any compensating factor 300 of our interned airmen "in anticipation of any Germans who may come into the country", the men released to be chosen by ourselves as we wish regardless of time of their arrival in Sweden. Mr. Boheman said that the Government prefers to release these men as a gesture of good will and friendship to the United States, does not desire to consider question on any basis of compensation for Sweden, and regrets that it is not practicable to release the entire number at once. He said that we should first get these men out, then we can examine the question of the remaining ones and see what may happen in meantime. It would be embarrassing for the Government, he indicated, from an internal political point of view, to empty all of the American camps at once.

He said that they might take up with us later the possibility of securing on the same terms as previous aircraft loaned to the Swedes, two additional ones to be refitted as transport planes but he said that this request would be made at a suitable time and was in no way tied up with the release of our men. Later on he said the Government hopes that the Swedish aircraft industry will be able to purchase license for manufacturing rights of an aircraft engine after the war of a type which has not yet been decided upon. He hopes that when this question comes up, it may be given sympathetic consideration.

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<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

<sup>75</sup> Telegram 2309, September 27, 1944, midnight, to W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, not printed.

I thanked Mr. Boheman for what his Government had done and told him that I was confident that it would be greatly appreciated by my own Government as well as by our air authorities.

Please inform War immediately.

My 1171 September 28, 7 p. m. repeats this to London for the Ambassador and General Spaatz.<sup>76</sup>

JOHNSON

858.248/9-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1944—8 p. m.

1946. Department's 1939, September 28, 2 p. m. War Department desires that you immediately inform appropriate Swedish authorities that we are agreeable to the release of the 3 German planes mentioned in your 3895, September 26, 10 p. m., against the release of as many American airmen as you can obtain. Please cable urgently as soon as their release has been effected.

HULL

858.248/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 28, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 10:19 p. m.]

8100. Foreign Office has been informed of our views on release of aircraft personnel interned in Sweden as set forth in last paragraph of Department's 7889, September 27, 11 p. m.<sup>77</sup>

We were told at the Foreign Office that a message had just been received from the British Legation at Stockholm stating that the Swedish Government had indicated that it was no longer prepared to agree to exchanges of British and American military internees for German military internees unless the Soviet Government agreed to such exchanges. It was added that Foreign Office had for some time felt that exchange effected in Sweden should be cleared with the Soviet Government as there are also Russian internees in Sweden. Foreign Office will now give immediate consideration to placing this question of exchanges either before the Air Ministry or before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will be promptly informed of Foreign Office decision.

WINANT

<sup>76</sup> Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in the European Theater of Operations.

<sup>77</sup> Not printed, but see paragraph No. 3 of telegram 1939, September 28, 2 p. m., p. 693.

858.248/9-2844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1944—11 p. m.

1970. Your 3939, September 28, 7 p. m. Please express to Mr. Boheman the appreciation of this Government for the gesture of good will on the part of the Swedish Government in releasing 300 interned airmen.

We are inquiring of the War Department as to whether the need for the remaining airmen is sufficiently great to warrant the political undesirability of carrying through further man-for-man exchanges without consulting the Soviet authorities. In view of very possible Soviet objection to exchange on this basis, it is suggested in the meantime that it may be advisable for you to follow up actively with Mr. Boheman the release of the balance of the airmen against the sale of P-47 aircraft and loan of 2 Flying Fortresses.

HULL

858.248/10-544: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*LONDON, October 5, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received October 5—6: 50 p. m.]

8372. ReEmbs 8205, September 30, 8 p. m.<sup>78</sup> We have just been given by the Foreign Office the following communication concerning the release of airmen interned in Sweden.

"Thank you for your letter of the 28th September last in which you referred to the great importance which your military authorities attach to the release from internment as soon as possible of all U. S. air personnel in Sweden. I need hardly say that we fully appreciate their point of view.

Since then events have developed most favorably of their own accord in that, as you will no doubt have heard, the Swedish Cabinet have decided to release immediately 300 Allied airmen 'on account'. Although the official intention is to release a corresponding number of Germans we understand that the release of further batches of Allied airmen may not in fact be held up until an equivalent number of Germans have arrived and been set free, but that we may expect further contingents of Allied airmen to be released 'on account' as soon as these initial 300 men have left Swedish territory and a few more Germans have arrived.

We have, however, been somewhat worried by the possible attitude of the Soviet Government to this repatriation of Germans who have come from the Eastern Front and may well return to fight there. We

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

feel that the Soviet Minister in Stockholm<sup>79</sup> should at least be informed of these arrangements and we have, therefore, instructed Mallet on the following lines:

1. While I could not have agreed to our doing a deal with the Swedes for the release to U. S. of British and American airmen against German military personnel who have fled from a Russian sphere of operations unless the Soviet Government had been informed, we have now been placed in the position not of being asked to agree to an exchange but of being informed that a release of internees has been decided upon by the Swedish Government.

2. All the same it is reasonable that the Soviet Government should be given equally favorable treatment with us and the Americans, the more so as the Germans in question have been fighting on the Eastern Front and may well return to the Eastern Front. The Soviet Government will certainly resent it if we appear to be acting behind their backs.

3. Report that Russian internees do not wish to return to Russia may well (to judge by experience here) prove to be largely, if not wholly, unfounded. In any case that is not an argument which we can use with the Soviet Government and I think it would be only reasonable that the Russian internees should be considered for inclusion in the next batch of Allied prisoners to be released.

4. It is, of course, for your Soviet colleague to protect her own country's interest in this matter, but you should keep her informed of developments. You should first inform your U.S. colleague of your instructions and give him the opportunity of taking similar action. If you think it necessary you may discuss matter first with Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' "

When giving us this communication Foreign Office stressed orally that it attaches greatest importance to keeping the Soviet Government informed of any exchange which involves the release of Germans.

WINANT

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858.248/10-544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*<sup>80</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 7, 1944—7 p. m.

2013. London has been requested to repeat to Stockholm and Moscow its 8372, October 4 [5] to the Department (our 1970, September 30, 11 p. m. to you). Please inform Mallet at once that as a matter of principle we naturally concur in the view of the British Foreign Office that the Soviet Government should be informed when there is an actual case of exchange of interned Allied military personnel against members of the German Armed Forces entering Sweden. However, since the present offer of Sweden does not immediately involve an exchange of personnel and since we attach the highest importance to the release of our airmen as soon as possible, we should appreciate it if Mallet could withhold action on his instructions until we have had an opportunity to hear from our military authorities.

HULL

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<sup>79</sup> Mme. Alexandra Kollontay.

<sup>80</sup> Repeated to Moscow as 2385, referring to telegram 3705, September 28, 1944, 4 p. m., not printed; and to London as 8247, referring to telegram 8372, October 5, 7 p. m., p. 696.

858.248/10-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 8, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 1:55 p. m.]

8487. We have given Foreign Office orally the substance of Department's 8247, October 7, 7 p. m.<sup>81</sup> When doing so we were told that a message had just been received from the British Minister at Stockholm stating that the Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Office had informed him that Madame Kollontay already knows of the proposed release of airmen and had been promised that in any release effected 10 Russian internees would be simultaneously released "on account".

Repeated to Stockholm and Moscow.

Our 8372, October 5, 7 p. m. has also been repeated to Moscow and Stockholm.

WINANT

858.248/10-1344 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 13, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received October 13—3:17 p. m.]

4165. ReDepts 2013 October 7, 7 p. m. and London's 8487, October 8, 1 p. m. to Department, 547 to Stockholm. I have kept Madame Kollontay currently informed of arrangements for evacuation of our internees. She has raised no objections and has expressed warm approval of our efforts particularly to get out the fliers.

My 1273 and 40 repeat this to London and Moscow respectively.

JOHNSON

858.248/10-1344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—midnight.

2068. Your 4165, October 13, 6 p. m. We are gratified at the attitude adopted by Madame Kollontay in regard to the release of our interned airmen. In view of this, it is assumed that the Swedish authorities will no longer hesitate to release additional airmen on account. Please press this matter most strongly with the Swedish Foreign Office as the release of these airmen at the earliest possible moment is considered by General Arnold, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, to be of highest military importance. The

<sup>81</sup> See footnote 80, p. 697.

Department desires to be kept currently informed of the progress of your negotiations in this matter.

Repeated to London as Department's 8516 and Moscow as Department's 2436.

HULL

858.248/10-1644 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, October 16, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received October 17—3:31 a. m.]

4212. Assumption in Department's 2068, October 14, midnight, that Swedish authorities are hesitating to release additional airmen on account is an apparent misconception. Release of our aviators is being constantly and almost daily pressed with the Foreign Office and with other officials and there is every reason to believe that Government wishes to meet our desires fully and intends to do so. See my 3939, September 28, 7 p. m. Views of our Air Command regarding importance of immediate release of airmen have been forcibly brought to attention of the authorities and situation is understood by them. Of the 300 already released, ATC<sup>s2</sup> service has up to present taken out 77. This operation is being carried out as rapidly as feasible. I hope Department will assure General Arnold that matter is never lost sight of here for one moment and is being pressed strongly and continuously. Results up to present have not been unsatisfactory and responsible Swedish officials are actively seeking ways and means to release one entire lot. In informal conversation, it is taken for granted there will soon be none remaining here. Foreign Minister Günther reiterated to me last night, however, that his Government would not consider any "bargaining" proposition for releasing internees.

Thus far, only 155 Germans have come into Sweden but Swedish Foreign Office hopes Finns will succeed in driving a sufficient number of German soldiers into Sweden to enable Government to release all remaining Allied internees here at once.

JOHNSON

858.248/11-1044 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 10, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 11—2:39 a. m.]

4609. For the Department only. All but 34 of 616 internees who have been released by the Swedish Government having now been car-

<sup>s2</sup> Air Transport Command.

ried to Great Britain, I requested Boheman yesterday for a further release. There are 463 remaining still unreleased. Boheman informed me this afternoon that the Government would now release 163 or as he put it "all except 300". Please inform General Arnold. I had some discussion with him about the matter and he said that that was all he could possibly get the Government to consent to at this moment (my 4287, October 21 1 p. m.<sup>83</sup>). They have just received Minister Boström's<sup>84</sup> report of conversations with officials of the Department regarding my 4367 October 26, 7 p. m.<sup>85</sup> and related correspondence and I gather that Mr. Boström's report has caused resentment. Boheman said that the Prime Minister<sup>86</sup> was so angry that he did not want to release any more internees but finally consented to 100. Boheman, without authority, has added the remaining 63. The Prime Minister is said to have remarked that he didn't see what use there was in trying to stretch points in favor of the Allies when no matter what the Swedes did it made no difference in our attitude. It may be useful in this connection to recall a fact of which the Prime Minister must be aware, and that is the liberal and extensive cooperation which the Swedish Government is giving certain of our agencies in activities not ordinarily the subject of correspondence.

As far as the internees are concerned, the War Department must know from reports of visiting officers and from the military stationed in Sweden the exceptional treatment which our internees have had in this country. General Curtis<sup>87</sup> on his recent visit here informed me that our men had been treated with a liberality and consideration which had no parallel in Switzerland or in any other neutral country that he knew of. The Department knows, and I hope the War Department realizes that in releasing the majority of our interned aviators, the Swedes have taken an action which they were under no legal obligation to do. Boheman told me that since the last release of 300, no German military have come into this country of any status to afford them the slightest legal basis on which to release our men so that approximately 500 of our men released have been in anticipation of Germans who have not yet arrived. Two notes of protest have been received from the Germans regarding release of our men which have not been answered.

Boheman also informed me that the Swedish Government has been notified by the Germans that the entire Baltic will now be considered a war area and that any ship will be sunk by the Germans at sight. Boheman says that this is undoubtedly directed at the ships which

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<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

<sup>84</sup> Wollmar F. Boström, Swedish Minister in the United States.

<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 653.

<sup>86</sup> Per Albin Hansson.

<sup>87</sup> Maj. Gen. Edward P. Curtis, U. S. Army Air Forces.

are carrying Swedish supplies to Finland. Both he and Sohlman<sup>88</sup> have told me that there are many indications, of which this declaration regarding the Baltic is perhaps the first, that the Germans are planning measures of retaliation against Sweden.

JOHNSON

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858.79661/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 21, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received November 21—9: 19 p. m.]

4774. For the Department only. Military Air Attaché has sent two cables to War Department following receipt of instructions mentioned in Department's 2304, November 16, 3 p. m.<sup>89</sup> (see my 4756, November 21, 3 p. m.<sup>90</sup>). He received today a reply in which it was stated that his two telegrams referred to had been communicated to the State Department. War Department's telegram of today reiterates that approval of the operation to transport the Norwegians will be given only on two conditions: (1) That Swedish consent for this operation is to be construed as approval by the Swedes of our desire hereafter to fly into Sweden on an open military basis; (2) that the Swedes now give their consent to the departure of all our remaining interned fliers on these planes when the Norwegian operation is finished and they are ready to fly back to Great Britain.

My comment on these two points is as follows:

1. I think it is a mistake of tactics to tie up this special Norwegian operation with the formal request we have made of the Swedes for ATC operations in Sweden<sup>91</sup> (Department's 2282, November 14, 7 p. m.<sup>92</sup> and related correspondence). We have reason to believe here that the Swedish response to our request for the general operations will be a favorable one. It is an important decision for this Government to make and it would appear to be in our interest to be patient. An attempt to force the issue by tying up their reply to the more important request with demands in connection with the special Nor-

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<sup>88</sup> Rolf Sohlman, Chief of the Commercial Division, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>89</sup> Not printed.

<sup>90</sup> In this telegram the Minister in Sweden notified the Department that U.S. military authorities in conjunction with Swedish and Norwegian officials had made arrangements to transport the first company of Norwegians to northern Norway in American planes. This is apparently a reference to the Norwegian "Policemen forces" recruited among Norwegian refugees in Sweden where they received military training. When Soviet troops crossed the Norwegian-Finnish frontier in October 1944, the Swedish Government agreed to permit elements of this force to depart for liberated portions of northern Norway.

<sup>91</sup> For correspondence, see pp. 683 ff.

<sup>92</sup> Telegram not printed.



wegian operation would not, I believe, affect the final decision on the more important issue but it would create resentment which it is unnecessary to create and might cause a delay.

2. There now remain 43 of our internees already released by the Swedes but not yet transported. There are 326 not yet released. So far the Government has not failed to release additional blocks of the internees when requested to do so and when we were prepared to take them out. It is even possible that all of these men may be out before the Norwegian operation is concluded. I therefore think it would be a mistake to make the present release of these men a condition for the Norwegian operation. I have told Colonel Hardison<sup>93</sup> and Colonel Balchen<sup>94</sup> that I was not willing to go again to the Swedish authorities on Hardison's telegram of today without reference to the Department of State for further instructions.

I fully appreciate the War Department's desire for affirmative and quick action on these two highly important matters. I do not think that the two conditions posed by the War Department for the Norwegian operation are the best way of getting those results.

[JOHNSON]

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858.79661/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 22, 1944—9 p. m.

2355. The Department considers that the attitude of the Minister of Commerce and others who have been hesitant to accede to our request regarding the establishment of ATC services will probably change as a result of the proposal contained in our 2347, November 21.<sup>95</sup> Accordingly, we have suggested to the War Department the advisability of modifying its instructions to your Military Attaché for Air so as to eliminate the first condition mentioned in your 4774, November 21, 10 p. m. It is believed that favorable consideration will be given to this suggestion.

With regard to the second condition mentioned in your telegram under reference, it is the view of the War Department and the Department that, as a matter of principle, it would be undesirable for the aircraft to return empty. The War Department realizes that all of our internees may be released and transported to the United Kingdom before the Norwegian operation is concluded. However, since General Arnold attaches the highest importance to their release and

<sup>93</sup> Lt. Col. Felix M. Hardison, Assistant Military Attaché for Air.

<sup>94</sup> Col. Bernt Balchen, since January 27, 1944, representative of the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, and responsible for the establishment and operation of air service between the United Kingdom and Sweden.

<sup>95</sup> *Ante*, p. 668.

return to the United Kingdom at the earliest possible moment, it is felt that we should insist on having the right to transport them by the ATC planes which will be engaged in the Norwegian operation as well as by AATS.<sup>96</sup>

STETTINIUS

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858.79661/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 24, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:58 p. m.]

4821. For Department only. The reason in my opinion why it is of importance not to insist on second condition mentioned in my 4774, November 21, 10 p. m., as well as first condition (re Department's 2355, November 22, 9 p. m.) is that it requires an act by Swedish Government as a prior condition for our making these planes available to the Norwegians. If Swedes should decide that as matter of policy they are unable to grant this permission on any conditions such as ones War Department proposes, it would be the Norwegians not the Swedes who would suffer. It is not the Swedes who have asked this service of us but the Norwegians nor did initiative come from Swedes; the idea was one of Foreign Minister Trygve Lie. Aside from practical considerations I do not think it helps the United States position to use the need of one of our Allies as leverage in forcing something out of Swedish Government. They do not understand why Norwegian request cannot be decided on its own merits and in light of our own military necessities and possibilities. Mr. Günther has, moreover, consistently maintained throughout my various discussions with him and Boheman on the release of these aviators that their release would not be considered by his Government on any basis of bargain. Releases so far secured by me have been entirely on basis of Swedish good will to Allied cause. The good will which produced release of our airmen still exists, but the Swedes who are proud and sensitive under a stiff front of reserve feel that there has been no real appreciation or understanding on our part for what they have done. They are fully aware that Sweden has been under no obligation to effect these releases. Even Boheman who has with great loyalty and often with personal courage fought our battles with his slow moving and obstinate Government remarked to me with a suggestion of sarcasm that "it would be interesting to know how many of your interned military personnel have been released by Switzerland and other neutral countries". Moreover, the treatment in every respect which the Swedes have accorded our aviators has been humane

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<sup>96</sup> Army Air Transport Service.

and understanding to a high degree and beyond any bounds of what are their obligations under international law and custom. The aviators themselves are fully appreciative of this fact, as testified to me by General Curtis on his recent visit here.

I have been reliably informed that Government Ministers in Cabinet meeting have voiced bitter resentment at what they call the "American way of treating Swedes as if they were slaves". I am not in a position as yet to report that Swedish Government will now immediately release all our remaining aviators. I am convinced, however, that their release will not be advanced one day through injecting any form of condition or implied threat on our part.

I should also add as a practical matter that although the instructions in this regard are sent by War Department to Colonel Hardison, action on them has to be taken by me. Hardison has no place whatever in situation beyond field of operations.

JOHNSON

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858.79661/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Johnson)*

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1944—5 p. m.

2363. The War Department has sent a telegram to your Military Attaché for Air, modifying his instructions along the lines indicated in the Department's 2355, November 22, 9 p. m. The number of men to be transported is the figure mentioned to you by Mr. Lie (your 4775, November 21, 11 p. m.<sup>97</sup>).

STETTINIUS

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858.79661/11-2844 : Telegram

*The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

STOCKHOLM, November 28, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:45 p. m.]

4876. I had a talk this morning with Foreign Minister Günther on subject matter of my 4841, November 25, 10 p. m. and 4842, November 25, 11 p. m.<sup>98</sup> Mr. Günther was sympathetic to my detailed arguments for additional release of our internees and made it clear once more that his Government would not consent to these releases on any basis of bargaining or on any conditions imposed by us. In this connection he mentioned conditions imposed by War Department for making planes available to carry the Norwegians to northern Norway and from his remarks it was necessary for me to tell him that my re-

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<sup>97</sup> Not printed.

<sup>98</sup> Neither printed.

quest for release of additional internees was in no way connected with the other matter. In reply to question from me he said his Government would have no objection to any internees who may have been released but not yet transported to England being sent on the planes which have carried the Norwegians when those planes return to England. He stated flatly however that even though the planes might be only partly filled or empty on return trip his Government could not give promise that any remaining internees would be automatically released at that time. He likewise confirmed what has been told me by Boheman and other Foreign Office officials, that crews of these planes must be provided with civilian clothes to wear when they appear at Swedish airports or when they go out in town. He appreciated as Boheman did our desire for the men to wear uniforms in flight and said that if they had on overalls over their uniforms when they landed at Bromma no inspection would be made. Günther then said he would appreciate knowing what my Government's decision would be regarding these planes, as if we are not willing to transport the Norwegians some other way will have to be found to do it. He remarked that he could not understand why we were trying to impose conditions on Sweden for a performance at Norwegian request and that he thought it a matter which Norwegians should take up with United States Government.

On my leaving he said he would take up with Prime Minister the question of additional internee releases and would let me know.

Von Post<sup>99</sup> phoned me this afternoon that Günther wished him to inform me of release of an additional 100 internees. This now leaves 211 internees here not released. Eleven of these have arrived in the last few days.<sup>1</sup>

Please inform War.

JOHNSON

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#### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

[Effected by exchange of notes signed at Washington, December 16, 1944. For text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 431, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1466.]

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<sup>99</sup> Erik von Post, Chief of the Political Division, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum dated January 13, 1945, the Secretary of State was advised by Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs, that the United States Army Air Force authorities had informed the Department that of the 226 American airmen remaining in Sweden 201 had been released and were "usefully employed" and 25 were still interned as a "token"; USAAF, having no objection to this action by the Swedish Government, did not wish the Department to press for the return of these airmen (711.62114A/1-1345).

## SWITZERLAND

### NEGOTIATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WITH SWITZERLAND FOR THE CESSATION OF EXPORTS TO GERMANY<sup>1</sup>

740.00112 European War 1939/10119

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] January 11, 1944.

The Swiss Minister<sup>2</sup> called this morning at his request. His purpose was apparently to tell me that while the tripartite trade negotiations now under discussion in London are progressing satisfactorily there seems to be one sticking point—namely the question of whether Switzerland should give Germany any credits whatsoever. (Mr. Bruggmann in reply to my question said that there was no problem as to the amount—he thought that could be worked out—but whether the Swiss could give Germany any credit whatsoever.) He went on to explain as he has in the past how dependent Switzerland is on Germany for coal and other raw materials, how she is doing everything to keep her trade with Germany to the barest minimum but insisted that Swiss economy was so geared that some credits to Germany were essential: without such credits the Germans would refuse to permit remittances on the large volume of insurance and other Swiss investments in Germany.

The Minister went on to say that there was a tendency here and especially in Great Britain to feel that the Swiss could be tougher with the Germans and that all danger of any German military attack on Switzerland could be eliminated. He said that his Government did not feel that this presents a true picture. His argument was based on the theory that if there should be an Allied landing on the French Mediterranean coast the Germans would wish to rush troops by the quickest and most direct route from Germany to that area. That route lay through Switzerland's weakest area, running from the Lake of Constance down through the western strip of Switzerland to the Rhone Valley. He also said that as an act of final desperation the Germans might be tempted to invade Switzerland purely for

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<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence regarding the War Trade Agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland, effected by exchange of letters December 19, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 824 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Bruggmann.

“vengeance”. I asked how many Divisions the Swiss had. He replied fifty, well-armed and well-equipped. I said I did not see where Germany was going to find fifty plus Divisions available at this stage of the war for a diversion into Switzerland. The Minister agreed that it was unlikely but stuck to his point that the danger to his country of a German invasion could not be ruled out.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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740.00112 European War 1939/10035 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 27, 1944.

[Received January 27—6:02 p. m.]

745. For Department, FEA,<sup>3</sup> WT<sup>4</sup> and Riefler.<sup>5</sup> The Counselor of the Swiss Legation London today handed Foot<sup>6</sup> the following memorandum regarding the Swiss delegation to arrive in London shortly:

“[1.] The Swiss Federal Council have now appointed as their delegates for the continuation of trade discussions in London Prof. P. Keller; M. R. Hohl, Counsellor of Legation; M. C. Rezzonico, Counsellor of Legation; M. V. Gautier, of the National Bank of Switzerland; M. A. C. Nussbaumer; M. E. Frey, Secretary of the ‘Vorort des Schweiz Handelsund Industrievereins’.

2. The Federal Council have given their delegates instructions covering the following items of the Allied Agenda of September 30, 1943: *a.* Credits to Axis countries; *b.* Transit by rail across Switzerland; *c.* Trade with Japan; *d.* Compensation deal; *e.* Activities of Swiss banks; *f.* Children relief. Together with the above subjects, the Swiss Government would wish to discuss the following additional items: *a.* Opening of new blockade facilities for industrial raw materials; *b.* Red Cross exports; *c.* Prevention of smuggling on vessels operating for Switzerland.

3. The Swiss Government feel that it would be somewhat difficult to discuss all the above subjects simultaneously. They therefore suggest that the two financial delegates should come over some time after the other delegates. They would also wish to know what date would be convenient for resuming the discussions.

4. The Swiss Federal Council are anxious to reach a satisfactory solution in the case of Messrs. Sulzer Brothers Ltd.,<sup>7</sup> prior to the departure of the Swiss delegates for London. They would there-

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<sup>3</sup> Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>4</sup> World Trade Intelligence Division.

<sup>5</sup> Winfield W. Riefler, head of the Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom, temporarily in Washington.

<sup>6</sup> Dingle Foot, Parliamentary Secretary, British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>7</sup> Swiss industrial firm; the Swiss Federal Council sought a decision as to the ceiling to be set for the exports of this firm for the first half of 1944.

fore greatly appreciate to receive the Allied reply to the detailed proposals which were handed to H. M. and the U. S. Legations in Bern on January 7th, 1944.

January 27th, 1944."

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10193 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, February 15, 1944.

[Received February 15—11:30 p. m.]

1294. For Department, FEA, Stone<sup>8</sup> and Riefler. Reference Embassy's 745, January 27, and 829, January 29.<sup>9</sup> Keller has arrived in London. He was received by Foot and Adams<sup>10</sup> this morning and the Swiss negotiations began.

By way of describing their trip, he said delegation had encountered some difficulty in getting facilities from the Germans to cross German-controlled territory for London. He took the opportunity to discuss Switzerland's situation as a neutral entirely surrounded by German-controlled territory, and to lament that the passage of time since the last war trade discussions in London left Switzerland still a long way from having a common frontier with us in Italy.

He elaborated upon the fact that although the power situation surrounding Switzerland had changed, it still left Germany in a very strong bargaining position there. Because of this, the ability of the Swiss to beat the Germans down on credit terms was not nearly so good now as the Swiss had hoped it would be by this time. He said he therefore wanted to urge that we give serious consideration to the Swiss request for leeway to grant the transfer guarantees up to 6 million francs per month for the first half of 1944. He said that to Switzerland's great dismay the power situation had not yet changed to the degree hoped for by Switzerland, and that the Swiss were therefore unable to be as tough with the Germans as they would in their own interests wish to be. He said the Swiss were now negotiating with the Germans for an agreement that would reduce exports to Germany to the level of Switzerland's December 19 agreement with us<sup>11</sup> but that it was as impossible to make such an agreement on a month-to-month basis as it would be to treat the agreement with us on a month-to-month basis, that it was therefore necessary for Switzerland to reach an agreement with the Germans valid to June 1944,

<sup>8</sup> William T. Stone, Director of the Special Areas Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>9</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Ware Adams, Second Secretary of Embassy.

<sup>11</sup> See exchange of letters, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 888-892.

and that the Germans were unfortunately and unexpectedly still in a position to cut off Switzerland's trade with the outside world, and hence in a position to insist upon the credit arrangements that the Swiss wished to meet within the 6 millions per month limit. Foot adroitly terminated this description of Germans' power by a discussion of Switzerland's power to cut off transit traffic to German-occupied Italy.

Keller said the Swiss wished to begin the agenda with the questions of credits to Germany and the delisting of Sulzer. The first full meeting for these discussions has been scheduled for Thursday morning, February 17.

MEW<sup>12</sup> and EWD<sup>13</sup> would appreciate advice regarding probable date on which Riefler and Lovitt<sup>14</sup> will arrive in London for these negotiations. Dingle Foot inquired about this yesterday with a view to planning discussions.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10451a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1944—9 p. m.

2098. For Riefler and Lovitt. Department desires to keep in close touch with present negotiations but have heard nothing thus far with regard to them. Request immediate telegraphic report and at least a weekly telegraphic report as to their progress.

The December agreement with Switzerland obtained a notable reduction in the export from Switzerland to Germany of arms and parts thereof, small arms ammunition, bearings, fuses, etc. You should use your utmost endeavors in the present negotiations, however, to bring such exports down to zero. Please include a report on the possibility of obtaining this objective in the cabled report requested above.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10407 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, March 23, 1944.

[Received March 23—7:05 p. m.]

2383. For Department and FEA. Late this afternoon Swiss presented memorandum of proposals for further reduction of exports of

<sup>12</sup> British Ministry of Economic Warfare.

<sup>13</sup> Economic Warfare Division of the American Embassy.

<sup>14</sup> John V. Lovitt, Department representative to the war trade negotiations in London.



items covered by Annex I<sup>15</sup> of agreement of December 19 for second half 1944. Exports to Germany including Poland and Alsace-Lorraine have been reduced from 20% of 1942 to 15% of 1942 in case of following items: 811/813 arms and parts, 1083/84 ammunition, 809A1/A3 ball and roller bearings, M6 machine tools, 948A fuses. Swiss state this represents reduction of approximately 13,000,000 francs. For other Axis Europe arms and parts reduced to 15%, ball and roller bearings group remains same (20%) M6 to 15% representing total reduction of 2,316,000 Swiss francs. On fixed quotas for Germany dynamo electric machines reduced to 4,000,000, M4 steam engines reduced to 794,000, total reduction 2,706,000. For other Axis countries MDY reduced to 5,576,000, M3 to 2,000,000, M5 to 5,000,000 of which not more than 3,000,000 diesel engines, total reduction 1,724,000.

Swiss state that in putting forward these proposals they expect:

(1) That article 7 of the December agreement will be revised in accordance with discussions which took place on this subject:

(2) That article 8B will be modified as follows: "For tariff items covered by Annex I to one-half of the global value of their exports in 1942".

Swiss memorandum continues

"Furthermore in view of the substantial reduction of Swiss exports of machinery to Axis countries already agreed upon in December 1943 and of the new concessions as outlined in the annex attached to the present memorandum (those given above) Swiss delegation would expect:

1. His Majesty's Government and United States Government to make full use of existing possibilities of imports of Swiss machinery and instruments within the framework of the compensation deal;

2. His Majesty's Government and United States Government to place such orders for after-war deliveries as to assist the Swiss Government in their endeavor to overcome the difficulties deriving from the above mentioned export reductions."

Swiss desire to modify article 7 to give more flexibility but agree to prevent concentration upon any particular article of manufacture. They point out that except for tariff items 753, 809A1/A3 and part of 747, annual quotas to manufacturers are not allotted by Swiss Government but by industrial groups and these groups allot quotas on a flexible basis. An elaboration of this point is covered in Embassy's despatch 14615 of March 23.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Not printed; it listed tariff items in six groups with quotas for exports to Germany and other Axis countries.

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

Complete Swiss memorandum is being sent you by air pouch.<sup>17</sup> We have not yet had an opportunity to study memorandum but desire you to have substance in time for Friday's meeting. Our comments will follow.

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10430 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 27, 1944.

[Received March 27—11:59 p. m.]

2489. From Plakias<sup>18</sup> to Russell.<sup>19</sup> For your guidance and information in considering United States and United Kingdom action vis-à-vis Swiss banks there are submitted at the suggestion of Embassy certain impressions I have gained as to London's thinking after initial discussions with Riefler, EWD and MEW.

London's thinking is focussed on the short and intermediate term activities of Swiss banks which benefit Axis war effort as against long-term facilities which Swiss banks may extend to finance trade in general with Axis. So far as London is aware Swiss banks are in fact not extending long-term facilities. This approach is based on the assumption that the Swiss banks know our attitude towards long-term financial facilities granted to Axis as well as the risks involved. (Reference immediately following telegram and United Nations' formal statement of position on Axis tainted collateral as expressed in January 5, 1943 declaration.) If effort is concentrated on short and intermediate facilities I suggest it may be possible to tie in present proposals as implementations of these formal statements. Under such circumstances London wishes to take action promptly to eliminate as soon as possible short-term banking facilities benefiting Axis war effort. So long as such action is delayed the Axis continues to benefit and with impending invasion London feels it is important to reduce to a minimum or eliminate short-term Swiss financial facilities which may implement Axis resistance.

London feels that:

1. Since War Trade Agreement with Switzerland would permit limited trade with enemy Swiss banks would correctly imply that we condone financial facilities in connection with this permitted traffic.

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<sup>17</sup> Despatch 14640 of March 24, and enclosed memorandum of March 23; neither printed.

<sup>18</sup> John Plakias, American delegate to the war trade negotiations in London.

<sup>19</sup> Presumably Francis H. Russell, Chief, World Trade Intelligence Division of the Department of State.

2. However, Swiss banks should not be permitted to infer from 1 above that we condone any and all other transactions with the enemy.

3. Thus far except in individual cases some of which resulted in listing action Swiss banks have not been specifically informed of the types of transactions with the enemy which are considered objectionable. They may have drawn their inferences but the interpretation of what is objectionable would depend largely on the pro-Allied or pro-Axis feeling of the bank or its desire for short-term profit with minimum of risk and would vary from institution to institution.

4. To impress on the Swiss banks the necessity of discontinuing financial assistance to the enemy in the short-term period prior to the armistice it would be advisable to submit quickly a statement of objectionable transactions. Such a statement could be transmitted through the Swiss Bankers Association to all concerned and it is believed that this warning would be much more effective than would be possible through approaches by Allied missions to individual banks regarding objections to financial assistance rendered to the enemy.

5. A list of objectionable transactions would be necessary because:

*a.* The War Trade Agreement covers only specific items, leaving a large portion of normal Swiss trade with Axis and Axis-occupied countries unaffected;

*b.* A further general warning to Swiss banks would not be effective, as they take little risk on short-term facilities;

*c.* Exemplary listing, following a further warning, may well boomerang, and newly-listed banks could then devote themselves wholly to Axis business.

*d.* At this stage of the war a substantial curtailment of assistance to the enemy might be expected by an approach of this character, provided that our list of objectionable transactions covers those items which materially assist the enemy war effort and yet permit the Swiss banks a limited field of operation to protect themselves.

6. In view of Switzerland's geographic position, unless some guidance is given to the Swiss as to the nature of transactions which would cause them to be eligible for listing, the threat of listing alone would not achieve the desired results, while, on the other hand, if listing on a broad scale is resorted to, we would incur definite disadvantages, namely:

*a.* Listed banks would facilitate trade with Germany and thus place themselves entirely outside our control and

*b.* The listing of important Swiss banks would probably be detrimental to the financing of our own requirements from Switzerland.

7. In order to achieve the maximum, it would be to our advantage to discuss with Nussbaumer the types of transactions to which we object and, through discussion, attempt to find the most effective manner in restricting or entirely eliminating such transactions.

8. Consideration should also be given to the possible pressure which the Bankers' Association may bring to bear on the Swiss authorities, both political as well as on the Swiss National Bank, in the event that the conditions imposed are too harsh and impractical to permit of a continuation of banking functions with neighboring states, even at a reduced level.

MEW's list of objectionable transactions has been based upon a rather thorough understanding of European banking and Swiss institutions in particular, buttressed by bitter experience in the first years of the war when Swiss commercial banks, among others, anticipated an Axis victory, and extensive intercepts showing a change in the attitude of Swiss banks toward the enemy and specifically short-term transactions now being carried on which directly or indirectly assist the enemy.

The tentative list may be found to approach a statement which in effect would require Swiss banks to cease for practical purposes all business with Axis states. In further discussions with MEW in which we shall have assistance of Talbot Peterson, former Berlin manager of the Guaranty Trust, and Adams, conversant with German banking and German-Swiss clearing arrangements, an attempt will be made to eliminate those types of transactions which Swiss banks would be unable to abandon and by which damage is caused to only slight extent. This analysis would attempt to set priorities on items in the all-inclusive statement and determine those which we would not abandon and those on which we might concede or qualify.

The Embassy assumes that the reason the Department has withheld the instructions mentioned in Department's 2032 of March 17<sup>20</sup> was caused by consideration Embassy's telegram 2308 of March 21<sup>20</sup> may have necessitated. It is hoped that such instructions will be forthcoming this week and that the Treasury and FEA will advance any necessary additional types of transactions which should be included in the statement and will comment fully upon those tentatively advanced by MEW. It is felt here that if a statement acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom is submitted to the Swiss, it would be very useful to have some indication from you as to how far United States delegates may recede from such a statement. The negotiations at Lisbon will be on a give and take basis, and will require delegation of authority to the United States delegates to permit rapid negotiation of an agreed Anglo-American unilateral statement acceptable to Nussbaumer and be brought to the attention of the Swiss Government. The final draft would of course be referred urgently from Lisbon to Washington and London for approval or any essential amendment. However the subject matter lends itself to endless

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<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

negotiations if it is necessary to refer each item back to London, Washington and Switzerland and receive counter proposals from each of these sources. As this course is not practicable, sufficient authority is requested by the Embassy for United States delegates to facilitate the conclusion of negotiations with minimum of delay when Swiss are prepared to accept agreed proposals.

There is general agreement here that once a statement is circulated to Swiss banks an infraction which warrants listing means that the listee will gain a permanent place on the list. It is also felt desirable that the statement be subject to amendment as changing conditions dictate and permit us to restrict further Swiss banking operations which assist the enemy, or as new types of objectionable transactions come to our attention. While the statement may be described primarily as an outline of objectionable transactions, it must be given to the Swiss as a fairly inclusive list, since the only advantage to the Swiss in receiving such a statement is that it gives them guidance for avoiding the lists.

Inform Treasury, EH<sup>21</sup> and FMA.<sup>22</sup> [Plakias.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10430 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1944.

2527. Reference your 2489, March 27. The following are the views of the Department, Treasury and FEA.

1. The approach to the problem of controlling objectionable activities of Swiss banks proposed in your telegram under reference and previous communications is approved subject to the following.

2. You are requested to forward to the Department as soon as it is available the list which results from your discussions with MEW. It is our view that the list should contain a hard core of transactions from which under no circumstances would we recede in the negotiations with Nussbaumer. It should be understood that the complete list, clearly indicating the points from which no recession will be made, is subject to approval in Washington prior to the commencement of the negotiations. The American delegates will then be given full authority to negotiate with Nussbaumer subject to the understanding that the final result of the negotiation shall be transmitted to Washington prior to final agreement. It should be clearly understood that Washington may suggest any amendments and may insist, if such amendments are

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<sup>21</sup> Eastern Hemisphere Division.

<sup>22</sup> Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs.

not agreed to by the Swiss, that no statement be made; in which event the British and United States Governments will, of course, feel free to list without further warning any Swiss institution which engages in objectionable transactions.

3. The delegates should exercise care in their discussions with Nussbaumer not to permit any ground for misunderstanding on his part that any of the types of transactions which may be the subject of concessions which they may make will be regarded as approved transactions by the American and British Governments. It should be made clear to Nussbaumer that omission of certain types of transactions from the list does not constitute a commitment on our part not to regard such transactions as undesirable at a later date or under certain circumstances or to take appropriate action with respect thereto. The list itself when finally presented to the banks should contain a statement to that effect.

4. In connection with numbered paragraph 1 of the telegram under reference, it should be made clear that we will regard certain financial transactions as undesirable even though they are connected with permitted trade under the War Trade Agreement and that there will be other transactions that we will regard as permissible if connected with permitted trade under the Agreement but will be cause for listing if not so connected. Certain transactions will, of course, be unsatisfactory because they relate to violations of the Agreement.

5. In order to make the approach effective, any breach of the terms should result in immediate listing regardless of the institutions concerned. You are requested to ascertain whether MEW agrees with this suggested strict enforcement of the terms.

6. We concur generally with the first sentence of the last paragraph of your reference telegram. It is suggested that an indication to that effect be inserted in the statement to Swiss banks. It is assumed, however, that in any specific case where deletion would be of definite advantage to us, appropriate arrangements could be made to accomplish such deletion. In this connection it is suggested that you collaborate with MEW in drafting a form of undertaking which could be used in cases where the bank had evidenced a tendency to evade the spirit of the statement without specific breaches of its terms and also in cases where the bank was listed for a breach of the statement but where it was believed after a period that the bank should be deleted subject to an undertaking backed by a bond exacted by the British. The drafting of such an undertaking should not, however, be allowed to delay the negotiations.

7. In view of numbered paragraph 7 of your reference telegram and of paragraph 2 of this instruction, Treasury and FEA are not commenting of [*on*] your 2308 of March 21.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

8. Plakias and Peterson are authorized to attend the conference with Nussbaumer at Lisbon. Travel authorization follows. Please inform Department when Bliss,<sup>24</sup> Peterson, and Plakias plan to leave for Lisbon and approximately how long you expect they will remain there.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10469 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 3, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 2:25 p. m.]

2042. The following telegram has been sent to London.

527, April 3, 10 a. m. At the meeting of the Mixed Commission March 30 Swiss representatives emphasized that the restriction on exports to Germany and the Axis countries would in the absence of an increase in exports to other countries create a serious labor problem. They estimated that the Swiss-German agreement might throw 30,000 out of work. They expressed the hope that we would make fullest possible use of Compensation Agreement and of the five new *tranches* now accorded. They stated they understood British authorities were willing to allow more orders to be placed in Switzerland for civilian consumption provided equivalent compensatory imports were not required. They mentioned the possibility of British purchases of spare watch parts for civilian needs under tariff item 934A to the approximate value of 500,000 Swiss francs.

The Swiss suggested that consideration might be given to according facilities for importation of raw materials of secondary priority (they mentioned cotton) in compensation for exports for civilian consumption.

Commercial Attaché and his British colleague stated that they were without any information on this matter which they pointed out would have to be discussed in Washington and London. In so far as the Swiss proposals for compensatory imports might relate to exports for civilian requirements in excess of existing quotas under the Compensation Agreement, Commercial Attaché and his British colleague agreed to recommend the matter to Washington and London for sympathetic consideration.

With regard to the more general question of an expansion of Swiss exports to offset losses through reduction to the Axis, Commercial Attaché and his British colleague expressed their sympathetic appreciation of this situation but pointed out that both the demand for Swiss goods and the supply of compensatory materials must be governed by the priority requirements of our war effort.

Repeated to the Department as 2042.

HARRISON

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<sup>24</sup> Don C. Bliss, Commercial Attaché in the United Kingdom.

740.00112 European War 1939/10638 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:28 p. m.]

3374. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. Reference Department's 3241, April 22.<sup>25</sup> All relevant developments in Swiss negotiations have been reported to you promptly either by telegram or despatch. We have purposely not reported discussions which have not developed tentative results.

The restrictions in the exports of ball bearings, et cetera, obtained in Annex I of the December 19 agreement are in force until June 30, 1944. The Swiss have already offered to extend these restrictions for the second half of 1944 with further reductions of 25% in ball bearings, arms, ammunition, machine tools, fuses, et cetera, (as reported in Embassy's 2383, March 23, and Embassy's despatch 14640, March 24<sup>26</sup>), in return for the continuation of the import quotas granted Swiss in December (Annex II<sup>25</sup> of December 19 agreement). Thus at present stage of negotiations we have not only safeguarded the position achieved in December but have obtained further reductions in the most strategic items without offering any import quotas for industrial raw materials.

Our full economic bargaining power is thus reserved for use in trying for lower limits of the export of most important items. From a strategic angle it seemed important to husband our bargaining power and to explore the extent to which the Swiss would go to meet our less important objectives before making our major attack. By the method employed it will be difficult for the Swiss to recede from points tentatively conceded and our maximum strength can thus be concentrated on the vital issue which we are now about ready to raise. In this connection you may be sure that the Swiss are profoundly aware of the address of the Secretary of State<sup>27</sup> and the recent action of the Turkish Government<sup>28</sup> which have been given wide and favorable publicity here.

To strengthen our hand we would most appreciate hearing from you with respect to the extent we may go to meet the Swiss requests for supplies. See Embassy's despatches 14075, February 24; 14160,

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>27</sup> For text of Secretary Hull's radio address of April 9, 1944, on Foreign Policy of the United States, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

<sup>28</sup> Presumably reference is to the suspension by Turkey in April of the export of chrome to the Axis countries. See telegram 717, April 21, from Ankara, vol. v, p. 831.



February 29; 14922, March 23 [April 7].<sup>29</sup> The Swiss have repeatedly raised this question and are particularly pressing for answer to their request for petroleum products. On assumption that Swiss concessions are in the end satisfactory, which of the Swiss requests for imports would it be impossible to meet on supply grounds? [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

740.00112 European War 1939/10657: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the  
Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 26, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received April 26—6:21 p. m.]

3433. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. After discussing with MEW we believe Swiss offer to extend Agreement of December 19, 1943 discussed in Embassy's 3374 of April 24 should be accepted now. As part of this offer Swiss wish to modify article 7 to provide only against concentration upon any particular article of manufacture. In this connection, Keller explained that export quotas are not assigned to manufacturers on the basis of 1942 business as was his impression in December and that except in a few cases these quotas are assigned by trade centers and not by the Swiss Government. The provision, therefore, does not operate and in order to avoid misunderstanding should be modified. The Swiss also desire to modify article 8B to read as follows: "For tariff items covered by Annex I to one-half of the global value of their exports in 1942". The further reductions in items on Annex I are those previously reported to you (see Embassy's 2383, March 23 and despatch 14640, March 24<sup>30</sup>). As further part of the offer Swiss desire a special quota of 1,563,000 francs for the export of 12 locomotives to Germany of which not more than 3 to be exported in the first half of 1944 (see Embassy's 2286 March 21<sup>31</sup>); and a special quota of 625,000 francs for the export of flour-milling machinery to Axis Europe other than Germany. On our part, the acceptance of the offer involves the continuation of the import quotas contained in the December agreement and an assurance that the Swiss may take during the second half of 1944 any quota unused during the first half of 1944. We propose to tell the Swiss that we will accept the offer provided that except for unfilled orders exports of ball bearings, ball-bearing machinery, arms, ammunition and fuses are prohibited. It is unlikely that we can

<sup>29</sup> None printed.

<sup>30</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

achieve our aim completely and we therefore should like authority to compromise on any figure between zero and the Swiss offer. Should we fail to get satisfactory reductions in priority items at this stage of the negotiations we will protect the position so that we can again press for these reductions in return for industrial raw materials. Authority to proceed as indicated is urgently requested. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10762 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 11, 1944.

[Received May 12—12:28 p. m.]

3854. [1.] Reference Embassy's immediately following telegram 3855 to Department (Bern's to London).<sup>32</sup>

[2.] Foot and I<sup>33</sup> saw Keller today. We told him definitely and frankly that further progress in the Swiss negotiations depended upon further drastic cuts in Swiss exports to the Axis in the items on Annex I of December 19 agreement. We handed him a proposed revision of the Annex in which fuses, arms, ammunition, ball-bearing and machine tools were given nil quotas for the last half of 1944 while other items were cut drastically from first half of 1944 [apparent omission] stated that if the Swiss accepted the schedule we thought that supplies for which they had asked might be made available in most categories and that we could come to agreement on our other outstanding points. We stated also that our interest in making supplies available depended primarily on securing reductions in these important items.

3. Keller stated categorically and definitely that if this were our attitude there was no basis for an agreement, that the reductions in Annex I of the December agreement were already very large and that the further reductions which he had offered in his March 23 [memorandum?] <sup>34</sup> constituted his absolute and final instructions with respect to all items except the item of textile machinery where he had subsequently received authority to make an adjustment. He also stated that he saw no advantage in even referring our proposal to Bern because he [apparent omission] from his experience there in January and the instructions he had subsequently received that Bern would not accept nil quotas on any of the items where we had asked

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<sup>32</sup> Telegram 3855, May 11, 10 p. m., from London (not printed) repeated to the Department the text of telegram 689, April 25, midnight, from Bern.

<sup>33</sup> Presumably the reference is to Mr. Riefler.

<sup>34</sup> See telegram 2383, March 23, from London, p. 709.

for nil quotas nor did he think that Bern was prepared to go beyond the drastic reductions which were already in effect or offered. Before he left he took our proposal for study but reiterated categorically that concessions further than those already offered on the item covered by Annex I of the December agreement were out of the question. He agreed that he was duty bound to tell Bern about our demands and as he was not now permitted secret contact with Bern he also agreed to the messages going forward through our Missions.

4. We pressed Keller vigorously for any indication of willingness to make concessions on particular items especially ball bearings but here too he was completely adamant simply stressing that his current offer already reduced exports of this item to negligible proportions.

5. Keller also pointed out that there was no utility in discussing the availability of supplies in return for our demands, since Germany would block Swiss access to outside supplies were Switzerland to impose the reductions which we had put forward.

6. We were prepared for strenuous resistance by Keller to our demands, but not for a complete refusal to discuss further the items on Annex I of the December agreement. It is difficult to imagine that the offers put forward by Keller on March 23 represented the maximum to which he was instructed to go, particularly in view of the fact that we know, on the basis of our own undertaking with SRJ, that maximum exports of ball bearings from Switzerland in the last half of 1944 will amount in fact to little more than 350,000 Swiss francs, as compared with the ceiling for ball bearings put forward by the Swiss on March 23 at one million six to six [*sixty-six?*] thousand Swiss francs for Germany. Keller refrained at this point therefore from advancing a concession which would have gone far toward meeting one of our demands. It may be that Keller is ignorant of the details of our undertaking with SRM but this seems doubtful. Bern's 689 of April 25, (which is being repeated to you) [apparent omission] also indicated that it would seem possible for the Swiss to consider cuts more drastic than those proposed in the memo of March 23 in the ceilings established in the December agreement for fuses and arms and ammunition, (10 percent of 1942).

7. I have an impression that the new attitude taken by Keller may reflect a policy decision taken by the Swiss Government with reference to our current campaign, vis-à-vis the neutrals. This campaign is now highly publicized and its progress in each country is being watched closely on all sides. The Swiss Government may have decided that at this stage of the war it would prefer to forego supplies, the acquisition of which is made dependent on acquiescence in publicized demands for embargoes. They may reason that, should the war end soon, their present stocks will carry them through until

they again have access to outside supplies, while should the war be prolonged, their access to outside supplies will in any case remain dependent on German acquiescence, which will not be forthcoming should they give in to our pressure. The apparent lack of interest in supplies of industrial raw materials also probably reflects the fact that recent discussions in Bern with respect to the continuation of the Compensation Agreement have indicated to the Swiss the possibility of obtaining supplies through that channel.

8. Our proposals now being transmitted to Bern through our Missions. If Bern backs up Keller's position, we would suggest that we be authorized to continue the December agreement provided it includes the March 23 additional reductions. Our concession would be limited to the suggested minor alterations in articles 7 and 8A. This course would involve continuance of the coal credit and transfer guarantee to the end of the year but without any increase in German indebtedness in the clearing. It might also involve agreeing up [*as?*] to the special quotas for locomotives, flour milling machinery and thermometers, as stated in our 3433 April 26 and 3700 May 7 [5],<sup>35</sup> but we would not yield on these points unless necessary. We would insist at the same time on obtaining other objectives such as those relating to exports to Japan and transit through Switzerland. We would grant no raw materials but merely continue the food and fodder quotas established in the December Agreement. This would insure our retention of the advantages established in the December Agreement and would reduce aggregate Swiss exports to Axis of items covered in Annex I of the Agreement by 18,977,000 Swiss francs, less 2,266,000 (special quotas for locomotives, flour milling machinery and thermometers) net 16,711,000 or by approximately 12 percent below the ceilings established for the first half of 1944. It is an agreement the Swiss could accept without fear of German retaliation and would still leave our control of industrial raw materials in reserve to bargain against further reductions if the opportunity subsequently arose. Such opportunities may well arise again when the current publicity has died down.

9. If this course is adopted no commitments under the Compensation Agreement should be made for important commodities such as cotton or wool for which the Swiss have also been bargaining here.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Bern as 115.

WINANT

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<sup>35</sup> Latter not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/11133

*The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant)*

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MERCHANT: With regard to the compensation trade between the United States/Great Britain and Switzerland, I am informed by my Government that proposals have been recently submitted to the Commission Mixte in Berne, according to which Switzerland would be agreeable to import on a compensation basis raw cotton and raw wool instead of critical materials, such as rubber, toluol, copper etc. against exports from Switzerland to this country and Great Britain.

The reason for this proposal is that my Government is anxious that the United States and Great Britain be placed into a more favourable position, enabling them to take advantage of the established quotas for which "Geleitscheine"<sup>36</sup> have been secured. At the same time such orders, as placed by the United States and Great Britain, would alleviate unfavourable employment conditions which are the direct result of Switzerland's very substantial reductions of exports to Germany.

I understand that at present the open balance of unused import facilities from Switzerland amounts to approximately 28 million Swiss francs which figure takes into consideration all orders placed in Switzerland up to the present moment.

My Government suggested to the Commission Mixte that goods be imported from Switzerland immediately for about 10 million Swiss francs against which amount Switzerland would be enabled to import for 9 million Swiss francs raw cotton and 1 million Swiss francs raw wool.

In connection with this proposal I would like to draw your attention to the fact that these shipments could be made from Swiss-owned stocks overseas, wherefore the Allied reserves would not have to be drawn on in any way. Furthermore, my Government is prepared to give every assurance that any article manufactured from the imported raw cotton or raw wool be destined for home consumption only.

Regarding the question of imports from Switzerland, I wish to point out at this opportunity that there is available an unused balance of over 10 million Swiss francs for machine tools (items M6), wherefore shipments of this category alone could suffice to exhaust the proposed compensation arrangement.

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<sup>36</sup> Customs transit permit or certificate.

With reference to the open balance of Swiss francs 759'785 in favour of Switzerland, which figure I communicated to the F.E.A. with my letter of April 19,<sup>37</sup> my Government proposed to the Commission Mixte that a third sector of the Compensation Agreement be established, whereby for this amount Switzerland is desirous to import as before such raw materials as are exclusively destined for the Army. Details regarding the desired items are at present being worked out by the Swiss Army authorities and will be submitted in the very near future.

Since the proposals outlined to you above are undoubtedly of great beneficial interest to all parties concerned, I sincerely hope that an arrangement may be worked out in the very nearest future along the lines set out by my Government.

I would appreciate it if you would inform me of your reaction to these proposals, and should you wish to discuss the matter with me, I hope that you will not hesitate to advise me to that effect.

Yours sincerely,

BRUGGMANN

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740.00112 European War 1939/10939d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1944—3 p. m.

1818. The possibility of discontinuing Swedish exports of piston rings to Axis is favorable,<sup>38</sup> FEA and Department have been informed recently. It is believed that the views of the Swiss on this subject should be explored and we are most anxious that they agree to a similar ban. Suggest that you and your British colleague,<sup>39</sup> when he receives similar instructions, discuss the matter jointly with Swiss Government officials in Bern, as we believe that if the matter is considered apart from current London negotiations, the prospects of success may be greater. Please ascertain the quantity and value of preemptive purchases required by us so that we can discuss matter with appropriate purchasing authorities here, should the Swiss raise the question. Repeated London,<sup>40</sup> sent Bern.

HULL

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<sup>37</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>38</sup> For correspondence regarding negotiations with Sweden relative to cessation of exports to German-occupied Europe, see pp. 456 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Clifford J. Norton.

<sup>40</sup> Repeated to London as telegram 4186, with the following addition: "Discuss with MEW this proposal and urge that there be sent to British Mission in Bern, parallel instructions."

740.00112 European War 1939/11033d: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1944—5 p. m.

1838. Department and FEA attach great importance to favorable outcome of present negotiations in London and we hope that Swiss will see their way clear to instruct Keller to offer greater reductions in Annex I exports than those proposed in March and it is requested that unless you consider it inadvisable you call at Swiss Foreign Office with your British colleague when he receives parallel instruction for purpose of informing Swiss of this. Even implied threat should not accompany these representations and that they are motivated solely by our desire to have Swiss fully understand our deep interest in reducing Swiss aid to enemy war effort should be indicated. You are authorized to approach Swiss Government in this sense without waiting for your British colleague to receive parallel instructions, if, after consultation with him, you think this approach should be made at once. Sent Bern, repeated London.<sup>41</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10913: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 30, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received May 30—6:35 p. m.]

4334. For Department and FEA and Riefler<sup>42</sup> from Lovitt. Following telegram has been sent Bern as Embassy's 147.

MEW agrees that this telegram shall be considered sufficient authority for your British colleague to join you in action suggested in Department's 4186, May 26 and 4234, May 27<sup>43</sup> (sent you, repeated to London).

In our counterproposals which we understand you presented to the Swiss Government on May 25, piston rings were assigned a nil quota as were other priority items. We leave it to your discretion after consultation with your British colleague whether an approach to Swiss Government should be made now or whether you should await Swiss response to our counterproposals.

[Lovitt]

WINANT

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<sup>41</sup> Repeated to London as 4234, with following addition: "Urge that MEW send parallel instructions to Bern after discussing foregoing proposal with MEW."

<sup>42</sup> Mr. Riefler left London May 27 to return to Washington for a short stay.

<sup>43</sup> See footnote 40, p. 723, and footnote 41, above, respectively.

740.00112 European War 1939/11133

*The Chief of the Eastern Hemisphere Division (Merchant) to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MINISTER: I received your letter of May 23, 1944 in which you were good enough to inform me of certain proposals which have recently been submitted to the Mixed Commission in Bern with regard to the implementation of the compensation trade between the United States, Great Britain, and Switzerland.

I have read these proposals with great interest, particularly the suggestion regarding the import into Switzerland of raw cotton.

All of the proposals will, of course, be studied by the appropriate authorities. Due regard will be given in these studies to certain general considerations.

I remain [etc.]

LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT

740.00112 European War 1939/10762: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1944—noon.

1875. London's telegram to Department no. 3854 of May 11th. Keller has stated categorically that reductions in Annex I of the December agreement are already very large and that the further reductions which he had offered on March 23 constituted his absolute and final instructions. He added that he saw no advantage in even referring our request for further reductions to Bern since he did not think Bern would go beyond reductions already made or offered. He agreed, however, that he must tell Bern about our demands and as he was not now permitted secret contact with Bern he also agreed to the message's going forward through our Missions.

London's 4091 of May 20th, 8 p. m.<sup>44</sup> states "We are inclined to think the Swiss offer of March 23 represents the bulk of any concessions in Annex I of the December 19 agreement that they are prepared to make". Telegram states that should this prove correct it is recommended that the less important concessions requested by the Swiss be granted in order to secure the reductions included in the March 23 offer. The telegram continues "If it is necessary to concede special quotas for locomotives, thermometers, and flour milling machinery amounting to 2,266,000 Swiss francs in order to hold the reductions in ball bearings, arms and ammunition, fuses, etc. amounting to 18,977,000 Swiss francs, we would do so. No industrial raw materials would be granted for an agreement along these lines. It is our opinion

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.



that on a balance such an agreement is advantageous. Are we authorized to make it if a reply from Bern is in the negative?"

The Department and FEA are considering the advisability of granting the authority requested but before coming to a definite decision would appreciate your opinion in the premises and wish to receive a reply to our representations which were transmitted to Bern through you and your British colleagues on or about May 11th.<sup>45</sup> You are therefore requested to urge the Swiss Government, without waiting for your British colleague to take parallel action, to give you an early reply to these representations and to inform the Government again of the great importance we attach to a favorable outcome of present negotiations along the lines indicated in Department's 1838, May 27, 5 p. m. British Embassy here is requesting London to instruct British Minister Bern in like sense.

Sent to Bern repeated to London.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10930: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 2, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 9:02 a. m.]

3507. The following telegram has been sent to London.

911, June 2, 9 a. m. Nil quota for piston rings included in counter proposals forwarded Swiss on May 25 (Embassy's 147, May 30<sup>46</sup> and Department's 1818, May 26 to Bern, repeated to London). CA<sup>47</sup> and CS<sup>48</sup> do not see any advantage in treating piston rings separately from other items covered by negotiations and believe it advisable in any case to await Swiss reply to May 25 letters. Swiss have been requested supply statistics exports piston rings to Germany and other Axis [countries] since first of year.

Repeated to Department as my 3507.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10926: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 2, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received June 2—8:42 p. m.]

3532. 1. As reported in my 3363, May 26 (874 to London)<sup>49</sup> London's counterproposal to Swiss proposal of March 23 was delivered

<sup>45</sup> See paragraph 8, telegram 3854, May 11, from London, p. 721.

<sup>46</sup> See telegram 4334, May 30, 9 p. m., from London, p. 724.

<sup>47</sup> Commercial Attaché (American).

<sup>48</sup> Commercial Secretary (British).

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

here to Swiss on May 25, (Department's 1838 May 27 and 1875, May 31) it was impossible to deliver this counterproposal until that date owing to necessity of obtaining from London the terms of Swiss proposal of March 23. We are reliably informed that Swiss are busy studying our counterproposal and so far we have received no indications that their reply would be a flat negative.

2. It was deemed desirable to withhold action on your 1838 pending consultation with my British colleague who has only today received similar instructions.

3. In view of situation mentioned in paragraph 1 above we are inclined to think that it would be preferable to await further information as to Swiss reaction to our counterproposal and that any expression of hope that they could improve their proposal might be misinterpreted at this juncture.

4. I consulted with my British colleague with regard to contents of your 1875. He has just received MEW's Arfar 1937 merely repeating to him Washington's 1095 May 30.<sup>50</sup>

5. Under the circumstances we propose to take the first suitable occasion to express informally to M. Pilet-Golaz<sup>51</sup> the hope that a reply to our counterproposal may soon be forthcoming and stressing the importance which our Governments attach to a mutually satisfactory outcome of London negotiations and the deep interest we have in reduction of Swiss contribution to war effort of enemy.

Repeated to London as my 919.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10958: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 6, 1944—noon.

[Received June 7—1:28 a. m.]

3606. The following telegram has been sent to London.

954, June 6, noon.

1. Friendly official Division Commerce has told DCA and his British colleague that our letters of May 25 have been discussed by Swiss authorities but that Hotz<sup>52</sup> has indicated he is in no hurry to reply or broach matter with us. (Sequence Legation's 919, 3532 to Department June 2.) Official said that Swiss were rather disappointed that following December 19 agreement we did not make a gesture by opening some import quotas for raw materials. Although we had undertaken to examine import requirements of Swiss agriculture their

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<sup>50</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>51</sup> Marcel Pilet-Golaz, Chief of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>52</sup> Jean Hotz, Director of the Division of Commerce, Swiss Department of Public Economy.

consideration had not led to granting additional facilities. US and England were the powerful parties. Swiss had made concessions regarding undesirable exports in expectation of some gesture of reciprocity. If they made further reductions they would expect something more concrete in form of raw material import facilities than on last occasion. Official although more reserved than usual indicated that a counter offer something between Swiss proposals of March 23 and ours of May 10<sup>53</sup> might be made to us.

2. CA and CS pointed out that Swiss had not only been given what was stipulated under December 19 agreement but had been allowed to carry over unused balances at end of quota period. Official agreed that latter was spontaneous gesture on our part and that if our offer of May 10 were accepted wholly counterpart would include opening up of new raw material quotas. He said he would talk to Hotz again about accelerating matters.

3. Attitude of Hotz may be intended to give impression of starting minor war of nerves. He is also inactive on question of iron imports (see British Legation's Arfar 2052) about which CN and CS continue remind him at intervals.

Repeat[ed] to Department as Legation's 3606.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10958 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1944—8 p. m.

2045. Department's 1875, May 31, noon; your 3532, June 2, 11 p. m. and 3606, June 6, noon. Department gratified that official Division of Commerce indicated that a counter offer something between Swiss proposals of March 23rd and ours of May 10th may be made to us. It is imperative, however, that this offer be made known within the next day or two, and your are therefore requested to call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to press for an immediate reply to London's counter proposal which you delivered to Swiss on May 25th. Dingle Foot is telegraphing similar instructions to your British colleague. Please cable result of your conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs and indicate if possible date on which we may expect reply.

Sent to Bern, repeated to London as no. 4725.

HULL

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<sup>53</sup> See telegrams 2383, March 23, and 3854, May 11, from London, pp. 709 and 719, respectively.

740.00112 European War 1939/11019 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 14, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received June 15—7:27 a. m.]

4774. For Department, FEA and Riefler from Lovitt.

1. During present negotiations the possibility of listing Swiss firms whose exports are not covered by December agreement has played a part in discussion of desired export ceilings. We have tended to withhold listing such firms in anticipation of reasonable ceilings which seemed possible of attainment.

2. Our demands on the Swiss Government with respect to drastic cuts in exports on items on Annex I of December agreement were made through Legation May 25. Communications from Bern at first seemed to be that Swiss Government might come at least part way to meet us but later telegram received by MEW indicate that Swiss may play for time. We now anticipate that Swiss Government will delay any definite reply because dislocation of French railways will detract from value Swiss may attach to quotas for raw materials which may be prepared to open.

3. Such anticipated delay should be avoided if possible. If Swiss delay their reply until end of month we may find ourselves in awkward position. We will then be faced with either repudiation of the December agreement or continuation (involving continuation of the food and fodder quotas). While there is no indication that Swiss might withdraw their March 23 proposal, transport difficulties across France may make the food and fodder quotas less attractive and therefore make the Swiss less likely to cede points which we hope to get coincident with the extension of the December agreement. (Embassy's 4091, May 21 [20]<sup>54</sup>).

There is also distinct possibility once the December agreement is continued Swiss may consider our goodwill is relatively assured and have little incentive accede demands with respect to priority items in consideration of import quotas for industrial raw materials which they may not be able to import for some time.

4. In an effort to prevent Swiss Government from feeling secure in delaying their reply it may be necessary to resort to listing or threats of listing.

5. Under the December agreement we may not list firms in the metallurgical industry solely for exporting items covered by that agreement so long as ceilings are observed.

<sup>54</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 1875, May 31, noon, to Bern, p. 725.

6. Before listing firms in the metallurgical industry for exporting items not covered by the December agreement, we must first ask the Swiss Government to impose a ceiling, it not to take effect however until July 1, 1944 unless the undesirable export was abnormal during the first half of 1944.

During the present negotiations, we asked Keller for a general formula designed to prevent abnormal developments as compared with recent years. This requested formula covered exports of the metallurgical industry other than those specified in the December agreement. We regard this request for a formula as a request for a ceiling within the spirit of the December agreement and therefore consider ourselves free to list such firms after July 1, 1944 if formula or equivalent ceilings are not put into effect by that time.

In cases where the export of such an item was abnormal during the first half of 1944 we would consider ourselves free to list now.

7. With respect to firms other than metallurgical firms, we have always been free to exert listing pressure.

8. We now propose to inform the Swiss Government of the position we take with respect to listing and say that we plan to list for substantial increases in exports to the Axis or for supplying some new enemy deficiency and express our sincere hope that an early satisfactory reply to our priority demands and to our request for ceilings may make the renewal of listing pressure unnecessary. In this connection our request for ceilings, refer to the request for a general formula applying to metallurgical exports referred to in paragraph 6 above and to limitations on other Swiss exports requested by United States during the negotiation (including requested additions to the A list or nil quotas) and sent you in our despatch No. 15339 of May 1.<sup>55</sup>

9. If you approve of the lines suggested in this telegram please authorize our Minister in Bern to associate himself with his British colleague. Since we have not been able to obtain Swiss trade returns due to ban on secret communication, Bern should be requested to report significant developments.

Sent Department; repeated to Bern. [Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/11012: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 15, 1944—noon.

[Received 5:35 p. m.]

3814. [Paragraph] 5 my 3532 (to London 919) June 2. Calling on Mr. Pilet-Golaz in connection with other matters I took occasion to

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<sup>55</sup> Not printed.

express hope that reply might soon be forthcoming to our counter-proposal and stressed the importance we attached to mutually satisfactory outcome of the negotiations in London as well as our interest in reduction Swiss contribution to enemy's war effort. Mr. Pilet then repeated to me what he had already told my British colleague namely that our last proposal was unacceptable but that this did not mean that it might not be possible to improve the Swiss offer of March 23. The Swiss, he said, had an argument with the Germans now here for commercial negotiations namely that the latter had failed to live up to their undertakings. The Germans were behindhand in the delivery of coal by some 48,000 tons and they had also failed to fulfill their obligations in iron deliveries.

Mr. Pilet then told me that the Germans had taken the position that it was no use to carry on discussions as the proposals which had now been presented by the Swiss were entirely unacceptable to them. Schnurre,<sup>56</sup> head of the German delegation, had called on Mr. Pilet on June 12 to state that he had asked for his accommodations to return to Berlin and that he expected to take leave of Dr. Hotz and his colleagues and depart before end of the week. Mr. Pilet was therefore awaiting developments to appraise German position. However, he pointed out that the Swiss could not afford to break with the Germans as, unlike Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey, Switzerland was entirely surrounded and could be cut off at any moment at the will of the Germans.

Mr. Pilet also repeated what he had said to Mr. Norton, namely, that he hoped that no publicity would be given in the way of threats against Switzerland at this time as that would play into hands of Germans in that the Germans would then claim that Swiss attitude was being forced upon them by the Allies and would use this as a reason for breaking off negotiations. Mr. Pilet expressed hope that Swiss would be left to do their best with the Germans.

2. CA and CS are to meet informally with Hotz, Kohli<sup>57</sup> and Homberger<sup>58</sup> today at latter's request and further report will be made immediately.

Repeated to London as 1023.

HARRISON

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<sup>56</sup> Presumably Carl Schnurre.

<sup>57</sup> Robert Kohli of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

<sup>58</sup> H. Homberger of the Swiss Commission for Supervision of Imports and Exports.

740.00112 European War 1939/11018: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 15, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:13 p. m.]

3835. The following telegram has been sent to London.

1031. Sequence my 1023 (3814 to Department) June 15. CA and CS had informal conversation on June 15 with leading members of Mixed Commission at latter's invitation on subject Annex I for second half 1944.

2. Swiss began by emphasizing that owing to present stoppage in communication in west they were more than ever dependent on Germany for trade facilities in directions north and east. Any import facilities which we are giving or might offer must therefore be regarded as purely theoretical for an indefinite period. They also pressed again for code facilities with their delegation at least in Bern London direction. They feared that further concessions to us would provoke Germany to retaliate both by withholding imports and denying transit to exports.

3. Swiss were unable, although warned of undesirability of further delay, to say when or how formal reply would be made to our letters of May 25. They requested urgent clarification on following points.

(a) As regards group 4 did we envisage a global ceiling (within which Swiss could utilize sub-ceilings for individual items according to their proposals) which would group together both Germany and other Axis countries? If so we might hope for a reduction to 35% instead of their proposed 50%. Or did we envisage two separate global ceilings one for Germany and one for other Axis countries in which case they could only envisage a reduction of each global total to 40%.

(b) On June 14 under the 15 *tranches* of compensation deal we still had unused balance of 29 millions. Did we want Switzerland to ask Germany for further *tranches* under Berlin protocol or make no request therefor or limit their requests to lower figures regarding which they would appreciate your views or even offer a cancellation of part of the outstanding balance? Swiss said naturally the less they had to ask Germany the easier it would be to induce it to accept any further reductions under Annex I.

4. As regards remainder of Annex Swiss indicated that their counterproposals would be as follows.

(a) Group 1A. From 15% to 10% for all items except M6 which would be retained at 15%.

(b) Group 1B. 20% except all three categories of ball bearings which would be reduced to 10%.

(c) Group 2. No change in Swiss proposals of March 23.

(d) Group 3. No change in Swiss proposals except that they would agree to transfer of M9 to group 4.

(e) Group 4. See paragraph 3a above but Swiss strenuously resisted your demand for nil quotas for piston rings. They eventually agreed to study this position again and to consider the possibility of making some reduction taking into account the particularly objectionable character of piston rings for use in airplanes.

(f) Groups 5 and 6. No change in Swiss proposals.

5. As regards group 1B Swiss explained their inability to reduce exports further under 914 and 954A on ground that existing reductions were utmost which could be conceded without crippling industries concerned.

6. CA and CS were constrained although pointing out they were acting merely as post office to press strenuously for a reduction in ball bearings for all destinations to at least 5%. They indicated that such a concession would affect the tenor of their report of this conversation in a manner which might be helpful to the Swiss. Notwithstanding their hints as to difficulties which might result from our rigid application of clause 7 Swiss remained adamant at 10%. Swiss left impression that they had not been authorized to go below 10%. Unlike the case of piston rings they did not even offer to reconsider ball bearings.

Repeated to Department as Legation's 3835.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/11019 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 19, 1944—9 p. m.

4839. From Department and FEA for Lovitt. Your 4774 of June 14 repeated to Bern, and Bern's 3814 and 3835 of June 15 and 3847 of June 16<sup>59</sup> repeated to London as 1023, 1031 and 1032.

After consideration and discussion with Riefler of reference telegrams, Department and FEA wish to comment as follows:

1. We agree that a threat of blacklisting formulated in the terms outlined in your 4774 may prove a powerful inducement to the Swiss to make us a more favorable offer. Bern is hereby authorized to make the proposed representations to the Swiss provided; (a) that you and MEW inform Bern that you consider such action desirable despite informal Swiss offer reported in Bern's 3835; and (b) that the two missions in Bern be given discretion to refrain from action if they deem it inadvisable on the basis of the attitude of the Swiss in Bern toward the negotiations.

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<sup>59</sup> Telegram 3847 not printed.



2. If as now appears most probable, negotiations cannot be concluded or a definite offer received from the Swiss in time for final action before June 30, we wish to receive your views and those of our Legation in Bern regarding desirability of informing the Swiss before end of June that in view of their reluctance to make more effective reductions in their exports to enemy we are unwilling to conclude agreement for last 6 months at present time; that pending receipt of more satisfactory proposals and conclusion of an agreement, we would reserve all rights to undertake listing action; that during this interim period we should expect Swiss to keep their exports to enemy at minimum levels, not in any event to exceed most favorable level proposed by them to date; that in consideration of such limitation, we would be prepared to continue, on interim basis, the present quotas on food, fodder, and tobacco; and that when negotiations are concluded on a more comprehensive basis additional concessions on both sides will be retroactive so far as feasible to July 1st.

3. As regards Swiss question on proposed global ceiling for group 4 (paragraph 3(a) of Bern's 3835) Riefler has informed us that counter proposal made to Swiss on May 25 envisaged two global ceilings, one for Germany and the other for other Axis countries. If MEW agrees please confirm this interpretation to Bern for transmission to Swiss.

4. We do not expect to request any further *tranches* in the Compensation Deal. We request that Bern, in informing the Swiss of this fact, endeavor to use this fact as a lever to obtain additional concessions from the Swiss, emphasizing Swiss argument that export reductions would be more acceptable to Germans if they did not ask for other concessions.

5. After preliminary consideration of Swiss offer we do not believe it constitutes an attractive compromise between the original Swiss proposal of March 23 and our counter suggestion of May 25. Before informing Bern of our final views, however, we would like to have additional information on the following points in the Swiss offer:

(a) The reason why the Swiss propose increased ceilings as compared with their March 23 offer for Group I items, other than bearings, exported to other Axis countries.

(b) The further concessions if any which the Swiss expect from us in return for reductions proposed in their June 15 offer.<sup>60</sup>

(c) The reason why the Swiss state that they would be willing to agree to the transfer of M9, Other machinery n.e.s. to Group 4. On the basis of the latest Swiss proposal this change does not appear to constitute any advantage to us.

(d) We do not understand Swiss reference to Item 914 in connection with reductions in Group 1 B.

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<sup>60</sup> See paragraph 4 of telegram 3835, *supra*.

6. We also request that Bern make every effort to obtain a more favorable offer from the Swiss for Item M6, Machine Tools of all kind. We are most anxious to achieve this since it now constitutes the group considered to have the greatest strategic value to the enemy.

7. We believe that it is of the utmost importance for our Minister at Bern to press the Swiss for a formal offer at the earliest possible date (our 2045 of June 14 repeated to London as 4725).

Please repeat the above message to our Legation in Bern as quickly as possible together with your comments and those of MEW on the points indicated above. We request that you also transmit your comments to the Department and FEA. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/11092 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 21, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11 : 59 p. m.]

4943. For Department, FEA and Riefler from Lovitt. Following sent to Bern as 176, June 21 in compliance with your telegram 4839, June 19 :

Comments of Embassy and MEW on Department's 4839, June 19 repeated to you as Embassy's 177, June 21 are as follows :

1. We believe you should have discretion to decide when to approach Swiss with reference to listing, in view of the recent informal offer of the Swiss. Without in any way detracting from your latitude of discretion we suggest that on an appropriate occasion it may be advisable to inform the Swiss of our view as to the question of our freedom of action with respect to listing as outlined in Embassy's 4774, June 14 to Department, repeated to you as 172. It would seem to be inappropriate now to threaten firms in the metallurgical industry exporting items on Annex I of the December Agreement.

2. We believe the new Swiss proposals should be accepted leaving it to you to attempt to secure any last minute concessions. Owing to disruption of traffic through France, quotas for raw materials and even quotas under the December Agreement tend to become theoretical and Swiss interest in reaching an agreement may wane. By December Agreement we obtained reductions in priority items from 229,000,000 Swiss francs to 140,000,000 Swiss francs. The March 23 offer reduces this to 122,000,000 Swiss francs. In May we asked for 61,000,000 Swiss francs and Swiss now offer 98,000,000. We desire to gain the immediate advantage of this offer before Swiss have a chance to protract the negotiation. The acceptance of this offer does not preclude us from asking further reductions in return for raw materials when transit is again available or if fundamental conditions change.

We further feel that Bern should press for a formal offer which should be then clinched in Bern. The bargain thus made should then

be referred to London for incorporation in an agreement covering such other objectives as we may be able to work in: If offer is not accepted in Bern but referred to London delegation, we believe delegation will probably prolong negotiations and ask for raw materials.

3. Counterproposal made to Swiss May 25 envisaged two global ceilings but we prefer single global ceiling with 35% limit to separate ceilings with 40% limit. We do not, in our opinion, lose substantially by combining Germany with other Axis Europe because ceilings for any one tariff item cannot exceed total for Germany and other Axis Europe under December agreement.

4. MEW agrees not to ask for further *tranches* in compensation agreement. If cancellation of unused balances would be helpful, supply departments here would consider the question promptly. You should have freedom of action to use this position to best advantage.

5. (a) No ceilings in group I are increased over March 23 offer. (b) MEW has asked Bern whether Swiss will ask for industrial raw materials. It seems to us less likely that Swiss will ask for them if offer is clinched in Bern promptly than if it is referred to Keller for further negotiations. (c) Transfer of M9 from group III to group IV does not change ceiling which remains at 40% as in the December agreement. Transfer was made at our suggestion. (d) See Embassy's 4876, June 19<sup>61</sup> which we are repeating to Bern as our 177.

6. We agree that further reduction in M6 is desirable but bearings, piston rings and arms and ammunition are still regarded as having priority here.

7. We entirely agree.

[Lovitt]  
WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/11092 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1944—9 p. m.

5005. Department and FEA approve substance comments contained in your 4943, June 21, 8 p. m. and sent to Bern as 176, June 21. We believe, moreover, that it is important that agreement should be come to by June 30. Our Legation at Bern is therefore instructed to press for a formal offer and if this offer coincides with the Swiss counter proposal outlined in Bern's 3835, June 15, 10 p. m., sent to London as Bern's 1031, Legation is instructed to clinch this offer either by an exchange of notes (to be incorporated in a comprehensive agreement which will be subsequently concluded in London) or by other means. In doing so, the Legation should make it clear to the Swiss that the export ceilings are open to review at any time and that a marked change in military conditions would in all probability cause such a review to be initiated by us.

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<sup>61</sup> Not printed.

If (repeat if) our Legation at Bern finds it necessary in order to clinch the agreement to agree to Swiss request for flour milling machinery and thermometers, it may do so. Since Swiss have not met our full requirements, we are extremely reluctant to grant Swiss request as to locomotives and Legation should only agree to this if they find it essential in order to clinch agreement without further delay. In any case, number of locomotives should be kept as low and delivery delayed as long as possible.

If you and MEW are in accord with the above, please repeat the above message textually to our Legation at Bern at once and request British immediately to send similar instructions to British Legation at Bern.

Telegraph action taken.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/11119 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 25, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received June 25—8:35 p. m.]

5047. For Department and FEA from Lovitt. Reference your 5005, June 24. Embassy and MEW agree with reference telegram which has been relayed to Bern and MEW has sent instructions to British Minister to join in action contemplated. [Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/11118 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 26, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:11 p. m.]

5060. For Department and FEA from Lovitt. Reference your 5005, June 24. Reference is made to instructions that in clinching Swiss offer it should be made clear that export ceilings are open to review at any time and that a marked change in military conditions would in all probability cause such a review to be initiated by us.

Your attention is called to paragraph 3 of December agreement to the effect that upon the opening of the Swiss frontiers it is agreed to hold new negotiations to meet the new situation and to the provision in the first letter of December 19<sup>62</sup> from Foot and Riefler to Keller which provides *inter alia* that we may regard ourselves released

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<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

from the agreement should any development materially increase the benefit derived from Switzerland by our enemies. We believe these two provisions in the December agreement give us substantially the latitude of review desired. For instance, with change in military conditions a small export of ball bearings may become more important to Germany. Do you have situations in mind which could not be taken care of within the terms of the December agreement? Any clarification would be appreciated.

It is of course desirable that the Swiss should accept the statement as worded in your telegram in order to prevent any future misunderstanding.

The Swiss may, however, want some more definite statement as to our intentions with respect to the review of export ceilings on the ground that they must have an export basis for current trade discussions with the Germans which would be reasonably stable for the last half of 1944. In this event could we say that except in exchange for raw materials et cetera, we have no present intention of asking for lower ceilings for the balance of 1944 otherwise than as provided for in the December agreement.

In considering this problem we must bear in mind that Swiss in all probability will want an escape clause in the parallel terms to any such clause that we insert for our benefit. This was the case in the December agreement. [Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/11118 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1944—midnight.

5069. For Riefler and Lovitt from Department and FEA. Reference your 5060, June 26th. We hope that a statement similar to that in our 5005, June 24th can be included in clinching agreement on ceilings and request that you make every effort to have it included. We believe the Swiss may well feel that opportunity for revisions in light of changed conditions would be in their interest as well as ours. However, we will not insist on its inclusion if (1) in Bern's opinion such a clause would jeopardize prompt conclusion of agreement, or if Swiss would insist on a parallel escape clause which might release them from ceilings for reasons other than action taken by us or with our consent as specified in Keller's letter of December 19th;<sup>63</sup> and (2) MEW and EWD are agreed and satisfied that the

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<sup>63</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 892.

Foot-Riefler letter of December 19th, mentioned in your reference telegram, covers the kind of eventuality suggested by you.

If written statement is not included, however, Bern should be instructed to inform the Swiss orally, when definite Swiss offer is received and accepted, that we will feel free to request further reductions in ceilings if military situation continues to develop as expected during the next few months. For your and Bern's information, we have no intention at present of requesting such additional reductions except with an accompanying offer to open raw material quotas, but do not want to commit ourselves definitely to Swiss on this point.

Please modify our 5005 along above lines and relay to Bern with substance of your 5060. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/6-2744: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1944—midnight.

5070. From Department and FEA for Riefler and Lovitt. If you and MEW agree, Department and FEA suggest that you transmit instructions to Bern that in the event that Swiss offer is not clinched by June 30, Harrison and his British colleague should inform the Swiss that we expect them to observe the ceilings contained in their informal offer of June 15 as from July 1 pending conclusion of agreement based on formal Swiss offer which we understand Bern is to receive this week. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/6-2844: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 28, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 9:52 a. m.]

4104. The following telegram has been sent to London.

1109, June 28, 9 a. m. Embassy's 181 (transmitting Department's 5005, June 24) June 25 and 183, June 26.

1. Upon receipt Embassy's 181 CA and CS urgently requested Hotz for interview which took place late evening June 27. They laid stress upon the importance which you attach to receiving the formal Swiss reply to our letters of May 25 before end of this month. They also gave Hotz written replies to the two questions<sup>64</sup> asked by Swiss on

<sup>64</sup> See paragraph 3 of telegram 3835. June 15, 10 p. m.. from Bern, p. 732.

June 15. Paraphrased text of these replies given in our 1110 (4105 to Department).<sup>65</sup>

2. Hotz began by expressing great surprise at your insistence on a prompt formal reply to us regarding Annex I. He found this "incomprehensible" in view fact that he was again in direct communication with Keller from whom he had already received certain impressions among these your reactions on machine tools and ball bearings. Hotz feared lest simultaneous communication to you through Keller direct and through us should create confusion.

3. Bearing in mind last sentence second paragraph of numbered paragraph 2 Embassy's 176 CA and CS expressed their surprise at Hotz' apparent reluctance to implement his promise of June 23 to let us have the Swiss formal reply in course of this week, (paragraph 5 Legation's 1088—4050 to Department June 24<sup>66</sup>).

4. Hotz endeavored to justify his evasive attitude on grounds that Keller had by now confirmed to you the Swiss intentions regarding Annex I as already communicated orally to us. Giving a formal reply in Bern seemed to him therefore unnecessary. When CA and CS continued pressing for this reply Hotz disclosed that he had in fact a draft reply in hand and eventually assured them that the formal reply would be delivered to them on evening of June 29.

Repeated to Department as Legation's 4104.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/6-2844: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, June 28, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 1:25 p. m.]

4105. The following telegram has been sent to London.

1110, June 28, 10 a. m. Paraphrase of text referred to in paragraph 1 my 1109 (4104 Department) follows:

"Quota for Group 4. Our authorities are willing to treat the global ceiling of 35% of 1942 exports as embracing both Germany and other Axis countries while permitting within this ceiling utilization of sub-ceiling for individual items to the amounts set forth in the agreement of December 19, 1943 i.e. up to 50%.

Compensation Agreement. In view of the considerations urged by Swiss representations at meeting of Mixed Commission on June 10, American and British authorities have decided to abstain from making any request for new branches [*tranches*] under Compensation Agreement. Furthermore, prompt consideration would be given to the question of cancellation of part of the outstanding balances under compensation deal should this prove mutually helpful.["]

Repeated to Department as Legation's 4105.

HARRISON

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<sup>65</sup> *Infra.*

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/7-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 8, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

5414. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt.

1. Last night <sup>67</sup> Keller presented the formal Swiss proposals offering further cuts in Swiss priority exports to the Axis. They coincided with the advance notice from Bern (see Bern's 1146, July 3 repeated to Department as 4228 <sup>68</sup>). Keller stated that the proposals he now made were as far as the Swiss Government could go and were made on the basis that raw materials would be made available to the Swiss.

2. Before presenting the proposals, Keller explained that Switzerland had done much unilaterally during the course of the negotiations to meet us in various directions. He stated that the reductions imposed on Swiss exports to Germany had resulted in a clearing commitment of 924 million Swiss francs, an amount well within the limits previously promised. Exports to Germany had been reduced to a level of from 25 to 26 million Swiss francs per month while imports from Germany were at 42 million leaving 17 million Swiss francs per month surplus exports from Germany to cover invisible items. Transit through Switzerland has been rigidly controlled. Swiss exports to Japan had been brought down to 1,000 pounds sterling last month and consisted entirely of books and watches. These instances were cited to show how the Swiss had worked to meet our demands.

3. The unused balances of export quotas referred to in reference cable are less serious than we earlier anticipated. They amounted to 8,639,000 Swiss francs, as follows:

(a) For Germany, 884/889B textile machines 4,964,000 Swiss francs, MDY dynamo electric machines 370,000, M3 hydraulic and wind motors; pumps 200,000. M4 steam machines 400,000, M7 food-stuffs machinery 776,917, A/B bicycles and parts 133,956, A/F magnets of all kinds, 706,000.

(b) For other Axis countries, 882 E/H refrigerating machinery 110,884/889B textile machinery 180,000, M9 other machinery, NES 800,000.

4. Most of our discussions centered on the provision of the December agreement providing for an immediate conference to meet the new situation which would result from an opening of the Swiss frontier. We asked for assurances that upon this contingency, the Swiss would be in a position to make an immediate further reduction in their ex-

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<sup>67</sup> Apparently reference is to a meeting of July 6.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.



ports to Germany. Keller could not give us such an assurance. He maintained that if the Swiss entered into a trade agreement with Germany covering the next 6 months, they would be bound to continue any exports agreed upon for that period so long as Germany lived up to her side of the bargain. We told Keller that this was entirely unsatisfactory and at odds with what we had the right to assume under the December agreement. We urged him to take this point up with his Government at once with a view to including in the Swiss-German agreement now being negotiated a proper escape clause to meet the situation envisaged.

5. Keller stated that any new Swiss-German agreement would be kept in suspense until July 14 and that until that time, no exports of Annex I items would take place other than unused balances from the first half of the year.

6. Our next step seems clear. The proposed reductions better those of the informal offer which we are already agreed are advantageous enough to be clinched. We have therefore prepared a letter to Keller offering to continue the December agreement provided the Swiss are willing to incorporate all the new reductions without raw materials from United States. On our part, however, we will grant the carry-over of unused balance so [of] items in Annex [I] as listed in (3) *a* above, the special quotas for flour milling machinery, thermometers and locomotives, and amendments of articles 7 and 8 of the December agreement along the lines requested by the Swiss. With respect to locomotives, however, we impose a condition to the effect that deliveries be postponed until September. We will also expand the food and fodder import quotas under the December agreement to include related agricultural requirements such as copper sulphate and certain chemicals and to do our best to supply malt for brewings as well as to adjust the fats and oils quota to meet Swiss requirements more adequately. We also state that if they incorporate a satisfactory escape clause in their trade agreement with the Germans which will permit them to meet our desires upon the opening of the Swiss frontier, we recommend the granting of navicerts for the shipment to and storage at Lisbon of cotton and wool. The terms upon which we would agree to the on carriage of these foods to Switzerland and the opening of other quotas would be disclosed when the frontier was open and transit facilities restored. On Viscoe Swiss case, we take the position that we could not discuss it further until we had received the Swiss reply to proposals made by the Black List authorities.

7. This letter had been posted but was recalled from the mail room upon receipt of British Embassy's telegram 1443 of July 7 to MEW from which we assumed you were sending parallel telegram. The letter is in line with your views as expressed in British Embassy's

telegram but the tactics envisaged are different. Embassy and MEW would prefer to proceed along the above lines and we urgently request your authority to do so. It should be noted that storage of goods at Lisbon should have considerable appeal to the Swiss. At the same time our control is preserved.

8. MEW agrees with us that your suggested approach to the Swiss Minister on the highest political line should be helpful. If this is done, the Swiss Minister should be told that the negotiators in London are offering the Swiss a more liberal agreement under the circumstances and that our proposals should be accepted without quibbling.

Repeated to Bern as our No. 209. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom*  
(Winant)

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1944—10 p. m.

5418. Paragraph 7, your 5414, July 8, 9 p. m. Department is glad that you recalled letter from mail room. Department had not authorized you to accept demands contained in Bern's 4228, July 3, 5 p. m.<sup>69</sup> to Department which repeated Bern's 1146, July 3, 5 p. m. to London.

We do not understand significance of demand *c* to effect that revised Annex I be regarded as part of the general agreement which would include a revision of existing schedules of Swiss-British War Trade Agreement of 1940.<sup>70</sup> Please cable further information as to what this demand involves. We cannot authorize carrying forward of unused balances and quotas under Annex I from first to second half of 1944 until we have studied this matter further.

Meanwhile you are not authorized to proceed along the lines advocated in your July 8 cable.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland* (Harrison)

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—5 p. m.

2398. Your 4422, July 11, 7 p. m.<sup>69</sup> Please inform Minister of Foreign Affairs that this Government requests the Swiss Government to make no commitments to the Germans for the export from Switzer-

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> Signed at Bern, April 26, 1940.

land to Germany, subsequent to the time at which the Swiss frontier may be opened, of any commodities. You are also instructed to state that this Government hopes that the Swiss Government will make no continuing commitments (or will have an adequate escape clause in such commitments) regarding export to Germany of any kind since the rapidly changing military conditions may cause this Government to request lower ceilings or even an embargo of the export of commodities to Germany before the opening of the Swiss frontier and since this Government will not be able to accept as a reason for refusal of such possible requests the fact that the Swiss have made commitments to Germany.

Sent to Bern, repeated to London as Department's [5499].<sup>72</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944—7 p. m.

5495. For Riefler and Lovitt.

1. After carefully weighing all the factors involved with a view to obtaining the most satisfactory agreement possible with the Swiss, especially in terms of our present economic warfare attitude toward Switzerland and other neutrals (as outlined below), we authorize you in agreement with MEW to inform Keller that we accept the ceilings on Annex I items put forward formally by him on July 6, but that our position toward the five demands accompanying his formal offer (which were outlined in your 4228, July 3, and further discussed in your 5472, July 11<sup>73</sup>) is as follows:

A. We agree to the prolongation of the December 19 agreement provided that the ceilings on Annex I conforms as of now to the Swiss offer of July 6. In return we are willing to concede the special quotas for flour-milling machinery, thermometers, and locomotives (subject to delay in delivery of locomotives until after September 1 and justification of price therefor as contained in section 3 of Bern's 4232, July 3,<sup>74</sup> repeated to London as 1150). We would also accept revision of Article VII and VIII of December Agreement along the lines requested by the Swiss. A new situation will undoubtedly arise upon the opening of the Swiss frontier, and we insist upon confirmation of the terms of the December Agreement and accordingly that any new Swiss-German agreement should allow Swiss liberty

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<sup>72</sup> Repeated to London with the opening sentence: "Please urge British to instruct their Minister in Bern to approach Swiss immediately in sense of following instructions to our Legation."

<sup>73</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

of action as soon as the Allies have access to Switzerland. (At such time we would expect to ask for an embargo on Swiss exports to Germany). In order that the Swiss should be in such a position, it is obvious that they should make no commitment in trade agreement about to be entered into with Germany covering the next 6 months which would negative this objective. The Swiss are also put on notice that changing military developments may make it necessary for us to request lower ceilings or even an embargo on Swiss exports of certain commodities to Germany even before the Swiss frontier is opened. You will make this clear to the Swiss, and will add that they should also bear this in mind in their current negotiations with the Germans.

B. In view of military developments, which in effect have led to the practical cessation of Swiss transit facilities in France (your 5405, July 8<sup>75</sup>) and which increasingly jeopardize security of shipments in transit to Switzerland, we agree that we cannot approve quotas for industrial raw materials at the present time. We would suggest that the Swiss merely be informed that we will be willing to discuss with them, in advance of the opening of free access to the Swiss frontier, the opening at that time of raw material quotas in return for objectives we may then desire. With reference to Paragraph 6 of your 5414,<sup>76</sup> we cannot agree at this time to expand the food and fodder import quotas under the December Agreement to include related agricultural requirements such as copper sulphate, certain chemicals, and brewing malt. We are reluctant to agree to the stockpiling in Lisbon, for eventual shipment to Switzerland, of cotton and wool, since we believe our later bargaining power vis-à-vis the Swiss would be weakened to the extent that they attach importance to such stockpiles. Moreover, it opens an opportunity for further bargaining. However, if you and MEW feel strongly that agreement to such stockpiles would obtain Swiss acceptance of the proposed ceilings, and that the ceilings would otherwise be unacceptable to them, you are authorized to agree, subject to the following conditions:

1. The quantity to be permitted will be determined by FEA and MEW after Swiss acceptance of the ceilings.
2. The stockpiles will be charged against our Compensation Deal indebtedness.

C. Because of the reasons stated above, we agree with your position that we cannot accede to this demand.

D. We cannot agree to the carrying forward of unused balances of quotas under Annex I from the first to the second half of 1944. Acceptance of this demand would contradict our previous policy towards Sweden and Switzerland with respect to unused quotas and would establish an unhealthy precedent for future agreements.

E. As to the Viscoe Swiss case, we agree with your position that we cannot discuss it further until we have received the Swiss reply to the proposals made by the blacklist authorities. We assume that these proposals were concurred in by the Proclaimed List Committee in Washington.

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<sup>75</sup> Not printed.

<sup>76</sup> Dated July 8, p. 741.

According to our information, axle bushings, articulation bearings, and flexible joints are capable of use in substitution for ball bearings. If this is confirmed by EWD and MEW, it will be necessary for you to insist, therefore, that there should be a clause in the Agreement placing a nil ceiling on these commodities.

2. For your information, our position towards the Swiss offer of July 7 [6?] (as stated above) is based upon the rapid changes in the military situation (even since June 15) which has caused us to change our whole economic warfare attitude toward the Swiss and the Swedes. We are firmly determined at this stage of the war not to indulge in protracted negotiations with the neutrals on concessions which they demand from us in return for compliance with our requests to cease or to reduce their economic aid to the enemy. We now believe that we can expect far more from the Swiss than before recent military developments. In other words, we are attempting to implement more effectively our policy toward the neutrals as outlined in the address of the Secretary of State on April 9.<sup>76a</sup>

To this end the Secretary is convoking the Swiss Minister to inform him that our policy toward the neutrals was fully and clearly stated in his address of April 9; that this Government has realized the difficult situation of Switzerland resulting from its geographical position and dependence on the Axis for certain raw materials and because of these considerations and since we believe that the Swiss Government was sincere in its expressed desire to curtail exports to the Axis to a minimum provided Swiss national security was not threatened by such action, we have shown great patience during the current negotiations. It has now become abundantly clear, however, that the Swiss have taken advantage of our sympathetic understanding of their problem and have deliberately delayed concluding an agreement by conditioning their latest offer upon the acceptance by us of demands which introduced into the negotiations new and disturbing factors. The very fact that the Swiss authorities feel themselves able to make proposals as indicated in their offer of July 6 proves that they do not consider that the export ceilings proposed therein would place them in a dangerous position vis-à-vis Germany. Our patience is now at an end.

The Secretary will continue to the effect that our negotiators in London are informing the Swiss of the maximum extent to which it is possible for us to meet the new Swiss demands. It is necessary that an agreement be concluded at once based upon the most recent Swiss offer and our very reasonable reply. In view of the necessity of fixing at once maximum limitations for Swiss exports in this and the immediately following months of products of military importance

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<sup>76a</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

to Germany, we must ask that the Swiss Government conclude an agreement forthwith upon the above basis. It will, furthermore, be pointed out to the Swiss Minister that the future interests of Switzerland would best be served by ceasing to give aid and assistance to the enemies of the United Nations.

It is believed that our views as outlined above could be brought home most forcefully to the Swiss Government were the British Foreign Secretary to convoke the Swiss Minister in London to inform him in a similar sense. The Ambassador is being requested in a following telegram to take this matter up with Mr. Eden.

Department would appreciate cable from you at earliest possible moment as to whether MEW agrees with us on what should be told Keller. In presenting this matter to MEW, you may inform them that this telegram represents the considered opinion of the Department of State and FEA and that it is our strong desire that an appropriate note should be sent to Keller immediately.<sup>77</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1444

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 14, 1944.

The Minister of Switzerland called at my request. I proceeded to take up with him the Swiss proposal of limiting further exports to Germany in reply to previous American proposals and constant and long urging. I took up in connection with the Swiss proposal of July third the American reply which is in the nature of a counter proposal.

I prefaced my remarks by speaking of the traditional and inherent friendly relations between our peoples and our countries. I said that I had already discovered that some of the countries listed as neutral did not seem clearly to appreciate the serious situation of countries like the United States in this war; that we were spending two hundred billion dollars and have eight million armed men fighting on all battle fronts; that we were supplying Great Britain and Russia to an enormous extent and we were losing thousands of lives.

I said that at the same time it was not unnatural that Swiss businessmen would ask the intercession of their Government with ours and would seek to retain just as much trade as possible; that I had seen this happen to a great extent during the other World War. I added that I had seen it happen in this war; that the Swedes had pled with tears in their eyes for some time about so-called excessive requests of

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<sup>77</sup> Two letters were sent to Mr. Keller on July 15; texts of the letters were transmitted to the Department in telegram 5624, July 15, from London not printed.

the Allied nations to limit still more and more exports into Germany; that possible loss of coal from Germany was their main argument and then we suddenly discovered that they had coal on hand to keep them supplied for a year and were moving rather complacently in certain business respects. I said that when a nation was spending what the United States was and was losing lives right and left because of neutral aid to the enemy in order primarily to gratify some businessmen, it presented a most serious question to this country.

I stated that I was requesting the Minister in the most earnest possible manner to take up this matter with his Government with a view to arriving at once at a satisfactory agreement based on the American reply to the Swiss proposal of July third. I said that one of these days the stand of some of the Swiss businessmen in question would be uncovered as in the cases of certain people in Sweden, resulting in inevitable friction between our countries. I discussed in some detail each of these points.

The Minister tried to argue but with very little success. He thought the Army and Navy were too insistent and extreme in their attitude. I said that the State Department was keeping up with all the facts and details and not relying on the Army and Navy to any great extent in this matter. The Minister said he would take the matter up at once with his Government and give it my message. I thanked him.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1944.

5589. From Department and FEA. When Riefler was in Washington, he stated that Swiss intended to handle transit traffic unilaterally and that it would not be included in any new agreement. He also stated that Swiss had agreed to discuss transit of goods in Mixed Commission regardless of their nature if we or the British believed quantities involved exceeded normal traffic levels. In view of this we do not understand instructions given British Legation in Bern in MEW telegram No. 1977 June 3 asking British representatives to discuss with Swiss and Italians suggested additions to list of materials whose transit from Italy to Germany Swiss agreed to prohibit. We are puzzled as to why reference telegram did not specify that discussions should take place in Mixed Commission.

We are satisfied to have the Swiss act unilaterally on transit traffic as long as this achieves objectives we desire. We believe, therefore, that the Swiss should be asked at the earliest opportunity to agree to following:

1. Swiss list of items classified as war materials should be as comprehensive as Swedish<sup>78</sup> and should apply not only to transit from Italy to Germany but also from Germany to Italy. List submitted by Swiss (your despatch No. 14,923 of April 7)<sup>79</sup> is incomplete and applies in one direction only.

MEW telegram to Washington 835, April 17 stated that list similar to Swedish list had been submitted to Swiss. Have Swiss accepted it?

2. Will Swiss impose global ceiling (your 2813 of April 6<sup>79</sup>) or do you believe that assurances given by the Swiss to accept goods for transit only on a commercial basis, and to regularize traffic in the event of any abnormal increase, etc., are sufficient? These questions should be discussed with Swiss persistently in order that satisfactory conclusion may be reached.

Telegram has been sent to Bern asking U. S. Legation to discuss transit of apparent abnormally large quantities of pyrites, fluorspar, scrap iron (Germany to Italy), and erica scoparia with Swiss in Mixed Commission. We suggest you discuss this with MEW so that the British Legation in Bern can take parallel action if MEW agrees. [Department and FEA.]

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1844: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, July 18, 1944—midnight.

[Received July 18—11:25 p. m.]

4601. The following telegram has been sent to London:

1270. July 18, 5 p. m. (Reference MEW's Arfar 1977, June 3 to British Legation, Bern; Embassy's 162, June 9; my 1078, June 22 and MEW's 2280 July 1.)

1. Upon receipt MEW's 2280, British Minister saw Pilet-Golaz July 7 and handed him *aide-mémoire* suggesting continuance discussion between British CS, CA and Hohl. Hohl finally arranged meeting July 17.

2. Hohl started by expressing surprise that our memorandum of June 16 embodied (a) request for global restriction of all transit and (b) a request for further reductions of transit as areas cease to be under Axis control.

Hohl stated that in view of your comprehension Swiss geographical position you had agreed not press these two points and that letters exchanged confirmed this. Asked to read confirmatory letters, he gave us copies Mr. Dingle Foot's letter June 27 to Keller, Keller's letter June 29 to Foot and Foot's acknowledgment to Keller July 1. CA and CS pointed out that while Keller's letter stated he thought these two points had been settled by Swiss statements, your meetings April 5

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<sup>78</sup> For correspondence regarding trade negotiations between the United States and Sweden, see pp. 456 ff.

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.



and 14, Foot's letter July 1 requests Hohl, during discussions to take place Bern to bear in mind views not only discussions latter meetings but views and wishes expressed in your telegram June 3 (Arfar 1977). We reemphasized your position expressed last sentence Foot's letter July 1 and Arfar 2280. Hohl then admitted letters did not confirm his previous statement that these requests had been waived by you. Asked what measures Swiss had introduced for additional control during period while we awaited Hohl's meeting for us, Hohl answered that in view of unilateral Swiss declaration March 24 involving "very large" concessions and in view strong pressure from Germans with regard transit facilities through German occupied countries, Swiss were not in position impose additional control measures at this time. He reiterated throughout conversation that March 24 [23?] memorandum was unilateral Swiss declaration expressing Swiss additional effort to regulate transit in light Swiss neutrality, legality and geographical position and that this memorandum should not be regarded as "a promise".

3. Hohl then referred to specific requests transmitted in memorandum from CA and CS. (Reference paragraphs in following are to numbered paragraphs Arfar 1977.)

Regarding Paragraph 3, he said to meet this request impossible as list included about half Swiss traffic categories and that refusal transit these goods on top those already prohibited or restricted would result in practical paralysis this transit traffic and would invite German retaliation on Swiss traffic. He said that certain items, i.e. telegraphic apparatus, were already forbidden under July 1938 decree and that many other items now subject to March 24 prohibition or control. He said even were Swiss in position consider our demands, presentation as made would make control impracticable as specific tariff items not mentioned. Asked whether, if this group were broken down into specific tariff items, Swiss would be willing to consider desired control, Hohl replied that on March 24 list went long way meet your desires and that he was not empowered to make any concessions on this group. We pointed out that according Hohl's own statement, wide margin traffic still untouched. Hohl merely reiterated his statement he was not competent grant any further concessions on this group.

Paragraph 5. Hohl stated Swiss statistics showed 5 tons cotton transmitted February and 43 tons June and in view this was prepared reexamine question suspension this traffic but stated he was not empowered now assure suspension traffic.

Paragraph 5 [?]. Hohl stated sulphur transiting originated exclusively from Romagna mines refined Rimini and that Germany had since 1937 taken entire annual production of 123,000 tons whereas present transit assignments according Swiss statistics averages only 2,000 to 3,000 tons monthly.

Paragraph 6. Hohl reiterated Swiss could not accept limitation total volume traffic nor could they accede your request make appropriate reductions as areas cease to be under Axis control. Hohl endeavored argument on maltraffic mostly Northern Italy and therefore no reason for reducing global transit or imposing offset as Allied Armies take more territory. We pointed out large part transit traffic involved south Italian and Sicilian products and produce. Hohl then merely reiterated that he had no power agree your requests.

Paragraph 7. As at beginning discussions CA and CS emphasized considerable importance you attach to these questions and expressed their concern over Swiss failure to meet any of your requests. Hohl admitted only concessions he was authorized to make was reexamine transit cotton and give assurance that transit for all destinations was being thoroughly checked. He closed by stating that he was not empowered to meet our desires further than this as his status is only that of technician and that should we desire again press for these requests, approach should then be made by the American and British Ministers to Pilet-Golaz.

Repeated to Department 4601.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-1744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1944—8 p. m.

5852. It is desired by Department and FEA to make certain comments on Bern's 4601, July 18, repeated to you as 1270. (Our 5589 and A-1262, July 17<sup>81</sup>)

1. Swiss attitude is most disturbing and it is believed course of action which we should adopt should be given consideration now. It appears that Swiss reaction is not along lines we had hoped since the unsatisfactory Swiss statements on enemy use of their railways were made after the Swiss Government had received a report of Secretary Hull's convocation of the Swiss Minister.<sup>82</sup> It is strongly believed that we should be ready to consider appropriate retaliatory action now.

2. A listing campaign is considered by us to be our most effective initial weapon in achieving new ceilings on Swiss exports of arms and machinery. Our views on plans for such a campaign are discussed in detail in an accompanying telegram. If by July 31 (10 days after Mr. Eden saw the Swiss Minister) Keller has not replied favorably on the new ceilings, we believe the two Legations in Bern should immediately approach outstanding Swiss firms demanding that they sign undertakings or the next subsequent supplement to the Proclaimed and Statutory Lists will show their names. In case Swiss do not meet our demands meanwhile, discuss this urgently with MEW with a view to obtaining agreement to joint action along these lines being taken July 31.

3. We believe that Harrison and his British colleague should be instructed to make immediate representations to Pilet-Golaz covering our dissatisfaction with Swiss measures to preserve the neutrality

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<sup>81</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>82</sup> See memorandum by the Secretary of State, July 14, p. 747.

of their transit facilities under present condition, with reference to enemy use of Swiss railway facilities, provided you and MEW agree. It is believed that at least the following points should be covered by such representations:

A. We in no sense meant that we would be content with inadequate control measures when we agreed that Swiss action on enemy use of Swiss railways should be unilateral.

B. We consider adequate control measures by Swiss to involve refusal to transport all war materials (defined at least as strictly as by the Swedes), transportation of other materials of possible strategic importance at levels not in excess of normal, and at least maintenance of total enemy traffic at normal, that is, prewar levels. These points have been made clear to the Swiss repeatedly. It is also expected that they prohibit shipment of looted goods of any type from Italy and that they adjust normal traffic levels in line with liberation of Italian territory.

C. The delaying tactics the Swiss have employed in this matter are deplored particularly and we are most dissatisfied with Swiss handling of the matter. Hohl stated when discussion of transit questions took place that he was only a technician and had no authority to deal with the problem, after the discussion had been postponed until his return. This we fail to understand.

D. The Swiss should be warned in strong terms that we will be forced to consider measures at our disposal to prevent the enemy from continuing to receive undue assistance from Swiss railway facilities, if they do not act immediately to implement neutrality of their railway facilities as outlined in B above. You are authorized to request Harrison to take necessary action if you and MEW agree as to the desirability of representations in Bern along these lines. Action taken should be cabled urgently.

4. In case Swiss do not comply with our request, discuss with MEW what counter-action we should take. Withholding food quotas is not favored here. Discussions with military as to feasibility of air attacks on key points in the approaches in Germany and Italy to the two main Swiss rail routes should be considered in any case we believe. Do not discuss this with Swiss at this stage however. Repeated Bern, sent London.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/7-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 28, 1944—midnight.

[Received July 29—1:20 a. m.]

6027. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. In accordance with Department's 5852, July 26, 8 p. m. (repeated to Bern), we have concerted with MEW the desirability of representations with

respect to Swiss transit facilities. MEW is instructing your<sup>83</sup> British colleague to make immediate representations to P. Golaz in the sense of 3(A), 3(B) and 3(C) (the phrasing has been sharpened somewhat to avoid a possible subterfuge). Please carry out parallel action. MEW is also instructing its Minister to inform P. Golaz that they attach great importance to (1) immediate and satisfactory response to our letters of July 15 and (2) that they do not wish to be committed to any particular form of escape clause which the Swiss may arrange with the Germans, but must be satisfied that the clause does in fact meet the conditions of our letter. We have no instructions on this point but you will possibly wish to associate yourself with your British colleague in the above sense.

2. MEW did not feel authorized to make representations in terms of 3(D) without approval of United States 15th Air Force and the Air Ministry in as much as such a warning might coincide inadvertently with a planned action, in which case strong security objections would prevail. Paragraph 4 of reference telegram is being discussed with Air Ministry.

3. Information received from Bern subsequent to sending of reference telegram indicates that Swiss are preparing to accept our proposals. Therefore, subject matter of paragraphs 1 and 2 of reference telegram are less acute. MEW agrees that in event Swiss do not meet our proposals sanctions should be considered. They also favor resort to the listing sanction in preference to the withholding of supplies, particularly in view of current relief and refugee problems. They do not agree, however, to immediate approaches to Swiss firms as suggested in reference telegram. They feel such immediate approaches might be construed as breach on our part of December agreement. Instead they would favor informing Swiss Government that (1) failure to implement escape clause of December agreement and/or (2) failure to agree on new and lower ceilings for latter half of 1944 had restored to us our freedom of action with respect to our commitments under the agreement, particularly our commitment not in general to approach Swiss firms in the metallurgical industries for undertakings. They feel that the announcement of this threat to the Swiss Government would produce the desired result. In view of rapidly changing circumstances at the present time they do no [apparent omission] irrevocably and automatically to implementation of this threat.

Above message sent to Bern as 229, July 28, midnight. Following sent to Washington only;

4. The above summarizes MEW's present position. We have not yet received accompanying telegram on tactics to be employed referred to in paragraph 2 of reference telegram.

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<sup>83</sup> Reference is to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison).

5. With respect to [apparent omission] in paragraph 3(D) of reference telegram to the effect that total enemy traffic should not exceed pre-war levels, MEW, in interest of speedy representations, have accepted wording suggested by you. They point out, however, that coal constitutes by far the largest volume of this traffic and that the Germans may again, as during a short period following the Italian armistice in 1943, drastically restrict coal deliveries to Italy. In such an event a total overall ceiling in terms of pre-war volume would defeat our ends. They would prefer, therefore, that the demand be redrafted to read "the limitation of total enemy traffic (other than coal) to prewar level". [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1944—7 p. m.

2642. Department desires that you associate yourself with your British colleague as regards escape clause (London's telegram to Bern 229, July 28, midnight, repeated to Department as 6027, July 28, midnight).

London's telegram to the Department also refers in numbered paragraph 5 to paragraph 3(d) of Department's 5852, July 26, 8 p. m. to London repeated to Bern as no. 2559, and points out that coal constitutes by far the largest volume of enemy traffic and that the Germans may again as during a short period following the Italian armistice in 1943, drastically restrict coal deliveries to Italy. In such an event, a total over-all ceiling in terms of prewar volume would defeat our ends. MEW would prefer, therefore, that the demand be redrafted to read "A limitation of total enemy traffic (other than coal) to prewar level". Department and FEA approve MEW's suggestion.

Sent to Bern, repeated to London as Department's no. 6068.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 1, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 1—7 p. m.]

6134. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. At meeting last night (Embassy's 6096, July 31<sup>84</sup>) Keller accepted terms of our letter of July 15 (Embassy's 5624, July 15).<sup>85</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Not printed.

<sup>85</sup> See footnote 77, p. 747.

In meeting our demand for an "escape clause" he stated that Swiss were now in a position to cancel their obligations under recent Swiss-German agreement on 4 weeks' notice.

The Swiss reply bettered ceilings previously offered in two respects: M-6 ceiling for woodworking machinery is now reduced to 603,000 Swiss francs representing a reduction of one million Swiss francs under previous offer; item 1083/84 small arms ammunition is now reduced to 2,665,000 francs equal to 5% of 1942 for the last half of 1944 (instead of 10% as previously offered).

Delegation expressed extreme disappointment at our attitude regarding quotas for industrial raw materials. They referred to reductions in ceilings which they were making at our request and taken with respect to trade with Japan and transit through Switzerland and plead very earnestly that in consideration of all they had done we would permit them to export three of locomotives now and let them lift 3,000 tons of cotton and 1,000 tons of wool from Swiss-owned sources overseas.

Three locomotives referred to are three which have been completed and for which Swiss had previously asked permission to export during first half of 1944. If they were permitted to take cotton and wool they promised to introduce their previously offered restrictions on export of textiles and were willing to store these commodities at Lisbon pending our agreement to the opening of facilities for on carriage to Switzerland.

They agreed to credit these commodities against what we owed under Compensation Agreement. They stated that 6 additional *tranches* under Compensation Agreement are now available to United States Command [*and?*] indicated that they no longer expected scarce materials in return for anything which we might order under this agreement. (British are again inclined to attach considerable importance to Compensation Agreement because of renewed pressure from supply people who had recently expressed indifference.)

We questioned Keller on subject of gold clause. He stated that Swiss could not accept our gold clause but that Swiss National Bank would not accept gold from Germany unless Reichsbank assured them that gold offered was in fact gold.

We again impressed upon Keller desirability of establishing an air service from Switzerland and suggested that they could not now found on international law any objection to flights over Italy with agreement of Bonomi<sup>86</sup> government with respect our second letter of July 15 (Embassy's 5624, July 15). Delegation agreed in principle with position which we took and hoped shortly to give us satisfactory specific assurances to prevent export of substitutes for ball bearings.

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<sup>86</sup> Ivanoe Bonomi, Italian Prime Minister.

Technical side of this question is being investigated in Bern and Keller expects further information shortly.

We emphasized importance of transit representations which are being made in Bern and promised Swiss that we would give our reply to their proposals here as soon as possible.

This message was sent to Bern as Embassy's 234, August 1, 8 p. m. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-144: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1944—10 p. m.

6095. Department and FEA are glad to hear Keller has accepted terms of your letter of July 15th. Your 5624, 15th,<sup>88</sup> gave the text of two letters to Keller. We presume your 6134, August 1st, 8 p. m. refers to first letter. Did Keller reply to second letter and if so what was the nature of the reply?

We do not understand Swiss delegation's reference to reductions in ceilings with regard to trade with Japan and transit through Switzerland, and would like to know specifically to what they refer. From our point of view, the transit situation is by no means satisfactory. Department's telegrams 5852, July 26, 8 p. m., and 5960, July 29, 1 p. m.<sup>89</sup> If you are not of same opinion, please inform Department on what you base your conclusions.

We are not willing to permit Swiss to export three locomotives before the end of September, since, for your confidential information, with the rapidly changing military situation we will probably wish, prior to the end of September, to request the Swiss to reduce drastically or even embargo shipment of war commodities including locomotives to Germany (our 2398, July 13, 5 p. m. to Bern repeated to London as Department's 5499). Are you completely satisfied as regards the type and price of these locomotives? How do Swiss justify the high price named for the shunting engines?

Escape clause as described in 1 (b) of Bern's telegram to London 1352, August 1, 8 p. m. repeated by Bern to Department as 4952,<sup>88</sup> appears inadequate and unsatisfactory to us. You are requested to remind Keller in this connection of representations made in Bern in accordance with our 2398 to Bern. (To Legation Bern: You are

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<sup>88</sup> Not printed.

<sup>89</sup> Latter not printed.

also requested to remind Minister of Foreign Affairs of above-mentioned representations.)

Swiss request to let them lift 3,000 tons of cotton and 1,000 tons of wool from sources overseas will be studied. We would like information as to what these overseas sources are.

Sent to London, repeated to Bern.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 5, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 5—6 : 50 p. m.]

6285. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. Reference your 6095, August 2.

1. Keller replied orally to second letter in the sense stated in Embassy's 6134 of August 1. At a meeting yesterday he said controls are being instituted in Bern to prevent export of substitutes for ball and roller bearings. We are still waiving a definitive letter.

2. The "ceiling sun [*sum*]" referred to in second paragraph of the telegram referred to the export ceilings for items on Annex I. The Swiss have taken unilateral action to control exports to Japan and transit through Switzerland. Keller stated that exports to Japan had fallen to a value of 1000 pounds for May 1944. Subject is discussed in Emb's despatch 14924 of April 7, telegrams 2813, April 6 and 3140 April 17.<sup>90</sup> Transit through Switzerland is being taken up further in Bern. The point made by Keller with respect to both of these subjects was that the Swiss unilaterally had taken action in the direction we desire without asking for a specific *quid pro quo* and that they hoped their unilateral action would have some effect on our attitude toward Switzerland.

3. The information on type of locomotive was sent you in Embstel 2286, March 21.<sup>91</sup> In explaining the high price of 125,000 Swiss francs per locomotive, Keller stated that even in normal times the cost of locomotives in Switzerland was considerably higher than in the United Kingdom and that prices had advanced 80 to 100% since the war.

4. At the meeting yesterday Keller orally explained that the 4 weeks' notice was a maximum and that the Swiss might be able to effect changes in their trade agreement with Germany in less than 4 weeks. He also stated that in the event of a major development, such as the total dislocation of the German economy, the Swiss could suspend all

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<sup>90</sup> None printed.

<sup>91</sup> Not printed.



exports immediately basing their action on the *rebus sic stantibus* principle. We made it clear that we could not be bound by any term in the Swiss-German agreement.

5. Embassy's despatch 15475 of May 6<sup>92</sup> gives you a list of Swiss overseas stocks. The Swiss own considerably more cotton and wool overseas than they are now requesting and Keller stated that we could determine which stocks we would prefer the Swiss to take. [Riefler and Lovitt.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War (Blockade)/8-1544

*Professor Paul Keller of the Swiss Delegation to Lord Selborne, British Minister of Economic Warfare, and Mr. W. W. Riefler of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom*<sup>93</sup>

LONDON, August 14, 1944.

DEAR LORD SELBORNE AND MR. RIEFLER: With reference to our negotiations regarding the Anglo-American-Swiss Agreement of December 19th, 1943, I attach a Schedule<sup>92</sup> of export ceilings for the second half of 1944 to replace Annex I of that Agreement.

It is agreed that clauses 7 and 8 of the Agreement of December 19th shall be modified as follows:

Clause 7. "The Swiss Government will control the grant of export licences so as to prevent an abnormal concentration upon any particular article of manufacture".

Clause 8. (b) 1, Repair Trade. "For tariff items covered by Annex I, to one half of the value of these exports in 1942".

I shall be glad if you will confirm that the above states correctly the outcome of our negotiations.

Yours sincerely,

P. KELLER

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 14, 1944.

[Received August 15—6:30 a. m.]

6532. For Department and FEA from Riefler and Lovitt. Following is the text of letter B to Professor Keller:

"We acknowledge receipt of your letter of today's date. On behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United

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<sup>92</sup> Not printed.

<sup>93</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 17486, August 15, from London; received August 22.

States Government we confirm that the outcome of our negotiations to date regarding the Anglo-American-Swiss agreement of December 1943 has been correctly stated by you.”

Following is the text of letter C to Professor Keller :

“With reference to our letter of today’s date on the subject of the Anglo-American-Swiss Agreement of December 1943 we wish to make it clear that in view of the rapidly changing military situation we reserve the right to call upon the Swiss Government at any time from now onwards for further reductions in or complete embargo on certain of all Swiss exports to the Axis.”

Following is the text of letter D to Lord Selborne and Mr. Riefler from Professor Keller :

“In reply to your letter of July 15th we are in a position to confirm that measures have already been taken by the Swiss Government to ensure that the advantages which His Majesty’s and the United States Governments derive from the ceiling on exports of ball and roller bearings will not be diminished by exports of other articles replacing such export. The competent technical services have received instructions to exercise a special control on applications covering such exports.”

Following is letter E to Professor Keller from Mr. Riefler with respect to gold policy :

“During our negotiations you stated that Swiss exports to Germany were paid for by imports of goods from Germany through the operation of the clearing and that a check of export licences against clearing figures shows that in any practical sense gold was not accepted in payment for these exports.

“We asked you for an assurance that this condition would continue in the future but you stated that you were uninstructed.

“It is presumably in the interests of Switzerland to take payment in goods rather than gold. However our Governments request that you give us a clear statement that no gold will be accepted as payment for Swiss goods exported to Germany.

“You expressed a willingness to take this matter up with your Government upon your return to Bern and we would appreciate it if such an assurance could be given in writing to our respective Missions.”<sup>94</sup>

Following is the text of British announcement to the press to be published Wednesday :<sup>95</sup>

“In view of the measures already taken by the Swiss Government to reduce Swiss exports to the Axis particularly exports of war material His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government have informed the Swiss Government that current import facilities through the blockade shall continue.”

<sup>94</sup> Letters exchanged on August 14, 1944, constituted a formal continuance of the agreement of December 19, 1943.

<sup>96</sup> August 16.

Following is text of the Swiss announcement to press:

"Trade discussions which took place in London during the last months between representatives of the British, American and Swiss Governments have led to an agreement which allows Switzerland to continue her imports of foodstuffs, fodder and fatty matters from overseas. The agreement has been signed by Lord Selborne on behalf of the British Government, by Minister W. Riefler for the United States Government and by Professor P. Keller for the Swiss Government on August 14th, 1944.["]

[Riefler and Lovitt]  
WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2144: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*<sup>96</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1944—9 p. m.

2876. Military developments will soon justify our making a formal demand, jointly with the British, that the Swiss suspend all exports to the enemy and prohibit all enemy transit traffic through Switzerland. We assume that in view of our reservation of rights in the London negotiations and the subsequent Allied landings in southern France<sup>97</sup> the Swiss expect, and are prepared at least partially to meet, such a demand. We feel, however, that it would be preferable if the Swiss Government came forward and, frankly recognizing an obvious situation, forestalled by voluntary and independent action the demands we have indicated we shall make. Action by the Swiss now to suspend within the framework of their agreements with the Germans all exports to enemy and enemy-occupied territory and prohibiting enemy transit traffic would make an excellent impression not only in official circles here but also in American public opinion. Swiss public opinion, we feel, would also support such a voluntary move. Its effect, if made immediately, on post-armistice and post-war economic negotiations would doubtless be more favorable to the Swiss than their grudging assent under pressure to demands of which they have been already forewarned.

Unless you or the Embassy at London to whom this is being repeated perceive any objection, the Department will authorize you and, at your discretion, your staff to take every opportunity in-

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<sup>96</sup> Repeated to London, with the addition of the following final paragraph, as telegram 6665: "Please discuss immediately with the appropriate British officials and cable the Department, repeating to Bern, the British reaction to (1) their associating themselves with a formal demand in the very near future, at latest when our forces reach the Franco-Swiss border and (2) their associating themselves with immediate informal *démarches* as outlined above. In view of the urgency of the matter we hope to instruct Bern to proceed with the informal approach this week."

<sup>97</sup> August 15, 1944.

formally to present to Pilet-Golaz and other appropriate Swiss officials the trend of our thinking here. Time is of the essence and we are asking the British to authorize their Minister in Bern to make parallel informal *démarches*. You may wish to illustrate how the rapid extension of the Allied front in southern France foreshadows the collapse of German military control of that area and in consequence of Germany's blockade of Switzerland. You should keep alive in the degree you judge most telling the Secretary's remarks to Bruggmann of July 14<sup>98</sup> and our whole attitude as already known to you toward further aid by Switzerland to our enemies.

If the Swiss ask whether we would be willing to assume an obligation to replace supplies now obtained from Germany, you may reply that upon complete cessation of Swiss exports to Germany and German transit traffic through Switzerland we will be glad to enter into immediate negotiations with the Swiss for an agreement regarding the supply of goods, the purchase of Swiss products by the United Nations and other economic questions. You should emphasize that the ability of the Germans to supply and deliver goods to Switzerland may be expected to deteriorate increasingly in the immediate future.

Please cable urgently your comments repeating them to London.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 24, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received August 24—7:30 p. m.]

6870. From Riefler. The Department's telegram to London No. 6665, August 21<sup>99</sup> was taken up both with Foreign Office and MEW. Foot of MEW has just informed me that British are prepared to go along with our informal approach to Swiss on the lines of reference telegram. They are also prepared to follow up the informal approach if unsuccessful with formal demands provided these demands are not of such a nature as to force Swiss breaking off political and diplomatic relations with Germany or endangering its position as protecting power. They feel, therefore, that we should be willing to accept if necessary, something less than complete stoppage of all Swiss exports (including low priority exports) to the Axis. They have shown me their telegram instructing British Minister in Bern to join his American colleague in initiating immediately the informal

<sup>98</sup> See memorandum by the Secretary of State, July 14, p. 747.

<sup>99</sup> See footnote 96, p. 760.

approach. This telegram is being repeated to Washington with instructions to show it to Department and FEA.

Repeated Bern as 272. [Riefler.]

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/10762: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, August 26, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received August 27—2: 17 a. m.]

5610. 1. On August 24 I called again upon Pilet-Golaz who handed me *aide-mémoire* in reply my memorandum July 31.

2. Reply said Swiss had not and would not authorize transit war materials and Swiss had gone further in prohibiting transit other goods, for instance liquid fuels which although not defined in international law as war materials were of great utility in war operations.

3. Swiss say they have limited transit other goods "having certain importance in conduct of war" to amounts conforming need and activities civilian populations. Reference my 5368 (1461 to London) August 18.<sup>1</sup>

4. Switzerland has not restricted traffic to "prewar normal currents" because conditions have changed radically from prewar period "rendering therefore a useful comparison between present and prewar traffic uncertain or impossible"; for this reason Switzerland has chosen make distinction between civilian and military traffic.

5. *Aide-mémoire* states control measures must needs be reconsidered and modified with changing situation and it has always been Switzerland's own intention to make changes; a change now under consideration will be made known to Legation in due course.

6. Reply adds transit of products "irregularly acquired" subject to increasing severe regulations while distinction between used and new products not hard and fast ("intangible") and "must not be obstacle to reinforced controls if necessary". (N. B. March 24 memorandum handed British Minister by Pilet-Golaz stated in part "in general requisitioned goods in particular used articles forbidden transit".)

7. *Aide-mémoire* concludes, "It goes without saying that the war as it nears the Alps changes aspect of transit problem and has a bearing upon its solution. For this reason federal authorities keep this problem under constant and careful watch. They have thus been able to observe that traffic in both directions has in general decreased and not increased since spring. In spirit of true neutrality which guides

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

them they will see to it that it follows the trend circumstances demand".

Comments will follow.

Repeated to London 1532.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*<sup>2</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944—midnight.

2958. In view of London's 272, August 24, to you,<sup>3</sup> you are authorized in the absence of serious objections on your part to proceed in concert with your British colleague to the informal *démarche* outlined in the Department's 2876 (repeated to London as Department's 6665.)

The phrase "within the framework of their agreements with the Germans" in the fourth sentence of our cable should not be interpreted too literally. We do not wish to furnish the Swiss with excuses for evading our demands. We sincerely hope that they will find, in their own interest and in their own way, a formula for meeting them.

Please report fully on the reactions you receive from Swiss officials. These reactions will prove useful in shaping our formal demands if the present *démarche* proves unproductive.

HULL

740.00112 European War 1939/8-3144 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, August 31, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received September 1—9 a. m.]

5710. After receipt your 2958 August 26 I asked for appointment. Mr. Pilet received me this morning and I made informal *démarche* outlined your 2876. My British colleague with whom I had concerted action had previously seen Mr. Pilet.

Mr. Pilet told me that he had spoken to President Stampfli and that question of exports to Axis would be taken up at meeting of Federal Council next Tuesday.<sup>4</sup> He had also spoken to Dr. Hotz. Mr. Pilet gave me to understand that he will urge on his colleagues impression [*importance?*] of taking prompt advantage of recent developments to give notice to Germans under escape clause. I therefore suggest that the outcome Tuesday be awaited.

<sup>2</sup> Repeated to London as telegram 6864.

<sup>3</sup> Same as telegram 6870 from London, p. 761.

<sup>4</sup> September 5.

During our conversation Mr. Pilet urged that it would strengthen his hand and also be convincing evidence of ineffectiveness of counter blockade if passage via France by truck for Swiss products of small bulk such as watches and precision instruments could now be permitted. My recommendation will depend upon Tuesday's decision.

As regards transit traffic Mr. Pilet told me that details re proposed additional controls would be given by Mr. Hotz to CA and CS.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 2, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:08 p. m.]

7200. The formal reply containing the British reaction to the points raised in Department's 6665 of August 21<sup>5</sup> has just reached me by letter from Mr. Eden. I realize this information has already reached you via the British Embassy in Washington, but am forwarding it to complete the record:

"I write to thank you for your letter of the 23rd August in which you enclosed a message from Mr. Secretary Hull to the American Minister at Bern<sup>6</sup> about the early resumption of trade discussions with the Swiss Government in view of the rapidly changing military situation.

Subject to an important reservation, with which I will deal below, we agree with the U.S. Government that a formal joint Anglo-American demand for the suspension of all Swiss exports to the enemy and prohibition of all enemy transit traffic through Switzerland will soon be justified by military developments. We also agree that informal approaches, as outlined in Mr. Hull's telegram to the U.S. Minister at Bern, should jointly be made forthwith to the Swiss Government.

The reservation to which I referred above is this. We attach very high importance to avoiding forcing the Swiss to take action which would result in a rupture of Swiss diplomatic relations with Germany. This would necessarily mean that Switzerland would cease to act as protecting power at a moment when this may be more necessary than ever before. After the recent murder of our airmen in Germany we are genuinely alarmed at the possibility that at the last moment before total defeat the Gestapo might run amok and commit wholesale murder of British and American prisoners of war. Obviously this is more likely to happen if the restraining influence of the protecting power is removed.

Accordingly, while we agree that we should ask for a complete cessation of exports to Axis territory we, for our part, should be prepared to accept an arrangement similar to our proposals of 9th [11th?]

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 96, p. 760.

<sup>6</sup> See telegram 2876, August 21, 9 p. m., to Bern, p. 760.

May last,<sup>7</sup> i.e. complete prohibition of export of high priority goods, drastic reduction of other exports and cessation of transit traffic in return for raw materials.

A telegram on the lines of this letter has been despatched to His Majesty's Minister at Bern and he has been instructed to concert with the American Minister an immediate informal approach to the Swiss Government on the lines suggested by Mr. Secretary Hull."

WINANT

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*<sup>8</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1944—9 p. m.

3065. It would appear that whereas we presented them together the Swiss are separating the questions of prohibiting exports to Germany and of enemy transit traffic, relegating the latter to a lower level. Hohl's remarks as reported in your 5759, September 2<sup>9</sup> are not only unsatisfactory as to content but reveal an obsolete approach to the problem. We realize that Hohl is a technical man and incompetent to pass on the broader political aspects involved. Please make it clear to Pilet-Golaz that the two questions are of equal importance to us and that we expect them to be considered on the same high level.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-544 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 5, 1944—11 p. m.  
[Received September 6—3:11 a. m.]

5856. Refmytel 5710, August 31. At his request I called upon Mr. Pilet this afternoon. He informed me that at this morning's meeting of the Federal Council the decision was taken in principle to give notice to German Government under escape clause of latest Swiss-German agreement. Formal notice of the action taken would be communicated to CA and CS at a meeting of Mixed Commission and Germans notified shortly. Extent of transfer guarantees which may be accorded after September 30 would depend upon revised agreement about to be negotiated. However, notification would not

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<sup>7</sup> Presumably reference is to proposals reported in telegram 3854, May 11, from London, p. 719.

<sup>8</sup> Repeated to London as telegram 7198, with the following opening paragraph: "Following is Department's to Bern in reply to latter's report of conversation between Hohl and British and American Commercial Attachés on transit question."

<sup>9</sup> Not printed; Hohl refused to restrict transit traffic from Italy to Germany to the satisfaction of the United States, stating that Switzerland must remain on as good terms with Germany as with the United States (740.00112 European War 1939/9-244).



be given to Swiss manufacturers prior to the deadline September 15 of any guarantee for their exports for month of October.

Shall report further details after meeting of Mixed Commission which has not yet been fixed by Hotz. Should greatly appreciate any indications you may care to give with regard to stoppage and reductions in exports which you think would be useful as guidance to CA at that meeting. Otherwise he will press for complete stoppage of items in group 1 of Annex I and severe reductions in remaining items.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1944—11 p. m.

7263. Department, FEA and British Embassy representative believe that decision taken in principle by Federal Council to give notice to German Government under escape clause of latest Swiss-German Agreement is not sufficiently effective (Bern's 5856, September 5, 11 p. m. to Department, repeated to London, number unknown). The escape clause (see Bern's 1352, August 1, 8 p. m. to London<sup>10</sup>) provides for a maximum period of 28 days for negotiation of a new agreement between the Swiss and Germans. The rapidity of military developments do not, we believe, justify our permitting Swiss exports to the Axis and transit traffic to remain at the present level for even 28 days or more. Moreover, instructions to CA and CS regarding stoppage and reductions in exports (in order that they might take the matter up at Mixed Commission) would bring whole discussion down to lower levels which would not impress the Swiss with the importance we attach to this matter. We therefore believe that formal *démarche* should be made at once along the lines of our immediately following telegram,<sup>11</sup> which is a redraft of MEW's Arfar no. 2052, September 2, to the British Embassy, Washington, repeated to British Legation at Bern. The redraft of paragraph 1 was agreed upon yesterday at a meeting attended by British Embassy, FEA, and Department representatives and reflects our thinking in Washington in light of Federal Council's decision.

With reference to redraft should the Swiss inquire what economic assistance is considered of immediate benefit to the enemy, it is our thought that Ministers in Bern should inform the Swiss that the

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> *Infra*.

export of the following items constitute such assistance and represent our minimum demands:

(Following lists number of tariff item and description.)

*Group 1.*

811/813 ~~X~~, arms and parts thereof; 1083/1084 ~~X~~, small arms' ammunition; 809a 1 ~~X~~, ball and roller bearings and parts, of one kg. and over; 809 2 ~~X~~, ball and roller bearings and parts, of 250 gr. to one kg.; 809 3 ~~X~~, ball and roller bearings and parts, of less than 250 gr.; 914h ~~X~~, aeroplanes and parts; ex 948a ~~X~~, fuses; 954a ~~X~~, radio equipment.

*Group 4.*

882e/h, steam and petrol locomotives; M5, gas and petrol driven motors; 914a/d, automobiles and tractors, chassis and parts; 954, telegraph and telephone apparatus.

*Group 5.*

M5, gas and petrol driven motors.

With regard to transit traffic the Ministers are authorized to inform the Swiss that our minimum present request is the cessation of all northward traffic and the cessation of southward traffic other than that necessary to preserve north Italian economy at a reasonable level.

The Federal Council has clearly rejected our total demands made in the informal *démarche*. A reiteration of total demands without giving authority to Ministers in Bern to inform the Swiss along the lines of the above paragraphs would, we feel, be a waste of time by raising the neutrality question and would receive a reply similar to that given to the informal *démarche*. On the other hand, the stepping down of our demands from 100 percent stoppage of exports and transit traffic might result in a more favorable reply and we would be asking for what is most important to us and what we feel the Swiss may be prepared to give. If this plan is adopted, our Ministers should make it clear to the Swiss that our minimum present demands are emphatic and that we desire an immediate reply.

If, however, you and the British consider it better tactics to make use of the phraseology used in paragraph 1 of Arfar's no. 2052, September 2, and to withhold authorization from our Ministers at Bern to make known our minimum demands regarding exports and traffic to the Swiss, you are authorized to instruct Bern accordingly. We must insist, however, on the changes outlined in the new draft in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Arfar telegram as we are not yet prepared to make the commitments outlined therein. A further telegram on this subject will follow shortly.

In presenting the note to the Swiss Foreign Office, it is believed that it would be very helpful if the American and British Ministers should emphasize Keller's statement at a meeting during the recent London negotiations on or about August 4 that "in the event of a major devel-

opment such as the total dislocation of the German economy, the Swiss would suspend all exports immediately, basing their action on the *rebus sic stantibus* principle" (paragraph 4, your 6285, August 5, 8 p. m. to Department.) The Ministers should also emphasize the reservation made by H.M.G. and the U.S.G. in a letter of August 14, 1944<sup>12</sup> to Professor Keller stating that, "with reference to our letter of today's date, on the subject of the Anglo-American-Swiss Agreement of December 19, 1943, we wish to make it clear that in view of the rapidly changing military situation, we reserve the right to call upon the Swiss Government at any time from now onwards for further reductions, or complete embargo on certain or all Swiss exports to the Axis".

Please discuss immediately with British authorities and report fully, repeating appropriate telegrams to Bern including the final text if agreed to in London.

Sent to London, repeated to Bern as Department's 3095.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1944—midnight.

7264. The following is the text of the note to be presented to the Swiss as discussed in our immediately preceding telegram:<sup>13</sup>

1. The rapid changes during recent weeks in the military situation, whereby Allied forces have reached the Swiss border and Germany's blockade of Switzerland has been raised, have radically altered the economic position of Switzerland. H.M.G. and the U.S.G. feel that in these new circumstances they are justified in asking for a change in Switzerland's economic policy towards the enemies of the United Nations. They note the decision of the Swiss Federal Council to give notice to the German Government under the escape clause of the latest Swiss-German trade agreement. However, they feel impelled to request the Swiss Government to prohibit at once all economic assistance to the United Nations' enemies of immediate benefit to the latter's war effort, including exports and transit traffic. In the light of the letter addressed to Professor Keller on August 14, they do not think this request will come as a surprise to the Swiss Government.

2. H.M.G. and U.S.G. realize that cessation forthwith of such trade with the enemy countries will cause certain difficulties to Swiss internal economy and, having regard also to traditional amicable relations which they have always enjoyed with the Swiss and to their

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<sup>12</sup> See telegram 6532, August 14, from London, p. 758.

<sup>13</sup> *Supra*.

warm appreciation of humanitarian and other valuable services rendered by the Swiss Government and people during the course of the present war, they are anxious to assist in mitigating those difficulties. With this object, they will be prepared to maintain Swiss food and fodder imports as fixed in the Agreement of December, 1943 up to the end of 1944 and to discuss with the Swiss Government Swiss requirements for additional supplies, following Swiss compliance with the requests outlined in paragraph 1.

3. Finally, the two Governments will be prepared, if the Swiss Government desires, to enter into discussions at an appropriate moment with the object of Swiss productive capacity being employed for the supply and rehabilitation of Europe."

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/9-944: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 9, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 7:38 p. m.]

5967. Department's 3065, September 5. I took opportunity during my visit to Mr. Pilet-Golaz on September 8 to impress upon him that we look upon the two questions of enemy transit traffic and exports to Germany as of equal importance and that we expect consideration on same high level to be given to both questions. To emphasize our dissatisfaction with the limited measures so far taken by Swiss Government to control this traffic despite our specific requests for drastic action and our unofficial suggestion that Swiss might prohibit all enemy traffic I handed Mr. P. G. an *aide-mémoire* dated September 8 which in general followed the line of comments transmitted in my 5812 (1583 to London) September 4.<sup>14</sup> The summary paragraph of my note reads as follows:

"In résumé the Legation desires to point out that although the further control measures instituted September 1 have met to a minor extent Legation's preliminary suggestion for control outlined in its memorandum of June 16, 1944 these measures and *aide-mémoire* of Federal Political Department of August 24 have failed to give assurances on several points raised in Legation's memorandum of June 16 and in all but one of the points raised in Legation's *aide-mémoire* of July 31. Furthermore Legation can only regret that principle of control enunciated in *aide-mémoire* of August 24, 1944 from Federal Political Department to effect that transit of goods is being limited to products for civilian consumption has not yet been implemented as can be readily observed from the types of products of which transit between Germany and Italy in both directions is still permitted."

I stated that I was pleased to learn that Hohl had orally assured CA that transit of chlorine had been stopped from September 1, but

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<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

reemphasized our concern over continued excess transit for iron and steel, continued transit for nonferrous metals although prohibited, and in general continued unsatisfactory high level of transit both ways for material of strategic importance. P.-G. said that as chlorine is not on recognized list of war materials, transit of this material had for some time escaped Swiss control but as soon as he learned of its passage he himself had ordered embargo on chlorine and that this item has been added to August 31 amended list (transmitted my 5759—1568 to London September 2<sup>16</sup>) P.-G. said he was glad to report that Swiss figures show reduction in south-north traffic to 45,000 tons in August from slightly over 50,000 in July. Latter checks with our total of 51,473 tons; Legation's data for first 20 days August shows traffic approximately 32,000 tons. P. G. informed me German Minister had protested against new quotas imposed September 1 but that he had refused to consider this.

P.-G. closed by saying he considered this problem would solve itself shortly and possibly within next 2 weeks.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/9—1944: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:17 p. m.]

6206. Department's 3220, September 17.<sup>16</sup> After concerting action with my British colleague I handed Mr. Pilet-Golaz last evening (September 18) formal note as directed London Embassy's 315, September 16 and *aide-mémoire* identical with one handed also to him by my British colleague. *Aide-mémoire* defined minimum demands regarding cessation of exports in accordance with paragraph 2 of your 3095, September 8 [7]<sup>17</sup> and held out possibility of release of Swiss owned stocks in United States in accordance paragraph 5 Embassy's 314, September 16. I also made oral statements along lines paragraph 6 Embassy's 314.

Mr. Pilet informed me that our requests would be discussed at meeting today of sub-committee of Federal Council including President, Mr. Nobs and himself with a number of other interested Swiss officials and that next meeting of Federal Council would take place Friday<sup>18</sup> after which he hoped to be able to give me an answer. Mr. Pilet indicated that speaking for himself 5-day period presented

<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

<sup>17</sup> Same as telegram 7263, p. 766.

<sup>18</sup> September 22.

difficulty. He also informed me that Schnurre was expected today. Shall report developments soon as possible.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/9—2944 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, September 29, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received September 30—9:22 a. m.]

6491. There is given below text of note handed to me on evening of September 28 by Mr. Pilet. (My 6467—London 1807, September 28.<sup>19</sup>) Mr. Pilet stated that this note represents Swiss reply to that part of note and *aide-mémoire* I handed him on September 18 (Legation's 6206, London 1734, September 19) concerning exports to Axis territory. He stated *aide-mémoire* transmitted to me on September 27<sup>20</sup> concerning transit traffic constituted Swiss reply to our demands on this point; Swiss reply on transit traffic question transmitted in separate telegram.

Text of Swiss note of September 28 is as follows:

"The Federal Political Department refers to the note and *aide-mémoire* transmitted by His Excellency Mr. Leland Harrison on September 18, 1944.

In order to confirm and define the first oral indications given on September 23, Political Department has the honor to make known to the Legation of the United States of America the following:

[I] A. As of October 1, 1944, export of goods under the following positions of the Swiss customs tariff is prohibited: 811/13 arms and parts thereof; 1082/84 explosives and ammunition; 809A1/A3 ball and roller bearings and parts; 914 H aeroplanes and parts; EX 954 A radio apparatus and parts except finished radio receiving sets destined for civilian use; 954 telegraph and telephone apparatus and parts.

B. In conformity with the obligations incumbent upon Switzerland as a neutral state under the terms of article IX of the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907,<sup>21</sup> concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in case of war on land, the prohibition of export of goods cited under I A will affect all belligerent states.

C. Export to Axis countries of steam and petrol driven locomotives under tariff rubric 883 A will also be prohibited. However, the Swiss Government considers that the special single quota of 1,651,000 francs export to Germany of 13 shunting engines granted to Switzerland according to Annex I of the arrangements of August 14, 1944 remains in force.

<sup>19</sup> Not printed.

<sup>20</sup> For summary of September 27 memorandum, see telegram 6546, October 1, 2 p. m., from Bern, *infra*.

<sup>21</sup> For text of Convention V regarding rights and duties of neutral powers, see *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. II, p. 1216.

D. In order to maintain the balance of clearing in economic relations between Switzerland and Germany, the Swiss Government envisages still other modifications in the compensation traffic with that country which modifications because of the effect that new transfer quotas bearing guarantee of the license will not be fixed until further notice. Among other consequences the order resulted in a considerable decrease in exports of goods under the tariff positions mentioned in *aide-mémoire* of September 18, 1944 and which positions are not listed under I A above.

II A. The Swiss Government takes note of the statement that the Government of the United States is ready to assure until the year 1944 importation into Switzerland of the goods cited under Annex II to the agreement of December 19, 1943.

B. Under the terms of the *aide-mémoire* accompanying the note of September 18, 1944, the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government declare that they are prepared to permit shipment to Switzerland of Swiss stocks at present in storage in the United States. Basing itself on this declaration, the Swiss Government desires to express the firm hope that in relation to the new export prohibitions which it is going to decree the two Governments will take into account imports which it desires to effect as set forth in the attached list.

The Swiss Government assumes that the two lists of merchandise communicated on April 20, 1944 and referred to in paragraph 2 of the *aide-mémoire* of September 18th are cited merely as examples and that the sense of the offer of the two Governments is to liberate the stocks of Swiss goods existing overseas. The attached lists asking about importations which it desires to effect also include therefore merchandise which without being included in one of the lists submitted on April 20, 1944 to London were either previously communicated (skins and hides 400) or which has not yet been communicated. In any case only merchandise of Swiss ownership greatly reduced by the requisitions enforced [apparent omission] years is involved.

C. The Swiss Government regrets that the Government of the United States and the Government of His Majesty have considered it necessary to abstain for the moment from including in the *aide-mémoire* of September 18, 1944, importation of Swiss army stocks of mineral oil. In the course of negotiations in London, Swiss delegation already had occasion to present seriousness in the supply situation of mineral oil and derivatives of coal and mineral oil which addition of have been assured to Switzerland by importations of Axis origin.

D. The Swiss Government declares that the raw materials or half-finished products which will be brought into Switzerland in consequence of present exchange of notes will not be utilized for reexportation to Axis countries. This declaration applies equally to the 3000 tons of cotton and the 1000 tons of washed wool the shipment of which to Lisbon was authorized August 14, 1944 at London; the Swiss Government expresses the hope that there is no further obstacle to the entrance of this merchandise into Switzerland.

E. In view of the prohibitions of exports described under paragraph I and aside from the Swiss stocks existing overseas, the Swiss Government considers as understood that acceptance will be given to the Swiss import demands presented in the course of the negotiations at

London in 1944. It is ready to enter upon new negotiations on this subject with the Government of the United States and with the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

III. The Swiss Government is ready to negotiate with the Government of the United States of America and the Government of His Britannic Majesty concerning the questions raised under paragraph 3 of the note of September 18, 1944 relative to the participation of Switzerland in the work of reconstruction.

IV. The Swiss Government desires as soon as possible clarification as to what extent the terms of the agreements of April 24, 1940 and of December 19, 1943 between Switzerland and the Allied Governments apply to the liberated countries. It firmly counts on the raising of the restrictions on Swiss exports to these countries imposed until now as a result of the blockade."

With regard to paragraph I B of his note Mr. Pilet stated that an unpublished decree will be sent today to appropriate Swiss controls to permit export of material listed I A to neutral countries in quantities not exceeding volume of recent exports to those countries.

As regards I D Mr. Pilet stated that amount of German credit in the clearing would depend in future upon German deliveries and as the latter might now be expected to diminish progressively the result would be a diminution in Swiss exports to Germany.

As regards IV Mr. Pilet mentioned particularly France.

Department will note that under 954 A exports of finished "civilian" radio receivers will continue to be exported; what proportion of Swiss radio exports are civilian as opposed to military is unknown and definition of "civilian" also uncertain.

Assumption made by Swiss in section II B of note that our offer regarding release of stocks applied to all Swiss stocks overseas is not justified by any statement in texts of note and *aide-mémoire* delivered September 18 nor by any oral statement made by me.

British's 3813 and 3814 to MEW September 29 give details of stocks and Swiss estimate of requirements of one quarter referred to in above note. London please repeat by airgram to Department.

Repeated to London 1808.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-144: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, October 1, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 6: 50 p. m.]

6546. I have received *aide-mémoire* dated September 27 from Federal Political Department (sequence Legation's 6467, September 28—1807 to London<sup>22</sup>) in reply to my memorandum to Pilet-Golaz of

<sup>22</sup> Not printed.



August 31 and *aide-mémoire* of September 8 (see Legation's 5710 August 31 and 5967, 1641 to London, September 9). On September 28 Pilet-Golaz informed me this *aide-mémoire* September 27 constitutes Swiss Government's reply to that portion of my September 18 note concerning transit traffic. Summary follows:

Italian-German transit traffic northbound averaged about 18,000 tons monthly during 1937-38 increasing gradually "due to more intensive economic relations with neighboring countries and as a result constant efforts federal railroads to engage more equitable measure in trans-Alpine traffic". Wartime increase due to interruption seagoing traffic between Germany-Italy forcing utilization railroads involving not only increased volume but a change in character of shipments and increases cannot be ascribed to transport of booty loot as Swiss control measures prevent passage loot "so far as this depends on Swiss".

Wartime Swiss transit traffic through Germany and German-occupied Europe increased exceptionally; same is true but to lesser degree of transit between Italy and Germany both ways. Restrictions on this transit traffic by Switzerland cannot be taken without considering possibility German reprisals on Swiss transit traffic through Germany and overseas commerce. "Finally it should be remembered that Switzerland is constrained by article 3 Gotthard Convention 1909<sup>23</sup> to assure exploitation Gotthard Railroad against any interruption insofar as this does not conflict with neutrality and national defense". (Legation note: article 3 reads in translation: "Except in case of *force majeure* Switzerland will assure exploitation of St. Gotthard Railroad against any interruption. Nevertheless Switzerland has right to take measures necessary for maintenance neutrality and for defense of country".)

"These provisions are in accordance with fundamental principle of free transit which in peace time is observed generally throughout Europe. Thus, as was set forth in *aide-mémoire* submitted in London last April by commercial delegation, this principle has not prevented Switzerland from taking all necessary measures to assure strict observance of 1907 Hague Convention." Further steps cannot be taken for reasons set forth Swiss *aide-mémoire* August 24 (see Legation's 5610, August 26—1532 to London).

In keeping with Swiss neutrality transit war material not tolerated. Liquid fuels are prohibited; articles enumerated in lists March 24 and August 30 are prohibited in whole or in part because impossible identify all requisitioned goods from Italy. Other goods particularly useful for German war effort whose volume has greatly increased above normal have been limited.

Swiss submit annexes with this *aide-mémoire* giving their figures of transit traffic for 1938; 1942 through August 1944; they promise tables containing current tables in future. *Aide-mémoire* comments on these statistics saying: (1) foodstuffs shipments northbound-southbound approximately equal; (2) last sulphur shipment made

<sup>23</sup> Convention between Germany, Italy, and Switzerland regarding St. Gotthard Railway, signed at Bern, October 13, 1909; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cv, p. 639.

first 10 days August; (3) Swiss services have means and instructions necessary to hinder shipment parachute silk; (4) Swiss admit "monthly iron steel quota has been exceeded in some instances but since 1st September shipments these commodities have remained within their quotas. Beginning September 1 however this transit will as Legation knows remain within fixed limit of 15,000 tons".

Legation's statistics, so *aide-mémoire* says, are inexact possibly because they complied [*are compiled?*] upon cars arriving border not taking into account cars refused passage after customs examination; no asbestos, aluminum, rubber, zinc, tin, minerals such as manganese, antimony, mercury, et cetera, passed while Legation was previously informed concerning passage lead for Sweden and passage by mistake certain copper pyrites for Germany.

War materials and liquid fuels not accepted for transit in either direction between Italy-Germany; Swiss exercise strict control over traffic having refused 587 cars between March 29 and September 18, 1944.

*Aide-mémoire* concludes: "As Federal Political Department has made known at different times Federal Council in making its own regulations concerning transit takes into account changes in political and military situation. Thus to complement its previous adjustments it has decided to add new restriction upon iron traffic and prohibit entirely chemical materials products for industrial purposes. These measures effective October 1 are detailed in Annex 7". End summary *aide-mémoire*.

Under Annex 7 all items under tariff category 707-810 (thus including following previously excluded from quota: 707, 770-784B, 786, 791A-792B, 810) for which monthly quota maintained at 15,000 tons with exception that transit ball bearings 809A1-A3 prohibited. 985-1088 chemical materials and products for industrial uses are prohibited.

Repeated to London.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-944 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1944—6 p. m.

8178. Bern's 6546, October 1 to Department, repeated to London. This is sequence to our 8091, October 3.<sup>24</sup> It is obviously desire of Swiss to separate two parts of our joint demand, regarding exports and transit respectively, and while coming considerable way to meet us on former to avoid discussion of latter. Department and FEA favor maintaining position that two demands are inseparable and any concessions on supplies depend on satisfactory Swiss performance on both.

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

Swiss note on transit traffic, as reported in Bern's 6546, is obviously unsatisfactory. Only concessions are to reaffirm 15,000 ton quota for iron and steel which had previously been extensively violated to include additional but unimportant items under that quota, and to prohibit passage of industrial chemicals (largely fertilizers). Swiss take no effective measures to counteract great increase in total volume of traffic, especially northbound, or the changes in character noted in Bern's 5812, September 4, paragraph 3 (repeated to London as 1568 [1583]).<sup>25</sup>

Swiss lay principal stress on their obligation as neutral and under Gotthard Convention to maintain traffic by this route. While we recognize that there may be obligation under Convention to permit some shipments, Swiss neutrality requires also that she refrain from contribution to belligerent campaign through allowing great change in volume and character of transit traffic, which change has taken place.

Great increase in volume took place immediately upon start of Allied campaign in Italy and certainly cannot be attributed to normal civilian trade. Increase has continued although portion of Italy in German hands has steadily diminished. (Bern's 5812, paragraph 4). Normal character of traffic completely altered to consist largely goods "having certain importance in conduct war" (Bern's 5812, paragraph 3).

Furthermore, the Swiss have already recognized (paragraph 3, Bern's 5610, September 5 [August 26]) that transit of goods other than war material but "having certain importance in conduct of war" should be limited to amounts conforming to the need and activities of the civilian population, though their claim to have made such a limitation is not supported by the facts.

Finally, Swiss must recognize rapidly changing circumstances of war in Italy, and apparently imminent German withdrawal, which dictates drastic change in their policy (see Bern's 5610, August 26, paragraph 7, repeated to London as 1532).

We propose that Swiss be informed as follows:

(A) Supply concessions offered them depend on immediate satisfactory compliance with all our demands.

(B) We are willing to agree to continued shipments of consumption goods for strictly civilian use only: such shipments not to exceed, for each category, normal peacetime volume of transit reduced proportionately for Italian population now under Allied control.

(C) Recent Swiss performance on transit traffic has created extremely bad impression in Allied Governments; Swiss have clearly allowed Germans to use Swiss neutrality to their advantage. This

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

feeling can be mitigated only by immediate Swiss action to redress balance.

(D) Swiss emphasis on danger of losing transit rights through Germany indicates that that consideration, rather than preservation of neutrality, is their real concern. Sweden stopped all transit traffic without incurring any penalty. Moreover, free transit through Germany will be less vital to Switzerland in view of opening of frontier by Allies, although Swiss should remember that the possibility transit across Allied territory will depend in large measure on Swiss action on this question.

In view of Bern's familiarity with details of transit question, we suggest that drafting of memorandum be left to agreement by two Bern Legations. Please discuss above with MEW and Foreign Office and if you agree, inform Bern, cabling us accordingly.

Sent to London, repeated to Bern.<sup>26</sup>

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-944: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1944—7 p. m.

8503. London's 8508, October 9, 8 p. m.<sup>27</sup> Our general position is as follows:

While we greatly appreciate the extent to which the Swiss have already gone to meet our wishes and would not be averse to expressing this appreciation either in words or by some gesture of good will, we believe we should, for the present, stand firm upon our minimum demands before giving the raw materials.

Subject to position stated above, we agree in principle with the British point of view expressed in MEW telegram 2349, October 9.<sup>28</sup> Comments on numbered paragraphs follow:

2. We agree that previous offer should be renewed for a very short time.

3. As to export of shunting engines, the subject has been spotlighted here to such an extent that it is unlikely that military clearance could be obtained and therefore we could not agree to withdrawal of demand on this point. For your confidential information, eventually, if our trading position requires, we may be prepared not to insist on the other Swiss departures from our demands on exports.

4. It is not clear that the British understood our proposal regarding a formula for transit traffic, which was to agree to "continued shipments of consumption goods for civilian use only". We intended

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<sup>26</sup> Repeated to Bern as telegram 3433, with the following addition: "Any views you may have on above would be appreciated. Please repeat them to London."

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Not found in Department files.

thereby to exclude industrial products including those enumerated in our 3473, October 10, noon to Bern, which was repeated to you as 8423, October 12.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, the reduction to normal (1938) levels should be further reduced to take account of proportion of Italian population under Allied control. Existing prohibitions will, of course, be maintained together with additional prohibitions under proposed formula. We agree that volume of traffic may advantageously be fixed for each route separately. Formula should be left to discretion of Ministers at Bern.

5. Swiss agreement to termination of Compensation Agreement did not constitute a concession since Compensation Agreement became valueless when Allied forces reached Swiss frontier and *geleitscheine* lost all value. We believe Swiss should be reminded that as soon as they meet us on transit and give reasonable assurances regarding restrictions on the export of textiles, we are prepared to authorize the on-carriage to Switzerland.

6. We are not averse, in principle, to this suggestion but believe that it would be better strategy to tell the Swiss that we are prepared immediately to grant export facilities as soon as the Swiss meet our objectives of which transit is now the most important. If Swiss take immediate action as requested, the immediate granting of export licenses would actually result in their receiving exports more quickly than by permitting on-shipment to Lisbon. However, the alternative, in so far as one quarter's stocks are concerned, may be offered to the Swiss. While we are on this subject it might be well to remember that all Swiss stocks here are of course subject to requisition and that in view of increasing demands for the liberated areas the Swiss must reckon with this as a real possibility.

We are not averse to some gesture of good will toward the Swiss to "sweeten the atmosphere" but believe that for the moment our best strategy is to remain firm until we hear from Swiss on transit.

If British agree, request them to instruct their Minister at Bern to join Harrison in approaching Swiss along lines of Department's 8178, October 6, 6 p. m. and subsequent telegrams.

Sent to London, repeated to Bern.

HULL

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-144 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland  
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1944—7 p. m.

3677. Since MEW has instructed British Minister in Bern to join you in approaching Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs along lines of

<sup>30</sup> Not printed.

Department's 8178, October 6, 6 p. m. to London, repeated to Bern as Department's 3509 [3433], and subsequent telegrams, the Department wonders if *démarche* has been made (London's 8956, October 19, 8 p. m. to Department<sup>31</sup> which London repeated to Bern). If not please make *démarche* as soon as possible and cable Department urgently the result of this action.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-3144: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, October 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received November 1—1:45 a. m.]

7245. My 7184, October 28.<sup>31</sup> I called on Mr. Pilet last evening and handed him note dated yesterday terms of which had been agreed upon with my British colleague in reply to his note of September 28 as well as *aide-mémoire* embodying essential points of your 3509, October 14<sup>32</sup> and previous and London's 8956, October 19<sup>31</sup> to Department with certain oral comments (copies of note and *aide-mémoire* are going forward by courier tomorrow<sup>33</sup> with copies for Embassy in London).

Mr. Pilet assured me he would bring matter immediately to attention of Federal Council. I urged importance of reply as soon as possible. This he promised.

As he read note and *aide-mémoire* Mr. Pilet made certain preliminary comments. As regards radio equipment he observed these were small machines for civilian use and for reception only. He minimized importance of delivery of 13 switch engines and hoped that this would be allowed. As regards transit traffic he pointed out that this was progressively diminishing and he expected that by end of November it would have reached normal. He would let me have October figures as soon as they were received. Transit of iron from Germany to Italy now about 7 to 8 thousand tons per month corresponded roughly to amount delivered Switzerland by Germany. Such amounts could no doubt be furnished by the Allies. While German deliveries of coal to Switzerland were decreasing Switzerland had to look to Germany for these vital deliveries. Their volume was such that the difficulty of their transport would make it impossible for them to be furnished by United States. If he were to stop transit of German coal to Italy he feared that Germans would cut off present

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<sup>31</sup> Not printed.

<sup>32</sup> Same as telegram 8503 to London, p. 777.

<sup>33</sup> Despatch 9688, October 31, not printed.

deliveries to Switzerland. The Germans had protested vigorously against further ceilings effective November 1. They had objected to ceilings on rice and cereals claiming that a portion of rice shipments was from Italian Red Cross to German Red Cross. His reply had been that this then should be handled through the International Red Cross. He also pointed out that if he were to embargo transit traffic this would have to be general which might prove to our disadvantage as we might some day wish to make use of Simplon Tunnel for transit traffic between France and Italy.

He admitted that importance of transit traffic through Germany to Sweden had now disappeared. On the other hand he had recently been asked to obtain permission from Germany to send relief supplies to German occupied Holland. He was continually being asked to take [*make?*] requests of the German Government and he had therefore always to have in mind the need to preserve a modicum of good will on their part.

HARRISON

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-3144: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland*  
(Harrison)

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1944—5 p. m.

3764. From Department and FEA. Your 7245, October 31. Department and FEA are gratified to learn of presentation by you and your British colleague of the *démarche* agreed upon by the U.S. and U.K. Governments. We cannot over-emphasize the urgency, both from our point of view and that of Swiss, of our receiving a satisfactory reply. We are disturbed by line of reasoning taken by Pilet in his oral remarks to you, especially in connection with transit traffic, which presages a continuation of delaying tactics and haggling, precisely what we had hoped to avoid in these discussions.

We are not clear what is meant by his assurance that transit traffic would reach its "normal state" by end of November. His contention that to embargo traffic might be disadvantageous to us in the future is irrelevant, since we have not asked a complete stoppage of the traffic, but only a reduction according to the formula outlined in our 3433 of October 6.<sup>34</sup> Finally, with regard to transmission of relief supplies to German-occupied territory, our strong view is that any conflict between our relief and economic warfare policies must be resolved in favor of latter. Our primary aim is to end the war as quickly and with as little further sacrifice of lives as possible, and we will continue

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<sup>34</sup> See footnote 26, p. 777.

to press for stoppage of every form of aid by neutral countries to Germany.

Throughout current negotiations with Swiss on transit, their replies to our requests have been temporizing and unresponsive. Impression thus created in Washington is extremely unfavorable and is progressively more disadvantageous to Switzerland. In this connection, the Swiss Legation has recently informed us that the Swiss have urgently requested in London the release of 94 tons of rubber and 20 tons of latex to relieve the acute rubber shortage in Switzerland. We had informally advised the Legation that pending a satisfactory solution of the transit question, no consideration could be given to this or similar requests. Legation has indicated that it will cable Bern in this sense.

We deem it advisable that our attitude be known to the Swiss Government while it has our latest transit proposals under consideration and suggest that you informally convey it to the appropriate authorities.

Sent to Bern, repeated to London as Department's 9243. [Department and FEA.]

STETTINIUS

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740.00112 European War 1939/11-644

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Woodruff Wallner of the Division of Western European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] November 6, 1944.

Dr. Feer<sup>35</sup> called at his request to inform me that his Government had learned that by order of a General Gray, whom he understood to be in command of Army Transportation in France, all Swiss traffic by rail and by truck into France had been prohibited. He asked if we had been informed of this measure and I told him that we had been advised that General Eisenhower<sup>36</sup> intended to handle the whole question of Swiss traffic into France on the basis of operational requirements and that in view of the transportation difficulties in France, we were not surprised at this decision. He also wanted to know whether the ruling was based on transportation alone or whether there was an angle of Military Intelligence. I replied that I did not know but assumed that both aspects might well be involved.

Emphasizing the importance to Switzerland of having an outlet toward the Allied countries, Dr. Feer inquired what steps he might take to obtain fuller information as to the scope and duration of this

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<sup>35</sup> Edward A. Feer, Counselor of the Swiss Legation.

<sup>36</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.



measure. He indicated that the first move was to inquire from SHAEF<sup>37</sup> through the Swiss Minister in London, but he also seemed anxious to know the Department's position. I stated that General Eisenhower had full powers to make decisions of that kind based on military considerations without reference to Washington. I said that in a general way we were interested, insofar as operational requirements permitted it, in having traffic resumed with Switzerland but that we generally were reluctant to make suggestions to SHAEF based on political or economic considerations. I added that in view of the present indeterminate state of our negotiations with the Swiss Government on the question of transit traffic, we were hardly in a position now to make any suggestions of any sort regarding General Gray's order. It was my intention to create by innuendo a grave doubt in Dr. Feer's mind as to whether or not we had really been behind the order prohibiting Swiss traffic in France. I believe I succeeded in this. In any case, Dr. Feer understood that we would not give consideration to intervening with the military authorities for the resumption of Swiss traffic through France until the transit question was satisfactorily settled.

Dr. Feer was much depressed as a result of the recent rebuff administered to Switzerland by the Soviet Government. I am preparing a second memorandum on this subject.<sup>38</sup>

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740.00112 European War 1939/10-3144: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1944—midnight.

9326. From Department and FEA. Bern's 7245, October 31 to Department. In the event of an unsatisfactory reply (foreshadowed by Pilet-Golaz remarks) by the Swiss Federal Council to our *démarche* of October 31 [30?], we feel formal withdrawal to our joint offer of supplies should be made without delay in order to protect our future position.

You are requested to approach MEW at once to ascertain their views.

Repeated to Bern as Department's 3787. [Department and FEA.]

STETTINIUS

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<sup>37</sup> Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

<sup>38</sup> Memorandum dated November 6, not printed; reference is to the Russian reply to the Swiss request for renewal of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

740.00112 European War 1939/11-1344: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, November 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11: 52 p. m.]

7510. In view of Mr. Pilet's reference again to possibility of reduction in south-north traffic as reported in paragraph 2 of my 7497 (2174 to London) November 13<sup>39</sup> I felt it advisable to reiterate to Mr. Pilet that the mere reduction in this transit traffic to approximately equivalent of 1938 tonnage would not meet with our demands. (Reference last sentence my 7422—2146 to London November 8.<sup>39</sup>)

Accordingly under date of November 11 I addressed a letter to Mr. Pilet calling attention to our conversation on November 7 with regard to our position on this subject and pointed out following which is a paraphrase of the other pertinent portion of my letter:

"May I recall demands my Government as set forth my *aide-mémoire* October 30, 1944 which called for reduction in this traffic to conform with monthly average 1938 but with elimination therefrom of rice, cereals, textiles, cotton, hemp, hides and skins, machinery, ores (including fluorspar) raw semi-finished and finished metals and after these deductions a reduction of balance of remaining items taking into account ratio of territory of Italy which has been liberated by Allied forces. According to study which I have had made a reduction on this basis in conformity with minimum demands my Government would result in a total monthly tonnage of about 6000 tons per month.

This amount moreover is susceptible to further reduction with respect to any of 1938 transit which might relate to goods mentioned page 2 paragraph B (ii) of my *aide-mémoire* October 30 (see my despatch 9688 October 31<sup>40</sup>) and eventually by further successive reductions in relation to further liberation of Italy by Allied forces."

Repeated to London 2177.

HARRISON

740.00112 European War 1939/11-2544: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, November 25, 1944—11 p. m.

9924. From Department and FEA. This supersedes Department's 9899 of Nov. 24,<sup>41</sup> repeated to Bern as 3988. British Embassy here has

<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

<sup>40</sup> Not printed; reference paragraph stated in part: "No goods should be permitted to transit through Switzerland which deprive the Italian population of supplies which are already too heavily depleted to allow their essential requirements to be met." (740.00112 European War 1939/10-3144)

<sup>41</sup> Telegram not printed.

received telegram No. 2627 from MEW (repeated to Bern), suggesting that recent military developments have already accomplished part of objectives sought in Anglo-American demand on Swiss in September. They propose strengthening our demand accordingly. Department and FEA agree, subject to following comments:

1. We would still insist on transit traffic being restricted to goods for civilian consumption only at normal level. No increase in quantities of such products over routes still passable, to compensate for routes closed by military action should be permitted.

2. We agree that drastic reduction in Swiss exports to Germany should be demanded. However, we believe some definite figure must be presented to Swiss, to avoid haggling over exact percentage of reduction in present and prospective German exports. We would be willing to leave to our Legation in Bern, which undoubtedly has better information than we, the exact reduction to be specified, but believe it should be at least 50 percent, and should apply both to total exports and by commodity to Annex I. In deciding upon a figure the following factors, among others, should be considered:

*a.* Direct stoppage of transportation routes by Allied advances, artillery fire, bombing or other operations.

*b.* Attack on sources of supply in whole Rhineland area.

*c.* Cumulative deterioration of German production and transportation facilities.

Swiss will cut down exports to Germany in their own interest, to avoid increasing German clearing deficit, and presumably will anticipate further slackening in supplies from Germany. We expect Bern to require greater concession than merely matching reduction in German shipments. Present German economic situation would thoroughly justify Swiss cancelling all commitments to Germany. Since any figure we may set for percentage reduction demanded would necessarily be arbitrary, and since military situation is moving very rapidly Legations should resolve every doubt in favor of largest reduction, looking toward complete stoppage of Swiss exports to enemy as soon as possible.

3. We agree to time limit on Swiss answer and suggest 1 week from date of approach to Swiss. Ministers should emphasize to Swiss that failing satisfactory reply within week, this and all previous offers become void, and that U.S. and U.K. could not support Swiss requests for permission to transport supplies into or out of Switzerland via France or any other territory under Allied control, except those needed explicitly for Allied purposes.

Please discuss with MEW and, if agreed, instruct Bern Legation to proceed. Repeated to Bern as 3997. [Department and FEA.]

STETTINUS

740.00112 European War 1939/12-244: Telegram

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, December 2, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 8:50 p. m.]

7888. I received from M. Pilet-Golaz on evening of November 30 (Department's 3394 [3997?] November 25<sup>42</sup>) *aide-mémoire* same date which replies to that part of note and *aide-mémoire* delivered by Minister Harris [Harrison] on October 30<sup>43</sup> covering transit traffic (see Legation's despatch 9688 October 31<sup>44</sup>). Copy and translation of Swiss *aide-mémoire* will be forwarded under cover of despatch<sup>45</sup> by next courier.

Following is summary of Swiss *aide-mémoire*:

a. First part of *aide-mémoire* reviews position taken by Swiss on transit traffic and stresses that Swiss at all times in prohibiting transit of military material went further than their obligations as a neutral. They state that Switzerland within framework of Gotthard Convention involving obligations to Germany and Italy but reserving to Switzerland rights of neutrality and national defense has taken into consideration changes in military situation and imposed appropriate prohibitions and restrictions. Downward in both north-south and south-north transit traffic is reviewed. They state that complete cessation of traffic would mean violation of Gotthard Convention and suggest that such an embargo might be to our own disadvantage in future since it would have to be applied to all belligerents.

b. Swiss reply to specific demands on south-north traffic raised under paragraph of Legation's *aide-mémoire* of October 30 is as follows (numerals correspond to Roman numerals of sub-paragraphs under 3 b of *aide-mémoire*):

1. Swiss maintain that despite German total mobilization not all industrial products are employed exclusively for conduct of military operations and that transit of larger parts of products to which this character could be attributed (machines, minerals, metals, et cetera) is already forbidden or strictly limited. They recall that since August 30 all machines are excluded from transit. Effective December 1, monthly transit from south to north of iron ore, iron steel and products fabricated from these metals is reduced from 7,500 to 5,000 tons. Transit of railway material (Swiss tariff items 733/741) forbidden effective December 1. Nil quota December 1 also placed on Swiss tariff position 609 argil, fluorspar, et cetera and Swiss tariff position 625/626 talc, pumice stone et cetera.

<sup>42</sup> Same as telegram 9924 to London, *supra*.

<sup>43</sup> *Aide-mémoire* not printed, but see first paragraph of telegram 7245, October 31, from Bern, p. 779.

<sup>44</sup> Not printed.

<sup>45</sup> Despatch 10106, December 5, 1944, not printed.

2. Swiss state restrictions they have already imposed to a large extent reduce shipments of foods, textiles et cetera and after pointing out quota of 2,500 tons of rice they state effective December 1 they placed embargo on transit of leather, skins unworked as well as worked and leather products (positions 172-192 of Swiss tariff not including shoes). They state that Italy has at all times shipped across Switzerland fairly large quantities of foodstuffs (12,000 monthly in 1938 of which 9,000 fruits and vegetables) and that foodstuffs still permitted to cross Switzerland in transit are not of volume important enough to place Italian people in want. They state that in absence of evidence that shipments represents requisitions they would not be justified in placing embargoes on transit of fruit and vegetables.

3. Swiss state transit of iron from Germany to Italy declined from 15,897 tons in July to approximately 1,000 tons in October and they observe that this indicates that Germany is no longer in a position to utilize industrial capacity of northern Italy for transformation of iron into finished products. They add that major part of shipments of iron exported from Italy to Germany via Switzerland consists of minerals and unfabricated iron and not finished or semi-finished products.

c. With regard to north-south traffic Swiss state that need for preventing transit of requisitioned merchandise does not exist and that consequently measures similar to those governing south-north traffic would not be justified. They recall that nonetheless they imposed embargo on transit of liquid fuels. They state they are unable to meet our demands on coal which they state is necessary for the urgent needs of civil population particularly in winter. They state monthly average of coal transit in 1938 was 108,000 tons compared with transit in October of 60,000 tons.

d. With regard to demands made in paragraph d of Legation's *aide-mémoire* October 30 Swiss state as follows:

1. Increased importance of transit traffic across Germany for commercial exchange with Sweden is recalled.

2. They state everything indicates that volume of transit traffic between Germany Italy via Switzerland in November closely approached pre-war level and that in December it will be less since new restrictions will decrease volume by 4,000 to 5,000 tons.

3. Simplon route has been employed merely to facilitate distribution of traffic in interior of Switzerland and not in order to duplicate or to relieve Gotthard. They state that all transit by Simplon now suspended (see Legation's 7855 November 30<sup>46</sup>).

4. They state north-south traffic is relatively more important for Germany and northern Italy than for southern Italy and that for this reason it is in practice impossible to impose mathematical formula limiting traffic to proportion of Italy remaining under German occupation.

HUDDLE

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

740.00112 European War 1939/12-444: Telegram

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, December 4, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

7924. Swiss have presented *aide-mémoire* dated December 2 giving their reply to that portion of Legation's note and *aide-mémoire* of October 30 concerning exports of undesirable items. Translation of *aide-mémoire* follows:

"On October 30, Legation of United States of America handed a note and *aide-mémoire* to Federal Political Department expressing disappointment of its Government because federal authorities had not taken into account all the desires expressed in note of September 18<sup>47</sup> with regard to prohibiting export of certain merchandise to Axis countries.

The Federal Government which on October 1st placed an embargo on export of war material and other similar articles did not expect such a *démarche*. It considers, in fact, that it has taken into account to a very large extent the desires of American and British Governments. There remain only a very few tariff items for which the demands of these Governments have not been entirely satisfied. The Federal Government does not see the possibility of taking immediately formal measures of prohibition for these remaining positions, that is for tariff items 883 A, M5 and 914 A/G. In the course of the last few months, the only mass imports of products essential to maintain industrial production and to secure work for the population did not come into Switzerland through the blockade. This fact obligates Switzerland to certain considerations if only for the sake of formality.

On the other hand, in practice, the Federal Government can meet to a larger extent the desires which it is not in a position to satisfy formally. The export of steam and petrol driven locomotives under tariff item 883 A can be suspended until the end of hostilities in Europe. Moreover, exports of diesel engines under tariff item ex M 5 will for the most part be stopped as was stated by the Swiss members of the Mixed Commission at meeting of October 26 during discussion of export program of Sulzer Brothers, Winterthur, the principal Swiss exporters. Also it will not be impossible in the near future to reduce the exports of tariff item 914 A/G and that of other tariff positions. With regard to tariff item 954 A radio apparatus, the Federal Government observes that complete radio receiving sets have not been included in the export embargo because of orders from countries which do not belong to the Axis.

The Federal Government hopes that in estimating the value of the concessions made the American and British Governments will not be stopped by questions of procedure and will appreciate the practical results obtained.

The Federal Government hopes that the measures envisaged added to all the measures already taken will remove the obstacles which held up the imports set forth in the note of September 18 and that it will

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<sup>47</sup> See telegram 6206, September 19, 8 p. m., from Bern, p. 770.

receive the necessary assistance in the transportation of these goods from the point of unloading to the Swiss frontier.”

Repeated to London as 2354.

HUDDLE

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740.00112 European War 1939/12-644 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Huddle) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, December 6, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 3:35 p. m.]

7964. 1. Swiss reply on transit traffic, summary of which was transmitted in Legation's 7888<sup>47a</sup> does not fully meet our demands.

2. However, while fully appreciating point of view stated Department's 3787, November 7<sup>48</sup> and 3764, November 4 and recognizing justification of severe attitude from standpoint of war effort and moral issues involved, Legation has reached conclusion that a continuation of our present tactics in attempting to force Swiss hand by proposing minimum demands is not likely to obtain further concessions at this time. Legation believes Swiss now appreciate seriousness with which we view transit problem but they are apparently sincerely convinced that we are refusing to consider their position and problems. Legation believes that our objectives should be to obtain maximum concessions possible (Legation believes Swiss may not have gone as far as they could) and that we are more likely to reach our goal if at this point we alter mode of attack.

3. At Mixed Commission meeting November 4 transit problem (our 7888—2333—December 2 and 7924—2354—December 4) was for first time discussed at length (Department will recall that Swiss representatives on Mixed Commission are primarily from Division of Commerce and that they are not empowered to “negotiate” on question of transit). Keller expressed his discouragement and feeling that solution of present impasse was extremely difficult as long as we ruled out possibility of meeting of minds by assuming an inflexible and doctrinaire position which we required Swiss to accept in entirety before we would consider question of releasing part of Swiss stocks. He indicated that refusal of any concession on our part in return for concessions already granted by Swiss made it extremely difficult for Swiss to continue to make concessions. He urged us to understand that Swiss can not comply with demands which take form of an ultimatum. Legation believes Keller was sincerely expressing reasoned view of Swiss Government officials and that under circumstances if we hope for further concessions we must demonstrate that

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<sup>47a</sup> Dated December 2, p. 785.

<sup>48</sup> Same as telegram 9326 to London, p. 782.

we are not ignoring altogether their arguments. This opinion has been reached with economic warfare objectives alone in mind but Legation suggests that overall political considerations also make it desirable that present impasse be satisfactorily resolved.

4. With these considerations in mind Legation has reviewed transit traffic problem and makes following comments on Swiss reply of November 30:

*a.* Legation does not believe that position taken by Swiss on south-north shipment of cereals, shoes and textiles is justified. Monthly quota on cereals including rice is 2,500 tons which is far in excess of 1938 average of 468 tons to say nothing of very large shipments made before imposition of quota. Therefore, Legation believes we should continue to insist on cessation of transit of this material.

*b.* Although Swiss have met us on fluorspar shipment in October of 15,000 tons of ores, metals and metal products and present quota of 5,000 tons can not be justified when compared with 1938 monthly average of 460 tons which included machines now forbidden transit, we should continue to insist on a nil quota.

*c.* Legation believes we should insist on Swiss imposing on transit of textiles and shoes quotas below 1938 monthly average. In 1938 all types textiles including raw materials averaged 2,500 tons; monthly average for leather products including shoes was 106. Since shipments leather products now consist exclusively of shoes monthly quotas should be fixed lower than this figure.

5. On other hand in interest of achieving concessions outlined paragraph 4 above, Legation believes it would be in our interest to accept certain arguments presented by Swiss:

*a.* Swiss statement that reasons for placing quotas on south-north traffic (possibility that goods are requisitioned) do not exist in case of north-south traffic is plausible.

*b.* That Swiss cannot suspend transit of coal from Germany to Italy without endangering shipments of coal from Germany to Switzerland (52,000 tons coal, coke, et cetera, in October) is probable, particularly since volume of coal shipped in transit in 1938 (108,017 tons monthly) exceeded recent transit (October 60,000 tons; November data not yet available). Rate of shipment likely to continue to decrease and if quota were to be fixed, we would probably find that future shipments actually were less than quota. Swiss distinction between coal as meeting civilian needs and liquid fuel as being for military purposes might be accepted although point is debatable.

*c.* Shipments of metals and metal products from Germany to Italy in October were 1100 tons. This well below 1938 average of 7064 tons and since direct (as opposed to indirect) connection with war effort difficult to prove and since shipments are relatively small and in any case likely to decrease, Legation believes this point should be dropped.

*d.* Swiss argument concerning transit of foodstuffs (other than cereals and rice) from south to north might be accepted since monthly average 1938 was 11426 tons compared with 2333 in October.



6. With regard to Swiss reply on exports undesirable items Legation believes that Swiss in fact, if not formally, have met or prepared to meet practically all our demands. Exports of arms and ammunition, fuses, ball bearings, airplanes and parts, telephone equipment and military radio equipment were suspended October 1. Having exported three shunting locomotives they are now prepared to guarantee informally that no further locomotives will be exported to Germany until armistice (such a promise is more useful to us than an export embargo which would be applied to all belligerents in case SHAEF or French desire to purchase Swiss locomotives). With regard civilian radios, exports to Germany in October were only 2,000 francs and none to other Axis; Swiss maintain that reason for not placing under export embargo (which would apply to all belligerents) is their desire to ship to Allied markets. Exports of M5 have for all practical purposes been stopped by Swiss acceptance of our position in case of Sulzer the major exporter (Legation's 7164—2064 to London, October 28<sup>49</sup>); in July through October exports this tariff item to Germany were 48,000 francs and to other Axis 65,000.

7. From practical views, Swiss have thus satisfied or are prepared to satisfy all of minimum demands on exports made in our notes on September 18 and October 30 except for 914A/G automobiles, tractors, parts, et cetera. Exports this item August through October were 659,000 francs to Germany and 55,000 other Axis. For this item Swiss hold out possibility of reducing "informality" and suggest that they will be prepared to extend similar "informal" reductions to other unnamed items.

8. Legation appreciates that anything short of minimum demands set forth in our communications of October 30 will be less than is considered justified. Legation is, however, convinced that no further concessions are likely to be obtained at present time by threatening reprisals in form of no-transit facilities across France and holding up Swiss stocks. Even if stocks were released now, Swiss would have no means transporting bulk of them across France and transit facilities across France are largely of symbolic importance as long as rail communications are not established and transport limited to a few trucks. On other hand, Switzerland is still receiving raw material from Germany (in October Swiss francs 25,268,506 imports from Germany compared with 15,900,660 francs exports) and Sweden (Swiss) 7,982,968 imports compared with 14,308,039 exports in October which must transit Germany. Swiss emphasize that they

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<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

are prepared to recognize changed situation but they cannot anticipate changes; they suggest that they would now be in very difficult position if Legation [apparent omission] September they had prematurely anticipated an immediate Allied victory and consequently deprived themselves of all Swedish, German and other Axis imports.

9. Legation therefore proposes that as soon as possible, Swiss may be informed that although not completely satisfied with their replies, we are releasing a limited amount of selected items from list of stocks included in our September 18 offer and that we will release remainder if they comply immediately with revised demands outlined paragraph 4 above and apply the further restrictions on undesirable export (locomotives items 914A/G, et cetera, (foreseen in their *aide-mémoire* of December 2<sup>50</sup>).

10. In submitting these proposals to Department and Embassy, Legation believes certain other aspects which up until now have not been discussed should be given consideration. SHAEF is apparently already anxious to obtain certain materials from Switzerland. Examples are orders for urgently needed replacement parts for damaged electrical installations in France and Belgium placed with Brown Boveri and Escher-Wyss by Irwin and Samways of London Committee of Public Utilities Department of Combined Resources Board during their trip to Switzerland on November 9-11; prospect that Brown Boveri and other firms may be called upon to supply similar parts for Italy (on November 29 Legation forwarded to Irwin for transmission to authorities in Italy a long list of Brown Boveri installations south of Po) negotiations of General Larkin of 7th Army with Swiss wood syndicate for 500 wooden barracks to be delivered in 6 weeks, and Department's inquiry made in telegram 3885, November 15,<sup>51</sup> concerning availability of locomotives. Legation believes it highly desirable that Swiss grant export permits without delay and that we do not encourage them to use such orders as bargaining weapons. Department may wish to consult SHAEF on this point.

Text of *aide-mémoires* with translations follows by current pouch.<sup>52</sup>  
Repeated London 2368.

HUDDLE

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<sup>50</sup> See telegram 7924, December 4, 11 a. m., from Bern, p. 787.

<sup>51</sup> Not printed.

<sup>52</sup> Despatch 10106, December 5, not printed; for text of *aide-mémoire* dated December 2, see telegram 7924, December 4, 11 a. m., p. 787; and for summary of *aide-mémoire* dated November 30, see telegram 7888, December 2, 9 a. m., p. 785.

ACCIDENTAL BOMBING OF THE SWISS CITY OF SCHAFFHAUSEN BY  
AMERICAN PLANES

740.0011 European War 1939/33765 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 1, 1944.

[Received April 1—10:56 a. m.]

1999. It is officially announced that on April 1, 1944 at 10:30 in the morning approximately 30 American planes flew over the Cantons of Thurgau and Schaffhausen. At about 11 a. m. bombs were dropped on the town of Schaffhausen. According to presently available reports several fires are raging in the station district and in the city. Further details will be announced later. All railroad traffic in direction of Schaffhausen has been interrupted.

Military Attaché<sup>55</sup> leaving immediately for Schaffhausen to investigate and report.

I shall immediately endeavor to obtain appointment with Foreign Minister<sup>56</sup> for further exploration matter. Details will be telegraphed as obtained.

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/33770 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 1, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:10 p. m.]

2020. My 1999 and 2010.<sup>57</sup> I called on Mr. Pilet-Golaz at his residence this afternoon to express my regret and sympathy. According his preliminary information some 50 American bombers flying from southeast in direction northwest suddenly appeared over Schaffhausen this morning and dropped bombs and incendiaries. A number of important buildings in the center of the town were hit also railway station and railway yards. Several factories on outskirts were set on fire by incendiaries. Some 100 people were killed and wounded, including a high cantonal official killed. Many persons rendered homeless; fires still burning. Railway communication with Schaffhausen interrupted. Mr. Pilet-Golaz was at a loss for any explanation of what apparently was a deliberate attack. He had sent instructions to Minister Bruggmann.<sup>58</sup> He has also given orders that press and radio announcements should be restrained and factual.

HARRISON

<sup>55</sup> Brig. Gen. Barnwell R. Legge.

<sup>56</sup> Marcel Pilet-Golaz.

<sup>57</sup> Telegram 2010, April 1, 4 p. m., not printed.

<sup>58</sup> Charles Bruggmann, Swiss Minister in the United States.

740.0011 European War 1939/33778 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 3, 1944.

[Received April 3—9 : 46 a. m.]

2687. Personal to the Secretary. This noon General Spaatz<sup>59</sup> and I called at the Swiss Legation and expressed to Mr. Girardet, who is Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of the Minister, our deep regret at the accidental bombing of Schaffhausen by our Air Force. General Spaatz told Mr. Girardet how sincerely sorry our airmen were that this had happened.

WINANT

740.0011 European War 1939/33770 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1944—6 p. m.

1117. We fully approve of your action reported in your 2020, April 1, and we have sent you in clear today the text of my statement to the press<sup>60</sup> expressing the deep regret of all of us over this tragic incident as well as Ambassador Winant's report of his and General Spaatz's call on the Swiss Chargé in London to express similar sentiments. Assistant Secretary Long and the Director of the Office of European Affairs, Mr. Dunn, representing me, called on the Swiss Minister this afternoon to express in person the regret of this Government over the incident and to inform the Minister that an investigation was under way by the military authorities and as soon as it was completed the findings would be made available to the Minister.

We hope the foregoing will be of some use to you in your conversations with Swiss officials. If you have occasion to discuss the matter further with Mr. Pilet-Golaz please express our deep appreciation for his orders that press and radio announcements in Switzerland should be restrained and factual.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/33815 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 4, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received April 5—9 : 30 a. m.]

2086. Swiss press, 3rd, carried UP item datelined London, 2nd, saying American Headquarters issues following communiqué in part

<sup>59</sup> Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in European Theater of Operations.

<sup>60</sup> Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1944, p. 314.

on Saturday's air operations: "On account of extraordinary navigation difficulties and bad weather some bombs fell by mistake on Swiss territory".

This announcement has had unfavorable reception. Terrestrial weather conditions Schaffhausen area were reported exceptionally clear with excellent visibility. If conditions in higher atmosphere were bad details thereof are essential if statement in communiqué to carry any conviction and not to be regarded as inept attempt at evasion.

Bern *Bund* 4th exclaims "Stick to the Truth, Please! and says Swiss public learns with greatest astonishment of announcement from official American headquarters England. Everyone in Switzerland believes bombs fell on Swiss territory because American flyers made mistake. But attempt headquarters to minimize severe misfortune and distortion facts must be energetically rejected. Weather over Schaffhausen enabled good visibility which even bombers themselves admitted, who certainly hit their objectives (station and industrial plants). Rhine Falls and Lake Constance offer exceptional possibilities especially by day so that unquestionably expert flyers should have easily recognized exact location.

It is painfully disturbing if American headquarters now talk about bad weather and instance of violation neutrality thereby not easier but more difficult because there arisen question of meniality [*sic*]. Also American press has played up 'bad weather' theme; bad weather from Swiss standpoint is important piece of wrong orientation of world public against which we raise protest."

*Gazette de Lausanne* dismisses London communiqué with words "The excuse of 'bad weather' is worthless".

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/33837 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 5, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:39 p. m.]

2110. Mayer [*Maher*] <sup>61</sup> informs me that Monday <sup>62</sup> afternoon Swiss authorities convened special press conference for confidential orientation Schaffhausen incident. This conference revealed that my prompt visit to Political Department was particularly appreciated and was compared favorably with rather reluctant attitude British in cases violation Swiss air space. On other hand state[ment] attributed to Americans regarding bad weather conditions caused much criticism.

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<sup>61</sup> Dale W. Maher, Second Secretary of Embassy in Switzerland.

<sup>62</sup> April 3.

Conference felt that this reflected on veracity other Amn communiqués (see my 2086, April 4). Finally correspondent expressed thought that Americans would probably try to buy Swiss sympathy by offering financial reparation but that this would never be enough.

I think last quoted statement need not be taken too seriously since of course financial reparations are expected by Swiss themselves. Statement itself is common reflection of thought of certain class of Europeans who not only now but in prewar period have engaged in this form of polemics against alleged Amn materialism. The idea is hackneyed and motives behind it are discredited.

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/33940a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1944—10 p. m.

1147. 1. Please call formally upon the appropriate Swiss authorities to say that with reference to the tragic incident at Schaffhausen on April 1 your Government would welcome information from the Swiss Government as soon as possible as to the full amount of the property and personal damage resulting from the accident in order that appropriate reparations can promptly be made to the unfortunate victims and thus at least to that extent help to alleviate their distress.

2. Strictly for your information only: It is the strong feeling of the War Department and of this Department that prompt action on the part of this Government in meeting without haggling the claims which the Swiss Government may make for the property and personal damage resulting from this accident will redound to our benefit. We wish therefore that you handle the matter in your dealings with the Swiss with this background in mind without however specifically informing the Swiss that we intend to pay their claims without question.

We understand that the War Department is informing Legge of the foregoing.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33870a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1944—9 p. m.

1176. I. To the end of implementing our 1147, April 5, please place at the disposal of the Swiss Government at once one million dollars and say under instructions that these funds are for the use of the Swiss Government to begin immediately compensation to the victims of the accident in such manner and amounts as in the opinion of the Swiss

Government will be most equitable and efficient in relieving the victims' distress. Please also say that such additional funds as may be required in the opinion of the Swiss Government will be made available immediately upon receipt from it of information as to the amounts required.

You may say orally that for our part we plan no publicity whatsoever regarding this action.

II. For your guidance: It is the desire of the War Department that we meet without question such bills in this matter as the Swiss Government may present to us hence please do not give the Swiss the impression that we expect any accounting as such of the funds we make available. You may in fact state that all we desire from them is a statement of the amounts required for the full monetary reparation of the damages by our bombers in this instance.

III. Daymont<sup>63</sup> is authorized to draw draft in this exceptional case on Secretary of State and against this instruction for one million dollars to effect payment. Render separate account.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33951

*The Swiss Minister (Bruggmann) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, April 7, 1944.

SIR: Acting upon the instructions of my Government I have the honor to draw your attention to the bombing of Schaffhausen by American planes which took place on April first.

When, on the evening of that day, I called at the State Department, detailed information was lacking and I could only request that an examination of the facts be made, and an explanation of them be given to the Swiss Government at the earliest possible moment.

Soon thereafter your Government officially pronounced the bombardment to be the result of error, and expressed its regret over the tragic consequences.

It also declared its intention of making a thorough investigation to determine the reasons of this disaster, and to take measures to prevent a recurrence. Moreover, it has expressed its readiness to make good as far as possible the damage wrought.

I have now received a first statement of facts as established by Swiss authorities which reads as follows:

"On April first several formations of American bombers flew over Swiss territory north of the Rhine between 10:28 and 11:01 in the morning, some of the planes reaching Eglisau. More than 70 planes entered Swiss air space. At 10:50 a. m. the city of Schaffhausen was violently bombarded by a formation of about 30 planes coming from

<sup>63</sup> Special Disbursing Officer.

Lake Constance, flying at an altitude of 15,000 feet and heading westward. The bombs were dropped in a volley, causing serious damage. So far, 35 bodies have been removed from the ruins. Furthermore, about 50 persons were gravely injured, two of whom have since died, and others are still in danger of death. Among the dead are a member of the Government of Schaffhausen and a cantonal Judge. More than 50 houses are badly hit, notably a wing of the Museum housing precious collections which were destroyed, part of the City Hall, a wing of the railroad station, the power plant, a garage and several factories, among which are a spinning mill, a leather factory, a pottery factory, a silver-ware factory and a twine factory.”

The report further states that the bombardment took place under fair weather conditions, with good visibility and with a light wind.

The above is a very brief statement of the results of the investigation to date and you will appreciate, without my stressing it, that the event has caused consternation among the Swiss people and anxiety as to the future.

The penetration of the Swiss air space by American planes resulting in the bombing of Schaffhausen constitutes a most serious violation of Swiss sovereignty and territory. The mistake which caused in broad daylight the partial destruction of a Swiss city is so grave an incident that the Government of the Swiss Confederation cannot consider it settled by its protest and by the expression of regret of the American Government. It is essential that the causes of this tragic error be determined exactly and that effective measures be taken to eliminate them in the future.

I am, therefore, instructed to request that the detailed results of the investigation, which is being conducted by the American authorities, be communicated in full to the Swiss Government, together with definite proposals of precautionary measures for preventing further infringement of Swiss rights.

Inasmuch as the American Government has voluntarily signified its intention of making “appropriate reparations for the damage resulting from this unfortunate event in so far as that is humanly possible”, it is not necessary for me to dwell further upon this subject in this note. The Swiss Government is forming a Commission of Appraisal, working with local authorities, which will, in due time, present its findings and make a report.

I may add that the Swiss Government appreciates the spontaneous expression of regret and sympathy, voiced officially by your Government and has confidence that your Government, in accordance with its attitude as already declared, will make not only full reparation and restitution for the injuries inflicted upon the Swiss people, but will likewise do the necessary to insure respect of their sacred rights in the future.

Accept [etc.]

CHARLES BRUGGMANN



740.0011 European War 1939/33902 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 10, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:44 p. m.]

2228. My 2204, April 8.<sup>64</sup> I was able to see Mr. Bonna<sup>65</sup> this afternoon and handed him letter addressed to Mr. Pilet-Golaz as directed your 1147 and 1176 with draft drawn by Daymont. Mr. Bonna expressed his sincere appreciation and assured me that he would not fail to inform Mr. Pilet-Golaz immediately upon his return which he expected would be in time for usual meeting of Federal Council tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. I also took occasion to say to Mr. Bonna that you planned no publicity. He thanked me and said he presumed that there would be no objection to eventual announcement here.

2. Mr. Bonna told [me?] the Federal Government had appointed an expert to determine damages in consultation with cantonal and city authorities and if I so desired he would be glad to arrange for a representative of Legation to follow the investigations. In his opinion criteria existed for determining material damage; it was more difficult to fix personal damages. I thanked Mr. Bonna for his offer and stated position as set forth last sentence, section II, your 1176.

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/33938 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 13, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:53 p. m.]

2310. In letter dated April 12, received today Mr. Pilet-Golaz acknowledges my letter of April 10 (see my 2228, April 10) and says "We thank you for this communication and for this payment and we wish to assure you that we appreciate very keenly the American Government's concern to provide with all the promptness possible for the reparation of damages caused by that tragic accident.

We have contacted at once the Swiss National Bank in order to examine how the exchange value of the sum placed at our disposal could be obtained."

Mr. Pilet-Golaz informs me of the appointment of Professor Bohren of Thun as Federal Commissioner to assess all damages and to be assisted by a committee on which cantonal and municipal authorities as well as the cantonal Tribunal will be represented. He concludes by stating that "measures have already been taken or are being studied in

<sup>64</sup> Not printed.<sup>65</sup> Of the Swiss Federal Political Department.

order to provide for the immediate undertaking of repair work and the payment of installment accounts to compensate the sufferers thus enabling them to make a new start in life without awaiting the final estimate of the damages which to be conscientious and objective will inevitably require a certain time”.

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/34014

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Bruggmann)*

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944.

SIR: With reference to your note dated April 7, 1944 regarding the bombing of Schaffhausen by American planes on April 1, 1944 and particularly to your request that the detailed results of my Government's investigation into the causes of this accident together with definite proposals of precautionary measures for preventing further such incidents be communicated to the Swiss Government, I have the honor to inform you that the Secretary of War has advised me that investigation of the accidental bombing of Schaffhausen by aircraft of American Army Air Forces has disclosed certain circumstances which led to this unfortunate and regrettable incident, as follows:

“The aircraft engaged in this mission encountered winds more than sixty miles per hour greater than expected. The leading aircraft of the air units involved was shot down and was replaced by the deputy leader. While the aircraft were approaching the target over almost solid clouds, there occurred a malfunction of special navigational equipment in the aircraft of the deputy leader. The loss of the leader of the formation, together with the unanticipated high wind and the failure of navigational equipment, caused a variation from the intended course. The bombardier of the leading aircraft dropped his bombs and markers on what he believed he had identified as the primary target through breaks in the clouds. Following aircraft released their bombs at the point marked by the leading aircraft, again in the belief that they were bombing the primary objective.

“Photographs taken on the mission show that the majority of the bombs pictured struck in woods outside of the town. The remainder of the bombs fell in the railroad yards and river front areas of the town of Schaffhausen.”

I am also informed by the Secretary of War that directives now in effect prohibit the bombing of any targets in Germany not positively identified if they are within fifty miles of the borders of Switzerland.

It is further understood that the War Department communicated to the American Military Attaché at Bern full details of the investigation as well as of the concrete measures to prevent similar accidents

in the future, and that he has already discussed these matters with the appropriate Swiss authorities.

I am sure that you will appreciate the necessity of my urging that the foregoing information be treated as confidential by your Government and not be given publicity either here or in Switzerland.

Accept [etc.]

CORDELL HULL

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[On October 11, 1944, a second installment of \$3,000,000 was paid to Switzerland to assist those in distress as a result of the bombing of Schaffhausen. Then several years later, October 21, 1949, the State Department in a note to the Swiss Legation offered the Swiss Government 62,176,433.06 Swiss francs, which included interest through that date, in full and final settlement of balance due on all claims for losses and damages inflicted on persons and property in all Switzerland during World War II by units of the United States Armed Forces in violation of neutral rights. By a note of the same date the Swiss accepted the offer and agreed that the Swiss Government would assume responsibility for making the payment of individual claims involved. The money for the payment had been appropriated by the 81st Congress on October 14, 1949. For texts of notes exchanged October 21, 1949, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 2112.]

## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

### REPORTS ON DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE CONCERNING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES<sup>1</sup>

861.001/18 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, January 3, 1944.

[Received January 4—3:15 p. m.]

6. In his New Year's message which appeared in Moscow papers of January 1 President Kalinin<sup>2</sup> reviewed the military successes of the Red Army for '43 and paid tribute to the self-sacrificing work of the Soviet people on farms and in factories in keeping the armies supplied during the offensive operations.

The later part of the message is devoted to the war effort of the Allies and the unity which resulted from the Moscow<sup>3</sup> and Tehran Conference.<sup>4</sup> In this connection Kalinin states: "Parallel with the blows of the Red Army our Allies also conducted an uninterrupted struggle with the German Fascist troops this year. Anglo-American troops drove the Germans from North Africa, Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica. Now the battle has been transferred to southern Italy where the Allied troops are steadily advancing toward the capital of Italy, Rome. The Anglo-American Air Forces have been working effectively destroying strategic industrial targets in Germany.

"The strongest ally of Germany in Europe, Italy, has capitulated and the Italian people are increasingly being drawn into the struggle with the Germans.<sup>5</sup>

"The joint struggle against German fascism has led to the close political *rapprochement* of the Allies".

Kalinin states that the Moscow Conference "assured the further *rapprochement* of the Allies in their affairs and paved the way for

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<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 497-613.

<sup>2</sup> Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union (President).

<sup>3</sup> For documentation on the Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Moscow, October 18-November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

<sup>4</sup> For documentation on this Conference held between November 27 and December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

<sup>5</sup> In regard to the surrender of Italy and its recognition as a co-belligerent, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 314 ff.

the meeting of the leaders of the Allied countries" and that the Tehran Conference "would go down in history as the Tehran Conference of the three great powers of the world". "The Tehran Conference, continues Kalinin, is in reality the greatest event of our times, a historical landmark in the struggle with the German aggressor. All the efforts of the Germans to separate the freedom loving nations failed. The leaders of the three great powers reached full agreement on questions of war and peace. Namely they achieved that for which the popular masses in the occupied countries suffering under the heel of the German boot are thirsting".

Kalinin stated that the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship and mutual assistance <sup>6</sup> was an important contribution in the struggle against German aggression.

In conclusion he reminded his fellow countrymen that the unremitting efforts of the front and rear were necessary for complete victory and expressed the hope that the final blows to the Fascist invaders would be dealt in 44 and Soviet territory entirely liberated.

HARRIMAN

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711.61/968 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 9, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received January 10—6:27 a. m.]

69. For President and the Secretary. I believe I should report to you the development of our relations with the Soviet officials since Tehran.

Although Molotov <sup>7</sup> and those with whom members of the Military Mission <sup>8</sup> have had contact are cordial and friendly and have given approval in principle to number of our proposals, we have had complete runaround in getting action on or even detailed discussion of these proposals. I am speaking particularly of the military proposals you gave Stalin <sup>9</sup> at Tehran and others submitted by General Deane on instructions from Washington. Also information, asked

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<sup>6</sup> Signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943: for text, see Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I (July 1948), p. 228, or *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxlv, p. 238. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*.

<sup>7</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>8</sup> The United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union, Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, commanding general. Concerning the proposal for establishment of this mission, and its acceptance, see telegram 934, October 1, 1943, to Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 704.

<sup>9</sup> Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

for, by Washington to justify Lend-Lease requests<sup>10</sup> has not been forthcoming or has been so vague as to be of little, if any, value.

About a week ago after discussion with General Deane and members of Military Mission, I came to the conclusion that the time had come for us to demand action. This policy has already shown some results but we are still far from satisfied.

If we don't get action promptly on those matters directly contributing to prosecution of war I intend to insist on interview with Stalin. At the moment I am inclined to believe that Soviet inaction comes not from ill-will but from the bottlenecking of all decisions in the Kremlin and fact that spirit of Tehran has not percolated to lower echelons. Unless we blast this open now, and I believe it can be done by firm but still friendly approach, a pattern will be set in our relations with Soviets which will result in our getting minimum of value out of cooperation agreed to at Tehran, except on the highest strategic level, in the war and in fact in our postwar relationships as well.

HARRIMAN

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711.61/970 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 11, 1944—noon.

[Received 9:47 p. m.]

86. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing my No. 69, January 9, 2 p. m., describing our current controversy with the Soviet authorities over their inaction on our military proposals, I have a letter from Molotov stating that the military authorities have given instructions to deal with the matters we have up. As a result, General Deane, for the first time, was called over yesterday by an officer of the General Staff. On all previous occasions, Deane's talks have been on his own initiative. There was a distinct change of attitude and about a dozen subjects were satisfactorily disposed of, perhaps the most important being full agreement to allow General Cannon<sup>11</sup> on his visit to Russia to study Soviet experience in air support of ground operations. Deane was told, however, that they were not yet ready to discuss the subjects covered by your memoranda given to Stalin at Tehran, including the military proposals submitted at the Moscow Conference.

I am encouraged by the above, but am satisfied we still have a fight ahead to get the cooperation to which we are entitled.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>10</sup> The Lend-Lease Act was approved on March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31. For correspondence concerning wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 1032 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon, with the United States Army abroad.

760c.61/2153 : Telegram

*The Chargé Near the Czechoslovak Government in Exile  
(Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:28 p. m.]

Czechoslovakia 1.

[The first part of this telegram describing relations between Poland and the Soviet Union is printed in volume III, page 1225.]

Speaking of Russian policy generally Ripka<sup>13</sup> said Beneš<sup>14</sup> had taken away three principal impressions: (1) The Russians desired sincerely to carry forward the policy of cooperation with Britain and the United States. He was convinced this was not a tactical move but a long range policy. (2) They desired to assure that Germany should not be able to disturb the peace. (3) They desired the neighboring states to have governments with which they could maintain good relations.

On the latter point Stalin had said to Beneš that Russia would have plenty to do to take care of its own internal problems without trying to interfere in those of other states. He did not [underestimate?] the value of the recently concluded treaty. Stalin and Molotov had indicated that the Czechoslovak Government should occupy Czechoslovakia within its prewar frontiers on liberation. There were no frontier disputes with Russia. Other frontier adjustments should be left for the peace conference. Stalin was also in agreement regarding the transfer of the Sudeten German population.

With regard to Soviet relations with other countries of southeastern Europe, Ripka was less precise as to Beneš' impressions. The Russian attitude regarding Austrian independence he said had been made public at the Moscow Conference.<sup>15</sup> As for Austrian-Czechoslovak relations the Soviet Government favored close cooperation but the forms was left vague and was to develop in an evolutionary manner.

With regard to Rumania, the Soviets would claim the return of Bessarabia and Bukovina.<sup>16</sup> They were willing to support the Rumanians with regard to Transylvania. They felt very strongly about the Hungarians.

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<sup>13</sup> Hubert Ripka, at times Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in place of Jan Masaryk.

<sup>14</sup> Eduard Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939-1945, recognized as President of Czechoslovakia by the Allied Powers after July 1940.

<sup>15</sup> The text of the declaration regarding Austria agreed on at the Moscow Conference is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 761.

<sup>16</sup> For correspondence concerning the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and its seizure of Bessarabia, see *ibid.*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 444 ff.

As regarded Yugoslavia,<sup>17</sup> they were not opposed to the King and favored the continuation of the Yugoslav State, believing that it was better to have the difficulties between the conflicting elements handled within the limits of a single state than to allow them to be divided into their component parts and thus become a cause of constant international disturbance.

[SCHOENFELD]

862.01/534 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received January 14—11:55 a. m.]

114. At the Moscow Conference the Soviet Government stated that its support of Free German Committee<sup>18</sup> in Russia had been from its inception a propaganda move designed to weaken German resistance and that the statements of Free German Committee were not expressions of policy of Soviet Government. Subsequent developments including discussions at Tehran have supported that statement. Such copies of *Freies Deutschland*<sup>19</sup> as Embassy has received since Moscow Conference have indicated a change in the propaganda line. They have ceased to hold out hope to the Germans that the German Army might be maintained intact after Hitler's overthrow and intimate time when such an outcome was possible has passed and that the overthrow of Hitler is now necessary for salvation Germany itself and preservations of lives of the troops in rapidly weakening German Army. Also the Kharkov trial clearly showed intention of Soviet Government to hold individual Germans responsible for crimes committed by them during German occupation of Soviet territory.<sup>20</sup>

It is believed that Department in revising or amplifying its airgram A-34, November 24,<sup>21</sup> will wish to keep in mind foregoing although fact should not be overlooked that Soviet Government at the Moscow Conference expressly asked that its attitude toward the Free Germany Committee be kept secret.

HARRIMAN

<sup>17</sup> In regard to the concern of the United States with internal conditions in Yugoslavia, see pp. 1330 ff.

<sup>18</sup> In regard to the founding of the "Free Germany" National Committee in Moscow under Soviet auspices on July 12, 1943, and its activities, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 552-605, *passim*.

<sup>19</sup> Newspaper published by the "Free Germany" National Committee.

<sup>20</sup> In regard to the trial and sentencing of German war criminals and the Kharkov trial, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 845 ff.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 602.



711.61/972 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 18, 1944.

[Received January 19—1:40 p. m.]

176. Stettinius'<sup>22</sup> radio statement regarding United States cooperation with Soviet Union receives 3½ inches of prominently placed space in Moscow newspapers for January 18.<sup>23</sup> Reporting Under Secretary's statement that any other policy would be a tragic mistake, item quotes his remarks regarding impression of Soviet peoples resourcefulness and courage derived from contacts with Soviet representatives in America, and statement America has much to gain and nothing to lose by continuing close collaboration with Soviet Union now and after war.

HARRIMAN

710.61/2 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*<sup>24</sup>

Moscow, January 18, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received January 19—5:24 p. m.]

180. As the Department is aware, a large number of diplomatic and official visas have been issued during 1943 to Soviet officials and employees proceeding to Mexico, Cuba, Colombia and Uruguay. According to the records of the Embassy a total of 128 such visas were issued here. Of these 27 were for Cuba (7 diplomatic, 20 official), 53 for Mexico (20 diplomatic, 33 official), 22 for Colombia (6 diplomatic, 16 official) and 26 for Uruguay (15 diplomatic, 11 official), of the 128 visas issued 56 were for wives. The few children who accompanied their parents were included in mothers' passports and are not included in the present figures. From the records of Embassy, it is not possible to determine the functions of those given official visas. This total is in marked contrast to number of Latin American officials resident in the Soviet Union: Mexico 6, Cuba 1, Colombia 1 and Uruguay none, all officers.

Latin American diplomats in Moscow are frank to admit that they know of no particular reasons for such large staffs in their countries.

<sup>22</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under Secretary of State.

<sup>23</sup> These remarks were made during the second broadcast of the National Broadcasting Company series, "The State Department Speaks"; see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1944, p. 74.

<sup>24</sup> A paraphrase of this telegram was sent in a circular airgram on January 31, 1944, to the American Missions in Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Russian interests in Latin America are and always have been relatively insignificant, apart from the political warfare activities which have been carried on in the past. It is difficult on basis of our present information to appraise at the moment what is the Russian attitude toward Latin America.

The Soviets are quite aware of the emotional aversion with which they have been regarded in Latin America, as well as the causes therefor. They must also realize that at present they can command far more sympathy than at any time since the Bolshevik revolution and that it is to their interest to cultivate it. There are numerous small evidences that they are trying in Moscow to please the Latin American diplomats with small courtesies and favors which are not always extended to other foreign representatives.

The Soviet Government having few men trained for Latin America and hoping under the changing attitude toward it to establish relations with other republics,<sup>25</sup> may be using its Missions in the four countries with which it now has relations as training posts. Having once been considered an outcast and now having attained the recognized status of a great power, the Soviet Government quite naturally wants the prestige attendant on universal recognition of its position. This would seem to be the most reasonable explanation of the movement of officials unless it is still intended to carry on the political activities of the past. Embassy has no evidence that latter is the case; nor has it, because of the difficulties in Moscow of obtaining direct and specific information on many subjects of political nature, much opportunity of knowing just what are the attitudes and intentions of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the other American Republics.

The Embassy will, of course, continue to report such items as appear in press and such other indications of attitude as it may be able to receive. It would be helpful in order to fill in parts of the picture and balance the Russian with the Latin American picture, if the Embassy could be provided with such information as Department may receive concerning the activities of Soviet officials in the countries with which relations have been established, as well as developments relating to the Soviet Union in the other Republics. The Department's airgram number A-37 of December 6, '43<sup>26</sup> was most useful and it is hoped this type of report may be continued.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>25</sup> See bracketed note enumerating some Latin American Republics which were considering recognition of the Soviet Union, vol. VII, section entitled "Attitude of the United States with respect to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the American Republics and the Soviet Union."

<sup>26</sup> Not printed.

861.4061 Motion Pictures/78: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 22, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received January 23—10:55 a. m.]

224. When I saw Dekanozov<sup>27</sup> this afternoon he stated that the Soviet Government desired to award decorations to the creators of two films that had contributed to strengthening friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, namely *North Star* and *Mission to Moscow*. He asked my reaction to this proposal.

I asked his opinion of the film *Battle for Russia*. Dekanozov replied that he had not seen it. I thereupon explained to him that it was prepared by the War Department for education of troops and that we all considered that it has made a great contribution to an understanding of the history of the war in relation to Russia, the gallantry of the Red Army, and the Russian people. Dekanozov appeared interested in my comments and said he would see the picture.

I inquired the names of the persons on whom the Soviet Government had in mind conferring the decorations. Dekanozov replied that they have not been decided upon and that he would advise me as soon as the matter was agreed to in principle.

I told him I would cable the Department and get an answer to his inquiry. I would appreciate advice on this matter as soon as practicable.

HARRIMAN

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861.4061 Motion Pictures/78: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1944—3 p. m.

173. The Department does not feel that it can undertake to pass on the desirability of the Soviet Government awarding decorations to the producers of the films mentioned in your 224, January 22. The selection of private persons for Soviet decorations is a matter for the decision of the Soviet Government alone.

In conveying the foregoing to Dekanosov you might if you consider it desirable and possible mention to him in a personal and informal manner the fact that at the time of its release the film "*Mission*

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<sup>27</sup> Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

To Moscow” aroused undesirable and heated controversy in the press and elsewhere in the United States concerning the Soviet Union and Soviet-American relations. This controversy has now subsided, but it is of course possible that the award of the Soviet decoration to the producer of this film might serve to revive it. An award to the producer of the “Battle For Russia” which you very properly brought to the attention of Dekanosov would certainly be better received in the United States. The Department leaves entirely to your discretion whether the above considerations should be mentioned or not to Dekanosov.

HULL

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861.03/6 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 31, 1944—8 a. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

302. An official of the Foreign Office told me last night at a social gathering, in response to my question, that the second item on the agenda for consideration at the current meeting of the Supreme Soviet,<sup>28</sup> namely, changing the People’s Commissariats for Defense and Foreign Affairs from All-Union Commissariats to Union-Republican Commissariats, envisages as one aspect giving the Union Republics the right to exchange diplomatic representatives with foreign countries in cases where the Union Republic and the foreign country concerned so desire. He remarked that the Soviets had in mind the practice of the British Commonwealth.

A similar statement was made to an officer of my staff by another Foreign Office official as an expression of personal opinion. This official added that the proposal would mean the establishment of individual Commissariats for Foreign Affairs in each of the 16 constituent republics. He said further that separate Commissariats for Defense and separate armies would also be organized in the individual republics.

We have no information as yet on the degree of control that the central Commissariats will exercise and on how much real autonomy will be given the individual republics.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>28</sup> The opening session of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union had taken place on the evening of January 28. At this session the budgets for the Soviet Union and the constituent republics had been presented. The last previous meeting of the Supreme Council had been a brief session held on June 18, 1942.

861.01/2297 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 2, 1944.

[Received February 3—12:55 p. m.]

347. The official communiqué concerning the tenth session of the Supreme Soviet reports that on February 1st at 7 p. m. the Supreme Soviet Lenin [*held a?*] joint session to consider the question of the reorganization of the All Union Commissariats of Defense and Foreign Affairs as Union Republican Commissariats. Molotov's report on this subject was frequently interrupted by prolonged applause giving expression to the approval of the proposals introduced by the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR and to the confidence that the forthcoming state reorganization would assist in the further strengthening of the state.<sup>29</sup> Molotov was followed by the following deputies: Y. I. Paletskis, Lithuanian SSR; M. D. Bagirov, Azerbaidzhanian SSR; V. T. Latsis, Latvian SSR; P. K. Ponomarenko, White Russian SSR; A. A. Bogomolets, Ukrainian SSR; I. Ya. Vares, Estonian SSR; M. S. Grechukha, Ukrainian SSR; and P. S. Prokonek, Karelo Finnish SSR.

The communiqué states that in the absence of opposition to the proposals Molotov refrained from making a final statement. The Supreme Soviet voting by houses then unanimously adopted the "law for the creation of military formations in the Union Republics and for the corresponding reorganization of the People's Commissariat of Defense from an All-Union to a Union Republican People's Commissariat" and the "law for granting the Union Republics plenipotentiary powers in the field of foreign relations and the corresponding reorganization of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from an All-Union to a Union Republican People's Commissariat".<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> A full translation of Molotov's speech was sent to the Department in telegram 359 on February 3. In particular, about the Commissariats for Foreign Affairs, Molotov explained: "After the establishment of the Union of Soviet [Socialist] Republics in 1922 foreign political relations were entirely concentrated in the All Union People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the separate republics turned over their plenipotentiary powers in foreign relations to this Commissariat. Now the Government of the Union proposed to grant to the Union Republics plenipotentiary powers to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conduct [*conclude?*] agreements with them. It is natural that the granting to the Republics of plenipotentiary powers in the field of foreign relations makes it necessary to create Commissariats for Foreign Affairs in the Union Republics and to reorganize the All Union Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as a Union Republican People's Commissariat." (861.01/-2298)

<sup>30</sup> Translations of the texts of these laws were sent to the Department in telegram 413, February 8, 1944, from Moscow (not printed). A translation of the law regarding the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and a partial translation of the circular note of February 11, from the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs about this reorganization were printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 6, 1944, p. 421.

The Supreme Soviet then proceeded to the third point on the agenda concerning a first vice president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This question was presented by Kalinin who proposed that N. M. Shvernik be elected First Vice President. Voting jointly the Supreme Soviet unanimously elected Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, First Vice President of the Presidium.

Thereupon the tenth session of the Supreme Soviet rose.

HARRIMAN

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861.00/2-344

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*<sup>31</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1944.

The full significance of the change in the People's Commissariats For Foreign Affairs and Defense which accords the right to the sixteen constituent republics (including the three former Baltic States) to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign countries and have their own military units can only be assessed when the manner of implementation of this change is known. This change in itself does not mean a move towards greater decentralization and does not basically alter the constitutional structure of the Soviet Union. The centralized control of Moscow has never been exercised through the Governmental structure but through the Communist Party and will unquestionably continue to be exercised through Party channels. No basic structural change has been made in the Soviet constitutional structural machinery since Union-Republican Commissariats are the rule rather than the exception in the Soviet Government. It merely means that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, for example, formerly only an All-Union Commissariat speaking for the Union as a whole will now have what amounts to branch offices in the sixteen constituent republics. Thus you will have a Commissariat For Foreign Affairs of the USSR in Moscow the parent body and Commissariats For Foreign Affairs in the sixteen Republics.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> This memorandum was sent to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to James C. Dunn, the Director of the Office of European Affairs and also Acting Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, and to H. Freeman Matthews, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs. The Division of Eastern European Affairs had been abolished on June 16, 1937, and its functions made a part of the Division of European Affairs. It was reestablished in a reorganization of the Department of State by Departmental Order 1218 of January 15, 1944. See Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1944, p. 55.

<sup>32</sup> In accordance with this law, the appointments of People's Commissars of Foreign Affairs for each of the Soviet Socialist Republics of the Union were announced before the end of the year.

Although the amendment to the Constitution introducing this change gives to each of the sixteen republics the theoretical right to maintain relations and to conduct negotiations with foreign governments, it is certain that this right will be exercised in accordance with Moscow's decisions. Molotov in introducing the resolution spoke only of this right being exercised in economic and cultural matters where the special interests of individual republics are concerned. There is no evidence as yet to support the view that this will mean sixteen diplomatic representatives from the Soviet Union in the capitals of the world. The All-Union Commissariat will continue to speak for Russia in most international matters.

The right to maintain military establishment will not according to Molotov affect the primary responsibility of the All-Union Government for the armed forces of the Soviet Union which will probably merely mean the designation by name of units from the various constituent republics.

Some of the motives which lay behind this change are apparent, others will have to wait further developments. It is no accident that this change giving the appearance of greater independence to the constituent republics comes at a time when the Soviet Armies are on the border of the former Baltic Republics. At least one of the purposes is to make more palatable the reincorporation of the Baltic States<sup>33</sup> since they will not now be absorbed by Russia but will be given on paper more of the appearance of semi-independent states with their own foreign offices and military establishments. It should also facilitate the public presentation of the incorporation of Eastern Poland which again will be Ukrainians and White Russians reuniting with a Ukrainian and White Russian republic rather than coming under the domination of Moscow.<sup>34</sup> It is apparent in view of this light that the change is not only designed to render these territorial acquisitions more palatable to world opinion but also to the inhabitants of the areas concerned.

While there is nothing to prevent the Soviet Government from using these sixteen republics of the constituent republics to add more weight in international negotiation, this will probably be confined to certain special subjects and not to negotiations on a high political level (this change was forecast by reports from London of the Soviet insistence that if the British Dominions were represented on the War Crimes Commission so should the constituent republics of the Soviet Union). In actual practice it is probable that any one of the constituent republics will only maintain diplomatic relations with border countries

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<sup>33</sup> For correspondence concerning the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 357 ff.

<sup>34</sup> In regard to the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile, and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 1216 ff.

with which they have special problems under, of course, the complete control and direction of Moscow. For example, White Russia and the Ukraine might well after the war maintain relations with Poland, the three Baltic Republics with Finland, the Central Asian republics with Afghanistan, and the Caucasian republics with Iran and Turkey.

There is no ground for believing that this change signifies a desire to make the incorporation of other territories any easier although it could obviously be useful if such were the desire. It must be remembered that all the areas affected have been thoroughly Sovietized and have been brought under the complete domination of Moscow. An attempt to apply this formula to non-Soviet areas would expose the Soviet Union to adverse criticism of imperialism without much real advantage.

From the internal point of view this change is a gesture in deference to the feelings of the national minorities within the Soviet Union. While the war has stimulated all over Europe, including the Soviet Union, the feeling of nationalism, the Soviet Government has drawn heavily on national feelings in its war propaganda and the Soviet press has almost exclusively expressed Russian nationalism. It is possible that some of the national minorities were becoming uneasy at the possibility of the recrudescence of great Russian chauvinism, and this move is designed to allay these fears in demonstrating that the Soviet national policy has not only not changed but is to be positively developed.

C. E. BOHLEN

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761.00/2-344

*Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of Eastern European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1944.

#### CERTAIN ASPECTS OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY

##### SUMMARY

Although many reports have been received regarding present Communist activities in other countries in Europe as well as in the Western Hemisphere, they have not been as numerous or as conclusive as those summarized below. It is believed, however, that these summaries covering six fairly different countries in Europe, all overrun by the Nazi, give a comparatively clear indication of one aspect of Soviet foreign policy which unless it is studied and correlated might not otherwise be apparent.



While it is obvious to any observer of the present international scene that the only solution for a lasting peace must, in the interests of all, the Soviet Union included, be based upon a policy of general security and cooperation, the summary below indicates that there are strong forces still operating behind the scenes which may detract from or prevent the full attainment of this goal.

Although the Soviet leaders most likely realize that the Moscow and Tehran policy of cooperation is the only one which can assure whole-hearted western aid for their devastated country, they apparently are not fully convinced that this policy will succeed. They are, therefore, fostering a rather extensive, pure Soviet, supplementary policy through the Comintern apparatus.

The following is an outline of this "new" Comintern technique and its results:

1. When the Soviet Union found itself fighting on the same side with the majority of the free nations of the world, it became apparent that the disadvantages of maintaining the Communist International with its site in Moscow, outweighed the advantages it could bring to the Soviet Government. This may have been one of the principal reasons for its dissolution in May 1943.<sup>36</sup>

2. Although the Communist International was officially dissolved, the resolution disbanding the organization indicated clearly that one of the reasons for its abolition was that the national Communist parties were now able to stand on their own without guidance from a central organization. They are now operating under this policy.

3. Through the Comintern techniques, refined over a comparatively long period of time, the various national organizations have been well schooled in the usefulness of the "front" organizations and how to utilize them in the common cause. Therefore it apparently proved expedient to announce publicly the dissolution of the Comintern and thus give greater opportunity to local Communist parties to work more openly as ostensible national political groups.

4. In this connection it should be emphasized that for over fifteen years the Comintern has been and still is used primarily as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy and not as an instrument for the attainment of world revolution.

5. Instead, as in the popular front technique of 1935, of encouraging coalitions among left wing groups in various countries, the present nationalist Communist policy is to back up and try to gain control of the most prominent and most appealing nationalist group, regardless of its political complexion.

The analysis given below indicates that the Communist elements are supporting directly or through their "front" organizations, such

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<sup>36</sup> For correspondence concerning the dissolution of the Communist (Third) International, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 531-538 and 542-543.

divergent political elements as the King and the Social Democrats in Norway, the trade unions in Norway, France and Italy, to anti-monarchy groups in Italy, Yugoslavia and Greece and anti-social Democratic groups in Poland. The "front" organizations are controlled by a small percentage of Communist Party workers, while a large majority of the members often do not realize that they are members of a Communist-dominated group. All reports indicate that the same general tactics are being followed by all the Nationalist Communist groups despite the dissolution of the central organization in Moscow.

6. On the basis of many reports received from various sources it would appear that in all the countries studied except Poland, where they failed to build a strong organization, Communist elements have built up the strongest political group in the nation and hope that they will be in *de facto* control of many of the areas at the time of liberation.

7. The recent emphasis given in the Soviet Union to the revival of the successful Czarist Pan-Slav policy in the Balkans, the increased prominence given to religious activities in the U. S. S. R.<sup>37</sup> which is at least partially for Balkan consumption, the conclusion of the Czech treaty, the break in relations with the Poles coupled with the Soviet insistence that it cannot deal with the "reactionary" Polish government<sup>38</sup> as it is now formed, the favorable Soviet reaction to the establishment of Tito's provisional government<sup>39</sup> and the position of dominance gained by the Communist-controlled resistance movement in Greece,<sup>40</sup> indicate that in Eastern Europe and the Balkans at least, some Soviet leaders may hope to establish more or less complete Soviet hegemony.

8. The rather considerable success gained by the Communist groups may be attributed in large part to their espousal of a more active resistance than preached by the Governments-in-exile who in general have little prestige among their harassed home populations. The activist policy of the Communists has gained for their organizations many members who are not communist sympathizers but who are disgusted with the conservatism, political bickering and passive resistance policies of the exile governments.

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<sup>37</sup> For correspondence concerning the interest of the United States in religious conditions in the Soviet Union, see pp. 1211 ff.

<sup>38</sup> For the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a Soviet-supported government in Poland, see vol. III, pp. 1398 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Josip Broz (Marshal Tito), military leader of the Partisan guerrillas in Yugoslavia, and chairman of the Committee of National Defence in the Provisional Government established by the Partisans on December 4, 1943.

<sup>40</sup> For United States policy with respect to the government of Greece following its liberation, see vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. The almost continuous Soviet and Communist plea for the immediate application of the full democratic process in all countries, is perhaps not unconnected with the efforts being made by nationalist Communist groups to strengthen their organizations particularly those of the "front" type. It cannot be excluded that the Soviet authorities feel that by encouraging the full application of the democratic process the Kremlin, through the dominant groups it is building up in most European countries, will be able in most postwar elections to win a substantial minority or majority and thus assure strong Soviet influence or even control over the new democratic European governments.

2. If the Communist policy in Italy is any criterion it would appear that they are insisting on the immediate application of all Democratic freedoms and elections in order to take full advantage of the political confusion which follows liberation and thus assure the most favorable outcome for the well-organized Communist-controlled elements before other less well-organized political groups can bring their programs to the electorate.

3. It would appear that one of the reasons for adopting this policy may be the realization on the part of Soviet leaders that their country will be so weakened after fifteen years of "pulling itself up by its bootstraps" combined with the loss of perhaps twenty million people during a war which has brought great devastation, undernourishment and debilitation to their country, that they wish to have their own *cordon sanitaire* and their own assurances, apart from any possible general security guarantee, that no country or group of countries will be in a position to threaten them until they can regain their strength.

4. In this connection it cannot be excluded that the recent Soviet constitutional amendments which tend to make a federation rather than a Union of the U. S. S. R., may not be unconnected with a possible plan to have other states which may be under Communist control, adhere to the new federation.

5. It would appear that the possible Soviet fear of the basic weakness of their country after the war gives us now our best lever with which to convince them they will have to drop their "Comintern foreign policy" if they want our aid and cooperation after the war.

If they are reluctant to drop this policy it could be pointed out to them that while they may gain a temporary respite, in the long run they will not only find it much more difficult to recuperate their lost strength but would have instead of our helpful assistance the dubious guarantee of perhaps temporary backing from various small states whose policies it might be difficult for them to control over a long period of time.

In order to convince them that it is in their interests to enter into a sincere and full understanding with us we should make it patently clear now that it will be impossible for us to give our wholehearted, full cooperation and aid to them if they insist on taking unilateral actions which are not in conformity with the basic principles agreed to in Moscow and Tehran.

In other words if by firmness, friendliness and positive action we can convince them that it is not only in our interest but theirs as well to join the family of nations as a full fledged member, we may be able to cause them to drop at least the most odious aspects of their "back door" methods of interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

In any event it would appear essential to us to recognize that a basic revolution has been and is still going on in Europe and that we should therefore attune our policy to this fundamental reality. That policy might best be implemented by giving aid and encouragement to any and all truly liberal governments or groups which show that they can command the respect of a large part of the nation. By giving considerable economic aid we perhaps can not only assist such regimes but also prevent a state of complete chaos from developing which situation, if it should come about, would only play into the hands of the enemies of liberal democratic groups.

#### INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES

With the historic achievements attained by the Moscow and Tehran Conferences which laid the foundation for the inauguration of a new era of cooperation between the western powers and the Soviet Union, it is felt to be in the interests of all to watch carefully every development which seems to have a bearing on the implementation of this sound policy. Only in this way can we attain the goal we have set for ourselves.

While it is obvious that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union to guide its policy into new channels which will bring it into harmony with the democracies, it is also obvious because of the long-standing differences in points of view and particularly in political methods that this hoped for result will not be easy of attainment.

Because of the possibility that information pointing to some of the possible pitfalls ahead comes from various sources and therefore is not always correlated, it is believed a useful purpose may be served in giving an outline of some of the developments which have been reported prior and subsequent to the Moscow and Tehran Conferences which may portend an outcome other than that which we hope for.

The outline given below of some of these developments is based on reports from Department listening posts abroad as well as reports from the War and Navy Departments, Office of Strategic Services and

British sources furnished by Office of Strategic Services. They refer primarily to moves made by various national Communist groups since the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943.

In the latter connection it should be borne in mind that:

1. Since 1927 the Comintern has not been particularly active as the guiding spirit in World Revolution but its influence has been used as a most effective adjunct of Soviet foreign policy.

2. At the last Comintern Congress in 1935<sup>41</sup> one of the principal proposals discussed was the advisability of its dissolution, since it was argued that the various national Communist parties reputedly had been sufficiently indoctrinated so that they no longer needed guidance from a central organization in Moscow, which therefore should be dissolved. This was one of the principal reasons given in 1943 for the dissolution of the Comintern.

3. The American Communist Party was the first to sever its official ties with Moscow in 1940,<sup>42</sup> although the policies it has since advocated have been very close to the "Party line" of the Comintern.

4. The Comintern with its site in Moscow has always been a source of embarrassment to the Soviet Government although it never admitted it had the slightest control over Comintern policies. This embarrassment became more intense when the Soviet Government found itself fighting on the same side with the great Democracies of the West. This as well as the argument of the 1935 Comintern Congress that national communist groups could carry on without the necessity of a publicly acknowledged central directing organization, may be assumed to be among the principal reasons why it was decided to dissolve the Moscow organization. In other words, the disadvantages of maintaining the central organization outweighed the advantages.

5. National communist groups operate not only under their own name but make, even today, effective use of "front" organizations which reputedly have no direct connections with Moscow or the national Communist parties.

6. In connection with point 5, it should be particularly borne in mind that since Lenin first inaugurated the system in 1903, Communist parties have always operated and with increasingly effective results, on a small membership basis. Only persons completely in-

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<sup>41</sup> Correspondence concerning the protest to the Soviet Union against activities of the VII Congress of the Communist International in violation of the pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of the United States is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 218-268.

<sup>42</sup> The Communist Party in the United States took action on November 16, 1940, to withdraw from the Communist International to avoid the necessity of registering under the Anti-Subversive Activities Act (Voorhis Act), approved on October 17, 1940; 54 Stat. 1201. See the *New York Times*, November 17, 1940, p. 9, col. 1.

doctrinated and willing to make any sacrifice and blindly follow the Party line as laid down by the directorate have been admitted to and retained in the Party. This accounts for the often mistaken idea that the Communists cannot represent any real important force since there are so few of them. This small group is often used to infiltrate into or operate the "front" organizations which they usually are able to control more or less effectively.

7. It appears possible that the Soviet Government, realizing that the brilliant action of the Red Army which has rightly increased Soviet prestige abroad, felt that national Communist Parties or their "front" organizations were in a most favorable position to seize the popular imagination in many countries and that the continued existence of the central organization would detract from taking full advantage of this situation; hence the dissolution of the Comintern.

With these preliminary thoughts in view the following outline of recent Communist activities in six Nazi-occupied countries may be of interest.

[Here follow six separate sections (not printed) which concern Communist activities in Norway, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Poland.]

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740.0011 European War 1939/33255

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)*

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1944.

The Minister of Lithuania<sup>43</sup> came in this afternoon to state that the position of his country was becoming very, very difficult with the approach of the Russian forces to the Lithuanian border, and he asked whether there was any possibility of some "international action" being taken, perhaps at the suggestion of the United States, which would clarify the status of his country and would preserve the rights of the Lithuanians to conduct their own Government at some time as soon as possible after the hostilities ceased, if not before. He also asked whether it would be possible for the United States to make some restatement of its attitude toward the Lithuanian Government.<sup>44</sup>

I told Mr. Zadeikis that I did not know of any international action which was now contemplated or which might even be possible of contemplation at this time or in the near future with respect to that

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<sup>43</sup> Povilas Zadeikis.

<sup>44</sup> The statement made on July 23, 1940, by the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, on the position of the United States regarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 401.

part where the war was now going on, nor did I know of any contemplated restatement of the position of the United States with respect to Lithuania. I said that to my mind there did not appear to be any necessity of a restatement of our position, nor did any present occasion seem to call for such a statement. There had been no change in the American Government's position in that regard, and therefore there seemed to be no call for making any statement in the premises.

I further stated that it was the policy of the United States to bend all its efforts to the promotion of general cooperation among the nations in the hope that on the basis of general cooperation many questions between various countries might better be dealt with within the framework of international cooperation generally. I said there were many things that it was not feasible to do during the prosecution of the war, and that we must not be discouraged in carrying forward the general principles of understanding and cooperation.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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861.01/2303 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 6, 1944—11 p. m.  
[Received February 7—11:15 a. m.]

392. It is too early to understand fully the implications of the action of the Supreme Soviet in transforming the All-Union Commissariats for Defense and Foreign Affairs into Union-Republican Commissariats. In fact I doubt whether Soviet officials, even if they were willing to expose their minds, would be able to predict definitely the developments that may take place. Certain aspects, however, are already clear and in addition it is perhaps of use to the Department to discuss some of the possible motivations and implications, both immediate and for the future.

It is well known that Stalin personally has taken a keen interest in the nationality problems within the Soviet Union, coming as he does from the strongly nationalist Georgian Republic. There is nothing surprising, therefore, in his initiating moves in the direction of the preservation and stimulation of opportunities for expression of racial consciousness, provided always that it is used to unite rather than to divide the bonds which hold the Soviet Union together.

It is startling, of course, that defense and foreign affairs should have been selected for decentralization since, in our concept, these two functions have been traditionally considered functions to be exercised by Central to get [*sic*] authority.

On the other hand, the constitution of the Soviet Union is a unique instrumentality of Government. Even where Union-Republican Commissariats have been set up, these are directed and dominated by Central Commissariats in Moscow. Although we have no definite information as to the extent of the autonomy of the existing Union Republican Commissariats, it is fair to assume that they vary with the particular functions of each commissariat and with the state of development of individual republics.

Underlying the constitutional structure is the Communist Party. It is not only the eyes and ears of the Kremlin throughout the Union, but is also the unquestioning instrument through which decisions are put across. In the background, too, there is the kind [NKVD]<sup>45</sup> with its more direct methods of enforcing the Kremlin will.

Whatever the future may hold in store, these new methods are designed to strengthen central control of basic policies, although encouraging local expression of local interests.

Whatever the implications may be in international relations, these moves must be interpreted internally as the first of a series of measures to project the supreme leadership of Stalin resulting from the war into the post-war period.

I believe we can see more clearly the motivations for the decentralization of the Commissariat for Defense than for Foreign Affairs.

When I arrived in Moscow in October<sup>46</sup> I had the strong impression that the Russian people were war-weary and that the Kremlin was gravely concerned. It is true that since that time the Moscow and Tehran Conferences and the brilliant victories of the Red Army have been used to stimulate renewed enthusiasm. Yet this move is a brilliantly conceived method of increasing interest in service in the Red Army and in production to support it. It has been historically difficult for Russia to draft certain of its populations into the army<sup>47</sup> and the Soviets have only partially been able to overcome these local problems. Differences in language and custom have made difficulties for the Red Army in incorporating different racial groups into one unit. The proposed scheme will facilitate the formation of divisions

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<sup>45</sup> Intended here is reference to the political police of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD).

<sup>46</sup> W. Averell Harriman had presented his credentials and assumed charge of the Embassy in Moscow on October 23, 1943. See telegram 1502 of September 30, 1943, from Moscow, and footnote 99, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 581.

<sup>47</sup> In his speech of February 1, transmitted to the Department by Moscow in telegram 359 of February 3, 1944, Molotov remarked that in tsarist times the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, Kirghiz, and a majority of the nationalities of the northern Caucasus, as well as the peoples of the north regions of the empire had not been called up for military service. Even at present only "partial inductions into the Red Army have been carried out in recent years in those regions of the Soviet Union where in the old days military inductions did not occur." (861.01/2298)



within Republics, of course always, as Molotov stated "constituent parts of the Red Army". This device, too, will make it easier to gain general support for the maintenance of a substantial army after the war. It is certainly easier to convince young men that it is their duty to serve in locally organized units than in an impersonal Union army. The greater willingness of people generally to pay taxes during peace time for the support of an army of their own Republic is undoubtedly a consideration. Then, too, there may be concern over the growing political strength of the Red Army. The partial decentralization of the army and thereby the injection of political influence at a lower level would tend to minimize the army's influence after the war.

From an internal standpoint the decentralization of Foreign Affairs, in addition to giving expression to national pride, will be a means of stimulating interest in international problems, settling to the satisfaction of each Republic the wide-flung individual problems with border states, and giving expression to international economic and cultural interests of the different Republics.

Mikoyan<sup>48</sup> has told me that there was no plan nor need for change in the status of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

From an international standpoint this new machinery gives a double-barreled gun with which to deal with foreign countries, using whichever barrel may be most effective. I doubt if even the Soviets themselves can foresee the manner in which they will from time to time function. There can be no doubt that the Union will retain control of such matters as those discussed at Moscow and Tehran.

On the other hand, boundary disputes such as exist with Afghanistan will possibly be left to be worked out by the Tadzhik Republic Foreign Affairs Commissariat with the full strength of the Union standing in the background. Local border relationships generally such as between the Ukrainian Republic and Czechoslovakia and Poland could be currently worked out by the Ukrainian Commissariat. It is interesting that the Ukrainian ambitions for more extensive claims for territory than has been proposed by the Union are now advanced, probably for trading purposes.

The Soviets may believe that these moves toward autonomy may make the absorption of the Baltic States more palatable to the populations thereof and to world opinion. In addition, at the time when they want us to recognize the absorption of the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may be expected to ask for an exchange of Ministers. The Union can remain detached from such questions until it feels it expedient to take a definite position.

The Soviets may well have in mind, as a by-product, the advantage of having more than one vote in international conferences, similar to

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<sup>48</sup> Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

the British Commonwealth and to what they appear to believe we have through the control they have publicly indicated they consider we have over the American Republics. This belief is revealed in an article in the December '43 issue of *War and the Working Class* discussing the White Plan.<sup>49</sup>

Except in the case of the Baltic States and possibly Outer Mongolia, we have no indication, at least for the immediate future, that the constitutional changes have an imperialistic motivation by making it more attractive for new states to join the Union. I doubt whether there is a present desire to add to the racial indigestion of the Soviet Union by adding to their problems the difficulties of absorbing the Finns and the Poles. The Czech Treaty and the Tehran declaration commit the Soviet Union to the independence of these countries. The recent withdrawal of Soviet troops from Sinkiang is significant.<sup>50</sup> Their attitude toward other countries has been made known to us. I have not heard any discussion about Outer Mongolia and it may or may not be a coincidence that the Premier of this country<sup>51</sup> visited Moscow just before the recent session of the Supreme Soviet. On the other hand this question I believe deserves constant analysis, particularly in relation to the future.

Since Tehran, in spite of our difficulties over Poland and some other matters, I have found in my talk with Stalin and many conversations with Molotov no diminution in their desire for development of the closest relationship with us and the British and in world cooperation. Beneš' reports give encouraging support to my impressions.

I am having lunch with Molotov Tuesday<sup>52</sup> in honor of the British Ambassador's<sup>53</sup> return and will take this informal occasion to seek further enlightenment.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>49</sup> The article by Academician Eugene Varga in *War and the Working Class*, No. 13 (1 December 1943), analyzed the White Plan critically on pp. 7-9. As early as 1942, Harry Dexter White, Special Assistant to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, and Director of Monetary Research, had prepared a plan for an international stabilization fund and investment bank. This had been made public in April 1942 as a "Preliminary Draft Outline of Proposal for a United and Associated Nations Stabilization Fund."

In regard to preliminary and exploratory discussions on postwar monetary and financial arrangements, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 1054 ff.

<sup>50</sup> On this subject, see section entitled, "Political Conditions in China . . .", *Foreign Relations*, 1943, China, pp. 191-400, and entries in Index under "Sinkiang" *ibid.*, p. 906.

<sup>51</sup> Marshal Khorloin Choibalsan, the Premier of the Mongolian People's Republic, was reported to have arrived in Moscow on January 16, and to have had a meeting with Stalin on January 22, 1944.

<sup>52</sup> February 8.

<sup>53</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

861.4061 Motion Pictures/86 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 9, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received February 10—11:20 a. m.]

433. My 224, January 22, 6 p. m. A note dated February 5 has been received from Dekanozov stating that in addition to certain persons who took part in the direction and production of "North Star" and "Mission to Moscow" the Soviet Government would also like to decorate those who participated in the direction and production of the film "Battle for Russia" and the commentator of the film "The Defeat of the Germans Before Moscow" actor Edward Robinson. The Soviet Government inquires whether this proposal is acceptable.

As the Soviet Government has in the light of my remarks to Dekanozov included "Battle for Russia" thus proposes to give recognition to three of the prominent films relating to Russia produced in the United States I feel that it would not be advisable to bring to the Soviet Government's attention the comments suggested for possible use in the last paragraph of your 173 January 29, 3 p. m.

I am accordingly informing Dekanozov with reference to all three films that the selection of private individuals for decoration by the Soviet Government is in the opinion of the Department a matter for the Soviet Government to decide.

I am also informing him that I am sure that the Department will share my personal gratification for the inclusion of "Battle for Russia" in the films to which the Soviet Government wishes to accord special recognition. I am mentioning that if any of the persons selected should be members of the Armed Forces or officers of the Government the question of acceptance should be taken up by the Soviet Government through the usual diplomatic channels.<sup>54</sup>

HARRIMAN

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711.61/977a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1944—midnight.

268. Personal for the Ambassador. I am becoming increasingly concerned over the repercussions in the press and elsewhere in the United States of the successive moves of the Soviet Government in the field of foreign relations. Your telegrams, as I have already told

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<sup>54</sup> In its telegram 307 of February 15, to Moscow, the Department expressed its approval of the views given by the Ambassador (861.4061 Motion Pictures/86).

you, have been of the greatest value to us in the continuous consideration which President as well as I and my associates here have been giving to every aspect of the situation. Your comments and observations have provided us with an excellent picture of the attitude of mind of the Soviet leaders and we in turn have endeavored to give you our views as seen from the United States and this telegram should be read in conjunction with our no. 88, January 15, no. 150 January 25, as well as the President's message to Stalin contained in our no. 236, February 7.<sup>55</sup>

While we have made every effort in our contact with responsible press correspondents and commentators to counsel patience and steadiness in commenting on the recent Soviet moves in foreign affairs, and particularly in regard to the Soviet-Polish dispute, there is evidence in the press and public comment in the United States of a mounting concern and apprehension, amounting in many cases to suspicion, as to the real motives of the Soviet Government. The cumulative effect of the *Pravda* attack on Willkie,<sup>56</sup> the Cairo dispatch reporting peace negotiation rumors,<sup>57</sup> the rejection of our tender of good offices,<sup>58</sup> the failure of the British efforts up to the present to make any progress in the Polish-Soviet dispute, the truculence of the Soviet press and particularly the *War and The Working Class* including the attack on the Greek Government-in-exile, and the recent Constitutional changes with the as yet unclarified potentialities in foreign affairs, have mystified and alarmed the American public.

Whatever the justification from the Soviet point of view of each individual statement or action, the fact that they are made without any adequate clarification or explanation which our people can understand can only serve to stimulate the suspicion we are so anxious to avoid in regard to Soviet objectives and to undermine faith in the validity of the results of the Moscow and Tehran Conferences. They also provide enemy propaganda with an opportunity which is by no means being neglected at the present time.

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<sup>55</sup> These telegrams, reflecting concern of the United States over current Polish-Soviet developments, are printed in vol. III, pp. 1228, 1234, and 1243, respectively.

<sup>56</sup> Reports on the visit of Wendell L. Willkie, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt, in the Soviet Union during September 1942 are printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 637-650, *passim*. Willkie wrote an article which was published in *Life* magazine for October 5, 1942, describing his meetings with Stalin. An article in *Pravda* had bitterly attacked this.

<sup>57</sup> The newspaper *Pravda* on January 17, 1944, published a report from its own correspondent in Cairo based upon reliable information about a recent secret meeting in one of the coastal cities of the Iberian Peninsula between two responsible British officials and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. The purpose of the meeting was to find out the conditions of a separate peace with Germany. It was presumed that the meeting had not remained without results. Two days later *Pravda* printed a Tass (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) dispatch from London reporting that the Reuter Agency had stated that the British Foreign Office had denied the rumors from Cairo.

<sup>58</sup> See vol. III, p. 1236, footnote 53.

If similar indications of the Soviet determination to deal unilaterally with the problems of Eastern Europe continue to manifest themselves, the American public even against its will and desires may well be forced to the conclusion that despite Tehran and Moscow the Soviet Government is not disposed to play a constructive part as a full and equal member of the family of nations in the movement of international cooperation. However valid the Soviet position on one or another of the questions of Eastern Europe may be, and as you know we have carefully avoided and shall continue to avoid any disputation with the Soviet Government on the merits of such questions, the present course of Soviet policy if translated into unilateral action cannot fail to do irreparable harm to the whole cause of international collaboration. For without public support of its present efforts in that direction this Government and any other democratic government can accomplish little. Matters are rapidly approaching the point where the Soviet Government will have to choose between the development and extension of the foundation of international cooperation as the guiding principle of the postwar world as against the continuance of a unilateral and arbitrary method of dealing with its special problems even though these problems are admittedly of more direct interest to the Soviet Union than to other great powers. The American people will be unable to reconcile the contradictions between the two and will not be disposed to favor American participation in a scheme of world organization which will merely be regarded as a cover for another great power to continue to pursue a course of unilateral action in the international sphere based on superior force. We share your view that it is of the utmost importance that the principle of consultation and cooperation with the Soviet Union be kept alive at all costs, but some measures of cooperation in relation to world public opinion must be forthcoming from the Soviet Government.

The foregoing is intended primarily for your confidential information, but you are authorized in your discretion and if you believe it will be helpful to use all or any part thereof in your conversations with Soviet officials not as the views of this Government but as indications of the present temper of American public opinion.

HULL

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861.24/1732 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 10, 1944—8 a. m.  
[Received February 11—12: 08 p. m.]

440. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Mikoyan asked me to call on him. He stated that since the splendid accomplishments

of developing the transportation route through Iran and the generally increased shipments on the protocol above schedule it had become generally recognized that "When the Americans undertake anything it is done". He has had a discussion with Marshal Stalin and they wish to award a number of decorations for these important accomplishments.

He said he believed General Marshall<sup>59</sup> and General Somervell<sup>60</sup> had played an important part in the organization and development of the Persian route and in sending supplies to Russia, and he mentioned General Arnold<sup>61</sup> in connection with the supply of aircraft. General Spalding's<sup>62</sup> name was also mentioned. They want to give recognition too to some of the men who have worked under General Connolly<sup>63</sup> "both rank and file". Mikoyan said it was impossible for them to know what would be most appropriate and asked for our help in selection of the individuals.

He then said he would like to give decorations to certain non-military who had made substantial contributions. He politely mentioned my name and Mr. Hopkins<sup>64</sup> and Mr. Batt's<sup>65</sup> names were discussed. I explained that there were certain difficulties in connection with awards to civilian officers of the Government because of political aspects. This he thoroughly recognized and said that possibly some or all of them might better be postponed. He is ready to give as many civilian decorations as we think appropriate or, if we would prefer, to leave them until after the war. However he wanted you and the President to know of this indication of their appreciation for what has been done and will be quite satisfied with whatever decision is reached.

Needless to say my name should not be considered in this connection.

I recommend that the United States adopt a policy of authorizing receipt of Soviet decorations for those army officers or enlisted men who are engaged in a purely operating capacity in connection with Soviet supply such as is being performed by General Connolly and members of his command. I think it would be appropriate if General Connolly were authorized to furnish me a list of about 10 names, 5 officers and 5 enlisted men, which I could submit to Mr. Mikoyan for his consideration. I feel that it is unwise for anyone currently engaged in supply matters here such as General Spalding to accept Soviet decorations. I do not feel qualified to express an opinion as to the other officers mentioned.

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<sup>59</sup> Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

<sup>60</sup> Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces.

<sup>61</sup> Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces.

<sup>62</sup> Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Chief of the Supply Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

<sup>63</sup> Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, commanding the Persian Gulf Service Command, October 1942 to December 1944.

<sup>64</sup> Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt.

<sup>65</sup> William L. Batt, Vice Chairman, War Production Board.

I do not know whether as a matter of policy you and the President may wish to have any civilian officers of the Government accept decorations during the war. I know however that Marshal Stalin and Mikoyan are fully aware of the leadership that Hopkins has given in this matter and also the work of Batt. They would be glad to have us add several names that we consider appropriate. Since the civilians involved, almost without exception, are currently engaged in formulating policy with regard to Russian supply, I am inclined to feel that no civilian decorations should be accepted at this time.

I can assure you that this offer of decorations is made with great sincerity. Mikoyan emphasized that he needed your and the President's advice and approval and wanted to do exactly what was considered most appropriate.

Whatever decision is reached, I feel it is of real importance that it be reached promptly. Decision regarding decorations for General Burns<sup>66</sup> and General Connolly requested in my previous cables should not be delayed.<sup>67</sup>

HARRIMAN

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861.01/2309 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 10, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received February 11—2:40 p. m.]

444. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Supplementing my number 392, February 6, Molotov gave a small lunch for the British Ambassador February 8 at which I was present. Dekanozov, Litvinov and Maisky,<sup>68</sup> Pavlov<sup>69</sup> and the British interpreter were also present.

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<sup>66</sup> Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Executive, Munitions Assignments Board, United States and Great Britain.

<sup>67</sup> Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanozov proposed to Ambassador Harriman on January 22, that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union "had decided to award decorations to Maj. Gen. James Burns and Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly in recognition of their services in expediting shipment of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union." At the Moscow Embassy this selection was looked upon as "most appropriate and that the acceptance would be useful in our general relations." (093.612/33) Again on February 6, Ambassador Harriman stated in his telegram 390 that the offer of decorations was "an official concrete recognition of the Soviet Government's appreciation of the value they have placed on Lend Lease shipments." (093.612/36) The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Charles E. Bohlen, in a memorandum of January 25, saw "no objection whatsoever" and felt that the offer "should be approved." (093.612/33)

<sup>68</sup> Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov, Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, and Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky were Assistant People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>69</sup> Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov was a translator and interpreter in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and secretary to Molotov.

The conversation was general and informal. The Soviet reorganization of the Foreign Office was discussed but nothing new developed not covered by my cable. Molotov emphasized that the question of exchange of representation between any of the Republics and ourselves was entirely a matter for the Republics and United States to determine.

I was able to make it clear that I did not consider it would be helpful for us to be confronted with the question of receiving representatives from the Soviet Baltic Republican Governments at the present time.

Clark Kerr described to Molotov the British Library of Information in New York and emphasized the difference between this organization where information was available to any one who wished to get it and a propaganda agency. Molotov showed great interest in this conception and I had an opportunity to describe the difference in the reaction in the United States between the two methods; also that the British had learned to their advantage not to have our relations with them become involved in internal politics, and that the same principle was one that the Soviet Government would do well to bear in mind. Maisky commented that it would be easier to do the latter now that the Comintern was dissolved.

Molotov asked me whether there was any other method by which they could improve their relations with the American public. I explained that it would be helpful if there were someone in the Foreign Office to whom American newspaper men in Moscow could go for guidance similar to the practice of the British Foreign Office.

Molotov accepted this but showed greater interest in the idea of a Library of Information in the United States. In this connection I had also an opportunity to discuss Archibald MacLeish's <sup>70</sup> desire to exchange Russian and American literature.

Although humor is [not] improved by translation, and the discussions had a serious undertone, the luncheon was the most informal, natural and good-humored meeting with Soviet Foreign Office officials in which I have participated in Moscow. The British Ambassador and I intend to attempt to encourage similar meetings as occasion arises.

HARRIMAN

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093.612/36 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944—7 p. m.

315. Personal for the Ambassador from the Acting Secretary. Policy relative to matter of decorations requires broad clarification

<sup>70</sup> Librarian of Congress.



by this Government from a military as well as a civilian standpoint. This will require discussions with the President and it might be another week or two before a definite statement of policy can be sent to you. However, initial reaction from War Department is that they are opposed to permitting officers to accept decorations from countries which receive Lend-Lease materials if such officers are connected with Lend-Lease transactions, but this should not be taken as final.

STETTINIUS

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093.612/43 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Acting Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received February 20—12:41 p. m.]

562. Personal for the Acting Secretary. I am glad to have the information contained in your 315, February 16, 7 p. m. which will be very helpful in explaining to the Foreign Office and Mikoyan the understandable reasons for delay in reply.

With regard to the question of policy involved in the decision as to the propriety of acceptance of the decorations offered by the Soviet Government may I give you my reaction for whatever value it may have.

In the first place I can fully appreciate that it would be unwise for any military or civilian involved in lend-lease decisions to accept decorations from a country receiving lend-lease aid. I am sure that this position would be fully understood and respected by the Soviets.

On the other hand I feel that there is a difference in respect to General Connolly's command. The PGSC<sup>71</sup> has nothing to do with lend-lease policy. They have been given a specific task to perform which they have carried out well under most difficult conditions. Altho the comparison is not entirely parallel I do not understand that we would hesitate to approve acceptance of decorations by them or merchantship personnel whose special efforts had contributed to the delivery of cargoes to Russian ports. In addition the offer and acceptance of the decorations in this connection is public recognition of the engineering competence of the United States Army.

If the point of view I have expressed can be justified, I believe it would be helpful in our relations with the Soviet Government and the Russian people to allow acceptance of the awards to General Connolly and a few of his officers and enlisted men who have made an outstanding contribution. If you agree I would appreciate your

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<sup>71</sup> Persian Gulf Service Command.

bringing my views to the attention of the War Department. General Deane concurs.

HARRIMAN

124.616/415 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts] <sup>72</sup>

Moscow, February 20, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received February 21—12:42 p. m.]

568. Personal for the Acting Secretary. Your No. 314, February 16, 6 p. m.<sup>73</sup> I have studied your personal cable to me on the subject of the *N[ew] Y[ork] Times* article of February 13 regarding the reprint in the Embassy Bulletin of the *Washington Post* editorial regarding Korneichuk's appointment as Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine.

Many of the heads of foreign missions have talked with me about the Soviet press and the reactions abroad. I can report that all of them are concerned over the Soviet press and not the American press. No criticism of the American press or our bulletin has come to the attention of any member of the Embassy from any other source.

As to the reaction of "Soviet circles" none of us has any information. I am quite certain, however, that the Soviet Government would much prefer to have us run a propaganda sheet for them, omitting all critical comment on Soviet policies. I am satisfied, however, that American interests are well served by the bulletin.

Now as [regards?] the bulletin I personally take full responsibility for it and the selection of its circulation. Its circulation is limited to the diplomatic corps, the British American press and the Foreign Office. I watch the reaction with great care. Almost every chief of mission and correspondent in Moscow has gone out of his way to express to me repeatedly his appreciation for the cross section of news and comment which the bulletin provides never before available in Moscow. These men have been impressed with the fairness of the selection which includes favorable as well as critical articles on the Soviet Government and similar comment on the American Government's policies and officials.

<sup>72</sup> The omitted portion commented upon the article in the *New York Times* of February 13, 1944, which was based upon a despatch from Ralph Parker, British correspondent in Moscow for the (London) *Times* and part-time correspondent for the *New York Times*.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

In the first place it has kept the diplomatic corps informed of American reactions and I have reason to believe that those individuals, who have more intimate personal relations with Soviet officials and editors than we, have discussed with them the mistake that is being made by the Soviet Government in its press.

Secondly the American correspondents tell me that the bulletin gives them for the first time a knowledge of what is going on in America which helps them in the selection and manner in which they report things from here. It has had a sobering influence and has encouraged more explanatory articles on certain Soviet actions which are misunderstood in the United States.

Thirdly I believe it is of value to get to Soviet officials information of the American reaction to what they say and do. Undoubtedly the Soviets are critical of the American press and the fact that the bulletin reprints criticism of the Soviet Government. I have expected that their attitude would find indirect expression in the press and this may continue. On the other hand the bulletin is useful to back up what I am telling them and I am satisfied that I am not injuring but strengthening my effectiveness by its circulation.

As to the OWI<sup>74</sup> I feel that it has done an excellent job in the selection of material and I wish to record my appreciation for it. I fully realize that it is my responsibility for decision as to what of their material is used in the bulletin.

Lastly as to whether the *Post* editorial was proper to reprint there is something to be said on both sides. It pointed [out?] Korneichuk's wife's<sup>75</sup> connections and the influence that this might have on issues vital to many people. It was the only material we had which gave American reaction to Korneichuk's selection for this important post. It did it, however, in an undignified manner but it certainly was not "vile". Incidentally I received only yesterday a most cordial letter from him in connection with his leaving Moscow to assume his new post.

To sum up, as far as Moscow is concerned I do not believe the Department need have concern at the present time over the bulletin or the reprint of this editorial. So far as I know the only effect of this incident in Moscow is that Parker's reputation as an objective journalist has suffered.<sup>76</sup> I am, of course, not familiar with the reaction in the United States.

HARRIMAN

<sup>74</sup> Office of War Information.

<sup>75</sup> Wanda Lvovna Wasilewska was head of the Soviet-sponsored Union of Polish Patriots and, after July 21, 1944, a Vice Chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (the Lublin Committee).

<sup>76</sup> In closing out this incident Ambassador Harriman commented in telegram 676 of February 29, that newspapermen believed Parker had expressed "his own resentment against the American press for criticizing the Soviet Government's policies" but that "no one in the Foreign Office has given any intimation of their criticism". (124.616/418)

861.415/98 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 21, 1944.

[Received February 22—12:50 p. m.]

573. Moscow papers to [of] February 20 publish 47 slogans of the Central Committee of the Party for the celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Red Army.<sup>77</sup> The slogans for the most part are addressed to the various branches of the services who are urged to continue the battle with vigor and to drive the enemy from Soviet territory and to the workers and population of the rear who are asked to put forth every effort toward continuing the flow of supplies to the front and effecting the rapid reconstruction of the devastated areas.

The following slogans are of special interest :

5. Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American military alliance over the evil enemies of humanity, the German Fascist enslavers! All the strength and combat force of the freedom loving nations for the speediest defeat of Hitlerite Germany!

6. Courageous patriots of Yugoslavia! Your struggle for the freedom and independence of your country serves as an inspiring example for all the enslaved peoples of Europe.

Long live the heroic people of Yugoslavia and its valiant People's Army of Liberation which is fighting self-sacrificingly against the Fascist invaders!

Greetings to the peoples of Europe who are fighting against Hitlerite imperialism! Patriots of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Denmark! Arise in armed struggle for your liberation from the Fascist yoke. Overthrow the Hitlerite tyranny!

8. Oppressed Slav brothers! Fan more widely the flame of the people's struggle against the Germans—the mortal enemies and oppressors of Slavdom! Long live the armed struggle of the Slavic peoples against the Hitlerite imperialists! Long live the unity in battle of the Slavic peoples!

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<sup>77</sup> To compare with the slogans of the previous year and Stalin's order of the day, see telegrams 192 of February 22, and 203 of February 24, from Kuibyshev and the memorandum of February 23 by Charles E. Bohlen of the Division of European Affairs, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 506, 507, and 506, respectively. In Stalin's order of the day for 1944, not printed, he extolled the Red Army's victorious offensive operations of more than 3 years and claimed that only the steadily increasing force of the blows of the Red Army could break enemy resistance and bring final victory. He went on to concede that "the position of Hitlerite Germany will be still more hopeless when the main forces of our Allies go into action and a powerful and increasing offensive of the armies of all the Allied states develops against Hitlerite Germany." (861.415/100)

A message from President Roosevelt to Stalin on February 22 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, February 26, 1944, p. 204. Stalin acknowledged the President's felicitations on February 29, *ibid.*, March 4, 1944, p. 224.

9. Greetings to the valiant airmen of the Anglo-American Air Forces who are dealing blows at the vital centers of Fascist Germany! Greetings to the brave sailors of Great Britain and the United States of America who are battling against Fascist pirates!

10. Battle greetings to the soldiers and officers of the first Polish corps, the Czechoslovak military units, the Yugoslav military unit in the USSR, the airmen of the French "Normandy" aviation squadron who are heroically battling on the Soviet-German front against our common enemy, the Fascists enslavers!

13. Infantrymen of the Red Army! Persistently follow up the success of the offensive, relentlessly pursue and destroy enemy troops, give them no opportunity to entrench themselves on new lines, steadily break through toward our western borders! Surround the German invaders, destroy and capture the personnel and equipment of the enemy! Long live the Soviet infantrymen.

HARRIMAN

093.612/56

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 3, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called upon me at his request to advise this Government that his Government wished to bestow on General Marshall the Order of Suvorov,<sup>78</sup> their highest military order.

He stated likewise that the same order had been conferred on General Eisenhower.<sup>79</sup> I immediately took the matter up. The Ambassador asked for a prompt response.

I talked to Colonel Stimson<sup>80</sup> and explained the situation. He promised to give me an immediate reply.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

861.032/23 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 6, 1944.

[Received March 7—1:20 p. m.]

740. The speech of the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR,<sup>81</sup> A. N. Kosygin, at the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR proposing the creation of Union

<sup>78</sup> The order named after the famous tsarist general of the XVIII century, Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, was instituted in three classes (degrees) by the Soviet Government on July 29, 1942. The Soviet Ambassador was informed in a note of March 22, 1944, that "General Marshall will be greatly honored to accept the decoration." (093.612/48)

<sup>79</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding general, Allied Forces in European Theater of Operations from December 31, 1943. In regard to the presentation of awards on April 11, see footnote 40, p. 861.

<sup>80</sup> Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.

<sup>81</sup> Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Republican People's Commissariats for Defense and for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR closely followed the lines of Molotov's speech on the same subject at the tenth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. With reference to the establishment of a Union Republican Commissariat for Defense Kosygin pointed out that this proposal was in line with the Lenin-Stalin nationality policy and gave all the nationalities included in the Soviet Union an opportunity to participate as national groups in the Red Army. He emphasized the importance of the new commissariat in the field of military training and military schools and stated that the new commissariat would work closely with the People's Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR and the Soviet of People's Commissars and Commissariats of Education in the autonomous republics as well as with the Oblast<sup>82</sup> and municipal executive committees. He emphasized the experience which these organizations had already had in the field of civilian defenses and the organization of anti-aircraft and anti-gas defenses.

With reference to the formation of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Kosygin stated that this step would strengthen international relations and asserted that it was necessary since the conduct of all international relations through the Central Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been shown not to satisfy the specific economic and cultural needs of the peoples of the constituent republics which require a more complicated and developed organization of these ties. This will be achieved only on the basis of the rights granted to the Union Republics for the establishment of independent foreign relations.

Kosygin emphasized that the constituent republics of the Soviet Union were sufficiently large, well developed and economically endowed [to] justify the granting to them of the right to conduct their own foreign affairs and drew comparisons between the RSFSR and various European states.

Full summary follows by air mail.<sup>83</sup>

HARRIMAN

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093.112/659a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1944—2 p. m.

491. Personal for the Ambassador. We do not yet have a definite and final solution of the decorations problem insofar as the military is concerned, although, as it now stands, battlefield decorations may be permitted but officers engaged in supply operations, such as lend lease,

<sup>82</sup> Region.

<sup>83</sup> Not found in Department files.

would not be permitted to accept. Additional information will follow as soon as possible on that aspect of the problem.

As to civilian officials of the Government, there is a statute<sup>84</sup> which definitely precludes acceptance unless authorized by Act of Congress.

STETTINIUS

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861.9111/493 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, March 9, 1944.

[Received March 10—3:15 p. m.]

790. For the Acting Secretary. There follows my third interpretive report on developments in Soviet policy as reflected in the press for the period January 29 to March 9 for distribution as suggested in my 2215 December 14, 2 p. m.:<sup>85</sup>

*Report begins, No. 3:*

Since the last report frequent tribute has been paid in public speeches and other press reports to the collaboration of the three powers established at Moscow and Teheran, notwithstanding the developments which have caused suspicion and concern in the U.S. over Soviet intentions. Extensive figures on lend-lease aid, reference to the approaching joint attack on the common enemy, and greater attention to the Pacific war have been featured in the press. Stalin in his order of the day to the Red Army reaffirmed the unity of interest of the three great powers and ridiculed Nazi efforts to negotiate a separate peace with any of them.

On the other hand the press has attacked with great violence the Polish Government in London and others who do not applaud Soviet policy. In weighing the significance of these articles it is well to bear in mind the technique the Soviet press has developed during the revolutionary period which cannot be accused of the use of understatement and does not comprehend a balanced appraisal of any subject.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Approved January 31, 1881; 21 Stat. 604.

<sup>85</sup> Not printed; but see telegram 2214 of December 14, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 608.

<sup>86</sup> Ambassador Harriman commented further in his telegram 875 of March 16: "We have a long and perhaps difficult road while the Soviets learn how to behave in the civilized world community. Effective results can I believe be obtained by taking a firm position when they take improper steps. If we don't follow this procedure now in connection with each incident we may well look forward to a Soviet policy of playing the part of a world bully.

We must of course be prepared to exercise patience, but forbearance is a sign of weakness to these people. They respect firmness even though they may not fully understand the reasons behind it." (865.01/2208)

4. The extension to the constituent republics of autonomous powers in the fields of defense and foreign affairs was presented as an implementation of the Lenin-Stalin nationality policy and as evidence of the strength of the Soviet Union and the coming of age of the member republics. *War and the Working Class* denied vigorously that the new move sought to pave the way for either an expansionist or isolationist policy as was variously charged in the foreign press, and contended that it was a logical step in the direction of world collaboration.

5. The Pan-Slav appeal continued to be featured, emphasizing the unity of all Slavs in the battle against the historic enemy, German imperialism.

9. Reporting of the Pacific war was extended and received more attention than operations in Italy. The Soviet press revealed increasing admiration for American actions in that theater and devoted more space to news items indicating the growing difficulties faced by the Japanese and the desperate measures being taken against them. *War and the Working Class* in a long review of the Pacific war stated that the Japanese were confronted by the alternative of permitting the Allies to approach important key defense points or of risking decisive battle. It predicted that more decisive actions lie ahead.

10. More than the usual limited coverage was accorded events in Latin America. Only United States viewpoint toward developments was presented. A long article in *War and the Working Class* criticizes pro-Fascist elements in Latin America which are interfering with the prosecution of the war.

11. Domestic propaganda during the month was centered around the celebration of the 26th Anniversary of the Red Army. Stalin's Order of the Day and the party slogans paid tribute to the army for its great accomplishments during the past year, credited it with bearing the main burden of the war and urged it on to perfection of tactics and unremitting struggle for complete and final victory. A new drive for contributions to the army fund was begun.



861b.6363/191 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 15, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received March 16—1:24 p. m.]

859. For the President and the Secretary. Vyshinski<sup>87</sup> handed me last night a statement which reads in paraphrased translation substantially as follows:

"I am instructed by my Government to advise you concerning the course of the negotiations for the liquidation of the Japanese coal and oil concessions in northern Sakhalin which are being carried out in Moscow with the Japanese Ambassador.<sup>88</sup>

"When the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed on April 13, 1941,<sup>89</sup> Molotov was informed by Matsuoka<sup>90</sup> that the Japanese Government would undertake to settle the question of the liquidation of the Japanese concessions in northern Sakhalin within the next few months. The Japanese Government did not wish to initiate negotiations on the matter following the German attack of the Soviet Union. In the autumn of 1943 however the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow stated that his Government was willing to initiate negotiations on the liquidation of the concessions.

"Premier Stalin informed the American Ambassador on February 2 that such negotiations were in progress. At the present time the preliminary negotiations on the liquidation of the concessions conducted by Ambassador Sato and Lozovsky<sup>91</sup> have terminated under conditions profitable to the USSR. During the first half of April it is proposed to sign a protocol.

"Negotiations on the continuation of the Fisheries Convention were carried on simultaneously."

In reply to my question as to compensation paid by the Soviet Government for the return of the concessions Vyshinski stated that "the Soviet Government would pay a small sum for a large property".

In reply to a further question he replied that he did not know the oil production of Sakhalin but that although it was not large in comparison with Soviet production it was of high benzine quality. In any event he stated that the Japanese would lose the oil.

HARRIMAN

<sup>87</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>88</sup> Naotake Sato.

<sup>89</sup> Signed at Moscow; for text of the Pact, see telegram 763, April 13, 1941, 11 p. m., from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. iv, p. 944.

<sup>90</sup> Yosuke Matsuoka was the Foreign Minister of Japan at this time.

<sup>91</sup> Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

861.014/3-2344

*Memorandum by Mr. George M. Abbott of the Division of Eastern European Affairs*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] March 23, 1944.

After examining the attached file <sup>92</sup> and consulting with Mr. Cumming, NOE,<sup>93</sup> and Mr. English, Le,<sup>94</sup> I called Mr. Humphrey <sup>95</sup> and informed him that while Wrangel Island <sup>96</sup> had been discovered by an American, the United States had never made any formal claim to sovereignty over the Island <sup>97</sup> and that it had been occupied and colonized by the Soviet Government for a number of years.<sup>98</sup>

GEORGE M. ABBOTT

740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of European Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1944.

## CURRENT PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

There are two general considerations which must be borne in mind before any individual problems involving Soviet foreign affairs could be examined:

1. *The specific theories which up till very recently at least have dominated Soviet thinking in regard to relations between the Soviet Union and "capitalist" states.*

It is our hope and indeed expectation that the agreements reached at Moscow and Tehran constituted the first step in the direction of breaking down the previous Soviet hostility and suspicions towards the Governments of non-Soviet countries. Recent actions of the Soviet Government and indications of Soviet thought, however, reveal that the previous concepts are still present to a large extent in Soviet thinking on international affairs. The tendency to regard with suspicion and even hostility the Governments of "capitalist" nations

<sup>92</sup> Not attached to file copy of memorandum.

<sup>93</sup> Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs.

<sup>94</sup> Benedict M. English, assistant to the Legal Adviser.

<sup>95</sup> Member of the Legislative Reference Service at the Library of Congress.

<sup>96</sup> Named for Ferdinand Petrovich, Baron Wrangel, a Russian Arctic explorer who sought in vain in 1823 to discover this island.

<sup>97</sup> Earlier correspondence in regard to the reservation of the United States of its right to Wrangel Island is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 278 ff.

<sup>98</sup> From 1926 the island was populated by some Chukchi and Eskimo peoples, had a polar observation post, and was administratively a part of the Khabarovsk kray (territory) of the Soviet Union.

stems from the original theory that there is an irreconcilable chasm between "socialism" and "capitalism" and that any temporary association in a common interest was an association of expediency for a specific purpose but with no underlying affinity of fundamental interest, civilization, or tradition. The association in the war against a common enemy, and the commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union at Moscow and Tehran have undoubtedly tended to modify this concept of irreconcilability between the two worlds previously so integral a part of Soviet Marxist thinking. In so far as the previous doctrine survives, Soviet relations with non-Soviet countries will continue to be based exclusively on the self interest of the Soviet state untrammelled by any basic feeling of community with or obligations towards the powers with which it is temporarily associated.

2. *It must be constantly borne in mind in attempting to evaluate the methods and procedures of Soviet policy that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship.*

This fact alone gives Soviet policy a degree of flexibility which is impossible in a democratic country. Any action deemed advisable by the considerations of self interest, however inconsistent with previous policy, can be effected overnight and the Soviet propaganda machine can be relied upon to provide the necessary excuse for Soviet and world opinion. The above consideration should be kept in mind in examining the specific European problems on which Soviet and American policy do not coincide.

(1) *The Baltic States*

The Soviet Union since the incorporation of the previously independent countries of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the Soviet Union in July 1940 have regarded these territories as an integral part of the Soviet Union. They have consistently maintained that they were incorporated as a result of the freely expressed will of the people and consequently do not form a subject of international discussion or fall within the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>99</sup> The United States Government on the other hand is publicly on record in refusing to recognize the incorporation of these three countries on the grounds that this incorporation had been brought about by the use of force or threat of force. The basis for the American attitude is that the so-called plebiscites occurred following the complete occupation of the three countries by the Red Army and that the plebiscites were held there under extreme duress. It might be added as a matter of historical record that even these plebiscites held under the bayonets of the

<sup>99</sup> Joint statement issued on August 14, 1941, by President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill, *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, p. 367. Adherence to the Atlantic Charter declaration by the Soviet Union took place by a resolution adopted at the second meeting of the Inter-Allied Council in London on September 24, 1941; see *ibid.*, p. 378.

occupying Red Army did not put before the people the question of incorporation into the Soviet Union. The vote was actually taken for the election of a government pledged to the maintenance and development of friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of existing treaties which would insure independence of the three countries concerned. The Government thus elected proceeded without reference to the people to arrange for the incorporation of the three Baltic republics into the Soviet Union.

The policy of the United States in respect to the Baltic question has been to avoid either of two extremes: (1) On the one hand to avoid having this question become a serious issue between the Soviet Union and the United States which would prejudice the prosecution of the war and the possibilities of collaboration after the war and (2) on the other hand to avoid during the war according any legal recognition or moral approval of the unilateral action of the Soviet Union, against which we protested in 1940. This Government, therefore, in conformity with its general policy of not recognizing juridically during hostilities any territorial changes brought about in connection with or as a result of the war, still recognizes the Baltic republics. In conjunction, however, with the final settlement of territorial questions in Europe at the termination of hostilities we would be prepared to re-examine the question of our attitude towards the Baltic States.

(2) *Poland*

The present Polish-Soviet dispute involves two main points the first of which dealing with the eastern boundary of Poland is subject to the same considerations set forth above in regard to the Baltic States and we likewise hold that the juridical and final settlement of the Polish-Soviet border should be made in connection with the general peace settlement. This Government, however, does not exclude under its general principles the possibility of an amicable settlement between the two members of the United Nations during the course of the war.

The second factor in the Polish-Soviet dispute is the absolute refusal of the Soviet Government to have any dealings with the present Polish Government in exile which the United States together with all other members of the United Nations recognizes as the only legal government representing the Polish state. The failure of the British efforts to try and arrange some compromise solution of the present Polish-Soviet dispute makes it clear that no solution short of the complete acceptance of its demands will satisfy the Soviet Government. Under the circumstances the only positive course that the United States Government could take to resolve this conflict, therefore, would be to abandon the Polish Government in exile and assist in forcing on Poland the Soviet territorial demands—a course of action which

would expose this Government to the justifiable charge of violating the principles for which this war is being fought.

(3) *The Exchange of Representatives with the Badoglio Government.*

Another point at issue between the Soviet and American Governments is the Soviet action in arranging without prior consultation for the exchange of diplomatic representatives between the Soviet and Italian Governments.<sup>1</sup> We have called the attention of the Soviet Government to this departure from the principles of allied as against individual approach to Italian problems and have proposed that the Soviet representative and his functions be brought within the framework of existing Allied machinery in Italy.

Aside from the above there are at the present time no other important divergences of policy between the Soviet and United States Governments. Other important issues however will unquestionably arise as the war progresses. The chief aim of this Government should be to continue to endeavor to bring the Soviet Government to the realization in its own interest and for the peace and stability of the world of the advantages of cooperative rather than unilateral action in the discussion and resolution of political problems arising out of the prosecution of the war.

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093.112/673 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 25, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received March 26—1 : 30 p. m.]

1040. The Foreign Office has informed me that according to Soviet regulations, the question of awarding foreign decorations to Soviet citizens should be taken up in the first instance with the Soviet Government, i.e., the Foreign Office, whose concurrence should be sought, but that the recipients of the decorations might be named either by the foreign state when the question of decorations was raised by it or subsequently by the appropriate Soviet agency or organization. (This would seem to cover Department's 119, January 21, 3 p. m.)<sup>2</sup>

General Deane has also been advised that this question should be handled initially through the Foreign Office.

In accordance with authority extended by the War Department to General Deane, I addressed to Molotov on March 14 a note stating that the United States Government desired to award 195 American decora-

<sup>1</sup> For correspondence on the concern of the United States regarding the maintenance of responsible government in Italy, see vol. III, pp. 996 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

tions to members of the Red Army for acts of valor or outstanding performance of duty in five specified Soviet military campaigns during the past 5 months.

I have now received a note from Molotov requesting me to transmit the thanks of the Soviet Government to the United States Government in the premises and stating that the Soviet Government would communicate in the near future the names of the individuals entitled to the awards.<sup>3</sup>

HARRIMAN

093.612/52 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 27, 1944.

[Received March 28—11:35 a. m.]

1067. Moscow papers for March 25 announce the award of the Order of Suvorov First Class to General Marshall "for distinguished military activity and services in the direction of the American Armed Forces in the struggle against the common enemy of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, Hitlerite Germany".<sup>4</sup>

HARRIMAN

710.61/3

*Memorandum by Mr. Marion Parks of the Office of American Republic Affairs*

[WASHINGTON,] March 28, 1944.

#### ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Diplomatic relations have been established with the USSR by four of the other American republics: namely—Mexico, Cuba, Colombia and Uruguay. The Soviet Legations were opened in Mexico City and Habana in April and July 1943, respectively. The Soviet Minister to Colombia<sup>5</sup> arrived in Bogotá on February 8, 1944 and the Minister to Uruguay<sup>6</sup> arrived in Montevideo on March 6.

<sup>3</sup> A note was received from Molotov on May 16, listing the 195 recipients for awards, in which 19 general officers were designated (093.112/725, 739).

<sup>4</sup> Moscow newspapers for June 7 reported the presentation ceremony at the Soviet Embassy in Washington on June 5.

<sup>5</sup> Grigory Fedorovich Rezanov.

<sup>6</sup> Sergey Alexeyevich Orlov.

Up to January 18, 1944, the American Embassy at Moscow had issued visas for 72 prospective Soviet officers and employees at these four missions. Fifty-six additional visas were issued for wives.\*

The Soviet Union at present has practically no economic interests and very few citizens residing in the four republics with which relations have been established. Yet the Soviet Embassy staff in Mexico is believed to number 47, and there is a personnel of about 17 at the USSR Legation in Habana, although there is but one Soviet citizen outside of the Legation staff residing in Cuba. The Minister, two Secretaries, two Attachés and seven or eight employees have been designated to Montevideo. Part of them have arrived there. The staff of the Soviet Legation in Bogotá is believed to include five or six officers in addition to the Minister. The new Russian missions thus appear to be quite large for the work they normally would be expected to perform in connection with existing Soviet interests.

The extent of the activities of the Soviet diplomats in Mexico and Cuba has been the subject of much rumor and conjecture.<sup>7</sup> Undoubtedly the Russian representatives have been doing all possible to promote friendly relations and extend the influence of their country in Latin America. It seems evident that they are spending money rather lavishly in Mexico in order to make a favorable impression locally and on the diplomatic representatives of the other republics of Central and South America. This program might account in part for the large staffs maintained. It also has been observed that these missions, especially the Embassy in Mexico, may be in use for the purpose of training officers who are expected to be transferred to other Latin American posts as and when relations are established. A Santiago radio broadcast of March 7 declared that the Soviet Legation in Colombia was organizing a "Seminary to prepare Soviet diplomatic personnel for service in Latin America".

\**Visas Issued:*

Mexico	20 diplomatic	33 official	total 53
Cuba	7 "	20 "	" 27
Colombia	6 "	16 "	" 22
Uruguay	16 "	11 "	" 26

Wives

138

56

72

(Minor Children traveled on mother's passport).

[Footnote in the original.]

<sup>7</sup> In connection with the appointment of Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky, formerly Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, 1939-1941, as Minister to Mexico in 1943, and speculation that it was in connection with Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere centering in Mexico, see the memorandum of May 19, 1943, by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant Chief of the Division of European Affairs, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 530.

Sergei Alexe[ye]vich Orlov, the new Minister to Uruguay, told American officers at Miami that the USSR was selecting high Russian officials as diplomats to interpret the new Soviet government. They are given military rank equivalent to their diplomatic status and are authorized to wear the insignia of such rank at all public functions. Ambassadors have the rank of Field Marshal or General. Minister Orlov is a Colonel General. He said the Soviet diplomats are required to take their wives and children with them and to set up a social position. They must study the most appropriate way to make a good impression on Latin Americans and must entertain with dignity and effectiveness.

There is no direct proof at present in evidence to show that the Soviet diplomatic missions are attempting to influence the internal affairs of the countries where they are established. There are many reports of collusion between the Soviet diplomats and local Communists but there is little or no conclusive evidence of directly subversive activities.

The new Soviet missions have an aggressive and well-financed program for the dissemination of trade and cultural relations propaganda, and for interpreting the new Soviet foreign policy—as divorced from spreading Communism—as well as the power shown by Russia in contributing to the defeat of Germany, in such a way as to win respect for the Soviet Union in Latin America. The role which the Soviet Union will play at the peace conference has already become the subject of much interested press comment in these countries, and leftist spokesmen and writers can be expected to render substantial assistance in laying the groundwork for Latin American support of Russia in a position of leadership at that time, as they believe their own future depends upon it.

The following observations on the activities of the Soviet missions in Latin America have been reported to date:

1. *Dissemination of Propaganda Preparing for Post-War Economic Penetration of Latin America.*

A recent example of Soviet commercial propaganda emanating from diplomatic sources is given in a report from our Embassy in Mexico. It shows that an officer of the Soviet Legation has asserted that Russia will be prepared almost immediately to ship low cost farm machinery to Mexico, taking Mexican products in return and using Russian ships for transportation. It has been reported that a catalogue of such Russian farm machinery is already available in Mexico. The latter statement has not been verified.

While the USSR is hardly likely to be in a position to make good these promises at an early time, the idea is one that might make a deep impression on certain Mexican officials and part of the Mexican public



which has been sharply critical of the United States due to its inability to supply large quantities of farm machinery at present needed by Mexico.

2. *Dissemination of Pro-Russian Propaganda as Distinguished from Communist Propaganda.*

At the present time in Mexico, the Soviet Embassy is paying for transmission of news given nightly on a 15-minute radio program called "Today on the Soviet Front" broadcast over a national network, headed by two government-sponsored stations. The program is based on news received directly from Moscow by Ambassador Oumansky and the reported daily cost of transmission is about \$285.00 (U. S. cy.<sup>8</sup>). The broadcasting costs, it is alleged, are borne by the Mexican government-owned *Petroleos Mexicanos*.

(It is interesting to note in this connection that in addition to the Russian news broadcast, Mexican government stations at present carry nine daily broadcast programs sponsored by European organizations. The programs are given in the interest of Free Germany, Free Hungary, the Liberty of Italy, the Third Spanish Republic and the Fourth French Republic, all representing organizations believed to have been subject to Communist influence. There is also a Tribunal of Youth program backed by Spanish Students, and of special interest, a radio talk by André Simone. Simone is in reality Otto Katz, an important figure in the Communist Party. In Europe he reputedly was assigned to check up on the loyalty and performance of Soviet diplomatic officials and other Russian operatives outside of the Soviet Union. He has been in Mexico for about three years, writing for the leftist newspaper *El Popular*, organ of the Confederation of Mexican Labor. He is a close collaborator of Vicente Lombardo Toledano.<sup>9</sup>)

In February, an official organ of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico made its appearance under the name "Boletín de Información". The 8-page illustrated pamphlet contained such material as articles on the Red Army and the rehabilitation of liberated regions (after Russian occupation). It carried a notice permitting reproduction of the material in it.

It also has been reported that the Soviet Legation in Mexico recently took a three-year lease on a moving picture theater, where Russian films will be shown.

3. *Use of Diplomatic Privileges to Promote Ideological Penetration.*

There is no direct evidence that any of the Soviet missions in Latin America are acting in collusion with the Communist Party as such, but connections are generally believed to exist between the missions and

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<sup>8</sup> Currency.

<sup>9</sup> Leftist Mexican labor leader with influence throughout Latin America.

local Communist groups. The following points have received consideration in this connection:

Despite the dissolution of the Third International, the Communist movement seems to be continuing along the same lines as before, throughout Latin America. It is often asserted that Soviet diplomatic channels are being used for the exchange of directives and communications between Communist and left-wing labor groups in the United States, Mexico and Cuba, and it may perhaps be logical to conclude that censorship intercepts appear to be few in number compared with the volume of communication which, all other evidence indicates, must be going on continuously between key members of these groups.

Another fact which should not be overlooked is that numerous Moscow-trained Latin American Communists as well as certain Spanish Communists are now actively working in the other American republics. An outstanding example is Jesús Hernández Tomás, a Spanish Communist who proceeded from Moscow to Mexico in the fall of 1943 and who is at the present time reported to be working in the Soviet Embassy. While the Soviet missions may be used to channel communications from Moscow to these leaders, only a minimum of contact with them would be necessary in view of their training and experience along Party lines. The Soviet missions could thus take advantage of the voluminous pro-Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda which is persistently generated by local Communist groups without running the risk of becoming involved in direct proselytizing.

For example, Pablo Neruda, until recently Chilean Consul General in Mexico City, made the Consulate General virtually a Communist headquarters. He was recalled because of his participation in public demonstrations demanding the release from prison in Brazil of Luis Carlos Prestes.<sup>10</sup> Ambassador Oumansky had been more often in contact—publicly, at least, with the Chilean Ambassador to Mexico, Oscar Schnake, a Socialist whose record is one of hostility toward Communism. Thus the rumors which circulate to the effect that Schnake transmits Soviet directives from Oumansky to Chilean Communists cannot be regarded very seriously. No one can say, however, at present, what connections privately exist between the Soviet Embassy and such thorough-going Communists as Neruda.

The Soviet missions do supply propaganda material to Communist Party representatives but there is no proof that the material delivered is other than the straight pro-Soviet Russia propaganda currently available for distribution to any agency which cares to take it. Nora Chegodaeva, Press Attaché of the Soviet Legation in Habana, is exceedingly active. She is believed to be in close touch with the Com-

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<sup>10</sup> A Brazilian Communist leader who had spent several years in the Soviet Union, and had been arrested in Brazil for attempting a *coup d'état*.

munist newspaper *Hoy*, with the Frente Nacional Anti-Fascista, with the headquarters of the Communist-dominated Cuban Confederation of Labor and with members of the Servicio Femenino de Defensa Civil which has Communist connections. Miss Chegodaeva was a Political Commissar in Russia. She was trained in Komintern schools and speaks fluent Spanish.

A report from Uruguay suggests that Communist Party members there are working for the new Soviet Legation. Eugenio Gómez, head of the Party, is known to be compiling information on economic and intelligence matters. It is asserted that he began work some time ago on orders from Moscow and that he will transmit the information obtained to the Soviet Minister.

#### 4. *Relations with Latin American Labor Organizations.*

It has been surmised that diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet Embassies in Washington and Mexico is used to convey directives and information linking the CIO<sup>11</sup> and some elements of the AFL<sup>12</sup> with the Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL). The latter leftist labor organization is well entrenched among the proletariat of many Latin American countries and includes strong Communist elements. Its President is the Mexican Vicente Lombardo Toledano. He is an avowed Marxist, atheist and friend of Soviet Russia but has never admitted belonging to the Communist Party.

There are persistent rumors that Ambassador Oumansky is in contact with Latin American labor groups through Lombardo Toledano. There is evidence that Lombardo is interested in the formation of a new international political organization paralleling the CTAL. Communist leaders, many with close Moscow connections, are active in this movement and in seeking to control the Latin American labor movement.

Whether the leftist Latin American labor groups are receiving directives from the Soviet diplomatic missions or not, the line of propaganda used in their periodicals, speeches and meetings will be of value to the USSR by helping to create a state of mind among Latin American masses which is friendly to the Soviet Union, which may tend to look more and more to the Soviet Union for guidance and example, and which is being prepared to welcome a dominant, powerful Russia in post-war world reconstruction.

#### 5. *Soviet Funds.*

Several rumors have been reported but not verified to date, regarding funds used by the Soviet diplomatic missions under review. One

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<sup>11</sup> Congress for Industrial Organization.

<sup>12</sup> American Federation of Labor.

informant stated that a large amount of the Russian gold entering the United States through Amtorg<sup>13</sup> and Corporation Carp<sup>14</sup> allegedly for purchase of merchandise for the war effort, is diverted to finance Communist activities in the Western Hemisphere.

A strictly confidential report from Mexico City shows that from July 1943 through March 10, 1944, the Soviet Embassy deposited 1,575,515 pesos in a Mexican bank. This was believed to be the only bank handling the Embassy's transactions. The balance on March 10 was 70,867 pesos, showing that 1,504,648 pesos were disbursed in eight and a half months. All disbursements were on the basis of bearer checks, and the largest individual withdrawals amounted respectively to 100,000 pesos, 400,000 pesos and 177,000 pesos.

A large part of these disbursements, it is pointed out, may have related to the purchase of the handsome property occupied by the Soviet Embassy. It also was reported that in leasing a theater for the showing of Russian films, the Embassy paid three years' rent in advance.

#### THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY

The selection of Constantin I. [A.] Oumansky as Soviet Ambassador and the elaborate arrangements made for his tour of duty in Mexico have been the subject of much comment.

One of the largest private residences in Mexico City was purchased for the Embassy, and there has been much comment regarding the dazzling impression made especially on Mexican Senators and Deputies, by the elaborate receptions held there.

Rumors have circulated to the effect that the personnel of the Soviet Embassy numbered into hundreds. Oumansky personally informed our Embassy that he believed the rumors were manufactured by the Polish Minister and certain Catholic elements. He asserted that the staff comprised 7 officers, the remaining personnel (of about 40) consisting of clerks and two Tass Agency representatives.

It would be difficult to determine whether Oumansky's mission goes beyond Mexico. He apparently outranks the present head of the Soviet mission in Washington<sup>15</sup> and it has been asserted that he is chief of the entire Soviet diplomatic service in the Western Hemisphere. He formerly was Ambassador to the United States and afterward served as Soviet Minister of Propaganda. The *New York Times* writer Cianfarra declared that Oumansky holds two positions simultaneously: that of Ambassador to Mexico and that of Chairman

<sup>13</sup> Amtorg Trading Corporation, New York, N.Y., the official purchasing and sales agency in the United States of the Soviet Union.

<sup>14</sup> The Carp Export and Import Corporation, New York, N.Y., whose president was Sam Carp, a naturalized American citizen and brother-in-law of Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov.

<sup>15</sup> Ambassador Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. The latter, said Cianfarra, is composed of a group of men who are experts in foreign policy, who study specific questions and recommend policies to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In the opinion of Ambassador Messersmith<sup>16</sup> Oumansky undoubtedly considers himself to be in a strategic position. Mrs. Oumansky is reported to have said that he at first was disappointed to be sent so far from the "home front" but accepted the post as a place where he could "do the most good" since Latin America was important now and would be even more so in the post-war period. Mr. Oumansky is aggressive and readily accepts opportunities to appear in public. It has been commented, however, that his desire to make himself *persona grata* may be influenced by the fact that he is the first diplomatic representative of his government in Mexico after a long break in relations which occurred in a manner unfavorable to the USSR.

Oumansky gave an impression of being indiscreet last November when he made a speech in which he implied that Russia intended to occupy Poland as far as the 1939 frontier, but later it became evident that he had only given advance expression to a pre-determined policy of his government. As a matter of fact, three months previously in Habana, Chargé d'Affaires Dimitri Zaikin<sup>17</sup> had made the same statement, but without arousing the attention given Oumansky's speech.

Last November the magazine of the Monterrey Chamber of Commerce devoted an article to Ambassador Oumansky. He is well qualified, it said, to overcome prejudices against the Communist regime; and his appointment to Mexico was a bold and clever maneuver by the Soviet government, for it placed a diplomatic officer of great ability in a country where he will perhaps enjoy greater freedom of action than he could have in the United States, while the prestige Mexico now enjoys in Latin America may be advantageous to his efforts in the other American republics.

It was also asserted in this article that Oumansky appeared to be openly striving to win a position of prestige and influence for the Soviet Embassy in Mexico which would surpass that of the Embassy of the United States. Several stories were quoted which, it was said, were being circulated in Mexico tending to build up Soviet prestige at the expense of the United States. The writer also held the view that Oumansky would direct from Mexico the Soviet diplomatic activities in other Latin American countries.

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<sup>16</sup> George S. Messersmith. American Ambassador in Mexico.

<sup>17</sup> Dmitry Ivanovich Zaikin. With regard to some difficulties which he experienced when entering at New York in 1939, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 857-868, *passim*.

The uncertain scope of Oumansky's activities together with his aggressiveness has caused concern to Mexico's Foreign Secretary Padilla.<sup>18</sup> The latter surmised that a connection existed between Oumansky and a trip to Chile last November made by Narciso Bassols, leader of *Acción Política*, a Mexican leftist group probably affiliated with the Communist Party, which was very active in the campaign for renewal of Mexican relations with the USSR. Another source reported that Bassols acted as courier for Ambassador Oumansky on this trip. In Chile Foreign Minister Fernández<sup>19</sup> said that he suspected Pablo Neruda, former Chilean Consul General in Mexico, of conveying directives from Oumansky to Chilean Communists.

There are reports from several sources indicating that Spanish Republicans are turning for help and directives to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. One observer stated that the Spanish Republicans had been disappointed in their hope of receiving backing from the United States and Great Britain and were therefore now looking to the Russians.

#### THE SOVIET LEGATION IN HABANA

The Soviet Legation was established in Habana in July 1943, and occupies a palatial residence at a rental cost of \$650.00 (U.S. cy.) per month. Diplomatic relations were established between Cuba and the USSR in October 1942. Maxim Litvinoff<sup>20</sup> was appointed the first Soviet Minister. After presenting his credentials, in April 1943, he returned to Washington and left Dimitri Zaikin as *Chargé d'Affaires* in Habana. Zaikin formerly was the Soviet Consul General in New York. His staff includes four Secretaries, a Commercial Attaché, a Press Attaché, five male and five female employees. All of the men are accompanied by their wives.

The few receptions which have been held at the Legation are reported to have been more lavish than affairs ordinarily given by representatives of other nations in Cuba.

The discrepancy between the amount of discernible Soviet interest in Cuba and the relatively important standing of Zaikin and large size of the Legation seems rather striking. As noted above, the Soviet Union has at present no economic interests in Cuba and outside of the Legation but one Soviet citizen resides in the Cuban Republic.

Offsetting these facts are the well-known advantages of Cuba as a listening post for Latin America and a center for the receipt and

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<sup>18</sup> Ezequiel Padilla.

<sup>19</sup> Joaquín Fernández Fernández.

<sup>20</sup> Maxim Maximovich Litvinov, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1941-1943.

transmission of information and propaganda as well as for the exchange of travelers.

Moreover, the position of the Communist Party is stronger in Cuba than in any of the other American republics. While not the largest of the Cuban political parties, it has power and cohesion due to its strong organization and disciplined membership. It is a legal political party, included in the government coalition. There are ten Communist Party members in the Cuban Congress and the Communist Juan Marinello is Minister without portfolio in the Cabinet. The Party owns a radio station, a daily newspaper, a publishing house and will soon have a moving picture theater. The Party dominates the Cuban Confederation of Labor. Among Party leaders, Fabio Grobart (alias Abraham Sinovich), the Instructor-General of the Cuban Communist Party, and Blas Roca, Secretary-General, were trained in Moscow.

Habana has been regarded as a sort of Caribbean regional headquarters for the Communist Party. Close contacts are known to exist between leaders in Cuba, Mexico and Colombia. Cuba also has for some time been an important center for the publication and distribution of Communist literature. Propaganda pamphlets disguised as Catholic religious booklets and bearing the imprints of Spanish publishers, for use in Spain, are known to have been printed in Habana. Communist propaganda printed there also finds its way to Puerto Rico, and scattered leaves of such imprints have been found on the decks of ships unloading in Venezuela.

It is evident that the Soviet government placed a high value on establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, for Dr. Concheso,<sup>21</sup> first Cuban diplomat accredited to Moscow, was personally received by Marshal Stalin. It was Dr. Concheso's belief that he was the only foreign diplomat other than the American and British Ambassadors to whom Stalin had accorded this distinction. By conduct of Concheso sealed letters were exchanged between Stalin and President Batista.<sup>22</sup> Cuba's attitude of friendship and respect for Soviet Russia has been indicated in many ways. A pointed instance was the celebration of the 26th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in November 1943. The observance was given government support, according to our Embassy, lending it a significance "which in recent years has been accorded only to the observance of either Cuban or American Independence Day."

Since its establishment in Habana the Soviet Legation has engaged in various efforts to promote friendship for the USSR. These efforts have included public appearances of the Minister, cultivation of good

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<sup>21</sup> Aurelio Fernández Concheso, Cuban Minister to the Soviet Union.

<sup>22</sup> Col. Fulgencio Batista.

relations with other diplomats and dissemination of propaganda, especially regarding the courage and power of the Soviet Union as shown in the war.

An indication that progress is being made in Soviet plans looking toward economic penetration of the Western Hemisphere after the war was seen in the statement made by a Communist Cuban Cabinet member that "due to opposite climates the Soviet Union and Latin America produce different and equally necessary products. A Cuban Foreign Office spokesman said publicly that "Cuba does not have to sell her sugar to the United States in the future." (It has been suggested that possibly in consideration of the free hand President Batista has given the Communist Party in Cuba, the Soviet government may have promised future trade agreements which would give Cuba economic independence of the United States. Russian wheat and oil, for example, might be promised in exchange for Cuban sugar, tobacco and coffee.)

In the line of propaganda activities, the Legation is furnishing photographs and articles for the Cuban Army publication, *El Cuatro de Septiembre*. Also, according to the Cuban press, a program for the promotion and development of cultural relations between Cuba and the USSR is being jointly undertaken by the Soviet Legation and the Cuban Ministry of State.

Recently it was understood that orders were given to intensify the activities of the *Unión Sionista de Cuba*, and it was alleged that the directive emanated from the Soviet Legation. Since December material for editorials has been transmitted from Moscow to the Zionist publication *Palabra Hebrea* over the Cuban Press Wireless. The cost of transmission, which amounts to more than \$100.00 daily, is being paid at the source, possibly by the Soviet government. The messages contain propaganda on the activities of the Jewish anti-fascist committee, atrocity stories of Nazi terrorism and material showing that Jewish peoples are fighting side by side with the Soviet peoples against Hitler.

#### POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS

No official gestures looking toward establishment of relations with the Soviet Union have been made in any of the other American republics besides Cuba, Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay, but labor and leftist elements are constantly bringing pressure to that end on the governments of Chile and Costa Rica, and there is evidence that the question is receiving serious consideration in Brazil.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> See vol. VII, bracketed note in section entitled "Attitude of the United States with respect to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the American Republics and the Soviet Union."



It is interesting to note that both Chile and Brazil apparently wish to avoid acting independently. President Rios<sup>24</sup> said in a recent public statement that if relations were to be established between Chile and the USSR, the initiative should come from a third friendly nation. President Vargas<sup>25</sup> has said publicly that Brazil will establish relations "in due course" and privately to our Ambassador<sup>26</sup> that if President Roosevelt wished him to take pertinent action in the matter at any time, he was prepared to do so. Recent favorable references in the Brazilian press to the Soviet government and war successes suggest that the public is being prepared for possible developments in this direction.

M[ARION] P[ARKS]

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093.612/49: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1944—9 p. m.

739. Your 1046, March 25, midnight.<sup>27</sup> The War Department has communicated to us its definite decision that General Connolly but not General Burns is eligible for Soviet decoration and is so informing General Deane. You are, therefore, authorized to inform the Soviet Government of the foregoing.<sup>28</sup>

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33802

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 29, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request. He said that Mr. Molotov, in reply to my recent message urging that he take occasion to show some interest in further support of the Four Nation Declaration,<sup>29</sup> agreed that it would be a fine and timely thing to do. I pointed out how Russia was suffering in the eyes of the American public on account of a number of acts which were being construed as unilateralism on the part of Russia, et cetera. I covered this whole field.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Molotov now sends me a reply to the effect that he sees no reason why Russia should come out at this

<sup>24</sup> Juan Antonio Ríos Morales.

<sup>25</sup> Getulio Vargas.

<sup>26</sup> Jefferson Caffery.

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

<sup>28</sup> Ambassador Harriman informed the Foreign Commissariat of the eligibility of General Connolly for a Soviet decoration on March 31, 1944.

<sup>29</sup> Signed October 30, 1943, at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 755.

time reiterating its support of the Four Nation Declaration, but that his Government would be willing for the United States, Great Britain and Russia to make a joint statement<sup>30</sup> reiterating their interest in and their support of the Four Nation Declaration. I thanked him and said that I would think more about this matter in the hope that something could be done to break down the rising hostility to Russia on account of these small acts on her part which are being interpreted as a movement toward unilateralism. I made this full and clear by means of several illustrations. The Ambassador said he fully understood; that he would give the matter further attention and communicate again with Mr. Molotov.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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861b.6363/192 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 30, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received March 31—1 : 15 p. m.]

1112. Vyshinski told me today on instructions and for transmission to my Government that the agreement with the Japanese for the relinquishment of their concessions in Sakhalin and the new fisheries convention were being signed today.<sup>31</sup> He said that the transfer of the Sakhalin concessions had already been effected and that the Japs no longer had any concessions in that area. With regard to the Fisheries Convention he said that he wished to point out especially that it provided that certain fishing lots would not be leased to the Japs until the end of the war in the Pacific. The other alterations were economic in character and introduced changes to the advantage of the Soviet side with regard to conditions of lease, etc. The new convention will run for a period of 5 years subject to annual renewal. Vyshinski emphasized that the Soviet Government had been able to obtain much more favorable terms in the present convention than in the past since its position was now much stronger as a result of the successes of the Red Army. He then showed me the text of the

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<sup>30</sup> Some thought was given within the Department of State to the working out of a draft statement. A penciled note of April 7, 1944, by James Clement Dunn stated: "Mr. Secretary thought it was difficult to work out a draft at this time." (740.0011 European War 1939/33802)

<sup>31</sup> The text of the protocol on the liquidation of Japanese oil and coal concessions in northern Sakhalin Island was published in *New York Times*, April 1, 1944, p. 4. For illustrations of the importance of these Japanese concessions in the Soviet part of Sakhalin Island, and of the suggested retrocession of the southern part of the Island to the Soviet Union by Japan, as conditions for the conclusion of a political agreement between Japan and the Soviet Union in 1940, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. 1, pp. 643, 670, 674, 676, and 679.

clause by which the Jap Government undertakes not to fish in waters off Kamchatka or in Olyutorski Bay<sup>33</sup> until the end of the war in the Pacific. Vyshinski remarked that it would be "inconvenient" to have Japs fishing vessels operating in these waters at the present time. He said that the foregoing restrictive provision would be kept secret but that the other terms of the Fisheries Convention would be published in the Soviet press.

HARRIMAN

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861b.6363/196 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 31, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received April 1—1:20 p. m.]

1126. The text of the Sakhalin protocol contains an agreement of the Soviet Government to furnish the Japanese Government with 50,000 tons of oil annually "for a period of 5 subsequent years starting from the conclusion of the present war" whereas the Japanese note of March 30 states that all leased fishing areas on the east coast of Kamchatka and in the Olyutorsk area will not be exploited "until the termination of the war in the Pacific".

The *Times* correspondent in Moscow has informed me that he requested the Foreign Office for a clarification of the first quoted phrase and was told that he could interpret it to mean "the conclusion of the war in the Pacific", so long as he did not attribute this interpretation to the Foreign Office.

HARRIMAN

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Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96, Box 2

*President Roosevelt to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin)*<sup>34</sup>

Many thanks for your message of March 25.<sup>35</sup> It is my hope that the International Labor Organization at the coming meeting will

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<sup>33</sup> The Olyutorsky Bay is situated along the northeastern base of the Kamchatka Peninsula, between the Olyutorsky Cape and Peninsula at the north, and the Govenka Cape and Peninsula at the south, facing into the Bering Sea.

<sup>34</sup> Paraphrase received through Naval channels at the Embassy in Moscow on April 3, 1944, and sent on for Stalin in a letter to Molotov on the next day.

<sup>35</sup> For text, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.: *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, vol. II, p. 136.

make it clear that it no longer is an organ of the League of Nations and that it will affiliate itself with the United Nations. I trust, therefore, that the Soviet Union will have representatives at the next conference.

I will keep you informed of what takes place at the meeting in Philadelphia.

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093.612/54a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944—4 p. m.

837. Reference your 440, February 10 and subsequent telegrams regarding decorations. The President has approved following policy regarding decorations agreed upon by the Departments of State, War and Navy:

“(a) That the Department of State be eliminated from participation in the handling of awards made by governments of cobelligerent nations and the American Republics to members of our armed forces;

(b) That officers and enlisted men of our armed forces engaged in transactions involving the allocation of Lend-Lease materials or credits to foreign governments be not permitted to accept such awards;

(c) That for the period of the war immediate awards from Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations should go only to members of our field or operating forces engaged with the enemy in active areas, and that awards covering services outside the field or operating forces should be held in abeyance until the end of the war;

(d) That awards conferred by American Republics or by any cobelligerent nation other than as specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) may be accepted without prior authorization from the War or Navy Departments;

(e) That when there is doubt as to whether an entity which desires to make an award is to be regarded as a cobelligerent within the meaning of the act of Congress, the War and Navy Departments will be guided by the decision of the Department of State.”

The above does not change the Government's policy regarding decorations for civilian personnel.

With regard to decorations for General Connolly's officers and men (your 1118, March 31<sup>36</sup>), the War Department states that it has no objection to the acceptance of foreign decorations by members of the Persian Gulf Command provided the prior approval of the theater commander is obtained.

You are authorized to inform Mikoyan of the War Department's decision in the case of Connolly's officers and men and to take appropriate steps after consultation with General Deane towards obtaining from General Connolly a list of officers and men for submission to the

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

Soviet authorities. It is felt preferable that an official communication to the Soviet Government regarding our new policy on decorations be delayed until General Deane has received instructions from the War Department and that the Soviet authorities be informed in such a way as to provide for the implementation of paragraph (a) of the new policy in future cases.

HULL

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860f.01/532 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 11, 1944.

[Received April 12—11:13 a. m.]

1261. The Soviet press for April 11 carried a message of congratulations from Beneš to Marshal Stalin on the occasion of the Red Army and Czech brigade reaching the Soviet-Czech frontier<sup>37</sup> and Stalin's reply thereto. Beneš message stated that the Red Army would bring to the Czech people freedom, hope and safety for the future. He recalled the common friendship of the two nations and stated that their mutual ordeals and their present struggle would guarantee the perpetuity of their union now and in the future. Stalin's reply stated that he did not doubt that the common struggle of the two peoples versus the common enemy would soon lead to the establishment of freedom and independence of the Czech Republic.

HARRIMAN

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861.4061 Motion Pictures/99 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 13, 1944—noon.

893. After consulting with various persons regarding the award of Soviet decorations to the motion picture personalities listed in your 1141 of April 1,<sup>38</sup> it appears impossible to determine which, if any, of the persons listed are at present in the Armed Forces of the United States or are civilian employees of Government departments or agen-

<sup>37</sup> Brig. Gen. Ludvik Svoboda crossed the frontier as commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Group with the Red Army of Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov.

<sup>38</sup> Not printed; the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on March 31, had listed 30 names to whom the Soviet Government proposed to award decorations. It wished to be informed of those persons who were members of the Armed Forces, or who were Government officials. (861.4061 Motion Pictures/99)

cies, without making direct inquiries of the motion picture authorities in Hollywood which would involve considerable delay and would probably lead to its becoming public knowledge that the Soviet Government was contemplating the awards in question.

It is accordingly suggested that you inform Soviet authorities that there would be no objection to the awarding of decorations in question except in so far as our laws may prevent acceptance by persons employed by United States Government. You should explain to them that the persons may fall into one of the following three classes:

1. Civilians not members of Armed Forces or employed by the Government. The Government would have no control over or connection with the granting of decorations to persons in this class.

2. Members of the Armed Forces. In accordance with new policy quoted in Department's 837 of April 8, Department of State is eliminated from participation in the handling of such awards. Approval of military authorities should be obtained.

3. Civilian employees of United States Government. Congressional consent would have to be obtained for the acceptance of these decorations.

Presumably the great majority, if not all of the persons concerned, would fall into category 1.

HULL

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861.4061 Motion Pictures/105: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 14, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 11:30 p. m.]

1291. I urge that the Department reconsider the procedure suggested in its 893 April 13, noon and that the Department proceed promptly with making the inquiries requested by the Soviet Government. It seems to me that the Department can do this much more expeditiously and with less embarrassment than can the Soviet authorities. Would it not be possible for the Department to approach each company by telegraph asking whether those listed were in the army or Government employment without mentioning the reason for the requested information.

In view of the time which has already lapsed since we received the Soviet request, and of the Soviet desire for an early reply, I earnestly hope that this matter can be handled with the utmost expedition as a matter of courtesy to the Soviet Government.

HARRIMAN

811.203/440a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944—noon.

921. War Department has raised question of criminal jurisdiction over members of armed forces of the United States in the Soviet Union.

It is the position of the United States that under international law members of its armed forces on foreign territory with the consent of the local sovereign are immune from criminal jurisdiction. In order to avoid misunderstanding however, recognition of such right has been obtained in places where our forces are situated. In some instances this has been done by exchange of notes, in others by unilateral action of the local sovereign. The Department has no preference as to the manner in which such right is recognized by the Soviet Government. You are authorized to approach the appropriate authorities and ascertain their disposition in the matter.

If an exchange of notes is desired the following text is suggested :

“It is the desire of the Government of the United States that the service courts and authorities of its military and naval forces<sup>39</sup> shall, during the continuance of the present conflict against our common enemies, exercise exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses which may be committed in the Soviet Union by members of such forces.

“If for special reasons the service authorities of the United States prefer not to exercise the above jurisdiction, it is proposed that in any such case notice to that effect shall be given to the Soviet Government through diplomatic channels.

“Assurance is given that the service courts and authorities of the United States in the Soviet Union will be willing and able to try, and on conviction, to punish all criminal offenses which members of the United States forces may be alleged, upon sufficient evidence, to have committed in the Soviet Union and that the United States authorities will be willing to investigate and deal appropriately with any alleged criminal offenses committed by such forces in the Soviet Union which may be brought to their attention by the competent Soviet authorities or which the United States authorities may find have taken place.

“The competent United States authorities will be prepared to cooperate with the authorities of the Soviet Union in setting up a satisfactory procedure for affording such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations and collecting evidence with respect to offenses alleged to have been committed by members of the armed forces of the United States.

“It is proposed that the foregoing arrangement shall be in effect during the present war and for a period of six months thereafter. If the above arrangement is acceptable to the Soviet Government, this

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<sup>39</sup> By telegram 1021 of April 25, 1944, the Department authorized the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to comply with the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that “military and naval forces” should be changed to read “armed forces” in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding (811.203/440a).

note and the reply thereto accepting the provisions outlined shall be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments.”

It is understood that General Deane has received instructions from the War Department and you should consult with him concerning the matter.

HULL

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093.612/59a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to transmit herewith a receipt for the Soviet decorations which were awarded and received on April 11, 1944.<sup>40</sup>

These decorations are being forwarded to the War and Navy Departments and to the Maritime Commission for delivery to the recipients.

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1944.

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093.612/57 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, April 17, 1944.

[Received April 17—11:15 a. m.]

1317. Moscow papers for April 15 announce the awarding of the Order of Suvorov Second Class to General Connolly and of various other Soviet orders to 33 American officers and men of the Persian Gulf Command “for the successful fulfillment of the instructions of the American Command in the Persian Gulf in transporting munitions supplies and foodstuffs to the Soviet Union which have provided great assistance to the Red Army in the struggle with the German Fascist invaders.”<sup>41</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>40</sup>The presentation of the Soviet awards to members of the United States Armed Forces and Merchant Marine took place at a ceremony in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel in Washington on April 11, 1944. The list of the recipients (which included General Eisenhower), the remarks by Ambassador Gromyko, and the reply by Secretary of State Hull are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, pp. 347-349.

<sup>41</sup>In a letter of April 16 from People's Commissar of Foreign Trade Mikoyan to Ambassador Harriman, the final paragraph stated that these decorations “express the friendship, which is growing stronger, of our great countries in the struggle against the common enemy for the better future of freedom-loving people.” (093.612/76)



861.9111/507: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, April 20, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received April 22—11:30 p. m.]

1369. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Herewith follows my fourth interpretive report on developments in Soviet policy as reflected in the press for the period March 9 to April 15 for distribution as suggested in my number 2215, December 14, 2 p. m.<sup>42</sup>

*Report begins, number 4.*

The press continues to concentrate on the war and to publicize accomplishments on the home front as well as the military with apparently the general purpose of exhorting the people to increased efforts for the drive for final victory.

With the advance of the Red Army toward and into neighboring countries Soviet political policy is unfolding as applied to the specific problems of individual countries. Soviet diplomacy is becoming increasingly active and positive. The pattern of these developments is consistent with the basic policies previously outlined by Soviet officials but in some cases is startling in its aggressiveness, determination and readiness to take independent action. Through the announced policies and articles in the press it is increasingly clear that the Soviet Union intends to play an important role in international affairs commensurate with its power and with the sacrifices it has made toward winning the war.

There is no indication that the Soviet Union does not value the relations they have attained with the British and ourselves. On the other hand, it is obvious that they are unwilling to compromise certain basic principles which they believe are essential to Soviet interests and security. With the exception of the compromise Curzon Line<sup>43</sup> for the boundary with Poland, the western boundaries established in 1940 are considered fixed and irrevocable from Finland to the Black Sea. Any semblance of a *cordon sanitaire* is to be ended, but confirmation is evidenced by Molotov's announcement regarding Rumania and exchange of representatives with the Badoglio govern-

<sup>42</sup> Not printed, but see telegram 2214, December 14, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 608.

<sup>43</sup> In regard to the origin of the Curzon Line and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations*, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. IX, pp. 272-273, 286, 434, 446-447; *ibid.*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794. Further details are in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1924), vol. VI, pp. 223-283, 317-322, and summary descriptions in S. Kononov, *Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

ment<sup>44</sup> that Communist form of governments in Europe is not a present objective of the Soviets, although full opportunity for political expression of the Communist parties appear a fixed objective.

Press comment on Great Britain and the United States was mixed. The Allied war effort was a major theme in dealing with Britain and America and special prominence was given to the Allied air war against Germany which received about as much space and prominence as the war in Italy and the Pacific combined. Expressions looking toward future cooperation with the Allies in the war and postwar period continued and in general news from Allied countries was treated sympathetically and prominence given to important declarations of Allied statesmen. Mr. Hull's radio address of April 9<sup>45</sup> was given unusually full though not complete coverage. A long article in *Red Star* cautiously canvassed the possibilities for the 1944 American Presidential election confining direct comment only to statements to the effect that Roosevelt's foreign policy had the support of wide sections of the American people and that foreign affairs were the chief problem confronting the United States at the present.

HARRIMAN

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858.711/2 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 28, 1944.

[Received April 28—3:15 p. m.]

1478. Moscow papers for April 26 publish a Tass despatch from Stockholm reporting the decision of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to revoke the privileges formerly enjoyed by Germany for sending mail through Sweden and the withdrawal of railroad cars with German personnel.<sup>46</sup>

HAMILTON

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<sup>44</sup> Secretary of State Hull had already advised Ambassador Harriman in telegram 632, March 18 (vol. III, p. 1061), that "this latest move of the Soviet Government has, however, added to the uncertainty and apprehension in the mind of the American public as to the sincerity and willingness of the Soviet Union to accept wholeheartedly the principle of collaboration in the conduct of international affairs."

<sup>45</sup> Address on the "Foreign Policy of the United States of America" broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, April 15, 1944, p. 335.

<sup>46</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, p. 336, footnote 43, and telegram 416 of September 26, 1940, from Helsinki, *ibid.*, p. 347.

800.00b International Red Day/268: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 1, 1944—midnight.

[Received May 2—11:04 a. m.]

1538. Stalin's Order of the Day for May 1, which is shorter than the orders for the past 2 years,<sup>47</sup> covers the following points:

(1) The successes of the Red Army during the last winter campaign.

(2) A generous tribute to the assistance of the Allies in the following language; "Toward these successes contributed in considerable measure our great Allies, the United States of America and Great Britain, who are holding a front in Italy against the Germans and are deflecting from us a significant number of German troops, are supplying us with very valuable strategic raw materials and equipment and are subjecting the Germans to systematic bombings military targets and thus undermining her military power."

(3) Fulsome praise for the efforts of the home front which in spite of unexampled heroism displayed by the Red Army "does not stand in the latter's debt". Stalin emphasizes the important industrial construction which has taken place in the rear during the course of the war. He particularly stresses the outstanding role played by women workers.

(4) The shaky position of Hitler's satellites and an appeal to the people of these countries to take the matter of their liberation into their own hands in order to spare themselves sacrifices and destruction and to win the understanding of the democratic countries. This statement places the imprimatur of Stalin's authority on the attitude toward the satellites expressed in recent months by the Soviet press.

(5) The necessity for completing of the liberation of Soviet territory and the reestablishment of the entire Soviet frontier from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea.

(6) A determination to pursue the wounded German beast to his lair and liberate from German slavery the Poles, the Czechs and the Allied peoples of Western Europe.

(7) A measured statement on the necessity for joint blows from the east and west. The statement in translation reads: "It is understandable that this task is a more difficult matter than driving the German troops from the borders of the Soviet Union. It can be decided only on the basis of the joint efforts of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of North America through joint blows from the east by the forces of our troops and from the west by the forces of the troops of our Allies. There can be no doubt that

<sup>47</sup> Concerning these Orders of the Day, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 439, and *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, p. 519.

only by such a combined blow can Hitlerite Germany be completely crushed”.

(8) An order for a 20-volley salute on May 1 in Moscow and eight other cities in honor of the historic victories of the Red Army and in recognition of the great successes of the workers, farmers and intelligentsia of the Soviet Union in the rear.

In contrast to his Orders of the Day for the past 2 years Stalin does not discuss the weakness of the German ideological or military position but assumes the inevitable defeat of Germany provided the Allied blows are coordinated. He makes a strong appeal to the satellites to desert the weakening German cause. His recognition of the Allied contribution is couched in cordial terms and his call for joint action is in much more sober language than several recent statements in the Soviet press which have disclosed a note of impatience. It is noteworthy that this year Stalin attributes the successes of the Red Army the [to] the correct strategy and tact[ics] of the Soviet Command, and the mastery of their weapons by the troops whereas in former years he called upon the command and the troops to perfect these qualities.

Full text of order follows by airmail.<sup>48</sup>

HAMILTON

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860n.00/5-644

*Memorandum by Mr. George M. Abbott of the Division of Eastern European Affairs to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY:

### THE BALTIC STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

#### I *Background.*

In order to estimate the possible position of the Baltic states in any future union or world organization, it is necessary to review briefly their past history.

The Baltic states formed a part of the Russian Empire before 1917 and achieved their independence as a consequence of the defeat of both Russia and Germany. The United States recognized this change of status in 1922.<sup>49</sup> By the Soviet-German agreement of 1939<sup>50</sup> Estonia and Latvia, and perhaps Lithuania, were assigned to the Russian “sphere of interests.” In October 1939, mutual assistance pacts, signed

<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

<sup>49</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1922, vol. II, pp. 869 ff.

<sup>50</sup> The text of the German-Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty, with protocols, signed in Moscow September 28, 1939, is printed in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VIII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 164. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 477 ff.

by each of the three Baltic states under Soviet ultimat<sup>51</sup>, permitted the Soviet Union to station some 60,000 troops at specific air, naval and land bases. Some 60,000 German Balts were hastily evacuated by agreements between the German Government and the Baltic states. Apart from the suppression of criticism of the Soviet régime there was practically no interference in the internal life of the Baltic states until the fall of France. In June 1940 the entire territory of these states was occupied under new ultimat<sup>a</sup> by large forces of Russian troops, and new governments were appointed by the Soviet authorities. Soon afterwards new parliaments of all three countries were elected from single lists of candidates nominated by Soviet-controlled governments.<sup>52</sup>

During the elections the possibility of the incorporation into the Soviet Union was refuted not only by the puppet governments but also by the emissaries sent by Moscow to supervise the elections. Nevertheless, the new parliaments met, requested, and received membership in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The nationalization and distribution of the land, and the introduction of social and economic institutions characteristic of the Soviet system, proceeded rapidly until June 1941, when the region was invaded by the German army. Substantial revolts took place in the rear of the Red Armies and attempts were made to reassert the independence of the three states. Since the German conquest in the summer and early autumn of 1941 the area has been ruled by the German East Administration with powerless local governments operating under its control.

## II *Soviet Viewpoint.*

The position of the Soviet Government is that the three Baltic states individually requested admission to the Soviet Union, and as a result of these requests, were duly admitted under the provisions of the Soviet Constitution. In each of the three countries, the decision to request admission to the Soviet Union was made by a parliamentary body which had been elected in the proper manner, by democratic processes; in other words, the Baltic states were in no way conquered or forced to join the Soviet Union; they joined of their own free will, and the decision was in accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.

As supplementary arguments in support of the Soviet viewpoint, it has been argued in many articles published under Soviet auspices that 1) the Baltic states were separated from Russia by force after the

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<sup>51</sup> With regard to pressure used by the Soviet Union to conclude pacts of mutual assistance with these Baltic States, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 934 ff.

<sup>52</sup> Regarding the forcible occupation of the Baltic States and their incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. 1, pp. 357 ff.

last war with German, Allied, and White Russian help; 2) during their independence, the Baltic states were a field of constant anti-Soviet intrigue; 3) from an economic point of view, the Baltic states formed an integral and essential part of the Soviet Union.

### III *Baltic States Viewpoint.*

The point of view of the Baltic states as expressed by representatives abroad of the former independent governments is as follows: 1. The Baltic states have little or nothing in common with the Soviet Union as regards race, culture, or religion. 2. They had reached an economic plane considerably in advance of that of Russia. 3. During their period of independence, they demonstrated their right to be considered as separate states under generally accepted criteria. 4. The decision to join the Soviet Union did not represent the will of the people, but was forced on them following the military occupation of the country by Soviet troops. 5. The great majority of the people residing in the Baltic states today desire only independence, and have no sympathy with either the Soviet Union or Germany.

### IV *The Position of the American Government.*

The point of view of the American Government was expressed by the Acting Secretary of State in a statement on July 23, 1940, reading as follows:

[Here follows text of statement by the Acting Secretary of State, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1940, volume I, page 401.]

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that recognition of the annexation of the Baltic states is one of the principal Soviet war aims; the Soviet Government will, in all probability, insist upon it as a prerequisite to its participation in collective security arrangements.

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861.014/5-644

*Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of Eastern European Affairs to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 6, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY:

#### THE QUESTION OF NORTHERN BUKOVINA

In June 1940, the Soviet Union presented an ultimatum to Rumania demanding the incorporation of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and a small area of Northern Moldavia into the Soviet Union. The ultimatum was accepted by Rumania, and the transfer of territory took place.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> With regard to the activities of the Soviet Union in the Balkans and the seizure of Bessarabia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. I, pp. 444 ff.

Both Northern Bukovina and Eastern Galicia (the southeastern corner of Poland) represent areas which never formed part of the Czarist empire and, therefore, the Soviet claims to these areas are not based upon historical reasons.

By acquiring Eastern Galicia and Bukovina, the Soviet Union secured a strong frontier on the Carpathians and gave it a common frontier with Czechoslovakia. It is apparently for this reason that the Soviet authorities demanded this territory in 1940. The only logical claims which the Soviets might have to this area is based on the fact that approximately 50% of the inhabitants of Bukovina are Ukrainians. There is little economic importance in the possession of Northern Bukovina.

Although this territory never formed part of the Russian state until 1940, the Soviet Government has constantly claimed since that time that it forms an integral part of the Soviet Union,<sup>54</sup> and it may be expected that they will continue to hold this position. This probability is enhanced by the close ties which have been built up between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Without this territory, and at least a good part of Eastern Galicia, the Soviet Union would not have a common frontier with their Czechoslovakian allies.

ELBRIDGE DUBROW

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760c.61/2296 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 9, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received May 10—12: 45 a. m.]

1618. For the President and the Secretary. This morning Salisbury, of the United Press, and Fleming, of the Columbia Broadcasting System, showed me and allowed me to make a copy in translation of a letter of May 5 addressed by Stalin to Father Orlemanski.<sup>55</sup> They were shown the letter by Father Orlemanski and promised that they would not make it public. Father Orlemanski, now en route to the United States, has the letter with him and intends to submit to Catholic authorities in America to decide whether to make it public. Salisbury and Fleming asked that their promise to Father Orlemanski in regard

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<sup>54</sup> Comments on the occasion of the third anniversary of the formation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the cry that "Moldavia was and will be Soviet" had been sent by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union in telegram 999, August 2, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 558.

<sup>55</sup> The Reverend Stanislaus (Stanislaw) Orlemanski was a Roman Catholic priest from Springfield, Massachusetts. Information regarding his visit to the Soviet Union between April 28 and May 6 is given in vol. III, pp. 1398-1409, *passim*.

to publicity be observed. Stalin's letter reads in paraphrased translation as follows:

"1. In your opinion is it admissible for the Soviet Government to follow a policy of coercion and persecution so far as the Catholic Church is concerned?

"Answer. Advocating as I do the freedom of conscience and of worship, I regard such a policy to be precluded and as inadmissible.

"2. In your opinion is cooperation possible with the Holy Father, Pope Pius XII, in the matter of struggle against persecution and coercion of the Catholic Church?

"Answer. In my opinion it is possible.

"3. Father Orlemanski desired that the above questions and answers be not published at present but be handed personally to him. This suggestion was not objected to by Marshal Stalin but Marshal Stalin at the same time said that he had no objection to the publication of these questions and answers should this be considered desirable by Father Orlemanski.

"(Signed) Marshal Stalin."

Fleming and Salisbury said that in talking with Father Orlemanski before his second interview with Stalin on May 4 they urged upon Father Orlemanski the desirability of endeavoring to obtain something in writing from Marshal Stalin on the religious question. As a result Father Orlemanski during his talk with Marshal Stalin expressed a desire to have a statement on this subject in writing. Marshal Stalin suggested that Orlemanski formulate his questions in writing and submit them. This Orlemanski did and received the letter from Stalin on the evening of May 5. Orlemanski left Moscow for the United States on the morning of May 6.

Fleming and Salisbury said that while Orlemanski had in their opinion come here primarily interested in the Polish question, he felt that Stalin's letter moved into the much broader field of general relations between the Kremlin and the Catholic Church, that he did not think himself competent to deal with such a broad subject and had therefore decided to submit the letter to Catholic authorities in the United States. Salisbury and Fleming thought that by his letter Stalin had given a definite manifestation of a desire to bring about improved relations between the Soviet Government and the Catholic Church and to remove a present source of friction not only in Soviet-Polish relations but also in relations with the United States and other countries.<sup>56</sup> The Embassy agrees with this estimate.

HAMILTON

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<sup>56</sup> In regard to the interest of the United States in freedom of religion and religious conditions in the Soviet Union, see pp. 1211 ff.



860f.01/541 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 9, 1944.

[Received May 10—10:37 a. m.]

1630. Moscow papers for May 9 announce the agreement with Czechoslovakia for relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Czechoslovak administration after the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovak territory was signed in London on May 8<sup>57</sup> by the Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia V. Z. Lebedev and the Acting Czechoslovak Foreign Minister G. [H.] Ripka.

The text of the agreement as published in today's press is identical with the text of the draft agreement as announced by Vyshinsky in his press conference on April 30.<sup>58</sup>

A Tass despatch from London refers to Ripka's and Masaryk's statements on the conclusion of the agreement.

Ripka is reported as expressing deep satisfaction with the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the wishes of the Czechs and toward Czech laws in signing the pact. Masaryk is reported as stating in Philadelphia that until the end of the war the fate of Germany must remain in the hands of the General commanding the Allied armies and their remarkable Russian allies. The war must end once and for all outbreaks of new aggression.

The leading article in *Izvestiya* for May 9 is devoted to the signature of the agreement. It emphasizes that the outstanding characteristic of the conversations was that the wishes of the Czechoslovak democratic government were taken fully into account by the Soviet Government and that as a result it was not necessary to introduce any changes into the draft. It states that the British and American Governments were consulted and expressed no objection to the draft prior to the signature of the agreement. The remainder of the article emphasizes that the new agreement is another link in the development of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. It reviews the various steps in the development of this friendship and quotes expressions of satisfaction which have appeared in the Czechoslovak and foreign press. This comment stresses the good will displayed by the Soviet Union in recognition the independence of countries liberated by its armed forces and in permitting the authorities of such countries to resume their administrative functions as soon as hostilities are terminated in any area.

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<sup>57</sup> For text, see Louise W. Holborn (ed.), *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, vol. II, 1943-1945 (Boston, 1948), p. 767.

<sup>58</sup> The draft of this agreement by the Czech Government was given to the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union during March. The Soviet Government accepted it without change on April 15, following which the United States and the United Kingdom concurred.

The agreement, continues the article, is now evidence of the consistent and principled policy of the Soviet Union in relation to small states fighting at the side of the major Allies against Germany imperialism. It flows directly from the great liberating mission which is being performed by the Red Army. It keeps step with the Soviet troops in their advance across the Carpathians where the suffering peoples await them. The task of the anti-Hitler coalition headed by the great powers, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, is to liberate the Allied peoples of Western Europe and trap the German beast in his lair. This task can be accomplished only by the joint efforts of the United Nations. The new agreement is an important contribution in uniting the forces of the democratic countries directed toward the speedy accomplishment of this historic task.

HAMILTON

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862.01/635

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Stevens)*<sup>59</sup>

[Moscow,] May 20, 1944.

Professor Lange<sup>60</sup> stated that he was calling at Mr. Hamilton's suggestion to discuss his contact with the Free Germany Committee. He said that he had visited the headquarters of the Committee which is located in a dacha<sup>61</sup> outside Moscow and had had a four-hour conversation with members of the Executive including Erich Weinert, General Von Seydlitz, General Lattman, Graf Von Einsiedel and others. He said that his impression was that the members of the Committee fell into at least four general groups: 1) Old line Communists such as Weinert who have spent many years in the Soviet Union. 2) Anti-Nazis who carried on underground activities in Germany during Hitler's regime, such as Ackermann and Kaiser, a Catholic priest. 3) Regular army officers such as General Von Seydlitz who in the past have taken no part in political activities in Germany and who are sincerely convinced that the Nazi regime is responsible for Germany's present situation. 4) Opportunists such as General Lattman who were formerly rabid Nazis, but who realize Hitler's game is up and are endeavoring to play with the winning side.

<sup>59</sup> Transmitted to the Department in despatch 493, May 23, from Moscow; received June 9.

<sup>60</sup> Oscar Lange came from Poland in 1937, became a professor at the University of Chicago the following year, and a naturalized citizen October 6, 1943. Information regarding his visit to the Soviet Union between April 23 and May 22, is printed in vol. III, pp. 1402-1409, *passim*. For an analysis of the report submitted by him, see the memorandum of June 28 by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, *ibid.*, p. 1418.

<sup>61</sup> A suburban cottage, or villa.

Professor Lange said that in his opinion the Free Germany Committee was established primarily for propaganda purposes and that it was still being used to that end. He gained the impression that the Committee's appeals directed to the front line troops had little effect since they were largely discounted as propaganda. The Committee had evidence, however, that their broadcasts were listened to in Germany by the civilian population and felt that they might have some cumulative effect.<sup>62</sup> Members of the Committee expressed the opinion that there was now a substantial amount of anti-Nazi feeling among the German population but that Gestapo control was still so strict and efficient that such feeling had little opportunity for expression in action.

The Committee is now apparently devoting a great deal of effort to work among German prisoners in the Soviet Union. Professor Lange had gained the impression that these efforts had not been without results and he stated that when the war is over German prisoners returning to Germany from the Soviet Union will go back as anti-Nazi. While many prisoners are reluctant to affiliate formally with the Committee lest they be considered traitors the overwhelming majority of the lower ranks and at least 50 percent of the officers are sympathetic to the aims of the Committee. Professor Lange stated that German prisoners had been taken on trips to scenes of mass atrocities committed by the Germans in the Soviet Union and that their reaction had been one of indignation and of fear that the entire army would be held responsible. Members of the Committee told Professor Lange that the average German soldier has no direct knowledge of such atrocities and that he would tend to discount rumors concerning them as enemy propaganda. Professor Lange observed at this point that a similar state of mind exists in the United States and Great Britain where little credence is given to Soviet statements regarding German atrocities. This is particularly true in the Middle West. He also criticized the handling of German prisoners in American prison camps, stating that the Nazi elements were in complete control and that anti-Nazi prisoners suffered cruel treatment from their fellows. He said that if the present policy in the United States is continued German prisoners will return from American prison camps as convinced Nazis as ever, whereas those returning from the Soviet Union will be anti-Nazis.

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<sup>62</sup> Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus, the captured commander of the German 6th Army defeated at Stalingrad in 1942, issued an appeal on August 8, 1944, to German war prisoners in the Soviet Union and to the German people urging the renunciation of Adolf Hitler and the establishment of a new government which would end the war and bring about conditions making peace possible. Foreign Commissar Molotov told the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, on August 14 that this statement "was useful but not particularly significant," and that the Free Germany Committee was used "entirely for propaganda purposes."

Professor Lange stated that his conversations with the members of the Executive were held in the presence of a Russian officer, this being the only occasion in his talks with various groups here where he has been subjected to such supervision. He said that accordingly he had been reluctant to raise questions which might otherwise have been of interest to discuss. He said that he had not had an opportunity to converse at any length about the aims or objectives of the Committee and that on that point he had been referred to the Committee's Manifesto.<sup>63</sup> He had not gained the impression, however, that the Committee was shaping up as a potential government or administrative organization to be used after occupation of Germany and thought that such a development was most unlikely, both in view of the policy of military occupation of Germany which Stalin had informed him had been agreed upon at Tehran and because of the apparent nature of the Committee's activities. He said that while it was frankly admitted that some of the leading members of the Committee were Communists, the Executive strongly denied that it aimed to establish a Communistic or Soviet regime in Germany.

Summarizing his impressions Professor Lange said that he felt that at the present time the role of the Committee was as follows: 1) An agency for disabusing German prisoners of their Nazi ideas and for developing in them an anti-Nazi attitude. 2) A propaganda weapon directed toward Germany which may be of increasing significance as evidences appear that German morale and the internal structure of the country are beginning to crumble. 3) A possible political weapon for use by the Soviet Union in the event that the Western powers should attempt to sponsor any German group to establish a bulwark against the spread of Communism or Soviet influence.

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123 Harriman, W. Averell/74

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>64</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1944.

In talking to me yesterday afternoon before preparing to leave to return to his post, Ambassador Harriman said the President requested him to do the following:

1. Tell Stalin the President is still hopeful that he can find a satisfactory solution to the Polish problem, that it will be kept out of

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<sup>63</sup> The Manifesto to the German Army and People, broadcast from Moscow on July 19, 1943, by the Free Germany Committee is summarized in *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 552.

<sup>64</sup> Addressed to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn) and the Deputy Director (Matthews).

“politics” and to express the hope that the Soviets would give the Poles “a break”.

2. Discuss with Molotov the Finnish situation<sup>66</sup> in an endeavor to ascertain if there is any other possible action which could be taken which has not already been attempted.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

861.00/5-2444

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs  
(Dunn) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Harriman came in yesterday to see me before he left, and he asked me to inform you of three matters which he had discussed with the President and had wished very much to take up with you to receive your views. He also asked me to tell you that if there was anything in the positions which he understands he should take with respect to these three matters, which you might wish to take up with him, he would be very grateful to have your instructions as to your own views.<sup>67</sup>

1. With respect to China, the President felt it would be advisable for Mr. Harriman to ask Mr. Molotov for information as to what the difficulties were which the Soviet Government was now encountering in its relations with China as there seems to be a period of coolness arising between the Soviet and Chinese Governments. Mr. Harriman therefore expects to explore this situation in a friendly way to the extent that the Soviet Government is willing to discuss it.

2. As far as Poland is concerned, Mr. Harriman is authorized by the President to inform Mr. Molotov that the Polish Prime Minister is coming to Washington sometime about the 6th of June next.<sup>68</sup> The President told Mr. Harriman that he could tell Mr. Molotov that the President expects to tell the Polish Prime Minister that he is to refrain from any public discussion of the Polish question while in this country, and to avoid any public meetings with groups in the United States particularly interested in the Polish situation. The President further informed Mr. Harriman, but not for conveyance to the Soviet Government, that he expects to urge upon Mr. Mikolajczyk the advisability of so adjusting the policy of the Polish Government in

<sup>66</sup> For correspondence regarding the failure of Finland to withdraw from the war with the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 556 ff.

<sup>67</sup> There is no record in Department files that the Secretary sent Ambassador Harriman an expression of his views.

<sup>68</sup> The Polish Prime Minister, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, visited Washington between June 5 and 14; see vol. III, pp. 1272-1289, *passim*.

London that no opportunity will be lost to improve the situation existing between the Polish and Soviet Governments.

3. Finland. The President told Mr. Harriman that he could, if he found that the suggestion would be well received, inform Mr. Molotov that this Government would be glad to receive any suggestions from the Soviet Government as to anything we might be able to do to be helpful in getting Finland out of the war and out of its association with Germany. The President did not have any particular suggestions in mind himself, but he thought that if the Soviet Government had any suggestions itself that he would be very glad to receive them and give them full and sympathetic consideration.

JAMES CLEMENT DUNN

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741.61/1007 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 26, 1944.

[Received May 27—1:30 p. m.]

1901. Moscow newspapers for May 26 published on the front page greetings from Molotov to Eden<sup>69</sup> on the second anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Alliance between the USSR and Great Britain.<sup>70</sup> Molotov extended greetings to Eden, the British Government and the British people in the name of the Soviet Government, the Soviet people and from himself personally.<sup>71</sup>

He stated that as a result of the successes of the Soviet Army and of the Allied Armies, the forces of Hitlerite Germany have been undermined and the common task now was to annihilate the foe by a joint decisive blow. The achievement of victory by the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition over the common enemy would still further strengthen the cooperation between the countries and would create a powerful basis for firm friendly relations between all freedom-loving peoples.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>69</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>70</sup> Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CCIV, p. 353, and also telegrams 2897 of May 24 and 2922 of May 26, 1942, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 558 and 564, respectively.

<sup>71</sup> For comparison with Molotov's luncheon on the occasion of the first anniversary of this treaty, see telegram 547, May 28, 1943, from Moscow, *ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, p. 536.

<sup>72</sup> In his next telegram, the Chargé in the Soviet Union summarized in detail newspaper editorials which he judged to be cordial, following the general line of 1943, but indicated that this year they "express much greater confidence in early victory and place much more emphasis upon political and postwar cooperation among the Allies." (741.6111/74)

Eden's telegram of greetings to Molotov stated that at the Moscow and Tehran Conferences, great events had been blueprinted. Hand in hand and together with their American and other Allies the two countries would carry through to its victorious end the mighty storming of the common enemy and would thus strengthen the bond of friendship and understanding upon which their alliance rested.

HAMILTON

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811.203/564 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 27, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received May 28—12:30 a. m.]

1903. Department's 921, April 15, noon. In conversation with Vyshinski on May 25, I referred to the question of criminal jurisdiction over members of the American Armed Forces in the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would soon see its way clear to taking action on this matter.

Vyshinski stated that the question presented certain complications in that no precedent had ever been established in the Soviet Union regarding matters of this kind. Remarking that he was merely offering his personal views and not speaking in an official capacity, he commented on the possible conflict between American and Soviet law in the administration of justice in the Soviet Union. As an example, he said that although speculation and barter were punishable offenses in the Soviet Union, they were not illegal acts under American law. American military personnel in the Soviet Union would be breaking Soviet law if they sold or bartered goods in their possession. Yet under American law no misdemeanor would have been committed. Furthermore, the question had arisen as to which code of laws, American or Soviet, would apply to personnel on leave or in some locality in the Soviet Union other than their place of military assignment. He said that he knew that various agreements had been reached on this question and that the Soviet Government was studying the matter carefully.

I remarked that in regard to some types of question it was not easy to reach an agreement covering every detail and every contingency, and that often the best way to proceed was on basis of general agreement and cooperation. I expressed the hope that a solution to the problem could be found that would be simple and would be based on cooperative understanding. Mr. Vyshinski replied that the Soviet Government was carefully considering the matter.

HAMILTON

861.4061 Motion Pictures/114 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—1 p. m.

1358. Your 1675, May 12.<sup>73</sup> The Hays organization<sup>74</sup> has now informed the Department that it is unable to locate the remaining persons. For your confidential information, it is understood the Hays organization is dropping the matter because of unfavorable publicity which has appeared in certain American newspapers denouncing as propaganda the Soviet intention to award decorations to a large number of persons in the American motion picture industry.

The Department does not know of any other practicable method of obtaining the desired information regarding the remaining members of the group in question. Moreover, it is felt that the Soviet Embassy in Washington could easily locate the persons through Kolatosov<sup>75</sup> who was understood to be in Hollywood.

You should accordingly approach the Soviet authorities in accordance with the second paragraph of Department's 893 of April 13. The Department will be glad to take up with the Army or Navy the question of acceptance of decorations by any of the group which are now in those services.

HULL

861.012/221

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

No. 520

Moscow, May 31, 1944.

[Received June 14.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a memorandum of conversation which I had with Mr. Vyshinski, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on May 25, 1944 concerning the renunciation of Soviet citizenship.

In view of the difficulties and delays which the Embassy is constantly encountering in arranging for the departure from the Soviet Union of Soviet wives of American officers and employees of the Embassy<sup>76</sup> it is believed that Mr. Vyshinski's frank discussion of

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.<sup>74</sup> Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc., New York, N.Y., of which Will H. Hays was the president.<sup>75</sup> Mikhail Konstantinovich Kalatozov, representative of Soyuzintorgkino, the All-Union Combine for Export and Import of Motion Picture Film, Photo-Chemicals, and Motion Picture Equipment.<sup>76</sup> The difficulties in obtaining exit visas for the Soviet wives of American Embassy employees in 1943 are described in telegrams 333 of April 21, from Moscow, 273 of May 1, to Moscow, and 422 of May 10, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 514, 518, and 524, respectively. For previous references to this long-standing problem, see *ibid.*, p. 514, footnote 47.



certain aspects of this problem is of considerable interest. It is realized, of course, that there are other factors which come into the determination of this question, such as the rigid control which the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs holds over the people of this country and which Mr. Vyshinski obviously did not touch upon. However, I believe that he spoke with unusual frankness, for a Soviet official, in discussing this question with a diplomatic officer of another country.

Respectfully yours,

MAXWELL M. HAMILTON

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second Secretary of Embassy  
in the Soviet Union (Page)*

MAY 25, 1944.

Mr. Hamilton stated that on several occasions he had taken up with various officials of the Foreign Office the question of the interest of the Embassy and the United States Government in the cases of Soviet wives of American officers and employees of the Embassy who desired to leave the Soviet Union to accompany their husbands to the United States. He said that one such case was that of Mrs. Kemp Tolley (I. V. Rabinovich), the wife of Commander Tolley <sup>77</sup> who was due to leave Moscow for the United States within the next few days. Mr. Hamilton expressed the hope that the appropriate Soviet authorities could expedite consideration of Mrs. Tolley's case so that she might accompany her husband.

Mr. Vyshinski replied that these cases presented certain difficulties and stated that they should be taken up through OVIR (Bureau of Visas and Registration). Mr. Hamilton stated that Mrs. Tolley had taken this case up with this Bureau. Mr. Hamilton mentioned that a few days ago Admiral Olsen <sup>78</sup> had wished to express directly to this Bureau his interest in the case of Mrs. Tolley, but the Bureau had informed him that it could not receive foreigners and that the place for foreigners to take up matters was at the Foreign Office. Mr. Vyshinski commented that the Soviet citizen involved always had access to OVIR. Mr. Hamilton said that anything Mr. Vyshinski and the Foreign Office could do toward expediting consideration of Mrs. Tolley's case would be appreciated, as we naturally looked to the Foreign Office as the agency to communicate an expression of our interest to whatever Soviet authority had jurisdiction over the matter.

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<sup>77</sup> Comdr. Kemp Tolley, Assistant Naval Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché for Air.

<sup>78</sup> Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, head of the Navy Division of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Hamilton then said that he would like to turn aside from the particular case and to ask whether Mr. Vyshinski could give him any information on the underlying concepts and origin of Soviet law concerning the denaturalization of Soviet citizens. He said it was difficult for us to understand the basic reasons in this aspect of Soviet law. He remarked that anything Mr. Vyshinski wished to say on the subject need not apply to the case at issue.

Mr. Vyshinski stated that perhaps the following historic reasons for the Soviet regulations pertaining to denaturalization would be of interest to Mr. Hamilton. At the time of the revolution many of the Russian upper classes and a large part of the aristocracy had succeeded in fleeing abroad from the Soviet Union. The same process had obtained during and after the French revolution. As a result—both at the beginning of the 19th century and following the Russian revolution—emigrant circles had grown up in neighboring countries which were inimical to revolutionary France and in the 20th century to the Soviet Union. They had caused trouble in subsequent years. These circumstances had undoubtedly been felt in the framing of the laws relative to the renunciation of Soviet citizenship and the departure of Soviet citizens from the Soviet Union. They had also contributed to Soviet traditions and contemporary thinking on the problem—although of course conditions had greatly changed since that time.

Mr. Hamilton stated that he was grateful to obtain these views of Mr. Vyshinski. He remarked that in the United States although the problem of divesting one's self of American citizenship had never been of comparable significance, that of acquiring American citizenship was much more difficult and one which involved much more time. Mr. Vyshinski welcomed this approach to the question at issue. Remark- ing that he was of course speaking entirely unofficially and on a personal basis he stated that after the Russian revolution, living conditions were extremely difficult in the Soviet Union and a great deal of toil and sweat had to be expended before life became easier. Some people, including many good workers, had tried to avoid the work of building up the Soviet state by leaving the country—and frequently under the cloak of marriage to a foreigner. The Russian state and the Russian people looked down on these shirkers and held them in contempt, not because they wished to enter into matrimony with a foreigner but because they used marriage as a subterfuge—as a means of avoiding their share of honest work that was required of all in the Soviet Union. In the revolutionary years certain laws were framed concerning the renunciation of Soviet citizenship and the right to leave the Soviet Union and certain traditions and ways of thinking were established. These Soviet traditions were deeply en-

grained and have prevailed and consequently the laws based upon them are difficult quickly to change.

The Soviet state does not oppose foreign marriages—be it to a Chinese, Negro or Englishman so long as the marriage is in fact culminated for the purpose of entering into honest marital relations. But it has been found that this has not always been the case and that marriage has been use[d] for another purpose—to divest oneself of Soviet citizenship in order to leave the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government will not tolerate marriages being used for that purpose. Interests of the state are involved and each foreign marriage must be judged on its own merits. It is not the formal act of marriage but the marital relationship that is the test; in other words, has the marriage been culminated because a woman really desires to enter into wedlock or because she wishes to divest herself of citizenship?

Mr. Vyshinski stated that these were the fundamental concepts of Soviet denaturalization law and added that it was of course not easy at first thoroughly to understand such laws of a second country unless the underlying reasons therefor were clear. He remarked that in the United States the acquiring of citizenship and establishing the privilege of immigrating were much more difficult matters than in the Soviet Union, whereas, in the Soviet Union the divestiture of Soviet citizenship was harder than in the United States. Both policies were based on the self protection of the state.

Mr. Hamilton thanked Mr. Vyshinski for the frank expression of his views and stated that an understanding of the underlying concepts or background on a subject offered great help in the avoiding of misunderstandings. Mr. Vyshinski agreed. Mr. Hamilton said that in this whole matter our principal concern was that families be not separated. Mr. Vyshinski said that the Soviet Government also believed that families should be together. He emphasized again that he was simply expressing personal views in the friendly, frank way which he liked to follow.

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811.0444/90

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1944.

Mr. Bazykin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, called this afternoon and left the attached *aide-mémoire*<sup>79</sup> concerning the recent decision of Surrogate's Court of the State [*County*] of New York in regard to inheritance cases of Soviet citizens in which the Court is charged with exercising discrimination against such citizens.

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<sup>79</sup> *Infra.*

In addition to the request contained in the last paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* he asked that the Department of State communicate as official information received from the Soviet Embassy in Washington the statement on page 3 that the right to inheritance of personal property of citizens of the USSR is protected by the Soviet Constitution (Article 10) and that in the Soviet Union there exists neither complete nor partial confiscation of inheritance and that the heirs are guaranteed the full possession of inherited property and such use of it as they may desire.

I told Mr. Bazykin I would refer this matter to the appropriate officials of the Department and that the Ambassador would be informed what action if any the Department could take in the premises.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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811.0444/89

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Surrogate's Court of the State [*County*] of New York (Judge Foley)<sup>80</sup> during the past four years has passed several decisions on inheritance cases of Soviet citizens, which were submitted to the above court for consideration. The decisions of the court tend to discriminate against the property rights of the citizens of the U.S.S.R. The first among such decisions was passed on February 15, 1940 in the case of Bold. Having recognized the property rights of Soviet citizens to the property left to them by their deceased relatives, the court at the same time refused payment of inheritance shares to Soviet citizens, ordering deposit of such shares with the City Treasurer of the City of New York. Later, the above-mentioned court in cases of inheritance due to Soviet citizens, passed similar, tending to discriminate their interests and rights, decisions. In particular, the court passed a decision in the case of Alexandrov, refusing to satisfy the lawful rights of Soviet citizens for the receipt of inheritance due them, having deposited the sums with the City Treasurer of the City of New York.

The decisions in question have been based upon Section 269 of the New York Surrogate's Court Act, which reads:

"Where it shall appear that the legatee, distributee or beneficiary of a trust would not have the benefit or use or control of the money or other property due him, or where other special circumstances make it appear desirable that such payments should be withheld, the decree

<sup>80</sup> James A. Foley, Judge, Surrogate's Court (Probate Court), New York County, since 1920.

may direct that such money or other property be paid into the surrogate's court for the benefit of such legatee, distributee, beneficiary of a trust or other person or persons who may thereafter appear to be entitled thereto. Such money or other property so paid into court shall be paid out only by the special order of the surrogate or pursuant to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction."

For passing a decision the court also used the amendment included together with the above section in the bill which was used as basis for decisions of the court, which reads:

"This amendment is proposed by the Executive Committee of the Surrogate's Court Association of the State of New York. The purpose of the amendment is to authorize the deposit of monies or property in the Surrogate's Court in cases where transmission or payment to a beneficiary, legatee, or other person resident in a foreign country might be circumvented by confiscation in whole or in part. The amendment authorizes the impounding of the fund by the Surrogate to await the time when payment can be made to the beneficiary for his own benefit, use and control."

It is known that cited above bill and amendment were passed with the purpose to protect the property belonging through inheritance to residents of Germany against whom the present German Government has proclaimed and enacted discriminatory laws of confiscation, fines and expropriation on account of race or religious belief.

It is also known that the right to inheritance of personal property of citizens is protected by the Constitution (article 10, Constitution of the U.S.S.R., 1936) and is under the protection of law, and there exists neither full, nor partial confiscation of inheritance shares and the heirs can fully possess the inherited property and use it in accordance with their wishes.

The Ambassador would be grateful to the Secretary of State if the proper United States authorities would undertake all measures within their power which would make it possible for Soviet citizens to receive rightfully belonging to them, as heirs, money or other property, left in their names or in the name of authorized by them attorneys.

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1944.

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701.6111/1249a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 2, 1944—9 p. m.

1399. The Soviet Ambassador called on me this morning at his request to inform me that he had been ordered home to report and consult with his Government. I expressed regret at his departure but added that I believed that a visit to his Government at the present

time might be of great help in promoting better mutual understanding between our peoples and that he would be able to emphasize to his Government how important it was that all of the great powers at present united in a great cooperative effort should avoid any appearance of unilateral action.<sup>81</sup>

HULL

861.9111/525 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

Moscow, June 9, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received June 10—4:17 a. m.]

2063. Analysis of Soviet press for May. During May the ever fluctuating balance of the Soviet press between cordiality and confidence in its Allies and mistrust of "reactionary" elements in the capitalist world inclined more than ever toward friendliness. The Italian offensive and mounting invasion preparations occasioned growing appreciation of the Allied military contribution to the anti-Fascist crusade.

There were strong indications also of Soviet intentions of continuing and strengthening broad political cooperation during and after the war. Editorials on the second anniversary of the Anglo-Soviet treaty emphasized successful cooperation in such matters as Italy and the joint warning to Hitlerite satellites.<sup>82</sup> Toward projected international organization such as world currency plans the press was reserved pointing out that the specific characteristics of the Soviet system must be considered but it has abandoned its former reticence.

On the negative side must be mentioned criticism of Anglo-American policy toward Spain and playing up of the "Fascist" trials in America. As usual there were many indications that the directors of Soviet opinion wished to keep alive fear of world "reaction" and "Fascism" which is pictured as having centers in all countries except the Soviet Union.

In Europe chief interest was taken in Poland and Yugoslavia. In both clear indications were given that the Soviets regard the native

<sup>81</sup> In a memorandum of June 1, the actual day of this conversation, the Secretary wrote that Ambassador Gromyko "said he understood and would bring the matter to the attention of his Government in the most helpful manner possible." (701.6111/1251) Formal notification of the Ambassador's departure was sent in a note of June 9.

<sup>82</sup> For correspondence on the development of the terms of the statement to be directed to the Axis satellites, see vol. I, pp. 585-606, *passim*. The text of the statement made public on May 12 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 13, 1944, p. 425.

“popular” movements as the only true representatives of these nations. Elsewhere the press continued to play up “popular” movements which opposed the Germans such as the Partisan movement in Italy and the “Fatherland Front” in Bulgaria.

Significant gestures indicating a possible Soviet attempt at a *rap-prochement* with the Catholic Church were indicated by reports of Orlemanski’s statements in Moscow and N[ew] Y[ork] quoting Stalin as “very favorably disposed” to the Church and as opposed to any Soviet persecution of the Catholic Church.

On the home front the press organized and spurred effort in war production and with evergrowing emphasis on reconstruction.

HARRIMAN

811.001 Roosevelt, F. D./9750 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 12, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 8 p. m.]

2086. Personal for the President. Molotov has asked me on behalf of Marshal Stalin to forward to you a silver framed photograph of an excellent portrait of the Marshal in his uniform with all decorations. The following is a translation of his inscription on the photograph.

“To President Franklin D. Roosevelt in memory of the day of the invasion of northern France by the Allied American and British liberating armies. From his friend Joseph V. Stalin. June 6, 1944.”

I am sending the photograph by the next diplomatic pouch.<sup>83</sup>

HARRIMAN

711.6111/16 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 12, 1944.

[Received June 12—11 : 59 p. m.]

2091. Editorials and other material dealing with the Second Anniversary of the Soviet-American Agreement<sup>84</sup> occupied over three

<sup>83</sup> The picture was sent from Moscow on June 14, and was forwarded from the Department of State to the White House on June 28.

<sup>84</sup> The master Lend-Lease Agreement had been signed at Washington on June 11, 1942. The text of the agreement and exchange of notes is printed in Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253; 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500; and Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1942, p. 531.

quarters of the front page space in Moscow newspapers for June 11. There was also published an announcement of the luncheon given on the 10th by Molotov for the American and British Ambassadors and members of the Military Mission and Embassy staff. The outstanding themes of the editorials were satisfaction with beginning of the western invasion and emphasis on desirability and feasibility of American-Soviet-British postwar cooperation.

[Here follow summaries of editorials which appeared in *Izvestiya*, *Pravda*, and *Red Star*.]

HARRIMAN

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711.6111/17 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 13, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 8:48 p. m.]

2108. The luncheon given by Molotov June 10 on the second anniversary of the signing of the Mutual Aid Agreement was an unusually cordial and informal affair. In addition to the usual toasts, Molotov particularly emphasized the great role which you have played in establishing Soviet-American collaboration and later remarked to me that it would be difficult to exaggerate the effect which your coming to Moscow had had on the successful conclusion of the Moscow Conference.

Mikoyan was fulsome in his praise of American industry and of the contribution which lend-lease has made to Soviet military achievements. He concluded by remarking with a smile that he hoped lend-lease would continue after the war. I responded by pointing out that the spirit of lend-lease was one of mutual assistance in a common purpose and that the United States was heartily in favor of continuing this spirit of lend-lease cooperation after the war.<sup>85</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>85</sup> Several days later in telegram 2226, June 22, Ambassador Harriman reported his "surprise and embarrassment on June 11" to have received from Mikoyan "an enormous polar bear rug, apparently a record specimen" and from Molotov at the luncheon the gift of "an astonishing and elaborate piece of porcelain, the original product of a Soviet artist, depicting a mythological story." Harriman said that he was "reporting these incidents because to my knowledge they are the first elaborate gifts of high Soviet officials and appear to be another indication of a return to old Russian customs." (711.6111/18)



811.0444/89

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

The Department of State has received the *Aide-Mémoire* of June 1, 1944 from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in which, referring to the practice of the Surrogate's Court of the State [County] of New York of ordering the deposit with the City Treasurer of the City of New York of shares of Soviet nationals in estates coming within the jurisdiction of the court, and the request is made that the proper United States authorities undertake all measures in their powers to make it possible for Soviet citizens to receive their shares in such estates.

As the Embassy is probably aware, in the absence of applicable treaty provisions, questions bearing on the rights of aliens to receive shares in estates in this country are not within the jurisdiction of the Federal authorities but are determined by the laws of the state in which the estate is situated.

A copy of the Embassy's note has been referred to the Governor of New York for consideration and appropriate action.<sup>86</sup>

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1944.

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861.014/289 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 21, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 10:23 p. m.]

2211. Press for June 16 publishes a Tass report of a meeting of the "Crimean Oblast Committee" of the party. *Red Fleet* for June 6 published a letter to Stalin signed by the Secretary of the Crimean Oblast Committee, Tyulyaev, reporting donations from the Oblast to the Red Army. In the letter, and in Stalin's reply, the expression "Soviet Crimea" was used.

It would appear that the Crimean autonomous republic of the RSFSR has been abolished. Unofficial sources state that this action

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<sup>86</sup> The copy was enclosed in a letter of June 15, 1944, from the Secretary of State to Thomas E. Dewey, the Governor of New York. The assistant counsel to the Governor, Lawrence E. Walsh, replied in a letter of June 22, wherein he pointed out that "the surrogates are independently elected officials and the Governor has no power to review their holdings." He further called attention to the fact that the attorney in each of the cases mentioned was Mr. Charles Recht, and that "in none of those cases did he see fit to appeal."

was taken about 2 months ago. While the Embassy is not in possession of sufficient information to interpret the significance of this development, it is probable that it reflects failure of the population fully to support the Soviet Government during the German occupation. A Soviet employee of the Embassy states that an acquaintance in the Red Army mentioned some months ago that the autonomous republic would be abolished because the Tartar element had not "behaved" properly. Correspondents returning from Sevastopol reported that repressive measures were being taken against the Tartars for alleged collaboration with the Germans, and similar reports have been received from other sources.<sup>87</sup>

HARRIMAN

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093.112/6-2744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 27, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 28—2:41 p. m.]

2308. For the President. Reference my Army cable last night advising of my presentation to Marshal Stalin of the Stalingrad and Leningrad scrolls.<sup>88</sup> Following is approved text of Marshal Stalin's statement in accepting them: "I accept the scrolls of honor from the President as a symbol of the fruitful collaboration between our Governments which is being effected in the name of the freedom of our peoples and the progress of humanity. The scrolls of honor will be presented to representatives of Leningrad and Stalingrad."

I have given this to the American correspondents here for release for Wednesday<sup>89</sup> morning papers. I have told them that I presumed the White House would release the text of your letter to Marshal Stalin and the scrolls, but that as Stalin's statement was a Moscow story, I would ask that it be not released from the White House but allowed to come from them.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>87</sup> The apparent suppression at about this same period for treasonable activity of the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the northern Caucasus had already been reported.

<sup>88</sup> The texts of these scrolls, dated May 17 and signed by the President, accompanied by a letter dated May 25 from the President to Marshal Stalin, and presented by Ambassador Harriman, are printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, July 2, 1944, p. 4.

<sup>89</sup> June 28.

861.00/6-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 29, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received July 1—12: 15 a. m.]

2348. Academician and Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs A. Y. Vyshinski delivered a 2½ hour lecture in the Moscow Hall of Unions on June 23 entitled "the Soviet State and Three Years of the Patriotic War".<sup>90</sup> The lecture was well attended with a large delegation of younger officers of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs present.

The content of Vyshinski's lecture followed the lines taken in many ideological articles in the Soviet press during the war. Stressing above all the wisdom and correctness of Stalin's leadership it attributed Soviet success to the new unique and highly effective Soviet political and economic system and a similar lecture given by Vyshinski during the recent Moscow scientific congress was published in the press and summary is being forwarded by despatch. Herein are presented only a few highlights of the address as heard by a member of the Embassy staff.

The lecture was a more aggressive presentation of Stalinist ideology than any that has recently come to the attention of the Embassy. Intended for internal consumption it reflects the aggressive self confidence engendered by success and at the same time perhaps indicates a feeling on the part of Soviet leaders that it is sound psychology for them to justify by reference to successes achieved the hardships which their people have undergone.

Vyshinski was very emphatic in the historical part of his lecture about the importance of state organization in establishing the rule of the Proletariat. He stressed the idea that the Soviet State is the body organized to defend the interests of the Proletariat just as in other countries the state is the agent of the *bourgeoisie*. He ridiculed political thinkers who regarded the state as the representative of the "common" or "public" interest. The success of the revolution in Russia was only assured he maintained by liquidating opposition. Here the state played a decisive role. Bukharin's<sup>91</sup> alleged idea that Socialist industry could co-exist peacefully with capitalist agriculture Vyshinski discussed in detail as one of the treasonable anti-Proletarian dangers overcome by the state under Stalin's leadership.

<sup>90</sup> A brief statement in praise of the valiant efforts of the Soviet Union in the war by Secretary of State Hull on the third anniversary of the German attack on the Soviet Union is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 24, 1944, p. 573.

<sup>91</sup> Nikolay Ivanovich Bukharin, an outstanding Communist theoretician and writer, a former editor of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, who had been tried and executed in 1938. See *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 527-528, 532-533, 545-546.

In discussing the twin principles of coercion and persuasion which he said guided the Soviet State Vyshinski remarked in passing that while coercion in the Soviet State was applied against the minority the opposite was the case in the capitalist countries. The Soviet State had many unique positive qualities also. For example it furnished guidance and help to the masses and provided them with unique educational and cultural opportunities. This was in contrast to the bourgeois conception of the limited sphere of state functions.

The sections of the speech which aroused most interest and enthusiasm among the audience were those dealing with foreign affairs especially with Soviet victories. Here the lecturer displayed great confidence, satisfaction and optimism. He stated that we were now in the last year and possibly the last six months of the war. The war had brought not only hardships but cause for pride. Comparing the liquidation of the Kulaks<sup>92</sup> with the fate that awaited Germany he stated that the same sort of Stalinist blow would be struck Germany as had rendered the Kulaks incapable of further resistance. Vyshinski said that the Soviets while taken by surprise by the Germans' treacherous attack had always known that they would have to fight Germany. "The future belongs to us" he stated at one point. He also said that the Russians intended to march to Berlin the heart of Germany.

Vyshinski did not devote as much attention to the Allies in this lecture as in his previous lecture as repeated in the Soviet press. However he spoke with great satisfaction of the increased recognition accorded the Soviet State by other countries during the war. Listing some of the countries which had recently sent reports to Moscow he jokingly remarked that the Soviets now had as guests most of the flags of the world.

The Anglo-Soviet-American coalition Vyshinski described as the mightiest in history and expressed the opinion that this coalition had been created largely as the result of the Soviet achievements. He listed various ways in which the Soviets were linked with their Allies including the Lend-Lease Agreement about which he spoke with evident satisfaction and the Anglo-Soviet treaty which he jokingly remarked guaranteed "at least 20 years of friendship". He declared that these and other developments showed the realization of other governments that cooperation with the Soviet Union was necessary. He expressed confidence that cooperation would be worked out in other fields and dwelt at some length on international air cooperation, he made some friendly remarks about the Allied invasion of France quoting Stalin's statement praising its scope and skill.

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<sup>92</sup> The most well-to-do class of peasants opposed to collectivization of agriculture and other policies of the Soviet Government, and deliberately liquidated as a class after 1929.

With the exception of his reference to Germany Vyshinski's lecture contained almost nothing on the European countries. However in discussing the merits of the collective farm system he pointed out that in his travels in Italy and the Mediterranean area he had seen backward, small-scale, tractorless agriculture, the existence of which was due to the social system prevailing in those areas.

Vyshinski concluded his lecture by bringing the spotlight back from relations with the Allies to Soviet achievements. His clever parody and refutation of a recent Goebbels article about the dangers of the "Bolshevik" and of the acquisition by the Russian people of modern technique brought enthusiastic laughter and applause from the audience whose interest appeared to lag during the theoretical parts of the lecture.

HARRIMAN

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811.203/578 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1944—9 p. m.

1611. Embassy's 1903, May 27. When occasion offers, you may informally advise Vyshinski that members of the armed forces of the United States committing offenses against Soviet law, such as speculation and barter, can be punished by court martial under the 96th Article of War for bringing discredit upon the military service of the United States by disobedience of local law, or the Commanding General can issue an order forbidding offenses denounced by local law after which the offender can be tried for disobedience of such order. Such is the practice in other countries where our forces are serving.

Vyshinski may also be informed that the exclusive jurisdiction which this Government desires to exercise over members of its armed forces stationed in the Soviet Union would apply to all offenses committed by them whether such personnel are on duty at the time an offense is committed or not. Such jurisdiction would not cover offenses committed by service personnel not stationed in the Soviet Union but who may be visiting there.<sup>93</sup>

HULL

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<sup>93</sup> On the part of the United States, an act to implement the jurisdiction of service courts of friendly foreign forces within the United States had been passed by Congress and approved on June 30, 1944; 58 Stat. 643.

860m.01/7-1044

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 10, 1944.

The Lithuanian Minister<sup>94</sup> called today at his own request and handed me the attached document.<sup>95</sup> He apologized for the length of the note but said that he wanted to have a summary of the entire picture as affecting Lithuania before the Department. He added that he was making no specific suggestion of action on the part of the United States Government, but did hope that the facts set forth in the attached note would be taken into consideration should an occasion present itself for the United States Government to exert, as he put it, "a moderating" influence on the Soviet Government.

I told the Minister that I would, of course, study his note and also see that it got to the appropriate officials of the Department. The Minister said he realized how difficult it was to do anything helpful in the present situation, but he said he felt that this "transition period" which is a tragic hour for his country is also one which will determine its future. He said that the information which he had received was that there was panic and complete disorder in Lithuania, and that both the Russian and German troops have been shooting a number of Lithuanians.

I obtained the impression that the Minister was presenting this note more for the record than in any hope that some action could be taken with the Soviet Government in regard to Lithuania.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

093.612/64 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1944—7 p. m.

1676. For your information, a Soviet Embassy note of July 6<sup>96</sup> indicates a desire to confer "the highest Soviet military orders" on

<sup>94</sup> Povilas Zadeikis.

<sup>95</sup> Not printed. The Lithuanian Minister in this note inveighed against the "devious processes" employed by the Soviet Union in the destruction of the independence of Lithuania from 1940 and its incorporation into the Soviet Union. It now appeared likely that present military operations would force out the German troops and be followed by renewed Soviet occupation, which the Lithuanian people viewed as a threat of permanent enslavement. He requested the American Government to use its good offices in further assisting his country to survive as an independent entity, so that Lithuania might see "the day when all the peoples of the world may live free lives untouched by tyranny and according to their varying desires and their own consciences." (860m.01/7-1044)

<sup>96</sup> Not printed.

Lt. General Omar Bradley,<sup>97</sup> Lt. General Leonard Gerow,<sup>98</sup> Lt. General Mark Clark,<sup>99</sup> and Maj. General James Collins<sup>1</sup> in connection with successful Allied operations in France and Italy. The approval of the War Department is being requested in accordance with former practice.

With reference to your 1480, April 28,<sup>2</sup> has the Soviet Government been informed of our new policy regarding decorations, particularly paragraph (a) of Department's 837, April 8?

HULL

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093.612/7-1444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 14, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 9:06 p. m.]

2572. Department's 1678 [1676], July 12, 7 p. m. We have not informed the Soviet Government of our new policy regarding decorations. The Military Mission has not yet received a copy of the memorandum contained in the Department's 837, April 8, 4 p. m. and in Department's circular instruction of May 27,<sup>3</sup> although it received early in June new detailed instructions on the acceptance of decorations. These instructions did not, however, contain all the points set forth in the memorandum. We feel that it would be preferable to postpone advising the Foreign Office of our new policy until action has been taken in accordance with the former practice on the Soviet request to decorate the Generals mentioned in the Department's reference telegram. When this has been done,<sup>4</sup> we propose informing the Foreign Office of our new policy. Since under the new policy, offers of decorations should be submitted to the senior Army or Navy Commander, I intend to furnish the Foreign Office for its convenience if the Department sees no objection the names of our senior military and naval representatives in those theatres in which the Soviet Government might wish to confer decorations.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>97</sup> Commanding General, 1st U. S. Army, Normandy campaign.

<sup>98</sup> Commander, U. S. Forces in England.

<sup>99</sup> Commander, 5th U.S. Army in Italy.

<sup>1</sup> In a note from the Secretary of State of July 24, 1944, approving the acceptance of the offered awards, the Soviet Chargé, Alexander Nikolayevich Kapustin, was advised of a possible error; it was presumed that Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding the VII Corps in France, was intended as the recipient of an award rather than Maj. Gen. James L. Collins, who was on duty in the United States (093.612/7-1844).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Latter not printed.

<sup>4</sup> The Moscow press on October 5 published the decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union which conferred various awards upon these Generals.

861.9111/7-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, July 15, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received July 17—2:50 a. m.]

2603. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. There follows the sixth interpretive report on developments in Soviet Policy as reflected in the press for the period May 26–July 8 for distribution as suggested in the Embassy's No. 2215, December 14, 2 p. m.:<sup>5</sup>

*Report begins: No. 6.*

News of the rapid succession of dramatic events in the early days of June—the inauguration of our shuttle bombing operations using Soviet bases, the full starting of the Red Army offensive, the commitments taken at Teheran were fulfilled. The ring of iron was closing relentlessly around Nazi Germany. The Italian campaign has ceased to be a minor diversion and has become part of a grand strategic plan of encirclement. Final victory was in sight.

A comprehensive survey of Allied material aid to the Soviet Union on June 17, the anniversary of the Soviet-American mutual aid agreement gave generous recognition and gratitude for Allied aid in supplies and Allied bombings. Stories of Soviet-American camaraderie at shuttle bombing bases were featured.

On the other hand references have frequently been made to the expectation that more rapid progress in France will result when the "main forces" of the Allies come into action. Although criticisms of Allied military activities have been entirely lacking, there are continued occasional references to last minute efforts by "appeasement" groups in Britain and the U.S. to split the coalition and work for a compromise peace. There was also implied criticism of our lenient policy toward Franco's<sup>6</sup> regime in Spain.<sup>7</sup>

2. Comment on the anniversaries of the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the Soviet-American mutual aid agreement emphasized the importance of continuing into the postwar period the wartime cooperation of the three great powers. The value of cooperation in international air transport was discussed without disclosing the Soviet position except for criticism of the concept of "freedom of the air." News reports of the opening of the International Monetary Conference<sup>8</sup> were published without comment.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed; but see telegram 2214 of December 14, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 608.

<sup>6</sup> Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Head of State in Spain.

<sup>7</sup> For correspondence concerning agreement between the United States and Spain on a number of outstanding issues, see pp. 297 ff.

<sup>8</sup> The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to 22, 1944. Correspondence concerning this Conference is printed in vol. II, pp. 106 ff.



3. American affairs received an unusual amount of attention. The visits of Vice President Wallace<sup>9</sup> and Eric Johnston<sup>10</sup> and their speeches were fully reported. The presentation of the scrolls of honor from the President to Stalin for delivery to Leningrad and Stalingrad was prominently reported.<sup>11</sup> Continued interest in the presidential election campaign was displayed, emphasizing particularly public support in the U.S. for the President's foreign and war policies. Criticism of Dewey was toned down as his nomination began to appear a certainty, but suspicion of the isolationist elements in the Republican Party was not allayed by the foreign policy plank in the platform, which was regarded primarily as a vote-catching device.

14. The surge of Russian nationalism has become even stronger in the cultural field. Achievements in Russian culture in all phases have been glorified and foreign contributions, particularly those of Germany, minimized.

15. An important development in religion was the announcement of the formation of a Council for Affairs of Religious Cults as a liaison between the Government and all religious denominations except the Orthodox Church.<sup>12</sup>

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 European War 1939/7-2044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 20, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received 8:05 p. m.]

2669. In a frank and informal conversation with Maisky, he expressed gratification at the over-all developments in our relationships including military, but indicated that in his opinion we would have difficulties when it came to dealing with Germany particularly in regard to the question of punishment of war criminals and indemnities. He explained that it was not only a question of the views of the Soviet Government but all the Russian people as well, 100% of whom would demand harsh punishment and large indemnities. He said he knew that the American and British people would be more lenient

<sup>9</sup> Henry A. Wallace. For some reports on his travels in Siberia and the Far East between May 20 and July 10, 1944, see pp. 961-972, *passim*.

<sup>10</sup> Eric A. Johnston was president of the United States Chamber of Commerce. For reports on his visit to the Soviet Union between June 1 and July 7, 1944, to discuss future trade possibilities, see pp. 955-979, *passim*.

<sup>11</sup> In regard to the presentation of these scrolls on June 26, see telegram 2308, June 27, from Moscow, p. 887.

<sup>12</sup> See telegram 2385 of July 1, from Moscow, p. 1215.

and that the divergent points of view would be difficult to reconcile. He indicated further that the Soviets would expect German forced labor to rebuild the destruction but he would not mention a figure. He assumed that these questions would be thrashed out in the European Advisory Council<sup>13</sup> but in addition he realized that the Soviet point of view would have to be fully explained to the American and British people. At the present time, however, this could not be done as public discussion of this nature might prolong German resistance.

Repeated to London for the Ambassador as No. 130.

HARRIMAN

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740.0011 European War 1939/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 24, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received July 26—6:58 a. m.]

2737. The Embassy has sent forward a number of telegrams reporting material appearing in the Soviet press concerning the liberation of Vilna<sup>14</sup> and the Soviet advance into Lithuanian territory. I wish now to point out certain implications of these developments which have not been stressed in press material.

(1) The Soviet attitude toward the Lithuanians has been outwardly somewhat more benevolent in recent years than toward the Latvians and Estonians. This was caused by various factors including, probably, common differences with Germany and Poland, the fact that Lithuania was a victim of German aggression in Memel<sup>15</sup> and the fact that Lithuania did not sign a pact with Hitler just prior to the outbreak of the war. Apparently this relatively favorable attitude will continue to be manifested.

(2) Every evidence shows that the Soviets intend to restore to Soviet Lithuania the same status within the Soviet system as existed there immediately prior to June 21, 1941. The Soviet press has stated that committees would be formed to administer Lithuanian territory as it is liberated. There is no indicated [*indication*] that any important change is contemplated in the composition of high Lithuanian

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<sup>13</sup> The European Advisory Commission was provided for at the Moscow Conference to consider all problems affecting the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union; see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 756. For its organization in London and its early operation, see *ibid.*, pp. 801 ff.

<sup>14</sup> Soviet armed forces entered Vilna during the night of July 8-9. A special Order of the Day for July 13 announced the capture of the city.

<sup>15</sup> The Germans seized Memel on March 23, 1939, after an ultimatum to Lithuania. See *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 87-90, 103-104, and *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. v, pp. 418-532.

Government and party organs. It is noted that the head of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Snyeichkus,<sup>16</sup> and the President of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Palyotskis,<sup>17</sup> are already in Vilna; but there is no evidence that they or their colleagues have yet resumed their functions. Nor has there been any report of the creation of a Committee for Foreign Affairs for the Lithuanian Republic. Presumably the local Soviet Lithuanian administration will be restored when larger portions of Lithuanian territory have been liberated.

(3) As far as can now be judged, the territorial limits of Soviet Lithuania will include, at least all of the territory composing the republic before the German invasion. Despite its very small Lithuanian population, the Soviet press has made it evident that Vilna will again be the capital city. As reported in my 2641, July 18,<sup>18</sup> it has been stated in the Soviet press that Vilna has been returned forever to the Lithuanian people. This would appear to dispose of any conjecture that this district might be returned to Poland. The Vilna District will presumably be assigned to Lithuania in the same delimitation as in 1940. The Department will recall at that time a small portion of the Vilna Woewodstwo,<sup>19</sup> together with the entire Vileika Woewodstwo, was included in the Byelo-Russian Republic. This arrangement will presumably continue.

(4) The Soviet press has yet given no indication of Soviet intentions concerning Memel. It would be natural to expect this district to be returned to the Lithuanian Republic. Its final disposition, however, may depend on Soviet plans with respect to northern East Prussia.

(5) The Suwalki District adjacent to Lithuania presents a special problem. This territory was an integral part of Poland in 1939, was included in the German sphere of interest in the second and final German-Russian demarcation<sup>20</sup> in the fall of that year and was subsequently, as I understand, actually incorporated into East Prussia. It is said to have considerable strategic value. The Poles could claim it as a former part of Polish territory well west of the Curzon Line. It might, on the other hand, be considered part of East Prussia and share whatever fate may await the northern portion of that province. An article in the Soviet press by a leading Soviet Lithuanian official, however, mentions a peasant uprising in the Suwalki District as a part of the resistance movement of the Lithuanian people against the

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<sup>16</sup> Antanas Sniečkus (Sniechkus), First Secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

<sup>17</sup> Justas Paleckis.

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> A voyevodstvo was an administrative region similar to a province.

<sup>20</sup> The text of the Supplementary Protocol on the delimitation of the Polish boundary was signed in Moscow on October 4, 1939; *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VIII, p. 208.

Germans; so there is apparently a possibility that the province may be assigned to Lithuania.

HARRIMAN

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711.62114/7-2844

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 740

Moscow, July 28, 1944.

[Received August 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's telegram No. 2683 of July 20, 1944, 6 p. m.<sup>21</sup> reporting the march of 57,600 German prisoners through Moscow on July 17, 1944, and to transmit herewith an illustrated article<sup>22</sup> describing the march which appeared in the *Moscow News* for July 19, 1944.

The statements in the enclosed article concerning the reaction of the Russian spectators to the march of the German prisoners are typical of similar articles which have appeared in the Russian press. Few of the members of the Embassy's staff who witnessed the march, however, heard the expressions of scorn and indignation from the crowd which the Soviet press reports.

There has been considerable speculation in foreign circles in Moscow as to the purpose of the Soviet authorities in staging this demonstration. In the opinion of the Embassy the Soviet authorities were motivated by some or all of the following considerations:

- 1) A desire to give effect to Stalin's promise early in the war that the Germans would march through the streets of Moscow, but not as conquerers; 2) a desire to strengthen the morale of the population of Moscow, and to give them a greater consciousness of the actuality of the war by displaying concrete results of the smashing victories of the Red Army; 3) expressing a desire to demonstrate to skeptics in the diplomatic corps and among foreign military attachés in Moscow that the huge numbers of prisoners claimed in Soviet communiqués have a basis in fact; 4) an attempt to demonstrate to the prisoners themselves the falsity of German propaganda claims that Moscow has been largely destroyed by bombing, to impress them with the size and impressiveness of the Soviet capital, and the relative normalcy of life here, and thus to condition them for the process of denazification which will inevitably begin immediately upon their arrival in the prisoner of war camps.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

GEORGE F. KENNAN  
*Counselor of Embassy*

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<sup>21</sup> Not printed.

<sup>22</sup> Not reprinted.

760p.61/8-544

*The Latvian Minister (Bilmanis) to the Secretary of State*<sup>23</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1944.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my note dated February 17, 1944<sup>24</sup> in which I requested that the sovereign rights of Latvia be preserved in view of the possibility of the Red army crossing the Latvian border in pursuit of its war against Germany. Soviet forces have now actually entered Latvian territory without the Soviet Government having made any declaration that Latvian independence would be fully respected. To the contrary, in its official war communiqués and elsewhere the Soviet Government continues to regard Latvia, contrary to international law, as a part of the Soviet Union.

As a free agent and representative of the Latvian Nation I have repeatedly protested against this unprovoked act of aggression and international injustice. The United States and all other world powers, with the exception of Germany, have never recognized the annexation of Latvia by the Soviet Union.

From information recently received, it appears that Soviet institutions have already inaugurated a regime of reprisals and persecutions within newly occupied Lithuanian territory. There can be no doubt that a similar regime of terror exists in that part of Latvia occupied by the Red forces. Thus the Latvian people again face a repetition of the sufferings and persecutions to which they were subjected during the first occupation by Soviet Russia. The Latvian population, having been decimated during the war by famine and disease, now faces the prospect of many thousands more being killed or deported by the Soviet authorities because they had been forcibly mobilized by the Germans who also had established a regime of terror in Latvia.

In the name of the Latvian Nation I have the honor to appeal to the Government of the United States as co-signator of the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration by United Nations, the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security, and the Declaration of the Three Powers, signed at Teheran,<sup>25</sup> to intercede with the Soviet Government so that the promises embodied in the above mentioned declarations be fully applied to the Latvian people.

Furthermore, I have the honor to request the good offices of the United States Government to see that the temporary military occupation of Latvia by the Red army proceed in accordance with the

<sup>23</sup> Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, who received the Latvian Minister, gained the impression that "he presented the note for the record."

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> Signed on December 1, 1943; for text, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 640.

international law and rules of warfare and that the territory liberated from German occupation be placed under Inter-Allied military control until the establishment of a Latvian legal civil administration; that the Soviet military authorities do not interfere with the civil liberties of the local population; that no Soviet civil administration be imposed or promoted and that the representative democratic administration be restored under the supervision of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission; that all constitutional laws and property rights existing prior to June 1940 be reinstated within the territory of Latvia; that no reprisals nor atrocities be applied against the inhabitants of Latvia and that all criminal prosecution be conducted in the regular courts of law in accordance with the penal code in force prior to June 1940; that Latvian citizens deported to the U.S.S.R. during the first occupation of Latvia in 1940-41 be released and permitted to return to their homes under the supervision of the International Red Cross; and that as soon as Latvia becomes liberated from German troops, the Red army leaves Latvia immediately.

As the duly authorized representative of Latvia I have the honor to state that the Latvian Nation is ready to establish neighborly and friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Latvian-Soviet Peace Treaty of 1920<sup>26</sup> and of International Law. Latvia is also ready to cooperate to its full extent to maintain peace, security, law and order and to participate in a general international organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace loving states, as provided by Article 4 of the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security.

Accept [etc.]

DR. ALFRED BILMANIS

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861.221/8-844

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 791

Moscow, August 8, 1944.  
[Received September 1.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a list<sup>27</sup> prepared in the Embassy of important Communist Party and Soviet Government leaders who have during the present war been assigned by the Party to do full or part time military work and have been given high military rank. A considerable number of these leaders have received very high military decorations. . . .

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<sup>26</sup> Signed at Riga on August 11, 1920; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. II, p. 195.

<sup>27</sup> Not printed.

Probably the most outstanding leaders in the enclosed list who have been given military rank during the war are Zhdanov<sup>28</sup> and Shcherbakov,<sup>29</sup> leaders, respectively, of the Leningrad and Moscow party organizations. A recent publication dealing with the defense of Leningrad during the present war contains numerous documents in which Zhdanov figures as a member of the military council of the Leningrad front. He holds the rank of Colonel General. It will, of course, be recalled that Stalin himself assumed the rank of Marshal on March 7, 1943, and that on July 30, 1944, he was awarded the highest Soviet military decoration, the Order of Victory.

While the attached list is probably quite incomplete, it illustrates a wartime trend demonstrating the infiltration of party leaders into leading military positions. The assumption of high military rank by party officials and the awarding to them of decorations emphasizes the leading role of the party in the conduct of the war. It is also doubtless one of the devices by which the party seeks to prevent development of an army caste distinct from the party. Moreover, high party officials scattered throughout the military organization of the country can exercise supervision over military affairs. It is possible that party leaders in the military councils may have played a large part in selecting some of the able young generals now leading the Soviet armies. A hint of this is given in the play "Front", in which a member of a military council engineers the removal of an incompetent general and his replacement by a brilliant young commander.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

GEORGE F. KENNAN

*Counselor of Embassy*

N.B. Above dates are those on which Soviet press indicated that the persons listed held the titles, offices or decorations noted. They do not necessarily indicate dates of appointment or awarding of titles or decorations. Sources are daily newspapers except where otherwise indicated.

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<sup>28</sup> Andrey Alexandrovich Zhdanov was the First Secretary of the Leningrad oblast and city Party Committee; he became a Lieutenant General on February 14, 1943, and a Colonel General on June 16, 1944. He received the Order of Suvorov (first degree) on February 22, and the Order of Kutuzov (first degree) on July 30, 1944.

<sup>29</sup> Alexander Sergeevich Shcherbakov was the First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, the head of the Soviet Information Bureau, Chief of the Political Administration of the Red Army, and an Assistant People's Commissar for Defence. He became a Lieutenant General in February 1943, and a Colonel General on September 17, 1943, receiving the Order of Suvorov (first degree) on February 23, 1944.

740.0011 European War 1939/8-1044: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 10, 1944.

[Received August 10—7:05 p. m.]

2928. Soviet press for August 4 publishes long message to Stalin dated July 30 from workers of Lwow. After expressing appreciation for liberation of city,<sup>30</sup> message states that old Ukrainian city of Lwow has become free and Soviet forever. Everything destroyed by the Fascists will be restored in short order, and Germans will never again be in Lwow. Lovers of other people's riches who hanker after Lwow, namely the Polish émigrés of Sosnkowski, Raczkiewicz, Kukiel, Matuszewski clique, who by their policy ruined the Ukraine and placed it under German yoke, are now longing to return. This shall never happen. From its very foundation Lwow was a Ukrainian city, and so it shall remain. Ukrainian people are interested in having friendly Poland on their frontier and genuinely welcome establishment of Polish Committee of National Liberation and Polish Army. Polish people assisted by Red Army will reconquer age old Polish lands in west which were seized by Germans, and free, democratic, independent and strong Poland will be established. Message concludes with indictment of Ukrainian traitors who helped German occupants and expression of loyalty of Ukrainian people to its fatherland, the great Soviet Union. It also pledges Ukrainian people to help their brothers in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.

HARRIMAN

093.112/8-2244: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 22, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:30 p. m.]

3107. For the President and Secretary.

Molotov came to the Embassy this afternoon to receive the 195 decorations awarded by the United States to officers and men of the Red Army. He was accompanied by Vyshinski, Colonel General Kuznetsov, Chief of Staff to Marshal Vasilevski,<sup>31</sup> Colonel General Nikitin,<sup>32</sup> Deputy Chief of the Red Air Staff and other officers of the Red Army and the Foreign Office.

<sup>30</sup> Lwow was recaptured on July 27, 1944.

<sup>31</sup> Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky, Chief of the General Staff.

<sup>32</sup> Alexey Vasilyevich Nikitin, who had received a decoration from Ambassador Harriman on June 5, 1944.



In reply to my remarks in making the presentation, he spoke of the effect of the awards as strengthening still further the friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States and referred to the conference that opened yesterday in Washington,<sup>33</sup> the success of which, he said, was assured by the good will of the peace-loving countries and the consciousness of the need of real guarantees against the instigators of new wars.

He stayed for an hour and we had a most cordial conversation. He said that he had received favorable reports of the opening of the conversations in Washington. He spoke with great respect of the Secretary and the work he did at the Moscow Conference<sup>34</sup> in laying the foundations for the present discussions.

He said that Marshal Stalin had a very high personal esteem for the President and was confident that he was in agreement with the President on all fundamental questions.

HARRIMAN

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861.00/2-1445

*Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

[Extracts]

Moscow, September 1944.

RUSSIA—SEVEN YEARS LATER<sup>35</sup>

It is characteristic of the contradictory quality of all Russian reality that one can argue whether it is more presumptuous to write about Russia after a long presence or after a long absence. Each doubtless has its values. Each also has its risks. It is the latter that I propose to undertake in this paper; and in justification of it I can cite only the subtlety of all change in a country where the relationship between public feeling and official policy, between motive and action, between cause and effect, is a jealously guarded secret of state. This subtlety often makes invisible to the permanent resident of Moscow the movement of the society in which he lives. He himself moves with the stream; everything that he sees moves with him; and like the navigator at sea he has no subjective perception of the current upon which he is borne. This is why it is sometimes easier for someone who leaves and returns to estimate the speed and direction of movement, to seize

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<sup>33</sup> The Conference on International Peace and Security Organization had opened at Dumbarton Oaks. For correspondence on this conference, see vol. 1, pp. 713 ff.

<sup>34</sup> For correspondence on the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18–November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. 1, pp. 513 ff.

<sup>35</sup> George F. Kennan had been Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, 1935–1937.

and fix the subtleties of trend. And this, incidentally, is why no foreign observer should ever be asked to spend more than a year in Russia without going out into the outside world for the recovery of perspective.

If political conditions are quiet internally, the same cannot be said for foreign policy. Ever since the conclusion of the purges and the establishment of Stalin's power beyond question in the internal political life of the country, the political effort of the Kremlin has concentrated in increasing measure on relations of Russia to the outside world.

It is depressing to reflect how many volumes could be filled with the speculation that has appeared in the foreign press during the past two years on Russia's foreign political aims. The questions involved have been repeated with a monotony that almost discourages the attempt to answer. Has Russian policy changed? Does Russia want to "communize" other countries? Does Russia propose to "cooperate"? Etc., etc.

These questions are one which, in the Soviet view, are very elementary. The reader must, therefore, not take it amiss if the answers are the same.

Soviet leaders have never forgotten the weak and vulnerable position in which the Soviet regime found itself in the early days of its power. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk,<sup>36</sup> the intervention of Allied forces in various parts of Russia, the repulse of the Red Army from the Baltic States, the invasion of the Western provinces in the Polish-Russian war of 1920; all these left in Soviet minds an indelible and undoubtedly exaggerated impression of the dangers which threatened Soviet power from without. Fed by the traditional Russian mistrust of the stranger, and reinforced by the continual reverses suffered in the early attempts to increase Russian power through communization, this feeling of fear and insecurity lived and flourished and came to underlie almost all Soviet thought about the outside world.

In the early years of communism it was still officially held, and widely believed, that Russia could and would be saved from what was felt to be its perilous predicament by the growing conflicts between the imperialist powers and by the world revolution which was bound to ensue. Orders given to foreign communist parties to direct their efforts to the earliest possible achievement of social and political revolution were therefore considered to serve the cause of Soviet military security as well as the broader purposes of communist ideology. To

<sup>36</sup> For documentation on the conclusion of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed March 3, 1918, between the Central Powers and the Soviet government of Russia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. 1, pp. 404-476; and for text of the treaty, see *ibid.*, p. 442.

Stalin's own sense of realism must go the credit for the gradual appreciation that not only were there no real chances for the success of this world revolutionary undertaking, but that the communist parties operating under such instructions were actually of less practical advantage to the Soviet Union than the groups of bourgeois-liberal enthusiasts for whom—somewhat to Moscow's own surprise—the Soviet Union soon came to have so powerful an attraction. Soviet policy thus began with time to lay less stress on the immediate bringing about of revolution in other countries and began to concentrate on using all foreign sympathizers, communist and otherwise, as vehicles for a purely nationalistic Soviet foreign policy. That was indeed a change, and an important change. But it did not alter the basic conception of Soviet policy, which was to increase in every way and with all possible speed the relative strength of the Soviet Union in world affairs, and to exploit to the utmost for this purpose the rivalries and differences between other powers.

During the years just preceding Hitler's rise to power in Germany the Kremlin, enamoured of its role as the innocent object of evil designs, began—like Shakespeare's lady—to protest too much. It fussed and fumed about the dangers of capitalistic encirclement and about the plans for "intervention" on the part of the "Anglo-French imperialists". It held propaganda trials to impress the population with the proximity of these dangers. All realists knew that the substance behind these fears was not great, and that the value of this constant beating of the alarm lay rather in the stimulus as it might bring to the domestic efforts of the Russian population than in the meeting of any real need for national defense. But it served its purpose in large measure, and the Soviet leaders succeeded in convincing many people, themselves included, that mortal danger was at hand.

With Hitler's rise to power, the Kremlin—having cried "wolf" largely out of ulterior motives for a number of years—suddenly found a real wolf at the door. What had once been declamation now became grim reality. During the years from 1933 to 1938, it was well understood in Moscow that the Soviet Union did not have the strength to sustain alone, without aid from outside, a German attack. It seemed to Russian minds, therefore, that the best chance of safety lay in inducing somebody else to fight Hitler before his plans for aggression in the east could develop. Had not Lenin himself said that the "contradictions between the imperialist powers" should always be ruthlessly exploited in the interests of communism? Perhaps this was not only Russia's mortal danger but also Russia's golden opportunity, depending on how it was played.

The result was a sudden enthusiasm for collective security. The Soviet press developed marked solicitude for the precarious position of the western democracies in the face of the Nazi menace. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. Litvinov went to Geneva, spoke eloquently of the dangers of aggression, of the indivisibility of peace and of the hopelessness of supposing that war, once begun, would not become universal. The western powers, he argued, should agree to fight at the first sign of German aggression anywhere. He advanced one legalistic formula after another designed to assure that there could be no German aggression which would not involve the western powers. He was generous in his offers to join anyone and everyone in pacts of mutual assistance.

In all of this, there was no real evidence that Moscow had any serious intention of undertaking major military activities on anyone else's behalf. Traditional Russian preoccupation with the *interpretation* rather than the *letter* of an agreement quickly suggested to the Russian mind that there could be little danger in incurring obligations which Russia herself would be able to interpret unilaterally when the time came to deliver. The main thing was to assure that Germany could not fight in the east without fighting in the west. Once military complications in that theatre were assured, Russia could take care of herself.

This, incidentally, is the answer to the Russian attitude at the time of Munich.<sup>37</sup> Russia, on the precedent of the Spanish War, would have been glad to give token military assistance to Czechoslovakia—particularly in the air. There was no will—and, as the Germans well knew, no possibility—for the despatch of any sizeable ground force to Czechoslovakia at that time.

Litvinov's efforts tided over a difficult period, during which both German and Russian armaments were built up. But they did not succeed in drawing the western powers into obligations which would compel them to fight Hitler if the latter embarked on a policy of expansion; and the chances of accomplishing this looked progressively dimmer as Nazi power increased and western appeasement continued.

If Russia could not rely on the western nations to save her, it then seemed to Russian minds that the alternative lay not only in the utmost development of Russian military power within the 1938 borders, but also in new territorial acquisitions designed to strengthen Russia's

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<sup>37</sup> For documentation relating to the German-Czechoslovak crisis of 1938, see *Foreign Relations*, 1938, vol. I, pp. 483 ff; and for text of the agreement signed at Munich on September 29, 1938, between Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, see *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949), p. 627, or *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. II (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 1014.

strategic and political position, and in the creation of a sphere of influence even beyond these limits. In drawing up this expansionist program, Soviet planners leaned heavily on the latter-day traditions of tsarist diplomacy.

The experience of Munich, at which moment the nightmare of an isolated German-Russian war seemed close to becoming reality, finally dispelled all serious hopes in the prospects of inducing the western world to fight Hitler except in direct self-defense, and the stage reached at that moment in the military industrialization of Russia lent justification to the final junking of Litvinov's tenuous program. The road was now open for a policy of open territorial expansion, designed if possible to forestall attack on Russia, but at any rate to soften the shock of the attack when it came. In this way it came about that the Kremlin, in the summer of 1939, rejected the advances of the western powers,<sup>38</sup> who had neither the will nor the strength to hand over whole sections of the eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, and accepted the advances of the Germans,<sup>39</sup> in whom neither this will nor this strength were lacking.

It would be useful to the western world to realize that despite all the vicissitudes by which Russia has been afflicted since August 1939, the men in the Kremlin have never abandoned their faith in that program of territorial and political expansion which had once commended itself so strongly to Tsarist diplomatists, and which underlay the German-Russian non-aggression pact of 1939. The program meant the re-establishment of Russian power in Finland and the Baltic states, in eastern Poland, in the northern Bukovina, and in Bessarabia. It meant a protectorate over western Poland, and an access to the sea for the Russian empire somewhere in East Prussia. It meant the establishment of dominant Russian influence over all the Slavs of central Europe and the Balkans, and, if possible, the creation of a corridor from the western to the southern Slavs somewhere along the border between Austria and Hungary. Finally, it meant Russian control of the Dardanelles through the establishment of Russian bases at that point. This program was intended not only to increase the physical military strength of Russia. It was intended to prevent the formation in central and eastern Europe of any power or coalition of powers capable of challenging Russian security.

It was considered in Moscow in 1939 that if a portion of this program could be realized by an agreement with the Germans such as

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<sup>38</sup> For the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations attempting to reach an agreement against aggression, see *Foreign Relations*, 1939, vol. I, pp. 232 ff.

<sup>39</sup> Concerning the improvement of German-Soviet relations culminating in the Treaty of Nonaggression signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939, see *ibid.*, pp. 312 ff.; and for text of the treaty, with secret additional protocol, see *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, series D, vol. VII, pp. 245-247.

was actually concluded, an agreement which would at the same time turn the point of German weapons toward the west, this would be a handsome achievement. While it was recognized that it would hardly prevent the growth of a power in central Europe dangerous to Russia, it did seem to assure that that power would first exhaust itself against the western nations, and would in any event not be turned against Russia alone.

The course of the war proved a bitter disappointment to this line of Russian thought. The west collapsed rapidly, without having brought any serious exhaustion to German military power. Hitler turned out to be in a position to turn a large portion of German strength against Russia in a period of quiescence of military activity in the west. And the territorial gains of the non-aggression pact proved to have little real military value. The Russians lost their eastern half of Poland more rapidly, when the time came, than the Poles had lost their western half in 1939. What minor strategic advantages the newly acquired territories might have brought were at least partially balanced off by the ruin of the national armies they had once supported. If still in existence, these armies might have taken up at least some of the shock of the German attack. Their disappearance, to which Russia herself had so largely contributed, left the Red Army face to face with the Reichswehr.

But all these reversals failed to shake Russian confidence in the ultimate efficacy of this policy of expansion. The Russian conclusion was not that the policy had been unsound. It was rather that it had not been carried far enough. When, after the first war winter, the prospects of victory began to grow on the horizon, Russian minds saw the possibility of completing successfully in 1945 what had been unsuccessfully begun in 1939. This time there would be no powerful Germany to be reckoned with. An exhausted and war-torn eastern Europe would provide a plastic and yielding mass from which the objectives of Russian statesmanship could easily be moulded.

Until June 1944, however, all such Russian aims had to await the exertion of a real military effort by the western powers. Without that effort, not even Russian victory was assured. The second front was a paramount requirement of all Russian policy. The suspicious Russian mind naturally exaggerated the danger of Russia's being left in the lurch by her western Allies. To offset this danger the Kremlin was prepared to go a long way to meet the requirements and the prejudices of the western world.

Western conceptions of future collective security and international collaboration seemed naive and unreal to the Moscow eye. But if talking in unreal terms was the price of victory, why not? If the western world needed Russian assurances of future collaboration as

a condition of military support, why not? Once satisfied of the establishment of her power in eastern and central Europe (and who, after all, would be able to prevent the establishment of that power when the day of German collapse arrived?) Russia would presumably not find too much difficulty in going through whatever motions were required for conformity with these strange western schemes for collaboration in the preservation of peace. What dangers could collaboration bring to a country which already held in its hand the tangible guarantees of its own security? On the contrary, if it were properly exploited, participation in arrangements for world security might even be made into a form of re-insurance for the protection of Russia's interests. Considerations of prestige, furthermore, would demand that Russia not be missing from any of the counsels of the world powers.

In this way, thoughts of international collaboration settled down only too easily beside dreams of empire in minds schooled from infancy to think and deal in even sharper contradictions than these. As long as no second front existed, expediency suggested that the idea of collaboration be kept rather to the fore, the idea of spheres of interest rather in the background. But when the second front became reality, there was no longer any need for excessive delicacy. The resultant bluntness of Soviet policy has caused some surprise and questioning in the west.

People at home would find Soviet words and actions easier to understand if they would bear in mind the character of Russian aims in eastern and central Europe. Russian efforts in this area are directed to only one goal: power. The form this power takes, the methods by which it is achieved: these are secondary questions. It is a matter of indifference to Moscow whether a given area is "communistic" or not. All things being equal, Moscow might prefer to see it communized, although even that is debatable. But the main thing is that it should be amenable to Moscow influence, and if possible to Moscow authority. If this can be achieved inconspicuously, with the acquiescence of most of the inhabitants and through a concealed form, so much the better. If not, it will be achieved by other means. For the smaller countries of eastern and central Europe, the issue is not one of communism or capitalism. It is one of the independence of national life or of domination by a big power which has never shown itself adept at making any permanent compromises with rival power groups. Neither the behavior of Red Army occupying forces nor the degree of "communization" of the country is any criterion of the eventual outcome of this issue. It is not a question of boundaries or of constitutions or of formal independence. It is a question of real power relationships, more often than not carefully

masked or concealed. As such—and in no other way—should it be judged.

Today, in the autumn of 1944, the Kremlin finds itself committed by its own inclination to the concrete task of becoming the dominant power of eastern and central Europe. At the same time, it also finds itself committed by past promises and by world opinion to a vague program which western statesmen—always so fond of quaint terms agreeable to their electorates—call collaboration.

The first of these programs implies taking. The second implies giving. No one can stop Russia from doing the taking, if she is determined to go through with it. No one can force Russia to do the giving, if she is determined not to go through with it. In these circumstances, others may worry. The Kremlin chimes, never silent since those turbulent days when Lenin had them repaired and set in motion, now peal out the hours of night with a ring of self-assurance and of confidence in the future. And the sleep of those who lie within the Kremlin walls is sound and undisturbed.

The men I have mentioned<sup>40</sup> are all men prominently connected with Russia's formal diplomatic relations with the western world. They are men who have contact with foreigners in their work and presumably access to the foreign press and foreign literature. Possibly this has indeed widened their horizons to some extent. But what about those other leading figures in the regime whose voice in the inner councils of state is obviously greater than the voice of any of these four, except possibly Molotov? What about such men as Beriia, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Andreyev, Kaganovich, etc? What advice do these men give to Stalin about foreign policy?

These prominent Soviet leaders know little of the outside world. They have no personal knowledge of foreign statesmen. To them, the vast pattern of international life, political and economic, can provide no associations, can hold no significance, except in what they conceive to be its bearing on the problems of Russian security and Russian internal life. It is possible that the conceptions of these men might occasionally achieve a rough approximation to reality, and their judg-

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<sup>40</sup> In the omitted portion of document the author had commented upon the powerful position of Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, and these men in particular who were prominently engaged in diplomatic relations with Western Powers and who presumably gave advice to Stalin on foreign policy: Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs; Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, formerly Chief Prosecutor of the Soviet Union; Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, formerly Secretary General of the Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern); and Dmitry Zakharovich Manuilsky, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, formerly a leading member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the III (Communist) International (Comintern).



ments a similar approximation to fairness; but it is not likely. Independence of judgment has never been a strong quality of leading Communist figures. There is evidence that they are as often as not the victims of their own slogans, the slaves of their own propaganda. To keep a level head in the welter of propaganda and autosuggestion with which Russia has faced the world for the past twenty years would tax the best efforts of a cosmopolitan scholar and philosopher. These men are anything but that. God knows what strange images and impressions are created in their minds by what they hear of life beyond Russia's borders. God knows what conclusions they draw from all this, and what recommendations they make on the basis of those conclusions.

There is serious evidence for the hypothesis that there are influences in the Kremlin which place the preservation of a rigid police regime in Russia far ahead of the happy development of Russia's foreign relations, and which are therefore strongly opposed to any association of Russia with foreign powers except on Russia's own terms. These terms would include the rigid preservation of the conspiratorial nature of the Communist Party, of the secrecy of the working of the Soviet state, of the isolation of the population from external influences, of feelings of mistrust of the outside world and dependence on the Soviet regime among the population, of the extreme restriction of all activities of foreigners in the Soviet Union, and the use of every means to conceal Soviet reality from world opinion.

There is reason to believe that these influences have a certain measure of control over the information and advice that reach Stalin. Certainly there has been no appreciable relaxation, as compared with seven years ago, in the restrictions on association between foreigners and Russians; and representatives of Russia's allies continue to be treated today with no less suspicion than was shown to German representatives in the days of the most violent anti-fascist press polemics, prior to the conclusion of the Non-Aggression Pact. Fortunately, however, there is as yet no reason to conclude that this issue is finally decided and that the isolationists have entirely won the day. The overwhelming sentiment of the country is against them, so much so that this may become a serious internal issue in the aftermath of the war. So is the pressure of events in international life. They are undoubtedly balanced off by many men who have a healthier, a saner, and a more worthy conception of Russia's mission in the world. But that this xenophobic group exists and that it speaks with a powerful voice in the secret councils of the Kremlin is evident. And that it is in no way accessible to the pleas or arguments of responsible people in the outside world is no less clear.

As long as this situation endures, the great nations of the west will unavoidably be in a precarious position in their relations with Russia. They will never be able to be sure when, unbeknownst to them, people of whom they have no knowledge, acting on motives utterly obscure, will go to Stalin with misleading information and with arguments to be used to their disadvantage—information which they cannot correct and arguments which they have no opportunity to rebut. As long as this possibility exists, as long as it is not corrected by a freer atmosphere for the forming of acquaintances and the exchange of views, it is questionable whether even the friendliest of relations could be considered sound and dependable.

Those men of good will, among the foreign representatives in Moscow, for whom the relations of Russia with the world at large have become one of the great experiences and hopes of contemporary life, may go on with their patient work of unraveling the never-ending tangle of misunderstandings and difficulties which lie across the path of Russia's foreign relations. They will continue to be borne up in this trial of patience by their unanimous faith in the greatness of the Russian people and by their knowledge of the need of the world for Russia's talents. But at heart they all know that until the Chinese wall of the spirit has been broken down, as the actual Chinese wall of Moscow's business district was recently broken—until new avenues of contact and of vision are opened up between the Kremlin and the world around it—they can have no guarantee that their efforts will meet with success and that the vast creative abilities of Russia will not lead to the tragedy, rather than to the rescue, of western civilization.

Russia remains today, more than ever, an enigma for the western world. Simple American minds imagine that this is because "we don't know the truth about it." They are wrong. It is not our lack of knowledge which causes us to be puzzled by Russia. It is that we are incapable of understanding the truth about Russia when we see it.

We are incapable, in the first place, of understanding the role of contradiction in Russian life. The Anglo-Saxon instinct is to attempt to smooth away contradictions, to reconcile opposing elements, to achieve something in the nature of an acceptable middle-ground as a basis for life. The Russian tends to deal only in extremes, and he is not particularly concerned to reconcile them. To him, contradiction is a familiar thing. It is the essence of Russia. West and east, Pacific and Atlantic, arctic and tropics, extreme cold and extreme heat, prolonged sloth and sudden feats of energy, exaggerated cruelty and exaggerated kindness, ostentatious wealth and dismal squalor, violent

xenophobia and uncontrollable yearning for contact with the foreign world, vast power and the most abject slavery, simultaneous love and hate for the same objects: these are only some of the contradictions which dominate the life of the Russian people. The Russian does not reject these contradictions. He has learned to live with them, and in them. To him, they are the spice of life. He likes to dangle them before him, to play with them philosophically. He feels competent to handle them, to profit from them. Perhaps he even expects, at some time in the dim future, to lead them out into a synthesis more tremendous than anything the world has yet seen. But for the moment, he is content to move in them with that same sense of adventure and experience which supports a young person in the first contradictions of love.

The American mind will not apprehend Russia until it is prepared philosophically to accept the validity of contradiction. It must accept the possibility that just because a proposition is true, the opposite of that proposition is not false. It must agree never to entertain a proposition about the Russian world without seeking, and placing in apposition to it, its inevitable and indispensable opposite. Then it must agree to regard both as legitimate, valid conceptions. It must learn to understand that Russian life at any given moment is not the common expression of harmonious, integrated elements, but a precarious and ever shifting equilibrium between numbers of conflicting forces.

But there is a second, and even more daring, *tour de force* which the American mind must make if it is to try to find Russian life comprehensible. It will have to understand that for Russia, at any rate, there are no objective criteria of right and wrong. There are not even any objective criteria of reality and unreality.

What do we mean by this? We mean that right and wrong, reality and unreality, are determined in Russia not by any God, not by any innate nature of things, but simply by men themselves. Here men determine what is true and what is false.

The reader should not smile. This is a serious fact. It is the gateway to the comprehension of much that is mysterious in Russia. Bolshevism has proved some strange and disturbing things about human nature. It has proved that what is important for people is not what is there but what they conceive to be there. It has shown that with unlimited control over people's minds—and that implies not only the ability to feed them your own propaganda but also to see that no other fellow feeds them any of his—it is possible to make them feel and believe practically anything. And it makes no difference whether that "anything" is true, in our conception of the word. For the people who believe it, it becomes true. It attains validity, and all the powers

of truth. Men can enthuse over it, fight for it, die for it—if they are led to believe that it is something worthy. They can abhor it, oppose it, combat it with unspeakable cruelty—if they are led to believe that it is something reprehensible. Moreover, it becomes true (and this is one of the most vital apprehensions) not only for those to whom it is addressed, but for those who invent it as well. The power of auto-suggestion plays a tremendous part in Soviet life.

Let not the brash American think that he personally stands above these disturbing phenomena of the Russian world. Unless he is a man of great mental obtuseness or of great mental strength, he too, upon the first contact with Russian life, will begin to react strongly to these man-made currents, the reality of which he would have contemptuously rejected from a distance. He will soon take them as real forces, as real threats or as real promises. In that, he will be right. But he will not know what he is doing. He will remain the tool, rather than the master, of the material he is seeking to understand.

Soberly viewed, there is little possibility that enough Americans will ever accomplish these philosophical evolutions to permit of any general understanding of Russia on the part of our Government or our people. It would imply a measure of intellectual humility and a readiness to reserve judgment about ourselves and our institutions, of which few of us would be capable. For the foreseeable future the American, individually and collectively, will continue to wander about in the maze of contradiction and the confusion which is Russia, with feelings not dissimilar to those of Alice in Wonderland, and with scarcely greater effectiveness. He will be alternately repelled or attracted by one astonishing phenomenon after another, until he finally succumbs to one or the other of the forces involved or until, dimly apprehending the depth of his confusion, he flees the field in horror.

Distance, necessity, self-interest, and common-sense may enable us, thank God, to continue that precarious and troubled but peaceful co-existence which we have managed to lead with the Russians up to this time. But if so, it will not be due to any understanding on our part of the elements involved. Forces beyond our vision will be guiding our footsteps and shaping our relations with Russia. There will be much talk about the necessity for "understanding Russia"; but there will be no place for the American who is really willing to undertake this disturbing task. The apprehension of what is valid in the Russian world is unsettling and displeasing to the American mind. He who would undertake this apprehension will not find his satisfaction in the achievement of anything practical for his people, still less in any official or public appreciation for his efforts. The best he can look forward to is the lonely pleasure of one who stands at long

last on a chilly and inhospitable mountain top where few have been before, where few can follow, and where few will consent to believe that he has been.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

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120.39/9-144

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 884

Moscow, September 1, 1944.

[Received September 19.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams Nos. 1418 and 2766 of April 24, 2 p. m. and July 26, 7 p. m., respectively,<sup>41</sup> and to other communications from this Mission concerning marriages of members of United States Government personnel to Soviet citizens.

There are at present six cases of American-Soviet marriages of this sort, in which the wives, although they wish to leave the Soviet Union and have applied for permission to do so, have not been permitted to leave. In three of these cases, the husbands have already left the country. These were all men connected with the Military Mission, which required them to leave Russia after their marriages to local citizens. In the three other cases, the husbands are members of the staff of the State Department establishment and in consequence of their marriage to aliens their resignations from the Foreign Service are to be accepted; but the Embassy has not pressed their departure from Moscow because it is reluctant to force their separation from their wives.

These cases present a most troublesome problem for the Chief of Mission at this post. It is not the practice of the Soviet Government to give direct refusals to requests for exit permits on the part of these wives. Instead of this, they indicate their unwillingness to permit the women to leave by simply failing to answer communications on this subject. This leaves the cases formally open, and permits the persons involved to hope against hope that somehow and some day a favorable reply may be received. This hope has been further stimulated by the fact that on past occasions various chiefs of mission, American and otherwise, have brought political pressure to bear in high circles to induce the Soviet Government to take favorable action in individual instances. These efforts have been successful, and despite the obvious fact that the effectiveness of this approach would not last long if used in every instance, each of the married couples is firmly convinced that the only reason that the desired exit permit

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<sup>41</sup> Neither printed.

is not forthcoming is that the Ambassador, presumably out of hardness of heart, is unwilling to go to Stalin and make the necessary request. This shifts the moral stigma of a harsh practice from the Soviet Government to the Ambassador.

In addition to this, the human appeal of these cases is often very great. In one case, the woman is American by birth and is recognized by our authorities as an American citizen. She acquired Soviet citizenship involuntarily while she was a minor, through the naturalization of her mother. Her husband and her father are both in the United States. She herself is expecting a child, and has no adequate housing in Moscow for the winter. In several, if not all, of the cases where the husbands have left there is good reason to believe that if the Embassy were to cease to exhibit interest in the case the women would be immediately picked up by the secret police and deported or imprisoned, or both, as punishment for their act in marrying the servant of a foreign government, which is regarded as little less than traitorous. This means that the Embassy cannot simply disclaim interest in the cases without subjecting the wives to personal danger and the husbands to much mental anguish. The Embassy is therefore put in the awkward position of having to keep both husbands and wives under its wing indefinitely or of taking moral responsibility for separations and personal catastrophes.

In order that the Embassy might be protected as far as possible from this dilemma, identic letters setting forth the Embassy's position have been addressed to the last two members of the staff to state their intentions of marrying Soviet women.<sup>42</sup> The text of these letters is submitted in Enclosure No. 1.<sup>43</sup>

But to take this step at a time when the persons concerned are already emotionally involved and when the women are already compromised in the eyes of the Soviet authorities by their association with Americans amounts to locking the stable door after the horse is stolen, and it will not essentially alter the present situation. It would be much preferable if all men coming to this post in the service of the Government, whether civil or military, were to sign statements either before departure or immediately upon arrival here, making it clear that they are aware of the situation prevailing in Russia in this respect and assuming the responsibility for the probable consequences in the event that they marry Soviet citizens. I enclose a copy of a suggested wording of such a statement.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> These were Foreign Service clerks at the Embassy, James A. Collins and William E. Wallace.

<sup>43</sup> Not printed.

I would appreciate learning the Department's reactions to this proposal, or any other suggestions it may have for the handling of this problem.<sup>45</sup>

Respectfully yours,

W. A. HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 16, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received September 16—8:41 a. m.]

3525. The Soviet press while publishing Allied communiqués concerning crossing of German borders by Allied troops and even noting this event in sub-headlines on September 13 has thus far offered no comment. It is apparent that Soviet press policy is to accord minimum recognition to Allied accomplishments in effecting final defeat of Germany and to continue to emphasize role of Red Army. There is a marked tendency to over-play role of Tito's forces<sup>46</sup> which the un-informed reader might be led to suspect were playing a part very nearly as important as that of Allied troops in west. No Soviet press comment on Allied operations in west has been noted which has not included some statement to the effect that the bulk of German forces are engaged on eastern front thereby assuring Allies overwhelming superiority in men and equipment.

HARRIMAN

860H.01/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—2 p. m.

2215. Dept has given the most careful study to the considerations which you raise in your 3404, September 9,<sup>47</sup> regarding the question

<sup>45</sup> In despatch No. 1117 October 19, from Moscow, the Chargé, George F. Kennan, recommended in view of wartime circumstances and the "mental anguish" of any forced separation, that the separation of employees from the service be held in abeyance "until the question of the release of their wives from Russia can be given adequate and normal attention." The Chargé expressed the hope that the Department would accept this position, and he proposed, in the absence of further instructions, "to allow these men to postpone departure until the release of their wives is effected or until such time as the Embassy is able to take these cases up with the Soviet authorities in circumstances which would permit them to be given fair and normal consideration." (124.61/10-1944)

<sup>46</sup> Marshal Tito (Josip Broz) was the military leader of the Partisan guerrillas in Yugoslavia, and President of the National Committee of Liberation.

<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

of the visa application of the proposed Moscow delegation to the All-Slav Congress.<sup>48</sup> The Soviet Embassy has also taken up the matter with the Department.

The Department appreciates to the full the political purpose of the proposed attendance to the Slavonic Conference in Pittsburgh of the Moscow delegation. It believes that a distinction should be made between the members of the delegation who are Soviet citizens and those who are not. In the case of the former, there appears to be no valid grounds to refuse visas requested by the Soviet Government in order to accept an invitation issued by a private organization in the United States. In the case of the non-Soviet members, however, the same considerations do not apply; since they are not Soviet citizens the Soviet Government is not in a position officially to sponsor their visit.

You are, therefore, authorized to issue official 3(2) visas but not diplomatic visas in any case to the six Soviet members listed in your 3378, September 8.<sup>49</sup> In regard to the non-Soviet members you should explain to the Foreign Office that this Government does not feel in a position to grant visitors' visas to the United States for the two Yugoslavs and one Pole without having had from the Yugoslav and Polish Governments some indication of their approval. You might add that in time of war it is the general rule of the Department not to issue visas for visits to the United States except when such visits are sponsored by the Government of the applicants themselves or occasionally for purely humanitarian reasons which do not apply in the present case.<sup>50</sup>

With reference to the Soviet group for whom visas are authorized Justice has informed Dept that participation by foreign persons at meetings of this character in the United States would in all probability bring them within the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act<sup>51</sup> and thus make them liable to registration as the agents of a foreign principal. You should mention this possibility to the Foreign Office in order that there may be no misunderstanding on their part and explain that it is purely a matter of the existing law of the United States.

HULL

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<sup>48</sup> The meetings of this second Congress were held in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, beginning September 23, 1944.

<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., had pointed out in a memorandum of September 12 that the "Department has steadily taken the position that it did not like foreign governments attempting to organize national-ity groups in the United States . . . or to try to make political use in this country of our great foreign language population." (860H.01/9-1244)

<sup>51</sup> Approved June 8, 1938, 52 Stat. 631; as amended, approved April 29, 1942 (effective June 28, 1942), 56 Stat. 248.



860h.01/9-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 24, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 24—6:30 p. m.]

3653. ReDepts 2215, September 26 [16], 2 p. m. I have received a letter from Vyshinski dated September 22 stating he has informed the All-Slav Committee<sup>52</sup> that the United States Government does not feel itself in a position to grant visitors' visas to the non-Soviet members of the Moscow delegation to the American Slav Congress in Pittsburgh and that the participation of the Soviet members in the work of the Congress would bring them within the provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

In reply Vyshinski says the All-Slav Committee has informed him that the refusal to issue visas to the delegates of Poland and Yugoslavia, the refusal to grant diplomatic visas to the (Soviet) delegates—generals and heroes of the Soviet Union, the delay in the issuance of visas to the (Soviet) delegates which made it impossible for them to arrive in time for the meeting, and above all the more than strange conditions of police registration in which prominent citizens of the Soviet Union might find themselves on arrival in the United States, make it necessary for the All-Slav Committee to refrain from sending a delegation to the meeting of American citizens of Slavic origin.

HARRIMAN

860h.01/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 28, 1944.

[Received September 28—1:15 p. m.]

3699. Second American Slav Congress was most prominent foreign news in press for September 27. Following items appeared:

1. Despatch datelined Pittsburgh September 24 featuring Krzycki's<sup>53</sup> speech. Krzycki referred to obligations of American Slavs in realization of goals of Moscow, Tehran and Cairo Conferences, predicted that American Slavs would vote for Roosevelt re-

<sup>52</sup> The All-Slav Committee of the Soviet Union had been formed about August 1941, and Lt. Gen. Alexander Semenovitch Gundorov was Chairman of the Presidium. He was the chief organizer for the Pan-Slav movement and its activities during the war.

<sup>53</sup> Leo Krzycki was vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (CIO), and national chairman of the American Slav Congress.

ardless of traditional party affiliations, praised role of Soviet Union in war against fascism and world leaders of Slavs, denounced American appeasers and alleged pro-Fascists elements, and demanded punishment of all Fascists and quislings. Item also refers to his criticism of John L. Lewis.<sup>54</sup>

Mention is also made of speeches by Metropolitan Benjamin<sup>55</sup> and Mayor Scully,<sup>56</sup> and of message from Thomas,<sup>57</sup> President of United Automobile Workers Union.

2. New York despatch September 26 reporting receipt of messages by Congress from Hull, Governors of Indiana<sup>58</sup> and Illinois,<sup>59</sup> Mayor of Chicago<sup>60</sup> and others.

HARRIMAN

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740.0011 European War 1939/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 28, 1944.

[Received September 28—3 p. m.]

3701. All Moscow papers for September 23 publish special articles on liberation of Tallinn.<sup>61</sup> Article in *Pravda* by N. Karotamm, Secretary of Central Committee of Estonian Communist Party, expresses gratitude to Red Army, Soviet people and Stalin for liberation of Estonia and describes enormous damage caused by Germans. He states that Soviet system is now in process of restoration and that district executive committees are working in all liberated areas. These committees are headed by the regular inhabitants who were leaders in struggle against German occupants. They include progressive people with qualities of initiative who are aiding Soviet authorities. First task is to assist Red Army by repairing roads and bridges and providing food. All harvests must be garnered. Peasant who reaps harvest from ownerless field will receive up to 40% of grain. Another important task is restoration of economy of liberated areas. Care must be exercised against saboteurs and spies left behind by Germans and German stragglers must be rounded up. Karotamm

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<sup>54</sup> President of the United Mine Workers Union.

<sup>55</sup> Metropolitan of the Aleutian Islands and North America; Patriarchal Exarch in America, who was endeavoring to gain control of the Orthodox church in the United States for the Patriarchate in Moscow.

<sup>56</sup> Cornelius Scully, Mayor of Pittsburgh.

<sup>57</sup> Rolland Jay Thomas.

<sup>58</sup> Henry F. Schriker.

<sup>59</sup> Dwight H. Green.

<sup>60</sup> Edward J. Kelly.

<sup>61</sup> The Soviet offensive into Estonia started on September 17, Tallinn was entered on September 22, and operations were nearly over by September 26.

appeals to all inhabitants to return to their homes at once and assures them they have nothing to fear. For 3 years he states, Germans have spread lies and slander which have not yet been completely counteracted. Enormous task lies ahead in enlightening population regarding achievements of Red Army, life of evacuated Estonians in Soviet rear, return of land to peasants, and international situation.

HARRIMAN

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120.39/9-144

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel (Davis)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1944.

MR. DAVIS: EE strongly endorses the views set forth in the attached despatch from Moscow<sup>62</sup> regarding marriages of United States Government personnel with Soviet citizens. This question has become a very real problem in the operation of our mission in Moscow. I have recently discussed the whole question with Mr. Hamilton,<sup>63</sup> former Minister Counselor there, and he also agrees that some serious step must be taken by the Department to halt the present trend.

From every point of view these marriages are highly undesirable. In the first place, under our regulations it requires the resignation of the American official concerned which involves the inevitable loss to the Service in many cases of efficient clerical personnel. Secondly, although all members of the staff in Moscow are aware of the prohibition against marrying alien wives and the necessity of resignation if such a step is taken, in practice for humanitarian reasons it is very difficult to order the official in question to leave without his wife, and during the period that he remains on in the Embassy with a Soviet wife his value to the Embassy, for obvious reasons, is greatly diminished. Experience has shown that Soviet Secret Police are quick to take advantage of the marriage of a Soviet citizen to a foreign official in order to attempt to obtain information from inside the Embassy. Such a situation is obviously unfair to the American involved as well as to his wife.

In addition as is pointed out in the attached despatch, the Soviet Government is strongly opposed to the marriage of its citizens to foreigners and in almost every case seeks by failure to act to prevent the departure of the Soviet wife with her husband. Mr. Vyshinski, the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, made the position of the Soviet Government on this question abundantly clear to Mr. Hamilton. He

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<sup>62</sup> No. 884, September 1, p. 914.

<sup>63</sup> Maxwell M. Hamilton, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

pointed out that the Soviet Government regards Soviet citizens who marry foreigners for the obvious purpose of leaving the country as deserters and for this reason, as a matter of basic principle, is not inclined to permit them to leave the country.

As the despatch points out the only method whereby favorable action can be obtained on these cases is for the Ambassador personally to make a real issue of them with the Soviet Government which is obviously impossible in each case and highly undesirable in principle since it involves the Ambassador personally in a series of continuing disputes with the Soviet Government which might well imperil his usefulness in the discharge of his official duties.

It might also be added that based on past experience even when the Embassy has been successful in obtaining permission for the Soviet wife to depart, these mixed marriages have not worked out well. The Soviet wives are in general unhappy and discontented when transplanted to a completely different environment.

EE, therefore, recommends that the procedure suggested in the attached despatch be followed in regard to any new bachelor personnel assigned to the Embassy in Moscow and in addition suggests that the Ambassador be authorized to obtain from the bachelor members of the staff now on duty in Moscow their signatures to the attached statement.<sup>64</sup> In my opinion the recent increase of marriages in the Embassy in Moscow is in large measure due to the leniency on understandable humanitarian grounds which the Department and Embassy have shown in allowing the clerk to remain on in Moscow for an extended period of time after his marriage, in the hope that the Soviet Government will permit the departure of his wife. For this reason it might be well in regard to the proposed statement to make it clear in the last paragraph that a member of the Embassy staff who, despite this warning, marries a Soviet citizen would be required to leave Moscow within a month after such marriage irrespective of the status of his wife. The last paragraph might therefore read: "I realize that if during my period of assignment to the American Embassy at Moscow I contract marriage with a Soviet national I will be required to depart from the Soviet Union within a month after the date of such marriage. I further realize that since the American Embassy in Moscow has no grounds for insisting that the Soviet authorities grant permission for my wife to leave the Soviet Union it is probable that I will be forced to depart without her and that she may be required to remain in the Soviet Union indefinitely, regardless of my own movements."

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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<sup>64</sup> Not printed.

861.9111 R.R./10-444: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, October 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 11:29 p. m.]

379i. Highlights of Soviet press for week of September 26, October 2 inclusive.

2. Germany. Problem of Germany's fate becomes increasingly acute in press. Much worry is shown in articles by Ehrenburg<sup>65</sup> and in selected news items over possibility of German criminals escaping just punishment, especially by taking refuge in neutral countries. At the same time, there is also concern over elements favoring easy peace for Germany as whole. This material was heavily balanced, however, by prominent publication of American and British official statements indicating Anglo-Saxon determination to punish German criminals and to treat Germany sternly.<sup>66</sup> Eisenhower's proclamation to German people was published almost in entirety.<sup>67</sup>

Russians undoubtedly are sincerely concerned over problem of possible future German aggression; but the handling of this subject by press also indicates that in order to appeal to the resistance or former resistance elements in occupied and liberated countries, they are deliberately fostering the belief that they will take sterner attitude toward Nazi criminals than will Western Powers.

Indication of substantial measure of agreement regarding treatment of Germany among Anglo-Soviet-American group was given by Tass despatch reporting accomplishments thus far of London Advisory Commission. General note of satisfaction with progress made in Commission was partly offset by indication of annoyance with leaks of information to London press circles.

3. Relations with Anglo-American Allies. Publication of Allied communiqués and especially Tass special correspondent's story from Nijmegen clearly indicated to Soviet readers that hard, heavy fighting was going on between Allied armies and Germans. Press tends to

<sup>65</sup> Ilya Grigoryevich Ehrenburg, a leading Soviet writer.

<sup>66</sup> For the statement on September 28, 1944, by the Secretary of State regarding warnings to neutral governments not to grant asylum to Axis war criminals, see vol. I, p. 1431.

<sup>67</sup> Issued on September 28, 1944; see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 357.

soft pedal fact that Americans were fighting on German soil, and portion of Eisenhower's message to German people which informed them that Allies had entered Germany was not published.

4. Miscellaneous. News items from Rumania indicated annoyance over delay in purging pro-Fascist elements and in reorganizing country's political life. Leading role of Communists was brought out in reports of political program drafted by democratic bloc.

Articles from Bucharest by *Pravda* war correspondent contrasted Russian strength and discipline with decadence and selfishness of Rumanians. They contained hints that Russians, particularly Russian troops, as is customary, were not to be allowed to expose themselves to foreign influences. Troops were admonished not to be misled by artificial glamour and flesh pots of bourgeois civilization. It is probable that unflattering descriptions of Rumanian life are partly calculated to offset shock to Russians at seeing an allegedly backward people living at a more comfortable standard than Russians are accustomed to.

News items regarding Finland indicated dissatisfaction with failure of Finns to make greater progress in operations against Germans.

Several brief items from Iran indicated that Soviets were pursuing vigorous and systematic policy of cultural penetration in that country.

HARRIMAN

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861.9111/10-2044 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, October 20, 1944—noon.

[Received October 21—3:30 a. m.]

4000. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. There follows this Mission's eighth interpretive report on developments in Soviet policy based on the press for the period August 28—October 12 . . .

*Report begins, No. 8.*

Although important military developments occurred during this period resulting in the rolling back of both northern and southern flanks of the Germans' eastern front emphasis for the first time since the Soviet Union was attacked in 1941 was on political rather than military events. With the withdrawal of Rumania, Finland, and Bulgaria from the war, with liberation of Greece and Yugoslavia and

collapse of Hungary in sight, Soviet intentions toward her neighbors to the west began to clarify. Soviet policy subject to variations to fit local situations seeks the establishment along the western border of regimes favorable to the Soviet Union but not necessarily the immediate imposition of communistic economic or social systems. While ostentatiously refraining from overt interference in the internal affairs of the countries the Soviet policy is encouraging Communist and sympathetic parties of the left to take control and pursue energetic programs demanding speedy arrest and trial of all persons associated with pro-Nazi Governments or anti-Communist tendencies and introduction of sweeping changes, notably land reform. Armistice terms providing for immediate and heavy deliveries in kind to the Soviet Union and the establishment of control commissions under chairmanship of Soviet generals to enforce these terms ensures effective Soviet influence over national economy. In these circumstances political ferment and economic upheaval in these countries appear unavoidable. In orthodox Marxist ideology these are recognized as the ideal conditions for a revolutionary movement; and the active local Communist parties which appear to be the only groups with a well defined program and strong backing may be expected to take advantage of the situation to attempt to gain for themselves when the moment is propitious the controlling voice in government.

Soviet interest in areas outside its own borders, however, is by no means limited to its immediate neighbors. Apparently satisfied that Germany is no longer a threat to its existence the Soviet Union is giving increasing evidence of its new role in the world. Interest is manifested in all forms of international organization and in such diverse questions as the postwar administration of colonies and the future status of the Kiel Canal. Particularly notable recently has been the growing Soviet interest in the Near and Middle East. Turkey with which the Soviet Union is showing increasing impatience and the Dardanelles, historic objective of Russian imperialist policy, are being caught in a great pincers movement of Soviet military political, and cultural penetration through the Balkans.

#### *The Middle East.*

In this whole area the Soviets are impinging on regions where British interests are vital and the possibility of friction as the Soviets press their advantage. The present visit of Churchill and Eden to Moscow must be viewed at least partly against this background.

851.01/10-2344 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 23, 1944—midnight.

[Received October 23—9:20 p. m.]

4050. I received at 10 o'clock this evening a letter from Molotov thanking me for the information contained in the letter referred to in my 4036, October 22, 1 p. m.,<sup>68</sup> concerning recognition of the Provisional Government in France, and stating that the representative of the USSR in France, Bogomolov, had been directed by the Soviet Government to make a declaration concerning the provisional recognition of the French Republic. He enclosed a copy of the declaration, which I understand was released to the press earlier in the evening. The declaration states that the Soviet Government has been informed by the British and American Governments of the establishment of the zone of the interior in France<sup>69</sup> and of the decision to announce recognition of the Provisional Government;<sup>70</sup> that the Soviet Government welcomes these decisions as warranted by the strengthening of the democratic foundations of the Provisional Government and as encouraging mobilization of French effort in the war against Germany; and that the Soviet Government announces its decision to recognize the Provisional Government and its wish to appoint Bogomolov Ambassador Extraordinary and Envoy Plenipotentiary in France.

KENNAN

093.612/10-2644

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The Soviet Government, placing high value on the services of American seamen engaged in convoy work from the United States of America to the Soviet Union wishes to reward by the bestowal of medals and orders of the U.S.S.R. on persons of the lower ranks of the American Navy who have distinguished themselves in the organization and the execution [*conduct*] of convoys.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.<sup>69</sup> Regarding the establishment of civil administration in France and recognition by the United States of the French Provisional Government, see vol. III, pp. 634 ff.<sup>70</sup> A statement by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius on October 23, announcing the recognition of the French *de facto* authority under the leadership of Gen. Charles de Gaulle as the Provisional Government of the French Republic is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1944, p. 491.



I will be grateful for an expression of the opinion of the United States Government on this question.<sup>71</sup>

Sincerely yours,

A. GROMYKO

800.00b International Red Day/11-244 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 2, 1944.

[Received November 2—5:30 p. m.]

4197. Fifty-four slogans of the Central Committee of Party for November 7 celebration<sup>72</sup> which were published in Moscow papers for October 31 closely parallel those issued for May 1 celebration (see Embassy's 1464, April 27 and despatch 413, May 3).<sup>73</sup>

Following slogans are addressed to Allies and people of various European countries:

"5. Long live the Victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting Alliance over the evil Enemies of Humanity, the German Fascist Invaders! All the Forces and fighting power of the United Nations for the most rapid defeat of Hitlerite Germany! Let us destroy the Robbers Nest of the Fascist Cannibals and assure stable Peace among the Peoples of all the World!

"6. Greetings to the valorous Warriors of Great Britain and the United States who are smashing the Hitlerite Hordes in western Europe! Greetings to the brave British and American Sailors who are battling against the Fascist Pirates!

"7. Greetings to the Yugoslav People! Long Live the heroic Peoples Liberating Army of Yugoslavia which Shoulder to Shoulder with the Red Army is liberating its Fatherland from the German Enslavers!

"8. Greetings to the Polish People which is struggling against the German Fascist Invaders! Patriots of Poland! Aid with all your

<sup>71</sup> In a note of November 9, the Acting Secretary of State expressed sincere appreciation to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union for this "gracious gesture of the Soviet Government" and a later note on December 20 declared that the Navy Department had approved in principle the proposed awards, and that "when specific awards and names are furnished the matter will be given further attention." (093.612/10-2644)

A letter of January 20, 1945, from the Soviet Chargé (093.612/1-2045) listed 190 orders and medals allotted by the Soviet Government for award to men of the United States Navy who had distinguished themselves. A list of candidates for these decorations, received from the Navy Department on March 7, was forwarded by the Department to the Soviet Ambassador in a note of March 21 (093.612/3-745).

<sup>72</sup> Concerning the nature of the 54 slogans for the XXVI anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution of October 25/November 7, 1917, see telegram 1804 of November 1, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 585. For texts of the messages sent for this XXVII anniversary by President Roosevelt to Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, and by Acting Secretary of State Stettinius to Molotov, on November 6, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 12, 1944, p. 569.

<sup>73</sup> Neither printed; but see telegram 1538, May 1, from Moscow, p. 864.

Strength you Liberators the Red Army and the Polish Army to destroy most rapidly the hated German Occupants! Long Live the valiant Soldiers and Officers of the Polish Army!

"9. Greetings to the French People who together with the Allied Armies are completing the Liberation of France from the German Yoke! Fighting Greetings to the valiant Aviators of the French Air Unit 'Normandy' who jointly with Soviet Airmen are smashing the German Fascist Barbarians!

"10. Greetings to the Czechoslovak People who are fighting against the German Fascist Monsters! Patriots of Czechoslovakia! All forces to the Aid of the Red Army which is liberating your Fatherland from the Hitlerite Invaders! Fighting Greetings to the Soldiers and Officers of the Czechoslovak Corps which is fighting together with the Red Army against the German Fascist Oppressors!

"11. Greetings to the Peoples of Europe who are fighting against Hitlerite Imperialism! Patriots of European Countries subjugated by the German Fascist Enslavers! Rise up in Battle for your Liberation from the Fascist Yoke! Down with Hitlerite Tyranny!

"12. Brother Slavs! All Forces for the Defeat of the German Invaders, the mortal Enemies of Slavism! Long Live the fighting Alliance of the Slavic Peoples who are fighting for the Destruction of Hitlerite Tyranny!"

The remaining slogans are the customary injunctions to all branches of the Red Army and of Soviet industry and to farmers and intelligentsia, women and youth.

KENNAN

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811.3361/11-244 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 2, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

4207. The following is the situation with respect to the visas for naval personnel mentioned in the Department's 2550 October 28, 8 p. m.<sup>74</sup> On September 28 Admiral Olsen<sup>75</sup> personally presented this matter to Admiral Alafuzov<sup>76</sup> and was assured that the matter had previously been submitted to the Foreign Office and would again be brought to their attention. On October 2 nothing further having been heard, Ambassador Harriman wrote directly to Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinski and made the earnest request that expeditious action be taken on these visa requests. On

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<sup>74</sup>Not printed. Visas for 12 naval personnel, which had been applied for between July 15 and October 16, to go to Moscow had not yet received the approval of Soviet authorities.

<sup>75</sup>Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, naval member of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>76</sup>Vladimir Antonovich Alafuzov, Chief of the Naval General Staff of the Soviet Union.

October 16 no further communication having been received from the Soviet authorities, Admiral Olsen wrote to the People's Commissar [of] the Navy Admiral Kuznetsov,<sup>77</sup> traced the history of these requests, pointed out that in no instance had the Foreign Office ever given a reason for the delay in taking action, and stated that he would gladly answer any questions or get any additional information required. He observed that this delay could not help but have an adverse effect upon the handling of lend lease and Soviet affairs both in the northern ports and thru this office as well as on the future handling of Soviet requests for visas. He has had no reply to that letter.

In view of the levels on which this matter has been taken up and the statements that have been made to Mr. Vyshinski and Admiral Kuznetsov, I do not consider that it would be efficacious or beneficial to our prestige if I were to follow up those communications with any similar approaches on my part. The interest of our government in this matter has now been expressed in the clearest way by our highest ranking officials in Moscow to both the Foreign Affairs and Navy Commissariats. There would be no further step I could take on my own initiative which would not appear to represent a retrogression rather than a stepping-up of our pressure. If our future requests for visas for official, military, and naval personnel are to be received with respect by Soviet authorities I think it essential that in this present instance the Russians be made to feel our displeasure in some concrete way. The Soviet reluctance to admit this personnel most probably originates in certain Soviet circles within the secret police and possibly the Navy Commissariat as well where the presence of American Naval personnel in Soviet ports and perhaps even in Moscow is viewed with mixed feelings. As long as these elements can hold up action in matters of this sort without palpable detriment to the interests of the Soviet Union the arguments of those who might wish to treat us more obligingly will not be forceful. Only if it develops that behavior of this sort leads promptly to results detrimental to the state interests of the Soviet Union will the arguments for prompt and considerate treatment of our visa requests begin to carry due weight in Soviet circles.

I do not think that the withholding of a few current visas for official Soviet personnel will be sufficient to ensure this development.

General Deane and Admiral Olsen have seen this message and concur.

KENNAN

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<sup>77</sup> Nikolay Gerasimovich Kuznetsov, Commander in Chief of Soviet Naval Forces since 1939.

861.9111/11-644 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

Moscow, November 6, 1944.

[Received November 7—12:30 p. m.]

4258. There follows a translation, prepared in the Press Bureau of the Foreign Office, of the third and last section of the report rendered by Stalin, in his capacity of chairman of the State Defense Committee, at the celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet this evening.<sup>78</sup> The first sections were devoted to military affairs and to the war effort of the Soviet Peoples, respectively, and will be reported later. The third section entitled "The Consolidation and Extension of the Anti-German Coalition Front. The Question of Peace and Security," reads as follows:

"The past year has been a year of triumph for the common cause of the anti-German coalition, for the sake of which the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States have joined in fighting alliance. It has been a year of consolidation of the unity of the three main powers and of coordination of their action against Hitler Germany.

.....

All through the war the Hitlerites have been making frantic efforts to cause disunion among the United Nations and set them at loggerheads, to stir up suspicion and unfriendly feeling among them, to weaken their effort by mutual mistrust and if possible by conflict between them as well. Ambitions like these on the part of the Hitler politicians are easy enough to understand. There is no greater danger for them than unity of the United Nations in the struggle against Hitler imperialism and they could achieve no greater military political success than by dividing the Allied powers in their fight against the common foe. It is well known however how futile the efforts of the Fascist politicians to disrupt the alliance of the great powers have proved. That means that the alliance between the USSR, Great Britain and the United States is founded not on casual short lived considerations but on vital and lasting interests.

There need be no doubt that having stood the strain of over 3 years of war and being sealed with the blood of nations risen in defence of their liberty and honour, the fighting alliance of the democratic powers will all the more certainly stand the strain of the concluding phase of the war.

.....

To win the war against Germany is to accomplish a great historical task. But winning the war is not in itself synonymous with ensuring for the nations lasting peace and guaranteed security in the future.

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<sup>78</sup> For comments on the speech made by Stalin on the anniversary of the revolution in 1943, see telegram 1871 of November 7, 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 594.

The thing is not only to win the war but also to render new aggression and new war impossible, if not forever, then at least for a long time to come.

After her defeat Germany will of course be disarmed both in the economic and the military political sense. It would however be naive to think that she will not attempt to restore her might and launch new aggression. It is common knowledge that the German chieftains are already now preparing for a new war. History reveals that a short period of time, some 20 or 30 years, is enough for Germany to recover from defeat and reestablish her might. What means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part and if war should start nevertheless to nip it in the bud and give it no opportunity to develop into a big war?

The question is the more in place since history shows that aggressive nations, as the nations that attack, are usually better prepared for a new war than peace loving nations which having no interest in a new war are usually behindhand with their preparations for it. It is a fact that in the present war the aggressive nations had an invasion army all ready even before the war broke out while the peaceloving nations did not have even a fully adequate army to cover the mobilization. . . .

Well what means are there to preclude fresh aggression on Germany's part and if war should start nevertheless, to nip it in the bud and give it no opportunity to develop into a big war?

There is only one means to this end in addition to the complete disarmament of the aggressive nations: that is to establish a special organization made up of representatives of the peaceloving nations to uphold peace and safeguard security; to put the necessary minimum of armed forces required for the aversion of aggression at the disposal of the directing body of this organization and to obligate this organization to employ these armed forces without delay if it becomes necessary to avert or stop aggression and punish the culprits.

It will be a new, special, fully authorized world organization having at its command everything necessary to uphold peace and avert new aggression.

Can we expect the actions of this world organization to be sufficiently effective? They will be effective if the great powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord. They will not be effective if this essential condition is violated."

KENNAN

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811.3361/11-244 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1944—8 p. m.

2667. Department has been requested in writing by War and Navy to take up formally with the Soviet Government the question of Soviet delay in acting on visa applications for United States naval and mili-

tary personnel assigned for duty in the Soviet Union (Department's 2550, October 28, 8 p. m.).<sup>79</sup> After consultation with War and Navy on the basis of Embassy's 4207, November 2, Department desires that you deliver personally to Vyshinski a note along the following lines:

*Begins.*

The United States Government desires to call to the attention of the Soviet Government the unexplained and protracted delays which continue to occur in action on applications for Soviet visas officially requested by this Government for United States military and naval personnel assigned for duty in the Soviet Union. The specific cases involving extended delays have been on a number of occasions brought to the attention of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs by the Embassy and to the attention of the Soviet military authorities by the United States Military Mission in Moscow, but so far no reply has been received on these representatives.

As the Soviet Government is aware the assignment of United States military and naval personnel to the Soviet Union has in every case a direct connection with the common war effort against Germany, and in many cases these offices and technicians have been assigned to the Soviet Union for the specific purpose of facilitating the shipment of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union. Already the delays which have been encountered from the failure of the Soviet Government to act promptly on these applications have had an adverse effect upon the practical arrangements for the expeditious movement of supplies to the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the United States military authorities engaged in the handling of supplies to the Soviet Union cannot plan in advance the necessary technical arrangements if continued delays are encountered in obtaining visas for specially trained personnel assigned to the Soviet Union for that purpose.

The United States Government, therefore, proposes that a reciprocal arrangement be entered into between the two Governments whereby applications for visas for the members of their respective Armed Forces, not covered by the reciprocal waiver of visa requirements for operational personnel already in effect, be acted upon within 15 days after date of application. Under such an arrangement the two Governments would reciprocally undertake either to grant visas for military personnel within a maximum period of 15 days from the date of application or within the same period to communicate the reasons why a specific application or applications could not be granted.

The United States Government is seriously concerned over the inevitable adverse affect on the movement of supplies from the United States to the Soviet Union which a continuation of the delays at present encountered in regard to applications for Soviet visas for United States military and naval personnel will inevitably entail. The United States Government, therefore, attaches the highest importance to the conclusion of some arrangement along the above lines to insure expeditious handling on a reciprocal basis of the visa applications of their respective military and naval personnel. *Ends.*

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<sup>79</sup> Not printed; but see footnote 74, p. 927.

In delivering the note you should at the same time endeavor to impress upon Vyshinski orally the importance which the United States military authorities attach to the early conclusion of the 15-day agreement and immediate action on the pending cases.<sup>80</sup>

STETTINIUS

870.01/11-1844

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 18, 1944.

MR. MATTHEWS: While I was in New York with Ambassador Gromyko in connection with the Soviet Rally,<sup>81</sup> he and I had an opportunity for several long leisurely talks. One thing on his mind was the status of the three Baltic States—Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. He tells me that in 1940, all three states, by acts of their own legislatures, declared themselves as part of the Soviet Union and that these three are included in the present listing of the 16 Soviet Republics.<sup>82</sup> He states that his Government has been mystified as to why our Government, under these conditions, continues to recognize these states as independent countries with Legations in Washington and the fact that their Ministers receive the status of an independent country. He is also bewildered over the activity of the nationals from these countries in the United States who are urging independence, when the act has already been taken.

I assured him that the Department would review the whole situation promptly. Would you please be good enough to have the proper officer of the Department prepare a memorandum on the whole subject in order that we can talk to the Secretary and to Mr. Dunn<sup>83</sup> about it on their return to the office.

<sup>80</sup> In telegram 4392, November 16, 4 p. m., Kennan advised the Department that in the absence of Vyshinsky, he communicated the note on November 16 to Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Dekanozov (811.3361/11-1644). The Chargé was able to report in telegram 4474, November 23, that visas had been recently authorized for six of the United States naval officers (811.111 Diplomatic 61/1229).

<sup>81</sup> A meeting of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship was held in Madison Square Garden, New York City, on November 16, 1944, to celebrate the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. (See *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 1 ff.) For this occasion President Roosevelt sent a message to the Chairman, Joseph E. Davies, and the Acting Secretary of State made some remarks in person. See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 19, 1944, pp. 589-591.

<sup>82</sup> In regard to appeals by the legislatures of the Baltic States requesting incorporation into the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. I, pp. 393-408, *passim*. For the law of August 7, 1940, adopted by the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union making changes in the constitution of the Soviet Union in consequence of the admission of new Soviet Socialist Republics, see *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 216-217.

<sup>83</sup> James Clement Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs.

In addition, Ambassador Gromyko stated that the Estonian Chargé d'Affaires<sup>84</sup> had several ships previously owned by that Government which he has been operating now as a personal project and which has become a very profitable personal business. This matter should also be investigated.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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711.60n/11-2044

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 20, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS:

Subject: United States Policy Regarding the Baltic States.

*Historic*

In October 1939, after the division of Poland between the Soviet Union and Germany, the Soviet authorities concluded mutual assistance pacts with the three Baltic States which provided, among other things, for the stationing of Soviet garrisons at specified points in each one of these countries for the essential purpose of the mutual protection of both parties to the agreement. In June 1940 the Soviet Government presented ultimata to the three Baltic States alleging that the governments of these States had not lived up to the terms of the mutual assistance pacts and stating that additional Soviet troops would enter the respective countries in order to assure the immediate establishment of a government capable of and ready to assure the honest execution of the mutual assistance pact and to avoid provocative acts against Soviet garrisons in these countries.

Within a few hours after issuing the ultimata Soviet troops crossed the frontiers of the Baltic States and arrangements were made shortly thereafter for new elections for the ostensible purpose of putting governments in power which would be "capable" of proper implementation of the mutual assistance pacts. These elections were run on the Soviet pattern of one list of candidates and were supervised by the Red Army. The electoral campaign emphasized the need of electing a government capable of implementing the pacts and protecting the sovereignty and independence of the three States. No mention was made about incorporation into the Soviet Union. On July 21, six days after the elections, the new governments petitioned the Supreme Soviet in Moscow for permission to join the Soviet Union as constituent republics.

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<sup>84</sup> Johannes Kaiv.



On the basis of these developments and apparently on direct instructions from the White House, the Acting Secretary of State on July 23 issued the following statement:

[Here follows text of the statement of July 23, 1940, by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1940, volume I, page 401.]

In compliance with the policy outlined in the Acting Secretary's statement, it was also announced that the United States would continue to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic republics as Ministers of sovereign governments now under duress.<sup>85</sup>

Since that time the United States Government has continued to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic States in Washington. At the time of the signing of the British-Soviet pact in May 1942 the Soviet Government made efforts to induce Great Britain to recognize in the pact the absorption of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. When the British Government approached the United States Government on this question they were informed that we did not feel that it would be possible for us to recognize such territorial changes during the war and therefore we could not go along with the British if they desired to comply with the Soviet request. While Great Britain did not accede to the Soviet request in regard to this matter, it did, in August 1942, drop the Ministers from their regular place on the London diplomatic list and placed them in a special category in the back as being personally accredited to the King without mentioning the names of the countries.

### *Baltic States Ships*

In view of the decision to continue to recognize the Ministers of the Baltic States, we refused to accept the Soviet request in 1940 and 1941 to assist them in taking custody of the fifteen odd Baltic ships located in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>86</sup> Since that time many cases have come before United States courts regarding these ships. In regard to the Latvian and Lithuanian ships, the Soviet lawyers were able to get partial recognition of their interest in the ships through joint trustee arrangements. The Estonian Chargé, who is an admiralty lawyer himself, has been very successful in all the suits brought by the Soviet attorneys who have been unable to force him to agree to joint trustee arrangements. In any event, in view of the recognition still accorded

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<sup>85</sup> On the continued recognition of the Baltic States by the United States, see *Foreign Relations*, 1940, vol. III, pp. 377-378.

<sup>86</sup> For correspondence concerning the status of Baltic ships in the Western Hemisphere, see *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 391-392, 443-444; *ibid.*, vol. III, pp. 403, 411, 438-440, 441; and *ibid.*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 633-634, 664, 666, 680, 685, 701, 708, 732-733, 784-785.

to the Baltic Ministers by the United States Government, no courts have ever held that the ships should be turned over outright to the Soviet Government. At the present time all the ships have either been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian or are in the process of being requisitioned for use by that organization, except for one Estonian vessel which is in such poor condition that the War Shipping Administration does not wish to charter it and it is now being operated by the Estonian Chargé in the interest of the original Estonian owners.

*Political Aspects of the Question*

While, from a purely foreign relations point of view and our relations with the Soviet Union, it might be advisable to acknowledge the absorption of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., there are many important factors which make it impossible for us to take such action. The following are the principal reasons why we must maintain our position:

1. The reasons given by the Acting Secretary of State in 1940 for not recognizing the absorption of the Baltic States were based upon the principle and our long-standing policy of not recognizing territorial changes brought about by force or the threat of force.

2. It is the officially announced policy of the United States Government not to recognize any territorial changes in Europe during the course of the war.

3. Certain sections of the American public have received the impression that the United States Government has adopted a policy of "appeasement" toward the Soviet Union and that we have abandoned the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter. Therefore, if we should at this time give any indication that we have accepted the absorption of the Baltic States by the U.S.S.R. there might be very grave repercussions which would seriously prejudice the possibility of the American public accepting the Dumbarton Oaks plan.

It is felt, therefore, that the advisability of reversing United States policy on this question is of such fundamental importance that it can be decided only by the President.

ELBRIDGE DURBROW

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120.39/9-144

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

No. 355

WASHINGTON, November 21, 1944.

SIR: The Department has received your Despatch No. 884 of September 1, 1944, with regard to the marriages of United States Govern-

ment personnel to Soviet citizens, and agrees fully both with the concern expressed by you as to the increasing number of such cases and as to the need for corrective action.

If such a statement as you propose, testifying to the employee's knowledge of the regulations and the consequences of their contravention, were required to be signed in Washington prior to the departure of the employee for Moscow, it is felt that he would quickly forget the subject matter of the statement, and it would have to be brought to his attention again after his arrival in Moscow. Moreover, there will be many cases in which persons are transferred to Moscow from other posts abroad, and the statement would in any case have to be obtained from them upon arrival.

Therefore, the situation should be explained and a signed statement required from every bachelor officer or employee of the permanent and auxiliary Foreign Service now at Moscow, or who arrives there in the future for service in the Soviet Union. The text of the statement should be substantially similar to Enclosure No. 2 to your Despatch No. 884 of September 1, 1944, except that the last paragraph might, in your discretion, be made stronger and amended to read:

"I realize that if during my period of assignment to the American Embassy at Moscow I contract marriage with a Soviet national I will be required to depart from the Soviet Union within a month after the date of such marriage. I further realize that since the American Embassy in Moscow has no grounds for insisting that the Soviet authorities grant permission for my wife to leave the Soviet Union it is probable that I will be forced to depart without her and that she may be required to remain in the Soviet Union indefinitely, regardless of my own movements".

In the case of employees of agencies other than the Department of State, serving at Moscow now or in the future, the situation should also be explained to every individual by an officer of the Embassy and a similar signed statement required, the text being altered to meet the particular circumstances. You should consult with the chief representative of each agency in Moscow, with a view to incorporating any suggestions which may be made by him as regards employees of his agency. You should inform the Department in the unlikely event that the head of any other agency should not cooperate fully with you in this matter. Because a document signed in haste in the first days of arrival at a new post is apt in time to lose significance, you will know best whether, or how often, to remind persons who have signed such a statement of its content and significance.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
G. HOWLAND SHAW

851.01/12-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

Moscow, December 11, 1944.

[Received December 11—11:50 p. m.]

4770. Items on General de Gaulle<sup>87</sup> in Moscow press December 11.

1. Next Soviet French communiqué on stay of General de Gaulle, Mr. Bidault in Moscow.

“Stay in Moscow of General de Gaulle, President of Provisional Government of French Republic, and Mr. Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was marked by numerous manifestations of sympathy which united peoples of France with Soviet Union and which has been strengthened by ordeals borne during course of war.

Conversations took place with Chairman of Council of People's Commissars of USSR I. V. Stalin and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov. These conversations covered all questions referring to continuation of war and organization of peace and in particular the German problem. These conversations showed the presence between both Governments of a wide agreement of points of view and also the most sincere desires for firm cooperation.

Both Governments affirmed anew their decision to carry out military action until full victory over Germany and their will to undertake together all suitable measures for safeguard of Europe from new aggression.

In spirit of these decisions both Governments on December 10 of this year signed a treaty of alliance and mutual help, text of which will be specially published.”<sup>88</sup>

HARRIMAN

740.0011 European War 1939/12-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 15, 1944.

[Received December 16—10:55 a. m.]

4841. Moscow papers December 15 devote 4½ columns to appeal of 50 German generals to German people and army. This appeal was previously printed in German newspaper published in Soviet Union *Freies Deutschland* December 10. Text of appeal is accompanied by photographs of appeal in German as signed by German generals and of issue of *Freies Deutschland* in which appeal was published.

<sup>87</sup> Gen. Charles de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of France.

<sup>88</sup> For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 7, 1945, p. 39; or *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, p. 230.

*Summary begins.* Germans: We, German generals along with many hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers, prisoners in the USSR, consumed with fear for the future of our people, appeal to you in this hour. With deepest emotion we observe your superhuman but hopeless efforts and your ever growing suffering. Our country has never endured such a disaster and the hour of final collapse finally approaches. Hitler is responsible for this situation. He deceived our people. His various policies finally united all peoples of the world in a war against Germany. Since Hitler took into his own hands the High Command defeats have followed one after another. There are no hopes for a change in this situation and no single power of the world will hold peace parleys with Hitler. In spite of the millions of dead and crippled, in spite of ruined families and approaching famine, cold and illness, Hitler wants to continue the war. They are determined to lead the German people to self destruction. This is meaningless, serves only for preservation of Hitler and his party leaders. But our people must not perish and therefore it is necessary to quickly end the war. It is true that our country will be occupied but sacrifices [at] front and at home will cease, and housing and enterprises remaining whole will be preserved. It is true that there will be punishment for all injustices inflicted on the peoples of opposing nations. But only those who are guilty of crimes against laws of culture and humanity will be put on trial. It's true that our future will be hard, we will work and reconstruct, but before us ways of advance are open. In place of terror and race hate, law, order and humanity will rule. In place of endless catastrophe there will be peace. We will move forward towards the day when the free German people possessing rights equal to those of other people will occupy its place among nations. When the situation in 1918 was hopeless Hindenburg<sup>89</sup> and Ludendorff<sup>90</sup> ended war. German people, arise and overthrow Hitler and Himmler<sup>91</sup> and their regime. Free yourself from criminal leadership. End the war. No miracle can save you. Germans, reestablish by manlike battle the honor of the German name and take the first step to a better future. *Summary ends.*

Repeated to Paris for Reber<sup>92</sup> as 49.

HARRIMAN

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851.01/12-2244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State*

PARIS, December 22, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received December 22—5:25 p. m.]

1016. In rendering his report to the Consultative Assembly this afternoon on his trip with General de Gaulle to Moscow and the signature of the Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assist-

<sup>89</sup> Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorf und Hindenburg, later President of the German Republic, 1925-1934.

<sup>90</sup> Field Marshal Erich von Ludendorff.

<sup>91</sup> Heinrich Himmler, Commander in Chief of the Schutzstaffel (Elite Corps), and chief of the German police, 1936-1945.

<sup>92</sup> Samuel Reber, temporarily detailed to London as Counselor of Mission on staff of the United States Political Adviser, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, with personal rank of Minister.

ance the Foreign Minister spoke at length but did not bring out any important new items of interest. He emphasized that the treaty was entered into in an atmosphere of friendship and amity between two countries which had suffered and sustained unprovoked German aggression. He several times reiterated that it was neither France's nor the Soviet's desire in concluding the treaty to do anything which might in any way be contrary to their strong and wholehearted friendship and understanding with Great Britain and the United States. He mentioned in the course of his speech France's desire to avoid the formation of an occidental or any other European block but rather the firm determination of France as well as of the Soviet Union to work with the United States and Great Britain for an effective world security organization after victory.

He concluded with a rather detailed account of the Polish question which he implied had been discussed in some detail at Moscow. He affirmed the Soviet desire to see a strong renascent Poland although with different boundaries. He referred to the force which Poland might derive out of the parts of Silesia and of East Prussia which would be assigned to Poland in compensation of any territory which might be lost in the east. He expressed France's sincere desire for a true reconciliation between the various Polish factions.

CAFFERY

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**DISCUSSIONS RELATING TO POLICIES AND PROBLEMS, AND MISSIONS CONCERNED WITH THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AT TIMES WITH BRITISH PARTICIPATION**<sup>93</sup>

\*Treatment of Merchant Seamen in the Northern Ports of the Soviet Union; \*Consideration of Ways to Improve Communications and Exchange of Information; Possibility of Cooperation in the War in the Pacific; Stettinius Mission to London; \*Prospects of Cooperation with the Soviet Union on Postwar Policies; Visit of Eric A. Johnston to the Soviet Union; Peace Proposals by Japan to the Soviet Union; Tour of Vice President Wallace in Siberia; Mission of General Fleming; Postwar Public Works Construction; \*Internment of American Bomber Crews in the Soviet Union; Mistaken Attack by an American Airplane upon the Soviet Tanker *Emba*; Prime Minister Churchill's Conversations in Moscow with Stalin

196.6/1677

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 148

Moscow, January 20, 1944.

[Received February 21.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's telegram number 1292, November 27, 1943<sup>94</sup> and previous telegrams on the subject

<sup>93</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 613-736. (The subtitles which are identical with those in the 1943 volume are here preceded by an asterisk.)

<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

of payments of rubles to American seamen in north Russian ports, and to inform the Department of the receipt from the Foreign Office of a memorandum dated January 14, 1944, a translation of which is as follows:

"With reference to the memorandum of the Embassy of the United States of America dated December 2, 1943 and its memorandum of December 10, 1943 the Embassy is hereby informed that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. has instructed its representatives at northern ports of the Soviet Union to initiate the payment of sums of money to the crews of American vessels transporting war supplies to the Soviet Union, in accordance with the agreement reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States of America under the conditions set forth in the memorandum of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union dated September 23, 1943.<sup>95</sup>

"With reference to the question of the procedure for payments to crews of American vessels which are obliged to remain in Soviet ports for more than six weeks, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade feels that such cases should be considered individually."

The Embassy understands that rubles have already been furnished the representative of the War Shipping Administration in North Russia for the purpose of making these payments.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:  
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON  
*Minister-Counselor*

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811.7461/28: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 1, 1944—midnight.  
[Received February 2—8:59 p. m.]

335. On December 31 I wrote Molotov<sup>96</sup> pointing out the seriousness of the present slow radio communications and calling attention to the fact that no reply had been received to the request which we presented at the Moscow Conference<sup>97</sup> for Soviet collaboration in the improvement of signal communications between the United States

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<sup>95</sup> Not printed; but see telegram 1513, October 2, 1943, 10 a. m., from Moscow, and footnote 61, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 705-706.

<sup>96</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>97</sup> For correspondence on the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, October 18—November 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

and the Soviet Union. Molotov replied on January 31 that the People's Commissariat for Communications were planning certain measures, part of which would be carried out shortly. Molotov summarizes these measures as follows: (a) the Scientific Research Institute of the People's Commissariat for Communications has been instructed to work out a series of arrangements for improving communications; (b) an additional, powerful, 60 kilowatt transmitter will be available for communications with the United States by February 1; (c) the reception of American stations will take place during hours of stable passage and in four to five channels; and (d) special high effective antennae will be constructed within three to four months. Molotov states that communications can be improved only if corresponding measures are taken by American telegraph companies.

General Deane<sup>98</sup> is cabling the War Department about this and I urge that the Department give it urgent attention. It is of the utmost importance in the interest of effective wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union to have the most expeditious signal communications possible between the United States and the Soviet Union. Please telegraph me the reaction to the Soviet measures, with indication of the time when some corresponding measures can be taken in the United States.

For your information, General Deane has worked out with General Connolly<sup>99</sup> a plan to establish direct radio service between the military mission in Moscow and the Persian Gulf Command at Tehran which has rapid and direct radio communication with Washington. Such a service would avoid the bad atmospheric condition that often interferes with direct radio communication between Moscow and the United States.<sup>1</sup> General Deane has proposed this plan to the Soviet authorities and we shall continue to press it.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>98</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Commanding General, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>99</sup> Maj. Gen. Donald H. Connolly, commanding the Persian Gulf Service Command, October 1942 to December 1944.

<sup>1</sup> At a meeting of the Board of War Communications in Washington on February 10, the problem of poor radio communications was discussed. The delays caused by magnetic storms and interference in the transmission of radiograms was considered, with possible remedies mentioned. It was believed that most of the atmospheric difficulties could be avoided by sending messages to England by cable and thence by radio to Moscow. See telegrams 1351, September 14, 4 p. m., and 1409, September 21, 1 p. m., 1943, from Moscow, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 690 and 697, respectively.



*Memorandum of Conversation Held in the Kremlin, February 2, 1944,  
at 6 p. m.*<sup>2</sup>

[Participants:] The American Ambassador  
Marshal Stalin <sup>3</sup>  
Mr. Molotov  
Mr. Stevens <sup>4</sup>  
Mr. Berezhev <sup>5</sup>

Subject: Bases in Soviet Far East for American Bombers.

After discussing bases in the West for shuttle bombers from Great Britain and Italy, the Ambassador stated that he desired to take up matters concerning the Pacific War which had been discussed with the President at Teheran.<sup>6</sup> He said he understood the delicacy of this question, but pointed out that the planning of our whole Pacific strategy depends in large measure on the type of cooperation the Soviet Government would give, and particularly on the size of the United States bombing force which can be based on the Maritime Provinces or other Soviet territory in the Far East. He said it was easy enough to fly planes, but that the bases from which they operate and the supply question must be planned long before operations begin. Decisions on these matters must be reached at as early a date as possible and certainly prior to the defeat of Germany. Marshal Stalin indicated agreement with this viewpoint.

The Ambassador continued that the need for secrecy was obvious and that any arrangements Marshal Stalin may deem proper in this connection will be understood. However, planning for the size of a force to operate in the Far East and arrangements for its operations are matters of importance and we should therefore like to begin preliminary discussions as soon as possible.

Marshal Stalin inquired who would represent the American Government in the discussions on this question. The Ambassador replied that he and General Deane would participate, and that Admiral Olsen <sup>7</sup> would be brought in when naval questions were under consideration. He continued that he did not wish them to go into too much detail, but said that operations were planned against the Kuriles Islands and

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<sup>2</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>3</sup> Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier).

<sup>4</sup> Francis B. Stevens, Second Secretary and Vice Consul in the American Embassy at Moscow.

<sup>5</sup> Valentin Mikhailovich Berezhev, Interpreter for Molotov.

<sup>6</sup> For correspondence regarding the conference between President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin, with their advisers, at Teheran, November 28–December 1, 1943, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*.

<sup>7</sup> Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, naval member of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

Paramushiro. The date of these operations might be advanced if Soviet forces were prepared to cooperate.

Marshal Stalin asked whether such cooperation was desired now or at a later date. The Ambassador replied that he was referring to the type of cooperation and strategic planning which was desired at a future date. He then showed Marshal Stalin on a globe the present stage of operations in the Pacific. The Ambassador described briefly the strategic problems of the Pacific war, explaining the importance of operations in the North.

The question of how large an air force we can base on Soviet territory is one to which we would like to have an answer as early as possible. When it is received we can proceed to the preparation of plans.

Marshal Stalin replied that at present the Soviet Government is unable to take part in operations against Japan since its forces in the Far East are too small. It will be necessary to reequip the Red Air Force in the Far East before it can participate in operations. This is being done, but it will require another two or three months. By that time the Soviets hope they will have a new air force there. Four infantry corps of 20 to 22 divisions will then be transferred to the Far East. It can not be done now, as the Red Army is very busy in the West. When German resistance in the West begins to weaken, divisions will be sent to the Far East. By the end of the summer the question of whether the divisions can be transferred will have been clarified. As soon as these forces are transferred, the Soviet Government will cease to fear Japanese provocation and may even provoke the Japanese itself. It is too weak to do so now, however, as such action might result in the loss of the coastal positions. Consequently there is no immediate possibility of cooperation in that theater; it can only materialize later. With regard to the question of beginning conversations about basing air forces in the Far East, the matter was discussed at Teheran and discussions can be continued. Stalin stated that six fields could be made available for 300 American planes to be based there—and here he interposed that there would also be a Soviet bomber force. The question of the location of these fields—whether on Kamchatka or near Vladivostok—must be considered. Marshal Stalin said he would invite the Chief of the Red Air Forces in the Far East to come to Moscow and bring a map showing the available air fields. The fields for bases for American planes can then be selected, and if the number is insufficient new fields will be provided.

The Ambassador said that he knew the President understood Marshal Stalin's feelings about not provoking the Japanese until he is ready to do so. The President will be very pleased to receive this information. It will be communicated only to the President, General

Marshall,<sup>8</sup> General Arnold<sup>9</sup> and Admiral King.<sup>10</sup> It will be of great assistance in planning operations.

Marshal Stalin reiterated that if Japan is provoked now there is a danger of losing the Soviet territory available for air bases in the Far East. The Ambassador replied that the President understood this and fully agreed. Marshal Stalin then emphasized that the information must be limited to a very small group, and said that on the Soviet side the matter would be handled by General Antonov.<sup>11</sup>

The Ambassador pointed out that General Arnold had had 1,000 bombers in mind as the optimum number to permit the full weight of an air attack to be made against Japan. Marshal Stalin replied that if that number were to be based in the Far East new fields will have to be built. He said that they would see what was possible. Decisions can be reached after the map is received and after discussions with the Chief of the Red Air Forces in the Far East.

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861.01/2314 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 20, 1944—noon.

[Received February 21—1:30 p. m.]

567. I have been puzzling over the motivations of the Soviets in the recent Foreign Office reorganization<sup>12</sup> and the possible effect on their future policies. I do not sense in my many talks with Soviet officials any difference in their immediate objectives from those disclosed to us at Moscow and Tehran in spite of the fact that the methods they are employing are crude and abhorrent to our standards of behaviour. I still believe it is their firm purpose to adhere to the stated objectives.

On the other hand developments outside the Soviet Union may influence their future actions. It seems entirely within the realm of possibility that after the collapse of the satellite countries their economic position as a result of the war and of possible indemnities placed upon them may become so difficult that, stimulated by the activities of the Communist Parties within these countries, there may

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<sup>8</sup> Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

<sup>9</sup> Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces.

<sup>10</sup> Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.

<sup>11</sup> Gen. Alexey Innokentyevich Antonov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army.

<sup>12</sup> See pp. 810-813.

develop a strong sentiment in favor of joining the Soviet Union as a so-called autonomous republic.

If the Soviet Union is able, and I believe it will be, to reconstruct speedily a secure and reasonably satisfactory life within the Union, the people in the adjacent countries may well look with envy across the border. Quick relief from intolerable economic conditions may have a great appeal for joining the Union. Thus without perhaps its now being the intention of the Soviet Government to expand the Union, pressure may come from the outside for expansion. Although it appears that the thinking of Stalin and his principal advisors is directed toward the consolidation and development of the Union within the limits of the territory already indicated, the revolutionary spirit is still alive within certain circles, at least of the Communist Party. Regardless of present intentions, pressure from the outside may make it difficult to resist imperialistic expansion. I have no knowledge of whether these ideas are at present within the thinking of the party. I have not however found any evidence that they exist among the responsible members of the Government.

I do not believe that the Soviets have any intention of fostering communism within Germany as they do not wish to take any responsibility for the well-being of the German people. What I say above therefore refers to the satellites and not Germany.

Although the Soviets have given us direct indications of their attitude toward Germany we have not discussed in any detail their attitude toward the satellites.

It would seem useful I believe if I were to take some opportune occasion to discuss the future of the satellite countries with Molotov and attempt to ascertain what the Soviet general attitude is.

In this connection it would be of use to me to be informed of what the Department's present attitude is toward the reconstruction of economic life of these countries. UNRRA<sup>13</sup> will give certain immediate but limited aid. Have any ideas been developed as to what will follow when UNRRA's work is completed and what helping hand we are prepared to give to those countries in the later reconstruction period? Has the US sufficient interest in the development of sound economic conditions under a democratic form of government within those countries to justify a program being developed now through which it might be hoped that politically stable conditions might result? It would be helpful if I could be informed of any preliminary thinking of the Department on these questions.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>13</sup> For correspondence concerning the agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, signed November 9, 1943, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 851 ff.

811.7461/30 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1944—1 p. m.

384. The question of slow radio communications between the United States and the USSR to which you referred in your number 335 of February 1 was brought to the attention of the Federal Communications Commission from whom a reply has now been received,<sup>14</sup> the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

“This is a matter of serious concern to the Commission and the steps taken by the Soviet Union in this regard are deeply appreciated.

For some time the Commission has had this matter of providing good service over this inherently difficult path under discussion with engineers of Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, Press Wireless, Inc., and RCA<sup>15</sup> Communications, Inc., which are operating direct radiotelegraph circuits to Moscow and many improvements have been made on the United States end. As a matter of fact, the Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company is making still more tests with a view to improve the efficiency of its directional antennas which are used on the Moscow circuit. Highly directional antennas and high power transmitters of approximately 40 kw are presently in use. Past experience indicates that further improvement in antennas and higher power would only be helpful to a small degree during the marginal period when signals begin ‘coming in’ or ‘going out’. When transmission conditions are poor, an increase in effective radiated power over this circuit path would result in very little additional improvement.

The operating personnel of the companies involved feel that some improved service between New York and Moscow could be accomplished by making every effort to keep the frequencies used interference-clear by the respective governments. For instance, the United States companies are frequently asked to change frequency by Moscow and then it is found that Moscow itself is transmitting on the original frequency or one closely adjacent to it. The United States Government is taking every possible precaution in this regard.

If these measures do not prove satisfactory, it may be necessary to give consideration to relaying Moscow traffic over circuits which have more desirable paths, particularly during poor transmission periods, for example, Mackay via Algiers, Algeria; Press Wireless via Berne, Switzerland; and RCAC via Italy. Since Mackay operates the station in Algiers and RCAC operates the Italian station, it appears that such relay circuits are practical, although, at present, the facilities at these two points are limited. It may also be practical to relay via Cairo, Egypt. Before initiating any negotiations looking forward to the establishment of these relay points, however, it would appear advisable to obtain the comments of the Soviet Union.”

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<sup>14</sup> Letter of February 17, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, to the Secretary of State.

<sup>15</sup> Radio Corporation of America.

Please bring foregoing to attention USSR officials for their consideration and comment.

STETTINIUS

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111.16 Stettinius, Edward R. Jr./151a: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1944—1 p. m.

490. Personal for the Ambassador. Ambassador Gromyko called this week and extended to me an official invitation to visit the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> I have replied that due to other pressing official engagements I have undertaken that it will not be possible for me to make the visit this spring.

He also informed me officially of the award of the Order of Suvorov to General Marshall and requested a prompt reply.<sup>17</sup> I have this matter up for consideration by the War Department.

STETTINIUS

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111.16 Stettinius, Edward R. Jr./151b: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1944—8 p. m.

508. You may have seen in the press round-up sent to the Embassy speculation as to reasons for my forthcoming visit to London.<sup>18</sup> Today in his press conference the President announced that I was going to London but merely for the purpose of general discussions and not for any sensational purpose. The British as you probably know have for some time desired to have an American official visit them at least as a return visit of courtesy of their diplomatic representative to Washington. As the Secretary is unable to go I am making a visit in his behalf. It might be well in order to avoid speculation on the part of the Soviet Government as to the purpose of my visit if you on a suitable occasion when the opportunity presents itself would inform the Soviet Government that my visit is one of courtesy and for the purpose of general discussion and with no specific political objectives.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>16</sup> Soviet Ambassador Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko had officially extended an invitation to the Acting Secretary to visit the Soviet Union in a conversation on February 19, 1944 (740.00119 European War 1939/2194).

<sup>17</sup> See the memorandum of March 3 by the Acting Secretary of State, p. 834.

<sup>18</sup> For correspondence on the mission of Under Secretary of State Stettinius to London, April 7-29, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

811.79661/102a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 10, 1944—5 p. m.

535. The Foreign Liaison Section of G-2,<sup>19</sup> War Department has drawn the attention of the Department to an arrangement which the Soviet Purchasing Commission<sup>20</sup> has made with the Air Transport Command, without reference to either the Department or the War Department, for the transportation of official Soviet passengers and mail to the Soviet Union. According to this information, at the end of January General Rudenko approached the head of the Air Transport Command<sup>21</sup> with the request that the ATC provide transportation for passengers and Soviet diplomatic mail from Washington to Great Falls, Montana, "on a special mission basis". At Great Falls these passengers and mail were to be transferred to Lend-Lease<sup>22</sup> planes scheduled for delivery to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Purchasing Commission estimated that ATC facilities would be required once or twice a month for passengers and approximately 3,800 pounds of mail per flight. The ATC agreed to make available such transportation and since the end of January in 4 flights has provided transportation between Washington and Great Falls for 12 Soviet official passengers and approximately 14,400 pounds of "diplomatic mail" for the Soviet Purchasing Commission. The Foreign Liaison Section of G-2, War Department, is concerned at the volume of material which the Soviet Purchasing Commission is sending out of the country without any possibility of control since this large quantity of mail is sent out "under diplomatic seal".

In addition to the security element it was further pointed out that the Soviet Government is obtaining American facilities for the transportation of mail to the Soviet Union including the utilization of planes delivered to the Soviet Government under Lend-Lease for the transportation of official passengers and mail without any reciprocal facilities being offered us by the Soviet Government.

It is obvious that the Soviet Government would have little interest in the improvement of air communications for the transportation of passengers and mail between the United States and the Soviet Union,

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<sup>19</sup> Military Intelligence.

<sup>20</sup> The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States was appointed on February 27, 1942; Lt. Gen. Leonid Georgiyevich Rudenko was Chairman of the Commission in 1944.

<sup>21</sup> Maj. Gen. Harold Lee George, Commanding General, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces (since 1942).

<sup>22</sup> The master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed at Washington on June 11, 1942. The text of the agreement and exchange of notes is printed in Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, and 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.

concerning which as you know several proposals have been submitted to the Soviet Government, if their needs are being adequately covered by the above arrangements. Since we have no agreement with the Soviet Government limiting the weight or quantity of diplomatic mail the Department does not feel that there is any ground for objecting to the quantity of diplomatic mail going from the Soviet Embassy. However, before replying to the War Department on the second point, namely, that of reciprocal facilities, the Department would like to have your views and those of General Deane.

In the meantime the War Department is requesting the Air Transport Command not to accede to any further requests for "special missions" without consultation with both the War and State Departments.

HULL

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861.20/599 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 11, 1944—8 p. m.

557. Personal for the Ambassador from the Under Secretary. Have considered your 761<sup>23</sup> and 808<sup>24</sup> and have called it [*them*] to the attention of the Secretary. We feel these are British discussions and your presence in London would inevitably raise the whole question of Soviet participation in them. While the importance of the subjects you wish to discuss is well understood, the Secretary feels that it would be advisable for you to postpone discussion of them until it is possible for you to come to Washington. [Stettinius.]

HULL

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President  
Roosevelt*<sup>25</sup>

Moscow, [March 12, 1944.]

304. For President from Harriman signed Deane. You will perhaps recall that one of the military proposals contained in the memo-

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<sup>23</sup> In this telegram of March 8, 1944, to the Acting Secretary of State, Ambassador Harriman explained: "I am considering whether it would not be valuable for me to fly to London for a couple of days while you are there to discuss the several urgently important subjects in our Soviet relations. I don't feel I can afford to be away from Moscow long enough to go to Washington on account of the military questions being currently dealt with which require my presence whereas the short trip to London might be feasible." (111.16-Stettinius, Edward R. Jr./151)

<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

<sup>25</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.



randa you submitted to Stalin in Teheran was the improvement of radio communications between Moscow and Washington.<sup>26</sup> In the discussions General Deane has had with Soviet authorities, the Soviets had agreed to the operation by us of a radio station in Moscow provided we would give them a similar privilege in the United States. Gen. Deane has been informed by the War Department that under our laws no foreign government can be given the privilege of operating a radio station in the United States and has communicated this to the Red Army Staff with whom he was negotiating. He made an alternative proposal for a hook-up through Algiers to be available to both the Soviet Military Authorities and the War Department. I have just received a letter from Molotov stating again that they had agreed to give us the privilege of establishing a radio station in Moscow if the Soviets were permitted the same privilege in the United States, but stating that as this is not possible under our laws, the Soviet Government is unwilling to consider any other alternative.

General Deane and I consider that the settlement of this radio communication problem is of the utmost importance not only now in speeding up our important communications but is essential in connection with the shuttle bombing<sup>27</sup> and for operations we have in mind in the future. Negotiations regarding shuttle bombing are progressing satisfactorily, and I believe that the Soviets will make an exception for necessary limited radio communications for this particular operation. We believe, however, that before any large United States forces can operate successfully within the Soviet Union, this question will have to be settled on a broad basis, and that from the Soviet Government's standpoint their position is understandable, in that they will expect to receive reciprocal privileges to those granted to us. The British are operating a radio station from Moscow to England and the Soviets in the reverse direction from England. I am not familiar with your War Time powers, and therefore ask whether these can not be used to give the Soviet Military Authorities the privilege of operating a radio station for the duration of the war, of course, providing they give us parallel privileges of operating from Moscow to Washington and other US Military Headquarters. May I ask that this matter receive urgent consideration because of its immediate helpful effect in working out arrangements in connection with shuttle bombing and as an essential step in connection with more important operations in the future.

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<sup>26</sup> See memorandum of November 29, 1943, from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, p. 617.

<sup>27</sup> The first shuttle raiding bombers of the 15th Army Air Force reached the Soviet Union on June 2, 1944.

861.01/2320 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 13, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received March 14—9:26 a. m.]

828. I have read with interest the memoranda prepared by officers in EE<sup>28</sup> and FC<sup>29</sup> entitled "Certain Aspects of Present Soviet Policy"<sup>30</sup> and "Russia and Eastern Europe"<sup>31</sup> which have been brought here by Page.<sup>32</sup>

As indicated in my 567, February 20, noon, I am impressed with the consideration that economic assistance is one of the most effective weapons at our disposal to influence European political events in the direction we desire and to avoid the development of a sphere of influence of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe and the Balkans. All countries involved including the Soviet Union will be to a greater or less extent impoverished by the war and earnestly seek our assistance. The analysis covered by these memoranda would indicate the need for our establishing at the earliest moment machinery by which economic assistance can be made available based of course on a sound policy of mutual economic advantage to the United States.

The granting of economic assistance should be in accordance with our basic policy vis-à-vis each country and subject to withholding if individual countries do not conform to our standards. This policy would include economic assistance to the Soviet Union which as I have expressed in other cables is one of our principal practical levers for influencing political action compatible with our principles.

Every attempt should be made to concert our economic policies with those of Great Britain and the Soviet Union and others of the United Nations, but we should retain independence of action if agreement cannot be reached. This policy should not preclude agreement with Great Britain if none can be reached with the Soviet Union. At all costs we should avoid in the immediate post-war period use of Government credits for competition on a purely short-range commercial basis which does not give consideration to the political aspects.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>28</sup> Division of Eastern European Affairs.

<sup>29</sup> Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

<sup>30</sup> For extracts from this memorandum, see p. 813.

<sup>31</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>32</sup> Edward Page, Jr., Second Secretary and Consul at the American Embassy in Moscow.

111.16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr./153: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 15, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received March 16—2:36 p. m.]

871. Personal for the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Reference your 557, March 11, 8 p. m. I feel that I should explain to you in more detail what I had in mind in connection with my suggestion that I go to England for a few days while Ed<sup>33</sup> is there, during the latter part of his visit.

In the first place before making the suggestion I gave considerable thought to the possible Soviet reaction. I had in mind discussing it with Molotov and believe that he will recognize its importance and will in no way object to it. If I found any adverse reaction I would of course communicate this and possibly cancel the trip.

Your cable is not clear to me whether you fear adverse reaction here or at home. I would have thought that the importance of our discussions from the long-range standpoint in our Soviet relations would more than offset any temporary reaction in the United States and that a way could be found to make a satisfactory explanation. Whenever we have had a bilateral discussion with the British the question of why the Soviets were not present has always been raised in any event. It would seem to me that the people of the United States would recognize the importance of Ed's getting my information for his consideration and the reasonableness of my taking advantage of his presence in London to communicate it to him.

I perhaps should have emphasized that because of the character and importance of the military matters with which I am personally involved with the Soviets, I do not see daylight ahead for the long trip home so that I look upon the talks with Ed in London as the only one I will have the opportunity to have for a considerable period.

We are in a critical moment in our relations with the Soviet Union and it is my feeling that mutual exchanges with Ed will help clarify the issues and contribute to their eventual solution.

Your cable however brings to mind another question. From my knowledge of the developments of our military relationships with the British I know that we have found it essential to have frequent meetings because of the differences that have arisen even with the British after a very few months. I have thought for several weeks that the

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<sup>33</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

first opportunity should be used to bring about triangular discussions with the Soviets and British again. It now occurs to me that Ed's trip to London might be used as an occasion to have perhaps very informal triangular discussions if an important Soviet official can be induced to meet him there. I doubt whether Molotov would come but it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Vyshinski<sup>34</sup> would be sent if it were urged that he do so and a sufficiently clear reason put forward. I mentioned this yesterday to the British Ambassador.<sup>35</sup> His preliminary reaction was most favorable. I can see no harm and some good in the extension of the invitation even if not accepted.

I believe also that I may not have made clear the importance I place on my contemplated talks with Ed. In the first place I have not been able and I doubt if it is ever possible to report by cable fully and clearly the atmosphere and background in Moscow. This is partly due to the fact that I am increasingly out of touch with the thinking at home. In this connection I have in mind all of the political subjects which are causing difficulty. In addition we are about to negotiate the fourth protocol<sup>36</sup> and plans for aid for reconstruction. I have certain ideas as to how this might be handled in such a way as to be helpful in our overall relations and to avoid pitfalls that I see ahead. I feel I can only put them forward in personal discussion. Here again so much depends upon what the thinking is at home to certain aspects which it is difficult to interchange by cable.

We are setting the foundations for our long-term relationship with the Soviets and I can only say that I believe it would be a great mistake if I were not permitted to make this trip to London. I regret that the military considerations do not permit me to go to Washington when Ed returns as this would be much more satisfactory. I earnestly ask therefore that you reconsider your message to me.

I would appreciate also receiving your reaction to the idea of the invitation to a member of the Soviet Government, possibly Vyshinski, to come to London during the latter part of Ed's visit. I have not sufficient information on the plans for Ed's trip to make a recommendation. I do feel strongly however that the first occasion possible should be used for another tripartite discussion as I believe this is the only way we can keep from drifting apart during this formative period and when deep-seated suspicions of long standing exist.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>34</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>35</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr.

<sup>36</sup> In regard to wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see pp. 1032 ff. The fourth (Ottawa) protocol was finally signed on April 17, 1945. For text, see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 89-156.

111.16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr./153 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944—8 p. m.

613. In response to your wire No. 871 Stettinius and I discussed matter thoroughly with the President at lunch today. We feel for reasons which Stettinius will explain to you when he sees you that it would be unwise for you and him to meet in London but Stettinius will meet you in Cairo if you feel it desirable at the close of the London Conference. He will advise you from London the probable date he could meet you in Cairo.<sup>37</sup> There is a possibility he might be going to Cairo in any event.

HULL

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111.16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr./161 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, March 18, 1944—midnight.

[Received March 19—11 : 30 a. m.]

918. As Hamilton<sup>38</sup> was seeing Zarubin<sup>39</sup> on March 8 I asked him to communicate to Zarubin the reasons for the Under Secretary's visit to London as set forth in the Department's 508, March 7, 8 p. m., with request that Zarubin pass the information on to Molotov. Zarubin said that he of course would transmit the information. We have had no reaction from him or other Soviet officials on the matter. Reference your 618, March 17, midnight.<sup>40</sup> The Soviet inquiry in London as to the questions which might be considered during the Under Secretary's visit is in line with Soviet practice. If the British are to give the Soviets information on the subject which might be considered, I recommend that we also inform them directly.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>37</sup> In telegram 948, March 20, 1944, Ambassador Harriman expressed his readiness to go to Cairo or anywhere in North Africa for the meeting. He made the further suggestion that Stettinius should "consider a very quick trip to Moscow, remaining not over three days." (111.16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr./176) As a result of communications from London, Harriman made plans to meet with Stettinius in Marrakech. He left Moscow on the morning of April 26 for this meeting, and was prepared to continue on to Washington.

<sup>38</sup> Maxwell M. Hamilton, Counselor of Embassy with honorary rank of Minister.

<sup>39</sup> Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Chief of the American Affairs Division of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>40</sup> Not printed. It reported that the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Fedor Tarasovich Gusev, had asked the British Foreign Secretary for any information "concerning the purpose of the Under Secretary's forthcoming visit to London and the questions which might be considered." (111.16 Stettinius, Edward R., Jr./175b)

811.79661/103 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received March 25—4: 16 p. m.]

1021. Referring to your 535, March 10, 5 p. m. and 659, March 22, 5 p. m.,<sup>41</sup> delay in my reply is due to discussions with General Deane on this subject and certain negotiations up with the Soviet Government on military matters.

As a result of recent favorable decisions of the Soviet Government and because we have one additional request just submitted on which we expect a reply shortly, General Deane, who has been requested to express his views direct by General Marshall, has cabled him recommending approval of certain special flights requested by the Soviet Purchasing Commission and that no action be taken at this time suspending arrangements which had previously been made with the Soviet Purchasing Commission and ATC.<sup>42</sup> He further states that on the completion of the negotiations here as described above he believes that the whole question of air communication between the United States and the USSR should be reviewed and an agreement negotiated satisfactory to United States. He states also that he will be prepared to make definite recommendations at that time and he feels that when the subject is reviewed all aspects should be given consideration such as the improvement of air communication between Tehran and Moscow, use of lend lease transport planes being delivered to Russia, payment for air transport, and the number of air transport planes we furnish the Soviet Government in the future.

HARRIMAN

033.1161 Johnston, Eric/1 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 25, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received March 26—1: 30 p. m.]

1044. Have learned from press that Eric Johnston<sup>43</sup> is planning to come to Russia middle of May. Would appreciate advice on the details of the purposes of his trip and the Department's views. I welcome his trip and believe his objective should be to obtain information

<sup>41</sup> Latter not printed.<sup>42</sup> Air Transport Command.<sup>43</sup> Eric A. Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce.

and create goodwill. I hope Mr. Johnston will be asked to discuss postwar trade matters only in the most general way and after consultation with me.

HARRIMAN

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811.7461/31 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 27, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received March 28—12:30 p. m.]

1061. The substance of the Department's 384, February 23, 1 p. m., was communicated to the Foreign Office which in a reply dated March 21 states as follows:

"The People's Commissariat for Communications is continuing to take practical steps in the direction of improving radio communications between the Soviet Union and the United States. In particular, efforts are being made to increase the selectivity and sensitivity of radio receiving installations and to protect the principal radio circuits from interference by other radio stations.

"The Soviet Government considers the proposal of the United States Government to organize communications in other paths in case radio waves on the direct Moscow-New York circuit encounter unfavorable conditions acceptable and further considers that it is desirable to select the circuitous path through Cairo or Algiers.

"There might also be recommended a circuitous path through the south of the Soviet Union. In this case Tiflis would be the most advantageous point for the relaying of communications. It would be necessary for this [apparent garble] however immediately to import two 50 kilowatt radio transmitters and 10 complete special radio receivers with high selectivity (Russian text *S. Uzkoi Polosoi Propuskaniya Chastot*) from the United States."

Please keep me informed of any further developments and let me know of any additional steps I should take here.

HARRIMAN

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861.20 Missions/10 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 27, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received March 28—12:30 p. m.]

1062. For the Department's confidential information and supplementing my telegram No. 1061, March 27, 2 p. m., General Deane on instructions from the War Department is conducting negotiations with the Soviet military authorities for the setting up of a transmit-

ting and a receiving station in Moscow with US equipment and operated by Soviet personnel, each country to have teletypewriter terminals in Moscow and in Washington.<sup>44</sup> I trust that the efforts to improve commercial services between the two countries will not be allowed to conflict with General Deane's negotiations which are progressing satisfactorily and which I consider of great importance in the prosecution of the war. More detailed information of the War Department's proposal may be obtained from the Chief Signal Officer, US Army.

HARRIMAN

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033.1161 Johnston, Eric/2a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1944—3 p. m.

757. Personal for the Ambassador. About 6 weeks ago Eric Johnston during a personal call on the Under Secretary mentioned that when he had seen Oumansky<sup>45</sup> in Mexico the latter had suggested that he visit the Soviet Union. At that time Johnston said that he had received no specific invitation and was not certain whether it would be possible for him to make the trip even if he were to receive such an invitation. He was told in general that the Department would have no objection in principle to his visiting the Soviet Union in response to an invitation from the Soviet Government.<sup>46</sup> It was suggested to him and he wholeheartedly agreed that while he was in the Soviet Union he would place himself entirely in your hands and be guided by your suggestions as to what he should say or do while in Moscow. No further specific information was received from Johnston prior to the press announcement that he intended to make a brief visit to the Soviet Union in the middle of May. Following the announcement Johnston called on me and I took occasion to emphasize the importance of keeping in touch with you.

I am sure that Mr. Johnston intends to be guided entirely by your advice in regard to any conversations which he may have in Moscow on postwar trade and related matters of interest to American business

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<sup>44</sup> In telegram 1195, May 13, 1944, the Department replied that the War Department had requested that General Deane be authorized "to sign agreement governing operation of military radio circuit between United States and U.S.S.R." The Department had no objection to giving the necessary authorization. (861.20-Missions/10)

<sup>45</sup> Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky, Soviet Ambassador in Mexico; formerly Ambassador in the United States, 1939-1941.

<sup>46</sup> Ambassador Gromyko later extended an official invitation to Johnston.



and under those circumstances we consider that his visit will be most helpful. We will keep you currently informed of any further developments.

HULL

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611.6131/657 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 1, 1944—8 a. m.

[Received 4 p. m.]

1129. Reference Department's mail instruction No. 80, February 28.<sup>47</sup> I heartily endorse report on [of] the Interdepartmental Committee "Post-War Trade Between the United States and the USSR" received with above mentioned despatch,<sup>48</sup> as a basis of approach to the subject. On the one hand we should allay the exaggerated optimism as to the possible volume of post war trade with the USSR<sup>49</sup> which this memorandum indicates exists in certain quarters without, on the other hand, minimizing its importance and by stimulating adoption of the policies necessary to expand it to the fullest extent practicable. I am most anxious to get the Department's thinking on this second aspect.

I have mentioned to Mikoyan<sup>50</sup> the subject of increased imports into the United States from Russia and the necessity of combined study. He indicated great interest but, as is typical, so far has offered no concrete suggestions.

In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union will undoubtedly obtain substantial imports from Germany in reparations, and from Great Britain and other countries, her requirements for equipment from United States will be so great for reconstruction and development of her economy that I am optimistic about the potentialities of our trade, provided we will adopt import policies that will make it possible to take advantage of the situation.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

<sup>48</sup> No copy of this report is filed with the Department's copy of the instruction. An amplification of this report was sent to the Embassy in instruction 150, May 6, 1944, of which the abstract is printed *infra*.

<sup>49</sup> An article by Clifton Daniel in the *New York Times* for May 5, 1944, reported that the Soviet Trade Commission in Great Britain was conducting negotiations with British business interests for large postwar orders similar to orders totalling \$2,500,000,000 already placed in the United States. Other such articles caused the Department of State to inform the Embassy at London in telegram 3650, May 6, 1944, that "There has been no special Soviet purchasing mission in the United States, and as far as the Department is aware, the only negotiations which have been carried on have been between Soviet Purchasing Commission here and certain large American firms. As far as is known, the contemplated contracts do not envisage sales for more than a few million dollars." (611.6131/657a)

<sup>50</sup> Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

611.6131/660

*Report by the Interdepartmental Subcommittee on the Soviet Union  
of the Committee on Trade Agreements*

[WASHINGTON,] April 1944.

## ASPECTS OF POST-WAR SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE

(Abstract)

1) The objective is to estimate possible United States exports to the U.S.S.R. during the post-war decade on the basis of the following studies:

- a) The post-war export potential of the U.S.S.R., by commodities;
- b) Post-war imports into the U.S.S.R. from Europe, by countries;
- c) United States post-war imports from the U.S.S.R., by commodities.

Reparations, price changes, gold movements, credit arrangements including lend-lease, services rendered, and possible United States stockpiling, are omitted from detailed statistical consideration in arriving at these estimates. Brief consideration, however, is given to the possible effect on post-war trade of Soviet gold exports and credit arrangements.

2) The estimated total average annual export potential of the U.S.S.R. during the post-war decade based upon the export probabilities of the twenty-five major pre-war export commodities, is from 400 to 500 million dollars. All sums shown in this abstract are based on pre-war prices.

3) The estimated annual average of Soviet imports from European countries, excluding Germany and Italy, during the post-war decade is at least 200 million dollars, and more than double the pre-war figure.

4) The estimated annual average of United States imports from the U.S.S.R. during the post-war decade ranges from 30 to 70 million dollars. In order to achieve the higher figure, the United States would require a national income of about 150 billion dollars and total imports of 12 billion dollars per year. These estimated imports into the United States form part of the estimated Soviet export potential of 400 to 500 million dollars per year. United States imports from the U.S.S.R. during the latter 1930's averaged about 25 million dollars per year.

5) The Soviet export potential of 400 to 500 million dollars per year would pay for Soviet imports of 200 to 250 million from Europe together with imports of, say, 50 to 100 million from other countries

and leave 100 to 200 million dollars for imports from the United States. Soviet exports to the United States of 30 to 70 million dollars per year would supply exchange for about a third of these amounts, the balance being covered by multilateral payments.

6) Gold exports might add several hundred million dollars a year to Soviet purchasing power, and a substantial part of this addition might be used for further imports from the United States.

7) If the United States granted the Soviet Union large credits in the early post-war years, the possible additional United States exports resulting therefrom would of course be more than offset by the amortization and interest requirements of such loans in the later years and might consequently impose a heavy burden on the Soviet balance of payments at that time.<sup>51</sup>

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033.1161 Johnston, Eric/3: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 12, 1944.

[Received April 13—4:50 p. m.]

1269. Moscow papers for April 12 carried a Tass<sup>52</sup> report London containing a statement of Mr. Eric Johnston to the effect that he was going to Russia to discuss future trade possibilities with the Soviet Union and to find out how the postwar position of Russia and its trade will affect the average United States citizen. Tass quotes Mr. Johnston as stating that he intended to speak frankly to the Russians, that he hoped they would speak frankly with him and that he intended to study the economic consequences of the differences in the social, political and economic systems of Russia and the United States since if "we wish to have peace we must learn how to cooperate together".

HARRIMAN

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<sup>51</sup> Later in the year the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, A. Bland Calder, wrote two memoranda (transmitted in despatches No. 987 of September 20, and No. 1020 of September 25, neither printed), which gave consideration to possible increases in exports of two Soviet commodities which in the past had occupied top places in the total value of Soviet exports to the United States (manganese ore and fur skins). These could be calculated to furnish an important source of *valuta* in early postwar trade as a likely means of servicing loans or credits in the United States for Soviet purchases of capital equipment for the rapid reconstruction and expansion of Soviet industry. Even in the most favorable circumstances for expanded postwar trade, the amounts that might be realized from the export of these commodities would still be seriously inadequate for the servicing and liquidation of the credits and loans that the Soviet Union would certainly need and would probably desire to obtain. (840.50/9-2044, 9-2544)

<sup>52</sup> Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communication agency of the Soviet Government.

740.00119 European War 1939/2497

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*<sup>53</sup>

I am instructed by the Soviet Government to ask you to bring to the attention of the United States Government the following confidential information.

Several days ago the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Sato,<sup>54</sup> approached the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Mr. V. M. Molotov, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Shigemitsu,<sup>55</sup> with a proposal, analogous to the proposal of the Japanese Government, transmitted by Ambassador Sato to Mr. V. M. Molotov on September 10, 1943.<sup>56</sup> To the mentioned Japanese proposal the Soviet Government has given a negative reply, an analogous reply given to the proposal of the Japanese Government of September 10, 1943, about which the Government of the United States was confidentially informed in due time by the Soviet Government.

811.003 Wallace, Henry A./43 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*[Extract<sup>57</sup>]

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944—4 p. m.

1020. Department has just received details of Vice President Wallace's proposed trip through Soviet Union. (Department's 979, April 20.<sup>58</sup>)

He plans to leave Fairbanks about June 1 but it is possible that the whole trip may be advanced by a few days.

The Vice President has indicated that in connection with his interest in agricultural matters he is very desirous of visiting agricultural

<sup>53</sup> Handed to the Secretary by Ambassador Gromyko on April 13, 1944.<sup>54</sup> Naotake Sato.<sup>55</sup> Mamoru Shigemitsu.<sup>56</sup> The information about this earlier Japanese peace proposal, and its rejection by the Soviet Government, was contained in a note dated September 14, 1943, from the Soviet Embassy to the Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 696. Regarding rumors of a possible separate peace between Germany and the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 484 ff.<sup>57</sup> The details of a preliminary itinerary in Siberia have been omitted. A revised itinerary was sent to Moscow in telegram 1142, May 8, 1944 (811.003-Wallace, Henry A./56½).<sup>58</sup> Not printed; it indicated that only on April 20 had Vice President Wallace taken up with the Department the question of his visit, although some time before he had spoken informally to Ambassador Gromyko of the possibility of visiting in Siberia on his way to China.

colleges, institutions and experimental stations. He has asked that you indicate to the Soviets his desire to visit such institutions in order that they may make certain suggestions in connection with his itinerary.

You will note that the Vice President will be in Tashkent for 3 days, and he suggests that if satisfactory and convenient for you you might make arrangements to meet him in that city.

The Vice President particularly desires that you tell the Soviet authorities that he will, of course, welcome any comment or suggestions, and make clear to them his desire that the visit be as informal as possible and in such a manner as will be most convenient for the Soviet authorities.

HULL

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811.003 Wallace, Henry A./54 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 7, 1944—11 p. m.  
[Received May 8—12: 43 p. m.]

1595. I have received a note from Vyshinski stating that the Soviet Government has no objections to the proposed itinerary of the Vice President nor to his visiting all the places listed in the Department's telegram insofar as the technical possibilities connected with the route and the furnishing of aircraft fuel permit.<sup>59</sup> The note continues that all necessary measures will be taken in this end, that many of the places listed have suitable facilities for a C54 plane and that at such points on the itinerary where adequate facilities do not exist lighter Soviet aircraft will be placed at the disposal of the Vice President. The note concludes that the Soviet Embassy in Washington has been instructed to issue visas to the Vice President's party and crew. It requests that the Foreign Office be advised of any further information on the trip.

HAMILTON

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811.7461/31 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 15, 1944—6 p. m.

1199. See your 1061, March 27. Board of War Communications has been considering problem of improving radiotelegraph circuits between United States and U. S. S. R. and it has recommended that the desired improvement be effected by utilizing the American-owned and operated facilities of Mackay Radio at Algiers, and R.C.A. com-

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<sup>59</sup> Vice President Wallace departed from Washington on May 20 for Siberia and the Far East.

munications at Naples for the relaying of traffic between the United States and the U. S. S. R.

Will you please ascertain immediately from the appropriate Soviet authorities whether this meets with their approval and advise the Department as soon as possible. Meanwhile authorization is being requested on behalf of Mackay to relay traffic from Algiers to Moscow. No such authorization is necessary in connection with the R.C.A. station at Naples.

HULL

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[For the text of the report dated May 22, 1944, by Under Secretary of State Stettinius to the Secretary of State concerning his conversations in London between April 7 and 29, which included discussions on current political topics involving the Soviet Union, see volume III, pages 1 ff.]

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811.79661/115

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)* <sup>60</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 31, 1944.

Word has just come from General Arnold that the Soviet Government has granted the French the right to run airplanes to Moscow, the route being Algiers-Damascus-Tehran-Moscow. In return, the Soviet Government is to have the right to run a plane into Algiers every two weeks.

This for background in connection with the suggestion that we likewise ask for service into Moscow. It was General Arnold's opinion that we can get the same thing if we are tough enough about it.

A[DOLF] A. B[ERLE], JR.

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811.003 Wallace, Henry A./65: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 3, 1944.

[Received June 4—11:25 a. m.]

1991. Moscow newspapers for June 3 published a Tass despatch datelined Irkutsk June 2 and headed "Address of Vice President of the United States of America, Mr. Wallace, in Irkutsk." <sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Addressed to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Grew), the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen), and the Chief of the Aviation Division (Morgan).

<sup>61</sup> Vice President Wallace had landed in the Soviet Far East on May 23. Reports of his speech on June 12 in the opera house at Novosibirsk, which consisted of variations on the themes of the speech in Irkutsk, were printed in the Soviet press on the next day.

The despatch occupies about 17 column inches in prominent positions on the foreign pages of the papers.

The text of the item reads in translation as follows:

"The Vice President of the United States of America, Mr. Henry A. Wallace, while passing through here delivered an address last night at a gathering of the intelligentsia and representatives of the public organization of the city which took place in the building of the Oblast Theatre. The audience greeted Mr. Wallace very warmly. In his address delivered in the Russian language Mr. Wallace stated,

'I was deeply moved when I entered your country last week. I have visited Welkal, Seimchan, Magadan, Komsomolsk, and Yakutsk. I made the acquaintance of your agricultural experts. I also observed the determination of Sov[iet]-people to turn out the maximum production in mines, in metallurgical and aircraft plants and in shipbuilding yards. I worked in your victory gardens and met your gardeners. I saw high quality cattle and I saw hogs and chickens. I saw your airdromes and met your aviators and military men among whom I especially want to mention General Semenov and hero of the Sov[iet] Union Colonel Mazuruk. Among your outstanding administrators I should like to mention the director of the Far Eastern Construction Administration I. S. Nikishov and also the leaders of the factories and plants of the rapidly growing city of youth Komsomolsk.

There are no more similar countries in the world than the Sov[iet] Union and the Uni[ted] States of America. The vast expanses of your country, its virgin forests, its broad rivers and great lakes, all types of climate from tropical to polar, its inexhaustible natural riches remind me of my own homeland. The history of Siberia and its heroic population remind me of the history of the far west of the Uni[ted] States. The pioneers of our countries in the titanic struggle with nature and with hard conditions of life went forward fearlessly building new towns and villages, new industry and a new life for the welfare of their homeland and of all humanity.

In this struggle in this construction, characters were tempered, the best traits of human personality were developed, inborn social instincts manifested and the feeling of social solidarity was strengthened.

It is no accident that in the present war Siberia has played and continues to play such a tremendous role. Her fighters are in the first ranks on all fronts and in important work in the rear, her technical forces have constructed in a very short time a new and full arsenal essential to the great Red Army in the struggle with the hated and powerful enemy and have thus substantially contributed to its victories.

Free people born on free expanses cannot tolerate any injustice, any aggression, cannot even temporarily live in slavery. Now when the early dawn of the future postwar world is beginning slowly to appear on the horizon it is becoming perfectly clear that only the full cooperation of our two great countries and their allies can assure to the world stability and proper development.

In the cause of the greatest postwar reconstruction it will be vitally necessary that in the interests of the whole world the important role of the northwestern part of the United States and of Canada, Alaska and Sov[iet] Siberia be recognized. These enormous thinly populated

territories have in our time been mastered by aviation. Now they require development both of their agriculture and of their industry. It is the duty of the United States and Canada to undertake determined scientific efforts in the development of their northern areas such as have been displayed by the Soviet Union in developing Siberia and the Far East.

I am convinced that by [*the*] exchange of information and of varieties of seeds and of the best breeds of cattle with the Soviet Union, Canada, and the United States can substantially increase the productivity of all these regions. The vast masses of people who have experienced all the horrors of general and personal catastrophes have faith that their torments and sacrifices have not been in vain and that the terrible days of war will be followed by bright days of peace in justice and in abundant peace for every man.

My present journey through the regions of the Soviet Far East and Siberia, my visits to factories and plants in these regions, to experimental agricultural stations and fields, my meetings and conversations with the leaders of industrial enterprises and agricultural establishments, with workers and with the best stakhanovites<sup>62</sup> of war, industry and agriculture, their tremendous interest in everything being done in native country in the United States of America, fills me with firm confidence that the friendship between our great countries confirmed by the blood of the best sons of the peoples of both countries on the fronts of the deadly struggle against the enemy of humanity, Hitlerite Germany, will grow and become stronger in the postwar period also.<sup>7</sup>

After the meeting Mr. H. Wallace attended a performance. The play, *Men of Stalingrad*, was presented.<sup>77</sup>

HARRIMAN

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>63</sup>

Moscow, 11 June 1944.

Personal for the President. In my talk with Stalin yesterday evening we discussed in considerable detail the participation of the Soviet Union in the Japanese war and in that connection China. I brought up the question of the basing of our bombers in the Soviet Far East and stated that you and our Chiefs of Staff believed no time should be lost in coming to an agreement and in working out the necessary plans for supplies. He agreed that this was desirable and stressed the necessity for the utmost secrecy. He added that it was not only a question of the Air Force but that the ground operations and naval operations

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<sup>62</sup> A stakhanovite was a worker who emulated the achievements of Alexey Grigoryevich Stakhanov, employed in the Donets coal mines in 1935, who succeeded in overfulfilling the established norms of production.

<sup>63</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.



should be considered as well. He explained that there were now 12 air fields, some of them new in the area between Vladivostok and Soviet-skaya Gavan suitable for heavy bombers and that we could expect to receive the use of 6 or 7 of them. More with metallised strips could be provided if necessary. It is evident that since my talk with Stalin in February the Soviets have gone ahead with the construction of heavy bomber bases in the Far East, using, I believe, the experience gained from us in preparation of the fields for shuttle bombing.<sup>65</sup> Stalin agreed that it would be desirable to start promptly in building up reserves of gasoline and other supplies using the Pacific route as the Japanese no longer interfered. I explained that it was hoped that the northern convoys could be resumed again at a later date so that this stocking could be done without interference with the protocol commitments. Stalin asked whether the British would have to participate in these discussions and stated bluntly that his military did not trust General Burrows<sup>66</sup> the present head of the British Military Mission. He explained that this was personal in respect to General Burrows and he was not speaking of the British in general. In reply to my direct inquiry he stated that they had full confidence in General Deane. I said that these discussions could be carried on between General Deane, his Air Officer General Walsh,<sup>67</sup> and Naval Officer Admiral Olsen, with the appropriate Soviet Officers and that it was not necessary to involve the British at this time as they did not have day bombers. At a later stage when the entire strategy of the Pacific War was considered the British of course would be involved. He agreed that these discussions should start promptly. I could not pin him down on a date but he assured me that it would not be long delayed, saying, "the sooner the better". Stalin brought up the question of the supplying by us of heavy bombers for the Red Air Force. I explained that General Arnold was ready to begin to deliver them beginning in the Autumn after agreement had been reached regarding our operation from Soviet Far

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<sup>65</sup> The first shuttle raiding bombers of the 15th Army Air Force reached the Soviet Union on June 2, 1944. Units of American bombers raided military objectives in the area of Galatz in Rumania on June 6, operating from air bases within the Soviet Union in cooperation with Soviet aircraft. In despatch 563, June 12, 1944, the Minister Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union, Maxwell M. Hamilton, enclosed newspaper clippings on this raid and other Allied military operations and made this observation: "The cordial tone of these articles is typical of all comment on Allied operations which has appeared in the Soviet press since the capture of Rome [on June 4]. The chary praise and carping criticism which has been a feature of Soviet press comment on Allied military operations up to this time is now conspicuously absent and has been replaced by a note of admiration and appreciation for the recent military achievements of Anglo-American military forces." (740.0011 European War 1939/6-1244)

<sup>66</sup> Lt. Gen. Montagu Brocas Burrows, head of the British Supply Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>67</sup> Maj. Gen. Robert LeGraw Walsh, air member of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

Eastern bases. We would not only give them the planes but would help train the Soviet crews in the flying of the bombers and in the tactical operations either in the United States or by sending instructors to the Soviet Union. He said he would prefer to have instructors come to the Soviet Union as only trained Soviet pilots and navigators would be used. These are of course details that can be worked out later.

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033.1161 Johnston, Eric/6-1544

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 576

Moscow, June 15, 1944.

[Received July 3.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report on a press conference<sup>68</sup> granted by Mr. Eric A. Johnston to correspondents of the American and British press at Spaso House,<sup>69</sup> Moscow, at 3:30 p. m., June 14, 1944, as recorded by a member of the Embassy's staff who was present.<sup>70</sup>

Outstanding significant topics discussed and statements made by Mr. Johnston are as follows: (1) He quotes Mikoyan, Commissar of Foreign Trade, as stating that the Soviet Union desires to purchase after the war from the United States "many many billions of dollars worth of goods on credit terms mutually advantageous to the two countries"; (2) He quotes Mr. Mikoyan further as stating that the Soviet authorities wish to carry on these transactions direct with American business men; (3) He affirmed, in answer to questions, that American business would not be likely to object to the effecting of financing arrangements through the Export Import Bank of Washington; (4) He quoted Mikoyan and Molotov as stating that not only capital goods but American technical assistance is desired by the Soviet Union; (5) He intimated that the credits might run from ten to twenty-five years, the longer terms the more business possible; (6) He indicated that reciprocal trade items which the United States could take from Soviet Russia in return would consist of furs, bristles,

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<sup>68</sup> Not printed.

<sup>69</sup> Residence of the Ambassador in Moscow.

<sup>70</sup> At a luncheon in Moscow on June 3, tendered by Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mr. Johnston described the significance of Communists in the United States in these words: "Our American Communists . . . lack originality and realism. They still follow and imitate what they think is your current policy. If you take pepper they sneeze. If you have indigestion, they belch. They annoy our trade unions much more than they annoy our employers." (033.1161 Johnston, Eric/7)

flax, tungsten and other non-ferrous metals—including possibly gold—wood pulp, and some handicraft goods; (6) Mr. Johnston recognized that the question of the extent of German reparations to the Soviet Union might be a factor in determining the amount and character of capital goods which would be desired from the United States.

Mr. Johnston informed an officer of the Embassy that he had told Mr. Mikoyan that he would like to quote Mr. Mikoyan in the sense of the statements attributed to Mr. Mikoyan and that Mr. Mikoyan had given his consent.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:  
MAXWELL M. HAMILTON  
*Minister Counselor*

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811.003 Wallace, Henry A/72: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 20, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received 10:51 p. m.]

2199. For the President and the Secretary. I have just returned from spending two days with Mr. Wallace at Tashkent and one at Alma Ata,<sup>71</sup> at which latter point he headed for China. He was greeted by the Soviet officials and agriculturists with great cordiality and respect, and with enthusiasm on the part of the Russian audiences at the theatres he attended. His speech delivered in Russian at Tashkent was well received.

His interest in and knowledge of scientific agriculture made a profound impression. He himself has been greatly impressed by the scientific work and seed selection carried on by the Soviet stations he visited in Siberia and Central Asia, and the results attained in the application of science to the substantial increase of agricultural production. He concentrated his attention in his travels largely on these stations and collective farms. He leaves Russia with real enthusiasm for what has been accomplished in this field in so short a time.

I had the opportunity to discuss in detail with him and Mr. Vincent<sup>72</sup> my talk with Marshal Stalin on Soviet-Chinese relations as reported in my Navy cable no. 110541, June 11.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>71</sup> Ambassador Harriman, with Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Second Secretary and Counselor of Embassy, had left Moscow on June 14 by airplane for Tashkent for this rendezvous with Vice President Wallace.

<sup>72</sup> John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.

811.003 Wallace, Henry A/74 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

Moscow, June 21, 1944.

[Received June 22—12:43 p. m.]

2223. Press for June 21 prominently published Vice President Wallace's statement released in Alma Ata. The despatch datelined Alma Ata June 19th had a prominent heading. It read in translation as follows.

"The Vice President of the USA, Mr. Wallace, released the following statement for publication in the press.

"Leaving your hospitable country today <sup>73</sup> I should like to express deep gratitude to you for the cordial welcome which I have received everywhere. . . . I have had the opportunity of seeing with my own eyes everything that I have heard and read about the Soviet Union. I must say that my personal impressions exceeded all my expectations. I am delighted with the sweep of construction and magnificent achievement. The heroic efforts of the peoples of the USSR have been crowned by brilliant successes in all branches of science, industry and art. The successes of the Soviet Government in creating the conditions which made possible the unprecedented progress of the Yakuts, the Buriat Mongols, the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks in popular education, culture, technology and self-government made a deep impression on me. The grandeur of the valiant Red Army's victories has inscribed a glorious new page in the history of the struggle for a free world. But besides the Red Army in Siberia and Central Asia I personally observed the no less heroic efforts of the army of workers in industry and agriculture, men and women in factories and state and collective farms who work tirelessly with skill and patriotic enthusiasm producing foodstuffs, machines and armaments for victory. I should especially like to pay tribute to the Soviet working women who, taking the places of their husbands and brothers fighting at the front, with exceptional spirit and enthusiasm and with great effort are carrying out various types of difficult work. They also find time to cultivate vast numbers of victory gardens. In the US and Great Britain it is customary these days to call all individual kitchen gardens, "victory" gardens which I saw all throughout Soviet Siberia. By their heroic labor these women are forging victory. I am glad to have the opportunity to report regarding all this to my fellow countrymen in the US. I am confident that my words will still further increase the feeling of deep mutual sympathy between our two pioneer peoples. Altho our methods of approaching the satisfaction of the need of the common man differ, our ultimate purposes are the same. Differences in the way of solving the same problems will always exist thanks to the historic past and the geographic position of our countries. But this in no way can interfere with deep mutual sympathy and close

<sup>73</sup> Vice President Wallace arrived in Chungking on June 20, 1944.

cooperation for the welfare of all free humanity. In the early years of my life I became acquainted with the Anglo-Saxon and Latin cultures, the chief cultures of the American continent. My present journey has made it possible for me to acquaint myself with the culture of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Soon I will get to know the culture of the Chinese people also. Only the continuation of close cooperation among these four cultures upon the termination of the present war can serve as a firm guarantee of lasting peace for all peoples.”

HARRIMAN

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811.003 Wallace, Henry A/76: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 23, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received June 24—2:18 a. m.]

2242. I spent two days with the Vice President in Tashkent and accompanied him for one day to Alma Ata. I was accompanied by the Chinese and Mexican Ambassadors,<sup>75</sup> the former under instructions from his Government and the latter upon the invitation of the Vice President. Although the Soviet officials we met were formally correct in their relations with the Chinese Ambassador their attitude toward him was noticeably cool and was in direct contrast to the friendliness of their reception of Vice President, the Mexican Ambassador and myself.

The public was manifestly sincere in the ovations given Mr. Wallace at the special theatrical performances which were given in his honor in Tashkent and in Alma Ata.

The population of Tashkent has increased by over 400,000 since the war largely, we were told as a result of the influx of evacuees, and the population of the city is now 1,000,000 of which about a half are Russians or Ukrainians and the others principally Uzbeks. For the present the Uzbek Government is not readily according permission for these evacuees to return to their homes, particularly if they are engaged in industry. The President of the Uzbek Government is an Uzbek, one of the Vice Presidents is a Georgian and the other Vice President a Russian. While it appeared that Uzbek language, culture and traditions were encouraged—and the local population takes pride in this—it was obvious that the Russian language and Moscow direction were firmly established.

We visited several agricultural experimental and selection stations and a collective farm where the Vice President was greatly impressed with the application of science in the development of agriculture.

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<sup>75</sup> Foo Ping-sheung and Luis Quintanilla, respectively.

The work in cotton selection was, according to the Vice President, as good as any he had ever seen. We were told there had been an increase in irrigated acreage under cultivation in the Tashkent area of over 30 percent in the last 5 years. Fruits and vegetables have been particularly fostered, also cotton and sugar.

Although there were complaints of a shortage of farm labor and mechanical equipment, men out of uniform appeared in greater evidence than in other parts of Russia I have visited, indicating that less drastic drafts had been made. On the other hand, at one collective farm where we were told there were 140 families, 200 men were in the army. As only six of these had been killed, however, it would appear that their induction into the army had been relatively recent.

Little progress appears to have been made in implementing the decision to establish local defense and foreign affairs commissariats.<sup>76</sup> We were informed that the commissariats were being formed but that commissars had not yet been appointed. There were representatives of the old USSR Commissariat for Foreign Affairs functioning in both Tashkent and Alma Ata. The population appeared to be well fed and, allowing for the difference in level of civilians, healthier than in Moscow. There were no commercial stores in operation in either Tashkent or Alma Ata. Fruits and vegetables were plentiful in the Tashkent market and prices reasonable as compared with Moscow.

Alma Ata is a cleaner and more progressive looking city than Tashkent and shows more evidence of Western standards and energy. Since the railroad reached the city in 1925 the population has increased from 40,000 to 350,000. It has not received many evacuees. In the short time available we were able only to inspect an apple selection station where we were told that about 25 percent of the fruit crop in the immediate area had been destroyed by frost. We were also informed that five hydro-electrical stations had been or were being built near the city. The industrial development is largely in food processing. I was struck by the fact that a large theatre where a special performance was given for the Vice President had been completed since the outbreak of the war, thus showing the importance the Soviets attach to the theatre in maintaining morale and developing Soviet culture. The Russian agriculturalists were obviously impressed with the Vice President's knowledge of scientific agriculture, and the Soviet officials by his friendliness and sincerity, and I believe his visit has made a substantial contribution to good Soviet American relations.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>76</sup> See pp. 809-813.

633.1161 Johnston, Eric/13: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 27, 1944—4 a. m.  
[Received June 27—12:15 a. m.]

2295. This evening<sup>77</sup> I introduced Eric Johnston to Marshal Stalin. The conversation, which lasted 2½ hours, was most affable. Johnston was much impressed with Stalin's intimate knowledge of American production figures, both war and prewar. Stalin gave him considerable information as to Soviet production and future objectives.

Johnston indicated that he would do everything he could to promote extension of credits by the United States to Russia for the purchase of American machinery for reconstruction and assured the Marshal that American business desired the development of the fullest trade and commerce with the Soviet Union in both directions. A detailed report will follow.<sup>78</sup>

Johnston handled himself well and Stalin obviously liked him and what he said.

HARRIMAN

811.003 Wallace, Henry A./6-2744: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 27, 1944.  
[Received June 27—5:20 p. m.]

2305. Press for June 27 published following dated Alma Ata, June 17, 1944:

“Letter of Vice President of the United States, Mister H. A. Wallace, to Comrade J. V. Stalin.

My Dear Marshal Stalin: On the eve of my departure from the city of Alma Ata for China I should like to express to you my deep gratitude for the splendid cordial hospitality shown toward me during my 3 weeks' visit to Siberia and Soviet Central Asia. The official representatives and the people whom I met in towns and villages, on collective farms, in factories and mines, impressed me by their initiative, capacity and skill, and also by their constant courtesy in helping me to acquaint myself as well as possible with the plans and problems facing them, and with their great achievements.

I found especially interesting the agricultural experiment and selection stations, a great number of which I visited along the whole route from Magadan to Alma Ata. They are doing outstanding work for the benefit of the state and collective farms and innumerable victory gardens. The progress and achievements attained by the Yakuts,

<sup>77</sup> June 26.

<sup>78</sup> See telegram 2369, June 30, 3 p. m., from Moscow, p. 973.

Buryat-Mongols, Kazakhs and Uzbeks made a particularly deep impression upon me. The policy of the Government of the USSR which has made this progress and these achievements possible is clear evidence of the most outstanding and gifted political leadership.

I want to thank you again for the opportunity given me to see for myself the enormous army of men and women in Siberia and Central Asia who are fighting to achieve victory in the factories and on the farms.

May our two great nations working in close harmony make their contribution to the cause of the prosperity of the whole world by the same abundant production in peacetime as was achieved by them during the war.

Ambassador Harriman will transmit to you this expression of gratitude together with my best wishes and greetings.

Henry A. Wallace, Alma Ata, June 17, 1944."

HARRIMAN

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033.1161 Johnston, Eric/6-3044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 30, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received July 1—2:40 a. m.]

2369. Reference Embassy's 2295, June 27, 4 a. m. The most interesting features of Eric Johnston's conversation with Marshal Stalin were as follows:

(1) Stalin paid tribute to the assistance rendered by the United States to Soviet industry before and during the war. He said that about two-thirds of all the large industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union had been built with United States help or technical assistance. Johnston remarked that he had noticed that distribution methods had failed to keep pace with production methods and said he felt that American chain store executives might help in improving Soviet distribution methods after the war. Stalin agreed and indicated that assistance in this field would be welcome.

(2) In reply to Johnston's inquiry, Stalin said that after the war Soviet imports would be largely industrial equipment and machinery and not consumer goods. Part of this equipment, however, would be used to produce consumer goods. Domestic manufacture would also be applied to the production of equipment for rehabilitation and reconstruction. He explained further that the Soviet problem was not only to rebuild the devastated areas but also to reconstruct their industrial machine. They had made previous mistakes in their plans which would now be corrected.

(3) Stalin said that Soviet domestic requirements in the foreseeable future would prevent the Soviet Union from becoming an exporting



nation of manufactured goods. Exports would never play a great role in Soviet economy except to cover imports. The Soviet Government has never fought for foreign markets; on the contrary it has always endeavored to widen its imports. Foreign markets for manufactured goods would be left open to Great Britain and the United States. With Germany and Japan destroyed there would be enlarged opportunities. Stalin enumerated the known raw materials which could be exported to the United States after the war and in reply to an inquiry as to the possibility of exporting certain specialized manufactured goods, stated that Soviet production could adapt itself to requirements and that when it became known what manufactured goods the United States desired to purchase, he felt sure that the Soviet Union could supply them.

(4) The goal of Soviet iron and steel production for postwar would be 40 million tons of pig iron and 60 million tons of steel annually. Stalin explained that this was a big undertaking considering that the present annual production was between 10 million and 12 million tons of steel and 7 million and 8 million tons of pig iron as compared with 20 million to 22 million tons and 16 tons, respectively, before the war.

(5) American technical assistance and equipment might well be required in the rehabilitation and development of the Soviet post-war electric power production.

(6) Stalin was very anxious to obtain Johnston's views on the presidential elections. Johnston expressed the belief that the nation would reelect the President on his foreign policy, that the House would be Republican but that the Senate would remain Democratic. He added that the President and Mr. Hull were working in cooperation with the Senate on foreign policy and that he was satisfied Congress would continue to support the President on foreign policy. Stalin stated that "his colleagues were very much interested in the elections and some were perturbed lest the President be not reelected". He said that the Russians knew the present United States leaders, have a common language with them, and that cooperation had been established. It was not certain, however, what would happen if the President were not reelected. The Soviet Government remembered with some apprehension the Hoover administration.

(7) In referring to the invasion, Stalin said: "Now Germany must realize that no large scale war can be waged without a powerful navy. They are fools to have attempted a great war without a great fleet." Stalin added that he also had in mind a merchant fleet which of course would not exist without a great navy. On the other hand a great navy could not be developed without the presence of a great merchant fleet from which it draws its personnel. I am reporting these remarks

as a further indication of the desire of the Soviet Union to have a strong navy and merchant fleet in the post-war period.

A full report of the conversation is going forward by air mail.<sup>79</sup>

HARRIMAN

861.9111 RR/7-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 11, 1944.

[Received July 11—11:52 a.m.]

2506. *Izvestiya* for July 9 published a letter from Eric Johnston to Stalin dated Tashkent July 7 and reading in translation as follows:

"I am returning to America with deep respect for the growing industrial might of Russia. The industrial progress of your country made a great impression on me everywhere I traveled especially in the young and flourishing cities of the Urals. This development constitutes a tribute to your farsighted leadership. The production of your industrial machine has to a considerable degree helped to save the world from Nazi enslavement. I also carry away with me many pleasant memories of my experience in Russia of which the greatest was the inspiring meeting with you in the Kremlin.<sup>80</sup> Please accept my best wishes for your good health for many years and speedy victory over our common enemy."

HARRIMAN

811.003 Wallace Henry A/7-2944

*Report by Captain Kenneth Knowles, Observer and Military Secretary of the Wallace Mission*<sup>81</sup>

WASHINGTON, 15 July 1944.

[The first two pages of this report, containing introductory material, are here omitted.]

During the course of rather extensive travels through Siberia and Soviet Asia many agricultural enterprises were visited, including

<sup>79</sup> Not printed.

<sup>80</sup> Considerable attention in the Soviet press was accorded to Johnston's stopovers on his return trip to the United States at Magnitogorsk, Sverdlovsk, and Omsk. In a statement at the last city, his favorable comments about the development of Siberia and his expression of confidence that "the mutual economic and commercial relations of the Soviet Union and America would expand and become stronger" were prominently reported. (861.9111 RR/7-344) After his return home, Johnston contributed an article, "My Talk with Joseph Stalin," to the *Reader's Digest*, vol. XLV (October 1944), pp. 1-10.

<sup>81</sup> This report was sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Headquarters, Air Transport Command, Washington, with copies to Vice President Wallace and John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. Later Wallace himself wrote a book, *Soviet Asia Mission* (New York, 1946).

State and Collective Farms, agricultural Experiment and Selection Stations, Agro-technical Research Institutions, Universities, etc. These activities are all carried on in a most enlightened scientific manner, in no way inferior to the methods employed by the Federal and State Departments of Agriculture in the United States. Every effort is being made to improve agricultural methods and obtain the highest possible utilization of the soil. Many research workers and farm directors have been decorated for their contributions to advanced agricultural methods. The Directors of these activities all expressed the keenest interest in American agricultural methods as ably described by Mr. Wallace, and requested that he use his influence in setting up channels whereby an exchange of agro-technical knowledge and methods could be instituted between the United States and the USSR.

The impression gained in traveling through the great industrial area east of the Ural Mountains was one of remarkable utilization of both human and natural resources. Every individual is busy, and has a fairly comprehensive idea of where his efforts fit into the overall picture of a great nation at war. Many of the tasks performed are humble, but are accomplished cheerfully and energetically by individuals who have been carefully selected for the particular work in which they are engaged in order that the fullest utilization of individual abilities may be achieved. In industries where practicable, the piece-work system of remuneration has been adopted in order to further stimulate the individual worker's production, both through a spirit of competition and the incentive of increased earnings. Libraries are thronged by men and women anxious to learn more about the work in which they are engaged in order to earn advancement and greater income. At the same time the executives of the government controlled industries are constantly striving to improve the health and standard of living of the individual workers by such means as industry-operated State farms supplying the workers with fresh fruits and vegetables, industry-operated cafeterias serving balanced and vitamin enriched meals to the workers at cost, housing developments for workers and their families, nurseries for the care of children while both parents are at work, parks of culture and rest, including dance halls, movie theatres, athletic grounds, etc., and libraries where workers may study a wide range of subjects, either increasing their knowledge of the work in which they are engaged, or improving their cultural background.

In many of the areas visited there are racial minorities, such as the Buryats, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Yakuts, etc. In these areas the Russians have gone to great pains to enlist the wholehearted support of the minorities in the Soviet program. The culture of the racial minorities is emphasized in schools and in theatricals, the latter due to expert

and professional leadership and direction are widely acclaimed throughout the land for their excellence and authenticity. As an example of this, when the Ulan Ude Buryat theatrical group presented the Buryat operetta "Bair" Buryats and others traveled from as far as Ulan Bator to witness the production. Additionally, newspapers are published in both languages in these areas in order that the minority may enjoy every advantage provided for the majority. Copies of newspapers from each city visited were collected by Mr. Hazard<sup>82</sup> and turned over to O.S.S.<sup>83</sup> upon our return. Each city has several outdoor radio loudspeakers strategically located in public squares and parks, disseminating news and cultural programs in both languages. Some of the executives and officials are able to obtain individual receiving sets equipped with both long and short wave bands, but a majority of homes have a simple loudspeaker connected by wire with the municipal receiving station which re-broadcasts programs from Moscow and other large cities in addition to programs of local origination. Every town visited appeared to be connected with the master radio network, even the small settlement at Telman Cooperative Farm<sup>84</sup> maintains a fairly powerful transmitting and receiving station. Many of the larger cities have more than one of these stations, and the absence of other media of communication over great distances, leads one to believe that this radio network is used for the transmission of a considerable volume of official as well as personal messages which in the United States are normally carried by telephone and telegraph lines.

Local transportation in the areas visited presents a difficult problem due to the unsatisfactory condition of streets and highways and the limited numbers of automobiles in service. There are extremely few concrete or asphalt surfaced highways in Siberia, and the steps which are taken after the war to remedy this situation will undoubtedly be a major factor in the rate of development of this vast area. In all the cities and towns we visited, with the exception of Tashkent, it was apparent that the requirements of our party taxed the local supply of automobiles to the limit. Government officials, industrial executives and high ranking Army officers are assigned Government owned vehicles, but privately owned automobiles are extremely rare. Although there is apparently an adequate supply of trucks of various types there appeared to be only two types of passenger cars—the heavy "Russian Buick" and a lighter Russian version of the American Ford. Many cities maintained bus service, but due to the age of the

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<sup>82</sup> John N. Hazard, Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply of the Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>83</sup> Office of Strategic Services.

<sup>84</sup> Located near a branch line of the Transsiberian Railroad, southeast of Ulan Ude. This farm was operated by Buryats, and Ochirov Daba was president.

equipment and the condition of the streets this form of transportation leaves much to be desired.

Although it is difficult to judge the amount of food available to the average individual on the basis of the sumptuous meals provided for the Vice-President's party, visits to food stores throughout the areas involved indicated an adequate supply of necessities. Except for fresh fruit and vegetable shops, all food stores are government controlled and operated, and all principal items are rationed. Shelves were universally well stocked and it is believed that the food supply per capita under the rationing system is fully adequate for maintaining the health of the people. No indication of malnutrition was observed during our stay in the U.S.S.R.

At all points visited in Soviet Russia, government officials and industrial executives appeared most anxious to have the Vice President and his party inspect war industries of all kinds. There was no indication of secretiveness concerning any details of production in which an interest was evidenced; on the contrary it was not uncommon for an expert to be summoned to explain such matters. The Russians were eager to learn how their production methods compared with those employed in the United States, and in several instances mentioned proudly that they had followed American suggestions or plans in building certain industries, and indicated genuine enthusiasm for an exchange of ideas and knowledge between themselves and their counterparts in the United States.

The following report contains detailed observations made at each city visited in Soviet Russia, on which the foregoing general statements are based.

[Here follows the detailed report, not printed.]

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033.1161/7-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1944—midnight.

1710. Personal for the Ambassador. As you know Major General Philip B. Fleming, Administrator, the Federal Works Agency, has for some time been working on a program of public works construction for the postwar period. The President feels that this planning has now reached the stage where it would be valuable to study similar

programs being developed in Great Britain and the Soviet Union and to exchange views with officials engaged in this work in those countries. The President proposes to send General Fleming to Moscow to arrive about the middle of August.<sup>86</sup>

Will you please speak with Molotov and inquire if the visit of General Fleming will be convenient to the Soviet Government at this time and request cooperation in arranging for General Fleming to meet the proper Soviet officials.

HULL

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861.9111 RR/7-1844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 18, 1944.

[Received July 18—9:21 a. m.]

2630. Press for July 16, devotes 18 inches to a Washington report of Eric Johnston's press conference on the prospects for postwar Soviet-American trade. Item refers to Johnston's statements that there is a great opportunity for a much larger Soviet-American trade [in] the post-war period than there was before the war. The Soviets will desire American goods to help rebuild the devastated areas and will purchase capital goods useful in producing consumption goods, although there is little prospect of their purchasing consumption goods. In return for American goods, the Soviets can export timber, certain agricultural products and minerals such as nickel, wolfram, and manganese.

The item quotes Johnston's statements regarding necessity for long-term credits to foster this trade.

The despatch also reported Johnston's belief that there are excellent prospects for post-war Soviet-American friendship and his statement that he had frankly discussed with Stalin his views regarding non-interference by Soviets in American affairs and American recognition that Soviets have a right to their system without American interference. Johnston's answer to a question regarding possibility of deals between a Capitalist and a Communist state to effect he and Stalin considered this entirely possible, is reported.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>86</sup> General Fleming had proposed to the President in a letter of July 5 that such a trip "would be in the interest of the government", to which the President agreed on the next day (033.1161/7-1544). General Fleming called on Under Secretary of State Stettinius on July 14 and informed him that "he had been requested by the President to go to Moscow to exchange views with the Soviet Government on the subject of post war public works." (840.50/7-1444)

033.1161/7-1944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 19, 1944—3 p. m.  
 [Received July 20—12:20 a. m.]

2660. Personal for the Secretary. Department's 1710, July 15, midnight. I have written Molotov a letter regarding General Fleming's proposed visit and will speak to him about it on my next call. I am sure Molotov will ask exactly what General Fleming would wish to see and learn in the Soviet Union. I doubt whether Molotov will have a concept of public works in our sense, as in Russia all construction except for a very few small houses is a government activity under the responsibility of different commissariats. It would be helpful if you could give me at once a list of the type of projects General Fleming has in mind.<sup>87</sup> For example is he interested in city planning, power developments, irrigation, flood control, etc.

HARRIMAN

033.1161/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, July 24, 1944—10 p. m.  
 [Received July 25—8:30 a. m.]

2738. In the course of a recent conversation with Vyshinsky, I mentioned my letter to Molotov regarding General Fleming's proposed trip. Without giving me the formal approval of the Soviet Government, he indicated that he saw no objection to the proposed visit but was interested in knowing precisely what General Fleming wished to see while in the Soviet Union. The Department's cable No. 1744, July 20, 8 p. m.,<sup>88</sup> was in such general terms that I was unable to satisfy him.

Is it desired that we should await General Fleming's arrival before making any specific plans or should some program be worked out prior to his arrival? If it is to be the latter, I suggest that someone familiar with the Soviet governmental organization and economic system should discuss this with General Fleming and that I be informed of General Fleming's wishes.

<sup>87</sup> A list of the types of public construction projects which General Fleming would be interested in seeing was sent in the Department's telegram 1744, July 20, 1944 (033.1161/7-2044).

<sup>88</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 87, above.

Reconstruction of devastation and industrial development will be emphasized in postwar construction program. In connection with the first, city planning will play an important part. I would think that if General Fleming were to ask to be informed of the city planning for reconstruction and for development of some of the larger cities, he would obtain interesting information on a number of the items listed in the Department's cable above-mentioned such as housing, streets, viaducts, airport terminals, sewers, water sanitation facilities, schools, hospitals, health facilities, parks, government buildings and recreational facilities, port developments, et cetera. If he were to ask to see some of the larger power developments, he would also see other items of interest to him.

Another general subject might be irrigation, soil conservation and reforestation, which would lead to his seeing some of the agricultural developments.

The Soviet developments in the use of rivers connected by canals is an important form of inland transportation particularly because of the inadequacy of their railroad system.

I am told that the Soviets have had in the past little if any program of flood control and have let their rivers overflow their banks periodically but are now planning to give the subject greater consideration. On the other hand, they have a well developed meteorological service which includes careful estimates of the department of snow in the water sheds and predicts accurately river levels. This service, as I am told, is in some ways more complete than our own.

I do not find anything of interest in the Russian railroads. They are backward in total mileage, methods of operation and equipment. Grade separations are unknown except in the streets within the larger cities.

Highways, as we understand the term, are practically non-existent in Russia and secondary roads are unspeakable.

It should be borne in mind that the all-absorbing question is the expansion and development of industry. I believe the Soviet Government's policy will be to direct as large a percentage of national effort to this directional effort as is practicable.

I have gone into the above detail in order to simulate detailed planning for General Fleming's trip before his arrival. Unless this is done, I am fearful he will waste a lot of time. It takes the Soviets a long time to clear through the different commissariats the question of whether a foreigner be allowed to see certain things and to make the necessary arrangements for the visit.

HARRIMAN



033.1161/7-2944 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1944—8 p. m.

1820. General Fleming has been shown your 2738, July 24 and is going ahead with plans for his trip. In accordance with your recommendations he would like to meet with officials in charge of reconstruction and development of cities. He is more interested in talking with officials and examining plans and projects than in visiting actual developments.

General Fleming would also like to talk with officials in charge of plans for highway construction and development since he saw a great deal of the Soviet Commission which visited the United States some time ago to study this subject.

Another subject in which he is particularly interested is the construction of what are known in the United States as Federal public buildings, such as Government office buildings, capitols, post offices, et cetera. He feels that plans for construction of buildings of this type must be under consideration both in the liberated areas and in the cities in eastern Russia and Siberia which have grown so rapidly in population since the beginning of the war.

General Fleming is not particularly interested in irrigation, soil conservation, reforestation, nor in power developments.

As General Fleming wishes to leave as soon as possible please take up with the appropriate authorities the question of his Soviet visa. Application will be made here in the next day or so.<sup>90</sup>

STETTINIUS

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811.2361A/8-144 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Vladivostok (Ward) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, August 1, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 4:20 p. m.]

34. Diplomatic agent<sup>91</sup> has just informed me that on July 29 at 18 hours 34 minutes 150 East Meridian time, an American airplane B-29, number 32, landed on an airdrome in the vicinity of Ugolna, about 30 kilometers to the north of Vladivostok.

The crew, which consists of 11 persons, is in good health.

Before landing the crew destroyed all documents, radio equipment and bomb sight.

Pursuant to international law, the crew has been interned.

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<sup>90</sup> Application for the visa was made at the Soviet Embassy in Washington on August 1.

<sup>91</sup> Semen Petrovich Dyukarev, representative in Vladivostok of the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

He is of the opinion that this airplane took part in the bombing of Mukden and he has reason to believe that the cause of the landing was shortage of fuel.

Commanding officer of the airplane has requested access to me and tentative arrangements have been made for my travel to Ugolna tomorrow afternoon.

Repeated to Moscow.

WARD

033.1161/8-1044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 10, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received August 10—8:54 a. m.]

2913. Personal for the Acting Secretary. ReDepts 1885, August 8, 8 p. m.<sup>92</sup> I need guidance on how much pressure I am to exert in regard to visa for General Fleming. I have written Molotov a letter, spoken in detail with Vyshinski who seemed well disposed to the visit, and followed up this talk with a further letter, in each case asking for a prompt reply. My experience is that if I bring maximum pressure on the Foreign Office by calling them up daily and finally to the point of rudeness insisting on action, I have been successful in getting visas through. I have followed this procedure in connection with military personnel or others vital to the prosecution of the war and of immediate importance. It is my opinion that I can only do this sort of thing without causing offense when the visitors are of real importance to our common interests.

In General Fleming's case I suggest that I write a courteous letter to Molotov or Vyshinski stating that unless Fleming's visa is approved by whatever date may be specified, it will be too late for him to make the trip. I believe this will get favorable action but cannot be sure. I request instructions.<sup>93</sup>

HARRIMAN

811.2361A/8-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 15, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 11:59 p. m.]

2999. Soviet military authorities have furnished Military Mission with names of 34 additional United States aviators who are under-

<sup>92</sup> Not printed; it requested the Ambassador to try to hasten the issuance of a visa for General Fleming (033.1161/7-1544).

<sup>93</sup> The Ambassador's proposal was agreed to by the Department in telegram 1927, August 12, 1944 (033.1161/8-1244).

stood to have landed near Petropavlovsk several weeks ago. Further particulars are being awaited. It is not clear whether these were Army, Navy or Marine planes.

Foregoing is for your<sup>94</sup> information only but you should of course report promptly any information you may receive.

Sent to Vladivostok, repeated to Department as No. 2999 August 15, 7 p. m.

HARRIMAN

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033.1161/8-1544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 15, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received August 16—12:52 a. m.]

3001. Reference my 2913, August 10, 9 p. m. [*a. m.*]. I received a reply this morning from Vyshinski to my letters regarding General Fleming's visit. He states that postwar public works programs have not been developed in the Soviet Union, that they are only in a preliminary and exploratory stage, and that as a result of this there is unfortunately no possibility of satisfying General Fleming's desire to acquaint himself at the present time with materials on this question.

Although this is not a refusal in so many words, I take Vyshinski's letter to mean that the Soviet Government does not find it convenient for the General to visit the Soviet Union at this time and recommend it be so interpreted.

HARRIMAN

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Moscow Embassy Files : Lot F-96, Box 2

*The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov)*

Moscow, August 20, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. MOLOTOV: I have just received the following message from the President to Marshal Stalin:

"Personal and Secret for Marshal Stalin from President Roosevelt: "I have just seen our Commanders in the Pacific theater. Though I am highly pleased with the progress that is being made, I am greatly impressed with the magnitude of the task. Your agreement to inaugurate promptly planning for future joint cooperation between our respective forces has been reported to me by Harriman. I have

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<sup>94</sup> The Consul General at Vladivostok, Angus Ivan Ward, is here intended.

been told by General Deane of the proposals which he submitted to the Red Army General Staff concerning Soviet-American collaboration. I hope that you will instruct your Staff to pursue expeditiously with the United States Military Mission in Moscow the joint preparation of plans. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have authorized the Military Mission to represent them in this planning in preparation for the time when you are ready to act. I feel that there is nothing we could do at the present time in preparing to bring the Pacific war to a speedy conclusion that would be of more assistance."<sup>95</sup>

Will you please transmit this message to Marshal Stalin?

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

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*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>96</sup>

[Translation<sup>97</sup>]

I have received your message on the Pacific Ocean matters.

I understand the significance you attach to these matters.

We also attach great importance to your successes there. I am confident at the same time that you are well aware to what an extent our forces are just now strained in order to ensure the success of the struggle going on at the present time in Europe. All this allows to hope that the time is not far off when we shall attain a solution of our urgent task and will be able to take up other questions. I hope that General Deane will already now successfully cooperate with our staff.<sup>98</sup>

AUGUST 22, 1944.

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033.1161/8-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1944—6 p. m.

2004. Reurtel 3001, August 15, 9 p. m. The President has personally requested that you take up again with Molotov the question of General Fleming's visit. In your conversation with Molotov you are authorized to express the personal interest of the President in this case.

HULL

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<sup>95</sup> For correspondence concerning the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Pacific, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, pp. 361 ff.

<sup>96</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>97</sup> Translation revised by the editors.

<sup>98</sup> In an attached memorandum the President noted: "I think this does not need an answer. F.D.R."

861.4061 Motion Pictures/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 25, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

3151. For the Department's information only. I am considerably disturbed by evidences in recent months of the apparent reversion in the Soviet film industry to the earlier policy of isolationism. During the first part of this year, there seemed to be an increased disposition on the part of the industry to take a larger number of American films and to adopt a policy of closer cooperation with the American industry.

The Embassy has now received reports that on instructions from the Soviet political authorities, a decreased number of American films is to be purchased and that only those are to be acquired which show American life and society in an unflattering light. It is furthermore reported that dubbing and subtitling in Russian are to be done in such a way as to create an impression that an inferior product is being shown with a consequent implication that the Russian industry has little or nothing to learn from abroad. Certain recent examples are either deliberate bungling or gross incompetence. This shift coincides with a drastic reorganization of undetermined origins which the industry is now undergoing and which has resulted in almost complete cessation of Soviet production. It has not been possible to find out more precisely just what has been going on.

At the time the invasion of France took place, the Film Committee begged that newsreels of the event be sent as rapidly as possible. When the material arrived at the end of June, it was first shown by the Embassy and was then turned over to the Kremlin for Stalin to see. He sent it then to the Film Committee with instructions to release it publicly. It has, however, not yet been released. I have had indications that it will not be released and that no material will be shown publicly which shows the scope and magnitude of Allied operations in the West.

I do not believe that this apparent reversion in policy in any sense represents the views of the technicians and professional people in the industry whom I believe have a sincere respect and admiration for American films. Rather it appears to be a political decision based on the old fear of showing the Soviet people anything from which they could conclude that a system or way of life superior in any respect to the Soviet Union exists anywhere in the world.

HARRIMAN

033.1161/8-2544 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 25, 1944—2 p. m.  
 [Received August 26—1:10 a. m.]

3153. ReDepts. 2004, August 22, 6 p. m. You will recall that in original cable No. 1710, July 15, midnight, regarding General Fleming's visit, the President's personal interest was mentioned. I therefore explained this fact fully when I made the request. Under the circumstances therefore I feel it would be more dignified if the matter were reopened in Washington with Ambassador Gromyko.

Soviets are undoubtedly sensitive to fact they have not a well developed program of the kind I was instructed to explain General Fleming was interested in studying. Bearing this in mind, through a new channel it would be easier to discuss his visit with some different emphasis as to reasons for his trip.

HARRIMAN

033.1161/8-2544

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to inform him that Major General Philip B. Fleming, Administrator, Federal Works Agency, has for some time been working on a program of public works construction for the post-war period. The President feels that this planning has now reached the stage where it would be valuable to study similar programs being developed in Great Britain and the Soviet Union and to exchange views with officials engaged in this work in those countries.

Ambassador Harriman was in July instructed to take up with the proper Soviet officials the question of a visit to the Soviet Union by General Fleming. Ambassador Harriman reports that he has received a communication from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs indicating that it might be difficult at this time to supply General Fleming with the type of information which he desires.

Nevertheless the President still feels that a visit by General Fleming to the Soviet Union would result in a useful exchange of information on similar, if not identical, problems of the post-war period. It would accordingly be greatly appreciated if you would bring this matter to

the attention of your Government and request authorization for General Fleming to visit the Soviet Union as soon as practicable.<sup>99</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1944.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt*<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, 10 September 1944.

Personal for Harry Hopkins. I feel that I should report to the President at the earliest convenient time and place. Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last 2 months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown an unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems.

We started the proposal for winter program for FRANTIC<sup>2</sup> at the end of June and formally presented it to the Foreign Office in early July. No acknowledgement even of my letters or numerous talks has been received. All requests for PR<sup>3</sup> unit have been unacted upon for the last several weeks. Prior to that time they were operating several a day. No answer or permission to transport trucks to our Air Forces in China has been received. There has been no reply to our request presented a week ago followed by urgent conversation with Molotov to allow General Eaker's<sup>4</sup> bombing appraisal party to visit Ploesti.<sup>5</sup> The Soviets indifference to world opinion regarding their unbending policy toward Poland and ruthless attitude toward the uprising in Warsaw<sup>6</sup> are best described by Molotov's statement that the Soviets would judge their friends by those that accept the Soviet position.

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<sup>99</sup> In telegram 2074, August 29, 1944, Ambassador Harriman was advised that this request had been made (033.1161/8-1544). A note from Ambassador Gromyko on September 2, declared that he had taken up this matter with the Soviet authorities (033.1161/9-244). On September 6 the Department sent the information to both London and Moscow that the Soviet Embassy had stated that the Soviet Embassy in London had been authorized to issue a visa to General Fleming (033.1161/9-644). By telegram 3606, September 21, Ambassador Harriman reported that General Fleming had arrived in Moscow on the previous day (033.1161/9-2144).

<sup>1</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>2</sup> The code name for England-to-the-Soviet Union air-shuttle bombing operations.

<sup>3</sup> Photographic Reconnaissance Aircraft.

<sup>4</sup> Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces.

<sup>5</sup> The oil fields around Ploesti had been bombed by airplanes of the 15th Army Air Force on June 6, 9, and 13, 1944.

<sup>6</sup> The bitter fighting carried on inside Warsaw against the German occupying army through 63 days between August 1 and October 3, 1944, by the Polish Home Army forces and the population of the city under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Tadeusz Komorowski (General Bor). For correspondence on the attempts of the United States and British Governments to furnish assistance to the underground forces, and their unsuccessful attempts to secure the helpful participation of the Soviet Government, see vol. III, pp. 1372-1398.

In spite of Stalin's promises no action has been taken on major future planning. These are only a few examples.

I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin's advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of Red Army.

Demands on us are becoming insistent. You have seen a part of it in the negotiations over financial terms of the Protocol in Washington.<sup>7</sup> We have other examples here. The general attitude seems to be that it is our obligation to help Russia and accept her policies because she has won the war for us.

I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.

Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction. No written agreement[s] can be of any value unless they are carried out in a spirit of give and take and recognition of the interests of other people.

I am disappointed but not discouraged. The job of getting the Soviet Government to play a decent role in international affairs is however going to be more difficult than we had hoped. The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. It is our problem to strengthen the hand of those around Stalin who want to play the game along our lines and to show Stalin that the advice of the counselors of a tough policy is leading him into difficulties.

I realize I cannot in a cable convey to you a fully comprehensible picture of the perplexing developments. However what I say is fully endorsed by General Deane, the Air Officers here and the Embassy Officers.

The relation of Deane and our other Officers with the Red Air Force are good. The Soviet Officers have shown embarrassment at the attitude expressed through the Foreign Office. The influences that

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<sup>7</sup> For correspondence regarding continuation of wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, and consideration of a supplementary agreement to enable the extension of aid for postwar reconstruction and credits, see pp. 1032 ff.



I speak of are as unpopular with this group as with us. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly *quid pro quo* attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress.

I feel that I should urgently report personally to the President these recent developments and my recommendations. I would appreciate your discussing this message with the President and advising me.

[HARRIMAN]

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861.857/9-1344

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

On August 28, 1944 at 7 a. m. local time the Soviet tanker *Emba*, displacement 14800 tons, which was proceeding from Vladivostok to United States ports at 51°06,5' northern latitude and 157°18,5' eastern longitude (six miles from the eastern coast of the southern part of Kamchatka) was suddenly attacked by a plane. As a result of the attack a Red Navyman was killed and the senior radio-operator wounded as well as serious damage was inflicted to the vessel.

In view of the fact that the attack on the tanker *Emba* was made under cover of a fog and the plane quickly disappeared, a precise determination of the distinguishing marks was not possible. However, a stabilizer from an aviation bomb and several large caliber bullets which were found after the attack by the plane on deck of the tanker give ground to believe, that the plane which attacked the tanker *Emba* belongs to the United States Army Air Force. This is also affirmed by the testimony of the interned on August 28, 1944 near Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka commander of an American plane, John Armour Dingel, who stated that on August 28, 1944 he attacked a vessel which he detected in the fog in the region of Shumushu and Paramushiro Islands (Kurile Islands).

Informing you of the above I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to bring the aforesaid to the attention of the United States Government for conducting an investigation and application of necessary measures so that the guilty should bear strict responsibility and the inflicted damages be compensated to the families of the killed and wounded Soviet sailors.<sup>8</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] September 13, 1944.

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<sup>8</sup> The Secretary of State informed the Soviet Embassy on October 17 that this incident "has been referred to the appropriate authorities of this Government for investigation", and that "Upon the receipt of a report regarding the results of the inquiry, a further reply will be addressed to the Soviet Embassy." (861.857/9-1344). For the reply dated January 3, 1945, see p. 1031.

740.0011 EW 1939/9-1844 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1944—10 p. m.

2234. You are aware of the very grave and far-reaching decision which the Soviet Government has considered taking within the past few days on a vital question at the Dumbarton Oaks conference.<sup>9</sup>

This and other recent developments which you have reported raise most serious doubts with regard to future long range Soviet policy. I have begun to wonder whether Stalin and the Kremlin have determined to reverse their policy of cooperation with their Western Allies apparently decided upon at Moscow and Teheran and to pursue a contrary course. In deciding how to meet this change in Russian attitude, I should greatly value the benefit of your estimate of the present trend of Soviet policy. I should find particularly helpful your views as to the causes which have brought about this change in Soviet policy toward the United States and likewise a report on the principal causes for the hardening of Russia's attitude toward Great Britain. To what extent, if any, do you feel that Russian reaction to the meeting of her two Allies without her presence at Quebec<sup>10</sup> may be reflected in her recent decisions at Dumbarton Oaks?

I need not tell you that questions of the highest import to the future peace of the world are involved and that I look forward to your reply with the greatest interest.

HULL

861.917/9-1944

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern  
European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 19, 1944.

Mr. Kapustin, Soviet Counselor, during his call this afternoon inquired whether I had heard of the Ambassador's conversation with the Under Secretary regarding the Soviet desire to issue a magazine in the United States on the same basis as the forthcoming United States magazine in Moscow is issued. I told Mr. Kapustin that I

<sup>9</sup> This issue concerned the question of voting procedure in the Council of the proposed international organization for the preservation of peace when one of the parties to a dispute was also a member of the Council. On the discussions of this issue in its decisive phase at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, see vol. I, pp. 788-850.

<sup>10</sup> British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and President Roosevelt, together with their military and civilian advisers, met at the Second Quebec Conference between September 11 and 16, 1944. Correspondence on this Conference is scheduled for publication in a subsequent volume of *Foreign Relations*.

had heard of this conversation and had understood that Mr. Orekhov, Press Attaché of the Soviet Embassy, would discuss the matter with me in detail.

I took occasion to point out to Mr. Kapustin that apparently the Ambassador had not been correctly informed as to the arrangements under which the American magazine is to be issued, since he referred to a statement that it was distributed free. I explained to Mr. Kapustin that these magazines when printed in the United States and passed by the Soviet censor were turned over to the International Book Company in Moscow<sup>11</sup> who then placed them on sale through regular channels and that the large size magazine would sell for 15 rubles a copy and the smaller for from 3 to 5 rubles. I added that from the proceeds of the sale 30% would go to the International Book Company for expenses connected with distribution and sale and 70% would be turned over to the Embassy.

Mr. Kapustin said that he would inform the Ambassador of this and would let me know when Mr. Orekhov would come and see me on this matter.

C. E. BOHLEN

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500.CC/9-2044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 20, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received September 20—5:40 p. m.]

3600. I must confess that a telegram is a difficult medium in which to attempt to answer the questions raised in your 2234, September 18, 10 p. m., and feel that I could only adequately do so if I were permitted to come to Washington. My cable 3572, September 19, 1 p. m.,<sup>12</sup> gives some background. I will now address myself to your specific questions.

1. I do not believe that Stalin and the Kremlin have determined to reverse their policy of cooperation decided upon by them at Moscow and Tehran. The difficult thing for us to understand is precisely their concept of the understanding that was reached at these conferences. Molotov has on a number of occasions indicated to me that he considered that after they had put us on notice of a Soviet policy or plan and we did not at that time object, we had acquiesced in and accepted the Soviet position. Point 1 of my cable of yesterday referred to above is a case in point. I believe the Soviets consider that we accept at Moscow their position that although they

<sup>11</sup> Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, central distributor for Soviet publications.

<sup>12</sup> Vol. I, p. 826.

would keep us informed they had the right to settle their problems with their western neighbors unilaterally. Then too, words have a different connotation to the Soviets than they have to us. When they speak of insisting on "friendly governments" in their neighboring countries, they have in mind something quite different from what we would mean. With Czechoslovakia they have insisted upon a military alliance.<sup>13</sup> Although they guaranteed Czechoslovakia non-interference in internal affairs, they insisted that Beneš<sup>14</sup> should agree to give a prominent position in his national government to the Communist Party. As they appeared satisfied with the attitude of Beneš' government, these were the only conditions imposed. In the case of Poland, however, where there is not the same political stability and where greater suspicion of Soviet good intents exists, they are insisting on a hand picked government which will insure Soviet domination.<sup>15</sup> It is too early to judge how far this policy will be carried in other neighboring countries or how far they will insist in the future on subservience to the Moscow will. In terms that we would understand I believe that it is their intention to have a positive sphere of influence over their western neighbors in the Balkans. It is also too early to judge how far they expect to extend Soviet practices in these states on such questions as secret police (thereby eliminating personal freedom), control of the press, and controlled education. It can be argued that American interests need not be concerned over the affairs of this area. What frightens me however is that when a country begins to extend its influence by strong arm methods beyond its borders under the guise of security it is difficult to see how a line can be drawn. If the policy is accepted that the Soviet Union has a right to penetrate her immediate neighbors for security, penetration of the next immediate neighbors becomes at a certain time equally logical. In my talks with Molotov about Poland he has given me the impression that he does not understand why we and particularly the British are unwilling to support their demand for a friendly government, and all arguments that I have used regarding our policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country appear not to have impressed him.

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<sup>13</sup> Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance, and postwar collaboration, with protocol, between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed at Moscow on December 12, 1943; for text, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cXLV, p. 238, or Department of State, *Documents and State Papers*, vol. I, no. 4, p. 228. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 670-734, *passim*.

<sup>14</sup> Eduard Beneš, President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939-1945, recognized as President of Czechoslovakia by the Allied Powers after July 1940.

<sup>15</sup> In regard to the interest of the United States in the Polish Government in Exile, and in its relations with the Soviet Union, see vol. III, pp. 1216 ff.; and on the attitude of the United States toward the establishment of a Soviet-supported government in Poland, see *ibid.*, pp. 1398 ff.

It seems to me that we have a basic issue with the Soviet Government on the definition of the term "friendly governments". I am not optimistic that we can in the near future arrive at an understanding with the Soviet Government on this matter. At the present time I believe they certainly expect us to give them a free hand with their western neighbors. They are therefore most suspicious that this policy will be affected if they agree to refrain from voting on disputes in which the Soviet Government is involved.

Before discussing the problem as it relates to world organization it is my strong feeling that the only way we can eventually come to an understanding with the Soviet Union on the question of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is for us to take a definite interest in the solution of the problems of each individual country as they arise. If we give them a free hand with any one country the precedent will be established, whereas if through our influence we can temper Soviet domination in each situation, I believe we have a chance to lead them to a behavior in international affairs that is compatible to our concepts. Specifically I have in mind not only the Polish situation but now also the former enemy satellites Rumania and Bulgaria. In the case of Rumania I strongly recommend that we appoint an experienced political representative on the Control Commission and insist that he shall have freedom of contact with the Rumanian Government and freedom to obtain information outside of the Allied (Soviet) High Command. Wherever we find that Soviet behavior offends our standards we should call it forcibly to the attention of the Soviet Government. I recognize that this will lead to unpleasant situations but for reasons which I will explain later I am satisfied that the Soviets will accede at least to a reasonable degree to our insistent demands. I have particularly in mind objection to the institution of secret police who may become involved in the persecution of persons of truly democratic convictions who may not be willing to conform to Soviet methods, and also to suppression, under the pretence of military requirements, of public information not only in Rumania but in the outside world. I refer to the interpretation which the Soviets will, I am afraid, place on their powers under articles I, V and XVI of the Rumanian Armistice Agreement.<sup>16</sup> I believe it was not an incident of drafting but design which motivated the Soviet Government in insisting upon the words "in particular to the Soviet Union" in article XV. The same principles should be applied in my opinion to Bulgaria.<sup>17</sup> I hope I have made it plain that I am not rec-

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<sup>16</sup> For negotiations leading to the signing of an armistice with Rumania at Moscow, September 12, 1944, see pp. 133 ff.

<sup>17</sup> For negotiations leading to the signing of an armistice with Bulgaria at Moscow, October 28, 1944, see vol. III, pp. 300 ff.

ommending interference in Rumanian affairs but quite the reverse, insisting that the Soviets do not unduly interfere in exercising their responsibilities as the occupying power.

The Polish question is of course far more complicated. I consider it so partly because of my lack of sympathy with the attitude of a number of the men in the Polish Government in London. I refer of course particularly to General Sosnkowski<sup>18</sup> and Messrs. Kot<sup>19</sup> and Kukiel.<sup>20</sup> I cannot help but agree with the insistent demands of the Soviet Government that these men play no part in Poland's future. I feel their objection is equally well founded as is ours against Colonel Farrell<sup>21</sup> in Argentina. But when it comes to forcing on the Poles with the support of the Red Army the handful of individuals making up the Polish Committee of Liberation<sup>22</sup> I don't see how we can afford to stand aside without registering the strongest of objections.

2. In attempting to answer the questions you raise in the last two sentences of the second paragraph of your cable I can first say with confidence that the meeting of the two Allies at Quebec without Soviet participation has not affected the Soviet attitude expressed at Dumbarton Oaks. It is however more difficult to put one's finger on the causes for the change in Soviet attitude toward the United States and Great Britain. I am not certain that there is a change in fundamental policy or attitude. It might well be that the change in developments has brought to the surface the underlying attitude. A clearer understanding on their part however of our and the British attitude on different problems may well have had an influence on the Soviet attitude.

As to their attitude toward us as distinct from the British, it is my feeling, without being entirely clear, that when the Soviets saw victory in sight they began to put into practice policies they intend to follow in peace. In order to get our cooperation during the war they have to a small degree at least bent their policies to foster our cooperation.

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<sup>18</sup> Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had been relieved as successor-designate to the presidency of Poland in June 1944, and who was dismissed on September 30 as Commander in Chief of the Polish Army.

<sup>19</sup> Stanislaw Kot, former Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1941-1942, and Minister of Information in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, 1943-1944.

<sup>20</sup> Lt. Gen. Marjan Kukiel, Minister of National Defence in the Cabinets of Mikolajczyk and Tomasz Arciszewski, 1944-1945.

<sup>21</sup> Gen. Edelmiro S. Farrell, Acting President, then President of Argentina from March 10, 1944, following the failure of a *coup d'état*. For correspondence on the non-recognition by the United States of the Farrell régime, see vol. VII, section under Argentina entitled "Withholding of recognition from the régime of Edelmiro Farrell by the United States."

<sup>22</sup> The Communist-sponsored and Soviet-supported Polish Committee of National Liberation was established by decree of the National People's Council of Poland on July 21, 1944. It originally met in Kholm (Chelm), but early in August transferred to Lublin, after which it was frequently called the Lublin Committee.

True it has been meager in comparison with what we considered we were entitled to but this policy did permit the approval of granting to U. S. the use of bases for shuttle-bombing and in other ways giving our people certain consideration and information. It would seem that their post-war policy will be to have the Soviet Government and its officials participate in world affairs, but to protect the Russian people from almost all contact with and influence of Western civilization and ideas. There is evidence that the NKVD<sup>23</sup> and the Party never liked the idea of our troops coming into Russian bases. Influence was perhaps brought to bear from these sources to close them down as soon as possible. On the other hand, although we have had less consideration of the many matters that we have taken up with the Soviet Government in which our interests are involved, we have frequently had the quickest of action on the part of the Soviet Government on matters in which they consider their interests are affected. I mention as an example the quick response which was obtained when I was instructed to inform the Soviet Government that Mr. Morgenthau<sup>24</sup> would announce the report of the experts on monetary matters without Soviet participation unless word was received the same day. Within 3 hours of leaving my meeting with the Commissar of Finance,<sup>25</sup> Molotov called me over to give me the Soviet *aide-mémoire*. Although this case is somewhat more dramatic than others it is not the only case. The Soviet Government, as we well know, is not handicapped by the need to be consistent and when it found that it was up against a stone wall of British opinion in regard to aid to the insurgents in Warsaw, backed up by our own representations, the Soviet Government gave in, with bad grace it is true, but the fact remains that it did give way. This incident is the most encouraging we have experienced and I will refer to it again later.

As to the British there is no doubt that the Soviet attitude is less friendly to and more suspicious of them than U. S. However I do not feel we should place too much importance on this. This is due no doubt not only to the historic clashes but also to the greater insistence of the British in their demands. For example, the British have been more aggressive in opposing the Soviet policy vis-à-vis Poland and you are familiar with the difficulties that the Prime Minister had with Molotov in April over Rumania. They are also suspicious of the British moves in Turkey, Greece, et cetera. The Soviets also do not feel that they have as much to look forward to in aid from Britain in reconstruction as they have from us and have been somewhat more careful not to offend us. I believe they have the feeling also that we are not going to oppose their policies in Europe to the same degree as the British.

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<sup>23</sup> The Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

<sup>24</sup> Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury.

<sup>25</sup> Arseny Grigoryevich Zveryev.

However as I have explained above our long term interests may compel us to take issue with Soviet policy in Europe as it unfolds. When it comes to the Far East, we may also find ourselves in conflict with the Soviet policy at various points.

3. On the constructive side I desire to make the following brief comments. In spite of what I have said in this cable and in my background cable of yesterday referred to, it is my conviction that Stalin and his principal advisers place the greatest importance and reliance on the newly won relationship with the British and ourselves and desire above all else to take a leading role in international affairs. We must realize that very few of them have ever been abroad and those who have for any extended period of time are suspect in the minds of the others. Thus they, the group as a whole, have little understanding of the real concept of Western civilization. They are fearful of the antagonism of the world against them. They are always conscious of the fact that they are a backward country materially and culturally. Now they take great pride in the strength of the Red Army. All of this makes them unduly sensitive and suspicious of our motives and actions. With it all they are realists and have developed a fairly clear idea of what they want. I believe the time has come to develop a more definitive policy toward them than has been possible up to now. In general we should be understanding of their sensitivity, meet them much more than half way, encourage them and support them wherever we can, and yet oppose them promptly with the greatest of firmness where we see them going wrong. In the latter there can be no compromise or indecision if we are to build a sound foundation for future relations with this strange country. When we oppose them we must be certain that we are right and be clear in advance how far we are ready to go. In minor matters, the registering of our objection may be sufficient but in these cases we must make it plain that we do not intend to take further action. When it comes to matters of greater importance, we should make it plain that their failure to conform to our concepts will affect our willingness to cooperate with them, for example, in material assistance for reconstruction. They should be made promptly to feel specific results from our displeasure. Lastly on matters that are vital to us and on which we can find no compromise (as I understand from what you say is the case in connection with the voting of the four powers) I believe we should make them understand patiently but firmly that we cannot accept their point of view and that we are prepared to take the consequences if they adhere to their position. In such cases, I am satisfied that in the last analysis Stalin will back down. We have seen him reverse his decision in connection with aid to the insurgents in Warsaw.

We should bear in mind always in connection with the Soviets that many of Stalin's counselors see things to a degree at least as we



do, whereas others are opposed. The Soviet Government is not one mind. Through our actions we should attempt to encourage his confidence in the advice of the former group and make him realize that the others get him into trouble when he follows their advice. There is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the Russian people want friendship with us, and my contacts in Moscow lead me to feel that the principal men in the Government hold the same view.

If a general policy of the kind that I have outlined is adopted and consistently pursued by all branches of our Government, I have confidence that in time we can find common ground with these people.

HARRIMAN

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761.94/9-2344

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*<sup>26</sup>

I am instructed by the Soviet Government to bring to the attention of the United States Government the following confidential information.

A few days ago the Japanese Government through its Ambassador, Mr. Sato, has put before the Soviet Government the question regarding the sending to Moscow a special Japanese Mission from Tokio. The Japanese Government motivated its proposal by its desire to exchange opinions with the Soviet Government on the questions of Soviet-Japanese relations.

The Soviet Government, being briefly aware that the mission in question has as its aim not as much the question about the relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. as ascertaining the possibility of concluding a separate peace between Germany and the U. S. S. R.,—has rejected the proposal of the Japanese Government.

[File copy not signed]

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1944.

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861.917/9-2744

*Memorandum From the Embassy of the Soviet Union*<sup>27</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1944.

The magazine<sup>28</sup> is planned to be issued once a month on approximately 64 pages. There will be a subscription rate for it. The cir-

<sup>26</sup> Handed to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Gromyko on September 23. The Secretary "thanked him" for this communication. To compare this proposal with that contained in Ambassador Gromyko's note of April 13, see p. 961.

<sup>27</sup> This memorandum was left by the Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, Alexander Nikolayevich Kapustin, on September 30, with Charles E. Bohlen, the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

<sup>28</sup> The proposed Soviet magazine referred to in the memorandum of September 19, p. 991.

ulation and price of a single copy of the magazine has not yet been determined.

The general character of the magazine—social-political and literary-artistic. The following material will be published in the magazine:

1. Articles on international situation and foreign policy.
2. Articles on industry, agriculture and state structure of the U. S. S. R.
3. Information on science, art and sports in the Soviet Union.
4. Stories on life in the Soviet Union.

It is proposed that the magazine will be illustrated. It is also proposed that it will be published in New York where the editorial office will be located.

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740.0011 E.W. 1939/9-2844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 28, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received September 28—3: 03 p. m.]

3707. I received this afternoon from the Soviet Foreign Office a memorandum the contents of which were substantially as follows:

On September 18, 6:30 p. m., two United States Air Force planes had appeared 2 miles southeast of Lopatka Point<sup>29</sup> on Kamchatka Peninsula over the 3-mile zone of Soviet territorial waters. Having violated the Soviet border, one of the planes opened fire with machine guns on the border guard vessel *Dzerzhinski*, which was at that time passing through the first of the Kurile Straits. This was not the first time American planes had violated the Soviet border. During the single week of September 14–21, according to Commissariat's information, 13 violations by American planes had occurred. The Embassy was requested to bring these facts to the attention of the United States Government, and the Commissariat expressed the hope that measures would be taken at once to stop these violations.

General Deane is reporting this to the Chiefs of Staff.

HARRIMAN

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740.0011 P.W./9-2944

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*

[Memorandum—Translation]

1. During the first eight months of this year, from January to August inclusive, airplanes belonging to the United States Army Air

<sup>29</sup> A cape at the southern tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Force operating against the Japanese bases on the Kurile Islands (Shumushu and Paramushiru) violated the State borders of the Soviet Union 105 times. Ninety of these violations occurred in the Kamchatka Peninsula and Bering (Komandorskie) Islands regions.

The violations of the Soviet State borders were carried out both by single airplanes and by groups of airplanes, and the violations by groups of planes occurred more frequently than those by single planes.

2. According to the information at the disposal of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the violation of the USSR State borders, which is in itself illegal, was accompanied by the dropping of bombs by American airplanes within the limits of the Soviet territorial waters and on the territory of the Soviet Union.

This is confirmed by the fact that the Soviet frontier authorities found incendiary and aircraft bombs, made in U. S. A. factories, on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

As for instance:

*a)* On June 11 of the current year, on the coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula (2.5 miles northeast of Cape Lopatka) 103 incendiary bombs were discovered, 25 of which had not exploded, with inscriptions on their casings showing that they were made in the U.S.A.

*b)* On June 23 of the current year, on the west coast of the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Yavina River region (44 miles northwest of Cape Lopatka) three more unexploded aircraft bombs of American make were discovered. Besides this, several cases were recorded of the dropping of bombs by United States Army Air Force planes within the limits of the Soviet territorial waters.

3. The cases of violation of the State borders assumed a special mass character in the second part of the month of August of this year. From August 15 to September 13, inclusive, the Soviet State borders were violated 22 times by airplanes belonging to the United States Army Air Force. Twelve of these violations occurred in the period between August 15 and September 1, and the remaining ten in the first 13 days of September.

In view of the fact that the number of violations, as noted above, has a tendency to increase, we have reason to believe that the United States Army Air Force Command does not take the appropriate measures to end the systematic violation of the USSR State borders by American Fliers.

In bringing the above-mentioned facts to the attention of the Government of the United States of America, the Soviet Government hopes that urgent measures will be taken for the termination of the violation of the Soviet State borders by American airplanes.

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1944.

711.61/9-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 29, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received (September 30?)—12:10 a. m.]

3721. For the President and Secretary. Supplementing my 3600, September 20, 8 p. m. Several weeks ago the Embassy and the military mission adopted a somewhat firmer and more uncompromising policy toward the Soviets with whom we have relations here, particularly in those matters which were within our controls. Among other things at that time General Deane with my approval wrote a firm but friendly letter to General Antonov,<sup>30</sup> Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, to the effect that the Red Army's constant neglect to give consideration to the United States Army proposals could not help but create a feeling in American Army circles that the Red Army did not wish to cooperate with us and react unfavorably on our previous all-out desire to assist Russia, particularly in allocations of items not immediately needed for the war. Whether it is the result of this policy or a coincidence, there have been recently more quick and favorable decisions by the Red Army than for months previous. For example: (1) Approval within 24 hours for visit to Bulgaria by American party to investigate mistreatment of our prisoners, (2) immediate approval by NKVD General to OSS Mission remaining in Bulgaria, (3) when the Anglo-American technical experts were finally allowed to visit German experimental rocket installations in liberated Poland, they were given the most complete collaboration and attention, (4) for the first time, a partially satisfactory reply was made to our many proposals regarding the improvement of air transport between Washington and Moscow, (5) Stalin's immediate approval when I asked him for permission to send 500 trucks through Russia to our Air Force in China (the Foreign Office called up the next day to find out what arrangements we wanted), (6) General Deane has been called over several times recently by Red Army staff officers and received satisfactory answers to previously neglected matters.

I do not want to give the impression by any means that all our problems are solved as we still have no decision or even reply on many important subjects. We all feel, however, that some little progress is being made.

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<sup>30</sup> Army General Alexey Innokentyevich Antonov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, 1943-1945, and Chief of the General Staff, 1945-1946.

I am reporting this to you as it is our feeling that more satisfactory results of the last few weeks is an indication of what might result from the general adoption of the above policy.

HARRIMAN

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*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt* <sup>32</sup>

[LONDON,] 3 October 1944.

790. 1. Anthony <sup>33</sup> and I start Saturday <sup>34</sup> and hope in two or three days to reach U[n]cle J[oe].<sup>35</sup> We should like you to send a message to him saying that you approve of our mission and that Averell <sup>36</sup> will be available to take part in discussions.

2. Will you tell Averell or General Deane what can be said about your Far Eastern plans and let us know what you have told them, so that we all keep within the limits prescribed. We want to elicit the time it will take after the German downfall for a superior Russian army to be gathered opposite the Japanese on the frontiers of Manchukuo and to hear from them the problems of this campaign, which are peculiar owing to the lines of communication being vulnerable in the later stages.

3. Of course the bulk of our business will be about the Poles, but you and I think so much alike about this that I do not need any special guidance as to your views.

4. The point of Dumbarton Oaks will certainly come up and I must tell you that we are pretty clear that the only hope is that the three great powers are agreed. It is with regret that I have come to this conclusion contrary to my first thought. Please let me know if you have any wishes about this matter,<sup>37</sup> and also instruct Averell accordingly.

PRIME

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<sup>32</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>33</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>34</sup> October 7.

<sup>35</sup> Sobriquet for Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin.

<sup>36</sup> W. Averell Harriman. In a telegram to President Roosevelt on October 3, Ambassador Harriman stated that he would delay returning to the United States because a "prominent personage" was coming to Moscow for conversations with Stalin. Harriman asked for the President's views, and expressed the hope that a settlement would be reached for the Polish situation which was "becoming increasingly bitter and difficult of solution."

<sup>37</sup> For President Roosevelt's reply on October 4, see *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 7.

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>38</sup>

Moscow, 5 October 1944.

Personal for the President. As I received your cable 041815 after my talk with Stalin last night I have sent your message to him by letter.<sup>39</sup> I clearly understand your instructions. There is one subject on which I had been hopeful. The Prime Minister might be able to come to a definite understanding with Stalin, namely, the Polish situation. It seems clear that the longer the situation drifts the more difficult a solution becomes. I assume that you will have no objection if the Prime Minister can work something out with Stalin provided you are not involved or committed to any line of policy at this time. I am told that Generals Brooke<sup>40</sup> and Ismay<sup>41</sup> are accompanying the Prime Minister. There may therefore be talks between them and the Red Army Staff. I will request that General Deane be invited to attend these talks as an observer and I anticipate no difficulty in this respect as when I was here two years ago<sup>42</sup> the Army Officers who accompanied me were included at my request in similar discussions at that time.

711.94114A/10-944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 9, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:15 p. m.]

3861. In communication dated yesterday and received today Forn Off reports forced landing near Petropavlovsk, [at] Kamchatka, of AAF B-24, serial number stated, on September 25 at 4:02 p. m. Crew of officers and men have been interned and will be removed shortly to detention center near Tashkent for American interned aviators. Cause of landing stated to have probably been motor trouble and insufficient fuel.

Military Mission states that above are probably Navy airplane and personnel and that Navy Department is being informed.

HARRIMAN

<sup>38</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>39</sup> See telegram 76, 4 October, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 6.

<sup>40</sup> Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

<sup>41</sup> Gen. Sir Hastings Lionel Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defence (Winston S. Churchill) and Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet.

<sup>42</sup> For reports concerning Prime Minister Churchill's conversations with Stalin in Moscow in August 1942, which Harriman attended, see *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, pp. 621-626, *passim*.

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President  
Roosevelt*<sup>43</sup>

Moscow, 9 October 1944.

Personal for the President. I met the Prime Minister on his arrival today at noon about 34 hours from England. He looked remarkably well considering his long trip. I saw him very informally late this afternoon after his nap. He is dining tonight with Stalin. He told me that having gone to see you he thought it would create good feeling if he were to come to Moscow. This was his main object in coming. He said that you had asked him not to attempt to come to agreement on the principal outstanding question of Dumbarton Oaks and that when the subject came up he would say that it could be argued both ways and that when the 3 of you got together he felt sure the matter could be talked out to agreement. He said that he was now somewhat open-minded on the subject. That he had first felt strongly that the great powers should not [disagree?] on matters affecting them but that since his return to England he realized there was a great deal to be said for the Russian viewpoint. He hopes to be able to find some solution to the Polish question. He has Mikolajczyk on call with a plane waiting to bring him to Moscow if possible before his own departure. He wants to talk out with Stalin the Greek situation and intends that Eden should thrash out with Molotov, Yugoslavia and Tito's recent strange behavior.<sup>44</sup> He thinks that his presence here will expedite decisions about Hungary and Bulgaria. He is not worried about Rumania. He expects that the subject of the war with Japan<sup>45</sup> will come up and asked me to brief him on the cables that have been sent to General Deane. He confessed that he knew very little about the Pacific War and agreed that the discussions with the Russians about it were primarily ours. As to my participation in his discussions here he said that he was disappointed that you did not wish to make the discussions triangular by sending General Marshall or Stettinius or by giving me authority to participate but that you had made it plain that I should be an observer only and therefore with less authority than at the talks 2 years ago. Under the circumstances he said that he thought it was better for me not to participate in his tête-à-tête talks with Stalin although he would gladly invite me to the

<sup>43</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department of State files under 741.6111/10-1144.

<sup>44</sup> Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), the President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia, had secretly gone to Moscow in the latter part of September, where, on the 29th, he had signed an agreement for the passage of Soviet troops through Yugoslavia. See telegram 510, September 23, from Caserta, p. 1410.

<sup>45</sup> For correspondence relative to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 361 ff.

larger meetings. He said however he would keep me fully informed of all his talks. I said firmly that although I fully understood the reasons for and value of tête-à-têtes with Stalin you wanted me to be present at as many discussions as appropriate so that I could report fully to you on my return. The talk could not have been more friendly and was on the same basis of intimacy I had with him during the years in England. Although it is not entirely clear how it will work out it is my guess that he will have most of his important talks with Stalin alone and so will Eden with Molotov. I will be asked in only occasionally. I am sure however he will see me daily and tell me his impressions of how things go. I would appreciate being informed whether the above is generally satisfactory to you or whether you wish me to urge my being included in more of the meetings. The Prime Minister told me of his suggestion to attempt to get Stalin to come to meet you and himself at The Hague in November. He asked me about Stalin's health. I told him that in my last talk with Stalin on the subject it seemed he was being advised against flying particularly at high altitudes and I thought that it might be more possible to get Stalin to come by sea through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean area. It would be helpful if you would tell me whether you would prefer to have the meeting in the North or in the Mediterranean. There is no doubt that Stalin and his advisors are concerned about his taking strenuous trips and it may well be that the meeting would be jeopardized if the North is insisted upon.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President  
Roosevelt*<sup>46</sup>

Moscow, 10 October 1944.

Personal for the President. Supplementing my 092352z<sup>47</sup> from my talk with the Prime Minister yesterday I believe that the British conversations here are likely to take the following course.

1. On the Dumbarton Oaks question the Prime Minister although he will of course follow the line outlined in my message yesterday will I believe give Stalin the impression that he is inclined toward the Russian viewpoint.

2. It is impossible to foresee what will result from the talks with Poland but Stalin's agreement last night to allow Mikołajczyk to come to Moscow at once augurs well.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1144.

<sup>47</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>48</sup> For correspondence relating to the visit of Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk to Moscow at this time to discuss Polish problems, see vol. III, pp. 1318-1328, *passim*.



3. On matters in the Balkans, Churchill and Eden will try to work out some sort of spheres of influence with the Russians, the British to have a free hand in Greece and the Russians in Rumania and perhaps other countries. The British will attempt to retrieve a position of equal influence in Yugoslavia. They can probably succeed in the former but I am doubtful about the latter objective.<sup>49</sup>

4. As to the Far East I am a little concerned that the Prime Minister's talks with Stalin may minimize the importance of the conferences that have been agreed to between General Deane and the Red Army Staff. We now have a full agreement from Stalin not only to participate in the Pacific War but to enter the war with full effort. The important thing now therefore is to ascertain what are the Russians capabilities in the East. In this the limiting factors are of course the logistics about which we know so little. General talks are no longer needed and full discussions by General Deane are therefore the next essential step. The Prime Minister's talks therefore with Stalin should emphasize the importance of the detailed Staff discussions. I will try to see that the Prime Minister's conversations take this line. I have already General Ismay's agreement.

5. The Prime Minister yesterday said little about Germany so I cannot report on this subject yet.

It would be helpful to have your reaction to any of the above for my guidance.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President  
Roosevelt*<sup>50</sup>

Moscow, 10 October 1944.

Personal for the President. Stalin gave a lunch today to the Prime Minister lasting in all about 4 hours which combined some enthusiastic speeches at lunch and interesting private discussions afterward. As I sat next to Stalin I had an opportunity to talk with him and to hear his conversations with Churchill. These confirmed my feeling that if we can get the matters in which we are interested direct to him satisfactory agreements can be reached.

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<sup>49</sup> In regard to the proposal to share wartime influence on the basis of proposed percentages in the Balkan countries, see vol. v, pp. 112-131, *passim*. See also *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, (New York, 1948), vol. II, pp. 1451-1459, and Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. VI, *Triumph and Tragedy*, (Boston, 1953), pp. 72-81, 226-235. The substance of the arrangements, particularly concerning Yugoslavia, was given in Churchill's speech of January 18, 1945, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 407, cols. 398-399.

<sup>50</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1144.

He paid sincere tribute to you personally, to the value of the collaboration between our three countries and to the importance of cementing our relations for the future. Churchill and Stalin had agreed last night to send you daily a joint telegram of their talks. Churchill prepared a draft of last night's discussions which is now being sent you with certain modifications by Stalin. The most important change Stalin made related to the Balkans.

I have not the message before me but after the sentence that tells of their talks regarding the Balkan countries Churchill had included the words "having regard to our varying duty towards them."

The implication of this phrase was clearly a recognition of a sphere of influence of Russia and Britain in the several countries. Stalin crossed this phrase out and Churchill agreed.

After lunch talking across Churchill I told Stalin that you would be very glad that he had eliminated this phrase as you believed that all questions should be dealt with by the three of us. Stalin said he was glad to hear this and reaching behind Churchill's back shook my hand.

Molotov confessed to Eden that Tito had recently visited Moscow. Churchill thereupon expressed to Stalin his surprise at Tito's visit without informing the British and explained that he would have heartily endorsed it if he had known in advance. Stalin replied cryptically that it was "a folly" on Tito's part but that it was nationally characteristic of the Yugoslavs to be secretive and suspicious.

Stalin gave Churchill no explanation of why the Russians had concealed the visit from the British.

I am dining with Churchill tonight and he has asked me to give him the Chiefs of Staff's cable to Deane on the Pacific War preparatory to his talk with Stalin on this subject. I am going to try to persuade him not to do anything that would jeopardize the agreement we have reached with Stalin regarding staff talks between Deane and the Red Army Staff.

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*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>51</sup>

[Moscow,] 10 October 1944.

794. In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our agreement, social and otherwise. We have invited Messrs. Miko-

<sup>51</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

lajczyk Romer<sup>52</sup> and Grabski<sup>53</sup> to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish National Committee. We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to Dumbarton Oaks issues and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr. Harriman to sit in as an observer at all meetings where business of importance is to be transacted and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries together with Mr. Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make.

We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on prowess of United States Forces and upon the conduct of the war in the west by General Eisenhower.<sup>54</sup>

CHURCHILL                      STALIN

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*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*<sup>55</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 11 October 1944.

82. Personal for Ambassador Harriman. Receipt is acknowledged of your 092352[z]<sup>56</sup> and 101117.<sup>57</sup> In regard to your participation in current conferences between Churchill and Stalin it is, of course, inadvisable for you to attempt to break into the tête-à-têtes. My desire is that you attend those conferences to which you are invited, where you should be in the position of a listener in preparation for giving me an accurate report and estimate of the results of the conference when you come to Washington.

Your status in this Churchill-Stalin conference seems to be clearly expressed in my message 041850,<sup>58</sup> part of which you delivered to Stalin.

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<sup>52</sup> Tadeusz Romer, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet.

<sup>53</sup> Stanisław Grabski, Chairman of the National Council of the Republic of Poland in London.

<sup>54</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commanding General of Allied Forces in the European Theater of Operations since December 31, 1943.

<sup>55</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>56</sup> Dated 9 October, p. 1004.

<sup>57</sup> Dated 10 October, p. 1005.

<sup>58</sup> See telegram 76, 4 October, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 1945, p. 6.

In regard to the location of the next meeting, I prefer to have it some place such as The Hague, but will go to the Mediterranean or elsewhere as necessary such as Cannes or Monaco or even Rome in order that we may have a meeting of Churchill, Stalin and myself.

ROOSEVELT

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*President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*<sup>59</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 11 October 1944.

83. Personal for Ambassador Harriman. Your 101643<sup>60</sup> and 110907<sup>61</sup> received and read with much interest.

My active interest at the present time in the Balkan area is that such steps as are practicable should be taken to insure against the Balkans getting us into a future international war.

Regarding our war plans for the Pacific, I understand that Deane has all the information as to American plans that are available and that he has given, or will give, this information to the Soviet Staff.

If Deane has already informed the Soviet Staff and unless Deane should consider it inadvisable at the present time, I have no objection to your giving this information to Churchill.

You are correct in assuming that the Pacific campaign will remain an American command and there is no objection to Churchill's informing the Soviet that the British Fleet and British Land and Air Forces will participate in those areas, at present undetermined, where their services will be of the greatest value to the war against Japan.

ROOSEVELT

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President  
Roosevelt*<sup>62</sup>

Moscow, 11 October 1944.

Personal for the President. At dinner last night I got for the first time a more definite picture of what the Prime Minister and Eden have in mind working out with the Russians in regard to the Balkan countries and Hungary. In connection with this Churchill has been using the unpopular term "sphere of influence" but as Eden describes

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<sup>59</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>60</sup> Dated 10 October, p. 1006.

<sup>61</sup> See telegram dated 11 October, *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 363.

<sup>62</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1144.

his objectives it is to work out a practical agreement on how the problems of each country are going to be dealt with and the relative responsibility of the Russians [and] the British. They stated that they have explained to Stalin and Molotov that they have no authority to commit us and that whatever is worked out will be submitted to us. They consider that on the basis of the armistice terms Russia will have a pretty free hand in Rumania since our representatives on the Control Commission have little or no authority. In connection with the Control Commission for Bulgaria and Hungary, Eden is attempting to get Molotov's agreement to greater authority for the British and our representatives. As to Yugoslavia he is attempting to obtain Molotov's agreement that the Russians should not take any independent action but should join with the British and ourselves in bringing the factions together and continue to work with us rather than independently as the Russians have in the past. Eden feels he has made some progress with Molotov.

As to Greece the Prime Minister feels he has already obtained Stalin's approval to keep hands off and to use Soviet influence to prevent the Greek Communists from being a disruptive influence and to induce them to play a constructive part in a national government. Churchill and Eden both hope that you and Mr. Hull will be satisfied with the agreements that are worked out as they feel that unless something along these lines is done there will be political turmoil in these countries if not civil war, and the British will find most difficult situations to deal with. They put Poland in an entirely different category as the Polish question requires specific solution involving all of us. Mikolajczyk placed conditions on his coming to Moscow but after a firm message from Churchill he is now on his way.

For speed, security, and your convenience I have been using your Navy channel of communication for all reports both political and military of the Prime Minister's visit here. May I assume that Secretary Hull is being kept informed?

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*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>63</sup>

[Moscow,] 11 October 1944.

795. We have found an extraordinary atmosphere of goodwill here, and we have sent you a joint message.<sup>64</sup> You may be sure we shall handle everything so as not to commit you. The arrangements we have made for Averell are I think satisfactory to him and do not pre-

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<sup>63</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>64</sup> Telegram 794, October 10, p. 1007.

clude necessary intimate contacts which we must have to do any good. Of all these I shall give you a faithful report.

It is absolutely necessary we should try to get a common mind about the Balkans, so that we may prevent civil war breaking out in several countries when probably you and I would be in sympathy with one side and U. J. with the other. I shall keep you informed of all this, and nothing will be settled except preliminary agreements between Britain and Russia, subject to further discussion and melting-down with you. On this basis I am sure you will not mind our trying to have a full meeting of minds with the Russians.

I have not yet received your account of what part of the Pacific operations we may mention to Stalin and his officers. I should like to have this because otherwise in conversation with him I might go beyond what you wish to be said. Meanwhile I will be very careful. We have not touched upon Dumbarton Oaks except to say it is barred, at your desire. However Stalin at lunch today spoke in praise of the meeting and of the very great measure of agreement that has been arrived at there. Stalin also in his speech at this same luncheon animadverted harshly upon Japan as being an aggressor nation. I have little doubt from our talks that he will declare war upon them as soon as Germany is beaten. But surely Averell and Deane should be in a position not merely to ask him to do certain things, but also tell him, in outline at any rate, the kind of things you are going to do yourself, and we are going to help you to do.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>65</sup>

Moscow, 11 October 1944.

Personal for the President. Eden told me this afternoon that after a further satisfactory talk<sup>66</sup> with Molotov they had come to an agreement that a meeting between Tito and Subasic<sup>67</sup> should be arranged at an early date and a joint British, Soviet message which was now being drafted should be sent to them both, urging that they get together and work out their problems. Eden hopes that we will agree to participate in this message. As soon as I receive it I will send it to Secretary Hull for his consideration.

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<sup>65</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1244.

<sup>66</sup> See earlier telegram from the Ambassador to President Roosevelt, dated 11 October, p. 1009.

<sup>67</sup> Ivan Subasić was the Prime Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Government. With regard to his meeting with Tito at the end of October and early in November, see the report by Major Charles W. Thayer, of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito, November 4, from Belgrade, p. 1417.

As to Bulgaria and Hungary, Eden has agreed with Molotov that the Control Commission for these countries should be set up under the direction of the Soviet Commander as in Rumania during the period of hostilities against Germany but that hereafter the Control Commission would be made genuinely Tripartite with equal authority of each member but with Soviet Chairmanship. When I get the details I will inform Secretary Hull.<sup>68</sup>

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>69</sup>

Moscow, 12 October 1944.

Personal for the President. In a speech last night at dinner at the British Embassy Stalin outlined the history of the three World Wars in which England and Russia had joined together against aggressor nations. He explained that in the first against Napoleon they had been successful but in World War I the aid of the United States had been necessary for final defeat of Germany.

In the present war he expressed the opinion that unless the United States had thrown into the war its full strength, industrial and military, it is very doubtful whether victory could have been won for the democracies. Continued friendship between the three countries was necessary to secure for the democracies a peaceful world in the future. He spoke with warm feeling of you and your continued health and success. After dinner I told him that I knew you would highly appreciate his expressions of personal friendship and value the high tribute he had paid to the part of the United States in the war.

You may wish to send him a brief message in the same sense as his statements were made with such sincerity and generous recognition of the United States contribution to the war.

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>69</sup>

Moscow, 12 October 1944.

Personal for the President. In a series of conversations during and after dinner lasting in all 6½ hours the following were the principal matters discussed:

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<sup>68</sup> For further details on this subject, see telegrams 3911, October 12, from Moscow, 8651, October 12, from London, 3933, October 13, from Moscow, and 2437, October 14, to Moscow, vol. III, pp. 449, 450, 903, and 906, respectively.

<sup>69</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1344.

1. Poland. Stalin explained why Warsaw could not have been taken. In the first drive he had hoped that the Red Army could overrun Warsaw by the impetus of their rapid advance. In this they had failed because the Germans put up strong opposition and the Red Army naturally run ahead of their supplies. Warsaw was on higher ground than Praga<sup>70</sup> and this made a frontal attack across the Vistula impossible or unjustifiably costly. To outflank the city will require 50 divisions and it thus became necessary to clean the Germans out of the Baltic States to protect the right flank and to release the necessary forces. He showed his resentment of the "scribblers" in England and the United States who had doubted Russia's good faith. After some remarks of the Prime Minister regarding the aid to Warsaw from the air the question of Mikolajczyk's visit was discussed. It was agreed that the British and Russians would put the maximum pressure on both Mikolajczyk and the leaders of the Polish Committee to come to an agreement. If however agreement was not reached as the result of discussions between the Poles, the Russians and British should agree between themselves or [*on*] an equitable solution. Both of them would then attempt to force the Poles to accept this solution.

2. There was a long discussion about the Balkan countries particularly Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister took Stalin to task for receiving Tito without informing him. The only explanation that Stalin gave was that Tito had asked him to keep his visit secret. Stalin explained that he had never seen Tito before although he had lived in Russia during 1917 and 1918. At Tito's request he had promised to give him arms principally captured German but also some Russian. It was agreed between Stalin and the Prime Minister that they should work together in attempting to bring the Yugoslav peoples together for the establishment of a strong federation but that if it was found that such a federation was impracticable without continued internal strife Serbia should be established as an independent country. Both agreed that the former was far more desirable and the latter was only the last resort. This led to an interesting statement by Stalin on the subject of Pan-Slavism which he said he considered as an unrealistic conception. What the different Slavic peoples wanted was their independence. Pan-Slavism if pursued meant domination of the Slavic countries by Russia. This was against Russia's interests and would never satisfy the smaller Slavic nations. He said he felt he would have to make a public statement before long to make this clear. In connection with Yugoslavia, Churchill explained that England had no "sordid interests" but wished to see her moral obligations to the Yugoslavs fulfilled. Stalin brushed this aside saying that he

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<sup>70</sup> A suburb on the right bank of the Vistula River captured by the Red Army on September 14, 1944.



did not consider Britain's [interests] in Yugoslavia as sordid. They were very real interests, both in mineral concessions but principally because Yugoslavia had a long stretch of Mediterranean coast. Protection of the Mediterranean was vital to Great Britain's world communications. Stalin recognized and approved these interests. This turned the conversation to Italy and its future. Both men agreed that the Italians should be forced to work out their own existence within the Isthmus [*sic*].

3. The battle in Italy turned attention to the war in general. Stalin developed in considerable detail the conception that it was unnecessarily costly to attempt to break the German lines in Italy and the Siegfried Line.<sup>72</sup> A plan of encirclement should be adopted. Fifteen of the 25 Allied divisions in Italy could hold the present line and 10 might be sent through Austria to outflank the Germans and assist the Red Army's advance through Hungary into Austria. The Siegfried Line's left flank rested on Switzerland. Switzerland should be forced to allow transit of Allied troops through her territory to outflank the Germans strong position. When Churchill protested Stalin said Switzerland had played a false role in the war and should not [*now*] be made to cooperate. He said that your intervention with Switzerland would obtain her agreement. It was agreed that the military matters should be talked out at another meeting. Churchill explained that not only did he and Brooke wish to exchange information and views regarding the European war with Marshal Stalin and his staff but also General [Antonov] would present at the same meeting the situation in the Pacific.

4. This is of course a brief report of many hours of conversation. To give an accurate picture I should explain that frequently both men were talking at the same time and not always on the same subject. When you appreciate also that the two interpreters were attempting to translate what was being said you will realize that a conclusion was not always reached on each point. In general I should add that Stalin shows clearly that he is genuinely glad to have the Prime Minister in Moscow and is using the occasion to attempt to come [to] a meeting of minds with Churchill on as many subjects as possible.

5. During the evening Eden had a good talk with Molotov about the Poles at which time I had an opportunity to explain how important it was in our relations with Russia for the American people to be satisfied that the Russians were being generous to and patient with the Poles in their difficulties and that in the United States the Polish question was looked upon as the first real test of collaboration in dealing with world problems. Eden and I both got the impression that for

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<sup>72</sup> The heavily fortified German line constructed on the western European front.

the first time Molotov was really interested in understanding the public reaction in England and the United States to the Polish question.

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103.9169 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 12, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11:10 p. m.]

3913. From Spalding<sup>73</sup> to SPC,<sup>74</sup> Wesson<sup>75</sup> and to the Department for information. General Fleming is returning to the United States after a very successful trip here. He has visited Dnieperstroi,<sup>76</sup> Stalino and Leningrad and has discussed reconstruction and housing. Suggest that you can obtain valuable and authoritative information from him in connection with lend-lease problems. Soviet authorities especially foreign trade have been most helpful and cooperative in arranging his visit. [Spalding.]

HARRIMAN

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740.00119 E.W. 1939/10-1344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State*

ANKARA, October 13, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 7:45 p. m.]

1961. The British Ambassador<sup>77</sup> informed me today that agreement has been reached to the effect the armistice with Bulgaria is to be signed on behalf of the Allies by both the Russian military commander and SACMED<sup>78</sup> or SACMED's representative. The signature is to take place in Moscow.<sup>79</sup> Peterson also informed me that agreement has been reached for 80% Russian and 20% Anglo-American representation in Bulgaria and Hungary and 50% Russian and 50% Anglo-American representation in Yugoslavia. The Russians have also agreed to insist on Bulgarian withdrawal from Greece and Yugoslavia.

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<sup>73</sup> Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Chief of the Supply Division, United States Military Mission to the Soviet Union.

<sup>74</sup> Presumably the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States.

<sup>75</sup> Maj. Gen. Charles M. Wesson, Director, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>76</sup> Dneprostroy was the huge hydro-electrical power station and dam on the Dnepr River near Zaporozhe.

<sup>77</sup> Sir Maurice Drummond Peterson.

<sup>78</sup> Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

<sup>79</sup> Signed on October 28, 1944; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 437, or 58 Stat. (pt. 2) 1498.

Peterson indicated Churchill and Eden were annoyed at Tito's trip to Moscow and remarked King Peter's failure to take advantage of the opportunity apparently offered him by the British a long time ago to return to Yugoslavia might make it extremely difficult for him to keep his throne.

STEINHARDT

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt*<sup>80</sup>

Moscow, 15 October 1944.

Personal for the President. Stalin was in high mood yesterday. He paid Churchill an unusual and significant compliment by attending the Ballet and Red Army concert at the Opera House. I understand Stalin has not been seen at the Opera since the war.

Churchill and Stalin received a tremendous ovation from the audience. In the long entr'acte Stalin entertained at a very small supper for Churchill, Eden and Brooke including Kathleen<sup>81</sup> and myself. He made good humored fun of all of us. Kathleen was the only woman in the official box and at the supper. Stalin is showing on every occasion his appreciation to Churchill for his visit.

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740.0011 EW 1939/10-1644

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] October 16, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: From the information we have received from Ambassador Harriman regarding the Churchill-Stalin conversations, although as far as we know no concrete agreements have yet been reached, the following comments can be made:

*Atmosphere*

The general atmosphere has been exceedingly cordial and Stalin has gone out of his way to be friendly and conciliatory in his attitude towards Churchill and the United States. Stalin's cordiality and apparent greater frankness is in contrast to his previous attitude towards his Allies and undoubtedly reflects his recognition of the changed situation in the war resulting from the Anglo-American invasion of Europe. It is of interest that Stalin has made a special point of bring-

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<sup>80</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10-1544.

<sup>81</sup> Daughter of Ambassador Harriman.

ing the United States into the picture and undoubtedly, as a result of the President's cable,<sup>82</sup> has emphasized a number of times the tripartite nature of the Allied association. He has gone out of his way in toasts and other remarks to draw attention to the vital part which the United States has played in the war and at one point specifically congratulated Mr. Harriman when the latter referred to the necessity of tripartite consideration of all questions.

#### *Dumbarton Oaks*

Although in their joint message to the President of October 10, both Stalin and Churchill gave assurances that they would not discuss the Dumbarton Oaks' issues at this meeting and would defer them until a meeting with the President, Churchill will in all probability disclose to Stalin that he is tending more and more to favor the Soviet position on voting in the Council.

#### *Poland*

In Ambassador Harriman's opinion, Stalin and Churchill will, if humanly possible, force a settlement between the Polish Government and the Lublin Committee, and if this is not possible, will be disposed to agree privately on a British-Soviet solution. The chief obstacle, in Mr. Harriman's opinion, is the strong suspicion that exists between the two Polish groups. Despite the meetings which have been held between Churchill and Stalin separately and jointly with Mikołajczyk and the representatives of the Lublin Committee, the main issues remain the same; namely, (1) the Polish-Soviet frontier, and (2) the composition of a provisional Polish Government. Mikołajczyk apparently has no authority from his Government to accept the Curzon Line<sup>83</sup> as the future Polish-Soviet frontier, but in this connection Churchill has made it plain to him that the British Government is committed to accept the Curzon Line with compensation for Poland in East Prussia, Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder. (During the discussion on the Curzon Line, Molotov made the statement that the President at Tehran had also favored the Curzon Line with compensation for Poland from German territories in the west. Mr. Harriman, rather than introduce the question of the President's position at the meeting with the Poles, spoke privately to Churchill after the meeting who agreed that the President at Tehran had specifically taken no position for or against the territorial arrangements suggested in regard

<sup>82</sup> See telegram 626. 4 October 1944, and footnote 2, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 362.

<sup>83</sup> In regard to the origin of the Curzon Line and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. ix, pp. 272-273, 286, 434, 446-447; *ibid.*, vol. xiii, pp. 793-794. Further details are in H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, (Oxford, 1924), vol. vi, pp. 233-283, 317-322, and summary descriptions in S. Kononov, *Russo-Polish Relations: an Historical Survey* (London, 1945), pp. 33-38, 57-63.

to Poland and Mr. Harriman intends to correct privately Molotov's misconception on this point.<sup>84</sup>)

No progress apparently was made at the various meetings in regard to the question of the composition of the Polish Government. It is too soon to attempt to forecast the chances of solution or the exact lines which a solution, if any, of the Polish question will take. Present indications are that a possible solution would be the acceptance by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line as the *de facto* Polish-Soviet frontier with the suggested territorial compensation in the West in return for a compromise solution of the Governmental question along the lines of the Polish proposals of August 30.<sup>85</sup> (We have a copy of the Polish proposals of August 30 which provide for the organization of a Polish Government based on representation from the five chief Polish political parties including the Communist, but specifically recognizing the legal continuity of the Polish Government-in-exile. Reference was made in the discussions in Moscow to an oral statement which Mr. Grabski made to the Soviet Ambassador in London in presenting these proposals on August 30. This oral statement we have not received but will endeavor to obtain.)

### *Balkan Questions*

Respective Soviet and British interests in the Balkans have formed a prominent part of the Moscow talks. On this subject the information received from Harriman is somewhat general in nature but would appear to forecast a spheres-of-influence arrangement in which Great Britain would assume "responsibility" in Greece and the Soviets in Rumania and to a lesser degree in Bulgaria. The chief point of discussion appears to be Yugoslavia with some fifty-fifty arrangement for that area in prospect. Both Churchill and Stalin profess a desire to see a Yugoslav federation but in the event such a federation should prove impractical, they are apparently prepared to agree to an independent Serbia which would be under Soviet influence and an arrangement for the Dalmatian Coast which would be under British influence. In discussing Balkan affairs Stalin made the interesting comment that he considered Pan-Slavism an unrealistic concept since it could only mean Russian domination of the other Slav countries whose one desire was to be independent and that before long he might have to make a public statement presumably expressing disapproval of the idea of Pan-Slavism. The real significance of Stalin's remark is yet to be seen.

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<sup>84</sup> See vol. III, p. 1323, footnote 94.

<sup>85</sup> See Polish Series telegram 88, August 30, from the Chargé near the Polish Government in Exile at London, *ibid.*, p. 1315.

*Bulgarian Armistice Terms*

Eden and Molotov agreed on a redraft of Article 18 of the Bulgarian armistice terms regarding the composition and character of the Control Commission. This redraft represents a departure from the previous British position which was similar to ours, and is accordingly not regarded as satisfactory to us.<sup>86</sup> Harriman and Winant have been so informed.

*Far East*

It is not entirely clear the extent to which Churchill and Stalin intend to discuss Far Eastern strategy, but Mr. Harriman has made it quite clear that General Deane must participate in any military discussions involving the Far East.

*European War*

The discussion with regard to the European war has been according to our information only in general terms. Stalin expressed the opinion that it was a mistake to try and take the Siegfried Line by frontal assault; and that it would be better to turn Germany's flank through Switzerland forcing the latter to agree to the transit of Allied troops. Churchill demurred on the grounds that Switzerland is neutral. Stalin said that the Red Army had been unable to take Warsaw by frontal assault and it had been necessary therefore to clear out the Baltic States before any further offensive on the central front could be undertaken.

H. F[REEMAN] M[ATTHEWS]

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*The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Stalin) to President Roosevelt*<sup>87</sup>

[Translation]

"1. During the stay of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden in Moscow we have exchanged views on a number of questions of mutual interest. Ambassador Harriman has, certainly, informed you about all important Moscow conversations. I also know that the Prime Minister had to send you his estimate of the Moscow conversations. On my part I can say that our conversations were extremely useful for the mutual ascertaining of views on such questions as the attitude towards the future of Germany, Polish question, policy in regard to the Balkan States, and important questions of further military policy. During the conversations it has been clarified that we can, without great

<sup>86</sup> See telegrams 8651, October 12, from London, and 8526, October 14, to London, vol. III, pp. 450 and 455, respectively.

<sup>87</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

difficulties, adjust our policy on all questions standing before us, and if we are not in a position so far to provide an immediate necessary decision of this or that task, as for example, on the Polish question, but nevertheless, more favourable perspectives are opened. I hope that these Moscow conversations will be of some benefit from the point of view that at the future meeting of three of us, we shall be able to adopt definite decisions on all urgent questions of our mutual interest.

2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me about his recent conversation with Mr. Hopkins, in which Mr. Hopkins expressed an idea that you could arrive in the Black Sea at the end of November to meet with me on the Soviet Black Sea coast. I would extremely welcome the realization of this intention. From the conversation with the Prime Minister, I was convinced, that he also shares this idea. Thus the meeting of three of us could take place at the end of November in order to consider the questions which have been accumulated since Teheran. I would be glad to receive a message from you on this matter.<sup>88</sup>

OCTOBER 19, 1944.”

033.1161/10-2144

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1130

Moscow, October 21, 1944.

[Received November 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that Major General Philip Fleming, Federal Works Administrator, left by air on Monday, October 9, 1944, 8:30 a. m. from Stalino in the Soviet Ukraine for Baku and Tehran. During his stay from September 20 to the time of his departure from Stalino, General Fleming received the cooperation of Soviet organizations in his purpose of becoming acquainted with Soviet planning and construction in fields of effort corresponding to those of the Federal Works Agency in the United States. The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries<sup>89</sup> assisted in arrangements for interviews with various public officials in Moscow and Leningrad; and the Commissariat of Foreign Trade invited the General as its guest to visit the Dnepr Dam and Electric Station located in Zaporozhe as well as the city of Stalino in the Donets Basin.

Following are listed the chief events of General Fleming's visit. On September 25 he interviewed Mr. Mordvinov, Chairman of the Committee on Architectural Affairs, and assistants. Mr. Mordvinov

<sup>88</sup> For the reply, see telegram 100, October 24, 1944, *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 11.

<sup>89</sup> Briefly referred to as VOKS.

is in general charge of city planning in the U.S.S.R. and is chiefly engaged at present in study of problems of city planning and reconstruction in devastated cities of the U.S.S.R. On the same day General Fleming interviewed Mr. Alabyan, the architect in charge of the reconstruction of Stalingrad. Mr. Alabyan was able to explain some of the principles and practical problems involved in his work. On September 26 an interview was held with Mr. Bourgman, Deputy Commissar of Construction in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Bourgman's commissariat is largely concerned with industrial construction and reconstruction. On the same day, General Fleming left for Leningrad where he interviewed Mr. Baranov, Chief Architect of Leningrad, and members of his staff, who explained the future plans for their city and the particular problems arising from German destruction there. On September 29, in Moscow, an interview was held with Dr. Sokolov, head of the Institute for Sanatoria and Sanatorium Treatment. Mr. Yasnov, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow Soviet, was seen on the same day as well as Mr. Kollé, Deputy Chief Architect of Moscow. On September 30 an appointment was had with Mr. Perepelkin, Chief of the Highways Administration of the R.S.F.S.R., and another with Mr. Makarov, Commissar for Communal Economy in the R.S.F.S.R. All the arrangements up to this point were in the hands of VOKS (The All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries). All the appointments which General Fleming requested through VOKS were arranged with one exception—that with the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.

General Fleming had planned to stop at Stalingrad on the way to Teheran and arrangements had been made. His plane was held up for several days, however, and he decided to go straight through without stopping there. When this decision was communicated to Soviet authorities, they expressed regret and stated that the Commissariat of Foreign Trade had hoped that the General would be their guest on a trip to the Dnepr Dam and Electric Power Station at Zaporozhe and mentioned also the possibility that he might be able to visit the Donbass. In view of the fact that the proposed trip promised to be fruitful from the point of view of his own interests and that of the Embassy, the General accepted the invitation. On October 4, he left for Zaporozhe in a special plane accompanied by Mr. Whitney, Attaché of the Embassy, Miss Morozova of Intourist<sup>90</sup> and Captain Rubanov of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. He was met at the Zaporozhe airport by Mr. Kandalov, the Director of Dneprstroï, the construction trust in charge of the reconstruction of the dam and power station, and by local officials. On October 5 he was taken on a trip

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<sup>90</sup> All-Union Society for Foreign Tourism in the Soviet Union, the official travel agency.



through the Dnepr Dam and Electric Power Station and the city of New Zaporozhe. On October 6 he visited the Zaporozhstal Metallurgical Works in Zaporozhe. On October 7 he travelled by air from Zaporozhe to Stalino and was met at the airdrome by Mr. Struev, Chairman of the Stalino Oblast Executive Committee, and by other local officials. On the same day he visited the Stalin Metallurgical Works at Stalino. On October 8 he was taken on a trip which included visits to the large electric power station near Zuevo, a collective farm, a coal mine, and the Kirov Metallurgical Works at Makeevka. This concluded General Fleming's visit and he left by plane, as stated above, the next morning.

General Fleming was accompanied throughout by Mr. Whitney of the Embassy staff who assisted him in making his arrangements and acted as a translator on occasion. Detailed reports on his visits and conversations as recorded by Whitney as well as on incidental information picked up in the course of his visit are being submitted as they are prepared.<sup>91</sup> Some of these have already been transmitted and the remainder will be completed as soon as possible.

The General himself seemed to feel that his visit was successful and from the Embassy's point of view it can be stated that much interesting material was made available as a result of his trip. In particular it should be noted that General Fleming is the first American to visit the Dnepr Dam and the Donbass since the liberation of this area by the Russians.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:  
 GEORGE F. KENNAN,  
*Chargé d'Affaires ad interim*

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*The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt*<sup>92</sup>

LONDON, 22 October 1944.

801. Many thanks for your number 631.<sup>93</sup>

1. On our last day at Moscow<sup>94</sup> Mik[olajczyk] saw Berut<sup>95</sup> who admitted his difficulties. Fifty of his men had been shot in the last

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<sup>91</sup> None printed.

<sup>92</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>93</sup> This telegram has not been found.

<sup>94</sup> The remarks made by Prime Minister Churchill in his speech of October 27, 1944, in the House of Commons about his conversations in Moscow are printed in *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 404, cols. 491 ff.

<sup>95</sup> Boleslaw Bierut, Chairman (President) of the National People's Council of Poland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa), formed in Warsaw at the end of 1943, which by decree of July 21, 1944, established the Committee of National Liberation.

month. Many Poles took to the woods rather than join his forces. Approaching winter conditions behind the front could be very hard as the Russian Army moved forward using all transport. He insisted however that if Mik were Premier he must have 75% of the Cabinet. Mik proposed that each of the five Polish parties should be represented, he naming four out of the five of their best men whom he would pick from personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

2. Later at my request Stalin saw Mik and had one and one-quarter hours very friendly talk. Stalin promised to help him and Mik promised to form and conduct a government thoroughly friendly to the Russians. He explained his plan but Stalin made it clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin that unless Mik had 50/50 plus himself the western world would not be convinced that the transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an independent Polish government had been set up. Stalin at first replied he would be content with 50/50 but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure. Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov who seemed more comprehending. I do not think the composition of the government will prove an insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mik had previously explained to me that there might be one announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin government and a different arrangement among the Poles behind the scenes.

4. Apart from the above Mik is going to urge upon his London colleagues the Curzon Line including Lwow for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the next fortnight we may get a settlement. If so I will cable you the exact form so that you can say whether you want it published or delayed.

5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in international law but he replied if there were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long confinements. In face of this view from this quarter I do not wish to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as withdrawn.

6. We also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland, Czecho and Hungary to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of south-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian

federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U.J. is strongly opposed.

7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.

8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a triple meeting towards the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

9. U. J. also raised formally the Montreux Convention,<sup>96</sup> wishing for modification for the free passage of Russian warships. We did not contest this in principle. Revision is clearly necessary as Japan is a signatory and Inonu<sup>97</sup> missed his market last December. We left it that detailed proposals should be made from the Russian side. He said they would be moderate.

10. About recognizing the present French administration as the provisional government of France,<sup>98</sup> I will consult the Cabinet on my return. Opinion of UK is very strongly for immediate recognition. De Gaulle<sup>99</sup> is no longer sole master, but is better harnessed than ever before. I am sure he will make all the mischief he can, but I still think that when Eisenhower proclaims a large zone of the interior for France it would not be possible to delay this limited form of recognition. Undoubtedly De Gaulle has the majority of the French nation behind him and the French government hold support against potential anarchy in large areas. I will however cable you again from London. I am now in the air above Alamein<sup>1</sup> of blessed memory. Kindest regards.

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<sup>96</sup> Signed on July 20, 1936; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. CLXXIII, p. 213. Correspondence regarding the conference on the Straits held at Montreux, June 22–July 20, 1936, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1936, vol. III, pp. 503 ff.

<sup>97</sup> Ismet İnönü, President of Turkey.

<sup>98</sup> Regarding the recognition by the United States of the French Provisional Government, see vol. III, pp. 634 ff.

<sup>99</sup> Gen. Charles Joseph de Gaulle, President of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional Government of France.

<sup>1</sup> The attack begun by the British VIII Army against the El Alamein line on October 22, 1942, which led to the rout of the Italian and German forces in Egypt and Libya.

340.1115A/11-744 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 7, 1944—noon.

[Received 12:35 p. m.]

4260. ReDepts 2610, November 4, 8 p. m.<sup>2</sup> We have inquired through the Foreign Office whether the Soviet postal authorities are agreeable to the resumption of parcel post service from the U. S. to the Soviet Union. We will endeavor to obtain an early reply but a delay of several weeks is possible.

KENNAN

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*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to President Roosevelt*<sup>3</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1944.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND POLICY IN EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN  
EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST

While the Government of the United States is fully aware of the existence of problems between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, this Government should not assume the attitude of supporting either country as against the other. Rather, this Government should assert the independent interest of the United States (which is also believed to be in the general interest) in favor of equitable arrangements designed to attain general peace and security on a basis of good neighborhood, and should not assume that the American interest requires it at this time to identify its interests with those of either the Soviet Union or Great Britain.

In Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the Near East, as elsewhere, the United States Government should consistently maintain and actively endeavor to further the following general principles irrespective of the type of territorial or political settlements which may result from the war:

1. The right of peoples to choose and maintain for themselves without outside interference the type of political, social, and economic systems they desire, so long as they conduct their affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of others.

2. Equality of opportunity, as against the setting up of a policy of exclusion, in commerce, transit and trade; and freedom to negotiate,

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed; this telegram indicated that the Post Office Department proposed to resume parcel post service immediately with all of the Soviet Union (340.1115a/10-2844).

<sup>3</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

either through government agencies or private enterprise, irrespective of the type of economic system in operation.

3. The right of access to all countries on an equal and unrestricted basis of bona fide representatives of the recognized press, radio, news-reel and information agencies of other nations engaged in gathering news and other forms of public information for dissemination to the public in their own countries; and the right to transmit information gathered by them to points outside such territories without hindrance or discrimination.

4. Freedom for American philanthropic and educational organizations to carry on their activities in the respective countries on the basis of most-favored-nation treatment.

5. General protection of American citizens and the protection and furtherance of legitimate American economic rights, existing or potential.

6. The United States maintains the general position that territorial settlements should be left until the end of the war.

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811.2361/11-1544 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 15, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 5:25 p. m.]

56. According to information received today from Diplomatic Agent American plane B-29 number 365 landed on November 11 at 16 hours 40 minutes on airdrome in vicinity of Ugolovaya 30 kilometers northeast Vladivostok. The crew numbering 11 men under command Captain Weston Price were unhurt and are well and have been interned. The plane has been put under guard.

Diplomatic Agent stated that plane was intact but was understood to have sustained some damage presumably over Japan but neither origin of flight nor place of action was certainly known to him. He professed to have no knowledge regarding condition of plane instruments but in reply to my question said documents had been burned. I informed Diplomatic Agent Consulate had supplies, food, clothing, et cetera available if such were needed. Diplomatic agent was unable to give that or other detailed information regarding men or plane but said he would ascertain pertinent particulars and inform me accordingly. I stated that I should like to visit crew; he said he did not know present location of internment but that if location was not in prohibited zone he would endeavor make desired arrangements.

Diplomatic Agent supplied names, ranks of full crew but being

assured that those are available American military authorities I am not forwarding that information with telegram.

This telegram repeated Moscow.

CLUBB

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740.0011 P.W./9-2944

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*<sup>5</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of September 29, 1944, with regard to reported flights of United States aircraft over Soviet territory.

The United States military authorities have informed the Department that investigation fails to reveal that any reports have been made of violations of Soviet territory and territorial waters of the character described in the Soviet Embassy's note and that from the information furnished by the Soviet Embassy it has not been possible to verify the violations claimed.

The Department has been requested by the United States military authorities to point out in this connection the extremely difficult conditions under which United States aircraft operate in the Kuriles-Kamchatka region. The extreme distances which must be flown on these missions require our planes to follow a course which brings them close to Cape Lopatka on the southern end of the Kamchatka Peninsula. Any deviation from that course caused by adverse weather or other conditions might bring them over Soviet territory. In addition, the poor visibility which prevails in this area most of the time frequently requires that bombing be done by instrument, often through complete cloud cover. This fact, coupled with the fact that the terrain and coast line features of the Northern Kuriles bear marked similarity to those of the Kamchatka Peninsula, increases the likelihood that pilots may be mistaken as to the area over which they are flying.

Under these conditions it is quite possible that some planes may have violated Soviet territory as stated by the Embassy without being aware of their true position, a fact which would explain why there is no record in the military and naval reports of any such violations of Soviet territory.

It is requested that your Government be informed that all practical measures will be taken by the military and naval authorities of the

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<sup>5</sup> The text of this note was sent by the Department in telegram 2666, November 14, to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union and for the information of General Deane at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

United States in order to avoid future violations of Soviet territory and territorial waters by United States aircraft.

WASHINGTON, November 15, 1944.

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811.2361/11-2444 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Vladivostok (Clubb) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, November 24, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received November 24—6:10 p. m.]

58. United States plane, B-29, pilot First Lt. William J. Mickish landed on airdrome vicinity Uglovaya, 30 kilometers northeast Vladivostok at 15 hours, Nov. 21, with one motor out otherwise no damage. Crew of 11 unhurt and well; have been interned; plane put under guard. Was notified today of matter; visited men this afternoon. Mickish reports instruments intact; papers destroyed accordance orders.

This telegram repeated Moscow.

CLUBB

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861.917/11-3044 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, November 30, 1944—11 p. m.

2762. The Soviet Embassy recently inquired <sup>6</sup> whether there would be any objection to the publication in English and distribution in the United States of a Soviet informational magazine.

The Embassy was informed orally on October 3 that there would be no objection to the publication of the proposed magazine, provided, of course, that it was published in accordance with existing legislation, notably the Foreign Agents Registration Act.<sup>7</sup>

Since we have learned from OWI <sup>8</sup> that Soviet officials appear to have some doubts on this subject, you are requested to confirm to the Foreign Office the attitude of this Government.<sup>9</sup>

STETTINIUS

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<sup>6</sup> See the memorandum from the Embassy of the Soviet Union, September 27, p. 998.

<sup>7</sup> Approved June 8, 1938, 52 Stat. 631; as amended, approved April 29, 1942 (effective June 28, 1942), 56 Stat. 248.

<sup>8</sup> Office of War Information.

<sup>9</sup> Ambassador Harriman stated in his telegram 4831, December 14, 1944, that this information had been given to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (861.917/12-1444).

121.67/11-2144

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

No. 386

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1944.

SIR: Reference is made to the Embassy's despatch No. 1159 of November 1, 1944<sup>10</sup> regarding the refusal of the Soviet Government to permit American couriers to travel overland between Tehran and Moscow and to the Embassy's telegram no. 4448 of November 21, 4 p. m.,<sup>11</sup> concerning the possibilities of establishing courier service between Moscow and Stockholm.

In view of the accessibility of European routes heretofore closed, the Department is most anxious to set up new and more direct routings for official air and surface mails and for official supplies. From the informative despatches both of the Embassy and the Embassy at Tehran, the Department is fully cognizant of the disadvantages of dispatching courier and other official mail to Moscow by way of Tehran, not only because of the difficulties of obtaining Soviet permission for couriers to travel overland between these latter two cities, but also because the dispatching of mail to Moscow via Tehran is a lengthy, difficult route, practical only as long as other more direct means of communication between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are blocked. It is possible that the Russian authorities are not fully appreciative of the difference between the positions of the two Governments in the matter of transmitting diplomatic mail and supplies between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been far more favorably situated in this regard, since it has been able, with its own planes, to use the direct ALSIB<sup>12</sup> route.

Because the progress of the war in Europe has recently opened more direct travel communications between Washington and Moscow than the present route by way of Tehran, the Department is particularly

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Not printed. In it the Chargé, George F. Kennan, stated: "In a recent conversation with the Soviet military authorities on the subject of air lines General Deane was informed that the Stockholm-Moscow air line could not be opened up at the present time because of military considerations." Kennan further commented: "No regular commercial air service has been established between Moscow and Helsinki. There is no indication that the Soviet Government intends to set up any service on this route in the near future which would be regularly open to foreigners on the same basis as the Moscow-Tehran service. It is doubtful that any definite or long term arrangements could be made at this time with the Soviet authorities who will undoubtedly wish to keep rigid control over the exploitation of the Helsinki-Moscow service." (121.67/11-2144)

<sup>12</sup> The Alaska-Siberia air route.



eager to establish, if possible, diplomatic courier and mail services at the earliest date to and from Moscow via the following connections:

- (1) Bucharest—for air courier;
- (2) Helsinki and Stockholm—using air, surface, or a combination of both means of travel;
- (3) Black Sea ports—for steamer pouches;
- (4) ALSIB route—for air courier.

The Embassy is requested to direct its efforts toward the opening of these more direct courier and mail connections between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. The Department envisages the reduction of the lengthy courier and mail service from Washington to Moscow via Tehran as soon as the more direct routes are operating satisfactorily.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:  
DEAN ACHESON

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811.71561/12-2644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 26, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 6:10 p. m.]

4990. ReDepts 2876, December 22, 10 p. m.<sup>13</sup> Our original note to the Foreign Office regarding the resumption of parcel post service dated November 6<sup>14</sup> was followed up by a second note dated November 27. On December 21, an oral inquiry was made regarding the status of the matter and we were informed that the Foreign Office “was working on it”. We will continue to press for a reply.<sup>15</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>13</sup> Not printed. It stated that the Post Office Department was “extremely anxious to begin service” and inquired about the status of this matter. (811.71561/12-2244)

<sup>14</sup> See telegram 4260, November 7, from Moscow, p. 1025.

<sup>15</sup> After additional correspondence and delays Ambassador Harriman reported in telegram 663 on March 7, 1945, that the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had declared in a note of March 5 that “the Soviet communications authorities are prepared to renew the exchange of parcel post between the Soviet Union and the United States.” The United States postal authorities should communicate directly with the People’s Commissariat for Communications about “practical questions connected with the resumption of this service.” (811.71261/3-745)

861.857/9-1344

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1945.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Soviet Embassy's memorandum of September 13, 1944 regarding the attack on the Soviet tanker *Emba* on August 28, 1944 by an aircraft allegedly belonging to the United States Army Air Forces.

The question was referred to the proper United States authorities and as a result of the careful investigation which was conducted it appears that the *Emba* was bombed and strafed in the approximate vicinity reported in the Soviet Ambassador's memorandum by a Ventura plane attached to a unit of the United States Pacific Fleet.<sup>16</sup>

The plane was given a mission to bomb and strafe Japanese shipping and supplies at Onekotan Island in the Kuriles. When the plane sighted what was thought to be its objective off the coast of Onekotan, it was, through errors in navigation, really off the east coast of Kamchatka. Due to the similarity of the landmarks near Onekotan and those in the vicinity of Kamchatka the pilot was not aware of his error and presumed to have reached the area of his target.

When he sighted a tanker in the distance, he assumed it to be an enemy vessel. Upon approaching to within ten miles of the tanker, the pilot, using binoculars, saw what appeared to be a white rectangle with a red circle in the center, painted on the side of the vessel amidships.

Observing markings which appeared to be the characteristic Japanese insignia on a vessel, assigned him as a primary target, in a location thought to be adjacent to the coast of Onekotan, his target area, the pilot decided on a low level strafing and bombing attack on the tanker.

As the plane came into the attack at top speed it was subject to intense anti-aircraft fire from four to six positions on the tanker. While all of the members of the plane's crew were, of course, very much preoccupied with their several duties, the navigator reports having observed during the attack a flag made up of red and yellow stripes flying over the superstructure amidships. Other crew members reported sighting a white flag with a red circle in the center flying over the vessel amidships.

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<sup>16</sup> A letter of November 6, 1944, from Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, had informed the Secretary of State of this mistaken attack by the Ventura plane, but declared that it was not commanded by the internee, John Armour Dingel (861.857/11-644).

It was only as the plane was pulling away from its target that the crew members definitely made out the letters "U. S. S. R." painted on the side of the vessel amidships, just above the deck line.

It is the opinion of the American authorities that the regrettable attack on the Soviet tanker *Emba* was the result of an unfortunate combination of circumstances involving errors in navigation, similarity of landmarks near Onkotan and Kamchatka, the fact that tankers were the primary objectives of the plane, mistaken identification of the target from a distance, diversion of attention by heavy defensive fire and concentration on their task by the crew members.

If, in spite of the foregoing explanation, the Soviet Government feels that compensation is due for those injured and killed in this regrettable attack on the *Emba*, it is requested that particulars be furnished including the injuries sustained and the amount claimed as compensation. The Department would then be in a position further to examine the question.

The Secretary of State reiterates the expression of keenest regret made orally to the Ambassador when the latter brought this unfortunate incident to the attention of the Department of State. The Secretary has been requested by the United States military authorities to state that stringent measures have been taken to prevent the possibility of attacks on Soviet shipping through mistake.

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**CONTINUATION OF WARTIME ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOVIET UNION, AND CONSIDERATION OF A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT TO ENABLE THE EXTENSION OF AID FOR POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND CREDITS<sup>17</sup>**

861.51/3019 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 7, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received January 8—10:56 a. m.]

56. Personal for Hopkins.<sup>18</sup> On my return from Tehran<sup>19</sup> I told Molotov<sup>20</sup> that the President regretted he had not had the time to

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<sup>17</sup> For previous correspondence on wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 737 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to President Roosevelt and Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee. This Committee was established by President Roosevelt on October 30, 1942, with responsibility for the fulfillment and general coordination of the Soviet supply protocols. Maj. Gen. James H. Burns served initially as executive officer.

<sup>19</sup> For the conference at Tehran between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Marshal Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, President of the Council of People's Commissars (Premier) of the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.

<sup>20</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

discuss with Stalin the question of United States participation in the reconstruction of damage and dislocation caused by the war to the economic life of the Soviet Union, and that he had asked me to discuss the subject with Molotov at some convenient time.

In my subsequent talk with him on December 31, Molotov brought up the question on his own initiative and asked me what might be done. I outlined the approach I had discussed with the President and you at Tehran. I told him that the legal limitations on lend-lease make it necessary to devise other methods of handling Soviet requests on the United States which could not be justified as needed for the direct prosecution of the war. I divide the subject into three categories:

(1) The possibility of the extension by an agency of the United States Government to the Soviet Government of a credit for the purchase in the United States of equipment and supplies for reconstruction;

(2) the desirability of the Soviet Government's making known to us the specific type and quantity of equipment which were most urgently needed and over what period;

(3) the value of having American experts come to the Soviet Union to assist in planning and in obtaining information as to Soviet needs in the various branches of industry, transport, agriculture and housing, and possibly also the dispatch of Soviet experts to the United States.

I explained the difficulty of making available any large quantities promptly because of our war requirements. I indicated, on the other hand, the time that would be saved by making plans now even to the point of developing detailed designs so that, as the opportunity arose during the course of the war and after, there would be no loss of time in putting their requirements into production. Molotov showed the keenest interest and by his questions and comments indicated that he understood and approved the approach I had outlined. I explained to him that everything I said was tentative and that much of it was my personal analysis of what might be done.

In reply to his inquiry as to how I thought the matter could best be developed, I suggested that Mikoyan<sup>21</sup> should be authorized to discuss the matter with me. He said he would arrange this and I expect to hear from Mikoyan shortly.

By this long talk with Molotov I believe that I can work out here the framework of a basic understanding for consideration in Washington.

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<sup>21</sup> Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union.

I ask to be advised specifically :

1. Whether in principle the approach as described above is tentatively approved.

2. The size and general terms of a credit that might be considered at the present time and the agency which would extend it. I have in mind that the first credit might be relatively small, to be expanded at a later date if desirable, and that the specific projects under this credit would be approved in Washington item by item, with such recommendations from us here as may be required.

I am not suggesting that I be authorized to make a definite offer to the Soviet Government, but only to direct their thinking along lines that we would want and to develop a proposal for approval in Washington. Please bear in mind the difficulties we had 10 years ago over the meaning in Russian of "loan" versus "credit".<sup>22</sup> In order to avoid similar difficulties the term "credit" should always be used, as I understand the Russians consider a loan is granted without restriction as to use of the funds.

3. Whether it is approved in principle to send to Russia a few experts assigned to us here, if and when the Soviets want them, in fields where they can be of value. For example, Molotov showed interest in an American expert to assist in reconstruction of their Donbas coal mines, in prefabricated housing, railroads, etc. The work of these men might be of considerable value to the war, to the morale of the Russian people, and in getting our proper share of Soviet post-war business. In addition they could assist in determining whether Soviet requests should come under lend-lease terms or be applied against the proposed credit for reconstruction.

4. Whether it is agreed that the general negotiations should be carried on in Moscow under my direction based on instructions from Washington and submitted for final approval in Washington. The actual placing of orders by the Soviets should be done in the United States with approval of the appropriate agency in Washington.

Until a general understanding is reached, I strongly recommend that no discussions be carried on between any Government agency in Washington and the Soviet representatives here [*there*].

It would be helpful if you could give me promptly a preliminary reaction to all or any part of the above for guidance in my discussions with Mikoyan.

From our standpoint, it seems clear that orders from the Soviet Government for reconstruction can be of considerable value in easing dislocations to our own employment problems if properly selected and timed for production when we are cutting back WTD [*war*]

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<sup>22</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 65 ff.

production during the course of the war and after. This will require the closest cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3022 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 9, 1944—noon.

[Received January 10—3:20 p. m.]

67. For Secretary and Under Secretary <sup>23</sup>: Copy to Hopkins. Reference my No. 56, January 7 to Hopkins: While at Tehran I had the opportunity of discussing with the President and Mr. Hopkins the methods by which the United States could supply equipment and material to the Soviet Union for reconstruction. I am sure you agree that this matter should be initiated on a carefully considered basis, bearing in mind all of its ramifications. As the Soviet Government places the utmost importance on our cooperation in this field, it is a factor which should be integrated into the fabric of our overall relations rather than dealt with independently in its purely commercial and economic aspects.

The Soviet Government seems anxious to come to understanding promptly and I believe this is of importance to us also, not only as a factor in cementing our relations with the Soviet Union but also as an outlet for American manufactured goods at the time our factories and labor are released from war production both during and after the war.

In addition, there is an aspect to lend-lease which is causing me considerable concern. There is no doubt that the supplies we have shipped up to the present time under lend-lease in almost all categories are badly needed for the Russian war effort, but we have already found in the few items we have been allowed to check here that the Soviets have over ordered and will probably not be able to use during the war all of what has been or is scheduled to be shipped. Also as the war approaches its conclusion there will probably have been accumulated in Russia a large quantity of equipment and material received under lend-lease which cannot be used for the war and which will be available for other uses. I recognize that because of length of time required to plan, produce and ship material to Russia and because no one can safely predict the end of the war, the condition I have described above is to a considerable extent unavoidable. On the other hand, I believe the time has now come when we should know more about the real need for some of the Soviet requests that are being presented and unless they

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<sup>23</sup> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

can be reasonably justified for the war, they should not be granted under lend-lease terms but against a credit for reconstruction.

Thus if a credit is now opened for reconstruction a method will be provided by which Soviet requests, which we are willing to fulfill but which they are not reasonable to justify as required for the war, can properly be met.

As explained in my telegram to Hopkins,<sup>24</sup> I saw Molotov at the President's request and discussed with him the general procedure which might be followed. I hope that action can be taken promptly to crystallize a program that I can be authorized to discuss at least in preliminary with Molotov, Mikoyan and other commissars involved. It seems clear that a better deal from our standpoint can be developed here in Moscow, negotiating with senior officials of the Soviet Government, that [*than*] by attempting to negotiate in Washington through Soviet representatives who have no authority.

May I suggest this question be discussed with Mr. Hopkins who is familiar with the talks at Tehran and preliminary instructions at least be cabled me at earliest possible date.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3020 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 9, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 8:40 p. m.]

68. For the Secretary, the Under Secretary and Hopkins: Supplementing my No. 56 and No. 67, January 7 and 9, although I have not sufficient information to make definite recommendation I outline below for your consideration general terms under which a credit for reconstruction might be offered to the Soviet Government:

1. The amount of the credit might be initially possibly 500 million dollars repayable over 25 to 30 years in annual installments beginning perhaps five years after termination of hostilities. The interest rate might be between 2 and 3 percent on net amounts drawn. I suggest a gold clause be incorporated to protect against possible future devaluation of the dollar. The credit might be granted under existing authority as a cash reimbursement credit under lend-lease or by the Export-Import Bank.

2. Use of the credit should be limited to payment for manufacture[d], semi-manufactured, and raw products and services obtained from the United States. Although purchases during the war should

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<sup>24</sup> *Supra*.

be made through a U. S. A. Government agency, the Soviet Purchasing Agency might later be allowed to negotiate with commercial firms direct. In any event no purchases under the credit should be made without the approval of a designated [government agency].

This agency in exercising its responsibility for approval, should give consideration to the desirability of the order from the standpoint of our own or peace-time economy and any other factors in which American interests are involved. During the war period at least, the Soviet Government should be required to give reasonable information as to the need for the items requested. We should maintain a small staff in Moscow to advise and make recommendations to this agency.

[3.] As a matter of general policy, the United States Government should retain control at all times of the unallocated balance of the credit and there should be no implied or actual commitment to accept orders if for any reason it is considered inadvisable to do so. Although I do not wish to suggest entering this transaction in atmosphere of suspicion, there are many undetermined questions in our relations with the Soviet Union and we should not, therefore, put ourselves in position where this credit could be used for purposes incompatible with United States interest or unless our relations are developing satisfactorily in other directions.

4. Before the first credit or additional credits are fully expended, consideration should be given to the extension of a new credit by the Government, unless at that time the Soviet Government can obtain credits through normal channels.

I would appreciate receiving your reactions to the above.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1721a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1944—11 p. m.

62. From Hopkins for Harriman. A substantial reduction in stated requirements has eased considerably the raw materials situation since Batt<sup>25</sup> made inquiry on November 25 for Soviet production analysis to determine aluminum and nickel needs. This is true particularly of aluminum and some other metal but not of nickel. The output of aluminum at present has reached the point where reduced production has been directed. This development has been discussed in American press and is known to USSR representatives in Washington.

<sup>25</sup> William L. Batt, Vice Chairman, War Production Board.



In view of present conditions I suggest you drop inquiry regarding metals mentioned in your 131 of January 6<sup>26</sup> since additional ingot aluminum for USSR can now easily be provided for, and with respect to nickel we have no intention to depart materially from Protocol.<sup>27</sup> Batt agrees.

Respecting general policy towards securing supporting data on Soviet requisitions and for new Protocol, my suggestion is that you leave matter in abeyance until problem can receive further consideration here. You will be advised when a decision on the policy to be followed is fixed. I recommend that until you hear further from us no action be taken to obtain information from Soviet representatives to support their requests for extra items not in Protocol.

(For Harriman only—Personal) It is important Batt feels that you clearly understand reason for his November 25 inquiry. He has felt that any available information regarding importance of USSR needs would be most useful to help him effectively push USSR needs versus other competing claims here. He had reason to believe that personal conversations between you and Mikoyan might produce helpful information although he has been unable to get anything on this side. Although desirable, whether you are permitted to transmit such information was not so important as that you should reach a conclusion regarding urgency and could communicate it to us. No approach, it was believed here, other than your personal contact with Mikoyan would be likely to succeed. Neither was it expected that the issue should be so formalized as to have U.S. threaten to deny assistance unless supporting data were furnished. [Hopkins.]

HULL

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861.51/3020 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1944—10 p. m.

83. We are substantially in agreement with considerations raised in your telegram no. 68 of January 9 and previous telegrams. We have been unable as yet to discuss the matter with Harry Hopkins who is ill but we hope soon to give you something in reply to the specific questions for guidance in your conversations with Mikoyan. However, in view of the importance of this question and of the interest

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<sup>26</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>27</sup> For Third (London) Protocol, between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union, signed at London, October 19, 1943, covering the year beginning July 1, 1943, see Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office), pp. 51-89; cf. also Department of State *Bulletin*, October 23, 1943, p. 272.

of other departments and agencies of the Government in it, this subject must be carefully and thoroughly studied by many officials of the Government before any definite instructions can be issued to you. We will keep you fully advised.

HULL

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861.24/1720 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 15, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received January 16—4 p. m.]

138. For Hopkins. Your 62, January 12, 11 p. m. I am glad to learn that the Soviets can be supplied with additional aluminum. As I reported in my talk with Mikoyan and subsequent talk by Spalding<sup>28</sup> with Krutikov<sup>29</sup> it was indicated that with additional aluminum shipments above the Protocol the Soviets could increase their aircraft production as they could themselves increase production of the other components. I would appreciate being advised the additional tonnage of aluminum and Duralumin that it is now planned to ship. The Military Mission and I will keep in touch with the Soviet officials and attempt to ascertain how much additional production of aircraft results. I believe we can at least get some general information on this subject which I assume will be of value in connection with consideration of aircraft allocations for the Fourth Protocol.<sup>30</sup> It would be useful also to be advised when there is any change in the nickel situation.

No one is or has been more anxious than I to get to the Soviets all of their requirements but I must report to you that we have definite information that the Soviets have over-ordered on the few items we have been allowed to check and I can see no reason why we should deprive ourselves of urgent requirements unless we are reasonably satisfied that the supplies are put to good use here. We require the most exhaustive studies from our own and British sources and as a result waste has been substantially reduced. Now that the military crisis in Russia is passed and the volume of our shipments is attaining such tremendous proportions I see no reason why reasonable supporting evidence at least should not be expected from the Soviets.

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<sup>28</sup> Brig. Gen. Sidney P. Spalding, Chief, Supply Division, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>29</sup> Alexey Dmitriyevich Krutikov, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, responsible for coordinating transportation of lend-lease supplies.

<sup>30</sup> For year beginning July 1, 1944.

In addition to aluminum and nickel we have been requested to obtain information on alcohol, electrolytic copper bars, and heavy tires. I do not interpret your cable to cancel these requests. In our contacts with the Soviets we have not been refused information, in fact we have been promised it, although only a little information has as yet been forthcoming. I am satisfied that if we are firm we will obtain more useful information and the pressure we are exercising will undoubtedly have the effect of making the Soviets analyze their requirements more carefully than I believe they have been doing to date.

We are at present insisting that our cargoes in the north be handled with at least ordinary care. Reports from our representative as to breakage due to carelessness in unloading and pilferage are startling.

The Soviet Government is allowing us to see more and more and if you will support us I am satisfied that a reasonable job can be done to protect American interests without creating any strain in our relations here, in fact I am sure that they will respect us more.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1726a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1944—noon.

118. From Batt. Representatives of U. S. S. R. requesting 30,000 tons aluminum composed of 6,000 tons fabricated shapes, principally duralumin sheet, and 24,000 tons ingot for delivery prior to July 1. Account sharply reduced military requirements here, we are now easily able to furnish these amounts. Our willingness to comply will now be communicated to Soviet representatives. This, together with amounts already committed, will make about 126,000 short tons available during third Protocol period from Canada and United States. [Batt.]

HULL

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861.51/3023 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, January 26, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received January 27—12: 10 p. m.]

253. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. A few days ago I had a long talk with Mikoyan in regard to our cooperation in recon-

struction. He had been informed by Molotov of my talk with him and asked me to repeat what I had said to Molotov.

I told him substantially what I reported in my 56, January 7, 4 p. m., on my conversation with Molotov. He showed great interest in subject; he asked me a number of questions and particularly pressed me for a figure as to what might be the size of a first credit. I explained I had no instructions.

I understand that there is concern in lend-lease regarding the 300 million dollar program for plants which we have agreed to consider putting into production for shipment during the Fourth Protocol. I understand that the request the Soviets are now making for plants in this connection are to some extent at least difficult to justify as a direct contribution to the war because of the length of time it will take to put them into operation.

I further understand that in November a Soviet official discussed the question of a loan with Mr. Jesse Jones.<sup>31</sup> I hope it is agreed that no discussions of a loan will be carried on with Soviet officials in Washington until a policy has been agreed to and worked out in its larger aspects through diplomatic channels.

I would appreciate advice on all of the above and what progress has been made in crystallizing a policy.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3025 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 1, 1944—midnight.

[Received February 2—8:57 p. m.]

334. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Supplementing my telegram 253, January 26 and previous cables. Mr. Mikoyan asked me to call on him this afternoon to discuss further the question of a credit for reconstruction. Mikoyan outlined his ideas of the terms of an original credit to be used for purchases in the United States when they can be made available, as follows:

1. As a first credit he suggests one billion dollars.
2. Credit to run an average of 25 years, repayment beginning in the 16th year in equal annual installments until the 35th year.
3. Interest one half of one percent. I explained that I had no instructions and that I could not comment on the amount. I pointed out that if the amount of the initial credit was a smaller figure, it could be expanded as occasion required. He said he had picked one

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<sup>31</sup> Secretary of Commerce.

billion dollars as he was developing plans based on that figure and would like to submit it as a program. He could not yet tell me the general categories of supplies required but stated that they had already submitted requests for equipment for plants totaling 500 million dollars of which he thought 300 million dollars was definitely for war purposes and could properly be applied under lend-lease but he recognized that perhaps 200 million of this equipment should more appropriately apply against a credit. I explained carefully again that no orders for reconstruction could be taken which would interfere in any way with our own war effort.

As to repayment, I told him I thought that we might expect repayment to begin earlier. He explained that he had mentioned repayment to begin in the 16th year because the reconstruction of their economy would not be sufficiently advanced to allow them to safely undertake to begin repayments earlier and take care of their current requirements, and that their reconstruction plans were being based on a 15 year program and that after that they were certain they could meet repayment obligations.

As to interest, I told him that his suggestion of one half of one percent was too low. I pointed out to him that the United States Government itself paid more for its long-term borrowings. He commented that he considered that the use to which the credit would be put made the suggestion admissible.

He pointed out that he had been asked to have his requests for the Fourth Protocol <sup>32</sup> submitted by March 1 and as some of these requirements undoubtedly will be for reconstruction he feels that it is desirable to come to some arrangement shortly in regard to the credit.

I agreed to cable you his suggestions and to request instructions.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3023 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 2, 1944—midnight.

211. The Department has submitted for the approval of the President a program for the handling of the various problems referred to in your 253, January 26, 1 p. m. and previous telegrams on this subject.

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<sup>32</sup>The Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, covering the period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945, was signed only on April 17, 1945, by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Soviet Union. The text is printed in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 89-156. The announcement of the signature made in Ottawa on April 20, 1945, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 22, 1945, p. 723.

As indicated in the Department's 83, January 14, the Department's proposals are in general agreement with your suggestions that discussions be initiated in Moscow in regard to postwar reconstruction. However, the question of the 300 million dollars worth of goods under Lend-Lease is being considered by Hopkins. Moreover, it is felt that negotiations should be carried on through regular diplomatic channels and that these discussions should form an integral part of our over-all relations with the Soviet Union. If the President approves of these proposals they will be incorporated in a telegram to you.

It has been learned on the basis of preliminary considerations given to this matter that we cannot at this time make any definite arrangements for the financing of postwar trade until certain legal limitations have been removed. You should, therefore, in discussing credits with the Soviet authorities limit yourself only to generalities.

HULL

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*The Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee  
(Hopkins) to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)* <sup>33</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] 4 February 1944.

Personal to W. Averell Harriman. In reply to your Numbers 56, 67 and 68. Your suggestions regarding aid for post war reconstruction in the USSR are closely related to certain problems arising under Lend Lease. Consideration here of these problems has suggested a method which, to a large extent, would be a start toward effectuating your suggestions concerning reconstruction.

As you know, the Third Protocol contains a provision of approval of orders for 300 million dollars worth of industrial equipment for delivery after June 30, 1944. Under this provision the Russians have requested oil refineries, and power plant, metallurgical plant, and other types of capital equipment. All of this equipment has a dual use—a war use and post war use. Most of the equipment will take many months to produce and to get into operation. Because of uncertainty as to when the war would end, some quarters were hesitant about putting equipment into procurement, the production of which might be only partially completed when the war ends. However, since no one can now determine when the war will be over, it seems preferable that there should be no interruption in the procurement of supplies for the USSR war program in the event that hostilities should continue beyond normal expectations and, at the same time, that there should be an assurance that after the termination of hos-

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<sup>33</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

ilities the USSR will accept such items as are undelivered and have a post war use and will agree now as to the method of repayment for such items.

As a result of considerable discussion within the Government, it is the prevalent view here that we should go ahead and procure this type of equipment as soon as possible and in a manner consistent with our normal allocation procedure for materials in short supply, provided an understanding can be reached with the USSR as to the disposition of equipment not shipped before the end of hostilities against the common enemy. If hostilities continue beyond June 30, 1944, delivery of equipment in the 300 million dollar category will, in all probability, be covered by a Fourth Protocol and supplied on a straight Lend Lease principle. In the case of equipment contracted for but not shipped before the cessation of hostilities, an agreement ought to be worked out with the USSR for repayment on a credit principle. Such a credit principle might be repayment over a long period of years either in cash or commodities, or both, as mutually agreed upon.

The same principle of obtaining repayment for items contracted for before but shipped after the cessation of hostilities could be extended to other items in the Third Protocol, with the possible exception of munitions and foodstuffs. Items like copper, aluminum, steel, communications equipment and railroad equipment, for example, are also likely to be useful both for war purposes and for purposes of reconstruction.

At any given time, there is likely to be more than a billion dollars worth of Protocol supplies in procurement or inventory. Under the Lend Lease Act<sup>34</sup> as it now stands, these supplies could be delivered to the USSR up to July 1, 1947, to the extent necessary to carry out a contract with the Soviet Government. Accordingly, it is considered advisable to propose to the USSR a supplementary agreement to the Third Protocol, the principle of which can also be incorporated in the Fourth Protocol, along the following lines. The United States should undertake to supply and the USSR should undertake to accept materials and supplies to be mutually agreed upon which are useful for both war and reconstruction purposes and which are contracted for but not shipped before the cessation of hostilities against the common enemy. The USSR would agree to pay for such supplies in cash, or goods, or both, over a period of time as mutually agreed upon in the agreement. If this kind of agreement is consummated, the programming of a larger amount of dual purpose supplies can probably proceed on a more realistic basis because, if the war is still on they can be used for war purposes, but with the assurance that when hostilities

<sup>34</sup> Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31.

end the Russians will take items not delivered before that time and will pay us for such items on an agreed basis. The large quantities of supplies which could be covered by such an agreement would be useful in the war and might also be a big start for the USSR reconstruction program.

To the extent that this arrangement may cover the goods needed for post war reconstruction, it would accomplish some of the results you envisage. It would differ, however, from your proposed credit arrangement in that it would not require the extension of separate credits and would be effectuated practically as an integral part of the Lend Lease Agreement with the USSR.<sup>35</sup>

Items which may not have a war use but which will be needed by the USSR for purely reconstruction purposes could have their procurement facilitated by the extension of credits in the manner suggested by you.

Until such time as we are able to ascertain to what extent an agreement along the lines suggested above permits the effective procurement of articles having both a war and reconstruction use, it seems advisable that we do not attempt to reach a definitive understanding with the USSR regarding the extension of credits for the procurement of supplies for reconstruction alone. Inasmuch as the agreement outlined above can be consummated as a supplement to the agreement between the United States and the USSR in the Third Protocol, I believe it may be advisable to conduct the negotiations here in Washington, while keeping you fully advised of what is being done and calling on you for help if necessary in Moscow.

With respect to expert personnel such as engineers, the same criteria would apply as in the case of Lend Lease supplies, i.e., if their services are connected with a war purpose, Lend Lease funds could be used at least until the termination of the war. As you know, the services of experts have been frequently furnished under Lend Lease for the installation, operation and maintenance of projects vital to the war. After the termination of the war, their services could be compensated for on an agreed basis. If their services are needed in connection with projects having no relation to the war, other arrangements, of course, could be made.

It is requested that you advise on the following:

1. Do you share our thought that a considerable portion of the USSR requirements for immediate reconstruction after the cessation of hostilities could be fulfilled through an agreement of a type discussed above, if items having no connection with the war are covered by separate credit arrangements?

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<sup>35</sup> Master Lend-Lease Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed at Washington, June 11, 1942; for text, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 253, or 56 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500.



2. Do you think that the possible excess stockpiling of Lend Lease goods you mention has been so serious as to make it advisable to attempt to formulate a principle and to reach an agreement on reimbursement for Lend Lease supplies, on hand after the termination of hostilities, useful for rehabilitation or reconstruction purposes?

3. Would enlargement of your staff be required under the proposed arrangements and would enlargement for those purposes be acceptable to the USSR?

Since, as suggested, the agreement outlined above would be supplementary to and directly connected with the Protocol, negotiations on this subject would be conducted in Washington. We are agreed that negotiations with the Soviet Government relating to American participation in purely postwar reconstruction, and having no relation to Lend Lease, will be conducted by you in Moscow.

HARRY HOPKINS

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861.51/3027a

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] February 7, 1944.

You are no doubt aware that Ambassador Harriman has been carrying on informal talks with Soviet officials in a preliminary effort to obtain from them information on the needs of Soviet economy for postwar construction and the best means by which we could be of assistance to them.

This is of such political importance as an indication of our sincere desire to be of assistance to them that it is felt it would be desirable more or less to formalize these preliminary steps. Moreover, the increased Soviet requests for capital goods which cannot easily be justified under Lend-Lease makes it imperative to study ways and means of satisfying this demand and making appropriate temporary financial arrangements to assist the Soviets in getting these goods.

Apart from this immediate problem Ambassador Harriman has suggested that we endeavor to obtain as accurate information as possible from the Soviet authorities regarding their longer term needs.

In order to study and handle this problem here it is felt that it would be advisable to set up an Interdepartmental Committee for this purpose.

As you will note from the attached draft telegram to Ambassador Harriman,<sup>36</sup> it is suggested that this Committee be set up under a State Department chairman and that the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department, the Tariff Commission, the Foreign Eco-

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<sup>36</sup> Telegram 246, *infra*.

conomic Administration and perhaps the War and Navy Departments should be asked to nominate representatives to the Committee.

Please indicate if you approve of this suggestion.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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861.51/3023 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 8, 1944—9 p. m.

246. Department's 211, February 2, midnight. As a result of preliminary discussions which have taken place regarding postwar trade and reconstruction with the Soviet Union, the following procedure has been approved by the President:

1. You should continue to make clear to the Soviet Government the desire of the United States Government to assist, as far as it may be possible, in the post-war reconstruction of the Soviet Union. In order that plans may be made as soon as possible and in order that there shall be no delay in the delivery of such goods as the United States may be in a position to furnish to the Soviet Union, you should impress upon the appropriate Soviet authorities the desirability of obtaining as soon as practicable, accurate information regarding the amount and type of post-war reconstruction goods which they feel may be purchased in the United States.

In discussing this question you should request the Soviet authorities to furnish detailed information regarding immediate needs which cannot legally be furnished under Lend-Lease and as full information as possible regarding longer term needs.

2. As indicated in my 211 February 2, midnight, Hopkins is studying the question of the 300 million dollars worth of goods under Lend-Lease and will communicate with you on this question. In regard to long-term financial arrangements you should make it plain to the Soviet authorities that while we are disposed to assist them in every way possible in this matter we cannot at this time indicate either the amount or the exact nature of these long-term financial arrangements.

For your background information, the only agency of this Government having authority to extend credits for developmental purposes and the export of capital goods is the Export-Import Bank. Legal limitations now exist on the extension of credit by the Bank to countries such as the U.S.S.R. in which there are outstanding unsettled

intergovernmental obligations.<sup>37</sup> Moreover the total lending authority of the Export-Import Bank is limited and the ceiling has been virtually reached. Thus the Bank has no existing authority to make credits in anything like the amount suggested.

Careful study is being given to both of these problems as well as to the general question of methods of financing immediate trade which cannot be arranged under Lend-Lease, as well as long-term, post-war development credits.

3. In order to coordinate here the work of the interested governmental agencies, there will be set up under a State Department chairman, a committee composed of representatives of the following organizations: Commerce, Tariff Commission, Treasury Department, Foreign Economic Administration, and perhaps the War and Navy Departments as well as the War Shipping Administration. The duties of this Committee will be to study and coordinate all matters related to this question resulting from negotiations in Moscow and to set appropriate machinery in motion in order to finance and expedite the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union.

HULL

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Hopkins)*<sup>38</sup>

Moscow, 9 February 1944.

Referring to your long cable<sup>39</sup> regarding Russian Protocol and reconstruction program I heartily endorse the general principles you outline but urge that you reconsider certain specific parts of your suggested program.

(1) I see no need for a supplementary agreement to the Third Protocol. I believe it will be time enough to incorporate the suggested new principles into the Fourth Protocol which should of course cover the material and equipment placed into production under the Third Protocol but shipped after June 30, 1944. I am not concerned over any shipments made prior to June 30. I am satisfied that the course of events will justify Third Protocol shipments under existing terms and I believe it would be most unfortunate if we should attempt to negotiate a supplement to the Third Protocol at this time. I feel

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<sup>37</sup> The failure of negotiations to implement the agreements of November 1933 in regard to claims and credits between the United States and the Soviet Union is described in *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 166-191. The most significant of the legal limitations was the Johnson Act, approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.

<sup>38</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.

<sup>39</sup> Dated 4 February, p. 1043.

it will be misunderstood and might seriously complicate our relations in other directions. I am cabling you <sup>40</sup> for your personal information more fully about this aspect.

(2) We have not been in a position to obtain evidence so far of any accumulation of excessive stocks except as we have specifically reported. On the other hand we do know that it takes many months before material shipped from the United States can be put into use by the factory or consumer. It is the volume of this pipeline which may well exist up to the termination of hostilities that causes me concern and should be given consideration in connection with the Fourth Protocol. I therefore recommend that you do not limit your proposal that the Soviet Government reimburse us for the shipments subsequent to cessation of hostilities against the common enemy but include at least some items that have been shipped for a period prior thereto of from 3 to 6 months depending on the item and perhaps longer for plant equipment of dual value. Offhand I would exclude food but would include items having use for reconstruction such as those you have mentioned and also particularly machinery, equipment for plants and machine tools. These should as you suggest be applied against a reimbursement credit arranged under Lend Lease.

(3) I don't understand why we should be committed to ship munitions after the termination of hostilities unless the Soviets are prepared to pay for them. I agree that the Soviet Government should be committed to buy from US under the credit you propose other supplies and equipment that are in production which have a post war use.

(4) I agree with your proposal for accepting requests under the Fourth Protocol for items which have the dual purpose and including a provision in the Protocol for reimbursement over a period of years for the unshipped items as well as those shipped as defined above. I believe it is in our interest however to begin to work at once with the Soviet Union on their reconstruction program as a whole including those items for plant equipment which cannot be reasonably justified for war use on account of length of time required before any substantial production can be obtained therefrom. I agree that your proposal will take care of some of the needed items. On the other hand it will take a long time to make plans and develop detailed designs which if done now would give immediate business to our factories and employment to our labor when hostilities cease or even before. If we don't become involved now in discussions with the Soviets over this program and obtain an understanding of it we will lose a competitive advantage to which we are entitled and information of value in other directions. In addition the Soviets place great importance on knowing now our general attitude toward their recon-

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<sup>40</sup> *Infra.*

struction problems and if we push aside the consideration of their whole program doubts may be aroused as to our serious intents. Mikoyan has indicated a desire to work with us along these lines and although the terms of the credit he suggests would not be to my view acceptable particularly as to the interest rate I believe we should attempt to agree upon a credit for reconstruction now in so far as and in such amounts as we legally can. A reconstruction credit if extended now would allow us to join with them in planning for the larger program. Perhaps you can find a way to carry this on under the Lend Lease reimbursement credit or perhaps it might require an additional credit from the Export Import Bank. I am in no position to judge and will appreciate enlightenment. If we work with the Soviets on their entire reconstruction program it should not be difficult to arrive at decisions item by item as to what we are ready to accept under Lend Lease because of its dual purpose character and what items should be allocated in the first instance to the reconstruction credit. I therefore recommend that a credit be negotiated now available for procurement by the Soviets if items for reconstruction which we do not believe will be finished in time to be of real value for the war. As to the time when we shall put any of these items into production we should suit our convenience.

(5) I recognize that the details of any program will have to be worked out in Washington but whatever program is agreed to should I believe be at least cabled me prior to any discussions with the Soviet Missions in Washington for my final recommendations to you and in order that I will be in a position to discuss and explain our objectives to Mikoyan personally. I believe you will wish continually to get advice from me and the Supply Mission as to our reaction to the program as a whole and individual items on which our advice may be useful.

(6) In direct reply to your three questions my answer to Number 1 is Yes as qualified above. I have already partially answered question Number 2 in so far as I now have information by suggesting provision in the Fourth Protocol for reimbursement of certain materials shipped prior to the termination of hostilities. Members of the Military Mission and I expect to make extensive trips in the Soviet Union and we may have further impressions and information at a later date. It is my feeling that the general provision of Lend Lease which allows repossession by the United States of unconsumed Lend Lease supplies would protect us if we should find a situation sufficiently serious to call for action. Also it is my belief that any overstocking of particular items can be adjusted by reduced shipments during the Fourth Protocol. It might be desirable to include in the Fourth Protocol a general provision for downward revision of any

item if events prove the item is not needed. As to question Number 3, I don't believe that the proposed arrangements would require a substantial enlargement of the Supply Mission. [Here follows a brief section on administrative matters.] As much of what I say is of interest to Stettinius and the Dept of State if consistent [*convenient?*] will you show this cable to them.

[HARRIMAN]

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Hopkins)* <sup>41</sup>

Moscow, 9 February 1944.

Personal to Hopkins. Referring to my immediately preceding cable <sup>42</sup> it is my belief that an attempt to negotiate a supplement to the third protocol will be misunderstood by the Soviets and among other things will be interpreted to indicate a doubt in our minds as to their intentions to live up to the commitment taken in Teheran regarding action against our enemies. As you know satisfactory progress is being made in discussions about operations and nothing should be done to jeopardize these proceedings. If events develop as I am sure they will anything that we ship before June 30, 1944 will be amply justified under Lend-Lease terms. I urge that you support my judgement in this matter. I fully agree however to tough realistic terms being incorporated into the Fourth Protocol including Third Protocol items undelivered before June 30 along the lines that you have suggested and with the additions that you have seen in my cable. I think the Fourth Protocol should be negotiated on the assumption that we will get full cooperation after the defeat of Germany but before it is finally signed I ask that I have an opportunity to give recommendations based on the progress at that time of the negotiations now being carried on here. I finally suggest that we should have a clause in the Fourth Protocol that any commitments should be subject to review by us on cessation of hostilities with any of our common enemies.

[HARRIMAN]

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<sup>41</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>42</sup> *Supra.*

861.51/3028 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 9, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received February 10—9:28 a. m.]

437. For Hopkins. With further reference to our exchange of cables regarding the Soviet Protocol and reconstruction, I had an opportunity to discuss with Mikoyan in most general terms the question of whether any long-term credit, which might be granted by us, should include some provision for repayment in goods. His off-hand reaction is that this would complicate rather than facilitate the matter because of the difficulty of setting prices now for future deliveries, as well as determining what the Soviets would then be able to ship. He indicated that it would be easier for the Soviet Government to plan ways of repaying us in cash resulting from their overall world trade.

I am inclined to share this view from our own standpoint as well for many reasons, particularly, as it is so difficult to predict now our future requirements for commodities.

HARRIMAN

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*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (Hopkins)*<sup>43</sup>

Moscow, 13 February 1944.

(1) On rereading my cable 081219<sup>44</sup> I am not sure I made it plain that I did not intend to register objection if it is necessary to make a supplementary agreement to the Third Protocol covering shipments subsequent to 30 June 1944 particularly as to equipment for plants. My objection was intended to be limited to a supplement that would cover shipments made prior to 30 June 1944.

(2) I have received a cable from the Department<sup>45</sup> indicating that there are legal difficulties in making arrangements now for a reconstruction credit except as can properly be done under the Lend Lease Law because of the Johnson Act<sup>46</sup> prohibiting loans to nations who had not fulfilled their obligations to us and because of the small balance left of appropriations to Export and Import Bank. Under these circumstances I heartily agree that Lend Lease should be used to the fullest extent appropriate but recognize that it is only a stop gap and does not meet the issue.

<sup>43</sup> Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

<sup>44</sup> Dated 9 February, p. 1048.

<sup>45</sup> Telegram 246, February 8, 9 p. m., p. 1047.

<sup>46</sup> Approved April 13, 1934; 48 Stat. 574.

(3) If aid for Russian reconstruction is to be of real value in our overall relations with the Soviet Government as a benefit which they can obtain from us if they play the international game with us in accordance with our standards we must have a well forge[d] instrument to offer them. Vague promises excite Soviet suspicions whereas a precise program offered now to them but kept always within our control to suspend will be of extreme value. Stalin must offer his people quick reconstruction to retain supreme leadership. We on the other hand want Russian business quickly during our period of conversion from war production. I therefore urge that this matter be not left to an interdepartmental committee for study alone but that the subject be energetically pursued in the hope of finding a solution permitting prompt action. I realize of course the political difficulties at home but I hope that the double barreled advantage of prompt action may offer ammunition for dealing with this aspect. I am also expressing these views to the Department.<sup>47</sup> Your long cable<sup>48</sup> was most helpful to me and I hope you will continue to keep me currently informed of the thinking in Washington as well as definite action.

[HARRIMAN]

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861.24/1745

*Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1944.

Russia continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat of Germany. We must therefore continue to support the U. S. S. R. by providing the maximum amount of supplies which can be delivered to her ports. This is a matter of paramount importance.

The U. S. S. R. has been requested to state requirements for a Fourth Protocol, to cover the period from July 1, 1944 to June 30, 1945. Within the limitations of available resources, the various interested agencies are being requested to make every effort to meet these requirements.

Pending the formulation of the Fourth Protocol, it is my desire that every effort be made to fulfill the provisions of the Third Protocol, which terminates June 30, 1944.

It is planned to make the Fourth Protocol offering in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada in accordance with the procedure and formula utilized in the Third Protocol.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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<sup>47</sup> Telegram 506, February 14, 5 p. m., p. 1054.

<sup>48</sup> Dated 4 February, p. 1043.



861.51/3029 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 14, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received February 15—1:20 p. m.]

506. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Regarding your 246, February 8, 9 p. m. I have received a long cable from Hopkins regarding capital goods requirements of Soviets under lend-lease, and have replied. Certain aspects of these cables have an important bearing on the Soviet reconstruction program, as it would seem that lend-lease can properly be used to assist in this connection. It is impossible to draw a clear cut line between war and post-war capital requirements. Requirements for reconstruction of devastated areas, not only for industrial and agricultural production but also public services, etc., for the civilian population, and requirements for the expansion of production and transportation facilities elsewhere are certainly difficult to appraise as between war and post-war needs, especially as the length of the war is so uncertain. Moreover the general morale factor is one that cannot be calculated nor overlooked.

It seems clear however that, although lend-lease can properly plan an important role in taking care of the most pressing Russian requirements, it cannot be used to meet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Mikoyan tells me that they are now planning a 15 year reconstruction program. It would appear that a knowledge of what they can expect from us in the way of equipment and credits is an important element. It would also appear of great advantage in many directions to the US to have an opportunity to study their program with them now insofar as it relates to possible purchases from the US.

I am fearful that, unless we are able to offer a definite credit program, the Soviet Government will be unwilling to expose its hand. We would then lose a competitive advantage in obtaining business for the time when it is most needed for the readjustment of our war production program. Many months are required to develop plans and detailed designs. It may well prove of advantage to take some of this business even before the complete cessation of hostilities. It will certainly be of enormous value in cushioning the shock from war to peace if we are prepared to put into production Russian orders immediately upon cessation of hostilities.

I believe that an agreement on a reconstruction program will have a major effect on the successful prosecution of the war in Russia. It will permit the release in Russia of reserves of materials and manpower for the direct war effort. It will give new hope to people generally and in the devastated areas and enable the nation to con-

tinue to give undivided attention to the war. We get into the habit of thinking that under Stalin and the Communist Party the Russian nation can be forced to take the road that leads to the goal desired. However there has been great loss of life and untold suffering, and every day we see evidence that it takes the most skillful leadership, the most ingenious political planning to keep the people at their maximum effectiveness for carrying on the war.

In addition, if aid for reconstruction is to be of real value in our over-all relations with the Soviets as a benefit which can be obtained from us if they work cooperatively with us on international problems in accordance with our standards, we must have a well forged instrument to offer them. Vague promises excite Soviet suspicions whereas a precise program offered to them (but always kept within our control thru the approval of each transaction) will, in my judgement, be of definite value.

I therefore recommend that lend-lease be used to the fullest extent possible for this reconstruction and, in addition, that the study you indicate is being made for financing projects which cannot properly be made under lend-lease be pursued energetically and expeditiously.

I have cabled so fully in the hope that the triple-barrelled advantages to us which I describe may furnish ammunition and ideas for dealing with political problems at home in obtaining effective legislation.

It would be most helpful if I could be kept informed of the progress of the study referred to and the developments of lend-lease policy as applied to this problem.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1741: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1944—7 p. m.

407. For the Ambassador from the President's Soviet Protocol Committee. The following message is a result of conferences with Messrs. Hopkins, Stettinius and Crowley.<sup>49</sup> Reference is made to your no. 131 to War of January 6<sup>50</sup> and to similar messages to other agencies in Washington.

After careful consideration it has been decided that it is inadvisable to subject U. S. S. R. requirements to screening in Moscow or to reject Soviet requests because of failure to provide operational or other justification to your mission. Our experience indicates that existing

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<sup>49</sup> Leo T. Crowley, Administrator, Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).

<sup>50</sup> Not found in Department files.

limitations on ocean tonnage forces the Soviets to give continuous preference to badly needed high priority items and operates to limit Soviet requests to their approximate needs, thereby achieving your objective which is to prevent serious overstocking in the U. S. S. R.

Subject to reasonable allowances for the changing needs of war, it is agreed that overstocking in the U. S. S. R. of material produced in the United States is highly undesirable. Whenever you find excess stocks prompt action will be taken here to limit shipments of such items.

It is generally agreed here that any radical change in present procedure might cause the Russians to withdraw a large part of the Soviet Purchasing Commission which would not be understood by the public here or elsewhere.

Moreover, offerings to U. S. S. R. must be based on complete information on overall requirements of United States and other United Nations, as well as on available resources, and rapidly changing shipping capabilities. Such information cannot be assembled and transmitted promptly and fully to Moscow to permit final decision there on offerings to U. S. S. R.

We shall keep you informed on requests made by the U. S. S. R. for items which are in short supply and of our progress in negotiating the Fourth Protocol in order that we may have the benefit of your advice and comments. [President's Soviet Protocol Committee.]

STETTINIUS

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861.24/1740 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, February 29, 1944.

[Received March 1—2:05 p. m.]

672. Moscow newspapers for February 29 publish as their most prominent foreign news a London report of Crowley's statement<sup>51</sup> regarding American shipments of munitions and other lend-lease material to Soviet Union in 43.

Reporting almost 200% increase of 43 over 42, and giving overall dollar and tonnage figures for the period October 41 to January 44 item states that American shipments reached their peak in December 43. Item also reports that while in 42, of every hundred ships carrying cargoes for the USSR the enemy sank 12, in 43 only one in every hundred were sunk. Item gives figures of delivery of 7800 airplanes, 3,000 of them delivered by air, 4700 tanks, 170,000 trucks, auto-

<sup>51</sup> Statement by the Foreign Economic Administrator, February 28, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 4, 1944, p. 223.

mobiles, and 25,000 other military machines delivered up to January 1st 44. It also reports that figure of 5,000 planes in 43 was more than double that of the preceding year. Figure of 6 million pairs of army shoes as well as great quantity of provisions for Soviet Army, and aid to liberated areas, including 9,000 tons of seeds, is also reported.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1741 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 2, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received March 3—12: 15 p. m.]

699. For President's Protocol Committee, copies for Hopkins, Stettinius and Crowley. Reference your 407, February 25, 7 p. m., I believe there has been a misunderstanding of my two cables addressed to Hopkins No. 131, January 6 sent through army channels,<sup>52</sup> and No. 138, January 15, 1 p. m., through the State Department. In order to clear up any misunderstanding that may exist please let me restate my recommendations in which General Deane<sup>53</sup> concurs:

1. I did not contemplate that there should be a general screening in Moscow of all requests submitted by the Soviets nor that there should be in any case final decision on our part here as to what should be shipped to the USSR. We had contemplated that our activities should be limited to recommendations on those matters on which we were requested by Washington to express an opinion and to those items which in the light of our general knowledge of the situation here we had reason to believe should be questioned.

2. We had never contemplated that any activity on the part of ourselves here would interfere with the operation of the Soviet Purchasing Committee in Washington or the President's Protocol Committee but only to supplement them. The activity I suggest is the kind of work that I did in London<sup>54</sup> and as a result not only were unnecessary shipments eliminated but information was obtained which substantiated British requests resulting in decisions in Washington to supply urgently needed requirements.

I fully realize that it will be impossible for us ever to get on the basis with Soviet officials that we were on with the British but certainly it is desirable to attempt to break down Russian traditional reluctance to give reasonable information. I believe we can show

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<sup>52</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>53</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>54</sup> Mr. Harriman had served as President Roosevelt's Special Representative to facilitate material aid to the British Empire.

them that by frank and open dealings their own best interests can be served. Some progress along these lines has already been made and I ask for support from Washington in this direction.

3. It will be difficult for us to get information on Soviet requirements unless there is a belief that is established in the minds of Soviet officials that recommendations of myself, General Deane, General Spalding and Admiral Olsen<sup>55</sup> carry weight in Washington.

4. From your cable I understand that you are not in disagreement with what I have stated above. I therefore earnestly ask that you let the Soviet Purchasing Mission in Washington understand that you are depending upon us for our recommendations. I am satisfied that this will open the door to us to obtain desirable information which will save some over-ordering by the Soviets themselves and will generally increase our effectiveness in dealing with other matters of vital importance to the United States.

5. Although I agree that in the past limitations of ocean tonnage have forced the Soviets to give preference to badly needed high priority items and that this has limited the Soviet requests to their more urgent needs I do not feel that this will necessarily continue in the future. The increasing tonnage at their disposal is eating up the backlog of urgent war requirements and we are approaching the period when postwar reconstruction requirements will be merged in with their war needs. I am referring to requests not only for plants but for other supplies as well. Unless we now begin to get at the least some knowledge of the purposes for which they are using our shipments we lay ourselves wide open to just criticism at home. I do not wish to give the impression that I am opposed to shipments to Russia for reconstruction but it seems obvious that we should have reasonable knowledge in regard thereto.

6. We are not suggesting that supplies in general should be traded against the acceptance by the Soviets of requests we present here on instructions from Washington. It is a fact however that in connection with our requests it is the practice of the Soviets to say they will consider them on the basis of reciprocity. We may wish to recommend that in respect to some specific items Soviet requests be held up until the Soviets take action on U. S. requests of a related character in order to carry out the Soviet concept of reciprocity.

7. I would appreciate advice on whether I have made our recommendations clear and whether in principle you approve them.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>55</sup> Rear Adm. Clarence E. Olsen, naval member of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

861.24/1751a

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley) to President Roosevelt*

[WASHINGTON,] March 6, 1944.

We enclose for your consideration a draft of telegram<sup>56</sup> proposing a general line of policy with reference to the Fourth Protocol on Soviet supplies, applicable also to uncompleted parts of the Third Protocol. We may wish to apply this policy in the case of our plans with certain other countries receiving lend-lease aid. At this stage of the war, we cannot assume that the war will stop at any fixed time. We believe, therefore, that we must act and plan as if the war were going on indefinitely, so as to assure the uninterrupted flow of supplies needed for the war. We believe that there should be maintained, however, the present limit (with its exceptions) of eighteen months from the time of presenting a request as the period within which the materials can be delivered and installed.

We propose also, in the interest of an orderly liquidation of the lend-lease program, to enter into separate payment contracts with the lend-lease governments permitting the delivery of the uncompleted parts of such programs on non-lend-lease terms after the termination of hostilities. When regular facilities for post-war credits have been established, it may be that these demobilization contracts could be taken over and refinanced. Certainly these arrangements are not conceived of as in any way a substitute for methods of helping to finance the main job of reconstruction.

If you agree with the purport of this message, we suggest that it be sent to Mr. Harriman in Moscow for his guidance, and given to the Protocol Committee as a policy directive for its immediate use in preparing appropriate schedules of supplies. At the same time, we propose to proceed at once to the negotiation with Soviet representatives in Washington of an appropriate payment-contract under the authority of Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act,<sup>57</sup> supplementing the Master Agreement, to cover the period of possible deliveries on certain categories of the Protocol schedules after the termination of hostilities. In these negotiations we shall, of course, consult with officials of the Treasury Department and keep in close touch with the new Committee on the financing of reconstruction plans as to appropriate credit terms in the contracts.

As soon as these negotiations with the Soviet have taken suitable preliminary shape, we may wish to obtain the advice of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and the Foreign

<sup>56</sup> See telegram 510, March 7, 9 p. m., *infra*.

<sup>57</sup> Approved March 11, 1941; 55 Stat. 31, 32.

Relations Committee of the Senate on the matter. We hope that enough progress can be made to permit a consideration of these problems during the hearings on the extension of the Lend-Lease Act or the appropriations under that Act.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.  
LEO T. CROWLEY

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861.51/3029 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1944—9 p. m.

510. The Department and the Foreign Economic Administrator have given careful attention to the problems of war and postwar needs of the U. S. S. R. for reconstruction which have been the subject of your 506 of February 14, 12 [5] p. m. and other telegrams. The following are our conclusions with respect to policy and procedure:

1. While hostilities continue this Government will accept requisitions for transfer under the master Lend-Lease agreements of considerable amounts of capital goods needed for the improvement, rehabilitation, or reconstruction of transportation, production and other facilities for the fullest and most vigorous prosecution of the war, in liberated areas as in other parts of the Soviet Union. It is proposed that requests for such purposes continue to be handled and screened through the regular mechanism involving the President's Soviet Protocol Committee and that there be maintained the present limit (with its exceptions) of 18 months from the time of presenting a request as the period within which the materials requested can be delivered and installed in the U. S. S. R.

2. Some of this material may not have been delivered at the conclusion of hostilities. Obviously, however, our lend-lease program must assure an uninterrupted flow of supplies needed for the war until hostilities are actually concluded. In order to assure an orderly liquidation of these war programs at the conclusion of hostilities, it is proposed that we request the Russians to agree to take any equipment in certain categories not delivered at the conclusion of hostilities under a separate contract calling for regular payments on terms of interest and amortization to be laid down. In the first instance the powers of Section 3-C of the Lend-Lease Act will be used to permit such contracts. If an appropriate extension of the powers of the Export-Import Bank mentioned below receives Congressional approval, it may be desirable for that bank eventually to enter into

arrangements with Lend-Lease and the U. S. S. R. so that the bank might take over this part of the operation.

3. In the absence of the establishment of a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction and Development, we are considering the possibility of obtaining authority to use the Export-Import Bank for the United States share of the financing of regular reconstruction activities not definable as war essential. This may require, as previously indicated, amendment of the Export-Import Bank legislation both to increase the lending power of the bank and to eliminate default (similar to the Johnson Act) limitations which would stand in the way of extension of credits to the U. S. S. R. and certain other European countries.

4. In order to permit private participation—such as that of private financing institutions and of manufactures of heavy equipment—in the extension of credits to the U. S. S. R. and certain other European countries, it may be necessary to obtain the repeal of the Johnson Act.

5. The Department, the Foreign Economic Administration and other interested agencies are now considering with the President the timing of presentation to the Congress of requests for legislation relating to the Export-Import Bank and the repeal of the Johnson Act. In addition, it is proposed to discuss the use of Section 3-C of the Lend-Lease Act for the purposes mentioned in item 2 above in connection with hearings on the extension of the Lend-Lease Act or the appropriations under it, if these arrangements with the Soviet reach sufficiently tangible form in time. Otherwise, the policy will probably be discussed with the appropriate committees of the Congress before agreements are finally executed.

6. It is proposed to inform the President's Soviet Protocol Committee of the above policy and procedure decisions and to direct that Committee to establish current Soviet Protocol programs with these considerations in mind, authorizing the fullest transfer under Lend-Lease of supplies needed to assure the most vigorous prosecution of the war in and from the Soviet Union.

7. We would appreciate your further views on this and the results of any exploratory talks you may wish to have with Mikoyan on this subject. You may also wish to request Mikoyan promptly to give you two lists of essential data in all possible detail. The first of these lists should be, as a minimum, the billion dollar list suggested in your 334 of February 1, midnight, and it is suggested that careful explanation of the items be presented so that the President's Soviet Protocol Committee can determine how much of this list may be handled by the straight Lend-Lease procedure suggested above. The second list should be a broader list of the projects involved in the 15 year reconstruction program mentioned in your 506, so that this Government



will have an opportunity to consider the amount and types of equipment involved from the point of view of finance, of our productive capacity, and of the general economic and commercial policy implications of such a program.

STETTINIUS

103.9169/2856a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1944—9 p. m.

599. From York,<sup>58</sup> President's Soviet Protocol Committee. Over-all consideration of the following messages from Moscow determined our concept of your proposals: 128 January 4 to Agwar, 131 January 6 to Agwar,<sup>59</sup> 128 January 14 State Department<sup>60</sup> from Deane to Crowley for Wesson,<sup>61</sup> 147 January 17 to Agwar.<sup>62</sup>

Clarification embodied in your 699 March 2 appreciated. It was intended in our 407, February 25 to indicate that when appropriate, we would request from your Mission specific information and recommendations on USSR supply requests. Your comments and recommendations, adverse or favorable, which are based upon your general knowledge of the Soviet situation will be appreciated and will carry weight in the determination of the extent to which we will meet Soviet requests. These objectives possible within framework our 407.

Without doubt there will be cases in which we shall advise the Soviet Purchasing Commission here that your recommendations have been requested and that decision cannot be made until your reply has been received. However, in order to protect your position with the Russians, and at the same time to make it possible to utilize fully your advice and recommendations, it is believed to be unwise to inform the Soviet Purchasing Commission here of all cases in which we have requested your views. We are hopeful that this procedure will effectively demonstrate to the Russians our reliance upon your Mission and that this will open up to you additional channels of information.

Your message indicates a feeling there that shipping limitations will soon become a less critical factor in aid to Russia. Although we are somewhat ahead of the minimum targets under the Third Protocol, we still have unshipped balances under the Second Protocol,

<sup>58</sup> Brig. Gen. John Y. York, Jr., Acting Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee.

<sup>59</sup> Sent to the War Department; neither found in Department files.

<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

<sup>61</sup> Maj. Gen. C. M. Wesson, Director, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration.

<sup>62</sup> Sent to the War Department; not found in Department files.

and we are losing ground due to difficulties of navigation in the Pacific and a rapidly developing scarcity of ships available for the USSR. In our view, shipping, rather than the availability of supplies, will for some time to come remain the limiting factor in our program of aid for the USSR.

Other matters to which you refer it is believed are being covered in messages from FEA and State Department. This cable approved by Stettinius and Crowley. [York.]

HULL

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861.51/3035 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 17, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received March 18—1:40 p. m.]

889. I saw Mikoyan a few days ago and outlined in general terms the program described in your 510, March 7, 9 p. m., for the use of lend-lease for reconstruction projects definable as essential for the war, with an agreement for the Soviet Government to accept equipment undelivered at the conclusion of hostilities under a separate reimbursement contract. I also described the possibility of the Export and Import Bank obtaining Congressional authority to carry on into post war. I did not mention the possibility of a United Nations Bank for Reconstruction participating in this field as I have insufficient information on this subject.

Mikoyan said that he wished to give the program consideration and would discuss it with me again. He said he would be glad to give me, as soon as it was completed, the billion dollar list he was preparing but that he was not yet in position to give me anything on the longer range program. He explained that the billion dollar list included what was urgently needed for delivery up to the end of 1945 and included only items important for the prosecution of the war. He added that if he had accepted all of the requests of the different Commissariats it would have been a very much larger list.

Mikoyan asked whether he understood correctly from what I had said that requests for plant equipment should be submitted through the protocol machinery to which I replied in the affirmative. He asked me why there was a delay in the acceptance of the balance of the 300 million dollar requests already submitted to which I replied that I had no specific information but that I knew there were considerations of acute shortage of labor and productive capacity to carry on our immediate war program.

I would appreciate a prompt cable commenting on this conversation and giving any supplementary information I should have for the next conversation.

I believe you should bear in mind that Mikoyan will probably submit his billion dollar program for consideration in the Fourth Protocol. I do not see how we can foresee now how much of it we may find it advisable to put into production and deliver before the end of 1945. I suggest for your consideration that we do not take a definite position one way or the other on the amount we will accept for production under the Fourth Protocol. The events of the war may develop in such a way that we would be ready to take substantially more or perhaps less than would appear at the moment. Any commitment we took now would have to be a minimum and therefore cause useless argument with and misunderstand[ing] by the Soviet authorities. It would seem therefore that the wise policy would be to screen the list as promptly as feasible after it is received and to indicate to the Soviets that we would accept the approved items for delivery at the earliest time compatible with our interests. We should however begin at once to do engineering work and other preparatory work on the approved items so that we can fit them quickly into our production program at a time when we readjust our program to conform to our own changed requirements. I have in mind that when Germany collapses and we concentrate on the war in the Pacific these Russian orders may be of value to us in relieving dislocations.

In emphasizing the value that these orders might have in keeping in balance our own program, I do not wish to give the impression that I minimize the importance of the program to the Russian war effort which I have expressed in previous cables.

I believe, therefore, that although we should not, at this time make any actual or implied commitment as to time of delivery, we should accept the approved items for delivery at our option and put them into production as our situation permits. Am I right in assuming from your cable that lend-lease has the authority to fulfill such a commitment even for some items the production of which may not have actually started when hostilities end? Please confirm for my information.

Mikoyan may ask me in my next talk what terms we expect for repayment for the items undelivered at the termination of hostilities. Please confirm my assumption that these terms would be negotiated in Washington.

In reply to your inquiry, I feel the suggested program is soundly conceived and, if implemented by reasonably early legislation expanding the authority of the Export and Import Bank as suggested, will competently deal with the problem to the mutual advantage of both

countries. I am not clear, however, about the International Bank for Reconstruction in this connection and will cable you further on this aspect.

HARRIMAN

861.24/1760a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—noon [–2 p. m.]

625 [–627]. From Department and Foreign Economic Administration. Referring to previous cables about the Russian war aid and reconstruction programs, particularly our 510 of March 7, we should like after receiving your views and the results of any exploratory talks you may wish to have with Mikoyan on the subject to present to the Russian representatives in Washington substantially the following draft agreements:

AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

RECITALS

1. The Government of the United States has provided, and is continuing to provide, vital war supplies, services and information to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Act of Congress of the United States of March 11, 1941, as amended, and pursuant to the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942 between these two Governments.

2. The Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desire to insure the continued flow of such supplies, services and information required for the war program of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics without interruption due to uncertainty as to the date when active military operations against the common enemy will cease; and desire to insure further that supplies maintained in inventory or procurement in the United States for the purpose of providing war aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be disposed of, following the cessation of active military operations against the common enemy, in an orderly manner which will best promote their mutual interests.

For the purpose of attaining the above stated objectives, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree as follows:

AGREEMENT

*Article I*

The Government of the United States, in a Protocol signed on October 19, 1943 by that Government and the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and Canada,

undertook to make available certain war supplies for dispatch to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period from July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1944.

The Government of the United States agrees that, except as otherwise provided in this agreement, transfers to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of supplies which the United States has heretofore agreed to make available in order to provide war aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and which shall be exported or otherwise transferred prior to a determination by the President of the United States that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, shall be made under the terms of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942. The provisions of this Article may be extended to future protocols or agreements by mutual agreement.

### *Article II*

The Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after a determination by the President of the United States that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to accept, those supplies included in the categories set forth in Schedule I<sup>63</sup> annexed to this Agreement which the United States shall have agreed to make available in order to provide aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, prior to said determination of the President, shall have contracted for or shall have in inventory, and which shall not have been exported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prior to said determination;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars the full cost of the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, and interest thereon at the rate of . . . percent per annum from the date of transfer. The first payment of . . . % of the principal due shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . years from the date of said determination by the president, and payment of the balance of the principal shall be made within the succeeding . . . . years in accordance with Schedule II<sup>64</sup> attached. Payment of interest due shall be made annually from the date of transfer.

Additional categories may be added to the categories in Schedule I from time to time prior to said determination by the President by the mutual agreement of the parties. When so added, the financial arrangements set forth in this Article shall apply.

### *Article III*

The Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accept, such items of industrial equipment required in its programs of war production as have a lengthy production cycle and a long period of useful life as may be

<sup>63</sup> For text, see p. 1091.

<sup>64</sup> Apparently merged with Schedule I; see p. 1094.

mutually agreed upon from time to time and as may be contracted for prior to the determination by the President that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars the full cost of the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, and interest thereon at the rate of . . . percent per annum from the date of transfer. The first payment of . . . % of the principal due shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . . . years from the date of transfer and payment of the balance of the principal shall be made within the succeeding . . . . . years in accordance with Schedule III [II?] attached. Payment of interest due shall be made annually from the date of transfer.

#### *Article IV*

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released from its obligation to accept supplies under the provisions of Articles II and III upon the payment to the Government of the United States of any net losses to the United States, including contract cancellation charges, resulting from the determination of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not to accept such supplies.

Delivery of any supplies under the provisions of Article I, II, and III may be cancelled without cost to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if the President of the United States shall determine that the security of the United States so requires.

#### *Article V*

The Government of the United States agrees that the provisions of Article V of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942, shall not apply to supplies made available to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the provisions of Article II or III of this Agreement.

#### *Article VI*

Nothing in this Agreement shall modify or otherwise affect the final determination, under the Act of March 11, 1941, as amended, and the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942, of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics receives aid, except for the aid made available under the provisions of Article II and III of this Agreement. [*End of Agreement*] <sup>65</sup>

(1) This proposed agreement does not involve any modification of the Third Protocol provisions. In fact, Article I specifically states that the U. S. will continue shipments under the Third Protocol after June 30, 1944, so long as the war continues.

(2) This proposed agreement would permit us to continue with a full scale procurement program of industrial equipment and supplies for the Russian war program and would reduce the danger of being

<sup>65</sup> Brackets appear in the original telegram.

caught with a large quantity of such supplies in procurement or inventory at the end of the war. It is not intended, of course, to propose that the Russians buy munitions or even food from us after the war is over unless they want to and we felt that munitions or food should be supplied. Schedule I mentioned in Article II of the agreement is intended to include only agreed types of equipment and supplies which may have both a war and a post-war use. Except for certain types of long-range industrial plant facilities, which are covered in Article III, we intend to maintain and use the present 18 months' rule under Article II for industrial equipment required in the War. This list can be added to from time to time if and when additional supplies become available and the Russians want them on the same principle. It is possible that as the supply becomes less short on particular items procured under Lend-Lease that such additions may be made. It is also possible that motor vehicles and industrial items procured by the War Department for its own use may, because of changes in the war or supply situation, be available for such additions. As you know such items procured from direct appropriations to the War and Navy Departments can be transferred under the Lend-Lease Act and the transfer of such items as may be agreed upon is provided for in the proposed agreement.

(3) Article III concerns certain classes of long-range industrial equipment with a long potential post-war use as well as a war use. We have already received extensive requests from the Soviet representatives for such equipment, but approval is being delayed on some of them until the financial arrangements are determined under which they are to be supplied. The types of equipment to be furnished under this Article will, of course, depend upon questions of policy to be decided within the U.S. Government and upon negotiations with the Russians. For example, if it is decided that Russia needs certain equipment which takes longer than 18 months to manufacture, ship and install, we may want to use the arrangement under Article III to supply it. As a matter of fact, items such as refinery equipment, and plant equipment generally, have in the past usually required more than 18 months to manufacture, ship and install. Also, in the case of equipment which takes less than 18 months but which has a relatively long potential post-war life, we may want to supply this to the Russians under Article III instead of under Article II. Although this equipment has a war use if it arrives before the war is over, its peace time use is likely to be so extensive that we think it fair to propose that the Soviet agree to pay us for it regardless of the date of shipment.

(4) It is our thought, based on the experience of the Export-Import Bank and the possible effect on post-war trade relations with the USSR and other countries, that the rates of interest and the terms of pay-

ment relating to transfers under Articles II and III should be somewhat as follows:

The problem of rates of interest and rates of repayment is under active discussion here with representatives of the Treasury. We thought it would be useful for you to have the general structure of the proposed agreement before you for discussion, in order to obtain a more concrete expression of Russian views on the problem of repayment, of interest rates and of amortization. For your own information, opinion here considers it feasible to propose the same rate of return and of repayment for the schedules under Article II and Article III, with relatively long periods of amortization. We are tending to think of a return linked to the present rate on U.S. Government long-term securities, somewhere between 2-1/2% and 3%.

(5) We would appreciate your detailed views on the draft agreement and the rates of interest and terms of payment. [Department and Foreign Economic Administration.]

HULL

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861.51/3037: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 23, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received March 24—11:25 a. m.]

996. For the Department and FEA. Reference is made to Department's Nos. 625, 626 and 627 of March 18 and to my 889 March 17, 8 p. m., reporting my preliminary conversations with Mikoyan and commenting on Department's 510, March 7, 9 p. m. My further comments below are supplementary to my No. 889 and please read them together.

In my talk with Mikoyan I discussed only the idea expressed in article 2 of proposed agreement and did not explain the concept of article 3. I heartily endorse the concept of article 3 as I recognize it will give greater flexibility in accepting justifiable Soviet requests for items which appear to have a minimum war value and a maximum post war value, as you have described them. I will describe the concept of article 3 to Mikoyan next time I see him.

As to terms of repayment and interest rates under articles 2 and 3, I have already expressed my preliminary opinion in my No. 68, January 9, 1 p. m. In my 334, February 1, 11 p. m. [*midnight*], I transmitted Mikoyan's suggestion which I consider as his initial trading position. You will note that I proposed to you a credit for from 5 to 30 years at an interest rate of between 2 and 3 percent and repayment beginning 5 years from termination of hostilities in annual



installments, whereas Mikoyan suggested an interest rate of one half of one percent and payment beginning with the 16th year in equal annual installments over 20 years thereafter.

I agree with your suggestion of an interest rate approximating the present rate of US Government long term securities.

I believe it well to ask the Soviets to begin repayment at the end of 5 years as I believe it important to establish at an early date the habit of repayment. We might well however agree to small initial payments and subsequent larger payments. I do not feel in position to recommend a definite period for full repayment but recommend that the longest period justifiable be offered.

As a suggestion, it might be agreed that the Soviets:

- (1) Pay annually an amount equaling the interest on the original figure due and, as amortization payments are made, the saving in interest be credited to amortization of principal; and,

- (2) Make amortization payments of 1 percent during the 6th through 10th years, 2 percent during the 11th through 15th years, and from the 16th year on amortization at an annual rate sufficient to repay the principal by the end of 30 years after hostilities have terminated.

I believe that the detailed terms of this proposed agreement, including financial terms, should be negotiated in Washington. I believe it would be useful and facilitate the Washington negotiations if I continued to condition Mikoyan to our basic conceptions without making any commitments. I will therefore tell him on the next occasion that interest rates should, in my opinion, be linked with the present rate on US long term securities, without entering into an argument with him over this question. I believe it would also be helpful if you would indicate your preliminary thinking on amortization.

As to my general reaction to your draft agreement, I like it in principle but do not feel that I can say much more at this time as so much depends upon the interpretation of what classes of supplies are to be included under articles 2 and 3. I agree that we should not be committed to supply, or the Soviets be committed to accept, munitions generally or food on the termination of hostilities. I agree that we should have a free hand in determining whether we want to continue to ship these items. On the other hand items such as motor vehicles, tractors and railroad rolling stock should, I believe, come under article 2, whereas certain industrial equipment including railroad equipment such as block signals might be considered applicable to either article 2 or article 3 depending on their character, use and speed of delivery and installation. I have not given enough thought to raw materials to express an opinion at this time but would appreciate having your views.

I feel your approach is sound to reach an agreement with the Soviets as to the classification of each category of item between the articles of the proposed agreement as well as to provide that categories can be added from time to time. I assume that in the case of industrial equipment agreement would have to be reached on each item as to its classification at the time it is up for final acceptance.

It is my desire to be as helpful as I can and I would therefore much appreciate being kept informed of developments in your thinking.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3035 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*<sup>67</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1944—10 p. m.

766. After consultation with the Treasury and other interested agencies we suggest the following terms of interest and amortization, in connection with the supplemental Lend-Lease agreement referred to in the Department's 510 of March 7 and 625, 626 and 627 of March 18, and your 889 of March 17, 8:00 p. m. and 996 of March 23, 1 p. m.:

(a) The same terms would apply to both Articles II and III.

(b) The rate of interest would be set at the average rate of carrying costs on the United States public debt plus  $\frac{1}{8}$  of 1 percent. Under the present circumstances the interest rate would thus be set at 2.1 percent. The Soviet Government would be notified in December of any given year of the rate applicable to the ensuing year. This procedure would assure our public that the cost of the credits advanced to the U.S.S.R. is fully paid and it would assure the U.S.S.R. that it would be getting the best terms which this Government could afford.

(c) Amortization—There would be a 3-year period of grace followed by a 20-year period of amortization.

(d) On Article II materials, interest and amortization would be dated from the date of transfer of the goods. On Article III materials, interest and amortization would be dated from the date of transfer of the materials except in the case of those materials transferred before a determination by the President that active military operations against the common enemy had ceased. For the latter goods, interest and amortization would be dated from the time of such determination.

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<sup>67</sup> Acknowledging this telegram, Ambassador Harriman replied in telegram 1175, April 4, 2 p. m., that he would not attempt to negotiate the matters mentioned with Commissar Mikoyan but would attempt to prepare his mind, if a favorable opportunity arose, for negotiations in Washington (861.51/3040).

The  $\frac{1}{8}$  of 1 percent to be included in the rate of interest charged the Soviet Government covers fees and other charges and costs incidental to handling the United States public debt.

It should be carefully noted that the suggested terms of interest and amortization under the supplemental Lend-Lease agreement are entirely distinct from terms which might be laid down by the Export-Import Bank, an international investment bank, or private financial organizations for financing of post-war reconstruction and development.

(e) As for the \$300 million worth of industrial equipment which we agreed to consider in connection with the Third Protocol in order to insure a constant flow of such supplies for the Russian war program, we have approved about \$180 million worth, not all of which is yet in procurement. Additions to this amount will be considered in the near future, but it is not expected that the production and especially the shipping situation will permit putting into production before June 30, 1944, the full \$300 million worth, nor is it felt that this is necessary to insure a constant flow of industrial equipment to the USSR. As you know, while aggregate shipments of all items during the Third Protocol period will probably greatly exceed the Protocol schedule, notwithstanding this, large quantities of industrial equipment will be on hand and on order June 30, 1944—enough to meet all that can be shipped for 8 to 12 months, exclusive of locomotives and flatcars.

(f) Your suggestion about handling industrial items in the negotiation of the Fourth Protocol is being carefully considered. We agree on the desirability of such contracts for our economy and our future trade relations with the Soviet, although we wish to avoid giving any firm or group of firms either a monopoly of trade with the Soviet or an unduly preferred position in that trade. For war production, however, we believe that contracts must be placed for all practicable items as rapidly as possible, and we emphasize that all items considered under this program must be part of the Soviet programs of war production.

(g) While we are unable to forecast specifically the amount of funds which will be available under Article III of the proposed agreement beyond the coming year, our best estimate for the next 15 months is between \$300 and \$500 million, with possible variations in either direction as need may appear, and the military, shipping and production situations warrant.

HULL

861.51/3028 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 1, 1944—6 p. m.

773. With further reference to the preparation of the proposed agreement under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act for submission in Washington to the Soviet Ambassador,<sup>68</sup> we should appreciate your views on two further questions.

Is it too soon to estimate whether the Russians will wish to have substantial quantities of food included in the schedules under Article II, or of raw materials?

With reference to raw materials, which have a rapid turnover, our interest is not as great in having the Russians agree to accept and pay for such items under Article II, with the possible exception of steel in a form adapted to post-war use. However, if the Russians desire that any such items be included in the list, we shall consider each case on its merits.

Along the lines suggested by you in your cable to Hopkins of February 9, we contemplate that another article might perhaps be incorporated in the proposed agreement providing for repayment for inventories of unused lend-lease supplies in the USSR at the end of the war where such items have a post-war use and we do not desire to exercise our right of recapture. The list of supplies to be covered by such an article would resemble the list of supplies under Article II, except that it may include additional items such as raw materials for which the Russians might be willing to pay because they are on hand ready for use. An article of this sort would be to our advantage since the recapture of most of these supplies would present practical difficulties and would be uneconomical, and their return to the United States would interfere with new production here. It would be advantageous to the USSR since, if we waive our recapture rights, these supplies will provide a readily available source for immediate relief and reconstruction needs.

Is it practicable in any sense for the Russians to determine their inventories of lend-lease supplies at the end of the war, or would a preferable approach be to include supplies shipped within a fixed number of months preceding the President's determination that hostilities against the common enemy have ceased?

In answer to your inquiry, Lend-Lease has authority under Section 3(c) of the Act to fulfill a commitment to a foreign government to deliver after the end of hostilities an item which has not been actually contracted for by that time, provided that the contract of manufacture

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<sup>68</sup> Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

is entered into before the expiration of the Lend-Lease Appropriation. It is contemplated in the Agreement, however, that we would, with possible exceptions necessary to complete specific projects begun, limit our commitment to deliver, and the commitment of the USSR to accept and pay, to items actually contracted for before the President's determination that hostilities have ceased.

HULL

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861.24/1767a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1944—9 p. m.

800. War Food Administration has asked Department for advice on matters affecting 1945 goals for United States food production, for the most part to be consumed in 1946. We assume that "basic essential needs" of Russia for food imports will remain unchanged through 1946 irrespective of status of hostilities. Do you feel this assumption valid?

Based on this assumption, your judgment is requested on following question. To what extent would Soviets change requisition for food shipments from United States in 1945 and 1946 from present level:

(1) If lend-lease financing stops without further credit arrangements.

(2) If arrangements are made under section 3(c) of lend-lease agreement as contemplated by recent telegrams.

HULL

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861.51/3041 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, April 5, 1944—8 a. m.

[Received April 6—2:45 p. m.]

1179. Reference your 773, April 1, 6 p. m., regarding proposed agreement under section 3(c) of Lend-Lease Act for submission in Washington to the Soviet Ambassador:

I have not seen Mikoyan since my last cable and therefore the answers to your two questions are my present best guess.

I feel it is too soon to estimate whether the Russians will wish to have substantial quantities of food included in schedules under article II as so much depends on when hostilities end. Preliminary information indicates that the Germans fostered cultivation during the autumn and winter in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and I am

told by observers that relatively little damage was done to crops or facilities in their withdrawal. I intend to discuss with Mikoyan the next time I see him what effect the liberated areas will have on the Russian food situation after the 1944 and after the 1945 crops.

As to raw materials, I would think that the Soviets will have a different attitude towards different types of materials and therefore think your idea of considering each item on its merits is wise. I would think that considering our own interests we would wish to put as many semi-fabricated materials as feasible in the schedules under article II.

I believe the Russians will think that the price of raw materials will go down after the war and they will probably try to be sharp in their trading on price in connection with all raw materials included in the schedules.

In answer to your question regarding the contemplated article providing for repayment of inventories of unused lend-lease supplies of such items as have a post-war use left in Russia at the end of the war, off hand I can't think of any item which we would wish to repatriate providing the Russians would buy it at a reasonable price. I had presumed the recapture clause would be used as a lever in negotiation for reasonable payment for useable items. I would think that any definition at this time which would commit the Soviets to pay for any items they had in stock would be desirable.

I believe that it would be practicable for the Russians to determine approximately their inventories of lend-lease supplies at the end of the war, but there would be absolutely no way for us to check any part of their statements. Also there would be difficulties in coming to an agreement as to what constituted inventory—steel that was being processed for tanks might be of value for scrap only whereas steel being processed for structural purposes might be 100% useable. From our standpoint therefore it would be better, I would think, to provide for repayment for supplies in categories useable in post-war shipped within a certain number of months prior to the termination of hostilities. The period might vary with different categories. I would think that the more items for which a formula for settlement can be arrived at now, the better.

It is difficult to generalize. Of one thing only can I be certain, and that is that the Soviets will bargain to the last dollar and I feel that we will be able to protect our interests better by reaching an agreement now if practicable rather than waiting till after the war.

HARRIMAN

861.51/3046: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 19, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received April 20—2:15 p. m.]

1361. My oral statement of March 11,<sup>69</sup> reference my immediately preceding telegram,<sup>70</sup> reads in paraphrase as follows:

1. Soviet requests for transfer of what is possible (under the Lend-Lease Act and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement) of equipment needed for the improvement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of transport, production, and other facilities in liberated areas and in other parts of the USSR which is useful for the fullest and most vigorous prosecution of the war will be given consideration while hostilities continue. Acceptance of requests under the limited authority of Lend-Lease will have to be confined, as at the present time, to those which can be delivered and installed in the USSR within a justifiable period of time.

2. At the conclusion of hostilities some of the material for these projects may not have been delivered. Obviously, however, the lend-lease program must assure until hostilities are actually concluded an uninterrupted flow of supplies needed for the war. Simultaneously an orderly carrying out of these war programs at the conclusion of hostilities should be assured. With these considerations in mind it is proposed that the Soviet Government undertake to accept all equipment in agreed-upon categories which is not delivered at the conclusion of hostilities under a separate contract calling for repayment on terms of interest and amortization to be agreed upon.

3. There is no agency of the U.S. Government at the present time which is empowered to finance projects for reconstruction not definable as essential for the war. For this reason there is being given consideration to securing legislation for increasing the lending powers of the Export-Import Bank and to eliminating certain limitations which now [stand in the way of extending credit to the Soviet Union and to certain other European]<sup>71</sup> countries.

4. I have been asked to obtain from you in connection with the above a list of items included in the billion dollar program which you mentioned to me some weeks ago, and also as much information as is available on subsequent requirements for the projects in connection with your long-range reconstruction program which you have in mind. I would appreciate receiving this information or any part thereof as soon as possible since it will be most helpful in connection with developing in the United States a program to deal with Soviet requirements in the most effective manner possible.

Mikoyan's oral statement of April 18 reads in paraphrased translation as follows:

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<sup>69</sup> Statement left with Commissar Mikoyan by Ambassador Harriman during conversation reported in his telegram 889, March 17, 8 p. m., p. 1063.

<sup>70</sup> Not printed.

<sup>71</sup> Corrected on basis of copy in Moscow Embassy files, Lot 53-F 11, Box 2.

The Ambassador's statement made March 11 during the last meeting, setting forth the United States position with respect to the delivery to the Soviet Union of equipment needed for the improvement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of transport, industry and other facilities, has been brought to the attention of the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government has noted with satisfaction the Ambassador's statement to the effect that the United States Government in the period prior to the termination of hostilities against the common enemy will deliver to the USSR, according to the Lend-Lease Act and the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, equipment necessary for the improvement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of transport, industry, and other facilities in the liberated areas and in other parts of the USSR and useful for the fullest and most energetic prosecution of the war.

From the Ambassador's statement, the Soviet Government expects that Soviet orders for delivery from the United States of the above-mentioned equipment will be treated most favorably.

The Soviet Government agrees with the proposal of the United States Government to the effect that all equipment in agreed-upon categories not delivered upon the termination of hostilities will be accepted by the Soviet Government on conditions which will be established in an agreement between the two Governments and will be subject to regular payment of principal and interest.

The Soviet Government, in accordance with the desire of the American Government which has been communicated by the Ambassador, will transmit to the United States Government, as soon as the data are prepared, information regarding further requirements for the effecting of the long-range reconstruction plans.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1769 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 19, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received April 20—11:50 a. m.]

1363. I do not believe that the assumption expressed in Department's 800, April 4, 9 p. m., that "basic essential needs of Russia for food imports will remain unchanged through 1946 irrespective of status of hostilities", is valid.

You have doubtless by now received the Soviet Fourth Protocol request which shows a very large decrease in cereals over the Third Protocol, a substantial decrease in sugar and concentrates and a renewed request for more canned meats than we have been able to give them, other categories remaining about the same.

Regardless of the status of hostilities, I believe that the food import requirements will be further reduced after the crop of 1945 than



requested for the Fourth Protocol and very considerably less after the crop of 1946. Please note I am not speaking of calendar years.

After the first crop subsequent to the end of hostilities against Germany, I believe the return of men from the army to the farms and the release of production for increase of farm equipment will substantially reduce food import requirements. If lend-lease financing stops without further credit arrangements, Soviet food requests will be kept to a minimum and, even if arrangements are made under section 3(c) of Lend-Lease Agreement, Soviet policy will be to limit their requests, as their policy will be to use credit facilities for capital equipment and they will not wish to build up a large external debt except for this purpose. It is impossible at this time to give any accurate figures on the above. I have discussed the question generally with Mikoyan and my statements are based on this conversation. He stated that the grain and vegetable oil import requirements after the 1945 crop would be substantially less. There would be substantial production of sugar in the Ukraine in 1945 but little in 1944. Increased production in Russia of meat and animal fats would naturally be slower. He stated he would be in better position to give me more information in July. He observed of course that so much depended upon the weather that no forecast could be accurately made for the 1945 and 1946 crops.

He explained that they were hopeful of obtaining substantial quantities of grain from the liberated areas in the Ukraine this year. As previously reported, preliminary information indicates that the Germans fostered agriculture in the Ukraine west of the Dnieper and the withdrawal was so fast that little damage was done to the crops although many sugar beet factories were destroyed. Further, according to public statements of Soviet officials, the country, not considering areas liberated last autumn and winter, is better prepared for 1944 farm work than last year and, given normal weather, should yield an increase over that of last year.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3043 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1944—9 p. m.

999. Your 1297 April 15.<sup>72</sup> During the past 4 months there have appeared periodic news stories reporting the formulation of plans to sell approximately a billion dollars worth of goods a year to the

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<sup>72</sup> Not printed ; it requested information about the bases for public reports.

Soviet Union for the first 10 years after the war. Some of these reports have contained the erroneous statement that there was a secret Soviet trade mission here negotiating for this business. The origin of these reports is not known.

The Department has recently learned, however, that the various firms have been discussing with Amtorg<sup>73</sup> or the Purchasing Commission plans for postwar exports to the Soviet Union. It is known that Dupont is on the point of signing a technical assistance contract for the manufacture of synthetic rubber which calls for a minimum payment of \$400,000 a year, and the Standard Alcohol Company concluded a contract with the Commissariat for the Rubber Industry which calls for a minimum annual payment of \$82,000. Westinghouse is negotiating with the Purchasing Commission for the sale of two aviation engine testing units costing \$3,100,000 which are to be delivered in about 1946. It is also known that General Electric, International Standard Electric and RCA are also discussing postwar trade with Soviet officials here.

It is possible that information regarding these negotiations has inspired the various news reports on postwar Soviet trade.

HULL

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861.24/1771 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 22, 1944.

[Received April 23—1:20 a. m.]

1396. I have given the following statement to the American press in Moscow concerning my recent trip to the northern ports "Press statement re north Russian trip":

I have recently returned from a trip with Admiral Olsen to the north Russian ports of Murmansk and Archangel. These ports were very active discharging a large number of American and British merchant ships. I found that this work was efficiently organized. The cargoes were being discharged with care and speed 24 hours a day. The workmen were both civilian and military. Women were working with the men. Many of the ships' winches were handled by women. Young boys were doing some of the lighter work such as sewing up damaged bags. I found all of them working with energy and spirit.

The records show the speed of discharge has constantly improved and it is now at a pace that any port might be proud of particularly considering the handicaps under which they were working. The cargo was carefully distributed on the docks and the ports were being cleared rapidly by the railroad.

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<sup>73</sup> Amtorg Trading Corporation, official purchasing and sales agency in the United States of the Soviet Union, New York City.

Murmansk has been subjected to intensive bombing by the Germans. Much of the living quarters of the town have been destroyed. The Russians now have superiority in the air and strong antiaircraft defenses.

This far northern port of Murmansk, way above the Arctic circle, is one of the important supply routes for the Soviet Union. The battle to keep this port in operation has been a great achievement and when the full account of Murmansk can be told it will be one of the dramatic stories of the war.

Captain S. B. Frankel, USN, Senior United States Naval Officer in the north who has been there from the early days, gave me a dramatic account of the fight to keep open this supply line vital to the Red Army.

At Archangel where I met our naval officer Lt. [Commander] J. H. Harshaw, USN, the Soviets are carrying on the work of the port in spite of difficult ice conditions through their highly skillfull operation of ice breakers. Here I met the famous arctic explorer Rear Admiral I. D. Papanin,<sup>74</sup> who is now in charge of the Arctic Sea routes. Among other responsibilities he directs the operation of the ice breakers and he took me for a trip on one of them.

I talked with a number of our ship masters and seamen and there were two things that stood out in their impressions. About their voyage to the north they expressed admiration for the British escorts that had successfully protected them against many submarine attacks. Not one ship in the convoy had been damaged and they saw a number of attacks on German submarines. On arrival in the Russian port the first impression which they told me about was the energy and speed with which the discharge of their ships was being tackled including heavy lifts such as locomotives and tanks. Those who had been there before spoke of the improvement that had taken place since their previous visit.

While at Murmansk I visited the naval base of Polyarnoye. Admiral A. G. Golovko,<sup>75</sup> Commander of the Northern Fleet, showed me through the facilities developed just prior to the war and took me on board Soviet ships. He spoke highly of certain American built craft that had been obtained from the United States under Lend-Lease and described the effective use that they were being put to against the enemy submarines and shipping. The Germans obtain nickel from the Finnish port of Petsamo and the interference to the shipments of nickel to Germany is an important contribution to the war being made by the Soviet forces operating the far north. In this the Red Air Force plays an important part. Lt. General Andreev<sup>76</sup> of the Red Air Force showed me American built aircraft operating along with their own aircraft from Murmansk bases which had been skillfully and ingeniously adapted to the special task to be performed. He was high in his praise of these American aircraft, Bostons and Airacobras, and told me of the successes the Soviet forces had had with them.

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<sup>74</sup> Ivan Dmitriyevich Papanin, head of the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route.

<sup>75</sup> Arseny Grigoryevich Golovko, Commander in Chief of the Northern Fleet.

<sup>76</sup> Alexander Kharitonovich Andreev, Commander of the the Naval Air Force in the area of Murmansk.

Operations and maintenance are being conducted under difficult conditions, weather, snow and cold.

At Archangel I was taken to naval headquarters by Vice Admiral S. C. Kucherov,<sup>77</sup> Commander of the White Sea flotilla. He told me of the valuable addition American built naval craft had been to his command in his operations in attacking submarines and protecting shipping.

In the far north there is little if any agriculture and therefore all food must be shipped in. I met the Mayors of the two cities who told me of the value American food, particularly fats and meat so necessary to maintain energy in the cold climate, has been to their people. Part of the food coming from the United States had been allocated to them by the Soviet Government.

Everyone in the north, civilians and military alike, expressed appreciation for the direct assistance that United States equipment had been to them and for the volume of supplies which they had seen passing through the ports going south to the Red Army and the Russian people.

I returned to Moscow with admiration for the competence of the Soviet organization and the spirit of the people in the north. I received direct evidence of the value of American equipment and supplies to Soviet forces and the effective use to which our equipment is put. All information that I asked for was given me and I was received with great hospitality and cordiality by everyone I met.

I traveled in an American built Douglas transport skillfully handled by a Soviet crew. Traveling between Murmansk and Archangel the plane was escorted by a number of Red Air Force fighters.

HARRIMAN

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861.51/3045 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944—6 p. m.

1022. Reference your 1360 of April 19<sup>78</sup> and earlier telegrams. The agreement for the orderly liquidation of certain parts of the lend-lease program will soon be submitted to the Russians here in much the original form reported to you in our 625, 626 and 627 of March 18. A copy of the agreement as submitted and the note accompanying it<sup>79</sup> will be sent you by air pouch.

The provision calling for the Russian purchase of inventories of lend-lease supplies in the Soviet Union after the war discussed in our 773 of April 1 has been omitted at this time. It was decided to take up that question, and the cognate matter of the disposal after the war of installations of lend-lease origin, in a separate agreement

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<sup>77</sup> Rear Adm. Stepan Grigoryevich Kucherov.

<sup>78</sup> Not printed.

<sup>79</sup> See *aide-mémoire* to the Embassy of the Soviet Union, p. 1087.

to be proposed within the next few months, if further intensive study of the factual side of these problems supports such a course, both for the British and the Soviet lend-lease programs.

An identical agreement under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act is expected to be submitted shortly to the British.

HULL

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861.24/1780: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1944—10 p. m.

1126. 1. We agree with you that supplies for use in the liberated areas of the Soviet Union during the course of the war can be supplied on lend-lease terms under the Protocol and that no attempt should be made to enter into a separate commitment for such supplies or to segregate them. As suggested in your 669 of February 28,<sup>80</sup> such supplies can be included by the Russians in preparing the Fourth Protocol. Consequently, all United States participation in furnishing supplies will be through lend-lease financing as military aid. Such a procedure would of course be followed only in the active military period.

2. As long as the only means of access to Eastern Europe is through Soviet inlets and transport facilities limit the volume of Protocol shipments that can be made, we would not initiate any proposals to provide supplies directly to governments of non-Soviet liberated areas if the practical result would be to reduce Protocol shipments. However, we would wish to offer any feasible direct assistance to those countries. For instance, we would be sympathetic to any arrangement the Czechs might be able to make with the Soviet Union which would allow shipment of Lend-Lease supplies via Soviet inlets for Czech account for use in Czechoslovakia. When supply routes have opened up and recognized indigenous governments have been constituted in non-Soviet areas, the whole problem of supplies for such areas will, of course, be open to reconsideration.

3. It is not contemplated that UNRRA<sup>81</sup> will act in non-Soviet areas until it can make arrangements satisfactory to it for the transportation of its supplies and the necessary personnel. The Czechs in London have asked UNRRA whether it could at a future date replace supplies which the Soviet Government might have previously made available to liberated areas of Czechoslovakia. This is not

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<sup>80</sup> Not printed.

<sup>81</sup> United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; for correspondence on participation by the United States in the work of UNRRA, see vol. II, pp. 331 ff.

feasible both because of the practical difficulties of accounting and supervision and because of the doubt as to whether UNRRA funds could be used to replace relief supplies previously furnished by another. It might also violate the principle that UNRRA funds are not to be used to finance relief administered as a part of military operations.

You should not yet discuss these matters with the Soviet Government but your telegraphed comments on the principles stated above would be welcomed.<sup>82</sup>

HULL

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861.51/3049

*Memorandum by the Associate Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Phelps) to the Chief of the Division (Collado)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1944.

Ambassador Harriman, in general, approved the course which is being followed in relation to proposed Lend-Lease settlements with Russia. It was stated that an attempt is being made to determine the magnitude of the installations for which payment may be requested. This information will probably be available within the next six weeks or two months. Ambassador Harriman stated that in his opinion the magnitude would be so great that payment would interfere with the ordinary development of trade and, therefore, that the settlements should be very generous. He thought that every attempt should be made to avoid long negotiations in relation to Lend-Lease and that the terms should be just as definite as possible. Perhaps some arrangement should be made whereby only installations which had been made from importations after a given date should be considered for settlement. He evidently was willing to press for Lend-Lease settlements quickly but saw no reason for rushing matters if they were not to be considered in the fourth protocol now under discussion. The question was raised as to securing material for rehabilitation under Lend-Lease. Ambassador Harriman stated that he had noted to Mr. Mikoyan that this was the only manner at present in which materials for installations could be secured in as much as no funds were available from the Export-Import Bank and direct loans were forbidden under the Johnson Act. He said that he hoped the Department would do everything possible to press for additional funds for the Export-Import Bank and for repeal of the Johnson

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<sup>82</sup> The Chargé in the Soviet Union, Maxwell M. Hamilton, in telegram 1606, May 8, 1944, 9 p. m., indicated that it was assumed that questions concerning relief supplies would be discussed with Ambassador Harriman, who was soon to be temporarily in Washington (861.24/1779).

Act. It was noted by Mr. Bohlen that General Electric was thinking in terms of 8½ percent on the loan needed for procurement of equipment for the Dnieper Dam. He is following the policy of stating to representatives of concerns interested in furnishing equipment to Russia that although the Department has no policy objections to negotiations, nevertheless, it would like to be informed in advance of any actual contracts for materials and equipment. He recognizes the fact that there is no legal basis for obtaining such information. He said that representatives of various companies with whom he had spoken were very willing to provide such information to the Department.

D[UDLEY] M. P[HELPS]

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861.24/5-2344

*Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Harriman),  
Temporarily in the United States*<sup>83</sup>

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Lend-Lease Settlement

1. If we intend to make any post-war claims with reference to the lend-lease supplies we are providing the Soviet Union, it is essential that we explain our policy to the Russians during the war. Any presentation of unanticipated claims afterwards would seriously threaten the continuance of good relations. While it may not be possible to have a formal lend-lease settlement at this time, it might be feasible for me to explore the subject with the Soviet representatives at some appropriate moment in the evolution of our relations with them, and to set forth the general principles which in your view should govern in the final settlement.

2. We are concerned with two broad categories of supplies:

(a) Lend-lease supplies destroyed, lost or consumed during the war. As I read the Master Agreement, your various statements on the subject, and the 1943 Reports of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I assume there would be no financial claim for such articles. They represent an integral part of our own war effort.

(b) Lend-lease supplies left over in the Soviet Union at the end of hostilities. These fall into three categories: (1) stocks of military supplies; (2) consumable supplies of use to the civilian economy of the Soviet Union; and (3) installations and capital equipment of a productive nature which will have a permanent post-war value to Soviet industry. I think that category (3) raises the chief problem.

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<sup>83</sup> Prepared on May 19 but not dated or sent; see memorandum of May 23, p. 1087.

We have the option of asking for the return of supplies furnished under lend-lease. If you wish to request some appropriate benefits, direct or indirect, as compensation for the post-war value of those supplies which we do not want returned in any one or more of the three categories listed above, I think we should make the point to the Russians as soon as our position can be formulated in detail. It should be noted in this connection that under the Liquidation Agreements now proposed, with your approval, the Russians will undertake to make substantial post-war payments for equipment supplied for long-range projects and for the purchase of lend-lease supplies undelivered at the end of hostilities. Additional payments for lend-lease supplies would, I believe, be a serious burden to our post-war trade with them.

(c) If, on the other hand, you wish ultimately to wipe the slate clean as to all of the categories in paragraph (b), discussions with the Soviet Government on the matter might be held in abeyance for possible use in the conversations on post-war trade policy under Article VII of the Master Agreement. Article VII is a commitment on both sides to seek the expansion of trade and production, through appropriate international and domestic measures. Our expectations under Article VII will be discussed with the Russians in the context of the lend-lease settlement, though not, I assume, as the specific *quid pro quo* for the position you wish taken on the points listed above.

I shall be in Washington on Monday,<sup>84</sup> and should like to discuss this problem with you for a short time then.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

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861.24/5-2244

*The Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States (Rudenko) to the Acting Executive of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee (York)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1944.

DEAR GENERAL YORK: We wish to call your attention to two recent instances of diversions to the Navy Department of industrial equipment procured for the U.S.S.R., which diversions were made not only without our consent, but without our prior knowledge or without our even being informed of intention to divert.

At the request of the Navy Department, the Division for Soviet Supply of F.E.A. agreed to divert the following equipment under our requisition R-10438:

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<sup>84</sup> May 22.



1. Number 2 Witter cross roll shell mill.
2. Two rotary hearth furnaces—25 ft.

Under requisition R-11371, the Machine Tool Section of W.P.B. directed that the following equipment be diverted to the Navy.

1. 400 ton hydraulic turret type shell piercing press.
2. 1-100 ton hydraulic descaling press.
3. Pump accumulator station.

This equipment is urgently needed by U.S.S.R. Ordnance. Equipment under R-10438 was scheduled for shipment to the U.S.S.R. in June and shipping instructions had already been issued by the Commercial Dispatching Corp. under their release numbers, CDC-50569 and CDC-49799. Equipment under R-11371 was to be delivered to the port of embarkation on or before June 30th and was accordingly scheduled for shipment to the U.S.S.R. in July.

We cannot agree to the diversions made by W.P.B. and F.E.A.'s Division for Soviet Supply inasmuch as it will definitely hurt our war effort to forfeit this equipment at this time. We further wish to point out that the manner in which these diversions were executed is contrary to the provisions of the Third Lend-Lease Protocol, which stipulates that due consideration is to be given to U.S.S.R. interests before diversion is made, as well as that we are to be given an opportunity to fully discuss the diversion in question and to ascertain the effect such diversion might have on the U.S.S.R. war effort.

In view of the fact that the aforementioned diversions will create serious difficulties for our ordnance industries, we request that the W.P.B.'s and the Division for Soviet Supply's directives to divert the material in question be cancelled and that the equipment be promptly reinstated on our account so that we may ship it on schedule.

We also request that in the future, intention to divert any material requisitioned by the U.S.S.R. Government be filed with us sufficiently in advance to enable us to inform our government, to weigh the matter and to discuss it with the proper agencies prior to any action. Only in this way can we exercise our rights, as stipulated under the Protocol, of expressing our opinion in matters of vital concern to our mutual war effort.

Sincerely yours,

L. G. RUDENKO  
*Lt. General*

861.24/5-2344

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1944.

MR. ACHESON :

Subject: Lend-Lease Settlement.

I enclose herewith the memorandum on this subject<sup>85</sup> which Mr. Harriman had intended to discuss at the White House. This memorandum was not sent as it was felt that the Secretary should review it. He has now done so and suggests that it should be made the subject of careful consideration and discussion in the Department before being taken up with the President. I should greatly appreciate it if you would consider it in collaboration with Messrs. Pasvolsky,<sup>86</sup> Hawkins<sup>87</sup> and an appropriate representative of the Office of European Affairs and any other members of the staff who might have an interest in the problem and have prepared a memorandum containing appropriate recommendations which would reflect the consensus of opinion in the Department which you and I can then review and discuss with the Secretary.<sup>88</sup>

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

861.24/1792a

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*<sup>89</sup>

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

There is attached for the consideration of the Government of the Soviet Union the draft of a proposed agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, sup-

<sup>85</sup> *Ante*, p. 1084.<sup>86</sup> Leo Pasvolsky, Executive Director, Committee on Post-War Programs, and member of Policy Committee.<sup>87</sup> Harry C. Hawkins, Director, Office of Economic Affairs.<sup>88</sup> In an undated penciled memorandum by Ambassador Harriman for Mr. Acheson, the Ambassador wrote: "I recommend that in connection with the terms of repayment if the Soviets put up a strong argument, we liberalize the terms to the extent of (a) 5 years of grace after hostilities cease instead of 3 yrs. (b) 25 yrs. period of repayment of principal instead of 20 yrs. (c) fixed payment of interest & principal instead of interest plus equal annual principal payments. W. A. Harriman." (861.24/1795a)<sup>89</sup> Handed to Ambassador Gromyko on May 24. In telegram 1366, May 31, 1944, 2 p. m., the Department informed the Embassy in Moscow that the *aide-mémoire* and draft agreement had been handed to Ambassador Gromyko on May 24 and that Ambassador Harriman "saw and approved the final text while he was in Washington." (861.24/1803a) The texts were sent to Moscow in instruction 179, June 8 (not printed).

plementing the Preliminary Agreement of Mutual Aid between the two Governments, dated June 11, 1942.

The subject matter of the proposed agreement is a plan for the continuance of an uninterrupted flow of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union during hostilities against our common enemy and for the orderly liquidation of lend-lease supply arrangements upon the termination of hostilities. Pursuant to powers granted by laws of the United States, and particularly by Section 3(c) and other sections of the Act of March 11, 1941, as amended, an agreement between the two Governments is suggested embracing the following broad points:

1. It would be understood that transfers of supplies by the United States under the Third Protocol prior to a determination by the President that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased would be made on lend-lease terms, under the Agreement of June 11, 1942.

2. It would be agreed that certain supplies would be exported by the United States to the Soviet Union after that date, on certain terms of repayment. The categories of supplies and the terms of repayment applying to them would be agreed upon in a schedule to be attached to the agreement. Additional categories of supplies could be added from time to time by mutual agreement. It is contemplated that supplies in these categories would exclude those which it was mutually agreed were subject to the terms of paragraph three, but would include a large variety of industrial supplies, and other supplies of importance to the war production program of the Soviet Union, which had been contracted for by the United States, or were in inventory in the United States, in the course of the program of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, and had not been exported or otherwise transferred to the Soviet Union prior to the determination by the President that hostilities against the common enemy have ceased.

3. It would be agreed to establish a second class of supplies, to be transferred during the period of hostilities, and for the statutory period thereafter, on certain terms of repayment. The terms of repayment applying to such supplies would be agreed upon in a schedule to be attached to the Agreement, and the supplies involved would be agreed upon from time to time and inserted in this schedule. It is contemplated that this schedule would include certain supplies, required as part of the war production program of the Soviet Union, which take an unusually long time to produce, or reproduce if already constructed, and which have an unusually long period of expected usefulness. Payment on credit terms for such supplies is thought to be appropriate. Within the period allowed by statute, after the President's determination that active military operations against the com-

mon enemy have ceased, the United States would undertake to deliver such of the undelivered supplies in this class as have been contracted for by the United States, or title to which is in the United States, prior to such a determination by the President.

4. The remaining clauses of the proposed Agreement consist of technical provisions allowing both contracting parties certain cancellation privileges, made desirable by the uncertain course of the war; and of provisions defining the relationship of the proposed Agreement to certain Articles of the existing Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942.

[Enclosure]

AGREEMENT SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT  
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNION  
OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

[Here follows text of preamble of the agreement almost identical with paragraphs 1 and 2 of "Recitals" given in telegram 625-627, March 18, printed on page 1065.]

*Article I.* The Government of the United States, in a Protocol signed on October 19, 1943, by that Government and the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and Canada, undertook to make available under conditions stated in the Protocol certain war supplies for dispatch to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the period from July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944.

The Government of the United States agrees that transfers of supplies by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the aforesaid Protocol prior to a determination by the President of the United States that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, shall be made under the terms of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942. The provisions of this Article may be extended by mutual agreement to future protocols or agreements, subject to the other Articles of this Agreement.

*Article II.* Within such periods as may be authorized by law, the Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after a determination by the President of the United States that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to accept, those supplies included in the categories set forth in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement which the Government of the United States shall have agreed to make available in order to provide war aid to the Govern-

ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, prior to said determination of the President, shall have contracted for or shall have in inventory, and which shall not have been exported or otherwise transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prior to said determination.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars the cost of the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, and interest thereon, according to the terms and conditions set out in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement.

Additional categories may be added to the categories in Schedule I from time to time prior to said determination by the President by the mutual agreement of the parties. When so added, the financial arrangements set forth in Schedule I shall apply.

*Article III.* Within such periods as may be authorized by law, the Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accept, those items of capital equipment needed in the Soviet Union's programs of war production, requiring a long period to produce, or to reproduce if already constructed, and having a long period of useful life, which may by mutual agreement be included from time to time in Schedule II annexed to this Agreement and which the Government of the United States shall have contracted for or shall have title to prior to the determination by the President that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars the cost of the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, and interest thereon, according to the terms and conditions set forth in Schedule II annexed to this Agreement.

[Here follows text of articles IV–VI, virtually identical with that given in telegram 625–627, March 18, printed on page 1065.]

*Article VII.* This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this . . . . . day of April, 1944.

For the Government of the United States  
For the Government of the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics

[Subenclosure]

## SCHEDULE I

The terms and conditions on which the supplies in the categories listed below are to be transferred by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article II of this Agreement, are that the Soviet Government pay the Government of the United States the cost of such supplies, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from the first day of the month following the month in which transfer took place, at the average rate of carrying costs on the public debt of the United States during the preceding calendar year, plus one-eighth of one percentum per annum. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be notified in December of each year of the rate applicable for the ensuing year. The rate applicable for the current year is two and one-tenth percentum. Interest shall be paid within twelve months from the first day of the month following the month in which transfer took place, and annually thereafter.

The first payment of five percentum of the principal due shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics between the first day of the thirty-seventh month and the last day of the forty-eighth month following the month in which the transfer shall have been made, and payments in the same amount shall be made annually thereafter until the principal shall have been extinguished. If by reason of extraordinary and adverse economic conditions during the course of payment, the transfer of a due payment on principal would not be in the joint interest of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, further transfer of payment on principal may be postponed by agreement of both Governments for an agreed upon period.

The following categories of supplies are those referred to in Article II of this Agreement, and except as otherwise noted correspond to categories listed in "United States of America, Standard Commodity Classification, Volume I, United States Government Printing Office, Washington: 1943". The supplies comprised in these categories shall not include any of the supplies referred to in Article III of this Agreement and listed by mutual agreement in Schedule II annexed to this Agreement.

<i>U.S.A. Standard Commodity Classification Group Number</i>	<i>Commodity Description</i>
01	Live animals
08	Metallic Ores, Concentrates and their Unrefined Metallic Prod- ucts
09	Crude Non-Metallic Minerals, ex- cept Coal and Petroleum
19-100000 to 19-690000 incl. and 19-800000 to 19-999000 incl.	Chemicals except explosives
21	Iron and Iron and Steel Scrap
22	Steel
23	Ferro and Non-Ferrous Additive Alloys
24	Non-Ferrous Metals
25	Fabricated Metal Basic Products
26	Non-Metallic Mineral Basic Products—chiefly structural
27	Non-Metallic Mineral Basic Products—chiefly non-struc- tural
29	Miscellaneous Basic Materials
31	General Purpose Industrial Ma- chinery and Equipment
32	Electrical Machinery and Appa- ratus
33	Special Industry Machinery
34	Metalworking Machinery
35	Agricultural Machinery and Im- plements, except Tractors
36	Construction, Mining, Excavat- ing and Related Machinery
37	Tractors
38	Office Machines
39	Miscellaneous Machinery
41	Communication Equipment and Electronic Devices
43-6000 to 43-9190 incl.	Marine Main Propulsion Machin- ery and Gears, Shafting and Ship Propellers, Steering Gears, and Miscellaneous Spe- cial Ship Equipment
44	Railroad Transportation Equip- ment

<i>U.S.A. Standard Commodity Classification Group Number</i>	<i>Commodity Description</i>
45-1000 to 45-2199 incl. 45-5000 to 45-9000 incl.	Motor Vehicles including Jeeps except Combat Vehicles and Ordnance Service and Repair Trucks and Trailers
49	Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment
51	Plumbing and Heating Equip- ment
52	Air Conditioning and Refrigera- tion Equipment
53	Lighting Fixtures
54	Furniture and Fixtures
55-1000 to 55-5900 incl. and 55-9000	Photographic Equipment (ex- cludes Film and Paper)
56	Optical Instruments and Appa- ratus
57	Indicating, Recording, and Con- trolling Instruments and Ac- cessories except Watches and Clocks
58-5000 to 58-9000 incl.	Professional and Scientific In- struments and Apparatus ex- cept Indicating, Recording and Controlling (excludes Dental, Medical, Surgical and Hospital Equipment)
59-1112 to 1229 incl. } 59-1232 to 1241 incl. } 59-1243 to 1290 incl. } 59-1300 to 1500 incl. } 59-1700 to 9000 incl. }	Miscellaneous Equipment (ex- cludes Military)
68	Footwear
69	Fabricated Textile Products ex- cept apparel
71	End Products of Leather except Apparel, Footwear and Lug- gage
72	Converted Paper Products and Pulp Goods



<i>U.S.A. Standard Commodity Classification Group Number</i>	<i>Commodity Description</i>
74-1000 to 5000 incl. 74-6700, 6910, 6920, 6960, and 6990	Rubber End Products, Natural and Synthetic, except Footwear and Clothing (excludes Medical and Hospital Goods)
75-1100 and 75-2000 to 9000 incl.	End Products of Metal Industries, except Machinery and Equipment and Hospital Utensils
76	Finished Wood Products except Furniture and Millwork
77	End Products of Glass, Clay and Stone
79-1000 to 3000 incl. 79-5000 to 9000 incl.	{ Miscellaneous End Products of Manufacturing Industries (excludes Surgical and Medical Supplies)

#### SCHEDULE II

The terms and conditions on which the supplies listed below are to be transferred by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Article III of this Agreement are the same as those set forth in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement, with the exception that in the case of supplies transferred prior to the determination by the President that active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, the date of transfer shall be deemed to be the date of the determination aforementioned.

861.24/1791 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 24, 1944.

[Received May 25—12:15 a. m.]

1863. Moscow newspapers for May 24th publish as their most prominent foreign news item a 36-inch Washington despatch on President's 15th quarterly lend-lease report to Congress.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>90</sup> President Roosevelt's letter of May 22 transmitting this report to Congress is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, May 27, 1944, p. 495. For the chief references to the Soviet Union in the *Fifteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Period Ended March 31, 1944* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1944), see chapter iii, pp. 24-29. Some additional statistics for the year 1944 are in the 16th, 17th, and 18th reports.

Slightly over half of the despatch dealt with the Soviet Union. Item quoted the President's statements regarding Soviet victories, impending joint military blows from east and west, which had been prepared for by Soviet efforts in East and Anglo-American Mediterranean and European air operations. It gave many figures regarding dollar value and general extent of aid to Russia and figures of aircraft, tank and other types of aid including steel, leather and foodstuffs.

HAMILTON

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861.24/1798a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944—8 p. m.

1380. Appropriate security agencies today authorized release on a confidential basis of 1943 statistics of U.S. production, consumption and exports of manganese ore, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium and platinum to Soviet Purchasing Commission, Washington.

The need has arisen for statistics showing USSR production and imports of the minerals listed above. This information will be treated in a confidential manner. The requested information should be transmitted to the Department by cable as soon as possible. The Embassy is authorized, if necessary to obtain the requested information, to point out to the appropriate USSR authorities that similar U.S. information has been made available to the USSR Purchasing Commission in the U.S.

The Department feels that it might be advisable to take up at this time the question of the future exchange of statistics on a reciprocal basis.

HULL

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861.24/1801 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, June 6, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 10:54 p. m.]

2009. Your 1380, June 1, 8 p. m. It is well known that it is not the custom of the Soviet Government to give out statistical information on production as has been our practice. This is considered information of vital importance to conceal from the enemy. We on the other hand have had the policy of publicizing our production in order to undermine enemy morale.

There is no doubt the Russians do not trust our security particularly on matters of this type and they are always fearful that leaks will occur. There is evidence that the Soviet concern on this point is justified.

Furthermore the Soviets do not have in anything like the same degree statistical reports on phases of their economy such as those prepared by the United States Government.

I am convinced that any suggestion for a general exchange of statistical data will for the above reasons be declined.

Before I came to Moscow in October, I reached a definite understanding with the Chiefs of Staff that we would not continue to make requests on the Soviet Government for general intelligence information; that when specific information was required the matter would be presented by the American Military Mission explaining the reasons why the particular information desired would be of direct value in the conduct of the war. This policy has led to the establishment of confidence and as a result we are obtaining more and more information of vital importance to military operations. Unless the agency requesting the information can justify the request for the data referred to in the above-mentioned telegram as of direct benefit to our military operations, this request will not conform to the decision of the Chiefs of Staff.

It might be better to initiate requests for production information informally with the Soviet Purchasing Commission in Washington. After you have considered the above I would appreciate further instructions.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1803 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 12, 1944.

[Received June 13—7:50 a. m.]

1206. Deliveries to the Soviet Union by the United States, Great Britain and Canada during the Soviet-German war were listed on the front page of the Moscow newspapers for June 11. About 40 column inches of text under a headline in large black type were devoted to this announcement. The announcement states that the United States and Great Britain united with the Soviet Union in the common and great purpose of achieving the earliest possible defeat of Hitlerite Germany and its associates in Europe, began to supply the USSR with armaments, industrial equipment and food soon after the incursion of the German Fascist hordes into the Soviet Union. A part

of these supplies has also been sent by Canada. It made deliveries to the USSR within the British obligations until July 1, 1943, and subsequently began to make them independently.

By supplying the Soviet Union with the above-mentioned valuable materials the United States of America, Great Britain and Canada are contributing to the successes of the Red Army in the cause of the liberation of its homeland from the Fascist invaders and in the cause of hastening the common victory of the Allies over Hitlerite Germany and its satellites.

These deliveries were made by the United States on the basis of the lend-lease law, by Great Britain chiefly on the basis of the agreement concerning mutual deliveries, credit and method of payments of the 16th August 1941 and also on the basis of the agreement concerning the financing of military supplies and other military help of the 22d June 1942, by Canada according to the Canadian law concerning mutual help between the United Nations.

Data supplied by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade regarding deliveries to the Soviet Union by the United States of America, Great Britain and Canada are then listed in three sections.

The American section deals with lend-lease deliveries made between October 1, 1941 and April 30, 1944. Among other things it states that the United States despatched to the Soviet Union 7,400,000 [8,500,000] tons of shipments in the value of \$5,357,000,000. Of these shipments there reached the Soviet Union 7,400,000 tons valued at \$4,612,000,000. Breakdowns are given by years and by categories. *Pravda* published on page 3 a large photograph showing hundreds of American trucks captioned "American motor vehicles in the USSR before despatch to the front."

Text of deliveries announcement follows by airmail.<sup>91</sup>

HARRIMAN

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861.24/1805b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1944—10 p. m.

1534. Should appreciate your exploring with Mikoyan and possibly other officials any problems which may be presented by the proposed agreement under Section 3(c) of the Lend-Lease Act which has been in the hands of the Russians for some time. You may emphasize that delay in reaching agreement may well interfere with

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<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

the procurement of long-term capital items contemplated for the Fourth Protocol.

HULL

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861.24/6-2744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 27, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 10:02 p. m.]

2306. At a meeting between General Spalding and Krutikov, Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade, the following information was developed with reference to State Department telegram No. 1534, June 22, relating to proposed modification of the mutual aid agreement.

Delay had been caused by errors in cable transmission of the proposed agreement, and it had been necessary to await the original paper coming by diplomatic pouch. Also it was at first understood that our proposals were being submitted for acceptance as drafted. However, additional information indicated that Soviet counter-proposals would be considered. No particular difficulties had been encountered. Stepanov, Vice Commissar of Foreign Trade, is now in the United States and will very shortly be prepared to negotiate. He has the basic material for the negotiations. It was said the Soviet counter-proposal was similar to that of the United States. Mr. Krutikov said that it was not an appropriate time to give us a copy of the Soviet proposal nor to discuss the issues. The impression was given that a number of points would be finally settled as a result of negotiation.

It was pointed out that we are particularly interested in concluding the agreement so that the Fourth Protocol may be completed in order to prevent delays in the flow of supplies, with consequent slackening of the war effort. Mr. Krutikov said that steps would be taken to complete the negotiations as rapidly as possible.

It is requested that we be kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/6-944

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*<sup>92</sup>

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In the course of the administration of the program of aid to the Soviet Union under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, known

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<sup>92</sup> Handed by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Chargé of the Soviet Union (Kapustin), on July 6.

as the Lend-Lease Act, a problem has arisen requiring the consultation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States. This problem is the transfer by the Soviet Government to the Governments of third countries of articles or materials similar to those which the Soviet Government has received from the United States as lend-lease aid. The disposition of such articles and materials is manifestly of concern to both the United States and to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and it is to the interest of both governments that their policies with reference to such supplies be coordinated and brought into concert. While the issue has not yet become urgent, it is expected that it will arise more frequently with the favorable progress of the war.

In order to establish a procedure which will facilitate the cooperative solution of such issues, the Government of the United States proposes an exchange of notes with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the sense of the attached draft.

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1944.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT NOTE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

EXCELLENCY: With reference to and in supplement of the Preliminary Agreement of June 11, 1942, between our two Governments on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War against Aggression, I have the honor to set forth the agreement in principle of the Soviet Government to the following procedure for the transfer or other disposition of articles and materials within the scope of United States program of supply for the Soviet Union.

1. With a view to supplementing Article III of the aforesaid Agreement of June 11, 1942, the Soviet Government will not authorize an assignment to any third Government or other public authority of articles or materials similar to those which the Soviet Government has received from the United States as lend-lease aid until the matter has been referred to and agreement received from the Government of the United States.

2. The consultations and agreements contemplated by this note will take place in Washington or in Moscow, as may be most convenient. Accept [etc.]

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861.24/7-844: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1944—8 p. m.

1645. The Soviet Chargé was handed yesterday an *aide-mémoire* transmitting a draft of a suggested exchange of notes whereby the

Soviet Government would agree not to authorize the transfer to third governments and other public authorities articles and materials similar to those received under Lend-Lease, without prior consultation and agreement with this Government, such consultation and agreement to take place either in Washington or Moscow as might prove most convenient. The full text of *aide-mémoire* and note will be forwarded by airmail pouch.

You are familiar with the reasons for this suggested note and the text is substantially as you saw it in Washington. Should the Soviet officials raise the question with you you might explain that the purpose of the suggested commitment from the Soviet Union is to bring the procedure in regard to Lend-Lease materials with the Soviet Union in line with those already adopted with other countries and to insure the most effective use in the common interest of materials supplied for the prosecution of the war under the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942.

HULL

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861.24/7-1344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

Moscow, July 13, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received July 13—11:40 a. m.]

2539. . . .

I believe the Department should bear in mind that in my informal talk with Mikoyan last November on the question of Soviet requirements for relief supplies, Mikoyan made it clear, as I then reported, that he appeared to view the question from the standpoint of whether asking for supplies for relief from lend-lease or UNRRA would mean increased allocations of shipping.

I have just learned from the President's Protocol Committee that in connection with the Soviet request for shipment of 7 million tons for the Fourth Protocol we are offering a minimum commitment of 5,400,000 tons with an undertaking to ship additional tonnage if it is found possible. It would seem therefore that the basic problem of relief supplies is not one of supplies but one of shipping.

It would also be helpful to receive a reply to the other two questions raised in my cable before the meeting with Vyshinski.<sup>94</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>94</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

861.20211 Amtorg/7-2844

*Memorandum by Mr. Auguste Richard of the Office of Wartime  
Economic Affairs*

[Extract]

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1944.

EXTENT OF DISPERSAL OF U.S. TECHNICAL INFORMATION TO FOREIGN  
COUNTRIES DURING WORLD WAR II

The U.S.S.R. has ranked second to the British, both in the dollar amount of Lend-Lease aid and the extension of technical information. As to the latter, the disclosures under the heading of research and developmental information have been limited. For instance, OSRD<sup>95</sup> has not extended any to the Russians except in the area of medical science. Neither has the machinery been set up for an interchange of patents for the obvious reason that under the present Russian patent system mutuality is impossible. The amelioration of this situation for post-war is something for our Government to undertake for the benefit of American business.

However, in the second and third categories, i.e., industrial "know-how" and information relating to the operation, servicing and repair of equipment and implements of war, we have been increasingly liberal in 1943 and 1944. The policy for the release of such data has been laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and implemented by the armed services. The War Department has handled the lion's share of such releases. They have been made by the individual services of the Army Service Forces, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces and the Navy Lend-Lease Office, through the medium of lists prepared by a Subcommittee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Disclosure of Technical Information. The established policy is to release all unclassified items, those on the restricted list, and those items classified as confidential, secret and top secret equipment "intended to assist the Soviets to kill Germans or to be used from Soviet bases" (as in the case of shuttle bombing).

While it is difficult to give any exact measures of the relative contributions made to the British and U.S.S.R. it can be stated that although the British had a long head start, the Russians are rapidly catching up, particularly in category (3). In addition engineers and inspectors connected with the Soviet Purchasing Commission have had rather free access to war plants producing their Lend-Lease equipment. Through this medium they have undoubtedly secured a great deal of technical information of which no U.S. Government agency has any record.

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<sup>95</sup> Office of Scientific Research and Development.



The discrimination mentioned above in category (1) is, however, notable, and will probably continue. While OSRD claims to have received no contributions from U.S.S.R. in their sphere, the Surgeon General's Office has benefited to some extent from information supplied concerning field medical aid.

Consideration must also be given to releases to U.S.S.R. via FEA on items other than those classified as military. So far only one major transfer has been arranged, i.e., plans and full technical information for the erection in Russia of six Hi-Octane gasoline refineries (with the collaboration of the Petroleum Administrator for War<sup>96</sup>). Substantial sums were paid by our government to the American owners on the understanding that the payments covered only wartime use of such data and that the U.S.S.R. would recognize the peace-time rights should manufacturing be continued.

While FEA has furnished some other technical data of a non-military nature to U.S.S.R. they have not been of major importance and were generally limited to patents or processes on individual items. FEA conducted the negotiations with the owners and paid for the release thereof, sometimes merely "for the duration" and in other instances for permanent transfer.

The case of synthetic rubber has peculiar significance because there was an opportunity here for an interchange of data since U.S.S.R. had made important progress in the field prior to our rubber crisis after Pearl Harbor. It is one of the few instances in the industrial field—perhaps the only one of real importance—where governmental negotiations with U.S.S.R. have proceeded on a give and take basis. For that reason it is worthwhile to outline some of the details of this enlightening story furnished by Col. Bradley Dewey, Rubber Director. Attached Exhibit A gives the highlights. While the inference should not be drawn that all the blame for the delays lay on the Russian side it is obvious that when the U.S.S.R. had something that we badly needed they did not hesitate to bargain to the limit in spite of our Lend-Lease and other favors. Precious months were lost in these maneuvers at a time when our whole war production effort hung in the balance because of the threatened rubber shortage. This experience certainly merits close attention for the future. The Russians are good traders and they respect others who look out for their own interests.

A very large quantity of machinery and equipment has been furnished to the U.S.S.R. via Lend-Lease. The Fourth Protocol is now under consideration. The value of machinery and equipment requested therein exceeds one billion dollars (this includes some carry-over from the Third Protocol). Approximately \$617,000,000 falls in

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<sup>96</sup> Harold L. Ickes.

the Lend-Lease classification of "within 18 months" and some \$434,000,000 in the long-range classification which will require some special financing by the U.S. Both new equipment and surplus war plants are wanted. Involved in the release of such plants is the technical information that would go with them. There is at present no one agency or group in Washington that can speak authoritatively on the policy matters involved in the transfer of the technical information.

To summarise regarding the U.S.S.R. it appears that although a substantial amount of technical information has been supplied by the armed services the disclosures of industrial technology have not been so complete as to seriously weaken the present trading position.

A. RICHARD

[Annex]

"EXHIBIT A"

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1944.

INTERCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION WITH USSR ON  
SYNTHETIC RUBBER

The Baruch report, issued in September, 1942,<sup>97</sup> strongly criticized the officials responsible for the rubber program for not having availed themselves of the Russian offer made some months prior thereto to exchange technical information with the United States on synthetic rubber.

Accordingly, when Mr. Jeffers<sup>98</sup> was appointed Rubber Director and Col. Bradley Dewey Deputy Rubber Director<sup>99</sup> one of their first acts was to appoint a rubber mission to visit Russia under the chairmanship of Mr. Ernest Pittman, President of InterChemical Corp. After spending two months assembling the most recent and important data available in this country the mission proceeded to Russia by plane in December, 1942. The mission was authorized to exchange this data.

In Moscow a mutual exchange of very general information—without any discussion of details of equipment, operating conditions, etc., consumed several weeks. A visit to three rubber plants was then arranged. During this trip the mission was toured through the plants for a general inspection but were not given any detailed information covering the important practical features of the equipment,

<sup>97</sup> This report, dated September 10, 1942, is printed in the *New York Times*, September 11, 1942, pp. 1, 15.

<sup>98</sup> William M. Jeffers, Rubber Director, 1942-1943.

<sup>99</sup> Col. Dewey became Rubber Director in 1943.

methods of production, introduction of catalyst and techniques used for polymerization control. At the factories they were told that this data could only be made available in Moscow.

Some time after their return to Moscow, i.e. on February 20, 1943, the mission was advised that the desired information would not be given them but might be disclosed by a Soviet Rubber Mission which had meanwhile been dispatched to the U.S. without notifying our mission that they were leaving. The Russian Mission arrived in this country on February 16.

Since there was no longer anything which our mission could accomplish in Moscow they formally withdrew their offer to exchange information and applied for return transportation. Only after the strong intervention of Admiral Standley<sup>1</sup> did our mission get away some five weeks later.

The Russian Mission on March 22nd notified Col. Dewey that they were not prepared to begin the exchange of information until, as a prerequisite, we agreed to furnish equipment plus technical assistance in the design, installation and initial operation of plants for the production of butadiene, styrene, Buna S, neoprene, ethyl alcohol and butyl rubber.

Col. Dewey replied that the provision of equipment was outside the jurisdiction of the Rubber Director's office and that he could not meet the request for data on neoprene and ethyl alcohol as these processes were owned respectively by Dupont and Standard Oil of New Jersey. As a result the negotiations temporarily broke down while the Russians started conversations with the two private companies.

In July 1943 the Russians came back to Col. Dewey with the suggestion that negotiations be reopened on the basis originally proposed by Mr. Pittman in Moscow, i.e., the U. S. would furnish all data for the government controlled processes and plants. By that time a large number of our newly constructed plants were in production and many of the technical questions which earlier had troubled us had been answered in operation. As a result what Russia now had to offer would be largely matters of refinement in quality, cost or yield, some of which could not be introduced without basic equipment changes which would only slow up our production program. As a result, Col. Dewey stated that the offer made by Mr. Pittman in Moscow and withdrawn prior to his departure could no longer form the basis of negotiations. However, so as to return the courtesies extended to our Mission, the Russian group were taken on a tour of factories in this country. Months went by without further progress and the Chief

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<sup>1</sup> Adm. William H. Standley, Ambassador in the Soviet Union, February 1942-October 1943.

of Mission, Mr. Makeev,<sup>2</sup> returned to Russia. A new chief, Dr. Petrenko, arrived here in March, 1944.

The principal Russian development had centered around the production of butadiene from alcohol. In this process they had achieved excellent results with a high yield which was still of interest to us. Ever since last April communications and correspondence have been going back and forth without concrete results. On June 29, 1944 Dr. Petrenko notified Col. Dewey that he was prepared to exchange information on everything *except* the production of butadiene from alcohol on which matter "we are awaiting instructions from Moscow."

The above summarises a year and one half of futile negotiations.

A. RICHARD

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861.24/7-2744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1944—5 p. m.

1786. (From FEA for Spalding) We have been advised by War Department of three instances of reported failure of US Lend-Lease Material as follows:

1. Tractors. International Harvester type Artillery Prime Mover or Caterpillar tractors instead of Allis-Chalmers have been requested on several occasions by Sovpurchase. Since this non-standard tractor type is being produced only by Allis-Chalmers now, and a substantial reduction in overall production of all makes would be result of shifting of lines at this late date, such a shift is impossible. Following are points by which Sovpurchase supports its request: Special mixture of lubricant and fuel oil, lack of which results in serious breakdown is required by GMC<sup>3</sup> diesel engine in Allis-Chalmers tractors which is of two cycle type; complaints concerning failure of bogie wheel bearings, cracking of frames and pulling off of winches have been received from front on Allis-Chalmers type; and no failures of International Harvester and Caterpillar models have been reported.

Crumbling of main and connecting rod bearings and tearing off and cracks in cylinder liners are said to be most frequent failures of GMC engine. It is necessary for proper engineering analysis that more information be made available and there is little data here to support Soviet claims. Obtain maximum amount of background information concerning performance of our Prime Mover Tractors on Soviet front from proper Soviet authorities in Moscow. Suggest

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<sup>2</sup> Apparently intended is Vasily Vasilyevich Zhmayev.

<sup>3</sup> General Motors Corporation.

inquiry particularly why proper oil cannot be made available for tractors since tanks with similar diesel engines are being supplied with it apparently. Since translation can be done here, you may forward direct to Washington in original Russian any Red Army Staff Reports available.

2. Diesel Engines. A General Motors four cylinder diesel engine being provided apparently for a tracked vehicle produced in USSR may have caused similar trouble. Main Bearing Wheel and connecting rod bearing are failing prematurely in spite of use of high speed engine fuel and aviation oil according to reports by Chief of Sovpurchase automotive Department. Mass deterioration of clutch pressure plate and premature failure of fuel injector are other difficulties reported. Sovpurchase has requested large scale replacement of these parts and overall spare parts supply for 3500 engines totaling approximately 60 percent of value of engines has been requested also. Send us samples of defective parts of this engine if possible and obtain additional details about actual performance including number of each type of failure and corresponding serial numbers of engines. Since there have been difficulties with two different General Motors engines it may be desirable to propose sending General Motors representative to USSR.

3. 37 mm. Ammunition. Due to defective tracer and self-destroyer which in most of the lots did not function, a total of over 900,000 rounds of 37 mm. high explosive anti-aircraft shells were found unsatisfactory Sovpurchase reports. This quantity represents a large share of available ammunition since total of only 1,250,000 similar rounds have been assigned to USSR. Since this type is no longer being produced, replacement requested is difficult. Suggest you discuss with proper Soviet authorities proof firing by which these defects were discovered and the extent of need for replacement in order that we may be assured in this regard. [FEA.]

HULL

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861.24/7-2844

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 28, 1944.

Mr. John Howard of the FEA called me to state that in negotiations with the Russians the latter had requested the following changes in the terms and payment in the proposed 3C Supplemental Agreement:

1. That payment might be made alternatively in dollars or in gold.
2. That there be a uniform rate of interest of 2% rather than the sliding scale suggested.

3. That the period of grace be 10 years rather than 3 years.
4. That the period of amortization be lengthened.

It appeared that with respect to gold the Russians also had in mind some sort of gold clause that their payments in gold would be at an equivalent never lower than \$35.00 per ounce, a sort of hedge against appreciation of the dollar!

I told Mr. Howard that when Ambassador Harriman had been here I had discussed with Messrs. White<sup>4</sup> and Bernstein<sup>5</sup> of the Treasury possible modifications in the suggested terms and that we had decided that it would be possible to substitute a flat rate of 2.5% for the sliding scale, to substitute period of grace of 5 years for the 3 years suggested, and a period of amortization of 25 years instead of the 20 years. With respect to payment in gold I saw no objection to a simple alternative.

I suggested that he call up Bernstein, as White is out of town, regarding the tricky gold clause which apparently the Russians had suggested. He stated that he would inform us of the results of his telephone talks with Mr. Bernstein.

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861.24/8-144

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*

MEMORANDUM

Reference is made to the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires' call on the Acting Secretary of State on July 31, regarding an article to be published in the August 11 issue of *Collier's* magazine. This article will deal with the delivery of Lend-Lease supplies to the U.S.S.R. via Alaska. The Chargé d'Affaires requested that the publication of the article be stopped.

A careful investigation of the circumstances surrounding the publication of this article has been made. It appears that the publishers of *Collier's* magazine took up with the War Department early in May the question of the advisability of publication of the article in question. On May 15 a proof of the article was shown to the Assistant Soviet Military Attaché for Air, who, after suggesting certain minor deletions and changes, said he saw no objection to the publication of the article. On May 24, the War Department wrote to the Soviet Military Attaché enclosing a copy of the article, with deletions and changes as suggested by the Assistant Soviet Military Attaché, and inquired if there were any objections to the publication of the article.

The reply from the Soviet Military Attaché dated May 29, 1944, indicated that neither he nor his assistants were authorized to express

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<sup>4</sup> Harry Dexter White, Director of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

<sup>5</sup> Edward M. Bernstein, Division of Monetary Research, Treasury Department.

an opinion regarding the publication of an article in an American magazine and "that is why we leave the question for your own consideration." This letter, taken together with the previous conversations with the Assistant Military Attaché, was interpreted by the War Department as indicating that the Soviet authorities had no objection to the publication of the article. After careful consideration of the article from the point of view of military security, the competent officials of the War Department informed *Collier's* magazine that there was no objection to its publication.

On July 21, the Soviet Military Attaché informally approached the War Department and inquired if it would be possible to have the article suppressed. The War Department immediately inquired of *Collier's* magazine and was informed that the issue containing the article was already printed. It should be explained that magazines such as *Collier's*, with a wide national circulation, are printed considerably in advance of the date on which they appear on sale. The Soviet Military Attaché was accordingly informed that nothing could be done to stop the publication of the article since it had already been approved by the United States War Department and it was already printed.

Various informal inquiries regarding the possibility of stopping the article were made to officers of the Department of State in the latter part of July. These officers made inquiries and informed the Soviet Embassy that as far as it could be determined the article had already gone to the press; however, if important questions of military security were involved, a new approach to the War Department might be made. It should be pointed out that, under American law, civilian authorities have no control or right of censorship over American newspapers and publications. Since the article in question dealt with military matters, the War Department would have authority to suppress it if questions of military security were involved.

It is regretted that under the circumstances as outlined above the article cannot now be withdrawn.

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1944.

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861.24/8-244 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1944—5 p. m.

1834. Stepanov at the Monetary Conference<sup>6</sup> told Acheson before returning to Moscow he desired to discuss the proposed 3-C Lend-

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<sup>6</sup>The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, from July 1 to 22, 1944. For correspondence, see vol. II, pp. 106 ff.

Lease agreement in order to take advantage of his presence here to expedite the negotiations.

Acheson and appropriate Lend-Lease officials have had two talks with Stepanov on this subject. For your information the following is a summary of points raised in these discussions:

1. Stepanov stated that he desired to discuss the draft agreement submitted to the Soviet Government on May 24 but that the Soviet authorities in Moscow desired to negotiate the contents of schedules annexed to the proposed agreement. It is not clear just what negotiations regarding the schedules Stepanov desires to have discussed in Moscow. We are endeavoring to obtain clarification and will inform you on this point in a subsequent telegram.

2. Stepanov suggested that the proposals for payment contained in Articles II and III should be changed to provide that payment could be made at the option of the Soviet Government either in dollars or in gold at the rate of \$35 an ounce. This question is being studied by Treas[ury].

3. Stepanov observed that the reference to the Third Protocol contained in Article I might be eliminated in as much as the Protocol period had expired and suggested that Article I be rewritten to refer to the Fourth Protocol. A tentative redraft of Article I was submitted to Stepanov for study. As soon as an agreement is reached on this point the text will be transmitted to you.

4. Stepanov indicated that while he did not object to the language of Article IV he believed that it was somewhat one-sided since the Soviet Union would have to pay cancellation costs in the event they did not desire to accept delivery of supplies under Articles II and III. He stated that the Soviet Union would have to bear certain losses in the event that we determined to cancel part of our obligation for security reasons, and he indicated that the existing language of Article IV does not provide for consultation with USSR before cancellation by United States.

It was explained to Stepanov that our right to cancel was based only on security reasons while the Soviet right was unlimited and that in any event the President did not have power under the Lend-Lease Act to pay for any losses which the Soviet Union might feel it had sustained from failure to obtain Lend-Lease supplies. It was further explained that under the Protocol full cognizance is given to the needs of the USSR before supplies are diverted to other claimants or for other purposes. Stepanov was informed that we would endeavor to clarify the language of Article IV to bring it more into conformity with the desire of the Soviet representatives. These changes have not yet been agreed upon.



5. As was expected Stepanov brought up the question of the term "cost" and asked for a clearer definition. We promised to study this matter and to submit a definition of the term as soon as possible.

6. In regard to the proposed interest rate Stepanov stated that the Soviet Union desired to have a fixed rate for the entire period and suggested that since the average rate for United States Government loans at present time was 1.97 he felt that a rate of 2% would be equitable.

This question was taken up with Treas[ury] and discussed with Soviet representatives at second meeting yesterday. They were informed that in event they could not accept original proposal the interest rate would have to be 2.50%, the rate at which US Government can today sell 30-year bonds. It was explained that it would be necessary to have this rate in order that American Government could protect itself, if it felt it necessary, by floating an equivalent loan at that rate in the market today.

After considerable discussion during which Stepanov argued that the rate should be 2% he stated he would have to study the question further before making a reply.

7. In regard to the amortization payments Stepanov stated that the Soviet Government felt that the 3-year period of grace was too short since the Soviet Union would be very hard-pressed during the early period after the war and might not be able to meet the amortization payments. He suggested, therefore, that the first 5% payment should become due 10 years after the cessation of hostilities with the balance to be paid over the ensuing 20 years.

After discussing this question with Treas[ury] Stepanov was informed yesterday that while Treas[ury] felt that 3 years was a sufficient period of grace they were willing to extend the period of grace to 5 years with amortization payments being made over ensuing 25 years. Soviet representatives were also informed that it might be possible to work out a sliding amortization rate which would be comparatively low during the first years of repayment with a gradual increase to a higher amortization rate to the end of the loan period.

Stepanov replied that he still felt that a 10-year period of grace should be granted but said he would study this question and give us a reply later.

8. Stepanov also suggested that consideration might be given to including a provision in the agreement to cover assistance in transportation of supplies. We promised to give this matter consideration.

Dept will keep you currently informed of negotiations as they proceed.

STETTINIUS

861.24/8-244 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 5, 1944—9 p. m.

1869. ReDepts 1834 of August 2. Following is summary of the third talk we had with Stepanov on August 2:

1. After discussing the question with Treasury, Stepanov was advised that it might be difficult for the United States Government to accept his suggested gold clause providing for payments to be made in United States dollars or gold at the rate of 35 dollars an ounce. Stepanov was told that it would be necessary for him to discuss this question with Treasury. We have since learned that Treasury officials think that it might be possible for them to work out a gold clause somewhat similar to that suggested by the Soviets. We will report results of these conversations as soon as possible.

2. Considerable further discussion took place regarding the rate of interest. Stepanov was assured that the amount of principal on which interest would be charged would be based upon the aggregate cost of the various items furnished under the agreement as calculated by cost formulae which are to be worked out.

In this connection he raised the following points:

a. Stepanov stated that after studying our proposals he still felt that 2½ percent was too high since this rate was the rate at which the U.S. Government sells its taxable bonds and that roughly speaking one-half of one percent is returnable to the Government as taxes.

b. While the repayment of principal on U.S. 23-28 year, 2.4 [2.5?] percent bonds does not begin until at least the 23rd year, the Soviet Government plans to start amortization payments in 5 or 10 years and thus the average time of the outstanding Soviet indebtedness would be shorter than 30 years and therefore Stepanov felt the interest rate should be lower than that charged for U.S. thirty-year bonds.

We promised to give consideration to these points.

3. While Stepanov admitted and agreed that of course the President, in the agreement, has the discretion to determine the date upon which active military operations against the common enemy have ceased, he nevertheless suggested that he thought it would be advisable throughout the agreement to change the phrase "active military operations" to read "military actions." He explained that it was felt some ambiguity might arise from the use of the present phrase and he therefore hoped that a new phrase could be worked out. We promised to give consideration to his suggestion and after studying the question, plan to suggest that the phrase "military resistance of the common enemy has been overcome" be used to replace "active military operations."

4. A lengthy discussion took place on point 1 in the telegram under reference regarding where the negotiations on the items to be included in each schedule should take place.

Acheson outlined the following suggested procedure for further talks:

*a.* We would continue to discuss the textual provisions of the agreement with Stepanov and endeavor to settle all questions therein.

*b.* In order to settle the question of what categories of goods should be listed in schedule I or schedule II, we provisionally proposed that we might give to the Soviet authorities as soon as possible our tentative offerings under the Fourth Protocol indicating which items we consider to be in schedule I and which in schedule II with the remainder falling under straight lend-lease. The offerings with the indicated classification would be transmitted by Stepanov and the Department to Moscow in order that you and the Soviet authorities could study them and thus ascertain whether, under the classifications which must of necessity be decided by us, the Soviet authorities desire to obligate themselves to take the supplies offered under the terms and conditions to be worked out in the 3*c* agreement.

Acheson explained that while it might be decided that a general category of goods should fall within schedule I, there might be special items in this category such as special presses which take a comparatively long time to produce and have a long life, which have to be classified under schedule II despite the fact that presses in general were classified under schedule I. Acheson further explained that we should have the right to decide into which category any supplementary requisitioned item should fall if such item had not been included in the original Fourth Protocol offerings. In this connection, Stepanov suggested that it might be possible to define carefully the categories in such a manner that there would be no question about special items being transferred from schedule I to schedule II. We feel this would unnecessarily complicate matters, might be almost impossible to define and therefore are of the opinion that all such basic decisions should be made in Washington where both the American and Purchasing Commission technicians are familiar with all classification problems while in Moscow neither any of your staff nor the Soviet staff has this knowledge.

Stepanov argued at some length that you and General Spalding together with Soviet officials should be the ones to decide in which schedule various items of the Fourth Protocol should be placed and he indicated that he had already telegraphed Moscow suggesting that these discussions should be carried on simultaneously with the talks here. We again explained that while we felt that discussions should take place in Moscow to determine what supplies the Soviet Government desires to obligate themselves to take under the terms and conditions of the 3*c* agreement, we could not agree that the Soviet

Government should have final decision regarding the category in which various items should fall.

As a tentative alternative, Mr. Acheson suggested that perhaps after reaching provisional agreement on the textual part of the agreement, Stepanov could : 1) either go to Moscow to discuss categories which the Soviet Government would desire to obligate themselves to take under 3c; 2) remain here and have this question worked out by you with the Soviet authorities and telegraphed here for final approval; or 3) reach an agreement here on as many categories as possible and have Stepanov discuss the remaining categories after returning to Moscow.

5. After having made the above tentative proposals to the Soviet representatives the lend-lease authorities have studied the question further and now plan to propose the following arrangement to the Soviet representatives: instead of submitting the full list of offerings under the Fourth Protocol they plan to revise the third paragraph of schedule I submitted with the proposed agreement to the Soviet authorities on May 24, 1944, and to submit a new schedule I showing in greater detail the various items which we are prepared to offer under the agreement. It is felt that the submission of a more detailed schedule I will make it easier for Moscow to decide which items they are willing to obligate themselves to pay for under schedule I and under the terms of the proposed agreement.

It is also proposed that in addition we will furnish to Stepanov a breakdown detailed list of all items which we are also prepared to furnish under the agreement, in order that the Soviet authorities, if they so desire, may make additional requests for the inclusion of categories beyond those which we propose in the revised schedule I.

It is also planned to deliver to Stepanov a list of projects which the Soviet authorities have already expressed an interest in and which we are willing to consider under schedule II. This list would also contain the conditions which we would have to impose before final approval could be obtained of projects under schedule II.

We are working on the revised schedule I and the rewording of the third paragraph of schedule I and hope to get it to you as soon as possible.

STETTINIUS

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740.00112EW/8-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 11, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received August 11—11:20 a. m.]

2938. Supplementing my 2768, July 26, 8 p. m.<sup>7</sup> I have had no answer to my letter of July 24 to Molotov, reference advice by General

<sup>7</sup> Not printed.

Spaatz<sup>8</sup> that USSTAF would carry 180 tons of ball-bearings from Sweden to Moscow, and no indication of Soviet Government's desires. Military Mission are now being asked by USSTAF for a decision.

Members of the Red Air staff have indicated to General Walsh<sup>9</sup> that the delay in reply might be because the ball-bearings were not needed immediately and it would be better to await the clearing of the Baltic States for daylight operation rather than by night as now proposed.

If there is no real need for a prompt reply I recommend that we let the matter rest and that USSTAF be informed to suspend further planning for the operation.

I believe that in our relations with the Soviets we should bear in mind that whenever we offer them something gratis they are apt to be suspicious, oriental style, of our motives and aggressive pressure at this time might lead them to believe that our ulterior motive was perhaps the establishment of an airline from Sweden to Moscow.

If, on the other hand, it is desired to obtain a prompt answer I recommend that I be instructed to write Molotov that unless some word as to the Soviet Government's wishes in [is] received within a specified period, say one week, we must assume that the Soviet Government is no longer interested and we will be thereby relieved of any obligation to transport these bearings.

Repeated to London as my 135.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/8-1244

*Memorandum by the Chief Liaison Officer, Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration (Hazard) to the Director of the Division (Wesson)*<sup>10</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] August 12, 1944.

*Negotiations on Financing.*

While discussing with Mr. Eremin<sup>11</sup> yesterday some routine matters, he opened the subject of the negotiations on the Amendment to the Master Agreement. I report his remarks, not only because they may throw light on the Soviet attitude in these negotiations, but because they outline the Soviet method of negotiating.

Mr. Eremin asked whether the Protocol offerings were to be delayed for the financial negotiations. I said I thought not, but we were disappointed at the delay in these negotiations. He said he

<sup>8</sup> Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in European Theater of Operations.

<sup>9</sup> Maj. Gen. Robert L. Walsh, of the U.S. Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>10</sup> Transmitted by Maj. Gen. C. M. Wesson to Assistant Secretary of State Acheson for his information.

<sup>11</sup> Ivan Andreyevich Yerebin, Assistant Chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Commission in the United States.

felt this delay partly our fault, as the proposal had been agreed to in principle by both countries and it was only necessary to clarify details. I replied that the details were of such importance that they went to the heart of the agreement—as, for example, an interest rate. I said I thought his people were inclined to underestimate the attention which must be given by U.S. Government officials to reaction in the press. We have to have an interest rate which will not be lower than the cost of the money to the government. Otherwise the people and, therefore, Congress would not stand for it.

He said, of course, I know they carefully studied such things. They felt certain that the people as a whole were so responsive to the part the U. S. S. R. had played in the war that only a small percentage would criticize special concessions. He noted that many corporation presidents had called upon him recently. They said they were Republicans, but they would go farther than the Democrats seemed willing to go in broadening trade relations with the U. S. S. R. He said that I must know myself that U. S. industry was in large measure idle in the types of equipment the U. S. S. R. wants, and that it is certainly to the government's interest to get business into these plants. (I believe this was said to indicate that a sacrifice in interest might be beneficial if it helped business to continue).

I suggested that if his government held to its position, it might jeopardize the whole agreement. He said he expected that after the negotiators had reached their limits and clearly outlined the extent of disagreement, the highest people would make the decisions for both sides which would be agreement. He thought this would happen in one or two months. I said that the war was running out, and we would have to act promptly.

He replied to this that he did not think we could yet foresee the end. A few weeks ago Moscow had said to the troops they would be in Berlin in a short time, but the Germans had brought up reserves and stalled the advance. There was no telling how much resistance was left. Also he had read of the discussions to the effect that Lend-Lease would be extended after the war. I said these had been denied by Mr. Stettinius. He just looked quizzical.

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861.24/8-244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1944—10 p. m.

1965. General Deane is taking with him an instruction dated August 14, 1944<sup>12</sup> enclosing all pertinent information on negotiations with Stepanov which took place up to that date.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

There is also included with this instruction the revised detailed schedule I referred to in point 5 of the Department's 1869, August 5 as well as a tentative list of the offerings we are prepared to make under schedule II. The detailed list of schedule I and the tentative offerings in schedule II represent the items requested by the Soviets under the Fourth Protocol which we propose to make available to them in the new protocol.

In the instruction you are requested to obtain from the Soviet authorities as soon as possible their decision regarding the items in schedule I which they desire to obligate themselves to take under the conditions of the proposed agreement (item 4(b) of the Department's 1869, August 5). The instruction also requests you to impress upon the Soviet Government that if they are not prepared to obligate themselves to take most of the items of schedule I, which have a definite postwar use, we will be reluctant to sign the proposed agreement. You are also requested, in connection with any discussions you may have with the Soviet authorities regarding the agreement, to impress upon them that the agreement must be signed prior to the collapse of Germany since, if it is not signed by that time, Government credits, in all probability, could not be made available to them and private concerns could not conclude contracts with them to provide postwar items on a credit basis.

The following is a summary of pertinent points discussed at the last three meetings we had with Stepanov:

1. Stepanov accepted the redraft of Article IV (cancellation clause), the text of which is enclosed with the instruction under reference. We submitted to Stepanov the new detailed schedule I as well as the tentative offerings which we would be prepared, by mutual agreement, to include in schedule II provided the Soviet authorities were prepared to comply with the conditions stipulated by us. The full text of these conditions are enclosed in the above mentioned instruction.

Stepanov states he has telegraphed the new revised schedules to Moscow and sent copies by airmail via Siberia. He was informed that on the basis of these lists it was hoped that you and the Soviet authorities could decide which items the Soviet authorities desired to obligate themselves to take under the proposed agreement.

2. We informed Stepanov that, after calculating various amortization schemes, Treasury had come to the definite conclusion that the best interest rate we could offer the Soviet Government was 2.3/8 percent which represents the minimum cost which the U.S. Government would have to pay for the type of credit which it is proposed to make available to the Soviet Government. Mr. Stepanov again argued that we should not charge more than 2 percent since the average cost of all U.S. Government obligations today is slightly less than 2 per-

cent. He was informed that we could not use the average cost today as the basis for the interest rate for the proposed credit since we, in all probability on the basis of present calculations, would be offering the Soviet Government a credit at a better rate than the U.S. Government itself could obtain. Despite our detailed explanations, he stated that he could not accept an interest rate higher than 2 percent which brought us to a practical impasse. In pleading for a 2 percent interest rate, Stepanov stated that we should take into consideration the "special" factors of this particular credit to the Soviet Government and the general spirit of the lend-lease agreements. While we promised to give consideration to his arguments, we informed him that we did not feel that we could offer a lower rate than  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent since, in all probability, Congress would not appropriate money for the credit in the event that the rate was lower than the U.S. Government could obtain, and he was further informed that if we granted such a rate to the Soviet Government this would be a precedent for other countries which we would not be willing to establish.

While we have not again discussed interest rates, we plan to tell Stepanov, after having discussed amortization and costs with him, that if he can not accept our proposed rate of interest, he will have to seek new instructions from his Government if we are to continue negotiations at this time.

3. Regarding amortization, Stepanov stated that while he felt that repayment should not begin until the end of the 11th year, he was prepared, in order to meet partially the American proposal that the first payment should start after the 5th year, to propose that amortization payments start at the end of the 9th year. We are discussing this question with Treasury and feel that it may be possible to accede to this Soviet request.

4. At our last meeting we presented to Stepanov a cost formula, the pertinent parts of which are as follows: *a*) Costs of supplies under the agreement shall be the contract purchase price, f.o.b. point of origin, or if contract purchase price can not be determined, the cost shall be the estimated average contract purchase price for similar articles during the three months prior to the determination by the President that the military resistance of the enemy has been overcome, *b*) The cost of supplies transferred under the agreement will be subject to the following deductions: 10 percent for supplies which shall have been delivered by the contractor to the U.S. Government prior to the date of determination by the President or in case such supplies shall not have been delivered to the U.S. Government prior to that date, the reduction shall be 5 percent.

It was explained to Stepanov that the 10 percent reduction would be applied to goods which might be in surplus and that the reduction included the best estimates that can be made at this time to cover



renegotiations of contracts and other items which would reduce the cost after the termination of hostilities and that the price after the deduction represented the price at which it was anticipated the U.S. Government, on the average, would sell surplus items of the nature of those in schedule I. Contracts covering supplies which have not been delivered to the U.S. Government prior to the determination by the President could be cancelled at an approximate cost of 5 percent and therefore if the Soviet Government obligated itself to take these items, these contracts would not have to be terminated and thus the Soviet Government could be granted the 5 percent reductions which otherwise the U.S. Government would have to pay.

Stepanov argued at considerable length that he did not feel that a flat reduction would be acceptable but wanted to receive whatever reductions might be applied to any item after consideration had been taken of savings from renegotiations of contracts, excess profit taxes, and other factors which might reduce the price of surplus items. We explained that if the Soviet Government should obligate itself to take the items in schedule I, they would be assured that these items would be delivered to them, while if they did not obligate themselves to take these items, there was no certainty that any particular item would be in surplus and available for sale. Furthermore, in the latter event, they might have to compete with other bidders for the surplus products with no assurance that the Soviets would be the successful bidders. Stepanov, however, urged that we accept the general cost formula he had submitted at the first meeting (attachment C to minutes of first meeting which are enclosed with instruction under reference), which provides among other things that the cost in any case shall not exceed the cost at which we will dispose of similar items in stock. We explained again the various reasons why we could not accept this provision and Stepanov promised to give further consideration to our proposals and discuss the question at a later date.

Since drafting the above, we have had a further talk with Stepanov, the results of which will be reported subsequently.<sup>13</sup>

HULL

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861.24/8-244

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs (Collado) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1944.

Reference is made to telegram 1965 of August 17, 10 p. m., to Moscow regarding negotiations with Stepanov regarding the 3(c) agreement. I note that there has apparently been extensive consulta-

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<sup>13</sup> See telegram 1997, August 22, 10 a. m., p. 1119.

tion with the Treasury Department regarding the terms of interest and amortization which might be appropriate and that certain concessions may have been or will probably be made both in connection with rate of interest and the period of grace.

In view of the fact that all of the original documents on this matter were undertaken by a subcommittee of which I was chairman, I am rather surprised that FMA<sup>14</sup> has not participated at all on this matter. In addition, I have certain doubts regarding the extension of some of the concessions which Treasury is being urged to make in order to please the Russians.<sup>15</sup>

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861.24/8-2144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 21, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received 8:39 p. m.]

3097. The Military Mission has received an answer from the Red Air Staff regarding our offer to transport by air ball bearings from Sweden. It is stated that they have no instructions on this question and therefore inquiry should be made through me to the Foreign Office. Letter ends by suggesting possibility that the Soviet Civil Aviation will be given the task of carrying out this mission.

I am not taking this matter up again with the Foreign Office until I receive a reply from the Department to my No. 2938, August 11, 10 a. m. [*p. m.*] One cannot help but have the impression that the Soviets do not urgently need these bearings.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/8-244 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1944—10 a. m.

1997. ReDepts 1965, August 17, 10 p. m. The following are the pertinent results of the seventh meeting we had with Stepanov on August 16.

After lengthy discussion with Stepanov we made the following proposals to him which we feel will expedite the negotiations and

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<sup>14</sup> Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs.

<sup>15</sup> Notation by Mr. Acheson: "I have been conducting these negotiations myself. D.A."

permit the signing of the agreement if they are acceptable to the Soviet Government:

1. Stepanov was told that *a*) if he was prepared to accept an interest rate of  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent, the lowest rate which we possibly can offer, *b*) we would accept his proposal to have amortization payments begin at the end of the ninth year after the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy had been overcome, and *c*) we would be willing to meet certain of his suggestions in a new cost formula, the pertinent parts of which are given below.

While Stepanov indicated willingness to give careful consideration to these proposals, he stated that the best interest rate he was in a position now to accept was 2 percent but asked that we submit the new cost formula to him in writing in order that he could study the proposals.

The following is a summary of the new cost proposal which was handed to Stepanov on August 17:

For supplies under schedule I:

*a.* Transfer of title and risk of loss shall pass to the Soviet Government immediately upon loading supplies on vessel in American port,

*b.* Cost of supplies shall be determined by the President, or an officer of the U.S. Government designated by him, and shall be the sum of the following items:

Sub 1. The contract purchase price f.o.b. point of origin paid by American Government to contractor less 5 percent of such amount, or if contract purchase price can not be ascertained, the average contract purchase price f.o.b. point of origin paid by American Government for similar goods during the 3-month period preceding the date of determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has been overcome, less 5 percent of such amount.

Sub 2. Cost of storage, if any, after the date of the determination by the President, will be computed on the basis of fixed rates which shall be included in the agreement.

Sub 3. Inland transportation and accessorial costs after the date of determination by the President shall be based upon published commercial export rates.

*c.* For such supplies as the President or duly authorized officer of the American Government shall determine are standard in that they have been contracted for by the American Government in accordance with standard U.S. specifications, the Soviet Government may elect to substitute in lieu of item Sub 1 above the price at which the President, or duly authorized officer of the American Government, shall determine that similar supplies of comparable quality and comparable quantity shall be sold by American Government to any buyer at or

about the time of transfer to the Soviet Government. This election will be made by the Soviet Government only in the event that the aforesaid price can be or is determined.

For supplies under schedule II:

*a.* Title and risk of loss shall pass to the Soviet Government immediately upon loading supplies on vessel in American port.

*b.* Cost of supplies shall be determined by the President, or a duly authorized officer of the American Government, and shall be the sum of the following items: the contract purchase price paid by the U.S. Government to the contractor, the cost of storage, if any, computed at the same rates as for items in schedule I, and inland transportation and accessorial costs prior to the transfer of title based upon published commercial export rates.

It will be noted that with the option given in regard to standard specification supplies, reduction of cost price is different in present form from that reported in the Department's 1965, August 17.

2. Stepanov asked for clarification in regard to the list of plants which we are willing to furnish under the Fourth Protocol but only on a cash basis (enclosure no. 8 to Department's instruction of August 14, 1944<sup>16</sup>). He stated that it was his understanding that under the proposed agreement, the U.S. Government was prepared to make available to the Soviet Government on a credit basis all industrial equipment needed by the Soviet Government in connection with its war effort or for reconstruction purposes. He was therefore at a loss to understand why the plants in the above-mentioned list were not included in schedule II and asked whether we had changed the basic principles upon which the proposed agreement was based.

We explained in great detail the reasons why lend-lease funds could not be used for any other purposes than those which could be justified as being directly connected with the Soviet war effort and thus in the interest of the defense of the United States. Despite our detailed explanations it is not certain whether Stepanov fully understands this question. If you feel that the Soviet authorities are of the same misapprehension as Stepanov, you might, in your discretion, explain to them the reasons why we could not justify furnishing under lend-lease or the 3(c) agreement such items as two sets, continuous automatic potato chip and julienne machinery or other equipment which would not contribute directly to the Soviet war effort.

HULL

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

740.00112EW/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 23, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received August 24—2: 55 p. m.]

3122. ReEmbs 2938, August 11, 10 a. m. [*p. m.*] I have received a letter from Molotov dated August 22 of which the following is a paraphrase translation :

“I wish to inform you with respect to your letter of July 24 that the Soviet Government, taking note of the assurances of the American military authorities who are maintaining communications with England, has in mind that the export from Sweden of the ball bearings ordered for the Soviet Union should be effected not directly from Stockholm to Moscow but by the same route used for previous shipments of ball bearings, namely from Sweden to England and thence to the Soviet Union by sea.

M. A. Nikitin, the Soviet trade representative in Sweden, has been instructed to undertake measures connected with the organization of the export from Sweden of the ball bearings. I should be grateful, Mr. Ambassador, if you would advise me with which of the American representatives in Stockholm Mr. Nikitin should get in touch as well as when and where.”

A reply on this matter has been received after a month's delay and only after pressure from myself on the Foreign Office, from the Military Mission on the Soviet military authorities, and from General Spalding on the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. The Soviet attitude is doubtless due to the fact that they do not want our planes to fly in the Soviet Union. In view of the long delay in replying, it would appear that the need for these bearings is not vital and, as a matter of principle in our relations with the Soviets as well as from the standpoint of the proper use of our planes, I recommend that we decline to transport the bearings to England and that I be instructed promptly to inform Molotov to this effect.

I suggest that the reply be made along the line that, as the Soviet Government has had our offer under consideration since July 24 and is now proposing a round-about route which would involve considerable further delay, the American authorities have concluded that the need for bearings is not sufficiently urgent to warrant the risk to the American personnel and planes involved, particularly as it would appear that a safe route may likely be available by the time the bearings could be transported to the Soviet Union by the route proposed by the Soviet Government.<sup>17</sup> General Deane concurs.

<sup>17</sup> In telegram 2141, September 5, 1944, 11 p.m., to Moscow, the Department replied it did not desire any further approach to be made to the Foreign Office and understood that General Deane was being informed by the War Department of this decision (861.24/8-2144).

Sent to Department, repeated to London as my 152, August 23, 10 p. m.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/8-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944—8 p. m.

2045. ReDepts 1380 June 1 and reembs 2009, June 6. After careful consideration of your telegram the War Department has renewed its request for certain USSR statistics. Statistics are requested showing 1943 production, imports, and consumption, and stocks as of January 1, 1943, for the following commodities: platinum, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, iridium rhodium, mica, especially high quality large sheets quartz crystals, manganese ore, especially high grade metallurgical ores.

In a letter from the chief of the materials branch of the War Department it was pointed out that these statistics are urgently needed in planning and scheduling the production of war equipment. The War Department's inability to predict United States future supplies of platinum from the Soviet Union has prevented the development of various military implements, and army engineers have been handicapped in designing war material based on the use of platinum since it has not been deemed safe to schedule platinum consuming war material beyond the limits of supply from other sources. Some military programs have had to be cut back because of conservation necessitated by the limited platinum supply. Similar reasons exist in the case of the other commodities mentioned herein.

Accordingly, the Embassy is requested to make every effort to obtain these data and cable them to the Department as soon as possible. You may assure Soviet authorities that special precautions will be taken under our security regulations to safeguard these data from falling into enemy hands.<sup>18</sup>

HULL

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861.24/8-2444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1944—3 p. m.

2066. ReDeptel 1997, August 22. There are given below the pertinent results of the eighth, ninth, and tenth meetings with Stepanov:

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<sup>18</sup> On September 7 the War Department, having heard from General Deane in Moscow, decided that the need for statistics was not sufficiently great to make an issue of the matter and would leave it to General Deane's judgment.

1. In connection with the three proposals put to Stepanov at the previous meetings regarding interest rate, amortization, and cost, he at first replied that he was only authorized to accept an interest rate of 2 percent and desired to record our differences in order that we could discuss the other two proposals.

In a later discussion, Stepanov proposed that the Soviet Union be given an option to pay either interest at the average yearly cost to the United States Government (original American proposal), or if the average yearly cost should go above  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent, that figure would be the maximum amount the Soviet Government would be called upon to pay. We gave consideration to this proposal and informed Stepanov that, since it was possible that the yearly average cost of credit to the United States might go above  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent, we could not bind ourselves by accepting this formula, since it might mean that the United States would be giving credit to the Soviet Government at a lower rate than it could receive itself.

At the last meeting, we told Stepanov that we could not, under any circumstances, accept an interest rate other than either the average yearly cost or a flat rate of  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent.

2. In regard to amortization, a lively discussion took place as to whether, if repayments begin during the 9th year, the Soviet Government should have the following 25 years in which to repay the credit, or whether the entire credit should be paid in 30 years from the termination of hostilities. We explained that, in accepting the Soviet counter-proposal to start repayments during the 9th year, we had not altered our position that the final payment should be made at the end of the 30th year. On Stepanov's insistence that his proposal to begin the repayments during the 9th year also had contained the provision that these payments should take place during the ensuing 25 years, we promised to discuss the matter with Treasury and inform them of our decision later.

At the last meeting, we informed Stepanov that, since the fixed interest rate which we had offered was based on a 30-year credit, we could not, under any circumstances, extend the time of the credit to 34 years as he had suggested.

3. Cost. Stepanov stated that, after studying our new cost formula, he felt that we had made a substantial effort to come nearer the Soviet proposal, although he felt that the reduction provided for non-standard goods was too small and cited figures which he stated showed that the renegotiation of contracts in 1942 had brought about recoveries of considerably larger sums than 5 percent.

Stepanov then asked for clarification of what goods we would consider as standard, and asked specifically whether we would consider

as non-standard supplies those goods which were standard in every respect except certain minor attachments or features which might be placed on the equipment to meet special Soviet requirements such as metric gauges, etc. We studied this question and wrote into the new cost formula a definition of standard supplies along the following lines: Standard supplies shall not be deemed to exclude standard supplies which have minor adjustments, features, or attachments which are non-standard. Stepanov seemed satisfied with this definition.

After giving further study to our cost formula, Stepanov reiterated his belief that the percentage reduction for non-standard goods was too low since, according to the figures available to him, the renegotiation recoveries were larger than 5 percent, and he again argued at great length to try to convince us that we should also deduct from the contract purchase price a percentage which would take into account the high excess profit and other war taxes. He therefore proposed that the reduction on manufactured goods should be 20 percent and on raw materials, 15 percent. He also argued that he felt that these reductions should apply to standard goods which we were offering to them at the surplus goods price at which similar goods were sold to other purchasers. We informed Stepanov categorically that, since taxes did not enter into the price of goods, we could not in any circumstances give consideration to reductions in the cost price because of high taxes, and we informed him that we could make no percentage reduction for standard goods which we were offering at surplus goods prices.

We explained to Stepanov that the various proposals we had made to him represented the maximum which we could legally accept, and that, if he felt that the interest rate, amortization arrangements, or the cost formula were not acceptable, it might prove impossible to conclude the agreement, and we could not in all probability put into production any of the schedule II items desired by the Soviet Union for its war effort which took a long time to produce and were also useful for peacetime purposes. Stepanov argued that he felt this was not in harmony with the original proposals which he alleged the United States had initiated, and he indicated that he was of the impression the United States had proposed the agreement since we were most desirous of giving business to American firms to help tide them over from a wartime to a peacetime basis. Stepanov was reminded that the original suggestion to purchase industrial equipment on a credit basis had come from Mikoyan, and that we had worked out the proposed agreement in an effort to assist the Soviet Government in this matter.



In an effort to obtain a greater reduction than 5 percent for non-standard goods, Stepanov stated that, if it would be possible for us to grant a greater reduction to cover possible recoveries from renegotiation of contracts, etc. he would be prepared to propose to his Government that it accept an interest rate higher than 2 percent. We promised to study this question and inform him at a later date. He was informed, however, that on the basis of all calculations we had made, 5 percent more than covered any possible deductions which would come from renegotiation.

4. Cost of items in schedule II. We asked Stepanov if he agreed to the cost formula covering schedule II items. He replied that he felt that the same principles as applied to schedule I articles should apply for goods furnished under schedule II. We explained that, since items in schedule II were special supplies to be manufactured for the Soviet Government, we could not accept any reduction whatsoever in the contract purchase price for these items. It was explained to Stepanov that, for items in this category, the Soviet Purchasing Commission could take part in the negotiating of the contract and before the contract was entered into with the supplier, the Soviet authorities could decide whether they desired to have the particular item at the cost at which it was offered. If they should decide not to accept the offer, the only expense the Soviet Government would obligate itself to pay would be engineering costs in connection with the proposed project. Stepanov promised to study this question further.

5. Shipping. In regard to shipping, Stepanov had asked whether we could guarantee to make available shipping to move the supplies during the life of the agreement. After studying this question, we informed him that we could make no concrete commitments on this point, but would undertake to use our best efforts to obtain shipping facilities for the Soviet Union provided it was consistent with the security of the United States.

Stepanov expressed the hope that we could make a firmer commitment on shipping, and also asked whether it would be possible for us to include shipping costs in the credit arrangements. We promised to study this question but informed him that a) since we could not guarantee to make the shipping available because of the possible needs of the United States for the prosecution of the war in the Pacific, and b) since we could not make a firm contract under the agreement except during the lifetime of the lend-lease act, it might prove difficult to provide credits for shipping since, as a general rule, shipping contracts were made on an individual voyage basis.

HULL

861.24/8-3044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)* <sup>19</sup>

Reurtel 3206, August 29, noon.<sup>20</sup> The following paragraph is proposed for food items if such items are included in the proposed agreement supplementary to the mutual aid agreement:

“Within such periods as may be authorized by law, the Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accept, those supplies included in the categories set forth in Schedule III annexed to this Agreement, in the quantities which, at the time of the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has been overcome, shall be allocated by the appropriate agency of the United States Government from United States supplies for the purpose of providing war aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the respective periods set forth in Schedule III. It is understood that the quantities of supplies to be transferred by the United States under the provisions of this Article may be reduced if the President of the United States shall determine that such supplies are more urgently needed for other purposes.”

It is contemplated that the periods referred to would be agreed upon for each of the various food categories in the light of Soviet needs and United States supply.

Our proposal regarding the price at which food items would be transferred under the agreement to the Soviet Union is that the price would be the cost of the supplies to the United States or the price at which the United States sells similar food supplies to other buyers, whichever is lower.

The above wording has not yet been submitted to Stepanov or discussed with him. Although the subject of prices of industrial supplies is still under discussion, we have not gone into the prices of food items. We shall submit the above wording to Stepanov at our next meeting, and shall mention the price formula, as our proposal with respect to food items in the event that Moscow wishes to include food in the agreement.

We have not finally determined whether the above wording should constitute the basis for a separate article in the agreement, with a special Schedule III for food categories, or whether the substance of the wording should be incorporated in Article II, with appropriate revisions in the agreement and with the addition of food categories to Schedule I.

[HULL]

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<sup>19</sup> Transmitted through military channels on August 30.

<sup>20</sup> Not printed.

861.24/8-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1944—6 p.m.

2079. FEA has requested Department's views on advisability of beginning negotiations with Soviet Government to obtain expenses of United States Army and military freight, including mail and passengers, from Tehran to Moscow on reverse lend-lease.

War states under existing arrangements they must pay Intourist \$206.25 per person and 63 rials per kilo of freight or mail as well as \$1.00 per ton mile from Tehran to Moscow. War has recently arranged to transport 250 Soviet personnel to the United States from Tehran at a cost of \$944.04 per person which will eventually be charged to lend-lease.

In as much as arrangements for provision of services and supplies in connection with shuttle bases have been arranged under reverse lend-lease, War feels that similar reverse lend-lease should now be extended to cover transportation.

Before making any decision in the matter Dept desires your views as to advisability of taking this up with Soviet Government at present time. Of course a clear distinction will be made between expenses for operational purposes and expenses incurred solely because of representation of our interests such as air transportation of Embassy and Military Mission personnel. Similar expenses of the Soviet Embassy and Purchasing Commission here are not charged to Lend-Lease.

HULL

861.24/8-3044 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, August 30, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received August 30—4: 39 p. m.]

3231. ReDeptel 2066, August 29, 3 p. m. I have noted that the Department has given Stepanov final terms on all points under discussion in connection with Fourth Protocol financial proposal. I am so informing Mikoyan in connection with a letter I am addressing to him on related matters. The Department has been most cooperative and patient with the Soviets in what must have been most exasperating negotiations and I hope that as a matter of principle no further concessions will be made.

HARRIMAN

861.24/9-344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 3, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received September 3—7: 15 p. m.]

3282. Personal for Harry Hopkins from Nelson.<sup>21</sup> Mikoyan during my meeting with him September 1 raised with me a serious question regarding the list of items expected to be included in paragraph III, group V of the 4th Protocol, for which financial assistance of the Lend-Lease Act will not be extended. Mikoyan said that inasmuch as during the current negotiations on the proposed 3-c agreement the Soviet Government had already accepted the principle of repaying the United States Government from now on for long-term equipment purchased for Russia with lend-lease funds, he could not understand why these particular items should be excluded from receiving lend-lease financial aid. I replied that I was inclined to feel as he did although I was not intimately familiar with the matter and I would take the problem up immediately with my Government. It seems to me that with the exception of a few minor items such as automatic potato chip and julienne machinery, the categories of equipment on the list referred to by Mikoyan are not essentially different from the many others we have already agreed to finance with lend-lease funds under the 4th Protocol and that in particular the plants for manufacturing housing materials should be considered essential to the Russian war effort. Mr. Harriman is fully informed and I wonder if after you have considered this matter you could cable to him for transmission to Mikoyan your views thereon. [Nelson.]

HARRIMAN

861.24/9-344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 3, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 3—7: 17 p. m.]

3283. Personal for Harry Hopkins. Embassy's 3282, September 3, 10 p. m. With reference to Nelson's cable to you on the list of industrial items which we have declined to finance under the Lend-Lease Act, I was not present at Nelson's conversation with Mikoyan and I do not wish you to infer that I join him in his recommendation. I have specific instructions from the Department to explain to Mi-

<sup>21</sup> Donald M. Nelson, Chairman, War Production Board and head of U.S. Economic Mission to the Soviet Union, 1943, and to China, 1944; visited Moscow en route to China.

koyan why these items cannot be financed. If you decide to look into the matter I would appreciate more detailed information on the reasons why these particular items are considered ineligible.

At the present time the Soviet Government is being more than usually uncooperative in dealing with our requests on them for assistance, as for example their unwillingness to allow our trucks to pass through to Chennault.<sup>22</sup> I am satisfied that the only way we can induce them to give sympathetic consideration to our legitimate requests is to make them feel their negative attitude will affect our willingness to cooperate with them on matters that have no immediate effect on the war. As you know I have consistently recommended, and still do, maximum shipments in the immediate future.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/9-444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 4, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 4—10:45 a. m.]

3292. For Acheson. Last night Vice Commissar Krutikov informed Spalding that schedule I as itemized in enclosure 4 to your letter dated August 14, 1944,<sup>23</sup> was accepted without change. The desirability of including food items was stressed by Spalding but Krutikov replied that it was not desired to make any change in schedule I.

Krutikov expressed the hope that schedule II could now be agreed upon promptly. He urged the inclusion of the items, in enclosure 8 of the letter dated 14 August, for which financial assistance under the Lend-Lease Act has not been offered. He said that the materials to be produced by these plants were urgently needed for the war effort; that it is necessary for exerting the maximum war effort that construction materials be made available for providing housing in the devastated areas for such purposes as transportation facilities, operation of coal mines and the repair and construction of essential housing for workers in war industries.

When asked if there were any other questions regarding the completion of the amendment of the Lend-Lease Agreement, Krutikov stated that much of the difference would be met by the inclusion in schedule II of the items in enclosure 8. He mentioned however that some of the schedule II items were, as pointed out in the Protocol offerings, still under study, and that it was desirable that provision be

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<sup>22</sup> Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, Commanding General, U.S. 14th Air Force in China.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

made to include these in the final schedule II. He made no mention of the potato chip and julienne machinery and it is believed that Soviet authorities would offer no objection to these being [omitted] from the schedule.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/9-744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the  
Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 7, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 10:49 p. m.]

3364. ReDept's 2129, September 4, 10 p. m.<sup>24</sup> I hesitate to take up the question of the Department's *aide-mémoire* of July 6 without knowing how firm is the Department's position in regard to this question of retransfer to third countries of lend-lease materials. Is it our policy to insist on the Soviet Government's agreement to the extent of declining to sign the Protocol until it is received? I have doubts whether the Soviets will agree to it until this is made plain.

Although I have no information, lend-lease or similar items may now be moving into liberated countries. As the Department doubtless knows, the Polish Army is receiving considerable lend-lease equipment from the Soviet Government. At a time when the Polish forces in the Soviet Union were small units of the Red Army, this was perhaps justifiable without our consent. On the other hand, it would seem that the situation had changed in that the Polish forces are now a recognized army of a Polish political entity with which the Soviet Government has established relations.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/9-844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, September 8, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received September 8—9:30 a. m.]

3373. Reference transportation of Swedish ball bearings. The Department's telegram No. 2141, September 5, 11 p. m.,<sup>25</sup> is in reply to questions raised in my 3097, August 21, 7 p. m., but does not answer Molotov's request transmitted in my 3122, August 23, 10 [9] p. m. As I must answer Molotov's letter of August 22, I ask urgently whether

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed; it suggested informal inquiries as to when a reply to Department's *aide-mémoire* of July 6 might be expected (861.24/8-2544).

<sup>25</sup> See footnote 17, p. 1122.

approval is given to the reply I recommended in which General Deane concurs.

General Deane has received a cable from General Arnold<sup>26</sup> agreeing to our recommendation contained in my No. 3122 and stating that the State Department was sending instructions to me to make the suggested negative reply to the Foreign Office.

HARRIMAN

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[In a letter of September 9, 1944, President Roosevelt informed Secretary of State Hull: "It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lease Lend, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lease Lend material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn." In a memorandum of September 12 Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that he telephoned to Harry Hopkins to inquire "whether the letter should be interpreted as calling for the suspension of the discussions with the Soviet representatives", but Mr. Hopkins replied "that it should not be so interpreted and that he was prepared to take the responsibility of advising the Department, as the President's Lend-Lease Adviser, that this was the case." The Secretary of State in a letter of September 13 informed the President of this understanding. (800.24/9-944)]

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861.24/9-1944

*Statement by the Foreign Economic Administrator (Crowley)*<sup>27</sup>

#### THE SOVIET SUPPLY PROGRAM

##### I. *Fourth Protocol*

Schedules of offerings were submitted in August by the United States. The Preamble was submitted on September 9, 1944. Considerable delay was encountered this year in the preparation of the offerings, due in part to the Soviet delay of one month in presenting them over the schedule of other years and the large number of requests for industrial equipment which have required lengthy studies.

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<sup>26</sup> Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces.

<sup>27</sup> Transmitted by Leo Crowley to President Roosevelt on September 11 and forwarded by President Roosevelt to President Roosevelt on September 19 to Under Secretary of State Stettinius and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.

Offerings from the United States total 7,400,000 short tons, from which the U.S.S.R. is requested to select a minimum of 5,700,000 short tons for which shipping is assured. The balance will be procured as a reserve in the event shipping in excess of minimum commitments materializes.<sup>28</sup>

Soviet response to the offerings is anticipated. When negotiations as to the final form are completed, the document will be signed in Ottawa. This will complete the cycle of capitals: the first protocol having been signed in Moscow in 1941,<sup>29</sup> the second in Washington in 1942<sup>30</sup> and the third in London in 1943.<sup>31</sup>

## II. *Financial Discussions*

Discussions begun in July have continued throughout August to lead to an Amendment to the Master Agreement of June 11, 1942. Representatives of the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Acting Executive of the Protocol Committee have joined the State Department representatives for the discussions.

While the Soviet delegates declare their acceptance in principle of the proposal to arrange for the ultimate payment by the U.S.S.R. for certain specified categories of supplies which may be on hand or under contract at the termination of hostilities against a common enemy, the discussions have been protracted on the terms of the credit arrangements, and are not yet completed.

## III. *Shipping*

Clearances in August fell below the July tonnage, for only 558,000 long tons were shipped. The reduction was due to the fact that there were not sufficient available vessels to keep the Persian Gulf route full. Only five vessels sailed against a capacity of 25 or more.

In spite of reduced sailings in August, shipping for July and August exceeded minimum Protocol commitments by 39%. Estimates through January, 1945, indicate that the advance rate should continue so that by February 1st, the program will still exceed minimum commitments by 37%.

Increased shipping has presented problems in procurement, especially of metals for bottom cargo. The Subcommittee on Supplies of your Protocol Committee has authorized procurement to the full offering of 7,400,000 short tons, as set forth in the Fourth Protocol. This procurement will be speeded to assure availabilities well in ad-

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<sup>28</sup> In statistics prepared by the Secretariat Subcommittee on Shipping of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee, as of September 8, it was shown that "the minimum target (5,600,000) will be achieved by April, and the total offer (7,400,000) by June." (S61.24/9-1644)

<sup>29</sup> Signed October 2, 1941, Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols* (Washington, Government Printing Office), p. 3.

<sup>30</sup> Signed October 6, 1942, *ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>31</sup> Signed October 19, 1943, *ibid.*, p. 51.



vance of the end of the Protocol Period on June 30, 1944, since indications are that the material can be shipped.

#### IV. *Aircraft*

Clearance of Aircraft in August was considerably reduced over July figures, for only 247 planes departed. All but one of these left via the Alaska-Siberian route and included 55 for the account of the United Kingdom and 192 for the account of the United States.

The primary cause of reduction in departures is the smaller Fourth Protocol program calling for delivery of 245 planes per month.

Navy planes are now moving well. 138 have been delivered at Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and 30 have left the United States for departure points. These planes are not included in the Army Air Force plane figures reported above.

[WASHINGTON,] September 11, 1944.

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861.24/9-1144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 11, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received September 11—8:50 p. m.]

3431. ReDeptel 2079, August 20 [30], 6 p. m. If there be deducted the expenses incurred for transportation of regular Embassy and military personnel between Tehran and Moscow, remaining expenditures for movements of our freight and passengers in Russia would not be sufficient to warrant negotiations concerning covering of such expenses by reverse lend-lease. Very few movements of our personnel, mail or freight for strictly operational purposes have been carried out by Russians. Most, if not all, of these have not been charged to us by the Russians.

Unless we wish to make a clean sweep and propose that all such services to all governmental representatives be covered reciprocally by lend-lease, I believe that it would be better not to bring this subject up at all at this time with the Russians.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/9-1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 12, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received September 12—9:30 p. m.]

3459. Following the receipt by the Embassy of the Department's 2045, August 26, 8 p. m., the head of the Supply Division of the

Military Mission communicated on the subject with the War Department and has been informed in reply that while the desired information concerning Soviet minerals production would be of considerable value, it is not desired that the Soviet authorities be pressed for these data. I am therefore not making a request to the Foreign Office for the statistics as from past experience a request for information of this character will be completely disregarded by the Soviet Government.

We will bear in mind in the regular economic research work of the Mission the need for information on these subjects and will submit any information as it becomes available.

HARRIMAN

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861.24/9-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—6 p. m.

2220. Reference your 3364 of September 7. The extent to which the Department wishes to insist on the Soviet Government's agreement to the Department's *Aide-Mémoire* of July 6 is still under consideration. The Department suggests, therefore, that if you feel it desirable, you inquire of the Soviet Government, without discussing the contents of the *Aide-Mémoire*, when a reply may be expected.

HULL

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861.24/9-344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—7 p. m.

2221. Your 3283, September 3, 1944. We have concluded our negotiations with Stepanov. On September 8, he was given a draft of the text of the agreement and preambles of schedules I and II which brought together the results of the negotiations with him, and he was informed that this draft stated the United States position on matters in which difference of opinion exist. On September 9 and 12, we discussed the text with him and agreed to certain minor changes. These changes were incorporated in a new complete draft which was forwarded to him on September 14. The written text of this draft will be included in the Department's next following telegram.<sup>32</sup>

In submitting this final draft Stepanov was told, and you may so advise Soviet authorities, that we are prepared to add to the items in schedule II as they appeared in enclosure no. 6 of the Department's

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<sup>32</sup> Telegram 2226, *infra*.

instruction of August 14,<sup>33</sup> all of the items referred to in enclosure no. 7 to that instruction (those additional plants which were under consideration for inclusion in schedule II) except the buna-S plant which is still under consideration.

With regard to the items in enclosure no. 8 to the above instruction for which financial assistance was not offered under lend-lease, our position remains unchanged. You may inform Mikoyan that, in conformity with the principles underlying the agreement under discussion, the competent American authorities, after giving consideration to these items, reached the conclusion, on the basis of information available, that these plants are for the production of materials for general reconstruction purposes and therefore can not be justified under lend-lease since they would not apparently contribute directly to the Soviet war effort.

It was agreed with Stepanov that he may now either obtain instructions from Moscow regarding the signing of the agreement here, or he may return to Moscow with the draft of the agreement which represents the final United States position. It was emphasized to Stepanov that it is in the interest of both Governments to decide promptly whether the agreement is acceptable since, if it is not acceptable, we must proceed along other lines such as the International Bank or the Export-Import Bank which would necessarily cause a delay in putting into production items which the Soviet Government apparently desires to obtain as soon as possible, in order that they may contribute to the Soviet war effort.

It was also pointed out to Stepanov that in proposing this agreement the United States was making it possible for the Soviet Union to place orders now, that the Soviet Union could not obtain any lower prices if it placed the orders itself, that we are offering more favorable credit terms than could be obtained commercially, and that we did not feel we could be expected to do more.

The following points were discussed with Stepanov on September 9 and 12:

1. For the first time Mr. Stepanov stated that he was seriously concerned over the provision in Article III that the United States undertakes to transfer only those supplies which it shall have contracted for or shall have title to prior to the date of the President's determination. He requested that this provision be deleted or modified since it did not allow the Soviet Government much time to place orders. He said that the preliminary work of preparing requisitions and engineering might occupy as much as 6 months before a contract could be executed. He suggested that it would be in the mutual interest of both governments to modify the provision in Article III to allow more time for the placing of orders.

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<sup>33</sup> Not printed.

It was pointed out to Stepanov that the provision in Article III was fundamental and that the President had no legal authority to place contracts for these long-range supplies for the Soviet Union after a determination by him that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased. It was mentioned that this provision has been in every draft of the agreement and that the United States representatives have consistently stressed the need for speed in executing the proposed agreement so that schedule II orders might be placed promptly. It was recalled that the agreement had been originally submitted to the Soviet Government in May and that every day consumed in the negotiations made the agreement less valuable to the United States and the U.S.S.R. It was made very clear that the requested change could not possibly be made.

2. Stepanov asked that there be included in the agreement a paragraph covering technical items such as the details of transfer, acceptance, number of documents, warranties, testing, etc. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that this was a matter that should be worked out with Foreign Economic Administration and Treasury Procurement, and therefore, it would be advisable to cover these matters in a separate letter. On September 12, General Wesson addressed a letter to General Rudenko covering these points. The text of this letter is contained in the Department's next following telegram. It will be noted that the letter also indicates the extent to which the Soviet Purchasing Commission may participate in the negotiation of contracts. (Paragraph 4 of Department's 2066, August 29).

3. Stepanov mentioned that the United States draft did not include provision for payment for shipping on a credit basis. He was informed that we are not prepared at this time to agree to such a provision.

4. Stepanov was told that we could not agree to his proposal that the Soviet Government would not be liable for storage costs in case transportation of supplies is delayed after the President's determination, and supplies are stored without Soviet consent. It was explained that the United States might still be at war, could not assume liability for delays in transporting supplies which the Soviets called to port but that naturally we were as anxious as the Soviets to have supplies exported, and that they would have to proceed on the basis that we would act in good faith in moving supplies as fast as possible.

5. The following are the pertinent parts of the final price provisions for schedule I items incorporated in the draft :

The price of standard supplies would be the current price at which sales of similar standard supplies are made by the United States or the contract price less 5 percent to cover any possible recoveries through renegotiation, whichever is the lower. It was stated that the United

States expects to have sufficient standard supplies in inventory to fill Soviet needs. Similarly, the price of non-standard supplies which are delivered to the United States by the contractor prior to 30 days following the President's determination, and which are therefore either practically completed or already in inventory, would be sold at the current sale price of similar standard supplies or the contract price less 5 percent, whichever is the lower. If the current sale price is not determined the price would be the contract price less 5 percent plus an additional 5 percent which is thought to be a reasonable average deduction for sales of supplies in inventory.

In the case of non-standard supplies delivered to the United States subsequent to 30 days following the President's determination, the price would be the contract price less 5 percent to cover on the average any costs of cancellation which the United States would have to pay if the Soviet Union had not agreed to take and pay for the supplies and the contracts were cancelled.

In order to minimize argument, it is provided that the various determinations in the computation of prices be made by the President or a United States Government official.

The general principles underlying the United States proposal are that the United States does not wish to make a profit or take a loss on the supplies, with the exception that the United States is prepared to sell the supplies to the Soviet Union at the same prices at which similar supplies are sold to others.

6. In regard to prices of items in schedule II it was made clear that, in view of the present military situation, the United States did not intend, and had no authority, to pay for the production of long-range schedule II supplies at one price and sell them to the Soviet Union at a lower price. Therefore, Stepanov was informed that in schedule II items the price would have to be the contract purchase price paid by the United States Government. It was again explained to him that the Soviet Government, if it thought the cost of any item too high, was free to reject the offer and only pay any engineering costs which might have been incurred.

7. In submitting the final draft, it was made clear that the United States is prepared to offer either a fixed rate of interest of  $2\frac{3}{8}$  percent for the 30-year period of repayment, or the average rate of interest on the United States public debt for each year. Both are based on the principle of the cost to the Government of borrowing the money needed to procure the supplies covered by the agreement.

8. It will be noted that in the draft agreement, provision has been made for payment in either dollars or in gold at the current buying rate for gold at the time of delivery of any specific item.

HULL

861.24/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1944—11 p. m.

2226. The following is the written text of the final draft of the agreement submitted to Stepanov on September 14. The list of items in Schedules I and II, which, except for minor changes, are the same as enclosures 6 and 7 of the Department's instruction of August 14,<sup>34</sup> but which were submitted with the draft given to Stepanov, are because of their length not included in this message :

"The Government of the United States has provided, and is continuing to provide, vital war supplies, services and information to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Act of Congress of the United States of March 11, 1941, as amended, and pursuant to the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942 between these two Governments.

The Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desire to insure the continued flow of such supplies, services and information required for the war program of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics without interruption owing to uncertainty as to the date when the military resistance of the common enemy will cease; and desire to insure further that supplies maintained in inventory or procurement in the United States for the purpose of providing war aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be disposed of, following the cessation of the military resistance of the common enemy, in an orderly manner which will best promote their mutual interests.

For the purpose of attaining the above stated objectives, the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agree as follows:

*Article I.* The Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and Canada have under discussion and negotiation a Protocol for the period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945, setting forth certain types and amounts of war supplies to be stated therein to be made available by the United States and to be dispatched to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The provisions of this Agreement, except those of Article III, refer to transfers by the Government of the United States of certain categories of supplies set forth in this Agreement after a determination by the President of the United States that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased. All supplies undertaken to be provided by the Government of the United States under this Agreement shall be made available under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions of the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, and acts amendatory or supplementary thereto.

*Article II.* Within such periods as may be authorized by law, the Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, after a deter-

<sup>34</sup> Not printed.

mination by the President of the United States that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accept, those supplies included in the categories set forth in Schedule I annexed to and made a part of this Agreement which the Government of the United States shall have agreed to make available in order to provide war aid to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, prior to said determination of the President, shall have contracted for or shall have in inventory and which shall not have been exported or otherwise transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics prior to said determination.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars, for the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, an amount to be determined as set forth in said Schedule I, and interest thereon, according to the terms and conditions set out in that Schedule. The obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make payment in dollars in accordance with the terms of this Agreement may be discharged by the delivery of gold, which will be valued at the buying price for gold provided in the provisional regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934<sup>35</sup> as the same may be in effect at the time of each delivery.

Additional categories may be added to the categories in Schedule I from time to time prior to said determination by the President by the mutual agreement of the parties. When so added, the financial arrangements set forth in Schedule I shall apply.

*Article III.* Within such periods as may be authorized by law, the Government of the United States undertakes to transfer to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to accept, those items of capital equipment needed in the Soviet Union's programs of war production, requiring a long period to produce, or to reproduce if already constructed, and having a long period of useful life, which may by mutual agreement be included from time to time in Schedule II annexed to and made a part of this Agreement and which the Government of the United States shall have contracted for or shall have title to prior to the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to pay the Government of the United States in dollars, for the supplies transferred under the provisions of this Article, an amount to be determined as set forth in said Schedule II, and interest thereon, according to the terms and conditions set forth in that Schedule. The obligation of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make payment in dollars in accordance with the terms of this Agreement may be discharged by the delivery of gold, which will be valued at the buying price for gold provided in the provisional regulations issued under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 as the same may be in effect at the time of each delivery.

*Article IV.* The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released from its obligation to accept supplies under

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<sup>35</sup> Approved January 30, 1934, 48 Stat. 337; for proclamation of January 31, 1934, see 48 Stat. (pt. 2) 1730.

the provisions of Article II and of Article III upon the payment to the Government of the United States of any net losses to the United States, including contract cancellation charges, resulting from the determination of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics not to accept such supplies.

Delivery of any supplies under the provisions of this Agreement may be cancelled by the United States without cost to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics if the President of the United States shall determine that the security of the United States so requires, after due consideration is given to the needs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Article V.* The Government of the United States agrees that the provisions of Article V of the Mutual Aid Agreement of June 11, 1942, shall not apply to supplies made available to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the provisions of Article II or of Article III of this Agreement.

*Article VI.* Nothing in this Agreement shall modify or otherwise affect the final determination, under the Act of March 11, 1941, as amended, and the Mutual Aid Agreement between the two Governments of June 11, 1942, of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics receives aid, except for the aid made available under the provisions of this Agreement.

*Article VII.* The Government of the United States, after the determination by the President of the United States that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased, will, so far as it is consistent with the security of the United States, use its best efforts to supplement the shipping available to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to effect the prompt and orderly movement to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the supplies provided under this Agreement. The two Governments will discuss at an early date the manner in which and the terms upon which such supplementary shipping may be made available.

*Article VIII.* This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall continue in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

#### *Schedule I*

The terms and conditions upon which the supplies in the categories listed below are to be transferred by the Government of the United States to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the provisions of Article II of this Agreement are as follows:

Unless otherwise provided by mutual agreement, transfers of supplies shall take place, and title and risk of loss shall pass to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, immediately upon loading of the supplies on board ocean vessel in a United States port; provided, that those supplies which, prior to the end of the periods authorized by law referred to in Article II of this Agreement shall have been delivered by the contractor to the United States Government and shall not have been transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as above set forth, shall be transferred, and title and risk of loss shall pass to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, upon the last day of said periods.



The amount which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall pay the Government of the United States, for supplies transferred under the provisions of Article II of this Agreement, shall be the sum of the following items, as determined by the President of the United States, or an officer of the United States Government designated by him :

1. The price of the supplies, which shall be determined as follows :

In the case of standard supplies the price shall be the current sale price or the adjusted contract price, whichever is lower ; provided, that in the event the current sale price is not determined, the price shall be the adjusted contract price less five per cent of such adjusted contract price.

In the case of non-standard supplies which shall have been delivered to the United States by the contractor prior to thirty days following the date of the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased, the price shall be the current sale price or the adjusted contract price, whichever is lower ; provided, that in the event the current sale price is not determined, the price shall be the adjusted contract price less five per cent of such adjusted contract price. In the case of non-standard supplies which shall have been delivered to the United States by the contractor subsequent to thirty days following the aforesaid date of the determination by the President, the price shall be the adjusted contract price.

The determination of the said price of supplies by the President, or an officer of the United States Government designated by him, shall be made in accordance with the following definitions :

The term 'standard supplies' shall mean those supplies which have been contracted for by the United States Government in accordance with standard United States specifications. The term 'non-standard supplies' shall mean those supplies which have been contracted for by the United States Government in accordance with non-standard United States specifications. It is understood that those supplies which are standard except for minor non-standard features, attachments or adjustments shall be deemed to be standard supplies.

The term 'adjusted contract price' shall mean the contract purchase price f.o.b. point of origin paid by the United States Government to the contractor, less five per cent of such contract purchase price, or, if such contract purchase price cannot be determined for the particular supplies transferred, the estimated average contract purchase price f.o.b. point of origin paid by the United States Government for similar supplies during a period of three months preceding the aforesaid date of the determination by the President of the United States, less five per cent of such average contract purchase price.

The term 'current sale price' of particular standard or non-standard supplies transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall mean the price at which similar standard supplies of comparable quality and in comparable quantity have been sold by the United States Government, at or about the time of transfer of the particular supplies to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to any foreign or domestic buyer. It is understood that 'foreign or domestic buyer' shall be deemed to exclude United States Government agencies, States and political sub-divisions thereof, United States public, charitable, or educational institutions, relief organizations, and any persons or

organizations which may purchase supplies on special financial terms provided by law.

2. The cost of storage, if there be any storage, after the aforesaid date of the determination by the President and prior to the time of transfer, which shall be determined as follows:

When railroad or commercial storage facilities are used, the cost of storage shall be the storage and handling charges paid by the Government of the United States. When United States Government storage facilities are used, the cost of storage shall be the storage and handling costs as determined by the President of the United States, or an officer of the United States Government designated by him, but shall not exceed an amount computed at the following rates:

Storage charge per month, or fraction thereof, in covered storage facilities . . . . .	\$1.00 per ton
Handling cost into storage . . . . .	1.00 per ton
Handling cost from storage . . . . .	1.00 per ton
<i>Exception</i> —heavy lift articles weighing over 10,000 lbs. per unit	
Handling into storage . . . . .	2.00 per ton
Handling out of storage . . . . .	2.00 per ton
Storage charge per month, or fraction thereof, in open or ground storage facilities . . . . .	\$.40 per ton
Handling cost into storage . . . . .	1.00 per ton
Handling cost from storage . . . . .	1.00 per ton
<i>Exception</i> —heavy lift articles weighing over 10,000 lbs. per unit, requiring use of mechanical handling equipment	
Handling into storage . . . . .	2.00 per ton
Handling out of storage . . . . .	2.00 per ton

It is understood that the selection of storage facilities shall be made by the United States Government and that, when they are available, railroad or commercial storage facilities shall be used so far as is practicable.

3. Inland transportation and accessorial charges incurred by the United States Government after the aforesaid date of the determination by the President and prior to the time of transfer, based upon published commercial export rates wherever available to the United States Government. Said accessorial costs shall include handling, trucking, demurrage, dock, loading, lighterage, and similar charges, but shall not include administrative expenses of the United States Government. It is understood that the selection of the means of inland transportation shall be made by the United States Government.

Payment of the total amount determined as set forth above for all supplies transferred under the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on or before the last day of the thirtieth year following the last day of the month in which the President has determined that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased, in 22 annual instalments, the first of which shall become due and payable on the last day of the ninth year following the last day of the month in which the said determination by the President has been made. The amounts of the annual instalments shall be as follows:

each of the first four instalments shall be in an amount equal to 2.5 per cent of the amount determined as set forth above; each of the second four instalments shall be 3.5 per cent of said determined amount; each of the third four instalments shall be 4.5 per cent of said determined amount; each of the fourth four instalments shall be 5.5 per cent of said determined amount; and each of the last six instalments shall be 6 per cent of said determined amount. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from anticipating the payment of any of the instalments, or any part thereof, set forth above.

If by agreement of both Governments, it is determined that, because of extraordinary and adverse economic conditions arising during the course of payment, the payment of a due instalment would not be in the joint interest of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, payment may be postponed for an agreed upon period.

Interest on the unpaid balance of the amount determined as set forth above for any supplies transferred under the provisions of Article II of this Agreement, shall be paid by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, irrespective of the time when the determination of said amount is made, at a fixed rate of 2 $\frac{3}{8}$  per cent per annum from the first day of the month following the month in which transfer took place. Interest shall be payable annually, the first payment to be made upon the expiration of twelve months following the last day of the month in which the President has determined that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased; provided, that in respect of supplies for which said amount has not been determined as above set forth prior to the time when interest would be payable on such amount, if determined, interest from the first day of the month following the month in which transfer took place shall be included in the annual interest payments, provided for above, following the time when the said amount has been determined.

The following categories of supplies are those referred to in Article II of this Agreement, and except as otherwise noted correspond to categories listed in 'United States of America, Standard Commodity Classification, Volumes I and II, United States Government Printing Office, Washington: 1943 and 1944'. These categories shall not include any supplies requiring a long period to produce, or to reproduce if already constructed, and having a long period of useful life, with respect to which requisitions are approved by the United States subsequent to the execution of this Agreement. Such supplies shall be listed by mutual agreement in Schedule II referred to in Article III of this Agreement.

(List of Schedule I items follows in text submitted to Stepanov.<sup>36</sup>)

### *Schedule II*

The terms and conditions upon which the supplies listed below are to be transferred by the Government of the United States to the

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<sup>36</sup> Reference is to the revised detailed list of Schedule I items included with the instruction of August 14, 1944 (not printed, but see telegram 1965 of August 17, to Moscow, p. 1115). This list comprised 12 pages of items similar to many of those in Groups I, II, III, V (especially those preceded by the symbol "II"), and VI as printed in the detailed Annex II to the Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol signed on April 17, 1945. See Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 96-141.

Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the provisions of Article III of this Agreement are as follows:

Transfers of supplies shall take place, and title and risk of loss shall pass to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, upon the same terms as are set out in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement.

The amount which the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall pay the Government of the United States, for supplies transferred under the provisions of Article III of this Agreement, shall be the sum of the following items, as determined by the President of the United States, or an officer of the United States Government designated by him:

1. The contract purchase price paid by the United States Government to the contractor.

2. The cost of storage, if there be any storage, prior to the time of transfer, which shall be determined according to the same terms as are set forth in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement.

3. Inland transportation and accessorial charges incurred by the United States Government prior to the time of transfer, which shall be determined according to the same terms as are set forth in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement.

Payment of the total amount determined as set forth above for all supplies transferred under the provisions of Article III of this Agreement shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics upon the same terms and conditions as are set out in Schedule I annexed to this Agreement.

Payment of interest on the unpaid balance of the amount determined as set forth above for any supplies transferred under the provisions of Article III shall be made by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics upon the same terms and conditions as are set out in Schedule I, with the exception that in the case of supplies transferred prior to the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased, the date of transfer shall be deemed to be the date of said determination by the President.

The supplies listed hereunder are those referred to in Article III of this Agreement. The undertakings of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Article III refer to such of these supplies as the United States shall have contracted for or shall have title to prior to the determination by the President that the military resistance of the common enemy has ceased. All items listed below are subject to the following conditions:

1. Individual applications for such equipment will first be reviewed by appropriate United States Government agencies.

2. After approval of individual applications it will be necessary for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to complete arrangements under which patent or other property rights are protected to the satisfaction of their owners.

3. New production of equipment will not be undertaken whenever in the judgment of responsible United States authorities such equipment can be supplied from United States surpluses or from cancelled orders, account always being taken of conditions peculiar to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which will govern use of the equipment.

4. Approval for new production will be given only to the extent that equipment required for United States programs of comparable

urgency is being approved and priority ratings, where required, will correspond to ratings granted such United States programs.

5. The United States will not undertake to effect delivery of the equipment during a fixed time period, except as provided in Article III of this Agreement.”

(List of Schedule II items follows in text submitted to Stepanov.<sup>37</sup>)

There is quoted below the text of the letter sent by General Wesson to General Rudenko on September 12 regarding procedural matter:

“Since your letter of September 2, 1944, to Mr. John Hazard, regarding the procedure for making applications for projects to be furnished under the Fourth Protocol upon the terms of Article III of the proposed amendment to the Mutual Aid agreement of June 11, 1942, I have had this matter further reviewed. I am setting forth below the procedure which the representatives of WPB, Treasury Procurement and FEA believe to be most suitable under the circumstances.

Although WPB Form 3649 must be executed before materials can be allocated for the manufacture of these projects, we shall make other arrangements to have the form filled out so that it will not be necessary for your Government to do this.

In order that we may expeditiously handle this program, however, we believe that your Government should make application for each project in a preliminary letter form and submit such application to this office in quadruplicate. This application should contain as much information as possible relating to the specifications of the products to be produced, capacity of the plant, and all utilities required.

In consideration of this application we may wish to consult with your engineers on technical details regarding designs and equipment to be supplied.

Upon approval of the application a recommendation will be submitted to your Government as to the detailed information to be included in a formal requisition to be submitted to the Foreign Economic Administration for processing.

Treasury Procurement in securing contractors to design or supply equipment in accordance with approved requisitions has given assurance that:

(1) Your Government may select the engineering firms, provided that adequate justification is given for the selection made. It must be understood that any negotiations by Treasury Procurement with engineering firms are subject to the statutory limitations applicable to the United States Government.

(2) Negotiations will be carried on with engineering firms and suppliers by Treasury Procurement, which may solicit the participation of the Soviet representatives in the negotiations.

(3) Prime contracts will be placed with firms designated by your Government, provided that justification is given which meets the requirements of Treasury Procurement, and prime contracts will be

<sup>37</sup> Reference is to the revised detailed list of Schedule II items included with the instruction of August 14, 1944 (see footnote 36, p. 1144). This list comprised 8 pages of items similar to many of those in Group V (especially those preceded by the symbol “III”), as printed in the detailed Annex II to the Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol signed on April 17, 1945. See *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 111-128.

placed only after agreement between Treasury Procurement and the Soviet representatives concerning contract prices.

Your attention is invited to the fact that the U.S. Government will not contract in your behalf, or be obligated in any way, for patent rights, royalty payments, technical information and know-how, etc. Financial arrangements for such items must be consummated by your Government with the parties concerned.

All matters of procedure and detail having to do with the transfer and acceptance of supplies under articles II and III of the proposed agreement should be discussed and worked out by the representatives of our two Governments as soon as possible."

HULL

861.24/9-2044

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*<sup>38</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: The Government of the United States, in appreciation of the great contribution made by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the common cause against the Nazi aggressors and their satellites, desires to continue to provide the Soviet Union with the maximum assistance possible for the prosecution of the war in the form of military supplies, equipment, raw materials, and food.

In conformity with this policy of the Government of the United States, there are enclosed the preamble of the proposed Fourth Soviet Protocol together with a statement of the supplies and shipping which the United States Government is in a position to make available to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>39</sup>

The attached preamble, which covers the offerings of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada has been approved by the three Governments. It is understood that the schedules of offerings of the United Kingdom and Canada will be delivered to the diplomatic representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in London and Ottawa respectively.

It is my understanding that several copies of the attached documents have already been transmitted informally to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and it will be appreciated if you will communicate the draft Protocol and schedule of offerings to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order that it may make its selections from the schedules as soon as possible and thus permit the implementation of the fulfillment of the needs of the Soviet Union without interruption.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

<sup>38</sup> Ambassador Gromyko acknowledged receipt of this note on September 22.

<sup>39</sup> For slightly revised text as agreed to, see Fourth (Ottawa) Protocol, covering period from July 1, 1944, to June 30, 1945, signed on April 17, 1945, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 89-91.

861.24/9-2244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 22, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:20 p. m.]

3631. ReDepts 2220, September 16, 6 p. m. I am afraid that the Soviet Government will not agree to the Department's *aide-mémoire* of July 6 unless it is made a condition to signing the Protocol. I do not feel that anything will be gained by taking the matter up with the Foreign Office until the Department's policy is decided upon. Now that we have put the Soviet Government on notice of our attitude and unless we insist on its acceptance the Soviet Government will probably consider that by failing to take action they have served notice on us that they do not accept our proposal.

HARRIMAN

861.24/9-2544

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 25, 1944.

Subject: Negotiations with Soviet Government regarding Supplementary Agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement.

MR. MATTHEWS: Late in 1943 Mikoyan, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, approached Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to make inquiry regarding the possibility of obtaining, as soon as possible, long-range industrial equipment for the Soviet Government. After going into the matter, Mr. Mikoyan was informed that, under the present laws and regulations of the United States, it would not be possible until these laws had been amended to extend large credits to the Soviet Union for the purchase of long-range industrial equipment. Mr. Harriman, however, advised Mr. Mikoyan that he would nevertheless study the question and endeavor to see what arrangements could be made.

After going into the matter carefully, a formula was worked out early in 1944 by which the Soviet Government could be permitted to order under the lend-lease act industrial equipment which, if delivered before the termination of hostilities against the common enemy, would contribute to the Soviet war effort but which would also be useful to the Soviet Union for peacetime purposes. In this formula, which has been worked out within the framework of Section 3(e) of the Master Lend-Lease Agreement, provision is made for the putting into production of such long-range equipment with the proviso that the Soviet Government will accept and pay for 1) certain designated war sup-

plies, also useful for peacetime purposes, which shall not have been delivered to the Soviet Government prior to the determination by the President that the resistance of the common enemy has been overcome and which are in inventory in this country or contracted for, 2) certain designated industrial equipment which takes a long time to produce and has a long useful life. (In the latter case the Soviet Government will obligate itself to pay for this equipment on a credit basis regardless of whether hostilities had ceased or not with the credit payments becoming due only after the cessation of hostilities.)

After working out this formula, a memorandum was addressed to the President on March 6, 1944 outlining the proposed agreement to him. After the President had approved the procedure a telegram was sent to Ambassador Harriman outlining the provisions of the proposed agreement, and on May 24 a draft text of the agreement was transmitted to the Soviet Embassy for consideration of the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government accepted the proposed draft as a basis for negotiations and on July 27, 1944 negotiations were initiated with Mr. M. S. Stepanov and other Soviet negotiators for the purpose of concluding the proposed agreement. After protracted negotiations, the United States representatives presented to Mr. Stepanov on September 14, a final draft of the agreement which incorporated all the changes to which the United States Government had consented.<sup>40</sup> Mr. Stepanov was informed that in submitting the final American draft to his Government, he could either request instructions to sign the agreement in Washington, or if he desired, he might proceed to Moscow to discuss the draft with his colleagues and sign the agreement there. As yet Mr. Stepanov has not communicated further with the Department.

During the entire negotiations members of the American delegation were in constant communication with representatives of the Treasury Department and in particular with Mr. Clifton Mack, Director of the Procurement Division of the Treasury Department, as well as Mr. Harold Glasser<sup>41</sup> and Mr. Harry White. Mr. William Batt and other officials of the War Production Board have also been consulted in connection with the negotiations together with appropriate officials of Army Procurement.

Before initiating negotiations with the Soviet Government, Mr. Dean Acheson and Mr. Oscar Cox<sup>42</sup> discussed the proposed Agreement with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Appropriations Committee as well as the House Foreign Relations Committee and House Appropriations Committee. No objections were raised by the members of Congress to the proposed agreement.

<sup>40</sup> See telegram 2226, September 16, 11 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1139.

<sup>41</sup> Assistant Director, Division of Monetary Research.

<sup>42</sup> General Counsel, Foreign Economic Administration.



861.24/9-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 29, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 5:45 p. m.]

3719. [To Stockholm.] The offer for movement of Russian-owned ballbearings from Stockholm to Soviet Union by United States planes was declined by Soviet Government and counter-proposal that we should move them to England was turned down by us. The Soviet Government was so informed on September 12.

This was done by agreement with War Department.

Sent to Stockholm September 29; repeated to Department.

HARRIMAN

861.24/10-3044

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1944.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In response to the proposal of the Government of the United States of America for a Fourth Protocol, delivered by you with a note of transmittal, dated September 20, 1944, I have the honor to transmit to you, on instruction of the Soviet Government, the following:

The Government of the U.S.S.R. values highly the aid rendered to the Soviet Union by the United States of America in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy on the basis of the Lend-Lease Act in the form of military supplies, industrial equipment, raw materials and food. In these efforts of the United States of America the Soviet Government sees the most important manifestation of a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and a recognition of the high importance of the contribution which the Soviet Union has made in the struggle for the defeat of the common enemy.

In concluding the Fourth Protocol the Soviet Government is motivated by a desire to satisfy first of all the most important and urgent needs of the Soviet Union, relating to the conduct of the war. Taking into consideration the shortage of ships' tonnage, the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it must somewhat reduce the overall quantity of supplies to be received under the Fourth Protocol from the United States of America. At the same time the Soviet Government considers it of great importance that sufficient ships' tonnage be made available to move the supplies selected in their full

extent. This principle is of further importance in connection with the special list of equipment and materials transmitted to Mr. Harri-man on October 17,<sup>43</sup> which also must be assured of sufficient ships' tonnage.

The Soviet Government, therefore, thinks it possible, in place of the program of 7,404,000 short tons offered by the United States, to establish a program of 5,944,000 short tons, not counting shipments from Canada in the amount of 200,000 tons. In this figure there is included cargo in the form of stocks in warehouses and items in transit having a tonnage of 600,000 short tons, not including cargoes set forth in the list of October 17.

The Soviet Government expresses confidence in the possibility of satisfying this request for tonnage, bearing in mind in this connection the statement of the Government of the United States of America, that the tonnage set by it is considered by it as a minimum and that the Government of the United States admits the possibility of surpassing this minimum.

Considering entirely timely the raising by the Government of the United States of America of the question of a long term credit in connection with certain deliveries of industrial equipment from the United States under the Fourth Protocol, the Soviet Government has the intention of offering its proposal on this question in the near future.

Accept [etc.]

ANDREI GROMYKO

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861.24/11-644

*The Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union (Stepanov) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)* <sup>44</sup>

[Moscow,] November 3, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. ACHESON: In the letter of 14 September, 1944 <sup>45</sup> which I received from Mr. E. D. Durbrow it is stated that Appendix No. 1 "as agreed upon" is enclosed together with the draft agreement. I consider it necessary to point out that the reference to an agreement on Appendix No. 1 is evidently a misunderstanding, as the schedule under Appendix No. 1 was not discussed by us in Washington.

This schedule was likewise not agreed upon in Moscow. Brig. General S. P. Spalding, during one of his discussions with Mr. A. D. Krutikov, among many other problems touched the question of the schedule under Appendix No. 1. Mr. Krutikov, preliminarily giving his personal opinion, replied that in view of the necessity to expedite

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<sup>43</sup> List, as enclosed, not printed.

<sup>44</sup> Transmitted to Mr. Acheson by General Rudenko in his covering letter of November 6, not printed.

<sup>45</sup> See telegram 2226, September 16, 11 p. m., to Moscow, p. 1139.

the completion of the negotiations, taking place in Washington, he believed that no serious modifications would be made to the U.S. draft schedule.

However, after detailed examination, it was found that Appendix No. 1 included not only Industrial Equipment, which was discussed with Mr. W. A. Harriman but also many other materials and therefore Mr. Krutikov advised General Spalding of the necessity of making serious amendments to the above mentioned schedule.

As to the contents of the draft agreement and the appendices thereto, sent to me, I have to point out that the draft contains several provisions unacceptable to the Soviet Union, for instance the limited date of placing orders, the amount of discount when determining the prices, as well as the amount of percentage rate, regarding which no agreement was reached during the negotiations between us.

Sincerely yours,

M. S. STEPANOV

861.24/11-644

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States (Rudenko)*

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1944.

MY DEAR GENERAL RUDENKO: With reference to our conversation of November 6 and the letter from Mr. Stepanov which you handed to me at that time, you will find enclosed a reply to Mr. Stepanov which I would appreciate your delivering to him. As agreed between us, I am communicating with our Embassy in Moscow, asking them to give the same information to Mr. Stepanov.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

[Enclosure]

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union (Stepanov)*

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. STEPANOV: I have received from General Rudenko your letter of November 3 relative to the supplementary agreement to the master lend-lease agreement which we discussed here last summer. You state that you feel that there is perhaps a misunderstanding in regard to the agreement reached on Appendix no. 1. Moreover, you point out that the draft agreement submitted to you on September 14, 1944 contains several provisions regarding which we reached no agreement during the negotiations here.

I wish to assure you that in regard to the question of Appendix no. 1, there was no misunderstanding between us since this specific question was not discussed in detail in Washington. In this connection, we

fully understand that the Soviet authorities in Moscow after giving further and careful consideration to Appendix no. 1 desire to propose amendments to the schedule contained in that Appendix. We will be pleased to receive the further views of the Soviet Government in regard to this matter.

In connection with the other questions raised in your letter, we completely understood that the final draft submitted to you contained certain provisions to which your instructions did not permit you to agree. You will recall, in this regard, that in presenting the final draft to you, we explained that it represents on the points at issue the final position of the United States Government. Moreover, you will recall that in working out the details of the final draft it was explained that because of definite legal limitations we were not in a position to make any further changes in the proposed agreement on several of the specific points which you raised during the discussions.

It is our sincere hope that the Soviet authorities after giving careful consideration to the proposals made will authorize the conclusion of the agreement as contained in the final draft submitted to you, with such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon in Appendix no. 1.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

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861.24/11-1144

*The Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State*

Serial 385713

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1944.

SIR: Public Law 1, approved 19 February 1943 (57 Stat. 4) provides that any ship, boat, barge, or floating drydock of the Navy "may be leased . . .<sup>46</sup> but not otherwise disposed of" to foreign governments. In order to comply with this law for such ships or equipment as may be turned over to foreign governments under the provisions of the Act of March 11, 1941, it became necessary to prepare some form of lease agreement (charter party).

Enclosed<sup>47</sup> is a copy of a letter dated 18 March 1944 from Rear Admiral E. G. Allen, USN, Director of Budget and Reports, Navy Department, to Rear Admiral M. I. Akulin, U.S.S.R. Navy, Vice Chairman of The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A., which enclosed copies of a tentative draft of the appropriate charter party with a request for an expression of Admiral Akulin's views in this matter. Enclosed also is a copy of a letter dated 21 September 1944 from Admiral Allen to Admiral Akulin which referred to the previous letter and requested that consideration of the proposed charter party be expedited. In addition to the aforementioned correspondence, Captain A. P. H. Tawresey, USN, of the

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<sup>46</sup> Omission indicated in the original letter.

<sup>47</sup> Enclosures mentioned not printed.

Office of Budget and Reports, Navy Department, obtained an interview with Admiral Akulin on 29 March 1944 and explained in detail to him the nature of the proposed lease and the reason therefor. Since that time frequent telephone calls have been made to Admiral Akulin's office to ascertain whether he had heard from Moscow, to which place he had referred the matter for instructions.

Enclosed finally is a copy of a letter dated 9 October 1944 from Rear Admiral A. A. Yakimov, U.S.S.R. Navy, who relieved Admiral Akulin as Vice Chairman of The Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A., which, in the light of the above, appears to be a refusal on the part of the local Soviet representatives to enter into the required lease.

The lease agreement (charter party) is not inconsistent with but implements the Soviet master agreement of 11 June 1942. In consequence of the foregoing the Navy Department considers that it should be made clear to the Soviet Government that the execution of the lease agreement (charter party) is necessary as a compliance with the Act of 19 February 1943, and does not effect any change in the Soviet master agreement of 11 June 1942.

It is requested therefore that the Department of State make appropriate representations to the Soviet Government for the purpose of obtaining execution of the lease agreement (charter party) by the Soviet Government without further delay.

Respectfully,

FORRESTAL

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861.24/12-644

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, November 28, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 30, 1944 containing your Government's reply to and selections made from the proposals by the United States Government for a Fourth Protocol under the Master Lend-Lease Agreement of June 11, 1942.

The Government of the United States is most grateful for the expression of appreciation for the aid rendered by the United States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the conduct of the war against the common enemy.

In regard to the specific items offered by the United States Government for the Fourth Protocol period and the selections made therefrom by the Soviet Government in its note under acknowledgment, I have to inform you of the following:

(a) In the cases of those items in which the selections of your Government coincide with the specific offerings made, the United

States Government will endeavor to provide the quantities selected.

(b) The United States Government accepts the reductions made by the Soviet Government in regard to those items for which the selections were less than the quantities offered.

(c) A careful study of the enclosure to the note under reference indicates that in certain items the selections made by your Government are in excess of the amounts offered and that some items included in the selections were offered under the provisions of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement of June 11, 1942.

In regard to the selections made in excess of the offerings in my Government's note of September 20, 1944, I regret to inform you that the United States Government cannot commit itself to furnish the additional quantities selected.

Concerning the items in the United States Government's offerings which were specifically indicated as coming within the provisions of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement, I am certain your Government understands that the production of the items referred to in the proposed amendment cannot be undertaken until the agreement has been signed unless your Government wishes to proceed without the financial assistance of the Lend-Lease Act.

The Government of the United States is pleased to note that the Soviet Government is giving consideration to these proposals and that a reply on this question may be expected in the near future.

(d) In a few instances the selections of your Government cannot be reconciled with the United States offerings. We are prepared to make every effort to clear up any misunderstandings, but cannot at this time go beyond our offerings.

Note is also taken of your Government's request that the Government of the United States obligate itself to provide additional shipping so that it may be possible to ship from North America more than the 5,700,000 short tons set forth in the preamble to the United States schedule attached to the proposed Fourth Protocol. While it is quite probable that the additional tonnage your Government requests may become available to augment the shipping program to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the demands of the United Nations throughout the world are of such a nature that it will be impossible to make a firm commitment of the type suggested. It is appreciated, however, that the shipment of supplies requested in the special list of equipment and materials<sup>48</sup> transmitted to Ambassador Harriman on October 18, 1944 is a separate matter, and your Government will be advised subsequently as to the shipping to be made available to aid in the transportation of such supplies as are made available from this list.

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<sup>48</sup> Not printed.

I understand that the Canadian Government has invited the interested Governments to Ottawa for the purpose of signing the Fourth Protocol Agreement. I trust that it will be possible to sign the Protocol in the near future.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

861.24/12-244

*The Director of the Division for Soviet Supply, Foreign Economic Administration (Wesson), to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1944.

DEAR MR. BOHLEN: I am very much concerned by the treatment which has been accorded the various engineers who are working in the U.S.S.R. on Lend-Lease projects. We have received reports from our Mission pointing out that engineers are now grouped in Class 3 with clerks and enlisted men as far as the ration is concerned. Apparently this classification of engineers is too low to permit them to obtain the food which they require as active men working outdoors in remote areas of the U.S.S.R.

We have already sent a great deal of food to these engineers and have recently supplemented it with a shipment of an additional eight tons. A future shipment of 18 tons is planned for the spring. We never intended when this operation was begun to send so much food as we thought the U.S.S.R. could give a sufficiently high norm to the men to permit them to buy in the market. Certainly this was the intent of the Agreement which Mr. Stettinius signed with Mr. Lukashev<sup>49</sup> on July 6, 1943.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have written today to Lieutenant General Rudenko setting forth the situation.<sup>50</sup> In view of the over-all problem involving American citizens in the U.S.S.R. and the possibility of their number being increased in the future on various projects, I believe the State Department will have a vital interest in the matter. Would you consider the situation and advise me whether you believe it desirable for a note to be dispatched by the Secretary of State or Ambassador Harriman in Moscow asking for a revision of the ration norms as they relate to American engineers.<sup>51</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C. M. WESSON  
*Major General, U.S. Army*

<sup>49</sup> Konstantin Ignatyevich Lukashev was Deputy Chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. was then Lend-Lease Administrator.

<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Mr. Bohlen replied on December 9 and reported dispatch of a telegram to Ambassador Harriman authorizing him to support the request for increased rations for American engineers.

861.24/11-1144

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal)*

WASHINGTON, December 15, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Reference is made to your letter of November 11, 1944 concerning the desire of the Navy Department to obtain the consent of the Soviet Government to sign special charter parties for vessels turned over under the Lend-Lease Agreement to the Soviet Union.

This question has been discussed with the appropriate officials of this Department as well as with the Foreign Economic Administration, Division of Soviet Supply, and it has been decided that, since this involves a straight Lend-Lease matter, it would be advisable to take up the question directly with the Soviet authorities through the Supply Section of the Military Mission attached to our Embassy in Moscow, in order to explain the reasons why it is necessary under American law to follow the procedure outlined in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

861.24/12-1944

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko)*<sup>52</sup>

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with reference to the *aide-mémoire* of the Department of State of July 6, 1944 proposing an exchange of notes embodying the principle of consultation between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union before any articles or materials similar to those received from the United States under Lend-Lease are transferred by the Soviet Government to third countries or authorities, invites the attention of the Ambassador to the fact that no reply has been received to this proposal. The United States Government requests, therefore, that the following be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government.

In accordance with the basic objective of the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, the United States Government naturally expects as a matter of principle that the governments of all countries which are receiving assistance from the United States through the medium of this Act and agreements supplementary thereto will consult with the appropriate authorities of the United States Government before trans-

<sup>52</sup> Handed to Ambassador Gromyko by Mr. Acheson on December 19, with an explanation as suggested in Mr. Matthews' memorandum of December 6, 1944, not printed. In reply to questions, Mr. Acheson said the note set forth the American position as understood by other governments and that a written report of the Soviet attitude would be in the interest of clarity.



ferring to third countries or authorities through sale or other act any articles or materials similar to those received under Lend-Lease from the United States. In the case of the United Kingdom, for instance, this principle has been embodied in the form of an exchange of notes with the United States Government such as was proposed in the *aide-mémoire* of the Department of State referred to above. Whether or not such formal agreements exist, the United States Government considers that this principle applies to all countries receiving Lend-Lease assistance. The United States Government is, of course, prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any request from countries receiving Lend-Lease supplies for the concurrence of this Government in proposed transfers to third countries or authorities, since it recognizes that in certain instances such transfers might be directly connected with the furtherance of the common war effort.

In the event that articles or materials similar to those received from the United States under Lend-Lease are in fact transferred by any receiving government to third countries, other than in accordance with the principle of consultation and agreement with this Government, the United States Government will regard such transfers as evidence that the government in question no longer needs from the United States the specific articles or materials thus transferred.

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1944.

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861.24/12-1944: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 19, 1944—9 p. m.

2856. Following is summary of note handed to Soviet Ambassador by Mr. Acheson on December 19.

[Here follows summary of note printed *supra*.]

In handing the note to the Ambassador, Mr. Acheson stated orally that since the policy outlined in the note applies to all countries and since we have not received a reply to our *Aide-Mémoire* of July 6, 1944, we felt that it would be advisable to explain formally and in full our position on this question. He added that the policy outlined in the note has no connection with the current discussions for the Fourth Protocol or the proposed 3(c) agreement. Mr. Acheson, in reply to a question by the Ambassador, suggested that we would appreciate having a written reply to this communication.

In order that there may be no misunderstanding regarding the motives in sending the note, please make available to the appropriate Soviet authorities the pertinent points of the note and give them orally an explanation similar to the oral remarks outlined above.

STETTINIUS

**EFFORTS TO ARRANGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE AND ONWARD SHIPMENT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND MAIL FOR THE BENEFIT OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNED CIVILIANS IN JAPANESE-CONTROLLED TERRITORY**<sup>53</sup>

711.94114 Supplies/85 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Vladivostok (Ward) to the Secretary of State*

VLADIVOSTOK, via Moscow, January 8, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received January 13—2: 12 p. m.]

5. I was today permitted to view for first time storage facilities provided for war prisoner supplies mentioned in your 89 October 13.

Warehouse number 4, a non-heated frame structure sheathed and roofs with corrugated iron, has been set aside for storage of supplies not subject to damage from frost and 18,000 of the 22,574 food packages shipped on Soviet vessels *Sovetskaya Gavan*, *Novofohnihsk* [*Novorossisk*] and *Tungus* are now stored therein. I was not shown remaining 4574 packages, which are stated to be stored temporarily elsewhere in port. While warehouse is suitable in every respect for storing goods not subject to damage from frost, it will not accommodate all food packages mentioned above and nonfreezable goods now en route on the *Argun* (your 97 November 16) and the second shipment on the *Tungus* (your 107 December 31). Port administration will, I am told, make available such additional unheated storage facilities as may be needed as well as heated facilities for medical supplies in the *Argun* shipment.<sup>54</sup>

WARD

711.94114 Mail/40 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1944—11 p. m.

267. United States Post Office Department has made arrangements with Air Transport Command of United States Army for American prisoner of war and civilian internee mails for the Far East to be carried by air to Teheran from which point Teheran postal authorities state mails will be forwarded by surface means. (Embassy's 2236, December 15, 1943).<sup>55</sup> This route will now be used instead of the

<sup>53</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 799-828. For further correspondence on efforts by the United States to send financial and other assistance to American nationals held by Japan, see vol. V, pp. 1015 ff.

<sup>54</sup> For a summary of steps taken by the Department of State at this time in behalf of American nationals who were in Japanese custody, including the shipment of relief supplies to the Far East, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 15, 1944, pp. 78-84.

<sup>55</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 828.

route via Intercross<sup>56</sup> in Geneva which in past has forwarded mail via Basel, Istanbul, Tiflis, and Siberia. Precise route onward from Teheran is not known but presumably it will be via the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

In view of failure thus far of Soviet Foreign Office to implement agreement of postal authorities of United States and Soviet [Union] to carry prisoner of war mails (not relief supplies) from United States West Coast ports to Vladivostok for onward transmission to Japan, the mechanics of onward transmission from Teheran are being left to the postal authorities and should not be discussed with the Soviet Foreign Office unless question is raised by it in which event Embassy should emphasize that exchange of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail has been in accordance with terms of Geneva Convention.<sup>57</sup> (Department's 726, August 20).<sup>58</sup>

Repeat request for urgent consideration of matters set forth in Department's 1357, December 7; <sup>59</sup> 726, August 20; and 617, July 28.<sup>60</sup>

HULL

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711.94114 Supplies/120a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944—11 p. m.

319. Please transmit a communication to the Soviet Government in the sense of the following:

“Although the Soviet Government's cooperative attitude in respect of the proposal put forward by the Japanese Government and made known to the Soviet Government in the Embassy's note (based on Department's 205 to Kuibyshev, April 17, 1943<sup>61</sup>), in regard to the development of a means whereby regular shipments of relief supplies for distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody in the Far East might be made via Soviet territory, was made known to the Japanese Government in May 1943, the latter has thus far failed, despite repeated representations made by the United States Government, to indicate a means satisfactory to Japan whereby supplies sent from the United States to Soviet territory might be moved onward to Japan and to Japanese-controlled territory, there to be taken over by the appropriate agencies for distribution in prisoner-of-war and civilian internment camps.

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<sup>56</sup> International Red Cross, Geneva, Switzerland.

<sup>57</sup> International convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929; for text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, pp. 336-367, particularly section IV, articles 35-41, pp. 345-346.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 1943, vol. III, p. 814.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 826.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 807.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 801.

From all reports the conditions under which Allied nationals are held by the Japanese authorities have deteriorated to such an extent that unless prompt assistance can be extended to these persons the already high death rate not only will continue but will increase.<sup>62</sup> It has, therefore, become even more imperative than before to make every endeavor to develop a means whereby the medical, food and clothing supplies necessary for the maintenance of health and of life itself may be sent to these nationals; that such of the civilian internees as the Japanese authorities may agree to release be repatriated and that seriously sick and seriously wounded prisoners of war either be repatriated or evacuated to an area where their essential needs may be provided for and unnecessary deaths prevented.

The Government of the United States would therefore like to put forward to the Japanese Government an entirely new plan of relief as outlined below. As the assistance and cooperation of the Soviet Government would, however, be required in order to give effect to this plan, the Government of the United States inquires whether the Soviet Government would be prepared to extend the necessary assistance and cooperation, and earnestly hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to return an affirmative reply.

Under this plan Japanese nationals selected from those held in the Western Hemisphere, together with a quantity of relief supplies, would be put aboard a vessel provided by the United States to be manned by a Soviet crew and to travel under safe conduct from a United States West Coast port to a Russian Pacific port to be designated by the Soviet Government. From this point the ship would be taken on to Japan either by the Russian crew or by a Japanese crew to be sent from Japan to the designated Russian port. Upon arrival in Japan it would unload and pick up American nationals for repatriation to the United States, via the reverse of the same route. The plan envisages that the ship would make as many voyages as might be required to exchange all personnel which the respective Powers would be willing to release. It would also be proposed that seriously sick and seriously wounded military personnel be put aboard the ship but that if the Japanese Government objected to the repatriation of such personnel to the United States those persons might be accommodated in the Soviet Union for the duration of the war as provided in category B of the Model Agreement annexed to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.<sup>63</sup> The Government of the United States assures the Soviet Government that all expenditures in funds, shipping, or materials connected with the execution of this plan will be borne by the Government of the United States both in connection with the transportation of these nationals and their care during their sojourn on Soviet territory, and that the cooperation and assistance of the Soviet Government will not involve any expense on its part or any diminution either in shipping space or the amount and character of

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<sup>62</sup> Statements had been made about Japanese atrocities by the Secretary of State at a press conference on January 28, 1944, and by Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, at this time Special Assistant to the Secretary. See Department of State *Bulletin*, January 29, 1944, p. 115.

<sup>63</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 363.

supplies being made available to the Soviet Union under the Third Lend-Lease Protocol.<sup>64</sup>

The Government of the United States attaches the greatest importance to this matter and hopes that the Soviet Government will find it possible to inform the Government of the United States in the very near future of its willingness, in principle, to be of assistance in the manner proposed above in order that the Government of the United States may then seek to obtain the Japanese Government's agreement. While the Soviet Government's agreement to this proposal is being requested at this time in principle only, it would be helpful if the Soviet Government would indicate the Pacific port it would be willing to make available for this purpose."<sup>65</sup>

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Mail/52 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1944—7 p. m.

525. Department approves Embassy's proposal to request Soviet authorities to turn over prisoner of war mail received from Teheran to Soviet postal authorities for onward transmission to Japan (Embassy's 687, February 29).<sup>66</sup>

Embassy should take this opportunity to discuss again with Soviet authorities the routing of prisoner of war mails from United States to Far East via the Soviet Union. Discussion should be carried on in light of the assurance of the Soviet Government that it is ready to cooperate in the transmission of mail to prisoners of war and civilian internees in Far East (Embassy's 1915, November 11);<sup>67</sup> the agreement between the United States and Japan for the exchange of prisoner of war and civilian internee mail (Department's 1357, December 7, 1943);<sup>68</sup> and the fact that British prisoner of war correspondence has been sent to the Far East since 1942, going from the United Kingdom to Moscow, via the Arctic or Persia. Soviet postal authorities have assured the British postal authorities that such mails are reforwarded without delay to Shimonoseki. British prisoner of war mails destined for Far East via the Soviet Union have been enclosed in mails addressed to Moscow labeled via Abadan,

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<sup>64</sup> The text of this Third (London) Protocol of October 19, 1943, is printed in Department of State, *Soviet Supply Protocols*, pp. 51-85. For correspondence concerned with wartime assistance from the United States for the Soviet Union, see *ante*, pp. 1032 ff.

<sup>65</sup> A communication in accordance with this telegram was made by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky on February 18, in which "the great interest of the United States Government in this matter" was stressed. (711.94114 Supplies/121)

<sup>66</sup> Not printed.

<sup>67</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 823.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 826.

Bandar,<sup>69</sup> Pahlevi.<sup>70</sup> Clarification should be obtained from the Soviet authorities on the following points:

1. The route to be followed in the future by prisoner of war and civilian internee mail for the Far East (including mail from Japanese nationals held in United States) arriving in Teheran by air from the United States, including proper routing to be used hereafter by United States postal authorities in dispatching such mail. If such information is obtained, inform Teheran.

2. Government of the United States desires to suggest to Japanese Government that prisoner of war and civilian internee mail from Far East to United States (including mail for Japanese nationals held in the United States) be routed through Soviet Union to Teheran so that it may be carried to United States by air. This route would replace present route for such mail from Japan which is understood to be via Soviet Union to Switzerland and thence to United States. Ascertain whether Soviet authorities have objection.

3. Government of United States would appreciate receiving information concerning present status of proposed use of route from West Coast to Vladivostok for prisoner of war mails destined for Far East. (Department's 617, July 28).<sup>71</sup>

Arrangements to fly mail to Teheran were made by United States postal authorities through postal channels in accordance with normal custom of postal administrations.

Department fully concurs in recommendation of American Legation Teheran that our unfortunate nationals in the Far East are entitled to the fullest measure of our determination to leave no stone unturned in endeavoring to get mail to and from them. If appeal in highest quarters is necessary please give Department your urgent recommendations in this respect.

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/132 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 13, 1944—noon.

[Received March 14—9:39 a. m.]

822. Reference Department's 319, February 16, 11 p. m. I have received a letter from Molotov<sup>72</sup> dated March 10, in which the readiness of the Soviet Government in principle is expressed to assist in the execution of the measures proposed in my letter to him of February 16 [18] setting forth the considerations contained in the Department's reference telegram) as soon as the necessary arrangements between the American and Japanese Governments are reached with

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<sup>69</sup> Bandar Shahpur is intended.

<sup>70</sup> Formerly, Enzeli.

<sup>71</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 807.

<sup>72</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

respect to the plan. Molotov's letter continues that the Soviet Government is ready to make available the use of a Soviet port for the purpose indicated and that this port will subsequently be designated.<sup>73</sup>

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Mail/57 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 27, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received March 28—11:35 a. m.]

1072. Foreign Office states that the 11 sacks of prisoners of war mail mentioned in Embassy's 678 [687], February 29, 11 p. m.,<sup>74</sup> plus 10 additional sacks subsequently received from Tehran have been turned over to the Commissariat of Communications and will be forwarded to their destination in the near future. An early reply on the general question of rerouting American prisoner of war mail (reference Department's 525, March 9, 7 p. m.) in transit through the Soviet Union has been promised.

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Supplies/154 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1944—8 p. m.

729. Reference your 1043, March 25.<sup>74</sup> The term "American" nationals in Department's 319, February 16, was intended also to include Canadians and nationals of the other American republics. Department regrets failure to make this point clear and agrees that this should be made clear to the Soviet Government.

HULL

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711.94114 Mail/59 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 8, 1944—11 a. m.  
[Received 9:15 p. m.]

1219. Embassy's 1072, March 27, 7 p. m. A note from the Foreign Office dated April 5 states that the Soviet Government has instructed

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<sup>73</sup> Secretary of State Hull instructed Ambassador Harriman by telegram 671, March 23, to express the thanks of the United States Government for this readiness to assist, and to say that the Soviet Government would be informed of any developments (711.94114 Supplies/132).

<sup>74</sup> Not printed.

the Soviet Communications authorities to accept prisoner of war and civilian internee mail from the United States from American authorities in Tehran for transmission through the Soviet Union and delivery to the Japanese authorities.

The Soviet Government is also prepared to accept from the Japanese authorities and deliver in Tehran, mail from American prisoners and internees in Japan and mail for Japanese nationals interned in the United States, on condition that an agreement on this subject is reached by the Governments of the United States and Japan.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Tehran.

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Supplies/171 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, April 12, 1944—2 p. m.  
[Received 8:58 p. m.]

1265. The Embassy does not regard the Soviet Government's agreement in principle to assist in the measures set forth in the Department's 319, February 16, 11 p. m., as necessarily including agreement that the Japanese Government be given the choice as to whether a Soviet or a Japanese crew should man the vessel while proceeding from a Soviet Pacific port to Japan. Reference also Embassy's 822 March 13, noon. The Department's telegram 319 states that "the ship would be taken on to Japan either by the Russian crew or by a Japanese crew to be sent from Japan to the designated Soviet port". This language was followed in communicating the proposal to the Soviet Government. In the Embassy's opinion the question as to whether the crew on that leg of the journey would be Soviet or Japanese still remains open so far as the Soviet Government is concerned. While it may not be advisable in case an inaccurate impression has been communicated to the Japanese Government to send the Japanese Government a correction at this time the Embassy desires to bring the foregoing observation to the Department's attention.

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Supplies/171 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1944—11 p. m.

965. Department unable to follow Embassy's interpretation as set forth your 1265 April 12. That part of the proposal regarding the possible operation of the ship by a Japanese crew between Soviet and



Japanese ports was incorporated in the Embassy's note to the Soviet Foreign Office. Since the Soviet Government agreed to the proposal in principle without reservation it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet Government was aware of this aspect of the proposal and was not disposed to offer objection thereto. In as much as the Soviet Government's agreement in principle to the proposal was based on the working out of the necessary arrangements between the United States Government and the Japanese Government it would appear that no further approach to the Soviet Government in this matter will be required until the views of the Japanese Government have been ascertained. As the Embassy is aware the Swiss Government was requested on March 30 to present this proposal to the Japanese Government.<sup>76</sup>

HULL

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711.94114 Mail/59 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1944—11 p. m.

989. Following telegram has been dispatched to the American Legation at Bern and repeated to Tehran :

“Request Swiss to inform Japanese authorities that prisoner of war and civilian internee mail from the United States to Far East (including mail from Japanese nationals held in the United States) is now being carried by air free of charge from United States to Tehran. Soviet Communications authorities have undertaken to forward this mail by surface across Soviet Union and deliver it to Japanese authorities. Request Japanese authorities to deliver this mail as expeditiously as possible as envisaged by Article 36 of Geneva Convention.

The Soviet Government has indicated its willingness to accept prisoner of war and civilian internee mail originating in Far East from Japanese authorities (including mail for Japanese nationals held in United States). Soviet Government is prepared to forward this mail to Tehran from which point United States authorities will undertake to carry it to the United States by air free of charge and expedite its delivery to addressees in the United States. If Japanese authorities desire to accept offer of United States Government to carry this mail from Tehran to United States it is suggested that they approach Soviet authorities with view of routing mail for United States to Tehran.

Department would appreciate receiving urgently from Japanese authorities notice when mails from Far East are first routed via Tehran in order that final arrangements may be made for air transportation from Tehran to United States.”

HULL

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<sup>76</sup> See telegrams 1072 and 1073, March 30, to Bern, vol. v, pp. 1085 and 1087, respectively.

711.94114 Mail/72 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 3, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

1555. Pursuant to the Department's 988, April 21, 10 p. m.,<sup>77</sup> the subject of shipments of prisoners of war mail by Soviet vessels to Vladivostok was discussed with the new chief of the American Section of the Foreign Office<sup>78</sup> on April 28 who stated he would look into the matter.

In a previous discussion of this question another Foreign Office official confidentially expressed the personal view that the Soviet authorities were concerned that the carrying of such mail would cause difficulties with the Japanese. It was pointed out to him that this mail would in any event pass through Japanese hands and that the forwarding of such mail was in accordance with existing agreements between the Japanese and American Governments. The Soviet official stated that nevertheless he thought the Soviet authorities felt that the carrying of such mail might present an excuse for the Japanese to stop Soviet ships which the Soviet Government was anxious to avoid. He would not discuss the matter further and emphasized that he was giving a personal "impression" in confidence.

HAMILTON

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711.94114 Supplies/187 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 8, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received May 9—7 a. m.]

1598. I have received from the Foreign Office under cover of a letter dated May 5, marked Secret, a copy of a memorandum which the Foreign Office states was transmitted to the Japanese Government on April 8. The following is a paraphrased translation of the memorandum:

[“]The Government of the United States informed the Soviet Government in the spring of last year that together with the American Red Cross it was carrying on negotiations with the Japanese Government through the International Red Cross with respect to the satisfying of the immediate needs of American citizens detained by the Government of Japan in the Far East for provisions, medical supplies, and postal service. It has been pointed out by

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<sup>77</sup> Not printed; it instructed the Embassy to take up again the subject of the shipment of mail on Soviet vessels from Pacific ports of the United States to Vladivostok (711.94114 Mail/59).

<sup>78</sup> Semen Konstantinovich Tsarapkin had replaced Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin as Chief of the American Section in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

the United States Government that as a result of these negotiations the Japanese Government did not object in principle to the sending of packages and correspondence to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and in Japanese-controlled territory, but that it could not permit the entrance of neutral ships into waters where hostilities were taking place. The Japanese Government, according to the United States Government, nevertheless expressed its readiness to study the possibility of rendering assistance in the present situation on condition that the Government of the United States should send packages and correspondence for interned Americans to Vladivostok either by sea on Soviet vessels or by land across Siberia. In communicating this the United States Government inquired of the Soviet Government whether it would agree in principle to cooperate in sending such provisions, medical supplies, and correspondence destined for American prisoners of war and internees in Japan and in Japanese controlled territory across the territory of the USSR.

The British Government at the same time transmitted to the Soviet Government in connection with British prisoners of war and internees in the hands of Japanese authorities a similar request.

The Soviet Government stated in reply to the approaches of the American and British Governments that it was prepared to render assistance to the two Governments in sending provisions, medical supplies, and correspondence across Soviet territory for British and American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese-controlled territory provided that the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the one hand and the Government of Japan on the other reached an appropriate agreement on this question.

In connection with the requests mentioned above the having in view that, as would appear from the communications of the American and British Governments, the Japanese Government did not object in principle to sending packages and correspondence to British and American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan or on territory controlled by it, the stockpiling in the USSR of shipments of provisions and medical supplies for the above-mentioned purposes was agreed to by the Soviet Government.

The British Government informed the Soviet Government that it is greatly disturbed at the fate of British prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese hands and that in the hope of ameliorating conditions in the detention camps, the British Government is especially interested that:

- (1) There be recognized the right for the power protecting British interests, Switzerland, and also for the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit all camps which contain British subjects and to submit information on conditions existing there freely and openly.

- (2) There be drawn up a complete list of all British prisoners and civilian internees in Japanese hands, together with a complete list of those who have died in detention.

- (3) The Japanese Government should agree to accept Red Cross provisions which would be sent on neutral ships to Japanese ports at definite intervals and also to assist in the distribution to all areas which contain prisoners of war and internees of these supplies.

The Soviet Government has also been advised by the British Government that a long time ago the British Government requested the Japanese Government to fulfill the three requests mentioned above. Up to the present time, however, the Japanese authorities have refused to sanction the visiting of camps for internees in all the southern regions where are interned nine-tenths of the British prisoners. Furthermore they have refused to supply information on a certain number of prisoners in their hands. Japanese authorities have sanctioned only the sending of such supplies as might be transported on the vessels which carried out the exchange of the diplomatic and consular personnel of Great Britain and Japan after the outbreak of war. The provisions transported by these ships were absolutely insufficient for the large number of prisoners involved.

In bringing the above to the attention of the Soviet Government, the British Government requested the Soviet Government to prevail upon the Japanese Government to agree to the three points mentioned above and especially to the point concerning the sending of the provisions which are stockpiled at the present time in the territory of the USSR to British prisoners and internees. The Soviet Government has also been approached with a similar request to render assistance in improving the situation of Allied nationals under detention in Japan by the Government of the United States.

In bringing the aforementioned requests of the British and American Governments to the attention of the Japanese Government, the Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Japanese Government will favorably consider these requests".

HAMILTON

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711.94114 Supplies/187 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1944—9 p. m.

1171. Reference your 1598 May 8. Please express to the Soviet Government this Government's gratitude for the action taken by the former in urging the Japanese Government favorably to consider the representations and proposals previously made by the British and United States Governments to the Japanese Government with a view to ameliorating the condition of Allied nationals detained in the Far East, particularly with reference to the onward movement and distribution of relief supplies and mail now standing at Vladivostok.

It is quite likely that the Soviet communication quoted in the telegram under reference may have resulted in the offer of the Japanese Government recently received by the Department proposing a means whereby relief supplies and mail may be transported from Soviet territory to Japan and thence to interned Allied nationals, which will be the subject of a separate communication to the Embassy.<sup>79</sup>

HULL

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<sup>79</sup> *Infra.*

71L94114 Supplies/194a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1944— 5 p. m.

1180. The Legation at Bern has forwarded to Department text of recent Japanese communication<sup>80</sup> concerning onward movement of relief supplies now warehoused at Vladivostok and those to be sent subsequently via that port intended for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. This is the proposal originally taken up with the Soviet Government by the Embassy pursuant to Department's telegram 205, April 17, 1943,<sup>81</sup> and should not be confused with the more recent proposal envisaging accelerated exchanges and the shipment of relief supplies outlined in the Department's 319, February 16, 1944.

The above-mentioned Japanese communication states that Japanese Government is prepared to pick up these relief supplies and mail at Vladivostok and to distribute them to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. To this end it offers to send a Japanese ship to Vladivostok about once a month. The Japanese Government makes this offer contingent (1) upon the granting by the Soviet Government of permission for the Japanese ship to enter the port of Vladivostok for the purpose and (2) United States agreement to move in reverse direction such relief supplies and mail as Japan may wish to send to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in United States custody.

Please communicate the foregoing to the Soviet Government and request its agreement on an urgent basis, reminding that Government of the intense anxiety for the welfare of these prisoners which exists on the part of the people of the United States, Great Britain, and other Allied countries whose nationals are in Japanese custody. Should the Soviet Government be unwilling to permit a Japanese vessel to call at Vladivostok for this purpose it is hoped that the Soviet Government will be good enough to designate some other Soviet Pacific port for the purpose to which this Government could move these relief supplies from Vladivostok. The United States Government is of course prepared to defray all necessary expenses in this connection.

The Department is aware that in the Embassy's telegram 912, July 21, 1943,<sup>82</sup> the view was expressed that the Soviet authorities would not be disposed to permit Japanese ships to enter the Soviet Union to pick up these supplies. In view of the Japanese Government's insistent refusal during the past 2 years to permit the direct

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<sup>80</sup> See telegram 2949, May 10, from Bern, vol. v. p. 1033.

<sup>81</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 801.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 807.

shipment of relief supplies to Japanese ports even in neutral ships, it would appear that trans-shipment via Japanese ship calling at a Soviet port is the most practicable, if not the only way in which the regular shipment of supplies so urgently needed by Allied nationals in Japanese custody can be effected. The Department realizes that for security reasons this arrangement may not be entirely pleasing to the Soviet authorities, but hopes that the Soviet authorities may be able to take such security measures as may make it possible to accept the Japanese Government's proposal. You may find it advisable in this connection to point out that, as stated in the Department's 702, August 17, 1943,<sup>88</sup> failure to arrange for the onward movement of these supplies in the face of increasing public pressure upon the United States and British Governments will become increasingly embarrassing to all concerned. This will be the case even more if we fail to move these supplies now that the Japanese Government has made public its offer to pick them up at a Soviet port.

You may present the matter in such manner as in your judgment is likely to result in a prompt and favorable response by the Soviet authorities. If you are of the opinion that an approach to the Soviet Embassy at Washington would be helpful in supporting your action, please inform the Department urgently.

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711.94114 Supplies/195 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 15, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received May 16—3:47 p. m.]

1740. Reference your 1180, May 12, 5 p. m. I left with Vyshinski this afternoon a note addressed to Molotov in regard to the recent communication of the Japanese Government concerning the onward movement of relief supplies now at Vladivostok and those to be sent subsequently via that port intended for distribution to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. I requested, under instruction, the agreement of the Soviet Government on an urgent basis to the arrangement proposed. I supplemented my note with earnest oral representations.

Vyshinski said that the Soviet Government desired to be cooperative and helpful. He said that the Japanese Government knew that Vladivostok was a closed port; that the Japanese had long been trying on some pretext or other to arrange for their ships to enter Vladivostok; that as Vladivostok was a military zone, as the harbor was mined,

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<sup>88</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 811.

and as the port was a closed one, he thought the Japanese had advanced the proposal simply as a means of cloaking their refusal to cooperate since the Japanese must know that in all likelihood the Soviets would refuse permission for Japanese ships to enter. He said that the question of Vladivostok was especially difficult because it would mean a continuing thing, as the proposed arrangement envisaged one Japanese ship per month. He asked why the Japanese did not propose that the supplies be moved from Vladivostok by rail to Grodekovo,<sup>84</sup> Harbin, and thence through Manchuria to a port under Japanese control where Japanese vessels could receive the supplies. He said that this railroad route was open and that it would be much simpler than the proposal for a Japanese ship to call at Vladivostok. I went over with Vyshinski the various considerations set forth in the Department's telegram under reference. I stressed the fact that the Japanese had been obstinate and had come forward only after a very long time with the present offer. I expressed fear that the presenting of different and new proposals would result in additional delays and refusals by the Japanese and we earnestly hoped a solution could be found which would avert this. With regard to the suggestion that perhaps some Soviet Pacific port other than Vladivostok might be designated, Vyshinski said that this would be given special thought. He mentioned Petropavlovsk or some other Soviet port which might possibly be used, but made no commitment. He said that of course the Soviet Government would desire to be helpful, that he would have to refer the matter to the Soviet Government where it would receive careful study, that he had made the remarks about the difficulties because he wished to give his personal frank opinion about the matter. He said the Soviet Government would do everything possible to give an affirmative answer but the question of Japanese vessels entering Vladivostok presented special difficulties.

My estimate is that the Soviet Government will not agree to let Japanese vessels enter Vladivostok but that they will agree to permit Japanese vessels to enter another Soviet Pacific port or will propose that the supplies be moved from Vladivostok, by rail through Manchuria.

If the American Government desires further to press for Soviet acceptance to the proposal that Japanese ships be permitted to enter Vladivostok, I think that representations in Washington might be helpful. They would need to be on a very high level. Aside from the Vladivostok angle, it might be useful if the deep interest of the Govern-

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<sup>84</sup> Station on the line to the Manchurian border (the former Chinese Eastern Railway) 97 km. from the junction at Voroshilov Ussuryysky, 113 km. north of Vladivostok.

ment and people of the United States in the matter could be impressed upon Ambassador Gromyko<sup>85</sup> for communication to his Government.

HAMILTON

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711.94114 Supplies/198 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 18, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received May 19—5:15 p. m.]

1779. Reference Embassy's No. 1740, May 15, 7 p. m. The following telegram has been received from Vladivostok.

May 16, 11 a. m. Instead of permitting me<sup>86</sup> to check war prisoner supplies yesterday as arranged several days ago (my 72, May 12<sup>87</sup>), local representative of Commissariat for Foreign Trade called Consulate General translator to his office last evening where she was informed that all supplies shipped on Soviet vessels *Sovetskaya Gavan*, *Tungus* first and second voyages, *Novorossisk*, and *Argun* are now in storage at Vladivostok.

These supplies consist of 81,069 cartons American Red Cross standard Far Eastern food parcels; 2,625 cases Canadian Red Cross prisoner packages; 287 cases books and phonograph records; 100 cases cigarettes, 12 locker cases theatrical kits; 700 cases comfort supplies; 579 bales woolen clothing, blankets and towels; 472 bales men's overcoats; 750 bales men's tropical clothing; 321 bales men's apparel; 350 cases men's shoes, shoe repairing supplies, 50 cases repair kits; 25 crate [apparent garble] stands; 25 cases rubber cement, 150 cases medical packages; one case diphtheria antitoxin; 2,610 locker cases medical supplies.

A Narkomvneshtorg<sup>88</sup> employee informed our translator confidentially in an aside that some 70 to 90 cases believed to be principally food parcels have been lost or stolen in the port. I assume that failure to permit me to check the shipments yesterday issued from the desire of local authorities to conceal such shortage as may exist until further search is made in the port and that I shall, therefore, not be permitted to check unless I insist, which I shall not do.

I suggest that Embassy make telegraphic inquiry of Department regarding functions to be performed by Consulate General once regular shipments war prisoners supplies to Vladivostok are instituted and forwarding operations to International Red Cross representative in Japan are begun. If Department's reply is received by time I visit Embassy, we shall be able to discuss and decide on practical means for performing of Consulate General's functions.

In case American Red Cross proposes to send representative to Vladivostok to supervise, handling, checking, sorting, storing and shipping of war prisoner supplies sent here for transshipment, I believe that, in view of conditions peculiar to this post, it would prove to benefit of all concerned and greatly simplify and expedite

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<sup>85</sup> Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in the United States.

<sup>86</sup> Angus Ivan Ward, Consul General at Vladivostok.

<sup>87</sup> Sent to Department as No. 1712, May 14, 10 a. m., not printed.

<sup>88</sup> Narkomvneshtorg, contraction for the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.



liaison with Soviet officials and organizations if all war prisoner supply forwarding activities were assumed by Consulate General and work incidental thereto performed by a Foreign Service clerk assigned here for that purpose. Confusion and inefficiency in port incidental to handling inward cargoes such that I believe that one person would be kept fully occupied in checking and coordinating transshipment of 1,500 tons monthly of war prisoner supplies. Ward.

The Embassy does not believe that it would be advisable to make, at least at this time, any proposals for American supervision of the transshipment of such supplies as such proposals would make the Soviet authorities less inclined to agree to the arrangements now under consideration.<sup>89</sup>

HAMILTON

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711.94114 Supplies/195

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On May 15 the American Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow handed to Mr. Vyshinski a note concerning a recent proposal by the Japanese Government regarding the forwarding of relief supplies which are now stored at Vladivostok and those to be sent subsequently via that port for distribution to Allied civilian internees and prisoners of war detained by the Japanese. The Japanese Government stated its willingness to move these relief supplies and mail and to distribute them to Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody provided the Soviet Government is willing to grant permission for a Japanese ship to enter Vladivostok at approximately monthly intervals to pick up these supplies.

The United States Government realizes that since Vladivostok is an important naval base, the Soviet Government may be reluctant to permit a Japanese ship to call regularly at that port. The possibility also is recognized that the Japanese Government for this reason may have put forward its proposal with this condition attached in the hope of creating difficulties between the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In view of the urgent need to arrange for a means by which regular shipments of relief supplies may be made for Allied nationals in Japanese custody, the United States Government hopes that the Soviet authorities may find it possible to permit a Japanese ship to enter Vladivostok at least once under proper security safeguards to pick up the supplies which have been stored there since the fall of 1943.

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<sup>89</sup> The Department requested the Embassy in telegram 1318, May 26, to inform Consul General Ward that the "question of sending representative there to assist in handling of relief supplies at that point will be held in abeyance until definite arrangements shall have been made for their onward movement." (711.94114 Supplies/198)

If the Soviet authorities are unwilling to permit a Japanese ship to call regularly at Vladivostok to pick up relief supplies and mail, the United States Government earnestly hopes that the Soviet Government will designate an alternative port which this Government may propose to the Japanese for use on subsequent voyages.

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1944.

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711.94114 Supplies/210 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 25, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received May 26—3:05 a. m.]

1874. My 1740, May 15, 7 p. m. In conversation with Vyshinski this afternoon I referred to my note of May 15 regarding the onward shipment from Vladivostok of relief supplies for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan and expressed the hope that Soviet Government would be able to take early and favorable action on this matter.

Vyshinski replied that the Soviet Government could not accept Vladivostok as a transfer port for the supplies. It would permit, however, Japanese vessels to enter the port of Nakhodka which lies 50 to 60 kilometers to the north of Vladivostok to pick up the 1500 tons of relief supplies which are now in Vladivostok. These supplies would be sent to Nakhodka on Soviet vessels. As an alternate Vyshinski suggested that the supplies now in Vladivostok go forward to Japan by rail via Manchuria. With respect to future shipments he proposed that they be sent to Petropavlovsk for onward shipment to Japan in Japanese vessels. When I asked whether it would be agreeable to the Soviets for future shipments to go to Nakhodka should the Japanese so prefer he said this would be given consideration. He made it clear that the Soviet Government would not permit the Japanese to enter Vladivostok and stated that if the Japanese were sincere in their proposal to accept relief supplies and mail at Vladivostok they would agree to the Soviet counterproposal.

Vyshinski stated that the Embassy would receive a written reply to my note of May 15 in 2 or 3 days.

HAMILTON

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711.94114 Supplies/214

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

In reply to the memorandum of the Soviet Government on the question of delivery to Japan from the United States of parcels for the

Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, the Japanese Government, informing the Soviet Government of its consent to accept parcels intended for the American and British prisoners of war and internees, has suggested as a point of transference of the above freights the port of Vladivostok. This suggestion is not acceptable for the Soviet Government as the port of Vladivostok, being a principal naval base of the Soviet Union in the Sea of Japan, has been closed for Japanese vessels from the moment of Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R. Desiring, however, to assist the American Government to the maximum extent in the delivery of said freights to Japan and striving to find an acceptable way of solution of this question the Soviet Government is ready to carry out the transference of freights, at present in Vladivostok, either at the border railroad station Manchuriya,<sup>90</sup> or in the Soviet port Nakhodka in accordance which the Japanese Government prefers.

As to the American freights that will follow and are to be reshipped to Japan for the above-mentioned purpose the Soviet Government agrees to designate the port of Petropavlovsk on Kamchatka, which the Japanese vessels could enter for the reception of these freights.

The Soviet Government having informed the Japanese Government regarding the above, has expressed the hope that its suggestion would not meet with objections on the part of the Japanese Government.

The Soviet Government will not fail to inform the Government of the United States on the subsequent developments.

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1944.

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711.94114 Supplies/210: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1944—6 p. m.

1346. Since Soviet interests are involved, Department has refrained from giving publicity to the details of the Japanese proposal concerning the onward movement of relief supplies from Vladivostok, confining itself to the statement that the Japanese proposal has been received and is under urgent consideration although the fact that the Japanese authorities have given publicity to the proposal emphasizing in particular their offer to send a ship to Vladivostok has resulted in

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<sup>90</sup> Manchuli (Manchouli), or Lupin. Shipment of freight by way of this junction point would involve a trip of 2996 km. over the main line of the Transsiberian Railroad from Vladivostok to Karymskaya, and thence 366 km. over a branch line to Otpor, the border station in the Soviet Union opposite Manchuriya, on the former Chinese Eastern Railway, for transfer to the Japanese. This route may also have been the way intended by Vyshinsky as his alternate suggestion reported in the second paragraph of telegram 1874 from Moscow, May 25. *supra*.

the receipt by the Department of many inquiries from the press and other sources as to the details of the Japanese proposal.

When Embassy receives formal Soviet reply to May 15 note <sup>91</sup> (Embassy's 1874, May 25), please inquire whether Soviet Government would object to the usual statement being made in this country simultaneously with the forwarding of a reply for delivery to Japanese Government. Such a public statement is considered desirable in order to let the American public know of the progress of negotiations concerning the movement of these supplies, a subject of great public interest because of the wide dispersion of the families of our nationals in Japanese custody. The proposed statement would simply outline the Japanese Government's proposal (Department's 1180, May 12), which the Japanese Government has itself already made public, and would give in appreciative terms the substance of the Soviet Government's counter-proposal.

If agreeable to Soviet Government, Department's press release would read somewhat as follows:

"On May 10 United States Government received through Swiss Government channels a communication from the Japanese Government in which the latter offered to send at regular intervals a Japanese ship to a Soviet port to pick up and transport to Japan relief supplies shipped last fall to Vladivostok, and additional relief supplies and mail which with the Soviet Government's cooperation would be sent subsequently via Soviet territory, intended for distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody. The Soviet Government has been consulted in the matter and has expressed its willingness to cooperate. It has named a convenient Soviet Pacific port adjacent to Vladivostok to which a Japanese ship will be permitted to come to pick up the relief supplies already on Soviet territory awaiting onward transportation to Japan. An alternative but equally accessible port has also been named by the Soviet Government to which Japanese ships may come to pick up such relief supplies and mail as may be shipped in the future from this country for distribution to Allied nationals in the Far East. A reply in the sense of the foregoing has been communicated through the Swiss Government to the Japanese Government, and it is hoped that these supplies will be moved and distributed in the near future."

You may, if you consider it advisable, point out to the Soviet Foreign Office that the Department shares the view expressed by Vyshinski (Embassy's 1740, May 15) that the Japanese proposal may have been made, partly at least, as a pretext to gain access to the port of Vladivostok. Public announcement of the Soviet Government's counter-proposal (without drawing undue attention to the

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<sup>91</sup> It is apparent that Ambassador Gromyko had delivered the anticipated Soviet reply after this telegram had been drafted, but a while before it was sent on the afternoon of May 29; see *supra*. On the evening of the next day, a paraphrase of the Soviet reply was sent to the Embassy in the Soviet Union; see *infra*.

fact that access to Vladivostok has been denied) should make it difficult for the Japanese to insist upon permission to enter Vladivostok or to refuse to accept the Soviet Government's reasonable counter-offer.

It is hoped that the Soviet Government will be willing to confirm direct to the Japanese Government the terms of the Soviet counter-proposal which has been made and which the Department will communicate to the Japanese Government through Swiss channels as soon as the Soviet Government's written reply is received. The Department will instruct you to make a request in this sense when the reply to the Japanese Government is ready.

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711.94114 Supplies/214 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1944—8 p. m.

1364. On May 29 the Soviet Ambassador left with the Secretary an *Aide-Mémoire*, which in paraphrase reads as follows:

[The original *aide-mémoire* is printed on page 1175.]

Department assumes that you will in due course receive similar written reply to your communication of May 15. At that time or, if you deem it prudent, sooner in reference to above communication from Soviet Embassy here, please express to the Soviet Government the deep gratitude of the United States Government for the former's willingness to assist in this matter which is one of serious concern to the American people. Department particularly notes with appreciation that Soviet Government has itself so informed the Japanese Government.

Department for its part desires as soon as possible to reply in similar sense to the Japanese Government's proposal but will await your recommendation whether this may appropriately be done on basis of Soviet Embassy's communication or whether Department should await the Soviet Government's formal reply to your communication. Department desires to issue simultaneously with the forwarding of a reply for delivery to the Japanese Government a public statement concerning the matter and as requested in Department's 1346, May 29, desires to learn urgently whether Soviet Government agreeable to proposed press release. As the information, perhaps in an unfavorable light, is likely to be made public by Japan if not otherwise, Department considers it important from standpoint of this Government's responsibility to the American people on this subject to inform them officially and correctly of the Soviet Government's cooperation.

As it appears that the Soviet Government has already made its counter-proposal known to Japan, Department considers it important

that United States Government's reply in similar vein and issuance of press release on subject be expedited.

HULL

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711.94114 Supplies/213: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944—7 p. m.

1379. Your 1948, May 31.<sup>93</sup> Department has not discussed with Soviet Ambassador at Washington question of publicity. As regards amendments to press release as quoted in Department's 1346, May 29, please add at end of third sentence after word "Japan" words "and has suggested alternatively the overland transportation of these supplies via Manchuria, offering to deliver the supplies at the Manchurian border." Department agreeable to deletion from next to last sentence of words "alternative but". On the basis of the Soviet Government's statement to the British Government that no objection was seen to making public the Soviet Government's approach to Japan as indicated in your 1598, May 8, newspapers here are already aware of this phase of Soviet Government's action. Department, therefore considers it unnecessary to include in proposed release reference to Soviet approach to Japanese Government, although if Soviet authorities so desire, Department will be glad to include such a reference.

In the light of your 1921, May 29,<sup>93</sup> Department is now making through Swiss channels reply<sup>94</sup> to Japanese Government's proposal. It desires promptly to issue the above-mentioned press release, as amended, and hopes that you can obtain immediate Soviet concurrence.

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711.94114 Supplies/218: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, June 4, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received June 4—2:30 p. m.]

1996. Department's 1379, June 1, 7 p. m. Foreign Office states that it has no objection to publication of the proposed press release on negotiations for shift of supplies to Allied prisoners in Japan.<sup>95</sup>

HARRIMAN

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<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

<sup>94</sup> See telegram 1888, June 1, to Bern, vol. v. p. 1035.

<sup>95</sup> The statement released to the press on June 6 concerning the Japanese agreement to pick up relief supplies and mail at a Soviet Pacific port for distribution to Allied nationals interned in the Far East, with the subsequent agreement to cooperate by the Soviet Union, is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 10, 1944, p. 536.

711.94114 Supplies/7-1544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1944.

1708. There follows text of Japanese response received from Bern to this Government's reply to Japanese proposal concerning movement of relief supplies via Soviet territory to Far East for Allied nationals in Japanese custody:

[Here follows the text of telegram No. 4507 of July 14, from the Minister in Switzerland, printed in volume V, page 1041. The Japanese Government requested that the American Government negotiate further with the Soviet Government to obtain the use of Vladivostok as a port for the transshipment of supplies and mail, but stated that if this port could not be obtained the Japanese would agree to the use of Nakhodka as a transshipping place under certain specified conditions.]

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711.94114 Supplies/213: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1944—10 p. m.

1709. Please communicate to Soviet Foreign Office text of Japanese reply as set forth in Department's 1708, (reference Department's 1379, June 1 and previous telegrams concerning movement of relief supplies via Soviet territory for Allied nationals in Japanese custody).

United States Government is not disposed to press Soviet Government for permission for Japanese ships to enter Vladivostok. However, it would like to be able to inform the Japanese Government that this question has again been taken up with Soviet Government which has re-affirmed that it is not in a position to permit the use of that port but will permit the use of Nakhodka on continuing basis. This, of course, would mean that Petropavlovsk is not to be used as transshipping point.

Please seek the consent of the Soviet Government to conditions A, B, and C of paragraph 2, section 1, of Japanese response. It is hoped that you can obtain immediately from the Soviet authorities description of route to be followed through Soviet waters which, when combined in this Government's reply to Japanese Government with route laid out by Allied military authorities through non-Soviet waters, will provide Japanese authorities with complete route to be followed to and from Japan and Nakhodka.

It is assumed that Soviet Government's agreement to movement of Japanese ships to a Soviet port for this purpose implies that So-

viet Government will guarantee safety of Japanese ships engaged in this traffic. Definite assurances on that point would be appreciated in order that a statement to that effect may be made to the Japanese Government with reference to paragraph 4, section 2, of its response.

United States Government is prepared to reply in affirmative to those sections of the Japanese response which do not require Soviet concurrence, such as paragraphs 3, 4 (except Soviet safe conduct), 5, and 6 of section 2.

Please present this matter urgently to Soviet Government stressing the desire of the United States Government to reply to the Japanese response at the earliest possible moment. Since the Governments of the United States and Japan are now so near to an agreement on this question, it is hoped that the Soviet Government will be able to give its agreement to the points raised above, in order that the movement of these supplies may begin in the immediate future.

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711.94114 Supplies/7-1544: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1944—7 p. m.

1825. ReDepts 1708 and 1709 of July 15. You will note that the Japanese Government is ready to transship mail as well as relief supplies. If the consent of the Soviet Government is received to the conditions set forth in the Japanese reply, you are requested to endeavor to obtain the Soviet Government's authorization for United States' authorities immediately to load on Soviet vessels bound for Vladivostok mail for prisoners of war and civilian internees for transshipment on the Japanese vessel at Nakhodka.<sup>96</sup> This shipment of mail is meant to be supplementary to and not to replace the regular mail routed via Teheran and Moscow.

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/7-1544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1944—4 p. m.

1975. The Japanese response incorporated in Department's 1708, July 15, was made public in an official Japanese radio broadcast on

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<sup>96</sup> Ambassador Harriman reported in telegram 3200, August 28, 1944, that he had sent a note asking that Soviet vessels from the United States west coast to Vladivostok be authorized to carry mail for American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan (711.94114 Supplies/8-2844).



July 13. The fact that a Japanese communication on this subject is now pending is, therefore, a matter of common knowledge in the United States. In reply to questions from the press and interested persons and organizations, the Department has confined itself to the statement that the Japanese response imposed certain additional conditions which must be met before shipments can begin; that those conditions concern the Soviet Government; and that said conditions are now being discussed with the Soviet authorities.<sup>97</sup>

The fact that a month has elapsed since the Japanese communication was forwarded to the Embassy for communication to the Soviet Government without an indication of that Government's reaction having been received is a cause of serious and increasing embarrassment to this Government and, it is feared, will result in embarrassment to the Soviet Government. The United States Government is at present bearing the brunt of public criticism in the United States for the delay in forwarding supplies from a Russian port to Japan. Japanese propaganda broadcasts have made it appear that the Japanese are cooperating in the matter and that any delay in beginning these shipments is not attributable to them. As the tide of public indignation in the United States rises, it is feared that despite the efforts of the Department to divert pressure from the Soviet Government, resentment in the United States resulting from the present impasse will inevitably be transferred to the Soviet Government.

If you have not received a favorable reply concerning the additional Japanese conditions by the time you receive this telegram, please take this matter up again with the Soviet authorities, pointing out, in a way which seems best to you, the situation described above and endeavor to obtain an immediate response from the Soviet authorities, which the Department hopes will be one acceding to the additional Japanese conditions.

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711.94114 Supplies/8-2144: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 21, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 6:01 p. m.]

3088. I have written personally to Vyshinski in the sense of the Department's 1975, August 19, 4 p. m., concerning relief supplies for prisoners of war in Vladivostok.

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<sup>97</sup> For a press statement concerning additional conditions imposed by the Japanese Government for picking up relief supplies for onward shipment from a Soviet port, which were being considered by the Soviet Government, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 20, 1944, p. 179.

I may say that while I have not failed to bring to his attention the factor of public opinion in the United States, I do not feel, on the basis of past experience, that this argument carries any particular weight with the Soviet Government. An answer will be forthcoming on this matter only when the Soviet authorities have examined it from all angles; and the considerations uppermost in their minds in this examination will undoubtedly be those of preservation of secrecy and security with respect to the Far Eastern ports concerned. This being the case, it is probable that the answer will depend upon the findings of the organs of internal security, whose researches and decisions on requests of foreign governments are almost invariably time consuming.

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Supplies/8-2644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 26, 1944.

[Received August 26—12:55 p. m.]

3174. A note dated August 26th has been received from the Foreign Office which reads in translation as follows:

[“] With reference to the Embassy’s note No. 310 of July 18,<sup>98</sup> the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to say that on August 25 the Soviet Government sent the Japanese Embassy in Moscow an *aide-mémoire* with regard to the shipment of supplies and mail to American and Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians in Japan and in Japanese controlled areas. In this *aide-mémoire*, the Soviet Government confirmed its willingness to permit a single entry into the port of Nakhodka of a Japanese vessel for the purpose of loading and carrying away approximately 1500 metric tons total weight of the above mentioned supplies, in accordance with the Japanese memorandum to the Government of the United States of America. The course to be followed by the Japanese ship from the point of approach (42 degrees 24.6 minutes north latitude and 132 degrees 24.6 east longitude) to Nakhodka and back to this point was described in the *aide-mémoire*, as well as arrangements for transshipping the supplies from the Soviet vessel to the Japanese vessel.

The security measures to be taken by the Japanese vessel during the remainder of the voyage, from the Japanese port to the approach point mentioned above and return, were stated in the *aide-mémoire* to be a matter to be determined and agreed upon by the Japanese Government with the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America.

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<sup>98</sup> This note carried out the instruction contained in Department’s telegram 1709, July 15, p. 1180.

The Soviet Government proposed in the *aide-mémoire* that since the Japanese Government had been unable to agree to take over subsequent shipments of supplies and correspondence at Petropavlovsk, the station Manchuriya be used in the future as a transfer point.”<sup>99</sup>

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Supplies/8-2644: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1944—7 p. m.

2092. In communicating to Soviet Government text of this Government's communication to Japanese Government, Deptel 2093,<sup>1</sup> please inquire whether Soviet Government is unalterably opposed to Japanese ships coming to Nakhodka on a regular basis to pick up subsequent shipments of relief supplies and correspondence sent from the United States for Allied nationals in Japanese custody.

While this Government has indicated to the Japanese Government its agreement to the overland shipment from Soviet territory of relief supplies and correspondence, Department considers it unlikely that Japanese Government will agree to this means of shipment. It will be recalled that this method of shipment has been proposed several times before to the Japanese Government and that the latter has indicated no interest in arranging for overland transportation. It is not clear to the Department whether Soviet Government misunderstood Embassy's communication based on Department's 1709, July 15, as regards continued use of Nakhodka or whether Soviet Government preferred to ignore that portion of the Embassy's communication because of the former's disinclination to have Japanese ships putting in regularly at a Soviet port adjacent to a strategic area. Endeavor to ascertain informally whether, if Japanese react negatively to Soviet proposal in regard to subsequent shipment overland, Soviet authorities would be willing to permit Japanese ships to put in to Nakhodka on a regular basis for the purpose of picking up relief supplies and correspondence to be sent subsequently from the United States.

HULL

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<sup>99</sup> Following repeated inquiries, Ambassador Harriman stated in telegram 3977, October 18, 1944, that the Soviet Government did not object to the communication of the full text of this note to the Japanese Government by the United States (711.94114 Supplies/10-1844).

<sup>1</sup> *Infra*.

711.94114 Supplies/8-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1944.

2093. Reference Embassy's 3174, August 26. There is quoted below, the text of United States Government's communication to the Japanese Government in regard to this matter. Please communicate text of message to Soviet Foreign Office together with an expression of this Government's gratitude for the assistance which has been so graciously rendered by the Soviet Government in this matter, which is one of the deepest concern to the people of the United States.<sup>2</sup>

[Here follows the text of note sent in telegram 3006, August 31, to the Minister in Switzerland, printed in volume V, page 1049. The United States Government stated that it had been informed that the Soviet Government had sent to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow an *aide-mémoire* on August 25 confirming the willingness of the Soviet Government to allow a Japanese ship to come to Nakhodka to take away the relief supplies stored on Soviet territory awaiting transshipment to Japan. The United States Government also hoped that the Japanese Government would agree to the Soviet proposal that subsequent shipments of relief supplies should be made overland from Soviet territory to the border station Manchuriya, where such shipments would be received and taken onward by the Japanese.]

HULL

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711.94114 Mail/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1944—1 p. m.

2154. Reurtel 2485, July 8.<sup>3</sup> Since no prisoner of war mails have arrived in United States from Far East via Tehran, you are requested to ask the Soviet authorities whether the Japanese authorities have delivered mails to Soviet postal authorities for onward transmission to the United States via Tehran.

American Legation Tehran informed Department that on July 19 Legation's entire accumulation of east-bound prisoner of war mail totaling 37 sacks was turned over to Soviet military authorities at Tehran for forwarding through Soviet Union. Under present ar-

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<sup>2</sup> See press release of September 1, 1944, on the status of relief supplies for Allied nationals interned in the Far East, Department of State *Bulletin*, September 3, 1944, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

rangement at Tehran Soviet military will henceforth take delivery of mail direct from United States Army Postal Service upon arrival at Tehran.

HULL

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711.94114 Supplies/9-844: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 8, 1944—1 p. m.  
[Received September 8—9:33 a. m.]

3375. ReDepts 2092, August 31, 7 p. m. We do not think the failure of the Foreign Office's note of August 26 to reply directly to our inquiry concerning the continued use of Nakhodka resulted from a misunderstanding. We interpret it as indicating at least a strong reluctance to permit the continued use of the port.

In reply to an informal inquiry at the Foreign Office as to whether, in the event of a definite Japanese refusal to accept overland shipments, the Soviet Government would allow more than the one shipment of relief supplies to be made from Nakhodka, we were asked to put the question in the form of a note. This has been done.

The Foreign Office official with whom the subject was discussed remarked that the problem was primarily one of military security, and would have to be decided by the military authorities. The hypothetical nature of the question may also operate to delay a reply.<sup>4</sup>

HARRIMAN

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711.94114 Mail/9-1944: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 19, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received September 19—4:50 p. m.]

3584. ReDepts 2154, September 8, 1 p. m. A note from the Foreign Office dated September 17 states that the Soviet postal authorities have not received from the Japanese authorities in the Far East any mail from American prisoners of war and interned civilians or mail of any other kind for forwarding via Tehran to the United States.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>4</sup>Ambassador Harriman notified the Department in telegram 3646, September 23, 1944, that a note of September 21 from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had stated that possible continued use of Nakhodka had been "referred to the appropriate Soviet authorities for consideration and that the Embassy will be informed promptly of the decision reached." (711.94114 Supplies/9-2344)

711.94114 Supplies/10-2044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, October 20, 1944.

2488. Reference Department's 2093, August 31.

1. There follows the text of a Japanese note communicated on October 9 to Swiss Legation, Tokyo, concerning onward movement of relief supplies now on Soviet territory intended for Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody.

[Here follow texts of the Japanese note of October 9, and the Department's reply, contained in telegram 6916 of October 18, from Bern, and in telegram 3582 of October 20, to Bern, printed in volume V, pages 1059 and 1062, respectively. The two Governments reached agreement on the principles and procedures for sending a Japanese ship to the port of Nakhodka. The United States Government declared that it would forward, upon completion of this transfer, a proposal for continued operations of this nature to the Japanese Government to which it hoped that the latter would agree.]

3. Department, as will be noted from paragraph 2 above, is at the disadvantage of not having the full text of the Soviet communication of August 25 to the Japanese Embassy, Moscow. Department is hopeful, however, that the portions of the Japanese communication regarding security of the Japanese vessel while in Soviet waters are responsive to the Soviet communication of August 25. If new issues are raised in the Japanese communication it is hoped that the Soviet authorities in direct communication with the Japanese Government will be willing to arrange a mutually satisfactory procedure under which adequate guarantees of safety for the Japanese vessel while in Soviet waters will be given.

4. It is hoped that Department can be furnished full text of Soviet communication to Japanese Government regarding this matter.<sup>5</sup>

5. Please furnish Soviet Government full text of Japanese communication of October 9 (paragraph 1 above) and text of this Government's reply to Japanese Government (paragraph 2). At same time please approach Soviet Government in the sense of paragraphs 3 and 4 stressing again the urgency of the matter and expressing the hope that in order to bring this projected operation to a successful conclu-

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<sup>5</sup> George F. Kennan, who had become Chargé in the Soviet Union, told the Department in telegram 4038, October 22, 1944, that the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had received "a direct response from the Japanese Government to its *aide-mémoire* of August 25" to which it was "now drafting a reply which will repeat guarantees of safety already given for the Japanese vessel within Soviet waters." A copy of this response was promised for the United States Government. (711.94114 Supplies/10-2244)

sion Soviet Government will arrange in direct communication with Japanese authorities a mutually satisfactory procedure for safeguarding the Japanese vessel while in Soviet waters. Please note that Japanese Government has stated its willingness to despatch a ship toward end of October. In view of the time required to effect notification required in connection with Allied safe conduct, immediate action by Soviet authorities in regard to safety measures for Japanese ship while in Soviet waters is required.

HULL

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711.94114 Suppltes/10-2444: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 24, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received October 24—11:33 a. m.]

4056. ReEmbs 3200, August 28, 5 p. m.<sup>6</sup> We have received from the Foreign Office a note dated October 21 which states that masters of Soviet vessels now ready to sail from west coast ports of the United States have been instructed to accept from the appropriate American authorities postal correspondence sent from the United States to American prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japan.

KENNAN

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711.94114 Suppltes/10-2644: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944—10 p. m.

2532. ReDepts 2488, October 20. Spanish Embassy<sup>7</sup> has informed Department that Japanese ship will carry mail intended for Japanese nationals detained in the United States and Canada and the following items sent by the Japanese Red Cross: 9 cubic tons of books and 32 cubic tons of tea.

Department has informed the Spanish Embassy that since the reciprocal nature of this operation has been made known to the Soviet Government, United States Government foresees no difficulty in connection with the transshipment at Nakhodka of mail and relief supplies sent from Japan.

Soviet authorities should be informed of the nature and quantity of cargo expected to arrive at Nakhodka from Japan. It is hoped that Soviet authorities will arrange to forward Japanese mail and

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<sup>6</sup> Not printed, but see footnote 96, p. 1181.

<sup>7</sup> The representation of Japanese interests in the United States had been assumed by the Spanish Government.

relief supplies to United States on first available Soviet ship proceeding to this country.<sup>8</sup>

STETTINIUS

711.94114 Supplies/10-2744 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 27, 1944.

[Received October 28—7:33 a. m.]

4121. The following *aide-mémoire* dated October 26 has been received from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

"In view of the pending arrival of Japanese vessel in the Soviet port of Nakhodka to pick up food and relief supplies and medicaments for Allied prisoners of war and civilians interned in Japan the following is brought herewith to the attention of the Embassy of the United States of America.

1. The Japanese Embassy in Moscow has informed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR that the vessel may take on 400 tons of freight over and above the stipulated 1500 tons and if it is possible somewhat more by utilizing the upper deck of the vessel for freight.

2. Since the freight in Vladivostok is destined for American, English and Canadian war prisoners and interned civilians<sup>9</sup> and also having in view that the Japanese vessel will not be able to take on all this freight it is desirable to know what proportion should be held back in the loading of the vessel.

3. The appropriate Soviet authorities also desire to know which portion of the total freight to be forwarded on the vessel should consist of medicaments or whether all medicaments should be loaded.

4. Taking into consideration the specific character of the means of transport the appropriate Soviet authorities have in mind to turn over the freight in question to the Captain of the Japanese vessel<sup>10</sup> against a transfer receipt and not against a bill of lading.

5. The Japanese Embassy in Moscow has informed the People's Commissariat that the Government of Japan through its Minister in Spain<sup>11</sup> has advised the Government of the United States of America that there will be delivered on the Japanese vessel arriving in the Soviet port of Nakhodka freight consisting of 5 tons of books, 32 tons of Japanese tea and 4 tons of school books total 41 tons for

<sup>8</sup> The Department had made an announcement to the press on October 24 that Japan would send the ship *Hakusan Maru* on October 28 to a Soviet port to take on relief supplies for distribution to American, British, Canadian, Dutch, and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody. See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 29, 1944, p. 494.

<sup>9</sup> In the preceding telegram, 4120, October 27, 1944, the Department was advised that the following supplies were on hand at Vladivostok for transshipment. Food, 1833 tons; medicines, 101 tons; clothing, 95 tons; packages, 29 tons; books, 15 tons; shoe repair material, 4 tons; cigarettes, 2 tons; recreational supplies, 1 ton. There were also 250 tons of British supplies, and 232 tons of Canadian supplies. (711.94114 Supplies/10-2744)

<sup>10</sup> T. Watanabe.

<sup>11</sup> Yakichiro Suma.



forwarding to interned Japanese citizens in the United States and Canada and that the American Government should inform the Soviet Government of its agreement to receive this cargo.

6. In view of the character of the freight (small packages) and the consequent difficulty of transferring them from vessel to vessel it is not to be excluded that the vessel will be detained in the port of Nakhodka more than 3 days. In this connection, it is expedient that the appropriate American authorities responsible for the security of the passage of the Japanese vessel should be advised in advance concerning the possibility of such a delay of the Japanese vessel in the port of Nakhodka.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs awaits a prompt reply to all the questions touched on herewith."

KENNAN

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711.94114 Supplies/10-2044: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1944—9 p. m.

2551. Paragraph 2, Depts 2488, October 20. As stated in this Government's communication to the Japanese Government concerning the movement of relief supplies from Soviet territory to the Far East on the completion of the current operation this Government intends to propose to the Japanese Government further shipments of relief supplies. Until we are in a position to name a definite transfer point, however, a proposal of this nature cannot be made. Department is aware of Soviet Government's expressed preference for the overland route in connection with further shipments. Japanese Government, however, has stated (see Sexto, paragraph 1, Depts 2488, October 20) that it is doubtful that the desired amounts of supplies can be handled by rail. Dept is hopeful that the Soviet Government will extend permission for the continued use of Nakhodka for this purpose. The proximity of Nakhodka to Japan would seem to increase the chances of Japanese acceptance of that port as a transfer point for further shipments. Any transfer point that could be used, other than a Soviet Pacific port, would be so far distant from Japan that Japanese Government probably would not accept. Moreover, safe conduct between Japan and Nakhodka presents no serious problem. Difficulties would be presented, however, if Japanese ship were to pass through zones of active combat to and from the transfer point. It is understood from Embs 3375, September 8, that this question is under consideration by the Soviet military authorities.

As soon as the Japanese vessel has departed from Nakhodka, please approach Soviet Foreign Office regarding this matter stressing the importance of the use of Nakhodka in connection with further oper-

ations of this nature and endeavor to obtain early reply.<sup>12</sup> Speedy action is required in order that Dept may be in a position to forward a further proposal to Japanese Government immediately upon the arrival in Japan of the current shipment. STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/10-2844 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1944—midnight.

2552. Immediately upon the departure of the *Hakusan Maru* from Nakhodka en route to Japan, please communicate in a formal note to the Soviet Foreign Office substance of the following:

The Government of the United States desires to express to the Soviet Government its warm thanks for the Soviet Government's invaluable cooperation and assistance in the difficult and protracted negotiations leading up to the transshipment at Nakhodka of relief supplies and correspondence intended for distribution to Allied nationals in Japanese custody. The need of American prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Far East for supplemental food, clothing, and medical supplies has served greatly to increase the concern felt by the American people for the welfare of American nationals held by Japan. The American public has been fully informed of the part played by the Soviet Government in connection with the onward shipment to Japan of the supplies which have recently gone forward and the Soviet Government may be assured of the heartfelt gratitude of the American people for this friendly cooperation without which the onward shipment of supplies so desperately needed would not have been possible.<sup>13</sup> STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/10-2744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union.*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1944—3 p. m.

2558. ReEmbs 4120, October 27.<sup>14</sup> American authorities will accept all mail from Japan whether from American prisoners and in-

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<sup>12</sup> The Chargé in Moscow reported in telegram 4503, November 25, 1944, that a note about the continued use of Nakhodka had been sent on November 9 to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and that now another request was being made, as no reply had been received (711.94114 Supplies/11-2544).

<sup>13</sup> The most recent revision of the summary of the steps taken in behalf of American nationals in Japanese custody appeared in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 15, 1944, p. 439; and on the coming transfer of relief supplies on board the *Hakusan Maru*, in a press release of October 24, *ibid.*, October 29, 1944, p. 494.

<sup>14</sup> See footnote 9, p. 1189.

ternees in Japan or from Japanese citizens to Japanese prisoners and internees in Western Hemisphere. American authorities will also accept any relief supplies sent from Japan for Japanese nationals in Allied custody<sup>15</sup> (see also Depts 2532, October 26).

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/10-2744: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union  
(Kennan)*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1944.

2559. Embassy's 4121, October 27. Following numbered paragraphs refer to similarly numbered paragraphs Foreign Office *aide-mémoire* October 26.<sup>16</sup>

1 and 2. 2800-ton figure given in Department's 2531, October 26,<sup>17</sup> was received from Bern in a telegram which also gave a 1900-ton figure. Legation Bern endeavoring obtain clarification but in meantime Department, assuming from gross tonnage of Japanese ship that 2800-ton figure might be correct, forwarded that figure to Embassy. If 1900-ton figure correct, some cargo probably must be left behind.

Department suggests that Japanese ship be loaded as follows: First, all American medical supplies (which should not be exposed to temperature below freezing); second, all British and Canadian supplies (except individually addressed parcels, if any, which Japanese Government has requested be not sent); third, all clothing, books, shoe repair material, cigarettes, recreational supplies, and any similar items; fourth, remainder cargo capacity Japanese ship to be filled with American food packages.

3. See above paragraph.

4. American Government willing to leave such details to discretion Soviet authorities.

5. American Government willing to receive and permit International Red Cross to supervise distribution of relief supplies sent from Japan. Spanish Embassy, Washington, has been so informed. Japanese Government has also been so informed through Bern. Department understands that Canadian Government also has expressed its willingness to receive relief supplies and mail.

6. In the event Japanese ship cannot depart Nakhodka as now scheduled, Department should be given a minimum of 24 hours notice of new departure date. Allied forces will be promptly notified of new schedule.

It is hoped, however, that loading can be completed in time for

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<sup>15</sup> Japanese goods received from the *Hakusan Maru* for distribution in the United States reached San Francisco near the end of November.

<sup>16</sup> Text transmitted in telegram 4121, October 27, from Moscow, p. 1189.

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

present schedule to be met. To this end American Government willing to pay for overtime for personnel used in transferring cargo and willing to pay costs of any extra facilities required to effect transfer of cargo within time set out in present schedule.

In this connection Japanese Government has asked American Government to make payment direct to Soviet Government in respect of all charges incurred at Nakhodka in connection with this operation. While American Government's agreement to this request was set forth under paragraph 2 Department's 2488, October 20 (text of which was furnished Soviet Government), Embassy may wish to confirm to Soviet authorities that American Government will make direct payment to Soviet Government in respect of such expenses plus such additional charges as may be incurred in transferring cargo in time to conform to schedule for Japanese ship.

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/11-244: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 2, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:05 p. m.]

4212. In reply to my note transmitting the information contained in the Department's 2559, October 29, I have received from the Foreign Office an *aide-mémoire* dated November 1 which states:

(1) That it will not be possible to load the *Hakusan Maru* in less than 5 days and that the vessel will therefore leave Nakhodka on November 8 and not on November 6 as previously planned. The Foreign Office assumes that the appropriate American naval authorities will be informed of this change in the departure date.

(2) The Foreign Office has checked with the Japanese Embassy in Moscow and has been informed that 1900 tons is the correct cargo capacity of the *Hakusan Maru*. The Soviet authorities in Vladivostok have been informed of the wishes of the American Government with respect to the priority to be accorded the various categories of freight in loading the vessel.

(3) The Japanese Embassy has informed the Foreign Office that it has been decided not to ship any tea on the *Hakusan Maru*. It will therefore deliver at Nakhodka nothing except mail and nine tons of books. We have transmitted to the Foreign Office the contents of the Department's 2578, November 1,<sup>18</sup> regarding the bearings of the approach point for the Japanese ship.

KENNAN

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<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

711.94114 Supplies/11-344 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 3, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received November 3—6 : 03 p. m.]

4220. The Foreign Office informed us by telephone this evening that the *Hakusan Maru* arrived at Nakhodka at 7:00 a. m., November 3, Moscow time, to load relief supplies for Allied nationals in Japanese custody. The master of the vessel has stated that he will not receipt for the cargo by numerical count of packages but will receipt only for the number of tons taken aboard calculated on the basis of the draft of the ship before and after loading. The Foreign Office inquired whether such a receipt supplemented by a unilateral certificate of the Soviet authorities with regard to the number of packages loaded would be acceptable to the American Government. We replied that if this was the best that could be obtained without delaying the departure of the ship it would be acceptable.

KENNAN

711.94114 Supplies/11-1244 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 12, 1944—9 p. m.  
[Received November 14—12 : 45 a. m.]

4351. The following telegram has been received from Vladivostok:

161, November 11, 6 p. m. I was authoritatively informed today (ReConstel 156) that SS *Tashkent* actually carried from Vladivostok but 2000 tons of cargo in question, that *Hakusan Maru* arrived on 3d as scheduled but at 16 instead of 8 hours as anticipated, that Captain Watanabe of JNP 17,<sup>19</sup> wished at first to load but 1500 tons but was persuaded to take full 2000, that Watanabe refused to count cargo but signed and chopped document listing number of packages and weight as presented by Captain Soviet ship in receipt of cargo (document also signed by Soviet customs representative), that stevedores worked 36 hours straight and *Hakusan Maru* sailed evening of 5th instead of 6th as scheduled.<sup>20</sup>

Same source stated that the 2000 tons included all medical supplies, all Canadian packages, all American supplies except some food packages, and part of British cargo. Remainder of supplies is being held in a separate warehouse in Vladivostok. "A couple of carloads"

<sup>19</sup> A garble; possibly for "of the ship".

<sup>20</sup> An undated announcement of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tass) published in the Soviet press on November 23 declared that "in all 74,051 packages were despatched with an overall weight of 2,005,932 kilograms".

A Tokyo broadcast announced the arrival of the *Hakusan Maru* at Kobe on November 11. The United States thereafter accepted a Japanese offer "to transport these supplies in two ships, one to proceed to Shanghai and Tsingtao and the other to the southern areas" of Japanese controlled territory. See telegram 4105, December 5, 1944, to Bern, vol. v, p. 1074.

of new supplies, including at least some of British origin, arrived at Vladivostok by rail yesterday.

Consulate General would appreciate being kept informed of any developments this connection whether or not action on its part is required. Clubb.<sup>21</sup>

KENNAN

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711.94114 Mail/11-1744 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union*  
(Kennan)

WASHINGTON, November 17, 1944—8 p. m.

2694. Reurtel 4056, October 24. Please express this Government's gratitude to the appropriate Soviet authorities for permission granted to send prisoner of war and civilian internee postal correspondence destined for Japan on Soviet vessels departing from West Coast. United States postal authorities contemplate routing mail in future by both Tehran and West Coast-Vladivostok routes in hope that use of the two routes will assure more expeditious arrival in Japan of mail dispatched from United States.

In view of the generally unsatisfactory prisoner of war and civilian internee mail situation between the United States and the Far East (Reurtel 3584, September 19) and in view of the time involved in transit, you are requested to explore with the Soviet authorities the possibility of obtaining their consent for the carriage of prisoner of war and civilian internee letter mail flowing between United States and Japan on lend lease planes flying from the northwest United States to points in Siberia. It is understood that this route is now used by Soviet authorities for the carriage of diplomatic pouches and war materials. It is assumed that there would be more space available on west-bound flights than on east-bound flights. It is hoped, however, that if Soviets consent to carriage of west-bound mail that space might be found for east-bound mail on east-bound planes carrying Soviet ferry pilots to northwest United States. United States prisoner of war mails to Far East average less than 200 pounds per week at present.

The practicability of a prisoner of war and civilian internee mail service between the United States and the Soviet Union for United States and Japanese prisoner of war and civilian internee mail would, of course, depend to a considerable degree upon the method by which such mail could be moved from the Soviet Union to Japanese-occupied territory. In view of the fact, however, that the Soviet authorities have undertaken to deliver mail originating in the United States to the Japanese authorities (Reurtel 1219, April 8), it is believed that

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<sup>21</sup> O. Edmund Clubb, Consul General at Vladivostok from September 19, 1944.

no difficulty would be encountered in the onward shipment of this mail from such points in Siberia as may serve as terminals for lend lease planes.

For your information Sweden and Switzerland have granted landing rights to United States Army Air Transport Command planes carrying United States and German prisoner of war and civilian internee letter mail free of charge in both directions between New York and Geneva and New York and Stockholm.

Department would appreciate receiving urgent reply.

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/11-2544: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1944—8 p. m.

2886. News of arrival in Japan of *Hakusan Maru* cargo has resulted in increased pressure on Department to arrange for additional and regular shipments to the Far East. This pressure will increase.

It becomes increasingly urgent to obtain Soviet decision as to further use of Nakhodka (Deptel 2551, October 28, final paragraph Embs 4503, November 25<sup>22</sup>).

Department confident that Embassy actively pursuing this matter. Inform Department whether Embassy would consider it helpful in expediting Soviet decision if a note on this subject were delivered personally by the Secretary to the Soviet Ambassador, Washington.

STETTINIUS

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711.94114 Supplies/12-2644: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, December 26, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received December 26—5:24 p. m.]

5002. ReDepts 2886, December 23, 8 p. m. It might be helpful if the Secretary were to hand to the Soviet Ambassador a note concerning the continued use of Nakhodka as a port of transshipment for prisoner of war supplies. We have written three notes to the Soviet Foreign Office on the subject, dated September 7, November 9 and November 25 respectively, and have had no reply to any of them. Oral inquiries have elicited only the statement that the question was under consideration. It seems evident that the Soviet Government is at least strongly reluctant to permit the continued use of Nakhodka.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>22</sup> Latter telegram not printed, but see footnote 12, p. 1191.

711.94114 Supplies/1-445

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*<sup>23</sup>

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1945.

EXCELLENCY: On November 9, following the departure of the *Hakusan Maru* from Nakhodka carrying relief supplies which had been sent to Vladivostok from the United States intended for distribution to American and other Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees in Japanese custody, the American Embassy at Moscow addressed a note to the Soviet Foreign Office expressing the hope that the Soviet Government would extend permission for the continued use of the port of Nakhodka for additional operations of this nature.<sup>24</sup> It is, of course, necessary that this Government know whether further transfers of relief supplies may be effected at this or an equally conveniently situated Soviet Pacific port before the necessary steps can be taken to arrange with the Japanese Government for the onward carriage of further shipments of this character.

I am sure that you are aware of the concern felt by the American people for the welfare of American nationals in Japanese custody and their desire that needed supplies be sent regularly to supplement the inadequate Japanese issue of food, clothing, and medicines. The other Allied nations concerned are equally anxious to establish a means by which regular shipments of relief supplies to the Far East may be made. Since the feasibility of operations of this nature seems to have been demonstrated by the apparently satisfactory manner in which the recent transfer was effected at Nakhodka, this Government is confident that the Soviet Government will be willing to permit further operations of the same nature.

Thus far, according to the Department's records, no reply has been received by the Embassy at Moscow to the above-mentioned note of November 9. I should be grateful for such action as you may see fit to take in the matter with a view to expediting a reply to the Embassy's request. Since some time must necessarily be consumed in making arrangements for the Japanese Government to pick up further shipments at a Soviet Pacific port and in transporting supplies from this country to the transfer point, it is hoped that your Government will give an early favorable reply to this request in order that the interval

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<sup>23</sup> A copy of this note was sent on the same day to the British Embassy with the suggestion that "In view of the British interest in this question your Government may wish to make representations to the Soviet Government along somewhat similar lines with a view to expediting a decision on this question." (711.94114 Supplies/1-445)

<sup>24</sup> The instruction to the Embassy in the Soviet Union to make this approach to the Soviet Government had been sent in telegram 2551, October 28, p. 1190; see also footnote 12, p. 1191.



between the recent shipment and the next shipment may not be unduly long.

This question is one which is close to the hearts of a large number of the American people. The Soviet Government may be assured of their deep gratitude for its continued cooperation in making possible further shipments to the Far East of relief supplies so desperately needed by Allied nationals in Japanese custody.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

**THE TRIAL AND SENTENCING OF GERMAN WAR CRIMINALS BY THE SOVIET UNION, AND DIVERGENT ATTITUDES AMONG THE ALLIES REGARDING THE PROPRIETY OF THIS PROCEDURE**<sup>25</sup>

740.00116 European War 1939/1214 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1944—7 p. m.

9. Your 2337, December 27.<sup>26</sup> The War Department views with grave concern the publicity given to the Kharkov atrocity trials since it fears that such action during the course of the war may lead to reprisals against American prisoners of war. Furthermore, although the Soviet Government has not seen its way clear to adhere to the Geneva Convention,<sup>27</sup> the War Department considers it most important that efforts should at all times be made to preserve the humanitarian concepts so arduously built up under this Convention.

In view of the importance attached to matters of this kind please report full details of any similar trials.

HULL

740.00116 European War 1939/1224 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 3, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received January 3—8:14 p. m.]

39. From the American members of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee. With reference to the Department's instruction concerning the relation of the Kharkov trials to the Moscow

<sup>25</sup> For previous correspondence about the trial and sentencing of German war criminals and Russian accomplices in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 845 ff.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 853.

<sup>27</sup> International Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. I, p. 336. Earlier correspondence on the efforts of the United States to persuade the Soviet Union to adhere to this convention is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. I, pp. 1005 ff.

Declaration,<sup>28</sup> at the meeting of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee on December 24 (see my 8992, December 24, 11 p. m.<sup>29</sup>). The American members were informed by their British colleagues that the Department's view was that the Kharkov trials are outside of the sphere of the Moscow Declaration and that the Russian and British view was that the trials were within the sphere of the Moscow Declaration. At that time after considerable discussion it was agreed that the terms of reference of the Committee did not permit it to decide questions of policy or to interpret a declaration such as the Moscow Declaration or to determine the relationship between the trials and the Declaration, its function being limited to agreeing on propaganda directives in times of emergency. Furthermore, the Committee was without a Russian representative.

For this reason the Committee as a whole agreed to refer what was considered a question of policy to the two governments for decision.

With reference to the Department's 8267, December 31, 7 p. m.,<sup>30</sup> the American members of the Committee feel that it would be useless to bring up the matter again in the Committee until such time as some decision has been arrived at between the governments concerned. Pending some decision on the part of the governments concerned, the American members of the Committee will be guided by the Department's views that it seems both unnecessary and undesirable for it to be stated publicly that the Kharkov trials come either within or without the Moscow Declaration.

The Embassy can of course, if so instructed by the Department, take up the matter with the Foreign Office.

Please instruct.

Please inform Chiefs of Staff and OWI.<sup>31</sup>

WINANT

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740.00116 European War/1228 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 4, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 6:54 p. m.]

16. Reference Department's 9, January 1, 7 p. m. Will keep Department fully informed of future information we obtain regarding

<sup>28</sup> For explanation of the issuance of this Declaration of German Atrocities at the Moscow Conference, see the Summary of the Proceedings of the Twelfth Session of the Tripartite Conference, October 30, 1943, 4 p.m., *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 679. The text of the declaration is printed *ibid.*, p. 768, and in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-49* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 13.

<sup>29</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 852.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 853.

<sup>31</sup> Office of War Information.

atrocities trials.<sup>32</sup> As I understand your cable, it does not request me to take any steps against the Soviet Government and I will do nothing more unless instructed.

HARRIMAN

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740.00116 European War 1939/1224 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, January 10, 1944—10 p. m.

249. Reference your 39, January 3, 9 p. m. For the American members of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee:

We feel that it would be undesirable to take this matter up at the present time with the view to obtaining a decision and that it would be preferable to adhere to the position set forth in the Department's 8267 of December 31, 7 p. m.<sup>33</sup>

HULL

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740.00116 European War/1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary  
of State*

LONDON, January 12, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received January 13—9 a. m.]

269. This refers to Embassy's 39 of January 3, 9 p. m. Bucknell<sup>34</sup> has received the following communication from Sir Orme Sargent:<sup>35</sup>

"You will remember that at its meeting on 24 December<sup>36</sup> the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee recommended that the United States and British Governments should decide at once as to the relationship of the Kharkov trials to the Moscow Declaration.

We have been considering this point and have reached the following conclusion. The relevant passages of the Moscow Declaration seem to us clearly to mean that, at the time of any armistice with Germany, those Germans who have committed war crimes will be apprehended and sent to the places where the crimes have been committed for trial. This can only apply to those German war criminals who have not already fallen into the hands of, and been tried by, the

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<sup>32</sup> In telegram 92, January 12, 1944, the Ambassador sent a translation of an article by the Soviet jurist Aron Naumovich Trainin entitled "The Criminal Responsibility of the Hitlerite Criminals," printed in *War and the Working Class (Voyna i rabochy klass)* for January 1, 1944, wherein the Soviet attitude toward the trial of captured war criminals was plainly stated (740.00116 European War/1245).

<sup>33</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, p. 853.

<sup>34</sup> Howard Bucknell, Jr., Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

<sup>35</sup> British Deputy Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>36</sup> See telegram 8992, December 24, 1943, from London, *Foreign Relations, 1943*, vol. III, p. 852.

three powers making the Declaration or any of the other 32 United Nations. It does not impose an obligation upon either the three Allied powers or any of the other United Nations not to try, at any place or at any time where the legal powers to do so exist, German war criminals who may be captured before an Armistice is made with Germany. Thus the Declaration in our view only dealt with those German war criminals who will be handed over at the time of the Armistice with Germany, and is a solemn pronouncement of the intention of the powers concerned to try them and punish them in a certain manner.

Our conclusion therefore is that it is not possible to argue that the Kharkov trials are contrary to either the spirit or the wording of the Moscow Declaration. Conversely we doubt whether the Russians are entitled to claim that the trials are in accordance with the declaration since, as indicated above, it seems to us that two different sets of Germans are involved. None-the-less we are not in favor of raising the issue with the Soviet Government, not only because there seems no actual conflict between the Kharkov trials and the Declaration but also having regard to earlier arguments with the Russians about war crimes and to the present deadlock about their representation on the United Nations Commission on War Crimes.<sup>37</sup>

We are telegraphing on the above lines to His Majesty's Embassy at Washington and instructing them to communicate our view to the State Department.

We are also instructing His Majesty's Embassy to inform the State Department that we agree with their view, expressed just before Christmas,<sup>38</sup> that we should not allow ourselves to be drawn by the Kharkov trials into friction with the Russians. We also agree with them that, while publicity should for the present be played down, the position will have to be reconsidered if the Germans actually proceed to trials or if the Russians show signs of staging new trials.

Mr. Winant spoke just after Christmas to Mr. Eden<sup>39</sup> about a telegram which the State Department had sent to the United States Minister at Bern<sup>40</sup> on 24 December<sup>41</sup> instructing him to inform the Swiss Government that the United States Government were not proceeding against German prisoners of war along lines similar to reports of German intentions but were strictly observing the provisions of the Geneva Convention. There seems to us a danger that these instructions might be interpreted as implying that the United States Government regard the trial of prisoners of war as incompatible with strict observance of the Convention. According to our view, the position in this connection is as follows. The Geneva Convention to which His Majesty's Government, United States Government and the German Government are parties, but not the Soviet Government, does not prohibit the trial of prisoners of war for any war crimes they

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<sup>37</sup> Concerning the establishment of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 402 ff; for correspondence on discussions regarding procedures and scope of this Commission, see *ibid.*, 1944, vol. I, pp. 1265 ff.

<sup>38</sup> See telegram 8101, December 23, 1943, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 849.

<sup>39</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>40</sup> Leland Harrison.

<sup>41</sup> Telegram 3222, December 24, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, p. 434.

may have committed. What it does is to lay down certain procedural provisions which must be applied specifically the obligation to give due notification through the protecting power of the trial and of the nature of the offence charges, and the obligation not to carry out any death sentence until three months after the sentence has been communicated to the protecting power. His Majesty's Embassy at Washington is being instructed to bring this point also to the attention of the State Department.["]

The American members, pending such further instructions as the Department may consider necessary, will be guided by the Department's instructions in its 249 of January 10, 10 p. m. and in its 8267 of December 31, 7 p. m.,<sup>42</sup> and we will endeavor to see to it that in any propaganda directive which may be adopted in the event of further such trials any statement that the Kharkov trials either come within or without the Moscow Declaration will be avoided. We will also endeavor to see to it that comment on further trials will be held to a minimum.

WINANT

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740.00116 European War/1247 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 13, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 9:32 p. m.]

320. At a meeting of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee this afternoon it was agreed that the following temporary propaganda directive should be issued at once. (This refers to the Department's 249, January 10, 10 p. m.)

*a.* We should avoid in the event of new Soviet trials making any statement as to whether or not such trials are within the scope of the Moscow Declaration.

*b.* Any comment with regard to any future trials which may be held should be reduced to a minimum.

*c.* The Committee took note of the fact that any renewed Soviet statement that trials similar to the Kharkov trials are within the scope of the Moscow Declaration would leave Allied political warfare without an effective propaganda line.

*d.* Agreed to recommend jointly to the British and American Governments that the Soviet Government be asked to refrain from linking in any public announcements such trials with the Moscow Declaration.

*e.* To draw the two Governments attention to the urgency of the matter in view of recent reports that new trials by the Russians are to take place within the near future.

Please inform OWI and Chiefs of Staff.

WINANT

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<sup>42</sup> For latter telegram, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, p. 853.

740.00116 European War/1259: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 19, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:50 p. m.]

517. In a conversation between Sir Orme Sargent and Bucknell, Sir Orme questioned the advisability of phrasing lettered paragraph *d* in the Embassy's 320, January 13, 7 p. m., as had been agreed upon in the last meeting of the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee since he doubted whether the present terms of reference of the committee permitted it to make recommendations as to specific action which should be taken by the two Governments. He agreed, however, on the desirability of avoiding any difference in propaganda lines on the part of the British-American and Soviets and suggested that the following be substituted for paragraph *d* in the Embassy's telegram referred to above:

"Agreed to call the attention of the British and American Governments to the difficulty with which the Committee will be faced in carrying out (two), if the Soviet Government, in the case of any future trials, publicly link such trials with the Moscow Declaration, and to express the hope that the two Governments will supplement the ruling given in answer to the Committee's request of December 24, so that the Committee may be in a position to meet this difficulty if and when it arises."

The "two" referred to in Sir Orme's suggested draft is in connection with discussion during the meeting of the Committee where members were agreed upon the urgency of formulating a propaganda policy in view of recent reports that further trials by the Russians were to take place in the near future.

We see no objection to substituting Sir Orme's draft for paragraph *d* as he requests.

Please inform OWI and Chiefs of Staff.

WINANT

861.4061 Motion Pictures/76: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, January 22, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received January 23—6:10 a. m.]

217. Moscow cinemas have begun to show a full length feature film on the Kharkov trial entitled "The Trial Goes On". The film opens with a series of scenes depicting revolting German atrocities, particu-

larly pictures of women and children who have been killed and trenches filled with the corpses of Soviet citizens executed by the Germans. The major portion of the film is devoted to scenes from the trial itself including excerpt from the prosecutor's charge, recordings of the testimony of the accused in both German and Russian with particular emphasis on the use of gas cars and the sentence of death pronounced by the court. The arrival of the prisoners and their execution before a cheering throng are shown. The film concludes with scenes from recent offensives of the Red Army and the promise that vengeance will be carried out against Germans who are guilty of crimes against the Soviet people.

HARRIMAN

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740.00116 European War/1282: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, January 28, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6:35 p. m.]

770. This telegram refers to the Embassy's 517, January 19, 8 p. m. Sir Orme Sargent is forwarding the following memorandum to the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee as embodying the views of His Majesty's Government with respect to the recommendation of the Committee at its meeting on January 19, that the American Government and His Majesty's Government supplement the ruling already given in regard to the relationship between the Kharkov trials and the Moscow Declaration.

The Department will note that the British Government find themselves unable under present circumstances to supplement the opinion already communicated to the Committee (Embassy's No. 269, January 12, 6 p. m.).

"At its meeting on 19 January 1944 the London Political Warfare Coordinating Committee agreed to call the attention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the United States Government to the difficulty with which the Committee will be faced in formulating a propaganda policy, if the Soviet Government, in the event of any future trials of German war criminals, publicly linked such trials with the Moscow Declaration. The Committee expressed the hope that the two Governments would supplement the ruling which they had already given to the Committee in regard to the relationship between the Kharkov trials and the Moscow Declaration, so that the Committee might be in a position to meet this difficulty if and when it arose.

His Majesty's Government are conscious of the difficulties that might arise for our political warfare if the Soviet Government were publicly to link any future trials with the Moscow Declaration. His

Majesty's Government also had in mind the danger that the German Government might take the opportunity afforded by any such statement by the Soviet Government to carry into effect their threat to bring to trial British and American prisoners of war accused of serious breaches of international law. In the light of these considerations His Majesty's Government have examined the possibility of approaching the Soviet Government in advance with a view to dissuading them from issuing any statement on these lines. They have, however, decided that neither the possible political warfare difficulty nor the danger of German action<sup>43</sup> is at present so serious as to justify such an approach to the Soviet Government on a subject concerning which the Soviet Government are known to hold strong views and the discussion of which, on a hypothetical basis, might in present circumstances prove a disturbing factor in relations between the countries concerned.

For the foregoing reasons, His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable in present circumstances to comply with the Committee's request to supplement the ruling already communicated to the Committee in their memorandum of . . . January."<sup>44</sup>

WINANT

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740.00116 European War 1939/1350 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 13, 1944.

[Received March 14—11:05 a. m.]

824. Moscow papers for March 11 devote the two inside pages to a statement by the State Commission for the Investigation of German Atrocities<sup>45</sup> concerning documents and orders of the German Government and the German High Command with regard to the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians. The statement consists of six parts as follows:

(1) Secret Nazi directives regarding the extermination of Soviet citizens. This section states that according to preliminary data the Germans killed about two million Soviet civilians in addition to a large number of prisoners of war in Soviet territory occupied by them.

(2) Preparation for the mass extermination of Soviet prisoners of war and civilians. This section describes black lists of Soviet citi-

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<sup>43</sup> The Adviser on Political Relations, James Clement Dunn, in a memorandum of February 1 expressed the considered policy of the Department of State, "with which the War Department heartily agreed, that it was dangerous for this Government to make any public statements with respect to the Kharkov trials because of the danger of provoking reprisals upon American prisoners of war in the hands of the Germans. The War Department was particularly concerned over this matter." (740.00116 European War/1261)

<sup>44</sup> The omitted date is not available.

<sup>45</sup> The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union by ukaz of November 4, 1942, had formed an extraordinary state commission for ascertaining and investigating the offenses of the German aggressors and accomplices. The creation of this commission had been reported by the Secretary of Embassy at Kuibyshev in telegram 982, November 5, 1942, *Foreign Relations*, 1942, vol. III, p. 473.



zens prepared by the German secret police who were marked for systematic extermination by special commandos.

(3) Plans for the extermination of Soviet workers and Soviet intelligentsia. This section lists eight classes of Soviet citizens who were designated for the special attention of the security police.

(4) Attempts of German Fascist murderers to hide their crimes. This section describes the measures taken by the Nazis to conceal their work of extermination and to destroy the evidence thereof.

(5) The Nazis criminally trample on the rules of international law and the laws of war. This section presents evidence that the Germans denied prisoners of war and non-combatants the rights accorded them by international law.

(6) The Nazi Government and the German military command, the organizers of the monstrous crimes, must be brought to account. In this section the statement names the Germans principally responsible for the executions and states that they must bear severe punishment for their crimes.

Photostatic copies of a number of the secret German documents on which the statement is based are also published.

All papers devote their editorials to a discussion of the statement.

Full text follows by airmail.<sup>46</sup>

HARRIMAN

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740.00116 European War 1939/1371 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, March 27, 1944—noon.

[Received March 28—7:40 p. m.]

1059. The Embassy has still been unable to obtain from the Foreign Office a copy of the decree of April 19, 1943.<sup>47</sup> Department's 308, February 15, Embassy's 550, February 18, 4 p. m.<sup>48</sup>

An article in *Freies Deutschland*<sup>49</sup> for December 19, 1943, concerning the Kharkov trial however includes the following statement:

"Death by hanging was first introduced in the Soviet Union through a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dated April 19, 1943. A death sentence by hanging was first imposed last summer in the

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<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> The text of this decree had not been published, and efforts to obtain a copy of it had not been successful. Aron Naumovich Trainin wrote in his article in *War and the Working Class* for January 1, 1944, that one of the purposes of this decree was to give to "Soviet courts an appropriate weapon for the immediate struggle with the Hitlerite criminals."

<sup>48</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>49</sup> The periodical of the "Free Germany" National Committee founded in Moscow under Soviet auspices on July 21, 1943; regarding early activities of the Committee, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 552-580, *passim*, and pp. 602-605.

'Krasnipingdar [*Krasnodar*] trial' (in the matter of atrocities committed in the city and district of Krasnipingdar [*Krasnodar*] during its occupation by the German army) and for the second time in the recent Kharkov trial."

A microfilm of this issue of *Freies Deutschland* was forwarded to the Department under cover of my despatch No. 229, March 3, 1944.<sup>50</sup>

HARRIMAN

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740.00116 European War 1939/1409a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union*  
(Harriman)

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1944.

937. From War Refugee Board.<sup>51</sup> With reference to the statement made by the President<sup>52</sup> (Department's 699, March 24<sup>50</sup>) the British Government, in a reaffirmation of its attitude toward the Nazi war crimes and atrocities, directed that the BBC report the President's statement fully in all languages. Subsequently, on March 30, Mr. Eden, in the House of Commons,<sup>53</sup> reiterated the position of the British Government with regard to these crimes.

You are requested to approach the appropriate authorities of the Soviet Union and ascertain whether, in view of the positive action taken by the British Government, the Soviet Government would take similar action and issue a statement expressing its attitude concerning the crimes and atrocities of the Nazis. It is felt by the Department that such action on the part of the Soviet Government would have a most profound and important effect upon the leaders and peoples of Rumania and Hungary.

Please report the result of your discussions concerning this matter.<sup>54</sup>  
[War Refugee Board.]

HULL

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Established on January 22, 1944, by Executive Order 9417 (see 9 *Federal Register* 935, and Department of State *Bulletin*, January 22, 1944, p. 95), composed of the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, and of War, and a full time Director of the Board.

<sup>52</sup> March 24, 1944, vol. I, p. 1230.

<sup>53</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 398, col. 1562.

<sup>54</sup> Ambassador Harriman informed the Department in telegram 1395, April 22, 1944, that he had inquired of Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky on the day before "whether the Soviet Government would issue a statement expressing its attitude concerning Nazi atrocities." Vyshinsky had replied that his Government "had frequently expressed its position on this subject," but that he would personally study the matter. (740.00116 European War 1939/1406) At this time the Soviet press was often publishing in detail the reports of the Extraordinary State Commission of its investigations of Nazi atrocities found in regions being regained by the advances of the Soviet Armed Forces.

740.00116 EW/8-1944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, August 19, 1944.

[Received August 21—9 p. m.]

3073. Press for August 19 publishes "Communiqué of 'Polpress' agency" announcing formation of Polish-Soviet Extraordinary Commission to investigate German crimes committed in connection with concentration camp at Majdanek near Lublin. Press also publishes long Tass<sup>56</sup> Lublin dispatch describing results of investigatory work already undertaken by Commission.

Polpress communiqué states that Polish Committee of National Liberation,<sup>57</sup> taking into account fact that Germans carried out mass killings of Soviet prisoners in Lublin camp, proposed to Soviet Government establishment of Polish-Soviet Commission To Investigate German Crimes. Soviet Government accepted proposal. [Here follows a partial listing of the Soviet and Polish representatives appointed to this Commission.] Communiqué states that Commission has begun investigation of German Fascist crimes in Lublin and establishment of exposure of organizers and direct executors of these crimes.

Lublin despatch dated August 18 refers to several hours spent by Commission on camp territory and refers to thousands of pieces of evidence examined. It states that 2 million persons entered Majdanek camp, of which only a handful miraculously escaped. Of remainder, only photographs, entries in list of killed, articles of clothing, ashes or bones are left.

New evidence is constantly being unearthed. This includes dozens of boxes of passports belonging to Poles, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, Czechs, Greeks, Soviet persons and others. Despatch refers to letter of German firm manufacturing ovens for burning prisoners in which directions are given for use of these ovens.

It is estimated that at least 600,000 prisoners were burned in Majdanek ovens. Commission has also begun investigation of graves of Polish war prisoners and local inhabitants shot by Germans in nearby Krembecki Forest.

HARRIMAN

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<sup>56</sup> Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, the official communication agency of the Soviet Government.

<sup>57</sup> First established at Chelm (Kholm) by the National People's Council of Poland by a decree of July 21, 1944, as the executive authority of the Communist-sponsored and Soviet-supported government in Poland. Soon thereafter it transferred to Lublin and was commonly known as the Lublin Committee.

740.00116 EW/10-1944: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*  
 Moscow, October 19, 1944—10 a. m.  
 [Received 11:45 a. m.]

3984. One of the principal themes of Soviet press since beginning of process of liberation of European countries occupied by Germans has been necessity of speedy punishment of war criminals and collaborators with Axis. Press publishes very frequently news items regarding progress of purging of such elements. The term purge (*chistka*) is often used in these accounts.

[A list of reports of war crimes and of the arrests of certain war criminals in France, Holland, Bulgaria, and Rumania, with indications of future trials being planned for some of them, is omitted.]

These items are typical of reports appearing almost daily in Soviet press from liberated countries. Publicity is very often given to dissatisfaction of resistance movements with slowness of purges especially in western Europe. Apparently one of major concerns of Soviets is complete annihilation of all types of collaborationists. These elements are sometimes identified with anti-Soviet forces.

Sent Department, repeated London as 224.

KENNAN

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740.00116 E.W. 1939/11-2944: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*  
 Moscow, November 29, 1944.  
 [Received November 30—3:50 a. m.]

4562. Press for November 29 publishes despatch datelined Lublin November 28 reporting that trial of six Hitlerites accused of atrocities at Majdanek has begun. 1500 persons attended opening of trial and others filled streets surrounding court. Despatch states that shouts of hatred and indignation were hurled at criminals.

Following are names of accused: Anton Ternes, Oberscharfuehrer<sup>58</sup> of SS troops; Herman Vogel, Standartenfuehrer<sup>59</sup> of SS troops; Theo Scholen, Rottenfuehrer<sup>60</sup> of SS troops; Wilhelm Gerstenmeier, Hauptmarschfuehrer<sup>61</sup> of SS troops; Edmund Pohlman and Heinz Octland.

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<sup>58</sup> About the equivalent of First Sergeant, in the Schutzstaffel, the elite corps of the National Socialist German Workers' Party, used for military and police purposes.

<sup>59</sup> The approximate equivalent of the rank of Colonel, in the Schutzstaffel.

<sup>60</sup> About the equivalent of a Corporal, in the Schutzstaffel.

<sup>61</sup> About the equivalent of Master Sergeant, in the Schutzstaffel.

Despatch stated that all accused had had sanguinary careers in Dachau and Oranienburg camps. They were reputedly arrested in act of destroying evidence of their crimes.

Case is being tried by special Polish court consisting of President of Court Zembuzski, members Nadulska and Dymowski, prosecutors Czesljudk and Sawicki and five attorneys.

Despatch states that correspondents of Soviet, American and English press<sup>62</sup> and also press of democratic Poland were present.<sup>63</sup> Despatch adds that in connection with tremendous interest in the trial Lublin cinemas are showing documentary film on Majdanek made by Polish cameramen.

KENNAN

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740.00116 EW 1939/12-544: Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 5, 1944.

[Received December 5—9:53 a. m.]

4643. Items on the Lublin trials appearing in the Moscow press for December 3 and 4.

1. All papers December 3 give the testimony of Sobolewski, Chief Secretary of the Polish Soviet Commission for investigating German Fascist atrocities in Maidanek, as well as the testimony of one internee from the camp.

2. *Pravda* for December 4 quotes from the speech of the Prosecuting Attorney Cheslyuk which sums up the testimony against the accused. It states that after speeches of the Prosecuting Attorney and the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, the defense was heard. Nothing is stated on the nature of the defense. At the end of the same article a despatch from Lublin dated December 3 states that the five accused were condemned to death by the Court. As an exception to ordinary procedure, their execution will be public.

KENNAN

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<sup>62</sup> Telegram 4561, November 29, 1944, from Moscow stated that the American correspondent was Anna Louise Strong and the British representative was Dr. Stefan Littauer (740.00116 E.W. 1939/11-2944).

<sup>63</sup> In telegram 4579, November 30, from Moscow, the Chargé reported that requests by other American and British correspondents to attend the Lublin trial were rejected by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and by the representative of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Lublin Committee) in Moscow. A Polish official declared to an American correspondent that the Poles "would have been delighted to let the remaining American correspondents go but that they had been strictly forbidden to do so by the Russians." The Chargé believed that this incident "might be of interest to the Department from the standpoint of relations between the representatives of the Lublin Committee here and the Soviet Government." (740.00116-European War 1939/11-3044)

740.00116 EW/12-644 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 6, 1944.

[Received December 6—6:29 p. m.]

4659. Press for December 6 publish[ed] prominently Lublin account dated December 3 of hanging of five Hitlerites sentenced for crimes committed in Majdanek death camp.

Execution was witnessed by over 20,000 persons who according to story, hurled imprecations at Hitlerites, such as "that is what they deserve". Despatch adds that execution was greeted by stormy approval.

Sent to Department as 4659, repeated to London as 285 for Schoenfeld.

HARRIMAN

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**SUSTAINED INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION**<sup>64</sup>

861.404/556a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1944—10 p. m.

198. Towards the end of September last year a request was made of the President on behalf of the Order of Assumptionists, the Catholic Order of which Father Braun<sup>65</sup> in Moscow is a member, to have this Government take up with the Soviet Government the question of permission for a priest to go to the Soviet Union to act as assistant to Father Braun. After reference to the Department it was decided that in view of the imminent opening of the Moscow Conference<sup>66</sup> the moment was not propitious to take this question up with the Soviet Government. This request has now been renewed to the Department by the Provincial of the Order of the Assumptionists who wishes to

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<sup>64</sup> For previous correspondence on this subject and on the reestablishment of the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 855 ff. For the exchange of letters between President Roosevelt and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Litvinov) at Washington, November 16, 1933, in regard to freedom of conscience and religious liberty for American citizens residing in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939, pp. 29-33.

<sup>65</sup> Leopold Braun, an American citizen, arrived in Moscow during March 1934 to take charge of the Church of Saint Louis of France, the only Catholic church in Moscow.

<sup>66</sup> Conference of Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, held October 18-November 1, 1943; for correspondence on the Conference, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. I, pp. 513 ff.

send the Reverend G. Antonio Laberge, an American citizen, to Moscow to assist Father Braun in his religious duties.

If you perceive no objection, you are authorized to bring this request to the attention of the Soviet Government in the manner which you think most suitable. Please report by telegram the reaction of the Soviet authorities to this request.

HULL

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861.404/561 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton)*

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1944—3 p. m.

1241. Over a month ago Father Laberge applied to the Soviet Embassy for a visa (your 954, March 21),<sup>67</sup> but so far no authorization has been received from Moscow.

Please take up this matter with Foreign Office and express the hope that Soviet Government will find it possible to expedite favorable action in regard to Father Laberge's application.

For your information and such use as you may consider advisable:

It will not be understood in this country why the request to send Father Laberge to assist Father Braun in his religious duties in the Soviet Union has not been granted by the Soviet Government particularly in view of the recent visit of Father Orlemanski<sup>68</sup> and the publication in this country of Stalin's letter to him.<sup>69</sup>

Please telegraph the results of your representations.

HULL

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861.404/567 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 20, 1944.

[Received May 21—3:56 p. m.]

1804. Moscow papers for May 20 publish the following announcement: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in connection with the death of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed; in it the Ambassador in the Soviet Union advised that the acceptance of Father Laberge did not lie with the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and that it was not possible to indicate when an answer might be made to the request for a visa (861.404/561).

<sup>68</sup> Stanislaus (Stanislaw) Orlemanski, priest in a Roman Catholic church in Springfield, Massachusetts, upon the invitation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Stalin, visited the Soviet Union between April 13 and May 6, "to study the situation of the Poles and the Polish Army in the USSR." (760C.61/2291) For further information on this visit, see vol. III, pp. 1398-1409, *passim*.

<sup>69</sup> See telegram 1618, May 9, from Moscow, p. 868.

Sergius <sup>70</sup> has expressed its deep sympathy to the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church."

This announcement is followed by a six-inch Tass story describing the funeral of the Patriarch which took place on May 18<sup>1</sup> at the Bogoyavlenski Cathedral <sup>71</sup> in Moscow. The item notes that the Metropolitans Alexius, <sup>72</sup> Nicolai, <sup>73</sup> Ioann, <sup>74</sup> 11 bishops and more than 1,000 representatives of the Moscow clergy participated in the funeral mass. The service was attended by a large crowd of the faithful. G. G. Karpov, <sup>75</sup> head of the Church Affairs Commission, attended the service as the representative of the Council of People's Commissars.

HAMILTON

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861.404/568 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 22, 1944.

[Received May 22—7:54 p. m.]

1821. Moscow papers for May 21 announce that the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church at a meeting on May 15 carried out the arrangements contemplated in the Testament of the Holy Patriarch Sergius concerning the entry of the Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, Alexius, upon the duties of Patriarchal Locum Tenens.<sup>76</sup>

This item also includes a short biography of Metropolitan Alexius. The same issue of *Pravda* contains a letter dated May 19 from Alexius to Stalin in which he expresses his intention of pursuing the policy of Sergius. Texts of biography and letter follow by airmail.<sup>77</sup>

HAMILTON

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<sup>70</sup> Sergey had been Locum Tenens of the Patriarchate from 1925 until his election on September 8 and his investiture on September 13, 1943. The obituary announced that he had died on May 15 in his 78th year.

<sup>71</sup> The Bogoyavlensky (Epiphany) Cathedral was the patriarchal church inside the Kremlin wall.

<sup>72</sup> Alexy (born Sergey Vladimirovich Simansky, in 1877) was the Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod.

<sup>73</sup> Nikolay (born Boris Dorofeyevich Yarushevich in 1892) had become the Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna in January 1944.

<sup>74</sup> Formerly the Archbishop of Yaroslav and Rostov, Ioann (born Ivan Alexandrovich Sokolov, in 1877) became the Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, and Exarch of all the Ukraine in February 1944, in succession to the Metropolitan Nikolay.

<sup>75</sup> Georgy Grigoryevich Karpov, President of the Council for Affairs of the Orthodox Church, attached to the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.

<sup>76</sup> Alexy was invested as the thirteenth Patriarch in February 1945.

<sup>77</sup> Not printed. In his letter of May 19 to Stalin the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, among other things, declared: "In my future activities I will unalterably and steadfastly be guided by the principles which marked the ecclesiastical activity of the deceased Patriarch: observance of the canons and Church regulations, on the one hand, and unalterable loyalty to the country and to our Government headed by you, on the other." (861.404/575)



861.404/583

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1944.

MR. MATTHEWS: Mr. Andre Visson of the *Herald Tribune* said while in New York he had lunch with Pravdin,<sup>78</sup> the head of the Tass<sup>79</sup> Agency. During the conversation, Pravdin laid considerable emphasis on the importance of the Greek Orthodox Church in Soviet policies after the war, in the Balkans and Near East, stating that this factor was very often overlooked by American commentators. Pravdin said that, for the first time, there would be a well-organized dynamic and state-controlled Orthodox Church which would have great influence throughout the Balkans and the Near East; that the Soviet Government, while it did not intend to proselyte for the Greek Orthodox religion, would nevertheless back the Greek Orthodox Church and Greek Orthodox Christians wherever they were; for this reason, he doubted very much whether the Vatican would respond to Stalin's overture made through Father Orlemanski since the Vatican, in contrast to certain Catholic clergy in this country, was too well informed to look upon the Soviet Union as a center of Atheistic communism which Pravdin said belonged to the realm of the past. In his opinion, therefore, the Vatican is sufficiently intelligent to see in the Soviet backing of the Greek Orthodox Church a much greater threat to Catholicism than Atheistic communism had ever been. He added that it was necessary to have some force to combat the Vatican, and Protestantism could not do this since it was too divided within itself, and that the only force capable of doing so was the Greek Orthodox Church controlled by the Soviet Government.

In reply to Mr. Visson's question in regard to Zionism, Pravdin stated that since there were, at the most, 800,000 Jews in the Near East as against many millions of Arabs, the Soviet Government as realists would take cognizance of this difference in strength. Mr. Visson said that Pravdin made it quite clear in saying this; that the Soviet Government would be more inclined to work with the Arabs than with the Zionists.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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<sup>78</sup> Vladimir Sergeyevich Pravdin.

<sup>79</sup> Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communication agency of the Soviet Government.

861.404/572 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*Moscow, May 26, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received May 27—6:25 a. m.]

1894. I took up the question of Father Laberge's visa with Vyshinski<sup>80</sup> on May 25 (Department's 1241, May 19, 5 [3] p. m.) and expressed the hope that the Soviet Government would find it possible to expedite favorable action.

I commented briefly on Father Orlemanski's visit and the publication of Stalin's letter along the lines set forth in the Department's telegram. Vyshinski replied that the question of Father Laberge's coming to the Soviet Union should not be considered in connection with the question of religion in the Soviet Union which was clearly defined by the Soviet Constitution but from the practical point of view of whether his presence in Moscow as assistant to Father Braun was needed. He indicated that he would look into the matter.

HAMILTON

861.404/572 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944—5 p. m.

1476. Department's 1241, May 19 and Embassy's 1894, May 26. The Soviet Embassy here has still received no word in regard to the application of Father Laberge for a Soviet visa. In view of the deep interest of Catholic circles in this country which was again brought to the attention of the Department, please endeavor to ascertain from the Soviet Government when a decision may be expected and express again the hope of this Government that such a decision will be favorable.

HULL

861.404/7-144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary  
of State*

Moscow, July 1, 1944.

[Received July 1—6:30 p. m.]

2385. Press for July 1st publishes an announcement of the formation of a Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults under the Council

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<sup>80</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

of Commissars of the USSR. The announcement reads in translation as follows:

“By a decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR there has been organized under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR a Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults to provide liaison between the Government of the USSR and the leaders of religious societies: the Armenian Gregorian, the Old Ritualists, the Catholic, the Greek Catholic, and Lutheran Churches, the Moslem, Hebrew, and Buddhist confessions and sectarian organizations, in regard to questions concerning these cults requiring decision by the Government of the USSR.

Comrade I. V. Polyanski<sup>81</sup> has been appointed President of the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR.”

HARRIMAN

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861.404/7-544

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*<sup>82</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] July 5, 1944.

[The paragraph here omitted summarized telegram 2385, July 1, printed *supra*.]

The establishment of this Council is an organizational move to provide a central authority for coordinating the religious policy of the Soviet Government in regard to religious groups other than the Greek Orthodox. Although, in itself, it does not indicate what policy will be pursued towards these groups, it does indicate that they will receive a greater degree of recognition than heretofore accorded, and is in line with the more tolerant attitude adopted towards religion since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war and perhaps it should be considered in connection with the assurances given by Stalin to Father Orlemanski concerning the Catholic Church. The fact, however, that this governmental body is set up to deal with religions other than the Greek Orthodox Church, underlines the special and privileged position which the latter church will have in the Soviet Union.

Although all religious activities including that of the Orthodox Church will continue to be carefully controlled by the Soviet state and forced to conform with general Soviet policy, a distinction will be made in favor of the Greek Orthodox faith which has virtually been recognized as the State religion and unquestionably will be utilized in that guise as a political instrument of the Soviet State. Other

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<sup>81</sup> Ivan Vasilyevich Polyansky, whose position was comparable in behalf of other religious denominations to that of Georgy Grigoryevich Karpov for affairs of the Orthodox Church.

<sup>82</sup> Addressed to the Secretary of State and to the Director of the Office of European Affairs, James Clement Dunn.

religions will be even more carefully circumscribed and controlled and will not be permitted to develop to a point where they might threaten the position of the official Orthodox Church.<sup>83</sup>

The creation of this Council for religious cults at this time is undoubtedly related with the Polish question and is probably designed to provide machinery to handle questions involving the Catholic population of eastern Poland which the Soviet Government intends to incorporate in the Soviet Union.<sup>84</sup>

C. E. BOHLEN

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*Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the President*<sup>85</sup>

[Extracts]<sup>86</sup>

ROME, July 17, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit herewith an account of my audience with His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, which took place at the Vatican on July 12, 1944.

The subject of Communism raises the question of the Russian attitude toward Poland.<sup>87</sup> I assume the principal preoccupation of the Holy See in the Polish boundary question arises from the fact that within the territory east of the projected Curzon Line<sup>88</sup> a portion of the population is of Roman Catholic religious persuasion. The concern of the Holy See naturally follows to protect its children in

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<sup>83</sup> On July 7, Mr. W. O. Lewis, the General Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance, conversed with Mr. George M. Abbott of the Division of Eastern European Affairs on the significance of recent religious developments in the Soviet Union. In a memorandum of the conversation, Mr. Abbott wrote: "He appeared to be chiefly concerned that the improved position of the Russian Orthodox Church would eventually lead to the persecution of the Baptists by that church in the same manner as before the Soviet revolution." Mr. Lewis indicated also that if he were able to visit the Soviet Union and obtain information that Soviet policy "had changed for the better, he believed it would be a very important factor in building up good will for the Soviet Union in the United States among the 11,000,000 Baptists." (861.404/7-744)

<sup>84</sup> For correspondence on the interest of the United States in the problems of the re-establishment of Polish-Soviet relations, see vol. III, pp. 1216 ff.

<sup>85</sup> Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. At the direction of the President, a draft reply was prepared for his signature in the Department of State. It does not appear, however, that the letter was sent. The President had instructed Mr. Taylor in a letter of August 3, 1944, to assure Pope Pius XII of his desire to cooperate "in all matters of mutual concern and interest" and express "appreciation of the frequent action which the Holy See has taken on its own initiative in its generous and merciful efforts to render assistance to the victims of racial and religious persecutions." Myron C. Taylor, *Wartime Correspondence between President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII* (New York, 1947), p. 113.

<sup>86</sup> The passages here omitted dealt with unrelated subjects.

<sup>87</sup> Correspondence on this subject is printed in vol. III, pp. 1216-1446.

<sup>88</sup> In regard to the origin of the Curzon line, and for a description of it, see *Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, pp. 793-794.

the free exercise of their faith, and that assurance by Russia must be given and acted upon to guarantee them therein. The question then arises how could such guarantees be expressed and could they be relied upon?

In viewing the broader question of the Russian attitude re freedom of religion generally—following my discussion with His Holiness in 1941 and 1942, I carried on a lengthy discussion in London with Russian Ambassador Maisky.<sup>89</sup> We reached a point where the Ambassador enquired what form of statement of assurance to be made by Marshal Stalin<sup>90</sup> would be accepted. I did not feel competent to phrase such a vital statement without consultation. I informed His Holiness that I discussed the subject with the President of the United States, with Secretary Hull and others, including members of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy in America. The following statement was evolved:

I. "Because of the loyal participation in the defense of the Fatherland by all Russian people under the direction of constituted authority in the State, the Soviet Government by interpreting and applying Article 124 of the U.S.S.R. constitution publicly proclaims complete freedom of religious teaching and freedom of worship in all Soviet territory.

II. "Any abuse of these privileges, either to organize movements or incite the people to overthrow the Government, will be dealt with in each case according to law".

I did not feel in a position to make use of this statement—anticipating as we did that I would soon be returning to the Vatican and that I would present the suggestion to His Holiness in person for his consideration.

It was hardly a subject for telegraphic correspondence.

Events prevented my return until the present time.

It would seem timely to discuss this subject now, when the British, Russian and Chinese diplomatic representatives are beginning conversations in Washington, on a preliminary draft of a plan for an International Organization to preserve the peace of the world.<sup>91</sup>

I alluded in general terms to this plan in my first and second audiences with His Holiness. It would seem that in the early stages of that discussion the question of religious freedom might well be put forward. Good faith on which such a great undertaking will need rest and on which its permanency will depend is a primary religious precept.

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<sup>89</sup> Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky.

<sup>90</sup> Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union (Premier), Supreme Commander in Chief.

<sup>91</sup> For correspondence pertaining to the conference held at Dumbarton Oaks between August 21 and October 7, 1944, see vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

What, then, can one suggest to Marshal Stalin? One cannot negotiate in a vacuum: a formula is essential. The dangers of inaction are often greater than mistaken methods chosen.

Following my last audience with the Pope, I had a long discussion with Monseigneur Tardini,<sup>92</sup> Political Adviser to the Pope, who has very pronounced ideas on Russia and the spread of Communism. He objected to item II in the formula recited on page 3 hereof, but approved item I, as did His Holiness. I have promised to give each a copy of the formula and of the accompanying statement attached hereto (marked "A").<sup>93</sup>

I attach hereto a translation of a portion of a speech made by a communist member of the Italian Government, July 10, 1944 (marked "B").<sup>93</sup>

I attach a memorandum regarding Communism which the Pope discussed briefly in our first audience, but which was rewritten by Monseigneur Tardini (marked "C").

Sincerely yours,

MYRON C. TAYLOR

[Enclosure "C"—Memorandum]

1. In the U. S. S. R. the situation as regards the Catholic Church does not show any substantial improvement from what it was before the war.

The anti-religious Soviet legislation always remains in vigour.

Besides, the now very few survivors of the Catholic Clergy who had been arrested in Russian territory since the Soviet Revolution, were not set free nor were they afforded any possibility of exercising their sacred ministry. Only a certain number of Catholic priests, through an agreement with the Polish Government, in the second half of 1942, could leave the U. S. S. R., together with the Polish Army which was then leaving those regions. Also in this case not all the priests, previously imprisoned and deported from Poland, were set free, nor does it appear that they were set free after that date.

It has never been possible to learn of the fate of Archbishop Edward Profitlich, Apostolic Administrator of Esthonia, arrested in Tallin in June 1941 and deported towards the Urals.

2. Neither have certain events which have happened within the last two years, any value in modifying the above stated judgment about the religious situation in Russia.

<sup>92</sup> Domenico Tardini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

<sup>93</sup> Not printed.

It is true that, even before the death (December 1940) of the well-known director of the Godless organization—Jaroslavsk (Gubelmann<sup>95</sup>)—the atheistic propaganda had practically been suspended. But this suspension, which did not at all mean the suppression of existing anti-religious literature, is very far from constituting a positive recognition of religious liberty, and it is not difficult to find an explanation for it in the desire to take into account the obvious reasons of political and military opportuneness and the psychological needs of a people in war.

The publication of a book entitled “The Truth about Religion in Russia”,<sup>96</sup> is due also to propaganda purposes. This book, very widely diffused abroad in its various translations, and almost impossible to find in the U. S. S. R., is reticent, inexact and sometimes contains falsehoods.

The following information given by the “United Nations News”, June 28, is a proof of the kind of propaganda which is being carried on in this sense. According to the weekly review, “*Colliers*”, Russia has at the moment more than four millions of religious who care regularly for about 5,000 Orthodox Churches, 1,800 Roman Catholic Churches, 1,300 Mahomedan Mosques, 1,100 Protestant Churches, and 1000 Synagogues. For what regards the Roman Catholic Church this information is completely false.

Even the world press brought out the propaganda side of the re-appearance of the Patriarchate of Moscow (September 1943).

3. The Soviet Communism—even after the suppression of the Comintern (May 1943)<sup>97</sup>—continues to be the propagating center of a most active Communist Propaganda throughout the world. All leads one to believe that this propaganda aims at diffusing those principles and doctrines, which remain today as the foundation of Soviet Communism, since they have never been renounced. These principles are essentially materialistic and the doctrines based on them destroy the personality of the individual to the advantage of the State, proclaim class-war, tend to the dictatorship of the proletariat and antagonize Religion.

This propaganda is carried on especially in countries through which the war has passed or is passing, and avails itself of the very miserable conditions of these peoples. It is well known how it is also being carried on in Italy, which unfortunately presents, because of the actual economical, political and social situation, a very favorable ground.

<sup>95</sup> Emelyan Yarolsavsky (Minei Izraelyevich Gubelmann), Chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Militant Atheists of the Soviet Union.

<sup>96</sup> A book published in Moscow in July 1942, with a preface by the Patriarchal Locum Tenens Sergey, which was the first official statement about the church in many years issued by Orthodox churchmen in the Soviet Union.

<sup>97</sup> Concerning the dissolution of the Communist (Third) International, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. III, pp. 532-543, *passim*.

Such propaganda is indeed very cleverly carried on, nor does it reveal to the inexperienced the erroneous principles from which it springs and on which it bases itself; in fact it rather proclaims even a tolerance and an understanding for the Catholic Religion, respect for the Faith and religious practice and offers collaboration. Thus is renewed the policy of the "Extended Hand", already tried in other countries. However, because of the sad consequences which it has had, one cannot but entertain very serious concern.

4. Even recently there have been authoritative and not unimportant declarations by prominent persons and by representatives of various sections of the press, expressing from time to time, optimistic judgments on the religious situation in Russia and on the character of Soviet Communism at the present time and on its forms of propaganda.

Notwithstanding all this, in view of what has been stated above and after the sad experiences of the past, it is necessary to follow a policy of watchful expectation and reserve.

JULY 13, 1944.

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861.48/10-2444 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, October 24, 1944.

[Received October 24—10:05 p. m.]

4059. *Pravda* for October 23, publishes prominently on page 2 message to Stalin from Alexis, Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod and Patriarch Locum Tenens, referring to collections of funds in support of war effort by orthodox clergy and faithful and stating that with end of war in sight he had considered it appropriate to inaugurate collection of funds for children and families of Red Army fighters by all orthodox clergy and believers. One million rubles has been given by patriarchate to begin drive.

Alexis refers to efforts of church which have already netted 150 millions in contributions and states that these efforts were stimulated by Stalin's cordial replies to previous reports of collections. In conclusion Alexis refers to Stalin as "Our beloved God-given supreme leader" and expresses confidence that his appeal for funds to church will meet with Stalin's approval.

Stalin's reply reads as follows: "I thank you for your concern for the children and families of Red Army warriors. Accept my greetings and the gratitude of the Red Army."

KENNAN



861.404/11-2044

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1218

Moscow, November 20, 1944.

[Received December 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to the Department's Airgram No. 19 of May 6, 1943<sup>98</sup> concerning the status in Moscow of Reverend Leopold Braun.

In connection with the 11th anniversary of the resumption of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union<sup>99</sup> Father Braun addressed a letter to the Embassy, a copy of which is attached.<sup>98</sup> In reply to this letter he was invited to call at the Embassy, which he did on November 14th. I discussed with him the various matters which he had in mind. His principal difficulty, and the only one on which he had any definite request to make, concerned his ecclesiastical status. He considers that he is by rights apostolic administrator in Moscow. The Soviet authority recently established for the conduct of relations between the Soviet state and religious bodies within the Soviet Union has been unwilling to recognize him in this capacity. Father Braun feels that he should at least be recognized in this capacity by the American Embassy.

I explained to Father Braun that the Embassy could not be concerned in this question which would have to remain a matter for himself and the Soviet authorities. Father Braun said that he realized this, but that he would wish at least to be known to the Embassy in the capacity which he considers himself to enjoy here. I suggested to him that he might wish to ask his ecclesiastical superiors to consider informing our Government, for its information, of their conception of his status, although I stressed that the way in which he was known to us could have no practical consequences with respect to his status with the Soviet authorities.

Father Braun understands clearly, I think, that the United States Government and this Embassy cannot take any step to influence his status in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, he must be known to the Embassy in one ecclesiastical status or another, and I can see no objection to our Government's taking note, and informing the Embassy, of any communication which the competent authorities of Father Braun's church might wish to make on this subject. The Embassy would be glad to take cognizance of any information it receives through proper channels on this subject, although it would of course

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<sup>98</sup> Not printed.

<sup>99</sup> For correspondence on this subject, see *Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933-1939*, pp. 1 ff.

not be possible to use this mode of address until Father Braun could arrange for the recognition of this status by the Soviet authorities.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE F. KENNAN

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861.404/11-2844 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 28, 1944.

[Received November (29)—12:45 a. m.]

4548. Council of Bishops of Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow November 21-23 which made plans for Council of Russian Orthodox Church to be held January 31, 1945 to elect Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia is announced in Moscow newspapers for November 28.

Council was opened by Patriarch Locum Tenens Alexis who set forth tasks facing Bishops. Following also spoke: Rector of Orthodox Theological Institute, Archpriest Popov, regarding activity of Institute and theological courses;<sup>1</sup> Administrative Officer of Moscow Patriarchate, Archpriest Kolchitski, regarding proposed convocation of Council, and Metropolitan Krutitski, Nikolai, regarding current church problems. Congress of Bishops unanimously adopted resolution for convocation of "local" Council of Orthodox Church to elect Patriarch, Council to be attended also by representatives of clergy and laymen of each bishopric.

Meeting also decided to invite to forthcoming Council as honored guests, Universal Patriarch and Archbishop of Constantinople, Benjamin; Patriarch of Antioch and the East, Alexander III; Patriarch of Alexandria, Christopher; Patriarch of Jerusalem, Timothy; and Catholicos of Georgia, Kallistrat.

KENNAN

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<sup>1</sup> Ambassador Harriman had already sent information in telegram 3266, September 1, 1944, about the opening ceremonies of the Theological Institute and Theological Training School at their sites in the old Novodyevichi Monastery at Moscow on June 14, 1944. The speeches here delivered gave "evidence of the role which Orthodox Church is now playing as a servant of the state in furthering patriotism and loyalty to authority and of the corresponding help being furnished church by the government." (861.404/9-144) Earlier in the year a member of the American Embassy had been told by the Metropolitan Nikolay that a higher Theological Institute would have a 2-year course to which graduates of the 10-year schools could come from all over the Soviet Union. When conditions were more suitable, higher institutes might also be set up in Kiev and Leningrad. The lower Theological Training School, with a 3-year course, would take graduates of the 7-year school only from the Moscow oblast (county). In time it was intended to open these lower schools in each oblast center. (861.404/558)

THE KRAVCHENKO CASE: ATTEMPTS BY THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT  
TO OBTAIN HIS DEPORTATION FROM THE UNITED STATES

S61.01B11/153

*The Attorney General (Biddle) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, April 8, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: My attention has been called to the case of Victor A. Kravchenko.<sup>3</sup> While I have made no official check of the man's status, the various newspaper articles concerning him would indicate that, until his alleged resignation from his official capacity with the Russian Government, he was in the United States as a government official serving as a member of the Russian Purchasing Commission and also had some military rank in the Russian Army. A number of inquiries have been made of this office as to whether the man is subject to deportation and also as to whether it would be possible for him to go to some place like Mexico or Cuba rather than be returned to Soviet Russia.

Section 15, as amended,<sup>4</sup> of the Immigration Act of March [May] 26, 1924 (43 Stat. 162-3; 47 Stat. 524-5; 54 Stat. 711; 8 U.S.C. 215), dealing with the maintenance of exempt status of non-immigrants provides, in substance, that the various classes of persons admitted as non-immigrants, including accredited officials of foreign governments, must maintain their status and upon failure to maintain such status shall be subject to deportation. However, the section contains a proviso insofar as government officials are concerned, which proviso reads as follows:

"That no alien who has been, or who may hereafter be, admitted into the United States under clause (1) of section 3, as an official of a foreign government, or as a member of the family of such official, shall be required to depart from the United States without the approval of the Secretary of State."

It would appear from the above quoted section of the law that it would be futile for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to take any action requiring the departure of this, or any other, government official, until it has been ascertained whether the enforced departure of such person meets with the approval of the Secretary of State.

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<sup>3</sup> Kravchenko was born in Dnepropetrovsk in 1905, and had been a member of the Communist party since 1929. He had been educated as an engineer and had been so employed at places in the Soviet Union. He had some military service in the war between August 1941 and March 1942, with rank equivalent to Captain. After being demobilized because of disability, he resumed employment as an engineer, until on August 23, 1943, he took on his duties as "Engineer, Division of Metals," a relatively minor position as a governmental official or employee with the Government Purchasing Commission of the USSR in the United States, in Washington.

<sup>4</sup> By the acts of July 1, 1932, and July 1, 1940.

Inasmuch as the case is so actively receiving the attention of the press and the public, I would appreciate a letter from you indicating your position with regard to this matter.

Sincerely,

FRANCIS BIDDLE

861.01B11/149

*The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Hoover) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1944.

DEAR MR. BERLE: The official English translation of a statement released on the morning of April 7, 1944, by Fedor T. Orekhov, First Secretary and Press Representative of the Soviet Embassy, regarding Viktor Andreevich Kravchenko is as follows:

"The Press Division of the Soviet Union in Washington considers it necessary to give the following explanation in regards to the hostile towards the Soviet Union statements published on April 4 in the *New York Times*<sup>5</sup> and some other newspapers.

"Kravchenko lies stating that he was in charge in the Division of Metals in the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In reality, Kravchenko was neither a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission nor was he in charge of the Metals Division of the Commission.

"Being in Military Service, sent for temporary work at the disposal of the Purchasing Commission in the United States in the capacity of one of the inspectors of pipes, Kravchenko had to return to the Soviet Union to continue his military service. Two weeks before the date of his forthcoming departure to the USSR to serve in the Red Army Kravchenko betrayed his military duties and became a deserter, having refused to return to his motherland for military service. To cover his diversion, he made slanderous statements about the USSR on the pages of certain New York newspapers. The statements of Kravchenko do not require any denial in view of their evidently false character.

Signed, Press Division of the USSR  
April the 7th."

I thought that in view of the representations made by the Soviet Embassy you would be interested in knowing that Viktor Andreevich Kravchenko had informed representatives of this Bureau prior to the release of the foregoing statement that he had served in the Red Army as Captain of an Engineering Battalion from August, 1941 until the Spring of 1942 when he was hospitalized for frozen legs and was dis-

<sup>5</sup> In this article headed "Soviet Official Here Resigns", Kravchenko set forth the motivations for his resignation, and placed himself "under the protection of American public opinion". His attorney, Louis Waldman, of 302 Broadway, New York City, requested in a letter of April 17, 1944, to the Secretary of State that, "in view of the circumstances surrounding his presence here, that he be permitted to remain in the United States and become a resident thereof." (861.01B11/154)

charged under a Soviet Government order because of his engineering experience. He was thereupon, according to his statement, appointed Chief Engineer for thirteen factories in the Moscow district and prior to his assignment to the United States he became Chief of the Section of Engineer Armament for the Council of Peoples' Commissars in Moscow. His duties in the United States were those of an Engineer Inspector of Materials in the Metals Division of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission.

[Here follow two paragraphs which concern the proposed promotion and transfer of Kravchenko to the Bureau of Prices within the Government Purchasing Commission of the USSR in the United States.]

I thought you would also be interested to know that Mr. Kravchenko has expressed his intention of writing a personal letter to the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, informing him of his resignation from the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and his now Stateless status. This letter, according to Kravchenko, will express his loyalty to the United States and his desire to be of any possible assistance to the United States Government.

Sincerely yours,

J. EDGAR HOOVER

86L01B11/153

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 17, 1944.

During his call this afternoon Mr. Bazykin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, said that he believed that Mr. Zubilin<sup>8</sup> had spoken to me about having the registration of Kravchenko as a Soviet official canceled. I repeated what I had said to Mr. Zubilin that if the Soviet Government would send us a short notification to the effect that Kravchenko was no longer a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission or an employee of the Soviet Government, he would be dropped from the registration lists.

Mr. Bazykin then said that he hoped that we would deport Kravchenko. I inquired whether Mr. Bazykin was making a request for such proceedings on behalf of the Soviet Government. He quickly replied "no", he was merely making a personal observation.

I told him that without being familiar with the law on the subject I was sure that the case of Mr. Kravchenko would be considered in conformity with American law and practice in such cases. Of course, if a request for deportation was received from the Soviet Government the matter would be given the most careful consideration, I told him.

<sup>8</sup> Vasily Mikhailovich Zubilin, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

I added as a personal opinion that I understood that in cases of this kind automatic deportation proceedings were not instituted unless the individual in question had committed some act contrary to American law.

Mr. Bazykin did not pursue the matter further beyond reiterating that he was not making any such request.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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861.01B11/150

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

The Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honor to inform him that Victor A. Kravchenko, who was formerly attached to the Government Purchasing Commission of the U.S.S.R. in the United States for temporary work and has filled out the PR-1 form which was submitted to the Department of State on November 1, 1943<sup>9</sup> is no longer connected with the Government Purchasing Commission.

Victor A. Kravchenko, being in military service of the U.S.S.R. has deserted his post.

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1944.

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861.01B11/153

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to Mr. Raymond T. Yingling of the Office of the Legal Adviser*

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1944.

MR. YINGLING: I am sending you a letter from the Attorney General dated April 8 concerning the legal status of the Kravchenko case as well as a memorandum of a conversation which I had on April 17 with Mr. Bazykin of the Soviet Embassy.

Up to the present no official request has been received from the Soviet Embassy for the deportation of Kravchenko, and from the political point of view it would appear inadvisable for the Secretary on his own initiative to suggest that deportation proceedings be instituted against Kravchenko in view of the traditional American doctrine of the right of political asylum.<sup>10</sup> However, since it is possible

<sup>9</sup> The form itself is dated October 15, 1943.

<sup>10</sup> In a later memorandum of May 10, 1944, the Office of the Legal Adviser pointed out that "Generally speaking, this Government does not recognize a so-called right of asylum." (861.01B11/155)

that the Soviet Government may make such a request of this Government I would appreciate having a legal opinion on the law and precedent in such cases.

We have no extradition treaty with the Soviet Union<sup>11</sup> nor any arrangement providing for the return of deserters from our respective armed forces.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

861.01B11/153

*Memorandum by Mr. Richard W. Flournoy of the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1944.

PROPOSED DEPORTATION TO RUSSIA OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO

MR. BOHLEN: There seems to be nothing to show that Kravchenko has committed any offense against the United States which makes him subject to deportation under the Immigration laws. As to the question of his deportation to Russia on account of the recent termination, through his resignation, of his status as a Soviet official, attention is called to the provision of Section 15, Immigration Act of 1924, as amended by the acts of July 1, 1932 and July 1, 1940. This provision is quoted in the second paragraph of the attached letter of April 8, 1944 from the Attorney General.<sup>12</sup> As stated therein, Kravchenko cannot be required to depart from the United States (i.e., on account of the termination of his official status) "without the approval of the Secretary of State".

In his annual message to Congress of December 2, 1851, President Fillmore, referring to the Hungarian patriot, Louis Kossuth said: "This country has been justly regarded as a safe asylum for those whom political events have exiled from their homes in Europe." (6 Moore *Digest of Int. Law* 49) This attitude is reflected in the various extradition treaties to which the United States is a party, which contain provisions, with qualifications in some cases, that there shall be

<sup>11</sup> The Office of the Legal Adviser concluded that the United States had no extradition treaty with the Soviet Union, and that "extradition can only take place where there is a treaty between the United States and the requesting country." Even so, "all the treaties and conventions on extradition to which the United States is a party contain provisions that extradition shall not take place when the offense is of a political nature." The Extradition Convention of March 16/28, 1887, with Imperial Russia was not regarded by the Soviet Union as being in effect. Nevertheless, in article II of that treaty, desertion was not one of the offenses for which a person could be extradited; and furthermore, article III expressly prohibited extradition for "an offense of a political character." The full text is printed in 28 Stat. 1071, and Department of State Treaty Series No. 305.

<sup>12</sup> *Ante*, p. 1224.

no extradition on account of political offenses (4 Moore *Digest of Int. Law*, 332, *et seq*; 4 Hackworth *Digest of Int. Law*, 45 *et seq*.)

The above mentioned policy was followed by this Government after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia when it refrained from deporting white Russians to their own country, even though they were subject to deportation thereto under the laws of the United States.

It is inferred from your memorandum of April 17 that you apprehend that Kravchenko would be punished for political reasons if he should be sent to Russia, and the accounts in the newspapers of his resignation appear to support this belief.

Whether, in view of the above, the Secretary of State should inform the Attorney General, in reply to his letter of April 8, that he does not approve of Kravchenko being required to depart from this Country appears to be a question of policy. Considering the plain language of the law, there seems to be no question as to his authority for so doing.

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861.01B11/153

*The Secretary of State to the Attorney General (Biddle)*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I have received your letter of April 8 concerning the case of Mr. Victor A. Kravchenko, who recently severed his connection with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission. You point out that under Section 15, as amended, of the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924 no alien who has been an official of a foreign government admitted into the United States under clause (1) of section 3 of the Immigration Act "shall be required to depart from the United States without the approval of the Secretary of State". In view of the publicity which the Kravchenko case has received, you request a statement of my position in regard to the matter.

Up to the present the Department of State has merely been notified by the Soviet Embassy that Mr. Kravchenko is no longer in the employ of the Soviet Government and is regarded as a deserter from the Soviet armed forces. As a result of this information from the Soviet Embassy Kravchenko's registry with the Department of State as an official of a foreign government has been canceled. Up to the present, however, the Department of State has received no request from the Soviet Government for his deportation back to the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup>

Under the circumstances therefore, in so far as the Department of State is concerned, there would appear to be no reason for any request

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<sup>13</sup> See *infra*. This letter to the Attorney General appears to have been drafted on April 29, and to have been despatched before receipt of the Soviet *aide-mémoire* dated May 6.



from this Department looking towards his deportation from the United States. Should at some time in the future an official request be received from the Soviet Government for his deportation to the Soviet Union the matter can be considered in the light of such request.

If in your opinion, in view of the circumstances of the case, United States law and practice would appear to require his departure from the United States irrespective of destination, I would of course be glad to give due consideration to your recommendation in the premises.

CORDELL HULL

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861.01B11/155

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*

AIDE-MÉMOIRE <sup>14</sup>

Victor Andreevich Kravchenko, Military engineer of the third rank, inspector of the Government Purchasing Commission of the U.S.S.R. in the United States being in active military service in the Red Army and being temporarily sent to the United States, has deserted in the beginning of April, 1944 having violated the military laws of the U.S.S.R. and his military duty. His crime, deserter Kravchenko has covered up by a slanderous statement <sup>15</sup> trying to give his crime a political coloring and hoping thereby to avoid his extradition as a deserter to the Government of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government expresses confidence that the Government of the United States will agree that such crimes as desertion are especially dangerous under war conditions, and that the fight against them is necessary in the interests of our both Governments. The Soviet Government asks the Government of the United States, taking into consideration the above-mentioned circumstances, to turn Kravchenko over to the Soviet authorities for prosecution [of] him for desertion.

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1944.

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861.01B11/155

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Hackworth) to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1944.

MR. BOHLEN: I am returning the *Aide-Mémoire* of May 6 from the Embassy of the Soviet Union requesting that Victor Kravchenko

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<sup>14</sup> Handed to the Secretary of State on May 7, 1944, by the Soviet Ambassador.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 5, p. 1225.

be turned over to the Soviet authorities for prosecution for desertion, together with a memorandum dated May 10,<sup>16</sup> prepared by Miss Fite.

It will be seen from the attached memorandum that our practice with respect to deporting people to countries in which they might be subjected to harsh treatment has not been entirely uniform. In some cases we have returned them, in other cases we have allowed them to depart from the country to destinations of their own choice, and in still others we have not seen fit to deport them.

Under our own law desertion from the military service in time of war may subject the deserter to the death penalty. It is to be supposed that no less severe penalty may be provided for by the law of the Soviet Union. The *Aide-Mémoire* from the Embassy expresses the confidence of the Soviet Government that we will agree that such offenses as desertion "are especially dangerous under war conditions, and that the fight against them is necessary in the interests of our both Governments".

While desertion is a political or military offense and would not constitute grounds for extradition under our Extradition Treaties, no such exception is made in our laws with respect to deportation, since deportation is supposed primarily to be in the interest of the deporting country and may not ordinarily be drawn upon by the demanding country in lieu of extradition. On the other hand, the precedents and treaties referred to relate to peace-time situations. In times of war greater weight is given to requests of allied governments in matters pertaining to desertion and lesser military offenses. We are now permitted by agreement to exercise jurisdiction over our military personnel in many foreign countries without regard to the gravity of the offense. We also allow certain foreign governments to exercise jurisdiction in the United States over their military personnel, and there is now pending in the Congress a bill designed to give service courts of foreign governments in the United States authority to try members of their forces in this country. The same bill would require assistance of our judicial and administrative officials in apprehending offenders and turning them over to the service courts. We would undoubtedly expect assistance from our allies in reclaiming deserters and, generally speaking, we would reciprocate. We have no agreement with the Soviet Union on this subject and we are, therefore, free to take whatever course we may think proper under all the circumstances.

The case resolves itself into one purely of policy as to how our interests would best be served.

G[REEN] H. H[ACKWORTH]

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<sup>16</sup> Not printed.

861.01B11/156

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*<sup>18</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1944.

I discussed with Ambassador Harriman<sup>19</sup> last night the Kravchenko case. While he thoroughly agrees that the best solution of this matter would be to persuade the Soviet Government to withdraw its request for Kravchenko's deportation, he does not believe that the President should take up the question directly with Stalin.<sup>20</sup> He thinks that at least the first attempt should be made by the Secretary to Gromyko here or in a personal message to Molotov.<sup>21</sup> If it is decided to ask the Soviet Government to withdraw its request, I believe, and Mr. Harriman concurs, that we should at the same time make it clear to Kravchenko that if he is permitted to remain in this country, he cannot engage in any writings or public speeches concerning the Soviet Union, and that if he does so, he will be regarded as having abused the right of asylum which he claims and therefore subject to deportation.<sup>22</sup>

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

861.01B11/152

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] May 23, 1944.

THE SECRETARY: As requested, I have talked to Joe Davies<sup>23</sup> today relative to asking Ambassador Gromyko informally to withdraw the

<sup>18</sup> Addressed to the Secretary of State and to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn).

<sup>19</sup> W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union, temporarily in Washington.

<sup>20</sup> This method of proceeding to obtain the withdrawal of the Soviet request had been expressed in a memorandum of May 17, 1944, from Mr. Bohlen to Mr. Dunn, because "Any attempt to deport Kravchenko will probably be contested by his lawyers on the grounds of the right of political asylum and would undoubtedly provoke strong controversy & criticism of the action of this Government. On the other hand since the Soviet Government officially claims that he is a deserter from their Armed Forces, failure to deport him will undoubtedly be resented as an unfriendly act." (861.01B11/156)

<sup>21</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>22</sup> Reports had reached the Department to the effect that Kravchenko was planning to publish some articles. It was believed to be a good idea that he should in some way be advised unofficially and informally to engage in no polemics against the Soviet Government. His first book, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Officer*, was published in 1946.

<sup>23</sup> Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union during parts of 1937 and 1938. On May 10, at the Soviet Embassy, he had mentioned to Under Secretary of State Stettinius, "that he felt the Kravchenko case was quite important, and he hoped it would not be pressed." (861.01B11/152)

request pertaining to Kravchenko. Mr. Davies stated that he had made this request twice before and had gotten nowhere and he thought it would be useless to ask again. He said if you thought it wise he would be willing to address a personal letter to Stalin on the subject. I urged that he not do this, however, without your agreeing to it.

I finally persuaded Mr. Davies to have another conversation with Ambassador Gromyko in an attempt to get him to withdraw the request, and he has promised to report to you or me again on the matter within the next few days.<sup>24</sup>

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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811.91261/522 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Hamilton) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, May 26, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received May 27—4:02 a. m.]

1893. Embassy's 1892, May 26, 2 p. m.<sup>25</sup> In a conversation with Vyshinski<sup>26</sup> yesterday on the Sulzberg[er] visa case,<sup>27</sup> Vyshinski mentioned that the Soviet Government was requesting the United States Government to return Kravchenko to the Soviet Union. I would appreciate a synopsis of the facts on this case as well as an indication of the Department's views thereon. In my conversation with Vyshinski I obtained the impression that the Foreign Office is quite perturbed over the incident.

HAMILTON

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861.01B11/156

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*<sup>28</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] June 3, 1944.

The Legal Adviser's office has discussed the law and proceedings in the Kravchenko case with officials of the Department of Justice and

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<sup>24</sup> Davies informed Stettinius by telephone on June 2, that he was to have lunch with Ambassador Gromyko, when he would further pursue this matter. He still felt that it might be necessary for him to write a letter before the matter could be effectively handled. (861.01B11/6-244)

<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>27</sup> The Soviet authorities were being dilatory in granting a visa to Cyrus L. Sulzberger, foreign correspondent for the *New York Times*. Vyshinsky had remarked upon the attitude of this newspaper in publishing the remarks of Kravchenko in his "mud slinging campaign" against the Soviet Union. Eventually, after the middle of September, a visa for Sulzberger was promised.

<sup>28</sup> Addressed to the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews; the Legal Adviser, Green H. Hackworth; and the Secretary of State.

the situation is described in the underlying memorandum.<sup>29</sup> In brief the legal position is as follows:

1. We have no extradition treaty with the Soviet Union nor any agreement for the return of deserters from our respective armed forces. It is, therefore, impossible to institute extradition proceedings against Kravchenko on the basis of the Soviet charges that he is a deserter from the armed forces.

2. If you indicate to the Attorney General your approval of such action, deportation proceedings can be instituted against Kravchenko. There is, however, in accordance with our practice the real possibility that the Board of Immigration Appeals will permit Kravchenko to depart from the United States to any country of his choosing and will not uphold the request for his return to the Soviet Union. If the Board of Appeals, however, should support the order of deportation to Russia, Kravchenko's lawyers could through a writ of habeas corpus contest the decision in the courts. Any action in court would obviously give rise to violent public controversy in which unquestionably statements or possibly documentary evidence derogatory of the Soviet Union and damaging to Soviet-U.S. relations would be made public.

There is apparently no certainty under the law that the Soviet request that he be returned to the Soviet Union can be granted, and in any case the institution of deportation proceedings will certainly give rise to very undesirable publicity.<sup>30</sup> It is suggested, therefore, that you may give consideration to calling in the Soviet Ambassador and explaining to him orally the situation under our law and practice, and asking him under the circumstances if his Government would not give consideration to allowing their request for his return to the Soviet Union to lapse.

At the same time you might care to explain to the Ambassador that if Kravchenko should engage in any public or other activity in the United States inimicable to the Soviet Union, he would be regarded by this Government as an undesirable alien and possibly on that basis the question of his deportation would be reopened. You might also care to ask the Ambassador to transmit your observations to Molotov as a personal message from you.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

<sup>30</sup> In conversation on May 27 with Edward J. Shaughnessy, special assistant to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice, Richard W. Flournoy of the Legal Adviser's office explained that the Department of State "would like to find some way to avoid having Kravchenko sent to Russia, and that at the same time it would like to avoid having publicity given to the case." (861.01B11/156)

861.01B11/156

*Memorandum by Mr. G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1944.

MR. CHARLES BOHLEN: AS Mr. Stettinius told you yesterday, and as I told "Doc" Matthews<sup>31</sup> a week or so ago, Mr. Joseph Davies has received a communication on this matter indicating that no action is expected on our part. In view thereof I return to you the file on this matter including the proposed cable to Moscow on the question which we have held pending some word from Mr. Davies.

H. RAYNOR

861.01B11/11-2444

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 24, 1944.

Ambassador Gromyko called this afternoon at his request.

He stated that the purpose of his call was to take up again the question of the deserter, Captain Kravchenko. He told me that he had submitted a communication to Mr. Hull on the 6th of May on this subject and that he had never received an answer and he felt it was now time to follow it up with a further request. He then presented an *aide-mémoire*<sup>32</sup> which was in Russian, and I assured the Ambassador that the subject would receive the Department's most prompt consideration.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

861.01B11/11-2444

*The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State*

[Translation]

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On the 6th of May, 1944, the Soviet Government through its Ambassador in Washington, A. A. Gromyko, requested the Government of the United States to turn over to the Soviet authorities a former receiver of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in the U. S. A., V. A. Kravchenko, who being on active military service in

<sup>31</sup> H. Freeman Matthews.<sup>32</sup> *Infra*.

the Red Army and temporarily in the United States on a service mission, deserted in April of this year, thereby violating his oath, the military laws of the U. S. S. R., and his military duty.

In approaching the Government of the United States in due course with such a request, the Soviet Government was sure that it would meet with full understanding on the part of the American Government since desertion under war conditions is particularly insupportable. However, the decision of this question has been delayed.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to reaffirm the request outlined in the *aide-mémoire* of May 6, 1944, handed by the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R., A. A. Gromyko, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull.

The Soviet Government hopes to receive a quick and favorable answer.

NOVEMBER 24, 1944.

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861.01B/11-2844

*Memorandum by Mr. Richard W. Flournoy of the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1944.

MR. BOHLEN: Since our discussion of this case over the telephone before lunch I have given it further consideration and am obliged to say that I do not see how it is possible for the Secretary of State to avoid the necessity of approving or disapproving the deportation of Kravchenko to Russia, in view of the following proviso to the act of July 1, 1940:

*“Provided, That no alien who has been or who may hereafter be, admitted into the United States under clause (1) of section 3, as an official of a foreign government, or as a member of the family of such official, shall be required to depart from the United States without the approval of the Secretary of State.”*

As I have pointed out in previous memoranda, the deportation of aliens from this country is distinctly a matter for determination under our own domestic law and policy. The Soviet authorities evidently wish to have Kravchenko sent to Russia in order that they may punish him, and presumably they wish to impose the death penalty. Aside from the fact that deportation is distinctly our own business, it appears to me that the sending of this man to Russia for liquidation would be in violation of the principles for which this Government has stood. In this regard see my attached memorandum of April 28, 1944,<sup>33</sup> which Mr. Hackworth initialed.

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<sup>33</sup> *Ante*, p. 1228.

If you wish to return this file, I will take the matter up further with Mr. Hackworth.

P. S. The Secretary might inform the Ambassador that he is not called upon to make a decision unless the Attorney General requests him to do so with reference to the Act of July 1, 1940, but the Ambassador would probably reply asking the Secretary to bring the matter of deportation to the attention of the Attorney General.<sup>34</sup> R. W. F.

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861.01B11/11-2944

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Acting Secretary of State and Mr. Joseph E. Davies, Formerly Ambassador in the Soviet Union*

[WASHINGTON,] November 28, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: Do you remember the case of the deserter that you did a little extra-curricular activity on? They are in again, blasting officially now, saying that their understanding was that we would have a delay until a certain day in November passed and then it could be resumed. My understanding was that they just dropped it for good.

AMB. DAVIES: No. I asked them to do this and to be good enough not to press because I think it is very ill-advisable to press it and that "you will understand if there is no reply forthcoming."

MR. STETTINIUS: Now, they are pressing us again. They put it right bang up to me and wanted to know the answer.

AMB. DAVIES: I had been advised across the street, Pa,<sup>35</sup> that they had to get the answer, that they were clearly in their right under international law, in view of the fact that this man was a deserter. A week ago Gromyko asked me to lunch and brought it up with me. I told him that I hoped he wouldn't bring it up. He said there was no reason to do it, since he had received no instruction but said, "I think that I will be instructed on it."

MR. STETTINIUS: You know they took the position they were very much outraged that it hadn't been done as a voluntary thing.

AMB. DAVIES: Pa told me very definitely, after I had talked with Cordell, that the President said "very well, if they insist on it, of course, we will do it, because it is a case of a deserter from the Army

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<sup>34</sup> In a memorandum on the next day, Mr. Bohlen wrote: "It is not felt that the Department of State should be called upon to instruct Justice what to do in this case, but merely as the law provides to indicate that although he [Kravchenko] was an official he no longer has that status and that therefore the State Department would not object to any action against Kravchenko which the law and practice of the United States dictates in cases of this kind." (861.01B11/11-2944)

<sup>35</sup> Reference is to Maj. Gen. Edwin Martin Watson, Military Aide and Secretary to President Roosevelt at the White House.



violating his oath and naturally we would return him to military authorities because they are our allies." That is the way it stands.

MR. STETTINIUS: Joe, we will talk about it when we see each other.

AMB. DAVIES: I did all I could to delay them off.

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861.01B11/6-244

*The Secretary of State to the Attorney General (Biddle)*

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: I refer to your letter of April 8, 1944 and the Department's reply thereto dated May 6, 1944 regarding the case of Victor A. Kravchenko, who entered the United States as an employee of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and severed his connection with that organization on or about April 3, 1944.

As it was stated in the Department's letter of May 6, the Soviet Embassy has informed the Department that Mr. Kravchenko is no longer connected with the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission and is regarded as a deserter from the Soviet armed forces; and, in turn, Mr. Kravchenko's registry with the Department of State as an official of a foreign government has been cancelled. As far as the Department of State was concerned, at the time its letter of May 6 was addressed to you there appeared to be no reason for raising the question of Mr. Kravchenko's deportation from the United States. On May 6 the Soviet Ambassador addressed a note to the Department requesting the deportation of Mr. Kravchenko as a deserter from active military service in the Soviet Army. Subsequently, as the result of informal conversations, it appeared that the Soviet Government was prepared to let this request lapse for an indefinite period. Therefore, no further action was taken by the Department in this matter. However, the Soviet Ambassador has now submitted an *aide-mémoire*, a translation of which is attached,<sup>36</sup> to the Department renewing the Soviet Government's request for the deportation of Mr. Kravchenko to the Soviet Union.

I desire to point out that since Mr. Kravchenko no longer has the status in this country of an official of a foreign government, the Department of State therefore would have no ground for interposing objection to any legal proceedings which the Department of Justice would find applicable to his case in accordance with United States law and practice.

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<sup>36</sup> *Ante*, p. 1235.

I would appreciate being informed of the action which the Department of Justice proposes to take in this case, in order that I may inform the Soviet Ambassador with regard thereto.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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861.20211 Kravchenko/12-844

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 8, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: I don't know whether Mr. Dunn spoke to you about this or not. When Mr. Davies was in the other day, Mr. Dunn and he and I discussed thoroughly the Kravchenko case, and Mr. Davies said he would be glad to talk with the Attorney General in the premises next week. Both Mr. Dunn and I felt that this might be helpful since Mr. Davies could say things personally and informally to Justice which we could not do officially.

The most we could do officially is what was stated in the letter you signed to the Attorney General,<sup>37</sup> namely that the Department of State has no interest whatsoever in this man and is particularly not attempting in the slightest to protect him based on his former official status. Mr. Davies, however, could privately tell the Attorney General that we would like to have this case disposed of in the most satisfactory manner in accordance with American law and remove a possible bone of contention with the Soviet Government. In other words, privately we would like to see this fellow out of the country.

Mr. Dunn agreed that it might be a good idea to tip off the Attorney General not to reply to our letter until Mr. Davies has had an opportunity to talk with him. You may, therefore, care merely to telephone the Attorney General and tell him that next week Mr. Davies will want to speak to him on the Kravchenko case and to withhold reply until then, without, however, intimating in any way the line Mr. Davies will take.

C. E. BOHLEN

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861.01B11/12-1644

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 16, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called upon me this morning at his request. He stated that it had been three weeks since he had raised with me the question of the alleged deserter, Mr. Kravchenko, and that he was

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<sup>37</sup> Dated December 6, *supra*.

extremely anxious to have a reply. He said he attached the greatest importance to the matter.

I told the Ambassador that the whole situation was being studied and that I would communicate with him promptly.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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811.01B61/12-1844

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, December 18, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I am keeping very much in mind the case of Kravchenko which we have before us. The Department of Justice is working on the matter.

A preliminary investigation by the Legal Section of the Department of State reveals that the question of the deportation of Kravchenko falls within the provisions of the domestic laws of the United States in the absence of any treaty of extradition or any special agreement between our two countries covering cases of this character. You can thus understand that the Executive Branch can only act in accordance with and under the authority of the pertinent laws of the United States.

I am making every effort to have the Department of Justice expedite its consideration of the case and am confident that I will be able to give you further information on this matter in the near future. In the meantime I would be grateful if you would communicate the foregoing preliminary information to your Government.

Sincerely yours,

[File copy not signed]

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861.20211/12-2644

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 26, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador, Andrei Gromyko, called upon me this afternoon at his request.

Ambassador Gromyko stated he wished to talk to me about the Victor Kravchenko matter, which he had raised several times before and on which his Government was very anxious to receive an answer.

The Ambassador said that he had come to see me two weeks ago and had not yet received an answer. I reminded him that we had given him a note on this subject a week ago,<sup>38</sup> and he said, "Yes, but

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<sup>38</sup> *Supra.*

this note did not say anything." I advised the Ambassador that we had this matter very much in mind, I was giving it my personal attention, and there was nothing I could say to him this afternoon that could be helpful, but at the moment we were able to make a statement to him, I should communicate with him promptly.

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**ARRANGEMENTS RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT AND RECIPROCAL REPATRIATION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNED CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY ALLIED FORCES**

762.61114/7-1344

*The Chargé of the Soviet Union (Kapustin) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On instructions of the Soviet Government I have the honor to bring to your attention the following.

On July 9, 1944 a representative of the staff of General Eisenhower<sup>39</sup> has made at the press conference in London an extremely ambiguous statement regarding Soviet prisoners of war in the German Army. In this statement, the text of which I am enclosing herewith, is contained a number of improbable and evidently fictitious data, concerning Soviet citizens in military service, drawn, apparently, from German sources.

Arises a lawful question, what common Allied interests could have prompted such a statement, defaming Soviet people and casting a shade on Soviet citizens in military service who found themselves in German captivity?

The Soviet Government considers such a statement of a representative of the staff of the Supreme Command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces inadmissible. The Soviet Government hopes that the Government of the United States will give due consideration to this statement.

Sincerely yours,

A. KAPUSTIN

[Annex]

**TEXT OF STATEMENT**

"The Russians are serving in the German Army. Here is a typical example how the Russian soldiers are forced to join the German service:

A prisoner of war was a Sergeant in the Red Army. He was taken prisoner in the Viazma region in 1941. Soon after that he escaped and

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<sup>39</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.

in the course of two years was in the ranks of the Second Partisan Division.

In May, 1943 he was again taken prisoner and sent to Germany. On November 1, 1943 he was informed that he is a participant of the "Russian Army of Liberation",<sup>40</sup> and then he was sent to the coast of the English Channel as a soldier in the contingent of the Eastern Battalion. In most of the cases the personnel of these battalions is insufficiently trained to handle German arms. In one case it was found that Russian machine-gunners could not take apart and put together again their weapons. German corporals are treating the Soviet soldiers with contempt and insult them. The soldiers of the Eastern Battalion have shot some of their German corporals a few days before the Allied invasion. The Germans have suffered complete failure in their efforts to impress the Soviet soldiers with their doctrines with the aid of propaganda and other measures. The majority of these soldiers have preserved untouched their moral principles and political views, and they consider themselves as citizens of the U.S.S.R.

The chief mass of the Russian soldiers in German service, while they were in the Russian Army fought good but the fact that they have shown themselves badly in the West, proves their anti-Nazi feelings. Approximately 10 per cent of the Russians in service of the Germans may be considered as pro-German and consider that they joined the German Army at their own free will. In respect to the former officers of the Red Army, serving now as officers in the German Army, this percentage should be considered as somewhat higher. Recently Hitler issued an order, fully equalizing in rights these officers with the officers of the regular German Army. The staff of the "Eastern Troops" has worked out a complicated mechanism, the duties of which are to return dissatisfied Soviet soldiers to the camps under the control of the SS-troops.<sup>41</sup> This return to camps is considered as an extremely severe punishment, and such it is. Hunger plays the part of the most important factor for recruiting of former Soviet soldiers into the "Russian Army of Liberation" and into a number of other Eastern legions. Mess-halls in the camps for Soviet prisoners of war have sold to hungry soldiers human flesh—

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<sup>40</sup> The Russian Army of Liberation (R.O.A.) originally in 1943 contained units of Russian prisoners of war opposed to Communism which had been integrated into the German Army. This army became directly associated with anti-Communist, anti-Stalin movement led by Lt. Gen. Andrey Andreyevich Vlasov only toward the end of 1944. Some battalions had been sent to France for work with the Todt organization, a military construction unit, auxiliary to the German Army named after its founder, the engineer Fritz Todt. As members of the Todt organization, these units eventually fought against the Allied invasion in Germany.

<sup>41</sup> Schutzstaffel, the elite corps of the Nazi Party, used for military and police purposes.

corpses of dead prisoners. In other camps the procedure of receipt of food was not quite as good organized and the prisoners simply were lined up at a corpse of their dead comrade—prisoner of war—in order to receive their share.

In the beginning of 1942 the Russians, who were willing to go over into German service, were organized into separate battalions. In the contingent of these detachments they spent more than two years. At first these detachments were organized only so as to fight in their motherland, i.e. the Georgians would have fought on the territory of Georgia, and the Azerbaidzhanians for Azerbaidzhan. However, these soldiers went through a number of deportation and training stations and, finally, were assigned to field detachments at the Eastern front. In certain cases the field detachments were included in the contingent of army corps or groupings. The Russian battalions were used to fight against the guerillas, on communication lines. But many battalions joined the guerilla detachments. Other battalions fought together with German detachments at the front line but also in this case some of them tried to join the Red Army.”

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762.61114/8-244

*The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1944.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I wish to refer to your letter of July 18, 1944 <sup>42</sup> requesting information for use in replying to a note from the Soviet Embassy, <sup>43</sup> in which it is stated that on July 9, 1944 a representative of General Eisenhower's staff at a press conference in London made a statement, the text of which was inclosed, regarding Soviet prisoners of war in the German Army which the Soviet Government considers inadmissible.

General Eisenhower has informed me that no statement with reference to Soviet prisoners of war has been made by any of his staff officers at any press conference. On the date in question, July 9, individuals present have assured him that no reference to Soviet Russia was made. That particular conference had to do with ordnance matters. General Eisenhower adds that news stories in substantially the tenor of the statement forwarded by the Soviet Embassy were filed from Normandy by Associated Press and United Press war correspondents. These stories were passed by SHAEF <sup>44</sup> censorship since security was not involved.

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<sup>42</sup> Not printed.

<sup>43</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>44</sup> Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

I am entirely willing to take further action on this matter if the Soviet Government is able to furnish additional information as a basis therefor.<sup>45</sup>

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

711.62114/7-2944

*The Chief of the Special War Problems Division (Keeley) to the Assistant Provost Marshal General (Bryan)*

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1944.

MY DEAR GENERAL BRYAN: I have received your letter of July 29, 1944,<sup>46</sup> with regard to Soviet personnel captured with German para-military units.

After consultation with other sections of the Department of State concerned with this matter, I am able to inform you that they join me in concurring with the recommendations of the subcommittee of the Combined Administrative Committee,<sup>47</sup> a copy of which was enclosed with your letter under reference.

I have received from the British Embassy under cover of a letter from Mr. Gore-Booth,<sup>48</sup> paraphrases of the telegrams from the British Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, copies of which were also enclosed with your letter. Mr. Gore-Booth stated in his letter that the British Foreign Office was going ahead with arrangements forthwith but that the Embassy had been asked to inform the Department of this action. He added that the British Government would be grateful to know, in this connection, if the practice followed by the United States Government in dealing with this problem diverges substantially from that outlined in the Foreign Office's telegrams.

For your further information, in this connection, I enclose a copy of the reply<sup>49</sup> to Mr. Gore-Booth's letter under reference.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES H. KEELEY, JR.

<sup>45</sup> In a letter of August 24, 1944, the Secretary of State communicated the above information to the Soviet Ambassador, Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko.

<sup>46</sup> Not printed.

<sup>47</sup> These recommendations were: (1) Soviet personnel captured with German para-military units should be categorized as prisoners of war; (2) their treatment should be governed by the requirements of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva, July 27, 1929; (3) Soviet authorities should be offered an opportunity to take over such personnel as they find acceptable for incorporation into the Soviet forces; and (4) dealings with the Soviet authorities on this subject should be through military channels and any screening should be done in the United States or Great Britain and not in Normandy.

<sup>48</sup> Not printed; the letter was written July 27, 1944, by Mr. Paul H. Gore-Booth, First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, to Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey of the Special War Problems Division.

<sup>49</sup> The reply of August 7, 1944, written by Bernard Guffer, the Assistant Chief of the Special War Problems Division, is not printed.

711.62114/8-1244

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to a memorandum dated July 27, 1944, from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics<sup>50</sup> concerning seventeen prisoners of war at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia, who are said to be Soviet citizens. The Embassy requested permission to have a representative visit Camp Patrick Henry to interview these prisoners of war.

This request has received consideration and the Embassy is informed that the United States military authorities will welcome the visit to Camp Patrick Henry of a representative of the Soviet Embassy to interview these prisoners in the presence of an American officer. In order that proper arrangements may be made at Camp Patrick Henry for the reception of a representative of the Soviet Embassy it would be appreciated if the date and time of the proposed visit would be communicated in advance to Mr. Bernard Guffer, Extension 2080, Department of State. It would further be appreciated if this information would be communicated to Mr. Guffer well in advance of the departure of the Soviet representative for the camp in order that arrangements may be made for a date and time for the visits mutually convenient to the Embassy and the American military authorities.<sup>51</sup>

WASHINGTON, August 23, 1944.

711.71114A/9-444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 4, 1944—midnight

[Received September 4—11:59 p. m.]

3298. ReDeptel 2081, August 30.<sup>52</sup> On August 20, pursuant to instructions received by General Deane<sup>53</sup> I addressed a letter to Molotov<sup>54</sup> in which I submitted definite proposals regarding:

1. The working out of advanced plans for the prompt return of American or Soviet prisoners of war;

<sup>50</sup> Memorandum not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Nine of these Soviet nationals were accepted by their Government for service in the Red Army and were returned to the Soviet Union in September 1944.

<sup>52</sup> Not printed.

<sup>53</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>54</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.



2. Exchange of intelligence regarding the location of prisoner of war camps in hostile territory;

3. Sending of American or Soviet officers to such camps which come under control of our respective armies, and

4. The reporting by names of individuals or small groups claiming Soviet or American nationality who may be apprehended by or surrender to our respective military authorities in order that the claims may be investigated and arrangements made for their prompt evacuation.

My letter also requested Soviet assistance in connection with the planned evacuation to Istanbul of American prisoners of war who have been released in Bucharest.

General Deane is also taking up this general question with the Soviet military authorities.

HARRIMAN

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711.62114/9-944

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: In connection with the development of military operations in Europe, Soviet citizens are falling into the hands of the Allied Command, the majority of whom were taken by force into Germany and countries occupied by her, by the German usurpers. The Soviet Government considers that all these Soviet citizens should be returned to the Soviet Union at the earliest opportunity. The Soviet Government counts on the extension of full cooperation by the American military authorities to the Soviet representatives attached to the Allied Headquarters in the Mediterranean region as well as to the members of the Military Mission of the USSR in England, who have been entrusted with the task of repatriating the Soviet citizens mentioned. The Soviet Government would be very grateful to the Government of the United States for the extension of the necessary cooperation in the repatriation to the Soviet Union of the Soviet citizens mentioned, particularly those of them who, after falling into the hands of the Allied Armies in Europe, have been sent to England, the U.S.A. and Canada together with other prisoners. The Soviet Government would be very grateful also for making transportation available for the repatriation of these Soviet citizens to the USSR.

Very truly yours,

A. GROMYKO

711.62114/9-1244

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State  
(Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 12, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador took occasion to discuss with me at Dumbarton Oaks<sup>55</sup> today the question of Russian prisoners in American hands. He pointed out that there were a number of Russians who had been captured by the Germans and forced into the service of the German Army to perform various duties, such as working in kitchens and performing manual labor. Many of these Russians had been captured by our forces in North Africa, Italy and France, and a number of them had been brought to the United States as German prisoners of war. Some of them are said to have attempted to communicate with the Soviet Embassy but their mail had not been allowed to be delivered.

The Ambassador stated that in recent months arrangements had been made for six or eight of these Russians to be returned to the Soviet Union. Recently he had heard there were a number of Russian prisoners in a camp in West Virginia and he had arranged for Mr. Bazykin, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, to visit the camp and talk with the Russian prisoners there. Mr. Bazykin had learned they were not being well treated, were receiving literature critical of the Soviet Union and in some cases were being asked to remain permanently in the United States. The Ambassador stated that his Government was very disturbed and he hoped the entire matter would be looked into and he hoped some arrangement could be established under which the Soviet Embassy in Washington might regularly receive such information as the number of prisoners in the United States and where they were located. He hoped the Embassy might be kept currently informed as additional prisoners arrived.

I assured the Ambassador we would look into the entire matter immediately and would communicate with him as promptly as possible.

E[WARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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711.62114/9-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944—8 p. m.

2212. There have been taken by the forces operating in France under the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force a number of Soviet citizens or nationals possibly including Russians not of So-

<sup>55</sup> For correspondence on the conference held at Dumbarton Oaks, August 21-October 7, 1944, see vol. I, pp. 713 ff.

viet nationality who were found serving in the organization Todt or in other German military or semi-military bodies.

This Government has laid down the following policy with regard to claimants to Allied nationality found among German prisoners of war taken by American forces:

1. So long as they remain in American custody they continue to have the status of German prisoners of war and to enjoy treatment in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.<sup>56</sup>

2. Provided that they are able to satisfy appropriate representatives of the Government to which they claim allegiance and provided that these Governments are willing to remove them from the United States or from the custody and responsibility of the American military authorities they may be released to the service of the Government to which they claim allegiance. None of those so released are permitted to remain in American territory. In order to avoid the risk of reprisals against American nationals in enemy hands no persons taken as German prisoners of war have been delivered to Allied Governments against their wills.

In accordance with this policy, which has been made known to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, reDepins 13, December 13, 1943,<sup>57</sup> representatives of the Embassy have interviewed a number of Soviet citizens found among German prisoners of war held by the United States. Upon the request of the prisoners and of the Soviet Embassy, the prisoners have been released to the Soviet authorities on board ships of Soviet registry for transport to Soviet ports.

Arrangements between American and Allied authorities for the handling of the cases of such persons have been made and continue being made through military channels. The case of the Soviet citizens or Russians captured in France has, however, been taken up by the British authorities with the Soviet authorities through the diplomatic channel. Notes with regard to this matter have been addressed by the British Foreign Office to the Soviet Embassy at London. It has also been the subject of telegraphic instructions addressed by the Foreign Office to its Embassy in Moscow under dates of July 19 and August 19. It is understood that the British Embassy in Moscow has copies of the notes addressed to the Soviet Ambassador in London.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> The international convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva July 27, 1929, *Foreign Relations*, 1929, vol. 1, p. 336.

<sup>57</sup> Not printed.

<sup>58</sup> Fedor Tarasovich Gusev.

In view of the circumstance that the British Government had taken up this matter with the Soviet Government through the diplomatic channel, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have requested the Department<sup>59</sup> to approach the Soviet Government with regard to it and have so informed the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have established the following policy with regard to the personnel in question :

1. They will continue for the present to be treated in all respects as prisoners of war in accordance with the Prisoners of War Convention.

2. None of them will be handed over to any Allied authorities except by arrangements between Governments concerned or unless they have been found to be suitable for incorporation in their national forces or for formation into units for labor purposes.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff state that in establishing this policy they have envisaged that Allied authorities may press strongly for the transfer of such persons to them for purposes of trial and punishment and that the purpose of this policy is to avoid risk of reprisals.

You are requested to approach the Soviet Government with a view to ascertaining that Government's desire regarding the disposition to be made of those of the persons in question who may claim to be Soviet citizens or nationals. You will probably find it advisable before making your approach to the Soviet authorities to consult your British colleague<sup>60</sup> and to coordinate your efforts with his. The Department realizes that the matter is an extremely delicate one involving as it does: 1. This Government's treaty rights and obligations with regard to its own nationals in enemy hands and to persons taken by it as enemy prisoners of war, 2. The nationals of an Allied Power some of whom may resist return to the control of that Power and, 3. The possibility of reprisal against American nationals in enemy hands.

In view of these circumstances, the Department naturally expects that you will use your widest discretion in the handling of this matter. The Department would appreciate being kept informed currently of the developments with regard to it and would be especially grateful for an early report of any information you can obtain from your British colleague concerning his experiences with regard to this matter.

HULL

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<sup>59</sup> This request was made in a letter to the Secretary of State by Adm. William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, August 28, 1944 (711.62114/8-2844).

<sup>60</sup> Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

711.62114/9-1644 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 16, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 8:26 p. m.]

411. According to information received at AFHQ<sup>61</sup> from War Office in London an agreement has now been reached with Soviet Government for repatriation of Soviet citizens now or in future held as prisoners of war in Mid East irrespective of whether the individuals desire to return to Russia or not. Statements will not be taken from Soviet nationals in future as to their willingness to return to their native country. Mid East has received instructions from London to implement this agreement and arrange as soon as possible for transfer of these persons to Tehran. Macmillan<sup>62</sup> is apparently receiving instructions to this effect from the Foreign Office.

KIRK

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711.62114/9-1744 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 17, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received September 18—3:34 p. m.]

428. Reference my 411, September 16, 9 a. m. I assume Department is considering advisability of assuring itself of the nature of methods which may be applied in compelling those Russian prisoners of war, who under previous arrangements were given option of retaining prisoner of war status, to return to Russia, especially in view of fact that I understand some were taken by our forces and delivered to British under arrangement whereunder that option prevailed.<sup>63</sup>

Sent Department, repeated Moscow as 17.

KIRK

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<sup>61</sup> Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>62</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>63</sup> In airgram A-13, September 17, 1944, Mr. Kirk reported that in Italy American forces had captured and turned over to the British 4 officers and 3754 enlisted men from the German Army who claimed Russian nationality. In southern France 2 officers and 2682 enlisted men claiming Russian nationality had been captured by American forces. (711.62114/9-1744)

711.71114A/9-2144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)* <sup>64</sup>

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1944—6 p. m.

2255. Please express to the Soviet Government the appreciation of the Government of the United States for the assistance rendered by Soviet military authorities in arranging for the evacuation of American prisoners of war held by the enemy in the Balkan countries. Special assistance was given in the evacuation of American airmen from the vicinity of Ploesti by General Burenin who was most cooperative.

HULL

711.62114/9-2344

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 24, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called at his request and handed me a document in Russian, a translation of which is attached which he said related to the delivery to Soviet Russia of certain Russian prisoners captured in Europe by the Allied forces from Germany. He said they were being mistreated by the Allies in different ways and that some were being reenlisted in the Allied forces. I said to him that my country had twelve million men of its own enlisted and had no earthly use for any additional soldiers and that in any event there could be no motive on the part of the Allies either to acquire these Russian prisoners first taken by Germany to do forced labor or military service and that I cannot understand the reports which his government has received. I said there is difficulty in identifying persons of different nationalities and also in determining what an individual in many cases may have been doing, whether he has in fact played with the Germans either under compulsion or otherwise, et cetera. I said that in any event I would pass this on to the proper military officials and urge early and favorable action. I earnestly requested his Government to supply any possible information.

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

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<sup>64</sup> This telegram was in response to a request from the Office of Strategic Services forwarded to the Department by Mr. Kirk in telegram No. 339, September 9, 1944, from Caserta. Officials of the Office of Strategic Services in Bucharest had asked that a message of appreciation be sent to the Soviet Government for assistance rendered by the Red Army in evacuating American prisoners from the Ploesti region. (711.71114A/9-944)

[Annex—Translation]

*The Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Gromyko) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] September 23, 1944.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to bring the following to your attention.

As the Allied armies progress on the European continent, the number of Soviet citizens freed from the yoke of Hitler Germany continues to increase. With reference thereto there arises the problem of the speedy regulation of questions connected with the presence of the above-mentioned Soviet citizens on territories which are under the control of the Allies and also the problem of the organization of their speedy return to their country.

Practice has shown that the attitude of certain Allied authorities to freed Soviet citizens is characterized by a whole series of irregularities. Thus at times freed Soviet citizens are considered as prisoners of war and there is established for them a regime at times even more severe than for German prisoners of war. The legal and material conditions in which freed Soviet citizens find themselves are in a number of cases unsatisfactory. There are cases of propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union in the camps in which freed Soviet citizens are placed. Attempts are made to recruit freed Soviet citizens for foreign military units. A certain number of freed Soviet citizens by the unilateral decision of the Allied authorities were sent from Europe to Canada and Africa. Certain other irregularities have also occurred.

The Soviet Union considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to all the above-stated facts which correspond neither to the tenets of international law nor even less to the spirit of Allied sentiments. In this connection, [the Soviet Government]<sup>65</sup> expresses the firm conviction that the Government of the United States of America will take immediate and effective measures to prevent similar facts in the future. The Soviet Government expects that the authorities of the United States will immediately issue the following instructions:

1. That freed Soviet citizens will be regarded by all authorities not as prisoners of war but as free citizens of an Allied power.
2. That all authorities without delay will inform the appropriate Soviet diplomatic representatives or those designated by them concerning all Soviet citizens on liberated territory and will assure the Soviet diplomatic representatives or those designated by them free access to these citizens.

<sup>65</sup> Brackets appear in the file translation.

3. That freed Soviet citizens will be assured normal conditions of existence (living quarters, food, medical assistance, et cetera).

4. That the assignment of freed Soviet citizens for work will be made with the knowledge and consent of the Soviet diplomatic representatives or of those designated by them with the guarantee of normal conditions of existence and work.

5. That the transfer of freed Soviet citizens from Europe to other parts of the world will not be permitted without the knowledge and consent of Soviet diplomatic representatives.

6. That propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union among freed Soviet citizens will be categorically forbidden.

7. That the recruitment of freed Soviet citizens for foreign armed forces will not take place.

8. That all necessary measures will be taken for the facilitation of the most speedy return of freed Soviet citizens to their country.

The Soviet Government would appreciate it if the Government of the United States of America will inform it of the measures undertaken in regard to this question.

Accept [etc.]

A. GROMYKO

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711.62114/9-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, September 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received September 24—5:18 p. m.]

3652. ReDept's 2212, September 15, 8 p. m. The only action taken by the British Embassy in Moscow with respect to Soviet nationals captured while serving in German military or semi-military organizations has been to press the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for a prompt reply to a note addressed by the British Foreign Office to the Soviet Embassy in London regarding Russians captured in France and evacuated to the United Kingdom. The British Embassy here has been informed that a reply has been made in London but does not know what was said in it.

The British Ambassador has received a copy of a telegram dated September 14 from the Foreign Office to the British Resident Minister in Cairo in which Lord Moyne<sup>66</sup> was informed that so far as the Middle East was concerned all Soviet nationals held there as prisoners of war would be delivered to the Soviet authorities whether the individuals concerned desired to be repatriated or not.

In these circumstances I have made no approach to the Soviet Government on the subject since I assume the Department will first wish

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<sup>66</sup>Walter Edward Guinness, First Baron Moyne, British Deputy Minister of State in Cairo.



to obtain information concerning the Soviet-British negotiations in London and to give consideration to the implications of the British decision on policy in the Middle East which has probably been communicated to the Russians by this time.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile I would appreciate further enlightenment as to the exact nature of the policies established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff which is not clear to me from the Department's telegram. Does this mean that the Combined Chiefs propose to have Russians taken as German prisoners delivered to the Soviet authorities against their will. If so what is the meaning of their statement that the purpose of their policy is to avoid risk of reprisals.<sup>68</sup> If not how does the British Government come to instruct its Middle East command to deliver prisoners of war to the Soviet authorities whether they desire to be repatriated or not.

HARRIMAN

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711.62114/9-1244

*The Department of State to the Embassy of the Soviet Union*

MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Ambassador on September 12 informed the Under Secretary orally that he had learned that among the German prisoners of war held in the United States there were several who claimed Soviet citizenship. Pursuant to the Ambassador's request the various points brought up in his conversation have been investigated with the following results.

The records of the United States Army concerning German prisoners of war who claim nationality other than German are based on the statements of the prisoners themselves. Whenever such a prisoner indicates that he is a citizen of one of the United Nations, every facility is given him to communicate with the diplomatic representative

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<sup>67</sup> On September 26, 1944, Mr. Gore-Booth of the British Embassy transmitted to Mr. Bernard Gufer of the Special War Problems Division a memorandum prepared by the British military authorities in Washington. This memorandum reported that the British and Soviet negotiators had reached agreement on the treatment of Soviet nationals who were in prisoner of war camps in Great Britain. It was agreed that release of these individuals "should be contingent upon enlistment in the Russian forces in the United Kingdom." Since it was anticipated that the great majority would volunteer for service with the Russian forces, "it was felt that a final decision as to whether we should insist on the voluntary principle would have to await events. The matter could be reconsidered if any substantial numbers refused to volunteer." (740.62114/9-2744)

<sup>68</sup> The same British memorandum of September 26 also stated: "Above all, however, we have been influenced by the fact that when the Soviet overruns Germany they are almost certain to come across a number of our prisoners of war whom, naturally, we want properly treated. It is felt very strongly in London that the treatment of our men in Germany will depend very largely upon the way in which the Russians are treated in the United Kingdom."

of his country in the United States. Several such communications have already been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy by the Department. Whenever the diplomatic mission is interested in having one of its representatives interrogate the prisoners in order to verify their claims, the Department makes the necessary arrangements with the military authorities for such visit.

The Army records are not kept in such a way as to make it possible to give the Soviet Embassy a list of all German prisoners of war of Soviet citizenship. However, all German prisoners of war who claim Soviet citizenship are free to communicate with the Soviet Embassy.

In accordance with the terms of the Geneva Convention, prisoners of war enjoy the same standard of food, lodging and medical care as the members of the armed forces of the United States. The Department believes, therefore, that all prisoners of war are adequately cared for but will, of course, be glad to investigate any specific instance of ill treatment which the Ambassador may care to bring to its attention.

In regard to the reports that some of the prisoners visited by a representative of the Soviet Embassy staff were receiving literature critical of the Soviet Union, it should be pointed out that regulations in force in all internment camps permit prisoners of war to receive all current newspapers and magazines of wide circulation published in the English language in the United States. It is possible that since these publications, in accordance with the traditional free press policy of the United States, express divergent views on current subjects, some of them may have contained material which was not entirely favorable to all aspects of Soviet policy.

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1944.

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711.62114/8-2844

*The Secretary of State to Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1944.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL LEAHY: I refer to your letter of August 28, 1944,<sup>69</sup> setting forth the policy established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff with regard to claimants of Soviet nationality found among German prisoners of war taken by American forces, and enclose for your consideration the Russian texts, together with English translations, of two notes dated September 9 and September 23, 1944, from the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.<sup>70</sup> These notes concern the repatriation to the Soviet Union of such personnel

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<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> *Ante*, pp. 1246 and 1252, respectively.

and the problem of the regulation of questions connected with their presence on territories under Allied control.

I also enclose a copy of the Department's memorandum of September 27, 1944, to the Soviet Ambassador <sup>71</sup> in reply to certain questions raised by him in a conversation with the Under Secretary of State on September 12, 1944.<sup>72</sup> There are further enclosed a paraphrase of telegram no. 2212 dated September 15, 1944, which was transmitted to the American Ambassador at Moscow <sup>73</sup> in compliance with the recommendations made in your letter under reference and a paraphrase of telegram no. 3652 of September 24, 1944, from the American Ambassador at Moscow <sup>74</sup> in reply thereto.

It will be noted that in the telegram of September 24, the American Ambassador at Moscow raises certain questions concerning the policy established by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and states that he has not approached the Soviet Government in the matter since he assumes that the Department will desire to secure information concerning the British-Soviet negotiations at London and to consider the implications of the British policy in the Middle East. The British Embassy at Washington has been requested to furnish the Department with information regarding the British-Soviet negotiations in London concerning Soviet citizens who were evacuated to the United Kingdom after they had been captured in France. As soon as such information is received it will be transmitted to you.

I am not replying to the notes of the Soviet Ambassador on the basis of the information set forth in your letter of August 28 since they raise considerations to which your letter does not refer. I should appreciate receiving an expression of your views concerning the several matters referred to in the notes of the Soviet Ambassador and with regard to the questions raised in the telegram of September 24 from the American Ambassador at Moscow in order that appropriate replies may be made to those communications.

In view of the political complications involved in this problem, I suggest that it might be useful if representatives of the Department of State might be included in whatever subcommittee of the Combined Administrative Committee you may set up or have set up to make recommendations on this matter. In this connection I understand that the British Joint Chiefs have informed the British Embassy of

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<sup>71</sup> *Supra.*

<sup>72</sup> See memorandum of September 12, p. 1247.

<sup>73</sup> *Ante*, p. 1247.

<sup>74</sup> *Ante*, p. 1253.

their intention to recommend the inclusion in the subcommittee of representatives of the Embassy.<sup>75</sup>

Sincerely yours,

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

711.62114/10-744 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, October 7, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received October 7—9:32 p. m.]

670. Re my 411, September 16, 9 a. m. Macmillan's office has informed us that information has been received from British Foreign Office stating that despite terms of Geneva Convention it is not possible for a soldier captured by his own forces while he is serving (willingly or unwillingly) with enemy forces to claim protection of Convention vis-à-vis his own Government. Foreign Office added that if such a man is captured by an Allied Force, the Allied Government has a right to deliver him unconditionally to his own Government without being held responsible for violation of Convention. Foreign Office stated that in any event, Moscow Government has requested the men to be sent back to Soviet Union for furtherance of war effort or for further service with Red Army and since these men will no longer be treated as prisoners, the Geneva Convention will no longer apply.

Sent Department, repeated Moscow as 38.

KIRK

711.62114/10-1144

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

The Soviet Military Mission in the United Kingdom requested early in September that all Soviet nationals who had been captured in German uniforms or serving in Todt organisations and held as prisoners of war in the United Kingdom, should be released from prisoner of war status and treated as members of the Soviet forces; and the

<sup>75</sup> In a telephone conversation on September 29, 1944, Mr. Paul Gore-Booth of the British Embassy informed Mr. Bernard Guffler of the Special War Problems Division that the British military authorities in Washington were recommending to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that representatives of the Department of State and the British Embassy be included on the sub-committee dealing with the question of Soviet nationals taken as German prisoners of war. He remarked that the British hoped that the Department would refer matters relating to this question to the Combined Chiefs of Staff "in such a way as not to start combined military agencies working without coordination with the diplomatic side." (711.62114/9-2944)

Mission suggested further that, pending their repatriation to the U.S.S.R., they be organised under Soviet officers in companies and platoons to work in the interest of the British war effort until shipping was available.

2. His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to these proposals subject to the following points:

(a) Release from prisoner of war status would be conditional on enrolment and actual service in Soviet forces in the United Kingdom. No person who has been enrolled may be discharged in the United Kingdom from the Soviet forces,

(b) Any individual whose liberty in the United Kingdom might endanger British security would remain a prisoner of war pending repatriation to U.S.S.R.,

(c) Individuals would carry identity cards and be restricted to 5 miles radius from camps,

(d) Formal agreement covering the exercise of jurisdiction and discipline by Soviet officers in United Kingdom would be concluded in similar terms to those agreed with other Allied Governments; and would issue an order under the Allied Forces Act of 1940 in order to put the agreement into effect.

3. The Soviet Military Mission has been informed of this decision and a draft agreement is being prepared which when ready will be handed to the Soviet Ambassador for submission to his Government.

4. Subsequent to the decision referred to above, the Foreign Office received from the Soviet Embassy in London a Note which is apparently identical with the one received by the State Department<sup>76</sup> in which the Soviet Government protested strongly against the "mis-treatment" of Russians captured by the Allies and requested speedy action along certain lines.

5. The Foreign Office is at present considering what reply should be returned to the Soviet Embassy's note, and feel that it will probably be necessary to refute their arguments and criticisms and to press the Soviet Government to agree to the Allied Forces Act procedure which will give them substantially all they want and more. As soon as an order under the Allied Forces Act is made, the position of these Soviet nationals would be analogous to that of other Allied Forces (apart from United States forces) in the United Kingdom. His Majesty's Government are very anxious to adopt this procedure as there is not enough accommodation in the United Kingdom to hold all Soviet nationals (now numbering about 14000) as prisoners under British guard.

6. It had been hoped that the new proposal to change the status of these Soviet nationals into that of Allies by making an order under the Allied Forces Act, would meet the wishes of the Soviet Govern-

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<sup>76</sup> Dated September 23, p. 1252.

ment, especially as the Soviet Military Mission appeared to agree. The attitude of the Soviet Embassy now appears doubtful though it is not yet known whether this may be due to their not having fully understood the proposal and the advantage of making such an Order.

7. His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow was instructed on September 29th to convey His Majesty's Government's proposals to the Soviet Government.

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1944.

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711.62114/10-944

*Memorandum by Mr. Bernard Guster of the Special War Problems Division to the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 17, 1944.

MR. BOHLEN: I refer to the memorandum dated October 11, 1944, of Mr. Bailey's conversation with officers of the War and Navy Departments concerning the treatment to be accorded Russian nationals held as German prisoners of war in this country. A copy of Mr. Bailey's memorandum was sent to you and a second copy is attached hereto for your ready reference.<sup>77</sup>

I have now received a copy of the proposed reply to the Department referred to in Mr. Bailey's memorandum. It is Appendix "C" of the attached papers.<sup>78</sup> The proposed reply is substantially the same as the one Colonel Bernays dictated in Mr. Bailey's presence with the exception of the paragraph concerning the labor to be performed by the prisoners of war.<sup>79</sup> The new paragraph concedes somewhat more to the Soviet Government than the old one.

The new policy toward Soviet nationals differs from the policy hitherto followed with regard to them and with the policy which it is proposed to continue to follow with regard to other Allied nationals. The most notable difference is that no persons claimed by other Allied Governments are delivered to the custody of those Governments against their wills. The adoption of this new policy towards the Soviets will result in the delivery to the Soviet authorities of persons hitherto withheld from them because they were unwilling to return to the Soviet Union.

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<sup>77</sup> Not printed.

<sup>78</sup> None printed.

<sup>79</sup> In this version the Soviet Embassy was requested to "indicate to this Government, at an early date, the general types of work upon which it will be agreeable to have these personnel employed." (711.62114/10-944)

I would be grateful if you would let me have your reactions to the plan set forth in the draft letter as quickly as possible as the Army is pressing me for a reply.<sup>80</sup>

B[ERNARD] G[UFLER]

711.62114/10-644

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 19, 1944.

During his call this morning, the Soviet Counselor<sup>81</sup> said that the Embassy had received information that in a number of prisoner-of-war camps throughout the country there were considerable numbers of Soviet citizens. He gave the following list of camps and the estimated number of Soviet prisoners:

Camp Dix . . . . .	400
Camp Winchester, Va. . . . .	350
Camp Daleville, Ala. . . . .	146
Camp Opelika, Ala. . . . .	34
One Camp in Arkansas . . . . .	180

Mr. Kapustin said that the Ambassador had asked him to request the State Department to obtain permission for a representative of the Embassy to visit these camps in order to verify this information and interview these Soviet citizens.

I asked Mr. Kapustin if the Embassy had any detailed information as to the names of the individuals said to be Soviet citizens or other information in confirmation thereof. He said they had merely "heard" of the presence of this number of Soviet citizens in these camps and had no further details and that it was for this reason that the request was made to permit a Soviet representative to visit the camps.

I told Mr. Kapustin I would, of course, transmit the Ambassador's request to the appropriate authorities and then went on to tell him that we hoped in the near future to send a reply to the Soviet Embassy's notes on this general subject setting forth in detail the position of the American military authorities on this whole question. I said that I felt that this reply would clarify the entire question of Soviet nationals captured in German uniforms. Mr. Kapustin inquired whether

<sup>80</sup> In a memorandum of October 20, 1944, Mr. Bohlen signified his approval provided that the United States did not "obligate itself to determine which prisoners of war are Soviet citizens in order to advise the Soviet authorities in this regard." He suggested that the claimants to Soviet citizenship be segregated and that officials of the Soviet Embassy be allowed to interview them. (711.62114/10-944)

<sup>81</sup> Alexander Nikolayevich Kapustin.

the United States Government made any attempt to ascertain the nationality of the prisoners captured in order to separate Allied nationals from Germans. I said that as far as I was aware and in accordance with the Geneva Convention all persons captured in enemy uniform were treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the provisions of that Convention, and that only when the person himself laid claim to other than German nationality was a distinction made. I said in every case as far as I was aware when a person captured in German uniform laid claim to citizenship of an Allied country, his name and statement were immediately referred to the mission in Washington of that country, and reminded him that the Soviet Embassy had been immediately notified when any of the prisoners claimed Soviet nationality.

C. E. BOHLEN

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711.62114/11-244

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 2, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called this afternoon at his request.

The Ambassador stated that he had received a message from his Government stating that it was the practice in the American Army as it advanced to place Russian citizens whom it captured in German uniform in the same prison camps with German soldiers. The Ambassador stated this activity had taken place in France and Italy and he pointed out that these Russian nationals had been forced into the ranks in many cases for service purposes. The Ambassador stated that the American Army's practice was causing great resentment and he hoped it might be possible for the Department to make arrangements with the Army to place captured Russian nationals in separate prison camps.

During the discussion the question also arose of Russian prisoners in the United States. The Ambassador stated that he had received word that twenty-five had been released but he knew that many thousands were in the United States. He said he had not received a list of Russian prisoners which he had requested last summer and that we had only recently forwarded to him the unsatisfactory note stating that statistics were not available.

I told the Ambassador that I would look into it again.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]



711.62114/10-1144

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*<sup>82</sup>

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your communication of September 23, 1944, with regard to the regulation of questions connected with the presence on territories under Allied control of Soviet citizens found among German prisoners of war taken by Allied forces.

After consultation with the appropriate military authorities, I find that it has at all times been their policy not to transport to the United States claimants to Soviet citizenship captured by the Allied forces in the fighting against Germany. In those places where such personnel have been captured it has been the practice to turn them over to the British authorities for eventual disposition. A similar procedure is being established for other places where such personnel may be captured. Several thousand individuals have recently been turned over by the United States forces to the British authorities under this policy. Despite the foregoing, some Soviet citizens have been transported to the United States because, in the unsettled conditions prevailing in the combat areas, their identity as Soviet citizens had not been established.

In these circumstances, the Government of the United States is unable to inform you at this time who, among the approximately three hundred thousand prisoners of war in detention in the United States, are claimants to Soviet citizenship. However, this Government will make the necessary arrangements to segregate any claimants to Soviet citizenship at some place to be decided upon where representatives of the Soviet Embassy may have access to them for the purpose of interviewing them.

Any such personnel whose claims to Soviet citizenship are verified by the American military with your Embassy's cooperation, and whose return to Soviet control is requested by you, will be turned over to your authorities. Pending such turning over, these individuals will be housed, clothed, and messed, and given necessary medical

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<sup>82</sup> A paraphrase of this note was sent by the Department to the British Embassy in a memorandum of November 8, 1944. Beginning with the second paragraph, this note is itself a close paraphrase of the suggested reply to the Soviet Embassy drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of Department of State officials, and sent to the Department in a letter from Admiral Leahy to the Secretary of State on November 2, 1944. In his letter Admiral Leahy also said that since the British War Office, with Foreign Office concurrence, had agreed that all captured Soviet citizens should be returned to Soviet authorities without exception, "from the military point of view . . . it is not advisable for the United States Government to proceed otherwise vis-à-vis the Soviet Government with respect to persons in this category." (711.62114/11-244)

care and attention in all respects according to the same standards as are applied to the United States military personnel.

The personnel whose transfer to Soviet control has been requested by you will be delivered at a United States west coast port at such time and in such numbers as Soviet ships are there available to receive them for transportation to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It will be appreciated if you will indicate to this Government, at an early date, the general types of work upon which it will be agreeable to have these personnel employed while they are awaiting transportation as described above. Pending receipt of your views in this regard, it is the intention of this Government to employ them in suitable civilian occupations, primarily though not exclusively agricultural, during the hours and according to the working standards which are current for the civil workers in the region employed at the same work. They would continue to be paid at their present rate of 80 cents per day for such work. Apart from the above, they will not be required to perform labor except in connection with the administration, management, and maintenance of the installation occupied by them.

No occasion is presented for prohibiting propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union among the personnel in question. No such propaganda has at any time been employed. If, however, it is desired that these personnel be denied the right to receive all newspapers, magazines, and other literature normally published and circulated in the United States, it will be appreciated if you will so advise this Government, so that steps may be taken accordingly.

In view of what has been stated, it will not be necessary to refer to the recruitment of freed Soviet citizens for foreign armed forces except to inform you that at no time has any such recruitment occurred.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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762.61114/11-1044 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 10, 1944.

[Received November 10—9 p. m.]

4299. Press for November 9 published despatch datelined Paris November 5 reporting that many Soviet war prisoners and civilians brought to France by Germans have not received rights to which they are entitled as citizens of Allied power and are still held in camps together with German prisoners. Two examples are given of camps in which Soviet prisoners are detained with German prisoners under German camp commandants. In Marseilles area, according to des-

patch, terrorist methods are being used in recruiting Soviet citizens for Foreign Legion. Despatch refers to measures being taken by Soviet representatives in France for releasing Soviet citizens from French camps and preparations to send them home. It also states that Soviet Embassy has protested to French Foreign Minister regarding above conditions.

Repeated to Paris as No. 11.

KENNAN

740.6114/11-1144 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 11, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received November 12—2:15 p. m.]

4330. Articles concerning repatriation of Soviet war prisoners and civilians from Western Europe repeated in my immediately preceding telegram<sup>83</sup> confirm indications of past few days that Soviet press has begun campaign on this subject which is evidently intended to effect speediest possible return to Soviet Union of Soviet citizens in western Europe. There is apparently a fear here that such persons may become a source of trouble if they are not repatriated at first opportunity and that prestige of Soviet Union will suffer if it becomes generally known that some Soviet citizens are not accepting with enthusiasm offers of repatriation.

Embassy Secretary Melby<sup>84</sup> who returned today from trip to Murmansk where he witnessed arrival of first batch of repatriated Soviet prisoners from England reports that they were first welcomed at the docks with a brass band and then marched off under heavy armed guard to an unknown destination.

Repeated London 257, Rome 23, and Paris 15.

KENNAN

762.61114/11-2244

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] November 22, 1944.

The Soviet Ambassador called this afternoon at my request. At the end of our conversation I informed the Ambassador that we had taken up with the War Department his request of November 20<sup>85</sup> relative to a delegation of Red Army officers being received by General

<sup>83</sup> Not printed.

<sup>84</sup> John F. Melby, Second Secretary and Vice Consul in Moscow.

<sup>85</sup> In a memorandum of November 20, 1944, the Soviet Embassy notified the Department that a commission of Soviet officers had been appointed to supervise the repatriation of Soviet war prisoners from Western Europe and requested that General Eisenhower cooperate with them (762.61114/11-2044).

Eisenhower in connection with the repatriation of Soviet war prisoners. I told the Ambassador that I was confident Mr. Bohlen would be in a position to call him on the phone in the next day or two and give him a definitive answer.<sup>86</sup> The Ambassador seemed very anxious to receive a reply.

E[DWARD] S[TETTINIUS]

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740.00114 European War 1939/11-2744 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, November 27, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received 10:35 p. m.]

4526. ReEmbs 3298, September 4, midnight. At the request of General Deane I sent a letter to Molotov on November 6 on the question of reciprocal arrangements for treatment of prisoners of war. I referred to Mr. Harriman's letter of August 30 to which no answer had been received, and stated that since the advance of the Soviet armies had already enveloped the location of one prisoner of war camp known to have formerly held American war prisoners and since Soviet forces were apparently approaching another such camp in the Budapest area it was desirable that we should not delay any longer in arriving at an understanding along the lines proposed by the Ambassador.

I have now received a reply from Molotov dated November 25, the pertinent sections of which read in paraphrase translation as follows:

"The immediate rendering of assistance and return to their homes of Soviet prisoners and also Soviet citizens forcibly deported by the Germans to Germany and German occupied countries who have been liberated as a result of Allied military operations in the west is of interest to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is prepared to accept in principle the proposals which Mr. Harriman set forth in his letter of August 30 concerning measures regarding the return of American and Soviet war prisoners to their homeland.

The Soviet Government is prepared to designate representatives to study plans with American representatives concerning the reciprocal repatriation of war prisoners and interned nations [*nationals*] of both countries and also concerning the evacuation to the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens who have been forcibly deported by the Germans.

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<sup>86</sup> On November 24, the Acting Secretary of State informed Ambassador Gromyko orally that the War Department had cabled General Eisenhower recommending that he comply with the Soviet request. On this point the Department of Defense has supplied information to the effect that the action actually taken by the War Department was to refer the matter, with favorable recommendation, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the result that General Eisenhower subsequently received instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In this respect the Soviet Government has in mind that the above mention[ed] should also cover fully all those Soviet war prisoners and other Soviet nationals [*nationals*] who have been previously set free, some of whom were sent to the United States and are there at the present time.

The Soviet Government in this respect desires to bring to the attention of the American Government the inadmissibility, in relations between Allied countries, of a situation in which the above mentioned Soviet citizens are held in American prisoner of war camps together with German war prisoners—our common enemies—and subordinated to administrations of these camps which are appointed from German prisoners.

The American Government is requested by the Soviet Government to see that this situation is immediately corrected and that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington is furnished by the appropriate American authorities full information regarding these Soviet nationals, such information to contain data on the number of such prisoners, their whereabouts and living conditions. In this respect, the Soviet Government considers that these citizens should be regarded not as war prisoners but as free nationals of an Allied power and that they should consequently be placed in barracks separate from enemy war prisoners and that they should be accorded normal living conditions in the United States until they are repatriated. The hope is expressed, furthermore, that all questions connected with the appointment of the administrations at the residences of the Soviet nationals and with their movements on American territory until they are returned to their homeland be reached in agreement with the Soviet Embassy.

Until these Soviet nationals are repatriated to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government hopes that the American authorities will furnish them sufficient food, medical—sanitary services and clothing in agreement with Soviet representatives. The Soviet Government will reimburse the American Government for expenses undergone in this respect.

It goes without saying that those special questions regarding American prisoners in the Budapest and Rumanian areas, brought up in the Ambassador's and Mr. Kennan's letters, may be discussed at the meeting of our representatives authorized to study the question of repatriation of American-Soviet nationals.

It would be appreciated if you would transmit the contents of this letter to the American Government and inform me of the reply to the questions raised in it."

Deane has requested that this information be made available to the War Department.

Deane is already authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss these matters, and I feel I would be justified in replying to Molotov that he has been designated by my Government to conduct these discussions. In view, however, of Molotov's specific request that I transmit the contents of his letter to "the American Government" and his evident desire to keep the matter on a government to government

plane, I have thought it appropriate to consult the Department first, and I will await an indication of the Department's approval before taking this step.

KENNAN

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711.62114/12-144

*Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Bohlen) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] December 1, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: On your instruction I called this afternoon on the Soviet Ambassador. He said he desired to take up urgently the matter of the Soviet citizens who were still in prisoner of war camps in this country. He said that neither he nor his Government were able to understand why so long a delay had occurred in segregating these individuals and turning them over to the Soviet authorities. Furthermore, the treatment these men were receiving was in his opinion not in accordance with treatment which should be extended the citizens of one Allied nation by another.

The Ambassador then said he had a series of specific incidents of the treatment which he had in mind apart from the general question of delay in segregation and transfer of these Soviet citizens. The Ambassador listed the following specific complaints:

1. That Soviet citizens had been required to sign a statement to the effect that they would undertake to enter the Red Army when released and in so doing fully understand that if they were captured by the Germans they might be subject to summary execution by the German authorities and would not be covered by international conventions. The Ambassador admitted he understood that in the future Soviet citizens in the camps would not be required to sign this statement.

2. That at a camp at Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania, the Soviet officer who had visited the camp had been greeted with the Nazi salute on the part of the Soviet citizen confined who had stated that this was done under orders of the American commandant.

3. The Soviet Embassy, despite its request, had not been consulted as to the type of work these Soviet citizens should perform in the camps.

4. Soviet officers had not been permitted to visit all of the camps in which Soviet citizens were believed to be confined.

5. Despite the request of the Embassy through its Military Attaché<sup>87</sup> no list of Soviet citizens in these camps had been presented to the Embassy.

6. That anti-Soviet literature was still being distributed to Soviet citizens in these camps. The Ambassador particularly mentioned Camp Winchester where Soviet citizens were already segregated. Nevertheless, he said, a Lieutenant Kivko, whom he believed to be a

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<sup>87</sup> Col. Ilya Mikhailovich Sarayev.

chaplain, had brought in a suitcase full of a Russian language publication called *Rossiia* which is violently anti-Soviet, and he distributed it to the Soviet citizens there. The Ambassador requested that copies of Soviet newspapers be permitted to be distributed in the camps where Soviet citizens had already been segregated. I told him that I understood that this would be done as soon as the Soviet citizens were collected in Camp Rupert and that I would inquire as to other camps.

7. That at Camp Winchester against the wishes of the Soviet citizens there religious services had been held by priests of the branch of the Orthodox Church hostile to the Soviet Union.

I listened carefully to what the Ambassador had to say and took notes. I then told the Ambassador that we had discussed this question with the appropriate authorities of the War Department, and I could assure him, and requested him so to inform his Government, that there was not the slightest desire on the part of the War Department or any part of this Government to delay the segregation and return to the appropriate Soviet authorities the prisoners of war who turn out to be Soviet citizens.

I added that I had just been informed by the War Department that in a week they would begin the transfer to Camp Rupert, Idaho, of all persons in the prisoner of war camps who had any claim to Soviet citizenship and that once they were there the administration of the camp would be carried out in consultation with Soviet officials. I added that Colonel Saraev, the Soviet Military Attaché, had been informed by the War Department this morning that this would be done and that he had been promised that 700 Soviet citizens would be available for transfer to Soviet ships expected in the West Coast on December 20 which according to his statement was the maximum which could be handled by these ships.

I then emphasized to the Ambassador that although he had throughout his statement referred to these men not as prisoners of war but as the citizens of an Allied friendly country, in fact until their citizenship was established they were regarded by our military authorities as prisoners of war since they had been captured by the American Army on the field of battle, they were in German uniform and formed part of German combat units actively engaged in fighting United States forces. I said that under the circumstances they had obviously been treated as prisoners of war since our authorities had no way of knowing in the first instance they were Soviet citizens. I added that I was sure that in analogous circumstances the Soviet military authorities would have taken the same position. In this connection I added that I understood that the Red Army had captured a number of French citizens and that negotiations had been in progress for some months between the Soviet and French Governments and that while

some of the citizens had been released there were a considerable number of others which the Soviet military authorities had not been able to segregate and to identify.

I told the Ambassador that I knew our military authorities were most anxious to settle this matter quickly, and as soon as any individuals were identified as possible claimants to Soviet citizenship they were being assembled for transfer to Camp Rupert. I added that I understood from our military authorities that until this was done it would be impossible to put into effect all the specific requests that the Ambassador had made since these men were in many cases still mixed in with genuine German prisoners of war. I repeated that Soviet citizens would be at once sent to Camp Rupert and that every one of his specific requests would be given the most sympathetic consideration. I said that I felt, however, I could answer some of the specific points that he had brought up.

I said, for example, that although I had not previously seen the form of the statement which in the past had been required, I felt sure upon reading it that its purpose was to protect the United States authorities under the Geneva Convention in order to assure that the individual whose release was contemplated was fully aware of the conditions under international law of his release. I added that I could not agree with the Ambassador that it was designed to intimidate these men and prevent them from accepting release.

I said that in regard to the question of the Nazi salute I was sure that it had not been done under the instructions of any American officer but that there was some other explanation.

As to the distribution of the anti-Soviet newspaper *Rossiya* I had been told by the War Department that it was not on the approved list and that if any individual American officer was distributing it, it would be investigated immediately.

As to the question of visits to the other camps I said it was my understand[ing] that Colonel Saraev had already visited Camp Winchester and would visit Camp Dix next Monday but that in view of the imminent transfer of all Soviet personnel to Camp Rupert our military authorities did not consider it practical to visit other camps since to do so would merely delay the transfer of the Soviet personnel to Camp Rupert. I added that this seemed sensible to me since if Colonel Saraev or his representatives were to visit other camps the Soviet personnel would have to be held there pending his arrival and the transfer delayed until he had made his investigation. In conclusion I emphasized strongly to the Ambassador that it was not to the interest of the American Government to the slightest degree to delay the settlement of this question but quite the contrary and repeated that the difficulties had arisen from the fact that these men had been captured



in many cases in actual combat and that it had been a difficult and complicated task to attempt to segregate them since many had no documents and it was very often [difficult?] to distinguish between who was a Soviet citizen and who was merely of Russian origin. Although at the beginning of the conversation the Ambassador in every case had attempted to build up a thesis of calculated purpose behind these various instances, at the end of the conversation he appeared to accept my statements and merely urged that the question be handled as expeditiously as possible in accordance with the request of the Soviet Government.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

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740.00114 EW/12-544 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 5, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received December 5—9:26 a. m.]

4645. General Deane has brought to my attention the fact that the advance of the Soviet forces in Hungary is now approaching two localities in which American prisoners of war are known to have been contacted. For this reason he is most eager to get on with the discussions with the Russians on this subject. With this in mind he has asked me to approach the Soviet Government again without waiting for the receipt of the instructions mentioned in the Department's 2765<sup>ss</sup> and to ask that the Russians designate someone who will discuss with him the question of the treatment of any of our prisoners of war who may be liberated by the advance of the Soviet Armed Forces. In accordance with his request I am writing a letter to Molotov in this sense but making it plain that I am expecting further instructions on this matter and that the present request is of a limited nature.

KENNAN

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711.62114/12-1044 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 10, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 11:25 p. m.]

1669. Re my 411, September 16. British military authorities are assuming that our policy is same as theirs in providing for repatriation

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<sup>ss</sup> Dated December 1, 1944, not printed; it informed the Chargé that the Department was in consultation with the War Department, and that he would soon receive instructions (740.00114 EW/11-2744).

of Soviet citizens now or in future held as POWs<sup>89</sup> irrespective of whether individuals concerned desire to return to Soviet Union. Inasmuch as not inconsiderable numbers of Soviet POWs are acquired by American forces in this theater and handed over to British for disposition we would appreciate early information as to whether United States Government does in fact subscribe to British policy in this connection.

KIRK

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762.61114/11-2044

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union  
(Gromyko)*

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1944.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your note of November 20, 1944<sup>90</sup> informing me that General Golikov,<sup>91</sup> who has been designated by the Soviet Government to handle matters relating to the repatriation of Soviet citizens, desired to send a Soviet military mission headed by Major General V. N. Dragun to France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg to make arrangements for the identification and repatriation of Soviet citizens in western Europe freed by the Allied Armies. You requested that this information be conveyed to the appropriate United States military authorities and that the mission headed by General Dragun should be officially recognized by General Eisenhower and that they be permitted access to any camp in the zone of the Anglo-American Armies in which there are Soviet prisoners of war or Soviet civilian internees.

As I informed you orally on November 24,<sup>92</sup> this matter had been immediately taken up with the appropriate officials of the War Department and had been submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, with the recommendation that the facilities requested be accorded the mission of General Dragun. I am pleased to inform you that information has now been received that Supreme Allied Headquarters is prepared to afford General Dragun the facilities requested and that he has already arrived in Paris to work out the necessary practical arrangements for carrying out the purpose of his mission.

Accept [etc.]

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.

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<sup>89</sup> Prisoners of war.

<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Col. Gen. Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, Plenipotentiary of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union for the repatriation of Soviet citizens in Western Europe freed by the Allied Armies.

<sup>92</sup> See footnote 86, p. 1265.

711.62114/12-1044 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1944—2 p. m.

493. Reurtel 1669, December 10, 1 p. m. The policy adopted by the United States Government in this connection is that all claimants to Soviet nationality will be released to the Soviet Government irrespective of whether they wish to be so released.

STETTINIUS

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740.00114 EW/12-2944 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State*

Moscow, December 29, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received December 30—4:30 a. m.]

5053. ReEmbs 4645, December 5, 1 p. m. I have received a letter from Vyshinski<sup>93</sup> stating that Lieutenant General K. D. Golubev<sup>94</sup> and Major General N. V. Slavin<sup>95</sup> have been appointed by the Soviet Government to conduct negotiations with General Deane on questions connected with the plan mutually to repatriate American and Soviet prisoners of war and civilians in accordance with the principles set forth in Molotov's letter to Kennan of November 25. The pertinent sections of Molotov's letter were repeated to the Department in Embassy's telegram 4526 of November 27.

HARRIMAN

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740.62114/12-2944

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey of the Special War Problems Division*

[WASHINGTON,] December 29, 1944.

Colonel Rogers telephoned to say that a transport of 500 Soviet nationals left Rupert yesterday for a west coast port and a similar number left today. The Soviet colonel at Rupert told the military authorities there yesterday just before the departure of the group that he had received word from Washington that the shipment was not to

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<sup>93</sup> Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

<sup>94</sup> Lt. Gen. Konstantin Dmitriyevich Golubev, Deputy Chief, Soviet Commission for the Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

<sup>95</sup> Maj. Gen. Nikolay Vasilyevich Slavin, Assistant to the Chief of the Army General Staff.

take place. About an hour later he reported that he had received new instructions from Washington that the shipment was to go forward. Among the 1100 men sent to the ship about 70 did not want to go. These 70 men had, however, previously claimed Soviet nationality. Three of them attempted suicide, one by hanging, one by stabbing himself, and one by hitting his head against a beam in one of the barracks. In the end the three men have departed for the port.

## VATICAN

### APPEALS OF THE VATICAN TO THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS NOT TO BOMB ROME;<sup>1</sup> PROTESTS AGAINST BOMBING OF ABBEY OF MONTE CASSINO AND THE PAPAL VILLA AT CASTELGANDOLFO

865.413/16 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, January 20, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received January 20—4:48 p. m.]

446. This is Tittmann's<sup>2</sup> No. 9, January 10.

My 203, October 28.<sup>3</sup> Note dated January 8 from Secretariat of State states that the Holy See has just received communication from German Embassy to the effect that "insofar as the German military authorities are concerned everything possible is being done to preserve the Abbey of Monte Cassino from war damage both at the present time and in the future". [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/33218

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Following my previous letters on this subject I wish to say that I have been informed by the Cardinal Secretary of State<sup>4</sup> that in the course of another aerial bombardment bombs fell for the third time, and in large number, on the Papal Villa at Castelgandolfo killing many and causing grave material damage.

The building of the Propaganda College, in which many civilians from the neighborhood, women and children, sought temporary refuge, was also hit. This edifice, which belongs to the Holy See, not only adjoins the Papal Villa but is in part actually built on extra-territorial property. Precisely this section of the building was struck

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<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 910 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

and completely destroyed by bombs. Unfortunately the victims are numerous.

At the present time, due to the charity of the Holy Father, fifteen thousand homeless civilians, who were in abject misery, are living in the Villa or its environs. His Holiness even opened his official apartments to receive these poor people. All this places what has happened in a much more serious light.

The *Osservatore Romano* felt obliged to publish this sad news together with the necessary condemnation of the Holy See.

Again, the Holy See insistently requests that orders be issued to respect the extraterritoriality of Vatican properties.

With sentiments of esteem and highest personal regard, I remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

740.0011 European War 1939/33075: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland*  
(Harrison)

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1944—9 p. m.

499. For Tittmann. AFHQ<sup>5</sup> has made the following reply through the American Mission at Algiers to your telegram number 21 of January 21 (Department's 383, February 5, 7 p. m.):<sup>6</sup>

"The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces have made and will continue to make every effort to conduct their military operations without violating Vatican property or installations. However it has been repeatedly pointed out that we cannot afford to prejudice the success of our operations by imposing tactical restrictions on the attack of targets on road nets and within areas employed extensively by the enemy. Instructions have been passed forward concerning markings of Vatican vehicles with instructions that they will be respected whenever possible. However it is considered quite unlikely that fighter or bomber pilots involved in the attack of enemy transport on roads will be able to recognize the markings of an individual vehicle. It is suggested that the above points be communicated to the Vatican through the American representative at that state."

You may transmit as much of the above reply to the Secretariat of State as you deem appropriate.

STETTINIUS

<sup>5</sup>Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>6</sup>Neither printed.

740.0011 EW 1939/33293

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. HULL: In a radiogram which has just come to me and which is dated Sunday, February 13th, the Cardinal Secretary of State advises me that in an air raid which took place on Sunday morning several bombs were dropped in the vicinity of the Papal Villa at Castelgandolfo. One bomb fell just a few yards from the former Barberini Palace, now belonging to the Papal Villa, breaking all the windows in the building and causing other property damage.

His Eminence then adds that the announcements made by the British and American radios, in the name of the Allied High Command, on the alleged presence of German military personnel in this territory, cannot be said to refer to the actual territory of the Papal Villa, which enjoys the privilege of extraterritoriality. In his charity the Holy Father has permitted some thousands of unfortunate refugees from the civilian population of the surrounding country to take refuge in the grounds and buildings which make up the Villa. Several hundreds of these refugees had already been killed in previous aerial attacks.

In the light of the public assurances given by the President of the United States last summer in his letter to the Holy Father,<sup>7</sup> the Holy See finds it difficult to understand how such incidents can be taking place.

With the sentiments of esteem and with every best wish I remain  
Sincerely yours,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

865.413/22 : Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*

VATICAN CITY, February 15, 1944.

[Received February 16—1:43 p. m.]

47. My 9, January 10th.<sup>8</sup> Vatican asks me urgently telegraph following note dated February 15th.

[“] On February 14th German Ambassador<sup>8a</sup> gave to Abbot Primate of Benedictine Fathers following memorandum.

‘German military information states that announcements regarding German defense equipment in Convent of Monte Cassino are false. It is stated abso-

<sup>7</sup> See telegram 1621, July 10, 1943, 1 a. m., to Bern, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 926.

<sup>8</sup> See telegram 446, January 20, 9 p. m., from Bern, p. 1274.

<sup>8a</sup> Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, German Ambassador to the Holy See.

lutely incorrect that cannons, mortars or machine guns are there. No large size (*grössere*) troop concentrations are assembled there, that is in neighborhood of Convent. Moreover everything possible was done to prevent Monte Cassino from becoming transit center (*Durchgangspatz*).'

Today Ambassador gave Abbot Primate and Vatican Under Secretary of State another memorandum as follows.

'According to statement competent German quarters there are not Convent Monte Cassino and its immediate neighborhood either cannons, mortars or machine gun emplacements. Neither are there are [any] German troops there.'

TITTMANN

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740.0011 European War 1939/33246

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. HULL: In view of the recently publicized statements supposedly originating from the Allied High Command, to the effect that the actual territory of the Papal Villa at Castelgandolfo is "saturated with Germans and therefore subject to bombing", the Cardinal Secretary of State has instructed me to inform you that this report is not true. His Eminence states that no German soldier was ever admitted within the precincts of the Pontifical Villa and that no German military whatsoever are now within the Villa.

His Eminence has consequently instructed me to deny fully and publicly the foregoing false report.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my deep personal regard, I have the honor to remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

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740.0011 European War 1939/33424

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, February 17, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have been informed by His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, that for some days past Allied aeroplanes have undertaken an almost continuous bombardment and machine-gunning of sections of Rome, especially at the outskirts but also within the city proper. Notable damage has been caused to civilian buildings and to some churches. The recently reconstructed Hospice of Santa



Galla, which is the property of the Holy See, has also been seriously damaged.

His Eminence notes that since Rome was declared an open city by the Badoglio<sup>9</sup> Government last August it has been left practically without any anti-aircraft defense, and is not equipped with suitable air raid shelters. The population of the peripheral zones of Rome consists largely of working people among whom there already have been many victims.

In view of the foregoing and particularly in consideration of the sacred character of Rome, the center of Catholicism, the Holy Father as Bishop of the Eternal City, in his profound grief for the suffering population which has already been so sorely tried, ardently desires the cessation of these bombardments. His Holiness therefore, through me, addresses his personal and urgent appeal to Your Excellency, as President of the United States, for this purpose.

In this tragic hour the eyes not only of almost four hundred million Catholics, but of all of those who have God in their thoughts and who appreciate the spiritual values of life, are turned with anxiety to the Sovereign Pontiff. Destruction and ruin are being heaped upon Italy in these days. The entire population is subjected to the most extreme hardships of war. Without hope of helping itself the nation is forced to witness the obliteration of so many of its treasures of religion, art and culture which it has fondly safeguarded throughout the centuries not only for itself but for the world. What will be the judgment of centuries to come if now even Rome itself, whose very name is the symbol of our civilization, should be included among the ruins of the present war?

To Your Excellency, who has on many occasions manifested your noble concern for the city of Rome and for the suffering, I address this appeal, at the direction of the Holy Father and in his august name. With a grieving heart and with a cry that springs from the depths of his paternal soul the Sovereign Pontiff invokes Your Excellency's intervention that Rome may be spared from the horror and destruction of further aerial attacks.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my deep personal regard, I have the honor to remain

Respectfully yours,

[A. G. CICOGNANI]  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

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<sup>9</sup> Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government.

740.0011 European War 1939/33265 : Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*

VATICAN CITY, February 17, 1944.  
[Received February 17—4:07 p. m.]

50. Vatican note, today's date, states last few days city of Rome has suffered repeated air attacks, both by night and day causing numerous innocent victims in various localities of city itself, including two hospitals. Situation of city, which is practically undefended, is the more serious in that population increased by large numbers evacuees from battle areas elsewhere who were certain that Rome because of sacred and "open city" character would be spared any warlike attack. In conclusion note repeats serious reasons already advanced against involving city of Rome in war and asks me again to call matter to attention of Allied authorities with view to having precise instructions issued for protection of city.

TITTMANN

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740.0011 European War 1939/33270 : Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*

VATICAN CITY, February 18, 1944.  
[Received February 18—9:02 a. m.]

51. My 44, 11th.<sup>10</sup> Vatican note today states according to reliable information just now reaching Holy See there are no German artillery positions or other military equipment in proximity of Papal Villa Castel Gandolfo which can constitute objective for Allied Air Forces and asks that my Government be informed in order that bombing of that zone be avoided and danger to Villa, which at present is sheltering several thousand civilians evacuated from neighboring towns, be removed.

TITTMANN

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740.0011 European War 1939/33218 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland  
(Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1944—4 p. m.

568. For Tittmann. Your 43, February 10 and 44, February 11.<sup>11</sup> With reference to the bombing of the Castelgandolfo area, the De-

<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Neither printed.

partment has written the following letters in reply to several communications from the Apostolic Delegate:

"February 5. Your two letters of February 2<sup>12</sup> concerning the bombardment of Albano and Castelgandolfo were referred immediately to the appropriate American military authorities for investigation and report. I hope that a reply from the military authorities will be forthcoming within the next few days and I shall not fail to communicate with you promptly. In view of the combined military operation in Italy, copies of your letters have been furnished the British Embassy.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean theater<sup>13</sup> has been given specific instructions with respect to avoiding and protecting the property of the Holy See in and around Rome which enjoys extraterritorial privileges. This, of course, includes the Papal Villa at Castelgandolfo. Moreover, as the result of reports in August and September last from Mr. Tittmann at Vatican City, the attention of the appropriate military authorities was called particularly to the Papal properties and establishments at Castelgandolfo at that time.

I hasten to assure you that the policy of this Government with respect to Papal property in Italy as declared by the President in his letter to the Pope last July remains as expressed therein and Allied forces have instructions to carry out that policy to the extent that is humanly possible under conditions of modern warfare."

"February 16. I have received your letter of February 5<sup>12</sup> with further reference to the bombardment of the territory in which the Papal Villa at Castelgandolfo is situated. I made copies of your letter immediately available to the appropriate authorities of the War Department and, in view of the combined military operation in Italy, to the British Embassy.

The following information, which has been received from the War Department, may be of interest to you in connection with the unfortunate incidents reported in your letter under reference. The Allied Military Commanders in the area of Albano and Castelgandolfo are fully aware of the necessity for protecting Papal property and are doing all in their power to prevent damage from military operations. However, it should be pointed out that the center of a particularly critical military operation is approaching the Albano Castelgandolfo area and should it be determined that German forces are using the communications through this area it will be necessary to attack them. Otherwise Allied forces would be permitting the establishment of a sanctuary from which enemy operations could be launched or assisted without the danger of attack.

You may rest assured that if German forces are subjected to bombardment while near the extraterritorial property of the Holy See it will only be because the crucial military situation requires it."

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<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

"February 18. I have your letters of February 13 and 15 with further reference to the bombardment of Castelgandolfo. I deeply regret the loss of life and damage to Vatican property.

Your reports and the observations of the Holy See concerning the bombardment of the Castelgandolfo area have been brought to the attention of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson."

You may if you consider it desirable reply along similar lines to the notes which you have received from the Secretariat of State.

STETTINIUS

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740.0011 European War 1939/33424

*President Roosevelt to the Apostolic Delegate at Washington  
(Cicognani)*

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1944.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP: I have your letter of February 17 concerning the recent aerial attacks on Rome, especially in the outlying portions, and transmitting the urgent and personal appeal of His Holiness for their cessation.

The Allied military authorities in Italy are committed to a policy of avoiding damage to religious shrines and historical monuments to the extent humanly possible in modern warfare. This applies to the city of Rome as to other parts of Italy where the forces of the United Nations have been or will be engaged in active fighting.

However, we are fighting a desperate battle against a hard and unscrupulous foe whose ultimate defeat will accomplish the liberation of Italy and the Italian people. When the enemy uses all the facilities which a great center, such as Rome, affords in order to further his military campaign, thus postponing the ultimate liberation of the nation, these facilities must be denied him with all our force. When the enemy assumes a position exposing innocent civilians or uses a religious or historical shrine to his own military advantage, we have no choice but to attack and dislodge him. It is in the nature of a conflict thrust upon the world by evil powers whose strength is based on utter contempt of everything that is beautiful or holy that our military commanders may be obliged to make these painful decisions.

Our only reason in attacking any part of Rome is because it is occupied and used by the Germans. If His Holiness will be successful in persuading them to respect the sacred and cultural character of Rome by withdrawing from it without a struggle he could thus assure its preservation.

Please ask His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State to assure His Holiness that it remains our ardent desire that religious edifices and other monuments of our common civilization be saved from damage. To the degree that the hard exigencies of the campaign, through German ruthlessness in the use of such monuments, may not require inevitable exceptions, this principle will be applied in the conduct of the war.

Very sincerely yours,

[FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT]

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740.0011 European War 1939/33489 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, March 9, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 8:13 p. m.]

1437. This is Tittmann's 56, February 19.

Re bombing of Monte Cassino by Allies. Vatican is outwardly assuming a noncommittal attitude as indicated in *Osservatore Romano* article excerpts from which quoted my 54 February 18.<sup>15</sup> It is evident, however, high Vatican officials are holding Allies responsible.

Cardinal Maglione spoke to me about the matter this morning with some heat. He said he was convinced from evidence at hand there were no German soldiers, gun emplacements, etc. in Monastery or immediate neighborhood although he admitted he was unable to specify exactly extent of "immediate neighborhood". He added he thought the bombing entirely unnecessary from military point of view, was a "colossal blunder" and "a piece of gross stupidity" on part of Allies because needless destruction of this symbol of civilization was bound to react unfavorably on pro-Ally opinion everywhere. I told the Cardinal I did not believe for a minute the Allies would have destroyed Monastery had there not been overriding military reasons and I did not think he was justified in being so positive since only those on the spot were in a position to pass definitive judgment. To this he replied "Pardon me if I say so but I know what I am talking about and have access to sources of information that are probably not open to you". I was forced to admit that my only source so far was the radio.

Maglione said German Ambassador<sup>16</sup> had suggested that Holy See issue a public statement deploring the incident but that he had refused "at least so far" on grounds that Holy See did not wish to become involved in a controversy between belligerent parties. The Cardinal hinted, however, that Holy See might feel obliged to make

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, German Ambassador to the Holy See.

some sort of public statement later or [*on*] after further investigation. I said I thought any finger pointing at this late date in war would be badly received in general and especially in countries whose monuments had been destroyed by Germans. It is likely, however, that Holy See having openly championed the cause of Monte Cassino and being convinced of German good faith in present instance will find it difficult to remain silent especially under German pressure. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/33609

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to  
President Roosevelt*

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1944.

MR. PRESIDENT: I beg to acknowledge Your Excellency's valued letter of March 1, 1944, on the subject of the bombardment of Rome. I transmitted its content at once to His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, who now informs me that the Holy See has taken cognizance of Your Excellency's declaration of your "ardent desire that religious edifices and other monuments of our common civilization be saved from damage."

His Eminence directs me to present to Your Excellency various observations on the subject, and I respectfully transcribe them herewith as they were received.

Up to the present the destruction to sacred buildings and monuments is already enormous and involves losses that rise to many millions of dollars. Quite naturally this destruction is the source of grave concern to the Holy See and it is feared that in many cases adequate means have not been employed to carry out the repeatedly expressed desire of Your Excellency that such monuments and sacred edifices be spared from the devastation of war.

These conditions have been verified also in the most recent lamentable bombardments of Rome in which the large Ostiense station was the military target. Despite the fact that the target area was very extensive and attacked under conditions of clear visibility, two churches and many homes of working people were destroyed. All these latter structures easily could have been distinguished from the objective itself. These raids resulted in the killing of hundreds of innocent persons,—a fact which is the more painful since they belong to a nation already vanquished and which surrendered unconditionally.

The Holy See on its part begs to assure the Allied governments that every precaution is being used and the greatest vigilance employed lest any of the religious monuments of the Eternal City be used for military purposes. The destruction of the Abbey of Montecassino, falsely described as a German fortress, has been for the Holy See a sad lesson on the dangers of such erroneous statements. (In

this regard I have recently consigned a memorandum to Mr. Myron C. Taylor).

His Eminence further states that in the judgment of competent military observers a direct attack on Rome is neither necessary nor desirable. The city is situated on a plain, not far from the sea, and has an extensive network of roads fanning out to both the North and South, thus permitting an advancing military force to by-pass it easily. On the other hand house to house combat in the city would entail tremendous losses to both the attacking and defending forces, and of course principally to the innocent civilian residents.

It would appear therefore that to save Rome from such destruction would be in the interest not only of religion and civilization, but would also offer direct military advantage.

It is obvious that the destruction caused in the Italian campaign, and most particularly in Rome, is being made the instrument of widespread German propaganda against the Allies, with resulting distrust and aversion among those very people who might have been expected to follow the Allied standard.

I can assure Your Excellency, on the statement of His Eminence, that the Holy See will continue to make opportune insistence with the German authorities for the same purpose of saving Rome from further destruction.

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my deep personal regard, I have the honor to remain

Most respectfully yours,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

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740.0011 EW 1939/33540 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, March 13, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received 5:40 p. m.]

1529. From Tittmann.

80, March 7. My 73, March 3.<sup>17</sup> Note from Vatican dated March 7 states in translation:

“On the evening of March 1 some bombs were released from an airplane in the immediate proximity of the State of the Vatican City. Four of these fell on the property of the International Augustinian College of Santa Monica and the Pontifical Urban College of Propaganda where seminarists from every part of the world are living and caused damage to buildings and injuries to some persons. The explosions likewise damaged the Oratory of Saint Peter and the Holy [See?] office building, the domicile of four Cardinals and High Prelates of the Roman Curia, both of which buildings enjoy, as do the preceding ones, the privilege of extraterritoriality. Then in the Vati-

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.

can City itself, whose territory—sovereign and neutral—is unfortunately flown over frequently by aircraft, many bomb fragments fell and broke some windows of the Raphael Loggias. The Holy See, therefore, finds it necessary deeply to deplore once again air raids of this nature which are made on extraterritorial buildings, obviously without military equipment or objective of any kind whatsoever and in the immediate vicinity of the Vatican City and the dwelling place of the Holy Father himself.

The Holy See once again calls the attention of the belligerent parties to these ill-advised deeds (*gesti in consulti*) and would like to hope that whoever it may concern will not delay in adopting all necessary provisions to the end that such painful and deplorable exploits, which history will severely condemn, shall not be repeated.”

[Tittmann]

HARRISON

740.0011 EW 1939/33542: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, March 13, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 11:28 p. m.]

1530. From Tittmann 76, March 6.

My 74, 4th.<sup>18</sup> Vatican high officials as usual seem considerably upset by Allied daylight raid March 3rd which they maintain was made on Rome although objectives obviously restricted to railway yards and other military targets in periphery of city. Unfortunately, according Vatican reports some 500 civilians were killed but it seems largest proportion this loss due mischance when shelter received direct hit. Resentment of air attacks in Rome area has become so fixed an idea with Vatican that any recognition of the good work (of which I am told there is ample evidence in present instance) accomplished by our air men seems to be precluded. Two articles in *Osservatore Romano* mentioned in my 74 are misleading in that they give impression only civilian damage done. I have taken occasion to protest to appropriate authorities against this one-sided method of presenting the facts as I did once before (see my despatch 264, January 1st<sup>18</sup>). [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

865.413/31

*The Irish Minister (Brennan) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 15, 1944.

The Minister of Ireland presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honour to request that the follow-

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.



ing message, received from Prime Minister de Valera, be transmitted to President Roosevelt. The message is also being sent to the Heads of State of the other belligerent powers concerned:

"As Head of the Government of a State whose citizens in a great majority belong to the Holy, Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church, I think it my duty to express on their behalf the deep distress which they feel—a distress shared by three hundred million Catholics throughout the whole world, at the danger now threatening the city of Rome, and at the absence of any measures by the belligerent powers to ensure its safety. It is clear to all that if the city is to be militarily defended by one side, and by the other attacked, its destruction is inevitable.

"The destruction of this holy city, which for almost two thousand years has been the seat of the sovereign authority of the Catholic Church, and contains the great central temples of Catholic religion and the great central seminaries and libraries of Christian faith, would be a major calamity for the human race, robbing man for all time of the noblest memorials of his supreme religious and cultural heritage, whose origins teach of our Divine Saviour, Jesus Christ. Millions of Catholics would risk their lives to save these memorials, symbols of eternal things which alone give meaning to human life.

"I request you to listen to the voice of millions from every land praying the belligerents to seek, through appropriate intermediary channels, an agreement by which Rome may be saved.

"Future generations will forget the military considerations which may now seem to dictate the occupation or possession of Rome; but should the city be destroyed, the fact of its destruction will be remembered forever. So, too, should the city by agreement be spared, future generations will remember with enduring gratitude those States and their leaders who will have preserved for the ennoblement of mankind this great centre of Christian faith and civilization."

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740.0011 European War 1939/33542 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII*

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1944.

9. Your 76, March 6.<sup>19</sup> In answer to inquiries at his press conference on March 13 concerning the remarks of His Holiness reported in that day's press, the Secretary said,

"I think we all understand that the Allied military authorities in Italy are dealing primarily with considerations of military necessity forced on them by the activities and attitude of the German military forces. Naturally, we are as much interested as any government or any individual in the preservation of religious shrines, historic structures and human lives. I am sure that our military people have that same view. It is my understanding that the Allied

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<sup>19</sup> See telegram 1530, March 13, 5 p. m., from Bern, p. 1285.

military authorities are pursuing a policy of avoiding damage to such shrines and monuments to the extent humanly possible in modern warfare and in the circumstances which face them. If the Germans were not entrenched in these places or were they as interested as we are in protecting religious shrines and monuments and in preserving the lives of innocent civilians and refugees, no question would arise."

On March 14 the President made the following statement to the press concerning the use by the Germans of the city of Rome:

"Everyone knows the Nazi record on religion. Both at home and abroad. Hitler and his followers have waged a ruthless war against the churches of all faiths.

Now the German Army has used the Holy City of Rome as a military center. No one could have been surprised by this—it is only the latest of Hitler's many affronts to religion. It is a logical step in the Nazi policy of total war—a policy which treats nothing as sacred.

We on our side have made freedom of religion one of the principles for which we are fighting this war. We have tried scrupulously—often at considerable sacrifice—to spare religious and cultural monuments, and we shall continue to do so."

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33596

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: A recent communication of His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, informs me [of] the effects of a recent air raid over Rome, and I have the honor to make known to you the comments of His Eminence.

"Many civilian dwellings were destroyed and there were very numerous innocent victims in the air raid on March 14th, during which the Eternal City was subjected to prolonged and intense bombardment.

The increasing ruins in Rome are the source of deep sorrow and regret for the Holy Father. Granting that the Allied air forces seek to bomb exclusively military objectives, it is evident that all necessary precautions should be taken to confine the bombardment to such objectives. In Rome this should be relatively easy since that area is practically without anti-aircraft defense and the attacks are carried out in daylight and under conditions of very clear visibility.

The Holy See has fostered sincere hope that every possible precaution would be taken in regard to Rome, especially in view of the public declarations of Allied authorities in which it has been asserted that every effort would be made to spare historical, artistic and religious monuments. Now unfortunately the wholesale destruction and loss of life, especially among the civilian population, are the source of great concern for the fate of Rome, the center of Catholicism.

It is well known that the Allied authorities in earlier stages of the war engaged every possible means to avert the bombardment of Cairo and Athens, not so much for military reasons but rather on account of the outstanding artistic and historical importance of these two capital cities. Willingly and effectively the Holy See cooperated in the project.

Now with the repeated bombing of Rome, the center of the Catholic Church, it is felt with justification that the sentiments and desires of the Catholic world are not being accorded the same consideration as was given to the Mohammedans in seeking to spare their city of Cairo. In respect to Athens too, the Eternal City has far greater claims to consideration for its immensely greater wealth of cultural and religious treasures.

The Holy See fully appreciates the laudable desire of Allied Commanders to spare whenever and however possible the lives of their soldiers who are engaged in the Italian campaign. That same desire on the part of the Holy See to see lives spared in every possible manner makes it the more painful to witness repeated and useless killings among civilians in aerial attacks."

With the assurances of my highest consideration and of my deep personal regard, I have the honor to remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

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740.0011 EW 1939/33596a : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the  
American Republics*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1944—6 p. m.

For the Officer in Charge. It is obvious that the enemy is taking full advantage of the concern expressed by persons throughout the Christian world, particularly dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, over the threatened damage to the city of Rome and its religious and cultural monuments. During the past week, the Department and the White House have received a number of messages from leading Church dignitaries in the other American republics urging that Rome be spared any damage.

In this connection, you will have noted the statements made by the Secretary of State and the President which were quoted in full in Radio Bulletins 62 and 63 respectively.<sup>20</sup> The position taken in the statements places responsibility for inflicting the damages of war upon Rome directly upon the Nazi forces which are using Rome for military purposes and to kill United Nations' soldiers.

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<sup>20</sup> For statements of Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, see telegram 9, March 17, to Mr. Tittmann, p. 1286.

Although it is unlikely, in view of the message broadcast by the Pope on March 12,<sup>21</sup> that any high Church dignitaries would feel free to depart from the tenor of the Pope's remarks, please give your serious and urgent attention to the possibility of discreetly stimulating some comment on the part of high public officials, cultural leaders, and prominent newspapers which will clarify the point that so long as the Nazis continue to use Rome for military purposes, they must be condemned for placing Christian shrines in jeopardy, and that only by victory over Nazism can we preserve Christian civilization. Apologetic tone should of course be strictly avoided.

Any published comments should be reported to the Department and cabled by the Coordination Committee directly to the Coordinator's Office for short-wave broadcasts. Your comment on public reaction to this situation, and our handling of it will be welcome.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33642

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, March 22, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I must ask your kind indulgence for resuming so soon the theme of my letter of March 18th, expressing some concern of the Holy See. But the Cardinal Secretary of State has just sent me a further communication, and I think it well at the present time to keep you informed.

In the consciousness of his exalted spiritual mission, the Holy Father is unwilling to assume the responsibility of not having made known the truth, or of having neglected to exhort all belligerents to sentiments of humane consideration for the dangers and difficulties of civilian populations in all war areas. It is for these reasons that His Holiness desires, through this communication, to open his whole mind before his beloved people of America and before the President of the United States.

Cardinal Maglione points out that it is there the prevailing conviction that adequate precautionary measures would make it possible to limit aerial attacks strictly to objectives of military importance. This particular point was stressed in some detail in my letter of March 18th.

His Eminence also emphasizes that the continued bombings of Rome are lowering the prestige of the Allies, embittering a populace

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<sup>21</sup> For text of the Pope's message, see the *New York Times*, March 13, 1944, p. 6.

otherwise well disposed, and producing the further effect of fomenting Communism which is already rife in the great mass of the people.

He adds that in the bombardment of Rome on March 18th, the homes of numerous civilians were hit, while the large general hospital of Rome, known as the "Policlinico", as well as other smaller hospitals, was seriously damaged. Because of this fact, many persons were killed outright, and the necessary work of providing medical assistance for the wounded and the dying was rendered particularly difficult.

The Cardinal Secretary avails himself of this present communication to remark the fact that Allied aircraft still fly over the territory of the Vatican City State. His Eminence wishes to bring this to the attention of the United States Government, which has given repeated assurances that the neutrality of the Vatican would be duly respected, particularly in view of the danger of crashing planes, or of the accidental or forced release of bombs in an emergency.

With sentiments of high personal regard and with every best wish I remain

Sincerely yours,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

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740.0011 EW 1939/34370

*Memorandum by the Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to Mr. Myron C. Taylor, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII*<sup>22</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1944.

Inasmuch as the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States in Vatican City has communicated to the Cardinal Secretary of State the exact text of the statements issued by the President of the United States and the Honorable Secretary of State on March 13th and 14th with reference to the attitude of the Allies regarding the City of Rome, the Holy See wishes to take this occasion to recall certain considerations of paramount importance, even though it has already had occasion to stress these points in previous communications.

1) The City of Rome is not a "military center". To qualify it as such can easily give rise to equivocations, and thus open the way to dangerous exaggerations as was the case with Monte Cassino, which was erroneously described as "a German fortress".

2) While it does not pretend to question the value of considerations of "military necessity", the Holy See nevertheless wishes to observe that these considerations cannot prescind from higher considerations based on the historical, moral, and religious order, and that in all military operations there must be scrupulous regard for whatever is

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<sup>22</sup> Copy sent to Department from Mr. Taylor's office on April 6, 1944.

not a military objective, since with the proper precautions such objectives can be segregated from others having no military value.

3) Responsibility for the irreparable destruction of Rome and its monuments and for the killing of innocent victims will inevitably fall back on those who actually carry out these acts, no matter what reasons may be adduced to the contrary.

4) The Holy Father regards it as his sacred and bounden duty to insist on the above-mentioned considerations, first in order to fulfil his obligations as Bishop of Rome and Supreme Shepherd of the Catholic world, and likewise because of his fatherly interest in the true welfare of the American people. Military operations at variance with the principles previously enunciated provide the enemies of the Allies with most potent weapons of propaganda, and at the same time furnish the foundation for bitter recriminations in the future.

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865.413/31

*The Secretary of State to the Irish Minister (Brennan)*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1944.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Minister of Ireland and has the honor to refer to his note of March 15, 1944 containing a message from the Irish Prime Minister to the President of the United States. The message was delivered to the President and he has requested that the following reply be made to Mr. de Valera:

“I have received through your Minister your recent communication concerning the danger which now threatens the city of Rome. I share your concern for the preservation of that ancient monument of our common civilization and faith.

“It is well known that American military authorities in Italy are committed to a policy of avoiding damage to religious shrines and historical monuments to the extent humanly possible in modern warfare. This applies to the city of Rome as well as to other parts of Italy where the forces of the United Nations are engaged in active fighting. We have tried scrupulously—often at considerable sacrifice—to spare religious and cultural monuments and we shall continue to do so.

“However, in addressing an appeal to the Government of the United States to preserve Rome from destruction, you are, of course, aware that the Germans, occupying the Italian capital by force, are using to the limit of its capacities the communication network and other facilities of Rome to further a purely German military operation. If the German forces were not entrenched in Rome, no question would arise concerning the city’s preservation.

“I note that you have sent a similar communication to the German Government. The fate of Rome rests in that quarter.”

740.0011 EW 1939/38820: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 4, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 4:48 p. m.]

2067. Tittmann's 101, March 25.

(1) I trust Department has received my British colleague's telegrams reporting air attacks on Rome of March 14 (my 89, March 15<sup>23</sup>) and of March 18 (my 97, March 20<sup>23</sup>) which I asked to have repeated to Washington.

Many civilian lives were lost when bombs were dropped during these raids in residential districts. From all reports military effects were negligible especially in March 18 raid when only two bombs fell within enclosure of Macao barracks which apparently was main target. This last raid was carried out by waves of medium or light bombers between 3 and 4 o'clock in afternoon when population accustomed to morning intrusions was not expecting and latter circumstance may have had something to do with large number casualties. Some witnesses suggest that one wave ran into cloud over target but this has not been confirmed. Although from point of view of civilian devastation this was most severe of recent attacks on Rome, it has never been mentioned insofar as I am aware in all Allied communiqué or commentary.

While it is of course impossible for me to pass judgment on military value of such raids I do feel it my duty even at risk repetition to report that in opinion of our best friends here moral damage done to our cause for [*far*] outweighs possible military advantages. These friends insist raids of this nature in which the people are unable to perceive any military gain for Allies in compensation for their sufferings have to a large extent already turned public opinion against us and have thus played squarely into hands of our enemies. They feel much same way even with regards to our earlier attacks on marshalling yards, et cetera, in periphery of the city where military objectives although sometimes obtained were reliably reported to have suffered far less than surrounding civilian quarters.

Rome has now become practically a besieged city over-populated with insufficient public services and a food problem that is daily causing increased alarm (bread ration was reduced to 100 grams per day as of March 25). Prolongation of this situation, our friends say, has brought on state of demoralization and exhaustion among population and as a result there is grave danger that desire for liberation by Allies will give way to longing for relief from present troubles no matter by what agency. Our friends conclude that under these circumstances continuation of air attacks in which civilian populations

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<sup>23</sup> Not printed.

are principal sufferers can only lead to complete collapse of pro-Ally sentiment. While much of pessimism in foregoing picture is undoubtedly well founded I nevertheless feel confident once Allies are here spirits will rise again and past disappointments will be forgotten.

(2) On March 20 Germans here announced steps would be taken to avoid still further use of Rome as transit center for their troops and material (see my 101 [102])<sup>24</sup> and according to reliable reports since then far fewer German soldiers and less material have in fact been noticed in streets. Since then also there have been no air attacks on Rome district and air alarms which previously were averaging 4 or 5 daily have practically ceased. Even Fascist plane popularly known as "Black Widow" and which is believed to have been responsible for bombs dropped on several occasions in past in and around Vatican City seems to have abandoned its frequent "terroristic" night flights over Rome and Vatican City.

The concurrence of German announcement and absence of raids has had [led?] population to assume that some sort of agreement has been concluded whereby Rome will no longer be bombed. However, evidence so far available suggests German action was unilateral. Cardinal Secretary of State today told my British colleague and myself that about fortnight ago German Ambassador had brought him message from Kesselring<sup>25</sup> that Germans were taking steps to make Rome an open city. Cardinal said that he had asked Ambassador to obtain confirmation of this from his Government but that he had heard nothing further. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 EW 1939/33860: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 4, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received April 7—7:11 a. m.]

2073. Tittmann's 102, March 25, refers his 101, March 25.

From reliable source I understand that chief of German Press Bureau in Rome made following statement to correspondents March 20.

"Activity of Holy Father for protection of Rome as open city is continuing; however, attitude of Anglo-Saxons has in no way changed.

As far as Germans are concerned today as in past full recognition of Rome as open city is maintained and in order to avoid misunderstandings in this regard Germans will take another forward step

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<sup>24</sup> See *infra*.

<sup>25</sup> Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, German Commanding General of the Southwestern Theater of War.



and at cost of another sacrifice will avoid Rome as zone of transit for military movements and their own soldiers on leave will no longer be permitted to pass through or stop anywhere in Rome. Sacrifice of Germans is all the more noteworthy in that the roads around Rome are almost impracticable. In spite of this German decision will be fully carried out."

Impression reliable correspondents present was apparently (1) Germans wished it to be understood decision was theirs alone and had nothing to do with efforts of Pope, (2) decision would take effect immediately, (3) German measure which would appear to include as well removal from Rome of military stores and headquarters would be carried out within week.

Until now there has been no public recognition by Germans of Rome as open city although about 10 days ago some such intimation was given when German controlled Rome press announced that German fighters would no longer rise to meet Allied bombers over city out of respect for open city principle.

There is much speculation why it should have been convenient for German military authorities to make announcement just at this time. In addition to obvious need of Germans to ingratiate themselves with Roman population it has been suggested that they intend in any event soon to withdraw from this area and are endeavoring exploit military necessity for political and propaganda purposes. By taking initiative in agreeing to open city idea they may feel that they have set precedent that will make full use of Rome as military center by Allies politically and morally more difficult and at same time they may hope to gain favor with Catholic countries which have shown themselves interested in preservation of Rome. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 EW 1939/33982b : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, April 14, 1944—3 p. m.

2958. The preservation of Rome has been raised with this Government recently by the Irish and Spanish<sup>26</sup> Governments, by numerous appeals from the Catholic hierarchy in Central and South America and Australia, and is constantly kept before the Department by the Apostolic Delegate and the Holy See.

The recent offer of the Spanish Government to act as intermediary with the German Government to spare Rome the consequences of war was referred, with a communication from the Holy See on the same

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<sup>26</sup> See airgram A-219, April 26, to Madrid, p. 1297.

subject, to Admiral Leahy and the United States Chiefs of Staff on March 27.

General Marshall<sup>27</sup> replied on April 8 in the following sense:

The British have constantly objected to making Rome an open city on the grounds of military considerations as indicated in a letter of March 9 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff would welcome an opportunity to examine any proposal looking to the preservation of Rome from damage or at least placing the responsibility therefor on the Germans which might be put forward by General Wilson, by the British Chiefs of Staff or by the British Government, should the British change their attitude in view of recent developments. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff know no military reason why the question should not be taken up with the British Government on the political side, however, although they do not feel justified on military grounds in reopening the question with the British military authorities at this time.

The Under Secretary and his party have background information on the open city question of Rome with the exception of these more recent developments outlined above.

You should see Mr. Eden<sup>27a</sup> at an early date and discuss this question with him. Inform him of the concern of this Government and of a large group of Americans for the preservation of the monumental city of Rome. Inform him of the willingness of our military authorities to examine any proposal which the British military authorities might put forward looking to an agreement for the demilitarization of Rome and its recognition as an open city. Express the earnest hope of this Government that some means may be found to save Rome from further damage or, if that is not possible, at least to place the responsibility for further destruction squarely on the Germans. A possible solution may be that which the President discussed with the British Chiefs of Staff in Tehran last December. The Under Secretary has information concerning this plan.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/33642

*The Secretary of State to the Apostolic Delegate at Washington  
(Cicognani)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP: I have received your two letters respectively dated March 18 and 22, 1944 with further reference to aerial attacks on Rome.

You may rest assured that your communications have been receiving appropriate consideration.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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<sup>27</sup> Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

<sup>27a</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

740.0011 EW 1939/34038: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 22, 1944—9 a.m.

[Received 3:13 p. m.]

2569. This is Tittmann's 129, April 10.

My 102, March 25. Cardinal Secretary of State gave my British colleague and myself following summary of unsigned statement handed him by German Ambassador to Holy See in name of his Government on March 27:

"According to information furnished officially by German Ambassador to Secretariat of State:

1. Quartering of detachments of troops as well as any installation of services or supplies for German armed forces in Rome is forbidden. As sole exception permanent hospitals occupied by wounded soldiers and prisoners of war as well as small forces of German police are remaining in Rome.

2. The movement of reinforcements and supplies for German front is not taking place through the city.

3. In principle access to City of Rome forbidden to all members of German armed forces. Only individual persons who have business to transact with offices of Italian administration and exclusively in interest of welfare and security of population may on presentation of a document issued by a high authority of German Command enter City of Rome.

4. Consequently eventual air attacks on city would result in civilian objectives only being hit."

When I observed that it seemed rather odd to me that such a statement as that contained in paragraph 4 should have been included in German document Cardinal admitted this had been added verbally by Ambassador.

It seems likely that Holy See hoped to receive from German Government confirmation of a more formal and detailed nature but when it was realized this was not to be forthcoming decided to pass on instead Weizsaecker's statement to Osborne<sup>28</sup> and myself.

I took occasion to say to Cardinal that rumors to effect that agreement had been reached between belligerent parties whereby Rome would not be bombed in future were still circulating with insistence but that I knew nothing of such an agreement. I remarked that consequently I would not be surprised if bombardments were resumed from one moment to another should Allies consider such action necessary. Cardinal replied he hoped good will on both sides would continue but that in any event there had been no change in attitude of Holy See so often made known in past; namely, that irrespective of questions

<sup>28</sup> Sir Francis D. G. Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See.

of military objectives Rome should not be bombed because of its special position.

Repeated to Algiers. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/34041 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 22, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received April 22—4:23 p. m.]

2580. This is Tittmann's 131, April 13.

My 116, April 2.<sup>29</sup> Since Holy See had apparently received no communication from us presenting our side of case in matter of bombing of Monte Cassino, I decided to leave informally with Monsignor Tardini, Under Secretary of State, substance of Department's 868, March 6, to Bern (received here April 1).<sup>29</sup> This I did on April 3.

I have now received a memorandum (*appunto*) dated April 12 from Secretariat of State stating that after taking note of report of Allied Commanders in the field as furnished by me, Holy See can only confirm what it had already told me, namely that some Moxas [*Monks?*] and the Abbot remained in Abbey up to last moment ever watchful that nothing might compromise safety of Monastery; and that all of these without hesitation both orally and in writing have given formal assurances to Holy See that no German soldier or combattant nor observer was inside precincts of Abbey and that no military installations were there.

Memorandum is first official document I have received from Holy See on subject. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

740.0011 European War 1939/34006 : Airgram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Spain (Hayes)* <sup>30</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1944—4:25 p. m.

A-219. On March 23 the Spanish Ambassador<sup>31</sup> left with Mr. Long<sup>32</sup> the following memorandum:

"The plight of Rome causes such a profound impression not only on the Spanish Catholic circles but on the whole world in general, that

<sup>29</sup> Not printed.

<sup>30</sup> In telegram 1445, April 26, 6 p. m., the Department reported the substance of this telegram to Bern for Tittmann, and in telegram 1444, April 26, 5 p. m., instructed Tittmann to bring it to the attention of the Cardinal Secretary of State (740.0011 European War 1939/34006).

<sup>31</sup> Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.

<sup>32</sup> Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State.

the Government of Spain has entrusted me to approach the American Government to see whether it would be possible to do something to spare the Eternal City the consequences of war. The Government of Spain wishes the American Government to state upon what conditions the bombardment of Rome could be avoided, with the intention to submit them to the Axis Powers in an effort conducive to that end.

"This suggestion has no political significance at all, since it is only based on humanitarian principles and sentimental reasons."

On April 6, Mr. Long made reply to the foregoing in the terms set forth in the following memorandum of conversation between him and the Spanish Ambassador:

"The Spanish Ambassador came in at my request. Some two weeks ago he had left with me a memorandum from his government requesting that we advise the Spanish Government what we would require the German troops to do in order for us to refrain from military activity against Rome. Not having answered the inquiry and the Ambassador not having called since, I deemed it advisable to make some response to him, particularly so since he had informally and incidentally discussed the matter with Mr. Dunn<sup>33</sup> recently.

"I told the Ambassador that the inquiry that he had made did not offer a practical solution of the problem. The German authorities knew very well what they should do in the way of evacuating Rome and it was not practical for us to specify things which they should do since they already knew.

"The Ambassador asked whether our position was related to the provisions of the Hague Convention.<sup>34</sup> I replied that irrespective of the Hague Convention and our known desire to refrain from damaging unnecessarily civilian populations and particularly places of historic interest like Rome, it resolved itself into an application by the enemy of his own military resources in any locality, whether it be Rome, or Florence or some other city elsewhere or whether it be the area around the city. It was the question of the uses to which these places were put, and the Germans knew just as well as we know what uses they are put to by them and what is necessary for them to do to prevent the effects of military activity against them as an armed force."

The foregoing is sent for your information as the Department desires that you should know the exact terms of reply made to the Spanish Ambassador, which you are authorized in your discretion to disclose to appropriate high officials in case there should come to your knowledge any distorted version of this Government's position.

HULL

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<sup>33</sup> James C. Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs.

<sup>34</sup> Reference is presumably made to article XXV of the Annex of the Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land, which provided: "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." *Foreign Relations*, 1907, pt. II, pp. 1204, 1212.

740.0011 European War 1939/34006

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Shaw)*

[WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1944.

I called on the Apostolic Delegate this morning and gave him the copies of the Spanish Ambassador's memorandum and the memorandum of Mr. Long's conversation with the Ambassador both on the subject of the problem of the bombing of Rome. I explained to the Delegate that, in view of the many references to this matter in the press both at home and abroad, we had felt that it would be wise to let him have the actual text of the documents. He expressed appreciation of our thoughtfulness and went on to ask what I thought would be the attitude of the Department if neutral representatives, presumably the Swiss, after proper examination reported that all measures had been taken to demilitarize Rome. I said that I was not in any position to express an opinion on this idea and that all that I could do was to draw his attention to the Department's position as defined in Mr. Long's conversation with the Spanish Ambassador.

G. HOWLAND SHAW

740.0011 European War 1939/34041 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1944—1 p. m.

1550. For Tittmann. Your 131, April 13—Bern's 2580, April 22. With the concurrence of the War Department you may in your discretion acknowledge the Vatican's memorandum of April 12 repeating that the Allied Commanders in the field have unquestionable evidence that the Abbey of Monte Cassino formed part of the German defensive system.<sup>35</sup> We have no further comments to make at this time.

Sent to Bern, repeated to Algiers.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/34266

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 5, 1944.

The Spanish Ambassador came in this afternoon at his request and referred again to several conversations he had had with me on the

<sup>35</sup> For a discussion of this subject, see Martin Blumenson, *Salerno to Cassino*, in the official Army history *United States Army in World War II* (in preparation).

subject of Rome and in the course of which he had stated that his government would be glad to be of service in making arrangements for the safety of Rome if the United States would advise what it was that the Germans would be required to do in order to render Rome in such a situation to be satisfactory from a military point of view to the United States.

The Ambassador said that he had now heard again from his government. Senator Bridges<sup>36</sup> had written a letter to the President in which he had stated that a commission might be set up to make a finding as to the situation of Rome and what was necessary at the present time in order to prevent either belligerent from causing destruction to Rome. He said that the Secretary of State had made some reply to Senator Bridges. Carrying that thought a little farther his own government had instructed him to approach the American Government and to say that if the American Government could accede to the appointment of such a commission the Spanish Government would be very glad to see it done and thought that the work of such a body would be more authoritative and satisfactory if done in connection with the Holy See. So his government had directed him to make the suggestion that such a commission be approved by the United States with the Pope himself as Director of the Commission. It would eventually result in the Pope himself making the findings and certifying to the interested governments the situation in Rome.

The Ambassador further stated that his government had advised him that the Holy See had advised the Spanish Government that the Holy Father would be glad to serve as the Director of such a commission.

The Ambassador further stated that the Irish Minister had had some conversations with Mr. Dunn, acting for the Secretary of State, and that he had been informed of the substance of that conversation. This conversation did not relate to that but was a new proposal the Spanish Government was making.

I thanked the Ambassador for bringing the matter again to our attention and told him that we felt that his government was taking its position from humanitarian motives and with a view to the special nature of the city of Rome. I further stated that I would like the Ambassador to express to his government the thought that the American Government felt very keenly about the special nature of the city of Rome. We had always felt that way. At the time of the last approach the Ambassador made on the general subject we had taken the position that while we appreciated the attitude of his government our answer must be that the Germans knew themselves what they

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<sup>36</sup> Styles Bridges, Senator from New Hampshire.

were doing in the city of Rome which was objectionable from the military point of view as we saw it and that they knew as well as we knew what they would have to cease doing in Rome.

The proposal now made by the Ambassador would receive the serious consideration of the Department of State and at request we would talk with him again as soon as practicable.

B[RECKINRIDGE] L[ONG]

740.0011 EW 1939/34173c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 6, 1944—midnight.

1587. For Tittmann. For your secret information we would of course observe with interest the activities of any neutral commission which might be established with a view to saving Rome from the ravages of war. Bearing this in mind you should seek an early occasion for conversation with the Cardinal Secretary of State and in the course of your visit, but not indicating it as the reason for seeking the appointment, you should show discreet interest in the current rumors concerning the possible setting up of such a commission. You should not in any way convey the impression that you or your Government are now promoting or sponsoring the formation of the commission or that, if it were established, its recommendations might be acceptable to us.

You might mention in your discretion that should the commission be established you believe that the United States which has always shared the anxiety of the Holy Father for the preservation of Rome, would observe the functions of such a commission with interest.

Please report by telegraph the reaction of the Vatican with your comments on any current report in Vatican circles concerning steps which the Vatican may be contemplating or now taking toward the formation of such a commission and the extent to which it is believed that the Pope might be inclined to participate.

HULL

740.0011 European War 1939/34195: Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, May 9, 1944—11 p. m.

[Received May 9—10:03 p. m.]

2939. Tittmann's 162, May 3.

I have now received a note dated May 2 from Holy See regarding Allied air attack on convoy of 52 Vatican motor vehicles reported in



my 161, May 3.<sup>38</sup> Note begins by stating that unfortunately it has not so far been possible to put an end to these attacks which are a source of injury and constitute a serious threat to functioning of Vatican truck service. This service is employed solely for urgent needs of Vatican City State and charitable work of Holy Father in behalf of city of Rome which is in his diocese. After reciting with only slight variations details of attack as already reported note states that in view of perfect visibility, the noonday hour, the low altitude at which aircraft were flying and previous warning given of dates and itinerary of convoy in question (see my 148, April 26<sup>38</sup>) positive identification of Vatican column should have been a simple matter and that consequently the fact cannot be explained unless by admitting either deliberate aggression or at least extreme negligence and carelessness on part of aviators.

Note goes on to say that Holy See feels obliged furthermore to call attention in following manner to seriousness of situation and of consequences which may fatally result from repetition of such occurrences:

(a) Holy See which has suffered losses in personnel and vehicles in connection with this humanitarian work of relief cannot conceal its pained astonishment and disillusionment at repetition of such attacks on its convoys, attacks which can only be regarded as prejudicial to moral prestige of Allies.

(b) The disorders which might at any moment break out in city as result of hunger would have their inevitable and immediate reaction in Vatican City itself: The security of its inhabitants, the members of Diplomatic Corps there residing and sacred person of Holy Father himself would all be exposed to obvious peril. If unfortunately something like this should happen the Catholic and civilized world would certainly be disturbed thereby and in ensuing public controversy on the matter responsibility could be easily laid partly to fact that city was deprived of last means of subsistence left to it by occupying power.

A famine with all its terrible and unpredictable consequences impends over city of Rome whose civilian population as a result of war has increased to almost two million inhabitants helpless unconcerned in conduct of war and a great many of them destitute. There is no other means of supplying the vast city with food except by truck and to this service Vatican vehicles have generously contributed. It seems unbelievable that Allies could wish to deprive population of this ultimate means of subsistence.

Note concludes with request that assurances be given to Holy See such as to enable it not to suspend, because of the very serious risks of life and Vatican property, so urgent and charitable a service and

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<sup>38</sup> Not printed.

asks for my intervention in order that those serious anxieties may be removed.

Repeated to Algiers. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 EW 1939/34208 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, May 10, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 3:40 p. m.]

2948. This is Tittmann's 163, May 3; my 162, May 3.

1. Tone of Vatican note reveals not only indignation because of circumstances of attack which seems inexplicable to Vatican officials but also serious apprehension whether under present circumstances it will be possible to continue Vatican truck service on which provisioning of Vatican City and civilian population of Rome largely depends (see my 159, April 29<sup>39</sup>). I am told drivers of Vatican trucks are thoroughly frightened and may even decline further to risk their lives unless some assurance can be obtained with regard to their safety. Should it be found necessary to suspend Vatican truck service it is hardly an exaggeration to say gravest consequences would ensue both within and without Vatican City.

2. There are indications that the Pope himself has taken matter very much to heart. Obviously at insistence of Holy Father, Montini<sup>40</sup> invited Osborne and myself to accompany him and Galeazzi<sup>41</sup> to roof of St. Peter's in order that we might see for ourselves to what extent Vatican colors on trucks defiling in St. Peter's Square below were recognizable. Osborne could not go but I went and while I was obliged to admit colors could easily be distinguished at least from that height I pointed out recognition was probably more difficult from fast moving aircraft. I also mentioned that enemy would always be able to disguise his own vehicles by painting them yellow and white.

3. I notified Vatican in writing on February 24 and again on April 28 that immunity could not be given because of difficulties of identification. Nevertheless, Vatican continues to send me advance notice of departures of convoys which I telegraph to Department. As it occurs to me that this may be wasted effort please let me know if Department prefers that I discontinue sending such messages.

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<sup>39</sup> Not printed.

<sup>40</sup> Msgr. Giovanni Batista Montini, Papal Under Secretary of State.

<sup>41</sup> Enrico Pietro Galeazzi, Director General of the Technical and Economic Services of the Vatican.

4. My British colleague's telegrams Nos. 309 and 310 of May 3 on subject of attack were marked for urgent repetition to Washington.<sup>42</sup> Repeated Algiers. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 European War 1939/34208: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1944—3 p. m.

1646. For Tittmann. Competent authorities state that you should as heretofore continue to notify us immediately by telegraph of Vatican's advance notices to you of departures of its convoys (Bern's 2948, May 10—your 163, May 3). Such action on your part will not constitute guarantee of desired immunity but your telegrams will be relayed to the competent Allied Commander for his information.

For your own secret information, competent authorities do not wish to prescribe any rules as to how much advance notice Vatican should give in such cases. However, you will understand that unavoidable delays in the transmission and relaying of your telegrams make it desirable to have as long a notice as possible in each case.

Sent to Bern; repeated to Algiers.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/34195: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1944—5 p. m.

1649. For Tittmann. Bern's 2939, May 9—your 162, May 3. In reply to a similar note received from the Apostolic Delegate the Department is informing him today that the competent Allied Commander has been telegraphically advised of this matter through military channels with a view to his taking such action as may be possible to ensure immunity of Vatican motor truck convoys engaged in conveying food supplies to Rome. The Department is now advised that a communication has been received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff stating that they are conducting a thorough investigation of the methods by which immunity from attack for Vatican convoys might be effected.

You should acknowledge the Vatican's note of May 2 in the above sense, stating that this matter is receiving the sympathetic consideration of the Allied military authorities.

Repeated to Algiers.

HULL

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<sup>42</sup> Copies of two telegrams dated May 3, presumably Nos. 309 and 310, presented to the Department by the British Embassy on May 8, 1944, not printed.

740.0011 EW 1939/33982b Suppl. : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom  
(Winant)*

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1944—6 p. m.

3801. Personal for the Ambassador. We are most anxious to obtain at the earliest possible moment the reaction of the British Government to the views set forth in my 2958 of April 14, 3 p. m. in regard to possible measures for the preservation of Rome.

The Allied offensive in Italy announced in the afternoon communiqué from Naples make this matter exceedingly urgent.

The most important development since our telegram to you of April 14 was a proposal made to this Government on May 5 by the Spanish Ambassador<sup>43</sup> who, under instructions from his Government, stated that the Spanish Government would be willing to be of service in making arrangements for the safety of Rome if the United States would indicate what it is that the Germans would be required to do in order to place Rome in a situation which would be satisfactory to the Allied military authorities. The Spanish Ambassador also said that if the appointment of a Commission for the protection of Rome would be acceptable to the United States the Spanish Government would be glad to see it organized with the participation of the Holy See. Presumably the Spanish Government made a similar proposal to the British Government.

The Spanish Government's proposal was forwarded to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff where it is now receiving consideration.

We have been informally advised that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff see no imperative military reason why a proposal could not be considered to declare Rome an open city with a reservation of transit rights for both sides. Naturally we have no means of knowing whether Germany would agree to such a proposal but if the Germans rejected it the responsibility for further destruction in Rome would be placed squarely on Germany. You may of course inform Mr. Eden about the views on the military aspect of the question which we have received informally from our Chiefs of Staff.

Please telegraph the results of your conversation with Mr. Eden at the earliest possible moment, together with your comments and recommendations.

HULL

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<sup>43</sup> See memorandum of May 5 by the Assistant Secretary of State, p. 1299.

740.0011 EW 1939/34272 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 16, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

1599. From Murphy.<sup>44</sup> Cosmed No. 108, May 15, informs General Wilson from Chiefs of Staff that the State Department has raised the question of declaring Rome an open city subject to reservation of transit rights for both belligerents. This question was discussed at AFHQ this afternoon and Macmillan<sup>45</sup> and I were called on for advice in drafting a reply. It would be appreciated if the Department would consult the text of the message under reference which was repeated to Britman [*British?*], Washington as No. 2571 from AFKSO [*AFHQ?*] dated May 15 in which were incorporated three courses of action suggested by the Foreign Office.

It would have been exceedingly helpful in advising the Supreme Allied Commander regarding the draft of his reply if I had had the benefit of Department's thinking on this subject. The consensus of opinion at AFHQ is opposed to a declaration of Rome as an open city and there is also great doubt regarding the eventual implications of such a declaration. Allied military authorities insist that they must not be deprived of use of transit facilities through Rome after that city is reached by our forces. They feel that a declaration by the Allies now may be used later to the advantage of the enemy after its capture by us.

The matter will be discussed again tomorrow and a text approved for reply to the above telegram. In the absence of Department's advice regarding its desires I shall assume that it wishes a form of public statement which would have a desirable political effect without the forfeit of any essential military requirements.

Repeated to Naples for Kirk.<sup>45a</sup> [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

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740.0011 EW 1939/34272 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1944—midnight.

1544. For Murphy. Your telegram concerning the question of declaring Rome an open city (your 1599, May 16, 10 p. m.) was delayed

<sup>44</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>45</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>45a</sup> Alexander C. Kirk, American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy.

in transmission and did not reach us until today. We have learned informally from the United States Chiefs of Staff that the British message to Washington referred to in the first paragraph of your message has not yet been made available to the United States Chiefs of Staff.

On April 14, 1944 we sent a telegram to the Embassy at London reading as follows:

(Code Room: Here quote Department's 2958, April 14, 1944, 3 p. m. to London)

On May 12, 1944 we sent a further telegram to London marked Personal for the Ambassador reading as follows:

(Code Room: Here quote Department's 3801, May 12, 1944, 6 p. m. to London)

It is believed that these two telegrams will give you full information in regard to our attitude on this whole question. Your attention is invited to the fact that the suggestion that a proposal might be considered to declare Rome an open city with a reservation of transit rights for both sides originated in the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff after a full appraisal of the military aspects of the question, and not as General Wilson was informed in the State Department.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/6-144

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Cardinal Secretary of State (Maglione)*

#### MEMORANDUM

The Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America to the Holy See<sup>46</sup> refers to the Memorandum of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness dated April 12, 1944 on the subject of the bombing of the Abbey of Monte Cassino.<sup>46a</sup> It is stated in the Memorandum that up to the last moment some monks and the venerable Abbot remained in the Abbey in order to see that nothing should compromise the safety of the monastery and that all of these have without hesitation, both orally and in writing, formally assured the Holy See that no German soldier, combattant, or observer was inside the precincts of the Abbey and that no military installations were there.

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<sup>46</sup> In the absence of Myron C. Taylor, the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, Mr. Tittmann, Counselor of Embassy at Rome and Mr. Taylor's Assistant, took up residence within Vatican City on December 16, 1941, where he continued his special function in view of Mr. Taylor's absence. On December 24, 1941, Mr. Tittmann was authorized by President Roosevelt to use the rank of "Chargé d'Affaires" and he was thereafter received by Vatican authorities as a member of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See.

<sup>46a</sup> See telegram 2580, April 22, 5 p. m., from Bern, p. 1297.

In acknowledging receipt of the above-mentioned Memorandum the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States of America, under instructions from his Government has the honor to repeat that there is unquestionable evidence in the possession of the Allied Commanders in the field that the Abbey of Monte Cassino formed part of the German defensive system.

VATICAN CITY, May 23, 1944.

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740.0011 EW 1939/34369 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, May 23, 1944—midnight.

[Received May 23—10 p. m.]

3310. This is Tittmann's 184, May 19; Department's 1587, May 6.

Cardinal Secretary of State informs me that establishment of a neutral control commission for demilitarization of Rome would be looked upon with favor by Holy See and that Holy Father would be glad to be represented thereon. On other hand the Cardinal said if our intentions were that such a commission should assume the government of the city the Holy See could not consent to be a party thereto.

I understand on good authority that the formation of a commission of the first type is being discussed by neutral countries at present time and Holy See although unable to take the initiative is desirous that it should be established and start functioning as soon as possible. [Tittmann.]

HARRISON

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740.0011 EW 1939/34223 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1944—10 p. m.

1812. For Tittmann.

(1) Competent military authorities report that question of designating Assisi as a "hospital city" is part of overall problem of safeguarding religious and cultural objects as well as civilian population of Italy. The appropriate theater commander is being furnished for his information and guidance with the information contained in your 152, April 26, which was relayed in Bern's 2976, May 11.<sup>47</sup>

You may inform Holy See in above sense.

(2) For your secret information War Department also stated that a definite policy in this regard will ensue from deliberations now being held in matter of declaring Rome an "open city". Therefore, it is

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

necessary that a definite reply regarding Vatican's request concerning Assisi be withheld until a decision about Rome has been reached. You will be informed of decision.

Sent to Bern, repeated to Naples for Kirk.

HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/34403 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received May 29—12: 40 p. m.]

4312. This refers to Embassy's 4148, May 23, 5 p. m. to the Department and the Department's 4129, May 24, midnight.<sup>48</sup> I have received the following communication from Mr. Eden:

"You will remember that following Mr. Winant's letters to me of the 8th May, 12th May and 13th May, regarding possible measures for the preservation of Rome, you came to see me on this subject a few days ago.

As I explained, we felt it necessary to consult the British Chiefs-of-Staff, who in their turn wished to obtain the views of General Wilson. I think I cannot do better than to send you a copy of General Wilson's telegram to the Chiefs-of-Staff. You will see that he is opposed to any step which would limit our freedom of action once we reach Rome, and that he recommends the issue of a joint statement on behalf of our two Governments, the intention of which would be to make our position clear in the matter and to place on the Germans the responsibility for any damage which may occur to Rome.

His Majesty's Government, having given full weight to the political as well as the military issues involved, find themselves in agreement with General Wilson's conclusions, and they would propose, therefore, if the United States Government concur, the issue of a public statement by both our Governments on the lines of the enclosed draft, which is a slightly different version to that proposed by General Wilson.

Our idea is that General Wilson would be best able to judge in the light of military developments and prospects the right moment for the issue of this statement.

Perhaps you will be good enough to inform the United States Government of our views and let me know whether they concur in the issue of a public statement, and if so, whether they have any observations to make on the wording."

The text of the proposed Anglo-American statement will follow in my immediately following telegram.

BUCKNELL

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<sup>48</sup> Neither printed.



740.0011 European War 1939/34399 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 29, 1944.

[Received May 29—11:15 a. m.]

4313. The following is the text of an Anglo-American statement regarding the preservation of Rome which has been suggested by the Foreign Office.<sup>49</sup>

“The Allied military authorities, confronted by a ruthless enemy in Italy, are interested solely in the destruction and elimination of the German forces in that country. They have taken, and will continue to take, every possible precaution during the course of their campaign to spare innocent civilians and the cultural and religious monuments of permanent value to civilization. In particular, they are deeply conscious of the unique position occupied by Rome as one of the chief historical, religious, and cultural centers of the world, and of the fact that Rome is the seat of His Holiness the Pope and contains the neutral state of the Vatican City. It is, therefore, the firm intention of the Allied Governments and the Allied military authorities to continue to take every precaution in their power consistent with essential military requirements to safeguard the population of Rome and its historical and religious monuments. The Allies have only taken, and will only take, military action against Rome in so far as the Germans use the city, its railways and its roads, for their military purposes. If the Germans choose to defend Rome, the Allies will be obliged to take appropriate military measures to eject them. It is, therefore, the sincere hope of His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government that the enemy will not make this ill-considered choice. When the Allied armies themselves occupy Rome they will be in a position effectively to defend it from any attack which the Germans may be able to mount by land or from the air.”

BUCKNELL

740.0011 European War 1939/34403 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bucknell)*

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1944—11 a. m.

4343. 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved issuance of the Anglo-American statement (your 4312 and 4313 May 29) with the elimination of the last sentence. This meets with the Department’s approval.

2. Department concurs that statement should be issued by General Wilson on behalf of the British and United States Governments as such time as he may consider most appropriate in the light of military developments.

<sup>49</sup> The joint Anglo-American statement issued on June 3 through the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, was substantially the same as this except that it omitted the last sentence of this suggested text.

3. Department would like to be informed in advance of the place, date, hour and manner of release of statement, or if this is not feasible Department should be immediately informed of these details when statement is released.

HULL

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740.0011 EW 1939/34694a : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Acting Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1944—11 p. m.

1807. For Murphy. Department's telegram no. 1722, June 1<sup>50</sup> and memoranda on this subject which have been furnished you. You are familiar with the Department's efforts to spare Rome from destruction incidental to the present military campaign. The new military developments bring, if anything, increased responsibility to the Allied armies and governments to protect the cultural and religious monuments of Rome and Vatican City. In advising the Supreme Allied Commander on these questions, you should adopt the position that we should take all possible steps to prevent Rome being considered a military target by the enemy. It is recognized that a limited number of Allied forces must be kept in Rome at least in the early stages to maintain order and to distribute supplies to the civilian inhabitants. It is understood that it is necessary to establish Allied Military Government for this purpose at least for a limited period. It is hoped, however, that Italian administrative and police facilities will be used to the extent possible and that there will be as little evidence of "Allied occupation" of the city as possible. You should discourage any attempt of AAI<sup>51</sup> headquarters or AFHQ to establish themselves in Rome. The establishment of ammunition dumps or other military supplies within the city should likewise be avoided. If possible, the use of Rome by the Military should be limited to transit of troops and material by rail and highway, and no Allied troops except those necessary for policing and feeding the population should be quartered within the city limits. Rest camps within the city should likewise be kept at a minimum. If it is ultimately considered desirable for political and administrative reasons to move the seat of the Italian Government back to Rome, it is suggested that the three service ministries (War, Navy and Aeronautics) be established elsewhere as is now the case in Southern Italy.

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<sup>50</sup> Not printed.

<sup>51</sup> Allied Armies in Italy.

You should keep the Department fully informed of any plans concerning the use of Rome which in your opinion might tempt the Germans to bomb it as a military objective.

Sent to Algiers for Murphy, repeated to Naples for Kirk, and London.

STETTINIUS

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740.0011 European War 1939/34815

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to submit the enclosed Memorandum which contains the substance of a communication just received from His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, in reference to the Allied occupation of Rome.

With the assurances of my highest considerations, and of my deep personal regard, I remain

Yours very sincerely,

A. G. CICOGNANI  
*Archbishop of Laodicea*

[Annex]

*The Apostolic Delegate at Washington (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

MEMORANDUM

His Eminence, the Cardinal Secretary of State, has expressed the deep concern of the Holy See due to the continued presence of large bodies of Allied troops within the city limits of Rome, together with large quantities of military equipment. His Eminence voices the fear that the presence of these troops and equipment, and the constant use of the city of Rome for the transportation of war materials, may offer occasion for the further endangering the city, whose safety has thus far been assured only by the greatest effort.

The Apostolic Delegate in the United States has been directed by His Eminence respectfully to present to the Allied Governments, and the Allied High Command, the plea of the Holy See that the military authorities limit the troops within Rome to those necessary for police duty, and that they avoid the accumulation of war matériel and the transportation of the same through the city proper. It is observed that the road net-works outside and around the city of Rome are sufficiently developed to maintain military traffic in all directions without resorting to direct transit through the Eternal City.

In presenting the foregoing the Apostolic Delegate fosters the hope that the request of His Eminence will be given every possible consideration in order that the safety of Rome may not be further threatened.

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944.

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740.0011 European War 1939/34815

*The Secretary of State to the Apostolic Delegate at Washington  
(Cicognani)*

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1944.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP: I refer to your memorandum of June 12 and your letter of June 17, 1944,<sup>52</sup> in which, in connection with the military operations of the Allied forces in Italy, you express the concern of the Holy See for the safety of the Italian capital and request that this matter be brought to the attention of the competent authorities with a view to ensuring the protection of Rome.

I am glad to inform you that your communications, which have received the Department's most careful attention, have been duly transmitted to the competent authorities for their consideration and such action as may be deemed appropriate.

I shall communicate with you again on this subject at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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740.0011 European War 1939/34760: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Naples (Brandt)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1944—10 p. m.

301. For Kirk. Department's 274, June 29,<sup>53</sup> to Naples for you.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff having considered substance of your telegram relative to military aspects of Allied occupation of Rome (Naples' 259, June 22<sup>53</sup>) have informed Department:

"Referring to the telegram from Mr. Kirk, attention is invited to the cablegram of Mr. Murphy of June 16, 1944 (Algiers 2034 as repeated to Naples for you)<sup>53</sup> in which the statement is made that the Supreme Allied Commander had established a policy that the Allied troops in Rome will be kept strictly to a minimum in number, and which recites the cogent military reasons for the utilization of the Air Ministry building by the administrative echelon of the headquarters of General Alexander."

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<sup>52</sup> Letter not printed.

<sup>53</sup> Not printed.

2. Recent appeals received by the Department from the Holy See through the Apostolic Delegate at Washington voicing the concern of the Vatican for the safety of Rome in view of the presence there of Allied troops were referred to Joint Chiefs of Staff who in reply have informed Department as follows:

“It is pointed out that as one of the results of the recent successes in our Italian campaign, responsibility for the defense of Rome has now passed to the Allies. The Apostolic Delegate may be assured that the defense of Rome will be conducted with full appreciation of the special position which that city occupies. In this connection, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that the papal authorities appear unduly apprehensive of danger to Rome in view of the present over-all military situation, especially as to the Allied air supremacy over Italy and other military means at hand. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that there is little likelihood of serious German air or other attacks upon the city of Rome now or in the foreseeable future.”

The Apostolic Delegate has been appropriately informed in the foregoing sense. Please inform Tittmann.

Sent to Naples for Kirk, repeated to Algiers for Murphy, and London.

HULL

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**ANGLO-AMERICAN POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE TREATMENT OF  
DIPLOMATS OF ENEMY GOVERNMENTS ACCREDITED TO THE  
VATICAN**

701.6266A/10: Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the French Committee of National  
Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, February 21, 1944—noon.

[Received 7:55 p. m.]

559. With reference to the treatment to be accorded Axis diplomats accredited to the Vatican after the occupation of Rome, the British Foreign Office has recently informed its Ambassador to the Holy See<sup>56</sup> that any such diplomats found outside the Vatican City when Allied troops entered Rome would have to be given the immediate alternative of entering the Vatican City or leaving Italy under safe conduct. At the same time Foreign Office stated that it saw no reason why any diplomats already residing in the Vatican, least of all Allied diplomats, should move out to make room for Axis at present living in Rome proper.

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<sup>56</sup> Sir Francis D. G. Osborne, British Minister to the Holy See.

This matter has been discussed informally with AFHQ<sup>57</sup> and Makins<sup>58</sup> and it is felt here that it would be preferable that Axis diplomats should be given safe conduct home without the option of entering Vatican City. It would appear that from a technical point of view they would lose diplomatic immunity if [apprehended?] outside the limits of Vatican City.

The Department's instructions would be appreciated. Makins is telegraphing Foreign Office in same sense.

CHAPIN

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701.6266A/10 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Wilson)*<sup>59</sup>

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1944—9 p. m.

659. Your 559, February 21, noon. For Reinhardt.<sup>60</sup> The Department believes that the treatment to be accorded by Allied authorities to diplomats of enemy powers accredited to the Holy See should not be less favorable than that accorded to us during the Fascist regime and subsequently during the German occupation of Rome. The former Fascist regime permitted diplomats of nations at war with Italy and accredited to Holy See to move into Vatican City and remain there unmolested. The Department considers that the Germans, Japanese and other enemy diplomatic missions accredited to Holy See should be given the option of entering Vatican City upon the arrival of Allied troops in the Italian capital.

STETTINIUS

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701.6266A/12 : Telegram

*The Minister in Switzerland (Harrison) to the Secretary of State*

BERN, April 22, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received April 22—10:50 a. m.]

2577. This is Tittmann's 126, April 8, reference Department's 917, March 20 to Bern.<sup>60a</sup>

I should like to notify Holy See of our attitude but before doing so I would like to be certain that it is our intention to give enemy diplo-

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<sup>57</sup> Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>58</sup> Roger M. Makins, Assistant to the British Minister Resident (Macmillan) at Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>59</sup> Transmitted as telegram 917, March 20, 1944, to Bern for the Chargé at Vatican City, Harold H. Tittmann.

<sup>60</sup> G. Frederick Reinhardt, Assistant to Robert D. Murphy, the United States Political Adviser at Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>60a</sup> See footnote 59, above.

mats accredited to Holy See option of *leaving Rome altogether* or of moving into Vatican City. Although this seems to be implied in paraphrase of telegram received here it is not entirely clear. Please confirm by telegram. [Tittmann.]

Legation note: paraphrase was clear rendition of original.

HARRISON

701.6266A/12: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1944—6 p. m.

1432. For Tittmann. Your 126, April 8. With regard to enemy diplomats accredited to the Holy See the Department considers that upon arrival of armed forces of the United Nations in the Italian capital such enemy diplomats should be given the option of entering the Vatican City to remain there unmolested or of leaving the Italian capital altogether.

Foregoing is merely for your information and reflects the Department's views only. You should not inform the Vatican.

HULL

701.6266A/13

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 266

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

On February 3rd His Majesty's Minister to the Holy See asked the Cardinal Secretary of State <sup>61</sup> whether the German Ambassador <sup>62</sup> had been displaying any signs of interest in acquiring accommodation in the Vatican City in the event of the Allies capturing Rome. <sup>63</sup> The Cardinal replied in the negative, adding the hope that in such an eventuality Axis diplomatists would not be required to move into the Vatican City. His Majesty's Minister discounted this hope, saying that he thought they most certainly would be required to move. In that case, the Cardinal replied, His Majesty's Minister had better persuade some of his colleagues to move out in order to make place for the Axis representatives.

2. In reporting this conversation to the Foreign Office, His Majesty's Minister observed that none of the diplomatists now resident in the Vatican City would be in a position, or indeed have any desire, to move out in a hurry, and added that he foresaw difficulties over this question. On the other hand, there would be a certain advantage

<sup>61</sup> Luigi Cardinal Maglione.

<sup>62</sup> Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, German Ambassador to the Holy See.

<sup>63</sup> Rome was captured June 4-5, 1944.

in having the Axis representatives outside in Rome rather than within the Vatican City, as their movements would thus be easier to control.

3. In replying to this telegram, the Foreign Office stated that any Axis diplomatists accredited to the Holy See who were found outside the Vatican City when allied troops enter Rome would be given immediately the alternative either of entering the Vatican City or of leaving Italy under safe conduct. The Foreign Office saw no reason why diplomatic representatives already residing in the Vatican, least of all allied representatives, should move out to make place for Axis diplomatists.

4. When the above mentioned views of the Foreign Office were communicated to the Cardinal Secretary of State, the latter pointed out to His Majesty's Minister that His Majesty's Government and other allied governments whose missions were now in the Vatican City had always claimed that the Lateran Treaty<sup>64</sup> provided that diplomatists accredited to the Holy See were to be allowed to maintain their residence in Rome even if other countries were at war with Italy; this contention had always been upheld by the Holy See, which had protested to the Italian Government against the latter's refusal to abide by Article 12 of the Treaty. The Vatican stated that they had explained to the Italian Government that the article in question did not allow of any exceptions or exclude times of war. The Vatican further maintained that His Majesty's Legation had expressly upheld and defended this interpretation of the Article in a note of 1940.

5. The British Security authorities feel that, if Axis diplomatists were to be allowed to enter the Vatican City, they might do harm from there; they have suggested that these agents should be given safe conduct home, without option, on the grounds that technically they lost their diplomatic immunity when apprehended outside the limits of the Vatican City. The Foreign Office agree with this suggestion and also share the Security authorities' objection to leaving enemy diplomatists outside the Vatican City.

6. The Foreign Office agree with the views of the State Department<sup>65</sup> as conveyed to the Minister Resident, Algiers, by his United States colleague<sup>66</sup> at the beginning of this month and propose to instruct His Majesty's Minister to point out to the Holy See that they have overlooked the fact that Article 12 of the Lateran Treaty only established these rights and obligations as between the Vatican and the Italian Government, and not vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The

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<sup>64</sup> For the text of the Lateran Treaty, signed at Rome on February 11, 1929, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. cxxx, p. 791. For the text of the Concordat between the Holy See and Italy signed at Rome, February 11, 1929, see *ibid.*, p. 801.

<sup>65</sup> See telegram 659. March 2, 9 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1315.

<sup>66</sup> Robert D. Murphy.



Italian Government did not carry out their obligations satisfactorily and indeed His Majesty's Government, in their note of 1940, had deplored the fact that the Vatican had been unable to uphold its rights vis-à-vis the Italian Government. As the occupying power, however, His Majesty's Government do not consider themselves bound in any way by the obligations set forth in the Lateran Treaty, at any rate insofar as they may conflict with military and Security considerations. His Majesty's Minister would also point out that owing to the geographical peculiarities of the Vatican City, which make it necessary for many diplomatists accredited to the Holy See to reside outside, His Majesty's Government is prepared to give to any such agent apprehended outside the Vatican City, as a matter of grace rather than of right, the choice of entering the Vatican City or of returning to his own country under safe conduct.

7. His Majesty's Embassy is instructed to ask the State Department whether they concur in the action proposed and also to enquire whether they have been approached in this matter by the Vatican.

8. The Foreign Office add that if instructions on the lines proposed are sent now to His Majesty's Minister, the decision involved will doubtless be communicated by the Vatican to enemy diplomatists accredited to the Holy See but that the disadvantages of this must be weighed against the difficulty of concealing our intentions from the Vatican until the last moment and then of facing them with a serious accommodation problem at short notice after the entry of allied forces into Rome. When His Majesty's Government and the United States Government have reached agreement on this question, it is proposed that appropriate instructions should be sent by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Allied Forces Headquarters.<sup>67</sup>

WASHINGTON, May 17, 1944.<sup>68</sup>

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701.6266A/12: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1944—8 p. m.

1774. For Tittmann. Your 126, April 8, acknowledged in Department's 1432, April 25, to Bern.

Following is substance of proposal which has now been submitted to us by British:

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<sup>67</sup> Marginal note by Franklin C. Gowen of the Division of Southern European Affairs to Hugh S. Fullerton, Chief of the Division: "5-19-44. I think we should get Tittmann's views before taking final action. This is a delicate matter. Draft of teleg. to Tittmann attached. F.C.G."

<sup>68</sup> The *aide-mémoire* was originally dated May 12 as indicated by an obvious erasure of the "2" and the substitution of a "7". British references are to May 12.

1. [Here follows substance of proposal contained in British *aide-mémoire* of May 17, 1944, printed *supra*.]

2. The Department is in general agreement with this proposal but before notifying Vatican desires urgently your reaction and comments and indication whether you have been approached in this matter by the Vatican.

3. Department presumes upon entry of Allied troops into Rome large numbers of persons including some diplomatic missions would leave Vatican City thus making it possible for Axis officials accredited to Holy See to find accommodations in Vatican City. This is mentioned in case Vatican should maintain that it lacks space to accommodate these Axis diplomats.

HULL

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Lot 53 M 1, Miscellaneous Confidential Files 1943 and 1944: Telegram

*Mr. Harold H. Tittmann, Assistant to the Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, to the Secretary of State*<sup>69</sup>

[VATICAN CITY,] June 1, 1944.

198. Department's No. 1774 May 22, 8 p. m. to Bern.

1) I agree with proposal.

2) I have never been approached by Vatican on the subject nor have I discussed it with them. Some months ago Osborne told the Vatican in writing that it was not expected that Axis diplomats would be permitted by the Allies to remain in Rome after the entry of the latter, and received in reply a reminder that when Italy entered the war he and his colleagues had themselves insisted upon remaining in Rome unmolested in accordance with the terms of the Lateran Treaty and had only taken up residence in the Vatican under protest. The Department will remember that in my own case a year and a half later Vatican officials intimated strongly that they preferred to have me move to Switzerland to be accredited to the Nuncio there. It may be taken for granted that the Vatican today would be happy to have the Axis diplomats remain outside. On the other hand there is reason to believe that some if not all of these diplomats will prefer to take up residence in the Vatican City. Undoubtedly the Vatican will agree to receive them if pressed.

3) With regard to paragraph 3 of Department's telegram, in so far as I am aware the only quarters suitable for Axis diplomatic missions are the apartments now occupied by United Nations diplomats.

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<sup>69</sup> This copy, brought to the Department later, bears the following marginal notation: "This telegram did not reach the Department. It was scheduled to go to Bern by courier by Pouch No. 123 which was held at the Vatican State Department for several days and later was withdrawn when there was no possibility of sending mail to Bern."

It is assumed that the latter will leave the Vatican City after the arrival in Rome of the Allies, thus making apartments available to the former, but a reasonable time should be allowed for moving arrangements to be made. Other persons who will presumably leave the Vatican City do not occupy apartments, but are instead lodged here and there with permanent residents. The number of such persons is smaller than is perhaps generally supposed.

TITTMANN

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701.6266A/6-344

*The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Middleton) to Mr. Franklin C. Gowen of the Division of Southern European Affairs*

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1944.

MY DEAR GOWEN: With reference to our conversation yesterday morning I am writing to let you know that we agree with you that there is some apparent discrepancy between paragraph 5 and the last sentence of paragraph 6 of our *Aide-Mémoire* No. 266 of the 12th [17th] May on the subject of Axis Diplomats accredited to the Vatican. The gist lies in the last sentence of paragraph 6: we would like to know whether you agree that any Axis agent apprehended outside the Vatican City should, as a matter of grace rather than of right, be given the choice of entering the Vatican City or returning to his own country under safe conduct. I think it is clear that we do not wish to have such agents living in Rome outside the limits of the Vatican City.<sup>71</sup>

Yours sincerely,

GEORGE H. MIDDLETON

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701.6266A/6-1244

*The Apostolic Delegate in the United States (Cicognani) to the Secretary of State*

No. 171/44

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1944.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: According to a communication which has just come to me from the Cardinal Secretary of State, the Allied Military Police, on June 5th, placed under arrest Mr. Louis Wemmer and Mr. Albrecht von Kessel, respectively Minister Plenipotentiary and Counsellor of the German Embassy to the Holy See. Notwithstanding the repeated requests and remonstrances of the Holy See,

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<sup>71</sup> Two marginal comments are found on this document signed by F[ranklin] C. G[owen]: "Discussed with H[ugh] S. F[ullerton] and agreed to tell Middleton this is acceptable to us"; "Ackn'd to Middleton by phone stating that we agreed."

these diplomats have not yet been released.<sup>72</sup> His Eminence instructs me to bring this matter to the attention of the United States Government and to stress the gravity of this infraction of international law and the need of the prompt release of the above-mentioned officials.

I would add, for your confidential information, that the German Embassy to the Holy See has already lodged vigorous protests with the office of the Cardinal Secretary of State for this violation of diplomatic immunity,<sup>73</sup> and the German Government has likewise remonstrated with the Apostolic Nunciature in Berlin, asking the urgent intervention of the Holy See in order to secure the immediate liberation of the diplomats in question.

With assurances of my sentiments of high personal regard and with every best wish I am

Sincerely yours,

A. G. CICOGNANI

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701.0066A/7-144 : Telegram

*The Acting Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*<sup>74</sup>

ALGIERS, July 1, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 11:55 p. m.]

2221. From Murphy. AFHQ has informed General Alexander's<sup>75</sup> Headquarters that it may be assumed by this time that all enemy diplomats accredited to the Holy See who are not yet inside the Vatican City either cannot be accommodated there or do not wish to enter the city. Accordingly they should be removed to a safe place as soon as appropriate arrangements can be conveniently made and held until provisions can be made for their ultimate repatriation. This is to be carried out in conformity with instructions already issued that due regard should be given to their status as diplomats.

AFHQ has requested a complete list of enemy diplomats to be

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<sup>72</sup> In Note 80176, June 5, 1944 (not printed) the Papal Secretariat of State had requested that the American Chargé (Tittmann) intervene with Allied authorities for the release of Ludwig Wemmer who had been arrested at 7:45 a. m. The following day a similar protest was lodged in Note 80309 (not printed) against the arrest of the German Counselor, Albrecht von Kessel. The Papal Secretary of State (Cardinal Maglione) stated that he could not believe that members of the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See could receive treatment contrary to their diplomatic status, respect for which the Holy See could not fail to defend.

<sup>73</sup> The Swiss Legation, representing German interests in Washington, lodged official protests with the Department of State in memoranda dated June 20 and July 14, 1944; neither printed.

<sup>74</sup> Apparently this telegram was sent in answer to the Department's telegram 176, June 10, 1944, not printed. The Secretary had inquired concerning the present status of Axis diplomats: whether safe conducts to depart from Italy had been authorized or whether they had moved into Vatican City.

<sup>75</sup> Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

repatriated from Vatican which I will report as soon as received.<sup>76</sup>

Sent to Department as No. 2221, repeated to Naples for Kirk as number 27. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

701.6266A/6-1244

*The Secretary of State to the Apostolic Delegate in the United States  
(Cicognani)*

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1944.

MY DEAR ARCHBISHOP: With further reference to your letter of June 12, 1944 (file no. 171/44) concerning the temporary detention by the Allied military authorities of two members of the German Embassy to the Holy See, I am happy to inform you that instructions have gone forward to the Supreme Allied Commander to release these individuals and permit them to enter Vatican City.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

701.0066A/7-744 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Algiers (Lawton) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 7, 1944—noon.

[Received 10:30 p. m.]

2313. From Murphy. Reference my 2221, July 1, 1 p. m. Alexander's Headquarters report that in agreement with Control Commission they plan to arrange transfer to Palermo on July 10 of Axis diplomats to Holy See who have not entered Vatican. Pending repatriation they will be suitably accommodated under guard in Palermo.<sup>77</sup>

In absence of contrary instructions it is intended to release von Kessel to enter Vatican and to send Wemmer and Elling<sup>78</sup> to Palermo since it is considered most desirable to remove these two from Rome as soon as possible<sup>79</sup> and such action will not prejudice their ultimate disposal.

Repeated to Naples for Kirk.<sup>80</sup> [Murphy.]

LAWTON

<sup>76</sup> A marginal note dated July 4, 1944, from Mr. Gowen to Mr. Fullerton reads as follows: "Myron Taylor should know that we agree. We had better get his comments and recommendations, I believe. F.C.G."

<sup>77</sup> The Axis diplomats were housed at the Hotel Miramar at Taormina instead of Palermo as originally planned.

<sup>78</sup> Georg Elling, Attaché of the German Embassy, with the title of Wissenschaftsmitarbeiter.

<sup>79</sup> Both diplomats were under suspicion as being German intelligence agents. Allied Force Headquarters accumulated evidence to show that Elling was a member of the Sicherheitsdienst charged with directing occupational espionage.

<sup>80</sup> Alexander C. Kirk, American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy. Mr. Kirk transmitted the substance of this telegram to Myron C. Taylor at Rome in a letter dated July 8.

701.0066A/7-744 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consul at Naples (Brandt)*

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1944—4 p. m.

326. For Kirk. Algiers 27 to you<sup>81</sup> regarding enemy diplomats accredited to Vatican but who are not yet inside Vatican City.

We agree that such diplomats should either enter Vatican City, if feasible, or that they be removed from Rome as soon as practicable to a safe and suitable place where they would be held, with due regard for their diplomatic status, pending their repatriation under safe conduct.

Please repeat foregoing urgently to Myron C. Taylor (giving him substance of Algiers' aforesaid telegram, if you have not already done so) and inform him that we are anxious to receive his comments by telegraph together with any recommendations which he may wish to submit.<sup>82</sup>

Repeated to Algiers for Murphy.

HULL

701.0065/7-1144

*Memorandum of Conversation by the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] July 11, 1944.

The British Minister, Sir Ronald Campbell,<sup>83</sup> called at his request. He left with me a memorandum on the subject of the diplomatic representatives of the enemy countries in Rome, a copy of which is hereto attached.<sup>84</sup> He said that it had been understood by the British Government that we were in agreement with them that the enemy diplomats accredited to the Vatican would be permitted to enter the Vatican and reside there, but that if they did not take up residence in the Vatican they would be sent back to their respective countries. He said that the Allied military officers in Rome had proceeded to search for and round up the Axis diplomats, carrying out this understanding, but that they had now had word that Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War, had directed the American Army officials not to take part in this search and to refrain from taking any action whatever with regard to these Axis diplomats. He further stated that Mr. Tittmann had moved out of the quarters he had in the Vatican which made available his space for enemy diplomats

<sup>81</sup> Same as telegram 2221 from Algiers, p. 1321.

<sup>82</sup> The substance of this telegram was transmitted to Mr. Taylor at Rome in a letter dated July 8. The Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII arrived in Rome to take up his duties on June 20.

<sup>83</sup> British Chargé.

<sup>84</sup> *Infra.*

accredited to the Vatican to reside within its precincts. He intimated that this was unnecessary, and that it was unfortunate that additional space had been provided for Axis diplomats to reside in the Vatican. I told him that I would be glad to have this matter looked into and see what the circumstances of the situation were.<sup>85</sup>

C[ORDELL] H[ULL]

701.0065/7-1144

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

The views of His Majesty's Government on the treatment to be accorded to Axis diplomats accredited to the Holy See who might be apprehended by the Allied Military forces in Rome, were communicated to the State Department in an *Aide-Mémoire* No. 266 dated the 12th [17th] May. These views were briefly that any Axis diplomat apprehended outside the Vatican City should be given as a matter of grace rather than of right, the choice of entering the Vatican City or of returning to his own country under safe conduct; His Majesty's Government did not feel that they were bound by Article 12 of the Lateran Treaty concluded between the Holy See and the Italian Government, which provided that diplomats accredited to the Holy See were to be allowed to maintain their residence in Rome even if other countries were at war with Italy; at the same time His Majesty's Government saw no reason why diplomatic representatives already residing in the Vatican, least of all Allied representatives, should move out to make way for Axis diplomats. The United States Government were asked whether they agreed that this attitude towards Axis diplomats should be adopted as a joint policy and were prepared to make a joint *démarche* so informing the Vatican authorities.

No written reply was received to the above-mentioned *Aide-Mémoire*, but a member of the British Embassy was given to understand orally that, while the United States Government were disinclined to make a joint *démarche* since they had not been approached by the Vatican authorities in this matter, they were in substantial agreement as to the treatment to be accorded to Axis diplomats as outlined above.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>85</sup> In telegram 355, July 13, 1944, 1 p. m., to Naples (not printed), Mr. Taylor was informed of this conversation and the British memorandum, and was asked for a report and comment. His reply, telegram 236, July 17, 1944, sent as telegram 17, July 17, 1944, noon, Rome, from Kirk (not printed), was the basis for the Department's *aide-mémoire* of July 26, 1944, p. 1326.

<sup>86</sup> See footnote 71, p. 1320.

The matter was thereupon put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a view to appropriate instructions being sent to the Allied Commander-in-Chief in Italy, and on the 21st June a telegram was sent to General Wilson, under reference Fan 368, which read:

“United States Government and His Majesty’s Government have agreed that any Axis diplomat accredited to the Holy See apprehended outside the Vatican City should be given, as a matter of grace rather than of right, the choice of entering the Vatican City or returning to his own country under safe conduct.”

After the Allied capture of Rome there were delays in putting the agreed policy into effect, but on June 30th at the joint suggestion of the United States and British representatives at Algiers, Allied Forces Headquarters sent instructions to the Allied Military authorities in Rome that all enemy diplomats accredited to the Holy See who were not already inside the Vatican, should as soon as conveniently possible be removed to a safe place away from Rome until arrangements could be made for their ultimate repatriation, the assumption being that if they were not already inside, they either did not want to go in or could not be accommodated.<sup>87</sup> On July 4th, Mr. Tittmann and Sir D. Osborne jointly informed the Vatican authorities that steps in the above sense would be taken on mid-day, July 10th.

Up to this point Anglo-American policy as regards the treatment to be accorded Axis diplomats accredited to the Vatican had been jointly concerted and carried out. The United States Government had not at any time undertaken that their representative to the Holy See would refuse to leave the Vatican City in order to make room for Axis diplomats, but the undesirability of Allied diplomats moving in order that Axis diplomats should be accommodated was clearly indicated in the Embassy’s *Aide-Mémoire* of the 12th May.

It is now understood that, on instructions from Mr. Myron Taylor and Mr. Stimson,<sup>88</sup> Mr. Tittmann has suspended cooperation with Sir D. Osborne in negotiations with the Vatican on the question of Axis diplomats.<sup>89</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1944.

<sup>87</sup> See telegram 2221, July 1, 1 p. m., from Algiers, p. 1321.

<sup>88</sup> Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, arrived in Rome on July 4 for a tour of inspection.

<sup>89</sup> Marginal comment initiated by Mr. Gowen of the Division of Southern European Affairs is as follows: “Ackn’d verbally by Secretary Hull on understanding that we would call for report by teleg & communicate with Embassy on its receipt. FCG. Please see our attached teleg 326 of July 7 for Mr. Taylor.” Mr. Taylor was notified of the contents of telegram 2313 (p. 1322) and telegram 326 (p. 1323) in a letter dated July 8 from Mr. Kirk.



701.0065/7-1144

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*<sup>90</sup>

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

According to information received from the Department's representatives in Rome,<sup>91</sup> the negotiations concerning the entry into Vatican City of certain Axis diplomats accredited to the Holy See and the concentration of the remaining members of their staffs in Sicily were carried out entirely by Messrs. Reber and Caccia (joint American and British heads of the Political Section of the Allied Control Commission) under the immediate direction and with the approval of General Johnson, Commanding General of combat troops in the Rome area. No unpleasant incidents arose in the course of the negotiations or in carrying out the decisions, and the transfers to Vatican City and to Palermo have been completed.

The Department's position with respect to the treatment of enemy diplomats accredited to the Holy See when Allied forces should liberate Rome, namely, that they be given the option of entering Vatican City or of returning to their respective countries, was made clear to its representatives at Allied Force Headquarters and at Vatican City when the question first arose in March 1944.<sup>92</sup> It was thought that it was also made clear to a representative of the British Embassy at that time. It was never this Government's intention to prevent the Axis diplomats from exercising this option by obstructive tactics on the part of its representative at Vatican City. Consequently, Mr. Tittmann's instructions merely informed him of our policy of permitting enemy diplomats the choice of entering Vatican City or of returning home.

As the Embassy is aware, the United Nations diplomats who have been residing in Vatican City for the past several years have been there as the guest of the Pope. When the President's representative and the Secretary of War were received by His Holiness on July 6, the latter requested that Mr. Tittmann relieve the situation by giving up his quarters in Vatican City. Mr. Tittmann promptly complied with the request of His Holiness which he was not in a position to ignore, having already found suitable quarters for himself and his family outside Vatican City.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Handed to George Middleton, Second Secretary of the British Embassy, on July 27, 1944.

<sup>91</sup> See footnote 85, p. 1324.

<sup>92</sup> See telegram 659, March 2, 9 p. m., to Algiers, p. 1315.

<sup>93</sup> In telegram 234, July 14, 1944 (not printed), Mr. Taylor notified the Secretary of State that the influx into Rome of Italian and Allied Government offices and personnel created serious housing problems. The Vatican office had been moved into an unused portion of the Embassy and both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Tittmann had found apartments in the city.

The Department has informed Mr. Tittmann that it approves of his action in this regard.<sup>94</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1944.

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701.6266A/7-2444 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1944—3 p. m.

5917. Kirk at Rome reports that no oral assurances of safe conduct were given (ReEmbtel 5838 July 24, 5 p. m.<sup>95</sup>) except those implicit in statement that these officials would be repatriated. Monsignor McGeough, American member of Vatican Secretariat of State, accompanied Axis officials to Taormina where they are now held. (ReEmbtel 5767 July 21, 5 p. m.<sup>95</sup>)

Department perceives no objection to British plan to endeavor to exchange these Axis officials for British official group still in Germany but reserves decision until informed more in detail of British plan of action so that our reply (ReDeptel 5694 July 20, 11 p. m.<sup>95</sup>) to German Government may be coordinated.

STETTINIUS

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701.6266A/8-344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 3, 1944—4 p. m.  
[Received August 3—2: 25 p. m.]

6181. ReDeptel 5917, July 28, 3 p. m. Foreign Office has expressed satisfaction that Department perceives no objection to British proposal that 27 British officials still held by Germany be exchanged for seven German officials from Holy See.

With respect to coordinating British and U.S. replies to Germany, F.O. inquires whether Department has any objection to its replying to Germany in following sense:

“The British Government is prepared to repatriate from Sicily via Lisbon or a Spanish port, depending on availability of shipping, the German officials in question. The British, however, must insist that there shall be repatriated at the same time the 27 British officials at Bad Neuenahr, so that the exchange of these British officials and

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<sup>94</sup> By telegram 14, July 22, 1944, 10 p. m., to the Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy (Kirk), not printed.

<sup>95</sup> Not printed.

the German group shall be carried out at the same port under the auspices of Portuguese or Spanish Government depending on the port of exchange."

F.O. inquires as to Department's attitude towards the Vatican representative's accompanying the Germans. F.O. prefers that he be not allowed to accompany them as such procedure would be contrary to usual practice of British but in this instance F.O. would not insist on its usual practice. F.O. would appreciate receiving Department's views as soon as possible in order that it may reply to German request.

Please instruct the Embassy by telegram.

WINANT

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701.6266A/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 23, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

6848. ReDeptel 6219, August 5, midnight.<sup>1</sup> On August 19 Foreign Office despatched note to Swiss Legation concerning repatriation of officials of the German Embassy to the Holy See. Text of note which follows lines set forth in Embassy's 6181, August 3, 4 p. m., is being transmitted in Embassy's airgram A-1029, August 23.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office decided not to allow the Vatican representative to accompany the party after consulting with British Minister to Holy See. Foreign Office omitted Elling from the list of Germans since the Allied Forces Headquarters has special grounds why in its opinion Elling should not be accorded diplomatic status. (ReDeptel 6513, August 17, 2 a. m.<sup>1</sup>)

WINANT

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701.6266A/8-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, October 5, 1944—midnight.

8153. In reference to the British proposal to exchange some of the German diplomats from the Vatican now at Taormina for 27 British officials in German custody (Reurtel 6848 August 23 and related correspondence) it is apparent that it would not now be feasible to consummate the exchange in Spain or Portugal. The Department is

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

informed, however, that AFHQ Caserta has suggested the possibility of direct repatriation of sick and wounded repatriables with Germany through Switzerland after October 1 be investigated. If this is feasible it should likewise be possible to carry out the exchange of German diplomats for British officials through Switzerland. The British authorities may therefore wish to explore this possibility and utilize the opportunity of suggesting a new situs for the exchange as a means of stimulating German interest in the British exchange proposal. It is suggested that this thought be brought to the attention of the Foreign Office. Please keep Department informed of developments.

Sent to London as Department 8153; repeated to Rome for Kirk and Myron Taylor as no. 245 and to Caserta as no. 214.

HULL

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701.6266A/10-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, October 24, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received October 24—3:10 p. m.]

9124. ReDeptel 8153, October 5, midnight. With regard to possibility of using Switzerland as place for exchange of German diplomats formerly at Vatican City and certain British officials detained by Germans, Foreign Office comments in substance as follows:

“We agree that carrying out exchange from Spain or Portugal not possible and we are suggesting to the German Government, via the Swiss Legation in London, that if the Swiss Government will lend its good offices for the exchange we should be prepared to consider the exchange taking place in Switzerland.”<sup>2</sup>

WINANT

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<sup>2</sup> The exchange did not take place in Switzerland. The Axis diplomats interned at Taormina were transferred to Salsomaggiore, west of Palma, and repatriated in 1946. The Japanese diplomats at Vatican City departed from Italy on January 27, 1946, as a result of General Douglas MacArthur's directive of October 25, 1945, instructing the Japanese Government to recall diplomatic representatives abroad. The German diplomats at Vatican City retired from Italy on August 30, 1946.

## YUGOSLAVIA

### CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES WITH INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA<sup>1</sup>

800.00 Summaries/6d : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, January 4, 1944—8 p. m.

16. During the latter part of December Yugoslav Prime Minister<sup>2</sup> stated to MacVeagh<sup>3</sup> that the British Ambassador<sup>4</sup> had informed him that he could shortly expect joint pressure from the British and American governments to remove General Mihailovitch<sup>5</sup> from the Cabinet.<sup>6</sup> Since the Department had not been consulted by the British government regarding the Yugoslav situation nor had it instructed Ambassador MacVeagh to approach the Yugoslav government in the sense indicated the Ambassador at London<sup>7</sup> was instructed to ascertain from the British Foreign Office the exact tenor of the British Ambassador's remark to the Yugoslav Prime Minister.<sup>8</sup>

MacVeagh reports that the British Ambassador at Cairo evidently as a result of this approach has explained in some embarrassment that his remark to the Yugoslav Prime Minister was simply a general one to the effect that American and British policy must coincide. MacVeagh, however, believes that the Prime Minister understood him to imply that a joint policy had been decided upon. MacVeagh be-

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<sup>1</sup> For previous correspondence about the concern of the United States regarding disunity among the resistance forces in Yugoslavia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, pp. 962 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Bozhidar Purich.

<sup>3</sup> Lincoln MacVeagh, Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at Cairo; see his telegram 7, December 18, 1943, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 1031.

<sup>4</sup> R. C. Skrine Stevenson, British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at Cairo.

<sup>5</sup> Draza Mihailovich, Minister of War, Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, and leader of the Chetnik resistance forces.

<sup>6</sup> The Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., wrote in a memorandum of January 1, 1944, that the Yugoslav Ambassador, Constantin Fotich, had expressed the hope that "no final decision would be taken until we likewise had a report from our representative with General Mikhailovitch's forces." The Assistant Secretary replied that "of course we wanted all the information we could get on all angles of the situation." (740.60H114/26)

<sup>7</sup> John G. Winant, American Ambassador in the United Kingdom.

<sup>8</sup> See telegram 8141, December 24, 1943, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 1036.

lieves that the Department's action may be helpful in clearing up an apparent tendency on the part of the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav and Greek governments to treat keeping him informed of their plans as tantamount to securing American association therewith.

HULL

860H.01/696

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>9</sup>

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Reference is made to the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* of December 26th, 1943,<sup>10</sup> on the subject of Yugoslavia.

2. The British Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow has received a letter from Monsieur Molotov<sup>11</sup> in reply to the enquiry which, as indicated in the last paragraph of the British Embassy's *aide-mémoire* under reference, he was instructed to address to the Soviet Government regarding their views on the possibility of finding a compromise between the contending groups in Yugoslavia. The text of M. Molotov's letter is given in Annex A,<sup>12</sup> from which it will be seen that the Soviet Government feel the need for obtaining a more comprehensive and balanced picture than they have at present, before suggesting any practical measures.

3. It is understood that the departure of the Soviet Mission to Yugoslavia has been delayed on account of the illness of its leader but that the Soviet Government are most anxious that it should leave as soon as possible. In the meantime, as reported in the penultimate paragraph of the *aide-mémoire* under reference, the head of the British Mission with the Partisans<sup>13</sup> has been examining the whole situation with Marshal Tito.<sup>14</sup> His Majesty's Government hope that if his discussions lead to any hopeful developments, they may secure the support and assistance of the United States and Soviet Governments in putting such proposals into effect.

4. The general views of His Majesty's Government on the activities of the Partisans and of General Mihailovic and on their relations

<sup>9</sup> Handed to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, on January 13, 1944, by Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>10</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1943, vol. II, p. 1037.

<sup>11</sup> Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>12</sup> Not printed.

<sup>13</sup> Brig. Fitzroy H. R. Maclean, Commanding Allied Military Mission to the Partisans in Yugoslavia.

<sup>14</sup> Josip Broz Tito, President of the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia; military leader of the "Partisan" resistance forces.

with one another are summarized in a memorandum dated December 7th, 1943, a copy of which is attached (Annex B) <sup>15</sup> for information. Some revision of the proposals set out in the memorandum became necessary when His Majesty's Government were advised that it would be impossible to arrange for General Mihailovic to be brought out of Yugoslavia in response to the King's summons and that he would in all probability refuse to obey such a summons.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, a new aspect has been given to the situation by the broadcast on December 17th by the "Free Yugoslavia" radio station of the decisions reached and the resolutions passed at a meeting of the Partisan anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation on November 29th.<sup>17</sup> According to this broadcast the Partisan administration demanded political recognition for itself and formal withdrawal of rights from the Yugoslav Government in exile, and condemned not only General Mihailovic and the Yugoslav Government as traitors, but also King Peter for having supported them. In the light of these claims it seems to His Majesty's Government that the only way of reconciling their obligations to maintain recognition of King Peter and his Government and of continuing military support to the Partisans, whose military effort is of such great value, is to try to find some *modus vivendi* between the King and the Partisans.

5. The latter's main objection to the King seems to be his connection since 1941 with General Mihailovic and with what the Partisans consider to be pan-Serb elements. It therefore appears that if it were possible to bring the King and the Partisans together on the basis that the King would be prepared to set up a new Government in Yugoslavia and sever his connection with General Mihailovic and the exponents of a pan-Serb policy, thus demonstrating that the monarchy is not identified with a policy of Serb hegemony to which the Partisan movement are opposed, the Partisans might accept the King. This would not prejudice the right of the Yugoslav people after the war freely to decide whether they wish for a monarchy or not. The appearance of the King in Yugoslavia would remedy the isolation in which he now finds himself, while the Partisans would gain an advantage in that they would secure political recognition under the new Government which the King would set up, and would obtain the dwindling assets of the exiled Yugoslav Government, e.g. ships and service personnel. Moreover, once in Yugoslavia, the King,

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<sup>15</sup> Not printed.

<sup>16</sup> In Annex B it is stated that the Senior British Liaison Officer with Mihailovic proposed that the latter should be summoned to Cairo for consultations with King Peter II of Yugoslavia and there dismissed. "This is therefore the line that we are considering."

<sup>17</sup> Meeting held at Jajce to outline a constitution for post-war Yugoslavia.

by issuing an appeal for unity, might be able to bring about co-operation with the Partisans of Serbs and Chetniks to whose loyalty to the throne he could appeal.

6. It was with such a plan in mind that His Majesty's Government decided to send the head of the British Mission with the Partisans back to Yugoslavia to examine the possibilities (without, of course, committing the King to any specific course of action) of unifying the forces of resistance both in and outside Yugoslavia and of bringing together the contending parties.

7. It may be that the Partisans will not react favourably to the idea of the King's return to Yugoslavia, but there seems to be no harm in making the suggestion, it being understood that His Majesty's Government will continue to give full military support to the Partisans. His Majesty's Government will keep the United States Government informed of developments, and, should the outcome of the soundings taken of the Partisans prove favourable, will seek their support in recommending the proposal to King Peter, who has not so far been informed of the plan which is now under consideration. If the outcome is unsatisfactory it will be necessary to review the situation which will then arise.

8. In communicating the above views of His Majesty's Government on the solution of the Yugoslav problem and their appreciation of the present situation in Yugoslavia, His Majesty's Ambassador is instructed to say that His Majesty's Government would welcome an expression of the United States Government's views on these matters, and hope that if they concur in His Majesty's Government's appreciation and in the action which is being undertaken, the United States Government will lend His Majesty's Government their support.

WASHINGTON, January 12, 1944.

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860H.01/653 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

[Extracts]

CAIRO, January 17, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received January 18—9 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 13. The following concerns the subject discussed in my series of telegrams, the last of which was my Yugoslav Series 10 of January 11, 1 p. m.<sup>18</sup>

Maclean is now in Bari awaiting transportation to Yugoslavia and bears a personal letter from Mr. Churchill<sup>19</sup> to Marshal Tito in

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<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister.



answer to a message sent by the latter expressing hopes for the Prime Minister's recovery from his recent illness. Ambassador Stevenson has shown [apparent garble] informs me that its gist together with the Foreign Office's latest ideas as to future procedure regarding Yugoslavia are being communicated to the Department and also to the Soviet Foreign Office. However, in case it may add something to the Department's information, I give below a summary of the letter which I have been able to make here as well as a brief account of the Foreign Office's proposals and Ambassador Stevenson's reactions thereto.<sup>20</sup>

. . . . .

In connection with the above the Foreign Office has informed Ambassador Stevenson that it is considering advising King Peter to dismiss Mihailovitch on the grounds of his collaboration with the enemy. However, it is inclined to wait until the reaction of Tito to the Prime Minister's message has been ascertained. Copies of messages sent to the British Ambassadors in Washington and Moscow instruct these officials to ask whether the American and Russian Governments concur in the action the British have in mind and whether when the time comes they would join in representing to King Peter the wisdom of such a course.

Ambassador Stevenson has informed the Foreign Office that he believes the Prime Minister's letter will result in nothing more than an expression of pleasure on Tito's part regarding the decision in connection with Mihailovitch and an expression of understanding regarding the British position toward the King. Should such turn out to be the case, the Ambassador advises that the action of cutting off Mihailovitch should be taken but solely on military grounds. He further points out that this would probably entail the fall of the Puritch government and adds that if the King should then request British advice in forming a new government but only in that case His Majesty's Government should council him to form one whose publicly expressed purpose would be to support all resistance elements whatever their political color. "This would put the King on a reasonably good ticket".

MACVEAGH

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<sup>20</sup> The text of this letter of January 8, 1944, is published in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Closing the Ring* (Boston, 1951), p. 470.

860H.01/1-1944

*Memorandum by Mr. Carl F. Norden of the Division of  
European Affairs*<sup>21</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1944.

Mr. Pares,<sup>22</sup> British Embassy, has left the attached *aide-mémoire*<sup>23</sup> on the subject of Yugoslavia by way of supplementing the document handed Mr. Dunn by Mr. Wright on the previous day.

The *aide-mémoire* gives further details of Mr. Churchill's message to Tito which assures the latter that the British will seek to give him all possible aid whilst depriving General Mihailovitch of material support and requests Tito's cooperation including a cessation of polemics. The British Government will, in any case, retain relations with King Peter. The *aide-mémoire* goes on to say the British Government has been considering giving advice to King Peter in the near future to dismiss General Mihailovitch from the Cabinet and from his military command on the basis of unspecified "good evidence" that the General is at least indirectly implicated by his subordinates' collaboration with the Neditch regime<sup>24</sup> and the Germans and that he is the greatest barrier between the King and the majority of his people. However, it is proposed first to await the reaction of Tito to Mr. Churchill's message. We are requested to state whether we will concur in the proposed action and whether we will be willing to join in British representations to the King. A similar communication is being made to the Soviet Government.

I asked Pares what course he thought his Government would take in the event Tito decides to stand firm on the so-called "Yugoslav anti-Fascist Council for National Liberation" decision to forbid the return of King Peter until the question of King and Monarchy has been solved by the people themselves after the liberation of the country and to disown any future actions of the Government-in-Exile or its successor. Pares replied that he had no idea but supposed they would have to wait and see. He has since implied that this is only a first step in bringing about a more satisfactory state of affairs.

You will recall that the British Ambassador in Cairo recently expressed serious doubts regarding the success of a plan similar to the one outlined and that the Yugoslav Government has made it clear that it would resign rather than disown Mihailovitch. In Yugoslav series, telegram no. 15 [13], January 17, (received since this memorandum

<sup>21</sup> Addressed to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, and H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

<sup>22</sup> Peter Pares, Second Secretary of the British Embassy.

<sup>23</sup> Not printed. This *aide-mémoire* is filed separately under 860H.01/1-1444.

<sup>24</sup> The government of the German puppet state of Serbia under the presidency of Col. Gen. Milan Nedich.

was originally drafted) Mr. MacVeagh states that Ambassador Stevenson believes the Prime Minister's letter will merely result in an expression of pleasure on Tito's part with regard to the decision on Mihailovitch and an expression of understanding with regard to the British position toward the King. Ambassador Stevenson believes that in such an event Mihailovitch should nevertheless be cut off, but solely on military grounds, and that this would probably entail the fall of the Pouritch Government. In case the King should then request British advice in forming a new Government, Ambassador Stevenson believes he should be counseled to form one prepared to support all resistance elements, whatever their political color. It may be inferred from the foregoing telegram, that the British Ambassador in Cairo does not favor an official British demand that Mihailovitch be ousted on political grounds. Under the circumstances, and in view of the apparent "trial and error" character of the British approach, I take it that we will not want to commit ourselves to a definite stand on the British request at least until we know the nature of Tito's reaction to the Churchill letter, although elimination of Mihailovitch, at least as Minister of War appears to be necessary if a really broad solution of Yugoslav difficulties is to be achieved.

The considerations which have led the British to take the present step are evidently not stated fully in their *aide-mémoire*. We have no evidence even from British sources, that Mihailovitch is tacitly cooperating with the enemy or with Neditch other than the unsubstantiated assertions in the official version of the Maclean report.<sup>25</sup> On the contrary, the one report from the chief British liaison officer with Mihailovitch<sup>26</sup> in our possession, (via OSS<sup>27</sup>) whilst stressing Mihailovitch's stubborn, evasive and difficult character mentions his fear of Neditch and his deep distrust of the British, responsibility for which it attributes largely to British policies. The report does however make clear that Mihailovitch is in the first place preoccupied with his own and Serb national interests, and with the fight against the Germans only in second place. We have not yet had a definitive report from our own officers, the majority of whom have now been withdrawn. While the British doubtless have other information, it is to be assumed that it would have been made available to us had it been of a nature to strengthen their case.

It is therefore likely that the decision to support Tito exclusively was taken with reference to considerations similar to those which

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<sup>25</sup> Report of November 6, 1943, by Brigadier Maclean on "The Partisan Movement in Yugoslavia" was sent to the Department by the British Embassy on December 17, 1943; not printed.

<sup>26</sup> Brigadier Armstrong, report of November 7, 1943, not found in Department files.

<sup>27</sup> Office of Strategic Services.

appear to have prevailed in Greece <sup>28</sup>—i.e. that to back both factions would only lead to civil war, and that in view of the great difficulty of dealing with Mihailovitch on a mutually satisfactory basis it would be best to back the more dynamic group which in any case cannot be disposed of, for the sake of its military contribution and in the hope that a moderating influence can with time be exerted. This is a so-called realistic approach especially in view of the inevitable effect of the Red Army's westward march upon the imagination of Slav peoples, but it takes for granted that the moderate and national elements in the Tito camp will ultimately prevail and contains the implicit hope that in some manner not as yet apparent it will be possible to rally the population of old Serbia to an active role in the Allied camp and to a cooperative attitude with respect to a reconstituted and presumably federal Yugoslavia. British support of the King shows an awareness of the importance of the Serb element, and the decision to drop Mihailovitch does not in itself preclude support of Serb resistance under new leadership.

The British decision does not greatly change the *de facto* situation in so far as military supplies to the two factions are concerned, as Mihailovitch had in any case been about cut off whilst considerable aid has been going to Tito with our help.<sup>29</sup> It is, however, fairly sure to provoke a serious cabinet crisis in Cairo, whether or not Mihailovitch's ouster is requested, and this may well be one of the British objectives. The effect in Serbia itself cannot be estimated on the basis of the information available to us.

In the event the Pouritch cabinet resigns, there are several possibilities. A new "cabinet of functionaries" could be formed to carry out the original purpose for which the Pouritch Government was set up but which failed because the latter became a Pan-Serb instrument. Such a cabinet would give us a nominal authority with which we could deal, whilst leaving us considerable freedom of action in the field, but it could not be expected to solve outstanding problems, nor would the device be understood within the country where such a Government would have little authority. On the other hand it would leave the road open for an independent understanding between the Big Three looking to an over-all solution of the South Slav problem.

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<sup>28</sup> For correspondence respecting events and conditions in Greece, see vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

<sup>29</sup> In an annex to despatch 10, February 4, 1944, from Ambassador MacVeagh, not printed, the United States Military Attaché at the Embassy in Cairo, Lt. Col. Sterling L. Larrabee, reported that Mihailovich had received in all only about 300 tons of supplies, mostly small arms and medical supplies. In the last three months, "even that trickle has been stopped." He estimated that Tito, on the other hand, had received from combined American and British sources, about 6000 tons in the last two months alone. (740.0011 European War 1939/33232)

Pan Serb circles have recently agitated in favor of a cabinet "the color of the 1941 *coup d'état*" (General Simovic).<sup>30</sup> This and other variations on the Pan-Serb theme would in effect continue the present line and lead to a further deterioration in Yugoslav unity. Its only merit lies in a *reductio ad absurdum* of Serb intransigence. Given the stubborn and unreasoning nationalism of the Serbs, such a development is an evident possibility, although unlikely unless assured of support from some quarters.

A third possibility is the reconstruction of the Government-in-Exile on a truly national basis to include if possible some representatives from within the country. This would be difficult to bring about, but it would have the great advantage of placing Tito in a defensive position where he would have to show his colors, and would give the Government a chance to take the political initiative from him. Such a cabinet could make a beginning of agreeing on an interim post war machinery for solving the constitutional and racial issues which are at the core of the Yugoslav difficulties. The major obstacle will be the inability of the King, whose chief support is in Old Serbia, to take a Yugoslav line to an extent which would necessarily seem prejudicial to Serb national interests. Serb extremists would certainly wish to dethrone him in such an event. A reformed Government would require personalities of unquestioned integrity and prestige, which are scarcely to be found at this juncture.

I believe it would be unfortunate and dangerous for this Government to become politically involved otherwise than in rather general terms with an internal situation as difficult as this. If we desire to support the British, (subject to Soviet concurrence, and the Soviets are being very careful) I believe it would be preferable to act constructively rather than by supporting the British attempt to disown Mihailovitch, who, whatever his recent record was for a long time the spearhead of Yugoslav resistance to the Axis. I believe we might express to the British in general terms our interest in the attainment of unity for the common purpose of defeating the enemy, whilst refraining from giving approval to the specific British plan. We might also make use of the occasion to restate our wish that the Yugoslav people be assured freedom peacefully to settle internal problems in their own way after liberation.

The really important thing, however, is to seek unity of purpose with the British and Russians, not only as regards Yugoslavia but with respect to South Slav and Balkan affairs in general. There appears to be a strong current in favor of South Slav unity to include

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<sup>30</sup> Gen. Dushan Simovich, one of the leaders of the *coup d'état* of March 27, 1941, in which King Peter II assumed control of the State. See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 937 ff.

Bulgaria. The old ruling cliques in both Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are pretty thoroughly discredited and it is to be assumed that the peoples of these countries will not want to return to a *status quo ante*. This current has only begun, but it is unlikely that it can be stopped. The Russians appear to be taking advantage of it. If we could find ways of working in concert with them the evolution might take place in less drastic form than otherwise. Yugoslavia was, after all, the creation of the powers and without unity between them may have a hard time holding together. Unless we have some other feasible alternative in mind and are willing to go in pretty deep in backing it, it would probably be best to throw our weight in the direction of the moderate and democratically minded elements who look to the future rather than to the past. Such a policy also has its dangers, but that is true of any policy in this area. That need not mean support for Tito exclusively. Unless Tito can be brought in some manner to subordinate himself to the monarchy or any other authority which can act as trustee for the people of Yugoslavia, the ultimate aim of securing a free choice of government after liberation will be endangered.

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860H.20 Mission/1-2644

*Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)*<sup>31</sup>

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1944.

The Office of Strategic Services has kindly informed us that, under date of January 19, General Wilson,<sup>32</sup> theater commander of the Mediterranean area, asked General Donovan<sup>33</sup> to meet with him and Ambassador Macmillan.<sup>34</sup>

Wilson revealed that he now proposed to establish a military mission at Tito's headquarters in Yugoslavia, the mission to be responsible to General Alexander<sup>35</sup> in Italy. He invited the OSS to participate in this mission by sending officers with it. The head of the mission was to be Brigadier General McLain [*Maclean*], nominally a soldier but actually a British Foreign Office man in uniform.

OSS had declined this invitation in view of the fact that the mission, though nominally military, is obviously political in character,

<sup>31</sup> This memorandum was directed to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs. In an attached note the Under Secretary wrote: "I am inclined to agree with the position of the Office of European Affairs on this matter which I understand to be that we would favor a purely military mission but would look with considerable question on a political mission."

<sup>32</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>33</sup> Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

<sup>34</sup> Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>35</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir Harold R. L. Alexander, Commander in Chief, Allied Armies in Italy.

and that they would not care to send American officers to serve as juniors with a British political mission. They feel that we may wish to give immediate consideration to establishing a similar mission in Yugoslavia.

The position now is as follows:

The Soviet Government has announced that it proposed to establish a mission at Tito's headquarters.

The British are now establishing such a mission.

Plainly we would not care to be merely part of the British mission, in which case we would share the responsibility with no power to act. If we plan to have any part in the Yugoslav picture to the extent that Tito (Marshal Broz) dominates it, we should have to have independent representation.

A mission could be arranged, presumably through Allied Force Headquarters in Italy and reporting to the War Department and to the State Department through our mission in Italy or in Algiers. The OSS is in a position to facilitate such a mission; and probably arrangements could be worked out, if desired, to either put men into uniform or use capable men presently connected with OSS. In either case, approval of the Joint Chiefs would have to be obtained, but it is to be assumed that this could be got easily, should we wish it.

I should be glad to have instructions on the subject.

My recommendation would be that we make up such a mission and send it. This would be without prejudice, of course, to our having a similar mission with General Mihailovitch should that be considered desirable.

A[IR] A. B[ERLE], JR.

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860H.01/685 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, January 27, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received January 28—8:09 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 19. See my Yugoslav 17, January 25, 7 p. m.<sup>36</sup> and previous related messages. Maclean has now reported from Tito's headquarters that Tito "expressed and certainly showed gratification" over the receipt of Mr. Churchill's letter but that while he promised "to avoid further attacks on King Peter as he had no wish to embarrass the Allies whose position he understood" he "showed no inclination to discuss politics" and said that the thing which now matters is "kill Germans".

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed.

Ambassador Stevenson has replied to Maclean inquiring whether he expects to get any further reaction from Tito and adding that as His Majesty's Government attaches importance to the establishment of contact between Tito and the King it is desirable to know whether there is "any indication that Tito might be prepared to agree to this".

The Ambassador believes and has so told the Foreign Office that Tito's reaction so far indicates that "we must take it that his attitude toward the King will remain openly non-committal and covertly hostile" and he has suggested (1) that if Maclean's further reply substantiates this the Foreign Office should propose to the United States and the Soviets that they agree on a common attitude as set forth in his telegram to the Foreign Office No. 194 of December 12 which I quoted in full in my airgram No. A-5 of December 27, noon <sup>37</sup> and (2) that the British Government then make a public disavowal of Michailovitch including the statement that the British liaison officers are being withdrawn from him in such terms as to make it clear that while the decision to take such action was necessarily a British one it was taken after consultation with Britain's principal allies.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/694 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, January 29, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received February 1—4:05 p. m.]

Yugos 20. See paragraph 2 of my Yugos 19 of January 27, 6 p. m. Ambassador Stevenson has now heard again from Maclean who says that Tito will shortly reply to Mr. Churchill's letter and that Tito's attitude as well as that of his followers generally is "extremely friendly" and shows an increased appreciation of the help Britain is extending and of her part in the war. However, he also states that he believes from conversations he has had and from statements and publications made during his absence that there has been a "distinct hardening of attitude" toward the King, Michailovitch and the Government in Exile with a tendency to link them all more closely together than ever before. He suggests that if as the Ambassador has predicted Tito's answer to Mr. Churchill's letter is noncommittal he be authorized to seek a definite expression of the Marshal's views by addressing him in writing in the following sense:

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<sup>37</sup> Not printed.



The British Government is anxious to see as many elements as possible united in the common struggle against the invaders. It has no wish to force any form of government on the Yugoslav people against the latter's freely expressed wishes but on the other hand it does take a personal interest in the fortunes of the King who at the time when Britain stood alone against the Axis joined his forces with hers. It would therefore be glad to hear if the Marshal would be pleased with a view to the common prosecution of the war to enter into contact with him.

Finally Maclean suggests that such an approach should be made "if possible jointly with the USA and Soviet Governments".

Agreeing with the above, Ambassador Stevenson has telegraphed the Foreign Office that appreciation of British assistance and "the comparative failure of the latest German offensive" may have produced a favorable atmosphere in which to make the approach suggested, adding that "obviously" it would be desirable if the Soviet and USA Governments would agree to support it.

If, as I gather from the Ambassador may now be the case, the Foreign Office is currently advising and consulting with the Department in regard to this whole matter of Tito and the King, the Department may wish me to discontinue such detailed reports of British ideas and proposals as I have hitherto been sending, which possibly now only duplicate information being obtained more directly and with greater authority. Please instruct.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/699 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, January 31, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received February 1—10: 16 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 22. See my Yugoslav 20, January 29, 7 p. m. The following is the gist of Tito's reply to Mr. Churchill's letter. The text as received here is somewhat garbled,<sup>38</sup> but the sense appears to be clear enough: Tito (1) thanks Churchill for "valuable proof that our people have had British friends and Allies at their side who deeply comprehend our needs and aspirations", adding that for him personally Prime Minister's advice is an honor since it expresses his "high acknowledgment of our struggle and efforts to meet National Liberation Army",<sup>39</sup> (2) thanks the Prime Minister for photographs

<sup>38</sup> The full text of Tito's letter to the Prime Minister, which was received on February 3, is printed in Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 471.

<sup>39</sup> The official name of the Partisan military force.

of the Tehran Conference and says "We will endeavor to keep your friendship", (3) states that devastated Yugoslavia needs and will need the help of "our great Allies" both during the war and in the peace to follow, (4) expresses the wish "to fulfill to the utmost our duty as an Ally in the common effort against the common enemy" and adds that while appreciating the help already extended by the Allies "we also hope with your help to obtain heavy armament (tanks and aircraft)" which is now indispensable, (5) declares that he "quite understands" Churchill's engagement to the King and his Government and hopes as far as interest of our peoples allows to avoid unnecessary discomfort and not to cause inconvenience to our Allies in this matter, (6) assures the Prime Minister that the present situation in Yugoslavia is less the result of struggle between individual political groups than of "irresistible desire of all patriots" supported by the "majority of people of Yugoslavia" where at present moment "all our efforts lead to one direction and bigger action" aim being (a) to increase as far as possible the efficiency of resources against handicaps, (b) to bring about the brotherhood and unity of the Yugoslav nation which were non-existent before this war and before the internal disputes which have caused catastrophe and (c) to bring about conditions enabling "the establishment of a state in which all peoples of Yugoslav would feel happy and that is a truly democratic Yugoslav". Message concludes that Tito is "convinced that you will understand us and that we will have your valuable support in this storm of our peoples" and is signed "yours very sincerely, Tito, Marshal of Yugoslav". In view of the character of the above Ambassador Stevenson says he may briefly suggest to the Foreign Office that consideration of his further proposals reported in my telegram under reference is now in order.

MACVEAGH

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S60H.01/775a : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1944—6 p. m.

Yugos 3. The whole question of our attitude toward the resistance forces within Yugoslavia and their relations to the Government-in-exile is under review. Certain information essential to the Department in its study of this question has not yet become available, and recent reports through British channels have not been received here.

With reference to the last paragraph of your 20, January 29, 7 p. m., the Department has found your telegrams on this subject exceedingly valuable. Please continue to report all information of this kind.

HULL

860H.01/712: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*CAIRO, February 5, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received February 7—6: 48 a. m.]

Yugos 24. The Yugoslav Prime Minister asked me to see him this A. M. and gave me the text of a letter transmitted by him yesterday to Eden<sup>40</sup> through the British Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He requested that I forward this text to Washington for the Department's information and I am doing so in my immediately following telegram.<sup>41</sup>

Mr. Pouritch who said he felt the British would not take the proposed action against Michailovitch unless the U. S. Government agreed underlined to me at length the implications of his letter asserting that withdrawal of the British military mission from Michailovitch coupled with public announcement thereof broadcast to the world at large and particularly the Balkans would constitute in effect an act of war against Yugoslavia whose King and Government cannot morally disown their own people and must therefore remain loyal to Michailovitch. He said that he had remarked to the King in this connection that the two of them would probably be put in a concentration camp and that the King replied "All right, let's go".

He said further that he told the King that as King and the person principally concerned he should not necessarily take a mere Prime Minister's advice he could get another Prime Minister. But the King answered "I am not being guided by you I am simply thinking along the same lines as you".

It was obvious from my talk with Mr. Pouritch that the publicity part of the proposed plan was what particularly disturbed him. Perhaps therefore the best solution would be if support to Michael<sup>42</sup> must be still further reduced on military grounds to restrict the action wholly to the military sphere without giving it the political aspect which the proposed publicity would entail.<sup>43</sup> In addition I may say that talks with the Brit[ish] Amb[assador] here have indicated that it may be a British aim in this affair to secure the resignation of Mr. Pouritch and his replacement by someone likely to prove more co-

<sup>40</sup> Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

<sup>41</sup> Telegram 25, February 5, 1944, 8 p. m., not printed.

<sup>42</sup> Reference is to Draza Mihailovich.

<sup>43</sup> In despatch 10, February 4, 1944, Ambassador MacVeagh deplored the virtual cessation of supplies to Mihailovich: "In view of the overwhelming military advisability of maintaining 'holding attacks' against the Axis on all subsidiary 'fronts' while the main attack on some other front is pending, criticism of this disproportionate support of the much more active Tito would seem unexceptionable. But one should perhaps not shut one's eyes to the ultimate effects on Yugoslav's future of such opportunism, however justified, since we may have to deal with these effects in due time." (740.0011 European War 1939/33232)

operative as regards a *rapprochement* with Tito. But if this is the case the King's firm attitude suggests the question as to whether it would not be more advisable at the moment as well as more non-committal of Allied interests in the future to select if possible grounds less closely connected with Serbian national sentiments.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/726 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, February 9, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received February 11—11:26 a. m.]

Yugoslav Series 26. The British Foreign Office has authorized Maclean to make Tito the communication suggested by the British Ambassador as reported in my Yugos 20, January 29, 7 p. m. and instructions have been sent to Maclean to this effect. He has been additionally instructed that if Tito should ask whether His Majesty's Government has the support of the U.S. and Soviet Governments in this matter he may say that His Majesty's Government is willing to approach them on the subject if Tito agrees in principle.

Meanwhile Mr. Churchill has again personally communicated with Tito (see my Yugos 22, January 31, 7 p. m.) and the following is the gist of his message:<sup>44</sup> The Prime Minister says that he can "understand the position of reserve which you adopt toward King Peter" and that he himself has "for several months past been in favor of advising him to dismiss Michailovitch and to face the consequent resignation of all his present Ministers" but that he has been "deterred by the argument that this would be advising him to cast away his only adherents". He adds "You will understand that I feel a personal responsibility towards him".

Mr. Churchill then requests Tito to let him know whether King Peter's "dismissal of Michailovitch would pave the way for freer relations with you" and for the King's later "going into the field", it being understood that "further question of the monarchy is reserved until Yugoslavia has been entirely liberated".

In connection with the above Mr. Churchill argues that a working arrangement between Tito and King Peter would "consolidate many forces, especially Serbian elements, now estranged" and thus strengthen Tito's movement; also that it would enable Yugoslavia to speak with a united voice in coming councils. "I much hope that you will feel able to give me the answer you can see I want".

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<sup>44</sup> The text of this letter of February 5, 1944, is printed in Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 472.

Mr. Churchill then refers to that part of Tito's message to him expressing the aims of the Partisan movement (see under heading 6 of my telegram Yugos 22) and says that this "expresses exactly what His Majesty's Government desires". He adds, "You will certainly have support of His Majesty's Government in all this".

Passing to the question of Tito's present "indispensable" military needs as brought up by him in his message, Mr. Churchill says that he has asked the Supreme Allied Command[er] in the Mediterranean "to form immediately an amphibious force of Commandos, supported by air and flotillas, to attack with your aid garrisons which the Germans have left on the islands they have taken along the Dalmatian coast. There is no reason why those garrisons should not be exterminated with the force which should be shortly available". He concludes that "we must try to get through a line of communications with you from the sea, even if we must move it from time to time. This alone will enable tanks and anti-tank guns and other heavy munitions together with necessary supplies to be brought in in quantities which your armies require".

Commenting on the above from the military angle I understand from our OSS that the British Army authorities are [exe]rcised over the Prime Minister's projection of his authority into the strategic picture for diplomatic ends, and from the diplomatic angle I may say that the British Ambassador here has sadly observed to me, "We shall burn our fingers". In this connection, he expressed to me the idea that the resignation of the King's present Ministers could be effected without "casting away his only adherents", namely the Serbian elements which these Ministers represent, by not insisting on the dismissal of Michailovitch individually, but by simply demanding recognition by the Government of all Yugoslav resistance movements on an equal basis. Such an attitude is now beyond the possibility of the Pouritch government, which would have to resign, and in this way Michailovitch would be removed as War Minister automatically, by the resignation of the Government as a whole, and he and his admirers in Serbia, the numbers of which are at present impossible to determine but may be very large, could not claim that there was any discrimination against him personally, while support to him and his movement insofar as genuinely loyal could be continued without prejudice by the succeeding government. As the Department is probably aware there are [at present?] Serbs outside Yugoslavia including, as I am informed, the Ambassadors in Moscow and Ankara <sup>45</sup> who would be glad indeed to collaborate in a government of national resistance

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<sup>45</sup> Stanoje Simich and Iliya Shumenkovich, respectively.

recognizing all guerrilla movements on a purely patriotic basis under the King. I do not know how strongly Mr. Stevenson has urged his idea on the Foreign Office, but the Department may possibly feel that the public sacrifice of Michailovitch individually, and the consequent perhaps final antagonizing of the "Serbian elements now estranged", are things to be avoided if they are unnecessary.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/740 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, February 15, 1944—10 a. m.  
[Received February 17—4:50 p. m.]

Yugoslav 34. See my Yugoslav 26 of February 9 and previous related messages. A reply from Tito to the clear communication has now been received but it is so garbled that it may require another day to decipher completely.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, the gist appears plain. Tito acknowledges that all the faults laid at King Peter's door are not properly chargeable to him and also that he might be of value to the Partisan movement. However, he adds, that the Yugoslav man in the street does not recognize either of these things though he might be brought to do so eventually. Tito then goes on to say that if the King will dismiss Michailovitch, dismiss his present government and recognize the provisional government of the Partisans, further conversations regarding his personal status will be in order.

I hope to have complete information regarding this message later. Meanwhile Ambassador Stevenson expressed the view that the British Government would be assuming a "grave responsibility" if it should advise the King to cast aside all his present support merely to secure an opportunity for further discussions. It is the Ambassador's view that such discussions should precede rather than follow action on the King's part.

In regard to the Churchill letter summarized in my telegram above referred to, Ambassador Stevenson and I will both be obliged if the Department will be careful not to indicate to the British that he may have let me see the text. Should this happen it is highly likely that I would no longer enjoy the advantages of a source of information hitherto usefully cultivated.

MACVEAGH

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<sup>46</sup> The text of this letter of February 9, 1944, is printed in Churchill, *Closing the Ring*, p. 474.

860H.01/748: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, February 21, 1944—7 p. m.

[Received February 23—4: 56 a. m.]

Yugos 39. See my Yugos 36, February 16, 4 p. m.<sup>47</sup> The Foreign Office has approved the immediate withdrawal of liaison officers and has telegraphed the British Embassy in Washington to inform the Department of this fact and the reasons therefor as well as to express its hope that the Department "will agree with the action taken".

Upon receipt of this information the British Ambassador here has telegraphed to London that unless otherwise instructed and as soon as the plans for withdrawal have been worked out and approved by the Commander-in-Chief Middle East<sup>48</sup> he will advise the Yugoslav Prime Minister in a note as follows:

"I have been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government have decided that no further military supports would be given to General Michailovitch. The retention of the British liaison officers with the forces of General Michailovitch can in these circumstances no longer be justified and the Commander-in-Chief Middle East acting [Supreme?] Allied CIMC [Commander-in-Chief] Mediterranean forces is issuing instructions to the senior British Liaison Officer to withdraw the officers and men under his command from Yugoslavia as soon as possible.

I am to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to send immediate instructions to General Michail[ovich] to facilitate in every way the movement of the officers and men and to give the senior British Liaison Officer all the assistance possible that may be required in effecting their withdrawal from Yugos[lavia]."

Ambassador Stevenson informs that he will mark the above note most secret and will tell M. Pouritch that there will be no publicity advising him to treat the matter himself most carefully in the same way. He said that the Foreign Office had agreed to the "no publicity" idea and that he himself "intends to go on denying that any decision has been taken unless and until it becomes politically desirable to make some statement". Brigadier Armstrong is now absent from General Michail[ovich]'s headquarters but is returning and the Ambassador intends sending him his instructions as and when it may be possible to communicate with him. Regarding American aspects of this matter please see my next following telegram.

MACVEAGH

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<sup>47</sup> Not printed.

<sup>48</sup> Reference here is probably to Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson who was Commander in Chief, Middle East, prior to his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, in January 1944.

860H.01/751 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, February 21, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received February 23—9:46 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 40. See my Yugoslav Series 36 of February 16, 4 p. m.<sup>49</sup> According to Ambassador Stevenson, Colonel Bailey, second in command to Brigadier General Armstrong on the Michailovitch Mission, is "confident that Michailovitch thinks he can play off the United States" against the British and that he has been encouraged in this thought by Mr. Fotich in Washington.<sup>50</sup> Colonel Bailey has just arrived here as well as our own Captain Mansfield, the latter bringing with him a Captain Todorovitch of Michailovitch's staff and letters from Michailovitch personally to President Roosevelt and General Eisenhower<sup>51</sup> which the OSS now has in its possession. Of our mission of three officers to Michailovitch, Mansfield is here and Lieutenant Colonel Seitz is in Partisan territory expecting to be brought out presently by the British, but Lieutenant Muselin is still at Michailovitch's headquarters and, according to present OSS policy, will remain there after the British Liaison Officers depart. The British SOE<sup>52</sup> and our OSS have discussed this situation frankly and the British have stressed their view that it would be inadvisable for the two services not to act concurrently. In consequence, the OSS has referred telegraphically to General Donovan with a request for further instructions.

In this connection, Ambassador Stevenson has called on me wishing as he said "to enlist me" in support of his feeling that Muselin should not stay with Michailovitch and using the following arguments:

That (1) the withdrawal of the Liaison Officers is a military decision taken by the Supreme Command (2) there is nothing that Muselin can do and (3) for him to stay while the British leave would indicate a difference of opinion between the British and the Americans. Behind his feeling would appear to lie the fear that Michail[ovich] might attempt to exploit such a difference of opinion openly as proving that he still has friends among the Allies thus switching the whole matter from the military to the political plane. He spoke of "the undesirability of our being played off one against the other even on the level of the OSS and the SOE".

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<sup>49</sup> Not printed.

<sup>50</sup> Constantin Fotich, Yugoslav Ambassador.

<sup>51</sup> Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force in Western Europe.

<sup>52</sup> Special Operations Executive.



Lt. Col. Toulmin of the OSS tells me that because his primary job here is the collection of information he has recommended that Muselin be not withdrawn but adds that he must leave the political aspects of the matter to higher authority. In my view the Department may well wish to consider these aspects. In addition Col. Toulmin says he would be in favor should the decision be taken to withdraw Muselin of sending into Michail[ovich] a purely and confessedly intelligence mission having nothing to do like the present mission with supply problems.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps this would be a solution whereby we could attain our aims without conflicting with those of our allies or bringing political matters to the fore, incidentally the Department will realize that the need for coordination in this affair is strengthened by the facts that (1) the decision to withdraw Liaison Officers has been made by the Allied Command; (2) Muselin is under the orders of Armstrong by agreement with the OSS and (3) if an American intelligence mission is to be sent in subsequently it will depend on the British for transportation.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/763 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh)  
to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, February 29, 1944—noon.

[Received 12:22 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 50. I learned confidentially last night from the British Ambassador that King Peter and Mr. Pouritch have been "invited" to London where they will be "talked to" and "given advice". The Ambassador will accompany them and they will leave probably early next week.

This development coinciding with the release of the news of his son's<sup>54</sup> presence at Tito's headquarters appears to indicate that Mr. Churchill's pro-Tito policy has definitely triumphed over the Ambassador's caution which in recent weeks has seemed to be influencing the Foreign Office. I asked the Ambassador whether it means that pressure will be put on the King to dismiss Mr. Pouritch and he replied "undoubtedly".

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<sup>53</sup> This policy was subsequently adopted. On March 2, 1944, the Office of Strategic Services submitted a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the replacement of the present joint mission by an independent purely intelligence mission composed of a single American officer. The State Department was informed of this proposal in a letter from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, to the Secretary of State on March 2, 1944. (740.00118 European War 1939/2267)

<sup>54</sup> Maj. Randolph Churchill.

In this connection the Department will understand that Mr. Pouritch is exceedingly stubborn in his view that any abandonment of support of Michailovitch on the part of the Yugos[lav] Government would be a betrayal (see my Yugos 24 of February 5, 7 p. m.). Within the last few days he has reemphasized to me personally his determined feelings in this matter. Furthermore he appears to enjoy a considerable personal ascendancy over the young King based on close association, character, and racial loyalty. The coming "talking to" may therefore of necessity present some aspects not unreminiscent of Hitlerite procedure with Satellite leaders.

MACVEAGH

800.00 Summaries/10s: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)*

WASHINGTON, February 29, 1944—midnight.

1539. MacVeagh has secured another intelligence report concerning the Yugoslav situation, which confirms and amplifies previous information sent to you on this situation. It is stated that the people of Serbia proper are more concerned with internal problems than with the war against Germany and that while Mihailovic is technically fighting against the Germans as well as the Partisans, practically all operations are confined to attacks upon the latter element. While Mihailovic states that he will, at the proper moment, order a general attack against the Germans, he apparently is conserving his strength for use in possible post-war civil strife. Serbian hatred of England is becoming intense, largely as a result of a prevalent belief that England is selling Yugoslavia to the Russians. America, for the time being, is still popular. While there is extreme devotion to the King, the Government in exile is held in little esteem.

MacVeagh has just been informed that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, has transmitted an order directing that all members of the Allied Military Mission to Mihailovic be withdrawn. This order is applicable to the remaining American member of the Mission.

During a conversation between MacVeagh and the Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia,<sup>55</sup> the latter stigmatized the Yugoslav Government as stupid, but denied reports that Moscow was attempting to secure its resignation. The Ambassador maintained that Soviet policy is identical to ours in that the Government is recognized, but military support is given to all elements actively fighting the enemy. He explained recent Soviet press attacks on the Pouritch Government as mere opinion similar to privately expressed views in the American

<sup>55</sup> Nikolay Vasilyevich Novikov.

press. He stated that he believed that the Yugoslav Government must eventually give way since it refused to face facts and was pre-occupied with questions of ideology. He maintained that the Partisan movement is composed of Serbs as well as Croats and Slovenes and added that the Soviet Government had definite proof of Mihailovic's cooperation with the enemy. When the Serbians learned of this it would be impossible for the government to return unless supported by Allied bayonets. During this same conversation the Soviet Ambassador stated his belief that Turkey should enter the war at this time since Turkish neutrality was no longer of any use to the Allies. The Soviet Ambassador appeared to be very anxious to learn whether any large scale operations in the Balkans were under consideration by the American or British Governments.

STETTINIUS

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860H.01/770 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 3, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 8:52 p. m.]

1739. A Foreign Office official today said the following regarding Yugoslav affairs:

The British decision to withdraw its military mission of some 30 officers from Mihailovic was taken on military grounds by Maitland Wilson because of the fact that Mihailovic is contributing nothing to the Allied cause and it is extremely difficult to provide the mission with the necessary supplies without at the same time furnishing some war equipment to Mihailovic. Apparently neither Mihailovic nor the Yugoslav Government are yet aware of this decision, which was taken about a week ago.

With regard to the hiatus between Tito and the King, the British are not in a position to advise the latter to drop Mihailovic and his Government until Tito has declared himself regarding the King. A preliminary message has come out from the British mission with Tito (some 60 in number) which the British do not consider satisfactory from their point of view. Tito has proposed various measures to be taken by the King, including the dropping of Mihailovic and the Government, following which he, Tito, will give the matter of his attitude toward the King further consideration. If King Peter should take the measures proposed by Tito he would have burnt all his bridges and Tito might still repudiate him. The British feel that Tito must make clear his position vis-à-vis King Peter before they can advise the latter to take any drastic measures.

The British do not attach any particular significance to General Simovic's statement approving Tito.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps it might be of some importance if Tito gave some sort of recognition and welcome to the General's statement, as then it would be conceivable that he could act as a bridge between Tito and King Peter.

WINANT

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860H.01/771 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, March 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:45 p. m.]

1795. Further information regarding Yugoslavia was obtained from the Foreign Office today, the substance being the following:

King Peter, accompanied by Puric and Ambassador Stevenson, will reach Great Britain towards the end of next week. The purpose of his visit is to discuss the whole Mihailovic problem, but, as indicated in the Embassy's 1739, March 3, 6 p. m., the British are not prepared to ask the King to drop Mihailovic until they have had further word from Tito. This is expected within a few days and it is hoped that Tito will indicate more precisely his views regarding King Peter.

The Foreign Office official remarked that Puric has not been at all satisfactory as Prime Minister. He is entirely pro-Serb and really believes that Mihailovic has the backing of 90% of the whole Yugoslav people and that Tito is merely a flash in the pan and will lose most of his following when the Germans are expelled from Yugoslavia.

The Foreign Office stated that it is likely that King Peter will marry Princess Alexandra of Greece when he is in England.

WINANT

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740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3-1944

*Memorandum Prepared for the Mission to London of the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*<sup>57</sup>

The important factor in the Yugoslav situation today is not so much the Tito-Mihailovic-Cairo conflict, as the interplay of Soviet and British policy in the question.

The Soviet line is fairly clear. Moscow has openly given every political and moral support to Tito and the Partisans, and has not

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<sup>56</sup> Gen. Dushan Simovich issued an appeal over the radio on February 20, 1944, urging all Serbs to join Tito.

<sup>57</sup> This paper was prepared in advance for Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who went to London to hold discussions with members of the British Government, April 7-29, 1944.

abated the attacks on Mihailovic and the Government in exile, although the King has not been attacked personally. No military aid from Russia, so far as we know, has got through to Tito, but he doubtless has some Russian radio equipment (the "Free Yugoslavia" radio station which sends out the heavy Partisan propaganda traffic is supposed to be somewhere near Tiflis) and he is also believed to obtain funds from Russian sources.

The Russians have recently sent a large military mission into Tito territory, headed by a Lieutenant General and a Major General, thus pointedly indicating that they intend to operate independent of the less impressive British mission. The Yugoslav Ambassador and Military Attaché at Moscow have resigned and announced their adherence to Tito; they are staying on at Moscow. With all this evidence of support of the Partisans, plus the inspiration which Moscow has certainly given to the Partisan political schemes, Moscow is clearly aware of the importance of Serbia (which is largely anti-Partisan) in any solution of the Yugoslav question. The Russians profess that their policy is parallel to ours,—being designed to get on with the war, leaving politics to the Yugoslav people themselves. They have thus far kept formally correct relations with the Government in exile.

The British, who previously gave exaggerated praise to Mihailovic, and who engineered at least one of the reorganizations of the Government in exile, now have cut loose from him completely, and have said many harsh things about the Government. They appear to be working on a plan whereby the King would represent, as a symbol at least, the Serbian element, and the Government would be reorganized along Tito lines. The King and important ministers are now in London, being worked on to bring this about. An extraordinary feature of the British policy is the immense personal prestige, on the part of Mr. Churchill himself, which has been brought into play (his personal letters to Tito, the assurance of direct and personal access to the Prime Minister, wide publicity on personalities in the liaison mission, the appointment of Randolph Churchill to the Tito mission, etc.). All this may have been designed to achieve by flattery a position at least parallel to what the Russians had gained by indoctrination. The British maintain that they are not competing with the Russians for Tito's favor, and the Russians meanwhile are watching the British maneuvers with only mild interest. Tito himself has been very astute, and has refused to give the assurances of teamwork with King Peter which the British blandishments were designed to obtain. London is admittedly unhappy about this deadlock, having already promised a great deal and got nothing in return. The British Ambassador, Mr. Stevenson, has been rather bold in pointing out the dangers of

British involvements. Mr. MacVeagh thinks that Stevenson may now be in disfavor with Churchill.

The British probably hoped to persuade the people of Yugoslavia that Britain remains their friend, and, by a general encouragement of the leftist elements, strengthen the more moderate wing, against the communists who look to Moscow. It may be that the British Government has also in mind the effect of this policy on the labor vote in England. There is as yet no real indication that the British, in supporting elements to which the Serbs are antagonistic, are deliberately contributing to the separation of Croatia and Slovenia from Serbia, for some new aggregation of states in the Danube basin.

As for the U.S., the following recent developments are worth noting: 1. We are committed to giving military aid where it will do the most good, thus helping Tito in the military sense, without political relations with him; 2. We maintain correct relations with the Government in exile, without illusions as to its weaknesses, and have resisted British pressure to have Mr. Fotitch, the Ambassador here, withdrawn; 3. The President has approved a plan to send into Mihailovic territory an American intelligence group, though our liaison officers with Mihailovic were withdrawn with the British Mission; 4. We have liaison with the Tito forces, in conjunction with the British; and 5. The Tito organization is trying to get its hands on official Yugoslav funds in this country. This could be achieved, however, only after political recognition.

The Secretary's statement of December 10, 1943<sup>58</sup> is in all respects applicable to the situation today. Under the policy therein outlined we could continue to deal with any Yugoslav Government established by orderly processes.

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860H.01/806 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State*

CAIRO, March 28, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received March 30—2:05 p. m.]

Yugos 73. Colonel Robert Weil<sup>59</sup> an . . . officer on special assignment with Tito has just come out from Yugoslavia and has already sent his principals in Washington a telegraphic report of his mission.

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<sup>58</sup> Remarks made by the Secretary, in which he stated that the United States was prepared to assist all groups engaged in fighting the Germans, are printed in the *New York Times*, December 10, 1943, p. 9, col. 2.

<sup>59</sup> Maj. Richard Weil, Jr. The confusion over name is an apparent error; the confusion over rank probably results from an army policy of temporarily promoting officers for the duration of their tours of duty in Yugoslavia.

He is also preparing an extended written report and after a long conversation with him I believe the Department will be interested in both.<sup>60</sup> His contacts with Tito have been unique so far as American experience has gone to date and he appears to me to have gathered some valuable material on the Partisan military situation and future plans. On the political side while he seems unable to add anything essential to what the Department already knows he does provide information from Tito's own mouth of a desire for wider political contacts with the Allies. In this connection he is the bearer of a letter from Tito to the President<sup>61</sup> which the former hopes may be the beginning of a correspondence similar to that which he has already been enjoying with Mr. Churchill and also as he says with Marshal Stalin. Colonel Weil is personally in favor of our establishing such contact along with the British and Russians basing himself on his belief that Partisan success would surely follow throughout the whole of Yugoslavia and on the desirability of our earning the gratitude and friendship of the Yugoslav people. But while he is a shrewd observer and expresses himself as being alive to the necessity of avoiding any bias his knowledge of Yugoslavia clearly does not extend beyond the limits of the Partisan picture as seen from Partisan headquarters and the Department may therefore feel that his interpretations lack the authority of his facts.

MACVEAGH

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860H.01/867

*Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia to President Roosevelt*

SIR: The departure of Lt. Colonel Richard Weil, Jr. AUS, offers me the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to you for the assistance in material and in the cooperation of your Air Force, tendered to our Army of National Liberation by you and the people of America.

The superhuman struggle which has been waged by the people of Yugoslavia for the last three years, aims, not only at clearing our country of the criminal occupiers, but also at the creation of a better and more righteous order, which would guarantee true democracy, equal rights and social justice to all nations of Yugoslavia. These aspirations and perspectives have given our nations the strength to endure all the difficulties and sufferings of this unequal struggle. For the fulfilment of their strivings the people of Yugoslavia expect the aid of your great democratic country, of the people of the U. S. A. and of yourself.

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<sup>60</sup> Neither report found in Department files.

<sup>61</sup> *Infra.*

The achievement of the ideals of our nations is arduous. The enemy is still strong. The struggle with the occupier is still tough and extremely bloody. The home traitors Nedich, Pavelich,<sup>62</sup> Rupnik<sup>63</sup> and Draza Mihailovic, unite their efforts with the occupier to prevent the nations of Yugoslavia from attaining these great and progressive aims. But no sacrifices or difficulties frighten us, for we are convinced in the victory of our righteous cause, as we are certain in the victory of all the Allies over the German Fascist aggressors.

Perhaps no other country is so terribly devastated and ravaged as Yugoslavia. This war will leave painful wounds which will require a long time to heal. And this will be possible only if the nations of Yugoslavia receive full economic and political support in the creation of a new, truly democratic, federative Yugoslavia, in which all nations will have their national rights.

Lt. Colonel Weil will be able to expose to you our needs and wishes. I am convinced that they will be granted your support.

TITO

*Marshal of Yugoslavia*

15 MARCH 1944.

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740.0011 Stettinius Mission/29 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 15, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received April 15—3:15 p. m.]

3088. Deles<sup>64</sup> No. 13. In touching briefly on the Yugoslav problem and in reply to our question Sir Orme Sargent<sup>65</sup> remarked that somewhat to British surprise King Peter's marriage<sup>66</sup> had been subject to considerable disapproval in Yugoslavia and particularly in old Serbia. He feels that it is too early to estimate how seriously this has affected the King's standing among the bulk of the Serbian population but that the marriage has certainly not increased his prestige or popularity.

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<sup>62</sup> Ante Pavelich, Chief of State of the Nazi puppet "Independent State of Croatia", and leader of the Ustashi, the Croatian National Liberation Movement.

<sup>63</sup> Gen. Leo Rupnik, a Slovene general commanding troops fighting the Partisans in Slovenia.

<sup>64</sup> Designation for a series of telegrams from the Under Secretary of State to the Department in connection with his mission to London in April 1944. For the Under Secretary's report to the Secretary of State on his conversations in London, April 7 to April 29, 1944, see vol. III, pp. 1 ff.

<sup>65</sup> Sir Orme G. Sargent, Deputy Under Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office.

<sup>66</sup> King Peter was married to Princess Alexandra of Greece in London on March 20, 1944.



Both Mr. Eden and Sargent have admitted in conversation that there is no doubt of Mihailovich's great popularity in Serbia. Their information confirms the Department's feeling that he is regarded almost as a Messiah in that area.

WINANT

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740.0011 European War 1939/33942

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union  
(Harriman)*

WASHINGTON, April 15, 1944—midnight.

927. See your 1277 April 13.<sup>67</sup> The War Department has inquired whether the Department wishes to furnish any guidance for General Deane<sup>68</sup> in his relations with the military mission sent by Tito to Moscow. Assuming that he will consult with you on this matter the following background may be useful.

The relations of this Government with the Partisans in Yugoslavia have been kept on a purely military basis in accordance with the principle of supporting all resistance forces in Yugoslavia actively engaged against the enemy. This was discussed at some length in the Department's 1376 of December 13 [10].<sup>69</sup> There has as yet been no occasion for any transactions of other than military nature with the "National Committee of Liberation" and the Department thinks that the correct course would be to consider intercourse with Partisan representatives as of a distinctly military character. American officers are, as you know, in contact with the Partisan leaders in Yugoslavia, both for intelligence and for special operations purposes.

We know, of course, that the Committee has assumed various attributes of government, and Mr. MacVeagh has learned of information which came direct from Tito showing his desire for wider political contacts with the Allies. The Partisan representatives at Cairo, however, appear not to have sought to establish relations with Mr. MacVeagh, though they did manage to meet Governor Lehman,<sup>70</sup> by going along with Mr. Novikov when he called on Mr. Lehman.

We have little information concerning the progress of the British talks with the Yugoslav Government leaders at London, but without showing a rigid attitude which might be interpreted as ignorance of

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<sup>67</sup> Not printed; it announced the arrival in Moscow of a military mission of the Yugoslav National Committee of Liberation (740.0011 European War 1939/-33942).

<sup>68</sup> Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, Chief, United States Military Mission in the Soviet Union.

<sup>69</sup> Not printed.

<sup>70</sup> Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

the social forces at work within Yugoslavia or of the imperfections of the groups now in control of the Government in exile, we think that our official relationships should continue to be only with the recognized authorities. Your 955 of March 21<sup>71</sup> shows that you have these same considerations in mind.

Under this policy General Deane may have contact with the mission for the exchange of military information. He should, however, avoid in so far as possible intercourse of a ceremonial or official character or any formalities which traditionally carry implications of political recognition, or attend functions where the political dispute between Tito and the Government in exile is likely to be unduly stressed.

These observations outline the Department's general policy. We realize that you must be guided by your judgment as the occasions arise, in view of the special situation in Yugoslav matters at your post.

HULL

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S60H.01/866

*King Peter II of Yugoslavia to President Roosevelt*

LONDON, April 17, 1944.<sup>72</sup>

MR. PRESIDENT: I am sorry that I am forced to address myself to you in this way, but I am encouraged by your friendship, for which I am grateful and of which I am proud.

Immediately upon my arrival here, on March 15th, Mr. Eden advised me to change the Royal Government and to abandon the Minister of War General Mihailovich. Two days later the British Ambassador told me that I did not need a Government, that I should organize a Committee of three members, whose sole duty would be to take care of the officials in emigration and that I should thus await the development of events in Yugoslavia and the future organization of the country. On March 18th, Mr. Churchill asked that on the day following my marriage I should no longer have a Government, but only a committee, which would begin negotiation with Tito; thereafter, I should entrust the rule of Yugoslavia to the Committee, which would become the "chief constable" of Yugoslavia.

My reply was that I could not change the Government, that I was very satisfied with it, that it was very popular with the people, and that the head of the Government was the best that I ever had. Mr. Churchill while approving of all this, concluded that the Royal Government had been compromised in the eyes of Tito.

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<sup>71</sup> Not printed.

<sup>72</sup> The copy of this letter in the Department files was prepared by Ambassador Fotich and dated by him as Washington, April 17, 1944.

The crux of the question is the Minister of War General Mihailovich, whom the Government cannot abandon, without betraying the people, which for three years has been fighting under the most difficult conditions, without help, with its own blood and bread. I, personally would become the traitor of my people and My Army in Yugoslavia, of which I am Supreme Commander. I told Mr. Churchill that it was too great a responsibility for me to assume and that I would like him to transmit his view in writing. Mr. Churchill replied that all this was not an official conversation, but a friendly suggestion, on which Tito insisted. The reality is murder, under disguise of my personal suicide.

On April 6th, Mr. Eden called on me again, apologizing for his action, since he felt not to have the right to interfere in our internal affairs, but stating that he was acting upon instructions. Again he counselled me to replace the Government with a new one, which *de facto* would be composed of three persons favorable to Tito.

On April 13th, Mr. Churchill insisted again, this time with an ultimatum-like request and with the menace that he would accuse General Mihailovich of collaboration with the Germans and that he would treat all of us accordingly, Myself as well as the Royal Government. As a proof of the alleged collaboration he even showed me a safe-conduct, in German, for some chetniks in Montenegro, despite my explanation that the term "chetnik" is also being used by Nedich's detachments in order to create confusion.

We cannot believe that anything could have been decided, without our being consulted, either at Moscow or Teheran, concerning the future of Yugoslavia. If so, why do we have to commit suicide? Even if I should be forced, or worst, capable, of betraying, why provoke one of the greatest scandals in history by libelling as "traitors" our courageous people, who are fighting alone without anyone's help, drowning in their own blood?

We have been told that there will not be any landing in the Balkans. If such a fatal decision was taken I implore you to change it.

Questioned about what would become of us if the Germans, under pressure from different sides, retreated and evacuated Yugoslavia, and the civil war there continued, we were told that the policy of non-intervention would be followed, as in Spain. This in fact would mean that others would have the opportunity to intervene. The case of Tito is not Yugoslav alone. It is the test case for all of Central Europe, and, if successful, it will lead to much more, with no end in sight. Mr. Churchill was indeed correct when he stated that Tito was the "unifying element", but it is true only in the reverse sense: for Tito has united against himself all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

My people have always fought for moral principles of humanity, for liberty and independence, never asking the price to be paid with

their blood, carrying on their shoulders the Cross of our Lord. They should be helped and not left alone in their fight in the service of our civilization.

Tito's following does not exceed thirty thousand men, which is less than a quarter of one per cent of the population of Yugoslavia. It is obvious that Tito, as representative of international communism, is repudiated by our nation, which remains deeply attached to its democratic faith and national tradition. Tito is weak and therefore I have to renounce the only Allied Minister of War in an occupied country, General Mihailovich; therefore I have to turn over to Tito the authority over the country and its future and to await the decision about my throne, a question that the enormous majority of the people has never raised. All this for whose sake? My people and My Army in the country expect me either to come there and fight together with them, or to defend them outside of the country as courageously as they are fighting in the Fatherland.

We cannot accept that the future of Yugoslavia be decided outside of us and without the participation of one of the three great Allies the United States of America. Therefore, I beg you, Mr. President, to intervene that the question of Yugoslavia, if not of all the Balkans, be the subject of a common discussion between ourselves, the United States, Great Britain and Russia, and under their common guarantee.

I, My Government and My Army in the country, as well as my entire people stand ready, as always, to make the greatest sacrifices for the common victory over the enemy and to rise as one man at the chosen and agreed moment.

In these times so difficult for my people, and me being fatherless, I address myself to you, Mr. President, as to a trusted friend, asking you to be good enough and send me, without delay, your advice and opinion.

I remain,

As ever Yours,

PETER II

860H.01/829 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Harrison)*

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1944—3 p. m.

1355. Your 2240, April 11.<sup>73</sup> The Department approves a reply to the Yugoslav Committee along the lines you have suggested.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed; it reported the formation among Yugoslav war prisoner escapees in Switzerland of a "Committee Abroad of National Yugoslav Liberation", which drew up a declaration of fidelity to Tito and then petitioned the American and British Ministers in Switzerland for recognition and joint protection. The British Minister, Clifford J. Norton, refused to deal with the group on the grounds that his Government still recognized the Royal Yugoslav Government, and the American Minister, Leland Harrison, proposed to do likewise. (860H.01/829)

For your background information, the relations of this Government with the Partisans have been kept on a purely military basis in accordance with the principle of supporting all resistance forces in Yugoslavia actively engaged against the enemy. The Committee which has communicated with you may wish to give emphasis to its military character but since it cannot expect to engage in military operations it must be considered as motivated by political considerations. While we are conscious of the social forces at work within Yugoslavia and of the imperfections of the groups now in control of the Government in exile, we recognize only that Government as the authority conducting Yugoslavia's international relations.

HULL

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740.0011 Stettinius Mission/47 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, April 21, 1944—8 p. m.  
[Received 11:59 p. m.]

3289. Deles 24. From Stettinius. As earlier telegrams from MacVeagh indicated to be the case, the British have been bringing all possible pressure upon King Peter to get rid of the Pouritch government. Sir Orme Sargent and Ambassador Stevenson discussed British policy with regard to Yugoslavia at some length with Matthews<sup>74</sup> yesterday. They began by frankly saying that British policy toward Yugoslavia is based on the short term policy of giving the British [*Partisan?*] military all possible support; the long term view would imply greater consideration for Mihailovich. (They did not admit that Russian support of Tito was a factor in their policy nor did they throw any light on future Russian plans for Yugoslavia. They feel that Russian policy is one of day to day military opportunism and that present support of Tito, who is fighting the Germans, will not at some future time preclude a Russian shift of policy toward Mihailovich and his Serbs when the country is liberated.) They said that they had lost all hope of bringing about any reconciliation between King Peter and Tito; the latter has made it clear that he does not wish to have the King return to Yugoslavia during the war nor will he cooperate with any government which the King may set up. The British do feel that in view of Mihailovich's reported cooperation with the Germans, and in order to minimize Tito's opposition to the King, the present intransigent group must go. The only person the British see in sight

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<sup>74</sup> H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, who had accompanied Mr. Stettinius to London.

to head a new government is the Ban of Croatia<sup>75</sup> and they understand that King Peter has asked him to come to England at least to talk. The British endeavors to induce King Peter to drop the Pouritch government culminated in a long interview with Mr. Churchill several days ago followed by the similar appeal by King George VI himself. They say that as yet King Peter has reached no final decision.

Coupled with any change of government the British attach much importance to a declaration they would like King Peter to make of a general conciliatory nature. This declaration would be a plea for unity, appealing to all his people to concentrate their efforts on ousting the invader and promising to let the people decide the character of their government after Yugoslavia is liberated. As to Mihailovich, he would be dropped from his post of Minister of War but would continue, under the British plan, to be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The British believe that any effort to oust him from the latter position would not only be futile but would prove to be a boomerang and weaken the King's prestige in Old Serbia. However much they dislike the collaboration that some of Mihailovich's officers have given the Germans (they admit that he himself has never cooperated with the Germans) they recognize how strong his popular support in Serbia is and its probable lasting nature.

Matthews inquired what the British would do if King Peter declines to follow their advice. Sargent answered that they would then have to reexamine their position. In reply to a further question as to whether the British contemplated the possibility of recognizing the Tito regime as a government, Sargent answered in the negative. If King Peter, as they hope, does follow their advice they will view his new government as a somewhat stop-gap arrangement for the period of the war and confined to relative inactivity.

It was interesting to note that their present military jurisdictional rearrangement provides that Yugoslavia (and Albania) shall be handled from Bari and Algiers by Macmillan rather than from Cairo where the rest of the Balkans will head up. They say that this is purely for military operational reasons and the facility with which communications with and supplies for Tito can be handled from Italy. Matthews informed Sargent and Stevenson that our policy with regard to Yugoslavia is based upon the Secretary's statement of last October;<sup>76</sup> that we will continue our established policy of giving military aid to all who are fighting the Axis; that on the other hand

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<sup>75</sup> Ivan Subasić, former Governor of Croatia, and leader of the Croatian Peasant's Party.

<sup>76</sup> The statement on Yugoslavia is probably the one made by Secretary Hull on December 10, 1943. For text, see the *New York Times*, December 10, 1943, p. 9, col. 2.

we feel that Yugoslav political problems must await decision until the Yugoslav people are free to make their choice after the liberation of the country; in the interim we have no intention of recognizing the Tito regime as a government and will continue to recognize King Peter and whatever administration he chooses as the legal government of Yugoslavia. He added that we did not intend to bring pressure upon King Peter to make changes desired by the British (nor have they asked this here). Sargent expressed understanding of this view adding that he thought both our Governments would be subject to increasing efforts on the part of Tito to obtain some more formal recognition of his regime. [Stettinius.]

WINANT

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860H.01/857 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 7, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received 6:31 p. m.]

1481. From Murphy.<sup>77</sup> Norden<sup>78</sup> has returned from a brief visit to Bari and reports as follows, upon the basis of conversations with American and British specialists and informal contact with local Partisan representatives.

Yugoslav situation remains obscure but Partisan strength increasing. Partisans deny existence of a civil war and accuse all opponents of collaboration in line with their basic strategy of forcing a situation with the alternatives either to fight the Germans under their leadership or to collaborate with the enemy. Tito is said to have sent his best organizers into Serbia but the meager information available on that particular region indicates that his movement has not yet taken hold and that the popular mood is one of awaiting developments. The local Maček representative, Yanchikovic,<sup>79</sup> believes the bulk of his party favors passive support of Partisans owing to fear of Serb reprisals for the late massacres and desire for a Yugoslav solution on terms favorable to the Croats but he believes the peasantry to be hostile to post-war Partisan control. A decisive future factor will be disposition of personnel and above all the equipment of the occupying divisions especially satellite and Quisling units in the event

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<sup>77</sup> Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, and until March 31, 1944, American member of the Advisory Council, Allied Control Commission for Italy.

<sup>78</sup> Carl F. Norden, Foreign Service Officer attached to the office of the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, as of March 23, 1944.

<sup>79</sup> Toma Janchikovich, representing the Croatian Peasant's Party under the presidency of Vladimir Maček.

of a sudden decline of German fortunes or a change in the Bulgarian position. While the claim to have liberated three-fifths of Yugoslavia and to represent the whole country is misleading in absence of any other constructive leadership and with continued strong support, the movement seems destined to make further progress not least because it is only unequivocal and determined advocate of Yugoslav idea and because of its strong appeal to the younger generation. Some observers accept a later domestic reaction because of the movement's alleged semi-totalitarian nature but this is conjecture. The question of recognition appears to be a major preoccupation. Meanwhile it is difficult to exaggerate the intensity of feeling in both camps and the more mature observers still believe Serbia to hold the key to the future of the country.

There was no indication locally that the British policy had yet won the full confidence of those it is benefitting but this need not reflect the situation on a higher level.

With regard to Albania specialists in Bari believe the conservative coalition is basically the stronger element. Tito is believed to have liaison with LNC<sup>80</sup> and establishment of an LNC "Government" is held probable with an anti-monarchic policy. LNC leadership is judged young and inexperienced. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

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860H.01/862 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 12, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received May 13—7:45 a. m.]

3868. The Ban of Croatia arrived here at the beginning of the week and has seen King Peter. Nothing as yet has come of their conversations.

The Foreign Office believes that Subasic will not accept premiership, despite any wishes of the King in this regard, for the former considers it a part of Yugoslav tradition that the Premier be a Serb, but he would accept a Cabinet position. The Ban apparently envisages a very small nuclear government which could eschew politics and restore to the King a certain amount of the prestige which he has lost through the bunglers of the Puric government.

The Foreign Office said that Brigadier Maclean reports that Tito will have no dealings whatsoever with the King as long as Mihailovic

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<sup>80</sup> The Albanian Committee of National Liberation (Levizia Nacional Clirimtare), the Albanian "Partisans". For correspondence relative to the internal affairs of Albania at this period, see vol. III, pp. 271 ff.



remains Minister of War, but that it is remotely possible that Tito might deal with the King, on a purely personal basis and not as King, if Mihailovic were dropped. The Foreign Office says that Tito must be well aware that the King enjoys great popularity with the Serbs and it would therefore be advantageous to the Partisans to have some sort of cooperation with the King and the Yugoslav Government which is recognized by the Allied Governments.

The Foreign Office official said that the prestige of Tito in Allied circles may possibly have been overplayed, but, on the other hand, Mihailovic, although not pro-German is of no use to the Allies as he refuses to become involved in hostilities with the Nazis. The support of Tito must therefore be continued to the fullest extent possible because of his military value, but a delicate balance must also be maintained in support of the Yugoslav Government. The crux of the whole matter is the position of Mihailovic, and it is realized by the Foreign Office that the King is in rather a predicament as he believes, probably quite rightly, that Mihailovic has a very considerable prestige among the Serbs.

WINANT

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860H.01/867

*Draft of a Letter From President Roosevelt to King Peter II of Yugoslavia*<sup>81</sup>

DEAR PETER: I have read your letter<sup>82</sup> with most careful attention and have given much thought to the several questions you raise. I shall reply with complete candor and in simple terms, and I am sure you will see how deeply and sympathetically we in America realize the problems facing the Yugoslav people.

You remember the burst of admiration with which we greeted your country's defiance of Germany three years ago.<sup>83</sup> Believe me, our sentiments have not changed. We are pledged to the liberation of Yugoslavia and we hope again to see the union of its national elements under a common government, democratic in form and fact, as the purposes for which this war is being fought require.

It is one of the misfortunes of the war that your country, battered and dismembered by the enemy, has suffered also from internal conflicts, which in turn have revived other older antagonisms. You try, I know, impartially to defend the interests of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and to bind them together in loyalty to the common interest.

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<sup>81</sup> Draft dated May 12, 1944. No indication can be found in Department files or in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., of the date on which this letter may have been dispatched to King Peter.

<sup>82</sup> *Ante*, p. 1359.

<sup>83</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. II, pp. 937 ff.

Let me frankly say that I think your advisers and your officials have not always shown the wisdom necessary to achieve this end. I mention this because you speak of the Government's popularity with the people at home. I wish I could say that our reports from within Yugoslavia confirm this. On the contrary, they indicate that the people in Yugoslavia have sought, and still are seeking, a leadership which would have vision for dealing with the new social forces at work in the world today, and energy for undertaking the vast tasks ahead.

It is characteristic of you that you should find it hard to agree to a proposal which would affect the status of General Mihailovich. Let us not forget that the Mihailovich question has become more political than military. He did not mean it to be so, I am sure, and I really think it would be to the best interest of your country, and only fair to him as well, to use his excellent talents in the field but relieve him of government responsibility. It always seemed to me that this fine soldier should not have been expected to share the administrative burdens and the responsibilities of a member of the Cabinet, or of successive Cabinets, with which he has only intermittent contact, and of whose political decisions he can be kept only very imperfectly informed. In view of the important events ahead, a decision which would emphasize his service as a soldier in the field would be something which military men everywhere would understand. As a loyal officer he too would acknowledge the necessity for such action.

The suggestion that you might reorganize your Government by forming what one may call a "streamlined" administration, was doubtless one of several alternatives advanced in the search for a settlement of some of the troubles in Yugoslavia and some of the unhappy disputes among Yugoslav groups abroad. This is a question on which you will now have the wise counsel of Ban Subasic. I was pleased to learn of your decision to call him to London. Some of our officials here saw him before his departure, and he will tell you what our people have been thinking on Yugoslav matters in general and will assure you of our abiding interest in the welfare of your country.

He will report also on our attitude toward the Partisans, which is precisely what Mr. Hull and others have publicly stated,—military aid where it can be got through most effectively for resistance forces in operations against the enemy. While our relations with the Partisan leaders are of a military character, we are fully aware of the political implications of the Partisan movement, and of the desire of its leaders for representation or recognition, also in the field of foreign affairs. We contemplate no change in our present relationships, but you, better than anyone else, will realize how useful it would be to us in carrying out this policy if the public generally were sure

that an earnest effort is being made to resolve certain basic difficulties. One of them is that the Partisan movement is stronger, and has far greater popular support, and sympathy for it extends into larger areas, than your Government has been willing to acknowledge. I can assure you that our reports prepared by expert and impartial observers who have been able to evaluate and recheck the intelligence on the spot, as regards both the Mihailovich and the Tito forces, leave no doubt of this. Any fundamental approach to a solution of the unhappy civil strife in Yugoslavia must take this reality into account.

It is indeed our plan to work together with the British and the Soviet Governments in questions relating to Yugoslavia. I want you to know that, though we may be considered to have a less direct interest in Southeastern Europe, we treasure the friendship of your people, and are counting upon their cooperation both for expelling and defeating the enemy and for wholehearted association with us in a long-range program of general security and prosperity. These are the main objectives of us all, and we can speak frankly to the British and Soviet Governments on these things, and you may be sure I shall not forget the points you bring out in your letter.

If some of my observations seem disappointing, it is because my warm friendship for you prompts me to give you in this personal and direct way my thoughts on the several questions you ask.

Do not think I underrate your own admirable efforts on behalf of your country and people. These are times that strain to the limit the energies and wisdom of the most experienced statesmen, and I know with what earnestness and energy you are devoting your young years to your country's service.

I send you from my heart every good wish for your welfare and happiness.

Very sincerely yours,

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860H.01/867

*Draft of a Letter to Marshal Tito*

DRAFT OF A LETTER TO BE SIGNED BY THE HEAD OF THE PROPOSED AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION, FOR MARSHAL TITO IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT<sup>84</sup>

MY DEAR MARSHAL TITO: The President has directed me to thank you for your attentive reception of the American officers who were

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<sup>84</sup> This letter, drafted May 13, 1944, was approved by President Roosevelt on May 23 and was turned over to the Office of Strategic Services on June 14 to be sent to Marshal Tito. In a letter to President Roosevelt of May 17, the Secretary of State urged that the President adopt this indirect method of acknowledging Marshal Tito's letter on the grounds that "there has been no abatement in the conflict between Tito and the Government which we continue to recognize". (860H.01/867)

sent into Yugoslavia, and for the friendly letter which you handed to Major Weil for delivery to him.<sup>85</sup>

The people and government of the United States do not underrate the valiant contribution which the Yugoslav people have already made to our common cause. We Americans know to what degree the people of Yugoslavia have suffered because they chose the hard but nobler way when the enemy came down upon them, and we realize both the urgent need for help of many kinds, while the war continues, and the tremendous tasks ahead for repairing the ravages of war and rebuilding the institutions necessary to a free people.

I have been particularly directed to say that the information which our officers have already obtained within Yugoslavia will be most useful to our military authorities and to the Allied command in working out the plans for rendering more effective assistance in strengthening resistance in Yugoslavia to the Germans, for contriving improved service of supply, and for fitting the operations in Yugoslavia into the general scheme for the conduct of the war.

It is now our business actively to carry forward this work under arrangements which will be taken up with you separately. The President has directed me to say that he knows that we shall have your unreserved and energetic help.

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860H.20/130

*The Secretary of State to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan)*

WASHINGTON, May 18, 1944.

MY DEAR GENERAL DONOVAN: I have had under consideration your letter of April 7<sup>86</sup> requesting the Department's views on a proposal to expand the activities of the Office of Strategic Services in Yugoslavia by strengthening the military mission now operating with the Partisan forces.

I heartily approve of this project as outlined in your letter, and I take it that the enlarged mission would be so organized as to operate independent of, but parallel to, the British and Russian missions in that territory.

At the same time I think that notwithstanding every emphasis on the purely military nature of the mission in question we must be prepared for the fact that a political character will inevitably be attributed to it after its arrival in Yugoslavia. Consequently I suggest that we again confer when you have decided on the officer to head the

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<sup>85</sup> Dated March 15, p. 1356.

<sup>86</sup> Not printed.

mission, and perhaps we should arrange for some detailed discussion of the political questions likely to arise, in order to incorporate appropriate instructions in the directive for the mission.

Of connected interest, though the matter is not mentioned in your letter, is the desire of the Partisans, which has been made known to us in various ways, to send a military mission to this country, thus putting the project on the basis of an exchange of military missions. I think it would not be advisable for this Government to agree to receive a Partisan mission here, unless there are important military considerations of which I am not informed.

As I understand it the American mission to Yugoslavia will have precise functions for military intelligence, special operations, arranging supply lines, technical air force intelligence, and morale operations against the enemy. The functions of a corresponding Yugoslav mission here would therefore be not at all parallel. It seems to me that under the arrangements for the military theatre which includes Yugoslavia there would be little for a Partisan military mission to accomplish in Washington. I feel sure that its major activity would be political, and the effect would be detrimental to the effort now being made to resolve some of the controversies between the Partisans and the Yugoslav Government. I have in mind also the controversies among groups of Yugoslav-Americans, which have not been helpful to our national unity, and which would doubtless be sharpened by the attendant publicity if a new Yugoslav mission should come here while the general Yugoslav question is in its present fluid state.

If your proposal for an enlarged and independent American military mission to the Partisans is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officers of this Department will be glad at any time to enter into a detailed discussion with your organization, on the several political questions which might have bearing on the mission's work.<sup>87</sup>

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL

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711.60H/33

*Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 19, 1944.

The following are suggested as general principles outlining our Yugoslav policy:

*General Statement.* The disintegration of Yugoslavia at the time of the German invasion brought into relief the same factors which are

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<sup>87</sup>The proposal was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and after much delay the "Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito" began operations in August 1944.

involved in the internal controversies today, and which in turn must be dealt with in any future solution of the Yugoslav problem. It was the Serbian element which aligned Yugoslavia in resistance to Germany, and among the Serbs there are leaders who take it for granted that the Serbs should dominate the future state. The same reasons why resistance in Croatia was ineffectual in 1941 are hardly submerged in the present guerrilla activity, and will again be operative when the country is again united. The Slovenes, cut off from the Serbs, were helpless against the enemy, and as a weaker people aspiring to equality on a national basis they are likely again to seek an alignment with the dominant element.

As an alternative to this problem of balance of power within Yugoslavia there has been speculation along lines of separatism, with the idea of new looser groupings, such for example, as an eventual union of Serbia and Bulgaria. We think, however, that notwithstanding the bitter factional conflicts which have sharpened the older and fundamental controversies, a united Yugoslavia would offer the best prospects for the security and prosperity of the three national elements, and afford the best means of cooperation with neighboring countries.

With this end in view the following propositions are set down:

1. The United States does not intend to intercede in the internal political affairs of Yugoslavia. We have no special interests to promote, and seek no special privileges. Our interest is in the establishment of a representative government, upon the liberation of the country, according to the freely-expressed desires of the people concerned. We expect such a government to cooperate with neighboring countries, and with us, in a long-range program of general security and prosperity.

2. While we would not undertake to suggest the forms under which the Yugoslav people should organize their political institutions, we are cognizant of the social forces which are at work. We believe that the people of Serbia are just as much interested in democratic reform as are the people of Croatia or the borderland areas, and that no permanent system can be adopted which does not give full weight to the vigor and traditions of both the Serb and the Croat peoples. Thus the Sporazum of 1939,<sup>88</sup> with all its imperfections, as well as the newer projects of decentralization or federalization should be given enlightened attention as a starting point for rebuilding a common life between the Serbs and Croats, which is, of course, the cardinal issue in the Yugoslav question.

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<sup>88</sup> The Yugoslav constitutional settlement of 1939, which set up the semi-independent Banovina Croatia. The Ban, or Governor, was given full autonomy in certain specified regional matters.

3. We expect the people of Yugoslavia to work for their own liberation, and wish to strengthen the resistance forces in whatever way the military exigencies may permit. We should like to see the leaders within Yugoslavia concentrate on the military tasks ahead, and do not feel that either of the leading resistance groups now operating in the country can lay solid claim to representing, in the political sense, the sentiments of the country as a whole.

4. We are working jointly with Great Britain and the Soviet Union for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of occupied countries. There is not, and will not be, a separate American "policy" which might be appealed to by any Yugoslav group in divergence from the common policy for the prosecution of the war.

5. At the same time we realize that both the Russians and the British may have interests in the Balkan and Mediterranean area which we would prefer not to support. In any event, it is already apparent that the interest of these Governments is being implemented so dynamically that the effect is hardly consistent with our doctrine of non-intervention. It is therefore important that we should maintain independence of action as regards means of obtaining intelligence, military or political, and should decline to become associated with political transactions, purporting to be on a joint basis, in which the undoubted American prestige in Yugoslavia would be exploited and American responsibility engaged, unless we really know what is going on.

6. We have no engagements to King Peter or to any Yugoslav Government beyond those implicit in the relationships normally existing between governments, or gaining particular importance because of joint participation in the war. We would have no difficulty, however, in continuing political and diplomatic relations with a reconstituted Government, even though it may represent quite new elements. To the degree that forces from within the country may be assimilated into the government we hope that genuine efforts would be made to have them representative of the elements having sound claim to speak for the peoples constituting the broad masses of Yugoslavia. Particularly as regards members of the Government who have been residing abroad we feel that insistence on claims to "representative" character because of affiliations with pre-war political parties is bound to involve the Government in useless political controversy.

7. We are realistic enough not to expect unity among Yugoslav elements abroad, but we believe that the representatives of the various factions who seek support in circles close to the Yugoslav Government or Court could profitably be enjoined by the Crown and by the highest authorities of whatever government may be formed, and with-

out discrimination, to abate their mutual antagonisms during the provisional period of government from abroad.

8. Our relations with Ambassador Fotitch are determined by the rules of normal diplomatic usage. We recognize the practical advantages of continuity in the conduct of diplomatic relations, and consider that Governments in exile should, in general, try to avoid frequent changes of personnel. We would deplore a situation whereby an Embassy in Washington might become a political plum with frequent changes according to the conflicting currents in the groups contesting for power in a Government in exile. To attempt to correct a tendency toward "Serbism" in the United States (Mr. Fotitch is frequently accused of responsibility for this) by an appointment to please the Croatian element in this country, would hardly affect the basic problem, and serve chiefly to reverse the antagonisms. Unfortunately most of the "good Yugoslavs" are not trusted by either the Serb or the Croat enthusiasts.

9. We think that the Yugoslav element in the United States will be helpful to the people of Yugoslavia in the difficult days of rehabilitating their country, but that Yugoslav-Americans should not be considered as spokesmen for public opinion in Yugoslavia today.

10. We expect to be called upon for an important contribution for relief purposes and for the reconstruction of Yugoslavia. This will be mainly through international machinery established for that purpose, but we realize that the people of Yugoslavia will look especially to their friends and relatives in this country to help them in the difficult years ahead.

CAVENDISH W. CANNON

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860H.01/870: Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 19, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received May 19—5:40 p. m.]

4046. King Peter yesterday dismissed the Puric government. Foreign Office says that it has very little information as to the personalities who may be included in the new Yugoslav Government, but it is quite certain that the Ban of Croatia will play a prominent part in its formation. It is probable that he will be Prime Minister. Mihailovic definitely will not be included in the new government. The Foreign Office says this will be very small in number and that it will represent a break with the former associations, although it may be necessary to take in one or two of the older politicians as there is



nobody else available. The Foreign Office believes that a conciliatory gesture will be made to Tito. All is in the hands of King Peter, on whom the final decisions rest.

The Embassy will report further developments.

BUCKNELL

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860H.01/880 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Bucknell) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, May 23, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 8:52 p. m.]

4163. From Schoenfeld.<sup>89</sup> Your 3971, May 18, midnight.<sup>90</sup> I have just seen King Peter. He tells me British insists that he form a government today. There will be questions regarding Yugoslavia in the House of Commons tomorrow and Mr. Churchill feels he must be in a position to answer them.

King Peter says he has been conferring all day with Yugoslav personalities here but still does not know whether he can form a government today.

The present plan is to form a small Cabinet and a "resistance committee". The Cabinet would consist of 3 or 4 persons including one Croatian, one Slovene and one Serb. Mihailovic would be dropped as Minister of War but would remain CinC.<sup>91</sup> Tito would not be represented in the government. Both Mihailovic and Tito would be invited to send representatives to the resistance committee.

As for the composition of the Cabinet, King Peter says Ban Subasic is willing to join. A suitable Slovene is also available, either Kotze<sup>92</sup> or Czok<sup>93</sup> or Snoj.<sup>94</sup> A suitable Serb has not yet been secured. King Peter would like Jovanovic<sup>95</sup> and is seeing him later this evening. He feels an important Serb personality is essential among other reasons to offset the effect on Serb opinion of the change of status of Mihailovic. [Schoenfeld.]

BUCKNELL

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<sup>89</sup> Rudolf E. Schoenfeld, Counselor of Embassy to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London.

<sup>90</sup> Not printed.

<sup>91</sup> Commander in Chief.

<sup>92</sup> Possibly Edvard Kotzbek.

<sup>93</sup> Possibly Ivan Pchok.

<sup>94</sup> Frano Snoj.

<sup>95</sup> Slobodan Jovanovich, distinguished Serbian scholar who served as Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Government in Exile from January 12, 1942, until August 10, 1943.

740.0011 European War 1939/34389 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, May 27, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 9:40 p. m.]

1745. From Murphy. In response to a request to PWE<sup>96</sup> and OWI<sup>97</sup> in London for joint guidance on Yugoslavia, PWB of AFHQ<sup>98</sup> has received a message from PWE calling attention to Churchill's May 24 speech.<sup>1</sup> The message notes particularly his definition of the objective as being to make all forces in Yugoslavia work together "under Tito's military direction" for an independent and united Yugoslavia to drive the Germans out.

Since my understanding is that it is not the American objective to unite all Yugoslav forces under Tito, I am advising PWB tentatively that we cannot approve such a line. An urgent expression of the Department's views would be appreciated.

This particular case is an example of numerous problems that can be expected to come up more frequently in the future. I have noted the OWI views on integration of the Balkan Section of OWI at Cairo into PWB (Department's 1595, May 22, 5 p. m.<sup>2</sup>) particularly the points that it is not desirable for the United States to become identified with British policy in this area and that if the British want to take a strong propaganda line supporting a certain leader or ruler their statements, broadcasts or leaflets should bear a clear British label and could not bear an Allied label.

This seems to raise the fundamental question of whether OWI can continue to participate in PWB, which like other parts of AFHQ is such a closely integrated Anglo-American organization that it is operationally impossible for it to handle divergent propaganda lines. Any attempt to put a British label on a certain propaganda line and American label on another would destroy the fundamental principle of unity of action. Since it has long been the practice for leaflets dropped over occupied territory to call on the people to do various things in the name of "United Nations" or "The Allies", the putting of a clear British label on certain leaflets would make the divergence of policy immediately apparent and add ammunition to the enemy

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<sup>96</sup> Psychological Warfare Executive, the British counterpart of the American Office of War Information.

<sup>97</sup> Office of War Information.

<sup>98</sup> Psychological Warfare Branch of Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>1</sup> Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 400, col. 775.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

"split-the-Allies" line. Similar considerations apply to radio, PWB radio broadcasts being identified as "United Nations Radio".

While the policy toward Yugoslavia is the immediate issue, similar problems with regard to French, Greek and other affairs in this area should be anticipated.

I have consulted with Russell Barnes<sup>3</sup> and other OWI officials here and they feel that it is essential for the continued joint operation of PWB that they receive authoritative joint guidance on all propaganda matters. They suggest that London probably is the center at which the propaganda line can best be coordinated. In the past joint PWB-OWI directives have been received from London, indicating that machinery exists there for "marrying" Anglo-American propaganda lines. It is just such cases as the Yugoslavia guidance cited above, however, in which such coordination is essential if joint operation here is to continue.

PWB will attempt to avoid the issue regarding Tito as long as possible, but emphasize the urgent need of a propaganda theme acceptable to both British and American Governments.<sup>4</sup>

Sent to the Department as 1745; repeated to London as 181; repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

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860H.01/908: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, June 1, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received June 1—1:35 p. m.]

4387. The King of Yugoslavia has asked the Ban of Croatia to form a government.

The Foreign Office has just informed us that the King was scheduled to sign this morning a proclamation appointing the Ban and that this proclamation would be publicized this evening.

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<sup>3</sup> Director, Psychological Warfare Branch, Allied Force Headquarters.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 1834, June 10, 1944, 8 p. m., to Algiers, which was in answer to this telegram and to telegram 1915, June 9, 1944, 8 p. m., from Algiers (not printed) the Acting Secretary of State declared: "The Department is not now prepared to accept, as an Allied objective, the urging of all forces in Yugoslavia to work under Tito's military leadership, particularly since the British themselves have apparently reached no final decision in this respect as indicated by your 1850 of June 6, 5 p. m. [not printed]. Furthermore, the Department is of the opinion that the proposed objective would be premature in view of current negotiations for the formation of a representative Yugoslav cabinet. Finally, information available to the Department does not indicate that the proposed objective has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration." (740.0011 European War 1939/34389)

According to the Foreign Office, it has been impossible for the King to persuade the Serbs to participate in a government. The Serbian elements had agreed to join a government, on the condition that certain guarantees of support for Mihailovic would be given by the British, but the latter flatly declined to do so. Accordingly, the King has now decided to ask Subasic to form a government which will be a one-man government until other elements can be brought into the fold. The plan is that Subasic should proceed to Bari where he will establish contact with various Yugoslav elements there, including Chetniks, the Croat Peasant Party, and Partisans. "After consultation" with these groups, the Ban will form a government. The King will remain in Great Britain for the time being. The text of the proclamation, which has not yet been released, follows as section 2.<sup>5</sup>

WINANT

860H.01/921 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 9, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received June 10—1 a. m.]

1911. From Murphy. Marshal Tito and British and Soviet Missions are now established on Vis.<sup>6</sup> Air traffic between Vis and Italian mainland is now feasible. This information is to be treated as highly secret. It is also understood from British sources that new Yugoslav Prime Minister was appointed primarily to bring about an understanding among Yugoslav resistance groups and forces. He has indicated apparently that he would be willing to accept for such reorganization of Yugoslav forces any reasonable proposal. I am also informed that Prime Minister intends in the near future to confer with representatives of Tito. The disposition of certain elements of Yugoslav forces in this theatre are awaiting outcome of such conference. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

<sup>5</sup> Not printed. In his declaration, King Peter appealed to his people "to lay aside their differences and to postpone all internal political issues until after the liberation of the country, when they will be free to express their will regarding the regime under which they desire to live in the future." The King went on to say that as evidence of his sincerity he had decided to form a new government which will "consecrate itself to the high purpose of working with all those elements in our country who are actively resisting the enemy." Since the new government would function effectively only if it had the cooperation of all resistance elements in Yugoslavia, the King had directed Ban Subasic to establish contact with these elements before deciding on the composition of the new government. (860H.01/908)

<sup>6</sup> On May 25, Tito's headquarters were overrun by the Germans and he and his staff were forced to flee to the Adriatic island of Vis.

860H.01/935 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, June 11, 1944—midnight.

[Received June 15—7: 23 p. m.]

1965. From Murphy. As Department must be aware the King of Yugoslavia passed through Algiers today travelling on the British Prime Minister's plane. He was accompanied by Subasitch. Macmillan and General Wilson had a brief conversation with him having been advised by Prime Minister only during last night of the plan to rush negotiations with Marshal Tito with as much despatch as possible.

The King and Subasitch departed for Malta this afternoon and it is planned that Subasitch will proceed Monday to Bari and Vis for purpose of entering into negotiations with Tito and other Partisans.

At Bari, Subasitch hopes to find Topalitch<sup>7</sup> who is said to be Mihailovitch's political adviser and who is said to be ready to go to Vis with Subasitch.

Part of the plan developed in London, I am informed, contemplates an understanding by which under King's overall authority Tito will assume the military command of all Yugoslav forces and Subasitch the political and civil authority. In other words a Clemenceau-Foch relationship.

Tito, the British inform me, is in a "chastened" mood as a result of recent reverses. In Vis, as I have pointed out, he is much more under British influence and control due to the presence of substantial British forces than was the case in Bosnia. The moment therefore seems to our British friends propitious to strike a bargain and move toward a consolidation of Yugoslav forces. If achieved this would be followed by military, financial and economic accords.

The unknown quantity in all of this is the Mihailovitch reaction; whether he would prove amenable to suasion. I asked Macmillan what bait could be offered and he said that apparently his Government had no fixed notion but that there was always the possibility that he might accept at the hands of the King a promotion and eventually a mission to London.

It is very possible Tito will accept an invitation from General Wilson to visit latter's headquarters in Italy next Friday for a discussion of military operations. Incidentally there would be some political dis-

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<sup>7</sup> Zhivko Topalovich.

cussion and presumably Subasitch and others would attend. If appropriate the King would join the meeting.

Macmillan and I will closely watch developments.

Repeated Cairo for MacVeagh. [Murphy.]

CHAPIN

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860H.01/942c: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1944—10 p. m.

Yugos 30. The British Embassy has informed the Department that Tito was evacuated from Yugoslavia at his request because of a breakdown in his communications system. While at Bari he expressed readiness to meet Subasic, whose appointment he welcomed. In Vis, where he expects to remain for two or three weeks, Tito proposes to reestablish contact with the Partisans.

The British have decided that King Peter should remain in Malta, while Subasic and Stevenson proceed from there to Vis to open conversations with Tito with a view to achieving unification of all resistance forces in Yugoslavia. The British hope that later a friendly meeting may take place between the King and Tito and indicate that in any event the former may shortly proceed to Vis to take up his residence.

The Department at present has no direct communication with Subasic. The information summarized above, and the notification that the Government will be transferred to London, were received through the British Embassy.<sup>8</sup> Ambassador Fotitch states that he has received notification of Ban Subasic's appointment as Prime Minister, and of his, Fotitch's, retirement with instructions to turn over the Embassy to Dr. Franges<sup>9</sup> who would be Chargé, but no further information of any kind.

The Department questions whether the necessities of military secrecy should be held to cover the political transactions in view, but since the personalities involved are still in movement in a war zone the Department is not inclined to raise this question for the moment, though it maintains its well-known position against political censorship.

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<sup>8</sup> Prime Minister Subasić in a message transmitted as an enclosure to a note from the British Embassy on June 12, 1944, notified the Department that the seat of the Yugoslav Government was being transferred to London, and requested therefore that the American Embassy be moved from Cairo to London (860H.01/948).

<sup>9</sup> Ivan Franges, Yugoslav Counselor of Embassy in Washington.

From the above, and with particular reference to your 119 of June 13,<sup>10</sup> it is evident that delicacy and caution must be exercised with respect to the use of intelligence coming to us from British sources, particularly since the Yugoslav officials at Cairo and Washington are not being vouchsafed any information regarding the current political and military developments in their own Government.

Neither the Department nor the OSS has had detailed reports concerning the extent or success of the German operations preceding the escape of Tito.

HULL

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860H.01/940 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, June 18, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received June 18—4:10 p. m.]

233. From Kirk<sup>11</sup> from Murphy. Reference my telegram of June 11 from Algiers with regard to the passage of King Peter of Yugoslavia through Algiers.

The British representative at Bari<sup>12</sup> reported on June 15 that he had seen Tito the night of June 14 and handed to him a letter from Churchill and in so doing emphasized the importance attached by the British Government to attainment of an agreement between him and Yugoslav Government and King.

Tito replied that he also was anxious to reach such an agreement if possible. The proof of that was that he had invited Subasic to meet him. He had spent the greater part of the day in preliminary conversations with Subasic and intended to get down to business with Subasic in the presence of those among his advisors who are with him on the Island of Vis. Tito said that he was confident a practical working arrangement could be reached. He did not exclude the possibility of meeting the King later on. Tito pointed out, however, that only a minority of his advisors were with him and it would be necessary to consult the remainder by radio. He repeated his conviction of a possibility of a working arrangement with Subasic regardless of what the final decision about meeting King Peter might be.

Mr. Broad reported that a very cordial reception by the Partisans was given the British representatives at Vis. Apparently Tito was pleased and flattered by the fact that Subasic and British representatives had visited him. Broad said he expected to receive a reply to

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<sup>10</sup> Not printed.

<sup>11</sup> Alexander C. Kirk succeeded Robert D. Murphy as American Representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, March 31, 1944.

<sup>12</sup> Philip Broad, representative of the Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters.

Churchill's letter that evening (June 14). He added that he had seen Subasic that evening after the latter's conversation with Tito and Subasic seemed tired but fairly satisfied.

The British representative at Bari reported on June 16 that negotiations between Subasic and Tito seemed to be going reasonably well and Tito was apparently showing himself to be well disposed and anxious to conclude working arrangement. Some measure of cooperation between Tito and Yugoslav Government seemed likely as the final outcome. That Subasic and Tito should make some sort of a joint declaration also seemed to be possible and these were being drafted. There also seemed to be a possibility of a joint communiqué being issued for immediate publication.

The SAC<sup>13</sup> who invited Tito to visit him at Caserta and who had also made arrangements to have Subasic and King Peter present in case negotiations should be concluded successfully was informed by Brigadier Maclean on June 16 that Tito had withheld his reply to General Wilson's invitation to visit Caserta as a result of the subsequent suggestion that he (Tito) should also see King Peter at Caserta. Maclean is expected here today and it is also anticipated that Tito's Chief of Staff will arrive tomorrow. Subasic is also expected to arrive this evening with King Peter.

Prevailing sentiment at Caserta is that in these initial conversations, definite conclusions will not be reached on a number of points but that considerable progress looking towards some form of *rapprochement* will be made.

Repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh. [Kirk, Murphy.]

BRANDT

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860H.01/943 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, June 20, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received June 20—5:48 p. m.]

248. From Murphy. According to Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean who arrived from Vis last evening Josef Broz-Tito will not be able to visit General Wilson just now. Maclean brought with him a letter from Tito explaining that it would be most difficult for him to absent himself at the moment but that he would be glad to send his Chief of Staff. Tito's first suggestion to Maclean apparently was that he did not feel well but Maclean advised him that such an excuse would not be good enough. Tito according to Maclean at first was delighted with idea of coming over to visit Commander-in-Chief but when he learned that King Peter would be here he changed his mind. Maclean

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<sup>13</sup> Supreme Allied Commander.



believes Tito thought that some of his supporters would thoroughly disapprove his meeting with the King and that even if he came over here at a time when the King also present even if they did not actually meet the news would get around and effect on Tito's followers would be the same.

Maclean reports that Tito and Subasic reached substantial agreement some of which has been reduced to writing and I hope to obtain a copy.

The question of the monarchy under this agreement is to be deferred until after Yugoslavia's liberation. No appointments to the government are to be made without Tito's approval and Tito will have representatives in the Council of Ministers but will not himself actually be a member of the Council. Tito will retain command of the forces including remnants of the Yugoslavian Navy.

Subasic who is due here this afternoon will make his report of these negotiations to the King. I gather that the King is expected to approve the plan (I doubt that he will be permitted to disapprove) but I also believe that King and his supporters entertain small doubt regarding Tito's intentions concerning the monarchy. There is some intimation that sooner or later conflict is bound to develop and that present stage is one of jockeying for position pending the German defeat.

King and Subasic will return to London very shortly.

Repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh. [Murphy.]

BRANDT

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124.60H/7-144 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (MacVeagh), at Cairo*

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1944—6 p. m.

Yugos 39. Department's 29 June 17.<sup>14</sup> The Department is now arranging, under the President's authorization, to accredit Mr. Schoenfeld as Chargé d'Affaires ad interim near the Yugoslav Government at London, and to relieve you of the Yugoslav mission.

Major changes in your organization are not contemplated, however. It is believed that those Yugoslav matters most important to us in the conduct of the war, and as a basis for our long-term relations with Yugoslavia such as the coordination of political, military, economic, relief, refugee and propaganda activities, will continue to be handled in your area and through organizations with which you already are or will be working. Moreover the concentration in the Mediterranean area of major planning and negotiation activities with respect to other

<sup>14</sup> Not printed.

Balkan countries is expected to continue. The Department desires that an appropriate staff be maintained at Cairo to perform these important and diverse functions under your direction.<sup>15</sup>

HULL

860H.01/7-344 : Telegram

*The Counselor of Mission at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State*

ALGIERS, July 3, 1944—midnight.

[Received July 4—3:40 a. m.]

2264. The following has been received this evening from Merrill<sup>16</sup> at Bari:

"The policy committee today considered and revised draft of an overall directive to the forces under the control of the Balkan Air Force.<sup>17</sup> The section which concerns United States and regarding which our concurrence as a member of the committee is requested is now as follows:

"The general policy is that all possible military support should be accorded to those elements willing and able to resist the enemy. The final goal is to further the cause of national unity throughout the country in preparation for post-war settlements. No action should be initiated which would commit us to a recognition of any claims to the revision of pre-war frontiers. Such questions must be held in abeyance for settlement at the peace conference. This means in Yugoslavia that we should provide the fullest aid to Tito's Partisans. We should encourage the union of all the fighting units in Yugoslavia with the National Army of Liberation in a single front in accord with the provisions of the Tito-Subasich agreement. No support will be furnished the Mihailovich forces. Support will not be furnished the Partisans where it is obvious that they will use it not against the Germans, Bulgarians, Ustashi<sup>18</sup> and other definitely accepted Quislings, but merely against the Chetniks. Support may be given, however, in cases where Partisan forces are fighting Chetniks who are definitely collaborating with the Germans, Bulgarians or Quisling Serbian units and in cases where the Partisans find active opposition in attacks on mines, lines of communication or other objectives of a military value. We would use as our guiding principle, except for the two exceptions already noted, the idea that we must not become involved in or a party to purely internal conflicts or domestic issues in Yugoslavia.

As far as Albania is concerned, we should furnish the LNC military support, for it is the only element resisting the enemy on an active basis. We should do all we can to bring about a working agreement between the LNC and any elements such as the Nationalists in northern Albania which may be willing to cooperate. Hungary: The prime objective is to get Hungary out of the

<sup>15</sup> In a letter of June 20, 1944, the Secretary of State had recommended to the President that Ambassador MacVeagh remain in Cairo. He felt that in the foreseeable future all the principal matters in United States relations with Yugoslavia would be handled in the Mediterranean area, and added that "these questions, from our point of view, are much more important than the matter of formal relations with a Government which more and more is being obliged to conform to British plans." (123/MacVeagh, Lincoln/6-2044)

<sup>16</sup> Frederick T. Merrill, Foreign Service Officer in the Office of the U.S. Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>17</sup> The Balkan Air Force with headquarters at Bari had the mission of coordinating and supporting Allied military operations in the Balkans. The meeting of the policy committee referred to was held at Bari on June 28, 1944.

<sup>18</sup> The Croatian National Liberation Movement.

war as soon as it can be accomplished.<sup>19</sup> Any group which may emerge ready to resist the enemy would receive our support'.

Although Norden and I feel that certain portions of foregoing may be at odds with our policy as we last knew it (especially the expressed support of the Subasich-Tito agreement) we feel we should not object since the directive is to be applied only to present military operations and is subject to modification. What is your advice in this matter? Do we have your approval to agree to the directive when presented in final form to the committee on July 5th?"

I propose advising Merrill that we would object to the blanket statement "no support will be furnished the Mihailovitch forces". The statement as it stands is inconsistent with our stated policy to aid whatever forces may be fighting the Germans. It seems to me that if Mihailovitch forces are actively engaged in combatting Germans they would merit our assistance.

I should appreciate Department's comments.

CHAPIN

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860H.01/7-444 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 4, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received July 5—8:30 a. m.]

Yugoslavia 2. Ban Subasic has given Premier Churchill a memorandum on his recent discussions with Tito and has given me a copy. The memorandum is divided into three sections, the first dealing with the main principles of the agreement with Tito (see my 1, July 4<sup>20</sup>), the second dealing with the question[s] which should be solved immediately; and the third dealing with the new government. The substance of the memorandum is given below.

Under section 1, Subasic states: Before reaching their conclusions Tito and he agreed to divide their future work into two phases, the first preparatory and the second final. Tito and his leading collaborators in the anti-Fascist Council showed him documented proof of what Mihailovic and his Chetnik leaders had done in the name of the King. This they said was the main reason for the King losing his authority and popularity with the Partisans. Tito was aware that only the members of the former Yugoslav Governments were responsible for those deeds. He thinks there will be time enough to improve the position of the King and that this may be successfully

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<sup>19</sup> For United States interest in attempts to remove Hungary from the war, see vol. III, pp. 847 ff.

<sup>20</sup> Not printed; it contained the full text of the Tito-Subasić agreement.

done if the King and the new government show themselves prepared to do everything in their power actively to help the people and the resisters. Tito will then be able to be more outspoken in the matter. This end would best be served if a common single representation could be formed within and outside the country.

Subasic adds that the recently concluded agreement has the following significance for the King and the Government. It signifies first of all recognition by Tito and his anti-Fascist and executive councils of the legitimate representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This recognition is demonstrated by the fact that Tito and his national committee have discussed and concluded an agreement with the Royal Government of Yugoslavia.<sup>21</sup> In addition, Tito and his men agree to delegate two persons to the Royal Government.

For Tito and his associates the following claims have been accepted; recognition of the achievements by the people during their three years war: The democratic and federal organization of the state community; recognition of the established provisional administration and its executive organs in the country; recognition of the national fighting forces commanded by Marshal Tito, and condemnation of the traitors to the cause of the people.

It has been agreed that the problem of the King and the monarchy will not be discussed until the people themselves can freely decide on this matter. Similarly the question of the final organizations of the State will not be discussed for the duration of the war.

All national forces must be united and directed against the enemy. Both sides hope that their common efforts will help to eliminate existing difficulties and differences and bring the people on the one hand and the King and Government on the other nearer to each other.

Under section 2 of the memorandum Ban Subasic lists the questions which he and Tito agreed should be solved immediately;

(1) Yugoslav Navy. Tito wishes to bring the whole navy under its [*his?*] operative command. As a result of a discussion at General Wilson's headquarters, General Wilson, Admiral Cunningham<sup>22</sup> and Subasic agreed that they should settle this question at a conference to be held in Italy, at which both Tito and Subasic should take part. Tito and Subasic agreed that the Royal Yugoslav Navy should sail and fight under the Yugoslav flag without insignia (Red Star).

<sup>21</sup> In despatch 604, July 6, 1944, from Algiers, Mr. Murphy reported conversations that he had held with Dr. Subasić in Italy the week before. He found the Yugoslav Prime Minister optimistic but, "He made no effort to conceal the fact that the real power under the arrangement concluded remained with Tito who, retaining command of all the forces now serving with him and aided by the substantial assistance given him by the Allies, is in a very strong position." (740.0011 EW 1939/7-644)

<sup>22</sup> Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Commander in Chief of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean Theater.

(2) Army and Air Force. Tito wishes that all those who have declared for the Partisans should be put at his disposal at once. He would also approve of the Yugoslav regular forces—wearing royal insignia—fighting on Yugoslav soil. He does not mind in which part of Yugoslavia they fight.

(3) Supplies. Tito is asking for the following items; (a) armaments for the Navy and 10 speed boats; (b) 60 and 30 planes daily for the transport of supplies respectively to the forces in Yugoslavia and the civil population; (c) 80 tanks which he would be able to man with 960 trained men; (d) cannon and other weapons; (e) clothing; shoes, linen, food, medicaments etc. both for the forces and civilian population.

(4) Establishment of a permanent military mission in Italy.

(5) Proper disposition of Yugoslavs of Italian citizenship now in Italian concentration camps and wishing to fight in Yugoslav forces, estimated at about thirty thousand (20,000 in Sardinia and 10,000 dispersed over Italy).

Under section 3 of the memorandum Subasic states the government can only be formed of persons prepared to carry out the program of the recently concluded agreement. Tito agreed to designate two men from the liberation movement namely Dr. Drago Marusic (Slovene) and Sreten Vukosavljevic, a Serb. Subasic can nominate them as Cabinet Ministers without any further parley. In addition, Tito will nominate one member of the anti-Fascist council as liaison officer to the government. This will be a Serb from Sumadija. Further he will name delegates to various international commissions on which Yugoslavia is represented. He desires that Yugoslav Government nominate Dr. Smodlaka as Yugoslav delegate to Mediterranean commission.

Tito also asked whether Simic could be reinstated as Ambassador at Moscow. Subasic gathered from General Kornjejev<sup>23</sup> that Soviet Government would also welcome such a decision. Subasic told Tito and Kornjejev that Simic would first have to put himself at the disposal of the King.

[SCHOENFELD]

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860H.01/7-344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Counselor of Mission at Algiers  
(Chapin)*

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1944—2 p. m.

2140. For Murphy. Your 2264 July 3, midnight. The Department approves of your advice to Merrill.

Since the directive is to be applied only to immediate military operations and is subject to modification the Department would like

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<sup>23</sup> Lt. Gen. Nikolay Vasilyevich Korneyev, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission to Tito.

the American representative to have the following comments in mind for an early reexamination of the matter.

In general the British objectives, to which our assent is sought, are stated to be the extension of aid to elements prepared to resist the enemy, to achieve Yugoslav national unity and to avoid civil war or involvement in purely internal conflicts or domestic issues. The Department is in complete agreement with these objectives, which represent the policy which this Government has consistently followed.

To achieve these objectives, however, the British propose that (1) the fullest aid should be given to Tito under whose command all forces in Yugoslavia should be united, (2) no support should be furnished Mihailovich forces, (3) support should be given to operations against Chetniks who are definitely collaborating with the enemy or who are reported by the Partisans to be offering resistance to their sabotage operations and (4) on political as well as military grounds Tito's movement must be extended to and his activities must be promoted in Serbia (your 2244 of July 2, 2 p. m.<sup>24</sup>). These propositions are presumably based on the Tito-Subasic accord.

Available information indicates that the accord is not a compromise between Yugoslav political groups but essentially an arrangement between the British and Tito, representing an almost unconditional acceptance of the Partisan demands, which Subasic has been prevailed upon to agree to and which have now been put before the King.

The Department believed that the appointment of Subasic and the removal of Mihailovich as Minister of War prepared the way for negotiations from which a reasonable arrangement between the chief Yugoslav elements might be reached. From the rather meager information since received it appears, however, that the exclusion of Serbian interests in the subsequent negotiations and the insistence on giving Tito politically and militarily a free hand for all Yugoslavia have jeopardized the advantages which might have been gained. The reason commonly advanced is Mihailovich's alleged collaboration with the enemy, on which, in view of the confusing and somewhat contradictory accounts presented, the British themselves do not seem to have made up their mind.

Pending a clarification of the reasons why the Allies should have denied themselves all access to the heart of Yugoslavia, even for intelligence purposes, the Department would not approve a directive setting forth an irrevocable decision to withhold supplies from Serbian forces and giving support to a forcible penetration of Tito into Serbia. We are unable to understand how civil war or involvement

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<sup>24</sup> Not printed.

in Yugoslav internal conflicts and domestic issues can be avoided if such open and unconditional support is given one faction against the other, particularly since it appears that the proposed directive is based largely upon information received from or through Partisan sources and that any subsequent modifications thereof or action pursuant thereto would of necessity be determined largely by advices from the same sources. It is felt that to implement the present directive would work an injustice on certain large and deserving groups among the Yugoslav population, whose major offense appears to be their opposition to Partisan domination.

No objection is seen to the provisions of the directive relating to Albania and Hungary. Repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh and to London for Schoenfeld.

HULL

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860H.01/7-844

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1944.

Participants: The Yugoslav Ambassador  
Mr. Stettinius  
Mr. Cavendish W. Cannon, SE

The Yugoslav Ambassador called, at his request, on the Under Secretary at eleven o'clock this morning. He handed to the Under Secretary a letter addressed to the Secretary, a copy of which is attached hereto.<sup>25</sup>

The substance of this communication is that a new Yugoslav Government has been formed at London under circumstances which he considers as demonstrating that it does not represent the views of the majority of the Yugoslav people; the lack of Serbian representation will, the Ambassador thinks, cause the people of Serbia to believe that this new Government is directed against them; since he believes that the destiny of the Yugoslav people cannot be decided upon without the participation of the Serbs, he informs the Department that he is obliged to refuse to recognize the new Government.

After reading the letter the Under Secretary said that he regretted very much that Mr. Fotitch would no longer be the Yugoslav representative here, and spoke of the cordial relations with Mr. Fotitch, which the Department had had throughout the period of his service in Washington. The Under Secretary then asked Mr. Fotitch what plans he had made.

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed.

The Ambassador replied that he expected to remain in this country and that he thought that it was his duty to make known, in whatever way he could, what he believes are the realities of the situation as regards the people of Yugoslavia. He said that he appreciates the friendship which this Government and the American people have always shown for the people of Yugoslavia, and feels sure that this will endure, and that the Americans will also duly appreciate the reasons why the interests of all elements of the people of Yugoslavia should be safeguarded.

Mr. Fotitch then said that he could well envisage what would be the attitude of this Government toward the new Yugoslav Government which, he agreed, had been appointed by the King. He assured the Under Secretary that he would undertake "nothing that would embarrass the administration and the Department."

In the brief conversation that followed he spoke with some feeling, referring to the letter which King Peter had sent to the President in April in which the King had said that the course which people in London were urging him to take amounted to a betrayal of the interests of his people. He concluded by saying that he was confident that this phase in the state of Yugoslav affairs would not be permanent and that the ultimate solution would have to take into account the political realities of the situation. The Under Secretary again remarked that he was sorry to see our relations with Mr. Fotitch come to an end. Mr. Fotitch remarked that these were the "official" relations, and he hoped that the friendly personal relations would continue.

NOTE: It will be observed that Mr. Fotitch does not *resign*. By "refusing to recognize" his Government he sets himself in a position which may present complications.

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860H.01/7-1244: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 12, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received July 12—3:30 p. m.]

5480. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. Yesterday I asked Mr. Eden if he would prepare for me a memorandum on the Subasic-Tito question. I have just received it and am forwarding it to you herewith:

"The Yugoslav Prime Minister, immediately on his return to London after his conversations with Marshal Tito at Vis, set about the task of forming his new government. These efforts were successful and Dr. Subasic was able on the 6th July to announce the formation of his Cabinet which included two nominees of Marshal Tito, a Slo-



vene and Serb from the Sandjak and in addition Dr. Sutej<sup>26</sup> (Croat) Dr. Kosanovic<sup>27</sup> (Bosnian Serb) and Dr. Cankar<sup>28</sup> (Slovene).

After this Dr. Subasic prepared to go to Caserta, as the guest of General Wilson, where it had been arranged that he should meet Marshal Tito and discuss various outstanding military and political questions which had been left over from the last conversations. The agenda of the discussions included the use of the Royal Yugoslav Navy, the organisation of the Army and Air Force, the despatch of supplies to the Partisan forces and the appointment of a Yugoslav military mission in Italy. At the same time Dr. Subasic hoped to put forward a scheme for the appointment of a successor to General Mihailovic in the person of Brigadier Glisic and to bring Marshal Tito and Brigadier Glisic to agree upon terms of collaboration between the Chetnik and Partisan forces under the general command of Marshal Tito. He sent a message to Marshal Tito giving him a general outline of these plans. He had also intended to broach with the Marshal the possibility of a meeting between himself and King Peter although he was inclined to think that Marshal Tito would consider that it was still too early for him to agree to this.

The dates and agenda for the conference having been satisfactorily settled, arrangements were made for all the persons taking part in the conversations to meet on July 12 at the headquarters of General Wilson who was to preside at the conference. In accordance with these arrangements, which had been approved by all parties concerned, the Yugoslav Prime Minister, accompanied by members of his staff and Mr. Stevenson, His Majesty's Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government, left on July 10 for Caserta where they were due to arrive this evening.

This morning, however, a telegram was received from Brigadier Maclean, stating that after personally discussing with him only on July 9 the arrangements for his journey to Caserta, Marshal Tito had informed him that the National Committee and the anti-Fascist Council had decided that he should not go to Italy after all. Marshal Tito said that the reasons for this decision were that the reactions throughout the country and in particular in Croatia and Slovenia to the recent agreement with Subasic had not been favourable and that if he went abroad at this juncture it would have an even more unsettling effect on public opinion and would react unfavourably on his prestige.<sup>29</sup> He was deaf to all Maclean's arguments that this decision would make a deplorable impression and do great harm to his cause.

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<sup>26</sup> Juraj Sutej, Minister of Finance, Communications and Industry.

<sup>27</sup> Sava N. Kosanovich, Minister of the Interior, Social Welfare, and Public Works.

<sup>28</sup> Izidor Cankar, Minister of Education.

<sup>29</sup> The Consul General at Naples reported in telegram 395, July 13, 1944, 7 p. m., that "Some of Tito's supporters according to Maclean distrust Tito's recent negotiations with the Royal Yugoslav Government. The Russians suspect that Tito is being oriented too much toward the West at a time when they themselves are unable to strengthen their position by the supply program via Bari which they desire." (860H.01/7-1344)

Marshal Tito's decision seems unreasonable and Mr. Churchill is sending a personal message to Marshal Tito asking him to reconsider his decision."<sup>30</sup>

WINANT

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860H.01/7-1244 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Naples (Brandt) to the Secretary of State*

NAPLES, July 12, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received July 12—5:27 p. m.]

387. From Murphy. On arrival at Caserta, Macmillan and I met with General Wilson and received confirmation of Tito's reluctance to come to Caserta for the reasons previously stated; that is Tito's fear that public reaction to his negotiations with Subasic had met an unfavorable reception in Croatia and Slovenia. Ambassador Stevenson attended the meeting and showed me a letter addressed to Tito by British Prime Minister in which Prime Minister expressed in most cordial terms praise for Tito's efforts to achieve Yugoslav unity and in which he urged upon Tito the desirability of working out a harmonious relationship with King Peter.

After consideration of various reasons which might have persuaded Tito to refuse to come to Caserta including possibility he might have received advice from Soviet sources not to come at this moment, General Wilson decided to send a message to Brigadier Maclean at Vis instructing Maclean to inform Tito of General Wilson's surprise over his failure to proceed to Caserta as agreed, suggesting that it was necessary under the circumstance to survey Tito's requests for military equipment and regretting his failure to comply with the invitation to proceed to Caserta which has [*was?*] designed to promote the common war effort. Wilson requested Maclean to inform Tito that Maclean was being summoned immediately to Caserta.

Maclean is due to arrive at Caserta this evening.

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld and to Cairo for MacVeagh.  
[Murphy.]

BRANDT

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<sup>30</sup> Ambassador Winant reported in telegram 5527, July 13, 1944, 6 p. m., that the Foreign Office was extremely annoyed at Tito. A Foreign Office official said to him: "Tito might have had the grace to have taken this decision twenty-four hours earlier so that Subasich would not have gone to Bari and thus would not be placed in the present extremely awkward position." (860H.01/7-1344)

860H.01/7-2044

*The Director of the Office of Strategic Services (Donovan) to the  
Director of the Office of European Affairs (Dunn)*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1944.

DEAR JIMMIE: The following material was sent to us by Pribichevich,<sup>31</sup> who is attached to Tito, and is based word for word from him (Tito).

"They [Pribichevich and Tito]<sup>31a</sup> were together on July 14th between the time of 10 o'clock in the morning and 11 at night. Tito told Pribichevich that he was very much annoyed at the British efforts to associate him too closely with the Royal Government at such an early time. Although he didn't want the statement publicized, he said frankly that Britain's propaganda is attempting to show that Vukosavljevic<sup>32</sup> and Marusic<sup>33</sup> are his own personal representatives in the Subasich Government which they are not. Tito says that the job of these two men is to see to it that the agreement with the Subasich Government is carried out exactly to the letter and that they are men who have the confidence of the National Liberation movement. In the strictest confidence Tito told Pribichevich that by grouping him promiscuously with the *Emigré* Government, certain circles in Britain are working in order to disgrace him, which was the treatment received by Mihailovich. Pribichevich dictated this cable under the greatest secrecy. He would like this information to be sent to the State Department. From the liberated territories of certain Serbo-Croatian regions of Bosnia and Croatia, and of Slovenia, the first reports on popular reaction among the Partisans to the Tito-Subasich agreement have commenced coming in.

"The rank and file of the Partisans in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia have expressed misgivings on the announcement of the agreement, but have abstained from any direct criticism of the National Committee. The fact that the feeling of the common Partisan people with regard to the *Emigrés* is much more radical than the National Committee's policies is not completely realized abroad. Also, those outside do not realize that Tito, by his agreement with Subasich, has risked to lose among the Partisan people rather than to gain.

"It was not the domestic situation that made it necessary for Tito to take this step but rather international circumstances. Last year the Partisan masses might have accepted such a pact with more willingness, but since that time many of the Partisan fighters have become bitter because of several things which have happened. Two instances of this are: (1) Last January and December when the Germans were at the height of their sixth offensive against the Partisans, the Purich Government indicted Tito as a 'war criminal', (2) The Na-

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<sup>31</sup> Stoyan Pribichevich, *Time* and *Life* correspondent who entered Yugoslavia in the spring of 1944.

<sup>31a</sup> Brackets appear in the original letter.

<sup>32</sup> Sreten V. Vukosavljevic, Minister of Agriculture, Food, and Supply in the new government.

<sup>33</sup> Drago Marusic, Minister of Justice and Communications in the new government.

tional Liberation movement was denounced as 'a movement of terrorist violence'. When Pribichevich went to the Serbian regions of Bosnia he found that some of the older peasants would like to have Tito and Peter become reconciled, but if they should have to make a choice Tito would get their vote. The younger Partisans are definitely republican.

"As regards the *Emigré* Government, the people realize that the authority of any such government comes from 'legitimacy', which is a diplomatic recognition by the Allies, and not from popular support within the country; actually, this government has no standing among the old of [or] young Partisans. This does not intend to imply that the Partisans do not sympathize with certain of the *Emigré* personalities.

"The supporters of the National Committee say that it is too moderate and the pro-Mihailovich elements find the National Committee at the other extreme, i.e., too radical, which places this Government under a cross-fire. Tito's followers have been persuaded to agree to the pact with the Subasich Government only through his own firm personal prestige, but it is necessary for the National Committee to do much explaining to the people. The most violent objections to the agreement have come from the Serbian Independent Democrats, the Slovenian Liberals and the Croatian peasant party members.

"The Communist party which is the best disciplined party and the most realistic in the National Liberation Movement, readily accepted the agreement, which is contrary to what one abroad might believe. The Partisan leaders think that it is very important that the pact with the Subasich government be a success, because if it should not be allowed to work it may be assumed that popular pressure from the rank and file of the Partisans would be such that the National Committee would not negotiate any further with any *Emigré* Government. At the present time there are two governments of Yugoslavia, one abroad which the Allies recognize and one in the country which the National Liberation Movement recognizes.

"Sitting in the government recognized by the Allies are two men who are members of the Liberation Movement but who are not empowered to represent either the National Committee or Tito. This is an experiment to see whether or not it will be possible and desirable in the future to make the Royal Government and the National Committee one. After the war there will be a plebiscite to decide the one question of a Republican or a monarchist form of government in the future Yugoslavia. Still unchanged is the view of the anti-fascist Council of National Liberation."

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

860H.01/7-2244 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to  
the Secretary of State*

LONDON, July 22, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received 6 : 30 p. m.]

Yugoslav Series 9. Subasic returned to London on July 18 accompanied by Tito's nominees in the Cabinet, Vukosavljevic and Marusic, and by General Velebit.<sup>34</sup>

He was somewhat weighed down by the course things had taken at Caserta.

He gave me some sidelights on Tito's refusal to attend the Caserta meeting. Subasic said Tito took the position that if he was to discuss military matters at General Wilson's headquarters he should do so alone, i.e., without the Yugoslav Prime Minister. He would be willing to discuss political matters with Subasic but on Yugoslav soil. Subasic remarked to me that if Tito could not come to Caserta he naturally could not go to Tito.

He added that Tito had also sent him a message explaining that certain leftist elements were opposed to any contact with the "Royal" Yugoslav Prime Minister; they objected to any relationship, however indirect, with the King. Secondly the anti-Fascist council had not given its approval to the Tito-Subasic agreement. To go to Caserta in the face of this lack of approval would be to act like a dictator.

Subasic thought Tito would be able to bring round the leftist elements but it would take time. To my question whether a meeting was planned for later Subasic said this was so but a time had not been fixed.

I suggested matters thus appeared to have made little progress. Subasic said that Vukosavljevic and Marusic had been sworn in as Ministers and had taken the oath to the King. This was a step forward.

As for relations with Mihailovic, Subasic did not think King Peter would go ahead with his earlier idea of appealing to Mihailovic. He said the latter was an able officer but a revolutionary type and if such an appeal were made and he failed to heed it this would create a delicate situation.

It was still intended to send General Glisic into Serbia. He was a friend of Mihailovic and he might be able to work out something. But Subasic indulged no easy optimism on this score and frankly said he did not know whether Glisic would succeed.

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<sup>34</sup> Maj. Gen. Vladimir L. Velebit, Chief of the Military Mission of the National Liberation Army in London.

As for relations with the Serb leaders generally, he could report no improvement. He had received the resignations of quite a number of Serb diplomats including Hadzi Djordjevic, Minister at Cairo and Saponic, Undersecretary of State also at Cairo.

Subasic dwelt on his desire to bring about a united war effort and the avoidance of fratricidal war. He wished above all to have Yugoslavia follow a policy that coincided with that of its three great Allies so that when the war was over Yugoslavia would be in a position to receive the advantages of one of the United Nations. He hoped that if at any time he was not on the right track they would tell him.

[SCHOENFELD]

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740.0011EW/7-3144 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, July 31, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received August 1—4: 12 a. m.]

45. Tito is expected to arrive Caserta August 3. He will be accompanied by his Chief of Staff, his Director of Military Intelligence, possibly Lieutenant General Marko Rankovic and bodyguard of 16. During his brief stay at Caserta General Wilson plans [to] discuss with him future organization and equipment of Partisan forces; future supply policy; coordination of operations with BAF; hospitalization and care Partisan wounded; and other questions which may arise between now and time of visit.

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld 9, to Cairo for Shantz 3.<sup>35</sup>

MURPHY

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860H.01/8-1244 : Telegram

*The Chargé to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, August 12, 1944—5 p. m.  
[Received 8:30 p. m.]

Yugos 13. My 9, July 22. Referring to Tito's failure to attend meeting on July 12, Finance Minister Sutej states that Subasic, accompanied by Kosanovic and Cankar, left London for Caserta Thursday evening August 10 to meet with Tito. Subasic had not planned such a trip at this time. The decision to go was taken at a moment's notice at the instance of the British.

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<sup>35</sup> Harold Shantz, Counselor of Embassy to the Yugoslav Government in Exile, and at this time Chargé in Cairo.

Sutej adds that in addition to settling various military questions, Subasic hopes at the meeting to secure Tito's agreement to a declaration of policy adopted by the Cabinet at a meeting on August 8.

[SCHOENFELD]

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860H.01/8-1644 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 16, 1944—10 a. m.

[Received 5 p. m.]

142. Reference my 124, August 14, 10 a. m.<sup>36</sup> Tito has now departed from Caserta and is spending day in Bari. He planned to depart from Bari returning to Vis on 16 or 17 accompanied by Dr. Subasich. Tito while here in addition to military staff discussions reported in my 124 had three conversations with British Prime Minister and British political staff. Mr. Churchill expressed to me his satisfaction with way things have gone. Although conversations covered fairly wide range, results apparently boiled down to an agreement which Tito and Subasich agreed to reduce to writing after their arrival on Vis concerning future organization of Yugo[slav] Navy. Latter will fly Royal Yugo flag but personnel will be allowed to wear either Royal Yugo or Tito insignia according to their individual preferences and they will function under operational command of Allied CinC Mediterranean.

According to British Tito is conscious that his present value to Allied cause is not as great or as necessary as it was in early 1944 or during 1943.

I believe British are satisfied they have impressed Tito with strength of their position in Mediterranean and are encouraged to believe they will obtain in the future understanding cooperation from Tito.

While I did not participate in Brit-Yugo military and political discussions I did have several informal conversations with him as well as with his Chief of Staff Major General Zukovich.<sup>37</sup> Tito spoke to me at great length regarding important social possibilities of his movement for future of Yugoslavia and particularly its appeal to Yugo youth. He claimed it symbolizes a growing protest against reaction and that it was designed and would succeed in welding together all patriotic elements in country.

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<sup>36</sup> Not printed; it reported General Wilson's satisfaction with the progress of his military conversations with Tito (860H.01/8-1444).

<sup>37</sup> Tito's Chief of Staff was Lt. Gen. Arso Jovanovich. This reference is probably to Lt. Gen. Sreten (Crni) Zujovich, Tito's Deputy Commander in Chief. Both men were present at the Caserta talks.

He was enthusiastic in his reference to United States and part Americans could play in reconstruction of Yugoslavia. In his opinion European War is rapidly drawing to a close and postwar problems assume ever growing urgency. I found him direct and able but I thought I detected in his conversation a certain lack of assurance regarding his eventual acceptance by majority of his fellow countrymen as the political leader of Yugoslavia. He spoke of democracy and the Four Freedoms. He welcomed members of American Mission now assigned to his headquarters. He gives every indication of a desire to cooperate.

MURPHY

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860H.01/8-1844

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs  
(Matthews) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1944.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Pares of the British Embassy called yesterday afternoon and read to Mr. Cannon a telegram sent by Mr. Churchill to the President on August 14,<sup>23</sup> concerning the meeting of Mr. Churchill with the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito in Italy. Mr. Pares said that the British Ambassador was sending a copy of this telegram to the Secretary.

The telegram in question is rather remarkably lacking in substance, and the following observations may be of some interest in this connection.

It will be recalled that about a month ago arrangements were made for the Yugoslav Prime Minister and Tito to have their second round of conversations, with the idea of effecting a real working agreement between the Government in exile and the forces within Yugoslavia. According to agreement, the Yugoslav Prime Minister traveled from London to Caserta, and General Wilson himself was ready to preside at the meetings, but Tito simply refused to come. Mr. Subasic waited a few days and then returned to England. Almost immediately after his return to England, Tito sent word to General Wilson that he was now ready to come to Italy.

General Wilson postponed the meeting with Tito for some days but ten days ago arranged for "strictly military" talks with him. Tito arrived in Caserta with a few staff officers and a bodyguard, was invited to visit the Italian front, and on his own initiative also spent some time in Rome. It was about this time that Mr. Churchill decided to go to Italy, and presumably the British felt that if Mr. Churchill

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<sup>23</sup> For text of telegram, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston, 1953), p. 93.



should take the Yugoslav Prime Minister with him, and General Wilson should hold Tito at Caserta, a way could be found to oblige Tito and Subasic to continue their talks together and perhaps come to some agreement. It is against this background that we must view the announcement that "the two leaders reached a satisfactory agreement on a number of practical questions".

As regards the "simultaneous declaration" which the two Yugoslav leaders have now agreed to issue, it will be recalled that there was also an agreement to issue declarations after the first meeting which took place in June. At that time there was clear evidence of Tito's bad faith. First, he allowed the terms of the secret agreement to leak out to the press, then he arranged that the "Free Yugoslavia" radio station, which operates by way of Russia, should give practically the whole text of the agreement, and finally he announced that the two ministers whom he had designated as representatives in the Subasic Government were really not representatives of the Liberation Committee. As a consequence, the official texts of the agreement have never been released by the Yugoslav Government, and considerable misunderstanding has been caused by the mystery surrounding these negotiations, as well as the secrecy which the British Government has insisted on maintaining concerning the flight of Tito from Yugoslavia to Italy just before the negotiations began.

The question which is of chief interest to the United States at the present moment, in the matter of Yugoslavia, has reference to the supply of arms to the resistance forces, and to the reports that these arms, supplied by the Allies, are used, or are being held for use, in the struggle between the two major factions in Yugoslavia, rather than for use against the Germans. We have received several reports containing flat assertions that the American arms are being supplied to the Partisans to kill the Serbs. There is no doubt that as of a few weeks ago it was Tito's plan to invade Serbia, and he discussed this matter with the British mission and we have record even of the officers who would command the operation. It was expected at that time that Brigadier Maclean, the chief of the British mission, would accompany these troops. About the same time the British Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government reported that such a project might well succeed since the Serbs had been greatly weakened and many of their best men are held as prisoners of war by the Germans. It is of course notorious that the Germans released what Croatian prisoners they had, and the reports of the Red Cross and other agencies who have studied the prisoner of war situation indicate that the Yugoslav prisoners of war, numbering some 140,000, are almost entirely Serbs.

The Department has made clear to Mr. Murphy that we disapprove of any plan for building up the Tito forces at the expense of the Serbs,

and naturally we are disturbed by the reports that American arms are being supplied to Tito for use in this civil war. This matter was taken up last week with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>39</sup> According to a telegram received yesterday from Mr. Murphy, the arms sent to Tito are supplied by the British, but, says Mr. Murphy, it may be that some of them were manufactured for the British in the United States, and can be so identified.<sup>40</sup>

In view of the foregoing we have some reservations concerning the success of the conversations referred to in Mr. Churchill's telegram.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

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860H.01/8-2144 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 21, 1944—noon.

[Received August 21—9:38 p. m.]

175. From Norden. Yugoslav Prime Minister accompanied by Mr. Stevenson and Minister Kosanovic and Cankar returned to Bari at 10 yesterday morning and left for Gibraltar and London at 1 spending intervening 3 hours at British representatives' apartment. As, through an oversight, I was not advised of the precise time of their arrival and of their whereabouts, I was able to see the Minister for only a few minutes of uninterrupted conversation. However, Mr. Stevenson showed me a series of telegrams to the Foreign Office which mentioned that communiqués were to be issued today by Subasic and Tito, that Tito had agreed to present to the National Liberation Committee a draft plan for a "single Yugoslav state authority", that Serb representation had not been settled but that Tito desires to bring out non-Partisan Serbs "who are not compromised with Nedic or Mihailovic". It is proposed to use a General Ristic who recently left Belgrade and appeared in Partisan territory but has not joined Partisan movement. The telegrams mentioned that Dr. Subasic had been in poor health during last two days of his stay on Vis and had

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<sup>39</sup> On August 15, Mr. Matthews sent a memorandum to Admiral Leahy in which he reiterated the Department's desire to follow a policy of non-interference in Yugoslav internal affairs and asked Leahy to ascertain if these reports were true. (740.0011 European War 1939/8-744)

<sup>40</sup> Reference is to telegram 128 from Caserta, August 14, 1944, 2 p. m. This telegram also stated that competent American officers at Allied Force Headquarters felt that the reports of Titoist activity against the Serbs were exaggerated. They claimed to have evidence that Tito was using supplies received from the British in guerrilla activity against the Germans and they also claimed that there was no evidence that Tito was engaged in any operations against the Serbs. (740.0011-European War 1939/8-1444)

had heavy going with the Partisans on subject of diplomatic appointments concerning which he was unwilling to make definite commitments at this time. A plan was agreed for amalgamation of Partisan and Royal Yugoslav Air Forces on lines similar to those in effect for the Navy. Stevenson remarked to me that the really important thing was the establishment of a single Yugoslav state authority and that while some civil conflict seemed inevitable it would amount to a minimum in such a case.

I had only 2 or 3 minutes with the Prime Minister who seemed tired and distraught. He informed me that he had had interviews of over an hour each that morning with Adam Pribicebic<sup>41</sup> when [*whom?*] he had asked to submit written proposals, and with Smilianic. He wished the former to contact Topalovic before submitting his offer. Thereafter there would be no objection to the delegations being returned to Serbia. The other Minister[s?] had little to contribute although like the Prime Minister both expressed regret that there had been so little contact with American [*officials?*] during the last days. Cankar remarked that everything would have been different in such a case but he hedged when I pressed him for his meaning, no doubt because of the presence of his fellow Minister. Kosanovic expressed a desire to be named Ambassador to the United States.

Smilianic informs me that Pribicebic, while he was able to inform the Prime Minister of conditions in Serbia, was unable to secure any concrete assurance other than permission to see Topalovic and to make proposals in writing through British channels. He came away with the impression that the Prime Minister is a man of good will but tied to British policy.

To Smilianic the Prime Minister admitted that the civil war had increased in intensity since he came to power, stated that he would never do anything to harm Serbs but that his position was very difficult and suggested that only the two leaders themselves could bring about a truce.

Neither visitor was shown text of communiqués. General Ristic's name is unknown to the Royal Yugoslav officers stationed at Bari nor is it listed in any available political directory.

After the visitors left my British colleagues in Bari expressed considerable optimism concerning the trend of events. The usual thesis concerning the need to go along because of the revolutionary nature of the Partisan movement and differentiation between Nedic and Mihailovic on one part and the Serbian people on the other was made.

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<sup>41</sup> Adam Pribicevich, Chairman of the Independent Democratic Party, and a member of the National Democratic Union, the political organ of the Mihailovich forces.

It was interesting that Colonel Deakin<sup>42</sup> repeatedly spoke of "swamping" the Partisan movement.

The conversations at Bari and Vis were restricted to an Anglo-Yugoslavian basis without American participation and no invitation to participate was extended to us.

Sent Department as 175, repeated London as 30 and Cairo as 28. [Norden.]

MURPHY

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740.0011E.W./8-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1944—10 p. m.

73. The negotiations with the Yugoslavs leading to the agreement reported in your 147 August 16<sup>43</sup> indicate that the Yugoslavs are taking it for granted that the Italian province of Venezia Giulia, which includes the cities of Trieste and Gorizia as well as the Istrian peninsula, will be ceded to Yugoslavia.

While the Allied Forces' representatives must of course take into account the realities of the situation as regards the local authorities actually in control of the region or likely to be first on the ground, this agreement may be interpreted as supporting the Yugoslav claim. It is not the position of this Government, nor of the British Government so far as we know, that the Yugoslav claim to a part or all of this region should be acknowledged at this stage. You should therefore keep in mind the Department's views as indicated very briefly in its 20 of August 9, 5 p. m.<sup>44</sup> and the detailed discussion of the territorial question as regards the Italian territory claimed by Yugoslavia which will be found in the handbook of research documents which was sent to you for your secret information.

HULL

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<sup>42</sup> Lt. Col. William L. Deakin, a member of the British mission to the Partisan forces.

<sup>43</sup> Not printed; it reported that the Supreme Allied Commander reached agreement with Marshal Tito that when the Allies occupied northern Italy, Austria or Hungary, Marshal Tito would make available to them the necessary lines of communication. Under this plan the Allies would have control of Trieste, but would establish Allied Military Government west of the 1930 Italo-Yugoslav frontier.

<sup>44</sup> Not printed; it expressed the Department's view that Allied Military Government should be extended to all metropolitan Italian territory within the 1939 frontiers. Any other procedure would prejudice the final disposition of territories and settlement of the frontiers (740.00119 Control [Italy]/8-944).

860H.01/8-3044 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, August 30, 1944—11 a. m.

[Received 10:50 p. m.]

243. Reference my 194, August 24.<sup>45</sup> Following are principal points of informal conversations with Tito reported by Norden on his return from Vis.

Tito claims five Partisan corps have been formed in Serbia with two more in formation. He spoke of an impending offensive in Serbia in a manner that implied that it was directed at both Germans and Chetniks and expressed confidence that Mihailovic would shortly be in flight and cease to be a factor in Yugoslavia. He was unwilling to commit himself on possibility of a peaceful settlement with Chetnik Serbia. He claims principal Yugoslav cities will fall into his hands since he believes 75% of their population are with him and expects to be in Belgrade in about a month but admits there will be a struggle with Chetnik and Nedic elements. In strict confidence he estimated loss of lives by Partisans at some 200,000.

Plan for a single Yugoslav state authority (see my 175 August 12 [21]) he said was premature and would not be submitted to the National Committee for the present. He emphasized need for proceeding slowly and cited his difficulties with his supporters in the interior on occasion of his projected visit to Italy last July which visit he said would "more than likely" have been in accord with Moscow's desires. He had recognized competence of the Subasic government only in respect to external affairs, he said.

With respect to post-war developments he expressed a desire to build a strong unified but federal state which would act as a bridge but not a buffer between East and West and expressed a strong wish for American economic and especially technical aid. At same time he said attitude hitherto shown toward his movement had been a great disappointment and warned that Western Powers should proceed carefully lest Yugoslav people turn against them which he said was already the case in respect to British, although he has a keen regard for Maclean personally. He anticipates a long period of instability in Europe following the war and sees the only hope of order in Anglo-United States-Russian collaboration, adding somewhat archly that he hopes he may be helpful to us in that respect. He wants to repatriate German minorities in Yugoslavia to Germany and hopes for our support.

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<sup>45</sup> Not printed.

Of special interest was an emphatic and angry remark made apropos of opposition propaganda, that he would not permit the movement to be viewed in the sense of class struggle since far too heavy sacrifices had been made in its behalf.

A French but not an Italian mission would be welcome he indicated.

Tito who was resting from his recent trip was in an unusually relaxed mood. It was evident however that he considered himself future ruler of his country. Impression was of a man with a great gift for phrase, capable, energetic, with a singularly attractive personality which has an almost messianic hold upon his followers, a personal product of the Central European class struggle with a desire to outgrow his background and play a role upon a larger stage. However he seemed far more happy and at home in his role of romantic guerilla leader than in discussing peace time plans.

National Committee members Kardel, Zechevich and Ribnikar while determined and intelligent were more impressive as disciples than as personalities. By comparison, General Smetan Zujevic<sup>46</sup> who is said to be close to Tito and is frequently sent on special missions to lift morale is an outstanding personality.

(Following personal for the Secretary.)

Maclean in discussing the Yugoslav problem indicated that British policy was dominated by a desire to give Russia no cause for uneasiness and no excuse for military intervention, whilst seeking to extend western influence and moderating extremism by a constructive and sympathetic approach. Tito, he feels, might well prefer to be a ruler of an independent Yugoslavia rather than [a mere] Soviet official especially if properly handled. He was of course selling a line intimately bound up with his activities of the past year but added that he kept in back of his mind possibility of disillusionment on an epic scale. A full report of conversation follows by despatch.<sup>47</sup>

Norden did not participate in Maclean's *démarche* concerning Chetnik dissidents.

MURPHY

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860H.00/9-844

*Memorandum by the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Murphy), Temporarily in Washington, to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Cannon)*

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1944.

DEAR CAVENDISH: During the course of Marshal Tito's visit to Caserta he suggested several times that I visit him at Vis. After

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<sup>46</sup> Gen. Sreten Zujovich is intended.

<sup>47</sup> Despatch 721, August 30, 1944, not printed.

his return there he again reminded me of it on four different occasions, through the OSS Mission. I thought, therefore, that it might be well before departure to go over to the Island and, accordingly, I flew over there on Thursday, August 31.

He was in excellent spirits, I found, and on the *qui vive* regarding the pending military operations in Yugoslavia. He had been asked by SAC<sup>48</sup> to attempt to cut certain German lines of communication and to extend his sabotage activities. For that purpose he was being provided some additional means, although General Wilson said that he did not contemplate sending a large force to support him immediately.

I spent the entire afternoon with Marshal Tito, and had opportunity to ask him a few questions. Among those was whether in his opinion the Soviet Union would invade Serbia and attack the Mihailovic forces. He spoke with great assurance on this point, stating that he was convinced that the Russians would not enter Serbia, but would confine their activities along the Danube into Hungary, leaving Marshal Tito to deal with Serbian matters.

On the subject of territorial settlement after the war he said that the Allies would find Yugoslavia "stiff necked". He said Yugoslavia is entitled to, and will insist on, Istria, and in his opinion should also have the Kossovar area and parts of Macedonia and Thrace. He felt that the Allies could afford to be liberal in their treatment of Yugoslavia, in view of the sacrifices the latter has made in the winning of the war.

Marshal Tito also expressed the opinion that, while the German settlement was a matter which he felt could well be left to the great powers, he did believe that any proposal to partition Germany should be approached with the greatest delicacy. He said that he personally believed that Germany should not be divided, but that its economy should be used as a unit for the benefit of the European community of nations. That economy has been built up over a long period of generations and represents an element of the greatest importance to the well-being of all of Germany's neighbors. Punishment of German war criminals should not be confused with proper use of German economy.

He gave me the stock reply on the question of communism in Yugoslavia after the war, saying that Yugoslavia did not include a population whose traditions would tend toward communism, that he stood for a liberal and democratic form of regime, the form of which he was content to leave with the Yugoslav people. He made a long plea for economic support from the United States. There was no doubt in

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<sup>48</sup> Supreme Allied Commander.

my mind after meeting the members of the Russian Mission during a luncheon that the relationship between them and Marshal Tito could not be closer or more friendly.

ROBERT D. MURPHY

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860H.01/9-1344 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, September 13, 1944.

[Received September 13—10:36 p. m.]

7533. Press today carries excerpts from broadcast which King Peter of Yugoslavia made last night from London, calling on all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to unite and join National Liberation Army under leadership of Marshal Tito. He stated: "My Government, under its Prime Minister, Dr. Ivan Subasitch, has with my full knowledge and approval concluded substantial and advantageous agreements with our national army which is unanimously recognized, supported and assisted by Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The day of our liberation is at last dawning. No one who has been or may still be looking to the enemy for support to the detriment of the interests of his own people and their future and who remains deaf to this appeal shall escape the brand of traitor before his people and before history. By this message to you I strongly condemn that misuse of the name of the King and the authority of the Crown by which an attempt has been made to justify collaboration with the enemy, and to provoke discord among our fighting people in the very gravest days of their history thus solely profiting the enemy." King Peter urged that a wholehearted welcome be given "to the victorious Allied armies which may come to assist you in the complete achievement of the liberation of our country".

WINANT

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860H.01/9-1444 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk),<sup>49</sup> to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 14, 1944—4 p. m.

[Received September 15—11:59 p. m.]

393. Norden reports from Bari that Stoyan Gavrilovic, Yugoslav Under Secretary Foreign Affairs, returned to Bari after conversa-

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<sup>49</sup> Alexander C. Kirk succeeded Robert D. Murphy as Political Adviser on September 5, 1944.



tions with Tito. Gavrilovic informed Norden Tito is anxious to have able and "uncompromised" Yugoslav diplomats assigned as Ambassadors at Washington and London with the post going to a Serb if possible. Norden had impression there may be possibility of Gavrilovic being sent to Washington and that Velebit and Jukic were being discussed for London post and Wojan Simic<sup>50</sup> for Paris.

Gavrilovic who is proceeding to Cairo and Ankara and returning to London in about a week said that on his return to London matter of moving Government to a point nearer Yugoslavia will be discussed. He felt it was vital that Yugoslav Government be in a position to move to Yugoslavia at first opportunity "otherwise it will be too late". Apparently conversations with Grol and other Serbs are continuing but he believes it will be necessary to bring someone direct from Serbia in view of stiff attitude of exiled Serbs.

Gavrilovic stated Tito's attitude on Kossovo would not necessarily be irredentist in view of pro-German sentiments in that region but that Tito was above all a keen student of public opinion and would adjust his policy accordingly. He asserted Mihailovich is through and American friendliness to Serb nationalists could in his opinion only lead to Russian occupation.

Gavrilovic called at my office yesterday and after confirming above added Tito had discussed with him at some length question of post-war European frontiers. Tito apparently opposed to dismemberment of Germany. He told Gavrilovic some minor adjustments of frontiers would have to be made with Hungary and Austria (Klagenfurt to be definitely ceded to Yugoslavia); that he, Tito, would fight if necessary for Trieste and that he was determined to preserve at least present boundaries with Albania, Greece and Bulgaria.

Gavrilovic added there would be a purge of Yugoslav diplomats abroad most of whom would receive small pensions and be "advised" to live abroad. He said proclamation issued yesterday by King<sup>51</sup> would facilitate greatly task to be performed by Subasic government and that it had full approval of British Foreign Office before it was issued. He stated King Peter was anxious to proceed to this area so as to be near at hand on day of Yugoslav liberation but that Tito was opposed to this for the present.

KIRK

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<sup>50</sup> Stanoje Simich is probably intended.

<sup>51</sup> See *supra*.

860H.01/9-1544

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

## MEMORANDUM

Recent conversations between the Yugo-Slav Prime Minister and Marshal Tito in Italy have resulted in further satisfactory progress in co-ordinating the functions of the Yugo-Slav Government and the National Liberation Movement. These efforts have met with the warm approval of His Majesty's Government.

2. Now that the internal position of the Yugo-Slav Government has been to some extent assured His Majesty's Government are anxious to use their influence to strengthen the position of the Yugo-Slav Government in the international field, and think that it is desirable that representatives should be appointed to the Yugo-Slav Government in London by other allied powers. His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government agree with this view. As there is at present no United States representative present in London who is officially accredited to the Yugo-Slav Government, Mr. MacVeagh having remained in Cairo, His Majesty's Government hope that the United States Government will consider regularizing the position by appointing an official representative to the Yugo-Slav Government in London <sup>52</sup> instead of maintaining their representative in Cairo.

3. His Majesty's Representatives to the Turkish, Greek, Norwegian and Polish Governments have been instructed to make similar representations to the Governments to which they are accredited.

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1944.

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860H.01/9-1644: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 16, 1944—9 a. m.

[Received 3:50 p. m.]

405. Second Partisan corps in course of its present offensive in Serbia has overrun General Mihailovich's HQS. General is reported to have escaped although his documents apparently fell into Partisan hands. British Liaison Officer accompanying Partisans has been asked to submit full report immediately. He has been warned that it is essential element of Allied policy that arms are not sent to Tito for

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<sup>52</sup> A notation on this memorandum indicated that a new Ambassador, Richard C. Patterson, was designated on September 20, 1944.

purpose of fighting Chetniks unless latter are actively obstructing Partisan forces from reaching legitimate military objectives or are actively collaborating with enemy.

KIRK

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860H.01/9-2344 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 23, 1944—3 p. m.  
[Received September 24—9:50 p. m.]

519. See my 275, September 3, midnight.<sup>54</sup> A British representative at Bari telegraphed Foreign Office on September 21 Tito's reply to Subasic's message urging early formation of a single government authority. Tito's reply in brief states that conditions in Yugoslavia are such that it is impossible yet to take up question of formation of United Government and particularly a Royal Government. It states that consideration must be given to fact that a revolution is in full development in all parts of Yugoslavia and such a step would only weaken forces resisting Germans. Anti-Fascist Council and National Committee enjoy full authority with all Yugoslav people and are therefore most competent power in Yugoslavia capable of conducting the struggle for liberation to a successful conclusion. Tito's message adds that Subasic Royal Government may continue to function as representative of Yugoslavia with Allies in agreement with National Committee of Liberation.

This message concludes with statement that at an appropriate time possibility of forming a single united government which will undertake all necessary measures for the people to decide on form of internal government of Yugoslavia will receive consideration.

British Foreign Office is expected to react unfavorably to this communication from Tito.

KIRK

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860H.01/9-1644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1944—7 p. m.

167. Reurtel 407 September 16.<sup>54</sup> At the time they severed their connection with the Yugoslav Embassy here, Knezevich and Todoro-

<sup>54</sup> Not printed.

vic<sup>55</sup> requested the War Department to assist them to join the ranks of one of the Allied armies, and specifically, if it should be possible, to transport them to the area controlled by General Mihailovic. The War Department attached considerable importance to this request. It was felt that considering the particular attentions given by General Mihailovic to American aviators forced down in Yugoslavia while in operations against the enemy and the arrangements then being made for bringing them out, support should be given to the request for the return of these two Yugoslav officers to Mihailovic territory. The Department agreed, subject to the prior consent of the theater commander.

As reported in Murphy's 157 August 18,<sup>56</sup> AFHQ gave this consent without any condition whatsoever. Their travel from the United States was arranged on the understanding that these officers would proceed onward at the earliest opportunity.

The Department cannot believe that AFHQ could have been under any misapprehension concerning the officers in question, and it is quite incomprehensible to us that AFHQ, having found on reconsideration that they did not like the arrangement, should have sought a solution by referring the matter to Marshal Tito. Your position on this point as reported in your 308<sup>57</sup> is fully approved.

As we see it here, the refusal to carry through the agreement, and the delay resulting from the consultations with Tito and Gavrilovic have converted this military transaction into a political problem. It could well have been handled as an arrangement for sending to General Mihailovic two Yugoslav officers desiring to fight the enemy in exchange for the 225 Americans who were being returned from Mihailovic territory. We have no commitments and are under no obligations requiring clearance with Marshal Tito in matters of this kind.

It is important to keep in mind that although these officers were officially relieved of their functions at the Embassy, no action was taken to withdraw their commissions as officers of the Royal Yugoslav

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<sup>55</sup> Lt. Col. Zivan Knezevich, Military Attaché, and Capt. Borislav Todorovich, Assistant Military Attaché at the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, refused to recognize the new government of Yugoslavia and in July requested the War Department to transport them to Mihailovich territory. They left the United States in the latter part of August and were taken as far as Bari, Italy, where Allied Force Headquarters was to arrange their removal to Yugoslavia.

<sup>56</sup> Not printed.

<sup>57</sup> Dated September 6, 1944, 10 p. m. It revealed that the British Minister Resident, Macmillan, was strongly opposed to sending Knezevich and Todorovich to Yugoslavia because they had a long history of political subversion and were certain to make difficulties once there. The King and Tito would be very suspicious of Allied motives in sending two such people to Mihailovich. The British had consulted both Tito and the Yugoslav Government in London on the matter and were at present arranging with the Yugoslav Government an agreement to return no Yugoslavs to Yugoslavia without its prior consent. Mr. Kirk countered that these objections should have been raised earlier while the two men were still in the United States. (860H.20/9-644)

Army. We see no reason moreover for trying to interpret the King's recent declaration as classifying them as "traitors" (your 407 September 16) since that declaration, apparently by design, used equivocal language, and Mihailovic himself, so far as we know, is still a Yugoslav general. This is another example of the heavy political weighting of all Yugoslav military matters, demonstrating again the advantages, from the point of view of the American policy of keeping out of Yugoslav politics, of restricting military questions to their proper level.

From the foregoing it is clear that we expect AFHQ to hold to the arrangement approved in the field before the officers in question were permitted to leave the United States. In view of the development of military events within Yugoslavia during the time that these officers have been detained in Italy it may now indeed be difficult to deliver them to their destination. We should like to have verification of this, specifically whether there is now a Mihailovic controlled area of sufficient consistency, with facilities for communication, to make such an operation practicable. If not, we expect these men to be considered as Allied officers ready for active duty, until such time as they can be released for service of their own choosing. We do not consider that the proposed arrangement for covering Yugoslav military into the Partisan forces, alternatively for interning them at Elarish, Sinai (see MacVeagh's 54 September 9<sup>58</sup>) would be in any way a proper method of disposing of these men.<sup>59</sup>

HULL

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860H.01/9-2344 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 23, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received September 23—3:48 p. m.]

510. See my 463, September 21, 10 a. m.<sup>60</sup> Brigadier Maclean who has been in Mihailovich territory and who returned yesterday to AFHQ for consultation with regard to plans of Marshal Tito said last evening that he believed Tito had gone to a conference with Soviet generals in Rumania.<sup>61</sup> He said that several days ago head of Soviet

<sup>58</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>59</sup> Knezevich and Todorovich after being refused permission to enlist in the United States Army, were finally returned to the United States.

<sup>60</sup> Not printed.

<sup>61</sup> Marshal Tito had actually left Vis on September 22 and gone secretly to Moscow. In telegram 3730, September 30, 1944, the Ambassador in Moscow reported that on September 29 an agreement was reached between the Soviet command and the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation permitting passage of Soviet troops through Yugoslav territory for the purpose of developing operations against the enemy (740.0011EW/9-3044). According to telegram 8635, October 12, 1944, from London, Sir Orme Sargent, British Deputy Under Secretary of State, characterized Tito's sudden departure as "inexcusable", but he felt that Moscow's attempt to conceal the trip was even worse (860H.01/10-1244).

Mission in Yugoslavia had told him a conference of Soviet military authorities including General Korneev was shortly to be held in Bucharest to discuss "the future of the Balkans". Maclean stated he was not unduly alarmed over suddenness and manner of Tito's departure [from] Vis. He added that it was perfectly natural for Tito to want to meet Russians to discuss military matters and that undoubtedly some word would come from Tito in 3 or 4 days.

Maclean went on to say that he thought Tito would endeavor to persuade Russians not to enter Yugoslavia; that he would attempt to convince Soviets that Partisans with some Russian heavy equipment could complete liberation of the country. He added that in his opinion if the Russians should insist on participating in liberation of Yugoslavia, Tito would urge them not to do so until after the Partisans had captured Belgrade. Maclean commented that if Russians were as shrewd as he thought they would be, they would follow Tito's counsel.

Maclean then went on to outline what he thought Tito's future policy would be. He asserted that recent events in Yugoslavia now assured Tito's complete domination and he would exercise his power to the full. He would make it more and more difficult for Subasic and his government and Subasic would have to subscribe to Tito's tactics. Nevertheless Maclean said he felt it was in "our" interests to support Subasic as much as possible to show Tito we meant to install Subasic government in Yugoslavia at least for time being.

Maclean went on to describe recent mass enlistments of Tito's forces and stated that Mihailovich was a "finished man".

Brigadier Maclean asserted that he had recommended to General Wilson and latter in turn would recommend to Churchill that British policy towards Tito should remain as at present, i.e., policy of giving assistance and friendly advice and encouraging as much as possible Tito's ambition to be a chief of a strong and powerful democratic state rather than a puppet of Soviet Union or any other power. Maclean also said that shortly before he left Tito's headquarters to go to Serbia on his recent trip, latter during course of a convivial evening had described at some length his views on future of Yugoslavia and Balkans. According to Maclean, Tito said that while he had hoped and indeed still hoped that some sort of an association of federated states could be established as government of Yugoslavia, he feared more and more that it would not be practicable—at least not immediately after liberation—and it would probably be necessary for first few years to rule Yugoslavia with an iron hand to "cleanse" country of those undesirable elements which would go underground after triumph of Partisan cause.

860H.01/9-2444 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, September 24, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received September 24—9:45 a. m.]

522. Reference my 512, September 23, midnight.<sup>62</sup> Definite information has now been received that Tito has not yet returned to Vis but that order mentioned in telegram under reference was issued at Vis yesterday over his signature. Order is reported to state that members of British and American military missions accredited to Tito's HQ will not be permitted to circulate beyond Corps HQ. This in effect means that British or American members of these missions will not be allowed to advance freely into interior of Yugoslavia as liberated by Partisans and general interpretation here is that order was issued in order to avoid any British or American witnesses to civil war in Yugoslavia.<sup>63</sup>

KIRK

865.014/10-944

*The Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Chargé (Franges)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Yugoslavia, and has the honor to acknowledge his Note Pov. No. 682 of October 9, 1944,<sup>64</sup> concerning the administration of territory in northwest [*northeast*] Italy containing important Slavic populations. The views of the Yugoslav Government will be given careful consideration.

The Chargé d'Affaires ad interim is undoubtedly aware of the practice in Italy of extending Allied Military Government to Italian territory as soon as it is liberated from German domination. With

<sup>62</sup> Not printed.

<sup>63</sup> American military authorities took strong exception to Tito's order and retaliated by cancelling supply drops and flights evacuating Partisan wounded. The Department was informed of these measures in a letter written by Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, to the Secretary of State on September 24, 1944. General Donovan enclosed with his letter a copy of an OSS report of September 20, 1944, originating from Bari which conjectured: "Probably the motive behind Tito's move is his desire to curtail and control American and British military representation in the country now that he believes the civil war is all but in the bag and now that British and American supplies are no longer needed." (860H.01/9-2444)

<sup>64</sup> Not printed: in this note, the Chargé reported the alleged inhumanity and terrorization which had characterized Italian administration of Slavic territory since the last war. His Government believed that until a definite solution of the problem of Yugoslav minorities had been reached, these territories should be allowed to administer themselves. He also included a copy of a similar protest which the Yugoslav Government had lodged with the British Government on October 6, 1944. (865.014/10-944)

respect to areas removed from the line of combat, it has been the practice moreover to withdraw military Government and restore the territory to Italian civil administration when military conditions permit. In view of the considerable number of non-Italian peoples residing in certain frontier regions of Italy, it is contemplated that Allied Military Government will be extended to these regions up to the 1939 Italian boundaries, when German forces have been expelled from them, and that such military Government will be maintained until the question of national sovereignty of the areas involved has been finally determined.<sup>65</sup>

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1944.

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860H.24/10-2644

*Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)*

[WASHINGTON,] October 26, 1944.

MR. STETTINIUS: The underlying letter <sup>66</sup> concerning the Yugoslav request for trucks and uniforms under lend-lease leaves the matter, by design, in an indeterminate stage.

We are not at liberty to say to the Yugoslav Embassy that SACMED <sup>67</sup> is following a strict policy of limitation on the amounts of equipment made available to Tito. This was made very clear in Mr. Kirk's telegram no. 801 of October 16,<sup>68</sup> which reported that a certain amount of equipment would now be released to Tito for operations on the Dalmatian coast, but that Tito would be informed that no further supplies would be furnished to him except for special operations.

There will be no harm in the Yugoslav Embassy's conversations with the War Department, where the Embassy will doubtless be informed that both items are in very short supply, but if the application is to be pushed forward with any vigor we strongly recommend that no action be taken on it until clearance is obtained from SACMED.

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<sup>65</sup> In a memorandum to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman Matthews, on October 25 noted that before drawing up this note: "It was necessary to consult with the British on this matter, since a similar inquiry had been made of the British Foreign Office and it seemed desirable that the replies from the two Governments should be similar in substance. Mr. Middleton of the British Embassy informed the Department yesterday that our proposed reply would be quite in line with the note which the Foreign Office will send the Yugoslav authorities in London." (865.014/10-944)

<sup>66</sup> Not found in Department files.

<sup>67</sup> Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>68</sup> Not printed.



In this policy which SACMED has adopted, he is following exactly the American line, which is that military supplies should be available to Yugoslav resistance forces for use against the enemy, but should not be supplied for building up the potential of any one faction for making war on other elements within the country.

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

870.01/10-2844

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services  
(Donovan)* <sup>69</sup>

WASHINGTON, 28 October 1944.

The following is a cabled report which we received on 28 October 1944 from our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow: <sup>70</sup>

“King Peter saw Churchill this afternoon. Herewith report as given me by King. Stalin and Churchill discussed general Balkan situation. It was agreed that Greece will be under British only. Yugoslavia military operations and administration upon liberation will be under joint British-Russian control.”<sup>71</sup>

“Question of Monarchies in Balkans as a whole was discussed. Stalin was not in principle against re-establishment of Monarchies in Balkans. He said, ‘If a King can be more useful in waging war against enemy and maintaining stability after victory, he would prefer him to a makeshift Republic.’ Specifically as to Peter, Stalin said, ‘He seems to be a young man who is close to his people.’ But insisted that question of King’s return be postponed until people express will by plebiscite. Churchill added, ‘When time comes I shall see to it that plebiscite is conducted under British, Russian and American supervision.’ Churchill smilingly added, ‘I shall manage your campaign when time comes.’

“King informed Churchill that he learned from Sutej, Minister of Finance, that Subasic before departure harbored plan to create regency commission and appointing himself as member of same. King expressed anxiety that Subasic will attempt to perpetuate own political power and is not person upon whom King can rely to fight for his return. Churchill said that this regency idea was news to him and that it is despicable that Subasic promoted it. He assured King that if regency is suggested to him by Subasic or anyone, he will rudely reject it. He said, ‘You are neither minor nor at your death bed or mentally deficient, therefore there can be no question of appointing regent.’ Churchill amplified that if regent were ap-

<sup>69</sup> Sent in a letter of this date to James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of European Affairs, for transmission to the Secretary of State.

<sup>70</sup> Bernard Yarrow of the Office of Strategic Services, stationed in London, had been over a period of some months in close touch with Subasic and had been devoting special attention to the Yugoslav negotiations.

<sup>71</sup> For correspondence on the meetings of Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin in Moscow, October 9-18, 1944, see pp. 1002-1024, *passim*. Regarding conditions in Greece, see vol. v, pp. 84 ff.

pointed his acts of malfeasance would be charged against King hence unacceptable. Churchill made a note to send word immediately to British representative participating Tito-Subasic conferences and warn him of Subasic's regency scheme. King learned that Philip Broad, former secretary British Legation Belgrade, is British representative at conference. Churchill said that when he met with Tito and Subasic in Italy it was he who fought the battle of the Monarchy with Tito and not Subasic. Churchill said that Tito is only a Communist and will try to put one of his followers as Prime Minister who will exercise very little power. Tito retaining same.

"King asked Churchill to arrange conference between him and Tito in Churchill's presence. Churchill said, 'It is premature now but I will seek the President's opinion as to the advisability of such a meeting.'

"Churchill expressed view that King should not under any circumstances be on Yugoslav soil at present. First because he does not wish by King's presence to legalize some of the misdeeds perpetrated by Tito against some of Yugoslav people. Second that it would be easy to assassinate him and then claim that he was murdered by German agent or Michailovic henchmen. Churchill expressed annoyance at General Ristic's, Minister of Defence,<sup>72</sup> placing Royal Yugoslav Air Force and Navy under Tito's command. He said that he received word from his Admiral commanding Mediterranean that he will not tolerate same.

"Finally Churchill reassured King that he need not worry about Subasic-Tito conference for any agreement will have to get his sanction. He said that Stalin was not unreasonable about general Balkan situation but that of course Stalin is a very shrewd man and situation will have to be watched.

"King requests you to keep this report confidential. He is concerned that Churchill may be annoyed if he suspects that King is talking."

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

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860H.01/10-3144 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, October 31, 1944—midnight.

[Received November 1—1:57 a. m.]

1065. Re my 1053, October 31, 4 p. m.<sup>73</sup> Maclean has informed General Wilson that in his conversation with Tito on present state of British-Yugoslavia relations latter asserted that continued presence of an American [mission] with Mihailovic was bitterly resented by Partisans and was certain to react unfavorably on Partisan relations with United States and Great Britain. According to Tito Partisans

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<sup>72</sup> Gen. Borislav Ristic had succeeded General Mihailovich as Minister of Defense on September 12.

<sup>73</sup> Not printed.

had proved that Colonel MacDowell <sup>74</sup> was not limiting his activity to intelligence work but was representing himself, or in any event was permitting himself to be represented, as official representative of Government of United States sanctioned by Allied High Command on whose behalf HQ promised support to Mihailovic. There was also evidence that supplies have in fact been sent to Chetniks and to many of leading members of Mihailovic's groups. This fact was also very disturbing to Partisans. Tito told Maclean that he had been assured some time ago that instructions had been given for immediate withdrawal of MacDowell but latter was still in Yugoslavia running from one place to another with Mihailovic. Tito said that he could not understand this phase of Allied policy since fact of Mihailovic's collaboration with Nazis was now generally accepted and even King Peter had publicly denounced him. According to Tito so long as American mission was with Mihailovic it would be difficult to permit Colonel Huntington <sup>75</sup> of OSS facilities he would otherwise have liked to grant.

Maclean commented that mention of Mihailovic makes Tito and his followers see even redder than usual and they are completely baffled as to why there could be any adequate reason for American Government maintaining a mission with Mihailovic.

As Department is probably aware MacDowell has been endeavoring for over a month to leave Yugoslavia [but] has met with many difficulties due to increased tempo of fighting there. OSS here state that MacDowell is already with his party to be evacuated but that bad weather has made it impossible for plane to land at his present HQS.

KIRK

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860H.01/11-244 : Airgram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 2, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received November 14—9 a. m.]

A-45. Brigadier Maclean has reported that on October 27, Tito, speaking at the Victory Parade outside Belgrade, expressed his gratitude to the Allies who had made possible the victory. Great Britain and America during the past year had with the help of their glorious air forces sent the Partisans arms and ammunition and everything desired. The Red Army was now joining in the liberation of Yugo-

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<sup>74</sup> Lt. Col. Robert H. MacDowell, commanding United States intelligence mission in Mihailovich territory.

<sup>75</sup> Col. Ellery C. Huntington, commander of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito.

slav Territory and it was the duty of YANL<sup>76</sup> not only to disable but together with their Allies to join in wiping out the enemy in his own country.

Tito said in addition that some people both in Yugoslavia and abroad were counting on the British in Yugoslavia. But they were mistaken. The Partisans were willing to make their peace with any Yugoslav who would henceforth join them whole-heartedly in the work of reconstruction. They would, however, let no one deprive them of the fruits of their victory and at all costs would preserve the new federal democratic Yugoslavia which they had founded. They would be the puppets of no one, for they had won the right to full independence and to take part on equal terms with their great Allies in building a new and happier Europe.

Maclean reported further that the newspaper *Politika* is now appearing daily under the management of Dr. Ribnikar, President of AVNOJ,<sup>77</sup> and its original owner. In the issue of October 29 there was an article by Ribnikar of which the concluding paragraph is significant. Ribnikar wrote that the new federal and democratic Yugoslavia existed already both *de facto* and *de jure* and that with the old Yugoslavia it had nothing in common. All connections with the past had been severed and there was no continuity between them. The AVNOJ resolutions of last year<sup>78</sup> had established the new Yugoslavia once and for all. These resolutions represented the will of the people. No one could or would dispute the right of the Yugoslav people to self-determination after all they had suffered. Their great Allies themselves had proclaimed this.

Repeated to London for Schoenfeld.

KIRK

860H.01/11-1344

*Report by Major Charles W. Thayer of the Independent American Military Mission to Marshal Tito*<sup>79</sup>

[BELGRADE,] 4 November 1944.

1. The recent Tito-Subasic talks were commenced on or about 23 October somewhere in the Banat whither Dr. Subasic had flown from Bari. According to Dr. Subasic these preliminary conversations took place in a most friendly atmosphere, only the two principals being present, and the broad outlines of the final proposals were soon

<sup>76</sup> Yugoslav Army of National Liberation.

<sup>77</sup> Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia.

<sup>78</sup> Resolutions were made at Jajce in November 1943, which outlined a constitution for postwar Yugoslavia.

<sup>79</sup> Copy transmitted to the Department from Caserta in despatch 905, November 13. Major Thayer was a former Foreign Service Officer.

agreed to. Both of them had previously received a joint message from Messrs. Eden and Molotov expressing their hope that the conversations would result in the formation of a single unified Yugoslav Government.

2. On 27 October, Marshal Tito came to Belgrade to place the proposals before the Anti-Fascist Council. On the next day, Dr. Subasic followed him here and met with the Anti-Fascist Council. Apparently, the atmosphere on this occasion was not so friendly. At all events, Dr. Subasic described it to Brig. Maclean, in confidence, as "most difficult". He was not permitted to be accompanied by any advisers and even his secretary was excluded. During the course of several sessions, the Marshal and Dr. Subasic reached agreement with the Council, and by 30 October the final drafting of the plan for unification of the governments was begun. This final draft was to have been ready by 31 October, but apparently some obstacles were encountered for it was not until the evening of 1 November that the work was completed. The chiefs of the British and Russian Missions were then called in to witness the initialling of the final document. During the course of the conversations, Brig. Maclean saw both Tito and Subasic frequently. Though I did not discuss the matter with Tito himself, Dr. Subasic volunteered to me some comments, stating, in particular, that Tito had proved himself most reasonable, though he had been under considerable pressure from his followers, who as Dr. Subasic expressed it, "desired to accomplish overnight, the aims they had been dreaming of for many years." Though he did not say so himself, I gather that by "Tito's followers" he meant the Anti-Fascist Council. There is some evidence that Dr. Subasic himself, who had not been in Serbia since the war began, was somewhat surprised at the extent of Tito's following and of their determination to break away from the past.

3. The final agreement which was reached on 1 November is a two-and-one-half page document outlining the plan for unifying the Government.<sup>80</sup> A copy thereof, as well as an English translation, were shown to me by Brig. Maclean. It acknowledges, at the outset, the right of the people of Yugoslavia to choose their own form of Government. It then states that in order to preserve the continuity of Government, both internally and in its foreign relations, the Government would continue to be a constitutional monarchy until a duly elected constituent assembly might decide otherwise. The King, however, would not return to Yugoslavia pending the results of a plebiscite, but would, in agreement with Tito, appoint three regents to rule in his absence. (Both Tito and Subasic stated that it was out

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<sup>80</sup> The full text of this agreement is published in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 251.

of the question for the King to return now as his dynasty and the court in general were held responsible the past three years, and that his return would only cause disorders and might well cost him his life.) It is understood that the three regents decided upon included a 90-year old former head of the Serbian Radical Party,<sup>81</sup> a prominent Slovene,<sup>82</sup> and a well-known Croat.<sup>83</sup> None of them is believed to be more than a figurehead.

4. The agreement provides for a cabinet including the six members of Dr. Subasic's Government and the twelve members of the National Committee. Twenty-eight cabinet posts are specifically listed, including a Minister of Construction, a Minister of Reconstruction, and a Minister of Colonization. Whether the eighteen members of the two governments will by combining several portfolios fill all the posts, or whether other members are to be appointed from outside, is not made clear in the draft. Nor is any minister, including the premier, mentioned by name. At no time have either Tito or Subasic commented on the latter point, but I would hardly be surprised if Tito himself were elected to this post in view of his predominant position in the country.

5. The agreement ends with a statement that the new government will publish a declaration containing the principles of the new regime. It is to be federated and democratic. The principles enumerated by the Anti-Fascist Council at its second session concerning equality of nationalities within the state are to be reaffirmed. No one nationality is to have preponderance over the others. Freedom of person, freedom of speech, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom of religion are specifically to be guaranteed in the declaration. The agreement is to be signed by Subasic and Tito.

6. The signing, however, is to take place only after King Peter has approved the plan. For this purpose Brig. Maclean was asked to go to London with a copy in order to obtain the approval of Prime Minister Churchill and the British Foreign Office. Presumably, if they approve, Peter's consent will be readily forthcoming. Maclean left by plane on 1 November, planning to return by the 4th or 5th. In the meantime, Subasic has flown to Moscow for three or four days. His purpose in so doing, as explained to Maclean, is to determine for himself Soviet intentions toward Yugoslavia. Apparently the journey is made of his own volition as he has several times asked Maclean whether he thought such a visit might be profitable. The Brigadier on each occasion has expressed the view that it might be most useful.

7. The question now remains whether the plan will prove acceptable to Moscow and London. Before his departure Maclean stated

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<sup>81</sup> Arsa Stanojevich.

<sup>82</sup> Dushan Sernetz.

<sup>83</sup> Ante Mandich.

that he felt it was the best that could be hoped for, though he readily admitted its shortcomings which he said he would have to point out to his Prime Minister. Since he did not believe that anything Great Britain or the United States could do would result in a more satisfactory document, he was determined to try to obtain quick approval by his authorities and King Peter.

8. The defects which Maclean had in mind are not obscure. In the first place, the Regency to be named by the King, "in agreement" with Tito apparently will be composed of three figureheads without authority or influence. In the second place, the combined cabinet will have at least twelve of Tito's followers to six of Dr. Subasic's. It is this government that will arrange for the coming plebiscite and the constituent assembly. Furthermore, Tito is today the only leader with any real power within the country. His following, whatever its relative size in proportion to the population, is the only organized, armed and active group in Yugoslavia. Thus the new agreement only legalizes his position as the supreme authority in the country. It is believed that he intends to utilize his authority to set up the sort of Government desired by the Anti-Fascist Council and that the plebiscite will in all probability be a "take it or leave it" proposition with no alternative but to express acceptance or rejection of the Council's platform. Under these conditions, the results are a foregone conclusion.

9. The above considerations apply solely, so far as this report is concerned, to the manner in which Tito plans to establish a firm government under his command. What his future program is and how he plans to accomplish it, are not under discussion in this report, and it should not be assumed, necessarily, that once he is in power he intends to govern entirely without reference to the desires of the people of Yugoslavia.

CHARLES W. THAYER

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860H.01/11-744 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 7, 1944—midnight.  
[Received November 8—3:04 a. m.]

1398. Norden has reported that British political representative at Bari on his return from Rome, where he had seen Eden, discussed the Maclean reports concerning the Tito-Subasic conversations and was rather critical of the agreement reached and of Maclean. Broad informed Norden that he had telegraphed the Foreign Office and pointed

out that by virtue of his oath to National Committee only, Tito would not be responsible to Regency Council and that furthermore of proposed 28 members of the new United Government, 6 at most would be Subasic men and 3 of these were Tito appointees while Kosanovic had gone completely overboard for the Partisans and Cankar had resigned. In Broad's opinion, Tito had given barely enough to secure continuity and recognition. He would be Prime Minister and Subasic merely a subservient link with outside world. . . .

Broad also commented that Eden was favorably impressed by the Russian attitude which he found during his recent visit to Moscow<sup>84</sup> and is alleged to have stated that he found the Russians "reasonable" with no sign of territorial aspirations in the area. Eden was, however, "thoroughly fed up with Partisans in Yugoslavia and Albania".

KIRK

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860H.01/11-744

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 7, 1944—midnight.

[Received November 8—2:45 a. m.]

1207. In Medcos<sup>85</sup> 208 SAC has strongly recommended to British Chiefs of Staff for operational reasons<sup>86</sup> early recognition by United States and United Kingdom Governments of joint Yugoslav Government brought into being by recent agreement between Subasic and Tito.<sup>87</sup>

KIRK

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<sup>84</sup> Anthony Eden had accompanied Prime Minister Churchill to Moscow in October.

<sup>85</sup> Medcos was the message series indicator for messages from the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to the British Chiefs of Staff. Traffic in the opposite direction carried a Cosmed indicator.

<sup>86</sup> For some time General Wilson, the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, had been planning to introduce a sizeable British force into Yugoslavia, but he had found Marshal Tito unwilling to cooperate. Mr. Kirk reported from Caserta in telegram 1419, November 20, 1944, that General Wilson had told Prime Minister Churchill that Tito appeared to be using black-mail methods to hasten his recognition as head of the Yugoslav Provisional Government. At the same time General Wilson suggested that irrespective of political developments nothing should prevent the immediate introduction of British forces into Yugoslavia to ensure the isolation and destruction of the retreating Germans. (740.0011 European War 1939/11-2044)

<sup>87</sup> Mr. Kirk reported from Caserta in telegram 1234, November 8, 1944, 8 p. m., that he had been told by Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor that although the British Government had accepted in principle the recognition of the Provisional Government of Yugoslavia, he anticipated a delay of some two or three weeks before an actual statement would be published (860H.01/11-844).



860H.01/11-1544: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 15, 1944—10 p. m.  
[Received November 16—12:21 p. m.]

1323. British Resident Minister stated yesterday that he had been instructed by the Foreign Office to consult me with regard to proposal by the British Government for the evacuation of General Mihailovic from Yugoslavia. According to Macmillan the British Government felt that while Mihailovic should not be treated as a national hero there was considerable feeling that he should be rescued from Yugoslavia and placed in honorable forced residence abroad. The Foreign Office felt, however, that any action taken in this matter should be taken jointly with United States. Macmillan then asked whether this office would be willing to request OSS to evacuate Mihailovic and arrange his early departure for the United States. He stated that he thought that Mihailovic would be much happier living in the United States than elsewhere as there were so many Serbs who were residing in America. He also made reference to our generosity (*sic*) in case of Knezevitch and Todorovic, Mihailovic supporters who returned to United States last week.

We pointed out to Macmillan that we could understand the desire of the British Government to do something with regard to Mihailovic's present situation in view of the fact that he had rendered valuable services to the British war effort in the past and as the British Broadcasting Corporation had so clearly stated during 1941 and 1942 he kept alive opposition to nazism in Yugoslavia. We said that although we had no instructions with regard to this matter it was obvious that serious complications confronted the United States Government in an undertaking to evacuate Mihailovic or to transport him to the United States for future residence. . . .

He then stated that he would telegraph to the Foreign Office and recommend that if the Foreign Office felt strongly that Mihailovic should be evacuated preferably with United States participation, it should take up the matter through Halifax<sup>88</sup> in Washington. He added he would report to Foreign Office our reactions and would point out that the British Government would have to envisage Mihailovic's honorable forced residence in Malta, Egypt, or somewhere else in the British Empire at British expense.

KIRK

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<sup>88</sup> Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador in the United States.

860H.01/11-2144 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)<sup>89</sup>  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 21, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received 11 : 45 p. m.]

Yugos 4. Following is summary of a conversation between King Peter and Churchill on November 17, as given Yarrow by the King.

Churchill, holding in his hand draft agreement between Tito and Subasic, received King with comment that it might be worse and constitutional monarchy has at least been recognized for time being. King replied that he would not sign agreement for it is tantamount to abdication. King said regency was only a form to gain recognition by United States and Britain. New Government is to take oath to people not to King. Churchill said King knew he was opposed to regency. He had expected Subasic to oppose it. Now he would have to see what could be done about it. He reminded King that agreement is concession by Tito and Tito is in power at present.

King spoke vehemently against Subasic for going to Moscow<sup>90</sup> from Yugoslavia instead of reporting to him first, and indicated desire to disavow Subasic. Churchill replied equally vehemently that King should take no such premature action. He said he had asked Stalin personally to take no decision on the agreement during his talks with Subasic in Moscow, giving as reason that Subasic had not yet reported to his King and he, Churchill, had not had opportunity to study agreement. Stalin, he said, had agreed to this.

During the course of the conversation the King said to Churchill, "I have been following your advice, Mr. Prime Minister, for the last two years and look where I am today." Churchill replied, "Would you have fared better, Your Majesty, had you followed Mihailovic?"

The King assured Churchill that he would not do anything for the time being and would follow Churchill's advice again by waiting to discuss the whole matter with him when Subasic returns.

[PATTERSON]

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<sup>89</sup> Richard C. Patterson, Jr., who had been appointed on September 21, 1944, Ambassador to the Government of Yugoslavia, then established in London, presented his credentials to King Peter on November 17.

<sup>90</sup> Prime Minister Subasić after concluding his talks with Marshal Tito went to Moscow, arriving there on November 20.

860H.01/11-2444 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, November 24, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received November 24—6:50 p. m.]

Yugos 5. I called upon Dr. Kosanovich, acting Foreign Minister, this morning at his invitation. He said: "It is rumored that Draza Mihailovich with American or British help, and probably American, is on his way to Italy. The Yugoslav Government is concerned about this, for among other things Mihailovich would thus escape punishment." Also, if he leaves Yugoslavia, "he might hurt King and make it difficult for King with Tito and Yugoslav people."

In this connection, Kosanovich said that Knezevich, who refused at the time Ambassador Fotich was dismissed to follow orders of Yugoslav Government, was afterwards taken to Bari in an American plane. Pribicevich, too, was taken from Yugoslavia to Bari in American aircraft. These acts Yugoslav Government considered unfriendly.

Kosanovich went on to say he had made similar *démarches* regarding Mihailovich to Ambassador Stevenson who had replied that Churchill discussed problem of Mihailovich with Tito and promised that if he fell into British hands he would be interned in British territory, but Britain would not permit him to be extradited. Kosanovich, adding that Mihailovich is now probably in northern Dalmatia, said Stevenson had assured him British would not help Mihailovich to escape. Acting Foreign Minister then said if American Government does assist Mihailovich, Yugoslav Government might consider that United States if [*is*] officially supporting Mihailovich. Kosanovich suggested that if Mihailovich escapes into our hands he hopes we will turn him over to British authorities. He ended by saying, "There is an American representative in Bari who is friendly to Mihailovich." He requested me to bring all he had said to the attention of the United States Government.

This afternoon Ambassador Stevenson showed me his telegram to Lord Halifax asking him to discuss with the Department problem of disposition to be made of Mihailovich. Stevenson thinks US and Britain should combine in bringing Mihailovich out if his life is at stake, but not otherwise.

Repeated to Rome for Kirk and to Moscow.

[PATTERSON]

860H.01/11-2944 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, November 29, 1944—5 p. m.

[Received 7:20 p. m.]

1548. See my 1295 of November 13, 11 p. m.<sup>91</sup> Brigadier Maclean who arrived yesterday from London en route to Belgrade stated that Churchill although furious with attitude of Subasic for having gone to Moscow before returning to London to report to King Peter would urge King Peter and Subasic to accept the agreement arrived at between Tito and Subasic and get on as soon as possible with the formation of Yugoslav Government which would receive British recognition. He added that the British plan to send Ambassador Stevenson to Belgrade immediately upon the announcement of a government. When we asked whether King Peter would accept the agreement, Maclean stated that after all Tito was in control of the country and the agreement was in fact a much better one than most people thought could be obtained. He said it must not be forgotten that when Subasic arrived in Yugoslavia he was surprised to find the whole of the country including Serbia was behind Tito and considering that Subasic sat on one side of the table alone facing Tito and 20 of his closest advisers on the other side, Subasic did not come out at all badly. He added that it was all well and good to criticize the agreement but it should be remembered that Tito was in *de facto* control of Yugoslavia and had made some generous concessions to Subasic in accepting the Regency.

We asked whether any information had yet reached London as to the official American reaction to the proposed Tito-Subasic agreement. Maclean stated that he was with Churchill when Churchill dictated his telegram to the President on this subject,<sup>92</sup> and he did not think there would be too much difficulty about the British and ourselves getting together on this matter.

Maclean stated that when he saw Tito, he intended to be very "rude" to him and tell him that the incidents between the Partisans and British forces in Yugoslavia must cease. He said he would add that Tito must remember that he is no longer a brigand living on the island of Vis but is now a chief of state who must realize his responsibilities

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<sup>91</sup> Not printed.

<sup>92</sup> Apparent reference to telegram of August 14, 1944, printed in Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy*, p. 93.

vis-à-vis his western Allies. He added that he felt quite confident that he would be able to obtain satisfaction from Tito with regard to all difficulties between the British and the Partisans and stated that he intended to be energetic in his presentations to Tito. Maclean stated that General Wilson had spoken to him in London regarding British operations in Yugoslavia and Partisan misdemeanors in Italy (see my 1465, November 23, 9 a.m.<sup>94</sup>) and he felt certain that everything would be adjusted satisfactorily in the near future.

KIRK

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860H.248/11-2144

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State refers to the *aide-mémoire* of the British Embassy dated November 21, 1944,<sup>94</sup> inquiring whether the United States Government approves the equipment by the British Government of three to four single-engined fighter squadrons for the Yugoslav armed forces, in connection with a proposal envisaging the organization, equipment and training of the Yugoslav air and naval forces by Great Britain and similar undertakings by the Soviet Union with respect to the Yugoslav land forces. In the implementation of this arrangement senior British naval and air force officers and senior officers of the Soviet Army would be appointed, to advise the Yugoslav Government on the initial strength, composition and organization of the Yugoslav armed forces.

Since the proposal of the British Government presents a question having both military and political aspects, the matter has been referred to the appropriate American military authorities for their comment. The Embassy will subsequently be informed of whatever observations the American military authorities may wish to make.

The Department is, of course, in full agreement that military aid should be extended to Yugoslavia, and that coordination of effort should be so planned as to contribute effectively to the conduct of the war against Germany. Since recent events appear to have indicated that, presumably for political reasons, there has been some unwillingness in Yugoslavia to coordinate operations with the plans of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, it is hoped that in future arrangements with the Yugoslav authorities advantage will be taken of any opportunity to require some undertaking on their part that Allied aid will be utilized, under appropriate plans for coordination, in furtherance of the general conduct of the war against Germany.

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<sup>94</sup> Not printed.

With regard to the political aspects of the proposal the Department observes that, as stated in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, the question is related to an agreement reached in Moscow between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concerning a common policy in Yugoslavia, and that the proposed arrangement is presented as an appropriate division of responsibility under that agreement between the two Governments. This raises certain questions of broader policy. While the Department is indeed anxious to lend its support to plans of immediate usefulness in the common prosecution of the war, it feels that the contemplated arrangement between the British and Soviet Governments, reaching as it does into the postwar period, involves political questions of considerable importance with regard to the future of Yugoslavia. Subject to such observations as the American military authorities may make as regards the military factors involved, the Department would raise no objection to the proposal as outlined in the Embassy's *aide-mémoire*, except that, at this stage of the liberation of Yugoslavia, the Department feels that it should reserve its position as regards subsequent developments under any political arrangement which might lead to a situation prejudicial to the freedom of action under which the people of Yugoslavia themselves should determine the means of securing their future welfare and security.

WASHINGTON, December 2, 1944.

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860H.01/12-844 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 8, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 10—2:30 a. m.]

1656. Refer my 1650-51 and 52, December 8, midnight.<sup>95</sup> Brigadier Maclean yesterday telegraphed to Churchill that during his interview with Tito the latter broached the question of recognition. Maclean referred him to Churchill's message<sup>96</sup> and added that if Tito and Subasic together succeeded in forming a convincing government the British Government would consider granting recognition. Maclean warned Tito that recent events in Yugoslavia did not conform to western ideas of democracy and British Government's decision would depend greatly on both Tito's and Subasic's conduct in formation of a government.

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<sup>95</sup> None printed.

<sup>96</sup> See telegram 1668, December 9, from Caserta, p. 1429.

Tito stated he expected the Government to be formed before the end of the year, that it would consist of 24 members, Tito as Prime Minister, Subasic as Minister of Foreign Affairs, plus 11 Serbs, 7 Croats, 3 Slovenes, 2 Macedonians and 1 Moslem. In addition to himself there would be 2 Communist members.

Macleon reported further that Tito appeared tired and harassed, obliged to delegate responsibility to inadequate subordinates and still suspicious of Allied motives.

Sent to Department; repeated London for Patterson as 168, to Moscow as 158.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-944 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 9, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received December 10—11:09 p. m.]

1666. Thayer has reported a conversation with Subasic in which the Yugoslav Prime Minister indicated that his visit to Moscow had been a most difficult experience during which much time had been spent on discussing procedural questions for the Yugoslav Government pending the plebiscite which Subasic felt should take place 6 months after complete liberation of Yugoslavia. According to Subasic, Stalin expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav "experiments" in communism or bolshevism for Yugoslavia and insisted on free expression of popular opinion. Stalin appeared also to be shocked to learn some delegates to Serb congress were "elected" by acclaim which he characterized as undemocratic. Thayer stated that Subasic admitted to the British but not to him that the King's return to Yugoslavia was out of the question. He did state to Thayer that the King's return would cause disorders and riots. Yugoslav Prime Minister told Thayer he was returning to London obviously unwilling and fully conscious of his "failure" which he hinted he was inclined to blame partially on us and the English.

In commenting on his conversation with Subasic, Thayer reported that Subasic went to Moscow to ascertain what support he could expect from the Soviet Union in maintaining a democratic Yugoslavia and that if he got the true picture of the way democracy works in Russia, which he did, the visit could not have been encouraging in spite of the fact that in his conversations with Stalin there was an outward display of genuine concern for democratic forms. Thayer added that doubtless when Stalin expressed concern as he did about

democracy in Yugoslavia, Subasic could not help but feel that a different conception of democracy was in Stalin's mind and that while Subasic probably expected no support for monarchy, he undoubtedly had hoped for more support of the interpretation of democracy.

Report from Thayer stated it was difficult to understand how Subasic considers that he has been let down by the British and ourselves but his words on this subject were approximately "where one is faced with final decision in a difficult dilemma, one finds one's friends of not much use".

Thayer is inclined to doubt that Subasic's visit modified in any respect the working of the proposed agreement but merely changed his conception of the meaning of the words.

In Thayer's opinion there is no doubt that Subasic intended to urge King Peter to accept the proposed agreement as the only way to save the monarchy, at least until the constitutional assembly could be elected.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-944 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 9, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received December 11—3:04 a. m.]

1668. Reference my No. 1650 of December 8, midnight.<sup>97</sup> Churchill's message which Maclean handed to Tito was strongly worded and almost threatening. In this communication British Prime Minister protested against unsatisfactory and rude attitude of Tito and the Partisans toward the British and numerous incidents between Partisans and British forces were called to attention of Tito.

Churchill pointed out to Tito the desirability of democratic elections in implementation of Tito-Subasic agreement and expressed hope that all democratic elements would be free to offer their candidates and support them in election campaigns. British Prime Minister also expressed his wish to see question of monarchy put squarely up to Yugoslav people for a vote in accordance with normal democratic procedure.

Maclean has not concealed fact that Churchill's enthusiasm for Tito has diminished and that he is somewhat disappointed by Tito's recent actions.

Thayer has reported from Belgrade that he received impression from conversation with Maclean that Churchill's representations to

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<sup>97</sup> Not printed.



Tito for real democracy in Yugoslavia is mainly for sake of the record and does not reflect any great conviction that it will materially alter present trend in Yugo. It is to be assumed that Tito will reply to Churchill that the latter's appeal for democracy will be complied with.

Repeated London for Patterson as 172, and Moscow as 162.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-1044 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 10, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 11—2:07 a. m.]

1680. AFHQ is informed that in course of an interview with Subasic, Stalin emphasized necessity to combine popular feeling with discipline in forming of true democratic government. According to Stalin agreement reached between Tito and Subasic is satisfactory so long as it is representative of wishes of people. He criticized electoral method of acclamation recently used in Serbia and said correct elections ought to have been held. Yugoslav Prime Minister is convinced that return of King Peter would bring disorder to the country and feels that a democratic party system will eventually develop under the regency. He is working out composition of future united government.

Food crisis in Dalmatia is becoming worse every day according to BLO<sup>89</sup> and some anti-Allied feeling is said to be arising as result of non-arrival of supplies. Observers in Belgrade say that Partisan reluctance to permit UNRRA<sup>1</sup> observers complete freedom of movement is caused primarily by feeling that this request infringes against Yugoslav sovereignty. Partisans in Belgrade maintain that in any case it is not possible now to set up another government with a stronger legal title than present one which is at least an effective and *de facto* one.

Reports from Belgrade also state that Partisans there are distributing Russian relief supplies effectively through ordinary commercial channels and the supplies are thus available to everyone without regard to their political leanings.

KIRK

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<sup>89</sup> British Liaison Officer.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

860H.01/12-1144: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 11, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 6:27 p. m.]

1696. For Dunn. Reference my 1371 November 18, 2 p. m., 1445, November 22, 1 p. m. and 1519, November 27.<sup>2</sup> The incidents under reference are a few of a series which indicate that the time may have arrived when we should carefully reexamine and clarify our position in respect to Yugoslavia. Such events include the series of incidents in Dalmatia between Partisans and forces under SAC's command, the rigid attitude of Tito's representatives at the relief talks at Bari including the denial to our military observers of freedom of movement and the insistence that they be in effect under surveillance, the recent appearance of articles unfriendly to the United States in the Belgrade press and the ever mounting evidence that the present ruling group in Yugoslavia means to make use of every opportunity to enhance the prestige of the Soviet Union whilst seeking to discredit the Western Allies. The Soviet attitude in the present discussions of Balkan bomb lines may likewise be relevant.

These developments have not come as a complete surprise, and it would be imprudent not to recognize that they may well reflect deliberate policy, given the nature of the new Yugoslav regime and the source of its principal external support. While it can be argued that many of the current excesses should be ascribed to early revolutionary exuberance and to inexperience we should not close our eyes to potentialities of a revolutionary and authoritarian regime inseparable from one of the most dynamic and courageous of the European resistance movements, supported by a highly political army and an ably-controlled press and propaganda, strong in race consciousness, territorial ambition and suspicion of the western world and led by an able and ambitious leader who has shown a not inconsiderable capacity for cynicism and international blackmail. Nor can we be certain of the oft cited "reasonableness" of a leadership many of whose principal figures are apostles of a faith inspired not least by envy or who have been made vindictive by repression, are schooled in a philosophy of power and largely innocent of the meaning of give and take or of law in the lives of men and nations. Given this background their very asceticism can make these men dangerous.

Moreover, while this area may be geographically remote we cannot wisely be indifferent to events in a country whose fate is bound seri-

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<sup>2</sup> None printed.

ously to affect the equilibrium of political and moral forces in Europe, particularly after the withdrawal of United States and British forces from southern Europe, both by virtue of its proximity to Italy and the eastern Mediterranean, and by the repercussions its complete absorption in the Kremlin orbit would have as far away as France and Germany. Even were such considerations transmuted through an effective security system we cannot safely assume that the voice of Yugoslavia would be heard independent of power, political implications or tutelage.

We are thus faced with a *fait accompli* of serious potentialities both for good and evil, brought about not least by the moral and political bankruptcy of previous regimes and hence endowed with a considerable validity in Yugoslav eyes. It would be prudent therefore to give careful consideration to our approach at this crucial time. The most feasible course still open to us may well lie in seeking to hold the Yugoslav rulers to the spirit of the democratic principles they so glibly voice, which doubtless reflect the true aspirations of the great majority of Yugoslavs after the sufferings of the past years, and thus to seek to strengthen congenial and deserving elements whilst maintaining our prestige and integrity.

But we must also bear in mind that our experience thus far indicates that we would be ill advised to press our military or economic aid upon a government which at best shows many symptoms of having been unduly flattered, and even though it accept our proffered assistance may not with any certainty be counted among our friends.

Sent Department, repeated to London for Patterson as 175.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-1244 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 12, 1944—2 p. m.

[Received December 12—11:45 a. m.]

Yugos 8. Last evening with Shantz<sup>3</sup> I saw Prime Minister Subasic, who returned to London on December 10. The Premier told me he had signed three supplementary agreements with Tito, the texts of which he will give me in a few days. His hope is to have them all approved by Churchill and King Peter this week and then return.

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<sup>3</sup> Harold Shantz, Counselor of Embassy to the Yugoslav Government in Exile at London.

promptly to Belgrade, since he feels he must "strike while the iron is hot".

He talked with King Peter for 2 hours yesterday and will see him again today. The King, he said, agreed to all proposals except the Regency Council. When the King asked Subasic why he could not return to Yugoslavia, the latter replied "because it will mean civil war."

As Department is aware the Regency Council is the device by which Subasic obtained Tito's grudging recognition of the monarchy but since King Peter has said flatly that he would never agree to this (reference my 4, November 21) the Tito-Subasic agreements may come to nothing unless Churchill persuades King to change his mind, as he may very well do. Subasic said, "everything depends upon Churchill".

Subasic added that one of three supplemental agreements <sup>4</sup> contains a list of 25 members of new government which is to include 11 Serbs, 7 Croats, 3 Slovenes, 2 Macedonians, 1 Bosnian and 1 Montenegrin, and he emphasized that only 6 or 7 of total are Communists. Tito is to be Premier and War Minister; Subasic, Foreign Minister; and Kardelj, said to be a thorough Communist, is in key position as Vice Premier and also in charge of Ministry of Constituent Assembly.

A second agreement <sup>5</sup> calls for convocation of elected constituent assembly 3 months after complete liberation of Yugoslavia, and anti-Fascist council is to administer country until Assembly is convened and government formed.

A third agreement <sup>6</sup> provides that Regency will safeguard and administer King's property during his absence, that King will have free communication with Regency and that when a regent dies or resigns King shall appoint another from names proposed by government.

Subasic expects to see British Ambassador Stevenson today and Churchill tomorrow, after which I shall talk with him again.

Repeated to Caserta as my 33 and Moscow as my 127.

[PATTERSON]

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<sup>4</sup>The Agreement of November 1, 1944, is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 251. Neither the names nor the political affiliations of the proposed holders of portfolios are specified in the supplemental agreements.

<sup>5</sup>The agreement entitled "Elections for the Constituent Assembly and Organization of Public Powers," dated December 7, 1944, is printed *ibid.*, p. 253.

<sup>6</sup>The agreement entitled "Property of H.M. the King and Regency Council," dated December 7, 1944, *ibid.*

124.60H/12-1344 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 13, 1944—1 p. m.

[Received 7:17 p. m.]

1723-A. Re my 1510, November 26.<sup>7</sup> Thayer at Belgrade has sent an urgent message to OSS here stating that it was most desirable to send one or two Foreign Service Officers to Belgrade as soon as possible for protection of American interests and in order to make administrative arrangements for eventual reestablishment of our diplomatic mission there. I trust that Department will be able to give me some information regarding this matter at an early date.

Sent Department, repeated London as 181 for Patterson.

KIRK

860H.01/12-1344 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 13, 1944—3 p. m.

[Received 7:25 p. m.]

1725. Reference my 1170, November 5.<sup>8</sup> Churchill has received message from Maclean stating that in his opinion the best chance British have of consolidating their position in Yugoslavia is by trying to help Tito build up an air force and if this is to be done it is essential that work be begun immediately.

Regarding proposal which was put forward over a month ago that British should look after Yugoslavian Navy and Air Force and Russians take care of Army no progress towards implementation thereof seems to have been made.

Maclean stated that hundreds of Yugoslavian pilots are being trained by Russians and a considerable force of aircraft have been placed under command of Tito. These are apparently being flown by Russian pilots but will be handed over to Yugoslavia pilots as soon

<sup>7</sup> Not printed; it recommended, on the basis of reports received from the Office of Strategic Services, that the United States Government delay no further in sending official representatives to Yugoslavia. He pointed out that the British were already taking steps to reestablish their representation at Belgrade. Mr. Kirk felt that the value of Bari as a listening post was rapidly diminishing and he suggested that the staff there be sent to Belgrade to assume the protection of American interests and to reopen the United States Embassy. (740.00119 Control (Yugoslavia)/11-2644)

<sup>8</sup> Not printed.

as possible. Therefore unless British take out their claim before long Tito will have acquired an air force independently of the British.

In Maclean's opinion it is extremely urgent that an early agreement be reached with Russians and Americans and a firm offer of equipment and training facilities be given to Tito as soon as possible. Otherwise the Russians will undoubtedly get the contract and all it implies.

KIRK

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860H.48/12-1544: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 15, 1944—7 p. m.  
[Received December 16—6:31 a. m.]

1774. Ref. my 1726, December 13, 4 p. m.<sup>9</sup> We received a summons from Field Marshal Alexander<sup>10</sup> this morning to attend a meeting in his office at which were present CinC Med,<sup>11</sup> General Eaker,<sup>12</sup> General Harding,<sup>13</sup> new Chief of Staff to Alexander, General Gammell, and Broad, who is acting in Macmillan's absence.

Alexander opened discussion by stating that Admiral Cunningham was most disturbed by the news received in a telegram from Maclean with regard to the food situation in Dalmatia. (See my 1766, December 15, 11 a. m.<sup>9</sup>) Admiral Cunningham stated that he felt that this matter was "dynamite" and that something should be done at once to protect our position in case the world press should learn that the Allies were withholding relief from Yugoslavia just across the Adriatic Sea in Italy while "people were dying like flies in Dalmatia". Alexander then requested our advice.

We stated that the record was clear. We had been trying for many weeks to negotiate an agreement at Bari for distribution of relief with representatives of the Yugoslav Government and with representatives of Marshal Tito, but that Tito had up to the present time been unwilling to reach an agreement. We pointed out that many concessions have been made to Tito by SAC's representatives during the progress of the negotiations and that in spite of our efforts to expedite the matter (in view of implications of a delay in relief deliveries to Yugoslavia) Tito had refused to act. Alexander then stated that he considered the situation intolerable and wondered what

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<sup>9</sup> Not printed.

<sup>10</sup> Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. Alexander succeeded General Wilson as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, on December 12, 1944.

<sup>11</sup> Adm. Sir John Cunningham, Commander in Chief of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean Theater.

<sup>12</sup> Gen. Ira C. Eaker, United States Army Air Forces, Air Officer-in-Charge.

<sup>13</sup> Lt. Gen. Sir John Harding, General Officer, Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command, England.

he could do. We reminded him that the directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on relief for Yugoslavia set forth his instructions very clearly and that in the circumstances we could not advise him to depart from this directive without further reference to the Combined Chiefs. In the course of protracted discussion it was pointed out that since Tito was after all "boss" of Yugoslavia today and would continue to remain as master of the country, it seemed rather pointless to continue withholding aid thereby incurring his ill will. One suggestion was made that military supplies might be sent in to tide over a difficult situation. After considerable discussing during most of which my British colleague remained silent, it was agreed to send Maclean a telegram setting forth our position as reported in my message under ref[erence] and requesting Maclean to reiterate to Tito that this matter should be concluded at Caserta and that Tito should send his representatives to Italy as soon as possible.

We understand that Alexander will inform the CCS of this action and request further guidance in the light of recent developments.

KIRK

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740.00119 Control (Yugoslavia)/11-2644 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk)*

[Extracts]<sup>14</sup>

WASHINGTON, December 16, 1944.

481. Reurtel 1510 November 26, 4 p. m.<sup>15</sup> Department approves your suggestion that Norden proceed to Belgrade as your representative, accompanied by Constan.<sup>16</sup> . . .

Norden's detail should be regarded as exploratory in nature and he should be careful not to give the impression that he is establishing the regular mission. Until the relations between the Government at London and the National Liberation Committee have been clarified we consider it necessary that he function on this informal basis. Until he can judge the usefulness of his activities clerical personnel should not be sent in, but such personnel will be assigned if he so recommends after investigation.

It is contemplated that Norden's primary duties at this stage will be to advise and assist the Swiss authorities in extending needed aid to

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<sup>14</sup> The omitted portions of this telegram deal with administrative details and unrelated matters.

<sup>15</sup> Not printed; but see footnote 7, p. 1434.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Constan, Vice Consul at Bari.

American nationals and in protecting American property and other interests.

STETTINIUS

860H.48/12-1744 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 17, 1944—6 p. m.  
[Received December 18—5:54 a. m.]

1798. Reference my 1792, December 16, 12 p. m.<sup>17</sup> Due to continuing impasse with regard to relief supplies for Yugoslavia, Department may wish to give consideration to a course of action in this matter as a measure of self-protection. The Yugoslav people, of course, do not know the issues involved and have no knowledge other than rumors from Partisan sources of negotiations regarding food and relief. The Yugoslav people know that the Allies are providing food in those parts of Italy from which the Germans have been evicted. They also know that certain rehabilitation measures have been taken in Italy, a country which until recently was an enemy of the United Nations. It should perhaps be pointed out that the Dalmatian coast is practically the same distance as Italy from the sources of British and American food and relief and that there are enough Dalmatian ports open for discharging operations to proceed without much difficulty. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the public in Dalmatia and elsewhere in Yugoslavia is convinced that the United States and Great Britain is [*are*] in a position to supply food and relief at least to the people along the Dalmation coast whereas so far as it is aware, no food or relief is actually coming in. The Yugoslav public can only conclude, therefore, that this is either the fault of Anglo-American authorities or of the Partisans—the *de facto* Yugoslav authorities.

I hardly need to call the Department's attention to the fact that were the Yugoslav people to become convinced that the blame for the non-arrival of food and relief could be laid at the door of Anglo-American authorities, great indignation would be aroused against the United States and Great Britain. The Yugoslav people could claim that they deserved better treatment after all the sacrifices they have made in the Allied cause in the last few years. The propaganda line of the Partisan authorities aims at attaching the blame to the United States and Great Britain. Their present campaign together

<sup>17</sup> Not printed.



with the complete silence on the subject imposed by British and American directives is already tending to produce indignation in Yugoslavia against the British and ourselves. Partisan methods of propaganda in this matter even go so far as to exaggerate enormously the amount of Russian aid which has been furnished up to the present time.

It seems reasonable to assume that even if the Yugoslav public should learn that the absence of food and relief was due to the negligence or incorrect attitude of the Partisan authorities, it would be a difficult task to convince it that the withholding of food by the Americans and British was the proper method of forcing the Partisan authorities to toe the line. To explain the American and British position in such a case would be a difficult task since the hungry population of Dalmatia could not be satisfied only by the knowledge that its own authorities were to blame for starvation. The fact remains that the Yugoslav public is aware that in American and British hands lie the means of relief.

From the foregoing, two courses of action seem open to the British and ourselves in the immediate future. (1) Food can be sent into Dalmatia immediately and unconditionally, (2) we can stick to our position vis-à-vis the Partisans maintaining our attitude of withholding supplies pending conclusion of negotiations, however protracted. In the first case, it would be essential for the British and ourselves to insure that the maximum goodwill and benefit should be reached by giving the fullest publicity to the facts that relief has been afforded immediately and unconditionally. In the second place, it would be essential to make available to the Yugoslav public the fullest information regarding the postponement of relief and the reasons for the fact. This may well involve openly placing the blame on Tito and the Partisans in spite of all the consequences which this action may entail.

Insofar as the maintenance of Yugoslav goodwill and pro-British and pro-American feeling is concerned, the first alternative would clearly be the one which would prove most effective, and indeed, is the course which various high ranking military officials at AFHQ would like to see adopted. Personally, however, I resent the tactics of the Yugoslavs in jockeying the Allies into a position where their humanitarian motives are impugned when the fault lies in Tito refusing the safeguards essential to the achievement of those motives and consequently I would deplore any decision on our part which was not based on a realistic appreciation of the actual elements involved, and which led from a subservient condonation of what appears to be Tito's intransigent attitude. After all we are furnishing the relief we have at great sacrifice and have to consider other areas besides

Yugoslavia. The test therefore of our approach should [be] fundamentally practical from the point of view of the concrete ends to be achieved.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-1744 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 17, 1944—midnight.  
[Received December 17—10:42 p. m.]

Yugos 11. Reference my 9, December 14.<sup>18</sup> I saw Subasic twice yesterday. He seems much disturbed by King Peter's coolness towards him and repeated postponement of meeting with Churchill which is now scheduled for Monday 18th.

Returning my call yesterday morning Subasic gave me translations of his agreement with Tito of November 1 (reference Schoenfeld's despatch 18 of November 8<sup>19</sup>) and supplemental agreements mentioned in my 8 of December 12. Texts, sent Department by air despatch 7 of December 16,<sup>20</sup> are so vague as to be subject to almost any interpretation desired by proposed Tito Government.

Last night Subasic called at my hotel rooms and gave me copies of his answers to 14 questions asked by British Foreign Office regarding the agreements. I am sending texts of these by air today. Subasic's answers evade the issues and suggest that he realizes his inability to make interpretations with any assurance that Tito would accept them. Only unequivocal answer of importance he makes is that "the National Liberation Army will, immediately after the forming of the government, be declared to be the regular army. Outside this army, there will be no military formations".

In answer to Foreign Office questions as to how and when the constituent assembly will be elected, Subasic merely refers to statement in agreement that the elections "will be decided upon within 3 months of liberation of the whole country" and "will be held in accordance with the law for the constituent assembly which will be enacted in good time".

In this connection General Velebit said in a press conference on December 13 that no decision had been reached as to how the Yugoslavs would choose between monarchical and republican forms of government. He said, "a plebiscite, a constituent assembly or normal parliamentary action under article 116 of existing constitution after

<sup>18</sup> Not printed.

<sup>19</sup> Despatch not printed.

<sup>20</sup> *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 250.*

the holding of elections are all possibilities". Subsequently, I learned in strict confidence, Subasic told Velebit not to make any more statements to the press.

Repeated to Caserta as my 36 and Moscow as 131.

[PATTERSON]

860H.01/12-1844 : Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 18, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 18—6:04 p. m.]

Yugos 12. Ambassador Stevenson called on me today and said that the personal views of Churchill and Eden were favorable to the Tito-Subasic agreement and supplemental agreements, which they consider "the best possible under the circumstances". He added that Stalin has telegraphed Churchill for his views.

He said that Churchill's meeting with King Peter and Subasic has been postponed until later this week and Eden requests Secretary Stettinius' views before the meeting occurs. Please reply urgently.

When Stevenson asked for my views, I replied along the lines reported in my 11 for December 17.

He responded that the Regency is [a?] recognition of the King, that the King might lose his position through process provided in agreements but our record would be clear and it was, of course, best not to involve ourselves in the internal affairs of these small countries.

He also told me that he intends to go to Belgrade as soon as the Regency is appointed, and expects that to be very soon.

Texts of two supplemental agreements signed by Tito and Subasic and unsigned communiqué, all dated Belgrade December 7, are given in clear in my three following telegrams.<sup>21</sup>

Repeated to Moscow as my 132 and Caserta as my 37.

[PATTERSON]

860H.48/12-1544 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Political Adviser on the  
Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater  
(Kirk)*

WASHINGTON, December 20, 1944—7 p. m.

494. Department is in agreement with the position taken by you as stated in your no. 1774 of December 15. We feel that any discus-

<sup>21</sup> None printed; but see *Foreign Relations*, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 253-254.

sions or negotiations with the Yugoslavs should be conducted at some appropriate place where competent US and British representatives can participate. We are still opposed to any relaxation of our stand with respect to observers. We assume that if SACMED is unable to obtain an agreement along the lines specified by the CCS he will, in accordance with his instructions, so advise the CCS.

STETTINIUS

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860H.85/12-2044: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 20, 1944—midnight.

[Received December 21—7:48 p. m.]

1850. Reference my 1805, December 18, 11 a. m.<sup>22</sup> Field Marshal Alexander has received a message from Maclean stating that he asked Tito on December 16 whether he had come to any further conclusions with regard to draft relief agreement. Tito expressed considerable distaste for entire matter and said he had decided that the Allies were not being serious. Maclean stated that he strongly denied this and pointed out there were bound to be misunderstandings so long as whole question of relief was not regulated by an agreement embodying certain principles and conditions the Allies are bound to observe. Tito's reply accused Allies of trying to impose form of administrative control that infringed Yugoslav sovereignty. Maclean then presented a translation of draft agreement<sup>23</sup> which Tito apparently had never seen and pointed out that only item which might be objectionable was paragraph 9 providing for Allied observers and advisers. Maclean stressed the ridiculous situation of Tito's people starving while supplies lay idle in Italy pending settlement of such a small point as this, and suggested to Tito that if his attitude of wishing to avoid accepting relief from Americans and British was due to political reasons he should say so.

Tito insisted there was no need for observers, that Partisans were distributing food and relief to opponents and supporters alike. Maclean suggested that if this were true Tito should have no objections to observers who might even help to dispel rumors that Tito was trying to impose a Communist regime by force.

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<sup>22</sup> Not printed.

<sup>23</sup> Discussions had been underway at Bari since early October between Military Liaison (Yugoslavia) and a delegation from the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation over the question of civilian relief for Yugoslavia. At length the draft agreement referred to was drawn up and a copy was transmitted to the Department in despatch 929, November 23, 1944, from Caserta (860H.48/-11-2344).

Tito again objected to an unlimited number of observers as an uncontrollable swarm of foreign bureaucrats. Maclean corrected this description of Allied officers in question, whose only wish was to be of help, and advised Tito to overcome his distrust of Allied motives. Maclean reiterated that he personally had no authority to negotiate an agreement, but advised Tito that in view of his attitude toward unlimited observers he should submit a counter-proposal to meet this point, such as a fixed number of officers to enter Yugoslavia initially, to be increased as and when necessary by mutual consent.

Tito accepted this idea and after considerable argument fixed an initial number of officers at approximately 100, subject to increase if necessary at a later date. If paragraph 9 could be amended Tito was prepared to sign the agreement without further alteration.

Maclean's opinion is that full agreement will still be difficult to obtain so long as negotiations are conducted on Tito's behalf by delegates without any real authority.

If AFHQ considers Tito's present proposal a sufficient basis for agreement, Maclean asks for authorization:

1. To request Tito's confirmation that he is prepared to accept the present draft with the one modification mentioned,
2. To ask Tito to brief Goranovic<sup>24</sup> in this sense, in Maclean's presence, and
3. To request that Tito allow Goranovic to accompany Maclean to Caserta to conclude formal agreement on the lines indicated.

Maclean's message concludes with his observation that only such a general agreement will overcome the questions of principles which temporary measures invariably give rise to.

KIRK

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860H.01/12-2244: Telegram

*The Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson)  
to the Secretary of State*

LONDON, December 22, 1944—8 p. m.

[Received 9:25 p. m.]

Yugos 17. King Peter told Yarrow today that in response to his request to Churchill for a private meeting, he saw Churchill, Eden and Stevenson yesterday. He handed them a memo regarding article 42 of the Yugoslav Constitution which gives the King the right to appoint three regents and their deputies. He told Churchill he did not want to force himself on the Yugoslav people, who had the right to choose their form of government, but he insisted on his constitu-

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<sup>24</sup> Maj. Maksim Goranovich, Chief of the Yugoslav delegation at the Bari talks.

tional right to appoint the regents; and the Tito-Subasic regency agreement was not constitutional.

Churchill commented that Tito has done many unconstitutional things and will probably do more, but since he had the power, what could be done about it?

Peter reiterated that he wanted to designate the regents, and he would accept the agreements otherwise. To this Churchill replied that "you can't accept one part of the agreement and reject another. You should accept it entirely and wholeheartedly. There is no time to change it".

The King answered that Tito and Subasic took 2 months to agree and he thought himself entitled to a couple of weeks. The meeting ended with both Peter and Churchill asking the other to think the matter over further.

After relating the above to Yarrow, Peter added, "At least I gained some time. I will sign if I can name the regents, otherwise I will refuse".

Repeated to Moscow as my 136 and Caserta as my 40.

[PATTERSON]

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S60H.01/12-2344 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Patterson), at London*

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1944—6 p. m.

Yugos 6. Supplementary to your series of telegrams on the proposed agreement for the formation of a new Yugoslav Government the British Ambassador has informed the Department of a telegram from Mr. Eden stating that Subasic has given him a full explanation of the agreement with Tito which, when read together with the supplementary texts, seems to afford a "satisfactory basis on which to build a new federal Yugoslavia." He asks for the Department's reaction, and says that it would be helpful, if the Department favors the agreement as a whole, if you could be instructed so to inform King Peter, with whom the matter will be discussed by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden later this week.

You may inform both Dr. Subasic and King Peter that the Department has examined with attention the documents which you have submitted; that the principles enunciated in the agreement as a whole are generally in accord with those to which this Government subscribes, both for the conduct of the war and for general dealings with other governments; but that this Government would not undertake to ex-

press an opinion as to the prospects for securing an effective and loyal implementation of these principles, since so much will depend on the good will, cooperation, and mutual respect with which the personalities who may be designated to conduct the affairs of the new Government approach the admittedly difficult problems involved in rebuilding their country.

You should add that, as concerns our general attitude, this Government has consistently defended the rights of the various peoples of Yugoslavia to work out their own forms of Government without the exercise of any foreign influence or the imposition of the rule of any one national or political group within the country over other elements.

If questions should be raised concerning the particulars of the agreement and its supplementary texts, you may say that this Government hesitates to express an opinion, both because of the very general nature of the language used, and the technicalities of Yugoslav law which may be involved as, for example, in the project for a Regency and the provisions for elections. Since these questions moreover may involve a decision taking into account the realities of the situation in Yugoslavia, the good will of the parties involved, and the King's conception of his responsibilities to his people, you should not enter into discussion of any of them.

For your guidance it may be added that in the event of the King's acceptance of this or any other compromise agreement the question of "recognition" by this Government would not arise. Our formal relations would not be determined by our appraisal of the merits of the arrangement. Should the King reject whatever terms may be arrived at, we consider it probable that Marshal Tito would formally repudiate the Government in exile and request recognition of his organization as the responsible government. In such circumstances our decision concerning recognition would depend on a re-examination of the situation within Yugoslavia, followed probably by consultation with other governments with regard to the situation then prevailing.

In its memorandum to the British Embassy the Department is outlining our general attitude toward the proposed agreement. Pertinent sections are being repeated to you in the next following telegram.<sup>25</sup> Sent to London, Yugos. Repeated to Ampolad, Caserta, and Moscow.

STETTINIUS

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<sup>25</sup> Not printed; the memorandum of December 23, 1944, to the British Embassy, is printed in *Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, p. 255.

860H.85/12-2444 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 24, 1944—6 p. m.

[Received December 25—3 a. m.]

1896. Re my 1850 December 20. Proposal has been referred to CCS. Maclean was informed accordingly and that he may so inform Tito if he thinks fit. Maclean is further told that SAC's real concern is whether Tito in agreeing to figure of 100 officers has reference to observers described in draft agreement and appreciates that total number of personnel concerned in Yugoslavia is in neighborhood of 150 officers and 1500 other ranks and UNRRA civilians. Message to Maclean states that SAC believes it best that any further explanation of ML Yugos<sup>26</sup> intentions and organization should be made to Tito by senior British and American officers rather than Maclean have responsibility of making a bare statement unsupported by detail and that any further discussion with Tito other than specified in first sentence above should therefore be avoided until SAC's forthcoming visit to Belgrade when he hopes to make arrangements for a meeting between Tito and ML heads.

KIRK

860H.01/12-2744 : Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 27, 1944—9 p. m.

[Received December 28—2:05 p. m.]

1932. New oath of office of Yugoslav officials as carried in Belgrade press includes oath to "guard and protect achievements of National Liberation struggle". This may be viewed as another step toward identifying government with National Liberation movement and should help dispel doubts as to character of National Liberation Front as the party in a one party system. Weight and direction of its influence on any coming elections or plebiscites should be clear since it represents Partisan viewpoint.

British sources report from Bari that British troops operating in Montenegro against Germans are being used to good effect and that relations with local Partisan military attachés have improved greatly.

<sup>26</sup> Military Liaison (Yugoslavia).



In this connection Broad informed us that Maclean has reported to Foreign Office that new Yugoslav Government would of course be an authoritarian state.

Sent Department; repeated London for Patterson 191.

KIRK

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740.00119 Control (Yugoslavia)/12-2744: Telegram

*The United States Political Adviser on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater (Kirk), to the Secretary of State*

CASERTA, December 27, 1944—10 p. m.

[Received December 28—2:17 p. m.]

1533. Reur 481, December 16. Clearance for Norden and Constan has twice been refused by Bakic, Tito's Chef de Cabinet, on grounds that their duties re civilian matters would be political and not within scope of military mission and because Swiss Consul is already authorized to protect American interests and property. Bakic also stated permission for civilian representatives would not be granted pending establishment of regular diplomatic missions.

I have asked Thayer who is returning to Belgrade within next day or two to insist with Tito personally on grounds of my desire to send AmPolAd representation temporarily to Belgrade for purposes mentioned in Department's telegram under reference.

Sent Department; repeated Moscow 176 and London for Patterson 192.

KIRK

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